

THE SUMMA ABRIDGED

By REV. GERARD M. PARIS, O.P.

**Being an Abridgement of the Questions of the Entire *Summa Theologica* of
St. Thomas, Together with the Basic Reasons for Each of Their Articles**

1950

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Since we have already given the student of the Angelic Doctor the doctrine and schematic division of the entire *Summa* in tract-and-question form, our present purpose is to reproduce all the questions as they are in the original, together with the basic responses of each article, with notes where necessary, in a clear terse style suited to modern readers.

The method we have followed is this: To give first the response to the question asked in each article, whether in the affirmative or in the negative; and at the same time, where necessary for greater clearness, to explain the sense in which the article is affirmed or denied; then to introduce the appropriate reason or reasons directly by the words: The Reason Is, etc.

In this way the response follows immediately after the enunciation, with practically no change in the wording of St. Thomas.

Finally, so as not to neglect the teaching of the Angelic Doctor that is to be found in the answers to objections, we have expounded it briefly in notes at the end of the article. [These are indicated by the word *ad* followed by the number of the objection.]

In this way we have aimed to give the gist of the *Summa* to clergy and laymen, that this immortal work of St. Thomas may come to a wider and wider public, especially needful today, when truth is so much obscured.

For I am persuaded that, just as at the Council of Trent no other book was so frequently consulted for the renewal of Christian life as was the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas, so today we can offer no better book as a code of life to all who seek the truth than this same *Summa*, which indeed is a summation of all life.

This work, therefore, in which we have reduced the whole of the *Summa* to a fifth its original size, and which has cost us the labor of seven years, we offer gratefully to God and freely to the Church of Christ, that these articles that Aquinas wrote for beginning students may be within the reach of all, like rays of light, both human and divine; a book from which the whole world may draw salvation and true peace, founded on true justice and truth, especially if this work is translated, as we hope, into the major European tongues.

Written in Malta, the Convent of St. Mary of the Crypt,
on St. Thomas' feastday, 1947, in which we also celebrated our silver jubilee in the priesthood.

Father G. M. Paris, O.P.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Where the author's condensations seem obscure I have occasionally added words of explanation from St. Thomas. I have also included other notes where they were judged helpful for the elucidation of the text. These are indicated in brackets.

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PART ONE

SACRED DOCTRINE, comprising Question I, THE ONE GOD (QQ. II-XXVI, 145 articles in all). THE TRIUNE GOD (QQ. XXVII-XLIII, 72 articles); GOD THE CREATOR (QQ. XLIV-CXIX, 344 articles) Total of articles, 561.

SACRED DOCTRINE

For a clearer understanding of this work it is necessary first to investigate sacred doctrine, its nature and scope. To this end we shall devote 10 articles.

QUESTION I.—(PRELIMINARY)**ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE ANY OTHER SCIENCE BESIDES THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINES.**

YES.—Besides the philosophical disciplines another science is necessary, a) not only to know the truths that exceed human reason; but b) also to know with certainty some truths that are amenable to investigation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man is ordered to God as to an end, which exceeds the comprehension of reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. lxiv, 4).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the truth concerning God that is attainable by reason can be found by few men, and then only after a long time and with an admixture of many errors and with uncertainty. And yet on this knowledge of truth depends the whole salvation and happiness of man, which lie in God.

ART. II.—WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE.

YES, for: Sacred Doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by a higher science, which is the science of God and the saints, just as the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and the science of music from principles established by arithmetic.

THE REASON is that Sacred Doctrine proceeds from principles known by the light of the superior science, which is the science of God and the saints.—Whence, just as music believes the principles transmitted to it by arithmetic, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it by God.

ART. III.—WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS ONE SCIENCE.

YES.—For all things that are divinely revealed have this in common: The formal reason of the object of this knowledge, namely that they are divinely revealed, or revealable (ad 2).

NOTE.—Sacred doctrine extends to everything that pertains to the different philosophical sciences, in so far as they are knowable by divine light (ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE.

YES; but it is more speculative than practical.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sacred doctrine extends to the things that pertain to the different philosophical sciences, whether speculative or practical, in so far as they are knowable by divine light.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that sacred doctrine treats more particularly of divine things than of human acts, of which it treats in so far as man is ordered by them to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal happiness consists.

ART. V.—WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN THE OTHER SCIENCES.

YES, for: It transcends all the other sciences 1) both speculative 2) and practical.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sacred doctrine is more certain than the speculative sciences, and has a nobler subject matter; for it has certainty from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived; and it treats principally of the things that reach beyond the depth of reason.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that all the other practical sciences are ordered to the end of sacred science, which is eternal happiness.

NOTE: In the speculative sciences, that is called nobler which has a greater certitude and a nobler subject matter; but in the practical sciences that is called nobler that is not so much ordered to other sciences as others are ordered to it.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS WISDOM.

YES: For it is the chief wisdom among all the human wisdoms, not in one department merely, but simply.

THE REASON is that it considers the profoundest cause, not of some particular class of things, but that which is God; and not only with regard to what is knowable by creatures, but also with regard to what is known to Himself alone about Himself, which He has communicated to others through revelation.

ART. VII.—WHETHER GOD IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE.

YES.—For everything is treated in sacred doctrine under a God-aspect: Either because its subject is God Himself, or because it has a relation to God, as to its principle end.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS ARGUMENTATIVE.

YES.—For, since it is the supreme among all the sciences, it defends its principles against its adversaries, either by one article against those who deny another, or by solving the difficulties of reason advanced by unbelieving adversaries. Its own principles, which are articles of faith, it does not prove.

ART. IX.—WHETHER SACRED SCRIPTURE OUGHT TO USE METAPHORS.

YES.—For it is natural to man to rise to the intelligible through the sensible: For God provides for all things according to their nature.

ART. X.—WHETHER SACRED SCRIPTURE HAS MORE THAN ONE SENSE IN ONE TEXT.

YES.—It has a literal, an allegorical, a moral, and an anagogic sense.

THE REASON IS that God, who is the Author of Sacred Scripture, comprehends everything by His own intellect, namely the things that signify the thing itself by themselves (the historical or literal sense), or the things that, besides this thing, signify other things (the spiritual sense), and this in three ways: First, in so far as the Law of the Old Testament is a fit figure of the New Law (the allegorical sense); second, in so far as we ought to do the things that Christ did (the moral sense); third, in so far as they signify things that are in eternal glory (the anagogic sense).

THE ONE GOD

Three things are the object of inquiry in this question, of which the first two are preliminary to the third.

**QUESTION II
THE ONE GOD****ART. I.—WHETHER GOD'S EXISTENCE IS SELF-EVIDENT.**

NO.—For He is not self-evident with respect to us distinctly, but only confusedly.

THE REASON is that we do not know from God that He exists, but this must needs be demonstrated by the things that are known to us, namely by the effects, and also by the natural desire of man for happiness, which is therefore naturally known by man and by which he rises to a knowledge of God, who is man's happiness. Nevertheless, He is not simply known, but confusedly; for many think that the perfect good of man consists in wealth, others in pleasure, or in something else (ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD'S EXISTENCE IS DEMONSTRABLE.

YES.—By a demonstration *a posteriori*, i.e., from effect to cause.

THE REASON is that, when the effect is placed, the cause must already exist.

NOTE: The Holy Doctor in this article does not prove that nature is created, or the effect, but supposes it.—Likewise there is another demonstration *propter quid*, i.e., a demonstration prior to all effects [by the mere examination of the terms]; but in this way the existence of God cannot be demonstrated, because God is not self-evident to us (preceding article). Today science proves that the universe had a beginning.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD EXISTS.

YES.—And this is proved by five arguments or ways.

THE FIRST argument is taken from the movement of things: For it is necessary that that which is moved be moved by something else that is in act; and the first thing that is in act is of itself, and is the first mover, itself unmoved, which is God. For it is not possible here to proceed to infinity, for thus there would be no first mover, and consequently no other mover.

THE SECOND is taken from the reason of efficient causality: For there are efficient causes in the world; hence there must be a first efficient cause, which is God.

THE THIRD is taken from the reason of the necessity of something to exist. For there are many things in the world that are capable of non-existence, since they are corrupted and generated. But some things actually exist; hence it is necessary that certain things should necessarily exist (namely in so far as they do exist); and these things necessarily suppose a first being who is (absolutely) necessary, from which they have their necessity of being. Such a being has the necessity of its existence from itself, and it is God; for it is not possible to go back to infinity in necessary things that have a cause of their necessity.

THE FOURTH is taken from the degrees of goodness, truth, and the like, which are found in things: For the things that are in any genus suppose a supreme first thing, which is the cause of all things of that genus. Therefore it is necessary that there be that which is supremely being, supremely good, true, and beautiful—supremely, indeed, of any perfection—for all perfection is one, since being, goodness, truth, and the like are convertible; and this is God.

THE FIFTH is taken from the government of things lacking knowledge: For such things attain their end, and not by chance, since they obtain that which is best. Hence they are ordered by the knowledge of some intelligent being, as an arrow is ordered or directed by the archer. And such an intelligent being, which governs nature, is called God.

QUESTION III**The Simplicity of God**

In this question the Holy Doctor begins the enquiry into what God is; and, because we can know concerning God rather what He is *not* than what He is, he considers first that God is not complex, but simple; then he treats of the other attributes in subsequent questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS A BODY.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that God is the first Mover, Himself unmoved; but no body moves which is not moved, as is evident from induction.

THE SECOND REASON is that God is the First Being, who must be simply in act, and in no way in potency.

THE THIRD REASON is that God is that which is most noble: But the principle of life (in the body), which is the soul, is nobler than the body.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE IS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that God is not a body.

THE SECOND REASON is that the first and highest good, which is God, is such by essence, not by participation.

THE THIRD REASON is that the first and self-acting agent must be pure form.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE OR NATURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that in God there is no matter to individuate Him; consequently in God the suppositum and nature or essence are the same.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN GOD ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that any being that is not the same as essence must be caused. Now this cannot be said of God: a) Because God is first cause; b) because nothing suffices to be its own cause of existence if it has its existence caused.

THE THIRD REASON is that that which *has* being, and *is not* its own being, is being by participation; now God is first being.

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD IS IN ANY GENUS.

NO.—He is not in any genus either simply and properly or by reduction.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST IS THREEFOLD: a) Because in that which is any genus potentiality is added to actuality; b) because existence or being cannot be a genus, since all difference is existence or being; c) because the things that are in one genus differ in existence and are one in essence; whence in them existence and essence are not the same; but in God they are the same.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that that which is reducible to a genus does not extend to another genus; just as a point, which is reduced to the genus of continuous quantity, does not extend to anything else. But God extends to all things, in so far as He is the principle of all existence.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ANY ACCIDENTS.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that potential being is completely repugnant to God.

THE SECOND REASON is that what is being itself can have nothing else added to it.

THE THIRD REASON is: a) That, since God is absolute primal being, nothing can exist in Him accidentally; b) neither can there be in Him any essential accidents [as laughter is an essential accident of man, being caused by his constituent principles], for in God, since He is the First Cause, there can be nothing that is caused.

ART. VII.—WHETHER GOD IS ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that this follows from what has been said above.

THE SECOND REASON is that everything composite is posterior to its component parts, and dependent on them.

THE THIRD REASON is that everything that is composite has a cause of its composition.

THE FOURTH REASON is that in God there is no passive potency.

THE FIFTH REASON is that in every composite there is something that is not itself compound.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER GOD ENTERS INTO COMPOSITION WITH THINGS.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that God is first efficient cause. Now an efficient cause does not fall into the same numerical unity as the thing it causes, but only into the same specific unity; e.g., man generates man, but *another* man. Matter does not fall into either the same numerical or the same specific unity as the efficient cause, for matter is in potency; an efficient cause is always in act.

THE SECOND REASON is that that which enters into composition with something else is not a first and self-existing agent, but rather a composite.

THE THIRD REASON is that God is absolute primal first being (Q. II, art. 3); but no part of a composite can be simply primal in beings, not even matter and form, which are the primal parts of composite things.

QUESTION IV

The Perfection of God

Aquinas first inquires about God's perfection simply (art. 1), and then about God's perfection relatively to the perfections of creatures (aa. 2 and 3).

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS PERFECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that God is the first principle in the order of efficient cause. For the first active principle must be supremely in act, and in consequence supremely perfect.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN GOD THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL CREATURES EXIST.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that whatever of perfection is in the effect must be found in the effecting cause in a more eminent mode. (In our case the effects are

found in the cause, not univocally, or in the same way, as when one man begets another; but equivocally, namely according to a certain proportion.)

THE SECOND REASON is that, since God is absolute self-subsisting Being, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY CREATURE CAN BE LIKE GOD.

YES.—But only according to a certain analogy, in so far as creatures are beings, and are likened to God, as the first and universal principle of all being.

THE REASON is that God is not contained in any genus even with His effect; consequently He can be likened to a creature only by analogy.

QUESTION V

The Good in General

Because everything perfect is a good, the Holy Doctor next inquires about the goodness of God. And first he treats of good in general. Under this question come six articles: First, how good relates to being; this in turn gives rise to three articles: a) Whether good is the same as being in reality (a. 1); b) whether being or good comes first as a concept of the mind (a. 2); c) whether every being is good (a. 3).—Second, he proceeds to a definition of good, which takes up two articles, to wit: To a) what cause may goodness be reduced (a. 4); b) whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order (a. 5).—Thirdly, he asks concerning the divisions of the good, namely into the moral, the useful, and the delectable.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOODNESS DIFFERS IN REALITY FROM BEING.

NO.—It differs only in the mind; namely under the aspect of the desirable, which does not denote being; being denotes whatever is in act only.

THE REASON is that good is called desirable in the mind; but the desirable exists under the aspect of the perfect. Now whatever is perfect is so by reason of being in act, and whatever is in act is so by reason of being. Consequently goodness and being do not differ in reality.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOODNESS IS PRIOR IN REALITY TO BEING.

NO.—THE REASON is that being falls first in the conception of the intellect; for under the aspect of being each thing that is knowable exists in so far as it is in act. Hence being is the proper object of the intellect.

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL BEING IS GOOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that every being is in act, and thus perfect; but everything that is perfect is desirable, and therefore good.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE CHARACTER OF A FINAL CAUSE.

YES.—Though goodness presupposes an efficient and formal cause.

THE REASON is that goodness is that which all seek (I.P., q. V, art. 1); but this has the aspect of an end.—Nevertheless, in the good that is caused 1) there is form, by which it is a being; 2) considered in it is effective power, by which the good is perfect in being; 3) from this follows the formality of goodness, which is the foundation of the perfection of being.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE REASON OF GOOD CONSISTS IN MODE, SPECIES, AND ORDER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the essence of the perfect consists in its form itself, in that which precedes the form, and in that which follows from the form. By the form each thing is constituted in its *species*. The form presupposes a determination or commensuration of its principles, and this is signified by the *mode*; and from this follows an inclination to the end, and this pertains to weight and *order*.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GOOD IS SUITABLY DIVIDED BY THE MORAL, THE USEFUL, AND THE DELECTABLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that anything is good in so far as it is desirable and is a term of the movement of the appetite: This term may be either relative, i.e., as the means (a good that is useful for something) or absolute, i.e., the ultimate good (moral good); or it may follow from the term, i.e., rest and satisfaction in the thing desired (delectable good).

QUESTION VI

The Goodness of God

In this question the Holy Doctor asks three things in four articles: First, whether it is proper to God to be good (a. 1).—Second, he asks in what way good is in God, and this in two parts: a) Whether God is the highest good (a. 2); b) whether He alone is good by essence (a. 3); finally he treats of the relation of the goodness of creatures with the goodness that is in God (q. 4).

ART. I.—WHETHER TO BE GOOD IS PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since God is the first cause creative of all things, each thing seeks its own perfection in Him.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD IS THE SUPREME GOOD.

YES.—Good is in God equivocally or in the most excellent mode.

THE REASON is that good is in God as in the first cause of all things, but not in the same way as it is in creatures, or univocally.

ART. III.—WHETHER TO BE ESSENTIALLY GOOD BELONGS TO GOD ALONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that only to God belongs the threefold perfection of things, according to which things are called good. This threefold perfection exists: First, in so far as a thing is constituted in its own existence: But the essence of God alone is His own existence; secondly, in so far as some accidents are superadded to it, which are necessary to its perfect operation: Now God is not susceptible of accidents, but what is said of others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; thirdly, the perfection of anything exists by the very fact that something else attains its end in it. Now God is ordered to no other thing as His end than Himself.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE GOOD BY VIRTUE OF THE DIVINE GOODNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that everything is called good because of a similitude of the divine goodness inhering in itself, which is formally its own goodness [against Plato], whereby it is denominated good. Thus everything is called good because of the divine goodness, as the exemplar, effective, and final principle of all goodness.

QUESTION VII

The Infinity of God

After a consideration of the divine perfection, the Holy Doctor treats of the infinity of God and its existence in things. For to God is attributed whatever is everywhere and in all things, in so far as He is uncircumscribed and infinite.

In the question of the infinity of God, the Holy Doctor demonstrates how God is the only thing infinite, and that by His essence (aa. 1 and 2); afterwards, with respect to creatures, he proves that to them belongs neither the infinity of magnitude nor the infinity of multitude (aa. 3 and 4).

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS INFINITE.

YES.—By the infinity of perfection.

THE REASON is that anything is called infinite from the fact that it is not finite. The infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the character of something perfect. Since, then, divine existence is not received in anything, but God Himself is His own subsistent Being (Q. III, a. 4), it is manifest that God Himself is infinite and perfect [in contrast to the imperfect infinity of matter].

ART. II.—WHETHER ANYTHING OTHER THAN GOD CAN BE INFINITE BY ESSENCE.

NO.—That is, nothing besides God can be absolutely infinite; matter, however, and subsistent forms can be relatively infinite.

THE REASON is that everything that *has* being, and *is not* its own being, must have received its being.

NOTE: a) Prime matter is infinite only in a relative sense, inasmuch as its potency extends only to natural forms (ad 3).

b) Matter determined by form remains in potency to many accidental forms, which can be relatively infinite.

c) The forms that are in matter are simply finite, and in no way infinite.

d) Subsistent forms are relatively infinite in so far as they are not terminated or limited by any matter.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANYTHING ACTUALLY INFINITE IN MAGNITUDE.

NO.—Neither a natural nor a mathematical body.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every natural body has a determinate substantial form; therefore also it has (its own) determinate accidents, which follow from this form, among which determinate substantial forms is quantity. Now determinate quantity is never infinite.—Another reason: Every natural body has movement, whether straight or circular. Now an infinite body can have neither of these movements: Not straight movement, for nothing can move if it does not leave its place; but an infinite body cannot leave its place; not circular movement, because the parts of the circumference would be infinitely distant from one another, inasmuch as they would be infinitely distant from the center.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that anything we can imagine as a mathematical body must exist under some form and figure.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE INFINITY IN THINGS ACCORDING TO MULTITUDE.

NO.—a) There is no infinite multitude in act, either *per se* or *per accidens*; b) there is infinite multitude in potency only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the species of multitude are according to the species of numbers; but no species of number is infinite.—Moreover everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that increase follows from division; for the more things are divided the greater the resulting number. Therefore, just as there is a potentially infinite number of things in the division of a continuous quality, so also there is a potentially infinite number of things to be added.

QUESTION VIII

The Essence of God in Things

Under this question two things are considered: First, the existence of God in things, namely God is in all things; secondly, the ubiquity of God. This poses three questions: Whether God is everywhere, how He is everywhere, and whether existence everywhere is proper to God.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS IN ALL THINGS.

YES.—Not as part of the essence, or as an accident, but as an agent is present in that on which he acts.

THE REASON is that to create is the proper effect of God, which God causes immediately in things, not only when they first begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in existence.

ART. IV.—WHETHER TO BE EVERYWHERE IS PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—According to the totality of essence but not of quantity.

THE REASON is that God gives to things being and locative quality; in this way He fills all places.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE BY ESSENCE, PRESENCE, AND POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that (speaking humanly) God is in all things: a) In so far as all things are subject to His power (by power); b) in so far as all things are "naked and open to His eyes" (by presence); c) in so far as God is present in all things as the cause of their existence (by essence).

NOTE: God is in the saints in a special manner, i.e., as the subject of the agent is in the agent, in so far as the saints know and love Him by grace.—There is another special way by which God is in man, namely by Hypostatic Union, which we shall treat in P. III, Q. II, art. i (ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER TO BE EVERYTHING IS PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—It is proper to God first and *per se*.

THE REASON is that, whatever number of places there be, God must be in each of them, not accidentally but essentially, not in part, but in His entire being.

QUESTION IX**The Immutability of God**

Next to be considered is the immutability and eternity of God, which eternity follows from immutability.—With regard to immutability two questions are asked: Whether God is altogether immutable, and whether existence belongs only to God.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE.

YES.—THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Prime Being, which is pure act, is without admixture of any potency. For potency is simply posterior to act.

THE SECOND REASON is that in everything that is moved there is some composition, in so far as it remains with regard to something and passes with regard to something, but this cannot be said of God.

THE THIRD REASON is that God cannot acquire anything; neither can He extend to anything which He did not reach before.

ART. II.—WHETHER IMMUTABLE EXISTENCE IS PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that in every creature there exists a potency to change, either according to substantial being, in so far as incorruptible bodies are concerned, or according to local being only, as regards celestial bodies [the outmoded view by which the heavenly bodies were thought incorruptible]; or as regards the order to their end and the application of their power to different things, as in the angels; and in general all creatures have a common mutability according to the power of the Creator, on whose power depend their existence and nonexistence. Therefore, since God is mutable in none of these ways, absolutely immutable existence is proper to Him alone.

QUESTION X**The Eternity of God****ART. I.—WHETHER ETERNITY IS SUITABLY DEFINED AS THE SIMULTANEOUS AND PERFECT POSSESSION OF ALL LIFE WITHOUT BEGINNING OR END.**

YES.—THE REASON is that eternity receives its characteristics from two things: 1) From the fact that which exists in eternity is without beginning or end; 2) from the fact that eternity itself lacks succession, having its total existence all at once.

NOTE: We say *life*, rather than existence, because that which is truly eternal is not only being, but living.—We say *all*, not because it has parts, but in so far as nothing is lacking to it.—We say *perfect*, inasmuch as it excludes even the now of time, which is imperfect.—We say *possession*, because it is had firmly and peacefully (*passim* in the responses).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that God is supremely immutable.

NOTE.—Since God is His own simple existence, as He is His own essence, so also He is His own eternity.—When we speak of the eternity of creatures, we speak of participated eternity (at the end of the article and *ad 1*).

ART. III.—WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL IS PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that only God is absolutely immutable.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME.

YES.—For eternity is *tota simul*, has all existence at once, but not time. There are other differences: a) By reason of measure: For eternity is the measure of permanent existence, but time is the measure of movement. A second reason is that it is always possible to mark in time a beginning and an end by taking some parts of it, but this is not true in eternity; b) by reason of the things measured: For only that is measured by time which has a beginning and end in time; but not the things that are in eternity.

ART. V.—WHETHER EVITERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME.

YES.—Eviternity differs from time and from eternity, as being intermediate between them.

THE REASON is that between the permanence of being without any change added (eternity) and change itself (which is had by reason of time) stands eviternity, which together with permanence of being has the addition of change, either in act or in potency, as is the case with spiritual creatures.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE EVITERNITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since each thing is measured by the most simple thing of its genus, the existence of all things aeviternal is measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first.

QUESTION XI**The Unity of God****ART. I.—WHETHER UNITY ADDS SOMETHING TO BEING.**

NO.—Unity adds to being, only the negation of division.

THE REASON is that the existence of anything consists in indivision.

NOTE: Unity, which is the principle of number, adds something to being that belongs to the genus of quantity.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ONE AND THE MANY ARE OPPOSED.

YES, but in different ways.

THE REASON is that unity as the principle of number is opposed to multitude as measure to the thing measured; now unity, which is convertible with being, is opposed to multitude by way of privation, as the undivided to the divided.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS ONE.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is because of His simplicity. For God is His own nature (q. III, a. 3); and *God and this God* are the same. *This* something is one.

THE SECOND REASON is derived from the infinity of His perfection. For God comprehends in Himself the whole of the perfection of being; but if there were several Gods they would have to differ, and thus something would belong to one that would not to the other, and God would not have the whole of the perfection of being.

THE THIRD REASON derives from the unity of the world. For that first thing that reduces everything to unity must be one. Now all things that are in the world are ordained to one thing.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD IS SUPREME ONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that God is infinitely existent and infinitely undivided. He is self-existent Being undetermined by any mode; and He is infinitely indivisible because He is absolutely simple.

QUESTION XII**How God Is Known by Us**

Because in the former articles we have considered how God exists in Himself, it remains to consider how He exists in our knowledge, that is, how He is known by creatures.—On this head stand 13 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the final happiness of man consists in its highest operation, which is the operation of the intellect, if the created intellect can never see the essence of God, either it will never attain happiness, or its happiness will consist in something other than in God; but this is inconsistent with faith.

For the final perfection of the rational creature consists in that which is its principle of existence.—

Likewise, there is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he views the effect. If therefore the intellect of the rational creature cannot reach the first cause of things, the desire implanted by nature will be vain.

ART. 11.—WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD IS SEEN BY THE CREATED INTELLECT THROUGH SOME IMAGE.

NO.—On the part of the thing seen the divine essence cannot be seen by any image; but on the part of the visual faculty some similitude is required.

THE REASON is that no created form can be an image representing to the seer the essence of God; but on the part of the visual faculty an image is required, according to the nature of this power; i.e., the light of divine glory, whereby the divine essence by itself activates the intellect.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CAN BE SEEN BY BODILY EYES.

NO.—THE REASON is that an act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. But God is incorporeal.

NOTE: Glorified eyes do not directly see the divine essence; but the divine presence is made known to the intellect by means of them through the medium of corporeal things, because of the perspicuity of the intellect, and because of the refulgence of the divine glory in our renewed bodies (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE BY ITS OWN NATURAL POWERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that to know self-subsisting Being is connatural only to the divine intellect. For knowledge is in the knower according to the mode of the nature of the knower. But no creature is his own existence, for his existence is participated.

NOTE: God through His grace unites Himself to the created intellect as the object of its understanding (at the end of the article).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS ANY CREATED LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that everything that is elevated to something that exceeds its nature most needs be ordered by some disposition that is above its nature. Wherefore divine grace must be added to the intellect as the power of understanding, and this is done by the light of glory.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE PERSON WILL SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that he who has more charity will partake more of the light of glory; for desire makes the one desiring apt and prepared for the reception of that which he desires.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE COMPREHEND HIM.

NO.—THE REASON is that the created light of glory received in every created intellect cannot be infinite; but the being of God is infinite.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE SEE ALL THAT IS IN GOD.

NO.—No created intellect, by seeing God, can know all that God does or can do.

THE REASON is that no created intellect can totally comprehend God.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE THINGS THAT ARE SEEN IN GOD ARE SEEN BY THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE BY MEANS OF ANY SIMILITUDES.

NO.—THE REASON is that things are seen in God, not in so far as their similitudes exist in the knower, but in so far as their similitudes already exist in God; this is to see them in God, namely by the divine essence united to the intellect.

NOTE: Things are seen in God as in their effective and exemplar cause.

ART. X.—WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE SEE AT THE SAME TIME ALL THAT THEY SEE IN HIM.

YES.—THE REASON is that things that are seen in God are not seen singly by their similitudes, but all things are seen through the one essence of God; just as by one idea we understand at once all the things that are in that idea.

ART. XI.—WHETHER ANYONE IN THIS LIFE CAN SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE.

NO.—That is, according to the common order of things.

THE REASON is that the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the knower's nature. Now our soul, as long as we live in this life, when it has being in corporeal

matter, knows only those things that have their form in matter, or those that can be known through such things.

NOTE:—The vision of the divine essence enjoyed by Moses (Numbers xii, 8) and St. Paul (II Cor. xii, 2) was miraculous; they did not use their bodily senses.

ART. XII.—WHETHER WE CAN KNOW GOD IN THIS LIFE BY NATURAL REASON.

YES.—a) We cannot see the essence of God through natural reason; but b) we know concerning God that He exists, and His relation to His creatures.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that creatures, through which the natural reason knows God, are effects of God that do not equal the power of the cause.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that creatures are effects of God depending on Him. From them, therefore, we know the things that must belong to Him, inasmuch as He is the first cause of all things, exceeding all the things that He causes.

ART. XIII.—WHETHER THROUGH GRACE A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CAN BE HAD THAN WHICH IS HAD BY THE NATURAL REASON.

YES.—THE REASON is that human knowledge is helped by the revelation of grace, both with regard to the natural light of the intellect, because it is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light, and with regard to phantasms, which are divinely formed, because they express more powerfully divine things than do those things we naturally receive from the senses, or those things to which natural reason does not reach.

QUESTION XIII **The Names of God**

After considering the things that pertain to the divine knowledge, we proceed now to a consideration of the divine names. For each thing is named by us in so far as we know it, and from this head arise 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER A NAME CAN BE GIVEN TO GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, so far as anything can be known by us intellectually, so far can it be named by us.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD SUBSTANTIALLY.

YES.—Those names that are spoken of God absolutely and affirmatively signify the divine substance, but fall short of representing Him.

THE REASON is that our intellect knows God in so far as creatures represent Him, i.e., in so far as they have perfections; yet not so that they represent Him as something of the same species or genus; but as a pre-eminent principle, whose form they cannot reach.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD IN THE LITERAL MEANING.

YES.—In so far as the name signifies the reality, and this more properly belongs to God than to creatures; but not with regard to the mode of signification.

THE REASON is that names have a mode of signification that belongs to creatures. Yet perfections in God exist in a more eminent manner.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE NAMES APPLIED TO GOD ARE SYNONYMOUS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the names attributed to God, though they signify one thing, yet, because they signify it under many different aspects, are not synonymous.

NOTE: Those are called synonymous names that signify one thing in the same way (in body of article).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE THINGS THAT ARE SAID OF GOD AND OF CREATURES ARE SAID OF THEM UNIVOCALLY.

NO.—Yet not altogether equivocally either; but analogically.

THE REASON is that every effect that does not equal the power of the efficient cause receives the similitude of the agent, not in the same way, but as falling short of it. —Yet not altogether equivocally, for if this were so nothing could be known or demonstrated from creatures concerning God, but everything should be subject to the fallacy of

equivocation.—But these names are applied according to an analogy or proportion; for whatever is attributed to God and to creatures is said in so far as there is some relation of the creatures to God as to their principle and cause, in which all the perfections of things already exist in an eminent mode.

ART. VI.—WHETHER NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE PRIMARILY PRIMARILY PREDICATED OF CREATURES RATHER THAN OF GOD.

NO.—1) What is said of God essentially is said primarily of God, rather than of creatures, with regard to the thing signified by the name, but not with regard to the imposition of the name; 2) what is said of God metaphorically is said of creatures first; 3) what is said of God only as the cause is said of creatures before being said of God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such perfections as are said of God essentially flow to creatures from God. Yet, with regard to the imposition of the name, they are first given by us to creatures, which we know first.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that what is said of God metaphorically signifies nothing else than analogies with such creatures, as the name of lion is applied to God.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that what is said of God only as the cause (as when it is said that God is good, in so far as this signifies that God is the cause of the creature's goodness) includes in its meaning the perfections of creatures.

ART. VII.—WHETHER NAMES THAT IMPLY A RELATION TO CREATURES ARE PREDICATED OF GOD TEMPORARILY.

YES.—Not on account of any change in God, but on account of a change in the creature.

THE REASON is that, since God is outside the whole order of creatures, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God Himself; but in God there is no real relation of Himself to creatures.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE NAME OF GOD IS A NAME OF GOD'S NATURE.

YES.—Not in so far as the divine nature exists in itself, but in so far as it is known by us.

THE REASON is that God is not known to us in His nature; but He is made known to us by His operations or effects. Whence the name God is a name of operation, in so far as God has the universal providence of things; and in this way the name God is given to signify the divine nature.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE NAME GOD IS COMMUNICABLE.

NO.—a) It is not properly communicable; but b) by similitude.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the divine nature is not multipliable (Q. XI, a. 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that men partake of something divine by way of likeness, according to the words of Scripture (Ps. lxxxix, 6): "I have said, you are gods."

NOTE: The name God as given to signify the Divine Suppositum as incommunicable in all ways (at the end of the article).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE NAME GOD IS APPLIED UNIVOCALLY TO GOD BY NATURE, BY PARTICIPATION, AND ACCORDING TO OPINION.

NO.—The name God, in the three significations mentioned above, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically.

THE REASON is that the name God is not taken in different senses in the same way (i.e., is not taken univocally); or altogether in a different way (equivocally); but this name taken according to one signification is placed in the definition of the same name taken according to other significations, so that one of these significations is included in the other significations. Thus healthy, when said of an animal, is placed in the definition of healthy, in so far as it is spoken of urine and medicine. And thus the name God, when applied to God according to nature, by participation, and according to opinion, is predicated only analogically.

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE NAME, "HE WHO IS," IS THE NAME MOST PROPER TO GOD.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the name, He Who Is, signifies being itself; which belongs most properly to God, whose existence is His very essence.—THE SECOND REASON is that this name determines no mode of existence, but relates indeterminately to all; and therefore it fitly names "the infinite ocean of existence" (St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Lib. I, cap. 9).

THE THIRD REASON is that this name co-signifies being in the present, which belongs supremely to God, who has neither past nor future.

ART. XII.—WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED CONCERNING GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that in any true affirmative proposition the predicate and subject signify the same thing in one way in reality and a different thing in the mind; this is verified in propositions that are affirmed concerning God. But, although our intellect understands God under different conceptions, it knows that all its conceptions correspond to one and the same simple object, namely, the divine essence.

QUESTION XIV**The Knowledge of God.****ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS KNOWLEDGE IN GOD.**

YES.—God is at the summit of knowledge.

[Knowledge is the reception in the knower of forms other than himself. The being bounded by matter has only his own form, whereas the intelligent being receives in himself the forms of others (the idea of the thing known is in the knower). Hence the higher one goes in the scale of immateriality the greater is the knowledge, for only matter prevents the reception of other forms, and this is to know. Hence God, being at the summit of immateriality, is also at the summit of knowledge.]

NOTE: Man, according to the different things that he knows, has different knowledges. For insofar as he knows principles, he is said to have understanding; insofar as he knows conclusions he is said to have science; insofar as he knows the highest cause he is said to have wisdom; insofar as he knows things to be done he has counsel or prudence (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since God has nothing of potentiality, but is Pure Act, the intelligible species in the divine intellect is the divine intellect itself; and thus He knows Himself through Himself, and the divine intellect is its own act of knowing.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD COMPREHENDS HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that God's power in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD'S ACT OF KNOWING IS HIS SUBSTANCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the essence itself of God is also His intelligible species in act (q. III, a. 7).

NOTE: It is thus evident that in God intellect, knower, that which is known, intelligible species, and the very act of knowing are all one and the same (at the end of the article).

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that God knows His own power, which extends to other things.—ANOTHER REASON is that all effects of God pre-exist in Him, as in the first cause, i.e., in the very act of knowing Himself.

NOTE: God sees things other than Himself, not in themselves but in Himself, inasmuch as His essence contains the similitudes (species) of things other than Himself (at the end of article).

ART. VI.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY A DISTINCT KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—God knows things other than Himself, not only insofar as they share in the notion of being, but insofar as one thing is distinguished from another.

THE REASON is that every form, by which everything is constituted in its proper species, is a certain perfection; now whatever of perfection is in any creature wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in a pre-eminent manner.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS DISCURSIVE.

NO.—Neither according to succession, as when, actually knowing something, we proceed to know something else; nor according to causality, as when we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions through their principles.

THE REASON is that God sees all things at once in one thing, which is Himself (art. 4 and 5).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS.

YES.—Inasmuch as this knowledge is joined with His will.

THE REASON is that the knowledge of God stands to all created things as the artist to the things he has made, i.e., through the intelligible form, which, however, does not denote the principle of the action unless there is added to it an inclination to the effect, which inclination is by way of the will.

NOTE: This knowledge of God, which is the cause of things, is commonly called the *knowledge of approbation*; but the knowledge of God by which He knows the sins of creatures is called the *knowledge of disapprobation*, insofar as He reprobates and condemns sins.

ART. IX.—WHETHER GOD HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF NON-BEINGS.

YES.—God knows both those things (non-beings) which, though they do not actually exist, yet either were or will be (the *knowledge of vision*); and those things that are in the power of God or of creatures, which however neither are nor will be nor ever were (the *knowledge of simple intelligence*).

THE REASON is that God knows all things whatever that exist in any manner. Now whatever exists, whether actually or potentially, participates or can participate in the existence of God, who is Being Itself (Ad 2).

ART. X.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS EVILS.

YES.—God does not know evils through the privation existing in them, but through the good to which they are opposed.

THE REASON is that, since God knows good things perfectly, He also knows evils, which are privations of the good; otherwise He would not know good things perfectly.

NOTE: Evil is not knowable per se, because it is of the notion of evil that it is a privation of good (Ad 4).

ART. XI.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS SINGULARS.

YES.—THE REASON is that our perfection is to know singulars, or individuals. Now all perfections found in creatures already exist in God in a pre-eminent mode.

NOTE: God's knowledge of individuals is not by way of any universal cause, by virtue of the application of universal causes to particular effects; but by way of the extension of God's causality.

For the forms that emerge from universal causes are not individuated save by individual matter; and the application of universal causes to particular effects presupposes the knowledge of individual causes: But the knowledge of God, which is the cause of things (art. 8), extends as far as His causality, namely not only to forms but also to matter, as will be shown later (q. XLIV, a. 2).

ART. XII.—WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS.

YES.—BOTH BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIMPLE INTELLIGENCE AND BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF VISION.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God knows the things that are in the power both of God Himself and of the creature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that there are in fact certain infinites, namely the thoughts and effections of the heart, which will be multiplied infinitely, rational creatures remaining endlessly. These, however, God knows, not successively, but all at once (art. 7).

NOTE: It is not contrary to infinity to be comprehended by infinity; for equality suffices for comprehension. And thus what is infinite in itself can be called finite in the knowledge of God (Ad 2).

ART. XIII.—WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS OF CONTINGENT FUTURE THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that God's knowledge is not only about things that actually exist, but also about things that are in the power both of God Himself and of the creature, as was already shown.

NOTE: Future contingent things God knows in Himself, not successively but at once, because the knowledge of God is measured by eternity, as is His being.

The gaze of God extends from eternity to all things, insofar as they are in His presence (and power). Thus God infallibly knows all contingent future things, which however are called contingent as compared to their proximate causes (in body of article).

ART. XIV.—WHETHER GOD KNOWS ENUNCIABLE THINGS (I.E., PROPOSITIONS).

YES.—THE REASON is that enunciabiles are in the power of our intellect. Now God knows whatever is in His power, and that of the creature.

NOTE: God knows enunciabiles, not by way of enunciabiles, i.e., by composition and division; but by simple intelligence. For God by knowing His essence knows the essence of all things, and whatever can be added to them as accidents (in body of article).

ART. XV.—WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS VARIABLE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the knowledge of God is His substance (art. 1); which is absolutely immutable.

ART. XVI.—WHETHER GOD HAS A SPECULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS.

YES.—1) Concerning Himself God has a speculative knowledge only; 2) concerning the things that are done He has a speculative knowledge with regard to mode, and a practical knowledge; 3) concerning the things that He can do, but does not do at any time, he does not have a practical knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God Himself is not operable, i.e., cannot be made [a builder has an "operable" knowledge of the house he is to build.]

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, whatever in things we know speculatively by definition and division, this whole thing God knows in a much more perfect way.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that practical knowledge is called from its end.

NOTE: God knows evils by a practical knowledge, insofar as He permits or impedes or orders them (at the end of the article).

QUESTION XV

Ideas

After a consideration of the knowledge of God it remains to consider His ideas; and on this head three questions are asked:

ART. I.—WHETHER IDEAS EXIST IN GOD.

YES.—Both as exemplar forms and as principles of knowledge.

THE REASON is that the world is not made by chance, but is made by God through the active intellect, as will appear below (Q. XLVI, art. 6).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS MORE THAN ONE IDEA IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the order of the universe is properly created by God, and intended by Him. Now there cannot be any idea of any whole unless there are

particular ideas of the parts from which the whole is constituted.—Then again God knows His essence not only insofar as it is in itself, but also insofar as it is imitable by some creature; and therefore He knows it as the particular type and idea of this particular creature.—And thus nothing is had against the simplicity of the divine intellect, which knows many things.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF ALL THE THINGS GOD KNOWS.

YES.—There are ideas of all the things God knows, whether as exemplar forms or as types or principles of knowledge.

THE REASON is that all the things that are done by God at any time belong to His practical knowledge; and all the things that are known by God, even if they are not done at any time, are known in their proper idea.

QUESTION XVI

Truth

Since knowledge is of the truth, after a consideration of the knowledge of God we must next inquire concerning truth, and this will include eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER TRUTH IS ONLY IN THE INTELLECT.

YES.—Principally it is in the intellect; but secondarily it is in things.

THE REASON is that, as the term of the appetite, which is good, is in the thing desirable, so the term of knowledge, which is truth, is in the intellect. Wherefore the aspect of truth passes from the intellect to the thing known; yet a thing is also called true because it has some relation to the intellect.

NOTE: 1. Natural things are denominated as true from the truth of the divine intellect; artificial things, from the truth of the human intellect (in the body of the article).

2. Things can have a relation to the intellect either essentially or accidentally; Essentially, if the being of things depends on the intellect as a house in the mind of its builder; accidentally, if the intellect knows things already made, but does not make them (in body of article).

ART. II.—WHETHER TRUTH IS ONLY IN THE INTELLECT AS IT COMPOSES AND DIVIDES.

YES.—Truth is neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is; but in the intellect as it composes and divides.

THE REASON is that only by composing and dividing can the intellect know the conformity of itself with the intelligible or the known, in which truth consists.

ART. III.—WHETHER TRUTH AND BEING ARE CONVERTIBLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that anything is so far knowable, or expresses a relation to the intellect as being true, as it has being. Whence truth adds to being a reference to the intellect.

NOTE: Truth is secondarily in things, principally it is in the intellect. On the contrary, being is principally in things, secondarily in the intellect.—Now what is in things is convertible with being as to substance; but what is in the intellect is convertible with being as the thing manifesting with that which is manifested (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE GOOD IS PRIOR TO THE TRUE IN THE MIND.

NO.—Absolutely speaking, the good is not prior to the true.

THE REASON is that truth respects being itself simply and immediately; but the good follows from being insofar as it is perfect in any way, for thus it is desirable; likewise knowledge naturally precedes the appetite.

NOTE: In the answer it is said *absolutely speaking*, for in the order of desirables the good stands as the universal and the true as the particular, and thus good is prior, but it not absolutely prior (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD IS TRUTH.

YES.—God is Supreme and Prime Truth Itself.

THE REASON is that not only is the being of God conformed to His intellect, but also God is His own act of knowledge; and this act of knowledge of His is the cause and measure of all other being, and every other intellect.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE TRUTH, ACCORDING TO WHICH ALL THINGS ARE TRUE.

NO.—Insofar as things are referred to the created intellect truth is not one; but if things are referred to the divine mind truth is one.

THE REASON is that in many created intellects there are many truths, and in one and the same (created) intellect there are many things known.—Yet all things are true because of the PRIME TRUTH, to which each thing is assimilated according to its entity.

ART. VII.—WHETHER CREATED TRUTH IS ETERNAL.

NO.—THE REASON is that truth is in the intellect, and only the divine intellect is eternal; now the truth that is in the divine intellect is uncreated, and is God Himself.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER TRUTH IS IMMUTABLE.

NO.—The truth of the human intellect is not immutable; but the truth of the divine intellect is immutable.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the conformity of the human intellect to things known can vary, both on the part of the intellect itself, because of the fact that someone conceives a different opinion concerning a thing, while it remains unchanged; and on the part of the thing, if, while the opinion remains the same, the thing is changed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the divine intellect there can be no alternation of opinions, and nothing can escape its knowledge, as appears from what has been explained above (Q. XIV, art. 13).

QUESTION XVII**Falsity**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FALSITY IS IN THINGS.

YES.—Insofar as things imply an order to the intellect.

THE REASON is that in things truth exists only with relation to the intellect; and, because opposites are about the same thing, and the true and the false are opposed, it follows that falsity must be sought in the same place where truth is found.

NOTE: A thing is said to be simply false by comparison with the intellect on which it depends *per se*, i.e., with regard to being. And thus no natural thing can be called or be false by comparison with the divine intellect. Artificial things can be simply false by comparison with the human intellect, on which they depend *per se*.—A thing is called relatively false by comparison with the intellect on which it depends only accidentally, i.e., not with regard to its existence but when the intellect already supposes the thing to exist. And thus natural things can be false *per accidens* by comparison with our intellect, in which the truth of natural things exists, not principally but secondarily.—The falsity of things relatively to our intellect can exist in two ways: a) According to the character of the thing signified, if there is not in the thing that which is attributed to it by the intellect or speech; b) by way of cause, if the thing is such that it naturally creates a false opinion of itself (passim in body of article).

ART. II.—WHETHER FALSITY IS IN THE SENSES.

YES.—Namely: a) Falsity is in the senses accidentally and b) is concerned with things that are accidentally sensible.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that with regard to their proper objects the senses do not have false knowledge, except insofar as madadjustment of the organ distorts the nature of the objects of sense.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as regards the common objects of the senses or their accidental objects, the sense do not bear directly on them, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.

NOTE: The accidental object of sense is whatever is hidden under sensible appearances, as naturally connected with them, such as life, love, hate, or virtue

ART. III.—WHETHER FALSITY IS IN THE INTELLECT.

YES.—In composition and division the intellect can be deceived; not, however, in knowing that something exists, unless accidentally.

THE REASON is that the intellect in composition and division can attribute to a thing whose quiddity it knows something that does not follow from it, or that is opposed to it.—Yet, since that something exists is the proper object of the intellect, with regard to this the intellect cannot be false (as neither can the senses with respect to their proper object) except in so far as the composition of the intellect is intermingled with it, as when the intellect attributes the definition of one thing to another (and then the definition is false as regards the thing), or when it combines parts of a definition that are incompatible (and then the definition is false in itself).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE TRUE AND FALSE ARE CONTRARIES.

YES.—Namely they are not contradictories, as affirmation and negation.

THE REASON is that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject; but contraries both assert something and determine a subject, and this is done by the false and the true. The true asserts an adequate acceptance of the thing, the false, an inadequate acceptance of the thing. Wherefore the false and the true are contraries, not contradictories.

NOTE: Privation does not assert anything, but determines the subject (in the body of the article).

QUESTION XVIII **The Life of God**

Since knowledge belongs to living things, after a consideration of the divine knowledge and intellect we have next to consider the life of God, which will take up four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO ALL NATURAL THINGS TO LIVE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is not in all natural things to move themselves to any movement or operation.

NOTE: Those things are properly living that move themselves according to some species of movement (in the body of the article).

ART. II.—WHETHER LIFE IS AN OPERATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that properly the name life is not given to signify that external phenomenon of a thing, which is self-movement, and from which the name *life* is taken; but to signify the *substance* to which it belongs to move itself according to its nature.—Less improperly it is taken for the operations of life, as to feel and to know.

ART. III.—WHETHER LIFE BELONGS TO GOD.

YES.—Life belongs to God in the highest degree.

THE REASON is that to God, whose nature is His own act of knowing, it infinitely belongs to act through self, and to be moved by nothing else.

NOTE: Just as God is His own being and His own knowing, so also He is His own life (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE LIFE IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that all things that were made by God are in Him as the objects of His knowledge. But in God the act of knowing is the very act of living, or His life.

QUESTION XIX **The Will of God**

After a consideration of the things that pertain to the divine knowledge, we must consider the things that pertain to the divine will. So our first consideration will concern the will of God; the second, the things that belong absolutely to the will; the third, the things that belong to the intellect in relation to the will.—With regard to the will itself, 14 articles follow:

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that in God there is intellect. For an intellectual nature has an aptitude to good as apprehended by its intelligible form; so that when it has this good it rests in it; but when it does not have this good it seeks it. And both these things belong to the will.

NOTE: The object of the divine will is the goodness of God Himself, which is His essence. Whence the will of God is not moved by anything other than Himself, but by Himself only; and in this way the first mover moves Himself (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD WILLS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is of the notion of goodness to communicate the good that anyone has to others so far as is possible.

NOTE: God wills Himself as the end. Other things He wills as for the end, that they may partake of the divine goodness itself on account of His goodness (in the end of the article).

ART. III.—WHETHER WHATEVER GOD WILLS HE WILLS OF NECESSITY.

NO.—God wills His own goodness by absolute necessity; other things He wills only by the necessity of supposition (i.e., if He creates them He must will them).

THE REASON is that the goodness of God is His proper object.—But, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things, it follows that to will things other than Himself is not necessary except by supposition (if they do exist He must will them), because what He wills He cannot *not* will, since His will cannot be changed.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS.

YES, THE FIRST REASON is that one who acts by intellect and will is prior to one who acts by nature, since he determines nature to the end.

THE SECOND REASON is that, since the divine being is not determined, but contains in itself the whole perfection of being, it is impossible for it to act by the necessity of nature, but it acts (transiently) through the will.

THE THIRD REASON is that the inclination of God to do what He conceives by His intellect belongs to the will.

ART. V.—WHETHER ANY CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as God by one act knows all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS ALWAYS FULFILLED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the will of God is the universal cause of all things, what seems to escape the divine will according to one order slips back to it according to another [as when the sinner who escapes God's mercy meets His justice.]

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS MUTABLE.

NO.—THE REASON is that both the substance of God and His knowledge are altogether immutable.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IMPOSES NECESSITY ON THE THINGS THAT ARE WILLED.

NO.—Not on all.

THE REASON is that, for the complete ordering of the universe, God wills certain things to happen of necessity, to which He has added necessary causes, which cannot fail; other things He has willed to happen contingently, to which He has added defectible contingent causes.

NOTE: Since the divine will is altogether efficacious, it follows not only that those things are done that God wills to be done, but that also they are done in the way in which He wills them to be done (in the body of the article).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS CONCERNED WITH EVILS.

NO.—Moral evil (*malum culpae*) God in no way wills; but physical evil (*malum defectus naturalis* or penal evil) He wills *per accidens*.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that moral evil destroys the order to the divine good.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment are joined to some good, which is appetible.

NOTE: Evil is never desired, not even *per accidens*, unless the good to which it is united is more desired than the good that is deprived by the evil (in body of article).

ART. X.—WHETHER GOD HAS FREE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that God, who wills His goodness of necessity, wills other things not of necessity (as was shown above, art. 3).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THERE IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED IN GOD THE WILL OF SIGN.

YES.—THE REASON is that some human passions are transferred metaphorically to statements about the Diety, as when anger is attributed to God,

NOTE: In God there is distinguished the will properly and the will metaphorically so called. The will properly so called is called the will of good pleasure; will metaphorically so called is the will of sign, *voluntas signi* (in body of article).

[NOTE: The name will of sign derives from the fact that the passions are usually signs of the will to do something; for instance, when a man is angry, this is usually a sign that he will wreak vengeance.]

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE FIVE EXPRESSIONS OF WILL ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL.

YES.—Prohibition and permission, with respect to evil; precept, counsel, and operation with respect to good.

THE REASON is that someone declares his will, either by himself, by working good or permitting an evil (as by removing an obstacle thereto), or through someone else, by a commanding, or forbidding, or counseling.

QUESTION XX

The Love of God

We have next to consider the things that belong absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part are found in us both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, such as justice, fortitude, and the like. Whence we shall first consider the love of God; secondly, His mercy and justice. Regarding the love of God there are four articles:

ART. I.—WHETHER LOVE IS IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that in God there is will (Q. XIX, a. 1); now love is the first act or movement of the will and the appetite; all other appetitive movements presuppose love, as the first root.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the very being of anything is a certain good, which is from God, whose love infuses and creates goodness in things.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS EQUALLY.

NO.—a) That is, He does not love one thing more than another with a more intense will. b) But He does love one thing more than another on the part of the good that He wills for that which is loved.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God loves all things in one simple act of the will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that there would not be in things anything better than another if God did not will the good of one more than that of another.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD ALWAYS LOVES THE BETTER MORE.

YES.—THE REASON is that some things are better precisely because God wills a greater good for them.

QUESTION XXI

The Justice and Mercy of God

After a consideration of the divine love, we have next to treat of God's mercy and justice. This will consume four articles:

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS JUSTICE IN GOD.

YES.—a) Not commutative justice; b) but distributive.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as the Apostle says: "Who has first given to Him, that recompense should be made to him?" (Rom. xi, 35).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the order of the universe, which appears both in natural things and in voluntary things, demonstrates that God gives to each according to its dignity.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE JUSTICE OF GOD IS TRUTH.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the justice of God constitutes an order in things that is conformed to the rule of His wisdom; this conformity of thing to intellect is called (metaphysical) truth.

ART. III.—WHETHER MERCY BELONGS TO GOD.

YES.—Mercy is especially attributable to God, but as seen in its effect, and not according to the affection of passion.

THE REASON is that defects are not taken away save by the perfection of some goodness. Now God is the first origin of goodness.

NOTE: Mercy is a certain fullness of justice (at the end of the article).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN ALL THE WORKS OF GOD THERE ARE MERCY AND JUSTICE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that whatever God does in created things He does according to an appropriate order and proportion, in which the idea of justice consists.—And in every work of God there appears mercy with regard to its first root, because nothing is due to the creature except by the pure bounty of God.

QUESTION XXII

The Providence of God

The consideration of the things that belong absolutely to the will leads on to the things that respect both will and intellect. Such are providence, with respect to all things; predestination and reprobation, and their consequences, with respect to men, especially in relation to external salvation. For after the moral virtues in moral science comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence seems to belong. With regard to the providence of God four questions are asked:

ART. I.—WHETHER PROVIDENCE BELONGS TO GOD.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, since God is the cause of things through His intellect, it follows that the plan of the order of things to the end should already exist in the divine mind; this plan is called providence. [Tr. Note: Aquinas defines Providence as the all-regulating and stable plan by which God, as the Supreme Ruler of the universe, ordains all things.]

NOTE: To the care of providence two things belong: The plan of order, which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is called government. Of these the first is eternal; the second temporal (Ad. 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

YES.—Not only in general but also in particular.

THE FIRST REASON is that the ordination of effects to end extends only so far as the causality of the prime agent. Now the causality of God extends to all things.

THE SECOND REASON is that the knowledge whereby God knows all universals and particulars is compared to things as the knowledge of an art to the products of the art.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD PROVIDES IMMEDIATELY FOR ALL THINGS.

YES.—In so far as His providence is the plan by which things foreseen are ordained to their end, but not with regard to the execution or government of this order.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in His intellect God has the types of all things, even the least, and whatever causes He creates for some effects He gives them the power to produce those effects.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God governs inferiors through supe-

riors; so that He communicates the dignity of causality even to creatures.

NOTE: The fact that God has immediately the providence of all things does not exclude secondary causes, which are not the executors of this order (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PROVIDENCE IMPOSES NECESSITY ON THE THINGS PROVIDED.

NO.—Not on all.

THE REASON is that, in view of the perfection of the universe, the divine providence has prepared necessary causes for certain effects, and contingent causes for others.

QUESTION XXIII **Predestination**

After a consideration of divine providence we must treat of predestination, and of the Book of Life. This gives rise to eight questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINATED BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that men are transmitted by divine providence to an end exceeding the proportion and powers of created nature, which end is eternal life. The plan of this transmission existing in the divine mind is called predestination.

ART. II.—WHETHER PREDESTINATION ADDS ANYTHING TO THE PREDESTINED.

NO.—In so far as predestination is the plan by which some men are ordained to eternal salvation. But as regards execution it does add something to the one predestined.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such a plan, as part of providence, exists only in the divine mind.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that with regard to execution, or government, it adds (passively) to the one predestined a call and glorification (Rom. viii, 30).

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD REJECTS ANY MAN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to providence, of which predestination is a part, to permit some defect in the things that are subject to providence, lest the perfect good of the whole be impeded (Q. XXII, Art. 2, ad. 2).

NOTE: Reprobation does not denote foreknowledge only, but also adds the will of permitting someone to fall into sin and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for the sin. Wherefore reprobation is not the cause of sin, but is the cause of abandonment by God (in body of article).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE ELECTED BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the predestination of some things to eternal salvation logically presupposes that God wills their salvation; to this belong election and love.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS A CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the reason of predestination must be sought in the nature of the divine will, to which no cause can properly be assigned.—Yet God has preordained that He will give the effect of predestination to someone on account of certain merits, which in the particular case are the cause and reason of the effect of predestination. But in the general view it is impossible that the whole effect of predestination should have some cause on our part, because whatever is in man disposing him to salvation is all comprehended under the effect of predestination, even the very preparation itself for grace; for even that which is by free will is the result of predestination.

ART. VI.—WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN.

YES.—Predestination most certainly and infallibly obtains its effect; yet it imposes no necessity, i.e., its effect does not arise from necessity.

THE REASON is that the order of providence, of which predestination is a part, is infallible. But in this order is included also the freedom of choice, from which the effect of predestination contingently arises.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN.

YES.—The number of the predestined is certain to God, not only formally (i.e.,

with regard to number), but also materially (i.e., with regard to these or those to be predestined); and this not only by reason of the knowledge of God, but also by reason of a certain choice and determination.

THE REASON is that, among all creatures, rational creatures are especially ordained to the good of the whole, for as such they are incorruptible, and most particularly ordained are those that attain beatitude, for they immediately attain their last end.—In other words: THE REASON is that the predestined are preordained by God *per se* as essential parts of the whole.

[Men may be compared to the universe as measurements to a house; the builder must know exactly what and how many they are. Subrational things may be compared to the stones that go into the measurements. The builder does not determine their precise number; he need only have enough for his purpose.]

NOTE: 1) Some are preordained by God secondarily, as the number of individuals of any species (in body of art.)

2. The reprobate seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect, for whom all things work together for good (in body of article).

3. Since eternal beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, surpasses the common state of nature, especially as it is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, the number of the saved are in the minority (*pauciores*) (Ad. 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE HELPED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS.

YES.—With regard to the effects of predestination, but not with regard to predestination itself.

THE REASON is that providence, of which predestination is part, does not withdraw secondary causes, but thus provides effects, so that even the order of secondary causes is subject to Providence.—Yet no one is predestined by God because of the prayers of the saints.

NOTE: The reason of the predestination of some and the reprobation of others can be taken from the divine goodness itself, which, being one and simple in itself, must needs be multiply represented in things. We thus consider the whole human race, as the whole universality of things. Just as the reason why this part of matter is under this form and that part under another depends on the simple divine will; so why God chooses these for glory and rejects those has no other reason than the divine will, as the Apostle says (Rom. ix, 22, 23).

(But it is not therefore unfairness in God if He prepares unequal things for those who are not unequal. For it would be contrary to justice only if the effect of predestination were given because of what is due, and were not given because of grace).

QUESTION XXIV

The Book of Life

We have next to consider the Book of Life, which will be dealt with in three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE IS THE SAME AS PREDESTINATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Book of Life is nothing else than the figurative enrollment of those who are predestined by God.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE IS ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE GLORY OF THOSE PRESTINED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Book of Life denotes the enrollment of the elect for eternal life; but that for which anyone is chosen has the character of an end, which is the glory of life.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANYONE IS STRICKEN FROM THE BOOK OF LIFE.

YES.—That is, one who is enrolled there, not simply but conditionally.

THE REASON is that those who are registered simply in the Book of Life are ordained to eternal life by reason of divine predestination, which is infallible; those are conditionally registered there who have been ordained to eternal life only by grace, which can be lost through mortal sin.

QUESTION XXV

The Divine Power

After a consideration of the divine foreknowledge and will, and of what pertains thereto, it remains to consider the divine power, which will be dealt with in six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE IS POWER.

YES.—Not passive power, which is in no way in God; but active power, which must be attributed infinitely to God.

THE REASON is that God is pure act, and simply and universally perfect; in Him no imperfection can appear (Q. II, a. 3; and Q. IV, art. 1 and 2).

(The power of which St. Thomas speaks signifies the principle of operation *ad extra*, or transient operation, the name operation being extended both to action and to passion.)

NOTE: Active power is the principle of acting on something else; passive power is the principle of being acted on.—The character of power appears in God in this, that it is the principle of an effect; but it does not appear as being the principle of action, which is the divine essence.—Power in God denotes the character of a principle carrying out that which the will commands and to which knowledge directs. These three things belong to God in the same way (in body of article).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE POWER OF GOD IS INFINITE.

YES, THE REASON is that the being of God is infinite; but active power is found in God according as He is actually existing.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS OMNIPOTENT.

YES.—God can do absolutely all possible things.

THE REASON is that to every active power there corresponds something that is possible. Now the divine existence, upon which the reason of the divine power is founded, is infinite existence, not limited to any category of being, but already having in itself the perfection of all being. Wherefore whatever has or can have the character of being is contained under absolute possibles, with respect to which God is called omnipotent.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD CAN MAKE THE PAST NOT TO BE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the non-existence of the past involves contradiction.

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD COULD DO WHAT HE DOES NOT DO.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that God does not act by the necessity of nature (q. XIX, art. 3); but His will is the cause of all things, and His will itself is not naturally determined by necessity to do these things.

THE SECOND REASON is that the order implanted in things by the divine wisdom does not equal the divine wisdom, so that the divine wisdom is limited to this order; for the end of all things is the divine goodness, which exceeds created things beyond all proportion.

ART. VI.—WHETHER GOD COULD MAKE THINGS BETTER THAN HE MAKES THEM.

YES.—Not with respect to the goodness that is of the essence of the thing, but with respect to the goodness that is outside the essence of the thing.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the addition of substantial difference implies a substantial change of the thing.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God can give to things He has made a better mode of existence with regard to accidentals, such as making a good man better.

QUESTION XXVI

The Divine Happiness

Finally, after considering the things that pertain to the unity of the divine essence, we come now to a consideration of the divine happiness (four articles).

ART. I.—WHETHER BEATITUDE BELONGS TO GOD.

YES.—IT BELONGS INFINITELY TO GOD.

THE REASON is that under the name of beatitude nothing else is understood than the perfect good of an intellectual nature. But this good belongs infinitely to God.

NOTE: The perfect good of an intellectual nature consists: a) In the knowledge of its own sufficiency in the good that it has; b) in the fact that good or ill may befall it, and that it has control over its acts. Now both these things belong in a most eminent way to God, namely perfect and intelligent being (in body of article).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD IS CALLED BLESSED ACCORDING TO THE INTELLECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is intellectual operation, according to which it in a manner receives all things.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS THE BEATITUDE OF EACH OF THE BLESSED.

NO.—That is, on the part of the act itself; on the side of the object, however, God is the only beatitude.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that on the part of the act of knowing happiness is something created in blessed creatures.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that one is happy for this sole reason, that he knows God.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN GOD'S BEATITUDE ALL BEATITUDE IS INCLUDED.

YES.—THE REASON is that whatever is desirable in any beatitude already exists in more eminent degree in the divine beatitude.

(HERE ENDS THE TRACT ON THE ONE GOD)

TRACT OF THE TRINITY

After a consideration of the things that pertain to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to consider the things that belong to the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead. And, because the Divine Persons are distinguished One from Another according to relations of origin, the order of doctrine demands first that we consider their origin, or procession; secondly, their relations of origin; thirdly, the Persons Themselves.—Regarding procession five questions are asked.

QUESTION XXVII

The Procession of the Divine Persons

ART. I.—WHETHER PROCESSION IS IN THE GODHEAD.

YES.—a) Yet not as an effect proceeds from a cause; b) or as a cause is said to proceed to the effect, by moving it or impressing its image on it, which is to proceed transiently; but c) according to the action that remains in the agent itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that otherwise neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that otherwise the Father Himself would be what the Son is.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that procession in the Godhead is not to be taken according as it exists in corporeal things, by the action of any cause proceeding to an external effect; but according to an intelligible emanation, according to the likeness of the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances.

NOTE: 1. Divine Scripture, in describing divine things, uses names pertaining to procession (in beginning of art).

2. That which proceeds immanently, an intelligible procession, need not be distinct from that from which it proceeds; in fact, the more perfectly it proceeds the more is it one with that from which it proceeds (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER ANY PROCESSION IN THE GODHEAD CAN BE CALLED GENERATION.

YES.—Generation is properly applied to living things and therefore to God; in God it is without procession from potency to act, which is excluded from the Godhead.

THE REASON is that in the Godhead the Word proceeds by way of an intelligible action, which is a vital operation, both from a principle to which He is united (pre-

ceding article), and by way of likeness, and in the same nature (Q. III, art. 4 and Q. XIV, art. 4).

NOTE: Generation can be defined with reference to four causes: The origin of one living thing from another living thing to which it is united in such a way that it is like it in its specific nature.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS IN THE GODHEAD ANOTHER PROCESSION BESIDES THE GENERATION OF THE WORD.

YES.—A procession of love.

THE REASON is that in God there is will, in addition to intellect. Wherefore, just as there is procession according to intellect, so also there is procession according to will, as there is in us.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PROCESSION OF LOVE IN THE GODHEAD IS GENERATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the procession that depends on the will is not considered by way of a likeness, but rather by way of impulse and movement to an object. The will is activated by having an inclination to the thing that is willed. Hence by the name of spirit a vital motion and impulse are designated.

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE ARE MORE PROCESSIONS IN THE GODHEAD THAN TWO.

NO.—THE REASON is that in a nature that is divine and intellectual there are but two actions that remain in the agent, intellect and will.

QUESTION XXVIII
The Divine Relations

We have next to consider the divine relations, which will consume four articles:

ART. I.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ANY REAL RELATIONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the processions in the Godhead are in the identity of nature (Q. XXVIII, aa. 2 and 4); for those things that are spoken of as referring to something, if they imply a relation that is in the very nature of things, must necessarily be real relations.

NOTE: 1. Relations are not predicated of God according to the proper and formal meaning of relation (for in God there are no accidents); but rather as denoting a respect to another (Ad 1).

2. In God there is no real relation to creatures, for God produces them, not by natural necessity, but by His intellect and will. But in creatures there is a real relation to God, because they are under the divine order, and their nature is to be dependent on God (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN GOD RELATION IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE.

YES.—Relation in God is really the same as His essence; relation differs only according to our mode of understanding.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that whatever in created things has accidental existence (that whose existence is to inhere in something else) when considered as transferred to God, it has substantial existence, for nothing exists in God as an accident in a subject; but whatever is in God *is* His essence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that relation implies a respect to its opposite term, but this is not implied in the name of essence.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RELATIONS THAT ARE IN GOD ARE REALLY DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER.

YES.—Not according to that which is absolute, which is God's essence, but according to that which is relative.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the divine essence there are infinite unity and simplicity.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since in God relation really exists (art. 1 of this question), it follows that there really is in Him an opposition; but relative opposition by its concept includes a distinction.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ONLY FOUR RELATIONS, NAMELY PATERNITY, FILIATION, SPIRATION, AND PROCESSION.

YES.—THE REASON is that in God there are only two processions (qq.xxvii, art. 5) ; and from each of these processions two opposite relations arise. Likewise, of the opposite relations of each procession, one is of the relation of the Person proceeding from His principle, and the other of the principle Himself. Consequently, there are in the procession of the Word Filiation and Paternity, in so far as these names are used in the generation proper to living things; in the procession of love, which does not have a proper name (q. xx XXVII, art. 4), there are Procession and Spiration.

NOTE: 1. These two names, Spiration and Procession, pertain to the processions or origins themselves; not properly to the relations. Nevertheless, with regard to the thing signified and with regard to the use of the word, both names denote relations.

2. In God the intelligible relations are not multiplied to infinity, as in us; because God knows all things by one act only (Ad 1).

THE DIVINE PERSONS

After first examining the processions and relations, and the things thereto pertaining, we must now go on and treat of the Persons first, in an absolute and then in a comparative consideration. Concerning the Persons we must first consider Them in general, and then individually. To the common consideration of the Persons four things seem to belong: 1) The signification of the name person.—2) The number of the Persons.—3) The things that follow from the number of the Persons.—4) The things that pertain to the knowledge of the Persons. From the first head four questions follow.

QUESTION XXIX

The Term "Person"

ART. I.—WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF BOETHIUS, "A PERSON IS AN INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE OF A RATIONAL NATURE," IS SUITABLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the said definition of person places in him an individual substance, inasmuch as person signifies an individual in the genus substance; and adds "of a rational nature," in so far as it signifies an individual in *rational* substances.—This gives the whole perfection of person, namely a first substance, or hypostasis, ad *sui juris*, or having the control of his own act.)

NOTE: 1. By adding to the definition "individual," we exclude from person the idea of assumptibility (ad 2) ; and designate the mode of subsistence, which belongs to particular substances (ad 3).—We use the term nature, but not essence, because nature (which is called from *nativitas*, birth) is the specific difference informing each thing; whereas essence is taken from *esse*, being, which is the most common of predicates. (ad 4).

2. The separated soul, since it retains the nature of unibility, cannot be called an individual substance, which is a hypostasis (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER PERSON IS THE SAME AS HYPOSTASIS, SUBSTANCE, AND ESSENCE.

YES.—Namely in the genus of rational substances.

THE REASON is that hypostasis, subsistence, and essence signify a thing according to the threefold consideration of this kind of substance. It is called hypostasis in so far as it underlies accidents; it is called subsistence in so far as it exists in itself, and not in another; it is called essence, in so far as it signifies the quiddity of a thing.

NOTE: 1) *Hypostasis* among the Greeks by the proper signification of the name designates every individual of a substance; but by common usage it is taken for the individual of a rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature (Ad 1). Wherefore, just as we say *three Persons*, so the Greeks say *three Hypostases*. But we do not ordinarily say *three Substances*, to avoid seeming to imply three essences. (Q. XXX, art. 1, ad 1).

2. The name hypostasis does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, for God is not the subject of accidents. It does apply to Him, however, in its objective sense. For it is given to signify that which subsists (Q. XXIX, art. 3, ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NAME PERSON IS APPLICABLE TO GOD.

YES.—Not in the same way in which it is spoken of creatures, but in a more excellent way (Q. XIII, art. 2).

THE REASON is that everything that is perfect is attributable to God. Now a person signifies that which is most perfect in all nature.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE NAME PERSON SIGNIFIES A RELATION.

YES.—In the Godhead person signifies relation directly and the essence indirectly.

THE REASON is that, since there is no distinction in the Godhead save in the relations of origin (Q. XXVII, art. 2 and 3), the Divine Persons signifies a relation as subsisting. Thus it signifies relation directly and essence indirectly.

NOTE: In so far as the essence is the same as hypostasis, person signifies the essence directly and relation indirectly. But this signification was not perceived before the misrepresentation of heretics. But afterward the name person was applied to express relation, because of the unequivocal nature of its meaning (at end of article).

QUESTION XXX**The Plurality of the Divine Person**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MORE THAN ONE PERSON IS TO BE ASSERTED IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that person signifies in the Godhead a relation, a reality subsisting in the divine nature. Now there is more than one real relation in the Godhead (Q. XXVII, art. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE MORE PERSONS THAN THREE.

NO.—THE REASON is that in God there are four real relations (Q. XXVIII, art. 4), of which two, Paternity and Filiation, are opposite relations, and constitute two subsistences, or persons, namely the Person of the Father and the Person of the Son; but of the other two relations (Spiration and Procession), Procession is opposed only to Spiration, and it is a property constituting the Person of the Holy Spirit who proceeds. But Spiration, since it is not separated from the Person of the Father and Son, but belongs to Both, is not called a property, although it is a relation.

ART. III.—WHETHER NUMERAL TERMS DENOTE ANYTHING REAL IN THE GODHEAD.

NO.—a.) They are not derived from number, as a species of quantity; but b) are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense, referring to *formal* division by opposite or diverse forms.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus they are spoken of God only metaphorically, as are the other properties of corporeal things, such as length, breath, and the like.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that only such a multitude can be in immaterial things. In this sense numeral terms in the Godhead signify the things of which they are spoken. Thus when we say an essence is one, one here signifies undivided in essence; when we say a person is one, *one* signifies the person undivided, when we say the persons are many, we designate these persons and their individual undividedness; for it is of the essence of multitude that it should be composed of units.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE TERM PERSON CAN BE COMMON TO THE THREE PERSONS.

YES.—a) Not by a real community of terms; b) but by a community of idea; and thus not as a genus or a species but as a vague individual thing.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that otherwise it would follow that the Three have one Person, as they have one Essence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it is common in idea to all the Divine Persons, that Each of Them subsists in the divine nature, distinct from the others.

NOTE: A *vague individual thing*, as some *man*, signifies a common nature with a determinate mode of existence that belongs to individuals, that is, something self-subsisting, distinct from others.

QUESTION XXXI**The Things That Pertain to Unity or Plurality in the Godhead**
(in four articles)**ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS TRINITY IN THE GODHEAD.**

YES.—AS THE UNITY OF THREE PERSONS

THE REASON is that Trinity in the Godhead signifies the number of persons of one essence.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SON IS OTHER THAN THE FATHER.YES.—The reason is that the name other (*alius*) taken in the masculine signifies only a distinction of suppositum.**ART. III.—WHETHER THE EXCLUDING TERM "ALONE" SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE ESSENTIAL TERM IN THE GODHEAD.**

YES.—Taken as a syncategorematic term but not as a categorematic term.—

THE REASON is that, taken categorematically, the word "alone" asserts absolutely that which is signified in regard to a suppositum; thus "God alone" would signify that God is solitary.—Syncategorematically, however, it imports a relation of predicate to subject; and in this way nothing prevents the word "alone" from adding to some essential term in the Godhead, in so far as all things other than God are excluded from the company of the predicate. As if we should say: "Only God is eternal;" because nothing besides God is eternal.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE EXCLUDING WORD "ALONE" CAN BE ADDED TO THE PERSONAL TERM.NO.—This proposition: "The Father alone is God," if taken categorematically, is false (preceding article). If taken syncategorematically, so as to exclude all others from the form of the subject, it is true, but improper. If it excludes another in the masculine, it is false; but if it excludes something else (*aliud*), in the neuter, it is true, but improper.THE REASON is that, syncategorematically taken, in the first sense, it signifies: "He who with no other is Father is God." But this sense is not contained in ordinary speech.—In the second sense it is false, because even the Son is God (and the Holy Spirit is God).—In the third sense it is true, because Father is not another thing (*aliud*) from the Son, or from the Holy Spirit. But the word "alone" properly regards the subject, and therefore excludes rather another person than another thing.**QUESTION XXXI****The Knowledge of the Divine Persons**
(in four articles)**ART. I.—WHETHER THE TRINITY OF DIVINE PERSONS CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON.**

NO.—Natural reason can know concerning God the things that belong to the unity of Essence, but not the things that belong to the distinction of Persons.

THE REASON is that by natural reason man cannot come to the knowledge of God except through creatures. But the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity, i.e., belongs to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of Persons.

ART. II.—WHETHER NOTIONS ARE TO BE ASSERTED IN GOD.

NOTE: Notion here means the proper aspect under which a divine Person is known (art. 3 of this question).

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as we signify divine attributes, by abstract terms to signify simple forms (Q. III, art. 3), but we use concrete names to express their subsistence and completeness; so not only should essential names signify in the abstract and concrete, as when we say "Deity" and "God," or "wise" and "wisdom," but also personal names, as when we say "Paternity" and "Father." And this is because our intellect cannot attain to the divine simplicity itself, considered in itself.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE ARE FIVE NOTIONS.

YES.—Innascibility (of the Father), Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration, and Procession.

THE REASON is that a person can become known according to the modes of

origin of from whom another comes and of who comes from another. The Father is not from another, and hence his notion is innascibility. Inasmuch as the Son is from the Father, He is known by the notion of Paternity. Inasmuch as the Son is from Another He is known by Filiation. Inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, He is known by the notion of common Spiration, and in so far as the Holy Spirit is from Another, or Others, He is known by Procession.

NOTE: There are three personal notions, i.e., those that constitute the Persons, namely Paternity, Filiation, and Procession. Common Spiration and Innascibility are called notions of the Persons, but not personal notions, as will appear more clearly later.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO HAVE CONTRARY OPINIONS OF THE DIVINE NOTIONS.

YES.—If nothing against faith is intended.

THE REASON is that, with respect to the things that indirectly pertain to faith, anyone can hold an opinion without danger of heresy, before it is considered or determined that something contrary to faith follows from this.

QUESTION XXXIII

The Person of the Father

ART. I.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE FATHER TO BE THE PRINCIPLE.

(in four articles)

YES.—THE REASON is that another Person proceeds from the Father.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NAME FATHER IS PROPERLY THE NAME OF A DIVINE PERSON.

YES.—THE REASON is that the name Father, which denotes paternity, distinguishes the Person of the Father from the other Persons.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NAME FATHER IS APPLIED TO GOD FIRSTLY, AS A PERSONAL NAME.

YES.—But it is not applied first essentially, or as common to the whole Trinity, as when we say "Our Father."

THE REASON is that the whole notion of the name Father is perfectly preserved if taken personally; it is only relatively preserved if it is taken essentially, for the whole Trinity: For in the creature filiation with respect to God is not found according to its perfect character, but according to some similitude, whether of trace (a similarity to the Trinity found in nature), or of grace, or of glory.

ART. IV.—WHETHER TO BE UNBEGOTTEN IS PROPER TO THE FATHER.

YES.—By reason of His innascibility and His being the principle not Himself from a principle.

THE REASON is that according to the notion of innascibility and principle to be engendered belongs to the Father alone (see ad 2).

QUESTION XXXIV

The Person of the Son (the Word)

Here we have to consider the Person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son, namely Son, Word, and Image; the idea of Son is gathered from His relation to the Father. Hence we have to consider the Word and the Image. With respect to the Word three questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER WORD IN THE GODHEAD IS A PERSONAL NAME.

YES.—If word is taken properly it is a personal name, and in no way is it an essential name.

THE REASON is that Word, in so far as it is properly applied in the Godhead, namely as a concept of the mind only, signifies something proceeding from another, and this pertains to the personal names in the Godhead; for the Divine Persons are distinguished according to origin, as has been said (Q. XXVII, art. 3, 4, and 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER “WORD” IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE SON.

YES.—THE REASON is that “word” signifies a certain emanation of the intellect. Now the Person who proceeds in the Godhead according to the emanation of the intellect is called the Son; and this procession is called generation.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NAME “WORD” IMPLIES A RELATION TO CREATURES.

YES.—THE REASON is that God knows Himself and everything in one act; wherefore His single Word is expressive, not only of the Father, but also of creatures.

NOTE: The Word implies the action of God. Hence, with regard to creatures, the Word of God is not only expressive, as it is with regard to Deity, but also operative.—With regard to non-beings it is expressive and manifestive (Ad 5).

QUESTION XXXV**The Image**

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IMAGE IN THE GODHEAD IS USED PERSONALLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that in order that anything may be truly an image it is required that something proceed from another that is like it in species, or at least in some sign of the species. [Thus an egg, though it proceeds, is not an image.] But the things that import procession or origin in the GODHEAD are personal.

[Tr. Note: A “sign of a species” St. Thomas explains as particularly its figure. Thus color on a wall would not be a picture unless it had the outlines of a figure on it.]

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NAME IMAGE IS PROPER TO THE SON.

YES.—It is proper to the Son alone, contrary to the Greek Doctors, who commonly call the Holy Spirit the image of the Father and the Son.

THE REASON is that only the Son is said to be *born*; the essence of being born is likeness in species to that from which one proceeds; this does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to love, which is the Holy Spirit (who is the Divine Love).

QUESTION XXXVI**The Person of the Holy Spirit**

After the previous consideration we come now to the things that pertain to the Person of the Holy Spirit; because not only is He called Holy Spirit, but also Love and the Gift of God. Regarding the Holy Spirit there will be four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NAME “HOLY SPIRIT” IS THE PROPER NAME OF ANY DIVINE PERSON.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Divine Person who proceeds by way of the love by which God is loved, is appropriately called Holy Spirit.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE SON.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Son and Holy Spirit must be referred to Each Other by opposite relations; otherwise they are not distinguished from Each Other and would be one Person. Now the relations in the Godhead cannot be opposed except by reason of origin (Q. XXVIII, art. 4).—That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and not vice versa, is evident: First, because love must proceed from a word; for we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a conception of the mind.—Secondly, because the things that proceed from someone, in a way other than material only, must have some order to each other. Now the word Procession, of all terms that denote origin, is most common; for we use it to designate any kind of origin.

NOTE: When it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it is added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be excluded; for Father and Son are not opposed with respect to Their being a principle, but only with respect to the fact that One is Father and the other is Son (Ad 1).—Just so, the words: “No one knows the Son except the Father” (Matth. xi, 27), do not exclude the Son.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER THROUGH THE SON.

YES.—a) Not as through a secondary and instrumental cause; b) but by the same spirative power in the Father and the Son.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus He would proceed from the Father rather than from the Son (ad 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Son has this spirative power from the Father (Ad 2). In this sense it can be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately or principally (or even properly) from the Father, but mediately through the Son (Ad 1 and ad 2).

NOTE: The order does not run between the Father and the Son with respect to power but only with respect to supposita. And therefore it is said that the Father spirates through the Son, and not conversely (in body of article).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FATHER AND SON ARE ONE PRINCIPLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Father and Son are one in everything in which the opposition of relation makes no distinction between them. Being the principle of the Holy Spirit, moreover, does not introduce a relative opposition.

NOTE: The Father and the Son are *one principle* of the Holy Spirit, in so far as they are *one* in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property (Ad 1). Yet on account of the distinction of supposita, the Father and the Son, although They are one principle of the Holy Spirit, are two *spiratores*, as also two *spirantes*, because acts are referred to supposita; but it is better to say (adjectively) two *spirantes* than (substantively) two *spiratores*, on account of one Spiration (Ad 7).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas explains that *spirantes* (Those breathing) is an adjective and *spiratores* (breathers) is a noun. Adjective names have number according to the supposita they modify, but substantives take their number from their own nature.]

QUESTION XXXVII

The Name of the Holy Spirit, Which Is Love

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER “LOVE” IS THE PROPER NAME OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—In so far as the name “love” is taken in the Godhead personally, THE REASON is that the procession of the Holy Spirit takes place by way of will, which is a procession of love. For, on the part of the will, no other names are given that import a relation of the lover to the thing loved besides *diligere* and *amare*. [Tr. Note: *Diligere* means to esteem highly; *amare* to love with warmth, to feel attachment for.]

Accordingly, in so far as *amor* or *dilectio* imports only a relation of the lover to the thing loved, the word love is said of the essence, as “understanding” and “to understand.” In so far, however, as we use these terms to express the relation of that which proceeds to its principle by way of love, and *vice versa*, so that by *love* is understood love proceeding, and by *to love* is understood the spiration of the love proceeding, love substantively (*amor*) is the name of a person, and to “love” (*diligere* or *amare*) is a notional verb, like *dicere* (to say) or *generare* (to beget).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON LOVE EACH OTHER BY THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—Not in so far as the word to love (*diligere*) is used in the Godhead essentially, but in so far as it is used notionally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus the Father and the Son love Each Other by Their essence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus to love is nothing else than to spirate love, and in this way the Father and the Son love Each Other (and us) by a love proceeding, i.e., through the Holy Spirit, as the Father speaks Himself (and creatures) through the Word. Thus a tree is said to flourish because of its flowers, i.e., the ablative is construed as denoting a formal effect, but not as denoting a formal cause.

QUESTION XXXVIII**The Name of the Holy Spirit That Is "Gift"**

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER "GIFT" IS A PERSONAL NAME.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to a divine Person to be given to a rational creature and to be its gift; now a rational creature can so be made a partaker of the Divine Word and the proceeding Love that he can freely and truly know God and rightly love Him.

ART. II.—WHETHER "GIFT" IS A PROPER NAME OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that love has the character of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds as love.

QUESTION XXXIX**The Persons in Their Relation to the Essence of God**

It now remains to treat of the Persons in comparison with the Divine Essence and properties and notional acts, and of the comparison of these with one another. The first of these points will take up eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE GODHEAD ESSENCE IS THE SAME AS PERSON.

YES.—It is the same, by a REAL identity.

THE REASON is that a person is in reality a suppositum, which in the Godhead is the same as the essence.—There remain, however, three Persons and one essence, since relation, although with reference to the Divine essence it does not differ therefrom in reality, but only in our minds, yet in reference to an opposite relation it has, by virtue of that opposition, a real distinction.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THE THREE PERSONS ARE OF ONE ESSENCE.

YES.—In so far as the genitive, "of one essence," is understood as designating the form.

THE REASON is that, since in our way of conception, which is to receive knowledge from sensible things, the nature is the form, and the individual is the suppositum of the form, so also in the Godhead, the essence is taken as the form of the three Persons according to our mode of signification.

ART. III.—WHETHER ESSENTIAL NAMES SHOULD BE PREDICATED IN THE SINGULAR OF THE THREE PERSONS.

YES.—If the essential names are taken substantively; but if they are taken adjectively they are to be predicated of the three Persons in the plural.

THE REASON is that essential names taken substantively in the Godhead signify the divine essence, which is simple and absolutely one. Taken as adjectives, they are predicated in the plural, on account of the plurality of the supposita. Whence we say: "Three Persons having Deity," but "one God," for God is taken substantively; "having Deity" is used adjectively.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CONCRETE ESSENTIAL NAMES CAN BE USED FOR THE DIVINE PERSON.

YES.—Because of its mode of signification.

THE REASON is that concrete essential names, such as the name "God," because of their mode of signification can be properly substituted for a person, as when we say that God begets.—Sometimes they are taken for the essence, as when it is said: "God creates." For this predicate belongs to the subject by reason of the form signified, i.e., Godhead.

ART. V.—WHETHER ESSENTIAL NAMES SIGNIFIED IN THE ABSTRACT CAN BE USED FOR THE PERSON.

NO.—Although the name God can be used for the divine Person, yet the name essence cannot be used for the divine Person.

THE REASON is that the name God, although in reality it is the same as Deity,

yet in mode of signification it signifies essence as in the one who has it; but the same essence cannot, as regards its mode of signification, be used for person, because it signifies essence as an abstract form.—Now for the truth of expression it is necessary, not only to consider the things signified, but also the mode of their signification.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PERSONS CAN BE PREDICATED OF ESSENTIAL NAMES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although *adjectival* personal or notional names cannot be predicated of the essence (art. 3); yet substantive names can be so predicated, even the three Persons together, on account of the real identity of essence and person.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ESSENTIAL NAMES ARE APPROPRIATED TO THE PERSONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that by essential attributes, known by reason of the knowledge of creatures, the Persons are manifested by way of likeness and unlikeness. (Like the Son, who proceeds by way (of the likeness of) the intellect, as the Word, and like Power, which is appropriated to the Father.) For from creatures we can arrive at a knowledge of God's essential attributes, but not so well at a knowledge of His personal properties (Q. XXXXII, a. 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES ARE APPROPRIATED TO THE DIVINE PERSONS IN A FITTING MANNER BY THE HOLY DOCTORS.

YES.—In so far as our intellect is led to a knowledge of God through creatures.

THE REASON is that the creature can be considered a) in itself absolutely; b) as one; c) as operating and causing; d) according to the relation that it has to the things caused. In this way the essential attributes are appropriated to the Divine Persons by the holy doctors.—For, according to the first consideration, Hilary appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit. According to the second consideration, Augustine appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and harmony to the Holy Spirit. According to the third consideration, Power is appropriated to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, and Goodness to the Holy Spirit. And according to the fourth consideration to the Father are appropriated the expression *from whom*, to the Son the expression *by whom*, and to the Holy Spirit the expression *in whom*.

[Tr. NOTE: St. Thomas explains that the preposition *ex* denotes primarily a relation of material cause, "out of," which is inapplicable to the Godhead; sometimes, however, it has the relation of efficient cause. This belongs to God by reason of His active power, and, like power, is appropriated to the Father.—The preposition *per* sometimes denotes a relation of the form by which the agent operates, as we say that a craftsman works by (*per*) his art. Therefore, just as Wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so "by whom" is appropriated to Him.—The preposition *in*, denoting properly the relation of container, is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in so far as God by His goodness preserves and governs things by leading them to their end. And thus the Holy Spirit has the appropriation of *in quo*, as He has goodness.]

QUESTION XL

The Persons in Comparison With the Divine Relations or Properties (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER RELATION IS THE SAME AS PERSON.

YES.—THE REASON is that in God relations are not assistant or accidental properties (Q. XXVIII, art. 2); but relation considered as something in the Godhead is the divine essence itself; but in the Godhead essence is the same as Person (preceding question, art. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PERSONS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY RELATIONS.

Yes.—According to our mode of understanding, the Persons are more perfectly distinguished by relations than by origins.

THE REASON is that the origin of something is not signified as something intrinsic, but as a way from one thing to another; but relation in the Godhead is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis, as was said above.

ART. III.—WHETHER, IF THE INTELLECT WERE TO ABSTRACT RELATIONS FROM THE PERSONS, THE HYPOSTASES WOULD STILL REMAIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that relations are what distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases (preceding art.)—Likewise, every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person.

ART. IV. — WHETHER THE PROPERTIES PRESUPPOSE THE NOTIONAL ACTS.

NO.—Yet the notional act of the Father (generation) presupposes the personal property of the Father, in so far as it constitutes the Person.

THE REASON is that the action presupposes the person acting. And according to this point of signification Paternity is understood prior to Generation; for the Father is understood prior to the Father begetting.—Yet the personal property of the Father considered as a pure relation, expressing a pure order to something, presupposes the notional act of the Father, i.e., generation. For the Father denotes an order to the Son *because He begets Him*. And according to this point of signification Generation presupposes Paternity.—But notional acts or origins simply precede even the personal properties of the Persons proceeding, because origin passively signified is signified as the way to a Person constituted by the property.

QUESTION XLI

The Persons in Relation to the Notional Acts

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER NOTIONAL ACTS ARE TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSONS.

YES.—To signify the order of origin in the Divine Persons.

THE REASON is that origin, which is the basis of distinction in the Godhead, can be denoted only by certain acts, which are called notional acts, because the notions of the Persons are the relations of the Persons to One Another (Q. XXXIII, a. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE VOLUNTARY.

NO.—If the will is designated as the principle of action; but they are voluntary if the will is considered as nature, namely determined to one thing.

THE REASON is that will, as the principle of action, is one of the principles of those things that can be thus or otherwise, such as are creatures; but of the things that can only be thus, such as notional acts, the principle is nature.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS PROCEED FROM SOMETHING.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Son is not begotten of nothing; otherwise He would not be begotten but made; but He is begotten of the substance of the Father, who by begetting Him communicates to Him His whole nature, for the divine nature is incapable of division.

NOTE: When we say that the Son is born of (*de*) the Father, the preposition *of* always denotes consubstantiality (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN THE GODHEAD THERE IS POWER WITH RESPECT TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since power signifies nothing else than the principle of any act, it is necessary to place power in the Godhead, as notional acts are placed in it.

NOTE: Power is attributed to God in its proper meaning of principle (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE POWER OF GENERATION SIGNIFIES A RELATION AND NOT THE ESSENCE.

NO.—It does not signify a relation (except indirectly) but the essence.

THE REASON is that the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the Divine Nature, but not in the Person of the Father, except indirectly. For paternity cannot be understood as that which constitutes the Father; otherwise the Father would beget the Father.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE NOTIONAL ACT CAN TERMINATE IN MORE THAN ONE PERSON.

NO.—In the Godhead there can be no more than one Person begotten or Person spirated.

THE REASON is that subsistent relations, in which the Divine Persons consist, are forms of one species, e.g., paternity, and therefore are multiplied only in respect to matter, which is not in the Godhead.

Likewise, since God knows and wills all things by one simple act, there can be only one Person proceeding after the manner of word, and only One proceeding after the manner of love.

Likewise, nature is determined to one. But the Persons proceed naturally (Art. 2).

Again, since each Divine Person is absolutely perfect, He contains in Himself the whole perfection of Himself; so that there can be only one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit.

QUESTION XLII

The Equality and Likeness of the Divine Persons to One Another

ART. I.—WHETHER EQUALITY HAS PLACE IN THE GODHEAD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the degree (of power) in the Godhead is no other than the Divine Essence. Whence in the Godhead there is no greater and less.

NOTE: The Divine Persons are equal One to Another, because they are of one greatness and essence (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PERSON PROCEEDING IS CO-ETERNAL WITH HIS PRINCIPLE AS THE SON WITH THE FATHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature, which was perfect from eternity. The Son, therefore, was whenever the Father was; and the same is true of the Holy Spirit.

ART. III.—WHETHER IN THE DIVINE PERSONS THERE IS AN ORDER OF NATURE.

YES.—There is an order of nature, "not whereby one is prior to the other," as Augustine says, "but whereby one is from the other."

THE REASON is that order always has reference to a principle. Now in the Godhead principle has reference to origin, without priority. Wherefore it follows that there must be order in the Godhead according to origin, without priority.

NOTE: Nature, which is so called from nativity, in a certain way implies the notion of principle, but essence does not, for it takes its name from *esse*, being. And therefore the order of origin is better named the order of nature than the order of essence (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER ACCORDING TO GREATNESS.

YES.—According to the perfection of the divine nature.

THE REASON is that by generation from eternity the Son, like the Father, attains to the possession of the perfection of the nature that is in the Father.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SON IS IN THE FATHER, AND CONVERSELY.

YES.—In three ways: According to essence, relation, and origin.

THE REASON of the first is that, since the Father is His essence, and the Son is His essence, both the essence of the Father is in the Son and the essence of the Son is in the Father. It follows that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as regards the relations, it is manifest that each two relative opposites is in the concept of the other.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that according to origin it is also manifest that the procession of the intelligible word is not anything transient, but remains in the utterer, and that which is said by the Word is contained in the Word.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the power of action is from the perfection of nature. It has been shown (art. 1 and 4 of this question) that the very notion of divine Paternity and Filiation demands that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness, i.e., in the perfection of nature. And the reason holds for the Holy Spirit with respect to Both.

QUESTION XLIII
The Mission of the Divine Persons
 (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A DIVINE PERSON CAN PROPERLY BE SENT.

YES.—Not according to command, as a servant by his master; or according to counsel; but according to origin. Moreover, a Divine Person is not so sent that He begins to be where He was not before, but He begins to be there in some manner in which He was not before.

THE REASON is that the one who commands is greater, and the one who counsels is wiser; but in the Godhead there is equality according to the procession of origin. Likewise, the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, in so far as He begins to be in the world through assumed flesh, and yet He was in the world before, as is said in John i, 10.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DIVINE MISSION IS ESSENTIAL OR TEMPORAL ONLY.

ANSWER: It is only temporal, in so far as *mission* (as also *giving*) implies, together with the relation to the principle, a temporal term.

THE REASON is that for a divine Person to be had by some creature, or to be in a new mode of existence in it, is something temporal.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN INVISIBLE MISSION OF A DIVINE PERSON IS ONLY ACCORDING TO THE GIFT OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that no other effect can be the reason that the Divine Person is in a new mode in the rational creature than sanctifying grace, according to which the Holy Spirit is had and dwells in man as the object known is in the knower and the object loved is in the lover.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE FATHER TO BE SENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that mission in its concept and in the Godhead demands a procession from one person according to origin. But the Father does not proceed from another.

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE SON TO BE SENT INVISIBLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that to the Son (as also to the Holy Spirit) it belongs both to dwell in the soul by grace and to be from another. Now, although it belongs to the Father to dwell in man through grace, yet it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently it does not belong to Him to be sent.

ART. VI.—WHETHER AN INVISIBLE MISSION IS MADE TO ALL WHO ARE PARTAKERS OF GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that in all who are partakers of grace God begins to be (where He was before) in some new way; namely by the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal through grace.—Now mission by its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to be where he was not before, as is the case with creatures; or begins to be where he was before, but in a new way, according to which way mission is attributed to the Divine Persons.

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING FOR THE HOLY SPIRIT TO BE SENT VISIBLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that God provides for all things according to the nature of each. Now the nature of man is to be led to the invisible through the visible.

NOTE: It belongs to the Holy Spirit, in so far as He proceeds as Love, to be the Gift of sanctification; to the Son, in so far as He is the Principle of the Holy Spirit, it belongs to be the Author of this sanctification, but the Holy Spirit is visibly sent as the Sign of sanctification (in body of article). Accordingly, it was necessary that the mission endure only so long as He performed His office (Ad 4). [The Holy Spirit appeared as a dove in Christ's Baptism, as a white cloud in His Transfiguration, and as tongues of fire to the Apostles.]

ART. VIII.—WHETHER A DIVINE PERSON IS SENT ONLY BY HIM FROM WHOM HE PROCEEDS ETERNALLY.

NO.—A Divine Person can be sent, not only by Him from whom He eternally proceeds, but also by Another, or the other Persons.

THE REASON is that the One who sends can be designated a) as the Principle of the Person who is sent; accordingly, no Person is sent, except by Him from whom He proceeds; and b) as the Principle of the effect implied in the mission; and thus the whole Trinity sends the Person who is sent.

HERE ENDS THE TRACT ON THE TRINITY

[Tr. Note: Here begins what modern authors call the Tract on Creation.]

THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD

After a consideration of the Divine Persons, it remains to consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will have three parts: 1) The production of creatures; 2) their distinction; 3) their conservation and government.—Regarding the first point, three questions are to be considered: 1) What is the first cause of beings?—2) How creatures proceed from the First Cause—3) The principle of the duration of things.—The first question covers four articles.

QUESTION XLIV
The First Cause of Beings

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY THAT EVERY BEING BE CREATED BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that things other than God are not their own being, but participate of being from God, who is Himself self-subsistent absolute Being. But what is found in anything by participation must necessarily be caused in it by the one to whom it belongs essentially.

ART. II.—WHETHER PRIME MATTER WAS CREATED BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the universal cause of things, in so far as they are beings, must be the cause of things, not only as they are *such* by accidental forms, or as they are *these* by substantial forms; but also according to everything that belongs to their simple being in any way.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR CAUSE IS ANYTHING BESIDES GOD.

NO.—God is the first exemplar cause of all things.

THE REASON is that for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary in order that the effect may attain a determinate form. [Thus a smith who makes a horseshoe must either have a model horseshoe before him, or at least the idea of horseshoe in his mind.] Now the things that nature makes are given determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced, as to its first principle, to the divine wisdom, which conceived the order of the universe [just as an artist conceives the order of what he makes]. This order consists in the distinction of things.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD IS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that each creature intends to acquire its proper perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness.

NOTE: Imperfect agents, which are all creatures with respect to the Prime Agent, both act and receive action; to them it belongs that they also intend by their actions to acquire something. But to the Prime Agent, who is agent only, it does not belong to act for the acquisition of any end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness (in body of article).

QUESTION XLV

The Mode of Emanation of Things From the Principle
(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER TO CREATE IS TO MAKE OUT OF NOTHING.

YES.—THE REASON is that by the name of creation we designate the emanation of *all* being from a universal cause, which is God.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD CAN CREATE ANYTHING

YES.—Not only is it not impossible that anything be created by God out of nothing, but it is necessary to assert that all things were created by God.

THE REASON is that nothing can be in beings that is not from God, who is the universal cause of all being (preceding quest., art. 1 and 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CREATION IS SOMETHING IN THE CREATURE.

YES.—But only according to the relation of the creature to the Creator, as to the principle of its being.

THE REASON is that what is created is not made by movement, or by change. Wherefore God by creating produces things without movement. Now, if movement be subtracted from action and passion, nothing remains save a relation (preced. art., ad 2).

NOTE: Active creation signifies a divine action, which is God's own essence, with a relation to a creature. But in God relation to the creature is not real, but in the mind only. The relation of the creature to God, however, is a real relation, as was said (Q. VIII, art. 7). Yet passively taken creation is in the creature, and is the creature (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER TO BE CREATED IS PROPER TO COMPOSITE AND SUBSISTING THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that to be created properly belongs to that to which being belongs; now being belongs properly to subsistent things, whether they are simple, as are separated substances; or are composite, as are material substances.

NOTE: Accidents, forms, and the like, which do not exist by themselves, are rather co-existent than existent; thus they must rather be called *concreated* than *created* (at the end of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT BELONGS ONLY TO GOD TO CREATE.

YES.—Not only does it belong to God alone to create, but God cannot even communicate to the creature His power to create.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that being itself is the most universal among all effects; wherefore it follows that it is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God. For the more universal the effect the more universal and prior must be the cause to which it is reduced.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that creation is not from anything presupposed as already existing, such as can be disposed by the action of an instrumental agent. For if an instrumental cause did nothing according to what an instrumental cause properly does, it would be vain to use it to do anything.

ART. VI.—WHETHER TO CREATE IS PROPER TO ANY DIVINE PERSON.

No.—To create is not peculiar to any Divine Person, but is common to the whole Trinity; yet the Divine Persons, according to the nature of Their procession, have a causality with respect to the creation of things that is according to Their essential attributes, which are knowledge and will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to create belongs to God according to His Being, which is His Essence, and this is common to the Three Persons.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as an artist works through the word conceived in his intellect, and through the love of his will to make some object of his art, so God the Father made the creature through His own Word, which is the Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Spirit.

ART. VII.—WHETHER IN CREATURES WE SHOULD EXPECT TO FIND A VESTIGE OF THE TRINITY.

YES.—In rational creatures there is found a representation of the Trinity by way of image, and in all creatures, by way of vestige.

THE REASON is that, when the effect represents the cause as regards the likeness of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating, and a statue of Mercury, Mercury, there is had what is called *the representation of image*.

Now in rational creatures, in which there are intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, in so as there are found in them the word conceived and the love proceeding.

In all creatures there is found a representation of the Trinity by way of vestige, which represents only the causality of the cause [as smoke represents fire]. For every

creature in so far as it is a created substance, represents the cause and principle; and thus it demonstrates the Person of the Father, who is the principle from no principle. In so far as it has a certain form or species, it represents the Word, according to which the form of the thing made is from the conception of the artist. According as it has the relation of order it represents the Holy Spirit, in so far as He is love; because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CREATION IS INTERMINGLED WITH WORKS OF NATURE AND ART.

NO.—THE REASON is that it does not belong to forms to be made, or to be created, but to be *concreated*. In the works of nature, however, and *a fortiori* in works of art, something is always presupposed.

QUESTION XLVI **The Principle of Duration of Created Things** (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE UNIVERSE ALWAYS EXISTED.

NO.—Nothing besides God need have existed from eternity.

THE REASON is that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God will anything except Himself (Q. XIX, a, 3). Therefore, although God from eternity was the sufficient cause of the world, it does not follow that the world must be produced by Him, except in so far as it is in the predetermination of His will, i.e., He wills that there be being after not-being, in order that being may more clearly declare its Author.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS AN ARTICLE OF THE FAITH THAT THE WORLD HAD A BEGINNING.

YES.—The introduction of the world in time is known only through revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively, on the part of the world itself. [Hence it belongs to faith, which is of "things that appear not" (Heb. xi, 1)].

THE REASON is that the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing, which abstracts from the *here and now*. On the part of God, the will cannot be investigated by the reason, except with regard to the things that it is absolutely necessary for God to will. Such are not the things that He wills with regard to creatures; although the divine will with respect to them can be manifested to man through revelation, on which faith is based. (Author's note: Today, science holds that the world had a beginning, and not through chance.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CREATION OF THINGS WAS IN THE BEGINNING OF TIME.

YES—Heaven and earth were created together with time (Ad 1).

THE REASON is that this is declared by revelation: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" (Gen. i, 1).

[Tr. note: In Q. LXI, a, 3, Aquinas teaches that the creation of heaven before the world, although improbable, is not to be held erroneous.]

QUESTION XLVII **The Distinction of Things in General**

After the production of creatures in being, it remains to consider the distinction of things.—Hence this consideration, divided into three parts: 1) The distinction of things in general; 2) the distinction of good and evil; 3) the distinction of the spiritual and the corporeal creature. The distinction of things in general occupies three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MULTITUDE AND DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS FROM GOD.

YES.—By the intention of the Prime Agent.

THE REASON is that God, who has brought things into being in order to communicate His goodness to creatures, and through them to represent Himself (for He cannot sufficiently be represented by one creature), has produced many and varied creatures, so that what one lacks in representing the divine goodness is made up by another.

NOTE: Since matter is created by God (Q. XLIV, art. 2), whatever distinction arises on the part of matter must be reduced to a higher cause, which is God (in body of article).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INEQUALITY OF THINGS IS FROM GOD.

YES.—Just as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so is the inequality.

THE REASON is that the formal distinction of things requires inequality; for the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species are varied by the addition or subtraction of unity. But material distinction is for the sake of formal distinction; for matter is on account of form.

(Author's Note: In the *Codex Cassiensis* an article is contained that is not found in other manuscripts of the *Summa*. It is: **WHETHER IN CREATURES THERE IS THE ORDER OF AGENTS.**—Reply in the affirmative: Because the more perfect is compared to the less perfect as act to potency. But what is in act acts on what is in potency. And thus there is the order of agents in creatures.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE WORLD.

YES.—Meaning by "world" the universality of creatures that are now called by the name of world (Q., XLVI, art 1, in the first objection).

THE REASON is that all things that are from God have a relation one to another and to God Himself (Q., XI, art. 3, and Q., XXI, art 1 ad 3).

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR

We here consider, first the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and the material creature.—The first part concerns evil and its cause and occupies six articles.

QUESTION XLVIII**Evil****ART. I.—WHETHER EVIL IS A NATURE.**

NO.—THE REASON is that the being and perfection of any nature have the character of goodness. The only thing remaining, therefore, is that the name of evil signifies some absence of good.

NOTE: 1.—In this way, good and evil are called general, not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, just as every form has the nature of goodness, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil (Ad 1).

2.—The evil that constitutes a specific difference in morality is a good joined with the privation of another good, just as the end an intemperate person has before him is not indeed the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason (Ad 2).

3.—Evil acts formally or of itself because by reason of its very privation it corrupts good, because it is the very corruption and privation of good. Effectively, and as the final cause, it does not act of itself, but in so far as good is connected with it (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER EVIL IS FOUND IN THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the perfection of the whole demands that all degrees of goodness complete each other; hence it requires that there be inequality in things. This inequality requires that some things be corruptible, for the corruption of some is the perfection of others. Corruptibility implies that there are certain things that can fail in goodness.

NOTE: "God is so powerful that He can make even good arise from evil," as says Augustine (*Enchiridion*, c. 11). Therefore many things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER EVIL IS IN GOOD AS IN A SUBJECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the subject of privation and form is one and the same, namely being in potency, which is good in potency.

ART. IV.—WHETHER EVIL CORRUPTS THE WHOLE GOOD.

NO.—The good that is opposed to evil is taken away totally, as light by darkness, life by death, grace by sin, etc.; but the good that is the subject of evil is neither totally taken away nor diminished, just as the substance of air is not taken away or diminished by darkness; but the good that is the susceptibility of the soul to act (grace) is not taken away wholly, but is diminished.

THE REASON is that the substance of the subject always remains good in its root.

ART. V.—WHETHER EVIL IS SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED BY PUNISHMENT AND FAULT.

YES.—In voluntary things every evil is either punishment or fault.

THE REASON is that evil, which is the privation of good, occurs either by the subtraction of the form and integrity of a thing, and in this respect it has the character of punishment, for it is of the essence of punishment that it be contrary to the will; or it consists in the withdrawal of due operation; and in this it has the character of fault; for this is imputed to someone as a fault, since he fails in regard to perfect action, of which he is master by the will.

NOTE: It is of the essence of punishment that it should injure the agent in himself, but it is of the essence of fault that it should injure the agent in his action. And thus both are contained under evil, in so far as they have the character of injury (against the opposing arguments).

ART. VI.—WHETHER PUNISHMENT HAS MORE OF THE CHARACTER OF EVIL THAN HAS FAULT.

NO.—Fault has more of the character of evil than has punishment; and not only more than has sensible punishment, which consists in the privation of material blessings, but also more than has punishment in its most general sense, taken to include the privation of grace or glory.

THE FIRST REASON is that fault consists in a deordinated act of the will, whereas punishment consists in the privation of any of the things that the will uses; wherefore one becomes evil from the evil of sin, but not from the evil of punishment.

THE SECOND REASON is that the evil of punishment deprives the good of the creature, whether that good be created or uncreated; but the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good, i.e., to the fulfillment of the divine will, and to the divine love, by which the divine good is loved in itself, and not only in so far as it is participated by the creature. Wherefore God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of sin.

QUESTION XLIX The Cause of Evil

ART. I.—WHETHER GOOD CAN BE THE CAUSE OF EVIL.

ANSWER.—a) It is the cause of evil materially; b) it is not the formal cause of evil; c) neither is it the final cause; d) by way of the agent, good is the cause of evil, not *directly* but *incidentally*.

THE REASON is a) that the subject of evil is good (prec. quest., art 3).

THE REASON is b) that evil is the privation of form.

THE REASON is c) that evil is the privation of subordination to the proper end.

THE REASON is d) that evil is caused by good by way of the agent, either in the action, or in the effect (or in a thing): In the action it is caused on account of the defect of the principal or instrumental agent (for if it is caused by the defect of the agent evil is not caused directly but incidentally). But in a thing evil is sometimes caused by the power of the agent, although not in the proper effect of the agent (i.e., not directly but incidentally), just as water is expelled from wood by the power of fire. Sometimes evil is caused by the defect of the thing itself, or the matter. Wherefore in no way does evil have good as its cause except *incidentally*.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SUPREME GOOD, WHICH IS GOD, IS THE CAUSE OF EVIL.

NO.—a) God is not the cause of evil by the defect of His action; b) but the evil that consists in the corruption of certain things is reduced to God as to the cause, not as the direct but as the incidental cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God is the supreme perfection; whereas the evil that consists in the defect of the action, or that is caused by the defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the order of the whole requires that certain things exist that can fail, and sometimes do fail (Q., XLVIII, art. 2, and Q., XXII, art. 2, ad 2).

NOTE: Thus God is in no way the cause of sin, which is evil by defect of action. But He is the cause or the author of punishment on account of the justice of order. Likewise, whatever has being and action, even in an evil action, is reduced to God as to its cause; but the defect is owing to a defective secondary cause (in body of article).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS ONE SUPREME EVIL, WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF ALL EVIL.

NO.—There is no one principle of evils, as there *is* one principle of good.

THE FIRST REASON is that nothing can be evil by its essence; for all being, in so far as it is being, is good; and evil does not exist save in good, as in its subject.

THE SECOND REASON is that, although evil always diminishes good, it can never totally consume it. Wherefore if the contrary were true supreme or perfect evil would destroy itself.

THE THIRD REASON is that evil is caused by good (art. 1) and evil is not the cause, except incidentally. Wherefore evil cannot be a first cause.

NOTE: Those who have supposed two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into error from this root reason, that they did not consider the universal cause of all being, but only the particular causes of particular effects (in body of article).

After this we must consider the distinction of the corporeal and the spiritual creature. And 1) the purely spiritual creature, which in Holy Writ is called the angel.—2) Next of the purely corporeal creature.—3) Then of the creature composed of the corporeal and the spiritual, which is man.—With regard to angels we must consider: 1) The things that pertain to their substance.—2) The things that pertain to their intellect.—3) The things that pertain to their will.—4) The things that pertain to their creation. The substance of the angels is to be considered both absolutely, and by comparison with corporeal things. With respect to their substance five articles remain to be asked.

Here ends the Tract of Creation.

THE ANGELS QUESTION I

The Substance of the Angels Considered Absolutely

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGEL IS ABSOLUTELY INCORPOREAL.

YES.—We should logically expect some incorporeal creatures.

THE REASON is that for the perfection of the whole it is required that there be some (purely) intellectual creatures, in order that there may be a perfect assimilation of effect to cause. Now God produces creatures by intellect and will, causes purely spiritual.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM.

NO.—THE REASON is that an intellectual substance, such as the angel (preceding article), is altogether immaterial. For the operation of anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to know is an operation altogether immaterial.

NOTE: Although in the angel there is no composition of matter and form, there is in him a composition of act and potency. For if there be no matter, and it be assumed that the form itself subsists without matter, there still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potency to act. And such a composition is to be understood in the angel. Wherefore the angel is said to be composed of *whereby he is* and *what is*, or of *existence* and *what is*. *What is* is the subsisting form itself; the existence itself is whereby the substance is [as running is whereby the runner runs]. But in God *existence* and *what is* do not differ. God alone is pure act (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE IN ANY GREAT NUMBER.

YES.—Immaterial substances (angels) incomparably exceed in multitude material substances (as regards species).

THE REASON is that since the perfection of the whole is that which God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are so much the more numerous are they created by God.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS DIFFER IN SPECIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the angels are not composed of matter and form (art. 2). For the things that agree in the species and differ in the number agree in the form, but are distinguished materially; but this cannot be said of the angels.

NOTE: More or less, in so far as they are caused by the intensity and remissness of one form, do not diversify the species (as water is said to be more or less hot); but

in so far as they are caused by forms of different degrees they thus diversify the species; as when we say that fire is more perfect than air. And in this way the angels are diversified according to more and less (Ad 2); i.e., they differ in species according to the different degrees of intellective nature (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE INCORRUPTIBLE.

YES.—The angels must be called incorruptible according to their nature.

THE REASON is that a being belongs to the form considered in itself; just as roundness belongs to a circle considered in itself; for each thing is actually a being in so far as it has a form. But the angel's form subsists in itself (art. 1 and 2). A sign of this incorruptibility is the angel's intellectual operation, which is above time.

QUESTION LI

The Angels in Comparison With Bodies

This is dealt with in two aspects: 1) The comparison of angels with bodies.—2) The comparison of angels with corporeal places.—3) The comparison of angels with local movement.—The first aspect takes up three questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS HAVE BODIES NATURALLY UNITED TO THEMSELVES.

NO.—THE REASON is that the angels are perfectly intellectual substances in an intellectual nature, not needing to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Now in every genus in which something imperfect is found there must already exist something perfect in that genus.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGELS ASSUME BODIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that some apparitions of angels that are spoken of in Scripture were not imaginary, since in them angels were seen by everybody.

NOTE: An assumed body is united to the angel, not indeed as its form, or only as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed mobile body (Ad 2); i.e., so that by an assumed body he represents himself, or his own properties or those of God, of whom he is the emissary.—Now the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the divine power, so far as is necessary for the formation of the body to be assumed (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS IN ASSUMED BODIES EXERCISE VITAL FUNCTIONS.

NO.—THE REASON is that nothing can have a vital function that does not have life, which is the potential principle of such an action.

NOTE: 1.—As regards that which is common to other operations, such as speech [in so far as it is sound] walking [in so far as it is movement], etc., vital functions can be performed by angels by means of bodies they have assumed, but not with respect to that which is proper to living things, e.g., sensation (in body of art).

2.—Although food was not converted into the body of Christ after the Resurrection, but was resolved into pre-existing matter, yet Christ had a body of such a nature that food *could* be changed into it. Wherefore His eating was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither converted into the body they assumed, nor was that body of such a nature that food could be converted into it. Wherefore it was not a true eating but figurative or spiritual eating. And this is what the angel said to Tobias: "I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you: But I use an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen by men" (Tob. xii, 19).—(Ad 5).

QUESTION LII

The Relations of Angels to Places

(in three articles)

YES.—Not by contact of dimensive quantity, which is not in the angel; but by contact of power.

THE REASON is that by the application of the angelic power to any place it is said in some sense that the angel is in a bodily place, not indeed as contained therein, but as somehow containing it [as the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it].

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL CAN BE IN SEVERAL PLACES

NO.—THE REASON is that the angel is in the place where he applies his power; and the whole body to which the angelic power is applied corresponds to him as one place.

NOTE: A body is in a place circumscriptively; because it is measured by a place. Now the angel is in a place, not circumscriptively, since he is not measured by a place, but definitively; because he is in one place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is in a place neither circumscriptively nor definitively, because He is everywhere (end of article).

ART. III.—WHETHER MORE THAN ONE ANGEL CAN BE TOGETHER IN THE SAME PLACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. Now an angel is in a place by the application of his power. Again, since the angel is said to be in place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately as a *perfect container*, there can be only one angel in one place.

NOTE: The thing that prevents more than one angel from being in one place is not that the place is full, but the reason above mentioned (Ad 1).

QUESTION LIII**The Local Movement of the Angels**

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGEL CAN BE MOVED LOCALLY.

YES.—According as the angel is in a place, i.e., by the application of his power.

THE REASON is that, since the angel is not in a place except by the contact of his power, it follows that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the different contacts of different places successively, which movement may be continuous or non-continuous, according to the application of his power.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL PASSES THROUGH INTERMEDIATE SPACE.

YES.—If the movement of the angel is continuous, the angel cannot move from one extreme to another without passing through an intermediate space; but if the angel's movement is non-continuous it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without passing through an intermediate space.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that an intermediate space is that into which a thing that is continuously moved comes before arriving at the last into which it is moved. For in continuous movement the order is according to the order of the before and after in magnitude.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the substance of the angel is not subject to place as contained in it, but is superior to it, as containing it. Wherefore it is in the power of the angel to apply itself to a place as he will, either through or without the intervening space.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF AN ANGEL IS IN AN INSTANT.

NO.—THE REASON is that since the angel's local movement is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, it is impossible to say that during the whole time he is in one place, and in the last now of time he is in another place; but we must assign a *now*, in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many nows succeeding one another, there is necessarily time.

NOTE: The speed of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but by the determination of his will (Ad 1).—And thus the angel can be in one place in one instant and in another place in another instant, without any time intervening (Ad 3).

QUESTION LIV**The Knowledge of the Angels**

After a consideration of the things that pertain to the substance of the angel, we have now to proceed to his knowledge. This consideration will be in four parts. Part one considers the things that belong to the medium of his knowledge.—Part three the things that are known by him.—And part four the mode of the knowledge of these things. The first part consumes five articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGEL'S ACT OF UNDERSTANDING IS HIS SUBSTANCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that action is properly the actuality of power, just as existence is the actuality of substance. Now that which is its own actuality is pure act. Wherefore in God alone His substance is His existence and His action. Besides, if the angel's act of knowledge were his substance it would follow that the knowledge of the angel would be subsisting. But a subsisting act of intelligence can be only one. [Hence an angel's substance would not be distinguished from God's substance.]

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE ANGEL TO UNDERSTAND IS TO EXIST.

NO.—THE REASON is that the existence of every creature is determined to one according to genus and species. Now the act of understanding, like the act of will, is not determined to one, but has infinity simply, because its object is the true. Besides, the operation of every creature is distinguished from the being of the creature itself.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL'S INTELLECTIVE POWER IS HIS ESSENCE.

NO.—Neither in the angel, nor in any other creature is operative power the same as its essence.

THE REASON is that the act to which essence is compared is existence; the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in no creature is operation the same as its existence.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN THE ANGEL THERE CAN BE AN ACTIVE AND A PASSIVE INTELLECT.

NO.—In the angels there can be no active and passive intellect except in an equivocal sense.

THE REASON is that the angels neither are sometimes only potentially understanding, with respect to the things that they naturally understand, nor are their intelligible objects potentially intelligible; but they are actually such. Hence there is no necessity for the passive intellect and thus the necessity of the active intellect is excluded in the angels.

NOTE: 1.—In the angel knowledge is not generated, but is naturally present (Ad 1).

2.—That one angel enlightens another does not belong to the notion of the active intellect; nor does it belong to the motion of the passive intellect for it be enlightened as to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which it is sometimes in potency. But if anyone wishes to call these things the active and the passive intellect, he will speak equivocally; we need not bother about names (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN THE ANGELS THERE IS ONLY INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the angels do not have bodies naturally united to themselves, as was shown by the preceding (Q. LI, art. 1).

QUESTION LV

The Medium of the Angelic Knowledge

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW ALL THINGS BY THEIR SUBSTANCE.

NO.—The angel cannot know everything in his essence, but his intellect must be perfected by certain species in order to know things.

THE REASON is that that by which the intellect knows all things extends to universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect; but the substance of the angel is restricted to a genus and a species.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW THROUGH SPECIES RECEIVED FROM THINGS.

NO.—The species through which the angels know are not received from things but are connatural to them.

THE REASON is that the intellective power in spiritual substances higher than the soul, i.e., in the angels, is naturally complete; and it is complete in so far as it has intelligible species connatural to them, so as to understand everything that they naturally

know. These intelligible species the angels received from God together with their intellectual nature.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HIGHER ANGELS UNDERSTAND BY MORE UNIVERSAL SPECIES THAN THE LOWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the higher angels are nearer and more like to God. For the things that God knows by one form the lower intellects know by many; and by so many the more according as the intellect is lower.

QUESTION LXVI

The Angel's Knowledge of Immaterial Things
(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGEL KNOWS HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that the angel, since he is immaterial, is a subsisting form, and hence actually intelligible. From this it follows that he knows himself by his form, which is his substance.

ART. II.—WHETHER ONE ANGEL KNOWS ANOTHER.

YES.—By a species impressed by God.

THE REASON is that, as Augustine says (*Genesis ad Litteram, Lib. II*), the things that have pre-existed in the Word of God from eternity come forth from Him in two ways: In one way into the angelic intellect, namely through species impressed by God on intellectual being; in another way as they subsist in their own natures. Now in the Word of God there have existed from eternity not only the forms of corporeal things but also the forms of all spiritual creatures. Through these impressed species the angel knows both the corporeal and the spiritual creatures.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS CAN KNOW GOD BY THEIR NATURAL PRINCIPLES.

YES.—By their natural principles the angels can have some knowledge of God.

THE REASON is that the image of God is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence. Hence the angel knows God as in a mirror. Yet he does not see the essence itself of God, because no created similitude is sufficient to represent the divine essence. (We are speaking of the natural knowledge of the angels.)

QUESTION LVII

The Knowledge of the Angels With Respect to Material Things
(five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW MATERIAL THINGS.

YES.—In a more perfect and simple manner.

THE REASON is that all material things pre-exist in the angels themselves through their intelligible species, more simply and more immaterially than in the things themselves, because they are nearer and more like to God.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL KNOWS SINGULARS.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the angels have the provision and administration of singulars, as is patent from Holy Writ.

THE SECOND REASON is that it is unreasonable to say that man by any power of his knows anything that the angel does not know by his one cognitive power.

NOTE: With regard to the manner by which the angel's intellect knows singulars, it is to be noted, that, "just as God by His essence, by which He causes all things, is the similitude of all things and through His essence knows all things, not only with regard to their universal natures but also as to their singularity, so the angels by means of species infused by God (prec. quest., art. 2) know things, not only as to their universal natures but also as to their individuating conditions, in so far as they are manifold representations of that one and simple essence, which is God.—They know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the similitudes of things both as to their universal principles and as to their individuating principles (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW FUTURE THINGS.

NO.—a) Future things in themselves are not known by the angels, or by any created intellect; b) the angels know, however, future things in their cause, whether

necessary (and then they know them with certainty) or as they usually occur (and then they know them by conjecture). (As when a physician prognosticates the health of the patient.)

But the events that arise from their causes in the minority of cases are wholly unknown, such as things that happen by chance.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the angelic intellect, and any created intellect, falls far short of the divine eternity, in which future things are known in themselves and as present.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in their causes future events are known with sure knowledge.

NOTE: Although the species in the angelic intellect, in so far as they are species, refer equally to the present, past, and future, nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relation to the species, for present things have a nature by which they resemble the species in the mind of the angel, and thus they can be known through them (in *actu secundo*, actually). But the things that are to come do not yet have a nature whereby they resemble such species; consequently they cannot be known through such species (except in *actu primo*, in so far as the species have power to represent them) (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART.

NO.—The angels do not know thoughts as they are in the intellect, and affections as they are in the will; in this way they are known by God alone. But they know the thoughts of men in their effects.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the will of the rational creature is subject to God alone, and He alone can work in it who is its principal object and last end, as will appear more clearly later (Q. LXIII, art. 1, and Q. CV, art. 5).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this way thoughts can be known even by men, as is evident.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW THE MYSTERIES OF GRACE.

NO.—The angels do not know the mysteries of grace by a natural knowledge; they know them, however, by the knowledge that makes them blessed. But they do not know all mysteries, nor do all angels know the mysteries in equal degree.

THE REASON is that by natural knowledge the angels know things both in their essence and by innate ideas; but the mysteries of grace depend solely on the will of God. Now the things that depend on the will alone are known only by God. By the Beatific Vision they know in the Word those mysteries of grace that God has willed to reveal to them according to the degree of their perfection, and in so far as it is proper to their offices.

QUESTION LVIII

The Mode of the Angelic Knowledge

(in seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGEL'S INTELLECT IS SOMETIMES IN POTENCY, SOMETIMES IN ACT.

NO.—The angel's intellect with regard to the first act of its natural knowledge is never in potency; but it is sometimes in potency with regard to the second act.

THE REASON is that celestial intellects do not have any intelligible power that is not totally completed by the intelligible species connatural to them. Yet not everything that they know by natural knowledge do they always actually consider.

NOTE: The angel's intellect is also in potency to the things that are divinely revealed to them. But with regard to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things that it sees in the Word, it is never in this way in potency (except as respects the things that it sees causally in the Word); for in this Vision the angels' beatitude consists (in body of art).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL CAN KNOW MANY THINGS AT ONCE.

YES.—With that knowledge whereby the angels know things through innate species, they can know at once all those things that are known by one species, but not those that are known by different species.

THE REASON is that whatever can be known by one intelligible species is known as one intelligible object, and therefore at once, in so far as these things are one thing in the whole; but things known by indifferent intelligible species are apprehended as different intelligible objects. Now in the Word and through the Word the angels know all things in one intelligible species, which is the divine essence.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS KNOW BY DISCURSIVE REASONING.

NO.—THE REASON is that the angels behold at once, in the things that they naturally know, all the things whatever that can be known in them; and for this reason they are called intellectual.

NOTE: Human souls, which acquire a knowledge of truth through discursive reasoning, are called rational. This is due to the weakness of intellectual light in them. For if they had the fullness of intellectual light, as do the angels, they would at once comprehend, in the first view of principles, their whole range, by perceiving whatever can be reasoned from them (in body of art).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSING AND DIVIDING.

NO.—THE REASON is that, since in the angel there is perfect intellectual light—for he is "a pure mirror of clearest light" (Dionysius *On the Divine Names*, c. 4)—he at once has in the apprehension of the quiddity of the subject a knowledge of everything that can be attributed to the subject, or removed from it.

NOTE: By reasoning the conclusion is compared with the principle; by composing and dividing the predicate is compared with the subject (in the beginning of the art).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE FALSEHOOD IN THE ANGELIC INTELLECT.

NO.—In the intellect of any angel there cannot be falsehood, error, or deception, of itself; yet this happens incidentally, but in a way different than in us.

THE REASON is that by composition and division we *sometimes* arrive at an understanding of the quiddity of a thing; but the angels know by understanding the essence of a thing *all* that can be said about it. With regard to supernatural things, the demons can be deceived, because, since their perverse will withdraws their intellect from the divine wisdom, they sometimes judge supernatural things simply according to the natural condition of these things. But the good angels, even with regard to the supernatural, cannot be in error; for, having an upright will, they do not form judgments from a knowledge of the nature of a thing about the qualities that supernaturally belong to the thing except under the divine ordination. Therefore there can be no falsity or error in them, even accidentally.

NOTE: The angels' understanding of what a thing is is always true, except accidentally, in so far as it is referred, in an undue manner, to some composition or division (at end of article).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN THE ANGELS THERE ARE A "MORNING" AND AN "EVENING" KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that that, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad Litt.*, iv, cap. 22 and 31; *City of God*, xii, cap. 7 and 20), there is in the angels a knowledge of the very primordial being of things, in so far as things exist in the Word; and the knowledge of the very being of the created thing, as it stands in its own nature. For the being of things flows from the Word as from a primordial principle; and this effluence terminates in the being that things have in themselves.

[Tr. Note: St. Augustine used the terms "morning" and "evening" knowledge to designate the knowledge by which the angels knew creation. Augustine interpreted the creation as taking place in one day of angelic knowledge, directed to six classes of things. Hence in the morning of this day, before the world was created, the angels knew it as it exists in the Word; in the evening they knew it as it exists in itself. Both kinds of knowledge differ only in aspect, since the angels do not get their knowledge from things but from innate ideas.]

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE MORNING AND EVENING KNOWLEDGE ARE ONE.

NO.—If evening knowledge is so called in so far as the angels know through innate ideas the being that things have in their own nature.

THE REASON is that thus they know the being of things through another medium than by seeing the Word, in which morning knowledge consists, and thus Augustine seems to understand it when he holds one (morning) knowledge to be imperfect with respect to the other.—But if evening knowledge is so called in so far as the angels know in the Word Himself the being that things have in their own nature, thus evening and morning knowledge are one and the same in essence, and differ only in the aspect of things known.

QUESTION LIX The Will of the Angels

We first consider the will itself, secondly its movement, which is love. Four articles deal with the first part.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN THE ANGELS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as the angels know by their intellect the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is will in them, for will is an inclination to good in general.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE ANGELS WILL DIFFERS FROM INTELLECT.

YES.—In the angel the will differs from his essence and from his intellect (or also from the intellect of man).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that essence and will are the same only where good is totally contained in the essence of him who wills, namely in God, who wills nothing outside Himself except by reason of His goodness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that intellect and will must be different powers in every creature. For it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something that is outside it [that is, the intellect, which has within itself a thing outside itself, i.e., its form] and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. The first belongs to the intellect; the second to the will.

ART. III.—WHETHER IN THE ANGELS THERE IS FREE WILL.

YES.—More excellently than in men.

THE REASON is that angels apprehend the common note of goodness, from which they can judge this or that thing to be good. Every creature that can know what goodness is is free; every creature that cannot know this must be guided by another or its instinct.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN ANGELS THERE ARE AN IRASCIBLE AND A CONCUSPISCIBLE APPETITE.

NO.—For in the angels there is only the intellective appetite, whose formal object is good according to the universal aspect of goodness, not a particular good. Consequently their appetite remains undivided and is called will.

NOTE: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God—on account of resemblance in the effect (Ad 1).

QUESTION LX. The Love of the Angels

We have now to consider the act of the will that is love. For every act of the appetitive faculty is derived from love. This will cover five articles.

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas uses two words for love, *amor* and *dilectio*. After the first article he uses *dilectio* exclusively. *Dilectio*, which denotes high esteem rather than the warmth of affection, is more proper to the angels, in whom there is no concupiscence.]

YES.—THE REASON is that every nature (or essence) has some inclination, which is natural appetite, or love. In an intellectual nature this natural inclination is according to the will.

NOTE: Just as natural knowledge is always true, so natural love is always upright; for natural love is nothing else than an inclination implanted by the Author of nature (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN ANGELS THERE IS LOVE OF CHOICE.

YES.—Although in the angels intellectual nature is perfect, and there is found in them only a natural and not a deductive knowledge, yet there is in them a natural and elective love.

THE REASON is that it is the perfection of the intellect that it have naturally all objects of knowledge; but the act of the appetitive faculty is towards things, some of which are good in themselves, and therefore desirable in themselves (natural love); and some of which have goodness because of their relationship to something else, and are desirable on account of something else (this is elective love).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL LOVES HIMSELF BY NATURAL AND ELECTIVE LOVE.

YES.—Not in the same way but in different ways.

THE REASON is that the angel (like man) naturally desires his own good, which is his perfection; and he desires some good by choice.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ONE ANGEL LOVES ANOTHER AS HIMSELF BY NATURAL LOVE.

YES.—In so far as he agrees with him in nature.

THE REASON is that each thing naturally loves that which is one with itself by natural union. Now that which is one with some genus or species is one by nature.

NOTE: The expression *as* does not denote equality but similarity; for, since someone loves himself in so far as he wishes good for himself, so he loves another in so far as he wishes his good (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER BY NATURAL LOVE THE ANGEL LOVES GOD MORE THAN HE LOVES HIMSELF.

YES.—THE REASON is that in natural things everything that, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally and more naturally inclined to that other to which it belongs than to itself; otherwise natural love would be perverse and destructive.

QUESTION LXI

The Production of the Angels in the Natural Order of Things

After the preceding notes on the nature of the angels, and their knowledge and will, it remains to consider their creation, or their beginning generally. This includes three parts: 1) We shall consider how they were produced in the natural order of being.—2) How they were perfected in grace or glory.—3) How some of them became wicked.—Four articles cover the first question.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS HAVE A CAUSE OF THEIR BEING.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since in everything besides God, the essence of a thing differs from its existence, all things must exist by participation, namely must participate in the being of Him who exists essentially, and that is God alone (Q. 3, art. 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL WAS PRODUCED FROM GOD FROM ETERNITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as Catholic faith dogmatically teaches, only God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are from eternity.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED BEFORE THE CORPOREAL WORLD.

NO.—More probable seems to be the opinion of the holy Fathers that holds that the angels were created simultaneously with the corporeal creature.

THE REASON is that the angels do not of themselves constitute one universe, but both they and the corporeal creature together constitute one universe. [Tr. note: St. Thomas adds, however, that the contrary is not to be considered erroneous, on account of the great authority of St. Gregory Nazianzen.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN.

YES.—THEY WERE CREATED IN THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN that stands above corporeal creatures.

THE REASON is that, since the angels constitute one universe with the corporeal creatures, they have a relation to corporeal creatures and preside over them.

[Tr. Note: Aquinas admitted the existence of an empyrean heaven, beyond the world of the stars, but only as a simple probability founded exclusively on the testimony of Sts. Basil and Bede and the Greek geographer Strabo (I, Q. LXI, a. 4).

Since heaven is destined to receive the bodies of the glorified, the Schoolmen concluded that heaven is a real place, a determinate part of space; but were very far from confusing it with the "crystal spheres" of Greek cosmology, the existence of which they never admitted. They conceived of the empyrean as immobile, above the movement of the stars and the most subtle essence.]

QUESTION LXII

The Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and Glory

(in nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN BEATITUDE.

NO.—The angels in their creature were not given supernatural but only natural happiness.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that supernatural or final beatitude, by which we shall see God as He is, exceeds the powers of nature (even of the angels).—(Q. XII, art. 4 and Q. XIII, art. 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that natural perfection is not acquired by the angel by any progressive action, as by man, but he has it at once on account of his natural dignity (Q. LVIII, art 3 and 4).

NOTE: Natural happiness is ultimate rational perfection (in man) or intellectual perfection (in the angel), and consists [according to Aristotle] in the most perfect contemplation of man, whereby he can behold in this life the highest object of the intellect, which is God (in body of art).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGEL NEEDS GRACE TO TURN TO GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that to see God in His essence, in which ultimate happiness consists, is above the nature of every created intellect. Now the will, which follows the intellect, cannot rise to that which is above nature unless it is aided by some supernatural power (Q. XII, art. 4 and 5) [An example: Heat has a natural tendency to generate heat; but heat has no tendency to generate flesh except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.]

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS WERE CREATED IN GRACE.

YES.—More probably, and this is more in harmony with the words of the saints.

THE REASON is that as in Augustine's opinion (*Gen. Ad Litt.*, vii, c. iii), it is contended that the "seedlike forms," the seminal principles, were implanted in the creature when corporeally created; so, directly from the beginning, the angels were created in grace, which is called the *seed of God*.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE BLESSED ANGEL MERITED HIS BEATITUDE.

YES.—For, since ultimate beatitude surpasses the capacities of the angelic nature, the operation of the angel is not productive of beatitude but leads through grace to its end, or beatitude, which therefore is awaited as a gift of God.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ANGEL OBTAINED BEATITUDE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ONE ACT OF MERIT.

YES.—The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, by which he merited beatitude.

THE REASON is that grace perfects a nature according to the manner of the nature; now it is proper to the angelic nature to acquire perfection, not by passing from one stage to another, but to have it all at once naturally. So it is in the order of grace and glory: Immediately after one act informed by charity, the angel acquired beatitude.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE ANGELS OBTAINED GRACE AND GLORY ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF THEIR GIFTS.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is on the part of God Himself: Because, just as the angelic nature was made by God to attain grace and beatitude, so also, according to the wisdom of God, the degrees of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of the angel himself: For, when there is nothing to retard or thwart, nature is moved with its whole energy. And therefore it is reasonable that the angels who had a better nature should be turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. Even among men grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God.

ART. VII.—WHETHER IN THE BLESSED ANGELS THERE REMAIN A NATURAL KNOWLEDGE AND LOVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that nature is to beatitude as first to second; but the first must always be preserved in the second; and thus in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE BLESSED ANGEL CAN SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the angel who sees God stands to Him as anyone not seeing God stands to the common aspect of goodness. Now it is impossible that anyone should will or do anything except by aiming at what is good; or that he should wish to turn away from good considered precisely as such. Therefore the blessed angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE BLESSED ANGELS CAN ADVANCE IN BEATITUDE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the blessed angels have already attained their end, or the degree of beatitude to which they were ordained by the intention of the Mover, or by the predestination of God.

NOTE: The accidental joy of the angels over the salvation of those who are saved through their ministry (Luke xv, 10) can be increased until the judgment day. Yet they rather acquire this joy by virtue of their beatitude than merit it (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXIII

The Malice of the Angels With Regard to Sin

Here we consider how the angels became wicked. We treat successively of moral and physical evil. The first part occupies nine articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER MORAL EVIL CAN BE IN THE ANGELS.

YES.—THE REASON is that only the divine will is the rule of its act, for it is not ordained to a higher end. Now every will of every creature does not have rectitude in its own act except in so far as it is regulated according to the divine will, according to which it can be upright or not.

NOTE: The angel did not sin through ignorance but from want of considering the things that ought to be considered. For by his free will he turned to his own good (his own excellence) without subordination to the rule of the divine will (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE ANGELS THERE CAN BE ONLY THE SIN OF PRIDE AND ENVY.

YES.—THE REASON is that in spiritual goods there can be no sin unless in such affection the rule of the superior is not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride. After the sin of pride there ensued in the sinning angel the sin of envy, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the divine excellence according as God makes use of man for the divine glory, against the devil's will.

NOTE: Under pride and envy, as they appear in the demons, are comprised all the sins that are derived from them (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DEVIL DESIRED TO BE LIKE GOD.

YES.—Without any doubt the angel sinned by desiring to be like God, not by equality but by likeness.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the wicked angel knew by his natural knowledge that to be as God by equality was impossible; moreover there is in everyone a natural desire to preserve his being, which would not be preserved if it were transmuted into another nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the wicked angel sought as the ultimate end of his beatitude that to which he could come by the powers of his nature, and thus turned his seeking from supernatural beatitude which is by the grace of God.—Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is given by grace, he wished to have this by the powers of his own nature, not by divine help, according to the order ordained by God.

NOTE: The devil did not seek to be as God by being subject to no one else absolutely, for so he would be desiring his own non-being, since no creature can exist except by holding his own existence under God (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANY OF THE DEMONS ARE NATURALLY WICKED.

NO.—Since the demons are intellectual substances they can have no *natural* inclination to any kind of evil.

THE REASON is that every intellectual nature has a relation to the universal good, which it can apprehend, and which is the object of its will; for that whose nature is ordained to good according to good in general cannot according to its nature be inclined to any evil, because evil attaches to a particular good, not to good in general.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE DEVIL WAS WICKED BY THE FAULT OF HIS OWN WILL IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CREATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that that operation which begins simultaneously with the being of a thing comes to it from the agent from which it drew its nature. But God, from whom the angel has his existence, cannot be a defective cause, or the cause of sin.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY INSTANT BETWEEN THE CREATION AND THE FALL OF THE ANGEL.

NO.—On this point there are two opinions; but the more probable one, more in harmony with the opinions of the saints, is that the devil sinned immediately after the first instant of his creation.

THE REASON is that, since the angels (already created in grace) attain beatitude by one meritorious act (Q. LXII, art 5), the devil would have received beatitude after the first instant had he not interposed an obstacle by sinning.

NOTE: But if it be argued that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not have had an act of free will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval's being interposed between his creation and fall (at end of art.).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE HIGHEST ANGEL AMONG THOSE WHO SINNED WAS THE HIGHEST OF ALL.

YES.—If we consider, not the proneness to sin, but the motive for sinning.

THE REASON is that proneness to sin is more likely in the lower than in the higher intellectual creatures; but excellence, which was the motive of the devil's pride, was greater in the higher angels; and therefore he who sinned was the highest of all, for the angels did not sin from any proneness to sin, but because of their free will alone.

Nevertheless, there could be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE SIN OF THE FIRST ANGEL WAS THE CAUSE OF THE OTHERS' SINNING.

YES.—Not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation.

THE REASON is that all the demons are subjects of the highest one; as is evident from Our Lord's words: "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matth. xxv, 41).—For the order of divine justice exacts that whoever consents to another's temptation shall be subjected to him in his punishment, according to II Pet. ii, 19: "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."

NOTE: Requiring no time for speech and deliberation, as do we, the angels could consent to the affection of the highest angel in the same instant in which he expressed his affection by intelligible speech (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER AS MANY ANGELS SINNED AS THOSE WHO REMAINED FIRM.

NO.—More of the angels stood firm than sinned.

THE REASON is that whatever is done against the natural order is done with less frequency; for nature achieves its effect, either always or in most cases.—But the same argument does not hold good for men, for angels have only an intellectual nature; but in men evil arises from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most men, and forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known only to the few. (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXIV The Punishment of the Demons

ART. I.—WHETHER THE DEMON'S INTELLECT IS DARKENED BY THE PRIVATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL TRUTH.

NO.—a) Natural knowledge is not diminished in the demon; b) speculative knowledge acquired through grace is diminished but not totally taken away; c) affective knowledge acquired through grace is totally taken away.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that owing to the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn from the nature of an angel.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that as much of the divine secrets is revealed to them as is needful, either through the good angels or through some temporal effects of the divine power.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that affective knowledge acquired through grace gives rise to the love of God, of which the demons are totally deprived.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WILL OF THE DEMONS IS OBSTINATE IN EVIL.

YES.—Not because of the gravity of their sin but because of the condition of their nature or state.

THE REASON is that the angel apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles, which are the object of the habit of intelligence. Moreover, the will of the angel adheres to a thing fixedly and immovably. [The will follows knowledge.]

NOTE: The obstinacy of men who are damned will be explained later, (Suppl. Q. XCVIII, art. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS SORROW IN THE DEMONS.

YES.—Not as passion, but in so far as fear, sorrow, joy, and the like denote simple acts of the will.

THE REASON is that sorrow, in so far as it denotes a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance of the will to that which is or to that which is not. For it is evident that the demons could wish many things not to be that are, and many things to be that are not, especially since it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will.—Nevertheless, because the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin (Ad 3). To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin is a sign of goodness of will, to which the evil of sin is opposed (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER OUR ATMOSPHERE IS THE DEMONS' PLACE OF PUNISHMENT.

YES.—Not because of their sin but in order to try men in good, according to the will of divine Providence.

THE REASON is that by reason of their sin the demons' place of punishment is hell, where even now some of them are placed to torment those whom they led into evil, where all will be after the day of judgment. For the good of man is procured by divine Providence, albeit in an indirect way, when someone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition. And it is fitting that this procurement of man's good should be done through the wicked angels, lest after their sin they should wholly cease to be useful to the natural order.

NOTE: Our atmosphere is a penal place for the angel, not as affecting his nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it; because the angel apprehends that he is in a place not agreeable to his will (Ad 1).—Although the demons are not actually bound to the fire of hell when they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is not lessened, because they know that this imprisonment is their due (Ad 3).

THE PURELY CORPOREAL CREATURE

After a consideration of the spiritual creature we must now consider the corporeal creature. In the production of the material creation Scripture records three works: Namely the work of creation, when it is said: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth . . ." The work of distinction, when it is said: God "divided the light from the darkness; and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that

are under the firmament." And the work of adornment, when it is said: "Let there be lights in the firmament . . ." Therefore we must first consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; thirdly, the work of adornment.

QUESTION LXV
THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE IS FROM GOD.

YES.—Even the corporeal creature is from the good God, and not from an evil principle, as certain heretics contended.

THE REASON is that whenever in different things one thing is found in common, these different things must receive that one thing from some one cause. Now being is the common note of all things, however different they be in other respects. It therefore follows that there is one principle of being, from which all that exists in any way has being, whether it be invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal.

NOTE: All creatures of God in some respects continue forever, at least as to matter; because creatures are never annihilated even if they are corruptible (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE WAS MADE ACCORDING TO GOD'S GOODNESS.

YES.—The corporeal creature was made by the first intention of God, and not for the punishment of the sinful spiritual creature, as Origen supposed (*Peri Archon*, Book II, cap. 1 and 9).

THE REASON is that, after recounting the production of every species of corporeal creature, Scripture adds: "God saw that it was good," as if to say that each thing was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be.—Moreover, the whole universe with each of its parts is ordained toward God as to its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, the divine goodness for the glory of God. Hence the divine goodness is the end of all corporeal creatures.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE IS PRODUCED BY GOD THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELS.

NO.—Nothing can create anything except God alone, who is the first cause.

THE REASON is that the more widely a thing underlies everything else the more directly does it proceed from a superior cause. Therefore that which primarily underlies everything, that is, being, belongs uniquely to the causality of the first cause.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FORMS OF BODIES ARE FROM THE ANGELS.

NO.—Corporeal forms are not caused as emanations from some immaterial form, or from an independently existing form (as Plato said), or from a form existing in some separated intellect (as Avicenna taught), but by the reduction of matter from potentiality to act by some composite agent.

THE REASON is that what is properly brought into existence is not the form but the composite of matter and form; forms do not have being, but composites have being through them; for it is composites, not forms, that are generated or corrupted.—Now in the first production of the corporeal creature no transmutation from potency to act can have taken place. And therefore corporeal forms, which bodies had in their first production, were immediately produced by God, whose command alone matter obeys as its proper cause.

QUESTION LXVI
THE ORDER OF CREATION AS REGARDS DISTINCTION

Under distinction come the order of creation and the distinction as such. The first part occupies four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER FORMLESSNESS OF MATTER PRECEDED ITS FORMATION IN TIME.

NO.—That is, if we take formlessness for the absence of any form.

THE REASON is that to say that matter was first without form is to say that being existed actually, but without act, which is a contradiction in terms.

NOTE: Neither does St. Thomas admit that matter was created under some common form, for then the supervening forms would be accidents, and this would mean, not

generation but alteration. Therefore, he says, we must say that prime matter was created neither absolutely without form nor under one common form, but under distinct forms.

The formation that denotes the beauty (*formositas*) of matter is had, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad Litt.* i, 15), by the creation of light, by the separation of the earth from the waters, and by the creation of plants, herbs, etc. (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS ONE FORMLESS MATTER IN ALL CORPOREAL THINGS.

NO.—The matter of corruptible corporeal things and that of incorruptible or celestial things are not the same.

THE REASON is that, supposing that no form exists in a corruptible body, which remains as a substratum beneath generation and corruption, it follows of necessity that the matter of bodies by nature corruptible and of those by nature incorruptible is not the same. Otherwise matter would be at one and the same time have both form and the privation of form.

NOTE: As everyone knows, the Holy Doctor's conception of the physical and astronomical world has been superseded by modern science. Yet the metaphysical principles remain invariable and unassailable.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN WAS CREATED AT THE SAME TIME AS FORMLESS MATTER.

The empyrean heaven, if it is something that is fiery (empyrean, from the Greek, means fiery), not from its heat but from its brightness, was created at the same time as formless matter, which is that which does not yet have its beauty and embellishment.

THE REASON is that, just as spiritual glory had its beginning in the very inception of the world in the beatitude of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints, so it was fitting that even from the beginning bodily glory should begin in another body, which even in the beginning was not subject to corruption and change, but was composed entirely of light, even as the whole bodily creation after the resurrection is expected to be.

ART. IV.—WHETHER TIME WAS CREATED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH FORMLESS MATTER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, according to Augustine (*Confessions*, xii, chap. 12), formless matter (and the angelic nature) preceded formation (i.e., the embellishment and comeliness of matter) not in duration but in origin or nature. Other holy writers hold that there was an interval between the formlessness of matter and its full formation, and according to this opinion time was first in a manner formless, and then formed and distinguished into day and night (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXVII THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF

In this question we consider first the work of the first day, second, of the second day; third, of the third day. The work of the first day occupies four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WORD 'LIGHT' IS USED IN ITS PROPER SENSE IN SPEAKING OF SPIRITUAL THINGS.

NO.—If the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning; if it is taken in its popular and extended use it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

THE REASON is that the word "light" is primarily used to signify that which manifests anything to the sense of sight; but in popular usage it is extended to any sort of manifestation; as in the case of the word "see," which is applied primarily to the sense of sight and afterwards to the vision of the intellect [as when we say: "I see how it works now"].

ART. II.—WHETHER LIGHT IS A BODY.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that otherwise it would be possible for two bodies to be in the same place.

THE SECOND REASON is that it is impossible for a body to move in an instant.

THE THIRD REASON is that otherwise even the darkness would be a body, that is, generated from the corruption of light.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This question of the nature of light, like that of the physical nature of matter, is much debated even today. It is, however, physically certain that

light does not move in an instant, and we know its exact speed, 186,000 miles a second. This is the highest velocity man knows on earth; and, as some authoritative scientists say and mathematically prove, there is no greater speed possible in matter.

ART. III.—WHETHER LIGHT IS A QUALITY.

YES.—It is an active quality following from the substantial form of the sun, or of any other body that gives light of itself, if such there be.

THE REASON is that light is not a substance, nor does it have merely intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air, for it effects natural changes; neither is it the substantial form of the sun, since it is visible. It is therefore an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or a luminous body, just as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PRODUCTION OF LIGHT IS FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST DAY.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that light is the form of the primary body, i.e., the formlessness of matter arising from darkness is removed by the production of light.

THE SECOND REASON is that light is the more common form, for this is a common quality of the lower and higher bodies; but, as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal and the animal before the man.

THE THIRD REASON (according to St. Basil) is that all other things are made manifest through light.

THE FOURTH REASON is that day cannot exist without light.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: St. Thomas does not seem to admit that this first light, which was created before the sun, was a luminous nebula; nor does he admit that the sun's body was formed from this nebula (as all astronomers today hold), for he considered the sun as incorruptible; but he says, with Dionysius, that *this light* was the light of the sun, but still formless, being already the solar substance and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added a special and determinative power to produce and determinate effects (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXVIII THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (in four articles)

ART. 1.—WHETHER THE FIRMAMENT WAS MADE ON THE SECOND DAY.

YES.—1) If by "firmament" is understood that in which the stars exist, and by "days" succession of time, then it can strictly be granted according to the theory of Empedocles on the composition of the firmament, that it was made on the second day. 2) It is incompatible with Plato's theory of the composition of the firmament that it should be made on the second day as to substance. 3) Much less can it be asserted, according to the opinion of Aristotle on the composition of the firmament, that the firmament was produced as to substance on the second day, but in both opinions it may well have been embellished on the second day.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, according to Empedocles, the firmament is composed of elements and is indissoluble, because in its composition there was no strife, but only friendship. Therefore it is consistent with this theory that it belongs to the work of creation to produce the very substance of the elements (even of the firmament); and that to the work of distinction and embellishment it belongs to form some of the pre-existing elements.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Plato postulated that the firmament is composed of the element of fire. Now to make the firmament according to this theory is to produce the element of fire; but the production of the elements belongs to the work of creation, because the forms of the elements are those that are first added to matter.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, according to Aristotle, the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is a fifth body, or fifth essence, which, with regard to the production of substance, belongs to the work of creation, i.e., to the first day.

But if these days do not denote succession of time, but only the order of nature,

as Augustine held, there is no reason why, according to any of these opinions, the formation of the firmament as to substance should not belong to the second day.

Likewise, we can understand by firmament, not that in which the stars are fixed, but that part of the atmosphere in which clouds gather, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air in that region. And according to this theory none of the foregoing ones are repugnant to reason.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: As everybody knows today, the famous four elements are not truly simple, but compound. Water, for example, is composed of oxygen and hydrogen according to the formula H_2O .—Moreover, the stars are not fixed, but only appear so from their immense distances from us; they move at a terrific speed. Neither are they incorruptible, but are formed from nebulae and corrupted by dissolving into fragments. But as to the nature of intersidereal matter, or what is called the ether, we know nothing with scientific certainty; for some even of the most modern authorities, like Einstein, deny its existence.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE WATERS ABOVE THE FIRMAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is thus expressed in Holy Writ: (God) "divided the waters that were above the firmament from those that were under the firmament" (Gen. i, 7). Now these waters are corporeal, but their true nature must be defined according to the different theories about the firmament.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FIRMAMENT DIVIDES THE WATERS FROM THE WATERS.

YES.—Whether by firmament we understood the starry heaven, or the atmosphere of the clouds; it is suitably said that the firmament divides the waters from the waters, in so far as water denotes formless matter, or in so far as all diaphanous bodies are fittingly designated under the term "waters."

THE REASON is that the starry heaven distinguishes the lower diaphanous bodies from the higher. Now the region of clouds distinguishes the upper part of the atmosphere, which produces rain, and such products, from the lower atmosphere, which is connected with water and implied under the name of waters.

Thus St. Thomas, according to the science of his day, explained the sacred text: "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters" (Gen. i, 6).

[Tr. Note: This article is one of the classic Thomistic texts for the interpretation of Scripture in its relations with science. Aquinas here strikes an early blow at Harmonism, the too-ready tendency to interpret Scripture in scientific terms, or to adjust Scripture to science. Noting that, according to the theory of Thales and others, an infinite body of water extends above the clouds, he considered the temptation to give this explanation to the Genesisic text: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep."

But, he commented: "This theory can be shown to be false; it cannot then be held to be the sense of Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to an *ignorant* people, and that out of *condescension* to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. . . . Moses makes no express mention of air, to avoid setting something before people beyond their knowledge."

That Moses spoke according to appearances is the soundest rule of saving the accuracy of Scripture.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE HEAVEN.

NO.—THE REASON is that interpreters have made many divisions of the space they called the heavens, the chief of which may be reduced to three interpretations: For sometimes heaven is called by its proper and natural term, which comprehends the empyrean heaven, the aqueous or crystalline heaven, and the third or starry heaven, with its subdivisions. Sometimes the word is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity; this is the space between the waters and the moon. The third use of the word heaven is in the metaphorical or spiritual sense.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT THE GATHERING OF THE WATERS SHOULD BE SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON THE THIRD DAY.

YES.—According to the authority of Holy Scripture (Gen. i, 9-13). This, however, is differently explained by St. Augustine and the other holy doctors. In all these works, according to St. Augustine, there is no order of duration but only of nature and origin. According to him, the words: "Let the waters be gathered together, and let the dry land appear," signify that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance; and this belongs to the third day. For to the first day belongs the formation of the highest nature, namely the spiritual, inasmuch as it is said that light was made. To the second day belongs the formation of the higher bodies when it is said: "Let there be a firmament," by which is understood the impression of a heavenly form on formless matter.

Other holy writers suppose an order of duration, and that three formations took place in three days: The formation of darkness by light, the formation of the abyss (of water) by the firmament, and the formation of land by the receding of the waters, and this resulted in a distinction in the lowest body, namely that of earth and sea.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PRODUCTION OF THE PLANTS IS FITTINGLY RECORDED AS TAKING PLACE ON THE THIRD DAY.

YES.—For it is said in Holy Writ: "The earth brought forth the green herb." And afterwards follow the words: "The evening and the morning were the third day" (Gen. i, 12-13).

THE REASON (of congruency) is that on the third day the formlessness of the earth was removed, which formlessness is twofold, one whereby the earth was invisible or empty, because it was covered with water; the other whereby the earth was unembellished or bare, i.e., not having due comeliness. The first formlessness is taken away by the gathering together of the waters; the second, by the production of plants, which so to speak clothe the earth.

QUESTION LXX

THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY

We must next consider the work of adornment, first, of each of the days separately; second, of all the seven days in general.—On the first head we must consider the work of the fourth day; secondly, the work of the fifth day; thirdly, the work of the sixth day; fourthly, the things that belong to the seventh day.—The first consideration occupies three questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE LIGHTS OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PRODUCED ON THE FOURTH DAY.

YES.—The authority of Scripture suffices for the answer.

A REASON OF CONGRUENCY is that, just as heaven was made on the first day, and the first distinction belongs to the heaven, so to the heaven should belong the first day's adornment, which is on the fourth day of creation. The adornment of heaven results from the lights.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Contrary to the (physical) theory of modern scientists, who say that the suns (there are many suns) and stars were forged from nebulae, St. Thomas says that "in the production of the lights Augustine does not disagree with the other saints. For he says that the lights were made actually, not simply potentially. For the firmament has no power to produce the lights, as the earth has the power to produce plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: 'Let the firmament bring forth lights;' as it says: 'Let the earth bring forth the green herb'."

Yet the Holy Doctor admits that the matter of the lights, like corporeal light, was made on the first day, but was formless; on the fourth day it was formed to produce determinate effects (ad 2).

Regarding the so-called fixed stars, the Holy Doctor notes that already Ptolemy held that the luminaries were not fixed, but "have a movement separately from the movement of the spheres;" and this opinion seems to be admitted by Aquinas, with Chrysostom, against Aristotle, who admits only the movements of the spheres, for St. Thomas says: "The movement of the luminaries is [really] perceived by the senses, but not the movement of the spheres" (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: The "spheres" in ancient astronomy were not what we today know as the heavenly bodies, but revolving transparent spherical shells, in which the moon, sun, planets, and stars were thought to be borne along.]

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CAUSE ASSIGNED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE LIGHTS IS REASONABLE.

YES.—Because of the authority of Scripture.

THE REASON OF CONGRUENCY is that Moses, in order to recall the people from idolatry, touched only upon the reason that the lights were made for the sake of man, namely for his sight—"that they may shine in the firmament and give light to the earth;" for the changes of the seasons—"let them be for seasons and for days and for years;" and for the convenience of business and work—"let them be for signs"—namely to indicate fair or rainy weather, as favorable to different occupations.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE LUMINARIES OF HEAVEN HAVE SOULS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the operations of the soul cannot be exercised in the heavenly bodies: Not the nutritive operations, because the heavenly bodies are incorruptible by nature; not the sensitive operations, because these are performed by contact with the elements, of which the heavenly bodies are not composed; not the intellectual operations, because the heavenly bodies lack senses, by which phantasms are supplied to the intellect. A spiritual substance can exercise on the luminaries only a movement, not indeed as the form but by the contact of power; and in this way it can be said equivocally that the stars have a soul.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article of St. Thomas shows how great was the intellectual vigor of the Schoolmen, who, with their insufficient knowledge of the nature of the heavenly bodies, nevertheless reconciled the things perceived by the senses with the principles of faith and sound philosophy. If only those giant intellects had the scientific and mathematical knowledge of today! We should surely have no small progress in physical science.

[Tr. Note. Elsewhere (*Quodlibetales* XII, Q. VI. art, viii) St. Thomas was non-committal on this question, and contented himself with saying that faith was not involved.]

QUESTION LXXI THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY

We have now to consider the work of the fifth day, and it would seem that this work is not properly described.

On the contrary, the authority of Scripture suffices, for:

"God also said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven. And God created the great whales. . . And the evening and morning were the fifth day."

THE REASON OF CONGRUENCY is that this second day of adornment, which is the fifth day of creation, corresponds to the second day of distinction, which is devoted to the intermediate body, i.e., to water (and air), the adornments of which are the fishes and birds.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: As Augustine differs from the others regarding the production of plants, so also he differs regarding the production of fish and birds. For the others say that the fishes and birds were actually produced on the fifth day; Augustine says that on the fifth day the nature of the waters produced fishes and birds virtually; and this opinion of Augustine is more in harmony with modern science than the others.

[Tr. Note.—In ad 1, St. Thomas deals with the question of spontaneous generation. This he rejects, on the ground that nature produces its effects by determinate means; those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot naturally be generated in any other way. Although he believed that some of the lower animals could be generated from putrefaction, he held that in this case the formative power of generation lay in the influence of the heavenly bodies. At the first beginning of the world the active principle of life was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements either actually or virtually. If the material elements produced animals virtually, this was owing to the power of seed or the influence of the stars. Thus St. Thomas would have rejected what we today know as the mechanistic concept of plant and animal life.]

QUESTION LXXII THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY

(one article)

The sixth day is thus summarized: "And God said: Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth. . . And [God] said: Let us make man. . . And the evening and morning were the sixth day."

THE REASON OF CONGRUENCY is that the third day of adornment corresponds to the third day of distinction, on which the last body, that of earth, was adorned by the production of animals.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: St. Augustine holds also with regard to earthly animals that they were produced potentially, not actually.—In ad 1 St. Thomas speaks of the degrees of participation of life in living things, and is of great interest.

[Tr. Note.—St. Thomas remarks in ad 1 that the life of the plants is the most imperfect because their only vital act is generation, to which the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate. Amongst animals, those that live on land are generally more perfect than birds and fishes, because their limbs are more distinct and their generation is of a higher order (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture therefore does not call fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having life;" whereas it calls land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life. The life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, but to be made immediately by God. So St. Thomas. Modern scientific taxonomy follows the same general principle.]

QUESTION LXXIII THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE COMPLETION OF THE DIVINE WORKS SHOULD BE ASCRIBED TO THE SEVENTH DAY.

YES.—As regards completion or first perfection.

THE REASON is that the first perfection of the world is through the completeness of its parts; the second perfection is through the attainment of the end of the whole universe, which is the perfect happiness of the saints, and will be at the consummation of the world.—Note, however, that the consummation of the universe according to the completeness of its parts belongs only to the sixth day; but the consummation of the world, which is also according to operation, belongs to the seventh day.—There are three consummations of the world: The first is that of nature, of which Scripture here speaks ("On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made"); the second is of grace, through the Incarnation of the Word; the third is of glory, at the end of the world.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD RESTED ON THE SEVENTH DAY FROM ALL HIS WORK.

YES.—In so far as rest in spiritual things is taken in two ways: In one way for cessation from works, in another way for the fulfillment of desire.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that on the seventh day He ceased to create new creatures; for He did nothing afterwards that did not in some way exist previously in the first works.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God did not need created things, but was happy in the enjoyment of Himself. Therefore it is not said that He rested *in* His works; but rested *from* them, as in fact resting in Himself.

ART. III.—WHETHER BLESSING AND SANCTIFYING ARE DUE TO THE SEVENTH DAY.

YES.—For Scripture says: "And He blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because in it He had rested from all His work which God created and made" (Gen. ii, 3).

THE REASON is that, inasmuch as God ceased from creating new works, the governance and multiplication of creatures belong to the seventh day, and this is done by blessing.—Inasmuch as God rested in Himself, sanctification belongs to the seventh day; for whatever rests in God is specially sanctified.

QUESTION LXXIV ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THESE DAYS ARE SUFFICIENTLY ENUMERATED.

THE REASON OF CONGRUENCY is that there are three distinctions of created things: The first is that denoted by the word heaven, the second that denoted by the word water, the third that denoted by the word earth; to all these the three days of adornment respectively belong.—St. Augustine understands by the word heaven spiritual things, by the word water the higher corporeal things, and by the word earth the lowest part.

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL THESE DAYS ARE ONE DAY.

NO.—Without prejudice to the contrary opinion of St. Augustine.

THE REASON is that Scripture enumerates the days by saying: "The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there are a second and a third there cannot be said to be only one.

NOTE: St. Augustine, however, understands by "day" the angelic knowledge, which indeed is one in itself, but complex according to the natural order of things known.—According to the others, these days indicate both a succession of temporal days and a succession of the production of things.

ART. III.—WHETHER SCRIPTURE USES SUITABLE WORDS TO EXPRESS THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS.

YES.—The authority of Scripture suffices.

NOTE: In this article St. Thomas does not expound the body of the article, as he habitually does, but at once answers the objections, which are seven.

Of these objections the first is that the Word is not named in the creation of heaven and earth. To this he replies: According to Augustine, the Word is named in the phrase, "in the beginning."

The second objection is that water is not named. To this he replies that (according to Augustine) the name "earth" includes the formless matter of all bodies. According to other holy writers, Scripture names the extremes, i.e., heaven and earth, among which is water.

The third objection is that in the work of the second day it is not stated: "God saw that it was good," as in the other works.—To this he replies that this is done because the work of the distinction of the waters then begins and is perfected on the third day.

The fourth objection is that it is unsuitably said that "the spirit of God moved upon the waters;" for God does not move or have a position. To this it is replied, according to Augustine, that the Spirit of God does not move locally, but by pre-eminent power. According to St. Basil; "He moved upon the element of water, i.e., He fostered and quickened the nature of water after the analogy of a setting hen, infusing the vital power on the things that are fostered." [The Hebrew word for move in this text has the sense of "brood."]]

The fifth objection is that it is unsuitably said: "And God made the firmament," since He had already said: "Let the firmament be made, and it was made." And likewise in the other works. To this it is replied, according to Augustine, that the three words: "Be it made," "it was . . . done," and He "made," denote three things: First, the being of things in the Word; second, the being of things in the angelic mind; third, the being of things in their own nature. According to others: "Let be made" signifies a command of God concerning what was to be made; "it was done" denotes the fulfillment of the command; "He made" indicates that He did the works of creation by Himself, and not through other creatures, for example the angels, as some thought.

The sixth objection is that morning and evening do not sufficiently divide the day, since there are several parts of the day.—To this he replies that, according to Augustine, evening and morning refer to the evening and morning knowledge in the angels. According to Basil, morning and evening are stated as terms of the day, of which morning is the beginning and evening the end; or, because evening is the end of the day, and morning the end of the night.

The seventh objection is that Scripture should say: "Evening and morning became the first day," whereas it is said "one day." To this it is answered that "one day" is used in the first day of creation to designate that the space of 24 hours belongs to one day; or to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to one and the same point.

THIS ENDS THE CREATION TRACT.

TRACT ON MAN

After considering the spiritual and corporeal creature we must now consider man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance. And first we treat of the nature of man himself; secondly, of his production. Now to consider the nature of man belongs to the theologian on the part of the soul, but not on the part of the body, except as the body has a relation to the soul. And therefore the first consideration is about the soul. And, because according to Dionysius (chap. 2, *The Angelic Hierarchy*), three things are found in spiritual substances, namely essence, power, and operation, we shall first consider the things that pertain to the essence of the soul; secondly, the things that pertain to its power or faculties; thirdly, the things that pertain to its operation.—With regard to the first consideration there are two points of study: The first concerns the soul as such; the second, its union with the body.—The first point occupies seven articles.

QUESTION LXXV The Human Soul as Such

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS A BODY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the first principle of life, which is the soul, does not belong to a body because it is a body; otherwise every body would be living or the principle of life; but it belongs to it in so far as it is some particular body. Now a body is actually such by virtue of that which is its act. Therefore a body is living through its soul, which is the act of a living body. Therefore the soul is not a body.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS SOMETHING SUBSISTENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the human soul, which is also called mind and intellect, has an operation of itself, apart from the body. For it is manifest that man can know by his intellect the natures of all bodies; but this is impossible through the body, because every body has some determinate nature.

NOTE: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as the organ whereby such an action is exercised but on the part of the object [for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight]. But such a dependence on a body does not prove the intellect to be non-subsisting [or incapable of existing alone—any more than an animal's dependence on external objects for the performance of its sense functions proves that it is incapable of existing alone] (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOULS OF BRUTE ANIMALS ARE SUBSISTENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that in everything being and operation are parallel. Now the soul of the brutes does not have operation by itself; but every operation of the sensitive soul is of the composite, and this operation is evidently accompanied by a change in the body. Thus, in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color. [Hence if the operation cannot exist without the body neither can the soul.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE MAN.

NO.—Neither by reason of the species nor by reason of the individual. THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which the definition signifies belongs to the nature of the species; now in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the matter and the form—not indeed signate matter, which is the principle of individuation, but common matter.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that sensation, which is an operation of man, although not distinctive of him, does not belong to the soul only, but to the composite.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM.

NO.—Either as to the soul in general or as to the human soul.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it belongs to the notion of soul to be a form, i.e., the act by which it is the principle of the life of some body. Now matter denotes potency, which is opposed to actuality.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the human soul, and every intellectual substance, knows things in their forms absolutely. Now whatever is received in something is received in it according to the nature of the recipient. [For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the form of things would be received into it as individuals, since matter is the principle of individuation.]

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS INCORRUPTIBLE.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the human soul is a self-subsisting form (art. 2) ; but existence, which belongs to a form by virtue of itself, is inseparable from it.

THE SECOND REASON is that in the intellective soul there cannot be any contrariety; for whatever is received in it is received according to the manner of its being; therefore the knowledge of contrary things is one. Now wherever there is no contrariety there is no corruptibility.

THE THIRD REASON is that the intellect apprehends being absolutely and for all time. Therefore [since desire follows knowledge] everything having an intellect naturally desires to exist forever. But a natural desire cannot be vain.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SOUL AND THE ANGEL ARE OF THE SAME SPECIES.

NO.—THE REASON is that every separated form can be understood as belonging to but one species. Thus if whiteness existed in separation there could be only one whiteness. How there can be more than one soul of the same species will be shown later (next question, art. 3, *ad* 1).

NOTE: Since the soul by the nature of its essence exists in union with the body, it does not properly exist in the species, but only in the composite. And the very fact that the soul in some manner needs the body for its operation shows that the soul occupies a lower degree of intellectuality than the angel, who is not united to a body (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXXVI
The Union of Body and Soul
 (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM.

YES.—THE REASON is that that by which something primarily operates is the form of that to which operation is attributed. Now the soul is the first thing by which we have nourishment and sensation, movement and understanding.—Likewise, man is specified by that which is the principle of his operation as man, that is, his intelligence. Now everything is specified by its proper form. Therefore the intellective principle is the proper form of man.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS MULTIPLIED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF BODIES.

YES.—One intellect cannot be common to all men.

THE REASON is that several men would be one man, and not distinguished from one another, except by something that is outside the essence of each.—Likewise, several men would have one being; for the form is the principle of existence. Moreover, if one intellect belonged to all men, the diversity of phantasms that are in this man and in that could not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that.

ART. III.—WHETHER BESIDES THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL THERE ARE IN MAN OTHER SOULS ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the things that are denominated according to different forms are not one simply; and thus man would not be one thing simply.

THE SECOND REASON is that animal is essentially predicated of man and not accidentally; for animal is part of the definition of man.

THE THIRD REASON is that when one operation of the soul is intense it hinders another.

NOTE: The intellective soul contains in its power whatever is possessed by the sensitive soul of the brutes and the nutritive soul of the plants, as the pentagon contains in itself the tetragon, and exceeds it (in body of art.)

The embryo first has the sensitive soul only; when this is removed a more perfect soul is added, which is the sensitive and the intellective soul, as will be shown later (Q. cxviii, art. 2 and 2). So in Ad 3).

Tr. Note: Aquinas here follows Aristotle, who taught that the male embryo receives the spiritual soul 40 days after conception; the female, 80 days after. Such was the common opinion of the Fathers and even today it has some speculative adherents, such as Cardinal Mercier.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN MAN THERE IS ANOTHER FORM BESIDES THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL.

NO.—THE REASON is that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of man, and therefore gives him being simply; wherefore, just as it contains virtually the sensitive and nutritive soul, it contains virtually all the lower forms, and it does alone whatever the more imperfect forms do in others; and so generally of all more perfect forms with respect to the imperfect.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS PROPERLY UNITED TO SUCH A BODY.

YES.—The reason is that the body to which the intellective soul is united should be a mixed body, above all others reduced to the most equitable complexion, so that the sense of touch, on which the other senses are based, is most sensitive. [Now among animals man has the best sense of touch.] For the human soul, which occupies the lowest degree in intellectual substances, gathers a knowledge of truth from divisible (possibly a misprint for visible) things by the way of the senses.

NOTE: Among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of this is that those who are refined in physical features are well endowed in mind (at end of article).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF ACCIDENTAL DISPOSITIONS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the first of all acts, to which matter in a certain order is in potency, is existence. Now matter has actual existence by way of the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE ANIMAL BODY BY MEANS OF A BODY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the soul is not united to the body as a motor but as a form. Now the substantial form, since it is itself essentially an act, does not give essence to the body through any medium, but is by its own existence united immediately to the body, as the form to the matter.

NOTE: The Platonists, who thought that the soul is united to the body as a motor, said that the intellective soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and through it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others held that the soul is united to the body through the medium of light.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS IN EACH PART OF THE BODY.

YES.—Not by totality of power but by totality of perfection and essence.

THE REASON is that it is in every part of the body, not according to any of its powers, but as sight is in the eye, as hearing is in the ear, and so on with the others.—But according to the totality of its perfection (definition) and essence it is in every part the principle of operation; for no part of the body retains its proper action if the soul recedes from it.

NOTE: Because the soul requires diversity in parts, it does not bear the same relation to the whole as to the parts; but it relates to the whole primarily and essentially as to its proper and proportionate perfectible, but to the parts it relates secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole (at end of article).

QUESTION LXXVII

The Things That Pertain to the Powers of the Soul in General (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE SOUL IS ITS POWER.

NO.—THE REASON is that the soul's operation is not in the genus of substance (only in God is operation His substance). But power and act [operation] are referred to the same genus. [Therefore, if the soul's act is not in the genus substance, so neither is the power directed to that act.]

Moreover, the soul, inasmuch as it is a form, is not an act directed to a further act, but is the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore for the soul to be in potentiality to

another act does not belong to it according to its essence, in so far as it is a form, but according to its potentiality. Yet the soul remains the first principle of operation, but not the proximate principle (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUL HAS MORE THAN ONE POWER.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that, since the soul is in the lowest degree, according to nature, of those to whom beatitude belongs, it requires many different operations and powers to acquire that beatitude [just as a weaker person requires more remedies for perfect health than the stronger person].

THE SECOND REASON is that the soul is on the dividing line between the spiritual and the corporeal creation; and therefore the powers of both creations converge in the soul.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE POWERS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR ACTS AND OBJECTS.

YES.—Not any diversity of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed.

THE REASON is that a power, inasmuch as it is a power, is directed to an act. Now the nature of the act is diversified according to the difference in the nature of the object, either as the principle and moving cause, if the power is passive; or as the end and term, if the power is active.

NOTE: 1.—Act, though in existence it is posterior to power, is nevertheless prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is nevertheless the principle or end of the action. In other words, although it is materially extrinsic, it is formally intrinsic, or proportionate to the principle and end (Ad 1).

The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; for the higher a power is the greater the number of things to which it extends. And thus many things meet together in the one formality of the object, which the higher power considers of itself, although they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers. Thus it is that various objects belong to different lower powers, which however are subject to one higher power (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AMONG THE POWERS OF THE SOUL THERE IS ORDER.

YES.—According to a threefold consideration of order, i.e., according to the dependence of one power on another—in one way according to the order of nature, in so far as the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect; in another way according to the order of generation and time; and (thirdly) according to the order of the objects.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the intellective powers are prior to the sensitive powers; hence they direct and command them; and so with the rest.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the nutritive powers of the soul are prior in the process of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul, for the actions of which, therefore, they prepare the body, and so with the rest.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that certain powers have a natural order among themselves. These are sight, hearing, and smell; for the object of sight is common to the higher and lower bodies, and sound is made audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the commixture of elements from which smell results.

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE IN THE SOUL AS THEIR SUBJECT.

NO.—Not all the powers of the soul are in the soul as in their subject, but certain ones are in the composite.

THE REASON is that certain operations of the soul are exercised without a bodily organ, such as understanding and will, and therefore the principles of these operations are in the soul (alone) as in their subject; for a power belongs to it as to the subject of which it is the operation. But there are certain operations of the soul that are exercised through bodily organs, and the principles of these operations are in the composite as in their subject, and not in the soul only.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE POWERS OF THE SOUL FLOW FROM ITS ESSENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the powers of the soul are its proper and

essential accidents, it follows that they must flow from the essence of the soul; for an accident is caused by the subject so far as it is actual; for in substantial forms the actuality of the subject is from the form.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ONE POWER OF THE SOUL ARISES FROM ANOTHER.

YES.—One power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul, through the medium of another.

THE REASON is that there is order among the powers of the soul (art. 4, this question).—The powers of the soul that are prior in order of perfection and nature are the principles of the other powers in so far as they are their end and active principle. Thus the sense faculty is a certain imperfect participation of the intellect. Considered as a receptive principle, the more imperfect powers are principles in respect to others; for the animal is generated prior to the man.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ALL THE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SOUL WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY.

NO.—Those actually remain which have a proper subject in the soul, i.e., the intellect and the will; the others, which are in the composite as in a subject, do not remain in the soul except in their root or principle.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such powers, as appears from the foregoing, will necessarily remain in the soul after the body is destroyed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that after the subject is destroyed no accidents can remain. But these powers are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite; now the soul is the virtual principle of these powers. [Hence they remain as in root.]

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL SPECIFICALLY

We are now to consider the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has to inquire specifically only as to the intellective and appetitive powers, in which the virtues are found. But, since the knowledge of these powers in a measure depends on others, our consideration of the powers of the soul specifically will be in three parts. The first treats of the powers that are a preamble to the intellect; the second of the intellective powers; the third of the appetitive powers.—With regard to the first, four questions are asked.

QUESTION LXXVIII

The Powers That Are a Preamble to the Intellect

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE ARE TO BE DISTINGUISHED FIVE GENERA OF POWERS IN THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the genera of the powers of the soul are distinguished according to their objects. These objects, in turn, are distinguished according to their greater or lesser universality. Now the object of one power of the soul is only the body united to the soul (this genus of the powers of the soul is called vegetative). Another genus of powers regards a more universal object, namely any sensible body, and not only the body united to the soul (this is the sensitive genus). Finally, there is a genus that regards a yet more universal object, namely not only the sensible body but also all being in its universal extension (the intellective genus).

These objects are in some way connected with the powers. There are other objects to which the soul is inclined and directed; and this in two ways: Either as to its end, which is first in the order of intention; or as to the term of its operation and movement. To these objects correspond two other genera of the powers of the soul, namely the appetitive and locomotive powers. Thus there are five powers of the soul.

NOTE: 1.—Of the powers of the soul three are called souls: The vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective; this distinction rests on the different ways by which the operation of the soul transcends the operation of corporeal nature. This is done in three ways: a) In so far as the soul has an operation that is not exercised by a corporeal organ (the intellective soul); b) in so far as it has another operation, which is performed indeed through a corporeal organ but only for the proper disposition of the operation of the soul (the sensitive soul); c) in so far as it has another operation, which is per-

formed through a corporeal organ and by virtue of a corporeal quality of the organ itself (the vegetative or nutritive soul). This also transcends the operation of corporeal nature, because such operations are from an intrinsic principle (in body of art.).

2.—There are *four modes of living*, because there are four grades of living beings; The vegetative (as in plants); the sensitive—not, however, the locomotive power (as in motionless animals, such as shellfish); the sensitive, with locomotive power (the more perfect animals); the intellective (men) (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PARTS OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS THOSE OF NUTRITION, GROWTH, AND GENERATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of the vegetative part is the body itself that lives by and through the soul. To this body a threefold operation of the soul is necessary, to wit, generation, by which it acquires being; growth, by which it acquires due quantity; and nutrition, by which the living body is preserved in being and due quantity.—Among these parts the generative power exceeds the others in finality, nobility, and perfection, because it has its effect in another; and thus in a way it approaches the dignity of the sensitive soul.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FIVE EXTERIOR SENSES ARE PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and of itself.

Now that which is perceived by the senses is that which is the exterior cause of its being in some way modified, or changed. Now change is either natural or spiritual. It is natural inasmuch as the form of the thing changing is received in the thing changed according to the natural existence (of the form itself), as heat in the thing heated. But the spiritual form of the thing that changes is received in the thing changed according to spiritual or intentional being (of the form itself), as the form of color in the pupil of the eye, which does not become colored by this fact. Now, in certain senses there is found spiritual change only (the sight); in certain others spiritual change is accompanied by natural change, and this takes place either on the part of the object only, or also on the part of the organ. It takes place on the part of the object only either as to place, as through sound (hearing); or as to the alteration of the object, as when the object is altered and emits an odor (smell). On the part of the organ there is a natural change in touch and taste, as is evident.—Therefore the sight, which is without natural modification either in its organ or in its object, is perfectly spiritual, and the most perfect of all the senses, and the most universal.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INTERIOR SENSES ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED.

YES.—Namely into the common and the proper sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.

THE REASON is that in the perfect animals it is possible to observe, with regard to the apprehension of sensible things: a) A principle *receptive* of sensations, which is the *proper sense* and the *common sense*; b) a principle preservative of these sensations, so that it may apprehend them even in their absence, and this is done through the *phantasy* or the *imagination*; c) a principle to perceive intentions that are not perceived by the exterior senses, for example when a bird gathers straw to build its nest, and this is done through the *estimative power* [instinct]; and d) the principle that preserves these intentions, and this takes place through the *memorative power*.—Now with regard to exterior sensible forms, there is no difference between man and the other animals; but with regard to intentions, on account of their connection with the reason, instead of the estimative power there in man the *cogitative power* or the *particular reason*; and in place of the memorative power there is had not only memory but also *reminiscence*, whereby memory as it were syllogistically seeks for a recollection of the past.

NOTE: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible [i.e., as between black and green.] To the common sense belongs the discerning judgment of sensibles, to which are referred, as to a common term, all the apprehensions of the senses [as when someone discerns white from sweet, or sees that he sees] (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXIX
The Intellective Powers
 (in 13 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT IS A POWER OF THE SOUL.

YES.—The intellect is a power of the soul, and is not the essence itself of the soul.

THE REASON is that, in creatures, the essence itself of the thing operating cannot be the immediate principle of operation; otherwise, the operation of the thing would be the being of the thing itself; in other words, the soul would be its own understanding, as is God.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT IS A PASSIVE POWER.

YES.—According to the third way of calling something passive, in so far, namely, as it passes from potentiality to act.

THE REASON is that no created intellect can be as an act in relation to the whole of universal being; for every created intellect is not an act of all things intelligible by the very fact of its existence, but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act; and in this way our intellect is related, not indeed as its potentiality is always perfected by act, as is the case with the angels, but as a potentiality which is not always in act, but which proceeds from potentiality to act with respect to intelligible things, and at first is "like a clean tablet, on which nothing is written" (Aristotle, *On the Soul*, iii, 4).

NOTE: The first way of being passive exists (most properly) when from a thing something is removed that belongs to it by its nature, or by its proper inclination; the second way of being passive exists (less properly) when something is said to be passive because something, suitable or not, is removed from it; the third way of being passive (in the wide sense) derives from the fact that that which is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without anything's being removed from it (in beginning of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS AN ACTIVE INTELLECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the natures or forms of sensible things, which we understand, are not actually intelligible, and since nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by some being in act, it is necessary to assume some power on the part of the intellect, which makes things actually intelligible by abstracting species or ideas from material conditions; this power is called the active intellect.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS SOMETHING IN THE SOUL.

YES.—The active intellect is not the substantially separated intellect of Plato's conception, which lighted up phantasms and made them actually intelligible; but it is a power in the human soul itself participating in that superior intellect, through which power the soul makes things actually intelligible.

THE REASON is that, as in other perfect natural things, there are, besides universal active causes, proper powers implanted in each perfect thing and derived from universal agents. In this case we know this by experience, when we perceive ourselves abstracting universal forms from particular conditions.—Moreover, no action belongs to a thing except through some formal principle inhering in it.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS ONE IN ALL.

NO.—THE REASON is that the active intellect is something of the soul, as one of its powers (preceding art.). For one and the same power numerically cannot belong to diverse subjects.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE MEMORY IS IN THE INTELLECTIVE PART OF THE SOUL.

YES.—If memory is taken only for the power that preserves mental impressions or ideas, it must be said that memory is in the intellective part; but if it be taken for the memory of the past, as past things, then it is in the sensitive part only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that intelligible species are the proper object of the intellect, which is of a more stable nature and is more immovable than corporeal matter.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that past things, as such, are individual, be-

ing apprehended by the sensitive powers. These individuals the intellect apprehends under the formality of immateriality, understanding that it understood before.

NOTE: With regard to the retention of the species, the intellect is said to be habitual (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTIVE MEMORY IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM THE INTELLECT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the power of the passive intellect is not diversified by any difference of beings; for if a power by its nature is directed to some object according to the common notion of the object, this power is not diversified according to the individual differences of that object; just as the power of sight is not diversified by black and white.—Another reason is that it belongs to such a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

NOTE: The only difference between the active and the passive intellect is that they differ according to their formal objects: The active intellect stands to the object as a being in act to a being in potency; on the contrary, the passive intellect stands to its object as a being in potency to a being in act (in body of art).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE REASON IS ANOTHER POWER DISTINCT FROM THE INTELLECT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the reason stands to the intellect as movement to rest; for to reason is to advance from one understanding to another. But to understand is simply to apprehend the truth. To move and to rest are reduced to one and the same power, as in natural things.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE HIGHER AND THE LOWER REASON ARE DISTINCT POWERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the power of reason, to which belong the medium and the end, is the same. For the act of reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. For from the knowledge of temporal things, which are the object of the lower reason, we come, by way of discovery, to the knowledge of eternal things, which are the object of the higher reason; and from the eternal things that we already know we judge of temporal things, and according to the laws of eternal things we dispose of things temporal.—Yet they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits. For to the higher reason is attributed wisdom, and science to the lower.

ART. X.—WHETHER INTELLIGENCE IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM INTELLECT.

NO.—THE REASON is that intelligence is nothing else than the act of the intellect, or the act of understanding.

NOTE: Philosophers postulate the existence of four intellects, namely the active, passive, habitual, and actual intellect; of these the first two are distinguished as two powers (art. VII, in note), the last three are states of the same power. The passive intellect is in potentiality to receive intellectual ideas; *intellect in habit* is in the first act, i.e., knowledge, as we have said concerning the intellectual memory. The intellect is actual, or in *second act*, when it actually considers something [or turns to an object of the habit of knowledge]; it is also called *intellect in act* (in body of art.).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL INTELLECT ARE DISTINCT POWERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that they are only accidentally distinguished; for the practical intellect is directed to action; whereas the speculative intellect is directed only to the consideration of the truth.

ART. XII.—WHETHER SYNDERESIS IS A SPECIAL POWER OF THE INTELLECT DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as we have, naturally implanted in us, the principles of speculative things, which is by way of a habit called the *understanding of principles*; so we have naturally implanted in us the principle of practical things, which is by way of a habit called *synderesis*, whose function it is to stir us to good and to murmur against evil.

ART. XIII.—WHETHER CONSCIENCE IS A POWER.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that, by force of the name, conscience is *cum alio scientia*, that is, knowledge applied to an individual case; now the application of knowledge to something is by way of some act.

THE SECOND REASON is that from the things that are attributed to conscience conscience is said to witness, to bind or incite, or also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. Therefore conscience denominates an act, or the application of some of our knowledge to the things that we do. Yet sometimes it is taken for a habit, and is called synderesis, just as causes and effects are called after one another.

QUESTION LXXX**The Appetitive Powers in General**

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE APPETITE IS A SPECIAL POWER OF THE SOUL.

YES.—The reason is that, as in natural beings, i.e., those lacking knowledge, there is a natural inclination that follows the form, so in beings having knowledge there is a higher inclination (besides the natural one), which supposes an appetitive power of the soul.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTIVE APPETITES ARE DISTINCT POWERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that what is apprehended by the intellect is of a different genus from what is apprehended by the senses.

QUESTION LXXXI**The Power of Sensuality**

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SENSUALITY IS ONLY APPETITIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. Now the name of sensuality is taken from sensual movement.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS DIVIDED INTO THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE AS DISTINCT POWERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the inclination of the soul to pursue the things that are suitable to the senses, and to shun what is harmful (called the concupiscible appetite), and that inclination by which the soul resists the things that attack what is suitable and inflict injuries (called the irascible appetite), are not reducible to one principle. For the irascible appetite is as it were the champion and defender of the concupiscible, which shuns what is harmful.—Yet all the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the concupiscible, and terminate in them.

ART. III. WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITES OBEY REASON.

YES.—In one way as to the reason; in another way as to the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the particular reason, which compares individual intentions, and which corresponds to the estimative power in animals, is moved and directed in man according to the universal reason, as is evident in syllogistic arguments. But the universal reason commands the sensitive appetite, which is distinguished into concupiscible and irascible, and this appetite is obedient to it according to the political or regal principle; for it retains something of its own.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the sensitive appetite is subject to the will with respect to execution, which is by way of motive force. For man is not moved immediately according to the irascible and concupiscible appetite; but awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite.

QUESTION LXXXII**The Will**

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES SOMETHING OF NECESSITY.

YES.—By necessity of the end and by natural necessity; not, however, by necessity of coercion.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sometimes it is not possible to reach an end except by one way only (supposing other ways do not exist); as there follows from the will to cross the sea a necessity in the will to wish a ship.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as the intellect clings by necessity to first principles, so the will adheres by necessity to its ultimate end, which is beatitude; for the end is in practical things as the principle is in speculative things.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the necessity of coercion is contrary to the inclination of the will.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES OF NECESSITY WHATEVER IT DESIRES.

NO.—THE REASON is that there are certain particular goods that have no necessary connection with happiness; for one can be happy without these.

NOTE: The sensitive power simply apprehends some one thing, and is definitely moved to one thing accordingly; but the reason compares several things, and therefore the intellective appetite, or will can be moved by several things, but not by one thing of necessity (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WILL IS A HIGHER POWER THAN THE INTELLECT.

NO.—Taken simply and in itself, the intellect is higher than the will; taken relatively, or by comparison with something else, the will is sometimes higher than the intellect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the object of the intellect, which is the idea itself of a good desired, is simpler and more absolute than the object of the will, which is the good desired.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the object of the will is sometimes found in an object that is nobler than the soul itself, in which the objects of the intellect exist in essence.—Therefore, the love of God is better than the knowledge of God. On the contrary the knowledge of corporeal things is better than a love of them.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WILL MOVES THE INTELLECT.

YES.—Not by way of end but by way of agent.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in all ordered active powers that power that regards a universal end moves the powers that regard particular ends. Now the object of the will is good and end in general.

ART. V.—WHETHER WE SHOULD DISTINGUISH IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPIBIBLE PARTS IN THE SUPERIOR APPETITE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the sensitive appetite does not regard the common aspect of goodness, which is the object of the superior appetite, or will; for the concupiscible regards as its proper aspect the good as it is delightful to the senses and suitable to nature; and the irascible regards as its aspect the good as it repels and drives off that which does harm. Now the different aspects of particular goods diversify the parts of the sensitive appetite.

QUESTION LXXXIII

Free Will

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN HAS FREE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that man acts with free judgment, namely by an act of comparison in his reason. Now reason in particular matters may follow opposite courses. For particular operations are contingent, which permit the judgment of the reason to follow different courses, without being determined to one.—This is confirmed by experience, for otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibition, rewards, and punishments would be in vain.

ART. II.—WHETHER FREE WILL IS A POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the principle of any act in us is both a power and a habit. Now free will cannot be a habit; for it would have to be a natural habit. But this is impossible, for the things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to

free will, as was said concerning happiness. Likewise, habits are denominated according to good or bad operation. But free will stands indifferently to good or evil choice. Therefore free will, as it is the principle of action, is a power.

ART. III.—WHETHER FREE WILL IS AN APPETITIVE POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the proper act of free will is choice; now in choice the appetitive part concurs more than the cognitive; for the proper object of choice is that good that is called useful, and this is the object of the appetite.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FREE WILL IS A POWER DISTINCT FROM THE WILL.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as intellect stands to reason, so the will stands to the power of choice: For the appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers. Accordingly, just as the intellect is concerned with principles, and the reason with conclusions, so the will is concerned with the end, and free choice with the means to the end.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL

We have next to consider the acts and habits of the soul with regard to the intellectual and appetitive powers. For some powers do not come directly within the purview of the theologian. Now an act and a habit of the appetitive part pertain to the consideration of moral science; and therefore it will be treated in the second part of this work, in which we consider the matter of morality.

Now, however, we are to treat of the acts and habits of the intellectual part: First of acts; then of habits. Now in considering acts we shall proceed in this wise: First we are to consider how the soul understands while it is in union with the body; secondly, how it understands when separate from the body. The first consideration has three parts. First we shall consider how the soul understands corporeal things, which are lower than itself; secondly, how it understands itself, and the things that are in it; third, how it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.—With regard to the knowledge of corporeal things three matters are to be considered: First, by what means it knows them; secondly, how and in what order; thirdly, what it knows in them. The first consideration will take up eight articles.

QUESTION LXXXIV

How the Soul, When United to the Body, Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL KNOWS BODIES THROUGH THE INTELLECT.

YES.—It does not know bodies through separate species, or ideas, as Plato supposed.

THE REASON is that the intellect receives the species of bodies, which are material and movable, in an immaterial and immovable manner according to its mode: For the thing received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver.

NOTE: The error of Plato concerning separate species followed from another error, that the form of the thing known is necessarily in the knower in the same way as in the object known.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS THROUGH ITS ESSENCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that corporeal things are in the soul only by the abstraction of the intellect. The essence of God alone immaterially comprehends all things, as effects virtually pre-exist in the cause. Now the soul is said to be "in some manner all things," in so far as it is in potentiality to know all things.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS THROUGH INNATE SPECIES.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things it does not seem to be possible that it should have such a forgetfulness of this natural knowledge that it is not aware that it has such knowledge.

THE SECOND REASON is that, whenever any one sense is lacking, the knowledge of the things that are apprehended by that sense is also lacking.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ARE DERIVED BY THE SOUL FROM CERTAIN SEPARATE FORMS.

NO.—THE REASON is that if the soul is apt by its nature to receive intelligible species through the influence of certain separate principles only, and if did not receive them from the senses, it would not need the body to understand; hence there would be no reason for its being united to the body.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS MATERIAL THINGS IN THEIR ETERNAL ARCHETYPES.

YES.—Not in the object known (as when someone sees in a mirror the thing whose images are reflected therein); but in the principle of knowledge.

THE REASON of the first is that in this way only the blessed see everything in the eternal types, i.e., in God, whom they see, and all things in Him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the intellectual light itself that is in us is nothing other than a certain participated similitude of the uncreated Light, in which the eternal types are contained. Hence to the question: "Who showeth us good things?" (Ps. iv, 6, 7), the Psalmist replies: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as if to say: By the very seal of the divine light in us, all things are made known to us.—Yet it is not simply by the participation of the eternal types that we have a knowledge of material things (as the Platonists supposed), but intelligible species derived from things are required.

ART. VI.—WHETHER INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IS DERIVED FROM SENSIBLE THINGS.

YES.—Not as from the total and perfect cause, but rather as from the matter of the cause.

THE REASON is that phantasms, which are caused by the senses, do not suffice to alter the passive intellect, but they must be made actually intelligible by the active intellect.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND THROUGH THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES THAT IT POSSESSES, WITHOUT TURNING TO PHANTASMS.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON, as we shall see, is that if the act of the imaginative power is thwarted by the injury of the organ, man is prevented from actually understanding even the things of which he has acquired a prior knowledge.

THE SECOND REASON is that anyone can experience in his own self that when someone tries to understand something he forms for himself certain phantasms by way of examples, in which he views, as it were, what he desires to understand. For the power of knowledge is proportioned to the object of knowledge. Now the proper act of the human intellect is to view the universal as it exists in the individual.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLECT IS HINDERED BY THE SUSPENSION OF THE SENSES.

YES.—THE REASON is that everything that we understand in our present state we know by comparison with natural sensible objects. Hence it is impossible that we should have a perfect judgment of the intellect when our senses are suspended, through which we know sensible things.

QUESTION LXXXV

The Mode and Order of Our Understanding

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL AND MATERIAL THINGS BY ABSTRACTION FROM PHANTASMS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since our intellect stands midway between the senses and the angel, it knows material things, but in an immaterial manner, namely by abstracting from phantasms; for the intellect is not the act of any organ, but is a power of the soul, which is the form of the body—Accordingly, it is through material things thus considered that we come to a knowledge of immaterial things; just as on the contrary angels know the material through the immaterial.

NOTE: The active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, in so far as through the power of the active intellect we can consider the specific nature

without the individual conditions; and it is by the image of this specific nature that the passive intellect is informed (ad 4). The active intellect cannot, however, understand the things of which it abstracts the species except by turning to phantasms (ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ABSTRACTED FROM THE PHANTASM IS RELATED TO OUR INTELLECT AS THAT WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD, OR AS THAT BY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND.

IT IS RELATED AS THAT BY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND.

THE REASON is that the likeness of the thing understood, which is the intelligible species, is the form according to which the intellect understands the thing, just as the likeness of a visible thing in the eye is the form according to which the vision sees the thing itself.

Also, the things that we understand and the objects of science are the same. Now science concerns things.

Another reason is that otherwise everything that seems would be true [as when a man with a disordered taste perceives something sweet as sour].

Yet, because the intellect reflects upon itself, by the same reflection it understands both its own act of understanding and the species by which it understands; and thus the species understood is that which is secondarily understood. That which is primarily understood is the thing itself of which the intelligible species is the likeness.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MORE UNIVERSAL IS FIRST IN OUR INTELLECTUAL COGNITION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the things that are more universal are less distinct; for he who knows anything indistinctly is still in potentiality to know its principle of distinction, as one who knows the genus is in potentiality to know the difference. Therefore the animal is known to the intellect prior to the man. With regard to us, however, the knowledge of the individual comes before the knowledge of the universal, because our knowledge begins with the senses.

ART. IV.—WHETHER WE CAN UNDERSTAND MANY THINGS AT THE SAME TIME.

NO.—Not many things at the same time by more than one species.

THE REASON is that it is impossible for the same subject to be perfected simultaneously by several forms of one genus and different species; just as it is impossible for a body to be figured by different figures. Yet whatever things the intellect can understand under one species it can understand at the same time, namely as one.

ART. V.—WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION.

YES.—THE REASON is that our intellect does not have its whole perfection at once from the beginning; but first it apprehends the quiddity of the thing, which is the proper object of the intellect; and then the properties and accidents and the various circumstances of the essence of the thing. According to this one apprehension it composes and divides the apprehension of something else; and from one composition and division proceeds to another; this is to reason.—Now composition and division take place by a certain differentiation and comparison (Ad 1). But the composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the things that are composed (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE FALSE.

NO.—With regard to its proper and essential object, it cannot be false.

THE REASON is that every power, as such, is *per se* directed to its proper object. The proper object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which falls under the senses and imagination. Yet the intellect can be deceived when it orders one thing to another, either by composition or division or also by reasoning; for in these processes it may not totally reach the truth; but in simple things, in the definitions of which composition cannot intervene, we cannot be deceived.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ONE PERSON CAN UNDERSTAND ONE AND THE SAME THING BETTER THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—On the part of the one who understands; not, however, on the part of the thing understood.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that one person is more capable in understand-

ing than another. This happens both because their body (as matter in relation to form) is better disposed for knowledge—hence “we see that those who are soft of flesh are apt of mind” (Aristotle, *On the Soul*, ii, 9);—and because the lower parts of their powers (imaginative, cogitative, and memorative) are more apt.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus one person cannot understand the same thing more than another; for if he understood it otherwise than it is, either better or worse, he would be deceived and would not understand, as Augustine argues.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS THE INDIVISIBLE BEFORE THE DIVISIBLE.

NO.—With regard to that which is wholly indivisible, i.e., actually and potentially, as a point.—Yes, with regard to what is indivisible according to continuity and with regard to what is indivisible in species.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such an indivisible is known by the privation of divisibility.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND AND THIRD is that the intellect understands both kinds of indivisible of itself, as being its proper object, for the continuous and the species have a relationship to the quiddity [of a thing, which is the first and proper object of our cognitive power.]

QUESTION LXXXVI

What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS SINGULARS.

NO.—Directly and primarily it does not know singulars, but only indirectly and by reflection.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that what is abstracted from individual matter is universal; hence our intellect knows directly only universals.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, after it has abstracted the intelligible species, it cannot actually understand by them except by turning to phantasms, in which it understands intelligible species. But the intellect directly knows the immaterial singular (ad 3). It belongs to the senses to know the material singular directly (ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS.

NO.—Actually and habitually it cannot know infinite things; it can, however, know infinite things potentially.

THE REASON is that our intellect can actually know at one and the same time only through one species. Now the infinite (in quantity, of which we are speaking) does not have one species; otherwise it would be a complete whole [which it is not, by definition]. Secondly, habitual knowledge is caused by actual consideration. Our intellect, however, never understands so many things that it cannot understand several others. This is to know the infinite potentially, namely by receiving one thing after another.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN KNOW CONTINGENT THINGS.

YES.—Contingent things, as contingent, are known directly by the senses, indirectly by the intellect.

THE REASON is that everything is contingent because of matter; but necessity results from form. Now matter is directly an object of sense, but indirectly an object of the intellect. Therefore the universal and necessary forms of contingent things are known directly by the intellect.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE FUTURE.

NO.—It cannot know the future in itself; yet it can know it in its causes.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus only God knows the future, for to Him all things are present, in so far as His eternal gaze extends at once to the whole course of time, as has been said (Q. xiv, art. 13).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the future can be known according to the order of effect to cause, whether necessarily or contingently.

QUESTION LXXXVII**How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL KNOWS ITSELF BY ITS ESSENCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is connatural to our intellect, according to the state of the present life, to regard material and sensible things; the consequence is that thus our intellect understands itself in so far as it is actuated by species abstracted from sensibles, and through them the possible intellect understands, either particularly, from the fact that some one perceives that he understands, or universally, when we consider the nature of the human mind from the act of the intellect. Yet the judgment and efficacy of this knowledge, through which we know the nature of the soul, belong to us according to the derivation of the light of our intellect from the divine truth, in which the types of all things are contained (Q. lxxxiv, art. 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT KNOWS THE HABITS OF THE SOUL BY THEIR ESSENCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that nothing is known except as it is in act. Now a habit is as it were midway between pure potentiality and pure act. Yet a habit is known through its act, and through diligent inquiry, as was said of the soul (in the preceding art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT KNOWS ITS OWN ACT.

YES.—Secondarily.

THE REASON is that the operation of the intellect is not as an action extending to something else, but remains in the agent as its perfection and act. Yet the proper object of our intellect is the material nature of a thing; secondarily, the act itself is known, by which the object is known, and through this act the intellect itself is known.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS THE ACT OF THE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of the will is an intelligible inclination. For the act of the will is nothing else than a certain inclination resulting from the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination resulting from the natural form.

QUESTION LXXXVIII**How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself**

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IN THE PRESENT STATE OF LIFE CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES IN THEMSELVES.

NO.—THE REASON is that in the state of the present life our intellect understands nothing except by turning to phantasms.

NOTE: In this article the Holy Doctor diffusely argues against Averroes, who held that the active intellect is a separated substance in some manner united to us, through which we immediately receive knowledge concerning separated substances

ART. II.—WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES THROUGH ITS KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS.

NO.—Against those who supposed that the quiddity of a material thing abstracted by our intellect has something material, which is again and again abstracted until we come to the pure immaterial substance to be understood. So a celebrated Arab philosopher of the 12th century, one Avempace, or Aben-pace.

THE REASON is that, supposing, without asserting, that immaterial substances are altogether of a different principle from the quiddities of material things, however much our intellect abstracts the quiddity of the material thing from matter, it will never come to anything similar to immaterial substance.—Yet we can ascend from material things to some knowledge of immaterial things, but not to a perfect knowledge; for there is no adequate proportion between material and immaterial things (*ad 1*).

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS THE FIRST OBJECT KNOWN BY THE HUMAN MIND.

NO.—THE REASON is that the first thing that is understood by us in the state of the present life is the quiddity of a material thing, which is the object of our intellect; now we rise to a knowledge of God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom. i, 20): "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

QUESTION LXXXIX **The Knowledge of the Separated Soul** (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL SEPARATED FROM THE BODY CAN UNDERSTAND.

YES.—But in a manner besides its nature.

THE REASON is that the mode of operation follows the mode of existence. Just as its being separated from the body is besides the nature of the soul, so also is its simple act of understanding, without recourse to phantasms.

NOTE: The separated soul does not understand through innate species, or through species that it then abstracts, or only through the species it retains; but through the species arising from the influence of the divine light, which the soul shares like other separated substances, although in an inferior degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal phantasms, it turns to superior things. Nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author not only of the influx of the light of grace, but also that of the light of nature (ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL UNDERSTANDS SEPARATED SUBSTANCES.

YES.—By the fact that the separated soul knows itself.

THE REASON is that it is common to every separated substance that it understand that which is above itself and that which is below itself according to the mode of its substance; for something is understood according as it is in the one who understands. Hence the separated soul has a perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but only an imperfect and deficient knowledge of angels. This is to be understood of the natural knowledge of the separated soul. The knowledge of glory is built on another rule.

NOTE: The separated soul is more imperfect than the soul united to the body, if the nature of the body be considered; but it is freer to understand, in so far as on earth pure understanding is impeded by the body's heaviness and preoccupations (Ad 1).—The soul knows angels through similitudes divinely impressed on it.—There is great happiness in the knowledge of other separated substances (ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS ALL NATURAL THINGS.

NO.—It does not have a perfect and proper knowledge of all natural things, but a general and confused knowledge.

THE REASON is that the mode of knowledge of the separated soul is not natural to it. The angels, on the other hand, know by perfect knowledge all natural things, because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things He has produced in the angelic intelligence, namely for the government of the world, as Augustine says.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS SINGULARS.

YES.—Not all singulars, but only those to which it is in some manner determined.

THE REASON is that the separated soul knows through species, which are participated similitudes of the Divine Essence.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE ACT OF KNOWLEDGE HERE ACQUIRED REMAINS IN THE SEPARATED SOUL.

YES.—With regard to that which is in the intellect itself; but not with regard to that which is in the lower powers.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the intellect is incorruptible, and intellectual species have no contrary.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such (lower) powers do not remain in the separated soul.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE HABIT OF KNOWLEDGE HERE ACQUIRED REMAINS IN THE SEPARATED SOUL.

YES.—But not in the same way as now.

THE REASON is that by the intelligible species here acquired the separated soul can understand what it understood previously; not by turning to phantasms, but in a way suitable to the separated soul.

ART. VII.—WHETHER LOCAL DISTANCE IMPEDES THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL.

NO.—Contrary to those who held that the separated soul knows singulars by abstracting from the senses. This is evidently false.

THE REASON is that in the separated soul sense does not actually remain. But the divine light, through which the separated soul understands singulars, is indifferent to far and near.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOULS KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON ON EARTH.

NO.—By natural knowledge, which is here in question.

THE REASON is that the souls of the dead are by divine ordinance, and by the mode of their existence, removed from association with the living, and made associate with spiritual substances apart from a body, as St. Gregory (*Moralia*, xii, c. 14, in the beginning) and St. Augustine (*On the Care of the Dead*, c. 13 and 14) say.

NOTE: St. Augustine holds, not assertively, but with hesitation, that not even the souls of the blessed know what is going on on earth. St. Gregory the Great, however, says assertively that the souls of the saints see everything in the very splendor of God. The latter position St. Thomas is inclined to favor; because, as he says, the souls of the just in heaven are equal to the angels, as St. Augustine himself teaches: Yet they do not intervene in the affairs of the living except in so far as the disposition of divine justice demands.

THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN

Next to consider is the first production of man—the production of man himself, the end of production, the state and condition of man as he was first produced, and the place in which he was put.—With regard to production three things are to be considered: First, the production of man with regard to the soul; second, with regard to the body of the man; third, with regard to the production of the woman.—The first point calls for four articles.

QUESTION XC

The Production of Man with Regard to His Soul

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS MADE, OR IS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF GOD.

ANSWER: The soul is not of the substance of God, but is made. This is stated against the Manicheans, who said that God is corporeal light, and the soul a part of Him; and against Varrus, who said that God is the soul of the world. These adversaries could not distinguish spirit from body.

THE REASON is that the human soul is sometimes potentially intelligent, acquiring knowledge in some measure from things, and has different powers; God, however, is pure act (Q. iii, art. 7).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS PRODUCED IN BEING BY CREATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that it cannot be made out of pre-existing matter—either corporeal, because thus it would be of a corporeal nature; or spiritual, because thus spiritual substances would be transmuted into each other; but it is subsistent form, to which being and becoming properly belong.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL IS PRODUCED IMMEDIATELY BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the rational soul can be produced only by creation (preced. art.). Only God can create, because it belongs only to the Prime Agent to act with nothing presupposed (Q. lxxv, art. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL WAS PRODUCED BEFORE THE BODY.

NO.—Contrary to Origen, who said that it was created with the angels; and contrary to St. Augustine, who said (not assertively, however, and in deference to the authority of Scripture) that the causal principle of the human body was in the elements of the world, but that the soul had already been created.

THE REASON is that the soul, since it is a part of human nature, does not have natural perfection except in so far as it is united to the body. Now God established the first things in the perfect state of their nature so far as the species of each thing required.

QUESTION XC I

The Production of the Body of the First Man (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BODY OF THE FIRST MAN WAS OF THE SLIME OF THE EARTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since God is perfect in His works, He gave perfection to all things according to their nature; now it was suitable to the body of the first man that it should be formed of earth mixed with water, as well as of the other elements, so that man might be in a manner composed of all things, and that he should have points of agreement with the lower bodies, just as by his soul he has points of agreement with spiritual things.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HUMAN BODY WAS PRODUCED IMMEDIATELY BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that a human body had never been formed, whereby another body similar in species could be formed by way of generation. Now to produce a form in matter without the aid of a preceding material form belongs to God alone.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BODY OF MAN HAD A SUITABLE DISPOSITION.

YES.—God made the human body in the best disposition for the particular form (the soul) and operations for which it was intended even though not absolutely the best [for in certain senses and bodily formations the brutes are superior].

THE REASON is that all natural things were produced by divine art, and are, so to speak, the artifacts of God Himself. God therefore gave to each thing the best disposition according to its relation to its proper end, and this can be seen in every part of the body (as is proved in the replies to the objections).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PRODUCTION OF THE HUMAN BODY IS APTLY DESCRIBED IN SCRIPTURE.

YES.—For the authority of Scripture suffices.

THE REASON of congruency is that the things that we principally intend we are wont to do with greater care and deliberation.—For particulars see the answers to the objections.

(St. Thomas says, Ad 3, that the words: "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are an exposition of what goes before. God did not create first the body and then the soul, but both simultaneously. It is said "into his face" because vital operations are seen most clearly in the face.)

QUESTION XC II

The Production of the Woman (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRODUCED IN THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that it was necessary that woman should be made as a help to the man, namely as a help to generation; it was not suitable to man, on account of his perfection, to have in himself both active and passive powers of generation united, as is the case with certain plants and the lowest animals.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE FROM THE MAN.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the dignity of the first man consisted in this, that he was the head of the whole human species, as God is the head of the universe. This dignity was preserved by having the woman made from him.

THE SECOND REASON is that the man might love the woman more, and more inseparably cleave to her [as being made from him].

THE THIRD REASON is that male and female are united in men, not only because of the necessity of generation, as in the other animals, but also on account of domestic life, in which life the man is the head of the woman.

THE FOURTH REASON is that this signifies that the Church takes her origin from Christ, as the Apostle says (Ephes. v, 32).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED OF THE RIB OF THE MAN.

YES.—First, to signify that between the man and the woman there should be a social union. Second, for the sacramental signification, because from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross there flowed forth the sacraments, that is, blood and water, on which the Church was established.

NOTE: The rib belonged to the perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race (ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WOMAN WAS FORMED IMMEDIATELY BY GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the woman was not generated from seed. Now only God can produce things in being outside the order of nature.

QUESTION XCIII
The End or Term of the Production of Man
(in nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN.

YES.—An imperfect image.

THE REASON is that in man is found some likeness to God, which is drawn from God as a copy from the exemplar; yet it is not a likeness in equality, because the exemplar infinitely surpasses the copy.

NOTE: An image adds sometime to the notion of likeness, namely that it is copied from something else (according to species, or at least according to what is proper to the species, especially the figure).—In the words of Scripture: "Let us make man to our image," the preposition *to* signifies a certain approach, which pertains to a distant thing.—The image of God is in His Son, as the image of the King is in the son who is of the same nature as himself; in man, however, the image exists as in an alien nature, as the image of the King is on a silver coin (ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS FOUND IN IRRATIONAL CREATURES.

NO.—THE REASON is that it does not suffice for the notion of a proper image that something be copied according to genus, as the worm from man, or according to some common accident; but it is required that there should be a likeness according to species, or at least according to some accident proper to the species, and especially according to figure. Hence neither beings, in so far as they have being; nor living things, in so far as they have life, are properly called images of God, but only intellectual creatures in so far as they know and understand; yet other things have some likeness to God (ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL IS MORE TO THE IMAGE OF GOD THAN MAN.

YES.—Simply speaking; but not in some respects.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that in which the notion of God's image is first considered is intellectual nature, and this is more perfect in the angels than in men.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, inasmuch as man proceeds from man; as God proceeds from God; and as the soul of man is wholly in every part of him, as God is in all things, so the image of God is more in men than in the angel.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS FOUND IN EVERY MAN.

YES.—What is called the image of creation.

THE REASON is that man is said to be to the image of God according to his intellectual nature, by which he can most imitate God, namely in understanding and loving. Therefore in a threefold way the image of God is in man: First, in so far as man has a natural aptitude to understand and love God (the image of creation); second, in so far as he knows and loves God by the conformity of grace (the image of re-creation); third, according to the likeness of glory (the image of likeness).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN MAN THERE IS THE IMAGE OF GOD WITH REGARD TO THE TRINITY OF PERSONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that being to the image of God according to the imitation of the divine nature does not exclude being to the image of God according to the representation of the three Persons, but rather the one follows the other; for in God Himself one nature exists in three Persons.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN ONLY ACCORDING TO THE MIND.

YES.—In man the likeness of God is found by way of image according to the mind, and according to his other parts by way of trace.

THE REASON is that an image properly represents the likeness of the species, as was said (art. 2), but a trace represents by way of the effect pointing to the cause. By reason of his species, man is rational, and according to this he has the image of God both as regards the divine nature and as regards the likeness of the uncreated Trinity. For there are also in man a procession, in the mind, of the word through the intellect and a procession of love through the will.

NOTE: A trace of the Trinity is in other creatures in so far as there are in them: A modified and finite substance, which points to a Principle; species, which points to the Word of the Maker, just as the form of a house points to the conception of the builder; and order, which points to the love of the Producer, by which the effect is ordained to good, just as the use of a building points to the will of the builder (in body of text).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS FOUND IN THE SOUL ACCORDING TO ITS ACTS.

YES.—In so far as from the knowledge that we have we form, by thinking, an interior word, and from this we burst into love.

THE REASON is that, since a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image, the image of the Trinity that is found in the soul must be looked for where the soul approaches most closely to a representation of the species of the divine Persons, who are distinguished by processions.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF THE DIVINE TRINITY IS IN THE SOUL ONLY BY COMPARISON WITH THE OBJECT THAT IS GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that diversity of objects diversifies the species of the word and love.

ART. IX.—WHETHER "LIKENESS" IS PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED FROM "IMAGE."

YES.—Likeness is aptly distinguished from image as the preamble to it, and as resulting from it.

THE REASON is that likeness is considered in the light of the things that are more common than the properties of intellectual nature, wherein the image is properly to be seen. Thus, in so far as the soul is incorruptible, it is said to be like to God; with regard to the mind, it is called an image of God. Likeness can also be considered in so far as it signifies the perfection and fidelity of the image.

THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN

Next to consider is the state and condition of the first man; and first with regard to his soul; second as regards his body. The first consideration occupies two questions: 1) The condition of man with regard to the intellect; 2) the condition of man with regard to the will. The first question is in four articles.

QUESTION XCIV

The State and Condition of the First Man With Regard to the Intellect

ART. I.—WHETHER THE FIRST MAN SAW GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE.

NO.—Not according to the common condition of that life.

THE REASON is that no one who sees God through His essence can have his will turned from God.—Yet he knew God by a higher knowledge than we now know Him; because "God made man right" (Eccl. vii, 30). Hence the first man was not hindered by external things in the clear and steadfast contemplation of intelligible effects, which he perceived by an irradiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or a gratuitous knowledge.

NOTE: The first man, before sin, had a life of happiness in a certain measure, in so far as he had the gift of integrity and a certain natural perfection, as Augustine says (ad 1), which he lost through sin.

ART. II.—WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE SAW THE ANGELS THROUGH THEIR ESSENCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that even to the soul of the first man belonged the mode of understanding by turning to phantasms.—Yet the soul of the first man had a more excellent mode of knowledge of the angels than that we possess; because his knowledge was more certain and fixed with regard to intelligible things within him than our own; and on account of this excellence of knowledge, says Gregory, he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FIRST MAN KNEW ALL THINGS.

YES.—He knew everything in which it was man's nature to be instructed.

THE REASON is that, just as the first man was created in a perfect state as regards his body, so that it could procreate at once, so also he was created in a perfect state as regards his soul, so that he could immediately instruct and govern others; for the perfect precedes the imperfect by a natural order, as act precedes power.

NOTE: The first man knew all the things that virtually exist in self-evident first principles, namely whatever men can naturally know.—Concerning supernatural things he received only as much knowledge as was necessary for the government of human life according to the state of innocence.—Other things, which cannot naturally be known by human study, and are not necessary for the government of human life, were not known by the first man. But he had a knowledge of all things through species infused by God (ad 1.)

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN IN HIS FIRST STATE COULD BE DECEIVED.

NO.—As long as innocence remained, man's intellect could not accept anything false as true.

THE REASON is that, as will appear from the very rectitude of the primal state, as long as the soul remained subject to God, so long was the lower subject the higher in man, and the higher was not hindered by the lower. Now deception arises in the intellect from some lower faculty, i.e., the imagination or kindred powers.

NOTE: Eve was not properly deceived by the serpent, for, as Augustine said: "The woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her power, and in a presumption of self-conceit" (*Gen. ad Lit.* xi, 30) (Ad 1).

QUESTION XCV

The Things Pertaining to the Will of the First Man—Namely Grace and Righteousness

On this head two inquiries are to be made: 1) Concerning the grace and justice of the first man; second, the use of that justice as regards dominion over others. The first point takes up four questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE FIRST MAN WAS CREATED IN GRACE.

YES.—According to Eccles. vii, 30: "God made man right."

THE REASON is that this subjection of the body to the soul, and of the lower powers to the reason, was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since even in the demons the natural powers that were given them remained after sin. Hence it is manifest that that first subjection also, whereby the reason was subject to God, was not only according to nature, but also according to the supernatural gift of grace (as appears from the immediate consequences of the sin of the first man).

ART. II.—WHETHER PASSIONS EXISTED IN THE SOUL OF THE FIRST MAN.

YES.—But passions consequent on the judgment of reason, and only those passions that proceed from present or future good.

THE REASON is that in that state of innocence no evil was present or imminent. Hence there was not in the first man either sadness or sorrow, or anything else of the sort. But the passions concerned with a present good, such as joy and love, or those concerned with a future good to be had in due time, such as desire and hope that do not afflict the soul, did exist in the state of innocence, but only in such a way that the lower appetite was totally subject to the reason.

ART. III.—WHETHER ADAM HAD ALL THE VIRTUES.

YES.—In some measure, but not in the same manner.

THE REASON is that the virtues are nothing else than certain perfections, by which reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers are ordered according to the rule of rectitude of the primal state as has been said.—Yet he did not have all the virtues in the same way: He had charity and justice, which do not by their nature involve an imperfection, as regards both act and habit. Faith and hope, which involve an imperfection, but which could exist in the primal state, he had also, as regards both act and habit. Other virtues, which of their nature involve an imperfection, repugnant to the perfection of the primal state, he did not have as regards the act, but as regards the disposition or habit; thus he was so disposed that, should he sin, he would repent, and would have compassion for his neighbor, if the neighbor could suffer distress.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF THE FIRST MAN WERE LESS EFFECTIVE FOR MERIT THAN OUR OWN.

NO.—If the degree of merit be considered as it arises from the root of grace and charity, and likewise if the degree of the work be considered absolutely—then it must be said that the works of men were more meritorious in the state of innocence than after sin; but not if we consider the proportionate degree.

THE REASON is that grace was more abundant in the first man before sin than after sin, since no obstacle was found in human nature; and, since man was of greater virtue (absolutely), he would have done greater works. But a greater reason for merit is found after sin, on account of the weakness of man, which involves greater difficulty in the performance of meritorious works.

QUESTION XCVI**The Dominion Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence****ART. I.—WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD DOMINION OVER THE ANIMALS.**

YES.—THE REASON is that animals are naturally subject to man. Now in the state of innocence before disobedience, nothing disobeyed man that should naturally be subject to him.

That the animals are naturally subject to man appears from three things: First from the order observed by nature, which proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Thus the plants use the earth for their nutriment, animals use the plants, and man uses plants and animals; second, from the order of divine providence, which always governs the lower through the higher; third, from the respective natures of man and animals. Now in the animals there is a certain participation of prudence in regard to certain particular acts; but in man there is universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now everything that exists by participation is subject to that which exists essentially and universally.

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas adds, in ad 2, that the nature of the animals was not

changed by man's sin, and they would have preyed on one another then as now. In ad 3 he says that in the state of innocence man would not have had any need of animals for food or clothing but that he needed them in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures.]

ART. II.—WHETHER MAN HAD DOMINION OVER ALL OTHER CREATURES.

YES.—In the way in which he controls the things that are within him.

THE REASON is that man in a certain sense contains all things. Yet man was not master of the angels in the state of innocence, because reason in man has the position of master and not of subject [and the angels, whose intellect is higher than reason, are not subject to its use or command]. But he was master of the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man was master, not by commanding but by using them.

ART. III.—WHETHER MEN WERE EQUAL IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE.

NO.—Not only would there have been inequality with respect to age and sex, but also with respect to soul (i.e., by reason of justice and knowledge) and also with respect to body.

THE REASON is that on the part of the soul man does not act from necessity but by free will. With regard to the body he was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior agents (e.g., from climate) more or less benefit or help.

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN MASTER OVER MAN.

YES.—Not as mastery is opposed to slavery, but as it is commonly referred to a subject in any sense.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such dominion cannot exist without the punishment of the subjects; for it is a grievous matter for one to yield to another the good (liberty) that ought to be one's own.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by such dominion one rules another as a free man, i.e., for the good of him who is directed, or for the common good. Now man is naturally a social animal, and if one man had over others a superiority of knowledge and justice it would have been unsuitable unless this were used for the good of others.

QUESTION XCVII

The Preservation of the Individual in the Primal State

(in four articles)

(This part is followed by a question on the preservation of the species)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMORTAL.

YES.—Not because of matter or form, but because of the efficient cause, which is God.

THE REASON is that the body of the first man was not indissoluble by any vigor of immortality existing within him; but because there was in the soul a certain power supernaturally given by God, through which the body could be preserved from all corruption as long as the soul itself remained subject to God; so that thus the soul could preserve the body above the nature of corporeal matter, as befitted it.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSIBLE.

NO.—According to the proper sense of passibility (*passio*) he was impassible; he was passible only according to the general sense of passibility.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man could curb such passions as remove a natural disposition; thus he could avoid death as long as he refrained from sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that passibility (*passio*) is commonly denominated according to any sort of change, such as understanding or feeling, which is ordered to man's natural welfare. [Thus man in innocence could grow tired and sleepy, but he could suffer no disease or bodily injury.]

NOTE: The body of man in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; partly also by divine providence, which so protected him that nothing that could harm him could take him by surprise (ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD NEED OF FOOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the state of innocence the rational soul communicated to the body that which belonged to itself as a soul (*anima*); thus man is called animal, and as such needs food. [For the first principle of animal life is the vegetative soul, the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth.]

NOTE: After the resurrection the soul will communicate to the body that which is proper to it as a spirit: Immortality with regard to all; impassibility and glory and virtue with regard to the good (in body).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD HAVE ACQUIRED IMMORTALITY BY THE TREE OF LIFE.

YES.—But not absolutely.

THE REASON is that the tree of life had power to fortify the natural vigor of the species against the weakness arising from the mixture of extraneous sources. Yet the power of the tree could not extend to giving to the body the power of enduring indefinitely. [After the period for which the eating of the tree of life gave strength had passed, man either was to be transferred to a spiritual life or had need to eat once again of the tree.]

QUESTION XCVIII.

The Preservation of the Species

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN GENERATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since in corruptible things nothing is perpetual and abiding forever, except the species, it follows that the good of the species is the principal intention of nature, to the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. For that seems to be of the direct intention of nature which is invariable and perpetual.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN GENERATION BY COITION.

YES.—Contrary to those, like St. Gregory of Nyssa, who, considering the baseness of concupiscence that is found in coition in our present state, supposed that in the state of innocence there would have been no generation by coition.

THE REASON is that the things that are natural to man are neither withdrawn nor given to man through sin. Now the deformity of immoderate concupiscence, which exists in the present state, would not have existed in the state of innocence, when the lower powers were wholly subject to reason. Hence there would have been fertility without lust.

QUESTION XCIX

THE Condition of the Offspring as to the Body

The condition of the offspring must be studied as to body, justice, and knowledge. The first point occupies two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CHILDREN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD HAVE HAD PERFECT STRENGTH AS TO THE USE OF THEIR MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER BIRTH.

NO.—THE REASON is that, although man's members in the state of innocence could not fail the human will, yet a well-ordered human will is that which tends to acts suitable to itself. Now different acts are suitable to man according to every age.—The use of the members, according to St. Thomas, depends on the dryness of the brain.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE PRIMAL STATE WOMEN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the state of innocence nothing of what belongs to complete human nature would have been absent.

NOTE: 1.—Woman is said by Aristotle to be a "misbegotten male," because she

is outside the intention of nature considered in the individual case; but not outside nature as a whole (Ad 1). 2.—The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause. Thus Aristotle says that “the northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females;” sometimes also by some impression in the soul of the parents, which may easily have some effect on the body of the child. Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be determined (ad 2).

QUESTION C

The Condition of the Offspring as Regards Righteousness

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN IN A STATE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that original justice, in which the first man was created, was an accident of the nature of the species, as a gift divinely given to the whole of nature. Hence original sin, which is opposed to that righteousness, is transmitted from parent to descendants.

NOTE: The root of original justice, in the rectitude of which man was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which is by way of sanctifying grace (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHILDREN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN CONFIRMED IN RIGHTEOUSNESS.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is manifest that children at their birth would not have had more perfection than their parents in the state of generation.

QUESTION CI

The Condition of the Offspring as Regard Knowledge

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN WITH PERFECT KNOWLEDGE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is natural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as was said (Q. Iv, art. 2); he would have acquired it in course of time without difficulty, by discovery or instruction.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE HAD THE PERFECT USE OF REASON IMMEDIATELY AFTER BIRTH.

NO.—THE REASON is that in children there is an obstacle to the sensitive powers on account of the excessive humidity of the brain, as was said before (Q. xcix, a. 1).

QUESTION CII

Man's Primal Place, Which Was Paradise

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PARADISE IS A CORPOREAL PLACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that what is said in Scripture concerning paradise is proposed by way of a historical narrative. Now in everything that Scripture thus transmits to us, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanations we may offer.

ART. II.—WHETHER PARADISE WAS A PLACE SUITABLE TO THE HABITATION OF MAN.

YES.—According to the state of primal immortality.

THE REASON is that in paradise food was found that could counteract the interior corruption of the body, namely that which is owing to the consumption of the moist in man and to old age; and there was a climate tempered against external corruption, which chiefly arises from inclement weather.

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN WAS PLACED IN PARADISE TO DRESS IT AND KEEP IN.

YES.—THE REASON is that that operation would not have been laborious, as it was after sin, but would have been pleasant on account of the thrill of using one's

natural powers [a thing that in itself is always pleasant]; and the keeping of paradise would not have been against an invader, but that man might keep paradise for himself, so as not to lose it through sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN WAS CREATED IN PARADISE.

NO.—THE REASON is that God made man outside of paradise in order that the incorruption of the primal state, for which paradise was a suitable place, should not be attributed to human nature, but to grace, or the supernatural gift of God.

QUESTION CIII

The Government of Things in General

After first treating of the creation and distinction of things, it remains thirdly to consider the government of things: First government in general; secondly, the particular effects of government. The first question occupies eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ANYONE.

YES.—Contrary to those who held that everything was done by chance.

THE FIRST REASON is that in nature things happen always, or in most cases, for the best. This would not happen unless the things of nature were directed by some providence toward good as an end, which is to govern.

THE SECOND REASON is that, since it belongs to the best to produce the best, it is not befitting the supreme goodness of God to produce things without leading them to the attainment of their end.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD IS SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE WORLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the principle of things is something extrinsic to the whole universe, namely God (Q. xix, art. 4, and Q. xlv, art. 1 and 2); now the end corresponds to the principle.—Likewise, because the end of the universe must be the universal good, just as the end of a particular thing is a particular good, which partakes of the universal good. Now the universal good is what is good by its essence, namely God.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WORLD IS GOVERNED BY ONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the government of the world, whose end is that which is essentially good, is the best kind of government. Now the best government is that which is conducted by one, because unity belongs to the notion of good. And that which is in itself one is more suitably the cause of unity than many things united.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT IS ONE AND NOT MANY.

NO.—THERE ARE MANY effects, i.e., one end of government by reason of the end itself, two effects of government by which the creature is made like to God; and innumerable individual effects.

THE REASON is that there is one principal end of the government of the world, which is essential good, or assimilation to the supreme Good. Now the things in which the creature is made like to God in general are two, namely with regard to this, 1) that God is the cause of good, and so the creature becomes like to him by being good; and with regard to this, 2) that God is the cause of goodness, and so the creature becomes like God by causing others to be good. Moreover the effects of government in the individual case are innumerable, as it self-evident.

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that God is the universal cause of all being (Q. xlv, art. 1 and 2).—Likewise by reason of the end; because there can be nothing that is not ordained to the divine goodness as to its end, for the end of government is the divine goodness itself (prec. art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE IMMEDIATELY GOVERNED BY GOD.

NO.—As regards the execution of government certain things are governed by God by means of others; but in respect to the design of government all things are immediately governed by God.

THE REASON is that the essence of government is practical knowledge, which is

more perfect the more it extends to particulars. Yet it is a greater perfection for something to be good in itself, and also be the cause of goodness in others, than if it were only good in itself; and therefore God so governs things as to make some of them causes of others in governing.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that God is the universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general. Accordingly, from the very fact that from one viewpoint something seems to slip out of the order of divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause. Therefore so far as divine providence is concerned, nothing in the world is done by chance.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ANYTHING CAN RESIST THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

NO.—According to the general order, nothing can resist the divine wisdom; something can, however, resist a particular cause executing the divine government.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that everything tends, in its operation and effort, to nothing but good. Likewise, every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing else than an impression from the first mover [just as the inclination of an arrow to its target is nothing but an impulse received from the archer].

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the things that resist order do not totally resist the order of government—for even sinners intend something good—but resist some particular good, proper to their nature or state. And therefore they are justly punished by God (ad 1).

QUESTION CIV

The Special Effects of the Divine Government

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CREATURES NEED TO BE KEPT IN BEING BY GOD.

YES.—Either indirectly and accidentally, with regard to some things; or *per se* and directly, with regard to all things.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that indirectly and incidentally he is said to preserve a thing who removes from it a corrupting influence, as when someone keeps a child from falling into the fire. And thus God preserves many things, but not all; for some things do not have corrupting influences.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that being, which is participated in all creatures, does not belong to the essence of creatures themselves; but relates to creatures as the illumination of the sun to air: For illumination does not belong to the nature or fundamental principle of the air. Only God is being by His essence, and His essence is His being.

NOTE: The conservation of things by God is not through any new action, but by the continuation of the action by which He gives being. This action is without movement and time, just as the preservation of light in the atmosphere is by the continuous influence of the sun. (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD CONSERVES EVERY CREATURE IMMEDIATELY.

NO.—Both as to indirect and incidental conservation and as to direct conservation.

THE REASON is that there are many things that impede the action of corrupting influences, as has been said (prec. art.); likewise, since there are many ordinate causes, it is necessary that the effect depend first and principally on the first cause, but secondarily on all mediate causes.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD CAN ANNIHILATE ANYTHING.

YES.—THE REASON is that it depends on the will of God that God should communicate being to a creature (Q. xix, art. 4); in no other way can a thing be kept in being except by His continuous communication of being (art. 1 and 2 of this Q.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANYTHING ACTUALLY IS ANNIHILATED.

NO.—Nothing at all is annihilated, either according to the natural course of things or outside the natural order, or miraculously.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that creatures either are immaterial, and thus there is in them no potentiality to non-being, or they are material, and thus at least they remain always according to matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the substratum of generation and corruption.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the divine power and goodness are more clearly shown by preserving things in being than by annihilating them.

QUESTION CV

The Change of Creatures by God

Under the second effect of divine government come the change of creatures by God and the change of one creature by another. The first point occupies eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE MATTER IMMEDIATELY TO THE FORM.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the matter is contained under the divine power, being produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the divine power; now the form is nothing else than the act of the matter.

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD CAN IMMEDIATELY MOVE ANY BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since God can immediately impress the form on matter (prec. art.), it follows that He can move any body according to any movement; for it belongs to Him to impress the form, and to dispose to the form, and to give consequent movement to the form. But God's contact is a virtual one, as is evident, and not a corporeal contact (ad 1), or a power of bulk (ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD MOVES THE CREATED INTELLECT IMMEDIATELY.

YES.—Both so that the intellect has power to understand and so that the intellect actually understands through intelligible species.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since what is first in any order is the cause of the things that result from that order, it follows that to God, who is the first understanding, every power of understanding owes its being.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that all the intelligible types of things first exist in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects, so that they actually understand, and are derived also by creatures, so that they exist.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD CAN MOVE THE CREATED WILL.

YES.—Both as the object satisfying the will and as the cause of the power to will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the passive power of the will extends to good in general; now only God is general or universal good.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to will is nothing else than an inclination to the object of the will, which is universal good; now to incline anything to universal good belongs to the Prime Mover, to whom the final end is proportionate.—Hence in both ways it is proper to God to move the will, but chiefly in the second way, by inclining it internally.

NOTE: Thus God, in moving the will, does not force it, but gives it its own inclination (ad 1).—Likewise, to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle. But this interior principle can be caused by an exterior principle; and thus to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another (ad 2), since the reason for merit and demerit remains (ad 3) [since man can resist or co-operate with God's movement].

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD WORKS IN EVERY AGENT.

YES.—God so works in things that the things themselves have an operation of their own. He does this as the final, efficient, and formal cause of things, in a manner intimate to them.

THE REASON is that end and good are convertible. But nothing is or appears good save in so far as it partakes of some resemblance to the Supreme Good, which is God.—Likewise, every agent supposes a first agent; and God not only moves things to operation, as by applying the forms and powers of things to operation, but also gives forms to creatures as agents, and keeps them in being. But in all things He works intimately because God Himself is properly the universal cause of the very being of all things; now being is most intimate to things.

ART. VI.—WHETHER GOD CAN DO ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE ORDER IMPLANTED IN THINGS.

YES.—Not in so far as the order of things depends on the first cause, but in so far as it depends on any of the secondary causes.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus God would act against His foreknowledge, or will, or goodness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but such order is subjected to Him, as it were proceeding from Him, not by natural necessity but by choice of His will.

For God could have established another natural order; hence He can also act outside the present established order when He wills, for example, by producing the effects of secondary causes without them (From this ensues a miracle *ratione modi*, e.g., the conversion of water into wine); or by producing some effects to which secondary causes do not extend (miracle *ratione sui*, e.g., the resurrection of the dead). In so doing God does not act against nature, but outside it.

ART. VII. — WHETHER EVERYTHING GOD DOES OUTSIDE THE ORDER IS A MIRACLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that miracle is so called from being, as it were, full of wonder, i.e., has a cause that is absolutely and universally hidden. This cause is God.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ONE MIRACLE CAN BE GREATER THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—Not on the part of God, but on the part of the nature whose faculty the miracle exceeds.

THE REASON is that one miracle can exceed the faculty of nature more than another.—By this rule miracles are distinguished in three ways: 1) With regard to the substance of the deed, if the act is in no way produced by nature, e.g., the glorification of the human body; 2) with regard to the subject, if what is done is done by nature, but never in this particular subject, e.g., the revival of the dead, the illumination of the blind [for nature can give life, but not to the dead], etc.; and with regard to the manner, i.e., when a miracle exceeds the order and mode of nature's action, e.g., instantaneous healing, without natural healing and processes.

We have next to consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will occupy three parts: 1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; 2) how bodies move; 3) how men, who are composed of spiritual and corporeal natures, act. The first point has three considerations: a) How one angel acts on another; b) how he acts on the corporeal creature; c) how he acts on men.—With regard to the first consideration we must treat of the enlightenment and speech of the angels, and their ordination to one another, both the good and the bad.—The treatise on enlightenment occupies four articles.

QUESTION CVI

The Enlightenment of the Angels

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE ANGEL ENLIGHTENS ANOTHER.

YES.—By strengthening the intellective power of another, and (secondly) by the manifestation of the truth through a likeness of the thing understood.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in spiritual things for one thing to turn to another corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Just as the power of a more imperfect body is strengthened by the local proximity of a more perfect body, as what is less hot grows in heat by the presence of that which is more hot; so the intellective power of the inferior angel is strengthened by the turning of the superior angel to him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the superior angel in some manner distinguishes the truth that he conceives as a whole, and which the inferior angel cannot conceive as such, so that it can be conceived by the inferior, and thus proposes this truth to his knowledge.

NOTE: This enlightenment is not with regard to the divine essence, for all the angels see it; but with regard to the principles of divine operations. Those who see God more perfectly see more of these principles (ad 1).

ART. II. — WHETHER ONE ANGEL CAN MOVE THE WILL OF ANOTHER.

NO.—The angel does not move the will either as an object or as showing the ob-

ject. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of a creature, or of God, by way of persuasion.

THE REASON is that nothing sufficiently moves the will but the Universal Good, which is God, as was said above (preceding question) and it belongs to God alone to change the will on the part of the power of the will itself, because God alone gave the very power to will.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN INFERIOR ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN HIS SUPERIOR.

NO.—Never; not even God makes this possible, since it is unfitting.

THE REASON is that one order is so under another as cause is under cause.—In the order of corporeal nature, God sometimes miraculously works outside the order of nature, to direct man to a knowledge of Himself; but this has no place in the order of spiritual substances, for God never forgoes the order suitable to spiritual substances.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SUPERIOR ANGEL ENLIGHTENS THE INFERIOR CONCERNING ALL THINGS HE HIMSELF KNOWS.

YES.—Yet light is not received by inferior angels so excellently as in the superiors.

THE REASON is that, the more some agents are constituted in the participation of the divine goodness, so much the more do they strive to transmit their perfections to others, so far as is possible. If this is seen to be true in the things of nature, much the more will the holy angels, who are in the fullest participation of the divine goodness, impart to those under them whatever they receive from God.

QUESTION CVII **The Speech of the Angels** (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE ANGEL SPEAKS TO ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that one angel can by his will manifest to another angel the concepts of his mind. This is to speak to another.

NOTE: When the mind turns to consider an act that it has in habit (or in memory), one speaks to oneself; for the very concept of the mind is called the interior world. To make known these concepts of the mind to another is (among the angels) to speak to another.—And as soon as one angel wishes to manifest his concept, another immediately knows it, although this does not happen in us, on account of the grossness of the body (ad 1). Angels are aroused to attention by some intelligible power, as we are aroused to attention by some sensible object (ad 3).

ART. II. — WHETHER THE INFERIOR ANGEL SPEAKS TO THE SUPERIOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that in relation to the principle that is the will the one who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of the things that pertain to the will is conveyed through the one who wills to all others, whether superiors or inferiors. But the enlightenment that depends on the principle that is God is conveyed to the inferior angels only through the superior. And thus, although every enlightening is speech in the angels, yet not every speech is enlightening.—But every speech of God is an enlightening, because the will of God is the rule of truth, and it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know this rule (ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL SPEAKS TO GOD.

YES.—Not that he may communicate anything to God, but that the angel may receive something from God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God is the principle and creator of all truth and every will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the angel can direct his concept to God, by consulting the divine will on what is to be done, or by admiring the divine excellence, which he never comprehends.

ART. IV.—WHETHER LOCAL DISTANCE IS A FACTOR IN THE ANGELIC SPEECH.

NO.—THE REASON is that the angel's intellectual operation is altogether abstracted from place and time.—Even our intellectual operation abstracts from the here

and now, except accidentally, on the part of phantasms [which do not exist in the angels.]

NOTE: Just as local distance does not prevent one angel from seeing another, so also it does not prevent an angel's perceiving what is directed to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech (ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS KNOW WHAT ONE SPEAKS TO ANOTHER.

NO.—THE REASON is that the manifestation of the concept of one angel to another is through voluntary direction, as has been said (art. 1 of this q.).—But enlightenments, which emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the common principle of all the angels, are common to them all (ad 3).

QUESTION CVIII

The Organization of the Angels According to Hierarchies and Orders

Because it was said in q. cvi, art. 3, that the superior angels enlighten the inferior, and not vice versa, we must next consider the organization of the angels in hierarchies and orders. This will be in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE OF ONE HIERARCHY.

NO.—That is, on the part of the multitude organized under a prince (for hierarchy means a sacred principality), but not on the part of God, to whom all things are subject.

THE REASON is that, on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, principality is said to be one according as the multitude can be subject in *one* way to the government of the prince. And in this way the angels are divided into three hierarchies, according to the three degrees in which universal knowledge is received among the angels, to wit:

1) In so far as the principles of things, as to which the angels are enlightened, proceed from the first universal principle, which is God, and this mode belongs to the first hierarchy, which is immediately connected with God, and is as it were placed in the vestibule of God;

2) According as the principles depend on their universal created causes, which are already in some way multiplied;

3) According as these principles are applied to individual things, and depend on their causes, and this mode of knowledge belongs to the lowest hierarchy.

But among men there are no hierarchies, because all men are of one species, and one mode of understanding is connatural to them (ad 3).

ART. II. — WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORDERS IN ONE HIERARCHY.

YES.—THE REASON is that a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if different orders did not exist in the multitude.—Now the orders are distinguished according to acts and offices. Hence in every angelic hierarchy there are three orders, the highest, the middle, and the lowest. Thus in the first hierarchy are found the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; in the second, Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; in the third, Principalities, Archangels, and Angels.—In the hierarchy of men there are three general orders, or classes: The aristocracy, or society of the best; the middle class, and the common people.

ART. III.—WHETHER IN ONE ORDER THERE ARE MANY ANGELS.

YES.—According to our knowledge of the angels, which is imperfect.

THE REASON is that he who knows things imperfectly can distinguish only imperfectly, i.e., in general; and thus we distinguish the offices and orders of the angels. In this way many angels are contained in one order. If, however, we knew perfectly the offices of the angels and their distinctions, we would know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order in things.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DISTINCTION OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS COMES FROM THE ANGELIC NATURE.

YES.—Both in respect to the natural end and in respect to the supernatural end of the angels.

THE REASON is that according to the angels' natural end, which consists in the natural love and knowledge of God, the orders of the angels are distinguished according

to their natural gifts. In respect to their supernatural end, the orders are distinguished adequately by the gifts of grace, but dispositively according to their capacity for natural gifts.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ORDERS OF ANGELS ARE PROPERLY NAMED.

YES.—THE REASON is that they are named according to the degrees of the perfections that are in them, as Dionysius explains. Gregory, in his explanation of the angelic names, seems to have regard more to their exterior ministries (*Hom. xxiv in Evang.*) *Evang.*)

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF THE ORDERS ARE PROPERLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—Namely, in the first hierarchy: Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; in the second: Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; in the last: Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. So according to Dionysius (*The Celestial Hierarchies*, chap. 7, 8, 9,)

THE REASON is that, as we explained above (art. 1 of this question), the first hierarchy views the principles of things in God; the second views them in their universal causes; the third views them according to their determination to special effects. As regards relation to God, three things are considered, beginning with the lowest: The Thrones, who are elevated to receiving God intimately in themselves, and through whom God exercises His judgments; the Cherubim, who know the divine secrets in a supereminent way; and the Seraphim, who are most united to God.—With regard to government, these three things are considered: Beginning with the highest, the Dominations, to whom belongs the distinction of the things to be done; the Virtues, to whom it belongs to give the power of fulfillment; and the Powers, to whom it belongs to direct at once what is ordered or decided to be carried out by others.—As regards execution, the first are the Principalities, who are as it were the ones who begin the action and lead the others; secondly come the Archangels, to execute great things; and lastly the Angels, who simply carry them out.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE ORDERS WILL REMAIN AFTER THE JUDGMENT DAY.

YES.—As regards the distinction of degrees, but not as regards the execution of offices.

THE REASON is that the distinction of degrees is in the angels according to the difference of grace and nature (art. 4); yet the distinction of order will cease inasmuch as the offices of the angels are directed to leading some to their end, as is evident. But it will remain inasmuch as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus even the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER MEN ARE TAKEN UP INTO THE ANGELIC ORDERS.

YES.—Not as regards the degree of nature; but as regards the gift of grace.

THE REASON is that as regards nature a distinction of natures will always remain; but as regards the gift of grace, which perfects nature, equality with the angels (or even superiority to them) depends on the liberality of God, and not on the natural order, according to Luke xx, 36: "They are equal to the angels, and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection."

QUESTION CIX

The Ordering of the Bad Angels

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE ARE ORDERS AMONG THE DEMONS.

YES.—Not as regards the perfect state of grace, or the imperfect state of grace; but as regards that which belongs to nature.

THE REASON is that the bad angels were never in the state of consummated glory; yet they were in the imperfect state of grace, because they were created in grace and were able to merit, but from this state they fell. Yet as regards that which belongs to nature they are still among the orders, because they did not lose their natural gifts.

ART. II.—WHETHER AMONG THE DEMONS THERE ARE INFERIOR AND SUPERIOR.

YES.—The natural disposition itself of the demons requires that there be among them an order of inferior and superior.

THE REASON is that, since action follows the nature of a thing, whenever natures are ordered, it follows that the actions of these natures must be subordinated one to another, as is evident in corporeal things.—And this also is becoming to the divine wisdom, which leaves nothing unordered in the universe, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisd. viii, 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS ENLIGHTENMENT AMONG THE DEMONS.

NO.—Among the demons there cannot be enlightenment properly speaking.

THE REASON is that enlightenment is properly a manifestation of truth, according as it has a relation to God, who enlightens every intellect. This, however, cannot exist in the demons, on account of their perversity. They can, however, communicate their concepts to others by way of speech, in order to seduce them from the divine order.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE GOOD ANGELS HAVE PRESIDENCY OVER THE BAD.

YES.—THE REASON is that those creatures have influence over others who are more perfect, and nearer to God. And therefore the good angels have presidency over the bad, and the bad are ruled by them, inasmuch as divine justice demands that some things be done by the demons either for the punishment of the bad or for the exercise of the good.

NOTE: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons who may be naturally superior to him, because the power of divine justice, to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels.

QUESTION CX

How Angels Govern the Material World.

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CORPOREAL CREATURE IS GOVERNED BY THE ANGELS.

Yes.—THE REASON is that a particular power is governed and ruled by a universal power. Now the power of every body is more particular than the power of a spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individuated by matter, and determined to the here and now; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MATERIAL WORLD OBEYS THE MERE WILL OF THE ANGELS.

NO.—The informing of matter is not immediately from the angels, but is immediately from God, or from some corporeal agent.

THE REASON is that what is properly made in corporeal things is the composite. Now whatever makes natural things has a likeness to the composite itself, since it is the nature of like to make something like to itself; or since the whole composite, as regards both matter and form, is in its power, and this belongs to God alone.—Yet nothing prevents some effects in natural things to follow from the power of the angels, for which effects corporeal agents would not suffice. But this is not matter's obeying the mere will of the angel (ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER BODIES OBEY ANGELS AS REGARDS LOCAL MOTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that local motion is the most perfect of all corporeal motions, for it is in potentiality only to something extrinsic (that is, to place); but what is supreme in some inferior nature comes into contact with a superior nature. And thus corporeal nature has an aptitude to be moved immediately by a spiritual nature from place to place.

NOTE: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements, that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects (ad 2).

ART IV.—WHETHER ANGELS CAN WORK MIRACLES.

NO.—THE REASON is that a miracle is not said to be that which is done outside any particular nature—for in that case even the tossing of a stone upward would be a miracle—but that which is done outside the order of the whole of created nature. And this only God can do.—Yet the angels exercise some agency in the miracles that are done, as by collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that sort (ad 1).

NOTE: Because not every power of nature is known to us, marvelous things can be done even by the demons, which appear to be miracles to us, but which are not true miracles. Good Christians, in so far as they do miracles by divine justice, are said to do miracles by public justice; but bad Christians are said to work miracles by the *signs* of public justice, as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of sacred signs (ad 2).

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MEN

Here we consider the action of angels on men: 1) Whether they can change men by their natural power; 2) how they are sent by God to minister to men; 3) how they keep watch over men. The first point is in four articles.

QUESTION CXI
How Angels Can Change Men

ART. I.—WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN ENLIGHTEN MAN.

YES.—Both by proposing an intelligible truth to men under the likenesses of sensible things, and by strengthening man's intellect by their action.

THE REASON is that, according to the order of divine providence, inferiors are subject to the actions of superiors. Therefore, just as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to angels, can be enlightened by them. Yet this is in a manner that is fitted to man, namely by turning to phantasms (q. lxxxiv, a. 7). And by this action of the angelic intellect the human intellect, as being inferior, is strengthened.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANGELS CAN CHANGE THE WILL OF MAN.

NO.—From within and efficaciously, the will can be moved only by God; from without, however, the will can be changed by an angel, or moved, not by exciting it efficaciously, but by way of persuasion, as the will can also be moved by men and by passions.

THE REASON is that there is no natural inclination save from the One who gives nature; likewise, there is no efficacious inclination, because God alone is universal good, which necessarily moves the will. But the angel can propose only a particular good to the will. Moreover, even the angels can incite the passions, through which the will is inclined to will, such as the passions of wrath and concupiscence.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL CAN CHANGE THE IMAGINATION OF MAN.

YES.—Both the good and the bad angel can move the imagination of man by his power.

THE REASON is that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local motion (prec. quest., art. 3); now imaginary apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN CHANGE THE HUMAN SENSES.

YES.—EITHER FROM WITHOUT, or by sensible means; or from within, by the commotion of the spirits and humors.

THE REASON is that the angel can offer the senses a sensible object formed by nature, or formed anew by the angel himself, as he does when he assumes a body (q. li, art. 2); likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within (prec. art.).

[Tr. Note: Although the four humors, the choleric, sanguine, melancholic, and phlegmatic, which were once thought to regulate behavior, have gone out of scientific terminology, the classifications of mankind they denote are still valid. It is easy to see how behavior could be affected by disturbances of the nervous system.]

QUESTION CXII

The Mission of the Angels (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ANGELS ARE SENT ON WORKS OF MINISTRY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature (q. cx, a. 1), the angel is applied in a new way to that body through his power, and thus the angel begins to be there anew where he was not before. This is one way in which someone is said to be sent (q. xliiii, a. 1). Now the action exercised by the angel that is sent proceeds from God, as from its first principle, at whose nod and by whose authority the angels work, and is reduced to God as to its last end.

NOTE: Exterior actions in no wise impede the contemplation of the angel, because he regulates his exterior actions only through his intellectual operation; now of two actions, one of which is the rule and reason of the other, one does not hinder, but helps the other (ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS ARE SENT IN MINISTRY.

NO.—It must simply be said that the superior angels are never sent on outward works of ministry.

THE REASON is that the angelic order is viewed according to the gifts of grace. Hence it is not necessary that that order should be by-passed, as the order of nature is by-passed for the sake of the order of grace.—Then again, nothing is so great in the divine ministries (as far as the providence of men is concerned) that it cannot be exercised by the inferior angelic orders. This is evident from the mission of the Archangel Gabriel to announce the mysteries.—But as regards one angel's enlightening another, all angels are sent (ad 1), the superior to the inferior.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL THE ANGELS WHO ARE SENT ASSIST.

NO.—Properly only those assist who are of the first hierarchy.

THE REASON is that not all the angels, but only those superior angels, can perceive the divine mysteries in the very brightness of the divine essence; and through them they are announced to the inferior angels. Yet in so far as all see the divine essence, all angels assist, even those who administer.

[Tr. Note: The angels are spoken of as *assisting* and *administering* after the analogy of a royal court. Some of the couriers always attend (assist) the King and hear his commands directly. The lesser courtiers, whose office is to execute the commands, receive them from those who, assisting the King, know more of his secrets than others.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS OF THE SECOND HIERARCHY ARE SENT.

NO.—The Dominations are not sent; but the Virtues and Powers are sent.

THE REASON is that the properties of the angels are manifested by their names; now the name of Dominations does not involve any execution, but only a disposition to command concerning the things to be executed. The words Virtues and Powers are used with respect to any act. Hence it does not belong to the four superior orders to be sent in outward ministry.

QUESTION CXIII

The Guardianship of the Good Angels (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN ARE GUARDED BY ANGELS.

YES.—THE REASON is that according to the plan of divine providence, the movable and variable should always be moved and regulated by the immovable and the invariable.—Now it is manifest that in doing things the knowledge and affections of man can vary in many ways and swerve from God. Therefore it was necessary that angels be assigned to watch over men, to regulate them, and to move them to good.

ART. II.—WHETHER EACH MAN IS GUARDED BY AN ANGEL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains forever. Therefore, just as it is probable that different angels of the same

order are placed over the different species of things, so it is reasonable that different orders should be assigned to guard different men.

ART. III.—WHETHER TO GUARD MEN BELONGS ONLY TO THE LOWEST ORDER OF ANGELS.

Yes.—As regards individual men; but not as regards the guardianship of the human multitude.

THE REASON is that to procure the things that pertain to the salvation of one man seems to be the least of the angelic offices; now to announce the least belongs to the lowest order of the angels.—But as regards the guardianship of the human multitude, guardianship is multiplied according to the different orders, for the more universal is the agent the higher he is.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANGELS ARE APPOINTED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ALL MEN.

YES.—Not for the faithful alone.

THE REASON is that man is constituted in the state of this life as on a road, by which he should journey to heaven; but on a journey many dangers beset man.

NOTE: 1.—Even in the state of innocence man needed the guardianship of angels, not because of any danger from within, but because he was threatened by danger from without on account of the snares of demons, as was proved by the event (ad 2).—Although wicked men are not helped by the guardian angels as regards their meriting eternal life by good works, yet they are helped by being withdrawn from some evils, by which they can injure both themselves and others. [And by not being allowed to do so much evil as they would.]

ART. V.—WHETHER AN ANGEL IS APPOINTED TO GUARD A MAN FROM HIS BIRTH.

YES.—Not from the time of his Baptism, as some say.

THE REASON is that the benefits that are given to man by God because he is a Christian begin at the time of Baptism; but the things that God provides for a man in so far as he has a rational nature begin at birth, when he receives this nature.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GUARDIAN ANGEL EVER ABANDONS A MAN.

NO.—He never totally abandons a man.

THE REASON is that neither man nor anything else is totally withdrawn from the divine providence. Yet the angel does sometimes abandon a man with regard to something, e.g., when he does not prevent his escaping some tribulation, or even his falling into sin, according to the order of the divine judgments.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANGELS GRIEVE FOR THE ILLS OF THOSE WHOM THEY GUARD.

NO.—Either for the sins or for the punishments of men.

THE REASON is that, although the angels do not, universally and absolutely speaking (or simply or with an antecedent will), desire the sins and punishments of men, yet they desire that with regard to this the order of divine justice be maintained, according to which some are subjected to punishments and are permitted to sin (they desire this *secundum quid*, by a conditioned or consequent will).—Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there remains one reason for joy in the angels, namely the fulfillment of the order of divine providence (ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE STRIFE OR DISCORD AMONG THE ANGELS.

YES.—Not because their wills are contrary; but in so far as the things concerning which they consult God are in opposition.

THE REASON is that it sometimes happens that in different kingdoms or among different men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over the other. As to what is the ordering of divine wisdom on these matters the angels cannot know unless God reveals it. Hence they need to consult God's wisdom in regard to them. And, when they consult the divine will regarding contrary and conflicting merits, they are said to resist each other. Yet in such cases they all agree that God's sentence must be carried out.

QUESTION CXIV

The Assault of the Demons (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN ARE ASSAILED BY THE DEMONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that from envy they strive to prevent the good of men, and from pride they usurp the likeness of divine power, by assigning among themselves determinate ministers to assail men, just as good angels minister to God in determinate offices for the salvation of men.

NOTE: This assault proceeds from the malice of the demons, but the ordering of the assault is from God, who knows how to use evils by ordering them to good.

ART. II.—WHETHER TO TEMPT IS PROPER TO THE DEVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the devil *always* tempts so as to harm, by hurling one into sin.

NOTE: To tempt is the same as to make trial of anyone. The proximate end of temptation is knowledge; the ulterior end of which can be for good or for evil. The tempting of God consists in this, that man, as if uncertain, presumes to try God's power; this is a sin. God is said to tempt (or try) anyone in order to make others know [as in Deut, xiii, 3: "The Lord *triet*h you, that it may appear whether you love him"]. Flesh and the world are said to tempt instrumentally or materially (in body of art.)

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL SINS PROCEED FROM THE TEMPTATION OF THE DEVIL.

NO.—The devil is not the cause of all sin directly, but indirectly or dispositively.

THE REASON is that not all sins are committed at the instigation of the devil, but some are committed from the liberty of the will and the corruption of the flesh. Yet, because the devil instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there followed in the human race a certain proneness to all sins, it is therefore said that the devil is the cause of all sins.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DEMONS CAN SEDUCE MEN BY MEANS OF MIRACLES.

YES.—Not by a real miracle, which takes place outside the order of the whole of created nature; but by a miracle in the broad sense of wonder.

THE REASON is that they can do some things that exceed the powers and knowledge of men, and which thus excite the astonishment of men.

NOTE: The demon can not only change the imagination, but also the corporeal senses, as was said above (q. ci, art. 3 and 4). Likewise, he can form from air a body of any form and figure, so that by assuming it he visibly appears in it, and can in the same way invest any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to be seen in its species (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER A DEMON WHO IS OVERCOME BY MAN IS FOR THIS REASON KEPT FROM FURTHER ASSAULTS.

YES.—For a time, as is said in the temptation of Christ, for after the whole temptation was over the devil withdraw from Christ for a time.

THE FIRST REASON is God's mercy, for, as Chrystostom says: "The devil does not tempt men as long as he desires, but as long as God permits; for, although He permits the devil to tempt men a little while, then He draws him away on account of the weakness of human nature" (*Super Matt. Hom. v.*)

THE SECOND REASON is the devil's cunning, for, as Ambrose says: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat" (*In Lc., c. 4.*)

QUESTION CXV

The Action of the Corporeal Creature

We next consider the action of the corporeal creature, and fate, which is attributed to some corporeal things. The first point occupies six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER A BODY CAN BE ACTIVE.

YES.—It appears to the senses that some bodies are active.

THE REASON is that a body acts according as it is in act, and it acts on an-

other body according as it is in potentiality. For a body is composed of act and potentiality; and therefore it is both active and passive. Only prime matter does not act, because it is pure potentiality (ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE ANY SEMINAL PRINCIPLES IN CORPOREAL MATTER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the seminal principles are all active and passive powers, which are the principles of natural generations and movements. Now these exist in corporeal matter, and properly exist in living beings, from which nature derives its name, being so called from generation (*nativitas*).

NOTE: Principally and originally the seminal principles are in the Word of God as typical or causal ideas. Secondly they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in universal causes. In a third way they are in the things that are produced from universal causes in succession of time, as in this plant, and this animal, as in particular causes. In a fourth way they are in the seeds that are produced from plants and animals (in body of art.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF WHAT IS PRODUCED IN BODIES HERE BELOW.

YES.—The movements of these inferior bodies, which are varied and multiform, are referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.

THE REASON is that every movement proceeds from the immovable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies most immovable; for they are moved only by local movement.

NOTE: The heavenly bodies are not the first cause of the generation and corruption of the things that come into being on earth (ad 1); but they are special active movable principles, which by their presence and absence cause variety with regard to the generation and corruption of the inferior bodies, just as it is said that *man and the sun generate man* (Aristotle, *Physics* ii, 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN ACTS.

NO.—THE REASON is that it would follow from this that man did not have free will, but was determined in his actions, as are the other things of nature.—Yet indirectly and incidentally the impressions of the celestial bodies can reach the intellect and the will. They affect the intellect more than the will, for the intellect necessarily receives something from the lower apprehensive powers, which are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies, as are the other corporeal organs. The will, however, does not of necessity follow the inclination of the lower appetite. Wherefore the astrologers themselves say that man is controlled by the stars in so far as he is controlled by his passions (ad 3.)

ART. V.—WHETHER HEAVENLY BODIES CAN AFFECT THE DEMONS.

NO.—Either *per se* or *per accidens*, either directly or indirectly.

THE REASON is that the demons are intellectual substances, not united to bodies.

NOTE: The Peripatetics denied the existence of demons, and attributed to the powers of the celestial spheres a necromantic power. But, as St. Thomas notes, many things are done by demons for which the power of the heavenly spheres would be wholly inadequate, for example, when a man in delirium speaks in unknown tongues, and the like.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE HEAVENLY BODIES IMPOSE NECESSITY ON THE THINGS SUBJECT TO THEIR ACTION.

NO.—Not on all.

THE REASON is that it is not true that, given any cause whatever, an effect necessarily follows; for there are certain causes that are ordered to their effects, not of necessity but in most cases; sometimes they fail to produce them in the minority of cases, on account of some hindering cause. This can happen of necessity. Now an effect *per se* has a cause, but an accidental effect does not have a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.

QUESTION CXVI**Fate**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS SUCH A THING AS FATE.

[Fate is defined by St. Thomas as: "The ordination of secondary causes to divinely foreseen effects" (art. four of this q.).]

YES.—Not in the sense of the pagans, for whom fate was nothing else than an arrangement of the stars, according to which everything that is done here below results of necessity (as was said above); but inasmuch as everything that is done here is subject to divine providence, being preordained and as it were forespoken by it.

THE REASON is that the things that happen here by accident cannot be attributed to any active power in the celestial spheres, as was proved above (prec. q., art. 4); but are reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which is accidental from being considered as one by the intellect; otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger of a grave found a treasure."

ART. II.—WHETHER FATE IS IN CREATED THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the ordination of effects is considered, not only is so far as it is in God, and thus is called Providence; but also in so far as it is in the intermediate cause ordained by God to produce some effects, and thus it has the character of fate.

ART. III.—WHETHER FATE IS UNCHANGEABLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is subject to the unchangeableness of Divine Providence, not of absolute but of conditional necessity—e.g., if God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen. But in regard to second causes it is changeable.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO FATE.

NO.—THE REASON is that those things are subject to fate which are subject to second causes; now fate is an ordination of second causes to divinely foreseen effects. Accordingly, the things that are more subject to the necessity of second causes are more subject to fate. But the things that are immediately subject to God are not subject to fate—things such as creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like.

QUESTION CXVII**The Things Pertaining to the Action of Man**

Here we consider the things pertaining to the action of man, who is a compound of the spiritual and corporeal creation: 1) The action of man; 2) the propagation of man from man. The first point is in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE MAN CAN TEACH ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that one man can lead another from what he knows already to a knowledge of what he does not know, and that in two ways: First by proposing to him certain helps or means, which his intellect uses to acquire knowledge; for example, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which the learner is able to judge from previous knowledge, or he may propose to him certain sensible examples, etc.—Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner, not indeed by some active power, as the angels do, but in so far as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, if he does not have the skill to do this for himself.

ART. II.—WHETHER MEN CAN TEACH ANGELS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the highest men are subject to even the lowest angels in the same way in which the inferior angels are subject to the superior, a thing that is evident from the words of the Lord: "There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he" (Matt. xi, 11). Accordingly, just as the inferior angels can speak to the superior, but cannot enlighten them (q. cvii, a. 2), so men can never enlighten the angels, though they can speak to them by manifesting the secrets of hearts.

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN BY THE POWER OF HIS SOUL CAN CHANGE CORPOREAL MATTER.

NO.—Except by means of certain corporeal things, as was said concerning the angels (q. cx, a. 2).

THE REASON is that, as was said above (l. c.), corporeal matter is not changed as to form except either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom matter and form virtually pre-exist, as in the primordial cause of both.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SEPARATE HUMAN SOUL CAN MOVE BODIES AT LEAST LOCALLY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the soul can move only a quickened body; but no body can be quickened by a separated soul. The divine power can bestow something on the natural power of the soul. The angels can move bodies locally, because they are not determined to certain bodies. But the soul by its nature is determined to move a body of which it is the form, and can move no other body by its natural power (ad 1).—It is to be noted that demons frequently pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of the pagans who believed this (ad 2).

QUESTION CXVIII

Production of Man From Man as to the Soul

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SENSITIVE SOUL IS TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sensitive soul does not of itself have being and operation; consequently it is not made by creation, but its being made is due to composites, i.e., living things.—Now living bodies act to generate what is like themselves, both without a medium and through a medium: Without a medium, in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh; with a medium, in the act of generation. Now from the soul of the generator a certain active power is derived by the animal or plant seed itself. Yet it is immaterial to say that the soul of that which is generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by the power derived from it, which is in the semen; because the semen is as it were the instrument of the principal agent, i.e., the soul.

NOTE.—The active power of the semen does not have any organ in act, but is based on the vital spirit in the semen, which is frothy, as attested by its whiteness. In this spirit there is a certain heat from the power of celestial bodies; hence it is said that man and the sun generate man (ad 3).—2.—In perfect animals, which are generated by coition, the active power is in the male sperm, but the matter of the fetus is supplied by the female. In this matter the vegetative soul exists from the beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in those who sleep. But when it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power in the male sperm, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work toward the perfection of its own body, by way of nourishment and growth (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTIVE SOUL IS PRODUCED FROM THE SEMEN.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that it is impossible for the active power in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect.

THE SECOND REASON is that the intellective soul cannot be produced from the semen, for the power that is in the semen acts by virtue of the generator's soul, according as the soul of the generator is the act of the body; now the body has no part in the operation of the intellect.

THE THIRD REASON is that the intellective soul is subsistent, for it has the operation of life without the body, and, since it is an immaterial substance, it can be caused only by creation. Wherefore the Philosopher says: "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without" (*De Gener. Animal.* ii, 3).

NOTE: Since the generation of one is always the corruption of another, we must say that both in man and in the other animals, when a more perfect form is added the corruption of the previous form follows; yet so that the succeeding form has whatever was possessed by the first form, and even more; and thus through many generations and corruptions we come to the final substantial form, both in man and in the other animals. Accordingly, it must be said that the intellective soul is created by God at the end of human generation, which is at once both sensitive and nutritive, after the pre-existing forms have corrupted (ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER HUMAN SOULS WERE CREATED TOGETHER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that, if it accidentally belongs to a soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man, who is made up of this union, would be an accidental being.

THE SECOND REASON is that, as is shown by their different ways of understanding, the soul is not of the same nature as the angel, but needs to be united to a body, and to be without a body is against its nature.

THE THIRD REASON is that a soul existing without a body does not have the perfection of its nature; and thus God would begin His work with the imperfect, and with things that are outside nature.

NOTE: If anyone says that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he should seek the reason why it is united to the body. This could be either by the will of the soul itself, or by some other cause. But it is not by the will of the soul, because, if union with a body is not natural, this will of the soul would be unreasonable. If, however, the soul is united to the body for some other reason than its nature, it follows that this is the result of some violent cause; but this is unreasonable. That the soul remains after death without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which results from sin (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXIX

The Propagation of Man as to the Body (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SOME PART OF FOOD IS CONVERTED INTO HUMAN NATURE.

YES.—Food is truly converted into true human nature, in so far as it truly receives the species of bread and bone, and similar parts.

THE FIRST SERIES OF REASONS is against the opinion of some who held that the human form can be preserved only in the certain individual matter that was in the first man; therefore the multitude of human bodies comes through the multiplication of this matter in itself. Wherefore food is not changed into true human nature, but is received as a kind of alloy of nature, i.e., to resist the action of natural heat, to prevent the radical humor from being consumed, on which the power of the species is based, and which, if withdrawn, cannot be restored. Against this opinion the reasons are: a) According to this a form could be produced in another matter, and could cease to be in its own matter; but the body is corruptible. b) Because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species (e.g., the sun). c) Because the multiplication of matter can take place only by rarefaction, or by creation, or by the change of something into the matter itself: But the multiplication of the human body does not take place by rarefaction, or by creation, as is evident; but by the conversion of food into the real substance of the body. d) Because this is what takes place in plants and animals.

THE SECOND SERIES OF REASONS is against the opinion of others who said that the human form can indeed be made anew in some other matter, but in the individual the human form remains fixed in a determinate matter, which belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature. But, because such matter does not suffice for due quantity, it is required that other matter be added by the conversion of food into the substance of that which is nourished, as much as suffices for due growth. And this matter, they say, belongs secondarily to the true human nature, because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due him.

THE REASONS AGAINST THIS OPINION ARE: a) That it judges the matter of living bodies after the manner of inanimate bodies. For nothing would be added to living bodies if food were not converted into their true nature. b) Because if by the seminal power, which is derived from the soul of the begetter, a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, impress the true form of human nature on the food that is assimilated. c) Because food is required, not only for growth, but also to restore that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal unless what is formed from the food took the place of what is lost. And therefore, just as that which was there previously belongs to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SEMEN IS PRODUCED FROM SURPLUS FOOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the semen has its power to produce the whole body as derived from the soul of the begetter, it cannot be formed from food already changed into some determinate part, but before it is changed into the substance of the members.—Wherefore, adds St. Thomas with Aristotle, the larger animals, which need much food, have comparatively little semen for the size of their bodies, and comparatively few offspring; and similarly fat men have less semen for the same reason.

NOTE: Christ is said to have been in Adam according to bodily substance but not according to the seminal principle; because the matter of His body, which was supplied by His Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam. But the active power was not derived from Adam, because His body was not formed by the power of the male sperm, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit; for such a birth befitted Him who is above all blessed God forever and ever.

AMEN.

END OF FIRST PART OF FIRST PART

THE FORMAL OR FUNDAMENTAL REASONS OF THE ARTICLES FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART

Total number of questions, 114; total number of articles, 609

PROLOGUE

Since, as Damascene states (*De Fide Orthod.* ii, 12), man is said to be made to the image of God in so far as image signifies the intellectual part, and to be endowed with free will and self-movement, it remains, now that we have treated of the exemplar, namely God and the things that have proceeded from the divine power according to His will, to consider the image, that is, man, in so far as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free will and the control of his actions.

QUESTION I THE LAST END OF MAN IN GENERAL

We shall consider: 1) The last end of human life; 2) how man arrives at this end, or swerves from it. For from the end we must derive the reasons of the things that are ordained to the end. And, because the last end of human life is said to be beatitude, we must first treat of the last end in general, and thereafter of beatitude.—The first point is answered in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO MAN TO ACT FOR AN END.

YES.—THE REASON is that all the actions that proceed from any power are caused by it according to the nature of its object. Now man, as man, i.e., as he is the master of his own acts, acts by deliberate will, the object of which is his end and good.

NOTE: 1.—Although the end is last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And in this way it is a cause (Ad 1).

2.—Any action is said to be voluntary in two ways: In one way because it is commanded by the will, as to walk or to speak; in another way because it is elicited by the will, as the act of will itself, which cannot be the ultimate end, just as the act of seeing cannot be the first object of sight. Wherefore even the act of willing is a means to the end (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS PECULIAR TO A RATIONAL NATURE TO ACT FOR AN END.

NO.—Every agent must act for an end.

THE REASON is that no agent moves except by intending an end. Otherwise it would not do one thing rather than another. Therefore the things that have reason *move themselves* to their end, because they have the control of their acts; but the things that lack reason tend to their end by natural inclination, and thus they are directed to the end by another, namely by God.

ART. III.—WHETHER HUMAN ACTS ARE SPECIFIED BY THEIR END.

YES.—Whether they are considered as actions or passions, human acts receive their species from their end.

THE REASON is that each thing is specified by its act. Now in human actions, both in those by which man moves himself and in those whereby man is moved by himself, the object of the will is the good, and the end.

NOTE: The end gives to the human, or moral, act its species, according as it is prior in intention (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE IS ONE LAST END OF HUMAN LIFE.

YES.—Whether in the order of intention or in the order of execution.

THE REASON is that if there were no ultimate end in the order of intention, nothing would be sought, since there is no procession to infinity, nor would any action be concluded, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest. If on the other hand there were no first in the means to the end (in the order of execution), no one would begin to do anything, and counsel would have no term, but would go on to infinity.

Note: The things that are not ordered essentially, but are accidentally connected with one another, could go on to infinity; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this

way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends and of things that are ordained to the end (in body).

ART. V.—WHETHER ONE MAN CAN HAVE SEVERAL LAST ENDS.

NO.—It is impossible for the will of one man to be directed simultaneously to different things as its last end.

THE FIRST REASON is that the last end must so satisfy the whole appetite of man that nothing is left outside itself to be desired.

THE SECOND REASON is that in the course of the rational appetite that which is naturally desired is one; for nature tends to one thing only.

THE THIRD REASON is that all things that can be desired by the will belong, as such, to one genus, for in every genus there is one first principle. Now the last end has the character of a first principle.

ART. VI.—WHETHER MAN WILLS WHATEVER HE WILLS FOR THE LAST END.

YES.—Everything that a man desires he must desire for the last end.

THE FIRST REASON is that, if the good is not desired as the perfect good, which is the last end, it must be desired as tending to the perfect good; for every beginning of something is ordained to its consummation.

THE OTHER REASON is that the last end has the same relation in moving the appetite as has the prime mover in other motions. Accordingly, just as second causes do not move unless they are moved by the first mover, so second objects of desire do not move the appetite except in relation to the first object of desire, which is the last end.

NOTE: The power of the first intention, which is with respect to the last end, remains in every desire, whatever the object to which it is directed, even if the last end be not actually considered (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER ALL MEN HAVE THE SAME LAST END.

YES.—As regards the aspect of the last end; but not as regards that in which the aspect of last end is found.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that all men desire the fulfillment of their perfection, in which the last end consists, as was said (art. five of this q.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that some men desire wealth as their consummate good; some pleasure; others something else.—But that good is most complete which the man with well-disposed affections desires as his last end.

NOTE: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end truly consists, but not from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things (Ad 1); for, although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER OTHER CREATURES CONCUR IN THAT LAST END.

No.—As regards the attainment or enjoyment of the end, other creatures do not concur in the end of man (the *finis quo*); yet they do concur as regards the end as object (the *finis cuius*).

THE REASON is that rational creatures acquire their last end by knowing and loving God; but this does not belong to other creatures, which, however, acquire their last end in so far as they partake of some likeness to God—in so far as they exist, or live, or even know.

QUESTION II

THE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS

Here we consider: 1) In what happiness consists; 2) what it is; 3) how we can acquire it. The first point is in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN WEALTH.

NO.—It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth, whether natural [food, cars, houses] or artificial [money].

THE REASON is that natural wealth is sought to sustain man's nature; and therefore it cannot be the last end, but rather is ordained to man as a means to the end. Artificial wealth is sought only for the sake of natural. And its insufficiency is better

realized when it is possessed (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN HONORS.

NO.—Honor can indeed obtain happiness; but happiness cannot principally consist in it.

THE REASON is that honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of his. Now the excellence of man is most regarded according to happiness, which is man's perfect good.—To seek excellence for the sake of honor is ambition (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN FAME OR GLORY.

NO.—THE REASON is that fame, or human glory, if real, is derived from the knowledge of a good already existing in man himself; and thus it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness; for glory consists in "being well known and praised" (St. Ambrose).—On the contrary, man's happiness depends on the glory that is with God, as on God's knowledge, which is the cause of things known [human knowledge is only caused by things known].

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN POWER.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that power has the nature of a principle; but happiness has the nature of a last end.

THE SECOND REASON is that power is directed to both good and evil; but happiness is the proper and perfect good of man. Wherefore some of man's happiness might rather consist in the good use of power, which is by way of virtue, than in power itself.

NOTE: Here the Holy Doctor adds four general reasons to prove that happiness cannot consist in the above-mentioned external goods:

- 1) Because happiness is incompatible with any evil;
- 2) Because happiness must be sufficient of itself;
- 3) Because from happiness no evil can arise;
- 4) Because man is ordained to happiness through interior principles.

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN ANY BODILY GOOD.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that man is not the supreme good, but is ordained to something as to an end; wherefore it is impossible that the ultimate good of human reason and will should be the conservation of human existence.

THE SECOND REASON is that all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul as to an end.

ART. VI.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN PLEASURE.

NO.—THE REASON is that all delight is a proper accident, which follows from happiness, or some part of happiness.—Wherefore delight is sought by reason of good, and not vice versa (Ad 3).

NOTE: The good proper to the body, which causes bodily delight by the apprehension of the senses, is not the perfect good of man, but is a trifle compared with the good of the soul; for the part of the soul that is independent of a bodily organ has a certain infinity with respect to the body itself; because a form independent of matter is in a manner infinite (body). [sense, of course, knows only the singular and limited.]

ART. VII.—WHETHER SOME GOOD OF THE SOUL CONSTITUTES MAN'S HAPPINESS.

NO.—If happiness is considered as the thing itself that we desire to acquire; otherwise, however, if it is considered as the attainment itself of the thing, or the last end.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the soul itself, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality; for it becomes actually knowing from being potentially knowing, and actually virtuous from being potentially virtuous. But potentiality is for the sake of act.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man attains happiness through his soul.—Wherefore happiness is indeed something of the soul; but that in which happiness consists is something outside the soul.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN ANY CREATED GOOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that nothing can satisfy the will of man but universal good, which is the object of the will, as universal truth is the object of the intellect. Now universal good is not found in any creature, but only in God. Therefore in God alone does the happiness of man consist.

NOTE: The universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God as to the last end. Wherefore the good of the universe is not the last end of man, but God Himself (Ad 2).

QUESTION III WHAT HAPPINESS IS (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HAPPINESS IS ANYTHING UNCREATED.

NO.—If happiness be considered with regard to its acquisition or possession, or the use of the last end, or also as regards the essence of happiness itself, it is something created. But with regard to the object itself, it is something uncreated.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus happiness is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus happiness, or the last end, is God Himself, as we said above (q. of prec. art. 8).

ART. II.—WHETHER HAPPINESS IS AN OPERATION.

YES.—In so far as happiness is something created existing in man himself.

THE REASON is that happiness is the ultimate perfection of man. Now each thing is so far perfect as far as it is in act. But the last act of the agent is its operation.

NOTE: 1.—The action or operation that can be happiness is not that which proceeds from the agent to the exterior act; for such an action is rather the perfection of the recipient of the action than of the agent; but it is the action remaining in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will; because such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent (Ad 3).

2.—Considered as a state, happiness is "the state made perfect by the accumulation of all good things." So Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, Book III, prose part 2, at the beginning (Ad 2).

3.—In God happiness is essential, because His very being is His operation. In the angels the final perfection is in respect to some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good, and this operation is one and everlasting. In men happiness is, in the state of the present life, the final perfection with respect to the operation by which man is united to God, which however, is neither everlasting nor continuous, and consequently not one. Wherefore the more continuous and one an operation can be, the more does it have the nature of happiness (Ad 4).

4.—And therefore in the active life, which is occupied with many things, there is less of happiness than in the contemplative life, which centers about one thing, i.e., the contemplation of truth (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER HAPPINESS IS AN OPERATION OF THE SENSITIVE PART, OR OF THE INTELLECTUAL PART ONLY.

ANSWER: Of the intellective part only—that is, essentially; antecedently, however, and consequently, the operations of the senses can belong to happiness.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man's happiness consists essentially in this union with Uncreated Good, to whom man cannot be united by the operation of the senses. Likewise, man's happiness cannot consist in corporeal things, which however we attain only by the operation of the senses.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that for imperfect happiness, which can be had in the present life, the operation of the intellect (antecedently) requires a previous operation of the senses. Consequently, the operations of the senses can pertain to happiness in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven, because after the resurrection, "from the very happiness of soul," as Augustine says (*Epistle to Dioscorus*), there will be a certain overflow to the body," as will appear more clearly later (*Supplement*, q. lxxxii, art. 3 and 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER, IF HAPPINESS IS IN THE INTELLECTIVE PART, IT IS AN OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL.

ANSWER: It is an operation of the intellect, as regards that which is essentially in happiness itself; but as regards that which is a proper accident in happiness itself, i.e., the delight connected with it, it belongs to the will.

THE REASON is that essentially happiness is the attainment of the last end; now we attain an end by having it present to us by an act of the intellect. But the will desires the end, and, by being delighted, rests in the end already attained. So therefore the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect; but to the will belongs the consummation of happiness, for it is "joy in truth" (St. Augustine, *Confessions*, x, 23).

ART. V.—WHETHER HAPPINESS IS AN OPERATION OF THE SPECULATIVE OR OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT.

ANSWER: It is the operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect.

THE FIRST REASON is that happiness is the highest operation of man; but this highest operation must be of the highest power with respect to the highest object.

THE SECOND REASON is that contemplation is most sought for its own sake; but the acts of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of action, or for some end.

THE THIRD REASON is that in happiness man is made like to God and the angels through contemplation. Imperfect happiness consists principally in contemplation; secondarily, in the operation of the practical intellect ordaining human actions and passions.

NOTE: The practical intellect has a good that is outside itself; but the speculative intellect has a good in itself, namely the contemplation of truth; and, if that good is perfect, the whole man is perfected by it, and is made good. Such a good the practical intellect does not have, but directs man to it (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE CONSIDERATION OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCES.

NO.—Perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences.

THE REASON is that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science; now these principles are received by the senses. Therefore they do not extend further than the knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's final perfection, and therefore his final happiness, cannot consist in the knowledge of anything that is above the human intellect.—But, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

ART. VII.—WHETHER HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES, NAMELY ANGELS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the existence of the angel is participated (Part I, q. lxi, a. 1); but the proper object of the intellect is truth as such.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

YES.—His final and perfect happiness can consist only in the vision of the divine essence.

THE REASON is that man is not perfectly happy as long as there remains something for him to desire and seek. But this perfection is had when the intellect reaches the essence itself of the first cause.

QUESTION IV THE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DELIGHT IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS.

YES.—As concomitant with it.

THE REASON is that delight is caused by the appetite's resting in a good attained; now happiness is nothing other than the attainment of the supreme good.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN HAPPINESS VISION OUTRANKS DELIGHT.

ANSWER: Vision outranks delight.

THE REASON is that the operation itself (vision) in which the will rests is a good outranking the repose of the will in itself (the good, that is, of vision); for the will seeks good only for the sake of repose, for otherwise the very act of the will would be the end; but the end of the will is good.

NOTE: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good that is delightful. And therefore, according to the sensitive appetite that is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight. Hence its object is good primarily, and delight only secondarily. Thus it is that the divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, attached delights to operations for the good of those operations (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER COMPREHENSION IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS.

YES.—That is, comprehension not strictly taken, but as the apprehension and perception of a thing already present (Ad 1).

THE REASON is that the things necessary for happiness are to be considered from the standpoint of man's being ordered to his end. Now in the perfect attainment of an intelligible end three things concur: Vision, or the perfect knowledge of the end itself; comprehension, or the presence of the end itself; and delight, or enjoyment, which involves the repose of the lover in that which he loves. Thus the intellect and will concur.

ART. IV.—WHETHER RECTITUDE OF WILL IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS.

YES.—Rectitude of will is required for happiness both antecedently and concomitantly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that rectitude of will consists in being duly ordered to the last end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the will of one who sees God's essence, which is the very essence of goodness, of necessity loves whatever it loves in relation to God; just as the will of one who does not see the divine essence necessarily loves whatever it loves under the aspect of the good.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE BODY IS NECESSARY FOR MAN'S HAPPINESS.

NO.—It is not necessary to constitute his happiness, but for the well-being of happiness.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is from authority: "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith and not by sight—we even have the courage to prefer to be exiled to be from the body, and to be at home with the Lord" (II Cor. v, 7-8). And from reason: Because the divine essence cannot be seen through phantasms (P. I, q. xii, art. 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the soul will be more perfect in its own nature united to the body than without the body. And therefore it will more perfectly have its proper operation, in which happiness consists.

NOTE: 1.—For imperfect happiness, which can be had in this life, the body is necessary, because the operation of the intellect in this life cannot exist without phantasms (body of art.).

2.—The separation of the soul from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending fully to the vision of the divine essence. For the soul so seeks to enjoy God that even this enjoyment overflows to the body as far as possible; and therefore, as long as it enjoys God without the body, its appetite so rests in that which it has that it would still wish the body to share in it (Ad 4). Hence, after the resumption of the body, happiness increases, not in intensity, but in extent (Ad 5); and in this sense the angels have a more perfect happiness than men (Ad 6).

ART. VI.—WHETHER PERFECTION OF BODY IS NECESSARY FOR HAPPINESS.

YES.—For absolute happiness a perfect disposition of body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently.

ANTECEDENTLY, THE REASON is that if the body is not perfectly disposed it would weigh down the soul, and the mind would be turned from the very vision of the highest heaven, as Augustine says.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE REASON is that the happiness of the soul overflows to the body, so that the body enjoys some of the soul's perfection.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANY EXTERNAL GOODS ARE NEEDED FOR HAPPINESS.

NO.—For perfect happiness no external goods at all are needed.

THE REASON is that that perfect happiness which consists in the vision of God either will be in the soul without the body, or will be in the soul united to the body—then no longer animal, but spiritual.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS IS NECESSARY FOR HAPPINESS.

NO.—For the perfect happiness of heaven the society of friends is not essential to happiness, but simply conduces to its well-being.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man has the whole fullness of his perfection in God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, if the blessed souls can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by their seeing one another and rejoicing in God at their fellowship (St. Augustine, *Gen. ad Lit.*, viii, 25).

**QUESTION V
THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS**

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN CAN ATTAIN HAPPINESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that man is capable of the perfect good; for he comprehends the universal and perfect good, and his will can seek it (P. I, q. xii, art. 1).

NOTE: The rational nature can attain happiness, which is the perfection of an intellectual nature, in a different way than the angels. For the angels acquired it immediately after the beginning of their condition; but men reach it after a time (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER ONE MAN CAN BE HAPPIER THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—Not as regards the good itself that is the object of happiness, but as regards the attainment and enjoyment of this good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the good of happiness is the supreme Good itself, which is one.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the more one enjoys this good the happier one is. This follows from the fact that one is better disposed or ordered to its enjoyment than another.

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE CAN BE HAPPY IN THIS LIFE.

NO.—Some participation of happiness can be had in this life; but perfect happiness is not to be had in this life.

THE FIRST REASON is from the general idea of happiness, for in this life all evil cannot be excluded, nor can the desire of good be satisfied, as is obvious.

THE SECOND REASON is that man cannot come in this life to the vision of the divine essence (P. I., xii, art. 2).

NOTE: The true note of happiness is considered on the part of the object, which specifies the act, but not on the part of the subject. Wherefore imperfection on the part of the object takes away the character of true happiness; but imperfection on the part of the subject does not take away the character of true happiness, but it is called happiness imperfectly, by comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HAPPINESS ONCE HAD CAN BE LOST.

NO.—Perfect happiness cannot be lost.

THE FIRST REASON is that for perfect happiness, which perfectly quiets the desire of man, it is necessary that man obtain the assurance of retaining the good that he has. Now if this assurance is certain we have what we intend; but if it is false, it would be a false object of the intellect, which is an evil. Hence there will be no true

happiness if any evil inheres in it. So much for the general nature of happiness.

THE SECOND REASON is from the nature of happiness in particular: a) Because the blessed one who sees the divine essence never wishes to lose it; for such a vision fills his soul with every good, since it unites him to the source of all goodness; b) Because he cannot lose it by God's drawing it away; for that would be in the nature of a punishment, which would suppose a fault. Now there can be no fault in one who beholds the divine essence, because he has rectitude of will (q. iv, art. 4); c) Because no other agent can withdraw it; for the mind that is united to God is elevated above all other things, and thus no other agent can exclude it from such a union.

NOTE: Beatitude is consummated perfection, which excludes all defect from the blessed one; and therefore it is given to him who has it without mutability. This is owing to the divine power, which raises man to the participation of an eternity that transcends all change (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN CAN ACQUIRE HAPPINESS BY HIS NATURAL POWERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that every knowledge that is according to the condition of the created substance falls short of the vision of the divine essence, which infinitely exceeds every created substance (P. I., q. xii, a. 4).

ART. VI.—WHETHER MAN ATTAINS HAPPINESS THROUGH THE ACTION OF SOME HIGHER CREATURE.

NO.—THE REASON is that, since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, as having limited power and action, that which surpasses created nature cannot be achieved by the power of any creature. And thus man is happy only through the action of God.

NOTE. 1.—In the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by angels to attain his last end in respect to certain dispositions preliminary to its attainment; but the last end itself he attains through the Prime Agent Himself, who is God (Ad 1).

2.—The light of glory, by which God is seen, is indeed in God perfectly and naturally; but in every creature it exists imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Hence no creature can communicate its happiness to another.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANY GOOD WORKS ARE NEEDED THAT MAN MAY ACQUIRE HAPPINESS FROM GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature suitably obtains happiness without the movement of the operation by which it tends to it, and thus order is preserved in things.

NOTE: 1.—God could make a will that was both rightly directed to its end and was already in its attainment. But the order of divine wisdom demands that this not be done (in body).

2.—The angel, who is superior by nature to man, attained his happiness by the order of divine wisdom in one movement of meritorious operation (P. I, q. lxii, art. 5); but men attain it by many movements of their operation (ibid.).

3.—Because through Christ, who is both God and Man, happiness was to pass to others, His soul was happy immediately from the beginning of His conception, without any meritorious operation (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER EVERY MAN DESIRES HAPPINESS.

YES.—Considering happiness according to its general aspect; but not according to its specific aspect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the general note of happiness is perfect good. Now every man desires the satisfaction of his will; but the will is satisfied by perfect good.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the specific aspect of happiness is that in which the happiness consists; in this respect, not all know happiness, because they do not know in what thing the general notion of happiness is found.

HUMAN ACTS

Since, then, we are to reach happiness by means of certain acts, we must in consequence consider human acts, that we may know by what acts happiness is gained and by what acts thwarted.

But, because acts and operations are concerned with the concrete, all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it takes account of things in detail. The study of morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles, and secondly matters of detail.

In the treatment of the general principles of human acts, the first point of inquiry is concerned with the human acts themselves, and the second with their principles.

Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and the brute. And, since happiness is man's proper good, those acts that are proper to man have a closer connection with happiness than have those that man shares with the other animals. We must therefore first consider those acts that are proper to man; secondly, those acts that are common to man and the other animals, which are called passions.

Regarding the first of these points two considerations offer themselves: 1) The condition of human acts; 2) the distinction of those acts. Now since those acts are properly called human that are voluntary, inasmuch as the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man, we must consider the acts in so far as they are voluntary.

We have first, then, to consider the voluntary and the involuntary in general; secondly, the acts that are voluntary, as being elicited by the will itself, and as issuing immediately from it; thirdly, those acts that are voluntary as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.

And, because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and subsequently the circumstances of those acts that are found to be voluntary or involuntary. The first point is the subject of eight articles.

QUESTION VI THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY

ART. I.—WHETHER IN HUMAN ACTS THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY.

YES.—Especially in human acts is the voluntary to be found.

THE REASON IS that man especially knows the end of his act, and moves himself accordingly; in other words, he moves himself with a knowledge of his end.

NOTE: 1.—Whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of its end has in itself the principle of its own act, not only to act but also to act because of an end. But in that which has no knowledge of its end, even though it has in itself a principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action toward an end is imprinted on it (body of art.).

2.—It is not essential to the nature of the voluntary that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. But the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, which is the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the order of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an external principle according to other species of movement (Ad 1).

3.—God moves man to act, not only by proposing the object to his senses, or by affecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement, either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING VOLUNTARY IN THE BRUTE.

YES.—In an imperfect sense.

THE REASON is that the brute animals do not have a perfect but only an imperfect knowledge of their end, which consists in the mere apprehension of their end, without a knowledge of the nature of the end and the relationship of the acts that are means to the end. Now the imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary, in so far as the beast, though apprehending the end, does not deliberate, but is forthwith moved toward it.

NOTE: 1.—Perfect knowledge of the end is had when an object is not only apprehended as the end, but the nature of the end is also known, and the relationship of the means to the end is known (body of art.).

2.—The will designates the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word voluntary is derived from *voluntas* (will), and can be

extended to those things in which there is some participation of the will according to some resemblance to it; and in this way voluntary action is attributed to the brutes, in so far as they are moved to an end through some kind of knowledge (Ad 1).

3.—Because the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can tend to either; in this sense voluntariness is not in the brutes (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE VOLUNTARINESS WITHOUT ANY ACT.

YES.—Both without an exterior act and without an interior act.

THE REASON IS that the will by willing and acting can, and sometimes should, hinder not-willing and not-acting; consequently this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to the will, as proceeding from it. This is what is called the indirect voluntary, because it does not proceed directly from the agent.

ART. IV.—WHETHER VIOLENCE CAN BE DONE TO THE WILL.

NO.—That is, with regard to the proper act of the will, which is the act immediately proceeding from the will [and which is to wish], violence cannot be done to the will. Violence can, however, be done to it as regards acts commanded by the will [as walking and speaking].

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge; what is forced or violent proceeds from an exterior principle.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the will can suffer violence in so far as the external members of the body can be prevented from executing the command of the will.

ART. V.—WHETHER VIOLENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as that which is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural, so that which is against the will is called involuntary; for it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both should proceed from an intrinsic principle.

NOTE: 1.—Violence does not cause the involuntary with regard to the act itself of the will, because, as has been said (prec. art.), violence cannot be done to the will; but with regard to commanded acts (ad 1).

2.—Whenever an action is brought to bear by an external agent, where the will to suffer the action remains in the one who bears it, there is no violence simply. Consequently, this cannot be called involuntary (ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER FEAR CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS SIMPLY.

NO.—Fear causes voluntariness simply; involuntariness, in a certain respect.

THE REASON is that that which is done under the influence of fear, in so far as the act exists here and now, or in act, and under other individuating circumstances, has its principle from within. Thus the throwing of a cargo into the sea during a storm becomes voluntary here and now.

But considered as existing outside this case, in so far as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind; and consequently what is done through fear is involuntary in that respect, i.e., considered as existing outside the actual circumstances of this case. For everything is said to exist simply in so far as it is in act; what exists only in apprehension does not exist simply, but in a certain respect.

NOTE: In acting because of force or violence, the interior will does nothing; but in acting through fear the will does something, as has been said (body of art.).

ART. VII.—WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS.

NO.—It does not cause involuntariness, but rather makes something voluntary.

THE REASON is that by concupiscence the will is inclined to will that which it desires. Yet the will can resist passion, as will be explained later (q. lxxvii, art. 6 and 7).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IGNORANCE CAUSES INVOLUNTARINESS.

YES.—The ignorance that is antecedent to the act; but not that which is concomitant with it, or that is consequent upon it.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that *antecedent* ignorance is the cause of willing what otherwise one would not will; as when someone is ignorant of some circum-

stance of an act that he was not bound to know, and for this reason does something that he would not do had he known it.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that ignorance is had *concomitantly* with the act when there is ignorance of what is done, yet so that even if it were known it would nevertheless be done (as when a man, disposed anyhow to shoot an enemy, shoots him under the impression that he was a deer). Consequently, concomitant ignorance does not cause the involuntary, but the non-voluntary.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that ignorance is had *consequently* to the will in so far as the ignorance itself is involuntary, either directly, such as *affected* ignorance, or indirectly, when someone can and should know that of which he is ignorant. This is called the ignorance of *evil choice*.

QUESTION VII THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE IS AN ACCIDENT OF A HUMAN ACT.

YES.—THE REASON is that what is outside the substance of a thing, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. This is the case with circumstance, as is evident from the name, for in things located that is said to surround (*circumstare*) something that is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS ARE THE BUSINESS OF THE THEOLOGIAN.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that it is the business of the theologian to consider human acts in so far as through them man is directed to happiness; now an act is made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances.

THE SECOND REASON is that the theologian considers human acts in so far as they have the aspect of good and bad, worse or better; and this diversity depends on circumstances.

THE THIRD REASON is that a human act is judged to be voluntary or involuntary according to one's knowledge or ignorance of the circumstances. The same thing is also to be said of merit and demerit.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE PROPERLY ENUMERATED IN ARISTOTLE'S THIRD BOOK OF 'THE ETHICS.'

YES.—THE REASON is that a circumstance can touch the human act itself in three ways: It touches the act itself, the cause of the act, and the effect of the act. The act itself it touches either by way of measure, as time and place (when and where), or by way of quality, as the mode of acting (*how*). It touches the effect, as when we consider *what* is done. It touches the final cause by the circumstance *why*; the material cause, or the object, by the circumstances *what* and *about what*; the principal efficient cause, by the circumstance *who*; and the instrumental efficient cause, by the circumstance *by what means*.

The circumstances are thus enumerated by Aristotle in his third book of *The Ethics*, The middle of chapter i: Who, what, about what, where, when, how, by whom, for whose sake. Cicero, in his *De Inventione Rhetorica*, i, includes "about what" under "what," and thus enumerates seven circumstances.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MOST IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE 'WHY' AND 'IN WHAT THE ACT CONSISTS.'

YES.—THE REASON is that acts are properly called human in so far as they are voluntary. Now the object and motive of the will are the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important that touches the end, or the circumstance "why" or "for whose sake." The circumstance second in importance is that which touches the substance of the act, i.e., the circumstance "what he did." The other circumstances are more or less important, according as they more or less approach these.

NOTE: Although the end is not part of the substance of the act (but is extrinsic to the object), it is yet the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Consequently the moral act is specified by the end (Ad 2).

THE ACTS OF THE WILL IN PARTICULAR

We have next to consider the acts of the will in particular: First, the acts that belong immediately to the will, as being elicited by the will; secondly, the acts commanded by the will. Now the will is moved both toward an end and toward the things that are for the end.

Accordingly, the first point of consideration is the acts of the will by which it is moved toward the end, and then its acts by which it is moved to the means. Now the acts of the will that are means to the end seem to be three, namely, volition, enjoyment, and intention.

First, then we shall consider the will; secondly enjoyment; thirdly, intention.—The first point of consideration claims three questions: The will in regard to what it wills; 2) the will in regard to that which moves it; 3) how the will is moved. The first question is in three articles.

QUESTION VIII

THE WILL IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS OF GOOD ONLY.

YES.—Of the good apprehended by the intellect.

THE REASON is that the will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. Yet the good of the appetite, whether sensitive, intellectual, or rational, is not the good existing in a thing, but is good apprehended. Such an appetite follows from an apprehended form, and its end can be real good or only apparent good.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE VOLITION IS OF THE END ONLY, OR ALSO OF THE MEANS.

ANSWER: If the word *voluntas* designates the power of the will, it extends both to the end, and to the means to the end; if, however, we are speaking of the will in so far as it designates properly the act of the will, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is the object of the will for its own sake, i.e., that which is good and willed, is the end. Consequently the will is properly of the end itself. The means to the end, however, are not good or willed for their own sake, but as referred to the end.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SAME ACT TO THE END AND TO THE MEANS.

NO.—The will is not directed absolutely by the same act to the end and to the means; yet it is directed by the same act to the end in so far as it is the reason for willing the means, and to the means themselves.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the will can be moved to the end as such, without being moved to the means, and the end sometimes precedes the means even in time. [Thus a man may will health before deciding to send for a doctor.]

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the will cannot be directed to the means as such unless it is directed to the end itself.

QUESTION IX

THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL

(In Six Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE INTELLECT.

YES.—It moves the will by presenting its object to it, i.e., not as the efficient cause but in the order of a formal and final cause, or on the part of the object.

THE REASON is that good itself, universal good, which is the object of the will, is apprehended according to a special aspect comprehended under the universal aspect of truth. Thus the (practical) intellect moves the will as regards specification.

But the will moves the intellect on the part of itself (or of the subject) and as to the exercise of its act; for the (particular) truth itself, which is the perfection of the

intellect, is included under the universal good, as a particular good. In this respect the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. For we use the other powers when we will (body and ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY THE SENSITIVE APPETITE.

YES.—THE REASON is that that which is apprehended under the aspect of the good and fitting moves the will by way of object. Now it is evident that according to the passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore, according as man is influenced by a passion, something seems to him fitting that does not seem so when he is not under its influence. And in this way the sensitive appetite moves the will on the part of the object (and indirectly).

NOTE: 1. The will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite; but in respect to a man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

2. The acts and choices of men are concerned with the concrete. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise in particular cases (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WILL MOVES ITSELF.

YES.—As regards the exercise of the act according to the aspect of the end.

THE REASON is that the will, by the fact that it actually wills the end, moves itself to will the means to the end.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY AN EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE.

YES.—Not only on the part of the object, or as to specification (see above, art. 1); but also on the part of the will itself, or as to the exercise of the act.

THE REASON is that everything that is sometimes in act and sometimes in potentially needs to be moved by something that moves it. And, because it is impossible to go back to infinity, we must assume that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in chapter xviii of his *Eudemian Ethics*.—In this, however, there is no violence, but it is the will itself that wills, although it is moved by another (Ad 2). The will itself is the proximate agent, which is moved by another as the first mover (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A HEAVENLY BODY.

NO.—The heavenly bodies cannot possibly move the will intrinsically, or as to exercise.

THE REASON is that the will is a power absolutely immaterial and incorporeal, not bound to any corporeal bodily organ.—The heavenly bodies may, however, move the will in the same manner as other exterior bodies, i.e., as regards specification, either directly or by moving the organs of the sensitive powers.

Yet the wise man can resist his passions; and through his free will, which is in no wise subject to movements from the heavenly bodies, he resists the effects of such bodies; for the wise man, as it is said, governs the stars (Ptolemy: *Centiloquium*, v).

ART. VI. WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY GOD ALONE, AS THE EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE.

Yes.—As regards the voluntary, or natural, movement.

THE REASON is that the natural movement is (in the creature) caused only by that which causes the nature. Now the cause of the will can be nothing but God: a) Because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation (P. I., q. xc, art. 2 and 3); b) because the will has a relation to universal good; wherefore nothing can be the cause of the will but God alone, who is the Universal Good.

NOTE: God, as the Universal Mover, moves man's will to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some men specially to the willing

of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall explain later (Q. 109, A. 2).

QUESTION X THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED TO ANYTHING NATURALLY.

YES.—a) To the good in general; b) to anything at all that is suitable to the one who wills according to his nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that good in general is the principle of voluntary movement; now the principle in the things that belong to a thing is nature; for that which befits a thing in respect to its substance is said to be natural to the thing in one way (and this is that which of itself inheres in a thing). Likewise, good in general is the proper object of the will. Now every power tends naturally to its proper object.—Likewise, good in general is the final end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible as the principles of demonstrations do to things intelligible.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that there are certain goods that concern the natural being of man, such as the knowledge of truth, being, and living, and other things of the sort.

NOTE: It is not necessary that the will, which is reduced from potentiality to act when it wills something, should always be in the act of volition, should always actually will, but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of willing (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT.

NO.—The will is not moved of necessity by every object that confronts it.

THE REASON is that not every object that is proposed to the will is universally and in all respects good. Now only that good which is perfect and which is lacking in nothing is such a good that the will cannot help willing it, and that is happiness. But particular goods, in so far as they fail in some good, can be taken as not good, and thus be repudiated by the will.

NOTE: With regard to the exercise of the act, the will is not of necessity moved by any (created) object; for it is possible for someone not to think of any object; and consequently not actually to will it (body).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE.

NO.—Unless the reason is totally suspended by the lower appetite, or by passion.

THE REASON is that if the reason is not wholly engrossed by passion, there remains free judgment of the reason with regard to anything.—Wherefore either the movement of the will is not in man, but passion alone predominates, as happens in the brute animals; or, if the movement of the will is present, it does not of necessity follow the passion.

NOTE: Regarding the words of the Apostle: "For I do not do the good that I wish, but the evil that I do not wish, that I perform" (Rom. vii, 19), the Holy Doctor remarks: "Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising," of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I will not, that I do," that is, *I desire*, yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire, or not to consent to concupiscence; and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE EXTERIOR MOVER, WHO IS GOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that, since the will is the active principle not determined to one, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent, and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally. For God, to whom it belongs, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things, moves everything according to the condition of their being.

QUESTION XI
ENJOYMENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL
(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER TO ENJOY IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITE POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that to enjoy, (*frui*, seemingly derived from *fructus*, fruit) refers to love or delight, which someone has in realizing the longed-for goal, which is the end [just as fruit is the goal of a tree's existence]. Now the end and the good are the object of the appetitive power.

ART. II.—WHETHER TO ENJOY BELONGS TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE OR ALSO TO THE BRUTES.

ANSWER: It belongs even to the brutes, but in an imperfect manner; to the rational creature it belongs in the perfect sense.

THE REASON is that enjoyment is found in beings that have knowledge, for it belongs to the appetitive power. But in man the knowledge of the end is perfect, because man not only knows the end and the good, but also the idea of the universal end and good. The brutes know only the end and the good in particular, without knowing the formality of the end, and therefore are moved to the end and its enjoyment by instinct.

NOTE: Creatures lacking knowledge, even if they attain their end, yet do not enjoy their end; because to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement (in body of art.)

ART. III.—WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE LAST END.

YES.—Enjoyment properly so called and according to the complete notion of fruit, or enjoyment.

THE REASON is that for the complete notion of fruit it must come last and it should quiet the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. What is referred to something else is not simply one, and yet it can have enjoyment in a certain limited sense.

NOTE: The fruits of the Holy Spirit are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Spirit in us, but not so that we enjoy them as the last end. Or, according to Ambrose, it must be said that they are called fruits because "they are sought for their own sake," not indeed so that they are not referred to happiness, but because they have in themselves something that should please us (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ENJOYMENT IS ONLY OF THE END POSSESSED.

NO.—THE REASON is that, besides perfect enjoyment, which is of the end already actually possessed, there is another, imperfect, enjoyment, which is of the end not possessed actually, but only in intention: For the last end is had in two ways: In one manner perfectly and in another manner imperfectly, as has been said.—Yet imperfect enjoyment is enjoyment properly speaking, because its object is the last end, for the object is that which specifies the act; the enjoyment of any other object not only is imperfect, but also is not enjoyment properly speaking. Enjoyment is perfect or imperfect according to the one who attains it (Ad 2).

QUESTION XII
INTENTION

(In Five Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INTENTION IS AN ACT OF THE INTELLECT OR OF THE WILL.

ANSWER: Of the will, supposing the direction of the reason.

THE REASON is that intention, which signifies *to tend to something*, refers to that which moves to an end. Now the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as was declared above (q. ix, art. 1). Wherefore intention is properly an act of the will.

NOTE: Upon the words of the Lord: "If the light that is in thee is darkness . . ." (Matth. vi, 23), the Holy Doctor comments: "Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness, because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds" (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER INTENTION IS ONLY OF THE LAST END.

NO.—THE REASON is that intention can be also of the middle terminus, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end, or terminus, of the other, namely the preceding.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANYONE CAN INTEND TWO THINGS AT THE SAME TIME.

YES.—Whether they are ordained to one another or not.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that intention is not only of the last end but also of an intermediary end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man can prefer one thing to another because it is the better of the two.

ART. IV.—WHETHER INTENTION OF THE END IS THE SAME ACT AS THE VOLITION OF THE MEANS.

YES.—The movement of the will to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same.

THE REASON is that the reason of the end is also the reason for willing the means.

For one and the same act falls on the object and on that by reason of which it is the object.

ART. V.—WHETHER INTENTION IS PROPER TO THE BRUTES.

NO.—To intend an end as it belongs to the mover is not proper to the brutes, but it is proper to them in so far as they are moved.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to intend an end as it belongs to the mover is to direct the movement of either oneself or another to the end. This belongs to reason alone.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the brutes intend their end in so far as they are moved by natural instinct to something, which they do by the natural instinct of desire. Thus they are moved to their end (Ad 3).

QUESTION XIII**CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS**

We have next to consider the acts of the will in relation to the means. These are three: Choice, consent, and use. Now choice is preceded by counsel. We must first, then, consider choice; secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use. The first point demands six questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHOICE IS AN ACT OF WILL OR OF REASON.

ANSWER.—Substantially, it is not an act of the reason but of the will.

THE REASON is that, with regard to the substance of the act, choice relates materially to the order that is imposed by a superior power, i.e., the reason. Wherefore this act is formally from the reason. For the reason precedes the will and ordains its act.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHOICE IS TO BE FOUND IN THE BRUTES.

NO.—THE REASON is that in the beings that are wholly determined to one thing, choice has no place. Now the sensitive appetite, which alone is in the brutes, is determined to one particular thing according to the order of nature.

NOTE: In the acts of the brutes certain marks of sagacity are indeed apparent, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being directed by the SUPREME ART. And for this reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious—but not because there is in them the power of reason or choice. This is clear from the fact that all the brutes that have the same nature act always in the same way (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF THE MEANS, OR SOMETIMES ALSO OF THE END.

ANSWER: Choice is only of the means.

THE REASON is that in practical matters the end stands in the position of principle and not of conclusion. But that which falls under choice stands as the conclusion in a practical syllogism.—Yet one end can sometimes be considered as a

means to another end, and in this way it falls under choice. But the last end in no wise falls under choice, for it is one only (body and ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHOICE IS OF THOSE THINGS ONLY THAT ARE DONE BY US.

YES.—Choice is always of human acts.

THE REASON is that a means to an end (and therefore that which refers to choice) either is a (human) action or some intervening action by which man either makes the means or uses it (as a physician does in regard to medicine).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHOICE IS ONLY OF THINGS POSSIBLE.

YES.—That which is impossible does not fall under choice.

THE FIRST REASON is that our choices are referred to our actions (prec. art.); now the things that we do are always possible.

THE SECOND REASON is that no one can attain his end by that which is impossible.

THE THIRD REASON is that no one is moved to that which is impossible.

ART. VI.—WHETHER MAN CHOOSES OF NECESSITY OR FREELY.

ANSWER: Freely.

THE REASON is that choice, since it is not concerned with the end (art. 3) but with the means, is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other particular goods. And therefore man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.

NOTE: The end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered in that light (Ad 1).

**QUESTION XIV
COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE
(In Six Articles)**

ART. I.—WHETHER COUNSEL IS AN INQUIRY.

YES.—THE REASON is that in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry. Now counsel, which precedes choice, is concerned with contingent singulars, which because of their variability, are uncertain. This inquiry is called counsel.

ART. II.—WHETHER COUNSEL IS OF THE END, OR ONLY OF THE MEANS.

ANSWER: Only of the means.

THE REASON is that every inquiry supposes a principle; for a principle is taken for granted. Now the end in practical matters is of the nature of a principle.—Yet it is possible that what is regarded as an end in one inquiry may be regarded as a means in another; and thus it will become an object of counsel.

NOTE: That which is regarded as an end is already fixed. Wherefore, as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not regarded as an end; and therefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel, not about the end, but about the means (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER COUNSEL IS ONLY OF THINGS THAT WE DO.

YES.—THE REASON is that the inquiry of counsel is properly about the singular and the contingent, and not about the necessary and the universal, with respect to which the consideration of one man can suffice of itself. Now contingent singulars are sought in so far as they are useful for operations.

ART. IV.—WHETHER COUNSEL IS ABOUT EVERYTHING THAT WE DO.

NO.—THE REASON is that counsel is an inquiry, as we have said (art. 1 of this q.). Now inquiry is of the things that are called into question. But there are some things in human operations that do not admit of doubt; and this happens in two ways: In one way because we proceed by fixed paths to fixed ends (thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters); in another way because certain things are negligible, concerning which there is no need of counsel; for what is of little account is regarded by reason as nothing.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PROCESS OF COUNSEL IS ONE OF ANALYSIS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which indeed precedes in the order of intention, but comes afterwards into execution.

NOTE: To proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically; because causes are simpler than effects. If, then, the principle that is prior in intention is also prior in execution, the process is synthetic. If the principle is prior in intention, but comes afterwards into execution, the process is analytic; as when our judgment deals with manifest effects, which by analysis we resolve into their simple causes (body of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PROCESS OF COUNSEL IS INDEFINITE.

NO.—The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on the part of both the principle and its term.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the principle, considered as the end, does not fall under counsel, but is taken for granted. But a principle that is taken from another genus, i.e., that which is received through the senses as certain, does not fall under inquiry, but is taken for granted.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that that which is done for the sake of an end has the character of a conclusion, just as the end has the character of a principle.—Yet nothing prevents counsel from being potentially infinite, in so far as contingent singulars are potentially infinite (in body and ad 1).

QUESTION XV

CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONSENT IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE OR THE APPREHENSIVE POWER.

ANSWER: Consent more properly pertains to the will than to the intellect.

THE REASON is that sense (*sentire*), properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but *consentire* (to consent) means to feel with (*simul sentire*) and implies a sort of union to the object of consent. And therefore the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to *consent*; whereas the intellect is more properly said to *assent* (in body and ad 2 and 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONSENT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE BRUTES.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is not in the power of the brutes to apply the appetitive movement or not to apply it, to apply it to this or to that; but such movement is in them by the instinct of nature. To consent properly belongs only to rational nature. In the beasts the determination of the appetite to something is merely passive (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CONSENT IS DIRECTED TO THE END OR TO THE MEANS.

ANSWER: Properly it is directed to the means.

THE REASON is that the appetitive movement is applied to that which is decided as a result of counsel. Consent designates the application of the appetitive movement. Now counsel is concerned only with the means; wherefore consent, properly speaking, is concerned only with the means.—We say “properly speaking,” because here consent is taken in the strict sense; will, or volition properly refers to the end (Ad 1).

NOTE: Choice adds over and above consent a certain relation in respect to that to which something else is preferred; and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. If consent is concerned with several things that are conducive to the end (because they are all satisfactory, but out of them all, one is chosen), then choice differs from consent not only in our way of looking at it but also in reality.—But if only one is satisfactory then consent and choice are really the same, and not simply in the mind: For choice falls under consent in so far as a thing is approved for action; consent falls under choice in so far as one thing is preferred to others (Ad 3).

Wherefore we have the following order: 1. The apprehension of the end; 2) the willing of the end; 3) the counsel or inquiry of the means to the end; 4) consent, or the application of the appetitive movement to the means; 5) the choice of the means.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CONSENT TO THE ACT BELONGS ONLY TO THE HIGHER PART OF THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that consent to the act is the final decision concerning the things to be done. Now the final decision always belongs to the higher reason (in that sense in which the will is included in the reason), to which it belongs to judge (art. 1, of this q.).

QUESTION XVI

USE WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER USE IS AN ACT OF THE WILL.

YES.—First and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation.

THE REASON is that the use of anything implies the application of that thing to some operation. Now the will is that which moves the powers of the soul to their acts (q. ix, art. 1). But action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent [as building is ascribed to the builder, but not to his tools]. Wherefore use first and principally belongs to the will.

ART. II.—WHETHER USE IS TO BE FOUND IN THE BRUTES.

NO.—THE REASON is that use belong only to one who knows how to refer something to something else, and this is a function of reason. For it is use to apply some principle of action to action.

NOTE: Animals through their members do something by natural instinct, but not through knowing the relation of their members to these operations; wherefore they are not, properly, said to apply their members to action, or to use them (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER USE REGARDS ALSO THE LAST END.

NO.—THE REASON is that use implies the application of something to something else. Wherefore use never regards the last end, but always regards the means.

NOTE: The last end, simply speaking, is the thing itself; but, in regard to the individual (end), the attainment of the end is the last end. And in this sense we use the end (the thing) for the possession of the end. Similarly we speak of the enjoyment of the end, which is had by the use of the end (body and ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER USE PRECEDES CHOICE.

NO.—If by use we mean the will's use of the executive power.

THE REASON is that choice belongs to the first relation of the will to the thing willed, in so far as the thing willed is in the will by a certain proportion or order to the thing willed; and in this sense choice completes this proportion or relation. But use belongs to the second relation of the will to the thing willed, in respect to which it tends to the realization of the thing willed; and this is had through the use of the executive power.—But, because the will has reason, and uses it, the use of the means can be understood as consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end.

QUESTION XVII

THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL

(in nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER COMMAND IS AN ACT OF THE REASON OR OF THE WILL.

ANSWER: Essentially it is an act of the reason, but presupposes an act of the will.

THE REASON is that the one who commands orders him whom he commands to do something by way of intimation or declaration; now to order thus by way of intimation belongs to the reason.—But, as we said earlier (q. ix, act. 1), the first mover in the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will. Wherefore to command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, by virtue of which the reason moves by its command to the exercise of an act.

ART. II.—WHETHER COMMAND BELONGS TO THE BRUTES.

NO.—In the brutes, in which there is no reason, command cannot possibly exist in any way.

THE REASON is that to command is nothing else than to order someone to do something by a certain declarative action. Now to order is an act proper to the reason.

ART. III.—WHETHER USE PRECEDES COMMAND.

NO.—Use, considered as subject to the executive power, follows command; considered as in the reason referring this to an end, it precedes command.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that command is naturally prior to the obedience to the command; now command is obeyed by the use of the thing to which the use of the user is united [for one does not use a stick before doing something with it].

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such a use existing in the reason precedes choice, as was said above (q., prec. art. 4); therefore, all the more does it precede command.

ART. IV.—WHETHER COMMAND AND THE COMMANDED ACT ARE ONE ACT OR DISTINCT.

ANSWER: They are one human act considered as a whole; they are distinct considered in their parts.

THE REASON is that command stands to the commanded act as the act of the first mover to the act of the instrument. Now the act of the first mover is as a form in regard to the act of the instrument; for in human acts the act of the lower power is to the act of the higher as the matter, inasmuch as the lower powers act in virtue of the higher power that moves it.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ACT OF THE WILL IS COMMANDED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the reason can direct the act of the will.

NOTE: The first act of the will is not by the direction of the reason but by the instinct of nature, or of a higher cause, as was said (q. ix, a. 4).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE ACT OF THE REASON IS COMMANDED.

YES.—As regards the exercise of the act; as regards the object it is not always commanded.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the reason reacts upon itself; wherefore, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so also it can direct its own act; as when one is told to pay attention.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as regards the apprehension of the truth about something, this is not in our power, but happens by the power of some light, either natural or supernatural.

There is, however, another act of the reason, which assents to what it apprehends. Certain forms of assent are not in our power, such as the assent to first principles, to which the intellect naturally assents; and therefore, properly speaking, they are subject to the command of nature. Other forms of assent or dissent are in our power and fall under command. Such are those that are concerned with those objects it apprehends that do not convince the intellect; but the intellect can assent to them or dissent; or at least suspend assent or dissent for one reason.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE ACT OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS COMMANDED.

YES.—Not by a despotic but by a political command.

THE REASON is that the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. But the act of the sensitive appetite does not depend wholly on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of a bodily organ, which is not wholly subject to the command of reason, for sometimes a movement is suddenly aroused at the apprehension of an imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason. In this way are explained the words of the Apostle who says: "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind" (Rom. vii, 19). Here it is a question of the disposition of the body antecedent to the act of the sensitive appetite. The consequent disposition follows the command of the reason, since it results from the local movement of the heart (Ad. 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE ACT OF THE VEGETAL SOUL IS COMMANDED.

NO.—THE REASON is that the acts of the vegetal soul proceed from the natural appetite, which do not result from any apprehension; consequently they cannot be commanded by reason.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE EXTERNAL MEMBERS ARE COMMANDED.

YES.—The bodily members obey the reason with regard to their acts, which are moved by the sensitive powers; but not with regard to those that arise from the natural powers.

THE REASON is that the sensitive powers are subject to the command of the reason, for the members of the body are organs of the soul. But the natural powers are not subject to the command of the reason.

NOTE: The movements of the genital members do not obey reason in consequence of the punishment of sin, in the sense that the soul is punished for its disobedience to God in that particular member by which original sin was transmitted to posterity.

But we must consider the natural reason why the movement of these members (the heart and the genital members) especially do not obey reason: It is required for the movement of these two members that there be some natural alteration of the body, namely of heat and cold, and this alteration is not subject to the command of reason.

Especially does this occur in these two members, because each of them is as it were a separate animal being, inasmuch as it is a principle of life; and the principle is potentially the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal power, which is potentially an entire animal. Consequently they have their proper natural movements, because principles must be natural (Ad. 3).

THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS.

After this we are to consider the good and evil of human acts: 1) how a human action is good or bad; 2) what results from the good or evil of a human act, namely merit or demerit, sin and guilt.

The first head will take up three considerations: 1) The good and evil of human acts in general. 2) The good and evil of interior acts. 3) The good and evil of exterior acts. The first point comprises 11 questions.

QUESTION XVIII**THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS IN GENERAL.****ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD, OR SOME ARE EVIL.**

ANSWER: Not every human action is good, but some of them are evil.

THE REASON is that we must speak of the good and evil in actions as we must speak of the good and evil in things, for such as each thing is, such is the act it produces. Now, in so far as it has something of being, so far does it have something of goodness. But in so far as a human action has anything lacking to it of its due fullness of being, so far does it fall short of goodness, and thus is called evil. Thus it would be evil if it is lacking in quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something else of the sort. Wherefore evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GOOD OR EVIL OF A MAN'S ACTION IS DERIVED FROM ITS OBJECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that a human action has its species from its object, for a human action is to its object as a natural thing is to its form. For that which primarily gives the fullness of being to a thing is that which gives it its species, i.e., the form. Now, just as the primary goodness of a natural thing depends on its form, which gives the thing its species, so also the primary goodness of a moral act depends on an object suitable to the reason. And it is called good in its genus, i.e., by reason of the form itself.

Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion (according to right reason) to this or that action. And so,

inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness (Ad. 1).

2.—The object is not the matter of which [a thing is made], but the matter about which [something is done]; and it stands in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species (Ad 2).

The object is in some manner the effect of the active power, for it is the term of its action; and movement derives its species from its terms (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN'S ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM A CIRCUMSTANCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the fullness of the goodness of a (human) action does not wholly consist in its species, but also in certain additions that accrue to it because of certain accidents; and such are its due circumstances; just as there are due accidents in natural things, which are called proper accidents (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END.

YES.—THE REASON is that, besides the absolute goodness that exists in a human action, there is a measure of goodness from the end on which the action depends; for that which depends on another must be considered with relation to the cause on which it depends.

NOTE: In every human action a fourfold goodness can be considered: The first is according to its genus, in so far as it is an action; the second is according to its species, which is derived from its suitable object; the third is according to its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents; the fourth is according to its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness (body of art.).—An action is not good simply unless all (these four) forms of goodness concur, since "evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause," as Dionysius says (Ad. 3).—Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent in the action (Ad. 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS GOOD OR EVIL IN ITS SPECIES.

YES.—Moral acts differ in species as good and evil.

THE REASON is that in human acts good and evil are predicated in reference to reason, with which acts are either in accord or disaccord. If in accord they are good; if not, they are evil. This difference is essential; for essential differences cause a difference of species. Wherefore good and evil diversify the species in moral acts.

ART. VI.—WHETHER AN ACTION HAS THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL FROM ITS END.

YES.—Voluntary interior acts are specified by the end.

THE REASON is that that which is on the part of the will (in human acts) is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action; for the will uses the limbs to act as instruments, nor have external acts any measure of morality except in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action.

NOTE: Just as an external action derives its species from the object on which it bears, so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object (body of art.).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE END IS CONTAINED UNDER THE SPECIES DERIVED FROM THE OBJECT, AS UNDER ITS GENUS, OR CONVERSELY.

ANSWER: When the object is essentially ordained to the end, the species of goodness that is derived from the object contains that goodness which is derived from the end as under its genus.

THE FIRST REASON is that the specific difference that is derived from the end is more general; but the difference derived from the object is more specific, because it is derived from a more particular form.

THE SECOND REASON is that the specific difference that is derived from an

object ordained of itself to such an end is specific with respect to it; wherefore it is contained under the end as under a genus.

THE THIRD REASON is that the will, whose proper object is the end, is the universal motive with respect to all the powers of the soul, whose proper objects are the objects of particular acts.

NOTE: We say: When an object is ordained of itself to the end, because otherwise the specific difference that depends on the object would not of itself determine that which is derived from the end, or conversely. Wherefore we say that he who steals in order to commit adultery commits a twofold malice in one act (body of art.).

We say: "Ordained of itself," for otherwise the difference would not be specific, but accidental, and accidental differences do not diversify a genus [As if we should say: Irrational animals are divided into the winged and the wingless: Winged and wingless are not determinations of the irrational being].

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ANY ACTION IS INDIFFERENT IN ITS SPECIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason, as to pick up a straw from the ground; to go to the country, and the like; and such actions, according to their species, are neither good nor bad.

ART. IX.—WHETHER ANY INDIVIDUAL ACT CAN BE INDIFFERENT.

NO.—In the case of acts proceeding from deliberate reason.

THE REASON is that every individual act must necessarily have some circumstance that makes it either good or bad, at least with respect to the intention of the end. For acts must be either directed or not directed to a due end.—Now if an act does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from whimsy (as when someone strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot), such an act is not properly speaking moral or human, since this depends on the reason, and thus it will be indifferent, as being outside the order of moral acts.

ART. X.—WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE PLACES A MORAL ACTION IN THE SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, as is a specific difference in natural things; but at any point it can proceed still further; and thus it can consider the circumstance as the principal conditions of the object determining the species of the act, just as to steal an object in a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason, besides that which is constituted in the species of theft.

ART. XI.—WHETHER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MAKES AN ACTION BETTER OR WORSE PLACES A MORAL ACTION IN A SPECIES OF GOOD OR EVIL.

NO.—Because not every circumstance regards a special order of reason, for sometimes a circumstance presupposes another circumstance, from which a moral act has the species of good or evil; such as to steal anything in great or small amount. Now the circumstance "to steal something in great or small amount" does not change the species, although it can aggravate or diminish the sin.

QUESTION XIX

THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (in ten articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT.

YES.—Good and evil in the acts of the will are properly regarded according to their objects.

THE REASON is that good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will (q. prec. art. 5); now a difference of species in acts is according to the objects (ibid). Therefore the goodness or malice of the will depends properly on the object.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT ALONE.

YES.—Properly speaking, and if we consider the circumstances as pure accidents.

THE REASON is that the goodness of the will depends solely on that one thing which of itself constitutes goodness in an act, i.e., on the object and on the circumstances, which are as it were the accidents of the act. For that which is accidental is reduced to that which is essential.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE REASON.

YES.—The goodness of the will depends on the reason in the same way in which it depends on the object.

THE REASON is that the object of the will on which the goodness of the will properly depends (art. 1, ad 2) is proportionate to it through the reason; for the good of the intellect is the object of the will that is proportionate to it. For the will cannot desire a good unless it is first apprehended by the reason (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE ETHERAL LAW.

YES.—The goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law rather than on human reason.

THE REASON is that the human reason, by which the goodness of the will is measured (prec. art.), derives its light from the eternal reason or law, according to Ps. iv, 6: "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."—Wherefore wherever human reason fails we must recur to the eternal reason.

NOTE: Although the eternal law as it is in the divine mind is unknown to us, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason, which is derived therefrom as its proper image, or by some sort of additional revelation (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE WILL IS EVIL WHEN IT IS AT VARIANCE WITH ERRING REASON.

YES.—Every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.

THE REASON is that the goodness or malice of the will depends on the object, not in so far as it is considered in its own nature, but in so far as it is apprehended by the reason as good or evil, as something to be done or to be avoided.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE WILL IS GOOD WHEN IT ABIDES BY ERRING REASON.

NO.—The will that abides by a reason that errs by an error that is voluntary either directly or indirectly (through negligence) is evil; that which abides by a reason that errs by involuntary error is not evil.

THE REASON is that in the first case, since error is voluntary, it does not excuse from guilt the will that abides by a reason or conscience thus erring; but contrariwise in the second case, as we said concerning ignorance (q. vi, art. 8).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL, AS REGARDS THE MEANS, DEPENDS ON THE INTENTION OF THE END.

YES.—If the intention precedes the will.

THE REASON is that the goodness of the thing willed (which regards the end) consists in its ordination to the end (good), just as fasting has the character of goodness if it is done for the sake of God.—If however the intention follows the will, then this goodness of the will does not depend on the intention, except in so far as the act of the will is repeated with the subsequent intention.

NOTE: If the cause of willing is an evil intention, then the will cannot be called good, even if the means are good, e.g., the giving of alms for the sake of vainglory. But if the evil intention is subsequent to the act of the will it does not pervert the act of the will that preceded, but the act of the will that is repeated (Ad 2). Therefore, in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE DEGREE OF GOODNESS OR MALICE IN THE WILL DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF GOOD OR EVIL IN THE INTENTION.

NO.—The quantity of the goodness of the will does not always follow the quantity of the goodness of the intention, but the quantity of the malice is according to the quantity of the malice of the intention.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the quantity of the act, or the intensity of the act, in which the quantity of the merit consists, as will be explained later (q. cxiv, art. 4), does not always follow the quantity of the intention; wherefore one does not always merit as much as one intends to merit. For the goodness of the intention alone is not the total cause of the good will (Ad 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the malice of the intention alone suffices for the malice of the will; and therefore the intention is evil as far as the will is evil (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON ITS CONFORMITY TO THE DIVINE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the proper object of the divine will is the supreme good itself, which is the last end of the human will (q. i, art. 8). Now for the goodness of the human will it is required that it be ordered to the last end. Now this ordination or conformity of the human will to the divine will is not by way of equality but by way of imitation, as is evident (Ad 1).

ART. X.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE HUMAN WILL, IN ORDER TO BE GOOD, TO BE CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL, AS REGARDS THE THING WILLED.

YES.—The human will must be conformed in the thing willed formally, but not materially.

THE REASON is that the will of any man who wills some particular good is not a right will unless he refers it to the common good of all. Now from the end is derived that which is ordained to the end as the formal reason of willing. Wherefore the particular good is willed materially, the common good, formally. A man is bound to be conformed to the divine will in what is formally willed, but not in what is materially willed, for we do not know in particular what God wills.—Nevertheless, by reason of the efficient cause, the right human will is even materially conformed to God, because it wills what God wills it to will.—There is still another kind of conformity in respect to the formal cause, which consists in man's willing something out of charity, as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is, in respect to the last end, which is the proper object of charity.

QUESTION XX

THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTS

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOOD OR MALICE IS FIRST IN THE ACTION OF THE WILL, OR IN THE EXTERNAL ACTION.

ANSWER: In the action of the will.—THE REASON is that the proper object of the will is the end; wherefore the aspect of good or evil possessed by the external act with relation to the end is first found in the act of will, and from it passes to the external action.

NOTE: The goodness of the end of the act is derived from reason more than from the will, and in this sense the goodness of an external act is prior to the goodness of an act of the will; but, with regard to the execution of the act, the goodness of the will is prior (body of art.). The will is compared to the external action as the efficient cause (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WHOLE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTERNAL ACTION DEPENDS ON THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL.

NO.—THE REASON is that only that goodness which is according to the order to the end depends on the will (the end of the agent); the other goodness, which is derived from due matter and circumstances (the end of the action), depends on the

reason; and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends toward it.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE EXTERNAL ACTION ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE INTERIOR ACT.

YES.—When the external action is good or evil only from its relation to the end; but not when the external action derives goodness or malice of itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that then the end of the act of the will and the end of the external action are one and the same. Now the act of the will and the external action considered morally are one and the same act (q. xvii, art. 4, and q. xvii, art. 6 ad 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that then the end of the will can be distinct from the end of the external action, as is evident.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE EXTERNAL ACTION ADDS ANY GOODNESS OR MALICE TO THAT OF THE INTERIOR ACT.

YES.—The exterior act, which derives goodness or malice of itself, i.e., according to due matter and circumstances (the end of the action), adds to the goodness or malice of the interior act; if it derives goodness or malice from the end (the end of the agent), then the exterior action adds nothing except accidentally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus the external action is compared to the will as the term and the end; now every inclination or movement is perfected by realizing the end or attaining the term.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is evident from what has been said; for the goodness and malice of the exterior act are then had only from the goodness or evil of the end.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTERNAL ACTION ADDS ANYTHING OF GOODNESS OR MALICE.

NO.—If the consequence was not foreseen and does not follow from the act of itself, but only accidentally, it adds nothing to the goodness or malice of the act.

THE REASON is that we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE AND THE SAME EXTERNAL ACTION CAN BE BOTH GOOD AND EVIL.

NO.—It is impossible that one and the same external action, considered morally, should be good and evil by moral goodness and evil; but if it is one in natural unity, and not in moral unity, it can be both good and evil.

THE REASON is that in the first case the intention is one and the action is one morally; in the second case the intention can be diverse, and therefore there may be several actions in the moral order. [For example, a continuous walking is one, considered in the natural order, whereas it is not one considered in the moral order, and vice versa. For continuous walking may resolve itself into many actions considered in the moral order, if the will of the walker changes, for the will is the principle of moral actions.]

QUESTION XXI

THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS RIGHT OR SINFUL IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that a human action is called good inasmuch as it agrees with the eternal law and reason; it is called evil if it recedes from the order of the divine law and reason. For in the things that are done by the will the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Wherefore a human act, by the fact that it is good or evil, is either right or sinful.

ART. II.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION DESERVES PRAISE OR BLAME BY REASON OF ITS BEING GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that to praise and to blame are nothing else than to im-

pute to someone (who is master of his actions) the goodness or malice of his action.

ART. III.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS IN SO FAR AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that an act, which is human in so far as it is good or evil, has an order to retribution according to justice. Now man acts by good or evil for the benefit or hurt of another.

NOTE: When anyone acts for the good or evil of another individual there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit: In one way in respect to the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; in another way, as it is owed by society. For whenever one does anything for the good or evil of someone in society, this redounds on society as a whole, just as one who injures a hand in consequence injures the whole man (body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A HUMAN ACTION IS MERITORIOUS OR DEMERITORIOUS BEFORE GOD, ACCORDING AS IT IS GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—Whether the act is ordained to another by reason of the one who acts, or by reason of the community.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is a duty to refer all our acts to the last end (q. xix, art. 10).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in every community he who governs the community has especially the care of the common good; wherefore to him it belongs to dispense retribution for the good or ill that is done in the community. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, and especially of rational creatures.

NOTE: Man is not ordained to the body politic in all he is and has; and therefore every act of his need not be meritorious or demeritorious by relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can do, and has, must be ordained to God; and therefore every act of man that is good or bad has the character of merit or demerit with God, in so far as the action itself is concerned.

THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL

After this we are to consider the passions of the soul, first in general, then in particular. In general four points occur for consideration: 1) The subject of the passions; 2) their difference; 3) their relation to one another; 4) their malice and goodness.—The first point occupies three articles.

QUESTION XXII
THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS
(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY PASSION IS IN THE SOUL.

YES.—Not properly but accidentally.

THE REASON is that the word passive is employed in its proper sense when something is received, while something else is taken away, either for the worse (and this is the most proper sense of passive) or for the better, as health is taken away by sickness and sickness is taken away by health. Now passion accompanied by the loss of something is only in respect to bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul save accidentally.—In another way the word passive is used in a general sense, in so far as whatever receives something is passive; and thus the sensation and understanding of the soul is a kind of passion.

ART. II.—WHETHER PASSION IS IN THE APPETITIVE RATHER THAN IN THE APPREHENSIVE PART.

ANSWER: Passion is more in the appetitive part than in the apprehensive.

THE REASON is that the term passion properly so called implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power. For by the appetitive power the soul is drawn to things as they are in themselves; by the apprehensive power it receives things in its own way through knowledge.

NOTE: 1.—Passion refers to defect, inasmuch as it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Prime Perfection, namely God, there are little potentiality and passion; in other things, consequently, there are more (Ad 1).

2.—The appetitive power is to be more active because it is more the principle of the exterior action; and this for the same reason that it is more passive (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER PASSION IS IN THE SENSITIVE APPETITE RATHER THAN IN THE INTELLECTUAL APPETITE, WHICH IS CALLED THE WILL.

ANSWER: Passion is more in the sensitive appetite than in the intellective.

THE REASON is that passion properly speaking is found where there is bodily transmutation; in the act of the intellective appetite no bodily transmutation is required, because such appetite is not exercised by means of any corporeal organ.

QUESTION XXIII

HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER

(in four articles)

ART. 1.—WHETHER THE PASSIONS OF THE CONCUPIBIBLE PART ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE IRASCIBLE PART.

YES.—THE REASON is that the concupiscible power and the irascible power differ specifically; for they have different specific objects included under one common object; wherefore the passions that are in the concupiscible part differ in species from those that are in the irascible part.—Those passions that regard good or evil absolutely, or what is delectable or painful, belong to the concupiscible part. These are love and hate, desire and aversion, delight and sadness. Those passions that regard good or evil under the aspect of the arduous belong to the irascible part. These are hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger, which does not have an opposite.

NOTE: The irascible power is given to animals in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible part from tending to its object, either on account of the difficulty of attaining good, or on account of the difficulty of surmounting evil. And thus the passions of the irascible part all terminate in the passions of the concupiscible part (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CONTRARIETY OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS IS BASED ON THE CONTRARITY OF GOOD AND EVIL.

NO.—Not every contrariety of the passions is irascible according to the contrariety of good and evil.

THE REASON is that in the irascible part there is a twofold contrariety: One according to the contrariety of objects (good or bad); the other according to approach or withdrawal from the same term, such as fear and daring; and the reason of this is that the object of the irascible part is sensible good or evil—not indeed absolutely, as in the concupiscible part, but under the aspect of difficulty and arduousness. Thus contrariety arises, according to good and evil, between hope and fear; and contrariety arises according to approach and withdrawal from the same term between daring and fear.

NOTE: Good, as good, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such, but everything seeks it. Similarly, nothing seeks evil, as evil; but everything avoids it. And for this reason evil has no terminus whereto, but only a terminus wherefrom (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY PASSION OF THE SOUL HAS NO CONTRARY.

YES.—Anger, which cannot have a contrary either according to approach and withdrawal or according to the contrariety of good and evil.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that anger is caused by an already impending evil; wherefore it has no contrary according to approach and withdrawal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that an evil already impending is opposed by a good already won, which cannot now be arduous or difficult. After the good is won there remains no other movement than the repose of the appetite in the good that is won, and this quieting of the appetite pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

NOTE: The movement of wrath cannot have any movement contrary to the soul, but only cessation from movement is opposed to it. As the philosopher says in his *Rhetoric* (Book II, chap. 3 in beginning): "Calm is contrary to anger," i.e., by opposition, not of contrariety, but of negation or privation (body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN THE SAME POWER THERE ARE ANY PASSIONS SPECIFICALLY DIFFERENT, BUT NOT CONTRARY TO ONE ANOTHER.

YES.—There are 11 passions, of which six are in the concupiscible and five in the irascible part, which are specifically distinguished and are not contrary to one another.

THE REASON is that the passions differ according to the different active virtue of the power, whether concupiscible or irascible. Now in the movements of the appetitive part, good has as it were an attractive power, evil a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude, or connaturalness in respect to good, and this belongs to the passion of love; the corresponding contrary of this is hatred in respect to evil.—Secondly, if the good is not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved; and this belongs to the passion of desire or concupiscence; and contrary to it, in respect to evil, is the passion of aversion or dislike.—Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained; and this belongs to the passion of delight or joy; the contrary of which, in respect to evil, is sorrow or sadness.

Similarly, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And, in respect to good not yet obtained, we have hope and despair. In respect to evil not yet present we have fear and daring. In respect to good obtained there is no irascible passion; because it is no longer considered in the respect to already impending evil we have anger, to which no passion is opposed, for good already impending is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, but implies joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

QUESTION XXIV
GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MORAL GOOD AND EVIL CAN BE FOUND IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL.

YES.—Not as in themselves but as they are subject to the command of the reason and will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, considered in themselves, the passions are movements of the irrational appetite.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in so far as they are subject to the command of the reason and will, moral good or evil is in them.—In fact, because the sensitive appetite is nearer to the will and reason than the external members, the passions themselves can much more be called good or evil morally than the movements and actions of the external members. They are called voluntary either from the fact that they are commanded by the will, or from the the fact that they are not forbidden by the will.

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY PASSION OF THE SOUL IS EVIL MORALLY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the passions are morally evil, or are called diseases or disturbances of the soul, only when they lack the moderation of reason.—This is according to the doctrine of the Peripatetics, which Cicero, with the Stoics, wrongly attacked.

NOTE: 1.—In every passion of the soul something is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation (or, better, the return of the heart to its normal size after contraction); and in this way the heart is viewed in the light of a passion (Ad. 2).

2.—The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin; but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER PASSION INCREASES OR DECREASES THE GOODNESS OR MALICE OF AN ACT.

ANSWER: The passions of the soul add to and lessen in the human act goodness or malice, in so far as they are subject to the command of the will and reason.

THE REASON is that for the perfection of a moral act it is essential that man be moved to good not only in the will, but also in the sensitive appetite; for the good of man will be more perfect in proportion as it extends to more things suitable to man.

NOTE: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. In one way, antecedently; and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of a moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act. For it is more praiseworthy to do an act of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity.—In the second place consequently, and that in two ways: First by way of redundance, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement; and thus the passion that results in consequence in the sensitive appetite is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness (or malice).—Secondly, by way of choice; when a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite; and thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness (or malice) of the action (Ad. 1).—A passion that tends to evil and precedes the judgment of reason diminishes sin (but if it be consequent it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous) (Ad. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANY PASSION IS GOOD OR EVIL IN ITS SPECIES.

YES.—Not according to its nature, but in so far as in its species it partakes of something of the voluntary and the judgment of reason.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that passion in so far as it is in its natural genus does not fall under the rule of morals, as was said concerning acts (q. xviii, art. 6 and 7; and q. xx, art. 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the object of any passion can be of itself in accord with reason or in discord with it, as appears in the case of shame, which is base fear; and of envy, which is sadness at another's good; for thus they belong to the same species as the external act.

QUESTION XXV

THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS PRECEDE THE CON- CUPISCIBLE PASSIONS, OF VICE VERSA.

ANSWER: The concupiscible passions precede.

THE REASON is that the concupiscible passions have something relating to movement and something relating to repose, such as desire and joy; now the irascible passions have something pertaining to movement only. In fact, the irascible passions take precedence over the concupiscible passions and terminate in them. Wherefore they are midway between the concupiscible passions, which involve a movement to good or evil, and the concupiscible passions, which denote repose in good or in evil. An example is anger, which arises from sadness and terminates in the joy of revenge.

NOTE: We are here speaking of the passions as directly related to one another. (Ad. 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER LOVE IS THE FIRST OF THE CON- CUPISCIBLE PASSIONS.

YES.—In the order of execution love is first; but in the order of intention love is the last of the concupiscible passions in respect to good, for the object of these passions is good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the order of execution or realization three things are required: The aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good; movement to good; and rest in good. Aptitude is love, which is complacency in good; desire is movement; joy or delight is rest in good.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the order of intention the reverse is true: Delight causes desire and love.

NOTE: All the passions whose object is good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is evil, for evil is only the privation of good (body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER HOPE IS THE FIRST OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that hope and despair, since their object is good, precede fear and daring, whose objects are evil. But hope precedes despair, because despair does not have good as its object as such, but is rather a movement away from good. Now fear, since it is a movement away from evil, precedes daring. The object of anger is evil and supposes fear and daring, "for no one seeking revenge is angry unless he dares to revenge himself" (Avicenna, *De Naturalibus*, lib. vi). Wherefore in the order of the irascible passions anger comes last.

NOTE: The order of all the passions in the way of generation is as follows:

Love and hate; desire and aversion; hope and despair; fear and daring anger; joy and sadness (body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THESE ARE THE FOUR PRINCIPAL PASSIONS—JOY, SADNESS, HOPE, AND FEAR.

YES.—Joy and sadness are the principal passions with respect to present good and evil; hope and fear, with respect to future good and evil.

THE REASON is that the other passions have their completion or end. Yet joy and sadness complete the passions simply, for all the objects whose object is good end in joy, and those whose object is evil end in sadness. Hope and fear do not complete the other passions simply, because they are not final.

QUESTION XXVI

THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR

We have next to consider the passions of the soul in particular: First the concupiscible passions, and then the irascible passions. The first consideration will take up three parts: 1) Love and hate; 2) desire and aversion; 3) delight and sadness. Regarding love three subjects will be discussed: 1) Love itself; 2) the cause of love; 3) its effects. The first topic will be divided into four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER LOVE IS IN THE CONCUPIBIBLE APPETITE.

YES.—THE REASON is that love regards good absolutely, not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible appetite.

NOTE: Love or appetite is threefold according to the corresponding threefold movement to something that is suitable to it: Natural love, whose apprehension of the good to which it tends is not in the lover himself but in the Author of nature, as when a stone falls downward to rest; sensitive love, which is in the brutes, and follows the apprehension of the senses, and exists also in man, but to some degree obeys reason; and intellective or rational love, which follows from the apprehension of the appetitive subject according to free judgment. Now in each of these appetites love is that which is the principle of movement tending to the end that is loved (body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER LOVE IS A PASSION.

YES.—THE REASON is that passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now love is the first change of the appetite by the appetible faculty, which is nothing else than complacency in the thing sought.—From this complacency follows the movement to the appetible object, which is desire; and finally quiet, which is joy.

NOTE: Union belongs to love in so far as by the complacency of the appetite the lover stands in relation to that which he loves as though it were himself, or part of himself. And thus it is evident that love is not itself the relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Wherefore Aristotle says (*Polit.* ii, 1) that union is the work of love.—(Ad. 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER LOVE IS THE SAME AS DILECTION.

NO.—THE REASON is that dilection adds to love a preceding choice, as the name itself implies (*electio*, choice). Hence dilection is not in the concupiscible power but in the will only, and is only in the rational creature.

NOTE: 1.—Love, dilection, charity, and friendship differ from one another. Friendship is like a habit; love and dilection are expressed by way of act; charity can be expressed in both ways. Of the three movements that are expressed by way of act love has the widest signification; dilection adds to love the notion of choice; and charity

is used to denote that that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the name itself implies (from *carus*, dear) (body of art.).

2.—Love in so far as it is in the intellective appetite, is dilection (Ad. 1). Under the notion of passion, in the extended sense, the love of God signifies something more Godlike in the soul than dilection; because man can tend through love to God, being as it were passively drawn by Him. This is more Godlike than to tend to God by reason itself, which pertains to the nature of dilection (Ad. 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER LOVE IS PROPERLY DIVIDED INTO LOVE OF FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE OF CONCUPISCENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the movement of love tends to two things, namely to the good that someone wishes for someone, either himself, or another (the love of concupiscence) and to that for which he wishes good (the love of friendship). And this division is divided into primary and secondary, because that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; but that which is loved by the love of concupiscence is not loved simply and for itself but for another.—Wherefore he is properly called a friend to whom we wish some good; we are said to desire (*concupiscere*) what we wish for ourselves (Ad. 1).—Yet friendship that is useful and pleasant to us, in so far as it is connected with the love of concupiscence, loses the character of true friendship (Ad. 3).

QUESTION XXVII THE CAUSE OF LOVE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOOD IS THE ONLY CAUSE OF LOVE.

YES.—The proper cause of love is good.

THE REASON is that the proper object of love is good; now the cause of the movement of the appetitive power is its object. Now a thing is good to someone only in so far as it is connatural and proportionate to him. Evil is never loved except under the aspect of goodness.

NOTE: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. The beautiful adds to the good a certain relation to the cognitive power (through sight and hearing); so that we call good that which is simply pleasing to the appetite, and beautiful that which is pleasant to apprehend (we do not speak of beautiful tastes or beautiful odors) (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER KNOWLEDGE IS A CAUSE OF LOVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that good is not the object of the appetite except in so far as it is apprehended. Wherefore the apprehension of corporeal good is the principle of sensitive love; and the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the principle of spiritual love. It remains, however, that the formal motive of dilection is good, and not knowledge. Wherefore something can be loved more than it can be known, as in the love of God.

ART. III.—WHETHER LIKENESS IS A CAUSE OF LOVE.

YES.—The kind of likeness that arises from two things having actually the same quality is the cause of the love of friendship; the other kind of likeness, which arises from one thing's having potentially, and by a certain inclination, that which another has actually, causes the love of concupiscence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that whenever two things are alike, as having one form, they are in a manner one in that form, as two men are one in the species of humanity; and therefore the affection of one tends to the other as to one thing for himself, and he wishes good to him as to himself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that everything that is in potentiality has, as such, the desire for its act, and takes pleasure in its realization, if it possesses feeling and intellect.

NOTE: Everyone loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself in substance, and one with another only in the likeness of some form. And therefore, if the other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good (body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANY OTHER PASSION OF THE SOUL IS A CAUSE OF LOVE.

NO.—Every other passion supposes some love.

THE REASON is that every other passion of the soul indicates a movement to something or repose in something, which proceeds from some connaturalness or adaptation, which pertains to the notion of love.—Wherefore if delight causes love, this delight is however caused by another love that precedes it (Ad. 1).

**QUESTION XXVIII
THE EFFECTS OF LOVE**

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER UNION IS AN EFFECT OF LOVE.

YES.—Both of the love of concupiscence, as the effective cause, and of the love of friendship as the formal cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the love of concupiscence moves one to desire and seek the presence of the beloved as of something suitable and belonging to him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the love of friendship is itself this union or bond. For the love of friendship apprehends the beloved as another self, in so far as he wishes good to him as to his own self. Wherefore a friend is called "another self."

NOTE: 1.—Union has a threefold relation to love: a) One union is the cause of love, and this is substantial union, whereby someone loves himself; another union is the union of likeness, whereby someone loves other things. This again is twofold: b) that union which is love itself essentially, and this is affective union, both in the love of friendship and in the love of concupiscence; c) the second is real union, which is the effect of love (Ad. 2).

2.—Love is more unitive than is knowledge; for knowledge is perfected by the object of knowledge being united, through its likeness, to the knower; but love causes the very thing that is loved to be united in some way to the lover (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER MUTUAL INDWELLING IS AN EFFECT OF LOVE.

YES.—As the lover is in the beloved, and conversely, both as regards the apprehensive power and as regards the appetitive power.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the beloved dwells in the apprehension of the lover; for the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but seeks to gain an intimate knowledge of all that belongs to the beloved so as to penetrate to his very soul; and thus the movement of love penetrates into the beloved (Ad. 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that through the appetitive power the object beloved is in the lover as it is impressed on his affections by a kind of complacency. Conversely, the lover is in the beloved, because the lover himself seeks, with the love of concupiscence, to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating to his heart as it were. By the love of friendship the lover is in the object loved in so far as he deems the blessings or evils of his friend as his own, and the will of his friend as his own.

NOTE: In a third way mutual indwelling is understood in the love of friendship by way of reciprocity, in so far as friends love each other, and wish and do good for each other. This is not found in every kind of love (body of art., and ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER ECSTASY IS AN EFFECT OF LOVE.

YES.—a) Love is a dispositive cause of ecstasy, which is in the apprehensive part; b) the love of friendship is the direct cause of ecstasy in the appetitive part simply; c) the love of concupiscence is relatively the direct cause of ecstasy.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that love causes the lover to dwell in the beloved (prec. art.); now intense preoccupation with one thing draws one away from the others.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the love of friendship the affections of someone simply go outside himself, because he as it were cares and provides for his beloved.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in the love of concupiscence the lover is

not content to enjoy the good that he has but seeks to enjoy some other good outside himself.

ART. IV.—WHETEHR ZEAL IS AN EFFECT OF LOVE.

YES.—Zeal arises from the intensity of love.

THE REASON is that, since love is a movement toward an object of love, an intense love seeks to exclude everything that is opposed to it, or, if it cannot do this, grudgingly tolerates it. This is the case with the zeal of envy, or jealousy. But the zeal of the love of friendship causes man to be moved against everything that is opposed to the good of his friend, such as to be zealous for the sake of God, according to the words of John ii, 17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up" (body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER LOVE IS A PASSION THAT WOUNDS THE LOVER.

NO.—The love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but the love of a good that is not suitable to the lover injures and worsens him.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered thereby, if it be possible; wherefore man is especially perfected and bettered by the love of God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that what is adapted to something that is not suitable to it is hurt and made worse thereby; now love denotes a certain adaptation of the appetitive power to some good. Wherefore man is especially hurt and made worse by sin.

NOTE: 1.—As regards that which is material in the passion of love, which is some bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful by reason of the excess of the change (body of art.).

2.—There are four proximate effects of love: Melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. The freezing or hardness of the heart is a disposition opposed to love; but melting indicates a certain softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself ready for the entry of love. If therefore the beloved is present enjoyment follows; if it is absent, there follows sadness at its absence, which is languor. An intense desire for the winning of the beloved is signified by fervor. These are the effects of love formally taken (passim in the answers to objections).

ART. VI.—WHETHER LOVE IS THE CAUSE OF ALL THAT THE LOVER DOES.

YES.—Everything that anyone does he does because of some love.

THE REASON is that every agent acts for the sake of some end; now the end is the good desired and loved by each one.—We here speak of love in THE GENERAL SENSE.

QUESTION XXIX

HATRED

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EVIL IS THE CAUSE AND OBJECT OF HATRED.

YES.—THE REASON is that hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now what is hurtful and repugnant has the aspect of evil, just as everything that is suitable and attractive has the aspect of good.—Therefore evil is considered, not as a being, because as a being it is good; but by comparison with the apprehension as hurtful (in the replies).

ART. II.—WHETHER HATRED IS CAUSED BY LOVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that nothing is hated unless it is opposed to the suitable thing that is loved; now in every thing we should consider what agrees with it before we consider what disagrees.

NOTE: Love and hatred are naturally simultaneous in the mind, but not in reality, as in the species of numbers, figures, and movements (Ad. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER HATRED IS STRONGER THAN LOVE.

NO.—Simply speaking, love is stronger than hatred; but sometimes love is stronger (accidentally).

THE REASON of the first is a) that love is the cause of hatred, as was said (prec.

art.); now a cause is always stronger than its effect; b) something is moved to its end more strongly than to the means. Now recession from an evil is ordained to the attainment of a good as a means; but love is ordained directly to the end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that hatred is more keenly felt than love, for love is in man as a habit and a second nature; b) because the hatred that corresponds to a greater love moves us more than a lesser love.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN CAN HATE HIMSELF.

NO.—Properly speaking it is impossible for a man to hate himself. But accidentally a man can hate himself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to wish evil to himself, under the aspect of evil; for evil is contrary to the will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that it happens sometimes that that which is sought as good in some particular respect is simply evil; so on the part of the object.— b) On the part of the subject, one may hate oneself because man sometimes wishes certain things which are contrary to reason. Now in both ways he who loves iniquity hates, not only his own soul, but also himself.—Yet no one wishes and does evil for himself, except in so far as he apprehends this evil under the aspect of good (Ad. 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN CAN HATE THE TRUTH.

YES.—In particular nothing prevents a particular being and a particular truth from being an object of hatred, but not in general.

THE REASON is that in general every being and every truth is good; now good is what all desire; and therefore it cannot be hated.

Yet in a particular instance being and truth can have the aspect of something contrary and repugnant to the good that one loves. This can happen in three ways: a) In so far as truth is in the things themselves, when man wishes not to be true what is true; b) in so far as truth is in the knowledge of man himself, as when someone wishes not to know the truth of faith in order that he may freely sin; c) in so far as truth is in the intellect of another, in so far as this truth convicts the sinner. Therefore man hates truth, not in itself (for in itself truth is lovable), but accidentally.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE AN OBJECT OF UNIVERSAL HATRED.

YES.—As a particular nature can be a universal object of hatred, not only of the intellectual part but also of the sensitive part, inasmuch as the universal is considered under the aspect of universality, it can be hated on the part of the intellect only. But anger is always concerned with some particular thing.

THE REASON is that something can be opposed to an animal by reason of its common nature, as a wolf is opposed to a sheep. Hence the sheep hates the wolf universally. But when the universal is considered under the aspect of universality this results by abstraction from individual matter and thus it cannot be hated, except in the intellectual part.—On the other hand, anger is always caused by some act of one who hurts us, and actions proceed from individuals.

QUESTION XXX CONCUPISCENCE (In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE IS IN THE SENSITIVE APPETITE ONLY.

Properly speaking concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that concupiscence, as its very name implies some association in desiring, properly belongs both to the soul and the body; wherefore it is in a bodily organ.

NOTE: Concupiscence is properly to crave any thing under the aspect of a good that is delightful to the senses. Now to crave a good by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs only to the appetitive power (Ad. 3).—The craving for spiritual goods is sometimes called concupiscence by way of likeness, or also by reason of the overflow of the higher appetite to the lower appetite, as when it is said: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God" (Ps. lxxxiii, 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE IS A SPECIFIC PASSION.

YES.—Concupiscence is a passion specifically distinct from love and delight, by reason of the diversity of the activity of the object.

THE REASON is that an object pleasurable to the senses (which is the proper object of the concupiscible power), in so far as it adapts and conforms itself to the appetite, causes love; but in so far as it draws the appetite to itself as an absent good it causes concupiscence; in so far as it is present and calms the appetite in the rest it finds in itself, it causes delight.

NOTE: The diversity of object can arise either from the very nature of the object or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity arising from the active object, which is according to the nature of the thing, causes a material difference of passions (i.e., in the genus of nature, not in the genus of morality); but the diversity that is according to the active power causes a formal difference of passions, in so far as the passions specifically differ (body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER SOME CONCUPISCENCES ARE NATURAL AND SOME NOT NATURAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that a thing is pleasurable in two ways: 1) Because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; and such pleasurable concupiscence is said to be natural and is common to the brutes and all men; 2) something is called pleasurable according to the apprehension of reason, and the concupiscence of such a pleasurable object is not called natural and is more generally called cupidity. This is proper to men.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE IS INFINITE.

YES.—Natural concupiscence is actually finite and potentially infinite but concupiscence that is not natural is altogether infinite.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which nature requires is always actually finite; it is, however, infinite in potentiality by succession (as when one is thirsty, and satisfied, and then becomes thirsty again).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that non-natural concupiscence follows reason (prec. art.); now it belongs to reason to proceed to infinity.

LIKEWISE: The concupiscence of the end is always infinite, because it always seeks an end; on the other hand concupiscence of the means is not infinite. Wherefore those who place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who seek riches for the necessity of life seek finite riches sufficient for the necessity of life; and so with the rest (body of art.).

QUESTION XXXI DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DELIGHT IS A PASSION.

YES.—THE REASON is that delight is a movement in the animal appetite, resulting from an apprehension of the senses. For delight arises from the attainment of a perfection. This attainment, which occurs all at once when it is apprehended in animals through the senses, a movement of the soul is caused in the sensitive appetite and this movement is delight.—Wherefore delight is an operation, not in its essence but in its cause (Ad 1); for, although delight is a certain repose of the appetite, yet by reason of the impression made on the appetite by the presence of its object, delight is a kind of movement (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER DELIGHT IS IN TIME.

NO.—Delight as such is not in time, but is accidentally in time.

THE REASON is that in itself delight is in the good already acquired, which is already the term of movement; but if this good that is acquired is subject to transmutation delight will be accidentally in time.—But if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time either by reason of itself or accidentally.

In this life delight is always accidentally in time, because it is subject to changeable causes.

NOTE: 1.—Movement is twofold: One is the act of something imperfect, namely something existing in potentiality, as such; and such a movement is successive and in

time. Another movement is the act of something perfect, i.e., of something existing in act, e.g., to understand, to feel, and to will, and such like, also to have delight; and such movements are not successive or of themselves in time. (Ad 1).

2.—Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.

ART. III.—WHETHER DELIGHT DIFFERS FROM JOY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the word joy applies only in the delight that arises from reason.

NOTE: Gladness, (*laetitia*), exultation, and cheerfulness (*jucunditas*) which we find only in rational natures, pertain to joy. The first is derived from a dilation of the heart, as if one were to say *laetitia*, exaltation; the second is had in so far as an interior joy leaps to the surface (*exultare* means literally to leap forth); the last (cheerfulness) is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER DELIGHT IS IN THE INTELLECTIVE APPETITE.

YES.—Joy is in the will.

THE REASON is that a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason.

NOTE: Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. In this way it is not in the intellectual appetite; but it is in the intellectual appetite according to simple movement, as it is in God and the angels (Ad 2). Wherefore in us there is delight, not only in common with the brutes but also in common with the angels (Ad. 3).

ART. V. — WHETHER BODILY AND SENSIBLE PLEASURES ARE GREATER THAN SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES.

NO.—Whether delights are considered on the part of the knowledge of the senses and the intellect or whether delights are considered in themselves, objectively.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man is much more delighted by that which he knows by understanding something than by that which he knows by feeling something; for intellectual knowledge is both more perfect and is also better known, for the intellect reflects more on its act than does sense. Wherefore a man would rather save his intellectual knowledge than his sensible knowledge (if he had to forfeit one).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) on the part of the good that is brought into union with ourselves, because spiritual good itself is greater than bodily good, and is more beloved; b) on the part of that to which it is united, because the intellectual part is far nobler and more knowing than is the sensitive part; c) on the part of the union itself, because the union of the intellectual part with the object of its love is more intimate, more perfect, and more firm than that of the sensitive part: More intimate because the intellect penetrates to the essence of the thing; more perfect, because intellectual delight pertains more to perfect movement (i.e., without succession); and more firm, because spiritual delight is incorruptible in itself—yet, with regard to us, sensitive delights are more vehement: First, because sensible objects are better known with relation to us; secondly, sensible delights are accompanied by some bodily change; thirdly, bodily delights have contrary griefs; wherefore they are welcomed more, as though they were remedies against sorrows.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PLEASURES OF TOUCH ARE GREATER THAN THE PLEASURES AFFORDED BY THE OTHER SENSES.

YES.—By reason of utility the delight of touch is greater; by reason of knowledge sight is greater than the delight of touch.

THE REASON is that the usefulness of the objects of sense arises from their relation to the preservation in the nature of the animal. Now to this usefulness the sensible objects of touch bear a closer relation, for touch discerns hot and cold, moist and dry, and such like things which are vital to the animal.—Sight evidently is greater as regards knowledge, and as regards its relation with the delights of the mind.

The delight of touch is, however, simply greater than the delight of sight, because it is more closely ordained to the objects of nature, such as food, and sex, and the like; now in everything, that which is natural is most powerful.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANY PLEASURE IS NOT NATURAL.

YES.—Simply speaking there are delights that are against reason or the human species, and which are contrary to the preservation of the body, but which in a certain respect are connatural.

THE REASON is that it sometimes happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, and thus that which is against the nature of the species (simply) becomes accidentally natural to this individual, as fever makes sweet things seem bitter to a sick man, and conversely; or custom makes cannibalism delightful to some.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ONE PLEASURE CAN BE CONTRARY TO ANOTHER.

YES.—In contrary terms.

THE REASON is that pleasure is proportionate to repose. Now one repose can be contrary to another when they are in contrary terms (as repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place, so repose in spiritual delights is contrary to repose in physical).

QUESTION XXXII
THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE
 (in eight articles)

ART. I. — WHETHER OPERATION IS THE PROPER CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—Operation is the prime and proper cause of pleasure.

THE REASON is that pleasure requires the attainment of a suitable good and the knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind of operation.

NOTE: Operations are pleasurable in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since a human power is finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore, if it exceeds that measure, it will not now be proportionate, or pleasurable, but rather toilsome and irksome. And in this sense leisure and play and the other things pertaining to repose are pleasurable, inasmuch as they banish the sadness that is the result of labor (Ad 3).—The same thing must be said if labor is not according to the nature of man's liberty, and according to human dignity.

ART. II.—WHETHER MOVEMENT IS A CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—Movement is a cause of pleasure as regards everything that is found in pleasure itself, i.e., as to the pleasurable good, the union of the pleasurable object with the soul, and the knowledge of this knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that good is pleasurable to us in so far as by it a change is effected in us that is according to our nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on the part of the conjunction of the pleasurable good there also takes place a change of the pleasurable object, because the continued action of anything increases the effect.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that whenever some things cannot be apprehended all at once, it is pleasurable to experience a change in them, so that one thing passes, and another takes its place, and so the whole be perceived.

ART. III.—WHETHER HOPE AND MEMORY ARE CAUSES OF PLEASURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the good suitable to us is present to us even in hope and memory. In hope, so that something real is potentially realizable; in memory, by the simple conjunction of the apprehension. Wherefore according to degree, there is a greater pleasure in the senses than in hope, and a greater pleasure in hope than in memory.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SADNESS IS A CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—Sadness is a cause of pleasure both as it is actually and as it is in memory, on account of the subsequent escape from it.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that present sadness evokes the memory of a

pleasure object, the absence of which saddens one; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in so far as a man recollects that he "has escaped from that which causes pain and sadness, so much reason has he to rejoice, just as the greater was the peril in battle the greater will be the joy in the triumph," as Augustine says (*Confessions*, Bk. viii, chap. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF OTHERS ARE A CAUSE OF PLEASURE TO US.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that by the actions of others we obtain some good.

THE SECOND REASON is that honor and praise create in us some knowledge, or some esteem, of our own good, which causes pleasure.

THE THIRD REASON is that, if the actions of others are good, they are regarded as our own, on account of the power of love; if they are evil, they give pleasure to an enemy.

Wherefore the actions of others can cause pleasure in us: a) By the effect; b) by apprehension; c) by affection.

ART. VI.—WHETHER DOING GOOD TO ANOTHER IS A CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—a) By comparison with the effect; b) by comparison with the end; c) by comparison with the principle.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the good we do to others we reckon as our own on account of the union of love, even as the other blessings of a friend.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the good that one does to another one hopes to obtain some good for himself, whether from God or from man; now hope is a cause of pleasure.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that a) the faculty of doing good arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share; b) man's habitual inclination to do good makes the doing of good connatural to him; c) what we do from the motive of doing good causes pleasure, for everything that we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.

NOTE: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish cause pleasure, not as tending to another's hurt, but as pertaining to one's own good, which a man loves more than he hates another's ill (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER LIKENESS IS A CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that likeness is a kind of unity; wherefore that which is like, in so far as it is one, is pleasurable, as it is lovable (q. xxvii, art. 3).—Accidentally, however, even that which is like can destroy one's own good, and thus it becomes repulsive and saddening. And this results either by excess, as when overabundant bodily delights cause disgust in us; or by opposition to our own good; thus a potter dislikes other potters, because he loses his own excellence or profit because of them.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER WONDER IS A CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

YES.—Wonder is a cause of pleasure is so far as it is connected with the hope of obtaining a knowledge of that which one desires to know.

THE REASON is that wonder implies a certain desire to know the cause when the effect is seen. Now desire arising from hope is a cause of pleasure. The soul also rejoices in comparing one thing to another, because to compare one thing to another is a proper and connatural act of the reason.

NOTE: The contemplation of things that are already known is pleasurable in itself, because it is according to the definition of pleasure, which denotes a repose in good and a perception of this repose. But the pleasure arising from inquiry can accidentally be greater, on account of the intensity of the desire. Now desire is aroused by the perception of ignorance; wherefore man takes special pleasure in finding or learning things for the first time (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXXIII
THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EXPANSION IS AN EFFECT OF PLEASURE.

YES.—Both on the part of the apprehensive and on the part of the appetitive faculties.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that by the apprehension of any suitable good man apprehends that he has attained a certain perfection, which is spiritual magnitude, and in this sense the mind of man is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the appetitive power, which acquiesces in a pleasurable object and rests in it, offers, as it were, to enfold it within itself; and thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.

NOTE: Expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the lover spreads out to others; on the other hand, expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become more capacious (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER PLEASURE CAUSES THIRST OR DESIRE FOR ITSELF.

YES.—a) Pleasure actually realized does not of itself cause thirst or desire for the thing not possessed; b) spiritual pleasures especially cause a thirst for themselves; c) pleasure as existing in the memory of itself causes a thirst for itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that pleasure is the affection of the appetite for a present object. Now it happens that a present object is not perfectly possessed, either on the part of the thing possessed, as when someone takes pleasure in what he has and desires to possess that which remains; or on the part of the possessor himself, as when in this world we take pleasure in perceiving imperfectly something of the divine perfections (which in themselves exist as a simultaneous whole).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that spiritual pleasures do not exceed (as do bodily pleasures) the natural disposition, but perfect nature.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that pleasure in memory causes in man that disposition in which that which has passed was pleasurable to himself.

ART. III.—WHETHER PLEASURE HINDERS THE USE OF REASON.

YES.—The pleasure that is had in the very act of reason, as in contemplation or reasoning, does not hinder, but helps, the use of reason; but bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that we do more attentively that in which we take pleasure; now attention, which is had in an act of reason, helps an action.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that if the bodily pleasure is great it will either totally impede the use of reason, by attracting the intention of the soul to itself, or will greatly hinder it; b) that certain bodily pleasures, especially those that are in excess, destroy the estimate of prudence; c) because from pleasure there results a certain bodily change, which fetters the use of reason, as in drunkards.—Wherefore pleasure hinders the use of reason; a) by way of distraction; b) by way of opposition; c) by a certain suspension of the reasoning faculties.

NOTE: The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body faculties hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the acts of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PLEASURE PERFECTS OPERATION.

YES.—Pleasure perfects operation both by way of a supervening end and by way of an efficient cause, although indirectly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that pleasure adds to the good that is operation a quieting of the appetite.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the agent, by taking pleasure in his action, concentrates more intensely on it and does it more diligently.—Wherefore operation causes pleasure as the efficient cause; whereas pleasure perfects operation by way of a final cause (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXXIV
THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES
 (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY PLEASURE IS EVIL.

NO.—Some pleasures are good, some evil, both on the part of the good in which one rests and takes pleasure, and on the part of the operation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the moral as in the natural order there is a good pleasure whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason, and there is a bad pleasure whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that pleasures are more akin to operations than to desires. Wherefore, since the desires of good operations are good, and the desires of evil operations are evil, much more are the pleasures of good operations good, and of evil operations evil.

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY PLEASURE IS GOOD.

NO.—Not every pleasure is simply such and simply good.

THE REASON is that pleasure is the rest of the appetite in good; wherefore if a good is simply that in which the appetite rests, it will be simply pleasure and simply good; but if it is not good simply, but only in regard to this individual, then there is no pleasure simply but a pleasure for this individual; neither is it good simply, but good in some certain respect, or apparently good. The same thing can be said of evil pleasure: One kind is simply evil, the other, relatively evil.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY PLEASURE IS THE GREATEST GOOD.

YES.—That which obtains the happiness of man.

THE REASON is that the enjoyment of God denotes a certain pleasure in our last end. Here we are speaking of the greatest good in the human order. Now this enjoyment results from the contemplation of God, which obtains the perfect operation of the intellect.

ART. IV.—WHETHER PLEASURE IS THE MEASURE OR RULE BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF MORAL GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—The pleasure of the will is the rule in the moral order, but not the pleasure of the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that pleasure is the rest of the will and of any appetite in the good; wherefore a man is accounted good or evil chiefly according to the pleasure of his will; if a man takes delight in actions that are in accord with reason he is called good; if he delights in evil actions, he is called evil.

NOTE: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves as a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we chiefly form our judgment (Ad 1); for the goodness of the object depends on the end; and thus in a way the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of the goodness in the operation (Ad 3).

QUESTION XXXV
PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF

We have next to consider pain and sadness 1) First, pain or sadness in itself; 2) in its causes; 3) in its effects; 4) in its remedies; 5) in its goodness or malice. The first point occupies eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER PAIN IS A PASSION OF THE SOUL.

YES.—Pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul.

THE REASON is that pain is a movement of the sensitive appetite consequent on the apprehension of the conjoined evil that deprives one of some good; now a movement of the sensitive appetite is called passion, and especially those movements that indicate a defect.

NOTE: Pain at the loss of a good demonstrates the goodness of nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature desires something as a good; when nature perceives the removal of this good there follows the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER SORROW IS THE SAME AS PAIN.

YES.—Only that pain that is caused by an interior apprehension (whether of the intellect or of the imagination) is called sorrow (which is contradistinguished to joy, as was said above, q. xxxi, art. 3).

THE REASON is that joy, to which sorrow is opposed, is caused by an interior apprehension.—Now that pain that is caused by the apprehension of an external sense is called pain, indeed, but not sorrow, except in so far as it falls also under an interior apprehension.

ART. III. — WHETHER SORROW OR PAIN IS CONTRARY TO PLEASURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of pleasure, which is a present good, and the object of sorrow, which is a present evil, are contraries; for they differ according to form.

NOTE: Pain can be pleasurable accidentally, in so far as it is connected with wonder, as in spectacles; or in so far as it arouses a recollection of the thing loved, and causes one to realize the love of that whose absence causes pain. Wherefore, since love causes pleasure; both pain and everything else that results from love are pleasurable (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL SORROW IS CONTRARY TO PLEASURE.

NO.—a) According to their genus they have always a contrariety to each other; b) if they have one and the same object they likewise are always contrary; c) if they have different objects, they have no opposition to each other according to the nature of the species; d) if these diverse objects are contrary, then pleasure and sorrow not only have no contrariety according to the nature of the species, but even have a fitness and affinity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the genus of sorrow pertains to avoidance; whereas the genus of pleasure pertains to pursuit; now the things that are opposed according to the form of the genus are opposed universally, as are vice and virtue.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that they are opposed according to species, as justice and injustice with respect to the same object.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that they are disparate rather than diverse; as sorrow for the death of a friend and pleasure in contemplation.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that contrary relations to contrary things imply a certain likeness, such as to rejoice at good and feel sorrow at evil.

NOTE: Genus is taken from matter; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now in every sorrow there is a disposition of the subject contrary to the disposition that is in every pleasure. For in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses; but in every sorrow, as avoiding it; and therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy against every sorrow; and every sorrow hinders some pleasure, especially when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE IS ANY SORROW CONTRARY TO THE PLEASURE OF CONTEMPLATION.

NO.—No sorrow is contrary to the pleasure that is taken in contemplation itself, nor is any sorrow connected with it, except accidentally.

THE REASON is that nothing is contrary to the object of contemplation. For the natures of contraries, in so far as they are apprehended, are not contrary; but one contrary is the reason of knowing another. Wherefore contemplation itself, even if it be concerned with a harmful and saddening object, does not have the character of sorrow, but of pleasure. (Consequently neither does the pleasure of contemplation have sorrow annexed to it, as do bodily pleasures, because it is not caused by excluding anything distasteful, but because it is pleasurable in itself).—Accidentally sorrow is connected with the pleasure of contemplation indirectly, because the human mind is united in contemplation to the sensitive apprehensive powers, to whose act weariness is incidental; and therefore there is indirectly mingled with contemplation some affliction or pain.

NOTE: Contemplation in itself is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect; accidentally, however, it can be evil, in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of one more noble; or on the part of the object of contemplation, to which the appetite is inordinately attached (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER SORROW IS TO BE SHUNNED MORE THAN PLEASURE IS TO BE SOUGHT.

NO.—Of itself pleasure is more to be sought than sorrow is to be avoided; accidentally, however, the reverse can happen, on three accounts.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is a) that the craving for pleasure is naturally more intense than the shunning of sorrow; for pleasure can be entire and perfect, but sadness is always in part. b) Because the object of pleasure (good) is sought for its own self, but evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned in so far as it is the privation of good; but what exists of itself is stronger than that which exists accidentally.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS a) on the part of the apprehension, namely on account of the need for (the absence of) the thing loved, which causes sadness; for so much the more is sorrow shunned as love is more keenly felt, because sorrow is contrary to love. b) On the part of the cause that induces sorrow or pain, when it is more opposed to the good that is loved than is the good in which we take pleasure. Thus we shun blows on the body more than we seek the delight of food. c) On the part of the effect; because sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all.—Wherefore as regards the movement that is from within (natural movement) or the movement of the appetitive part, since it is from the soul to things, pleasure is more sought than sorrow is avoided; but as regards the movement that is from without, or the movement of the sensitive part, which is as it were from things to the soul, it happens accidentally that sorrow is more shunned than pleasure is sought, because that which is more contrary is felt more intensely (Ad 2).

NOTE: The temperate man is praised for not pursuing the pleasures of touch rather than for not shunning the pains that are contrary to them (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER OUTWARD PAIN IS GREATER THAN INTERIOR SORROW.

NO.—Interior sorrow is greater both by reason of the cause and by reason of the apprehension.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that interior sorrow arises from a thing's being opposed to the appetite itself; exterior pain arises from a thing's being opposed to the appetite *because it is opposed to the body*. Now always that which exists of itself precedes that which exists through another.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the apprehension of the reason and imagination is higher than the apprehension of the sense of touch.

NOTE: Not only is interior sorrow greater than exterior pain, but it is also more universal; because exterior sorrow can also increase interior sorrow, but not vice versa (body of art.).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY FOUR SPECIES OF SORROW.

YES.—Torpor, anxiety, pity, and envy, which however are called species, not as we commonly speak of species and genera, but by an application of the motion of sorrow to something foreign, as we say that a hot coal and a flame are species of fire.

THE REASON is that the something foreign can here be taken either on the part of the cause or on the part of the effect of sorrow. The cause of sorrow is one's own evil; the foreign element of the evil of sorrow is the evil of another; now sadness for the evil of another, in so far as it is regarded as one's own, is pity; but if another's good is regarded as one's own evil, it is envy. But the effect of sorrow consists in a flight of the appetite. This relates to something foreign when there does not appear any refuge for someone, and then it is anxiety, or also anguish.

If it proceeds so far that it renders even the limbs motionless, it is called torpor. The reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is that the voice of all the outward movements most expresses the inward thought and desire.

NOTE: 1.—Pleasure, since it is caused by good, has only one meaning, and so pleasure is not divided into species, as is sorrow, which is caused by evil, which happens in many ways (Ad 1).

2. Jealousy or indignation takes place when we grieve that someone has a good of which we consider him wholly unworthy; it is a species of sorrow, which is reduced to envy (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXXVI THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SORROW IS CAUSED BY THE LOSS OF GOOD OR BY THE PRESENCE OF EVIL.

YES.—The conjoined evil is more the cause of sorrow than the good that is lost.

THE REASON is that the evil conjoined in the passion of sorrow is not a mere privation of good, as in the natural order, but the very privation of good in so far as it falls under the apprehension, and thus has the aspect of a being, and is viewed as being contrary (to love). Now the good that is lost is not viewed as contrary. Wherefore, just as the proper object of pleasure is the good attained, so the proper object of sorrow is the evil conjoined.

ART. II.—WHETHER DESIRE IS A CAUSE OF SORROW.

YES.—Desire considered in itself is sometimes a cause of sorrow, by way of consequence.

THE REASON is that the delay of a good that is desired, or its total removal, causes sorrow.

NOTE: 1.—Desire, if it be taken for love in general, as it frequently is in St. Augustine, is the universal cause of sorrow; but properly taken it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow, since sorrow arises from desire by reason of the withdrawal of future goods, whereas, on the contrary, we grieve more for the withdrawal of present goods than for the removal of future blessings that we desire (body of art.).

2.—Desire gives pleasure as long as there is a hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CRAVING FOR UNITY IS A CAUSE OF SORROW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the craving for unity stands in the same way as the craving for good; for both are love. Therefore, just as the love or craving of good is a cause of pain (as was said in the prec. art.), so also is the love or craving for unity.

NOTE: The good of each thing consists in a certain unity, just as each thing has united in itself the elements of which its perfection consists (body of art); wherefore sorrow is not caused by the craving of any kind of unity, but of that unity in which the perfection of nature consists (Ad 1). In this sense separation can be a cause of pleasure, in so far as that is removed which is contrary to the perfection of a thing (Ad 2 and 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN IRRESISTIBLE POWER IS A CAUSE OF SORROW.

YES.—Such a power is a cause of sorrow when the inclination of the appetite to the contrary remains under it.

THE REASON is that an irresistible power is considered as a cause of the conjunction of the evil. But if a stronger power so far prevails that it changes the contrary inclination to its own inclination, there will now no longer be any repugnance or violence, but a natural inclination ensues.

QUESTION XXXVII THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PAIN DEPRIVES ONE OF THE POWER TO LEARN.

YES.—THE REASON is that a sensible sorrow (here in question) especially draws to itself the intention of the soul; for everything tends naturally with its whole intention to repel the contrary, as is apparent even in natural things. Yet a difference is to be noted according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or considering; because the greater the love the more will it retain the intention of the soul, so that it is not altogether directed to the pain.

NOTE: 1.—Both pleasure and sorrow, in so far as they draw upon themselves the

intention of the soul, hinder the consideration of reason; wherefore it is impossible, in the moment of sexual pleasure, to understand anything. But pain more than sorrow draws upon itself the intention of the soul, as we observe even in natural things that the action of a natural body is more inclined to the contrary, just as hot water is more affected by cold, so as to freeze more solidly. If therefore pain or sorrow is moderate, this may accidentally contribute to learning so far as it takes away an excess of pleasures; but of itself it hinders learning, and if it is intense it takes it away altogether (Ad 2).

2. External pain, which arises from bodily injury has a greater bodily change connected with it than has interior sorrow; although sorrow is greater according to the formal element in pain, which is on the part of the soul. And thus bodily pain more impedes contemplation, which requires complete quiet, than interior sorrow; and yet even interior sorrow, if it is very intense, so draws the intention that man can learn nothing for the first time (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF PAIN OR SORROW IS TO OPPRESS THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that man is said to be oppressed by the fact that some weight hinders him from his proper movement. This happens to him metaphorically through sorrow, which results from some present evil, which burdens the soul, so as to prevent it from enjoying what it wills. And when sorrow is great even sometimes the external movement of the body is hindered, so that man remains paralyzed, especially when sorrow takes away the hope of escaping.

ART. III.—WHETHER SORROW OR PAIN WEAKENS ALL ACTIVITY.

YES.—If activity be compared to sorrow as to that concerning which there is sorrow, sorrow hinders any activity; but if it be compared to sorrow as to its principle and cause, thus sorrow rather causes activity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which we do with sorrow we never do so well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the more one is saddened by anything the more does he endeavor to shake off sorrow, provided there remains a hope of dispelling it.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SORROW IS MORE HARMFUL TO THE BODY THAN THE OTHER PASSIONS OF THE SOUL.

YES.—Sorrow is especially hurtful to the body.

THE REASON is that sorrow is above all repugnant to the vital movement of the heart according to species; for the process of vital movement that proceeds from the heart is hindered by sorrow. The other passions, which indicate cravings to pursue some object, such as love, joy, and desire, can injure the vital movement of the heart according to measure by excess, in so far as they exceed the measure of movement; the other passions, which indicate the cravings of character with flight or withdrawal, are repugnant to the vital movement of the heart according to species, such as are love, despair, and sorrow; but especially sorrow, because it regards a present evil. Wherefore "a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones" (Prov. xvii, 22); and Prov. xxv, 20: "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart;" and Ecclus. xxxviii, 19: "Of sadness cometh death."

QUESTION XXXVIII

THE REMEDIES OF PAIN OR SORROW

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PAIN OR SORROW IS ASSUAGED BY ANY PLEASURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that pleasure is to sadness what in bodies repose is to weariness; for pleasure is the rest of the appetite in a good that is suited to it, whereas sorrow arises from what is repugnant to the appetite, and denotes a certain weariness or sickness of the appetite. Now weariness is assuaged or removed by rest.

NOTE: Although not every pleasure is specifically opposed to every sorrow, yet generally it is opposed, as was stated above (q. xxxv, art. 4, ad 2); and consequently on the part of the disposition of the subject every sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER PAIN OR SORROW IS ASSUAGED BY WEeping.

YES.—Tears and moans naturally assuage sorrow.

THE FIRST REASON is that anything harmful that is kept shut up is more afflictive, because this increases the concentration of the soul on it; but when it is outwardly diffused, then the soul's concentration is, so to speak, dispersed, and thus the interior sorrow is lessened.

THE SECOND REASON is that an action that befits a man according to the disposition in which he is is always pleasurable to him. But weeping and groaning are certain actions befitting one who is sad or in sorrow.

ART. III.—WHETHER PAIN AND SORROW ARE ASSUAGED BY THE SYMPATHY OF FRIENDS.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that, when someone sees others sympathizing with his sorrow, he imagines, as it were, that this burden (of sorrow) is being shared with him by others; and therefore the burden or sorrow becomes lighter, as happens in the carrying of bodily burdens.

THE SECOND, and better, REASON is that when his friends sympathize with him he perceives that he is being loved by them; this gives pleasure, for the cause of love most affords pleasure.

ART. IV.—WHETHER PAIN AND SORROW ARE ASSUAGED BY THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE TRUTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that the greatest pleasure consists in the contemplation of truth (q. xxxi, art. 5). Consequently, the more perfectly anyone is a lover of wisdom the more does the contemplation of truth assuage sorrow and pain.

NOTE: 1.—Knowledge causes sorrow on the part of the things known or on account of the difficulty and disappointment of finding truth, or knowledge causes man to know many things that are contrary to his will. But on the part of the contemplation of truth it causes pleasure (Ad 1).

2.—In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower part; and in this sense the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows to assuage even the pain that is in sense (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PAIN AND SORROW ARE ASSUAGED BY SLEEP AND BATHING.

YES.—THE REASON is that sleep and bathing and such remedies restore the nature of the body to its due state of vital movement, and thus assuage sorrow, which is opposed to such vital movement of the body (q. xxxvii, art. 4).

QUESTION XXXIX**THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL SORROW IS EVIL.

NO.—Although all sorrow is evil in itself, in so far as it hinders the repose of the appetite in good, yet sorrow is good if by it one feels sorrow for an evil deed.

THE REASON is that it belongs to good, supposing the presence of evil, to be followed by sorrow or pain; for not to feel an evil, or not to account it as repugnant to oneself, is manifestly an evil, as is evident in the case of the body.

ART. II.—WHETHER SORROW CAN BE A VIRTUOUS GOOD.

YES.—In the sense in which sorrow is good.

THE REASON is that every virtuous good proceeds from the rectitude of the reason and will; so also does good sorrow, which is such according to the knowledge and rejection of evil.

ART. III.—WHETHER SORROW CAN BE A USEFUL GOOD.

YES.—That is, sorrow for an evil that is to be avoided; there is no question here of present evil, since what is present cannot be not present.

THE REASON is that sorrow in the avoidance of evil redoubles the reason for avoiding it, for sorrow for evil causes the evil (which is already to be shunned in itself)

to be earnestly shunned, just as pleasure in a good causes the good to be more eagerly sought.

ART. IV.—WHETHER BODILY PAIN IS THE GREATEST EVIL.

NO.—No pain or sorrow can be the greatest evil of man, whether a) the sorrow is for a real evil; b) or it is for an apparent evil, which is really good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that there is always something worse than sorrow for a true evil, namely not to judge the real evil as an evil, or not to reject it.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it is always worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good.

THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS

We have next to treat of the passions of the irascible part; first of hope and despair, second of fear and daring, third of anger.

QUESTION XL HOPE AND DESPAIR (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HOPE IS THE SAME AS DESIRE OR CUPIDITY.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that among the qualities of the object of hope is this, that the object of hope is arduous and attainable with difficulty, for no one is said to hope for trifles, which are in his power to have at any time; and in this way hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regard a future good absolutely; whereas desire belongs to the concupiscible appetite, and hope to the irascible.

NOTE: With regard to the object of hope four conditions are to be noted, a) Hope concerns a) good, as opposed to fear, which regards evil; b) a future good, as opposed to joy, which regards a present good; c) an arduous good, as distinguished from desire or cupidity, which regards a future good absolutely; d) an attainable good, contrary to despair, which for that reason is called despair (body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE APPREHENSIVE OR IN THE APPETITIVE POWER.

ANSWER: It belong to the appetitive power.

THE REASON is that hope denotes a stretching forth of the appetite towards good; for hope is a movement of the soul following from the apprehension of a future and arduous but obtainable good; now movement to a thing properly belongs to the appetite; the apprehensive power, on the contrary, is perfected in so far as the things known are in the knower.

NOTE: 1.—Because hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope, in the two ways in which something is possible to him, namely his own power and by the power of another. What, therefore, one hopes to obtain by his own power he is said to hope for only, but what he hopes to obtain with the help of another's power he is said properly to expect, as it were to hope from another (Ad 1).

2. The movement of the hope arising from the reckoning and trust that man can obtain that which he desires is called confidence, as an effect from a cause that is better known (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE BRUTE ANIMALS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that if a dog sees a hare, or a hawk sees a bird that is too far off (and thus with the other brute animals) it makes no move toward it, as though not hoping to be able to catch it; but if it is near, it moves toward it as with the hope of obtaining it. Now the interior passions of the animals can be detected by the external movements. Such a movement in the animals arises from an apprehension whose principle is in the Separated Intellect, which is the author of their nature. The same thing is to be said of despair.

NOTE: Although the brutes do not know the future, yet the animal is moved by a natural instinct to something future, as if he foresaw the future; for such an instinct is implanted in them by the Divine Intellect foreseeing the future (Ad 1): Wherefore, although that which is future does not fall under the vision, yet from the things that the

animal sees in the present, his appetite is moved to the pursuit or avoidance of something that is future (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER DESPAIR IS CONTRARY TO HOPE.

YES.—Between hope and despair there is contrariety according to approach and withdrawal with respect to the same term, which contrariety is found in the passions of the irascible appetite (in the passions of the concupiscible part there is contrariety according to approach to contrary termini only; just as love is an approach to good, hate an approach to evil).

THE REASON is that the object of hope, as it is considered with the possibility of obtaining it, has the aspect of attractiveness; now the object of despair is without this possibility and has the aspect of repulsiveness, because, as is it is stated (Ethics, book iii, chap. 3): "When we come to something impossible, then men leave off."—(Consequently despair does not denote a mere privation of hope, but denotes a certain withdrawal from the thing desired on account of a supposed impossibility of obtaining it (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER EXPERIENCE IS A CAUSE OF HOPE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is both that experience creates in man a skill of doing something easily, and that experience, like teaching and persuasion, gives a man the impression that something is possible to him, which before experience he had thought impossible.

In this second case, however, experience can become the cause of the defect of hope, inasmuch as through experience man may believe that something is not possible to him, which he had supposed possible. And on this account the old lack hope, inasmuch "as many evils have befallen them" (Ad 2).

On the contrary, folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally, as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HOPE ABOUNDS IN YOUNG MEN AND DRUNKARDS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is a) that the young have much of the future ahead of them and little of the present; b) they have a great natural heat, and therefore much spirit; and thus in them the heart is expanded, so that they tend naturally to the arduous; c) they have suffered no defeat, and have experienced no obstacles in their endeavors; consequently they easily reckon a thing to be possible to them. These two last factors are also found in drunkards and fools, in whom there is hope, and again a heedlessness of dangers or lacks.

ART. VII.—WHETHER HOPE IS A CAUSE OF LOVE.

YES.—Inasmuch as an arduous good becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others.

THE REASON is that by the fact that we hope blessings will accrue to us through someone, we are moved to him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him.—But in so far as hope regards a good that is hoped for, it thus supposes love; for hope regards only a good that is desired and loved. Likewise love is the cause of hope accidentally, inasmuch as we hope by our love for someone that our love will be returned.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER HOPE IS A HELP OR A HINDRANCE TO ACTION.

ANSWER: Hope is more a help than a hindrance to action.

THE FIRST REASON is owing to the object of hope, which is an arduous but possible good; for the thought that it is arduous arouses attention, and the thought that it is possible is no drag on effort; wherefore it follows that man acts intensely through hope.

THE SECOND REASON arises from the effect: For hope causes pleasure, which helps action.—In some particular cases hope hinders action accidentally, inasmuch as it causes sorrow (Ad 2).

FEAR

We must next consider 1) fear and 2) daring. There will be four subjects of in-

quiry on fear: a) Fear itself, 2) its object, 3) its cause, 4) its effect. The first subject of inquiry will occupy four articles.

QUESTION XLI FEAR IN ITSELF

ART. I.—WHETHER FEAR IS A PASSION OF THE SOUL.

YES.—Among the other movements of the soul after sorrow fear has most the character of a passion.

THE REASON is that those are most properly called passions which denote a bodily transmutation with some detriment. Now fear is a movement of the soul regarding a future evil, which causes a contraction of the heart; yet it is not so hurtful as sorrow, which regards a present evil.—For the degrees of the passions, see xxii, art. i.

ART. II.—WHETHER FEAR IS A SPECIAL PASSION.

YES.—THE REASON is that fear has a special object, from which it receives its species, namely a future evil, difficult and scarcely possible to resist.—Consequently fear is in no wise in the concupiscible appetite, because it does not regard evil absolutely; but it is in the concupiscible appetite in so far as the irascible passions arise from the concupiscible passions, and terminate in them, as has been said (q. xxv, art. 1); thus fear arises from the avoidance of evil, which arises from the desire of good; and fear ends in sorrow, because the object of fear is painful (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS ANY NATURAL FEAR.

NO.—THE REASON is that fear as a passion regards a painful evil, which is not repugnant to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such a fear is not natural, because it is not found in inanimate things, for it supposes apprehension.—But fear that regards a corruptive evil, from which nature shrinks on account of a natural desire of existence, is natural.

Consequently, just as love, desire, and (in a certain measure) hope are also called natural on account of a natural inclination to good, so also is fear, as has been explained. Yet certain passions are never called natural, because for their movements a natural inclination in no way suffices; and this, either because they cannot exist without apprehension, as delight and sorrow or sadness; or because their movement is contrary to the very nature of natural inclination, such as anger and the fear that shrinks from repelling a contrary evil.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SPECIES OF EVIL ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—According to Damascene, who assigns six species of fear according to the proper division of the object of fear itself there are six species: Laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.

THE REASON is that evil, as also good, can be considered in the action of man and in external things. In man's action a twofold evil can be feared: First the labor that burdens nature, and thus it is called laziness, namely when someone shrinks from work on account of the fear of excessive labor. Secondly the baseness that is damaging to one's reputation; and thus if the baseness is feared in an act that is to be committed, it is shamefacedness; but if it is in a base deed already done, it is shame.

Now the evil that consists in external things can exceed man's power to resist in three ways: First by reason of its magnitude, when someone considers some great evil, whose outcome he cannot sufficiently gauge; and thus it is *amazement*. Secondly by reason of unwontedness, because some unwonted evil is offered to our consideration, and thus it is great in our estimation; and in this way it is called *stupor*, which is caused by an unwonted imagination. In the third way by reason of being unforeseen, as future misfortunes are feared, and such a fear is called *anxiety*.

QUESTION XLII THE OBJECT OF FEAR

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FEAR IS GOOD OR EVIL.

YES.—Fear first and essentially respects evil as its proper object; but it respects

good in so far as it has a relation to good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that fear first and essentially denotes a flight, now a flight is away from an evil, as pursuit is to a good.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that by evil we are deprived of a good; wherefore fear is caused only by the loss of a good that is loved, as St. Augustine says; b) because good can be a cause of fear, inasmuch as some good can by its power inflict some harm on the good that is loved as can God, inasmuch as He can inflict both spiritual and bodily punishments, and in this way also the power of a man is feared, and similar goods.

ART. II.—WHETHER EVIL OF NATURE IS AN OBJECT OF FEAR.

YES.—THE REASON is that evil of nature is corruptive evil, which is contrary to nature, just as painful evil is contrary to the will. Now fear, as we have said, arises from the imagination of future corruptive or painful evil.—Yet evil of nature is not feared if it is either far distant, or present without hope of evasion. Thus men, who all know that they will die, do not fear death; and similarly those who are condemned to death without hope of reprieve are not afraid, because then the evil is not regarded as future, but as already present.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE EVIL OF SIN IS AN OBJECT OF FEAR.

NO.—THE REASON is that the evil of sin has the human will as its cause. Now that which is subject to our power and will does not have the nature of fear; for the object of fear is an arduous future evil, which cannot be easily avoided.—Yet being led astray to sin and the evils consequent on sin falls under the nature of fear, as external causes of fear.

ART. IV.—WHETHER FEAR ITSELF CAN BE FEARED.

YES.—In so far as fear arises from an extrinsic cause, but not in so far as it is subject to the will.

THE REASON is that that alone is fearful that arises from an extrinsic cause. Now fear as a passion resulting from an imagination of imminent evil can be considered as an extrinsic cause of fear. For in this sense one can fear lest he be threatened by the necessity of fearing through being assailed by some great evil.—But fear is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys the reason, and in this sense fear cannot be feared.

ART. V.—WHETHER SUDDEN THINGS ARE ESPECIALLY FEARED.

YES.—THE REASON is that suddenness causes an imminent evil to appear greater, for all corporeal goods and evils appear less the more they are considered. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness withdraw the remedies that man can prepare to repel a future evil, and in this way they increase the weakness of the one who fears, and this increases fear.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THOSE THINGS ARE MORE FEARED FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REMEDY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the evils which, after they come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting forever or for a long time, and for this reason they inspire the greatest fear.

QUESTION XLIII THE CAUSE OF FEAR

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER LOVE IS THE CAUSE OF FEAR.

YES.—Not the efficient cause, but by way of material disposition.

THE REASON is that, although love does not inflict the evil that is feared, love is that by which something is regarded as an evil to be feared. For from the fact that anyone loves some good, it follows that all that deprives him of such a good is evil to him; and consequently that he fears it as an evil. Wherefore fear of itself is born of love (Ad 1).

NOTE: Fear of itself and primarily respects the evil that it shuns, and thus denotes flight; secondarily and accidentally it sometimes causes love, as when a man, who fears to be punished by God, obeys His commandments; and thus he begins to hope, and hope leads to love (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER DEFECT IS THE CAUSE OF FEAR.

YES.—Not a defect on the part of the efficient cause of fear, but on the part of the disposition of him who fears, and according to a certain measure.

THE REASON is that that which causes fear, if it has a defect, causes a lesser fear; for the cause of fear in this respect is not a defect, but strength and power, whose effect cannot be repulsed. On the contrary, a defect on the part of the subject diminishes the power whereby one can easily repulse imminent danger. Yet this defect must be according to a measure; otherwise fear becomes sorrow, which is about a greater evil, or it can wholly take away the sense of fear or the love of the good, whose contrary is feared, as happens in men who are being executed, in whom their defect exceeds the measure of fear (Ad 2).

QUESTION XLIV
THE EFFECTS OF FEAR
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FEAR CAUSES CONTRACTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that by the movement of fear, which results from the apprehension of an imminent evil, a weakness of power is felt, which extends to fewer objects the greater the weakness. Consequently, there follows from the imagination, which causes fear, a certain contraction in the appetite, or in the appetitive power. And according to the likeness of this contraction, which belongs to the animal appetite, there also follows in bodily fear (for bodily fear is the material element of the passion) a contraction of heat and vital spirits inward, i.e., from the heart to the lower parts (Ad 2) or to the nutritive parts (art. 3 of this q., ad 1).

NOTE: 1.—Because fear causes a contraction of bodily heat, not to the heart, but from the heart to the lower parts, it follows that those who fear do not promptly attack, but rather fly from the evil. On the contrary, in angry people the vital spirits and bodily heat are collected around the heart; and thus angry people are rendered prompt and daring to attack the evil (Ad 1).—For the same reason fear is contrary to the formation of the voice, which results from the emission of vital spirits upward through the mouth; and on this account fear makes people silent; and hence it is also that fear causes trembling, as the Philosopher says (in his book on *Problems*, xxvii, 1, 6, 7). In shame, on the other hand, the soul is as it were contracted in itself and so is free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement; wherefore they spread to the outward parts, and this is why people who are ashamed blush. But the evil that shame fears is not opposed to nature, but only to the animal appetite; wherefore a contraction occurs in the animal appetite, but not in the corporeal nature, as happens in danger of death, when those who fear turn pale (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER FEAR MAKES ONE SUITABLE FOR COUNSEL.

YES.—According to the will or anxiety of the counsellor, but not according to his faculty for giving good counsel.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the things that inspire fear are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they are apprehended as being difficult to repel and also because they are apprehended as being near at hand. Wherefore men especially take counsel when in fear.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to a man who is affected by any passion something seems greater or less than it really is. And thus owing to a defect in the rightness of judgment, any passion, in itself, impedes the faculty of giving good counsel.

NOTE: Fear makes men of counsel more than does hope; because hope is about a good that is possible of attainment; but fear is about an evil that is difficult to repel; and thus fear regards more the element of difficulty than does hope. Now in difficult matters we take counsel, especially in those in which we do not trust ourselves, as was said above (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER FEAR CAUSES TREMBLING.

YES.—THE REASON is that in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inward parts; and thus the outward parts remain cold; and for this reason trembling ensues in them, which is caused by the weakness of the power containing the members. To this weakness a loss of heat especially contributes, for heat

is the instrument whereby the soul moves (Aristotle, *On the Soul*, bk. II, text 50).

NOTE: When heat is withdrawn from the outward to the inward parts by fear, heat is multiplied interiorly, and especially in the direction of the lower parts, that is, the nutritive part; and, therefore, when the bodily moistures are consumed there follow thirst, and also, sometimes, a loosening of the bowels and an emission of urine and sometimes even of semen, on account of the contraction of the stomach and testicles (Ad 1).—Likewise, the heart especially trembles in those who fear, and the members that have some connection with the breast, where the heart is; because in fear heat deserts the heart, and is directed from the upper to the power parts. Wherefore those who are afraid tremble in the voice, lower lip, teeth, etc. (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER FEAR HINDERS ACTION.

NO.—On the part of the bodily instruments fear, considered in itself, always acts to impede exterior action; but on the part of the soul, a moderate fear aids efficiency.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that fear causes a loss of heat in the external members (prec. articles).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that then fear causes anxiety, and makes man more attentive in deliberation and action.

QUESTION XLV

DARING

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DARING IS CONTRARY TO FEAR.

YES.—Daring is farthest removed from fear.

THE REASON is that fear shrinks from a future hurt on account of its being overcome by that hurt; but daring turns on the imminent danger on account of its overcoming the danger.

NOTE: Safety does not denote anything contrary to fear, but only the exclusion of fear; for he is said to be secure who does not fear. Wherefore, as safety is opposed to fear as a privation, so daring implies safety (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER DARING ENSUES FROM HOPE.

YES.—THE REASON is that one attacks an imminent object of fear because he hopes to overcome it. But despair follows from fear. Consequently one despairs, because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he would hope for.

ART. III.—WHETHER SOME DEFECT IS A CAUSE OF DARING.

NO.—Unless perchance accidentally, as happens in the case of those who are drunk.

THE REASON is that daring arises from hope, and is opposed to fear. Now the things that, on the part of the appetitive movement, give rise to hope, which causes daring; and the things that lead us to regard victory as possible of attainment, etc.; and the things which exclude fear, for example, because a man has no enemies, and the like, do not have the character of defect. Similarly, the things that cause hope on the part of bodily transmutation, or which exclude fear, do not of themselves have the character of defect, because they are the things that cause heat around the heart. Thus animals that have a small heart, or men who are lovers of wine, are more prone to daring, not on account of defect, except accidentally, but on account of the heat of the heart, which causes the expansion of the heart. Wherefore no defect causes daring except accidentally, in so far as (the defect) has connected with it some excellence, whether true or supposed, either on the part of another or on the part of oneself (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DARING ARE MORE EAGER AT THE START OF DANGER THAN IN ITS MIDST.

YES.—THE REASON is that daring follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. Now the sensitive faculty does not make comparisons or inquire into circumstances, but its judgment is instantaneous. Wherefore the daring, where they already experience danger, find a greater difficulty than they reckoned with; and so lose heart. Reason, on the other hand, discusses all the difficulties of a situation.

NOTE: Even in the daring fear arises on account of the withdrawal of heat from the outward to the inward parts, as is the case with the timid; but in the daring the

heat withdraws to the heart; in the timid it withdraws to the inward parts, as was said in the preceding (Ad. 1).

ANGER

Here we are to consider anger: 1) Anger in itself; 2) the cause and remedy of anger; 3) its effect. The first point occupies eight articles.

QUESTION XLVI ANGER IN ITSELF

ART. I.—WHETHER ANGER IS A SPECIAL PASSION.

YES.—According to a certain generality.

THE REASON is that anger can be called general in so far as it is caused by the concurrence of many passions; for the movement of anger does not arise except on account of some sorrow inflicted, and unless there are a desire and a hope of revenge.

NOTE: The irascible power is named from *ira*, anger, not because all the movements of this power are anger, but because they all terminate in anger, and anger is most manifest among the other movements (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE OBJECT OF ANGER IS GOOD OR EVIL.

ANSWER: Anger always regards two objects, one of which is good, the other evil.

THE REASON is that the movement of anger tends to two objects, namely to revenge, which it seeks and hopes for as a good, in which it also takes pleasure. It also tends to the one on whom vengeance is sought, as to someone hostile and hurtful, and this belongs to the notion of evil. Hence anger is a passion composed, as it were, of contrary passions, and regards its object not simply, or as incomplex, but as complex.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANGER IS IN THE CONCUPISCIBLE FACULTY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the object of anger is not good or evil absolutely, which is the object of the passions of the concupiscible faculty; but its object is a certain arduousness, both on the part of vengeance, and on the part of the one on whom vengeance is sought; for we regard things that are next to nothing as in no way worthy of anger.

NOTE: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not because the same individual passion that before was anger afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a certain causality; for anger causes hatred when it lasts a long time (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANGER REQUIRES AN ACT OF REASON.

YES.—Namely that anger that does not proceed only from the imagination, as in the brutes (art. vii, ad. 1).

THE REASON is that the craving for revenge denotes a comparison of the punishment to be inflicted with the injury done itself, and this implies a syllogism.

NOTE: The movement of the appetitive faculty may require an act of reason in two ways: In one way it requires the reason as it commands, and thus the will requires an act of reason and hence is called the rational appetite; in another way it requires an act of the reason as it denounces, and thus anger requires an act of reason as manifesting an injury (Ad. 1). But anger does not perfectly listen to reason (Ad. 3), because the angered person does not perfectly listen to the command of reason.

ART. V.—WHETHER ANGER IS MORE NATURAL THAN DESIRE.

ANSWER: Anger is more natural: a) Not on the part of the object; b) but on the part of the subject, and moreover, not according to the generic nature of man; c) but according to his specific nature, and d) according to the temperament of the individual.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, on the part of the object, desire, especially for the pleasures of food and sex, is more natural than anger, inasmuch as these objects of desire are more natural than revenge, the object of anger.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, so far as man is an animal, desire is more natural than anger, inasmuch as desire is more necessary for the preservation of animal life than is anger.

THE REASON FOR THE THIRD is that anger pertains more to man as a rational animal than does desire, since anger requires an act of reason and desire does not.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that anger results more easily from a natural

disposition to anger, which is according to the temperament of the individual, than does desire, or any other passion. For a man is disposed to anger inasmuch as he has a choleric temperament. Wherefore Aristotle says (*Ethics*, vii, 6) that "anger is transmitted from parents to children more readily than desire."

NOTE: On account of the moderation of his temperament man does not have an excess of either anger or any other passion. Other animals are disposed to the excess of any passion, as a lion to daring, a dog to anger, a hare to fear, and so on. But on the part of the reason both anger and meekness are natural to man; inasmuch as reason somewhat causes anger, in so far as it announces the cause of anger; and somewhat it calms anger, in so far as the angered person does not listen perfectly to the command of reason (Ad. 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ANGER IS GRAVER THAN HATRED.

NO.—Hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

THE REASON is that the man who hates desires the evil of his enemy in so far as it is evil; but the angry man desires evil of him with whom he is angry, not in so far as it is evil, but in so far as it has a certain aspect of good, namely in so far as he thinks it to be just, inasmuch as it is an avenging evil. Now it is manifest that to seek an evil under the aspect of justice has less of the aspect of evil than to wish evil simply—in fact, to wish evil under the aspect of justice can be even according to the virtue of justice.

NOTE: In many ways anger differs from hatred: 1. Both the objects of hatred as complex (art. II of this q.) are evil, for the hater wishes evil to someone as to someone who is unsuitable to him; but one object of anger is always good, namely revenge considered as justice. 2. Since hatred seeks the evil of another as such, it is not satisfied by any measure of evil; wherefore Ecclesiastes xii, 16: "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the contrary, has mercy if the evil inflicted exceeds the measure of justice in the estimation of the angry person. Moreover, as regards the intensity of desire anger excludes mercy more than does hatred, on account of the inflammation of the bile, but it is presently subdued (Ad 1). The angry person seeks to have the one on whom he inflicts injury to feel, grieve for, and know why the injury inflicted comes to him. But the hater cares nothing for this, because he desires the other's evil as such (Ad. 2). 4. Hatred proceeds from a more lasting cause than does anger. For anger arises from a certain commotion of the soul on account of the injury done; but hatred proceeds from some disposition of man, according to which he regards as contrary and hurtful to himself that which he hates; wherefore hatred is more incurable than anger (Ad. 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANGER IS ONLY TOWARD THOSE TO WHOM ONE HAS AN OBJECTION IN JUSTICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that anger seeks evil in so far as it has the aspect of vindictive justice.

NOTE: Anger with inanimate things arises in us only from the imagination as it announces some injury. The same thing is to be said of anger with the dead; because they feel no pain, which the angry man seeks (Ad. 1). Likewise, properly speaking, no one is angry with himself, but only metaphorically (Ad. 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE SPECIES OF ANGER ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—Namely, bile, ill will, and rancor, which are taken from those things that give increase of anger.

THE REASON is that anger is aggravated in three ways: a) On the part of the movement itself, and such anger is bile, because it is speedily aroused [an excess of yellow bile was anciently thought to cause anger]; b) from the sadness causing anger, and this is ill will (Gr. *menis*), which is so called from remaining, because it remains long in the memory (the Greek word for to remain is *menein*); c) from the appetite for revenge, and this pertains to rancor (Latin *furor*), which never rests until it exacts punishment. Aristotle called the first movements acute, the second, bitter, and the last ill tempered. Irascibility belongs to the first species (Ad. 2).

QUESTION XLVII

THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER; THE REMEDIES OF ANGER

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MOTIVE OF ANGER IS ALWAYS SOMETHING DONE AGAINST THE ONE WHO IS ANGRY.

YES.—THE REASON is that vengeance has place only when an injury has preceded. Neither does every injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which pertains to him who seeks the revenge. With those who injure others we are angry and seek vengeance on them, because in some manner the injured ones belong to us, either by some relationship or at least by having a common nature (Ad. 2).

NOTE: Anger is not said to be in God according to a passion of the soul but according to the judgment of justice, in so far as He wills to revenge sin. For the sinner by sinning cannot effectively injure God in any way. Yet as far as he is concerned he acts against God in two ways: First in so far as he despises Him in His Commandments; second in so far as he does some injury to someone, either himself or another. This pertains to God in so far as the one to whom the injury is done is under the providence and protection of God (Ad. 1); thus God is said to be angry with men on account of sins, according to Psalm cv, 40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people."

ART. II.—WHETHER ONLY SLIGHT OR CONTEMPT IS A MOTIVE OF ANGER.

YES.—All the causes of anger are reduced to slight.

THE REASON is that just revenge has as its object only that which is unjustly done; and therefore what provokes to anger is always something viewed in the light of justice. Now injustice or injury can be done to someone in three ways: From ignorance, from passion, and from choice. Now to do something out of ignorance or passion diminishes the aspect of injury; and to some extent calls for mercy and pardon. On the contrary, those who intentionally do us an injury seem to sin from contempt; and therefore we are especially angry with them.—ANOTHER REASON is that from all our goods we seek some excellence; and therefore whatever injury is done us, inasmuch as it detracts from our excellence, seems to belong to slight.

NOTE: L.—The brute does not seek honor under the aspect of honor, but it does naturally seek a certain excellence, and therefore it is angry with what detracts from its excellence (Ad 2).

2.—Forgetfulness, exultation in others' misfortunes, the private denunciation of evils, the hindrance of anyone's carrying out his own will, and the like, which provoke anger, are reduced to contempt and slight (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN'S EXCELLENCE IS THE CAUSE OF HIS BEING ANGRY.

YES.—In respect to the motive of anger, but not on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive.

THE REASON is that the more excellent anyone is the more unjustly is he slighted in that in which he excels; and therefore those who have a certain excellence are most angered if they are slighted in this respect.—On the part of the disposition that is produced in him because of the aforesaid motive, a weakness or infirmity rather than excellence causes anger, for the things that pertain to a defect are especially painful, because men who are subject to defects are more easily hurt; and this is the reason why the weak are more easily angered, because they are more easily hurt.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A PERSON'S DEFECT IS A REASON FOR BEING MORE EASILY ANGRY WITH HIM.

YES.—The deficiency or littleness of the one with whom we are angry increases anger.

THE REASON is that this increases the *undeserved* contempt on the part of the one who inflicts the injury.—Yet sometimes littleness or deficiency diminishes undeserved contempt; and such deficiency or littleness does not increase, but lessens, anger; thus those who repent of injuries done, and humble themselves, and ask pardon, mitigate anger, in so far, namely, as such people seem not to despise but rather to esteem those before whom they humble themselves.

QUESTION XLVIII
THE EFFECTS OF ANGER
(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANGER CAUSES PLEASURE.

YES.—In so far as sorrow is to anger as the principle, and pleasure is as the effect and terminus.

THE REASON is that the movement of anger arises from some painful injury inflicted, for which sorrow a remedy is offered by vengeance. And therefore pleasure follows from the presence of vengeance, and so much the more in proportion as the sorrow was greater.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANGER ABOVE ALL CAUSES FERVOR IN THE HEART.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the movement of anger is not by way of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but rather by way of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat; consequently there takes place a movement of anger which causes a certain fervor of the blood and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the passions of the soul. For anger tends most of all to repel injury by seeking revenge.

NOTE: 1.—The fervor of anger is thus described by St. Gregory the Great (*Moralia*, v. 30): "The heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce; they who are well known are not recognized. With the mouth he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says" (body of art.).

2.—This is how the fervor of love is distinguished from the fervor of anger: "The fervor of love is accompanied by certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves; whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that the liver engenders love, because of the blood's being formed there.—On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness, with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil; whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile" (Ad. 1). Wherefore, just as a great fire is speedily extinguished when the fuel is consumed, so also anger soon fails by reason of its vehemence. (Ad. 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ANGER ABOVE ALL HINDERS THE USE OF REASON.

YES.—Not on the part of the movement of passion that requires reason, as has been stated; but on the part of bodily transmutation.

THE REASON is that anger most of all causes bodily disturbance around the heart, so that it passes even to the outward members. Wherefore the angry man in speaking cannot discern what should be hidden and what made known, or even devise ways of hiding anything. This arises partly from the dilation of the heart, which belongs to magnanimity, which is an effect of anger (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANGER ABOVE ALL CAUSES TACITURNITY.

YES.—Both in so far as it is accompanied by reason and in so far as it hinders reason if it is very vehement.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, on the part of reason, anger sometimes, when the soul is disturbed, induces silence as if by judgment, as Gregory says.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the disturbance of anger spreads even to the outward members, and above all to those members that most expressly reflect the heart, as in the eyes, the countenance, and the tongue. Therefore the disturbance of anger can be so great that the tongue is altogether hindered from the use of speech, or it can even cause death.—But if the disturbance is not so great, then out of the abundance of the heart, thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak (Ad. 3).

THE HABITS

After the acts and passions we must now consider the principles of human acts: (1) The intrinsic principles, (2) the extrinsic principles. Now the intrinsic principle is a power and a habit. But because we have already treated of power in the first part (q. lxxvii), it now remains to consider habits. And first in general, second as to the

vices and virtues, and such other habits, which are the principles of human acts.

Touching the habits in general four subjects are to be considered: 1. The very substance of the habits; 2. their subject; 3. the cause of the generation, increase, and corruption of habits; 4. their distinction.—With regard to the first, four questions are asked.

QUESTION XLIX HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HABIT IS A QUALITY.

YES.—Not in so far as habit is taken from having (*habendo*), inasmuch as man or any other thing is said to have something, but inasmuch as a thing in some manner has a relation (*se habet*) in itself or to something else.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus a habit is common to different genera and is placed among the post-predicaments, or it stands to the things that are under consideration as one genus, and is called a predicament. Of these, however, we are not now speaking.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, in so far as anything has a relation in itself or to something else, this mode of relation is according to some quality; and in this way a habit is a certain quality; wherefore a habit is called "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, either in regard to itself or in regard to another" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, v.).

NOTE: 1.—Habit (or having, *habere*), in so far as it is common to the different genera, is placed among the post-predicaments; as a predicament it is understood as something midway between the haver and that which he has, as "between the one who is clothed and the clothing that he has there is a habit." (*Metaphysics*, v, *ibid.*)

2.—Disposition always implies an order of that which has parts, and is three-fold: (a) According to place, and this belongs to the predicament of position, which is the order of parts in a place; (b) according to power, which includes those dispositions that are in course of formation and not yet arrived, such as imperfect knowledge and virtue; (c) according to species, which includes perfect dispositions, which are called *habits*, of which we are now speaking, such as the habit of perfected science and virtue. (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER HABIT IS A DISTINCT SPECIES OF QUALITY.

YES.—A habit (and disposition) is the first species of quality, not according to the reckoning of Simplicius but of Aristotle.

THE REASON is that a habit (and disposition) is a mode or determination of the subject according to accidental being in relation to the very nature of the subject. Now nature is that which is first considered in a thing.

The other dispositions of a subject according to its accidental being are sometimes in regard to action and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form. In this way we have the second and third species of quality, namely potentiality and its opposition, passion and passion-like quality. Sometimes the dispositions of a subject according to accidental being are according to quantity, and thus we have the fourth species of quality, namely form and figure.

Simplicius assigned the species of quality, not according to their mode or determination to the subject, with regard to the definition of quality; but held that habit and disposition are adventitious qualities, whereas other species of quality are as it were natural qualities. This distinction is unsuitable, because dispositions can be natural, and many passable shapes and qualities can be adventitious.

NOTE: 1.—Quality implies a certain mode of substance (mode is that which a measure determines). That according to which the material potentiality is determined to its substantial being is called a (substantial) quality, which is a difference affecting substance; and that in accordance with which the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference. The species of quality of which we are speaking here are accidental qualities (body of art.).

2.—The fourth species of quality (form and figure) do not have the aspect of easy or difficult, good or bad, quickly or slowly transitory, because it is without move-

ment and does not imply the notion of good and bad.

The second and third species, since they are according to action and passion, have the aspect of easy and difficult, speedily or slowly transitory, but do not imply the notion of good or bad.

But the first species (habit and disposition) imply the notion of easy and difficult to move and also the notion of good or bad; because since it regards the nature of the thing (the subject), it implies a reference to the end, according to which nature is the end of generation and movement. And therefore a habit is a (firm) disposition whereby someone is disposed well or ill, for by habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions. A habit is good when it is suitable to the nature of the thing; otherwise it is bad (body of art.).

3. This difference, "difficult to change," distinguishes habit from disposition. Disposition, properly so called, can be divided against habit in two ways: First, insofar as a disposition is had imperfectly, and easily lost; a habit is had perfectly, and is not easily lost. Thus disposition and habit are in the same species, and disposition becomes a habit as a boy becomes a man;—Secondly, in so far as a disposition has a changeable cause, but habits have an unchangeable cause; wherefore a disposition is easily lost, and a habit is not easily changed; and in this explanation disposition and habit are not of the same species, but of different species of one subaltern genus; and in this sense a disposition *does not* become a habit (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER HABIT IMPLIES ORDER TO AN ACT.

YES.—Consequently but principally.

THE REASON is that a habit, as has been said (prec. art.), implies a relation to the thing's nature, according as it is suitable to it or not; now the nature and notion of power is that it is the principle of act. Wherefore every habit that is subjected in a power principally implies relation to an act.

NOTE: I—It is not of the essence of habit to be related to power (except consequently), but to be related to nature. And, because nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HABITS ARE NECESSARY.

It is necessary that there be a habit wherever several things need to concur to dispose the subject to one of the things to which it is in potentiality, which things can be measured in various ways; and thus a thing is disposed well or ill to form or to operation.

THE REASON is that such a disposition, if it is firm, comes into existence by way of habit. For a habit is a disposition, and a disposition is "a relation of a thing that has parts either as to place, or as to power, or as to species," as was said above (art. 1 of this question Ad. 3).

NOTE: It follows from this that where there is no distinction of act and potentiality, or where there is that of which the substance is its own operation, or whose existence is for its own sake, there is no habit, as is clearly the case in God. Similarly, there is no habit where a thing is in potentiality only to one thing, as is clearly the case in many natural things (body of art.).

QUESTION L THE SUBJECT OF HABITS

(In Six Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS A HABIT IN THE BODY.

YES.—(a) In so far as a habit implies a relation to operation, it is not in the body except secondarily; (b) in so far as it implies a relation to the form, it is in the body but not perfectly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every operation of the body is either from a natural quality of the body, or from the soul moving the body; the natural operation of the body is determined to one thing, as we have said above (prec. q., art. 4). If the operation is from the soul through the body, the habit principally belongs to the soul itself; because habits are proportioned to operations; secondarily, however, a habit is in the body, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled to serve promptly the operations of the soul.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the body is compared to the soul as the subject to the form; wherefore there is a habitual disposition in it to health, beauty, and the like, which, however, are easily changeable on account of the changeableness of the subject. Wherefore they do not perfectly have the aspect of a habit, nor are they called simply habits, as are those that belong to the soul (Ad. 2).

NOTE: The qualities of the first species differ from those of the third species, because habit and disposition do not first and primarily imply an alteration in the subject, whereas a passion and a passion-like quality do so—a passion if it is speedily transitory movement, a passion-like quality if bodily changes are permanent (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUL IS THE SUBJECT OF HABIT IN RESPECT OF ITS ESSENCE OR IN RESPECT OF ITS POWER.

ANSWER: Habits are in the soul with respect to its power in relation to its operations; but in so far as habits imply a relation to nature, they cannot be in the essence of the soul except in reference to a higher nature (grace).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the soul is the principle of operations through its powers, by which it bears a relation to many operations.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the soul itself is the form that completes the human nature; wherefore it is not related as a subject to be disposed to something else, but as a form to which something is disposed; and in this way a habit or disposition is rather to be said to exist in the body in relation to the soul, than in the soul in relation to the body.—But in reference to a superior nature, of which man can be a partaker, according to II Pet. i, 4: "That we may be partakers of the divine nature," nothing prevents a habit from being in the soul according to its essence, namely grace, as we shall explain later (q. cx, a. 4).

NOTE: No accident can of itself be the subject of another accident. But because in accidents there is a certain order, a subject that exists under one accident is understood to be the subject of another accident; and thus one accident is said to be the subject of another, as surface is the subject of color; and in this way power can be the subject of habit (Ad. 2). Such a habit, however, does not imply a relation to nature but to operation, and is posterior to power (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY HABITS IN THE POWERS OF THE SENSITIVE PART.

YES.—Not in so far as they act by an instinct of nature, but according as they act at the command of the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus they are ordered to one thing.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus they can be ordered to different things, to which they can be well or ill disposed.

NOTE: 1.—In the brutes habits can in a sense exist, in so far as they are disposed by man's training to do a certain thing; but such a habit can exist only materially, because the brute does not have control over his act (Ad. 2).

2.—The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, and in the appetitive sensitive powers there are no habits, except in so far as they act by command of the reason. But the rational powers of apprehension have rather an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers; wherefore habits are more in the sensitive appetitive powers than in the powers of sensitive apprehension. But even in the apprehensive sensitive powers some habits can exist by virtue of which a man has a good memory or is a keen thinker, or has a lively imagination. But the exterior apprehensive sensitive powers, such as sight and hearing and the like, are not susceptible of any habits, but are directed to their specified acts according to the disposition of their nature. Such are the limbs of the body; habits do not exist in them, but rather in the powers commanding their movements (Ad. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE INTELLECT ITSELF.

YES.—The intellectual habits (wisdom, science, and understanding) are principally in the possible intellect, and secondarily in the sensitive interior powers.

THE REASON is that his is the habit of whom is the operation. Now to understand and consider are the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit by which we consider is properly in the intellect itself.—Likewise the phantasm is com-

pared to the possible intellect as the object to the power. Now habits are not in the object but in the power itself, for habits dispose the power to the object (Ad. 1).

But, because the powers of the sensitive apprehension interiorly prepare the proper object for the possible intellect, accordingly by the good disposition of these powers, to achieve which the good disposition of the body co-operates, a man is rendered ready to understand. It is thus that the intellective habit can exist in these powers secondarily (Ad. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE IS ANY HABIT IN THE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the will is a rational power, it can be directed in different ways to its act; and therefore there can exist in the will some habit whereby it is well disposed for its act (body of art.), for the good of reason, to which the will is inclined, has many distinct species.—Likewise, it is apparent from the very nature of a habit that a habit has as it were a principal relation to the will, in so far as "a habit is that which we use when we will" (body of art.); for the will, as the appetitive principle, is both mover and moved (Ad. 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE ARE HABITS IN THE ANGELS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the angels, in so far as they are in potentiality, need to be perfected by habits through certain intelligible species for their operation. They can approach to God, from whom they are infinitely distant, through habits that are called "deiform," by which they are conformed to God. But habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in the angels, since they are immaterial.

NOTE: In so far as the angel is in act, he can understand some things by his own essence; at least himself, and other things according to the mode of his substance, and so much the more perfectly the more perfect he is; and in this respect he does not need a habit (body of art.).

QUESTION LI

THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION

We have now to consider the cause of habits: 1) With regard to their generation, 2) with regard to their increase, 3) with regard to their weakening and corruption. (The first point will occupy four articles.)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY HABIT IS FROM NATURE.

YES.—There are in men some natural habits (i.e., dispositions to operation), partly existing from nature and partly from an extrinsic principle. These habits are both in the apprehensive and in the appetitive powers. In the apprehensive powers they exist in an inceptive form, both according to the nature of the species and according to the nature of the individual. In the appetitive powers there is no natural habit by way of a beginning on the part of the species (i.e., of the soul itself) with regard to the substance of the habit, but only with regard to certain principles of the habit. On the part of the body, however, there exist with respect to the nature of the individual some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings.

THE REASON is that, as regards the apprehensive powers, there is, with respect to the nature of the species and on the part of the soul itself, the understanding of principles, which is called a natural habit, for it belongs to man, by the very nature of the intellectual soul, that, immediately upon knowing what is the whole and what is the part, he knows that every whole is greater than its part; and likewise with the rest. But knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

With respect to the nature of the individual there is a habit of knowledge according to natural beginnings, in so far as one man, by reason of the disposition of his organs, is better apt to understand well than another, inasmuch as for intellectual operation we need the sensitive powers. Wherefore neither by reason of the species nor by reason of the individual does it happen that there are in men natural habits, so as to be wholly from nature.

With reference to the appetitive powers there is no natural habit by way of a beginning on the part of the soul itself, as we have said; because an inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but to the very nature of the powers.

On the part of the body with reference to the nature of the individual, there are

some habits, as we have said above (in the response); because some are disposed by their own bodily temperament to chastity, meekness, or the like.

NOTE: A habit, so far as it is a disposition of the subject in relation to the form or nature, happens to be natural in men both by reason of the species and by reason of the individual, either entirely from nature or partly from nature and partly from an extrinsic principle, because there is some natural disposition that is owed to the human species, outside which no man is found. But, because such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different degrees of that disposition belong to different men according to the nature of the individual, as was said concerning health (body of art.). In angels it happens that there are habits that are wholly from nature, namely operative habits, because they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them (ibid.).

ART. II.—WHETHER ANY HABIT IS CAUSED BY ACTS.

YES.—From multiplied acts there is generated a certain quality in the power which is passive and moved, which is called a habit.

THE REASON is that everything that is passive and moved by another is disposed by the act of the agent. Wherefore the agent, as agent, does not receive anything; but in so far as it moves by being moved by another it receives something from that which moves it; and thus a habit is caused (Ad. 1). Moreover, in an agent in which there is only the active principle of its act, as in fire in respect to heating, no habit can be caused by its own act, as is evident; and hence it is that natural things "cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed" (body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE GENERATED BY ONE ACT.

NO.—a) Moral habits are not caused by one act; b) in the apprehensive powers a habit can be caused in the possible intellect by one act, but not in the passive intellect; c) it is possible for bodily habits to be caused by one act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in order that any quality be caused in the passive principle, it is necessary that the active entirely overcome the passive. Now the reason, which is the active principle with respect to the generation of a (moral) habit, cannot totally overcome the appetitive power in one act, because the appetitive power has different relations to many things.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, with respect to the possible intellect, one self-evident proposition prevails on the intellect to assent firmly to the conclusion. With regard to the passive intellect, which is the particular reason, in which the cogitative power acts with the memory and imagination, the habit of science can be caused only by repeated acts for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that if the active (agent) is of great power it is possible for bodily habits to be caused by one act, as when sometimes a strong medicine immediately restores health.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANY HABITS ARE INFUSED IN MEN BY GOD.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the habits whereby man is disposed to lasting and perfect happiness, which exceeds the proportion of human nature, cannot be in man except by divine infusion; for a habit must be proportionate to that to which man is thereby disposed.

THE SECOND REASON is that God can produce the effects of secondary causes without secondary causes (as was stated above q. cv, art. 6); just as He gave the Apostles a knowledge of the Scriptures and of all languages, which men can acquire by study or practice, but not so perfectly.

QUESTION LII

THE INCREASE OF HABITS

(In Three Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HABITS ARE INCREASED.

YES.—The intensity and remissness in habits and dispositions can be considered either in itself or in the participation of the subject.

THE REASON is that a habit in itself can extend to more or fewer things; as health or science, which thus is said to be more or less; according to the participation of the subject, a habit is received in one more than in another, according to its different

aptitude, whether gained from nature or from learning, just as equal science or health is more received in one than in another.

NOTE: Habit is indeed a perfection; but not a perfection that is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less (Ad. 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER HABIT INCREASES BY ADDITION.

NO.—The increase of habits is not made by addition of one form to another, but is caused by the subject's more or less perfectly participating one and the same form.

THE REASON is that if increase is made by addition, this would be either on the part of the form, or on the part of the subject. If on the part of the form, such addition (or subtraction) would change the species; if on the part of the subject, this is done either because some part of the subject receive a form that it had not had before, or because some other subject is added which participates the same form; but the second of these two ways is not called something more (e.g., white or hot), but greater.

On the other hand, as by an agent that is in act something comes into act (e.g., becomes actually hot), as though beginning to participate the form (of the hot)—not as though the form itself were made, as is evident—so by the intense action of the agent itself it is made hotter as more perfectly participating the form, but not as though something were added to the form; i.e., not by addition.

And so it is with the habits, of the increase or quantity of which we are speaking, by reason of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination (art. 1 of this q.).

Yet, because certain accidents are increased even in themselves, some of them can receive increase even by addition, as in the case of science, which, however, is increased also by an intenser participation of the subject. In bodily habits there seems to be no increase by addition, but by intensity.

ART. III.—WHETHER EVERY ACT INCREASES ITS HABIT.

NO.—It depends on the intensity of the act.

THE REASON is that every act increases the habit or disposes it to increase, if the intensity of the act is proportionately equalled or exceeds the intensity of the habit. But if the intensity of the act falls proportionately short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to the increase of the habit, but rather to its weakening.

QUESTION LIII

THE CORRUPTION AND WEAKENING OF HABITS

(In Three Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE CORRUPTED.

YES.—Either directly or accidentally.

THE REASON is that a habit can be corrupted either by its contrary or by the corruption of the subject in which it is; and this again either by the corruption of the subject itself or by something else on which the subject itself depends—e.g., as the possible intellect in which is the habit of science is not corruptible on its own part, but depends on the process of reason, in which deception can enter, and thus corrupt science. But the habits of first principles, both speculative and practical, cannot be corrupted either directly or accidentally, because they are caused immediately by the active intellect, which does not have a contrary to it.

ART. II.—WHETHER A HABIT CAN BE DIMINISHED.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the diminution of a habit is as it were the path to its corruption. And just as habits are increased by the same cause that generates them, so they are diminished by the same cause by which they are corrupted.

NOTE: A habit considered in itself is a simple form (e.g., health); and in this sense it is not subject to decrease or increase, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it, which is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways (i.e., more or less intensely) or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things (i.e., by addition).—(Ad. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER A HABIT IS CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED THROUGH MERE CESSATION FROM ACT.

YES.—In so far as operation is an accidental mover i.e., as that which removes an obstacle.

THE REASON is that by cessation from act an act is removed that checked the causes that destroy or diminish the habit, whether with regard to the habits that are directly corrupted, i.e., by a contrary agent—and thus the virtues are corrupted by immoderate passions and operations, which grow up as a result of long cessation from the acts of the virtues; or with regard to habits that are corrupted accidentally, or by reason of the subject, as science and the other intellectual virtues, because from the cessation of the act there arise outside imaginations, which render man less apt to judge aright, and sometimes dispose him to the contrary, if they are not cut off and suppressed by the frequent use of the intellectual habit.

QUESTION LIV THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MANY HABITS CAN BE IN ONE POWER.

YES.—Whether as dispositions to nature or as dispositions to the operation which is the end of nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the parts of one subject can be taken in various ways; as in the human body, where there are health, fortitude, and beauty arising from the disposition of nature with regard to the humors, the similar parts, and the members respectively.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as several objects can move one passive power, so one passive power can be the subject of different actions or perfections according to their species. Now the passive power is related to the determinate act of one species as matter to form.

NOTE: As in natural things diversity of species is according to form, and diversity of genera is according to matter; so also the generic diversity of objects creates a difference of powers; but the specific difference of objects creates a specific difference of acts and consequently a difference of habits (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER HABITS ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS.

YES.—Habits are distinguished specifically even according to their objects.

THE REASON is that a habit, as a habit, implies an order to something. Now all things that imply order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is ordained, as a disposition, to nature and to operation. Likewise a habit can be considered as a form. Now forms are distinguished from one another according to their different active principles, because every agent makes something like itself according to species. Wherefore habits are distinguished specifically in three ways a) According to the active principles of such dispositions (habit); b) according to nature, in so far as a habit disposes nature itself; c) according to objects specifically different.

NOTE: Different habits can have the same material object, but not the same formal object. Similarly, the same object can be attained by different means, as by different active principles, whereby habits are specifically diversified, as we have said here. Thus the astronomer and the physicist demonstrate the sphericity of the earth: The first by means of mathematics, as by the shape of eclipses, the other by natural means, as by the movement of heavy bodies toward the center (of the earth), or by something else of the sort. Furthermore, the astronomer's science differs from that of the physicist (Ad. 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER HABITS ARE DIVIDED INTO GOOD AND BAD.

YES.—THE REASON is that habits are distinguished not only according to their objects and active principles, but also in relation to nature. If, therefore, habits imply an agreement with nature, they are called good; if they imply a discordancy with nature, they are called bad: Good habits are virtues, bad habits are vices. Wherefore the acts

of the virtues agree with human nature, because they are according to reason; the acts of the vices, since they are contrary to reason, are discordant with human nature.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ONE HABIT IS MADE UP OF MANY HABITS.

NO.—We are here speaking principally of operative habits.

THE REASON is that even in a multiplicity of (material) objects there is an ordination to some one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent. Hence it is that a habit is a *simple quality*, not constituted from several habits, even if it extends to many objects. Although certain virtues are called *parts* of the cardinal virtues, this is not said because they are integral parts from which the whole is (materially) constituted, but because they are subjective or potential parts, as will be explained later (q. lvii, art. 6 and 4, and II-IIae, q. xlvi).—(Ad. 2).

THE VIRTUES

We come now to a consideration of habits specifically. And, since habits, as we have said (prec. q., art. 3), are divided into good and bad, we must speak of good habits, which are virtues, and of other things connected with them, namely the gifts, beatitudes, and fruits; secondly, of bad habits, namely, the vices and sins. Regarding the virtues there are five heads of consideration: 1) The essence of virtue; 2) its subject; 3) the division of the virtues; 4) the cause of virtue; 5) certain properties of virtue. The first head takes up four articles.

QUESTION LV

THE VIRTUES WITH REGARD TO THEIR ESSENCE

ART. I.—WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A HABIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one thing, but are determined to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what has been said above (q. xlix, art. 3), and therefore the human virtues are called habits; just as the natural virtues are called active natural powers, which in themselves are determined to their acts. For virtue by its very name implies a certain perfection of power (art. 2 of this q.) [The Latin *virtus* means fundamentally manliness (from *vir*, a man); hence it came also to signify all the corporeal or mental excellences of a man, as strength and bravery].

NOTE: Virtue is used in three ways: For a habit, an act, and the object of the act. Thus faith, for example, is considered as a habit, as the act of belief and as that which is believed. But when it is said that virtue is the limit of power, the word must be taken for the object of virtue; as when a man can carry 100 pounds, and no more, his virtue (strength) is reckoned at 100 pounds (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS AN OPERATIVE HABIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that human virtue, of which we are speaking, is that which is proper to man; wherefore it is not in the body, and does not belong to the powers that are common to the body and soul, but to the powers of the soul only, which are rational. Now the soul holds the place of a form, and is a power, not in reference to being, but rather in reference to act. Wherefore human virtue, which is in the soul, implies a reference to act.—But if virtue is likened to health and beauty, which are the proper dispositions of the body, this happens because virtue itself is a kind of ordered disposition in the soul (Ad. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER HUMAN VIRTUE IS A GOOD HABIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the power of anything implies a relation to good. For virtue implies the perfection of powers, whose limit, to which it is ordered, must be good. Wherefore human power, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, and productive of good.

NOTE: Reason can be shown to be by so much the more perfect according as it is able to overcome or bear the infirmities of the body and the lower parts. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to the reason, is said to be made perfect in infirmity, not indeed the infirmity of the reason, but that of the body and the lower parts (Ad. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VIRTUE IS SUITABLY DEFINED.

YES.—Virtue is a good quality or habit of the mind, by which we live rightly, and of which no one makes bad use (and which God causes in us without us).

THE REASON is that this definition perfectly comprises the whole notion of virtue, according to all its causes. For the perfect notion of anything is gathered from all its causes.—The formal cause, which is derived from the genus and specific difference, is found in the word "quality" (genus) or in the word "habit" (the proximate genus) and in the word "good" (the specific difference).—The matter in which, or the subject of virtue (for virtue does not have a matter *out of which*, or *about which*, since we are here treating of virtue in general) is found in the word "of the mind."—The final cause is expressed by the words: "By which we live rightly;" and, to distinguish it from the things that relate sometimes to good, sometimes to evil, it is added: "Of which no one makes bad use." And the efficient cause, with regard to the infused virtues, is found in the words: "Which God causes in us without us." If this clause is omitted, the rest of the definition will be common to all the virtues, both acquired and infused.

NOTE: Virtue is called good, because by it something is good (namely the good of reason, or the good of the soul), which is to be in accord with reason (Ad. 1 and 2). The righteousness referred to in the definition implies an order to a due end and to the divine law, which is the rule of the human will, and is common to all virtue (Ad. 4)). Regarding the last member of the definition, it is to be noted that an infused virtue is caused in us by God without our agency, but not without our consenting to it. But what is done through us God causes in us but not without our agency; for He acts in every will and nature (Ad 6).

QUESTION LVI**THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE**

(In Six Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE IS A POWER OF THE SOUL.

YES.—**THE FIRST REASON** is from the very notion of virtue, for virtue implies a perfection of power; but perfection is in that which it perfects.

THE SECOND REASON is derived from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, for every operation is from the soul, by means of some power.

THE THIRD REASON is from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best, for the best is the end, which is the realization of the thing, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power.

NOTE: One accident cannot support another accident, for there is no accident of an accident; but one accident inheres to the substance by means of another accident, as color to a body by means of the surface. Wherefore surface is called the subject of color. Thus the power of the soul, which is an accident, is said to be the subject of virtue (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE IN SEVERAL POWERS.

NO.—One virtue cannot be in more than one power on an equal footing; but it may be in a certain order.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects (or by way of matter); but diversity of habits follows the special conditions of the objects (or by way of form); wherefore one virtue cannot be in two or more powers on an equal footing.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in a certain order one virtue can be chiefly in one power, and extend to other powers by a kind of diffusion or disposition (disposing to other powers), in so far as one power is moved by another, and in so far as one power receives from another. Thus prudence, which is in reason as in a subject, presupposes rightness of will as its principle (Ad 3).

NOTE: To know is a condition required for moral virtue, in so far as moral virtue acts according to right reason; but essentially moral virtue consists in the appetite (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—The intellect is the subject of virtue, though not simply but in relation to the will, which is simply the subject of virtue.

THE REASON is that habits that are in the intellect without any subordination to the will, such as science, wisdom, understanding and art, give indeed an aptness for a good act, but do not cause anyone rightly to use the aptness, and this belongs to the notion of virtue simply so called. For virtue is that by which a man is said to do good and to be good simply. Wherefore "virtue is that which makes good the one who has it and renders his act good." Now the intellectual virtues are called virtues in a particular sense, and a man who has these virtues is not called good simply, but only good in some sense, for example, a good grammarian, or a good craftsman.—But the subject of a habit that is simply called a virtue can be only the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. For a man's actually doing well follows from his having a good will. Now the intellect can be moved by the will, like the other powers. For a man actually considers by willing to do so. And thus the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. The intellect includes both the speculative intellect, or the reason, which is the subject of faith (for it is commanded by the will as regards the act of assent), and the practical intellect, which is the subject of prudence, which requires that a man be rightly disposed by rectitude of will; for prudence is "the right reason of things to be done."

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ARE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—Not considered in themselves but in so far as they are rational—i.e., participate in reason.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the irascible and concupiscible powers in themselves are parts of the sensitive appetite, and have rather the infection of the "fomes" than the good of virtue (Ad 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that they are naturally apt to obey the reason. Wherefore there must be in them a kind of habitual conformity to reason, whereby they are rightly disposed to the movement of the reason, as the instrument to the action of the craftsman.

NOTE: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul (namely by despotic command); but the irascible and concupiscible powers do not blindly obey the reason, but have their own movements, by which at times they go against reason. Wherefore the reason rules them "by political command," because they have, as it were, a will of their own (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS OF APPREHENSION ARE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE.

NO.—a) The sensitive powers of apprehension are not the subject of virtue; but b) they are the subject of a habit of use; and c) the sensitive powers of the appetite are the subject of virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done. And so virtue must be in that power which consummates the good act. But the sensitive powers of apprehension are only preparatory to intellectual knowledge. Wherefore virtue cannot be in them.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a habit by use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like a nature. Now such a habit of use is acquired by the sensitive powers of apprehension, especially the memory.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the sensitive powers of the appetite are apt by their nature to obey the rational appetite (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE WILL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE.

NOTE: We are here speaking of those virtues that are ordered to some extrinsic good.

YES.—The will is the subject of a virtue whose object exceeds the proportion of the one who wills, but not of a virtue whose object is a good proportionate to the will.

THE REASON is that a power needs a habit perfecting it for right action (or a virtue) when the proper nature of the power does not suffice for this purpose.

NOTE: Good exceeds the proportion of the one who wills, either as regards the whole human species (as the divine good, which transcends the limits of nature) or as regards the individual (such as the neighbor's good). And therefore such virtues, which order the affection of man to God, or to the neighbor, are in the will as in their subject—as charity, justice, and the like (at end of art.).

QUESTION LVII

THE VARIOUS KINDS OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

We have now to consider the various kinds of virtues: 1) The intellectual virtues, 2) the moral virtues, 3) the theological virtues. The first division claims six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT ARE VIRTUES.

Yes.—They are virtues in a certain sense, or in the first way, but not simply, or in the second way (see prec. q., art. 3).

THE REASON is that such habits cause only an aptness for good action, namely the consideration or contemplation of truth; but they do not cause us to use the power; this pertains only to the appetitive power. Wherefore, in this sense, there can be merit in the use of these speculative virtues, if they be done out of charity. Thus Gregory says that "the contemplative life has greater merit than the active life" (*Moralia*, Bk. vi, chap. 18).

NOTE: Those habits are called operative in so far as they are ordained to the interior act of the intellect (Ad 1), whose highest object is God, who is the supreme object of contemplation (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE ONLY THREE HABITS OF THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT, VIZ., WISDOM, SCIENCE, AND UNDERSTANDING.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of the intellect, which is truth, can be either self-evident, and about this it requires the habit of principles, which is called understanding; or it is such as is attained by the reason's inquiry; and this again can be in two ways: First, so that it is the ultimate term (of inquiry or conclusion) in respect of all human knowledge; and about this is the habit of wisdom, which considers the highest causes and therefore judges concerning everything (even self-evident principles); second in regard to what is ultimate with regard to some genus of truths; and about this is science. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter there are different habits of scientific knowledge, whereas there is only one kind of wisdom.

NOTE: 1—These three virtues (wisdom, understanding, and science) are not considered as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same thing is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive more perfect than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree; and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science and of the principles on which they are based (Ad 2).

2.—A virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is in no wise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore only those habits are called intellectual virtues whereby we always tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood; and therefore they are not intellectual virtues (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL HABIT OF ART IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—In the same way in which the speculative habits are virtues, i.e., not simply but in a certain sense.

THE REASON is that art, like the other speculative habits, does not make a work good with regard to use, for the will is necessary for this. But it makes a work good only as regards the aptness to work well. For art is right reason about certain works to be

made.—In this sense, therefore, art is called virtue of a virtue, in so far as it is moved to use by some moral virtue; for it is manifest that the artist is inclined by justice, which makes the will right, to make a faithful work (Ad 1 and 2).

NOTE.—The speculative habits, in so far as they are ordained to works of reason, for example, to the construction of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the works of counting or measuring, are also called arts by a kind of comparison. These are called liberal arts, because they depend on the soul, which is free (liberal), in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul. On the other hand, those sciences that are not ordained to any such work are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor does it follow, if the liberal arts are more excellent, that the notion of art is more applicable to them (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ART.

YES.—THE REASON is that art, as we said in the previous article, creates only an aptitude for a good work, but does not regard the appetite, for art is the right reason of things to be made. Prudence, on the contrary not only creates the aptitude for a good work, but also the use of the good work, for prudence regards the appetite as presupposing the rectitude of the appetite. Wherefore prudence is called the right reason of things to be done.

“Making is an act that passes into exterior matter.” Examples are building, sawing, etc. “Acting is an act remaining in the agent himself.” Examples are seeing, willing, and the like.

Prudence accordingly, since it is the right reason of those acts that are done and remain in the agent, requires that man be well disposed regarding an end. This is the result of a right desire. Wherefore prudence is a moral virtue. But the good of the products of art is not the good of the human appetite, but the good of these works of art themselves. Wherefore art does not suppose a right appetite. Hence, if the craftsman is willingly at fault he is praised as an artist, whereas the prudent man is more praised if he is unwillingly at fault.

NOTE: Art has something in common with both the speculative habits and with prudence. Yet it has more in common with prudence as regards its subject and matter. For both art and prudence are in the thinking part of the soul, and are about things that may be otherwise than they are. But art has more in common with the speculative habits than has prudence, if we consider art and prudence as virtues, for art creates only the aptitude for a good work, as do the other speculative virtues (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE NECESSARY TO MAN.

YES.—It is necessary to lead a good life—in fact most necessary.

THE REASON is that prudence is an intellectual virtue by which reason is well ordered to the means to an end. Now a good life consists in doing things well. Now doing things well requires that the action be good and the mode of acting appropriate. This will be true if the action is ordered to a right end through appropriate means. The right end results from a right appetite (will); the means are chosen by reason. Now the habit whereby the reason chooses proper means to attain a right end is prudence. This is especially necessary for good action, i.e., to lead a good life (body of art).—For prudence is the right reason of human acts (prec. art., ad 1).

NOTE: Prudence and art are virtues of the practical intellect, for they are assigned only with regard to contingent things—art with regard to things to be made, prudence with regard to things to be done.

In the speculative intellect, however, only those intellectual virtues are assigned that are about necessary things (wisdom, understanding, and science). The truth of the speculative intellect depends on the conformity of the intellect to the object. The truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity to a right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, but only in contingent matters (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER EUBULIA, SYNESIS, AND GNOME ARE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that command, which is the principal act of prudence, and is an act of the practical intellect, supposes counsel and judgment, which are acts

of the speculative intellect. Eubulia is a virtue that perfects good counsel, and synesis and gnome are parts of prudence in relation to judgment. Synesis judges of things do be done according to the common law; gnome, of things to be done according to the natural law in matters in which the common law is insufficient (Ad 3).—More will be said on these virtues in II-IIae, quest. li, art. 4).

QUESTION LVIII

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

We have now to consider the moral virtues: 1) How they are distinguished from the intellectual virtues; 2) how distinguished from one another according to their proper matter; 3) how the principal or cardinal virtues are distinguished from the others. The first part has five articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY VIRTUE IS A MORAL VIRTUE.

NO.—THE REASON is that moral is derived from *mos*, *moris*, according to which *mos* signifies some natural or quasi-natural inclination to some action. Now an inclination to action properly belongs to the appetitive power (q. ix, art. 1). And therefore not every virtue is called moral, but only that which is in the appetitive power.

NOTE: Sometimes *mos* signifies custom, but then it is reduced to the first meaning, for custom becomes a second nature and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. According to this natural inclination (or by an infusion of the grace of the Holy Spirit) the Holy Doctor interprets these words of Psalm lxvii: "Who maketh men of one manner (*moris*) to dwell in a house."

ART. II.—WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE DIFFERS FROM INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that moral virtues perfect the appetitive power, whereas the intellectual virtues perfect the reason. Therefore, just as the appetite is distinguished from reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from intellect. But, just as the appetite is the principal of the human act in so far as it participates in some degree in reason, so a moral habit has the character of human virtue, in so far as it is conformed to reason.—But besides intellectual virtue moral virtue is necessary, because reason does not command the appetitive power by despotic authority, as the soul rules the body, but by political authority, whereby a man rules free men, who have in some degree a right to contradict.

NOTE: In the definition of virtue, the words "right reason" are not assigned as an essential part of virtue, but as something participated in all the moral virtues, in so far as prudence (which is "the right reason of things to be done") directs all the moral virtues (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER VIRTUE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL.

YES.—AS REGARDS HUMAN VIRTUE.

THE REASON is that the principle of human acts, about which virtue is a habit perfective of good action, is twofold, the intellect (whether speculative or practical) and the will.

NOTE: 1.—Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: For it is right reason about things to be done (Ad 1).

2.—Continence in pleasures and perseverance amid sadness (as also patience) are not virtues, but something less than virtue; for they do not perfect the sensitive power of the appetite. This is evident from the fact that in the continent and persevering man inordinate passions abound. This would not be so, if the sensitive appetite were perfect whenever any habit conforms to reason (Ad 2).

3.—Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues, for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL WITHOUT INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE.

NO.—Moral virtue cannot exist without understanding and prudence.

THE REASON is that moral virtue is an elective habit, i.e., one that makes a good choice. Now for a good choice a due intention of the end is required, and that man rightly accept the means. Now this cannot be done without an understanding of principles that are naturally known, and without prudence, which is "right reason about things to be done." Yet this can, however exist without wisdom, science, and art.

Hence in the virtuous man it is not necessary that there be the use of reason with regard to everything, but only with regard to things that are to be done according to virtue. Wherefore even those people who seem simple, because they lack worldly wisdom, can be prudent, according to Matth. x, 16:" "Be ye therefore prudent as serpents and as simple as doves" (Ad 2).

NOTE: For good action a natural inclination to good is not enough, but a judgment of the reason is also required. In fact, the stronger this natural inclination to good is, the more dangerous it will be unless right reason is joined with it, just as a running horse, if it is blind, will fall so much the harder and will hurt itself so much the more, the faster it runs (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE INTELLECTUAL WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE.

NO.—Prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, cannot exist without moral virtue; but the other intellectual virtues can exist.

THE REASON is that prudence is "right reason about things to be done," not only in general but also in particular, in which actions judgment consists. Now actions are perfected by the moral virtues, according to which right judgment about an end becomes in some manner connatural to man (body of art.). Hence prudence cannot help us to be of good counsel or to judge and command aright, unless by moral virtue an impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed (Ad 3).

QUESTION LIX

MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS

Here we consider the distinctions among the moral virtues. And, because the moral virtues, which are about passions, are distinguished according to the difference in passions, we must first consider the relation of virtue to passion in general; secondly, the distinction of moral virtues according to passions. The first point requires five articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER MORAL VIRTUE IS A PASSION.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite (q. xxii, art. 3); but moral virtue is not a movement, but a principle of appetitive movement, an existing habit.

THE SECOND REASON is that the passions of themselves are not characterized by good or evil. For the good or evil of man is according to his reason. But virtues are disposed only to good (q. lv, art. 3).

THE THIRD REASON is that the movement of passion (granted that some passion is disposed only to good or only to evil) always has its beginning in the appetite and ends in the reason. Contrariwise, the movement of virtue always begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as it is moved by the reason.

NOTE: In its essence moral virtue is not a mean between passions, but in its effect, because it establishes the mean between passions (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITH PASSION.

YES.—In so far as by passions are meant certain movements of the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that the passions, as such, can be regulated by reason; and as such they are in a virtuous man.—The Stoics did not distinguish between the sensitive appetite and the intellectual appetite; accordingly they said that passions are inordinate affections, which as all admit, cannot be in a virtuous man after deliberation.

NOTE: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on

the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as though being commanded by reason, it helps toward the execution of reason's command (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER SORROW IS COMPATIBLE WITH MORAL VIRTUE.

YES.—Moral virtue can, and in fact must, be compatible with moderate sorrow in regard to things that in any way are opposed to virtue.

THE REASON is that some evil can be present in a virtuous man, which evil the reason detests. Wherefore the sensitive appetite in this follows the detestation of the reason, because it is saddened by this evil, but in a moderate manner, according to reason's judgment.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE ABOUT THE PASSIONS.

NO.—Not every moral virtue is about the passions; some are about operation.

THE REASON is that reason orders through moral virtue not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellectual, which appetite is the will, which is not the subject of passion (q. xxii, art. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORAL VIRTUE WITHOUT PASSION.

NO.—The moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, can be without passions; the other virtues, which are about operations, can be without passions.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it pertains to virtue that the things that are subject to reason should not be idle in the exercise of their own acts, but that they should execute the command of reason by performing their own acts.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that virtues that are about operations only, such as justice, by which the will is applied to its own act, are not a passion.—Yet joy at the performance of justice, which is in the soul, can cause the joy of passion by way of overflow; for the lower powers follow the movement of the higher (q. xvii, art. 7, and q. xxiv, art. 3).

QUESTION LX

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER (In Five Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE.

NO.—THE REASON is that in the moral order, where reason is as the one who commands and moves, and the appetitive power as the one commanded and moved, the appetite does not receive the direction of the reason univocally, as it were, because it is not rational by essence but by participation. Wherefore the objects of the appetite are constituted by the movement of the reason in various species, according to the various relations they bear to the reason.

NOTE: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is only one kind of truth. Therefore there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.—On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, which is the directing power (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT OPERATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THAT ARE ABOUT PASSIONS.

YES.—In so far as operations and passions are compared to the moral virtues, not as their effects, but as the matter about which they are exercised.

THE REASON is that good and evil in certain operations are taken from the very nature of these operations, no matter how a man may be affected toward them, in so far, namely as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate to something else; and the directive power of such operations is justice and its parts.—But in some operations good and evil depend only on their being commensurate with the agent, and the directive virtues in such operations are principally about the interior affections, or passions, of the soul; for in these good and evil can be considered

in so far as man is well or badly affected in regard to them.—In so far as the operations and passions are effects of virtue, the moral virtues are not distinguished, because every virtue is productive of some good operations, and some delight or sadness (q. lix, art. 4, ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE MORAL VIRTUE ABOUT OPERATIONS.

NO.—The moral virtues which are about operations (relative to another) agree in some general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another; but they are distinguished into different special notions of justice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in exterior operations (that is, with reference to another), the order of justice is established, not according to how man is affected by them, but according to the becomingness of the thing in itself; from this becomingness we derive the notion of something due, which is the formal aspect of justice. For it belongs to justice that one render a debt. Wherefore all such virtues, which are about operations, have in some form the aspect of justice.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues; and according to the different kinds of debt different virtues are taken. For example, religion, by which we render our debt to God; piety, by which we render our debt to parents or our country; and gratitude, by which we render our debt to our benefactors, and so with the rest.

NOTE: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is a debt in its perfect sense, which can be paid in the equivalent. But by extension the name of justice is applied also to all cases in which something due is rendered. In this sense it is not as a special virtue (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE ARE DIFFERENT MORAL VIRTUES ABOUT DIFFERENT PASSIONS.

YES.—a) About different passions generally speaking there are different moral virtues; b) about contrary passions there is the same virtue; c) about the passions that are ordained to one another, i.e., those that follow from one another in a certain order (as is true in the concupiscible passions), there is the same moral virtue; d) about the passions that are not of one order there are different powers, for example, about the irascible passions.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the passions generally speaking belong to different powers, therefore also to different virtues.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that moral virtue consists in some mean; now the mean in contrary passions is established according to the same notion, as in natural order there is the same mean in things that are opposed to each other.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the movements of the passions that follow from one another according to a certain order are ordered to the same thing, namely to acquire a good, or to avoid an evil; as from love proceeds desire, and from desire we proceed to pleasure; or, on the other hand, we proceed from hatred to aversion, which leads to sadness. There is one virtue about love, desire, and pleasure: This is temperance, which is also about opposite passions.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that the passions that are not of the same order are, of course, ordered to different things. Thus daring and fear are ordered to some great danger, and they have as their object fortitude; hope and despair are ordered to some difficult good, and they have as their object magnanimity; anger is ordered to overcome something contrary, which has done harm, and with respect to this is meekness.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS OBJECTS OF THE PASSIONS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the objects of the passions imply a relation to reason. Accordingly, according to the different ways in which the objects of the passions relate to reason they cause different species of virtues; for the perfection of a moral virtue depends on reason.—In so far, however, as the objects of the passions are ordained in different ways to the sensitive appetite, they cause different species of passions.

NOTE: The objects of the passions affect reason and the sensitive appetite in different ways. For a diversity of objects can cause a diversity of passions without caus-

ing a diversity of virtues (prec. art.); and contrariwise a diversity of the objects of the passions can cause a diversity of virtues without causing a diversity of passions, for example, pleasure, which is one passion about which different virtues are directed. Yet the difference of the objects of the passions always causes a specific difference of the virtues, inasmuch as this difference corresponds to a difference of powers—for instance, the difference between that which is good absolutely and that which is good and difficult to obtain.

2.—According to Aristotle there are 10 moral virtues concerned with passions, or diversified by the objects of the passions: "Fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimia (love of honor), gentleness, friendship (i.e., affability), truth, and *eutrapelia* (pleasant association, or "moderate recreation")—(body of art). These will be later discussed in II-IIae.

QUESTION LXI THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED CARDINAL OR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES.

YES.—Among the moral virtues some are assigned, which are called principal or cardinal.

THE REASON is that the cardinal virtues have the perfect character of virtue, i.e., rectitude of the appetite. For such a virtue not only produces an aptitude for right conduct, but also causes the very exercise of good action.—Prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, is also a moral virtue in its matter, as appears from what has been stated above (q. lviii, art. 4).

NOTE: Intellectual virtues other than prudence, although they rank before the moral virtues in point of their subject, do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES.

YES.—a) By reason of the formal principle of virtue, which is the good of reason; and b) according to the subjects, which are four.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the good of reason can be considered a) in so far as it consists in the very act of reason, and thus there is one principal virtue, which is called prudence; b) in so far as reason introduces order into anything; and this is either about operations, and then we have *justice*; or about passions, and thus we need two virtues, in so far as *passion* impels us to do something contrary to reason, and then *temperance* is called for; or in so far as it withdraws us from that which reason dictates, and this is the proper object of *fortitude*.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the subject of moral virtue is four-fold, namely the power that is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by prudence; and the power that is rational by participation, which is divided into the will, which is the subject of *justice*, and into the concupiscible part, which is the subject of *temperance*; and into the irascible part, which is the subject of *fortitude*.

NOTE: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus (Ad 1).—The other virtues are reducible to the four named, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY OTHER VIRTUES SHOULD BE CALLED PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN THESE.

NO.—Only the four moral virtues, namely justice, prudence, temperance and fortitude, are cardinal, and these outranking all the others: a) Both on account of their being more general than the others, b) and on account of their being more eminent in their matter.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that these four virtues are according to the four formal reasons of all the virtues, for every virtue that does the good in the act of reason's consideration can be called prudence; every virtue that does the good of what is due and right in operations can be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions can be called temperance; and every virtue that causes firmness of soul against all the passions can be called fortitude.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that these virtues are denominated from that which is principal in each matter of virtue. For example, prudence, which is preceptive; justice, which is about actions that are due between equals; temperance, which restrains the desires of the delights of touch; and fortitude, which strengthens one against the dangers of death.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER.

YES.—a) Not in so far as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul; but in so far as they are determined with regard to special matters.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as such, general conditions are found in all the virtues: Thus prudence is nothing else than a certain rectitude of discretion in any act or matter; and so with the rest. Viewed in this light, prudence would be a virtue distinct from the other three, because it is also an intellectual virtue; but the other three would not be virtues distinct from one another.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus each of the cardinal virtues is determined to one matter, in which that general condition from which the name of virtue is received is chiefly praised; and thus these virtues are distinct habits differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE CARDINAL VIRTUES ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SOCIAL, PERFECTING, PERFECT, AND EXEMPLAR VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that these virtues can be considered a) in so far as they are in God as exemplars, in so far, namely, as the divine mind itself that is in God is called prudence; temperance is the turning of the divine intention on itself; the fortitude of God is His immutability; and the justice of God is the observance of the eternal law in His works.—b) In so far as man is rightly ordered by these virtues in conducting human affairs; and thus they are called social virtues.—c) In so far as man tends by these virtues to God, so that because of prudence he despises all worldly things, in contemplation of the divine, and directs the whole thought of his soul to divine things alone; and so with the other virtues, which are called perfecting.—d) In so far as these virtues already attain to the divine similitude, and belong already to the perfect soul, so that prudence contemplates only divine things, temperance knows nothing of earthly desires, fortitude is blind to the passions, and justice is leagued in everlasting covenant with the divine mind, by imitating it. These virtues we say belong to the blessed or to those who are most perfect in this life.

QUESTION LXII

THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE ARE ANY THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that perfect happiness, to which man is intended (q. iii, art. 1), in so far as through Christ we are made "partakers of the divine nature" (II Pet. i, 4), exceeds the proportion of human nature; wherefore God must add to man certain principles by which he is thus directed to supernatural happiness, as by natural principles he is directed to his connatural end; and such principles are called theological virtues. They are called theological for three reasons: a) Because they have God for their object, in so far as by them we are rightly directed to God; b) because they are infused in us by God alone; c) because they are transmitted to us only by divine revelation.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES ARE DISTINCT FROM THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, who is the last end of all things, in so far as He exceeds the knowledge of our reason. But the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something that can be comprehended by human reason. Furthermore, habits are distinguished specifically according to the formal difference of their objects.

ART. III.—WHETHER FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY ARE FITTINGLY RECKONED AS THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as by natural inclination man is directed to the end connatural to him, so by the theological virtues he is directed to supernatural happiness. Now man is directed to the end connatural to himself by universal principles naturally made known to him by the light of the intellect, and by the inclination of the will naturally tending to the good of reason. But these are insufficient in relation to his supernatural end. Wherefore it is necessary that there be supernaturally added to man: a) Certain supernatural principles, which are understood by the divine light. These principles are the articles of faith, about which is *faith*.—b) That the will be directed to that end both as to the movement of intention, as to that which is possible to attain, and this pertains to *hope*; and c) as to a certain spiritual union, by which we are in some way transformed into that end, and this is the work of *charity*.

ART. IV.—WHETHER FAITH PRECEDES HOPE, AND HOPE, CHARITY.

YES.—In order of generation and in reference to act; but not in the order of perfection.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that by faith the intellect apprehends that which it loves and hopes for. Wherefore the act of faith precedes; but the habits are infused simultaneously. Likewise, with respect to hope, because from the very fact that man hopes for something, he proceeds to love it.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that both faith and hope are formed by charity, and acquire the perfection of virtue (as will be explained later: II-IIae, q. xxiii, art. 7 and 8).

NOTE: Hope, as regards its principal object, namely the good that is hoped for, does not precede love, but love precedes hope; for no good is ever hoped for unless it is desired and loved; but with regard to the one from whom one hopes that he can obtain the good, hope precedes love, although afterwards hope is increased by love itself. From the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him, and from the fact that he loves him he then hopes all the more in him. (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXIII THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER VIRTUE IS IN US BY NATURE.

NO.—Both the intellectual and the moral virtues are naturally in us according to aptitude and the tendency of origin only: a) Both by reason of species, which is from the soul, or also from by the body in so far as it is determined with reference to some particular soul; b) and by reason of the individual; but c) they are not in us in their perfect form.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in man's reason there are by nature certain principles naturally known, both of things to be known and of things to be done. These are the nurseries of the intellectual and moral virtues, in so far as there is in the will a certain natural appetite for good, and this is according to reason.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that according to the disposition of the body some men are disposed either better or worse to certain virtues, in so far, namely, as certain sensitive powers are act of certain parts of the body, by the disposition of which such powers are either helped or hindered in their acts, and consequently there are rational powers which such sensitive powers serve; and in this way one man has a natural aptitude to science, another to fortitude, another to temperance.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that nature is determined to one thing. But the perfection of these virtues is not according to mode of action, but differs in different ways according to different matters in which the virtues operate, and according to different circumstances.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANY VIRTUE IS CAUSED IN US BY PRACTICE.

YES.—a) The virtue of man that is directed to a good that is fixed by the

rule of human reason can be caused by human acts; but b) the virtue that directs man to a good that is fixed by divine law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, but only by the working of God within us.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such acts proceed from reason, by which power and rule such a good is established.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the principle of such acts is not reason, and such a good, which is fixed by divine law, is under the divine rule and power; wherefore Augustine defines such a virtue as "that which God causes in us without us."—Wherefore the virtues humanly acquired can be in man without grace, or in one in mortal sin, but not the infused virtues, especially if they are considered in their perfection (Ad 1). Moreover it is not an act, but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY MORAL VIRTUES ARE IN US BY INFUSION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the theological virtues, by which we are ordained to a supernatural end, are in the place of those natural principles from which all the virtues, both intellectual and moral, proceed that are acquired by our acts. It follows accordingly that, just as the acquired virtues stand to natural principles, so also the other divinely caused habits in us correspond to the theological virtues. For the effect must be proportionate to its causes and principles.

NOTE: The virtues acquired by us are not proportionate to the theological virtues; and therefore the others that are proportionate to them must be caused immediately by God (Ad 1). Likewise, the theological virtues sufficiently order us to our supernatural end inchoatively, i.e., to God Himself immediately, but the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VIRTUE ACQUIRED BY PRACTICE BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS INFUSED VIRTUES.

NO.—b) Both on account of the formal difference of their objects; b) and on account of that to which the virtues are ordained.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the movement that is imposed by the rule of human reason in the matter of virtue is of a different order than the movement that is imposed by the divine rule with respect to the same matter. Thus, for example, in the taking of food the measure fixed by acquired temperance is that the amount taken should not injure the body's health; but according to the rule of the divine law it is required that "man chastise his body and bring it into subjection" (I Cor., ix, 27), which is done by infused temperance.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the moral infused virtues men are well ordered to being "fellow citizens with the saints and of the household of God" (Eph. ii, 19). By the other acquired virtues man behaves well in respect to human affairs.

QUESTION LXIV

THE MEAN OF THE VIRTUES

WE HERE CONSIDER the properties of the virtues: 1) The mean of the virtues 2) the connection of the virtues; 3) their equality; 4) their duration. With respect to the first, four questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER MORAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the good of moral virtue consists in an equality (of movement with respect to the passions) according to the measure of reason. Discordance from this measure comes either when man exceeds it or falls short of it. Wherefore it is manifest that moral virtue consists in a mean: i.e., observes a mean between excess and defect in the measure of reason.

NOTE: With regard to magnificance and magnanimity, if they are considered according to absolute quantity, they observe an extreme and maximum; but if they are considered by comparison with circumstances, they have the character of a mean, so that they are where they should be and when they should be, and for what reason

they should be (Ad 2). The same thing is to be said also of virginity and the vow of poverty (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MEAN OF MORAL VIRTUE IS THE REAL MEAN OR THE RATIONAL MEAN.

ANSWER: IT IS THE RATIONAL MEAN: a) Not in so far as the mean exists in the act itself of reason; but b) in so far as it that which reason places in some matter:

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that moral virtue does not perfect the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power; and thus the mean of moral power is not the mean of reason.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as was said (prec. art), moral virtue is said to consist in a mean through conformity with right reason.

NOTE: The mean of the virtue of justice, in so far, namely, as justice gives to each what is his due, no more and no less, is the same as the real mean, because justice is about operations that consist in external things, in which right must be established simply and in itself. But the rational mean of the other moral virtues is not the real mean, because the other virtues are about passions in respect to which men are variously constituted. And thus the rectitude of reason in the passions is established in respect to us, who are affected by the passions (body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES OBSERVE THE MEAN.

YES.—Both intellectual virtues, the speculative and the practical, inasmuch as the true has the nature of that which is measured by things, have a real mean; the practical intellectual virtues, in so far as they have conformity with a right appetite, have a rational mean.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the good (which is the true) of intellectual virtue, whether speculative or practical, consists in a certain mean by way of conformity with the thing itself, insofar as it says that that is which is, or that that is not which is not.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the truth of the practical intellectual virtue with respect to the appetite has the character of a rule and measure. Wherefore prudence, which is a practical intellectual virtue, has a rational mean with respect to a right appetite, as do the other moral virtues—but with this difference, that the rational mean of prudence is as that which regulates and measures; the rational mean of other moral virtues is as that which is regulated and measured.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES CONSIST IN A MEAN.

NO.—Properly speaking, or if the measure of a theological virtue is taken according to the nature of theological virtue, it does not consist in a mean; accidentally, however, or if the measure is taken from our side, the theological virtues can be considered as having a mean and extreme.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus the rule and measure of a theological virtue is God Himself; for our faith is regulated according to divine truth; charity, according to the divine goodness; and hope according to the immensity of God's omnipotence and loving; and this is a measure exceeding every human faculty; and in this respect one is better the more nearly one approaches to the Infinite by believing, hoping, and loving.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although we can never tend to God as much as we ought, we ought nonetheless tend to Him by believing in, hoping for, and loving Him according to the measure of our condition. For in this way it can happen that we can exceed or fall short of the rule and measure. Thus, for example, hope, on our part, is a mean between presumption and despair, in so far, namely as anyone is said to presume by hoping for God a good that exceeds his condition; or to despair, because he does not hope for that for which according to his condition he can hope. But as concerns God there can be no superabundance of hope, for His goodness is infinite (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXV THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER.

YES.—a) The perfect moral virtues, i.e., those that incline one to do a good action, are connected with one another, whether they are taken according to the general conditions of the virtues (q. lxi, art. 3 and 4) or they are considered according to their matters.—b) The imperfect moral virtues, which are nothing else than inclinations in us either from nature or from practice to do some good work, are not connected.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, according to the general conditions of the moral virtues, as Augustine and Gregory say, each virtue must, if it is perfect, have discretion, which belongs to prudence; rectitude, which belongs to justice, moderation, which belongs to temperance; and strength of mind, which belongs to fortitude.

If however they are considered according to their matters, as Aristotle holds, all the moral virtues are connected in prudence, because it is proper to a moral virtue to make a right choice, for a moral virtue is a habit of choice. Now for right choice it is not enough to have an inclination to a due end, for this is the direct outcome of the habit of moral virtue, but also that one directly choose what is conducive to the end, and this is done through prudence, which leads to good counsel and judgment and which commands the proper means.—Similarly prudence cannot exist without the other moral virtues, for prudence is right reason about things to be done. Now the ends of things to be done are as it were the principles of prudence. And one is rightly disposed to the ends of things to be done by the moral virtues.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as we have seen, a man may be by natural temperament or custom prompt to works of liberality, for example, but not prompt to works of chastity.

NOTE: 1.—He who acquires a virtue can acquire other virtues by practice or exercise; and in this way he can be said to have the other virtues. For we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to Aristotle, *Physics* II, 56: "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." (Ad 1).

2.—The intellectual virtues are not interconnected, because they are about different matters, not directed to one another, as is evident in the different sciences and arts. Yet they all have relation to first principles, and in this way all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles, as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as has been said (in the answer of the first).—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY.

NO.—The infused moral virtues, i.e., in so far as they do good in relation to the ultimate supernatural end, and consequently cannot be acquired by human acts, cannot be without charity.

THE REASON is that if prudence (not infused), cannot be without the other moral virtues, in so far as such virtues make one behave well with regard to the ends of things to be done, from which the notion of prudence proceeds (prev. art.), much more can infused prudence not exist without charity, by which man is simply well disposed with regard to the last end. But the other moral virtues cannot exist without prudence; consequently neither without charity.

NOTE: It is plain from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and to be called virtues simply; because they order man well to the last end simply; the other virtues (namely those that are acquired) are virtues in some respect, but not simply. For they order man well with respect to the last end in any genus, but not with respect to the last end simply. And thus are interpreted the words of Romans xiv, 23: "All that is not of faith is sin," i.e., does not have the nature of a perfect virtue simply (body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT MORAL VIRTUE.

NO.—All the moral virtues are infused simultaneously with charity.

THE REASON is that God operates in the works of grace no less than in the works of nature. Now in the works of nature we find that whenever anything has the

principle of any works in itself we find also the things that are necessary to perform those works.

Now charity, in so far as it ordains man to his last end, is the principle of all good works that can be ordered to the last end. Wherefore it follows that all the moral virtues must be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.

NOTE: 1.—It is clear from what has been said that the moral virtues not only have a connection with one another on account of prudence but also on account of charity; and that he who loses charity through mortal sin loses all the infused moral virtues (at end of art.).

2. The habits of the infused moral virtues sometimes experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain contrary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue; because the repeated acts by which they are acquired remove also the contrary dispositions (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER FAITH AND HOPE CAN BE WITHOUT CHARITY.

YES.—Not according to the perfection of virtue, but in a certain inchoate state.

THE REASON is that it belongs to the notion of virtue that we not only do some good according to virtue, but also that we do it well. Now faith without charity cannot *will* to assent to what it ought; for the will is perfected by charity. "For every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love" (Augustine, *City of God*, xiv, 9).—Similarly with hope, hope cannot hope without charity for future happiness from its own present merits, because such merits are not had without charity. Charity hopes for this happiness from the merits that one proposes to acquire in the future, but this hope is not perfect.

ART. V.—WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE WITHOUT FAITH AND HOPE.

NO.—THE REASON is that one cannot have friendship for God, which is charity, unless one believes in such a fellowship and converse with God, and hopes to attain to this friendship.

NOTE: 1.—Charity is not any love of God, but the love of God whereby He is loved as the object of happiness to which we are directed by faith and hope (Ad 1).

2.—Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (q. lxii. art. 4), and thus charity cannot exist without them (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXVI EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE VIRTUE CAN BE GREATER OR LESS THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—a) Either in virtues specifically different or in virtue of the same species; and this in two ways: b) Either in reference to the virtue itself; c) or on the part of the subject participating in the virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the cause and root of human good (which is the object of virtue) is reason. Accordingly, the greater a virtue is the nearer will it come to the cause (or reason). Hence prudence, which perfects reason, outranks in goodness the other moral virtues. Justice, which is in the will, outranks fortitude, which is in the irascible appetite; and fortitude outranks the concupiscible part, which has a smaller share of reason.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the greatness or smallness of virtue, considered in itself, depends on that to which it extends.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that to attain the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either because of greater habituation, or because of a better disposition of nature, or because of a keener judgment of reason, or also because of a greater gift of grace, which is given to everyone "according to the measure of the giving of Christ" (Ephes. iv, 7).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES EXISTING TOGETHER IN THE SAME MAN ARE EQUAL.

YES.—a) We are not speaking of the virtues according to their inchoate state or inclinations; but b) of the perfect virtues according to the participation of the subject; and in this way all the virtues of one man are equal by a kind of equality of proportion, in so far as they all grow equally in man, like the fingers of the hand.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, with regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, namely the very inclination to the act of virtue, the one man can be more ready to do an act of one virtue than to do an act of another, and this may be due either to nature, to habit, or also to a gift of grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the moral virtues are connected, and become more intense or remiss together. If the connection among the virtues is understood according to the four general conditions of the virtues, thus it is plain that each virtue has all these conditions equally. But if we consider the connection of each virtue with respect to a determinate matter, the nature of the equality is considered on the part of prudence with regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues, for example, with regard to the ordinance of reason, for, as long as reason is equally perfect in one and the same person, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of the virtues.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ARE BETTER THAN THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

NO.—Simply speaking, i.e., according to the proper nature of the species or object—for this is to speak simply of anything—the intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are nobler than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite; but in relation to act the moral virtue is nobler and has more of the nature of virtue than has the intellectual virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the object of reason, since it is the universal, is nobler than the object of the appetite, which is the particular.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that moral virtue perfects the appetite, whose function is to move the other powers to act. And, since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtues.

ART. IV.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS THE CHIEF OF THE MORAL VIRTUES.

YES.—Simply speaking, and excepting prudence, which is an intellectual virtue concerned with the moral order.

THE REASON is that justice is nearer to reason, both because it inheres in the will as subject—but temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite—and because it is concerned with the operations whereby man is set right, not only in himself, but also in regard to others; wherefore “justice is the most excellent of virtues” (Aristotle, *Ethics*, v, c. 1).—Among the other virtues, fortitude is nobler than temperance, because fortitude subjects to reason the appetitive movement in matters that pertain to life and death, whereas temperance subjects to reason the appetitive movement in matters directly related to life in the one individual, or in the one species, viz., in matters of food or sex.

Relatively, however, one virtue is said to be greater in so far as it provides the support or ornament for a principal virtue (body of article). Thus patience, which has a perfect work, namely in the bearing of evils, is in this respect more perfect and greater than justice (Ad 2); and magnanimity, which is compared to the other virtues as their ornament, is relatively greater than all the others (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER WISDOM IS THE GREATEST OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues, because it considers the ultimate cause, which is God, through which wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues and is as it were the architect of them all.

Prudence stands in the position of the servant of wisdom; for it commands the

things that are directed to wisdom, viz., how men are to obtain wisdom; it leads to wisdom by preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king (Ad 1).

Likewise prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness; but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, which is the Supreme Intelligible (Ad 2).

2. Wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, cannot be perfectly acquired by man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession; this belongs to God alone. And yet this little knowledge about God, which we can have through wisdom, is preferable to all other knowledge (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHARITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the other theological virtues imply a certain distance from the object, although the object of these three virtues is the same. For faith is of things not seen, and hope is of things not possessed, but the love of charity is of that which is already possessed; for the object loved is in a manner in the lover, and also the lover is drawn by desire to union with the one loved, for which reason it is said in I John iv, 16: "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him."

NOTE: Faith and hope are the disposing, not the efficient, causes of charity. Now a cause that is nobler than its effect is not a disposing cause, as is evident; it is the perfecting cause (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXVII THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE.

YES.—a) Not with regard to the material element of the virtues, but b) with regard to their formal element.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part of the passions or operations according to a certain mode, which is fixed by reason. This material element does not remain after this life, where there is neither concupiscence nor fear, nor any other of the passions that imply imperfection; neither is there the communication and distribution of goods.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the formal element in all the virtues is the order itself of reason, which always remains in the other life, where reason will be perfectly right. Thus there will be prudence without any danger of error; fortitude without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance without the rebellion of the desires. Prudence will neither prefer nor equate any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most firmly; temperance will delight in Him who knows no imperfection (Augustine *On the Trinity*, xiv, 9). As to justice, its act will be to be subject to God, for even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice.

NOTE: Before the resurrection of the body the irrational parts (which are in the irascible and concupiscible appetites) will not be in the soul actually, but only radically, in its essence (I P., q. lxxvii, art. 8); wherefore neither will the corresponding virtues exist actually, but only radically.

After the resurrection, the irrational powers in the bodily organs will be in the bodily organs, just as they are now. Hence fortitude will be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, both being perfectly disposed to obey reason. Justice, however, will remain both by reason of the subject, because the will is incorruptible, and also on account of the tendency of its act, viz., to subjection to a superior; hence justice is said to be "perpetual and immortal" (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES REMAIN AFTER THIS LIFE.

YES.—The intellectual virtues remain after this life as regards the intelligible species, which are in the passive intellect.

THE REASON is that the intelligible species are received in the passive intellect immovably according to the mode of their container; wherefore the passive intellect is also called "the receptacle of the species," as preserving the intelligible species.—But as to phantasms, which are sense images, these are destroyed when the body that supports the senses is destroyed.

NOTE: 1.—The species are as it were the formal element of the intellectual virtues; The phantasms are in the position of the material element. Therefore the intellectual virtues remain after this life as regards that which is formal in them, but not as regards that which is material, as was said concerning the moral virtues (art. preced. art.).

2. The separated soul has after death a different mode of understanding than by turning to phantasms, as was said (P. I. q. xxxix, art. 1), and thus science remains; but it does not remain as regards the same mode of operation, as we have stated concerning the moral virtues (prec. art.).—(Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER FAITH REMAINS AFTER THIS LIFE.

NO.—Neither by reason of faith itself nor by reason of its subject.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the imperfection of faith, in so far as faith is "the evidence of things not seen" (Hebr. xi, 1), is of its very essence, and consequently belongs to its species. Hence when this imperfection is taken away by the clarity of vision faith loses the very thing that specifies it. Hence the identical faith cannot remain.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that faith is in its nature an imperfection on the part of the subject, so that the believer does not see that which he believes; but beatitude has by its very nature a perfection on the part of the subject, so that the blessed one sees that by which he is beatified. Wherefore it is manifest that it is impossible for faith to coexist with beatitude in the same subject.

NOTE: Faith stands midway between science and opinion. For it goes beyond opinion in that it has a firm adherence, but it falls short of science in that it does not have vision (in body of article).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HOPE REMAINS AFTER DEATH IN THE STATE OF GLORY.

NO.—THE REASON is that hope by its very nature implies the imperfection of its subject (as was said concerning faith), inasmuch as it implies a certain movement to that which is not had. Consequently, when that which is hoped for is possessed, namely the enjoyment of God, hope cannot now exist.

NOTE: 1.—The fear that remains in glory is not the fear that is opposed to hope, because of the opposition of good and evil; but it is reverential fear. In the damned it is not properly fear; for, as was said above (q. xiii, art. 2), fear never exists without some hope of escape. There is, however, in the damned some fear of punishment, as regards the succession of punishments, in so far as there remains in them some futurity, which is the object of fear (Ad 2).

2.—With respect to the glory of the body (after the resurrection, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not, properly speaking, hope; neither can hope remain as a theological virtue (for thus its object is God, and not a created good); nor can hope remain as it is commonly taken, because the object of hope is arduous, and in this case arduousness can have no place (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER ANY FAITH OR HOPE REMAINS IN THE STATE OF GLORY.

NO.—a) Nothing in faith that is identically or specifically the same remains in heaven, but b) only what is generically the same; c) neither does what is generically the same remain in the substance of the genus. d) As regards hope, nothing at all remains.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that when the specific difference is removed nothing remains identically or specifically the same, since the difference designates the genus. Moreover the knowledge of faith is here obscure by its very nature; but in heaven it will be a clear vision.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that faith agrees with the Beatific Vision as regards generic knowledge.

THE REASON FOR THE THIRD is that when the specific difference is removed the substance of the genus cannot remain identically the same, just as animality does not remain the same if there is another soul constituting the animal.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that hope does not agree with beatitude

even generically; for hope is compared to the fruition of beatitude as movement to rest in a goal.

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHARITY REMAINS, AFTER THIS LIFE, IN THE STATE OF GLORY.

YES.—THE REASON is that charity is love, in whose essence there is no imperfection, i.e., does not have an imperfection by reason of its species, as do faith and hope (as was said above). For the same charity may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity remains identically the same in heaven, and will be all-perfect, because everything accidentally imperfect will be removed from it, that is, by reason of the state of this life.

Therefore the charity of earth can never by increase equal the charity of heaven, on account of the difference on the part of the cause. For vision is a cause of love, and the more perfectly we know God the more perfectly we love Him (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXVIII THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE GIFTS DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES.

YES.—Not as regards the notion conveyed by the name, but as a habit, in so far as they are recorded for us by Holy Scripture under the name of spirits, since they are in us by divine inspiration (Is. xi, 2).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which is from another, such as a gift, can perfect anyone for good action, and thus would have the character of a virtue.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that inspiration implies a certain movement from without. Now everything that is moved must be proportionate to the mover. In man there is a twofold mover, one from within, which is the reason, the other from without, which is God.

Accordingly, just as the human virtues (even when infused) perfect man, in so far as it is the nature of man to be moved by reason in the things that he does interiorly or exteriorly, so there should be in man (higher) dispositions, according to which he is disposed to being divinely moved; and these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but because man is disposed by them to be rendered promptly movable by divine inspiration.

NOTE: 1.—The gifts are sometimes called virtues, but in the broad and not the proper sense of the word (Ad 1).

2.—Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason; but it is called a gift according as its work proceeds from the divine prompting. The same thing applies to the other virtues.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GIFTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAN FOR SALVATION.

YES.—In those matters in which the prompting of reason does not suffice.

THE REASON is that we do not have a full and perfect possession of the theological virtues, by which we are directed to our supernatural end; for we imperfectly know and love God, nor can we avoid folly in all things (Ad 3). Therefore, in order that we may be effectively moved to our ultimate end the movement of the reason does not suffice, even if the reason is informed by the theological virtues, unless there are added the prompting and movement of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: 1.—Reason is perfected more by the theological virtues than by its natural light. Yet the latter perfection is had in a higher manner by man than the former. For man has the perfection of natural light as in full possession only imperfectly (body of art.)

2.—The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works performed, as the counsels excel the commandments, but as regards the method of operation, inasmuch as man is moved by a higher principle (Ad 1).

NOTE: That the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not ordinary inspirations of grace, which are required for every supernatural act, but are special movements of the Holy Spirit, is evident not only because the gifts are seven in number, whereas the ordinary inspirations of grace are numberless; but also from the words of our Doctor. For he says that the gifts are required for "higher things" than for the things that relate

to the virtues; "for the disciple must be disposed to receive a higher doctrine from his master" (prec. art.). He compares the gifts with the heroic and divine virtues, of which Aristotle speaks, and according to which some men are called "divine" (prec. art. Ad 1). Here too (art. 2) he does not say that the theological virtues do not have an act of their own, but that the act of the virtues themselves is not perfect without the gifts, for without the gifts we "love and know God imperfectly." He also says, ad 3, that by the virtues we cannot avoid folly *in all things*; therefore we can in some things.

Therefore the theological virtues can operate even without the gifts, although imperfectly; and for this reason for the perfection of the virtues "we always need to be moved by a prompting of the Holy Spirit" (Ad 2). In this sense, therefore, are to be interpreted the illustration drawn by St. Thomas from the moon (which according to the Holy Doctor has in itself a certain natural but imperfect light) and from medicine.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE HABITS.

YES.—In order that man, in so far as he is possessed of free will, may himself act when he is moved by the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

THE REASON is that, just as the moral virtues are related to the appetitive power in comparison with the reason, so the gifts of the Holy Spirit relate to men in comparison with the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, just as the moral virtues are habits by which the appetitive powers are disposed promptly to obey the reason, so the gifts are also habits, whereby man is perfected for prompt obedience to the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: Because the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation, with regard to them the Holy Spirit always abides in holy men (Ad 1). (Consequently the gifts cannot be in sinners; and in this way, at least, they are to be distinguished from the movement of actual grace in those who do not possess sanctifying grace.)

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE APPROPRIATELY ENUMERATED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the movement of the Holy Spirit in man extends to all the human powers, just as the command of the reason extends to all the appetitive powers. Wherefore, just as the virtues exist in all the powers of man that can be the principles of human acts, so also do the gifts, namely in the reason and the appetitive power.

For the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by understanding; the practical reason, by counsel. In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by wisdom; the practical reason, by knowledge.

In man's relations to others, the appetitive power is perfected by piety; in his relations to himself it is perfected by fortitude, which is against fear. By the gift of fear, which corresponds to temperance, he is fortified against concupiscence and the inordinate inclination to pleasures (Psalm cxviii, 120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments.") And thus it is evident that these gifts extend to everything to which either the moral or the intellectual virtues extend.

NOTE: The first union of man with God is through faith, hope, and charity. Consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as their roots. Therefore all these gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derivations of them (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE CONNECTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that all the powers of the soul are ordered by the gifts in relation to the Holy Spirit, just as the appetitive powers are ordered by the moral virtues in relation to the government of the reason.

Accordingly, just as the moral virtues are interconnected in prudence, which perfects reason, so all the gifts are connected with one another in charity, by which the Holy Spirit dwells within us (Rom. v. 5).—Wherefore he who has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit; of which none can be possessed without charity (at end of art).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT REMAIN IN HEAVEN.

YES.—With regard to the essence of the gifts they will exist most perfectly in heaven; but with regard to the material object about which they are exercised in this life they will not be in heaven.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the gifts perfect the human mind to follow promptly the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and this will be especially in heaven, when "God will be all in all" (I Cor. xv, 28), and man will be wholly subject to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such operations will have no place in the state of glory.—Wherefore the actions of the active life will not be in heaven the matter of the gifts, but all will have their acts with respect to the things that belong to the contemplative life, which is the life of the blessed (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER ISAIAS XI ENUMERATES THE GIFTS IN ORDER OF DIGNITY.

YES.—According to the order of their matter, or relatively, the order of dignity of the gifts is thus enumerated by Isaias: Wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and the fear of the Lord.

THE REASON is that as regards their matter counsel and fortitude are aptly placed before knowledge and piety; for counsel and fortitude have place in arduous works, whereas piety and knowledge are exercised in ordinary works.

Simply speaking, however, i.e., by comparison with their proper acts, the dignity of the gifts should be enumerated according to the principles of their acts, as in the virtues, and the order will be thus: Wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear. Thus the intellectual virtues outrank the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues the contemplative outrank the active. Among the moral virtues justice outranks fortitude and temperance, and fortitude outranks temperance, to which virtues correspond piety, fortitude, and fear. Counsel corresponds to prudence.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE VIRTUES OUTRANK THE GIFTS.

NO.—a) The theological virtues outrank the gifts and regulate them; b) the gifts outrank the intellectual and moral virtues.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the gifts stand to the theological virtues as the moral virtues to the intellectual virtues. For just as in the intellectual virtues reason is perfected, which is the mover of the moral virtues, so in the theological virtues the gifts are perfected, which are united to the Holy Spirit through the theological virtues.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the gifts perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit, who moves them; whereas the virtues perfect either the reason itself (the intellectual virtues) or the powers in relation to the reason (the moral virtues).

NOTE: In the order of generation or disposition the moral virtues excel the gifts; for by the fact that a man is subordinate to his own reason he is disposed to be well subordinate to God (Ad 2).

2.—The relation of the virtues with one another and with the gifts is thus summarized: The virtues are distinguished into three groups, for there are certain theological virtues, certain intellectual virtues, and certain moral virtues. Now the theological virtues are those whereby the human mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby the reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those whereby the appetitive powers are perfected to obey reason. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are those whereby all the powers of the soul are disposed so as to be subjected to the divine guidance (in body).

QUESTION LXIX THE BEATITUDES

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BEATITUDES DIFFER FROM THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS.

YES.—As acts are distinguished from habits.

THE REASON is that the beatitudes are operations of the virtues and especially of the gifts (if we are speaking of eternal beatitude), by which we are moved and brought near to the end of beatitude. For beatitude here below is possessed in hope when someone is suitably moved to his end and draws nigh to it, and this is done through action.—Hence the beatitudes can be called certain excellent works of the virtues, and particularly of the gifts, inasmuch as they lead in a special manner to the attainment of true and heavenly beatitude.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE REWARDS ASSIGNED TO THE BEATITUDES PERTAIN TO THIS LIFE.

YES.—Those rewards that imply some beginning of beatitude; but not those that imply perfect beatitude.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the beginning of beatitude exists already in this life, as it does in perfect men. For they are consoled by the Holy Spirit; they have already gained mercy; God they see in some manner, having cleansed their eye by the gift of understanding, and are called and are the sons of God. Yet these things will exist more perfectly in heaven (Ad 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that perfect beatitude is not possessed here, but in the other life.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BEATITUDES ARE ADEQUATELY ENUMERATED.

YES.—Most adequately, according to Matthew, chap v.

THE REASON is that the beatitudes are enumerated according to the threefold beatitude of man. Of these the first is false, and consists in a sensual life. This is an obstacle to future beatitude. The second pertains to the active life, and the last to the contemplative life. Now the sensual life consists either in the affluence of goods, or riches, or honors, or in the gratification of the passions, whether irascible or concupiscible.

From absorption in riches and honors, man is withdrawn by virtue, which causes him to use them moderately; the gifts cause him utterly to depise them. To this corresponds the first beatitude: "Blessed are the poor in spirit."

From the immoderate following of the irascible passions man is withdrawn by a virtue; a gift calms them wholly; and to these corresponds the second beatitude: "Blessed are the meek."

From excessive following of the concupiscible passions man is withdrawn by a virtue, so that he uses them in moderation, and a gift causes him utterly to cast them aside, and if need be, to make a deliberate choice of sorrow. To this corresponds the third beatitude: "Blessed are they who mourn."

These three beatitudes, accordingly, are meant to remove the obstacles to the attainment of true beatitude.

The happiness of the active life is gained by good works toward the neighbor, by reason either of duty or benefit. By reason of duty man works through justice; by a gift he performs the works of justice with readiness and eagerness; and to these correspond the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice."

By benefits, or spontaneous gifts, we possess the virtue of liberality, by which we give to those to whom we should give, namely to our friends and those near to us; a gift does this on account of reverence to God, and hence a fifth beatitude arises: "Blessed are the merciful."

The contemplative life, whether perfect (in heaven) or imperfect, is considered as the reward of the active life, in so far a man is perfected in himself by having his heart purified of passions; and to this corresponds the sixth beatitude: "Blessed are the pure of heart."

In so far as man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, namely by the peace of justice, according to Isaias xxxii, 17: "The work of justice shall be peace," a seventh beatitude appears: "Blessed are the peacemakers."

The eighth beatitude—"Blessed are you when men will slander you"—is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. For by the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds in a manner to all the preceding seven (Ad 5).

NOTE: St. Luke (chap vi) names only four beatitudes, inasmuch as he relates that the sermon of Our Lord was given "to the multitude." Hence he enumerates the beatitudes according to the capacity of the crowd, which knows only sensual, temporal, and earthly happiness. St. Ambrose, however, enumerates these four beatitudes as works of the cardinal virtues, and says: "Poverty relates to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger to justice, since he who hungers is compassionate and, through compas-

sion, gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude" (Ad 6).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE REWARDS OF THE BEATITUDES ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED.

YES.—These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the condition of the beatitudes according to the three beatitudes mentioned above (prec. art.).

THE REASON is that for the temporal and perishable goods of sensual happiness our Lord most fittingly promises spiritual and eternal goods. That is, to those who relinquish riches and honors for God's sake, i.e., to the poor in spirit, He promises the kingdom of heaven; to those who prevent wars and quarrels (to which certain irascible passions impel)—i.e., to the meek—He promises the quiet possession of the land of the living, by which is meant the solid reality of eternal blessings.

To those who relinquish the pleasures of the world, which are craved by the concupiscible appetite, i.e., to them who mourn, the Lord promises consolation.

The fourth and fifth beatitudes pertain to works of active beatitude through justice and mercy toward the neighbor. Therefore, to those who leave injustice for justice's sake He promises content; and to those who do not withdraw from the miseries of others, for mercy's sake, He promises mercy, by which they shall be delivered from all misery.

The two last beatitudes relate to contemplative happiness, or beatitude, which are assigned as rewards for dispositions included in the merit of peacemaking, either in oneself or by making peace among others. To the first, who are disposed by cleanness of heart, Our Lord promises the vision of God; to the others, who by making peace among men are imitators of God, who is the God of unity and peace, He promises the divine sonship, which consists in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

NOTE: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXX **THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT** (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT THAT THE APOSTLE ENUMERATES IN GALATIANS V ARE ACTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that they are operations, which, under the aspect of that which is last, or the goal of delight, proceed from man in respect of the power of the Holy Spirit in man, as of a divine seed. Therefore, just as the operation of man, which proceeds from man in respect of the faculty of reason, is called the fruit of reason, so these operations are called the fruits of the Holy Spirit. The first are the second acts of reason and give pleasure because they are suitable to the agent; the second are the operations or acts of the virtues and gifts, which involve pleasure in respect to the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: 1.—Since fruit is something last and final, nothing prevents one fruit from bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Spirit working in us, are fruits; but in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they have rather the character of flowers. Hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus xxiv, 23: "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." (Ad 1).

2.—The names of the virtues are sometimes taken for their acts, as when it is said: Faith is to believe, and the like. And in this way the names of the virtues are taken in the enumeration of their fruits (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE FRUITS DIFFER FROM THE BEATITUDES.

YES.—More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.

THE REASON is that for a fruit it suffices that there be something that is last and pleasurable. But for a beatitude it is further required that it be something perfect and excellent. Wherefore all the beatitudes can be called fruits, but not conversely. Hence the beatitudes, because of their perfection, are rather assigned to the gifts than to the virtues.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FRUITS ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED BY THE APOSTLE.

YES.—There are 12 fruits, which are charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, long-suffering, meekness, faith, modesty, continency, and chastity; and they can be signified by the 12 fruits of which the Apostle John speaks: "On both sides of the river was the tree of life bearing 12 fruits" (Apoc. xxii, 2).

THE REASON is that the fruits of the Holy Spirit, which as it were proceed from a divine seed, are aptly enumerated according to the ways in which the Holy Spirit proceeds in us. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds thus: Our mind is well disposed first of all in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.

In regard to itself, man's mind is first well disposed with respect to love, which is the first of our emotions, and the root of them all; and this is the work of charity; and the consequence of charity is joy.

And after perfect joy there follows peace, both because peace implies freedom from external disturbances and also because he who has a heart that is perfectly at rest in one thing can be disturbed by nothing else, since it counts other things as nought.

Thus is the mind well disposed in regard to good things. In regards to evils it is so disposed by the Holy Spirit as not to be disturbed by the threat of evils, and this is done through patience; and (secondly) so as not to be disturbed by the deferment of good things, and this belongs to long-suffering.

As regards what is near to man, namely the neighbor, our mind is well disposed, first as regards the will to do good, and to this goodness refers; secondly as regards the carrying out of beneficence, and to this kindness belongs, for the kind are enkindled by the salutary flame of love; thirdly, as to suffering with equanimity the evil one's neighbor inflicts on one, and this pertains to meekness, which restrains anger; fourthly, as regards our not injuring the neighbor by either fraud or deceit, and this is the work of faith, if it be here taken for fidelity.

Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external actions, namely by modesty, which observes the mean in all that is said and done; and as regards internal desires, by continency and chastity.

NOTE: 1. If faith (as a fruit) be taken for the faith whereby we believe in God, man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subjects his intellect, and consequently all that is his, to God (body of art).

2. Continency and chastity differ in this: Chastity restrains man from illicit pleasures, and continency from licit pleasures. The two also differ in this, that the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not carried away by it; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to nor carried away by it (at end of art.).

3. As Augustine says on Gal. v, 22, 23, "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many there are of either the works of the flesh or the fruits of the Spirit, but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence a greater or lesser number of fruits could be given. And yet all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be conveniently reduced to these, inasmuch as all the virtues and gifts dispose the mind to some one of the above-named ways (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE CONTRARY TO THE WORKS OF THE FLESH.

YES.—a) The fruits of the Holy Spirit considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh; b) but not as considered singly, each according to its specific nature; c) Yet by a kind of adaptation, St. Augustine, commenting on Gal. v, 22, 23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are like movements upward and movements downward. For the Holy Spirit moves the human mind to that which is according to reason, or rather to that which is above reason; but the cravings of the flesh drag the soul down to sensual goods, which are beneath man.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as was said above (prec. art., ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the spiritual works, or all the carnal.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that thus charity, with which the soul is united to God, and in which true chastity is implied, can be contrasted to fornication, which

is the love of the satisfaction of lust apart from wedlock. And so similarly he contrasts joy with uncleanness, peace to the service of idols, long-suffering, kindness, and goodness to witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, and dissensions. To heresies is opposed peace; to envy, meekness; to drunkenness and revelings, continency.

NOTE: Because "good happens in one way, evil, in all manner of ways," as Dionysius writes, it is for this reason that many vices are opposed to one virtue. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the Spirit (Ad. 2).

VICES AND SINS

We have now to consider the vices and sins. On this head six subjects of inquiry occur: 1) The vices and sins considered in themselves; 2) their distinction; 3) their comparison with one another; 4) the subject of sin; 5) its cause; 6) its effect.—For the first question there are six articles.

QUESTION LXXI

VICES AND SINS CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES

ART. I.—WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO VIRTUE.

YES.—Vice is opposed to virtue in respect of that which is directly of the essence of virtue, i.e. inasmuch as virtue implies a certain disposition of anyone who is suitably disposed according to the condition of his nature.

THE REASON is that the vice (or defect) of anything seems to be that it is not disposed as is proper to its nature. Wherefore Augustine says (*On Free Will*, book iii, chap. 4, at end): "Whatever you perceive to be wanting to the perfection of a nature, call that its vice."

NOTE: 1. Malice is contrary to that which is virtuous according to its essence, not directly, but consequently, i.e., in so far as virtue indicates a disposition according to nature. Sin is opposed to virtue inasmuch as it indicates an inordinate act, even as an act of virtue is a due and well ordered act (in body of art.).

2. Vice is more opposed to virtue than disease or sickness of soul (for these two cannot be separated in the soul except in thought, as Cicero says); because vice is of wider extension than sickness or disease of soul. These last imply an inordinate affection, which vice does not of necessity imply; for there are certain sins that are caused more by infirmity or passion than by inordinate affection (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER VICE IS CONTRARY TO NATURE.

YES.—And, so far as it is contrary to the nature of man, so far is it contrary to the order of reason.

THE REASON is that vice is opposed to virtue (prec. art.); now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, and for this reason vice is taken from vituperation, as St. Augustine says.—But so far is it against the nature of man as it is against the order of reason, because the nature of anything is from its form. Now the nature of man, as man, is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore, what is according to reason is according to the nature of man, in so far as he is man, and on the contrary that is properly contrary to the nature of man that is against reason.

NOTE: 1. The presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.

2. The eternal law is compared to the order of human reason as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law (Ad. 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER VICE IS WORSE THAN A VICIOUS ACT.

NO.—THE REASON is that even in goodness and evil a habit stands midway between a power and an act. Accordingly, just as an act stands above its power in goodness and badness (for it is better to do good than to be able to do good; and it is more blameable to do evil than to be able to do evil); so also it stands above a habit.—And this is also apparent from the fact that a habit is called good or evil by reason of the goodness or badness of the act, since the cause of a thing's being such is yet more so than the effect.—Thus an act is above a habit; but, because a habit is more lasting than an act, or because it possesses other qualities, which an act, as an act, does not have,

therefore in this respect, i.e., considered relatively, a habit surpasses its act (Ad 1).

NOTE: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality; but act causes habit by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness (Ad. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SIN CAN CONSIST WITH VIRTUE.

YES.—a) With the acquired virtues; b) but not with the infused virtues, in so far as they are virtues; and unless it is a case of venial sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as a habit is not engendered by a single act, so neither is it corrupted by a single act.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the infused virtues, as virtues, i.e., as perfect, have their roots in charity, to which mortal sin is opposed, but not venial sin, which consequently does not exclude it, or the other virtues. Moreover dead faith and hope can consist with sin; but these, in so far as they are dead or unformed, are not perfect virtues.

ART. V.—WHETHER EVERY SIN INCLUDES AN ACTION.

NO.—In a sin of omission, treated here, a) if we understand only that which belongs of itself to the nature of sin, there is sometimes involved an interior act, sometimes neither an interior nor an exterior act. b) But if we understand also the causes and occasions of omission, thus there must be some act involved in a sin of omission, if these causes and occasions directly tend to the omission; if however they relate accidentally to the omission, the omission will be, absolutely speaking, without any act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that an omission is owing to the fact that someone *wills* not to do what he is bound to do—for example, when one wishes not to go to church when he is bound to do this. Sometimes, however, this is owing to the fact that at the time when he is bound, e.g., to go to church, he does not think of going or not going to church. (This can happen without fault.)

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if the cause or occasion tends directly to the omission (if the cause or occasion is subject to the will), this cannot be without at least an interior act of the will, for example when someone wishes not to go to church. But if the cause or occasion relates only accidentally to the omission, i.e., on account of the intention (for we call accidental what is besides the intention)—for instance when someone wills to sit up late at night, from which it follows (besides his intention) that he does not walk to church in the morning—then it can be more truly said that such a sin of omission can be without any act; because in judging about things we must be guided by that which is proper to them, not by that which is accidental.

NOTE: A sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept, which obliges always, but not at every moment (Ad. 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS A WORD, DEED, OR DESIRE CONTRARY TO THE ETERNAL LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that sin is nothing else than an evil human act. Inasmuch as it is a human act, it is in respect of something voluntary that is said, done, or desired, and this constitutes the material element of sin. Inasmuch as it is evil, it implies the lack of due commensuration, namely to the rule of the human will, which is law; and this is the formal element of sin.

NOTE: Law, or the rule regulating the human will, is twofold: One proximate and homogenous, and this is human reason itself; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is, as it were, God's reason (body of art).—By theologians sin is considered chiefly in so far as it is an offense against God; by the moral philosopher, in so far as it is contrary to reason. And thus Augustine more suitably defines sin with reference to its being contrary to the eternal law than with reference to its being contrary to reason, the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g., in matters of faith (Ad 5).

QUESTION LXXII THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (in nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SINS DIFFER IN SPECIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS.

YES.—Sins are specifically distinguished on the part of voluntary acts, rather than

on the part of the inordinateness inherent in sin.

THE REASON is that that which is essential to sin is on the part of the voluntary act, in so far as the sinner intends to exercise such an act in such a matter. Now the inordinateness of the act with reference to the rule of morality is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares. Moreover voluntary acts are distinguished specifically according to their objects (q. xviii, art. 2) or according to their end, which amounts to the same thing, since the object has the character of a good (Ad. 1).

NOTE: Sin is not a pure privation, but it is an act deprived of due order. And therefore sins are rather distinguished in species according to their opposites, although, even if they are distinguished according to the opposite virtues, it would come to the same thing, for virtues are distinguished specifically according to their objects (q. ix, art. 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL SINS ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED FROM CARNAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that pleasure, to which the appetite tends inordinately through sin (q. xxxi, art. 3), is twofold: One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in desire, as when someone takes pleasure in human praise, and this is called spiritual pleasure; the other is natural, or corporeal, and is perfected by a bodily touch, and this is called carnal pleasure. Examples are gluttony, which terminates in the inordinate pleasure of taste, and lust, which terminates in inordinate pleasure in sex. Now sins receive their species from their object and end.

NOTE: Although by reason of the end sins are distinguished specifically as spiritual or carnal, yet every failing of human reason originates in some way in the carnal sense (Ad. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN REFERENCE TO THEIR CAUSES.

NO.—a) Sins do not differ specifically according to their active or motive causes; but b) according to their final cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the active principles in voluntary acts are not of necessity determined to one thing, and therefore different species of sins can flow from one active or motive principle; thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to the neglect of the flock committed to his care.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the end is the object of the will; now human acts take their species from their end.—With regard to the formal and material cause, they do not apply here, because these constitute the substance, but not the act; now sin is not a substance, but an act.

NOTE: Objects, although in so far as they are *the matter about which* they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species, yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as terms have the character of an end (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SIN AGAINST GOD, AGAINST ONESELF, AND AGAINST ONE'S NEIGHBOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that sin is an inordinate act. Now order in man is threefold: One is according to the rule of reason, the second according to the rule of the divine law, and the third is that by which man is ordered to other men; for man is not a solitary animal, but is by nature political and social.

NOTE: The order of God contains the order of reason and transcends it: For some things are contained in the order of God that surpass human reason. Such are the things that belong to faith, and which are due only to God.

Similarly, the social order includes the order of reason and surpasses it, inasmuch as we are ordered in certain things according to reason in respect to ourselves alone (body of art.). These sins are specifically distinguished, not in so far as one order is included in another, but in so far as one order surpasses the other. Thus sin *against God* is properly against that by which the order or rule of the divine law surpasses the human rule, i.e., by sins against the theological virtues. Similarly, sins against justice are properly those that are against the neighbor; and sins against temperance and fortitude are properly against oneself (Ad. 1 and in body).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE DIVISION OF SINS ACCORDING TO THEIR DEBT OF PUNISHMENT DIVERSIFIES THEIR SPECIES.

NO.—The venial and mortal difference of sin, or any other difference taken according to punishment, cannot be a difference constituting diversity of species.

THE REASON IS that punishment has an accidental relation to sin on the part of the sinner; for it is besides the intention of the sinner—indeed against his will (Ad. 3). But that which is accidental never constitutes the species.

NOTE: 1. On the part of the justice that adjudicates the divers punishments, they are inflicted for different sins; wherefore the difference in the punishment of sins can follow from the specific difference of the sins, but cannot constitute them (body of art.).

2. The difference between venial and mortal sin follows from the difference of deordination, which completes the essence of sin. In mortal sin the deordination follows from the withdrawal of the principle of the order of morality, by a turning away from the last end, to which the soul is united through charity. In venial sin the deordination is in respect to the things that come after the principle, i.e., without prejudice to the principle; just as sickness is a deordination in the body, but without the destruction of the principle of life. Wherefore mortal sin, taken in itself, involves an irreparable fall, and therefore merits eternal punishment; whereas venial sin is a reparable deordination, since it saves the principle, even as one who in speculative matters does not err concerning principles, but only as to conclusions. Wherefore venial sin is so called as not meriting interminable punishment (passim in body).

3. Mortal sin differs from venial infinitely on the part of the turning away (i.e., from God), but not on the part of the turning to (i.e., the creature), by which it respects its object. Wherefore in the same species it is evident that mortal and venial sin can be found (Ad. 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER SINS OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION DIFFER SPECIFICALLY.

NO.—They do not differ specifically by a formal difference, but by a material difference.

THE REASON IS that sins of commission and omission are directed to the same thing, and proceed from the same motive. Thus, for example, the miser in order to accumulate money both robs and omits to give what he ought. But materially they differ in so far as, in the broad use of the term species, denial or privation may have a species. For in sins the material difference depends on the natural species of the acts of sin; the formal difference, on the order proper to one end, and this also is the proper object.

NOTE: In things negation is always founded on some affirmation, which is in a manner its cause (body of art.). Hence negation, although it is not properly in the species, is yet constituted in the species by reduction to some affirmation, which it follows (Ad. 3). Therefore omission and commission are reduced to one thing by a common point in which they share. An example: In the physical order it comes under the same head that fire gives forth heat and that it does not give forth cold.

ART. VII.—WHETHER SINS ARE FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SINS OF THOUGHT, WORD, AND DEED.

YES.—a) Not as different complete species, but b) these three sins belong to one perfect species of sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the consummation of a sin is in the deed; hence a sin has complete species when it is reduced to act; but its first beginning has, so to speak, its foundation in the heart. Its second degree is in the word, in so far as man readily tends to express the concept of his heart. The third degree is in the consummation of the deed. And thus these three differ according to the different degrees in which sin is perfected.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that these degrees of sin proceed from the same motive. Thus the wrathful man, by seeking revenge, is first disturbed in his heart; secondly, bursts forth into insulting words; and thirdly proceeds to injurious deeds; and the same thing is evident in lust and in every other sin.

NOTE: The sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed

when they are united together with it, they are distinct from one another whenever each is found by itself (Ad. 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER EXCESS AND DEFICIENCY DIVERSIFY THE SPECIES OF SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that wherever there occurs a different motive inclining the intention to sin there is a different species of sin. Now it is evident that there is not the same motive to sin in sins by excess as there is in sins by defect—in fact, the motives are contrary; just as the motive in a sin of intemperance is the love of bodily delights, and the motive in a sin of insensibility is a hatred of them. Wherefore such sins not only differ in species but also are contrary to one another.

NOTE: There are two things in sin, the act itself and its deordination in so far as it departs from the order of reason and the divine law. The species of sin is not regarded on the part of the deordination, which is besides the intention of the sinner (art. 1 of this q.), but on the part of the act itself, in so far as it terminates in the object to which the intention of the sinner extends (first part of the article).

ART. IX.—WHETHER SINS DIFFER SPECIFICALLY IN RESPECT OF DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

NO.—Unless the corruption of different circumstances is due to different motives.

THE REASON is that where there is another motive to sin, there is another species of sin, because the motive to sin is the end and object, as appears, for example, in the different species of gluttony, which are eating too hastily, too sumptuously, too much, too eagerly, and too daintily. But where the motives are not different neither do the circumstances diversify the species (Ad. 2).

QUESTION LXXIII

THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER

(in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL SINS ARE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER.

NO.—THE REASON is that by sin we depart from the unity of reason and approach the multiplicity of desirable goods in respect to the intention of the sinner. It is from these goods that sins take their species, and which have no connection with one another, but sometimes are even contrary. On the contrary, in the virtues we leave the multitude of goods to approach the unity of reason through prudence.

NOTE: The love of God is unitive, inasmuch as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are interconnected. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are varied and of many kinds; hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL SINS ARE EQUAL.

NO.—THE REASON is that not all sins equally depart from the rectitude of reason, but some more and some less. Neither is the order of reason ever totally taken away—otherwise evil, if total, would destroy itself. And the reason for this is that the privation indicative of vices and sins is not a pure and simple privation, which consists in *being corrupted*, like the privation of life, and which does not admit of more or less; but it is a privation retaining something of the opposite habit, which consists in *becoming corrupted*, and therefore admits of more and less, as for example does sickness.

NOTE: (All mortal sins indicate a privation of sanctifying grace, which is the life of the soul; but not all contain an equal deordination of reason.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS VARIES ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that sin is grave in proportion to the deordination occurring in some principle that is first in the order of reason, even as sickness is more dangerous the nearer it affects the heart, which is the principle of life. Now the principle in the order of reason has the character of the end of the acts, which are their objects (q. lxxiii, art. 3, ad 2). And therefore according to the difference of the objects there

will be a difference of gravity in sins. Indeed, the difference in sins that depends on their objects is first and foremost, because it is as it were a result of the species; for sins are specified by their objects.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF SINS DEPENDS ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE VIRTUES TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED.

YES.—a) Inasmuch as sin is opposed principally and directly to virtue in respect of its object; b) but not from the point of view of the extension of virtue in checking sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as on the part of the object the gravity of sin is greater, so also the dignity of virtue is greater, for both receive their species from the object (q. lx, art. 5; and q. lxii, art. 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus the greater any virtue is the fewer sins does it restrain; even so, abounding justice restrains wrath, which is less a sin than murder, which a lesser justice restrains, as the Lord Himself affirms (Matth. v).

ART. V.—WHETHER CARNAL SINS ARE OF LESS GUILT THAN SPIRITUAL.

YES.—If we consider only the difference between spiritual and carnal, and other things being equal.

THE FIRST REASON is on the part of the subject, because spirit denotes being turned to God, and being turned from Him. But carnal sin has more of the aspect of being turned to and adhering to the creature than of being turned away from God. And spiritual sin has less of the turning to and more of the turning away, in which the essence of guilt consists.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of that against which sin is committed. For by carnal sin, sin is committed against one's own body, which is deserving of less love in the order of charity than are God and the neighbor, against whom we sin by spiritual sin.

THE THIRD REASON is on the part of the motive, because the stronger the impulse to sin the less does man sin. Now the carnal sins have as their impulse concupiscence itself, which is born in us.

NOTE: Carnal sin is more shameful than spiritual sin, because carnal sins are about pleasures that are common to us and the brutes; wherefore man is in a manner brutalized by them, as Gregory says (*Homilies*, book xxxiii, chap. 2) (Ad. 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GRAVITY OF THE SIN DEPENDS ON ITS CAUSE.

YES.—a) Whether the cause is direct and proper, which in this case is the will to sin; b) or it is extrinsic and remote, if it induces the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will. c) It is otherwise, however, if the extrinsic cause induces the will contrary to its nature, either on the part of the judgment of the reason or on the part of the movement of the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST, as is evident, is that the will, being the direct cause of sin, is guilty of grave sin in proportion to the intensity of the will to sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the extrinsic and remote causes that induce the will in accord with its very nature, i.e., in accord with the end, which is the object of the will, increase voluntariness and malice; for he sins more gravely whose will is inclined to sin by the intention of a worse end.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such extrinsic causes, which incline the will against its order and nature, so influence it that it cannot move freely of itself, or in accord with the judgment of reason. Thus weakness, violence, fear or the like, as also ignorance, which is on the part of reason, diminish voluntariness; and if the act is wholly involuntary it is not sinful.

ART. VII.—WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

YES.—THE REASON is, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, Book ii, chap. 1), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes." Now sin is (also) caused by the absence of some circumstances, which one should observe according to the order of

reason—for example, if anyone works when he should not, or where he should not. Hence sin is naturally aggravated by its circumstance.

NOTE: Sin is aggravated by the circumstances in three ways: a) In so far as the circumstances transfer (the sin) to another kind of sin, as fornication with another's wife, which transfers the sin of fornication to that of injustice.—b) In so far as it multiplies the nature of sin, but in the same class of sin; as when a spendthrift gives to one to whom he should not, and when he should not.—c) In so far as it increases the deformity proceeding from another circumstance; as to receive stolen property, and to receive *much* of what belongs to another, and this aggravates the sin of theft.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF ITS CAUSING MORE HARM.

YES.—In so far as the harm was foreseen and intended by the sinner.

THE REASON is that if the harm is foreseen and intended, then it directly increases the gravity of the sin, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. But if it is merely foreseen, and not intended, then it also increases sin, but indirectly, because, although it is besides the intention of the sinner, yet it happens from the fact that his will is strongly inclined to commit sin, which causes the harm, although simply speaking he would not wish to do it, even as when someone in order to commit fornication takes a short cut over a field and knowingly does damage to the field. But if the harm is neither foreseen nor intended, then if this harm happens incidentally to the sin, it does not increase the sin, but those evils are imputed to a man that follow from his neglect. If however the harm follows directly from the act of sin; then it directly aggravates the sin; because whatever follows directly from a sin belongs in some way to the very species of the sin.—Wherefore the harm itself aggravates the sin in so far as it makes the moral act inordinate.

ART. IX.—WHETHER A SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY REASON OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM IT IS COMMITTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that a person against whom sin is committed is in some manner the object of the sin. Now the first gravity of a sin depends on the object (art. 3 of this q.); and the gravity of the sin is so much the greater as its object is a more principal end. A sin committed against a person united to God by reason of virtue or office reacts more against God. A sin against a person united to us either by natural kinship or benefits reacts more on us, and is therefore graver. But on the part of the neighbor the sin is so much the graver the more people it affects. Wherefore a sin against a public personage, for example a King or ruler, is graver than a sin against a private person.

ART. X.—WHETHER THE EXCELLENCE OF THE PERSON SINNING AGGRAVATES THE SIN.

YES.—Those sins that proceed from deliberation; but not those that proceed from a virtuous man unawares, on account of the weakness of human nature.

THE REASONS OF THE FIRST are: a) That more excellent persons, that is, those who excel in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin. Wherefore the Lord says (Luke xii, 47): "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes;" b) on account of ingratitude, according to Wisdom vi, 6: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented;" c) on account of a special repugnancy of the act of sin to the excellence of the person; d) on account of example, or scandal, because, as Gregory says (*Pastor.* i, 2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous when the sinner is honored for his position." The sins of the great come to the knowledge of more people, and excite greater indignation in men.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the virtuous man is less neglectful of repressing such sins as come on him unawares, because of the weakness of nature.

QUESTION LXXIV THE SUBJECT OF SIN

(in ten articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS A SUBJECT OF SIN.

YES.—Sin is in the will as in a subject.

THE REASON is that the will is the principle of moral acts (q. i, art. i; and q. xviii, art. 6). Now moral acts remain in the agent, i.e., do not pass to an exterior matter. For in them the subject of the acts is the matter itself to which they pass; but their subject is the agent itself, or the principle of the acts.—Yet the will is not inclined to evil under the aspect of evil, but because some evil is apparent good, and therefore the will sometimes seeks some evil; and in this way sin is in the will (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WILL ALONE IS THE SUBJECT OF SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that not only is the will the principle of the voluntary act, for voluntary acts are not only those that are elicited by the will, but also those that are commanded by the will (q. vi, art. 4) through the other faculties, which are compared as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon. Now the members of the body are not the principles of acts, but only their organs, and are compared to the moving soul as a slave, who is acted on and does not act (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSUALITY.

YES.—In so far as sensuality, i.e., the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, naturally obeys the reason; wherefore the sensuality in the brutes is not a subject of sin, as is obvious.

THE REASON is that, in so far as the sensuality obeys reason, it can be the principle of the voluntary act, as was said in the previous articles (Ad 1).

NOTE: Man cannot repress all the inordinate movements of the sensuality [i.e., by turning away from the sensuality he may run into vainglory] because the fomes is never completely taken away in this life; for, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. Yet we can repress each single inordinate movement, and this is enough to avoid sin (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MORTAL SIN CAN ARISE IN THE SENSUALITY.

NO.—Mortal sin cannot arise in the sensuality but only in the reason.

THE REASON is that mortal sin is a deordination corrupting the principle of spiritual life, which is the last end; now to direct anything to an end, and, in consequence, to misdirect it from the end, is not the work of the senses, but of reason alone.—Yet the act of the sensuality can concur toward a mortal sin (Ad 1).—A venial sin that is in the sensuality is a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason; even as the goodness in the imagination is a disposition to science, i.e., it is neither the same thing nor in the same subject (Ad. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER SIN CAN BE IN THE REASON.

YES.—According to the twofold act of reason, a) in so far as it can err in the knowledge of the truth and b) in so far as it is directive of other powers.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that there can be ignorance or error involved in respect to that which one can and should know.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the reason can command the inordinate acts of the lower powers, or can also fail deliberately to restrain inordinate movements when it should do so.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SIN OF MOROSE DELECTATION IS IN THE REASON.

YES.—THE REASON is that reason not only directs exterior acts but also the interior passions; and in this respect it can sin in two ways: When it commands unlawful passions, as when a man deliberately provokes lust; and when it does not represent an unlawful movement of passion, as when someone, after reflecting that this movement is inordinate, nevertheless dwells upon it, and does not expel it; and in this way morose delectation is in the reason.

NOTE: Delectation is called morose, not from a delay (*mora*) of time, but from the fact that the reason in deliberating dwells (*immoratur*) on a thing and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine says (*De Trin.* i, xii, chap. 12).—(Ad. 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SIN OF CONSENT TO THE ACT IS IN THE HIGHER REASON.

YES.—THE REASON is that in human acts the act itself comes last, whereas

pleasure is as it were the preamble to the act. Now that which comes last belongs to the sovereign judgment, that it may give final decision concerning it; otherwise judgment would be suspended, since it is impossible to appeal to a higher judgment. Now consent is a judgment concerning that to which consent is given. Wherefore consent to a human act, which is last in the human act, is in the higher reason, to which it belongs to judge according to the eternal types, by which judgment is finally pronounced. Concerning delectation relating to sin, the lower or practical reason judges, although even the higher reason can judge concerning the delectation.

NOTE: 1. Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging (q. xv, art. 3). The fact that consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason (q. xv, art. 1).—(Ad. 1).

2. Consent to delectation sometimes belongs to the lower reason only (and then it is not a sin, or the consent to the act of sin is not full and complete, wherefore it is not damnable or mortal). But if even after considering the eternal types man persists in the same consent, then such a consent will belong to the higher reason (and the consent is final, and the sin is mortal).—(Ad. 3).

3. The higher reason is said to consent, whether or not it thinks of the eternal law. For when it thinks of the law of God it actually despises it; and when it does not think of it it neglects it by a kind of omission. Wherefore at all events full consent to an act of sin proceeds from the higher reason (Ad. 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CONSENT TO DELECTATION IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—a) Consent to the pleasure of an act of fornication thought of is a mortal sin; b) but not consent to complacency in the thought of an impure thing.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the consent to such a pleasure results from the affection's being inclined to such an act. But that one deliberately chooses that his affection be conformed to things that are in themselves mortal sins is a mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that pleasure in the thought itself follows from the affection to the thought itself; this in itself is not a sin, for example when one entertains the thought of fornication in order to preach or dispute; sometimes it is only a venial sin, as when one thinks of these things to no purpose.

NOTE: What is said of pleasure in an impure thing can be applied to pleasure in all other things. Thus consent to the delectation that proceeds from complacency in an act of murder thought of is a mortal sin; but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder (Ad. 5).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE VENIAL SIN IN THE HIGHER REASON AS DIRECTING THE LOWER POWERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the deordination of the act of the lower powers to which the higher reason consents is not always contrary to the eternal types; for it does not always involve a turning from the last end, and in this case the higher reason sins only venially.

ART. X.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN THE HIGHER REASON AS SUCH.

YES.—As the act of the higher reason, which is a simple intuition, but not as any other act, which is deliberation.

THE REASON is that the sin that is against the eternal types (i.e., the truths of faith), although it is a mortal sin in its genus, can be venial on account of the imperfection of a sudden act, and this also results in accordance with a simple intuition, as when one suddenly apprehends that the resurrection of the dead is impossible naturally, and at the same act of apprehension rejects it before he has had time to deliberate that this is proposed to our belief according to the divine law. But if after this deliberation the movement of unbelief remains it is a mortal sin.—In the things that pertain to the lower powers the higher reason by consenting always sins mortally in matters that are mortal sins in their genus.

QUESTION LXXV
THE CAUSES OF SIN IN GENERAL
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SIN HAS A CAUSE.

NOTE: We are here speaking of efficient cause, for material cause has already been treated (Part I, q. xlix, art. 1), namely the good that is the subject of evil; and it was proved that sin could not be regarded as a formal or final cause (q. lxxi, et seq.), inasmuch as it is a deordination.

YES.—The sin that is a deordinate human act has its direct cause on the part of the act, which is the will itself; the deordination of the act is accidental, but is reduced to the will, for what is accidental is reducible to that which is essential.

THE REASON is that the will that foregoes the direction of the rule of reason and the divine law, by intending some mutable good (in which sin consists), causes the act of sin directly, for it directly deprives moral good of its act; but it causes deordination accidentally, because it causes it besides its intention.—Now a defect of order in the very act of sin is due to a defect of direction in the will; and thus the very deordination is reduced to the will.

Wherefore the direct cause of sin is the will itself, insofar as it omits to apply the rule of reason or the divine law (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER SIN HAS AN INTERNAL CAUSE.

YES.—A twofold internal cause of sin can be assigned: One proximate, on the part of the reason and the will; the other remote, on the part of the imagination or the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that the immediate cause of a human act is the reason and will, in so far as man is free in his will; but because of the apprehension of sense the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; this inclination draws the will and reason, as will appear later (lxxvii, art. 1).—But if reason ceases to consider the due rule sin already appears, even though it is not complete (Ad. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER SIN HAS AN EXTERNAL CAUSE.

YES.—Something external can be a cause *moving* to sin, but not sufficiently inducing to sin; but the cause sufficiently completing sin is the will alone.

THE REASON is that nothing external can be the cause of sin except either in so far as it moves the reason, as when a man or a demon persuades sin, or in so far as it moves the sensitive appetite through external sensible goods. But neither human nor diabolic persuasion nor a sensible object externally proposed moves of necessity either the reason or the appetite, unless perchance it is in some way disposed by the vehemence of the movement of passion, which takes away the use of reason; but in that case there will be no sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ONE SIN IS A CAUSE OF ANOTHER.

YES.—In so far as sin is an act; and thus according to four causes. But not in so far as it is a deordination.

THE REASON is that deordination has the character of evil, but an act has something at least apparently good for an end. Wherefore sin on the part of the act can be an efficient cause of another sin, either directly or accidentally: Accidentally, as removing an impediment, for sin loses grace, etc. Directly if by one act man is disposed to another similar act. As the material cause (not *from which* but *about which*), one sin is the cause of another insofar as it prepares matter for contention. As the final cause one sin can be the cause of another, insofar as a person commits one sin for the purpose of another sin, as injustice for the sake of ambition. And, because the end gives the form in moral matters, it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another; as in the case cited injustice is the material cause, ambition the formal cause.

QUESTION LXXVI
THE CAUSES OF SIN IN PARTICULAR

Here we treat of the causes of sin in particular: 1) The interior causes of sin, 2) the exterior causes, 3) the sins that are causes of other sins. The first consideration divides into three parts according to the premises; for we first treat of ignorance, which is the

cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. Regarding the first, four questions will be asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER IGNORANCE CAN BE A CAUSE OF SIN.

YES.—It can be a cause of sin accidentally, but not directly, nor is any kind of ignorance the cause of sin.

THE REASON is that ignorance, which is the privation of the knowledge perfecting reason, stands to the reason that forbids sin as that which removes its impediment. For it takes away the knowledge that forbids the act of sin, whether it is the ignorance of a universal principle, as, e.g., the principle that murder is forbidden, or the particular circumstance by which the principle is applied, e.g., that such an object is a man. And such ignorance is an accidental cause of sin. If, however, the sin is not done because of ignorance that removes knowledge, but on account of a disposition of the will, then, clearly, the ignorance is not the cause of the sin, but is only concomitant to the act. In this case a man does not sin on account of his ignorance, but rather sins "in ignorance," as Aristotle remarks (*Ethics*, book III, chap. 1). [The example is that of a man so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, but happens to kill somebody else.]

NOTE: Concomitant ignorance is not the cause of sin; antecedent ignorance is the cause of sin materially; but consequent ignorance is the cause of sin formally.

ART. II.—WHETHER IGNORANCE IS A SIN.

YES.—Vincible ignorance is a sin if it is about one of those things that one is bound to know; but not if it is about one of the things which one is not bound to know. Invincible ignorance is not a sin.

THE REASON is that whoever neglects to have or do that which he is bound to have or do sins by a sin of omission. Now man is charged with negligence if he is ignorant of what he is bound to know, whether it be the things that all are bound to know in common, such as the things of faith and the universal precepts of the law, or what some are bound to know in an individual case, or what belongs to their proper state or office.—Invincible ignorance is that which cannot be overcome by study.

ART. III.—WHETHER IGNORANCE EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER.

NO.—a) Neither antecedent ignorance b) nor indirect consequent ignorance excuses altogether from sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a thing of which one is ignorant can consist with some act concerning which there is a knowledge of sin; as when someone, knowing that a certain person is his father, strikes him as a man—a thing he would not do if he knew him to be his father. Wherefore if he strikes he is not excused from sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that indirect consequent ignorance, even though it arises from stress of work or other occupations, since it is accompanied by some negligence concerning the things one is bound to know, does not excuse altogether from sin.

NOTE: Direct consequent ignorance is *affected* ignorance, which rather increases sin, because it increases voluntariness. Concomitant ignorance neither diminishes nor increases sin; because it is not a cause of sin. Indirect consequent ignorance, or that which is accidentally voluntary, diminishes voluntariness; because it contains less contempt. Affected ignorance increases voluntariness, as is evident.

QUESTION LXXVII

THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED BY A PASSION OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE.

YES.—Indirectly.

THE FIRST REASON is in respect to a kind of distraction, because, since all the powers of the soul are rooted in one essence of the soul, it follows that, when one power is intensified in its act, the other power becomes remiss in its act, or is even altogether impeded in it. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive

appetite is intensified by any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite, which is the will, must of necessity become remiss or be altogether impeded.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of the object of the will. The judgment and apprehension of reason, which the will is meant to follow, is impeded by the vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power. Now the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite. And thus indirectly the passion of the sensitive appetite can move the will.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE REASON CAN BE OVERCOME BY A PASSION AGAINST ITS KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that he who is in the passion does not consider in the particular instance that which he knows habitually and in general to be true. Now passion impedes such a consideration in three ways: By a kind of distraction, as was said in the preceding article; secondly, by way of opposition, because generally passion inclines one to the contrary of that which man knows in general or habitually; thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, by which the reason is somehow fettered, so as not to exercise its act freely.—And in this way passion draws the reason to a judgment in the particular case that is opposed to the knowledge that it has in general or even habitually regarding particular things.

NOTE: Since the object of the will is a good, or apparent good, the will is NEVER moved to evil unless that which is not good is in some way presented to the reason as good. Hence it is that the will never tends to evil except with some ignorance, or error of reason. Wherefore it is said in Prov. xiv, 22: "They err that work evil" (in body of art.).

Now the very fact that something appears to the reason in a particular instance as good, although it is not good, happens because of a passion (Ad 2), which suggests another proposition, under which the reason draws its conclusions (Ad 4). This appears in the following syllogism of an incontinent man. Here there are four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, namely that no fornication is to be committed; the other is of passion, namely that pleasure is to be pursued. Passion, therefore, hinders the reason from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that, while the passion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second, as Aristotle says, in *Ethics* vii, chap. 3 (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION SHOULD BE CALLED A SIN OF WEAKNESS.

YES.—By analogy with the weakness of the body.

THE REASON is that, just as a member of the body is said to be weak when it cannot fully perform its operation, such as an eye when it cannot see clearly, so it is called weakness of soul when the soul is hindered in its proper operation by the insubordination of its parts. This insubordination is had when the parts of the soul are not subject to the reason, which rules the parts of the soul. When, therefore, this insubordination of the parts of the soul proceeds from passion, sin, if it ensues, is said to be a sin of weakness.—But, because sin is always an act of the soul, this sin is rather to be referred to weakness of soul than to weakness of body. It is, however, called the weakness of the flesh, in so far as the soul's passions arise in us from the condition of the flesh (Ad 2).

NOTE: It is indeed in the power of the will to assent, or not to assent, to the things to which passion inclines, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us. Nevertheless this assent or dissent of the will is hindered by passion in the manner already described. It is thus that we should interpret the words of Gen. iv, 7: "The lust thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it" (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the inordinate seeking of some temporal good, in which the direct and proper cause of sin is to be found—namely on the part of a turning to a mutable good, proceeds from the fact that someone loves himself inordinately. For to love someone is to wish good to him.—The inordinate love of self leads to contempt of God (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER CONCUPISCENCE OF THE FLESH, CONCUPISCENCE OF THE EYES, AND PRIDE OF LIFE ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS CAUSES OF SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the inordinate desire of good, which is the cause of all sin, has a twofold object according to the passions: One absolute, according to which it is the object of the concupiscible part, and the other under the aspect of the arduous, in so far as it is the object of the irascible part. Now concupiscence is twofold: One natural, which is concerned with the things by which nature is sustained, either as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food and drink, and such like, or as regards the preservation of the species, as in matters of sex. The inordinate desire of these things is called the concupiscence of the flesh; the other concupiscence is spiritual, which is about what is delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination; and the inordinate desire of these things is called the concupiscence of the eyes, in so far as the sense of sight extends to all the interior apprehensions.

The inordinate desire of an arduous good belongs to the *pride of life*, for pride is the inordinate desire of excellence, which is something arduous. And thus it appears all the passions are reducible to these three, which are the cause of sin. Wherefore they are suitably given as the causes of all sins.

NOTE: Covetousness, according as it denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good, thus includes pride under it. How covetousness is a special vice, which goes by the name of avarice, is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (q. lxxxiv, art. 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER SIN IS ALLEVIATED ON ACCOUNT OF A PASSION.

YES.—Antecedent passion alleviates sin; but consequent passion rather increases it.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that antecedent passion diminishes voluntariness on account of its impulse.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that consequent passion indicates the intensity of the will toward the act; wherefore it is a sign of the gravity of the sinning will.

NOTE: 1. Passion is called antecedent in so far as the passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will. It is called consequent, however, insofar as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower (in body of art.).

2. A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well rather by his passion than by the judgment of his passion, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER PASSION EXCUSES FROM SIN ALTOGETHER.

NO.—Unless the act is rendered totally involuntary.

THE REASON is that sometimes passion is not such as to intercept the use of reason; and then reason can exclude passion, by diverting it to other thoughts, or prevent it from attaining its effect; because the members are applied to the action only by the consent of reason, as was said above in q. xvii, art. 9.—If, however, passion is such that it totally removes the use of reason, as happens in the case of those who are mad with love or anger, then a distinction must be made: If such a passion was voluntary in the beginning, the act is imputed as sin, because it is voluntary in its cause. But if the cause was in no way voluntary, and the act is rendered altogether involuntary, then it is wholly excused from sin.

NOTE: A thing can be voluntary either in itself, as when the will tends directly to it, i.e., to the effect; or in its cause, as when the will tends to the cause, and not to the effect. Secondly, a thing is voluntary either directly or indirectly; directly, if the will tends toward it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not (in body of art.).

Hence it is that what is voluntary in itself and in its cause regards the movement of the will itself; but the object to which the will tends regards what is voluntary directly or indirectly.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER A SIN COMMITTED THROUGH PASSION CAN BE MORTAL.

YES.—If deliberating reason could come to the rescue, and did not.

THE REASON is that the fact that anyone proceeds to an act of sin through passion, or to deliberate consent, does not happen suddenly; wherefore deliberating reason can here come to the rescue; for it can drive the passion away, or at least hinder its effect, as was said in the preceding article. Wherefore, if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin. Wherefore the sin that arises from passion can be mortal, although as regards its origin it arose from weakness (in body of article and ad 1).

QUESTION LXXVIII

THE CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANYONE CAN SIN THROUGH DELIBERATE MALICE.

YES.—When he sins from the insubordination of the will itself.

THE REASON is that man can love more a lesser good, as when he loves some temporal good, for example wealth or pleasure, more than the order of reason or the divine law. From this it follows that he wishes to suffer the loss of some spiritual good in order to enjoy some temporal good, and this he does from choice. And this is what we mean by sinning with certain or deliberate malice, as though we knowingly chose evil.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANYONE WHO SINS FROM HABIT SINS THROUGH DELIBERATE MALICE.

YES.—Whenever anyone uses a vicious habit it follows that he sins with deliberate malice.

THE REASON is that to anyone who has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect to that habit has the aspect of something lovable according to his habit. But the fact that something is suitable to someone according to his vicious habit is owing to the fact that it excludes a spiritual good. From this it follows that man chooses a spiritual evil in order to obtain a good that is suitable according to his habit. And this is to sin with deliberate malice.

NOTE: Acts that proceed from habits are similar in species to the acts by which habits are bred; yet they differ from them as the perfect from the imperfect; and such is the difference in the sin that is committed with deliberate malice and the sin that is committed through some passion (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE WHO SINS WITH DELIBERATE MALICE SINS FROM HABIT.

NO.—The sin that is committed with deliberate malice always presupposes in man some deordination, which however is not always a habit.

THE REASON is that then only does one sin with deliberate malice when the will itself is moved by it to evil. This happens either by the fact that a man has some corrupt disposition inclining him to evil—whether it is a habit acquired by custom or a sickly disposition of the body—or by the fact that the will itself tends of itself to some evil—not precisely as evil, for this is impossible, but by reason of some obstacle, for example by the removal of the hope of eternal life, or by the removal of the fear of hell. From this it follows that one may sin with deliberate malice as being freed from a bridle.

NOTE: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from deliberate malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit; there is, however, always some deordination (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS MORE GRIEVOUS TO SIN THROUGH DELIBERATE MALICE THAN THROUGH PASSION.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that in sin with deliberate malice the movement of sin is more proper to the will, which is moved to evil of itself, than when sin is committed from passion.

THE SECOND REASON is that he who sins from malice sins for a longer time. For passion soon passes; but the habit by which one sins from malice is a permanent quality.

THE THIRD REASON is that he who sins with deliberate malice is badly disposed with regard to the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and thus his defect is more dangerous than that of him who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of passion for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle.

NOTE: He who sins from passion sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced by the passion to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he who sins through deliberate malice chooses evil of his own accord, in the way explained, and therefore his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin; and for this reason he is said to sin through choosing (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXXIX THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD IS A CAUSE OF SIN.

NO.—Neither directly nor indirectly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every sin is by way of departure from the order directed to God as to the end. Now God inclines and converts all things to Himself as to their final end; wherefore it is impossible for God to be the cause of this departure of the order directed to Himself, either in Himself or through others. Wherefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the reason God does not give to some the help to avoid sins (so that if He did give it they would not sin) is wholly according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He is Himself wisdom and justice. Therefore, if He does not give help God is most certainly justified by His wisdom and justice, inasmuch as He is not bound to give help. And thus not even indirectly is God the cause of sin.

NOTE: 1. One is directly the cause of his sin or that of another when he inclines his will or that of another to sin. Indirectly he is the cause when he can and should withdraw others from sin, and does not do so.

2. The effect that proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause. Thus if a servant does anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause. In like manner sin, which the free will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as its cause (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACT OF SIN IS FROM GOD.

YES.—In so far as the act of sin is both a being and an act, but not in so far as it has a deordination or defect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every being, whatever may be the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being. Now every being in act is reduced to the First Act, namely God, as to its cause, who is Act by His essence. For nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. And thus God is the cause of every action in so far as it is an action.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that defect is owing to a created cause, namely the free will, in so far as it falls away from the order of the First Agent, or God; since it is not subordinate to Him to whom it must be subordinate, even though the sinner does not primarily intend this falling away. Wherefore this defect is not ascribed to God as to its cause, but to the free will, just as a defect in walking is not ascribed to the motor power of the soul, but to a crooked leg.

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD IS THE CAUSE OF SPIRITUAL BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART.

YES.—a) Not as regards the movement of the soul that clings to evil and turns from the divine light, which is the work of malice; but b) as regards the withdrawal of grace, from which it follows that the mind is not divinely illuminated to see rightly, and the heart of man is not softened to live aright.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this is sin, and God is not the cause of sin, either directly or indirectly, as has been explained (art. 1 of this q.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since God acts freely and in the order of His wisdom, He chooses, by His own judgment, not to send the light of grace to those in whom He finds an obstacle. Hence the cause of the withdrawal of grace is not only he who places the obstacle to grace, but also God, who in His judgment does not give grace. And in this way God is the cause of spiritual blindness, because He does not illuminate the intellect; and of hardness of heart, because He does not soften the will by the fire of His charity.

NOTE: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment; and in this way, too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER BLINDNESS AND HARDNESS OF HEART ARE DIRECTED TO THE SALVATION OF THOSE WHO ARE BLINDED AND HARDENED.

NO.—a) Blindness by its nature is directed to damnation; b) but by the divine mercy or providence blindness may for a time be directed to salvation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sin of itself is directed to damnation; but blindness is the preamble to sin; wherefore the effect of reprobation is already placed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that only temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the salvation of those who are blinded. And this mercy is not given to all who are blinded, but to the predestined only, of whom it is said in Rom. viii, 28: "All things work together for good."

NOTE: All the evils that God permits to happen are directed to some good; yet not always to the good of him in whom the evil resides, but sometimes to the good of another, or even of the whole universe, as the crime of tyrants directs the martyr to good, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice (Ad 1). And in this way God is said to take pleasure in damnation—not, however, in the loss of man itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.

2. That God directs the blindness of some to their salvation belongs to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their damnation belongs to His justice; that He gives mercy to some, and not to all, does not mean favoritism on the part of God, as was said in the first part (Q. xxiii, art. 5, ad 3).—For it would be against justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as a due, and not as the result of grace; or it would be against wisdom if the effect of predestination were not to manifest in as many ways as is fitting the goodness of God.

QUESTION LXXX

THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF THE DEVIL

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE DEVIL IS DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF MAN'S SINNING.

NO.—The devil is not the direct and sufficient cause of sin, but only by way of one persuading or offering a desirable good.

THE REASON is that that is directly the cause of any act that moves the proper principle of that act to act. Now the proper principle of the act of sin is only the will, for every sin is voluntary. Now the will is internally inclined by no one save God and itself. By God it cannot be inclined to sin, because God is not the cause of sin. Therefore the will can be directly and sufficiently inclined internally to sin only by itself.

On the part of the object the will is of necessity moved only by the final end, not by creatures. It is, however, moved by creatures: a) By the object offered, as we say that food arouses the desire of man to eat; b) by that one who offers the object; c) by the one who persuades him that the object offered has the character of good; and thus man and the devil can move the will, not sufficiently and directly but by way of persuading or offering something desirable, which the will can resist.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE MAN TO SIN BY INTERNAL INSTIGATIONS.

YES.—By darkening the intellect, which is done through the imagination and the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that, as was explained in the first part, q. cx, art. 3, corporeal nature naturally obeys spiritual nature as regards local movement. Wherefore the devil too can cause everything that can result from the local movement of bodies here below, unless he is restrained by divine power. The devil moves the imagination through mental images; the sensitive appetite, by co-operating in certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits.

NOTE: The demons cannot impress a new form on the bodily organs of sense; they can, however, somehow transmute the forms retained in the organs of sense, so that certain apparitions are made from them (in body of article and in *De Malo*, q. xvi, art. I, ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DEVIL CAN INDUCE A NECESSITY TO SIN.

NO.—Unless he is restrained by God, the devil can induce someone to do some act (materially) that is a sin in its matter; but he cannot induce a necessity to sin (formally).

THE REASON is that the devil can totally impede the use of reason, by which man resists sinning, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite, as in the case of those possessed. But then, when the reason is thus fettered, whatever man does is not imputed to him as sin. If, however, the reason is not wholly fettered, he can resist sin in the part in which it is free. And thus in no way can the devil induce in man a necessity to sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THE SINS IN MEN ARE DUE TO THE DEVIL'S SUGGESTION.

NO.—Directly the devil is not the cause of all men's sins, but only occasionally and indirectly, in so far as he induced the first man to sin.

THE REASON OF FIRST is that, as Origen says (*Principles*, Book iii, c. 2), even if the devil did not exist, men would have a desire for food, sexual pleasures, and the like. This desire could be inordinate, unless ordered by reason, and this ordination is subject to free will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the sin of the first man human nature was so vitiated that all of us are inclined to sin.

QUESTION LXXXI**THE CAUSE OF SIN ON THE PART OF MAN: AND FIRST OF ORIGINAL SIN AS REGARDS ITS TRANSMISSION**

We have here to consider the cause of sin on the part of man. Now since man is the cause of another's sinning by external suggestion, as is also the devil, he has a special way of causing sin in another by way of origin. Wherefore we must treat of original sin; and on this head three considerations occur: 1) Its transmission; 2) its essence; 3) its subject. Regarding the first five questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE FIRST SIN OF THE FIRST PARENT IS TRANSMITTED TO HIS DESCENDANTS BY WAY OF ORIGIN.

YES.—Not by the will of a man descended from Adam, but by the will of the first parent himself.

THE REASON is that sin, by the very nature of its guilt, must be in the will. Now sin is not in the will of a man descended from Adam, and thus is not imputed to him as guilt, unless in some way all men can, by reason of species, be considered as one man in Adam, in whose will sin existed, and who moves by the movement of generation all men who derive origin from him. By this movement, which transmits human nature with its infection, namely by the transmission of seed, all who are born are made sharers in the guilt of the first parent.

NOTE: 1. According to Catholic faith it must be held that the first sin of the first man passed originally to his descendants. In this article we investigate how the sin of the first parent could originally pass to his descendants.

2. From Adam men are derived as so many members of one body. Accordingly, just as the act of one member of the body—for example, the hand—is not voluntary by the will of the hand itself, but by the will of the soul, which primarily moves the member; so original sin in this man is not voluntary by his own will, but by that of his first parent, by reason of his common species. Just so, actual sin, which is committed through a certain member, is not the sin of that member, except in so far as that member is something of the man himself. And, just as actual sin is called human sin, so original sin, which is incurred by reason of the human species, is called the sin of nature, according to Ephes. ii, 3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath" (in body of article, *passim*).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALSO OTHER SINS OF THE FIRST PARENT OR OF NEARER ANCESTORS ARE TRANSMITTED TO THEIR DESCENDANTS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the other sins of the first parents or of nearer ancestors are purely personal; and man does not beget individually the same thing as himself but only specifically the same sin. Now original sin, although it was a personal sin of Adam, was nevertheless specifically the sin of the whole human race, because original justice, which alone was lost through the original sin of the first parent, was a gift of grace divinely bestowed on the whole human race in the person of the first parent.

NOTE: 1. (Just as the prohibition of God concerning the eating of the tree in the midst of paradise was given to Adam for all men, so the transgression of the divine command was in a manner made by all of us; but not the other sins that Adam might have committed on his own account).

2. Certain qualities of nature, especially if nature is strong, are transmitted by the parents to the children, such as swiftness of body, goodness of nature, and other such things belonging to natural disposition; but these are not purely personal (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SIN OF THE FIRST PARENT PASSES BY WAY OF ORIGIN INTO ALL MEN.

YES.—According to Catholic faith it must firmly be held that all men, save Christ alone, who are derived from Adam contract original sin from Adam; otherwise not all would need the redemption that is through Christ, which is erroneous.

THE REASON is that, as was explained above (art. 1 of this q.), original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation; just as actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body by the will through the movement of the members.

NOTE: 1. According to St. Thomas, by force of the argument proposed by him here, original sin *was due* to be transmitted even to the Blessed Virgin but as the Church afterward defined (1854), the Blessed Virgin was, by an altogether special and unique privilege, exempted by God by virtue of the foreseen merits of Christ the Redeemer. (This question the Holy Doctor professedly touches in Part III, q. xxvii.)

2. Since death is the punishment of sin, all must die, at least for a short time before the resurrection; or, even if they do not die at the time of Christ's coming, there will yet be in them the debt of death, but the punishment will be taken away by God, since He can forgive the punishment due for even actual sins (Ad 1).

3. Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the *fomes*, which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself (namely the sensitive appetite, which is the base of the passions), in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin, insofar as they retain something of the oldness of the first sin (Ad 2). (With regard to the guilt, however, the sin of all men existed in the transgression of the will of the first man, as was explained in art. 1 of this q.).

4. Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are begotten bodily by Adam, so the grace of Christ is transmitted to all who are begotten by Him spiritually through faith and Baptism; and not only to remove the guilt of the first parent, but also to remove actual sins, and to lead us to glory (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN WOULD BE CONTRACTED BY A PERSON FORMED MIRACULOUSLY FROM HUMAN FLESH.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as we said in the preceding articles, only those contract original sin who descend from Adam by active power derived in a generation originally from Adam, and this is to descend from him according to the seminal principle. Wherefore if anyone were formed from human flesh by divine power, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam.—(We contract original sin only in so far as we are children of Adam; we are children of Adam through generation only).

NOTE: If a man were to be formed from human flesh (but not by generation) he would have been in Adam by way of bodily substance, but not by way of the seminal principle; and therefore he would not contract original sin (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER, IF EVE, AND NOT ADAM, HAD SINNED, THEIR CHILDREN WOULD HAVE CONTRACTED ORIGINAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as has been explained, original sin is transmitted by the first parent, in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of children; wherefore if anyone were begotten materially only from human flesh he would not contract original sin.

Now the mother supplies only the matter in the generation of the offspring; the active principle is from the father alone. Hence sin is not contracted from the mother, but from the father. Wherefore, if Adam had not sinned, but Eve had sinned, the children would not contract original sin.—Consequently neither would they lose original justice, or immortality, for this was the effect of original justice (Ad. 2).

QUESTION LXXXII
ORIGINAL SIN AS TO ITS ESSENCE
 (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS A HABIT.

YES.—It is not an operative but a quidditative habit, like sickness (Q. L. art. 1).

THE REASON is that original sin is an inordinate disposition arising from the dissolution of that harmony in which the essence of original justice consisted. Wherefore original sin is not a simple privation, but a corrupt habit, like sickness (Ad. 1). And this disordered disposition in human nature has the character of fault, inasmuch as it is derived from the first parent (prec. q., art. 1).—(Ad. 2).

NOTE: Although original sin is not an operative habit, yet some inclination to an inordinate act follows indirectly from it, namely by the removal of an obstacle, i.e., original justice, just as from sickness there follows indirectly an inclination to disordered bodily movements (Ad. 3).—It is not an infused habit, but one that is transmitted; nor is it acquired, except by the first parent (ibid.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL ORIGINAL SINS IN ONE MAN.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is on the part of the cause of original sin; because, as has been said (prec. q., art. 2), only the first sin of the first parent is transmitted.

THE SECOND REASON is from the very essence of original sin, or by reason of the species of the sin itself; because the cause of a corrupt disposition, which is called original sin, is one only, namely the privation of original justice, by which the subjection of the human mind to God is taken away. Wherefore original sin is one in species. In one man it is identically and specifically one; in different men it is one in species and proportion (with respect to the first principle, Adam), but identically diverse.

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words in Psalm i, 7: "And *in sins* did my mother conceive me," this expression is according to the usage of Sacred Scripture, whereby the plural number is often used for the singular, as in Matthew ii, 20: "They are dead who sought the life of the child;" or because in original sin even actual sins are virtually contained (Ad. 1).

2. Original sin does not incline one to different contraries of itself, but indirectly and accidentally; i.e., not by its form, according to which it inclines to one thing, but by the removal of an obstacle. Even as when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies, just so, when the harmony of original justice is

destroyed the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies (Ad. 2). For by original justice all the powers of the soul were held together in one (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS CONCUPISCENCE.

YES.—Original sin, materially considered, is concupiscence, in so far as it is a common deordination of the lower parts of the soul; formally taken, however, original sin is the privation of original justice.

THE REASON is that the form of sin is taken from its cause, by which it is specified, since everything takes its species from its form. Now the cause of original sin is the transgression of the will of the first parent, inasmuch as, by turning away from God, he caused the privation of original justice, by which the will was subject to God. Formally, therefore, original sin is a defect of original justice.—But mutable goods, to which the will inordinately turns, are the object of concupiscence in the general sense, in which turning original sin materially consists.

NOTE: In a man a certain concupiscence is natural, and another is against nature. So far is concupiscence natural to man as it is according to the order of reason. But the concupiscence that transgresses the limits of reason is against nature in man; and such is the concupiscence of original sin (Ad. 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS EQUALLY IN ALL.

YES.—As regards the defect of original justice, it is not capable of greater and less; similarly, as regards the relation of this defect (in us) to the sin of the first parent, from whom it is transmitted through his corrupt origin, and for whom original sin (in us) receives the character of fault.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that by original sin the whole gift of original justice has been taken away.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that relations are not capable of greater or less.

Wherefore original sin, as regards that which is formal in it, cannot be greater in one person than in another. Accordingly, the fact that one person is more prone to concupiscence than another is not owing to original sin, but is the result of a different disposition of the powers of the soul, according to which these dispositions are stronger in one than in another, on account of different bodily temperaments (Ad. 1).

NOTE: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin to the offspring, for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin. We must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all (Ad. 3).

QUESTION LXXXIII

THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS MORE IN THE FLESH THAN IN THE SOUL.

ANSWER:—As in its subject original sin can in no way be in the flesh, but in the soul only.

THE REASON is that only the soul is a subject of sin; the flesh of itself cannot be a subject of sin; wherefore whatever reaches the soul from the corruption of the first man has the character of fault; but whatever reaches the flesh does not have the character of fault, but of punishment.

NOTE: 1. The original sin of all men was in Adam himself as in the first principal cause, according to Rom. v., 12: "In whom all have sinned." But original sin is in the bodily seed as in an instrumental cause, inasmuch as by the active power of the semen original sin is transmitted to the offspring together with human nature. But as in its subject original sin is only in the soul (in body or art).

2. The soul of any particular man was not in the sinning Adam as in an effective principle, in respect of his seminal power, but as in a dispositive principle; because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it (Ad 3).—The stain on the soul is not caused on the part of God, who created the soul, but on the part of the flesh into which

it is infused (Ad 4).—God creates the soul, even knowing that it is infected by union with the body, because in His wisdom He does not overlook the general order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), so as to avoid this soul's contracting a singular corruption. For it is better for the soul to be thus, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation through grace (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL RATHER THAN IN THE POWERS.

ANSWER:—It is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers.

THE REASON is that original sin is caused through the origin of man. Consequently, that part of the soul that is first reached by man's origin is the first subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul according as it is the form of the body, inasmuch as it is the term of generation. But the form belongs to the soul in respect to its essence.

NOTE: Original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul; for it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ORIGINAL SIN INFECTS THE WILL BEFORE THE OTHER POWERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that original sin respects the powers of the soul in relation to act. Therefore, it follows that it first respects that power which has the first inclination to act, i.e., to sin. And this is the will (q. lxxxiv, art. 1 and 2).

NOTE: As regards its subject, original sin first respects the essence of the soul, as we explained in the previous article.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE AFORESAID POWERS ARE MORE INFECTED THAN THE OTHERS.

YES.—All the parts of the soul are corrupted by original sin; but especially corrupted are these three: The generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch.

THE REASON is that these three powers specially concur in generation; hence by them the corruption of original sin is especially transmitted. Now corruption, in so far as it is transmitted, is called infection.

NOTE: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will (prec. art.). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXIV

THE CAUSE OF SIN IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN'S BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE ROOT OF ALL SINS.

YES.—In the mind of the Apostle: "For covetousness is the root of all evils, and some in their eagerness to get rich have strayed from the faith and have involved themselves in many troubles" (I Tim. vi, 10), the covetousness that is the root of all evils is the covetousness of riches, i.e., according to this species; but not the covetousness of any sort of good, or generically; nor is it a certain inclination of corrupted nature to seek inordinately after temporal goods.

THE REASON is that the Apostle is not here speaking of any kind of covetousness, but only of the covetousness of riches; and the reason for this is that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, according to Eccles. x, 19: "All things obey money."

NOTE: Avarice is called the root of all evils, not because no other evil can be its root, but because other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRIDE IS THE BEGINNING OF EVERY SIN.

Yes.—Pride, as a special sin, according to Eccles. x, 15: "Pride is the beginning of all sin. God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes."

THE REASON is that, thus taken, pride is the inordinate desire to excel. Now such a desire, in a voluntary act, is according to the order of intention, which has the character of a beginning and end, and is in the acquisition of all temporal goods; for by them man has some special perfection and excellence. And in this sense the desire to excel is spoken of as the *beginning* of every sin. Or also, because pride respects sin on the part of the turning away (from God), from which the essence of evil begins. Covetousness respects sin on the part of a mutable good; by covetousness sin is nourished and encouraged; wherefore covetousness is called the *root* of all evils, and is according to the order of execution.

NOTE: Pride can be considered under two other aspects: a) As a generic sin, according to which pride denotes some actual contempt of God, as to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; b) as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature. Under both aspects pride can be said to be the beginning of all sin (in body).

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY OTHER SPECIAL SINS, BESIDES PRIDE AND AVARICE, SHOULD BE CALLED CAPITAL.

YES.—Taking the word capital metaphorically, in so far as it signifies the principle and director of the others, and moreover not simply but denominatively.

THE REASON is that there are certain other vices from which the other vices arise in respect to the origin of the final cause, which is formal origin; but they have the character of origin, not simply and universally, as does avarice, which is called the root, and pride, which is called the beginning, of all sin; but because of their character of proximate origin in relation to several sins (in body and Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SEVEN CAPITAL SINS ARE SUITABLY RECKONED.

YES.—a) Not according to the condition or disposition of the sinner; but b) according to the natural relationship of the ends of the vices to one another, in so far as they have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the sinner, who is strongly disposed to one particular end, for which reason he frequently goes forward to other sins, can have an infinite number of inclinations; and thus this mode of origin cannot come under the consideration of art.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to the fundamental reasons by which the appetite is moved there correspond the principal vices, from which the others can proceed and be directed. These fundamental reasons are received by the appetite according to the seven relations that it has with its object which is a good. Now a good moves the appetite either directly and of itself, and that in four ways: a) In so far as the good (which denotes happiness) is sought under the aspect of the perfect, i.e., excellence and glory, the inordinate pursuit of which is pride and vain glory; b) in so far as it is sought as sufficient, the inordinate pursuit of which is avarice; c) under the aspect of the pleasurable, whether by reason of a person or by reason of the species, the inordinate pursuit of which is luxury and lust. Or the good moves the appetite indirectly, and as it were through something else, which happens when someone avoids a good on account of some evil connected with it; and this happens in two ways: a) In respect of one's own good, and thus it is sloth, which is saddened about spiritual good on account of the physical labor connected with it; b) in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is saddened about another's good, in so far as it is an obstacle to one's own excellence, or it is attended by a certain recrimination with a view to vengeance, and then it is anger.

NOTE: 1. These principal vices need not be opposed to the principal virtues, because the virtues and the vices do not originate in the same way. For the virtues are caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God; the vices arise from the desire of a mutable good (Ad 1).

2. Among the passions, sadness and pleasure are reckoned among the capital

vices, as being the most important, to which the other passions are in some measure subordinated (Ad 2). Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e., of the right to vengeance, and in this way it is distinguished from the other capital vices (Ad 3).

Although many sins arise from ignorance, all of them can be reduced to sloth, because to sloth pertains negligence; for the ignorance that can cause sin is due to culpable negligence (Ad 5).

QUESTION LXXXV THE EFFECTS OF SIN

We have now to consider the effects of sin: 1) The corruption of the good of nature; 2) the stain of the soul; 3) the debt of punishment. The first head has six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER SIN DIMINISHES THE GOOD OF NATURE.

YES.—As regards natural inclination to virtue.

THE REASON is that from the fact of anything's being inclined to one contrary, its inclination to something else is diminished. Hence, since sin is contrary to virtue, man, by the very fact of his sinning, diminishes the good of nature, which is an inclination to virtue.

NOTE: 1. The good of human nature is used in three senses: a) The very principles of nature, from which nature itself is constituted, and the properties caused by them, such as the powers of the soul and others of the like, and this good is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin; b) an inclination to virtue, already discussed; c) the gift of original justice, which was bestowed, in the person of the first man, on the whole of human nature, and this good was completely taken away by the sin of the first parent (body of art.).

2. Nature is not changed in itself through a change in the voluntary action; it is the inclination that is changed, in so far as it is directed to its term (Ad 2).

3. Sin diminishes the good of nature as regards the powers of the soul, not effectively, but formally, because no accident acts effectively on a subject, but an accident acts formally on it in the manner of speaking that says that whiteness makes a thing white. And thus is caused a deordination in the powers of the soul—not, indeed, so that the sin acts on them as on its proper subject, but in so far as the object (of sin) acts on some power, and one power acts on another and disorders it; for in the actions of the soul something is active and something is passive (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ENTIRE GOOD OF HUMAN NATURE CAN BE DESTROYED THROUGH SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the diminution of an inclination to virtue (here in question) does not imply a diminution of the capacity of nature, or the root, as was explained in the preceding article. In fact, the root of such inclination always remains, because reason, by the very fact that it is reason, always tends to virtue; but the good of nature is diminished, even to infinity, on the part of the term, in so far as sin places an obstacle to the reaching of the end or term; for obstacles can be added to infinity. It is not possible, however, to destroy the good of nature utterly, because the root of the inclination to good always remains.

NOTE: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight; yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER WEAKNESS, IGNORANCE, MALICE, AND CONCUPISCENCE ARE SUITABLY RECKONED AS THE WOUNDS OF NATURE CONSEQUENT UPON SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that by the withdrawal of original justice the powers of the soul in some manner remain deprived of the proper order, whereby they are

naturally directed to virtue. This deprivation is called the wounding of nature. Now there are four powers of the soul that are directed to virtue (q. lxxiv): Reason, in which prudence resides; will, in which is justice; the irascible, the subject of fortitude; and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Reason is robbed of its subordination to truth by the wound of ignorance; the will is deprived of its subordination to good by the wound of malice; the irascible is deprived of its subordination to the arduous by weakness; and the concupiscible is robbed of its subordination to the delectable regulated by reason because of the wound of concupiscence.

These, therefore, are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature by the sin of the first parent. Now these wounds grow proportionately through actual sins; so that reason is blunted in action, the will is hardened with respect to good, a greater difficulty of doing good grows up, and concupiscence becomes more impetuous.

NOTE: Malice is taken here, not for sin, but for a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to Gen. viii, 21: "The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Ad 2).—Concupiscence, in so far as it is natural to man, is thus far subject to reason; that it exceeds the limits of reason is unnatural to man (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PRIVATION OF MODE, SPECIES, AND ORDER IS THE EFFECT OF SIN.

YES.—In so far as the privation of good is the effect of sin, or even sin itself.

THE REASON is that species, mode, and order follow from every created good. For species is constituted by form; form is according to measure, or mode, and is directed to something else. Now good is fourfold: a) In respect of substance, and this is not deprived or diminished (art. 1 of this q.); b) in respect of natural inclination to virtue, and in this the species, mode, and order of good are diminished through sin, but not taken away altogether, as has been explained (loc. cit.); c) the good of grace, which is totally taken away by mortal sin, and consequently its species, mode, and order; d) there is also a certain good that is the very act that is ordered, and which also has its mode, species, and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin itself.

ART. V.—WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER BODILY DEFECTS ARE THE RESULT OF SIN.

YES.—Original sin is not in itself the cause of such defects, but is the accidental cause, as removing the obstacle.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that death and other defects are besides the intention of the sinner.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the sin of the first parent original justice was taken away, by which not only the lower powers of the soul were held together under reason without any deordination, but the whole body was held together under the soul without any defect (I P, q. xcvi, art. 1). Just as human nature was wounded as to the soul through the deordination of the powers (prec. art.), so also it was made corruptible through the deordination of the body itself.

NOTE: 1. Death and the other defects not only are the result of sin, but also are its punishments; for the withdrawal or original justice has the character of punishment, as also does the withdrawal of grace; and such defects are ordered by the justice of God punishing (at end).

2. Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects. But each act is done according to the order of divine wisdom, at a fitting time, because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings before attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER DEATH AND OTHER DEFECTS ARE NATURAL TO MAN.

NO.—Death and other bodily defects are against particular nature; but they are according to universal nature, and moreover not on the part of the form but on the part of the matter.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the active and preservative power of some

particular nature intends the being and preservation of that to which it belongs, as is clear from nature itself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that universal nature, which is the active power in some universal principle of nature, intends the good and preservation of the universe, for which an alternation of generation and corruption in things is required, and in this way the corruptions and defects of things are natural, not indeed according to the inclination of the form, which is the principle of being and perfection, and which intends perpetual existence so far as possible, but according to the inclination of the matter, which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And in this way the corruptibility of man is natural because of the inclination of the matter or body.—But God, to whom all nature is subject, in the very creation of man supplied the defect of nature; and by the gift of original justice gave to the body a certain incorruptibility (I P., q. xcvi, art. 1). And in this way it is said that “God did not make death,” and that death is a punishment of sin.

QUESTION LXXXVI THE STAIN OF SIN

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL.

YES.—By analogy with a bodily stain.

THE REASON is that, just as the body is stained by its losing its beauty by contact with another body, so man's soul is stained by sin. By giving its love to some things against the light of reason and the divine law, it loses the twofold beauty of the light of natural reason and the light of divine grace. And thus it is stained by sin.

NOTE: 1.—The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: On the contrary, the soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and the divine law (Ad 1). For the love whereby the will cleaves inordinately to the thing beloved attaches the soul itself to the thing that is loved, as is said in Osee ix, 10: “They . . . became abominable as those things were which they loved” (Ad 2).—The intellect, however, is not stained, because the action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible things' being in the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected by them (Ad 2).

2. The stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation; it denotes a privation of the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE STAIN REMAINS IN THE SOUL AFTER THE ACT OF SIN.

YES.—Until the soul returns to the light of reason and the divine light, which is done through grace.

THE REASON is that the stain denotes some defect of brightness on account of the withdrawal from the light of reason or the divine law. And accordingly, as long as man remains outside this light, there remains in him the stain of sin. Even as one who runs does not immediately return to his starting point when his movement has ceased, but must approach it by a contrary movement on returning, so it is with sin.

QUESTION LXXXVII THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT

Here we consider the debt of punishment: 1) The debt itself; 2) mortal and venial sin distinguished according to the debt. The first question will occupy eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IS AN EFFECT OF SIN.

YES.—The debt of punishment is an effect of sin, but not the punishment itself, except dispositively.

THE REASON is that, since sin is an inordinate act, whoever sins acts against

some order. Now whatever in any order rebels against the order incurs a debt, so that it is put down by the order itself, or by the principle thereof, and this suppression is punishment. For whatever is contained under any order is in a manner one in relation to the principle of the order; and, as we see in the natural sphere, one contrary acts with greater energy when another contrary supervenes.

NOTE: According to the three orders to which the human will is subject man can be punished by a threefold punishment: One is remorse of conscience, according to the order of reason; the second is by man, according to human law; and the third is from God, in so far as man is subject to the universal order of divine government (in body of art.).

2. The punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment. Consequently, punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is an evil.

ART. II.—WHETHER SIN CAN BE THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN.

YES.—a) Sin by itself, by its nature, can in no way be the punishment of sin; but b) only accidentally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sin, in itself, is a voluntary act; but punishment is of its nature against the will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS THREEFOLD: a) Because through sin the help of grace is withdrawn; and therefore the sin that follows from this is called the punishment of sin; b) on the part of the substance of the act, because the act of sin causes affliction, whether the act be interior, as is evident in the case of anger and envy, or exterior, as when some are wearied on account of sin; c) on the part of the effect, as are infamy, poverty, disease, etc., from which other sins may follow.

NOTE: Sin, considered as a punishment, is ordained by God for the amendment of the sinner, or for the good of the virtue of others, who, seeing some fall from sin to sin, are more inclined to fear sinning (Art. 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER ANY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

YES.—Whatever sins turn one away from God, since they destroy charity, they, considered in themselves, incur the debt of eternal punishment.

THE REASON is that such sins destroy the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, i.e., they destroy the last end, to which man adheres through charity. Now every defect that withdraws the principle is, considered in itself, irreparable; even as, when the principle of sight is destroyed, no reparation of vision is possible, save by divine power. As long as the cause remains the effect also remains. Consequently, while the deordination remains because of sin, the punishment remains. This deordination can be repaired by divine power.

NOTE: From the fact that sin is temporal it does not follow that the punishment of mortal sin should not be eternal; for it is an act destroying supernatural life in the soul; now death, considered in itself, is perpetual. Therefore, the fact that a sin is committed in a brief moment does not mean that the punishment should be equally brief. This is not true even in human justice, which punishes certain offenses with life imprisonment or exile, or even death. Now the sinner places his last end in his sin, and thus has a will to sin forever, as Gregory says (*Dialogue*, book iv, chap. 44): "The wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins forever" (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SIN INCURS A DEBT OF PUNISHMENT IN QUANTITY.

NO.—a) In respect of turning to a creature sin does not incur infinite punishment; b) but in respect to its turning away from God it does incur infinite punishment.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST IS TWOFOLD: a) The mutable good itself is finite; b) the turning to this good is finite, for no act of a creature can be infinite. Consequently there corresponds to this deordination of conversion the pain of sense, which is finite.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the immutable good, from which the sinner turns by his sin, is infinite, for it is God Himself; and to this deordination there corresponds the pain of loss, which is infinite.

ART. V.—WHETHER EVERY SIN INCURS A DEBT OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that those sins incur a debt of eternal punishment that are irreparably opposed to the order of divine justice, as was explained (art. 3 of this q.). Now there are some sins that denote a deordination that is not contrary to the last end, but in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them, without prejudicing the order to the last end. And these are sins that incur only a temporal punishment.

NOTE: Venial sin, if it is found together with mortal sin in a soul that is lost, incurs eternal punishment accidentally, since in hell there can be no remission of sins. For the eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility (Ad. 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER SIN.

YES.—a) Either after the act of sin; b) or after the remission of the stain.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of divine justice, to which he cannot return save by paying some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice, so that he who has unduly indulged his will, by acting against a commandment of God, suffers, willingly or unwillingly, something according to the order of divine justice, contrary to what he would wish. This same order is observed even in injuries done to men.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the stain of sin is removed only if the will of man accepts the order of divine justice, so that he either voluntarily assumes punishment in recompense for past sin, or patiently endures it if it is sent by God; but in both ways the punishment has the character of satisfaction. Consequently, when the stain of sin is removed through grace, the debt can indeed remain, but not the debt of punishment simply, but the debt of satisfactory punishment. In the first case punishment in the strict sense does not exist, since it is of the nature of punishment to be against the will.

NOTE: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But (satisfactory) punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed (besides the will, which has already been healed through the removal of the stain). These powers were disordered by the sin committed. This is necessary in order that the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin may be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David (Ad. 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER EVERY PUNISHMENT IS INFLICTED FOR A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that both punishment in the strict sense and satisfactory punishment are always on account of some fault. Punishment in the strict sense, since it is not voluntary, always has a relation to personal fault, whether the sin be personal or original, and this either principally or consequently: *Principally*, through the loss of original justice, *consequently*, with regards to all the penalties that befall men as a result of natural defect.—Satisfactory punishment is either for personal fault or also for the sin of others; for it happens that those who differ in the debt of punishment are one in the will of a union of love.

NOTE: Some ordinary punishments or losses are not meant to restore the order of justice, but for the advancement of man; they are not punishments simply, but medicines; but they are reduced to sin as to their remote and indirect cause; because the very fact that medicinal punishments must be applied to human nature is owing to the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of original sin (in body of art.), as it was in the case of the man born blind (John ix, 3).—It is obvious that Christ bore satisfactory punishments,, not for His sins, which did not exist, but for ours (Ad. 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ANYONE IS PUNISHED FOR ANOTHER'S SINS.

NO.—With regard to punishment simply so called, no one is punished for the sin of another; but b) he may be punished by satisfactory and c) medicinal punishment.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that punishment, in so far as it has the character of punishment, follows the act of sin, which is something personal; wherefore everyone is punished with punishment simply so called only for his own sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that satisfactory punishment is voluntary, and thus one person can bear the punishment for another's sin in so far as they are in a manner one, as has been said (prec. art.).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such punishments as are ills sustained in bodily goods, or even ills of the body itself, are ordained for the salvation of the soul, as was explained above (prec. art.); wherefore nothing prevents someone from being punished by such ills for another's sin, either by God or by man, such as children for their fathers' sin, and subjects for their masters, in so far as they are as it were their property. These punishments, if patiently born, denote a good of the soul.

NOTE: 1. Spiritual penalties are never medicinal (for others), because the good of the soul is not ordained to another better good. Wherefore in the goods of the soul no one suffers ill without fault of his own, and thus one person is not punished for another (in body of art.).

2. The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in the children (Ex. xx, 5), because children who are brought up amid their parents' crimes are the more prone to sin, both by becoming accustomed to them and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their authority, as it were. Moreover, they deserve heavier punishment, if, seeing their parents' punishment, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation (Ad. 1).

QUESTION LXXXVIII

VENIAL IN COMPARISON WITH MORTAL SIN

Here we distinguish venial from mortal sin according to the debt of punishment: 1) Venial sin by comparison with mortal; 2) venial sin considered in itself. The first head takes up six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED AGAINST MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Taking mortal sin metaphorically for bodily death.

THE REASON is that, if mortal sin is literally taken, it is not opposed to venial sin, for infirmities and death literally taken are not in the same genus. But metaphorically taken mortal sin is opposed to venial sin, since the two are opposed as that which is irreparable and that which is reparable. Venial sins are reparable because they have a deordination with respect to things that are referred to the end, the order to the last end being preserved; but mortal sins are irreparable, because they denote a deprivation of the last end, in relation to which the life of the soul consists. Now such a deprivation cannot be repaired save by divine power, as was explained above (q. lxxii, art. 5); i.e., not by any intrinsic principle.

NOTE: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not an (univocal) division of a genus into its species, but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin; even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not *against* the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids nor omits what the law prescribes; but he acts *beside* the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN DIFFER GENERICALLY.

YES.—Something is a mortal sin by reason of its genus, and something is a venial sin by reason of its genus, according to the determination of the object.

THE REASON is that, because the will tends to something that considered in itself

is opposed to charity, by which man is directed to his last end, that sin has by its very object the character of being mortal, wherefore it is mortal in its genus, whether it is against the love of God, as blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of neighbor, as murder, adultery, and the like; consequently such are mortal sins by their very genus. But sometimes the will of the sinner is directed to that which in itself contains a certain deordinateness, but is not opposed to the love of God and the neighbor, such as an idle word, excessive laughter, and the like; and such are venial sins in their genus, as has been explained (q. lxxvii, art. 5).

NOTE: Because moral acts receive their character of good and evil, not only from their object, but also from some disposition of the agent (q. lxxvii, art. 6), it happens sometimes that that which is a venial sin in its genus becomes, by virtue of its object, mortal on the part of the agent, either because he places his last end in it, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its genus, for example when one directs an idle word to the commission of adultery. Similarly also on the part of the agent it happens that some sin that is mortal in its own genus becomes venial because the act is imperfect, that is, not deliberated by reason, as was explained above (q. lxxiv, art. 1) concerning sudden movements of infidelity (in body of art.).—Consequently there are three classes of venial sins: Those that are venial in their own genus, i.e., by reason of their object; those that are venial because of lightness of matter, which however can be grave matter, and such are called venial in their cause; and those that are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.

ART. III.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN IS A DISPOSITION TO MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Not as a direct cause, save by a certain consequence; but as an indirect cause, removing an obstacle.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the direct cause disposes to an act specifically similar. Consequently sin that is venial in its genus cannot directly, primarily, and of itself dispose to a sin that is mortal in its genus, since they differ in species.—Venial sin can, however, dispose by way of a certain consequence to mortal sin, namely on the part of the agent, inasmuch as when a disposition or habit has been strengthened through acts of venial sin the lust of sinning can grow so far that the sinner fixes his end in venial sin. And thus by sinning many times venially he will be disposed to mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who sins venially omits some order; and, as a consequence of his accustoming his will not to be subject to due order in lesser things, he is disposed so that he will not subject his will to the order of the last end. And in this way, by removing an obstacle, sin that is venial in its genus can dispose to sin that is mortal in its genus.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A VENIAL SIN CAN BECOME MORTAL.

NO.—a) The same identical act that is a venial sin in the beginning cannot afterwards be mortal; b) many venial sins never integrally constitute a mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sin consists principally in an act of the will, as does any moral act. Consequently it is not called morally one act if the will is changed, although the action be continuous in its own nature; but if the will is not changed it is impossible for a venial sin to become mortal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) on the part of the duration of the punishment, because mortal sin has the debt of eternal punishment, whereas venial sin has the debt of temporal punishment; b) on the part of the pain of loss; because mortal sin deserves the privation of the divine vision, to which no other punishment can be compared; c) on the part of the pain of sense, because mortal sin is pursued by the worm of conscience, but not venial sin.

That a generically venial sin may become mortal, or that many venial sins dispose to mortal sin, has already been explained (art. 2 of this q.).

NOTE: The comparison between venial and mortal sin that rests on the analogy of a curable and incurable disease is not valid here, because venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be resumed (Ad. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE A VENIAL SIN MORTAL.

NO.—a) A circumstance cannot make a venial sin mortal as long as the circum-

stance remains; but b) only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of a moral act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a circumstance, as such, cannot change that which is according to its species. Now venial sin, as such, denotes a deordination with respect to things that are referred to the end; but mortal sin denotes a deordination with regard to the end itself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that then a circumstance loses the nature of a circumstance, and constitutes a new species of a moral act. For example, when a man approaches a woman not his wife, the circumstance involves the deformity of an act that is opposed to chastity; and if he approaches another man's wife there is an additional deformity that is opposed to justice; and thus the circumstance constitutes a new species of sin.

NOTE: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g., disobedience, contempt, or the like (Ad. 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER A MORTAL SIN CAN BECOME VENIAL.

NO.—A mortal sin cannot become venial by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin; but it can become venial by reason of the imperfection of deliberation, as in the case of a sudden moral act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which is perfect cannot become imperfect by addition. Now a sin that is mortal is perfect in the genus of sin, but a venial sin is imperfect in that genus (art. 1 of this q. ad. 1). In fact, a mortal sin is aggravated on account of the deformity connected with it, as when one who fornicates adds an idle word.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a moral act has its species from deliberate reason; wherefore by the withdrawal of deliberation the species of mortal sin is destroyed.

QUESTION LXXXIX VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAUSES A STAIN ON THE SOUL.

NO.—Venial sin does not hinder the habitual or intrinsic comeliness of the soul, but it hinders the actual comeliness, which is as it were the external brightness of the virtues.

THE REASON is that venial sin does not exclude or diminish the habit of charity and the other virtues, but only hinders their act. Wherefore it can be said in an improper sense that venial sin causes a stain, since the stain is something permanent and habitual; but venial sin, as such, is something transient. Yet many venial sins can dispositively lead to mortal sin and consequently to the stain (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE SUITABLY DESIGNATED AS 'WOOD, HAY, AND STUBBLE.'

YES.—a) Mortal sins are not designated by these words; but b) venial sins are suitably so designated.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Apostle says (I Cor. iii, 12) that the man who builds up wood, hay, stubble "shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Now he who sins mortally cannot be saved.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that these things (wood, hay, stubble) are stored in a house, yet do not belong to the substance of the edifice, and can be burned while the building remains, so also venial sins are multiplied in man while the spiritual edifice remains, and on account of them he suffers fire, either the fire of temporal tribulation in this life, or purgatorial fire hereafter; and yet he attains eternal salvation.

NOTE: 1. As Aristotle says (*On the Heavens*, i, text 2): "All things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, and the end." Accordingly, all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, namely to wood, which remains longer in the fire; stubble, which is burnt up at once; and hay, which is between these two; because venial sins are

removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them (Ad. 4).

2. Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity; wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN COULD COMMIT A VENIAL SIN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE.

NOTE: The meaning of the article is not as though that which in us is venial would be mortal to a man in the state of innocence, on account of the dignity of the state; for the dignity of a person, as such, does not transfer a human act to another species. But the meaning is whether in the state of innocence man could sin venially before he lost the integrity of that state through mortal sin.

NO.—THE REASON is that venial sin in us happens either because of the imperfection of the act, such as sudden movements in the genus of mortal sins, or on account of a deordination with respect to things that are referred to the end, without the loss of due order to the end, as we have often explained. A sudden movement is one either of sensuality or of reason: The first happens because of sensuality's not being perfectly subject to reason; the second, by virtue of the fact that the execution of an act of reason is not perfectly subject to deliberation, which proceeds from a higher good (q. lxxiv, art. 10).

Now deordination with respect to things that are referred to the end arises from the fact that things that are referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which in matters concerning the appetite holds the highest place. Now such sudden movements and the deordination of an act were not possible in the state of innocence, because in that state there was unerring firmness of order (I P. q. xcv, art. 1), and the lower was always subject to the higher as long as the highest part of man was subject to God.—If man in the state of innocence could have sinned venially he could also have destroyed the integrity of the state itself by venial sin; but this could be and was done only through mortal sin (Ad 3).

NOTE: The vainglory that preceded man's fall was the first mortal sin; for it is said (in St. Augustine, *Super Gen., ad litteram*, book xi, c. 5) to have preceded his fall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to experiment, and, in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A GOOD OR A WICKED ANGEL CAN SIN VENIALLY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the things that are referred to the end, about which venial sin can be committed, are considered by the angelic intellect in the end itself, which is the principle. For the intellect of the angel is not discursive (I P., q. lviii, art. 3). Consequently the angels have by their very nature that there can be no deordination in them with regard to the things that are referred to the end, unless there is at the same time a deordination with respect to the end itself, which is through mortal sin. Thus the good angel is not moved to the things that are referred to the end save in accord with the due end, through charity; the wicked angels are moved only in relation to the end of their own pride, and thus in all things they sin mortally.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SENSUALITY IN UNBELIEVERS ARE MORTAL SINS.

NO.—If they do not consent to them.

THE FIRST REASON is that the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers; and the sensuality itself is not a subject of mortal sin (q. lxxiv, art. 4). Wherefore it is impossible that in unbelievers a simple movement of the sensuality should be a mortal sin.

THE SECOND REASON is that the dignity of a person never diminishes sin, but rather increases it; consequently sin in a believer is much greater than in an unbeliever.

NOTE: The Holy Doctor raises this question against those who, misinterpreting the words of St. Paul (Rom. viii, 1), "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh," concluded that the first movements of the sensuality in infidels are mortal sins, though they are not such in Christ Jesus. But the Apostle is speaking here of the damnation due for original sin, which is taken away by grace. Hence a movement of the sensuality in believers is not now a sign of damnation; but it is a sign of damnation in unbelievers as long as they are not baptized (Ad. 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE IN ANYONE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE.

NO.—It is impossible that venial sin can be in anyone with original sin, if he does not have mortal sin.

THE REASON is that, when anyone in original sin begins to have the use of reason he must deliberate concerning himself; and, if he directs himself to his due end, he will obtain through grace the remission of original sin; and thus venial sin would be no longer possible with original sin. If, however, he does not direct himself to his due end, he will sin mortally, by not doing what in him lies, and thus the venial sin that he would afterward commit would not be with original sin alone, but would be with mortal sin.

NOTE: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but he is not free from the sin of omission aforesaid, unless he turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's affirmative precepts, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zach. i, 3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you" (Ad 3). [Translator's Note: Some theologians do not accept St. Thomas' reasoning on this point.]

TREATISE ON LAW

We must now consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptation we have spoken in the first part (q. xci, art. 2 and 3). But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, who both instructs us by means of His Law and assists us by His grace. Hence we must first treat of law and then of grace.

Concerning law we must consider 1) law itself in general; 2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points occur for consideration: 1) Its essence; 2) the different kinds of law; 3) the effects of law.

Under the first head there are four points.

QUESTION XC THE ESSENCE OF LAW

ART. I.—WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON.

YES.—THE REASON is that law, which is so called from binding (*ligare*), is a kind of rule and measure, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting. Now the rule and measure of human acts is reason (q. lxvi, art. 1). Therefore law is something belonging to reason, and moreover to practical reason (Ad 2).

NOTE: Regarding the words of the Apostle (Rom. vii, 23): "I see another law in my members," it is to be considered that, since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways: First, as in that which measures and rules; and, since this is proper to reason (whose office is to direct to the end), it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, law is in something as in that which is ruled and measured. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law, so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially but by participation, as it were. And in this way the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE LAW IS ALWAYS SOMETHING DIRECTED TO THE COMMON GOOD.

YES.—Both by reason of the object, which is the last end, or beatitude, and by reason of the community.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the first principle of the practical reason,

to which the law pertains, is the last end, or beatitude. Hence law should most regard the order that is happiness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as a part must needs be directed to the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect, so man, who is part of a perfect community, must be directed to the community itself, by virtue of a common final cause (Ad 2), or by reason of the common good or prosperity, and this is done by law. Consequently, law is chiefly directed to the common good, and any other precept in regard to some particular work does not have the nature of law except as it regards the common good (at end of art.).

NOTE: Reason also directs to private good, but, as nothing stands firm with respect to the speculative reason, except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end, which is the common good; and whatever stands to reason in this sense has the nature of a law (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS.

NO.—THE REASON is that to order anything to the common good, which law first and foremost regards, belongs either to the whole community or to someone who has the care of the whole community, since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Consequently, he who governs a community that is not a perfect community, i.e., that is subordinate to another community that is perfect, can indeed make some commands or statutes, but not such as have properly the character of law (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO A LAW.

YES.—In order that law may have binding power, which is proper to law.

THE REASON is that law cannot have binding force, which is proper to law, unless those by whom it is ruled and measured are notified of the things that must be ruled and measured by the law. This is done by the application of the law, or by its promulgation.

NOTE: 1. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally (Ad 1).

2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

3. From the four preceding articles the definition of law may be gathered: "An ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."

QUESTION XCI

THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS AN ETERNAL LAW.

YES.—It is the governing reason of the whole universe, which exists in the divine mind.

THE REASON is that the world is ruled by divine providence. Therefore it must be the governing reason of all things, which exists in God. This reason existing in God as in the Ruler of the universe has the nature of a law; and, because it is in the mind of God, we must call it eternal.

NOTE: Regarding the promulgation of the eternal law, it must be observed that promulgation is made by word and by writing; and in both ways the eternal law has promulgation on the part of God Promulgating: For the Divine Word is eternal, and the writing of the Book of Life is eternal. But, on the part of the creature who hears or reads, the promulgation cannot be eternal (Ad 2).

2. The eternal law (existing in God) is not ordered to another end, because the end of divine government is God Himself; nor is His law distinct from Him (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS IN US A NATURAL LAW.

YES.—It is the participation of the eternal law in so far as we distinguish good and evil.

THE REASON is that everything that is subject to divine providence is ruled and measured by eternal law. Therefore the eternal law is in everything as in that which is ruled and measured by some participation, in so far, namely, as creatures have from its impression inclinations to their proper acts and ends.

Man is subject in a more excellent way to providence, inasmuch as he partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for himself and for others, and thus in a special way he has a share of the eternal reason.

Such a participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law, according to the word of the Psalmist (iv, 6): "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." This implies that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light.—Accordingly, the first direction of our acts to their end must be in virtue of the natural law (Ad 2).

NOTE: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the eternal reason, just as the rational creature does. But, because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as explained (q. of prec. art. 1). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS A HUMAN LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as from undemonstrable principles that are naturally known there come conclusions of the different sciences, the knowledge of which is not naturally implanted in us; so from certain general and undemonstrable principles does human reason proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed.

NOTE: Human law may be defined as an ordinance of human reason suitable to natural law, and promulgated for the common good by him who has the care of the community.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEED FOR A DIVINE LAW.

YES.—Besides the natural and human law, a divine law was necessary, by which man should be ordered and infallibly directed to his supernatural end, which is eternal happiness.

THE FIRST REASON is that the end to which man is ordered, which is eternal happiness, surpasses the natural proportion of human power (q. v, art. 5).

THE SECOND REASON is that, in order that man may certainly know what he must do and what he must avoid, it was necessary that he be directed in his own acts by a divinely given law, as to which it is certain that he cannot err.

THE THIRD REASON is that man can make a law concerning those things of which he can judge. Now concerning internal acts, which are not open to view, man cannot judge; and yet it is required for the perfection of virtue that even in his internal acts man be made right. Consequently, human law could not sufficiently restrain and order internal acts, but it was necessary that divine law should supervene for this purpose.

THE FOURTH REASON is that human law cannot punish or forbid all evil that is done, since otherwise it would hinder the advance of the common good. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

NOTE: By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE IS BUT ONE DIVINE LAW.

NO.—There is no distinction of species, but there is a distinction of perfect and imperfect within the same species.

THE REASON is that the divine law is distinguished, as between the Old and the New, as a man is distinguished by the boy and the adult (Gal. iii, 26). Now the New

Law is called more perfect than the Old for three reasons: 1) By reason of the end, or the common good: For the Old Law was directed immediately to a sensible and earthly good, as is evident by the promise of the Land of Canaan; but the law of the New Testament is immediately ordered to a spiritual and heavenly good, as is evident from the beginning of the preaching of Christ: "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matt. iv, 17);

2) By reason of the direction of human acts according to the order of justice; because the Law of the Old Testament did not order interior acts as did the New, as is clear from the words of Christ: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v, 20). Hence the Old Law restrains the hand (i.e., with punishment), but the New Law controls the mind;

3) By reason of inducement to the observance of the commandments, for the Law of the Old Testament was a law of the fear of punishments; the New Law is one of love, which is infused in our hearts by the grace of Christ, which is bestowed in the New Law, but only figured in the Old.

For the law could not be given perfectly to all until after the coming of Christ, for there is not the same help of grace before and after the coming of Christ (Ad. 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE IS A LAW IN THE 'FOMES' OF SIN.

YES.—According to the words of the Apostle, Rom. vii, 23: "I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind." This law is called law only indirectly and by participation, or as a penal law.

THE REASON is that *fomes*, or the impulse of sensuality, which is in man, is in him by virtue of man's being deprived of the dignity of original justice and the vigor of reason by divine justice. This has the nature of law indirectly by participation, or of penal law.

NOTE: 1. Law is essentially in him who rules and measures; by way of participation it is in that which is ruled and measured; and that in two ways: directly, in so far as the lawgiver directly moves the subject of the law to some end; or indirectly, when the lawgiver deprives someone subject to him of some dignity, from which it follows that the subject passes to another order, and as it were to another law, namely as to a penal law, and so it is of the law of *fomes* or concupiscence (in body of art.).

In the brutes such an impulse of sensuality is not against reason (which they do not have); hence it does not have the nature of a penal law, nor do they share indirectly in law, but in them the impulse of sensuality has simply the nature of law (in the way that law can be in such things [i.e., by analogy, as we say that fierceness is the law of the dog, and meekness that of the sheep].—(body of art.).

2. If the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called *fomes* in so far as it strays from the order of reason (Ad. 3).

QUESTION XCII THE EFFECTS OF LAW (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AN EFFECT OF LAW IS TO MAKE MEN GOOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is the function of law to lead its subjects to their proper virtue; for the virtue of any subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler, as Aristotle says (*Politics*, Book 1, last chapter). Since, then, virtue is that which makes its subject good, it follows that the effect of law is to make good those to whom it is given; and this is done either simply, namely when the intention of the lawgiver is directed to that which is good simply, or true good, as that which is directed to the common good and ruled according to divine justice; or in a limited sense, as when the intention of the legislator is not that which is simply good, but a good that is useful or pleasurable to himself, or even repugnant to divine justice. This makes the subject good in some particular order only, namely in relation to a particular government, as when someone is called a good robber.

NOTE: 1. The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (*Confessions*, bk. iii, chap. 8, a little from the beginning) that

"unseemly is the part that does not harmonize with its whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good unless he be well proportionate to the common good; nor can the whole well exist unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers (Ad. 3).

2. A tyrannical law, since it is not according to reason, is not a law strictly speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.

But such a law is not to be obeyed, as will be said further on (q. xcvi, art. 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACTS OF LAW ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—These acts are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish.

THE REASON is that the law is given for the purpose of directing human acts. Now there are three distinctions in human acts (q. xviii, art. 5 and 8): Some are generically good, since they are acts of the virtues; and with respect to these the act of the law is a precept or command. Some acts are evil generically, i.e., acts of vice, and in respect to these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect to these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent.—And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: In which respect punishment is an effect of law.

QUESTION XCIII THE ETERNAL LAW

We are now to consider each law separately: 1) The eternal law; 2) the natural law; 3) the human law; 4) the Old Law; 5) the New Law, which is the Law of the Gospel.—Of the sixth law, which is the law of *fomes*, suffice what we have said when treating of original sin (qq. lxxxii, and lxxxiii).—Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS A SOVEREIGN TYPE EXISTING IN GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the type (*ratio*) of him who governs the acts of his subjects has the character of law (q. xc). Now God is the Governor of all the acts and movements that are found in every creature (P. I, q. ciii, art. 5). Therefore the type of the divine wisdom as it moves all things to its due end has the character of law. And thus the eternal law is nothing else than "the type of Divine Wisdom, as it directs all actions and movements."

NOTE: 1. As is clear from what has been said (in the article), the eternal law is not said to be personally in the Godhead, but essentially; yet it is appropriated to the Son on account of the kinship that the type has with the word (of the mind) (Ad. 2).

2. This supreme type existing in God, which is the eternal law, is truth itself. For the divine intellect is not measured by things, as is the human intellect, but it is the measure of things; and each thing so far has truth as it imitates the divine intellect (I P., q. xvi, art. 1). And accordingly the divine intellect is truth in itself; wherefore its type is truth itself (Ad. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ETERNAL LAW IS KNOWN TO ALL.

YES.—The eternal law is known to all in some measure.

THE REASON is that all men in some measure know the truth; now every knowledge of the truth is to some extent an irradiation and participation of the eternal law, which is immutable truth; but no one knows the eternal law in itself except God alone, and the blessed, who see God in His essence.

ART. III.—WHETHER EVERY LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW.

YES.—All the plans of government that are in secondary governors flow from the eternal law.

THE REASON is that in all subordinate movers the power of the secondary mover is derived from the power of the first mover; for he does not move except in so far as he is moved by the first. Now laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are as it were subordinate movers to one end, namely the common good, which must needs be ordered to the last end according to right reason.

ART. IV.—WHETHER NECESSARY AND ETERNAL THINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW.

NO.—To the eternal law are subject everything in what God has created, whether they be contingent or necessary; but the things that pertain to the divine nature or essence are not subject to the eternal law.

THE REASON is that, since the eternal law is the plan of the divine government, all those things that are subject to the divine government are subject also to the eternal law, and these are all the things that are in the things created by God, whether they are contingent or necessary; all those things that are not subject to divine government neither are subject to the eternal law, and these are all the things that pertain to the divine nature or essence, which are actually the eternal law itself.

NOTE: The will of God is called *reasonable*, and therefore subject to the divine reason, not in so far as it is will itself, because thus God's will is His very essence; but with regard to the things that God wills with respect to creatures, because these things God wills according to the divine wisdom; regarded in itself, it should rather be called their type (*ratio*) (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER NATURAL CONTINGENTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as man impresses, as it were, the interior principle of acts on a man subject to him, by notifying him of his will, so also God impresses on the whole of nature the principles of its proper acts; by this means God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Psalm cxlviii, 6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away."

NOTE: 1. However much irrational creatures are subject to man, man cannot impose a law on them; because they do not move themselves, just as he cannot impose a law on the members of his own body. Although they are moved by the command of reason, they do not partake of reason, for they have no apprehension subordinate to reason (in body of art. and ad. 2).

2. The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things what the promulgation of law is to men: Because law, by being promulgated, imprints on a man a directive principle of human actions (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ALL HUMAN AFFAIRS ARE SUBJECT TO THE ETERNAL LAW.

YES.—Both because all men know to some extent the eternal law and because they act or suffer thereby. But this is different in the good and in the bad.

THE REASON is that, as has been stated (art. 2 of this q.), every rational creature in some way has knowledge of the eternal law, and again there is in each rational creature a natural inclination to that which is consonant with the eternal law.

Yet in the wicked both the (practical) knowledge of the eternal law and the inclination to virtue is depraved by vice; in the good both are found more perfect, for over and above their natural knowledge there is added to them the knowledge of faith and wisdom, and to their natural inclinations there is added the interior movement of grace and virtue. Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it; the bad are subject indeed to the eternal law, but imperfectly, in so far as they imperfectly know it and are imperfectly inclined to good, for sin does not take away the whole good of nature (q. lxxxv, art. 2). But this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, for failing to act in harmony with the eternal law.

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of the Apostle (Galat. v, 18): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law," it is to be noted that such are not under the law, not in the sense of refusing the obligation of the law, as are the wicked; but in the sense that they so voluntarily and lovingly live according to the law that the law does not, as it were, have binding force for them. Or it can be understood in another way, viz., that those who act according to the Spirit of God do not fall under the law because the Spirit

Himself is not under the law, as the Apostle says (II Cor., iii, 17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

2. A thing is maintained in the end and moved toward the end by one and the same cause: Thus gravity, which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law (Ad. 3).

QUESTION XCIV THE NATURAL LAW (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS A HABIT.

NO.—The natural law is not a habit properly and essentially, but improperly, in so far as it is held by a habit.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which a man does, and that whereby he does it, are not the same. Since therefore a habit is that whereby someone acts, whereas the natural law is something constituted by reason (just as a proposition is a work of reason), it is impossible that any law should be a habit properly and essentially.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered actually by reason; sometimes they are only habitually in it; accordingly, it can be said that the natural law is a habit, just as faith is called that which is held by faith.

NOTE: Synderesis is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions, and thus it is called the law of our intellect; but it is called law improperly, inasmuch as it virtually contains the law or the precepts of the natural law. Synderesis, as was explained in I P., q. lxxix, art. 12, is a habit inclining us to assent to practical principles (Ad. 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW CONTAINS SEVERAL PRECEPTS, OR ONE ONLY.

ANSWER: The natural law does not contain one precept only, but many, which however are founded on one precept: Good is to be done and followed, evil is to be avoided.

THE REASON is that, just as that being is first which falls under the apprehension simply, so the good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is ordered to action. Now law is a dictate of the practical reason. Accordingly, the first dictate of the practical reason is founded on the notion of good, which is: *Good is what all seek*. Consequently the first precept of law is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil to be avoided; and on this precept are founded all the other precepts of the natural law, in respect of those things to which man has a natural inclination, and which reason apprehends as good, and consequently as actually to be pursued, and their contraries to be avoided as evil.

According, therefore, to the order of the natural inclinations, there is an order of the precepts of the natural law. The first is an inclination to the good of nature, which man has in common with all substances, namely as regards the preservation of his being according to his nature; and in virtue of this inclination there belong to the natural law those things by which man's life is preserved and what is hostile to it thwarted.

The second inclination in man is to things that pertain to him more especially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals. And in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring, and so forth.

The third inclination is to good according to the nature of man's reason, which nature is proper to him: Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society; and in this respect whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things.

And so the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation (Ad. 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL ACTS OF VIRTUE ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE NATURAL LAW.

YES.—a) In so far as they are virtuous acts; b) but not in themselves, in so far, namely, as they are considered in their proper species.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since everything is inclined by nature to the operation appropriate to it according to its form, and the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is a natural inclination in every man to do what he does according to reason; and this is to act virtuously.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that many things are done virtuously to which nature does not incline at first; but through the inquiry of reason men have discovered them to be conducive to well-being; such as are fasts, the mortification of the flesh, perpetual chastity, etc.

NOTE: All sins, in so far as they are acts against reason, are also against nature; yet certain special sins are said to be against nature, in so far as man has a common nature with the animals. Such are the sins contrary to sexual intercourse, homosexuality, and the like (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE NATURAL LAW IS THE SAME IN ALL MEN.

YES.—As regards first general principles, the natural law is the same in all men, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; but with regard to the conclusions of the general principles of practical reason (which are the object of law), it is not the same for all men, but only in the majority of cases, both in rectitude and in knowledge.

THE REASON is that, as regards general principles (both of the speculative and the practical reason), there is the same truth or rectitude in all men, and it is equally known to all; but with respect to the particular conclusions (or in matters of detail) of the practical reason, some fail on account of obstacles interposed to rectitude, and also in respect of knowledge, according to the warping of reason by passion, either because of evil habit, or because of an evil disposition of nature; thus among the Germans brigandage was once not considered wrong, though it is expressly against the law of nature.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE CHANGED.

NO.—The law of nature cannot be changed by subtraction with regard to first principles. With regard to secondary precepts, which we have said to be certain proximate conclusions drawn from first principles, the natural law is not changed, so that what it prescribes is not right in most cases, but may be changed (in practice) in some particular case of less frequent occurrence through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts.

THE REASON is patent from what has been said in the preceding article.

NOTE: 1. By way of addition, the natural law can be changed, as in fact it has been changed; for many things have been added over and above the natural law that are useful for human life, and this by the divine law as well as by human laws (in body of art.).

2. Regarding God's command to Abraham to slay Isaac, and other such cases, we must note that God is the Lord of all things, and whatever is commanded by God is due, and in natural things whatever is done by God is in some way natural as has been explained (I., q. cv, art. 6 Ad 1).

3. With regard to the words of Isidore (*Etymologies*, book v, chap. 4): "The possession of all things in common and universal freedom are of the natural law," a thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways: First, because nature inclines thereto—e.g., that one should not do harm to another; secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: Thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense the possession of all things in common and universal freedom are said to be of the natural law, because the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Thus the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition. (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE ABOLISHED FROM THE HEART OF MAN.

NO.—a) With regard to general principles, which are known naturally to all, the

natural law (in the abstract) can in no way be blotted out from the hearts of men; but it is blotted out in the case of a particular action; b) regarding the secondary precepts, which are as it were conclusions following closely from the principles, the natural law can be blotted out of men's hearts.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the application of general to particular principles, reason can be hindered by concupiscence or some other passion, as was explained above (q. lxxvii, art. 2.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, even in speculative matters, errors may arise regarding necessary conclusions; the secondary precepts, moreover, are as it were conclusions from first principles. These secondary precepts can be blotted out either by evil persuasions, or also by evil customs and corrupt habits, as among certain nations theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom. i), were not considered sinful.

QUESTION XCV HUMAN LAW CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

Here human law is considered: 1) in itself; 2) its power; 3) its mutability.—The first head claims four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS USEFUL FOR SOME LAWS TO BE FRAMED BY MEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that aptitude for virtue, which is naturally in man, cannot arrive at perfection except by some kind of training, as even in certain necessary matters, such as food and clothing, we cannot arrive at perfection except by some industry. Now for this training man is not easily found self-sufficient, especially if he is prone to vice.

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY HUMAN LAW IS DERIVED FROM THE NATURAL LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that man-made law so far has the power of law as it is according to the rule of reason. Now the first rule of reason is the natural law (prec. q., art. 2). Consequently, all man-made law, as far as it has the nature of law, is derived from the law of nature.

NOTE: Some human laws are derived from the general conclusions of the natural law by way of conclusions; e.g., that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from this, that one must do harm to no man; and some things are derived therefrom by way of determination, e.g., the law of nature has it that one who sins must be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way is a determination of the law of nature (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER ISIDORE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE LAW IS APPROPRIATE.

YES.—Positive law, according to the *Etymologies*, book v, chap. 21, "shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good."

THE REASON is that human law must be proportioned to the end to which it is directed and be ruled according to a higher rule and measure, namely according to the divine and the natural law. Consequently Isidore writes three things into the condition for a law: Namely that it foster religion, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the divine law; that it be helpful to discipline, inasmuch as it is proportionate to the law of nature; and that it further the common weal, inasmuch as it is proportionate to its end, i.e., the utility of mankind. To these three all the other qualities he mentions are reduced.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ISIDORE'S DIVISION OF HUMAN LAWS IS APPROPRIATE.

YES.—Human law a) as it is derived from natural law, is divided into the law of nations and the civil law; b) as it is ordained to the common good, it is divided, according to the different sorts of its ministers, into military, royal, and priestly law; c) or according to the different sorts of governments; d) or according to the names of those who sponsored the law.

THE REASON is that Isidore introduces a division according to what is contained

in the notion of law, and this is properly to divide. For it is, first, of the essence of human law that it be derived from the law of nature, and in this way positive law is divided into the law of nations and the civil law, according to the two ways whereby something is derived from the law of nature, namely as conclusions from principles, such as just buying and selling, and other such things, without which men cannot live together; and by way of particular determination, in so far as every state decides what is best for itself.

Secondly, it is of the nature of human law that it be ordained to the common good of the state; thus it can be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good, such as priests who pray for the people; the rulers who govern the people; and the soldiers who fight for the people's safety.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law to be framed by the one who governs the community of the state, and thus human laws are distinguished according to the different forms of government. In so far as the government is in one man (monarchy) or is in the hands of aristocrats (aristocracy), or is held by a few rich and powerful men (oligarchy), or is government of the people (democracy), or is a government combining all features (and that is best).

There is also tyrannical government, which, since it is altogether corrupt, has no corresponding law, which is a dictate of practical reason.

Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions; and thus laws are distinguished according to the various matters with which they deal. These are sometimes named from their authors. Thus we have the *Lex Julia*, about adultery; the *Lex Cornelia*, concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer.

QUESTION XCVI THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE FRAMED FOR THE COMMUNITY RATHER THAN FOR THE INDIVIDUAL.

YES.—Human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual.

THE REASON is that the end of the law is the common good, for everything that is for an end must be proportioned to the end. It follows therefore that law should regard many objects, both as to persons and as to affairs, and as to times, for the common good comprises many things.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO HUMAN LAW TO REPRESS ALL VICES.

NO.—THE REASON is that human law is framed for the multitude of men, in which the greater part is formed of men not perfected in virtue. For law must be "possible, both according to nature, and according to the custom of the country" (prec. q., art. 3). Hence human law does not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous refrain, but only the graver sort, from which it is possible for the greater part of the community to refrain, and especially those that turn to the injury of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be preserved. Thus human law forbids murder, theft, and the like.

NOTE: Human law intends to bring men to virtue, not all at once, but gradually, and therefore it does not immediately impose on the multitude of the imperfect the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz., that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils. Thus it is written (Prov. xxx, 33): "He that violently bloweth his nose bringeth out blood;" and (Matt. ix, 17) that if "new wine," i.e., precepts of a perfect life, is "put into old bottles," i.e., into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine runneth out," i.e., the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break out into evils that are worse still (Ad. 2).

But the evils that human law permits are punished by providence (Ad. 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER HUMAN LAW PRESCRIBES ACTS OF ALL THE VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that law is ordained for the common good (q. xc, art. 2);

and therefore there is no virtue about whose acts the law cannot command, for there is no virtue the acts of which are not ordainable to the common good, whether mediately or immediately (Ad 3), with the exceptions mentioned in the previous article.

ART. IV.—WHETHER HUMAN LAW BINDS MAN IN CONSCIENCE.

YES.—If it is justly imposed, but not if it is unjustly imposed, unless it be to avoid scandals or greater evils.

THE REASON is that a just law is derived from the eternal law; consequently it is binding in conscience, according to Prov. viii, 15: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things" or according to St. Paul, Rom. xiii, 1: "All [human] power is from God . . . therefore he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God."

NOTE: Laws are called just, either: a) From their end, when, namely, they are ordained to the common good; or b) from their author, when the law does not exceed the power of the one who gives it; or c) from their form, when burdens are fairly apportioned among the subjects in relation to the common good; for man is a part of society, and each man, in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save the whole.—Laws are however unjust if they are contrary to the foregoing conditions.—Nevertheless, to avoid scandal or disturbance to society, the individual should, by reason of the natural law, yield his rights, according to Matt. v, 41: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other two."—But the laws of tyrants, if they are against the divine law, are in no way to be observed, because, as stated in Acts v, 29: "We ought to obey God rather than man" (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL MEN ARE SUBJECT TO THE LAW.

YES.—a) In so far as the law is the rule of conduct, all are subject to the law, as they are subject to a power; b) but in so far as it has coercive force, only the wicked are subject to the law; in this respect the good are not subject to the law [not violating it they do not have to answer to it].

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that all who are subject to a power are subject to law, which is enacted by him who has the power. This can happen in two ways: a) Simply, When one is released from subjection to the power, even as the citizens of one state are not subject to the power of the government of another state; b) relatively, when one is subject to a higher power, for in this respect he is not subject to the superior of a lesser power.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that whatever is coerced is contrary to will; now the will of the good is in accord with law, and the will of the bad is in disaccord with it. Consequently, in this sense the good are not under the law, but only the bad. For the Apostle says (Rom. ii, 15): "The law is not made for the just men, because they are a law to themselves, since they show the work of the law written in their hearts" (Ad 1).

NOTE: 1. With regard to those who are moved by the Holy Spirit, they are not subject to the law in respect to what is contrary to the guidance of the Holy Spirit; but the very fact that spiritual men are subject to human laws belongs to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, according to I Pet. ii, 13: "Be you subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake" (Ad 2).

2. As for the sovereign, he is not subject by force of coercive law; because no one can be properly forced by himself. Yet sovereigns are subject, with respect to the judgment of God, by force of directive law, as is shown by the words of Christ, who rebukes those who "say and do not" (Matt. xiii, 3).—(Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HE WHO IS UNDER A LAW MAY ACT BESIDE THE LETTER OF THE LAW.

YES.—When the common good demands this.

THE REASON is that law is ordained for the common welfare. Now in some cases it is most prejudicial to observe the law. Hence if a case emerges in which the observance of such a law is injurious to the common welfare, it is not to be observed, viz., if there is sudden danger, which does not brook such delay as is necessary to have recourse to a superior, for necessity is not subject to law.

QUESTION XCVII CHANGE IN THE LAWS

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY.

YES.—a) Both on the part of reason and on the part of men.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it seems natural to human reason to rise gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clearly seen from human institutions.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that human conditions, the acts of which are governed by law, are subject to change; for different measures are expedient for different conditions.

NOTE: The natural law is not subject to change, a quality it has from the immobility and perfection of the divine reason, which instituted nature. But human reason is changeable and imperfect; hence its law is subject to change. Likewise, the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which remain forever; but man-made law contains certain particular precepts according to the various cases that emerge (Ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER HUMAN LAW SHOULD ALWAYS BE CHANGED WHENEVER SOMETHING BETTER OCCURS.

NO.—THE REASON is that when law is changed, even for the better, the binding force of a law is diminished; for custom is of great force in securing the observance of the laws. Consequently, as was said by the jurist Ulpian (Lib. I, tit. 4, *De Constit. Princip.*): "In establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just."

ART. III.—WHETHER CUSTOM CAN OBTAIN THE FORCE OF LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the mind and will of the lawgiver are manifested not only in words but also in deeds. For everyone seems to choose as good what actually is done, especially by multiplied acts, viz., in so far as by external multiplied acts the interior movement of the will and the concept of the reason are most effectively manifested. Now these repeated acts create custom. Consequently, in this way, custom both has the force of law and abolishes law, and is the interpreter of the laws.—From this also it appears that no custom can obtain the force of law if it is against the divine or natural law, which do not depend on human will (Ad. 1).—Similarly, if the reason on account of which the first law was useful still remains, the custom does not prevail over the law, but the law prevails over the custom (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE RULES OF THE PEOPLE CAN DISPENSE FROM HUMAN LAWS.

YES.—THE REASON is that to dispense is properly nothing else than to measure out to individuals what is common to all. An example would be the case of a governor of a household, who is called a dispenser inasmuch as he distributes work and the necessities of life in due weight and measure to each one of the household. Just so, in a community one is said to dispense from the very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each individual for the sake of the common good. This however belongs to those who govern, not to individuals, unless perhaps on account of some evident and sudden danger (q. xcvi, art. 6).

NOTE: 1. If a governor grant this permission without any such reason, but of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an impudent dispenser: Unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reason for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke xii, 42): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise steward [dispenser] whom his lord setteth over his family?" (at end of art.).

2. It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor (Ad. 2).

QUESTION XCVIII THE OLD LAW

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GOOD.

YES.—But imperfect.

THE REASON is that the Old Law was in accord with right reason, for it repressed concupiscence, and forbade all sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. vii, 16): "I admit that the law is good." Now the divine law is perfect if it makes man wholly fit to partake of the happiness of eternity. But such was not the Old Law; for it could not confer the grace of God, which is eternal life (Rom. vi, 23). Hence it is said in John i, 17: "The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." And the Apostle (Heb. vii, 19): "The law brought nothing to perfection."

NOTE: The law is said to have killed, to have been deadly, as being not the cause but the occasion of death (after the coming of Christ), because of its imperfection, in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfill what is prescribed and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. vii, 11):

"For sin, having taken occasion from the commandment, deceived me, and through it killed me." For the same reason when it is said (loc. c.) that "law entered it, that sin might abound;" the conjunction *that* must be taken as consecutive and not final, in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. (Ad. 2). God, however, did not give the law to afford men an occasion for sinning, but in preparation for the New Law (following art.).—Yet the Law was perfect for that time (cf. foll. art. ad. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS FROM GOD.

YES.—From God, and not from the Devil, as the Manicheans said.

THE REASON is that the Old Law was given by the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ, that He might give testimony to Christ. As Jesus said: "All things must be fulfilled that are written in the Law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms concerning Me" (Luke xxiv, 44). And: "If you believed Moses you would believe Me also, for he wrote of Me" (John v, 46).

It was also given to withdraw men from idolatry, and thus it put them under the worship of the One God, by whom the human race was to be saved through Christ, as the Apostle said (Gal. iii, 23). This, however Satan could not do, because "if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself" (Matth. xii, 26).

NOTE: The article of faith that God wills all men to be saved (I Tim. ii, 4) was verified even in the Old Law. For, although the Old Law did not suffice to save men, yet there was some help given by God to men jointly with the law, by which they could be saved, namely the faith in the Mediator, by which the ancient fathers were justified, as we also are justified (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS GIVEN THROUGH THE ANGELS.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is general: Because, as Dionysius says (*The Celestial Hierarchies*, chap. 4 before the middle): "The things of God must be brought to men through the angels."

THE SECOND REASON is special: Because the Old Law was not perfect, but prepared for the perfect salvation of the human race, which was to be through Christ. Thus it was fitting that the Old Law should be given to men by God through ministers, or angels; whereas the New Law was given by God immediately to men. For in all powers and ordered arts, he who is superior performs the principal and perfect act by himself; but that which prepares for the ultimate perfection he does through his ministers. And by this He manifested the superiority of the New Law to the Old, as the Apostle said (Hebr. i, 5).

NOTE: Regarding the words of Exodus (xxiii, 2): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face," as a friend speaks to a friend, note what St. Augustine, in *Super Genesim, ad Litteram*, lib. xii, cap. 27, adds a little after the beginning: *Show Me Thy Glory*. "Therefore he perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not."

Therefore Moses did not see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly, when Scripture states that "He spoke to him face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him by means of a subordinate creature, i.e., an angel and a cloud.—Again we may say that this vision face to face means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence (Ad 2).

NOTE: The Holy Doctor in I P., q. xii, art. 11, ad 2, admits with St. Augustine that Moses and Paul saw God in His essence, but there he interprets another text, namely Num. xii, 18. Yet the same words, "to speak mouth to mouth," are interpreted in a different way in the First Part (1.c.), from the way in which the Holy Doctor explains them here.

[Tr. Note: See also 11-11, q. 175, art. iii, which declares that Moses had the divine vision temporarily.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE JEWS ALONE.

YES.—Not because the Jewish people remained loyal to the worship of the one God, for they swerved aside many times to idolatry even after the law was given, but "that the Lord might accomplish His words, which He promised by oath to thy fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" (Deut. ix, 6), inasmuch as Christ was to be born from among this people. Just why God chose this particular people, and not another, "seek not to judge, if you do not wish to err" (St. Augustine, *Tract. super Joan. xxvi*).

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL MEN WERE BOUND TO OBSERVE THE OLD LAW.

NO.—With regard to what is of the natural law, all men are bound, but with regard to what is added over and above it, only the Jewish people were bound.

THE REASON is that the Old Law was given to the Jews (prec. art.), in order that through it they might obtain the prerogative of holiness out of reverence for Christ, who was to be born of this people. For this reason this people was obligated to special forms and duties from which other nations were exempt.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW WAS SUITABLY GIVEN AT THE TIME OF MOSES.

YES.—Both in view of the proud and hard of heart and in view of the good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it was suitable at the time of Moses that the people should know, by the imposition of the Law, both their own ignorance, through which they had fallen into idolatry and the foulest vices, and their impotence, since they could not fulfill the law, which they knew. For man is made proud and hard of heart by presumption of knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the people most needed the help of God through the Law when the natural law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin.—And thus it was proper that between the law of nature and the law of grace the Old Law should have appeared.

NOTE: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man; both because man was so confident in his own reason that he did not acknowledge the need of the Old Law; and because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning.

QUESTION XCIX

THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ONLY ONE PRECEPT.

YES.—In relation to the end.

THE REASON is that all the precepts of the Old Law have a relation to *one* end, which is charity, as the Apostle says in I Tim., i, 5: "The end of the commandment is charity," which is the love of God and the neighbor, on which depend the whole law and the prophets (Matth. xxii, 40).—In respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end, however, the commandments of the Old Law are many.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS MORAL PRECEPTS.

YES.—Some moral precepts, not all of them, e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," "thou shalt not steal" (Exod. xx), and reasonably so.

THE REASON is that the Old Law was given to establish friendship between God and man. Now the essence of friendship (which is the essence of love) is similarity, according to Eccles. xiii, 19: "Every beast loveth its like." Now God is supremely good. Wherefore it is reasonable that there should be precepts of the Old Law even concerning the acts of the virtues, in order that man might be made good, and like to God.

NOTE: Human reason could not err in the abstract as to the universal principles of the natural law; but, through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in point of things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, so as to judge lawful even things that in themselves are evil. Hence there was need of the authority of the divine law to rescue man from both these defects (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW COMPRISES CEREMONIAL, BESIDES MORAL, PRECEPTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that man is directed to God, not only by interior acts, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external acts, by which man makes profession of service to God. And these acts are said to pertain to the worship of God. This worship is called ceremony—as from *munia*, i.e., the gifts of *Ceres*, who was called Goddess of Fruits.—Others explain the origin of the word ceremony differently.

NOTE: As Dionysius says (*The Heavenly Hierarchies*, chap. 4), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also are offered to the senses (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER, BESIDES THE MORAL AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS, THERE ARE ALSO JUDICIAL PRECEPTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to the divine law to direct men not only to God but also to one another in relation to God.—Now this, as regards the general precepts that are known by all, is done by the law of nature, but the precepts have to be determined by the positive law, whether human or divine. Accordingly, there are three classes of precepts of the Old Law: Moral, which concern the dictates of the natural law; ceremonial, which are determinations of divine worship; and judicial, which are determinations of the justice to be observed between man and man.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW CONTAINS ANY OTHERS BESIDES THE MORAL, JUDICIAL, AND CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS.

NO.—THE REASON is that all the precepts of the law are contained under the moral, ceremonial, and judicial heads; others do not have the character of precepts, but are directed to the observance of the precepts. These are those whereby man is brought to the fulfillment of the precepts of the law, and which have either the character of God Commanding, and such are called *testimonies*; or the character of punishment or reward, and these are called *justifications*.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW SHOULD HAVE INDUCED MEN TO THE OBSERVANCE OF ITS PRECEPTS, BY MEANS OF TEMPORAL PROMISES AND THREATS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, even as in the speculative sciences it is proper that means be proposed to students according to their conditions, so also in lawmaking. Now the Old Law was proposed to the people as the imperfect in comparison to the perfection that was to be through Christ (Gal. iii). Now it is proper to the imperfect that they should desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God. Hence it was proper for the Jewish people to be led to God by temporal promises and threats, to which the imperfect are especially inclined.

NOTE: It belongs to the perfect to despise temporal things and cling to spiritual goods. But it is proper to the imperfect to desire temporal goods, although in relation to God. To the perverse it is proper to desire temporal goods to establish their last end in them, to the disregard of spiritual things (at end of art.).—Hence this covetousness of the perverse is the bane of charity (Ad 1).

QUESTION C

THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW

- 1) Moral precepts; 2) ceremonial precepts; 3) judicial precepts.
(in 12 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BELONG TO THE LAW OF NATURE.

YES.—But in different ways.

THE REASON is that all human morals depend on their relation to reason. Now every judgment of human reason is derived from natural reason. For, just as every judgment of the speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so also does every judgment of the practical reason proceed from certain principles that are naturally known (q. xciv, art. 2 and 4).—Yet there are certain things that the natural reason of every man immediately and necessarily judges to be done or not to be done, such as: "Honor thy father and thy mother," and such are absolutely of the law of nature.

And there are certain things that, after a more careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g.: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and others of the sort.

And there are some things to judge of which human reason needs divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God; e.g., "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW ARE ABOUT ALL THE ACTS OF VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the divine law directs men to God. Hence the divine law proposes precepts concerning all those things by which men are well directed to communication with God. Now man is united to God by his reason or intellect, in which he is an image of God. Hence the divine law proposes precepts about all those things by which man's reason is well ordered. Thus this is effected through the acts of all the virtues. Of these some, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot be observed, fall under the obligation of precept; and others, which pertain to the well being of perfect virtue, come under the admonition of counsel.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW ARE REDUCIBLE TO THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE.

YES.—All a) those precepts that are first general principles, known naturally to all men; b) those that can be immediately known from these general principles after but slight reflection; and c) those that are discovered only by the careful investigation of wise men.

THE REASON is that the second class of precepts (b) are simply the 10 Commandments, which after slight reflection can be known by all men. The first and general class of precepts (a) are included in the second as principles in their proximate conclusions, for from them the secondary precepts (of the Decalogue) are easily deduced. The third class of precepts (c) is contained also in the precepts of the Decalogue, but are like conclusions contained in their principles; they are deduced by study from the precepts of the Decalogue.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER.

YES.—The distinction is made better by St. Augustine than by Hesychius and Origen.

THE REASON is that Hesychius (*Comm. in Levit., Lib. vii, chap. 26*) excludes the precept enjoining the Sabbath observance, for he says that this precept is not to be observed literally in all times; he classifies the precept: "I am the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt have no strange gods," as two distinct precepts. Origen classifies "Thou shalt have no strange gods," and "Thou shalt make no graven image," as two separate precepts, whereas they are one and the same. Consequently, whereas Hesychius and Origen distinguish four precepts as referring to God, Augustine distinguishes three. Likewise, as regards the precepts referring to the neighbor, Augustine makes out seven, and the others only six. For Augustine separates the commandment not to covet another's goods from that which forbids us to covet another's wife, which the others regard as one precept.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY SET FORTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that they set man in right relations to community or commonwealth under God (as under the Governor). For the first three precepts order him to God, according to fidelity ("Thou shalt have no strange gods"), according to rev-

erence ("Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy God in vain"), and according to service, through the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the benefits of God or His creation. For these three precepts are required in order that man may be well directed to him who rules the community.

The seven other precepts are directed to the end that men may have right relations to one another and to the commonwealth. The first of them is specific and concerns those to whom man is a debtor, and thus we have the commandment to honor father and mother. The second class of precepts refers in general to all other men, that no one may suffer an injury, a) either by deed, or against the person of the neighbor ("Thou shalt not kill"), or against a person united to the neighbor ("Thou shalt not commit adultery"), or against his property ("Thou shalt not steal"); b) or by word, and thus we have the commandment against bearing false witness; c) or in thought, and thus it is added: "Thou shalt not covet." Consequently the precepts of the Decalogue are suitably enumerated as those that are directed to the love of God and neighbor.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE TEN PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SET IN PROPER ORDER.

YES.—THE REASON is that they are arranged according to the order of the gravity of sins. First, those sins are graver that are done against God directly than those against the neighbor. Among these the gravest and most repugnant to reason is the sin against God Himself, in so far as He is the beginning and end of human life and society, and in this sense are the words of the first precept: "I am the Lord thy God." The other sins against God are those by which we are ordered to God; and these are forbidden by the other precepts according to the gravity of the sins, viz., against infidelity, irreverence, and the denial of service due, as was noted in the preceding article.

Against the neighbor, those sins that are committed against parents are graver than those against others. Wherefore the command to honor father and mother is put first, and then the other precepts regarding the neighbor according to the gravity of the sins. Among these the first place is held by the sins that are committed in act; afterwards, those that are committed by word; and finally those that are committed in thought only, as was said (previous art.). Hence the precepts of the Decalogue are arranged in due and fitting order.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE SUITABLY FORMULATED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the precepts of the divine law contain the highest wisdom; wherefore it is said (Deut. iv, 6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it is the part of wisdom to set all things in due manner and order.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE DISPENSABLE.

NO.—With regard to the essence of moral rightness contained in them, they are altogether indispensable.

THE REASON is that they contain the very intention of the Lawgiver, namely God. For the lawgiver can dispense in precepts that determine the special ways of attaining the lawgiver's intention, because this redounds to the common good; but he cannot, without denying himself, dispense in those points in which his intention resides, which is for the common good and to maintain the order of justice. This would happen, for example, if God should dispense anyone from observing due subordination to God, or from being subordinated to the order of justice.

Accordingly, the precepts themselves of the Decalogue, with regard to the essence of righteousness that they contain, are immutable; but with regard to some determination of the law by application to individual acts (as, for example, that this or that is murder, theft, or adultery or not), this indeed is sometimes changeable by divine authority alone, namely in those matters that are instituted by God alone, as Matrimony and other things of the sort; sometimes also by human authority, as in those matters that are left to the jurisdiction of men (as when a judge condemns someone to capital punishment), for in this respect men take the place of God, although not in all respects (Ad 3). Yet in all these things the order of justice must always be observed.

NOTE: Here St. Thomas answers certain objections drawn from apparent exceptions to the moral law found in the Old Testament. When the Israelites, by God's com-

mand, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them by God's judgment.—Likewise, Abraham did not consent to the murder of his son, Isaac, because his son was due to be slain by command of God, who is Lord of life and death; for He inflicts the punishment of death on all men on account of the sin of our first parents, and He can make man the executor of that sentence as well as carry it out Himself.

[Osee, (Osee i, 1-3), by marrying an adulterous woman, was not guilty of adultery or fornication, because he took one who was his by command of God, who is the author of the institution of marriage. (Osee is commanded by the Lord to take "a wife of fornications and have of her children of fornications." This does not necessarily mean that they were born in adultery, but St. Thomas' principle remains untouched.)]

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE MODE OF VIRTUE FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE LAW.

NO.—a) The mode of virtue whereby one firmly and immovably lives and acts does not come under a precept either of the divine law or of the human law. b) the mode of virtue in interior acts does not come under human law, but only under divine law. c) As regards external acts, which one does knowingly, the mode of virtue falls under the precept of both the divine and the human law.

THE REASON is that that properly comes under a precept of law for which a penalty of the law is inflicted, or can be inflicted; for a precept of the law, if it does not have coercive force, also does not have the proper character of a precept. Now the law coerces through fear of punishment. With regard to the mode of virtue first noted under a), it does not come under the precept, for a habit does not fall under a precept, but only an act; even as neither God nor man punishes as the transgressor of a precept one who gives due honor to his parents, although he does not have the habit of filial devotion. The second mode falls under the precept of the divine law only, for only God can judge concerning the interior acts of man. The third mode comes under the precept of the human law, for even man can judge of external acts. For the law's penalty is inflicted only for those things about which the lawgiver must judge, for the law punishes according to judgment.

NOTE: That works of virtue should be done without sadness falls under the precept of the divine law; for whoever works with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e., joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz., in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and the neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure; and in another does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE MODE OF CHARITY FALLS UNDER THE PRECEPT OF THE DIVINE LAW.

NO.—a) The very act of charity falls under the precept; but b) that the other virtues have the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, except in so far as all things must be referred to God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that there is a special command to love God and the neighbor: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." Those who do not have charity can and should dispose themselves to have it.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the intention of the end is the formal mode of the act ordained to that end (q. xii, art. 4). Wherefore one intention suffices that the human act may be complete. Thus one who honors his father, though he does not have charity, does not become the transgressor of the precept commanding the honoring of parents.—Yet we are bound to observe this precept by reason of charity, inasmuch as all things must be referred to God, according to the precept: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." But, since these precepts are affirmative, and hence not binding at all times, they can bind at different times (Ad 2).

ART. XI.—WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO DISTINGUISH OTHER MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE LAW BESIDES THE DECALOGUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, besides the precepts of the Decalogue, which reason approves after slight reflection, as was said (art. 1 and 3 of this q.), there are suitably added other moral precepts formulated by the wise, which more fully explain the Decalogue, and such precepts were transmitted by God through Moses and Aaron. Thus to the first precept it is added (Deut. xviii, 10): "Neither let there be found among you

anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire . . . neither let there be any wizard or charmer, or anyone who consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers who seeketh the truth from the dead." And similar determinations have been added to the other precepts.—Besides these, other moral precepts are given according to certain particular circumstances, such as is the precept of courage in waging war (Deut. xx, 3), and other such things (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW JUSTIFIED MAN.

NO.—The moral precepts of the Old Law did not justify man in the proper but only in the improper sense.

THE REASON is that these precepts did not infuse the habit of justice; for they did not cause grace. But they justified improperly, inasmuch as they disposed men for justifying grace, which they also signified. For, as says Augustine (*Contra Faustum, lib. xxii, cap. 24*): "Even the life of that people was prophetic, and prefigurative of Christ."

NOTE: As regards the execution of acts, all the precepts of the Old Law—moral, ceremonial, judicial—justified properly, in so far as they contained that which is just in itself; and thus, as long as he lived in them, man did not incur the penalty of death (in body of art. and ad 2).

QUESTION CI

THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES.

1) In themselves; 2) in their cause; 3) in their duration.—The first part takes up four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NATURE OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS CONSISTS IN THEIR PERTAINING TO THE WORSHIP OF GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was said above (q. xcix, art. 4), the ceremonial precepts determine the moral precepts in relation to God (just as the judicial precepts determine the moral precepts in relation to the neighbor). Now man is ordained to God through due worship; and therefore the essence of the ceremonial precepts consists in this, that they direct man to the worship of God (mediately or preparatively, as are the vestments of the priests, etc.) or (immediately) pertain thereto, as the sacrifices.

ART. II. — WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS ARE FIGURATIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the body is directed to God through the soul, so external worship, which consists in ceremonies, is directed to interior worship, which is performed by the will and intellect. Now external worship cannot be directed to interior worship except under certain sensible figures, as is suitable to human nature.—Interior worship, moreover, depends on the knowledge of truth, and therefore, since in the Old Law the divine truth was not manifested in itself, nor was a way open to come to it (Heb. x, 1), it behooved external worship not only to prefigure the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly father's home (as it now is in the New Law) but also to prefigure Christ, who is the Way leading to that truth of heaven.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANY CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS.

YES.—Both on account of the wicked and for the sake of the good.

THE REASON is that the wicked served idols in many ways; therefore many precepts had to be devised to repress these sins individually, and many burdens had to be imposed on such men, in order that, being weighed down, as it were, by their duties to the worship of God, they should have no time to serve idols.—With regard to the good, too, the multiplication of ceremonial precepts was necessary, both because their minds were thus referred in different ways to God, and more assiduously, and also because the mystery of Christ, which was figured by these ceremonial observances, brought manifold benefits to the world; and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified by various ceremonies.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW ARE SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO SACRIFICES, SACRED THINGS, SACRAMENTS, AND OBSERVANCES.

YES.—THE REASON is that in worship there are four things: Worship itself, the worshippers (ministers or people), and the instruments of worship. To worship sacrifices properly pertain; sacraments pertain to the ministers and people; and the observances were the means whereby the Jews were distinguished from the other nations, for example in the use of foods, etc. Sacred things were the instruments of worship, such as tabernacles, vessels, etc.—All these things in some manner foreshadowed Christ (Ad 2).

QUESTION CII
THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS
 (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS.

YES.—It was necessary that the ceremonial precepts be directed to some end, by which their reasonable causes could be assigned.

THE REASON is that, since God is Wisdom Itself, the things that are from God are set in order. Now the things that are set in order are ordained to a due end, and the means to the end are proportioned to the end. Now the ceremonial precepts are from God, and are directed to an end, which is the worship of God.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS HAVE A LITERAL OR MERELY A FIGURATIVE CAUSE.

ANSWER: The ceremonial precepts have a cause that is not only figurative, but also literal.

THE REASON is that the ceremonial precepts were ordained not only to the foreshadowing of Christ but also to the worship itself that was to be observed at that time.

NOTE: The ceremonial precepts, in so far as they foreshadowed Christ and the Church, are allegorical; in so far as they foreshadowed the morals of the Christian people, they were moral; in so far as they foreshadowed the state of future glory, they were anagogic. (at end of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER A SUITABLE CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES WHICH PERTAINED TO SACRIFICES.

YES.—Both on the part of the literal cause and on the part of the figurative or mystical cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the sacrifices represented the subordination of the mind to God, to which the one who offered the sacrifice was aroused. This was true inasmuch as man made the offering in honor of God from his own things as in sign of recognition that he had them from God, according to the words of David (I Paral., xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: And we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, among all the gifts that God has given the sin-fallen human race, the chief is that He gave His Son (John iii, 16). On this account all the other sacrifices were offered in the Old Law, that this one special and unique sacrifice might be foreshadowed, as the perfect by the imperfect.

NOTE: For the significations of each of the oblations and particular sacrifices, see the answers to the objections of this article, which are 14.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE CEREMONIES PERTAINING TO HOLY THINGS.

YES.—It behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine worship, AND THE REASON WAS that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God.

NOTE: St. Thomas treats of each of these reasons in the answers, which number 10.

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE SUITABLE CAUSE FOR THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacraments of the Old Law, both those that

pertained to the people and those that pertained to the ministers, had reasonable and literal causes in so far as they were ordained for the worship of God for that time, and figurative causes, in so far as they were ordained for the foreshadowing of Christ.

NOTE: The sacraments of the Old Law were properly those that were applied to the worshippers of God for a certain consecration, by which they were in some manner deputed to the worship of God. Now three sacraments pertained to the people, and three to the ministers. To the people pertained circumcision, by which they were initiated into the state of worshipping God, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal observances; the eating of the Paschal banquet; and certain external purifications and expiations from sins. To the ministers belonged consecration, the offering of victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition, and the other things that were deputed to the priests (body of art.).

NOTE: For the particular reasons for these sacraments, see the 10 answers to objections.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE CEREMONIAL OBSERVANCES.

YES.—There was a twofold reason for the observances of the ceremonial precepts: Fitness for divine worship; the foreshadowing of something in respect to the Christian life.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Jews, and especially the priests, were specially deputed to divine worship.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the worship of the Law foreshadowed the mystery of Christ. Consequently, all these actions foreshadowed those that pertain to Christ, according to I Cor. x, 11: "All these things happened to them in figures."

NOTE: For an explanation of the principal ceremonies, see the replies to objections, which are 11.

QUESTION CIII OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE LAW EXISTED BEFORE THE LAW.

NO.—Before the Law certain ceremonies were in existence, but they were not ceremonies of the Law.

THE REASON is that whoever worships God must needs worship Him in certain determinate ways, which ways pertain to external worship. Consequently, just as among men there were some judicial precepts in general, yet none instituted by the authority of the divine law, but only those established by human reason, so also there were certain ceremonies, not indeed determined by the authority of any given law, but only according to the will and devotion of the men who worshiped God.—Likewise, because even before the Law there were outstanding men who possessed the prophetic spirit, it is to be believed that they were led by divine instinct, as by a kind of private law, to a certain way of worshipping God, according to I Cor. x, 11: "All things happened to them in figure."

NOTE: The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law, as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER, AT THE TIME OF THE LAW, THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW HAD ANY POWER TO JUSTIFY.

NO.—The ceremonies of the Old Law had no power in themselves to free anyone from the uncleanness of sin, or the uncleanness of the soul, but only from the uncleanness of the flesh.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that expiation from sins could never be accomplished save through Christ, "who taketh away the sins of the World" (John i, 29). Now the ceremonies of the Old Law could not really contain in themselves the power flowing from Christ incarnate and suffering, as do the sacraments of the New Law, and therefore they could not cleanse from sin, as the Apostle says (Hebr. x, 4): "It is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away."—Yet these sacraments

did justify by reason of faith in Christ to come and by the devotion of the offerers. For the souls of the faithful in the time of the Law could be united by faith to Christ incarnate and suffering, and the observance of these ceremonies was a certain attestation of faith, inasmuch as they were figures of Christ.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such ceremonies were in a manner remedies applied by the direction of the Law to the removal of uncleanness caused by the statutes of the Law.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CEREMONIES OF THE OLD LAW CEASED AT THE COMING OF CHRIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that external worship must be proportioned to interior worship, which consists in faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, just as the external worship of the New Law ceases in heaven, where both heavenly goods and those by which we are led to heavenly goods are made present, so at the coming of Christ, those ceremonies of the Old Law had to cease which prepared for and foreshadowed the things that lead us to the New Law. But the things that foreshadowed heavenly goods in the Old Law remain even in the New Law, inasmuch as heavenly goods are in the future even under the New Law.

NOTE: Before Christ's Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but it was not as yet consummated (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER, SINCE CHRIST'S PASSION, THE LEGAL CEREMONIES COULD BE OBSERVED WITHOUT MORTAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that in attesting interior faith, which is done through external worship, if man witnesses to anything false, he sins mortally. Therefore, just as one would sin mortally who would now say, in attesting his faith, that Christ is yet to be born—a thing that the ancients could piously and truly say; so also he would sin mortally if he should now observe the ceremonies that the ancients piously and faithfully observed.

NOTE: 1. From the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel the legal ceremonies were indeed dead, because they had neither efficacy nor binding force; but they were not deadly, because those who were converted to Christ from Jewry could lawfully observe these legal precepts, provided they did not place their hope in them, so as to consider them necessary for salvation, as if the faith of Christ could not justify without the legal observances. And this was permitted to the Jews, because the Holy Spirit was unwilling to debar them immediately from observing the legal forms, although converted pagans were forbidden to observe their former rites (Ad 1). [For heathen rites were forbidden by God at all times; Jewish rites were good for the time in which the old dispensation ran, and ceased only through being fulfilled by Christ's Passion. Therefore they could be observed by those who had inherited them until the Gospel was promulgated.]

2. With regard to Paul's rebuke of Peter, it should be noted that Paul really rebuked him, and not fictitiously, because Peter really sinned. But Peter did not sin in observing the legal rites for a time, because this was lawful to him as a converted Jew; but he sinned by being too minute in respect to legal observances to avoid scandalizing the Jews, so that he scandalized the Gentiles as a result (Ad 2).

QUESTION CIV

THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS

1) in general; 2) in their causes.—The first is in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE THOSE WHICH DIRECTED MAN IN RELATION TO HIS NEIGHBOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that the judicial precepts are like determinations of the moral precepts fixed by God either mediately or immediately, to put men in proper relation to one another. Now these judicial precepts do not have binding force because of the dictates of reason itself, as do the moral precepts themselves, but by reason of their institution, whether divine or human.

NOTE: Judicial precepts are not only those that pertain to judicial disputes, but also whatever refers to men's relations with one another, which is subject to the direction of the sovereign as the supreme judge (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE FIGURATIVE.

YES.—Not primarily and in themselves, as were the ceremonial precepts, but consequently.

THE REASON is that the judicial precepts were not chiefly instituted to figure anything, as were the ceremonial precepts (CII), but principally to regulate the state of the Jewish people according to justice and equity. By consequence, however, they did prefigure something, inasmuch as the whole state of that people, which was regulated by these precepts, was figurative, according to I Cor. x, 11: "All things happened to them in figure."

NOTE: "The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently, the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine declares (*Contra Faustum, lib. xxii, cap. 21, in beginning*). (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW BIND FOREVER.

NO.—They were annulled by the coming of Christ; yet their observance, although dead, is not deadly.

THE REASON is that the judicial precepts were instituted to direct the state of that people which was ordained for Christ; and therefore when the state of that people was changed with the coming of Christ the judicial precepts lost their binding power; for the law was a pedagogue leading to Christ (Gal. iii, 24).—Because, however, these judicial precepts were not instituted for the purpose of being figures, but to do something, the observance of them was not absolutely prejudicial to the truth of faith (as is true of the observance of the ceremonies, as was said). Wherefore, if any sovereign should order the observance of the judicial precepts in his kingdom, he would not sin, unless, perhaps he should do this as though they were binding by force of the Old Law, and this would be a mortal sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSIGN A DISTINCT DIVISION OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the law is a kind of art of directing or ordering human life. Therefore, just as in every art there is a certain distinction of the rules of the art, so in every law there must be a distinct division of precepts; for otherwise the very confusion that would result would nullify the good to be done by the law.—Now this division is fourfold in the judicial precepts, as there is a fourfold order in every people: a) The order of rulers to subjects; b) the order of subjects to one another; c) the order of citizens to foreigners; d) the order of members of the same household, as that of the father to the son, of the wife to the husband, of the master to the servant. And thus the judicial precepts of the Old Law can be divided.—Each of these orders is discussed in the next question.

QUESTION CV**THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW ENJOINED FITTING PRECEPTS CONCERNING RULERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the political system established by the Law was a combination of kingdom, aristocracy, and democracy, a combination that makes the best political system. For this ordering of the state includes two things, which should be observed for the good of the state or nation, viz.: 1) All should have some share in the government, for this form of government insures peace among the people, and all love and support such a constitution, as Aristotle says in the *Politics*, Book ii, chap. 1; 2) That the form of government be according to the ordination of God, viz., whereby one man is given the power to preside over all; and under him there are others having governing powers.

Now such was the political order under the Old Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people; from the tribes there were chosen "men wise and honorable," who were made rulers (Deut. i, 15); and these were chosen by the people (Deut. i, 13).

NOTE: The Jewish people were governed under the special care of God, as is said in Deut. vii, 6: "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people." And

this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the supreme ruler (Num. xxvii, 16).—(Ad 1).

Nevertheless, from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. God did this because a monarchy, because of the great power granted to the King, easily degenerates into a tyranny, unless the one in power has perfect virtue. But such perfect virtue is to be found in few, and was not readily found among the Jews, who were cruel and prone to avarice (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS WERE SUITABLY FRAMED AS TO SOCIAL RELATIONS WITHIN THE NATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that communication of men with one another, which is necessary for good social living, is twofold, and these were formulated by the judicial precepts. One is that which is made by the authority of the rulers, because judgments among men must be exercised, and punishments must be meted out to wrongdoers, by the authority of rulers, and thus the law ordained, as is shown in Deut. xvi, 18: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgments;" and the like.

The other communication of man to man is that which is made through the personal will of individuals, who have control of their possessions, so as to sell, buy, or give them away. Here too the Old Law made sufficient provision, according to Aristotle's dictum in the *Politics*, Book ii, chap. 3, namely that a) possessions should be distinct and divided (Num. xxxiii, 53); b) that their use be partly common (Deut. xxii, 1); and c) partly shared by the will of the possessors (Deut. xiv, 28).—For each of these provisions, see the answers to objections, which are 12.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS REGARDING FOREIGNERS WERE FRAMED IN A SUITABLE MANNER.

YES.—THE REASON is that there are two modes of association with foreigners: 1) Peacefully, 2) hostilely, and the Law contained suitable precepts for both.

The Jews were offered a threefold occasion to communicate peacefully with foreigners: a) When they passed through the country as travelers (*advenae*). 2) When they came to dwell as newcomers (*peregrini*), and concerning them the Law established precepts of mercy: Exod. xxii, 20: "Thou shalt not molest an alien" (*advenam*); and Exod. xxiii, 9: "Thou shalt not molest a stranger" (*peregrino*). 3) When any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and worship. With them the Law made various provision according to their origin. Thus the Egyptians and the children of Esau, Jacob's brother (the Idumeans), were regarded as close relations with the Jews, and were admitted to their fellowship after the third generation. The Ammonites and Moabites, being hostile to the Jews, were never admitted to naturalization. The Amalekites were considered as being in perpetual hostility to the Jews (Exod. xvii, 16).—Likewise, with regard to enemies the Law ordained that: a) War could justly be made on enemies; b) the hindrances to war should be removed, by the sending home of certain persons who might offer hindrances; c) that war once undertaken should be prosecuted with firm confidence in God; d) moderation should be used in victory, by the sparing of women and children, and even by avoiding the cutting down of fruit trees in the country.

NOTE: 1. It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling toward those out of whom they made a profit (Ad 3).

2. Regarding hostile cities, a distinction was made. For some of them were remote, and not among those that had been promised the Jews. When they had taken these cities, the Israelites killed all the men who had fought against God's people, whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities, which had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor of Divine justice; for it is written in Deut. ix, 5: "Because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in."—The fruit trees were commanded to be left untouched, for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE OLD LAW SET FORTH SUITABLE PRECEPTS ABOUT THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Old Law suitably framed precepts with regard to the mutual relations of the persons of a household, according to their daily acts, which were directed to the necessities of life, both from the point of view of the individual, and from that of the species, i.e., as regards the relationship of master to servant, husband to wife, father to son.

As regards slaves the Law provided: a) That they be treated with moderation; b) that they not be burdened with excessive labor. Hence the Lord commanded that on the Sabbath "thy manservant and thy maidservant should rest, even as thyself" (Deut. v, 14). c) On those who mutilated their slaves it enjoined that they set them free (Exod. xxi). That after the seventh year the slaves who were taken from the Jews should go free with whatever they brought with them, even their clothing (Exod. xxi).

Regarding wives the Law ordained: a) That they should marry from among their own tribes (Num. xxxvi, 6). b) That a man should marry the wife of a brother who died without children (Deut. xxv, 5, 6). c) That they should not marry alien women, on account of the danger of perversion of faith, or relatives, because of the natural reverence that is due them. d) It commanded that husbands who falsely denounced their wives should be punished (Deut. xxii; xxiv); c) No public duties should be laid on a recently married husband, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife (Deut. xxiv, 1).—With regard to children, the Law made two determinations: a) That the father should educate them by instructing them in the faith (Exod. xii, 26); b) that they should also give them moral training (Deut. xxi, 2).

QUESTION CVI

THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, OR THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

1) Considered in itself; 2) in comparison with the Old Law; 3) its contents.—The first head is in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS A WRITTEN LAW.

NO.—Primarily the New Law is an instilled law (written on the hearts of the faithful); but secondarily it is a written law.

THE REASON is that that which is principal in the law of the New Testament, and in which its whole efficacy consists, is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ. Hence the New Law is primarily the grace itself of the Holy Spirit, which is given to the faithful of Christ (Rom. iii, 27; viii, 2).—Yet the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Spirit, and pertaining to the use of that grace; such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law.

NOTE: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural law is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to accomplish it (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW JUSTIFIES.

YES.—According to that which is primary in it, but not according to that which is secondary.

THE REASON is that the primary element in the New Law is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which justifies. But the secondary element in the New Law is the teachings of faith, and the commandments, and these do not justify, as the Apostle says (I Cor. iii, 6): "The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth." Hence the letter of even the Gospel would kill unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the New Law, as was said (art. 1, this q.), is primarily the grace of the Holy Spirit, which was not to be given abundantly before the impediment of sin should be removed from the human race, after the redemption by Christ. As it is said in John vii, 39: "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified."

THE SECOND REASON is that a thing is not brought to perfection at once, but

through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and afterwards a man (Gal. iii, 24).

THE THIRD REASON is that it behooved man first of all to be left to himself, so that, through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace (Rom. v, 20).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW WILL LAST TILL THE END OF THE WORLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the state of the world (men) can change in two ways: In one way, according to a change of law; and thus the state of the world will not change, because there cannot be a more perfect state of the present life than the state of the New Law, than which nothing can approach nearer to the last end, for it is the immediate cause of our being brought there. In another way the state of the world can change in so far as men stand in a different position to the same law. And thus the state of the New Law differs according to different places, times, and persons, inasmuch as the grace of the Holy Spirit is had more or less perfectly by some.—It is, however, not to be expected that there should be any future state in which the grace of the Holy Spirit will be had more perfectly than it was had hitherto, and especially than it was had by the Apostles, who "received the first fruits of the Spirit" (Rom. viii, 23).

NOTE: Regarding the preaching of the Gospel that is to take place in the whole world before the end of the world, it should be noted that such preaching can be understood in two ways: 1) As regards the publication of the knowledge of Christ; and thus the Gospel was preached in the whole world even in the time of the Apostles. And in this sense the words that follow—"and then shall the consummation come," refer to the destruction of Jerusalem (Matt. xxiv, 14). 2) The preaching of the Gospel may be understood as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that the Church would be founded in every nation. And in this sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius, (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but when it is, the consummation of the world will come (Ad 4). [Missionaries may be in the whole world today, but this does not mean that the Gospel has been sufficiently preached.—Tr.]

QUESTION CVII

THE NEW LAW IN COMPARISON WITH THE OLD

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS DISTINCT FROM THE OLD.

YES.—Not as being altogether or specifically different from the Old Law; but in the sense that it more closely directs man to his end than does the Old Law.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the end of both laws is the same, viz., that men may be subjected to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Old Law is as it were a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal. iii, 24): But the New Law is the law of perfection, because it is the law of charity, concerning which the Apostle says that it is "the bond of perfection" (Coloss. iii).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW FULFILLS THE OLD.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that everything perfect fulfills that which is wanting to the imperfect. Now the New Law fulfils in two ways that which is wanting to the Old Law: First, in respect of the end; because the Old Law did not properly justify; but it only figured justification (q. xcii, art. 2); but the New Law justifies by the power of Christ's Passion (Rom. viii, 3).

Second, the New Law fulfils the Old with respect to precepts. Now the precepts of the Old Law were fulfilled by Christ: a) In His works, because He willed to be circumcised, and to observe the other precepts of the Law, according to Galat. iv, 4: "Made under the law." By His doctrine: First, by expressing the true sense of the Law, as appears in interior acts as regards adultery and murder, which are forbidden even in thought; second, in the manner of observing the Law with respect to some things, e.g., not to swear except in case of necessity; thirdly, by superadding certain counsels of perfection, as appears in Matt. xix, 21, where Christ said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast . . ."

NOTE: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of the ceremonial precepts, as was stated above (q. ciii, art. 3 and 4). (Ad 1).

With regard to a man's not putting away his wife save for fornication, it should be observed that Our Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save on account of fornication. [The delay interposed by the bill of divorce was intended, according to St. Augustine (*Contra Faustum*, xix, 26), to serve as a "cooling-off period" so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. The Law, says St. Augustine, "did not say: 'Let him that wills put his wife away, the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay.]

The same thing is to be said of the prohibition of oath taking and retaliation: For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably; whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether.—With regard to the hatred of one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person but his sin.—Similarly, as to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed; but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as was said above (q. cii, art. 6, ad 1).—(Ad 1 and ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS CONTAINED IN THE OLD.

YES.—The New Law is contained in the Old, not actually, as a located thing is in its place, but as the effect is contained in the cause, or as that which is complete is in that which is incomplete, or as a tree is contained in a seed.

THE REASON is that the New Law is compared to the Old Law as the perfect to the imperfect, as the grain to the ear (Mark iv, 28).—For everything that is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith is contained in the Old Testament as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. Accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is contained in the Old (Ad 1).—Thus, as to the substance all the precepts of the New Testament are contained in the Old (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW IS MORE BURDENSOME THAN THE OLD.

NO.—In respect of external acts the Old Law is not more burdensome than the Old, but in respect of the works of the virtues in interior acts the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Old Law bound men to more external acts in many different ceremonies, than does the New Law, which in the teaching of Christ and the Apostles, has added very few precepts to the natural law, although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly prohibited in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, to which no penalty was attached. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue.

QUESTION CVIII

THE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW OUGHT TO PRESCRIBE OR PROHIBIT EXTERNAL ACTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is the primary element of the New Law, must be shown forth by faith working through love.—Now external works relate to grace (which is derived to us from Christ's humanity) in two ways: 1) As leading to grace, and such are the works of the sacraments; 2) as effects produced by the inspiration of grace; and such are the works that have a necessary connection with faith and grace, whether they are commanded or forbidden, such as the confession of faith or its denial; or which do not have such a necessary connection.

NOTE: As Aristotle says (*Metaphysics*, Book i, cap. 2): "What is free is the cause

of itself." Therefore he acts freely who acts of his own accord. Since, then, the grace of the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it.

So it is that the New Law is called the law of liberty, and that in two respects: First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. And for these two reasons the New Law is called "the law of perfect liberty" (James i, 25).—(Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW MADE SUFFICIENT ORDINATIONS ABOUT EXTERNAL ACTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the New Law commands those things by which we are led to the grace of God, viz., the reception of the sacraments, and the things that are necessarily connected with the right use of grace, namely the moral precepts. But the other things, which are not necessarily connected with the right use of grace, are left to human discretion, some relating to individuals, some relating to temporal or spiritual superiors for the good of the community.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NEW LAW DIRECTED MAN SUFFICIENTLY AS REGARDS INTERIOR ACTIONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as Augustine declares, the sermon the Lord delivered on the Mount contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian, and perfectly directs the interior movements of man, whether as regards himself or as regards the neighbor, in relation to the final end.

NOTE: With regard to the particular precepts of God concerning the interior movements of the soul in matters of vengeance, hatred of enemies, and temporal goods, see the answers to objections, which are six.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CERTAIN DEFINITE COUNSELS ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED IN THE NEW LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the New Law is the law of liberty; wherefore in the New Law counsels are added to the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which was the law of bondage.—Now the evangelical counsels are those whereby man can attain his last end better and more expeditiously, by giving up the goods of this world entirely, viz., riches, through voluntary poverty, the delights of the flesh, through perpetual chastity; and honors, or the pride of life, by the service of obedience. On these three every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based. For in the state of perfection these counsels are observed absolutely; but if they are observed only in some particular cases, this is taking the observance of the counsels in a restricted sense, as when someone does not follow his will in some action that he lawfully could do; or if he forgives an offense for which he could justly claim vengeance.

NOTE: With regard to the love of enemies and the light of which the Lord speaks (Matth. vi and Luke vi), if such things are referred to the preparation of the mind then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need is to be referred to the particular counsels (Ad 4).

THE EXTERNAL PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTS OR THE TREATISE ON GRACE

We have next to consider the external principle of human acts, namely God, inasmuch as we are helped by Him through grace to act rightly. We consider: 1) The grace of God; 2) its causes; 3) its effects. The first consideration is in three parts: a) The necessity of grace; b) grace itself as to its essence; c) its division.—The first question includes 10 articles.

QUESTION CIX

THE NECESSITY OF GRACE

ART. I.—WHETHER WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN KNOW ANY TRUTH.

YES.—He can know those truths to whose knowledge he can come through sensible objects; but those that surpass the natural light of the intellect he cannot know, unless he be perfected by a stronger light, as by the light of faith or prophecy, which is called the light of grace, in so far as it is added over and above nature.

THE REASON is that every form implanted in created things by God has efficacy with respect to some determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment, and beyond which it cannot go, except by a superadded form, as water can heat only when it is heated by fire.—And thus the intellect and every other created being depends for its action on God as regards two things: 1) In so far as it has from Him its perfection, or form, by which it acts; 2) in so far as it is moved by Him to act.

ART. II.—WHETHER MAN CAN WISH OR DO ANY GOOD WITHOUT GRACE.

NO.—a) Without the grace of God man, whether he be in the state of perfect nature, or (*a fortiori*) in the state of corrupt nature, cannot will and do any supernatural good. b) In the state of perfect nature he was able without grace to will and do the whole good that was proportioned to his nature. c) In the state of corrupt nature, however, man cannot fulfill the whole of this good that is proportioned to his nature by his natural powers alone, without the help of grace; yet he can [because our fallen nature is not altogether corrupt] perform without grace, but not without the natural help of God, some particular good, such as building houses, planting vineyards, and the like.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST AND SECOND was already given in the preceding article.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in the state of corrupt nature, as is evident from the terms, man is in the position of an invalid, who can indeed have some movement by his own acts, but cannot move about perfectly, with the movement of a healthy man, unless he be cured by the aid of medicine. For man's nature was not wholly corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of the whole good of nature.

Hence in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to be healed, and yet more to perform works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious.

NOTE: 1. Man is master of his acts, and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And, although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can be only by a previous deliberation; and, since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, namely by God, as Aristotle proves in the chapter *On Good Fortune* (Eudemian Ethics, vii, 18). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not such a master of its acts that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more the free will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of nature (Ad 1).

2. Man cannot know even truth without divine help, and yet human nature is more corrupted by sin in regard to the desire for good than in regard to the knowledge of truth (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS AND WITHOUT GRACE MAN CAN LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS.

YES.—a) In the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace superadded to his natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, although he needed the help of God to move him to this. But b) In the state of fallen nature man needs the help of healing grace even for this.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to love God above all things is something connatural to man—in fact to any creature. For each individual thing, by the fact that it naturally seeks and loves that which is according to its nature, loves by a natural appetite or love its own proper good for the sake of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Wherefore man in the state of perfect nature referred the love of himself to the love of God as to his end, and similarly with the love of all other things; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all else.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on account of the corruption of nature the rational will follows its private good, unless it is healed by the grace of God.

NOTE: This is the difference between the love of charity and natural love: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover, charity adds to the natural love of God a certain promptness and joy in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act that is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE AND BY HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS CAN FULFILL THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE LAW.

NO.—a) With regard to the substance of the works, man in the state of perfect nature could, without superadded grace, fulfill all the commandments of the law, but not in the state of corrupt nature, without healing graces. b) With regard to the mode of action, i.e., so that works are done out of charity, man cannot without grace fulfill the commands of the law either in the state of perfect nature or (*a fortiori*) in the state of corrupt nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that otherwise man could not have sinned in the state of perfect nature. Moreover, in the state of corrupt nature man easily sins without grace—in fact, already is in sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that charity depends on grace itself, as will be seen in the next question.

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT EVERLASTING LIFE WITHOUT GRACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that everlasting life is not an end connatural to man, but it is an end surpassing the proportion of human nature (q. v, art. 5). Hence to merit eternal life the power natural to man does not suffice, but a higher power is demanded, which is the power of grace, according to St. Paul, Rom. vi, 28: "The grace of God is life everlasting."

NOTE: The gloss upon Rom. vi, 23: "The grace of God is life everlasting," says (*Ord. Augustini, lib. iii, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, cap. 8*): "It is certain that everlasting life is meted for good works; but the works for which it is meted belong to God's grace" (Ad 2)

ART. VI.—WHETHER A MAN, BY HIMSELF AND WITHOUT THE EXTERNAL AID OF GRACE, CAN PREPARE HIMSELF FOR GRACE.

NO.—a) In order that man may prepare himself for grace he does not require another habitual gift that is superadded to the soul; but b) we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good purpose.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that if any other habitual gift is required, there would be an infinite process.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must turn to the last end through the movement of the first mover. Therefore, since God is the first mover simply, it is by His motion that everything turns to Him according to the intention of good, by which everything tends to be likened to God in its own way.

Hence Dionysius says that "God turns everything to himself" (*The Divine Names, iv*). But He turns just men to Himself as to a special end, which they intend, and to which they desire to adhere as to their proper good, according to Ps. lxxii, v. 27: "It is good for me to adhere to my God." And so man's turning to God is impossible without God's turning to him.

Now to turn to God is the same as to prepare oneself for grace.—Hence it is man's part to prepare his soul for grace, because he does this by his free choice; nevertheless he does not do this without the help of God who moves him and draws him to Himself (Ad 4).

ART. VII.—WHETHER MAN CAN RISE FROM SIN WITHOUT THE HELP OF GRACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that to rise from sin is for man to be restored to those things that he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a threefold loss by sinning mortally,

namely stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment; and these three things man cannot make good without the help of grace. For stain is the privation of the beauty of grace resulting from the deformity of sin; now such beauty cannot be restored unless God sheds His light anew. Similarly, the order of nature cannot be restored, so that the will of man is subjected to God, unless God draws man's will to Himself (prec. art.). And the debt of eternal punishment cannot be restored except by God, against whom the offense was committed, and who is the judge of men.

NOTE: With regard to the words of St. Paul, Ephes. v, 14: "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," and the like, we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free will, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER MAN WITHOUT GRACE CAN AVOID SIN.

NO.—a) In the state of perfect nature man could not sin, either mortally or venially, even without habitual grace; b) in the state of corrupt nature man needs habitual healing grace to abstain altogether from sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to sin is nothing else than to withdraw from that which is according to nature; and this man could avoid in the state of perfect nature, but he could not do so without the help of God who preserved him in good; were this withdrawn, nature itself would revert to nothingness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the state of corrupt nature man's reason is not totally subjected to God, nor is man's heart confirmed in God; consequently, many deordinations occur in the very acts of reason and the movements of the will, especially in sudden matters, unless man is speedily restored to due order by grace.

NOTE: In the present life man's soul can be healed, but the carnal appetite is not as yet wholly restored. Hence St. Paul, Rom. vii, 25, speaking in the person of restored man, says: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin." In this state man can indeed abstain from all mortal sin, a thing that depends on reason; but he cannot abstain from all venial sin, on account of the corruption of the lower appetite of the sensuality, the movements of which his reason can indeed repress individually—hence they have the character of sin and voluntariness—but not all collectively, because while it is resisting one, perhaps another will arise; and also because reason cannot always be on the alert to avoid such movements (body of art.), except through grace.

And yet, because it is by his own shortcoming that man does not prepare himself to possess grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER ONE WHO HAS ALREADY OBTAINED GRACE CAN, OF HIMSELF AND WITHOUT FURTHER HELP OF GRACE, DO GOOD AND AVOID SIN.

NO.—Man who is already constituted in grace does not need, in order to do good and avoid sin, a) any other infused habit; b) but he does need another help whereby he is moved by God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that if he did need another infused habit there would be an infinite series of habits. Hence no other habitual grace is needed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is twofold: a) General, because, as was said above (art. 1 of this q.), no created thing can proceed to any act except by the power of the divine motion.—b) Special, because, although human nature is healed by grace with regard to the mind, yet corruption and infection remain in it with regard to the flesh, by which "it serves the law of sin" (Rom. vii, 25). There remains also a certain obscurity of ignorance in the intellect, according to which "we know not what we should pray for as we ought" (Rom. viii, 26). Hence it is necessary that we be directed and protected by God, who knows and can do all things, so as not to be led into temptation.

NOTE: From the fact that after he receives grace man still needs divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given in vain, or that it is imperfect; for even in the state of glory, when grace will be altogether perfect, man will need divine help. Here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not wholly heal man, as was said in the body of the article (Ad 1).

ART. X.—WHETHER MAN POSSESSED OF GRACE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE.

YES.—Inasmuch as perseverance is a continuation of good until the end of life.

THE REASON is that for such a continuation in good to the end of life, man needs the divine help to direct and protect him against the onslaughts of temptations, as appears from the preceding article. Hence after one is justified by grace he still must seek from God the aforesaid gift of perseverance, so as to be kept from evil to the end of his life. For many are given grace to whom perseverance in grace is not given.

NOTE: It is easier for man to persevere with the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which the flesh did not rebel against the spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will be able not merely to persevere but will be unable to sin.

QUESTION CX THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GRACE IMPLIES ANYTHING IN THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the grace of God, as the name indicates, signifies a special love of God for man. Now all love of God for the creature infuses some good into the creature (I P., q. xx). Hence, just as by the common love, wherewith God loves "all things that are" (Wis. xi, 25), He bestows natural being on created things, so by a special love a special good is infused into man, by which God draws the rational creature above the condition of nature to the participation of God Himself. Now this supernatural good that accrues to man from God is called grace. By it man is made pleasing (*gratus*) to God.

ART. II.—WHETHER GRACE IS A QUALITY OF THE SOUL.

YES.—In so far as grace is an habitual gift infused by God into the soul.

THE REASON is that God provides for those whom He loves that they may have supernatural good no less than for creatures whom He loves that they may have natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures that He not only moves them to natural acts but also bestows on them certain forms and virtues, which are the principles of acts, so that they are inclined by them to such movements. Thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. viii, 1: "She (Wisdom) . . . ordereth all things sweetly."

Much more, therefore, will He infuse into those whom He moves that they may have supernatural eternal good certain supernatural forms or qualities, according to which they are sweetly and promptly moved by Him to attain eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.

NOTE: 1.—Grace is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause (prec. art., Ad 2); in so far, however, as grace is a quality, it is said to act on the soul, not by way of an efficient cause, but by way of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice makes a man just (Ad 1). And thus grace is an accidental form of the soul itself (Ad 2).

2. Grace is said to be created, from the fact that men are created in it, that is, are constituted in new being out of nothing, i. e., not from any merits of theirs, according to Ephes. ii, 10: "Created in Jesus Christ in good works."

ART. III.—WHETHER GRACE IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE.

NO.—THE REASON is that virtue is a disposition according to nature; for it is the disposition of what is perfect (Aristotle *Physics*, book iii). Therefore the virtue of anything has reference to some pre-existing nature, namely when anything is so disposed with reference to what befits its nature. Accordingly, just as the acquired virtues are dispositions whereby man is suitably disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man, so the infused virtues, which dispose man for a higher end, must logically dispose him also in relation to some higher nature, that is, with reference to the participated divine nature, which is called the light of grace, according to II Pet. i, 4: "He who gives us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature."

Accordingly, just as the natural light of reason is something in addition to the acquired virtues, which have reference to mere natural light, so also the light of grace, which is a participation of the divine nature, is something in addition to the infused virtues, which are derived from that light, and directed thereto.

NOTE: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition, which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT, OR IN ONE OF THE POWERS.

YES.—It is in the essence of the soul.

THE REASON is that every perfection of the power of the soul has the character of a virtue (art. i, q. lv, lvi). Now grace is not a virtue (prec. art.). Hence it is left that grace, just as it is prior to virtue, so it has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, viz., so that it is in the essence of the soul.

For, just as by his intellectual power man partakes of divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and by the power of his will partakes of divine love through the virtue of charity, so also by the nature of his soul he participates in the Divine Nature after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.

NOTE: Just as from the essence of the soul its powers flow, which are the principles of its acts, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace (Ad 1). Wherefore grace is the principle of a meritorious work through the medium of the powers, just as the essence of the soul is the principle of the acts of life through the medium of the powers (Ad 2).

QUESTION CXI THE DIVISION OF GRACE (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO SANCTIFYING GRACE AND GRATUITOUS GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that grace is that whereby man is directed to God. Now this takes place in two ways: 1) By man's being ordained to God immediately through grace, and this is done by sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), because this grace makes man pleasing (*gratum*) to God. 2) By man's leading others to God besides himself; and this is done by gratuitous grace, or the charismata, which God gives to certain persons for the benefits of others (I Cor. xii, 7). Accordingly, grace is suitably divided into sanctifying and gratuitous.

ART. II.—WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO OPERATING AND CO-OPERATING GRACE.

YES.—Both actual and habitual grace.

THE REASON is that if grace is taken for the gratuitous movement of God (actual grace), whereby God moves us to meritorious good, it is suitably divided into operating and co-operating, inasmuch as our mind does not move, but is moved by God, especially when the will begins to will good whereas it had willed evil before; or inasmuch as our mind is both mover and moved, and thus the operation is attributed not only to God, but also to the soul. But if grace be taken for an habitual gift, it has also a double effect (as of any other form, of which the first is being, the second is operation). That is, it heals or justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, and thus grace is called *operating*; and it is the principle of a meritorious act, which proceeds from free will, and thus it is *co-operating*.

NOTE: God does not justify us without our co-operation, inasmuch as by the movement of the free will, when we are justified, we consent to the justice of God. Yet this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect. Hence the whole operation belongs to grace (Ad 2).—For man is helped by God through operating grace that he may will good, and, the end being already intended, grace co-operates with us (Ad 3).—Operating and co-operating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what we have said (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER GRACE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PREVENIENT AND SUBSEQUENT GRACE.

YES.—In whatever way grace is taken (whether as actual or habitual).

THE REASON is that there are five effects of grace in us, one of which is called prevenient with reference to the other, which follows. Now these effects of grace are ordered in us thus: The first is that the soul is healed; the second, that it wills good; the third, that it efficaciously performs the good that it wills; the fourth, that the soul perseveres in good; and the fifth, that it attains to glory.

NOTE: The division into prevenient and subsequent graces does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and co-operating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace, whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace since the notion of neither implies imperfection (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED BY THE APOSTLE.

YES.—It is divided thus: The grace of the word of wisdom, of knowledge, and of faith; the grace of healing, the working of miracles, the grace of prophecy and the discernment of spirits; the grace of kinds of tongues and the interpretation of speeches (I Cor. xii, 8-10).

THE REASON is that gratuitous grace is ordained to this, that man, by outwardly teaching or persuading, may co-operate with another, that he may be led to God. Now for this three things are required (on the part of the teacher or persuader): 1) That man has gained the fullness of the knowledge of divine things, that from this he may instruct others; and for this faith is given, whereby one believes firmly and especially the things that he desires to teach others; wisdom is the knowledge of divine things, and knowledge, which is the knowledge of human things in relation to God. 2) that he be able to confirm or prove the things that he says; and for this the grace of healing, the working of miracles, prophecy, and the discernment of spirits are given. For these can be done only by God, and therefore they confirm the truth of God with perfect certainty; 3) that he may be able suitably to express to his hearers the thoughts that he conceives, and for this the grace of kinds of tongues and the grace of interpretation of speeches are given.

NOTE: Wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gratuitous graces (not as gifts of the Holy Spirit, but) inasmuch as they imply a certain abundance of knowledge and wisdom, so that man can not only have a right knowledge of divine things in himself, but also can instruct others and refute those who oppose the faith.

ART. V.—WHETHER GRATUITOUS GRACE IS NOBLER THAN SANCTIFYING GRACE.

NO.—Sanctifying grace is far more excellent.

THE REASON is that sanctifying grace ordains man immediately to union with his Last End, whereas the gratuitous graces ordain man to certain preparations for the Last End, in order that through prophecy and miracles and other things of the sort men may be led to union with their Last End. Now the end is always superior to the things that are directed to the end.

QUESTION CXII THE CAUSE OF GRACE

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE.

YES.—He is the efficient cause.

THE REASON is that the gift of grace surpasses every faculty of created nature, since it is nothing else than a participation of the divine nature, which surpasses every other nature.

NOTE: Christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by the power of the Godhead united with it, from which the actions of Christ's humanity have salutary

effect (Ad 1).—In the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is caused instrumentally by the sacraments themselves, but principally it is caused by the power of the Holy Spirit working in the sacraments (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER ANY PREPARATION AND DISPOSITION FOR GRACE IS REQUIRED ON MAN'S PART.

YES.—a) Not according as grace is a help of God moving the soul to good (actual grace); but b) according as it is an habitual gift of God (habitual grace).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that whatever preparation can exist in man is with the help of God moving the soul to good. Accordingly, the very movement of the free will, whereby one is prepared to receive the gift of grace, is an act of the free will coming principally from God, who moves the free will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that no form can exist in anything but disposed matter.

NOTE: 1. A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed—but of glory, which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can arise only from grace, as will be seen later q. cxiv, art. 2, Ad 1).

2. An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER GRACE IS NECESSARILY GIVEN TO WHOEVER PREPARES HIMSELF FOR IT, OR TO WHOEVER DOES WHAT IN HIM LIES.

NO.—However much one does what in him lies, and prepares himself for grace, grace is not necessarily given.

THE REASON is that to prepare oneself for grace implies, on the part of the free will, no necessity to obtain grace, since the gift of grace surpasses the preparation of human power. On the part of God moving, the preparation for grace obtains its effect or not according to the intention of God, which cannot fail. Accordingly, grace necessarily follows if God intends it, not by the necessity of compulsion but of infallibility.

For man is, in the hands of God, like clay in the hands of the potter (Jerem. xviii, 6). Clay does not receive its form from the potter's hand of necessity, however much it is prepared for this form (argument in *Sed Contra*). And this also is evident in natural things, in which the disposition of the matter does not obtain its form of necessity, except by the power of the agent, who causes the disposition (Ad 3). According to this principle then, we must understand the axiom: "God does not deny His grace to him who does what in him lies."

ART. IV.—WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE MAN THAN IN ANOTHER.

YES.—a) Not on the part of the end or object; but b) on the part of the subject, by reason of inherence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the object of grace is one: To unite man to the Supreme Good, which is God. And thus, in this respect, grace is not higher in one than in another.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who prepares himself more for grace, under the motion of God, receives a fuller grace. Hence the first reason of this diversity is God, who dispenses His gifts in different degrees, in order that the Church might be built up out of different degrees of beauty and perfection "in order to perfect the saints for the building up of the body of Christ" (Ephes. iv, 12).

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE HAS GRACE.

NO.—a) By himself (i.e., without a revelation from God) man cannot know with certainty that he has grace; b) he can, however, have a conjectural knowledge of this through several signs.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no one can have a knowledge of any conclusion, if he does not know the principle. Now the principle of grace and its object are God Himself, who on account of His Excellence is unknown to us, according to Job xxxvi, 26: "Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Wherefore "man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred" (Eccl. ix, 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a man can perceive that he takes pleasure in God and despises worldly things, and can know that he is not conscious of any mortal sin. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; wherefore the Apostle says: "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet I am not hereby justified" (II Cor., iv, 3); because, as is said in Psalm xviii, 13: "Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant."

NOTE: 1. Whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and other such things, which perfect the appetitive faculty. For certainty pertains to the perfection of the intellect (Ad 2).

2. One can know that one does not have grace; but cannot know that one has it; for sin has for its principle and object a mutable good, which is known to us. Now the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the immensity of its light, according to I Tim. vi, 16: "Who . . . dwells in light inaccessible" (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXIII THE EFFECTS OF GRACE

1) The justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; 2) merit, which is the effect of co-operating grace. The first point will be discussed in 10 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED IS THE REMISSION OF SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the justification of the wicked implies a certain passing from the state of injustice to the state of justice, according to the analogy of movement in man, which is from opposite to opposite. For justice is here taken, not as it is the virtue of giving to another man what is his own, whether particularly (particular justice) or generally (legal justice); but it is taken in so far as it implies a rectitude of order in the very inner disposition of man, viz., inasmuch as the highest part of man is subjected to God, and the lower powers of the soul are subjected to the highest, namely the reason.

Now this justice in man can take place in two ways: 1) By way of simple generation, which is from privation to form, as it was in Adam (original justice); 2) by the analogy of movement from opposite to opposite, as was said; and this properly is what is signified by the justification of the wicked; it borrows its name from the term *whereto*.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS REQUIRED FOR THE REMISSION OF GUILT, I.E., FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the effect of divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby man becomes worthy of eternal life, from which mortal sin excludes him. Wherefore remission of guilt would be meaningless without an infusion of grace.

NOTE: 1. The love of God, from the point of view of the divine act, is eternal and immutable; but with regard to the effects that it impresses in us, it is sometimes interrupted, in so far, namely as we sometimes lose it and sometimes again recover it (in body of art.).

2. Just as the love of God not only consists in the act of the divine will, but also denotes a certain effect of grace (q. cx, art. 1), so also, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the divine love that sin is not impudged to man by God (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED A MOVEMENT OF FREE WILL IS REQUIRED.

YES.—THE REASON is that God moves all things in the manner appropriate to each. Consequently He moves man also to justice according to the condition of human

nature. Now man by very nature is a creature of free will. Hence, in him who has the use of free will, no movement to justice is given by God without the movement of the free will. God so infuses the gift of justifying grace that He also at the same time moves the free will with it to accept the gift of grace in those who are capable of being moved thus.

Infants are not capable of the movement of their free will; hence it is by the simple infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also grace is given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration.

And the same reason holds good with the insane and idiots, who have never had the use of free will. But in the case of one who has had the use of it, and afterwards has lost it, either through illness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to have the sacrament. This does not happen without the use of free will (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MOVEMENT OF FAITH IS REQUIRED FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED.

YES.—In so far as man believes that God is the one who justifies him through the mystery of Christ.

THE REASON is that God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself. Now the first turning to God is done by faith, according to Hebr. xi, 6: "He who comes to God must believe that God exists."—Yet the movement of faith is not perfect unless it is informed by charity; wherefore simultaneously with the movement of faith in the justification of the wicked comes the movement of charity (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED THERE IS REQUIRED A MOVEMENT OF THE FREE WILL IN REGARD TO SIN.

YES.—A detestation of sin is required.

THE REASON is that the justification of the wicked, as was said (art. 1 of this q.), is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice in the movement of the free will mean detestation and desire. Accordingly, in the justification of the wicked there is a twofold movement of the free will: One whereby man directs himself to the justice of God in desire, and the other whereby he detests sin.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE REMISSION OF SIN OUGHT TO BE RECKONED AMONG THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR JUSTIFICATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the remission of sins is as the consummation in the movement of justification. For, as in any movement whereby something is moved by someone three things are required, so also in this movement of justification. These three things are the movement of the mover himself, and this is done through the infusion of grace; the movement of the one moved, which is here done by the movement of the free will, which is by way of withdrawal from sin and drawing near to God (prec. art.); and the consummation of the movement, or the arrival at the end, which is here done through the remission of sins; for in this justification is consummated.

NOTE: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin are substantially the same act, for by the same act God bestows grace and remits guilt. But on the part of the objects they differ according to the difference in the guilt that is removed and the grace that is infused; just as even in the things of nature generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one is the corruption of another (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED TAKES PLACE IN AN INSTANT, OR SUCCESSIVELY.

ANSWER: It takes place in an instant. That is, with regard to the infusion of grace; but with regard to the disposition for grace it sometimes takes place suddenly, and sometimes gradually and successively.

THE REASON is that the infusion of grace, by which the justification of the wicked comes about, takes place in an instant. For God, whose power is infinite, does not require for the infusing of grace into the soul any disposition except what He Himself makes (q. cxii, art. 2). And this He does as He wills, whether suddenly, as in the case of Paul and many others, or gradually, as He does ordinarily (q. cxii, art. 2, Ad 2).

NOTE: 1. The movement of the free will, which concurs in the justification of the wicked, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of justification, but a way to justification; as local movement is a way to illumination, and alteration is a way to generation (Ad 1).

2. As to the objection that it would be the same instant in which the infusion of grace takes place and the remission of sin is given (a thing that is impossible, for it would follow that two opposites could both be together in the same place at the same time), note that there is no last instant in which sin is present, but a last time (because here the measure is according to continuous time). But there is a first instant, in which grace is present, because the measure of this instant is discrete time, as is proper to the things that are above time (I. P., q. x, art. 4); whereas sin inhered in the whole preceding time (Ad 5).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE INFUSION OF GRACE IS NATURALLY THE FIRST OF THE THINGS REQUIRED FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED.

YES.—The aforesaid four requirements for justification are indeed simultaneous in time, because justification is not successive, as was said (prec. art.); but in the order of nature one of them is prior to the other; and among them the first in the natural order is the infusion of grace; the second is the movement of the free will to God, and consequently the detestation of sin; the last is the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover terminates; and this is the remission of sin, to which this whole transformation is directed as to the end.

NOTE: Considered from the viewpoint of God Moving, the infusion of grace is prior in the order of nature to the remission of sin, because the one who acts through the form that already exists in him acts to remove the contrary, just as the sun acts by its light to remove darkness. But considered from the standpoint of that which is moved, or the free will, the remission of sin is prior to the infusion of grace, just as from the standpoint of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED IS THE GREATEST WORK OF GOD.

YES.—a) On the part of the magnitude of that which is done, the justification of the wicked is greater than the work of creation; b) on the part of the manner of acting, the work of creation is greater; c) according to absolute quantity, the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that justifies the wicked; d) according to the quantity of proportion, the gift of grace that justifies the wicked is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just man.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the justification of the wicked terminates in the eternal good of the participation of God; but the creation of heaven and earth terminates in the good of mutable nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that with respect to the manner of action the greatest work is that which makes something out of nothing.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that thus the glorification of the just is a greater work than the justification of the wicked, which is ordained to glorification itself.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that the gift of grace more exceeds the worthiness of the wicked, who were worthy of punishment, than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just, who are justified by the very fact that they are worthy of glory.

ART. X.—WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED IS A MIRACULOUS WORK.

NO.—a) As something wonderful (*mirum*), the justification of the wicked (as also the work of creation) can be called miraculous. b) But with regard to the form intro-

duced, the justification of the wicked is not a miraculous work. c) As regards the fact that in miraculous works there is found something beyond the ordinary and wonted order of causing effects, thus the work of justification of the wicked is not ordinarily miraculous, but sometimes it is.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the justification of the wicked, since it can be done by God alone, has a hidden cause, and thus something is called wonderful simply.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the form of justification that is introduced is not above the natural power of the soul; for the soul is naturally capable of justification or grace, for it was created to the image of God.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the common and ordinary course of justification is that man is turned to God by God's interiorly moving the soul, first by imperfect conversion, that afterwards it may arrive at perfect conversion. "For charity begun merits increase, and, being increased, merits perfection," as Augustine says (Tract. 5 on the Epistle of John).

But sometimes God moves the soul so vehemently that it at once attains a certain perfection of justice, as happened in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous (at end).

QUESTION CXIV MERIT

(in ten articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A MAN MAY MERIT ANYTHING FROM GOD.

YES.—Not according to justice simply taken, but according to relative justice, in so far as some character of justice is found therein. This is according to the measure preordained by God Himself.

THE REASON is that justice simply taken is the justice among those between whom there is absolute equality. Now between God and man there is the greatest inequality (for they are infinitely far apart), and all that is good in man is from God. Consequently, there can be no justice of man with respect to God according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, namely in so far as the mode and measure of human virtue is from God. Hence the merit of man with God can be only according to the presupposition of a divine ordination, so that man obtains from God through his actions, as a reward, that for which God assigns him the power to act, as is plain even in natural things. Now this has the character of merit in man, because to act thus man moves himself by free will, which is not so in other creatures.

NOTE: 1. What is here called justice or merit in the relative sense is not to be understood as merit *de congruo*, or congruous merit, but it is merit *de condigno* (condign merit, not absolutely condign or by rigor of justice, but condign taken in the broad sense, or from condignity), because, supposing God's ordination, as was said, it has the true character of justice.

2. From our goods God does not seek profit but glory, i.e., the manifestation of His goodness; hence we merit something from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory (Ad 2).

3. Since our action has the character of merit only on the presupposition of God's ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be fulfilled.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANYONE WITHOUT GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE.

NO.—Whether in the state of perfect nature (in which Adam was before his sin) or (*a fortiori*) in the state of corrupt nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that life, eternal is a good surpassing the proportion of created nature, because it even surpasses the hope and thought of it (I Cor. ii, 9). Hence it is that no created nature is the sufficient principle of the meritorious act of eternal life, unless there be added to it some supernatural gift, which is called grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that (besides the reason given in the first) there is the impediment of sin, for the wages of sin are death (Rom. vi, 23).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN IN GRACE CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE CONDIGNLY.

YES.—a) Not with respect to the substance of the act, and in so far as the act proceeds from free will; but b) in so far as the meritorius work proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that there can be condignity here, on account of the infinite inequality. Hence the Apostle says, Rom. viii, 18: "The sufferings of the present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that will be revealed to us." But there is a congruity, on account of a certain equality of proportion. For it seems congruous that God should reward a man who does what he can, on account of the excellence of His power.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus the value of merit depends on the power of the Holy Spirit, who moves us to eternal life. The value of the work also depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. viii, 17.

NOTE: The grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree exists virtually. (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER GRACE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF MERIT THROUGH CHARITY RATHER THAN THE OTHER VIRTUES.

YES.—Both on the part of the divine ordination, as was stated above, and on the part of man's free will.

THE REASON is that the movement of the human mind to the enjoyment of the divine good, in which life eternal consists, is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, inasmuch as the other virtues are commanded by charity.—Another reason is that what we do out of love we do most voluntarily.

NOTE: The toilsomeness and difficulty of a work, if it is inherent in the work itself, increases merit; and thus charity does not diminish the labor of its performance—in fact, it makes us undertake the greatest labors, as Gregory says (*Hom. in Evang. xxx*). But if it proceeds from a defect of good will in the doer of the work himself, such toilsomeness diminishes merit (Ad 2).—The acts of patience, fortitude, and the other virtues or not meritorious unless they proceed from charity, according to I Cor. xiii, 3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, yet do not have charity, it profits me nothing" (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT FOR HIMSELF THE FIRST GRACE.

NO.—Man cannot merit for himself the first grace, a) whether the gift of grace be considered under the aspect of its gratuitousness or b) whether it be considered according to the nature of the thing that is given.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as Scripture says (Rom. ii, 9): "If by grace it is not now by works."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that grace surpasses the proportion of nature. Another reason is that before grace, in the state of sin, man has an impediment to meriting grace, viz., sin itself.

NOTE: 1. The beginning of faith is in us from God, as the truth of faith teaches; wherefore now the very act of faith follows from the first grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace (Ad 1).

2. God gives grace only to the worthy; not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER A MAN CAN MERIT THE FIRST GRACE FOR ANOTHER.

NO.—a) *De condigno*, no one can merit the first grace for another, except Christ alone. b) *De congruo*, one who is in grace can merit the first grace for another.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that someone condignly merits by force of the divine motion. Now only Christ is moved by God through grace in order that He may lead others to eternal life, in so far as He is the Head of the Church and the Author of man's salvation (Heb. ii, 10).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, from the fact that a man in the state of grace fulfills God's will, it is congruous, according to the proportion of friendship, that God should fulfill the man's will in the salvation of another, although sometimes He may have an obstacle on the part of the one for whom some holy person desires justification.

The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER A MAN MAY MERIT RESTORATION AFTER A FALL.

NO.—Neither condignly nor congruously.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the character of condign merit depends on the movement of divine grace, which motion is interrupted by subsequent sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if congruous merit, whereby someone merits the first grace for another, is prevented from obtaining its effect on account of the obstacle of sin in the one for whom someone merits, much more is the efficacy of such merit impeded by an impediment that is both in the one who merits and in the one for whom merit is gained: For here both impediments concur in one person.

NOTE: 1. The prayer whereby someone seeks restoration after a fall does not depend on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy (Ad 1).

2. Some have said that no one absolutely merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace—but only conditionally, i.e., if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin there arises an impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening impediment (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER A MAN MAY MERIT INCREASE OF GRACE OR CHARITY.

YES.—Condignly he may.

THE REASON is that that falls under condign merit to which the motion of grace extends. Now grace and charity extend to their increase; for in this advance in grace and charity consists. The term of grace and charity is life everlasting, according to Prov. iv, 18: "But the path of the just as a shining light fareth forward and increaseth even to perfect day," which is the day of glory.

NOTE: By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace, which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in due time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz., when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER A MAN MAY MERIT PERSEVERANCE.

NO.—a) The perseverance of glory falls under merit; but b) the perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit. (This is a question of condign merit).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the perseverance of glory consists in this, that free will, under the motion of God, is determined to good by grace consummated in its term, and this falls under merit.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the perseverance of the wayfarer consists in this, that God inclines man to good until the end, and this does not fall under merit, because God is here compared to the movement of perseverance as the principle of movement itself. Now the principle of merit does not fall under merit.—Yet the gift of perseverance, this we may impetrate from God in prayer either for ourselves or for another, although it does not fall under merit. (Ad 1); for prayer rests on mercy.

ART. X.—WHETHER TEMPORAL GOODS FALL UNDER MERIT.

NO.—a) Temporal goods considered in themselves fall only relatively under merit; but considered as being useful to the works of the virtues in relation to eternal life, they fall under merit simply.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that temporal goods considered in themselves are not ordained to eternal life; yet they have the character of a reward, with respect to the divine motion, whereby the wills of men are moved to pursue these (temporal goods), although sometimes men in seeking them do not have the right intention.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, according to this, temporal goods are among those whereby man is helped to reach beatitude after the first grace, as is also the increase of grace.

NOTE: All things happen equally to the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them (Ad 4). For the just, who are helped by these evils, they are not punishments, but rather medicines (Ad 3). And God gives just so much of temporal goods to just men, and so much of them to the wicked, as is expedient for them to attain life eternal (in middle of art.).

END OF THE TRACT ON MORAL SUBJECTS

**THE SUMMA ABRIDGED
CONDENSED BY REV. GERARD PARIS, O.P.
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART**

(189 Questions, 920 Articles)

PREFACE

After a general treatment of the virtues and vices, and relating matters, we must now consider the virtues and vices in particular. For the treatment of moral theology in the general and abstract is less useful, inasmuch as actions consist of particular cases.

Now something can be considered in particular in the field of moral science in two ways: 1) On the part of the moral matter itself, for example, when we consider this virtue or that vice; 2) with regard to the special states of men, for example, when we consider subjects and superiors, the active and the contemplative, or any other of the different classes of men.

We shall first, then, treat in particular of the things that pertain to all the states of men; secondly, in particular of the things that pertain to certain states.

With respect to the first, we have now to consider that, if we would make separate determinations in regard to the virtues, gifts, vices, and commandments, we should have to say the same thing many times. For one who wishes to treat sufficiently of the commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," must needs inquire concerning adultery, which is a sin of which even the knowledge depends on the knowledge of the opposite virtue. Accordingly, our method will be briefer and speedier if we proceed in the same tract to a consideration of a virtue and the gift corresponding to it, and the opposing vices and affirmative or negative commandments. This method of treatment will take the vices in the order of their species.

For we showed above (I-II, q. xviii, and lxxxii, and lxxxiii) that the vices and sins differ specifically according to their matter or object, but not according to and other distinctions of sins, for example, sins of the mind, tongue, and deed; or according to weakness, ignorance, and malice, and other such distinctions.

The matter about which virtue rightly acts and the opposed vices recede from rectitude, being the same, we shall reduce the whole matter of moral theology to a consideration of the virtues. Now all the virtues are reducible to seven, of which three are theological, which, we shall treat first. The other four are cardinal, and we shall handle them afterwards.

Now of the intellectual virtues, one is prudence, which is included and numbered among the cardinal virtues. Now art does not pertain to moral science, which is concerned with things to be done, but art is the right method of doing things, as was stated above (I-II, q. lvii, art. 3 and four).

The other three intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, have their names in common with certain gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence we shall treat of them in our consideration of the gifts that correspond to the virtues. Now the other moral virtues are all in some way reducible to the cardinal virtues, as is evident from what we stated above (I-II, q. lxi, art. 3). Hence in a consideration of any cardinal virtue we shall treat also of all the virtues in any manner pertaining to it, and of the opposing vices. And thus nothing pertaining to morality will be omitted.

**THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
FAITH**

Regarding the theological virtues, we shall accordingly treat first of faith; secondly, of hope; thirdly, of charity.—With regard to faith four heads remain to be considered: Faith itself, the gifts of understanding and knowledge thereto corresponding; the opposing vices, and the commandments pertaining to this virtue.—Concerning faith, we shall first consider its object; secondly, its act; thirdly, the habit of faith. The first head is in 10 articles.

**QUESTION I
THE OBJECT OF FAITH**

ART. I.—WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS THE FIRST TRUTH.

YES.—a) The first truth is the formal object of faith, and b) in some manner is also its material object.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the formal object of anything is that *by which* the object is known, which is the formal nature of the object. Now the faith of which we are speaking does not assent to anything unless because it was revealed by God. Hence it rests on divine truth itself, which is the first truth, as on the means whereby the object of faith is known.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that others besides God, to whom faith assents, do not fall under the assent of faith, save in so far as they have some relation to God, inasmuch as by them man is helped to direct himself to the enjoyment of God.

NOTE: The formal *object which* of faith, as the theologians say, or that which of itself and by its own nature is reached by faith, is the first truth in the order of being, or God Himself in so far as He surpasses natural reason. The formal object *by which*, or that through the medium of which the formal *object which* is attained, is the first truth in the order of speaking, or the divine veracity, which should be believed when it reveals.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH IS SOMETHING COMPLEX BY WAY OF A PROPOSITION.

YES.—On the part of the one who believes the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition; but on the part of the object believed it is not complex.

THE REASON is that the proper mode of the human intellect is to know truth by putting together and dividing. Hence simple things are known by complexity. But on the part of the thing itself, the object of faith is not complex, in so far, that is, as the Divine Intellect is concerned.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANYTHING FALSE CAN COME UNDER FAITH.

NO.—THE REASON is that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth (art. 1). Hence nothing can fall under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, just as evil cannot stand under goodness, or non-being under being.

NOTE: In this respect hope and charity do not have the same character. For faith perfects the intellect; hope and charity, the appetitive part. Now, since truth is a good of the intellect, all the virtues that perfect the intellect exclude falsity altogether.

Truth is not a good of the appetitive power. Yet neither can (theological) hope, as such, be subject to falsity. For it depends on the divine help of grace, in which, if it persevere, it will attain perfectly and infallibly eternal life. It is the same with charity; because to charity it belongs to love God, wherever He may be. Hence it makes no difference to charity whether God be in the individual whom we love for God's sake (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE OBJECT OF FAITH CAN BE SOMETHING SEEN.

NO.—The object of faith cannot be seen, either intellectually or sensibly.

THE REASON is that those things are said to be seen which by themselves move our intellect or senses to a knowledge of them. Now through faith the intellect assents to something, not because it is sufficiently moved by its proper object, but by a kind of choice voluntarily leading to one side rather than to another, without fear of error. For if it did assent with the fear of error it would not be faith, but opinion.

NOTE: 1.—Regarding the words of the Lord: "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed," note that Thomas saw one thing and believed another: He saw the Man, and, believing Him to be God, made a confession of faith, when he said: "My Lord and My God" (John xx, 29).—(Ad 1).

2.—Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways: First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or something of that kind, he saw that they ought to be believed (Ad. 2).

3.—The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For, just as by the habits of the other virtues man sees what is becoming to him in respect to that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to others (Ad. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH CAN BE AN OBJECT OF SCIENCE.

NO.—Those things that are of faith cannot be known in the same respect in the same matter.

THE REASON is that whatever things are known (by scientific demonstration) are in some manner seen. For all science is had by certain self-evident principles, and consequently is seen. Now faith is of things that are not seen (prec. art.).—Yet there is no reason why that which is seen or known by one person should not be believed by another. Nevertheless, that which is proposed to be believed equally by all is equally unknown by all as an object of science; and such are the things that are of faith simply.

NOTE: The reasons adduced by holy men to prove things that are of faith are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e., from the authority of Holy Writ. Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is proved in the eyes of all. Hence again theology is a science (P. I., q. i, art. 2) (Ad. 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THOSE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO CERTAIN ARTICLES.

YES.—As regards the formal element with regard to us, and so far as the objects of Christian faith are divided by means of articles into certain parts, having some connections with one another. The word *article* is apparently derived from the Greek word *arthron*, which signifies a fitting together of distinct parts.

THE REASON is that, wherever there is anything that for a special reason is unseen, there is a special article. Thus we distinguish the article of the Resurrection of Christ from the article of His Passion. But wherever many things are known or not known under the same aspect, articles are not to be distinguished. For example, that the Lord suffered, died, and was buried has one and the same difficulty, and for this reason all these things belong to one article. Yet this is so as regards the formal nature of the articles with regard to us, which is that it is unseen; but on the part of the thing that is believed, the formal aspect of all the objects of belief is one, namely the First Truth, as was said in the first article of this question (Ad 2).

NOTE: Faith is chiefly of these things that we hope to see in heaven, according to Heb. ii, 1: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Accordingly those things are in themselves of faith which order us directly to eternal life, such as that there are three Persons in Almighty God, the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like. And these are distinct articles of faith.

Certain things, however, are proposed to our belief in Holy Writ, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: For instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and other such things as are recorded in Holy Writ in relation to the manifestation of the Divine Majesty or the Incarnation of Christ; and in reference to such articles are not to be distinguished (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE ARTICLES OF FAITH HAVE INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME.

YES.—a) As regards the substance of the articles of faith, no increase has taken place in them in the course of time; b) but only as regards their more explicit knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that whatever posterity believed was contained in the faith of the preceding Fathers, although implicitly.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that certain things were explicitly known by those who came later, which were not known by those who were earlier. Hence the Apostle (Gal. iii, 24) compares the state of the Old Testament with childhood (Ad 2).

NOTE: 1.—All the articles of faith are contained implicitly in these first two, viz., that it is believed that God exists and provides for the salvation of men (Heb. xi, 6). Even so, what is possessed by natural reason is contained in self-evident principles, which are reduced to one as to the first principle: "It is impossible at the same time to affirm and to deny," as is evident by philosophy (in body of art.)

2. The final consummation of grace was made by Christ. Hence also His time is called the time of fulness (Gal. iv, 4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the Apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of the faith (Ad 4).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE ARTICLES OF FAITH ARE SUITABLY FORMULATED.

YES.—THE REASON is that those things belong of themselves to faith the vision of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are led to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to our vision, namely the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, by whom we have access to the glory of the sons of God (Rom. v, 2). According to these two distinctions the articles of faith are suitably formulated.

There are seven articles regarding the majesty of the Godhead, and seven with respect to Christ's humanity.

To the Godhead pertain: a) The unity of the Godhead (first article); b) the Trinity of the Persons (three articles); c) the works proper to the Divinity, namely creation, sanctification, and glorification through the resurrection of the flesh and life everlasting (three articles).

Concerning Christ's humanity, they are: First article, the incarnation or conception of Christ; second article, His birth from the Virgin; third, His suffering, death, and burial; fourth, His descent into hell; fifth, His resurrection; sixth, His ascension; and seventh, His coming to judgment.

ART. IX.—WHETHER IT IS SUITABLE FOR THE ARTICLES OF FAITH TO BE EMBODIED IN A SYMBOL.

YES.—THE REASON is that no one can believe unless the truth that he believes is proposed to him. The truths of faith are suitably gathered into one (for this is what the name symbol means, from the Greek *symbollein*, to gather), in order that they may more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone miss the truth through ignorance of the faith.

NOTE: 1. The many symbols that the Church has given in no other wise differ from one another save that in one they are explained more fully, and in another they are contained implicitly, according as the obstinacy of heretics demanded (Ad 2).

2. In the Mass the Symbol of the Fathers (the Nicene Creed) is publicly sung, and not that of the Apostles, because the former is declarative of the latter, and also was drawn up before the faith had been made public, and when the Church was at peace. On the other hand, the Symbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors (Ad 6).

ART. X.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOVEREIGN PONTIFF TO DRAW UP A SYMBOL OF FAITH.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to the authority of that person to publish a symbol to whose authority it belongs finally to determine the things that are of faith, so as to be held by all with undisputed faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, according to the words of Christ to Peter, whom He made the Sovereign Pontiff: "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii, 32).

NOTE: 1. It belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff alone to put out a new edition of the symbol, as all other things that pertain to the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council, and other such things (at end of art.).

2. As regards the symbol of St. Athanasius, observe that the saint did not compose this manifestation of faith by means of a symbol; but rather by means of a certain doctrine, as is apparent from his manner of speaking. But, since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith (Ad 3).

QUESTION II THE ACT OF FAITH

1) The interior act; 2) the exterior act. Under the first come 10 articles:

ART. I.—WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS TO THINK WITH ASSENT.

YES.—a) To believe is to think with assent, not as thought belongs to the cogitative or estimative power (I.P., q. lxxviii, a. 4), or b) as it is taken generally for any actual consideration of the intellect, but c) as it denotes a reflection of the intellect, joined with some inquiry and consent of the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to think is here not taken according as it is an act of the cogitative power, but according as it pertains to the intellect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to think thus taken (as generally) does not indicate the essence of that which is to believe, for in this way even one who considers the things that he knows, or understands, thinks with assent.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in this way the whole nature of the act that is to believe is understood, in so far as it is distinguished from all the acts of the intellect, which are about the true and the false; for to believe cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding. Yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear vision, and in this faith agrees with doubt, suspicion, and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent.

NOTE: 1. Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance, that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles (Ad 1).

2. The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will; wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACT OF FAITH IS SUITABLY DISTINGUISHED AS BELIEVING GOD, BELIEVING IN A GOD, AND BELIEVING IN GOD.

YES.—On the part of the object in relation to the intellect.

THE REASON is that the act of any power and habit is taken according to the relation of the power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith as it belongs materially to the intellect is to believe in a God (q. I, art. 1). In so far as it belongs formally to the intellect, it is to believe God, i.e., on account of the authority of God revealing (ibid.). In so far as it pertains to the will, namely in so far as it has the character of an end, it is to believe in God.—These three designations do not indicate different acts of faith, but one and the same act having a different relation to the object of faith (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE ANYTHING ABOVE THE NATURAL REASON.

YES.—In order that man may attain the perfect vision of beatitude, it is required first of all that he believe God, as a disciple believes his master.

THE REASON is that everyone who learns must believe in order to acquire science in a perfect degree. Now the vision of beatitude, to which man is supernaturally ordered through faith, cannot be attained by man except by way of learning from God as He teaches, according to John vi, 45: "Everyone who has listened to the Father, and has learned, comes to Me."

NOTE: As to the objection that for our perfection those things that belong to us according to our nature suffice, observe that man's nature depends on a higher nature, for the perfection of which natural knowledge is not enough, but a supernatural knowledge is required, as was said in our reply (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO BELIEVE THOSE THINGS THAT CAN BE PROVED BY NATURAL REASON.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that in so doing man more speedily acquires a knowledge of divine truth.

THE SECOND REASON is that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many can make no progress in the study of science, either because of dullness of mind, or on account of other occupations and necessities of this temporal life, or even on account of laziness. Yet these would be altogether deprived of knowledge unless a knowledge of God were brought to them through the medium of faith.

THE THIRD REASON is for the sake of certainty. For human reason is very defective in things concerning God.—The investigation of the natural reason has not proved sufficient to lead the human race to a knowledge of divine things, even those that can be demonstrated by reason alone (Ad 1), as is evident from the diversity of philosophic systems.

ART. V.—WHETHER MAN IS BOUND TO BELIEVE ANYTHING EXPLICITLY.

YES.—With regard to things that are in themselves an object of faith, by which man is made blessed; but with regard to the things that are accidentally an object of faith, as that Abraham had two sons and the like, which are contained in Holy Writ, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to hold his mind prepared to believe them. Yet he is bound to believe them even explicitly when it becomes evident to him that these matters are contained in the teaching of faith.

THE REASON is that the determination of a virtuous act to the proper and direct object of virtue is under the necessity of precept, as is also the very act of virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first objects of belief, which are the articles of faith, man is held explicitly to believe them, as he is bound to have faith. But the determination of a virtuous act to the things that are only accidentally or secondarily related to the proper and direct object of that virtue does not fall under the necessity of precept, save in relation to a particular time and place.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ALL ARE EQUALLY BOUND TO HAVE EXPLICIT FAITH.

NO.—THE REASON is that men of higher degree, to whom it belongs to instruct others, are bound to have a fuller knowledge of things to be believed, and thus to believe them more explicitly.

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SALVATION OF ALL THAT THEY SHOULD BELIEVE EXPLICITLY IN THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST'S INCARNATION.

YES.—The mystery of Christ's Incarnation had in some manner to be believed in all times by all men, yet in different ways according to different times and persons.

THE REASON is that this mystery belongs properly and essentially to the object of faith; for the way whereby men come to beatitude is the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion, according to Acts iv, 12: "There is no other name under heaven given to men, by which we must be saved."

NOTE: 1.—In the reply we say "in some manner," because before the state of sin man had an explicit belief in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin through the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no knowledge of his future sin.

After sin, however, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from sin and death.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed throughout the Church and publicly proclaimed, such as the articles that refer to the Resurrection (passim in art.).

2.—As regards the faith of the Gentiles in Christ's Incarnation, let it be observed many of the Gentiles received revelations concerning Christ, as is clear from

history. If, however, any were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job xxvi, 11: "Who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth."

[Tr. Note:—St. Thomas refers in this reply to false archaeological discoveries and to the predictions of the Sibyl, which are not accepted today. Yet there can be no doubt, as ancient history and a study of comparative religion reveal, that men generally have had a longing for a Redeemer, a consciousness of their own insufficiency in establishing right relations with God. This belief seems explicit enough for the saving faith required by the Angelic Doctor.]

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION TO BELIEVE EXPLICITLY IN THE TRINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the mystery of Christ's Incarnation cannot be believed without faith in the Trinity. Hence, just as the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was explicitly believed before Christ by the learned, but implicitly by the unlearned, so also with the Mystery of the Trinity. Yet after grace was revealed all were bound to believe explicitly the mystery of the Trinity, which all have bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matth. xxviii, 19: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

[Tr. Note:—With regard to Christ's Redemption and the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, many theologians hold today that no explicit faith is required for the salvation of these outside the pale of revelation, but that an implicit one suffices, such as is included in an act of faith whereby one believes in God as a rewarder (Hebr. xi, 6). This opinion is more probable in theory but less safe in practice.

In fact, some modern theologians go so far as to hold it probable that a saving faith can exist among those who, under the influence of grace, adhere to a truth that they falsely think has actually been revealed by God. This can apply to heretics, schismatics, Jews, and Mohammedans, if they are in good faith—for instance when a Moslem falsely believes in good faith that the mercy of God was revealed to Mohammed. Pagans can have as an object of faith the remains of a primitive revelation (of which modern anthropology has revealed strong traces) or may be helped by private revelation.]

ART. IX.—WHETHER TO BELIEVE IS MERITORIOUS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of belief is an act of the intellect assenting to divine truth under the command of the will as it is moved by God through grace. (See what we have said concernisg merit: I-II, q. cxiv, art. 3 and 4).

NOTE: 1.—Faith without charity cannot produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free will, for disposed matter can act only by a supervening form (Ad 1).

2.—The assent of the scientist to a scientific fact is not meritorious, because it is not subject to free will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is meritorious, if it be referred to the end of charity. In the case of faith, however, both these things are subject to the free will, so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious (Ad 2).

3.—The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the divine invitation. Hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge; hence he does not lose the merit (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER REASONS IN SUPPORT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE LESSEN THE MERIT OF FAITH.

NO.—a) Reasons in support of what we believe diminish merit if they precede the assent of faith; b) but if the reason is consequent to the will of the believer it increases merit.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that man must believe the things of faith, not on account of any human reason, but on account of divine authority. Accordingly, just as in morality a preceding passion lessens the praiseworthiness of a virtuous act, so reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith if they precede (as when a man will not believe unless he has human reasons).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that reasons in support of faith, if they follow faith, are a sign of a more prompt will, as in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will.

NOTE: The reasons brought forward in support of the preambles of faith, but not in support of the articles of faith, although they lessen the character of faith, since they make more apparent that which is proposed, do not lessen the character of charity, by which the will is prompt to believe those things, even if they are not apparent; and thus the character of merit is not lessened (Ad 2).

QUESTION III THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF FAITH.

YES.—The reason is that the confession of the things pertaining to faith is referred specifically, as to its end, to that which concerns faith, and hence is an act of faith. For the outward acts of any virtue are properly those that are referred specifically to the end of the virtue itself.—Hence fortitude, which removes fear or shame, is not properly and essentially the cause of the confession of faith; but is so accidentally, as it were, as that which removes the obstacle to faith (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONFESSION OF FAITH IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION.

YES.—To confess faith is not always or in every place necessary for salvation, but in some place and time, namely when by omitting this confession we would withdraw due honor to God, or would deprive our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him.

THE REASON is that the confession of one's faith falls under an affirmative precept. Now affirmative precepts, although they always oblige, are not binding for always, but according to place and time (I-II, q. lxxi, art. 5 ad 3, and q. lxxxviii, art. 1 ad 2).

NOTE: There is nothing commendable in making a public confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence the Lord said, Matth. vii, 6: "Do not give to dogs what is holy, neither throw your pearls before swine, or they will trample them under their feet and turn and rend you."—(Ad 3).

QUESTION IV THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH

1) Faith itself; 2) the ones who have faith; 3) the cause of faith; 4) its effects.—The first head is in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THIS IS A FITTING DEFINITION OF FAITH: "FAITH IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THINGS TO BE HOPED FOR, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT SEEN."

YES.—Although these words are not cast in the form of a definition, yet everything by which faith can be defined is touched upon in the aforesaid definition.

THE REASON is that faith, since it is a habit, must be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, and this is the act of the intellect determined to one thing by the command of the will (q. II, art. 2 and 3).

The object of the will is a good and an end, which, in this case, are expressed in these words: "The substance of things hoped for," taking substance for the principle in which the whole thing that follows is virtually contained. The object of the intellect, in so far as it is the object of faith, is designated in the words, "the evidence of things not seen," in so far as by evidence the intellect is led to

cleave to the truth, since the believer's intellect is brought by divine authority to assent to things he does not see.

Therefore the words of the Apostle can thus be reduced to the form of a definition: "Faith is the habit of mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not seen."

ART. II.—WHETHER FAITH RESIDES IN THE INTELLECT AS IN A SUBJECT.

YES.—THE REASON is to believe, whose object is truth, is an act of the intellect, and moreover the immediate object.—For faith, as belonging to two powers of the soul, namely the intellect and the will, that it may be perfect in its act must have its habit in both. For not only must the will be prompt to obey, but also the intellect must be well disposed to follow the command of the will (Ad 2); even as one can saw perfectly if the sawyer has the art, and the saw is well disposed for sawing.

NOTE: Faith is in the speculative intellect as in its subject, as clearly appears from the object of faith. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, it follows that faith works by charity, just as the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHARITY IS THE FORM OF FAITH.

YES.—The reason is that the divine goodness, to which faith is ordained, is the proper object of charity. Now the object of the will is an end, from which voluntary arts receive their species. The mode of the action corresponds proportionately to the end. Hence charity is called the form of faith, inasmuch as by charity the act of faith is perfected and formed.

NOTE: Charity is not the intrinsic form of faith, but only informs its act. Hence nothing prevents an act of faith from being informed by different habits, as by charity and obedience, even as are the acts of the other habits, as we have explained (I-II, q. xviii, art. 6 and 7 and q. lvi, art. 2)—(Passim in the responses).

ART. IV.—WHETHER LIFELESS FAITH CAN BECOME LIVING, OR LIVING FAITH, LIFELESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the distinction into formed and unformed, living and lifeless faith is not with reference to the intellect, for in themselves living and lifeless faith have the same object; but it is with reference to that which belongs to the will, i.e., charity. And thus it is evident that living and lifeless faith have the same habit.

NOTE: Since lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is only accidental thereto (just as childhood is not essential to man), lifeless faith itself becomes living (Ad 1). Consequently a lifeless faith cannot be compared to a living faith as something dead is compared to something living, because a living and a dead thing differ specifically (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER FAITH IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—A living, but not a lifeless faith, is a virtue.

THE REASON is that a habit that is always the principle of a good act can be called a human virtue (I-II, q. lv, Art. 3 and 4). Such is faith. For it is of the very essence of faith that the intellect should always tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith. The effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul always has its will directed to a good end.

From this it follows that a lifeless faith is not a virtue, since, although it has perfection on the part of the intellect, it is not directed to the due good of the will; for it lacks charity.

ART. VI.—WHETHER FAITH IS ONE VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the formal object by which faith is specified is one, namely the First Truth. Yet faith differs numerically in different subjects.—With regard to the things that are believed, faith is also one, since, although there are different objects of faith, yet all are reduced to one, which all believe (God Revealing).

ART. VII.—WHETHER FAITH IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES.

Yes.—a) In itself, faith is first of all the virtues; b) accidentally, some virtue may be prior to faith.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in matters of action the principle is the end. Now the last (immediate) end is the object of the theological virtues, of which faith is first, being in the intellect. For the will, in which hope and charity inhere as in a subject, does not tend to anything except in so far as it is apprehended in the intellect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that some virtues can remove an obstacle to faith, and in this respect they are accidentally prior to faith, just as fortitude removes fear, humility removes pride, etc., although they are not true virtues unless faith is presupposed.

NOTE: 1.—The principle and foundation of a thing are different. To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building, since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to Coloss. iii, 14. Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation, and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith (Ad 4).

2.—Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him (Ad 5).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER FAITH IS MORE CERTAIN THAN SCIENCE AND THE OTHER INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as regards prudence and art, these are concerned with contingent things, whereas faith is concerned with divine things, which never change.—But with regard to the remaining intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science, and understanding, faith is simply more certain, i.e., on the part of the cause, since faith rests on divine truth; the above named virtues are based on human reason.

In a certain respect, however, i.e., on the part of the subject, or with regard to us, faith is less certain, because the intellect less fully acquires the things that are of faith than those that are subject to the three aforesaid virtues; for the things that are of faith are above human understanding.

**QUESTION V
THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH**

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE WAS FAITH IN THE ANGELS, OR IN MAN, IN THEIR ORIGINAL STATE.

YES.—Supposing that man and angel were created with the gift of grace, and not in a purely natural state.

THE REASON is that, since both the angel before his confirmation in grace and man before sin did not have that beatitude whereby we see God in His essence, and which is the proper and direct object of faith, it is obvious that man or the angel did not have manifest knowledge, which would be incompatible with faith.

NOTE: In the original state there was no hearing (about the things of faith) from man speaking outwardly, but there was this hearing from God inspiring inwardly. Thus the prophets heard, according to Psalm lxxiv, 9: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me" (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS FAITH IN THE DEMONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the demons assent to divine truth on account of the command of the will, which moves the intellect. This happens, not indeed because of the subordination of the will to good, as in the case of the faithful, but because the demoniac intellect is forced by signs and evidence to assent to the things that the Church teaches as revealed to it by God, for example, that God is triune, and other such things.

NOTE: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe by their natural intellectual acumen (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN WHO DISBELIEVES ONE ARTICLE OF FAITH CAN HAVE A LIFELESS FAITH IN THE OTHER ARTICLES.

NO.—In a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith there remains no faith, whether lifeless or living.

THE REASON is that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things, nor does he rely on the First Truth. For faith inheres in all the articles of faith on account of one medium, namely on account of the First Truth proposed to us in the Scriptures, according to the teachings of the Church, which has the right understanding of them (Ad 2).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas adds: "But if someone is not obstinate he is no longer a heretic but only in error." Therefore material heretics can have true faith.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER FAITH CAN BE GREATER IN ONE THAN IN ANOTHER.

YES.—a) Not on the part of the formal object; but b) on the part of the subject.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the first Truth, as was said above (q. i, art. 1).—But with regard to the material object of faith, one man can explicitly believe more things than another, as is evident.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that one man can participate more intensely in faith than another; and thus, on the part of the intellect, he has a greater certainty and firmness, and on the part of the will, a greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

QUESTION VI THE CAUSE OF FAITH

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FAITH IS INFUSED INTO MAN BY GOD.

YES.—a) Both as to the things that are proposed to be explicitly believed; b) and as to the assent of the believer.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the things that are of faith surpass human reason; hence they do not fall under man's knowledge, unless God reveals them, either immediately (as the things revealed to the Apostles and Prophets) or mediately (by God who sends preachers), according to Rom. x, 15: "How shall they preach unless they be sent?"

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a cause externally inducing one to assent, such as miracles or the persuasion of man, is not sufficient: For of those who see one and the same miracle, and of those who hear one and the same prophecy, some believe and some do not. Hence we must affirm another, interior, cause, or supernatural principle moving inwardly, by which man in assenting to the things that are of faith is elevated above His nature. And this principle is God. For the will cannot be prepared and elevated for the things that are above its nature except by the grace of God.

ART. II.—WHETHER LIFELESS FAITH IS A GIFT OF GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that what is the cause of lifeless faith is the cause of faith simply. For the lifelessness of faith is not of the essence of the species of faith itself, because faith is lifeless on account of the defect of a certain exterior form, namely charity.

QUESTION VII THE EFFECTS OF FAITH

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FEAR IS AN EFFECT OF FAITH.

YES.—Both servile fear, whereby one fears to be punished by God, and filial fear, whereby one fears to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself with God, out of reverence for Him.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that through faith there is produced in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which are inflicted by divine judgment.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that faith makes us appreciate God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the worst evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equaled.

NOTE: 1.—The cause of servile fear is, properly speaking, lifeless faith; the cause of filial fear is living faith, which through charity makes man adhere to God and be subject to Him (at end of art.).

2.—Against the objection that faith begets hope, which excludes fear, observe that faith begets hope in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize that God awards the just; whereas it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate the punishments that He intends to inflict on sinners. Thus the same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER FAITH HAS THE EFFECT OF PURIFYING THE HEART.

YES.—THE REASON is that the first principle of the movement whereby we tend to God is faith, "since he who comes to God must believe that He is" (Hebr. xi, 6). By this movement to God the heart of man is freed from its impurity, which results from its subjecting itself to transient things (which are below Him) by loving them.—Accordingly, the first principle of the purification of the heart is faith, whereby the impurity of error (lifeless faith) is purified, and, if this be perfected through being quickened by charity (living faith), it causes perfect purification.

QUESTION VIII THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (Is Eight Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER UNDERSTANDING IS THE GIFT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the light of our natural intellect is of finite power; hence it can reach only to something determinate. Therefore, because man is ordained to supernatural beatitude, he needs to penetrate further in order to know certain things that he cannot know by natural light; and that supernatural light given to man is rightly called the gift of understanding, because it is taken from *intelligere* (to understand), as though meaning *intus legere* (to read inwardly), and it denotes an intimate knowledge.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS COMPATIBLE WITH FAITH.

YES.—We cannot perfectly understand the things that directly and of themselves fall under faith, as that God is one and triune, the Son of God is incarnate, and the like; yet in an imperfect manner we can understand even the things that fall under faith.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that perfect understanding is when we acquire a knowledge of the essence of the thing understood, and the truth, as it is in itself, of the proposition understood. And in this way it is impossible to understand the things that fall directly under faith as long as faith endures, for such knowledge would exclude faith. We can, however, in this perfect way understand the things that do not fall directly under faith, but which are ordained to faith, such as that Abraham had two sons, and everything that is contained in Scripture.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we understand in an imperfect way when the very essence of the thing, or the truth of the proposition, is not known as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we know that, whatever be the outward appearance, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we ought not on account of external appearances to depart from matters of faith. In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things that are the direct object of faith.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS MERELY SPECULATIVE, OR ALSO PRACTICAL.

ANSWER: It is also practical.

THE REASON is that the gift of understanding not only refers to the things that chiefly and primarily fall under faith, but also to all the things that are ordered

to faith, not indeed as being chiefly concerned with them, but so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law.—The excellence of the gift of understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as they are in themselves, but also as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object (Ad 2).

NOTE: Because the eternal law surpasses human reason, the knowledge of human acts, in so far as it is ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS IN ALL WHO ARE IN A STATE OF GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that in all those who have grace the will is ordained to good. Now the will cannot rightly be directed to good unless there is already some knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good understood. Since therefore it is by the gift of charity that the Holy Spirit directs the will of man so that it is directly moved to some supernatural good, so also it is by the gift of understanding that He enlightens the mind of man, so as to know a supernatural truth, to which the will should tend.

NOTE: 1.—Even those who are dull of mind are sufficiently instructed as to the things that are necessary for salvation by the Holy Spirit, according to I John ii, 27: "His anointing teaches you concerning all things" (Ad 1).

2.—With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons; but in order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things clearly (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS FOUND ALSO IN THOSE WHO HAVE NOT SANCTIFYING GRACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that by the gift of understanding man is easily moved by the Holy Spirit in so far as to have a right apprehension of the end. Now such a right apprehension of the last end man does not have unless he is unerring about the end, and firmly adheres to it, as to the best and highest end. This belongs only to him who has sanctifying grace.

NOTE: 1.—The distinction between the inspiration of the gift of understanding and the prophetic light is this: The understanding that is necessary for prophecy is an enlightenment of the mind with respect to the things that are revealed to the prophets; the inspiration of the gift of understanding is the enlightenment of the mind with respect to the right apprehension of the last end (Ad 2).

2.—There is no analogy between understanding and faith. Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed, but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which perception, except in the one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING IS IN ALL WHO ARE IN A STATE OF GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, and the gifts of piety, fortitude, and fear belong to the appetitive power. Now, with regard to the other gifts that belong to the cognitive power, namely wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, it is to be considered that with regard to the things that are proposed as objects of faith, two things are required on our part: 1) That they be penetrated or captured by the understanding; and this belongs to the gift of understanding. 2) That man have a right judgment concerning them, so as to believe that he must adhere to them, and withdraw from their opposites. This judgment therefore with regard to the things of God belongs to the gift of wisdom; but with regard to created things it belongs to the gift of knowledge; with regard to the application to individual works, it belongs to the gift of counsel.

NOTE: The intellectual gifts are thus opposed to their contraries: Understanding is opposed to dullness; wisdom, to folly (so called from the fact that it judges wrongly concerning the universal end of life); knowledge is opposed to ignorance; and counsel to rashness (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SIXTH BEATITUDE, 'BLESSED ARE THE CLEAN OF HEART,' RESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING.

YES.—Both on the part of merit (cleanness of heart) and on the part of the reward (the vision of God).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that cleanness of heart (as a kind of complement to the Beatific Vision) is a cleanness of mind purified from errors and phantasms, so as to receive the truths that are proposed to it concerning God, no longer by way of corporeal phantasms, or infected with heretical misrepresentations; and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.—Another cleanness of heart is a disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart's being cleansed of inordinate affections; and this cleanness of heart results from the gifts and virtues that belong to the appetitive power.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Sight of God, whether perfect, as it will be in heaven; or imperfect, as it is possessed on earth, by which we know concerning God what He is not, inasmuch as we understand that God surpasses whatever the intellect can comprehend, belongs to the gift of understanding. The first vision belongs to the consummated gift of understanding; the second, to the incipient gift of understanding.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER FAITH, AMONG THE FRUITS, RESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING.

YES.—THE REASON is that faith, as a fruit of the Holy Spirit, is not taken as a virtue, but for the certitude of faith, which is something ultimate and delightful; and this answers to the gift of understanding.

NOTE: 1.—Because the ultimate and delightful have the character of an end; and the end is the object of the will, it follows that what is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other powers. And thus as the last fruit there corresponds to the gift of understanding *joy*, which belongs to the will (in body and at end of art.).

2.—No special fruit corresponds to the gift of counsel, which pertains only to practical knowledge; because no fruit can be in practical knowledge, since such knowledge is not known for its own sake but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative knowledge has its fruit in its own self, which fruit is the certitude about the things known.

To the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge (in so far as they pertain to speculative knowledge) corresponds only one fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.

The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty is that the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective part (Ad 3).

**QUESTION IX
THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE**

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER KNOWLEDGE IS A GIFT.

YES.—THE REASON is that for the human intellect to assent perfectly to the truth of faith two things are required, one of which is that it rightly grasp what is proposed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding (q. viii, art. 6), the other is that it have a right and certain judgment concerning them, viz., by distinguishing what is to be believed from what is not to be believed; and for this the gift of knowledge is necessary.

NOTE: 1.—The knowledge that is a gift of the Holy Spirit is not discursive or argumentative, as is human knowledge; but in some way is absolute and simple, similar to divine knowledge, of which it is a participated likeness (Ad 1).

2.—The knowledge that is numbered among the gratuitous graces is that by which man not only knows what should be believed but also knows how to manifest faith, and to lead others to believe, and to refute deniers. And this knowledge is not given to all, but only to some. But the knowledge that is a gift is given to all who have grace (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE IS ABOUT DIVINE THINGS.

NO.—But it is about human and created things.

THE REASON is that, although a judgment of certainty concerning divine things can also be called knowledge generically, yet the special name given to judgment by the knowledge of the highest causes is wisdom. Now judgment by the knowledge of human causes is called knowledge, as designating by a common name certitude of judgment and appropriated to the judgment that is made by way of secondary causes. And thus the name of knowledge implies a gift distinct from the gift of wisdom.

NOTE: Although matters of faith are divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe belongs to the gift of knowledge, as of a created thing, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity, which unites man's mind to God.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE IS PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE.

NO.—The gift of knowledge primarily and principally regards speculation; secondarily, it extends to action also.

THE REASON is that the gift of knowledge is directed to the certitude of faith, which consists primarily and principally in speculation, inasmuch as it inheres in the First Truth; but it extends also to action, according to Gal. v, 6: "Faith . . . works by charity," namely in relation to the last end, as we stated concerning the gift of understanding (prec. q., art. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE THIRD BEATITUDE, 'BLESSED ARE THEY THAT MOURN,' CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that by right judgment about creatures, which is possessed by the gift of knowledge, man becomes aware of the loss of which creatures may be the occasion, since creatures are the occasions of man's being turned from God, when he places his end in them, according to Wis. xiv, 11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise."

NOTE: 1.—No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them; and this I say with regard to the beatitude of the wayfarer (Ad 3).

2.—Corresponding to the gift of knowledge is, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since by his right judgment man directs creatures to the divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward, which is begun in this life and perfected in the life to come (Ad 1).

**QUESTION X
UNBELIEF IN GENERAL**

Here we consider the contrary vices: 1) Unbelief, which is contrary to faith; 2) blasphemy, which is contrary to the confession of faith; 3) ignorance and dullness, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding. On the first head we shall consider unbelief in general, then heresy, and thirdly apostasy from faith. The first point includes 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER UNBELIEF IS A SIN.

YES.—a) As a pure negation, as it exists in those who have heard nothing of the faith, unbelief does not have the character of sin, but rather of punishment [of original sin]; b) but if it is taken by way of opposition to the faith, in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, it is a sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such an ignorance of divine things is a result of the sin of the first parent.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this completes the notion of unbelief;

moreover it is against nature, because it is in human nature that man's mind should not resist his inner instinct and the outward preaching of the truth (Ad 1).

NOTE: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith and the sound interpretation of the Fathers (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas adds that if purely material unbelievers are condemned it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief.]

ART. II.—WHETHER UNBELIEF IS IN THE INTELLECT AS ITS SUBJECT.

YES.—Unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as in its proximate subject; it is in the will as in its first motive.

THE REASON is that to dissent, which is the proper act of unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved by the will, as is the act of assent. Thus the cause of unbelief is in the will, whereas unbelief itself is in the intellect, by which it is elicited (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER UNBELIEF IS THE GREATEST OF SINS.

YES.—It is greater than any of the sins that occur in the perversion of morals.

THE REASON is that by unbelief man is more than ever estranged from God, since he does not have even a true knowledge of God; nor is it possible for one who has a false knowledge of God to know Him in any way at all.—It is otherwise, however, with the sins that are opposed to the other theological virtues, as we shall show (q. xx, art. 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER EVERY ACT OF AN UNBELIEVER IS A SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that mortal sin, which takes away sanctifying grace, does not totally corrupt the good of nature (I-II, q. 85, art. 1 and 2).—Yet whenever unbelievers do any work out of their unbelief, then they sin, according to Rom. xiv, 23: "All that is not of faith is sin." This can also be understood in the sense that the life of unbelievers cannot be without sin, since sins are not taken away without faith (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL SPECIES OF UNBELIEF.

YES.—THE REASON is that with relation to faith three species of unbelief can be assigned according to a determinate species, namely the unbelief of the pagans or Gentiles, which resists the faith not yet received, and the unbelief of the Jews, which resists the faith received in figure only; and the unbelief of heretics, which resists the Christian faith received in the very manifestation of truth.—In relation to error in the different conditions belonging to faith, there are no determinate species of unbelief, for errors can be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

NOTE: The formal aspect of any sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the good that is foresaken, and thus sin is one, and has properly no species, but is a privation. Secondly, it can be taken according to the sinner's intention; and in this case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. In this sense the species of unbelief are many, since the unbelievers follow different false opinions (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE UNBELIEF OF PAGANS IS GRAVER THAN THE OTHER KINDS.

NO.—a) In relation to faith, the unbelief of heretics is the worst; and the unbelief of the Jews is graver than that of the pagans; b) but in relation to the things pertaining to faith, the unbelief of the pagans is graver than that of the Jews, and that of the Jews, graver than that of the heretics.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that he sins more gravely against faith who resists the faith he has received in the manifestation of the truth, than he who resists the faith received in figure only, as do the Jews; the Jew sins more gravely than one who resists the faith not yet received, as is the case with the pagans.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, in this respect, the pagans err on more points than the Jews, and the Jews err more than the heretics, with the exception of heretics, such as the Manicheans, who err in matters of belief more than do the pagans themselves.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO DISPUTE WITH UNBELIEVERS IN PUBLIC.

YES.—Both with respect to the disputant, in view of his good intention, and with respect to the hearers, in view of their disposition.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is commendable for anyone to dispute concerning faith in order to refute errors, or even for practice.—On the other hand, if anyone disputes because he doubts about the faith, and does not hold the faith as certain, but seeks to test it in arguments, he is beyond doubt a sinner, as being a doubter in faith and an unbeliever.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that, if the hearers are wise and confirmed in the faith there is no danger in disputing about the faith. But if they are simple and molested or turned against the faith by unbelievers, for example, Jews or heretics, or pagans, then it is necessary to dispute about the faith in public; for thereby simple people will be confirmed in the faith, and unbelievers will be deprived of the means of deception; moreover the very silence of those who ought to resist those who pervert the faith would be a confirmation of error.

But if a simple public is not imbued with the error of unbelievers, then it would be dangerous to dispute in public before them, for their faith is firm for the very reason that they have heard nothing different from what they believe.

NOTE: With regard to the words of the Apostle (II Tim., ii, 14): "Not to dispute with words, for that is useless, leading to the ruin of the listeners," the Apostle did not forbid all disputation about the faith, but only an inordinate disposition, which consists of contentious words rather than sound speeches (Ad 7). Hence he says to Titus (i, 9): "That he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to confute opponents" (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER UNBELIEVERS OUGHT TO BE COMPELLED TO ACCEPT THE FAITH.

YES.—But a) unbelievers who have never received the faith, such as the pagans and Jews, are by no means to be coerced; b) but others, who at one time received the faith and profess it, such as the heretics and all apostates, should be subject to even physical coercion.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to believe depends on the will. Yet even pagans and Jews should, if possible, be forcibly prevented from impeding the faith of believers [by blasphemies or evil persuasions, as well as by open persecution.] For this reason Christ's faithful have often waged war against unbelievers, in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ [but not to force them to believe].

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that heretics should be compelled to fulfill what they promised, and to keep what they have once received. For just as taking a vow is a matter of the will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so to receive faith is a matter of the will, but to keep it after it has been received is a matter of obligation (Ad 3).

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of the Lord (Matth. xiii, 30): "Let both [the wheat and the weeds] grow together until the harvest," the meaning must be gathered from the preceding words: "Lest in gathering the weeds you root up the wheat along with them." These words, says Augustine (*Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*, lib. iii, cap. 2), clearly shows "that when this is not to be feared, that is, when a man's crime is so publicly known, known and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken" (Ad 1).

2. Note these words of Augustine (loc. cit.): "None of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war that he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some by the destruction of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations" (Ad 4).

[Tr. Note: It should be noted that St. Thomas knew nothing of traditional heretics, who remained in heresy for generations, without any fault of their own. The heretics of his day were all either reared in the Catholic faith or, like the children of the Albigensians, were but a generation removed from it. Had there been in his time any like the modern Protestants, who had acquired what might be called a prescriptive right of toleration, he would undoubtedly have ranked them with the Jews and pagans as claiming toleration.]

ART. IX.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO COMMUNICATE WITH UNBELIEVERS.

NO.—a) As a punishment for unbelief, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, because they have forsaken the faith they have received; but she does not forbid communication with infidels, who by no means have received the Christian faith.—b) For the protection of believers, the Church sometimes forbids communication, but a distinction must be made according to different conditions of persons, circumstances, and time.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Church has not the right to exercise judgment over negative unbelievers with regard to the spiritual punishment to be inflicted on them.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, if some are firm in the faith, so that it can be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than the perversion of the believers, the faithful are not to be forbidden to communicate with those who have not received the faith, namely the pagans and Jews; especially in case of necessity. But if they are simple and weak in the faith, and their perversion can probably be feared, they are to be debarred from communicating with unbelievers, and especially from having great intimacy with them, or communicating with them without necessity.

ART. X.—WHETHER UNBELIEVERS MAY HAVE AUTHORITY OR DOMINION OVER THE FAITHFUL.

NO.—If it is a question of dominion or authority as to be established for the first time; but if it is a question of dominion or authority already existing, then the distinction of believers and unbelievers considered in itself does not take away the dominion and authority of unbelievers over believers.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this would result in scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their demands.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the divine law (from which comes the distinction of believers and unbelievers and which is due to grace) does not abolish human law, which comes from natural reason, and by which the dominion and authority aforesaid are introduced.—It can, however, be justly taken away by the judgment and ordination of the Church, which has the authority of God to take away such a right of dominion or authority; since unbelievers, by reason of their unbelief, deserve to lose their power over believers, who are converted into children of God.

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE RITES OF UNBELIEVERS OUGHT TO BE TOLERATED.

YES.—On account of some good that is derived from them, or on account of some evil that is avoided.

THE REASON is that in this the Church imitates the divine government. For God, although He is omnipotent and infinitely good, permits some evils to happen in the universe which He can prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited or greater evils ensue. Hence Augustine says (*De Ordine* ii, 4): "Banish harlots from society, and you convulse the world in lust."

[Tr. Note 1: The words of St. Augustine just quoted "cannot be understood as implying a general permission everywhere and at any time for the toleration of public prostitution, much less any approval of prostitution, for a) St. Augustine wrote these words before his Baptism in a philosophical treatise. He had in view the conditions of his time, in which pagan morals had not yet disappeared. Therefore what might have been valid at that time cannot automatically be transferred to other times and places. b) St. Thomas quotes these words only as a confirmation of a general principle, that sometimes circumstances may be such that some evil can or even should be tolerated. c) At most, therefore, it can be deduced from these words that public authority, if asked about this matter, is obliged to examine the circumstances of each particular time and place to see whether they are such as to warrant the toleration of prostitution, and to what degree it can be tolerated."—Noldin, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, iv, N. 18.]

[Tr. Note 2: In the body of this important article, St. Thomas states that, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus the religious observance of the Jews bears witness to the time when the faith was forshadowed in a figure.

"The rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable, are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g., the scandal or dissension that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who, if they were unmolested, might in time be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous."

This is in essence no different from the modern Catholic view, as expressed by Heinrich Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought*, p. 370: "When the citizens are divided into a multitude of denominations and non-religious groups . . . religious neutrality . . . becomes a practical necessity. For, should the state compel its dissenting citizens, should one group . . . force the dissenting groups, though they behave as good citizens, to confess publicly a faith they do not accept, that would be a violation of the common good by producing hypocrisy, violation of consciences, and disturbance of the public order. The 'contents' of the concept 'common good' must be common to all citizens."

In this light, we can see that the Angelic Doctor is in perfect accord on this matter with Pius XII, in his Dec. 6, 1953, address to the Italian Jurists:

"Might God, although it would be possible and easy for Him to repress error and moral deviation . . . in certain circumstances . . . not give men any mandate, not impose any duty, and not even communicate the right to impede or to repress what is erroneous and false? A look at things as they are gives an affirmative answer. Reality shows that error and sin are in the world in great measure. God reprobates them, but He permits them to exist. Hence the affirmation that religious and moral error must always be impeded, when it is possible, because toleration of them is in itself immoral, is not valid absolutely and unconditionally. . . ."

"The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot therefore be the ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general norms, which in some circumstances permit, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy, toleration of error in order to promote a greater good."

The "greater good" mentioned by the Pope is specified by St. Thomas in the words we cited. This greater good is altogether different from mere expediency, since it involves respect for the individual conscience—"in order to avoid an evil, e.g., the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who, if unmolested, might in time be converted."

"The middle ages were not intolerant out of mere narrow-mindedness, but by reason of the spiritual fullness of the uniform Christian culture. The heretic was not punished by the secular power because he had committed the moral sin of heresy. He was punished because, in and with heresy, he was doing harm to the internal stability of the community . . . Juridical or civil toleration . . . had to be put into effect when the one Christian faith ceased to be a fact."—Heinrich Rommen, *The Natural Law*, p. 212.]

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE CHILDREN OF JEWS AND OTHER UNBELIEVERS OUGHT TO BE BAPTIZED AGAINST THEIR PARENTS' WILL.

NO.—THE REASON is that it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the wish of their parents. Now the custom of the Church has the highest authority, and ought to be zealously observed in all things.

These children should not be baptized (against their parents' will) for two reasons: 1) On account of the danger to faith; 2) because it is repugnant to natural justice. For the child is by nature something of the parent; hence the child, before having the use of free will, is under the parents' care, like an ox and a horse. Hence it belongs to the parents to provide for the salvation of their children, especially before they have the use of reason.

NOTE: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Thus it is the parents whom the danger threatens if, through being deprived of the sacraments, their children fail to obtain salvation (Ad 5).

QUESTION XI. HERESY

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HERESY IS A SPECIES OF UNBELIEF.

YES.—Heresy (which in Greek is a word meaning selection) is a species of

infidelity, referring to those who profess the faith of Christ but corrupt its doctrines.

THE REASON is that the heretic intends indeed to assent to Christ, but fails to do so in so far as he chooses for himself the things by which he assents to Christ; for he does not choose things that have truly been taught by Christ, but the things that his own mind suggests. The pagans and Jews refuse to assent to Christ Himself; and thus heresy incurs bad will with respect to the end itself, and thus is related to the species of infidelity common to Jews and pagans. Heresy properly so called is with respect to that which relates to the end, and thus is an act of the intellect, or elicited by the intellect.

NOTE: The proximate end of heresy is to adhere to a false opinion of one's own, and from this it derives its species; but its cause is shown from its remote end, namely that it arises from pride or covetousness (Ad 2), or also from some illusion of the imagination (Ad 3).

ART. 11.—WHETHER HERESY IS PROPERLY ABOUT MATTERS OF FAITH.

YES.—Whether about matters of faith directly and principally, e.g., the articles of faith; or about matters that pertain to faith indirectly and secondarily, as are the things from whose denial the corruption of an article follows.

THE REASON is that, since we are here speaking of heresy in so far as it implies a corruption of Christian faith, in that way there can be heresy, even as there can be faith.

NOTE: As Augustine says (*Epist.* 43): "By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, prepared to be corrected when they find the truth." This is because they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church.—The authority of determining what is of faith resides principally in the Sovereign Pontiff, as is declared in the Decretals (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER HERETICS OUGHT TO BE TOLERATED.

NO.—On the part of the heretics themselves, on account of the sin of heresy, not only do they deserve to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be banished from the world by death.

THE REASON is that it is a much graver matter to corrupt faith, through which is the life of the soul, than to counterfeit money, which supports temporal life; but this is justly sometimes punished by death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy, which looks to the conversion of the erring; and therefore she does not immediately condemn, but only after the first and second admonition, as the Apostle teaches (Tit. iii, 10). Afterwards, if he is still found obstinate, the Church, despairing of his conversion, provides for the salvation of others, by separating him from the Church by the sentence of excommunication, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be banished thereby from the world through death. For Jerome says, commenting on Gal. v, 9: "Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole dough, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame" (in middle and at end of art.).

[Tr. Note: These words of St. Thomas must be read in the light of Q. X, art. xi, and in relation to his time. It is highly improbable that he would have ever put forward the argument for the death penalty for heresy were it not to defend the penal legislation of his time. Vacandard, in *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, art. *Inquisition*, thus comments on this article, as regards the death penalty for heretics:

"Such a line of argument is hardly convincing. Why could not life imprisonment, why could not, perhaps, a medicinal punishment, serve for the protection demanded by the pain of death? It may be said that this punishment is too light to deter the faithful and keep them from falling in their turn into heresy. In that case, why not condemn at once even repentant heretics? This would more likely terrorize even those who might be tempted to persist in their error. Evidently, St. Thomas has no thought of dealing with all the consequences of his reasoning. He has only one purpose: To legitimize the criminal discipline of his time."

St. Jerome and the other Fathers did not favor death for heretics. It was not until

1179 that secular sanctions came to be demanded by the Popes for heresy. It was difficult in those days to distinguish heresy from revolution or treason.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CHURCH SHOULD RECEIVE THOSE WHO RETURN FROM HERESY.

NO.—They are not at all to be received by the Church.

THE REASON is that, as regards spiritual good, which is the proper object of charity, heretics are received by the Church through Penance, which affords them the way of salvation. As regards temporal good, which is the secondary object of charity, we are not bound to desire this for others, save in relation to the eternal salvation, both of them (the heretics) and of others.

NOTE: The practice of the Church with regard to those who return from heresy in the time of the Holy Doctor was this, as he himself said:

“The Church not only admits to Penance those who return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities that they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be sincere. We read of this as frequently being done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after being received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith; wherefore when they return again they are admitted to Penance, but are not released from sentence of death” (in body of art.).

2. As regards the Lord’s command to Peter to forgive our brother 70 times seven times, i.e., always, Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare one’s brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins committed against one’s neighbor or against God, for it is not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses (Ad. 2).

QUESTION XII APOSTASY

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER APOSTASY PERTAINS TO UNBELIEF.

YES.—That is, the apostasy of perfidy.

THE REASON is that apostasy is five fold, according as it is contrary to the different ways by which man is united to God, namely apostasy from Holy Orders, apostasy from the religious life, apostasy by disobedience to the divine commandments, the apostasy that is found in every mortal sin; and the apostasy by which someone departs from faith, which apostasy pertains simply and absolutely to unbelief. For if one departs from faith he seems altogether to withdraw from God, because faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and this is the apostasy of perfidy.

NOTE: Apostasy does not denote a determinate species of unbelief, because apostasy respects infidelity as (an entitative) *term whereto*, and thus of the movement of recession from the faith, but it does not regard infidelity as the term of movement, according to which the species of form or quality are considered. Apostasy is, however, considered as an aggravating circumstance, according to II Pet. ii, 21: “It had been better for them not to know the the truth than, after they had known it, to turn back” (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER A PRINCE FORFEITS HIS DOMINION OVER HIS SUBJECTS ON ACCOUNT OF APOSTASY FROM THE FAITH, SO THAT THEY NO LONGER NEED OBEY HIM.

YES.—By the sentence of the Church a prince who is an apostate from faith can forfeit his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.

THE REASON is that the Church can punish the unbelief of those who have received the faith; and they are appropriately punished in the loss of the allegiance of the subject faithful; for their unbelief can result in great corruption of faith, since an apostate maliciously contrives evil and sows dissension, by which he intends to separate men from the faith.—It is said, “by the sentence of the Church,” because unbelief in itself is not repugnant to dominion even over the faithful, as has been said (q. x, art. 10).

QUESTION XIII THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL

Here we treat of the sin of blasphemy that is opposed to the confession of the faith: 1) Of blasphemy in general; 2) of the blasphemy that is called the sin against the Holy Spirit.—The first consumes four articles:

ART. I.—WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS OPPOSED TO THE CONFESSION OF FAITH.

YES.—THE REASON is that the disparagement of the excellence of the divine goodness, in which blasphemy properly consists (Dionysius, *The Divine Names*, c. i, lect. 2), can be committed not only in the heart (the blasphemy of the heart), which is opposed to faith inasmuch as faith is perfected by love; but also externally through speech, in which consists the blasphemy of the tongue, which is, obviously, opposed to the confession of the faith.

NOTE: 1. Since the disparagement of the divine goodness can be either according to the intellect only, or also according to the affections, perfect blasphemy is had when one who speaks against God acts thus, not only because of a false understanding, but also because of a depraved will, which detests and impedes so far as possible the honor due to God (Ad 1).

2. Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works that God does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints redound, as a consequence, against God (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER BLASPHEMY IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to divine charity, as disparaging divine goodness (art. 1), which is the object of charity; and therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin in respect to its genus. That is, it cannot become venial by reason of light matter, but only from lack of understanding or consent (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY IS THE GREATEST SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the blasphemy that is opposed to confession of faith pertains to unbelief, which is the greatest sin with respect to its genus (q. x, art. 3) and aggravates that sin, i.e., by the detestation of the will, and does so still more if it finds expression in words.

NOTE: As the gloss on the words of Eph. iv, 31: "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from you," says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." For the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the blasphemer does; but he calls God to witness to a falsehood (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DAMNED BLASPHEME.

YES.—THE REASON is that the damned retain a perverse will turned away from God's justice; and such a detestation of divine justice is in them the internal blasphemy of the heart. And it is credible that after the resurrection there will be in them vocal blasphemy, as in the saints there will be vocal praise of God.

QUESTION XIV BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THE SAME AS THE SIN COMMITTED THROUGH DELIBERATE MALICE.

YES.—Not indeed when the sin is committed as the result of the inclination of a vicious habit, which is also called malice; but when the sin is committed because that which could prevent the choice of sin is discarded and removed through contempt. Such is hope, removed by despair; fear, removed by presumption; and certain other virtues, as will be explained later (following art. and qq. xx and xxi).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that malice as arising from the inclination of a habit is not the special sin of which we are here speaking, but a general condition of sin (Ad 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that all these things that prevent the choice of sin are effects of the Holy Spirit in us; and therefore thus to sin from malice is to sin against the Holy Spirit.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING TO DISTINGUISH SIX KINDS OF SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT, NAMELY DESPAIR, PRESUMPTION, RESISTANCE OF THE KNOWN TRUTH, THE ENVY OF A BROTHER'S GRACE, IMPENITENCE, AND OBSTINACY.

YES.—THE REASON is that that by which man can be prevented from choosing sin, and which is removed and despised by the sin against the Holy Spirit, is: 1) On the part of divine judgment, a) the consideration of God's justice tempered with mercy, which is removed by despair; and b) the fear of the punishment of God's justice, which is removed by presumption; 2) on the part of the gifts of God: a) The knowledge of truth, which is opposed by the resistance of known truth; b) the help of interior grace, against which is set the envy of a brother's grace; 3) on the part of sin: a) The consideration of the disobedience and shamefulness of the act of sin, and against this is impenitence, in so far, namely, as it implies a purpose of not repenting; b) the consideration of the littleness and brevity of the good that anyone seeks in sinning, according to Rom. vi, 21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those things in which you are not ashamed?" And this is taken away by obstinacy, which in this respect differs specifically from impenitence, because it has a different formal character (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT CAN BE FORGIVEN.

YES.—This sin is called unforgiveable, not because it absolutely is not forgiven, but because in itself it deserves not to be forgiven; and this both as regards the penalty and as regards the fault.

THE REASON is that the sin against the Holy Spirit, by reason of its nature, excludes the means by which forgiveness of sins comes about. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and merciful God, who sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.

NOTE: One who sins by deliberate malice does not have any excuse (as does one who sins from ignorance) to diminish his sin. Thus one who blasphemed against the Son of Man while His Divinity was not yet revealed could have some excuse on account of the weakness of the flesh that he beheld in Him, and thus have merited a lesser punishment. But he who blasphemed against Divinity Itself, the works of the Holy Spirit that Christ performed, by attributing them to the devil, had no excuse to diminish his punishment.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN CAN SIN FIRST OF ALL AGAINST THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—Without other sins presupposed.

THE REASON is that a man can despise in the first act the things by which man is withdrawn from sin, and this is properly to sin against the Holy Spirit. This can happen, both because of the freedom of the will and also because of many previous dispositions, or also because of some vehement thing moving him to evil, conjoined with feeble attachment to good.—The same thing must be said if the sin against the Holy Spirit is taken literally for the blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, as some of the Fathers accepted it; for such a blasphemy always precedes from contemptuous malice. [But it seldom or never happens that the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Spirit.]

NOTE: St. Augustine takes the sin against the Holy Spirit for final impenitence. But this (i.e., persistence in sin until death) does not constitute a special sin, but a special circumstance; and this impenitence presupposes other sins, as is evident. But impenitence in so far as it is habitual, and constitutes a special malice, can exist even before sins, because he who has never sinned can have the purpose of not repenting if he should sin (Ad 3).

QUESTION XV

BLINDNESS OF MIND AND DULLNESS OF UNDERSTANDING

Here we consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding; and because we have treated above (I-II, q. lxxvi) of ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge,

in our discussion of the causes of sin, we have now to discuss blindness of mind and dullness of understanding, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and this will be done in three articles.

ART. 1.—WHETHER BLINDNESS OF MIND IS A SIN.

YES.—In so far as the human mind does not heed that intelligible principle by which it can understand all the other things that it should understand.

THE REASON is that the fact of the mind's not heeding is voluntary; and this either directly, when someone freely and voluntarily turns from the consideration of such a principle (i.e., law) according to Psal. xxxv, 4: "He would not understand, that he might do well;" or indirectly through the mind's being occupied with other things, which it loves more; by which it is turned away from the consideration of this principle, according to Psal. lvii, 9: "Fire," i.e., of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun." In either of these ways mental blindness is a sin.

NOTE: The blindness that results from a natural defect in one who cannot see excuses from sin (Ad 1); and that which arises from the withdrawal of grace has rather the character of punishment than of guilt (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER DULLNESS OF UNDERSTANDING IS A SIN DISTINCT FROM BLINDNESS OF MIND.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that dullness of sense as regards the understanding denotes a certain weakness of mind concerning the consideration of spiritual goods; whereas blindness of mind denotes the absolute privation of the knowledge of these goods. Dullness of understanding has the character of sin, as does blindness of mind, in so far as it is voluntary.

ART. III.—WHETHER BLINDNESS OF MIND AND DULLNESS OF UNDERSTANDING ARISE FROM CARNAL SINS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that because of these carnal sins the mind's attention is most fixed on corporeal things, and in consequence man's intellectual activity is enfeebled. More often does this happen through impurity than through gluttony; and therefore from lust there arises blindness of mind, which almost entirely excludes the knowledge of spiritual goods; whereas from gluttony arises dullness of understanding, which makes a man weak in regard to these same intelligible things.

NOTE: Although some who are slaves of carnal vice are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit superadded thereto, at best their uncleanness is a clog to their knowledge (Ad 1).

QUESTION XVI

THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE OLD LAW THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PRECEPTS OF FAITH.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that in the Old Law there were no secrets of faith to be set before the people; and thus, supposing faith in the One God, to whom the people were subject, no other precepts are given in the Old Law that are of faith; but these precepts are proper to the New Dispensation. There could, however, be given precepts pertaining to man's subjection to God by the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to faith itself (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE OLD LAW THE PRECEPTS REFERRING TO KNOWLEDGE WERE FITTINGLY TRANSMITTED.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that these were suitably given for three purposes, namely for the acceptance of knowledge and understanding, for their use, and for their preservation. For the acceptance of precepts is realized through teaching and learning. Concerning learning the precept is given, Deut. vi, 6: "These words which I command thee will be in thy heart," i.e., through learning. And there follow the words: "And thou shalt tell them to thy children"—this refers to teaching.—The use of knowledge and understanding means meditation on those things which one knows or understands.

In reference to this it is added: "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house . . ." Their preservation is effected by the memory; hence the text continues: "And thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house."

THE VIRTUE OF HOPE QUESTION XVII

HOPE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

Next after faith comes hope for consideration: 1) Hope itself; 2) the gift of fear; 3) the opposing vices; 4) the precepts thereto pertaining. On the first head comes first a consideration of hope itself and secondly of its subject. The first part is in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER HOPE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of hope, of which we are now speaking, attains God inasmuch as we hope for something as possible to us through divine help. Hope therefore, which makes an act of man good, and causes it to attain God, is a virtue, and is caused in us solely by grace (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER ETERNAL HAPPINESS IS THE PROPER OBJECT OF HOPE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of hope must be proportioned to the help on which the one who hopes relies. Now this help is of God, whose power is infinite, as is His goodness. Therefore the good that is hoped from God, inasmuch as hope is a theological virtue (art. 5 of this q.), is infinite good, proportioned to such help and goodness. This good is moreover the enjoyment of God Himself, in which eternal happiness consists. The secondary object of hope is the other goods that are sought from God with reference to eternal happiness (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE MAN CAN HOPE FOR ANOTHER'S ETERNAL HAPPINESS.

NO.—THE REASON is that hope, since it is the movement or propensity of the appetite to some arduous good, directly regards one's own good, and not another's.—Yet, presupposing a union of love for another, one can hope and desire something for another as for oneself, and thus also eternal life.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN CAN LAWFULLY HOPE IN MAN.

NO.—As in a first efficient cause; he can, however, hope in him as in a secondary agent.

THE REASON is that, just as it is not lawful to hope for anything good besides beatitude as our last end, but only as it is ordained to the end of beatitude; so also it is not lawful to hope in any man, or in any creature, as in a first cause that moves us to beatitude. It is lawful, however, in a man or in a creature as in a secondary and instrumental agent, by which one is helped to obtain blessings that are directed to beatitude. And in this we turn to the saints, and seek also something from men.

ART. V.—WHETHER HOPE IS A THEORETICAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it has for its object God Himself, in so far as it relies on His help (the efficient cause) to obtain the eternal enjoyment of Him (the final cause).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HOPE IS A VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that hope has its own proper mode of adhering to God. For charity adheres to God for His own sake; faith and hope, for the sake of something else, namely faith, for the sake of the knowledge of divine truth; and hope, for divine help, inasmuch as it is the principle of perfect goodness in us.

ART. VII.—WHETHER HOPE PRECEDES FAITH.

NO.—Absolutely, faith precedes hope.

THE REASON is that the object of hope, which is divine help (the efficient cause), and the attainment of eternal life (the final cause), is proposed to us through faith, according to Heb. xi, 6: "He who comes to God must believe that He exists, and is a rewarder to those who seek Him."

NOTE: Hope is sometimes called the "entrance to faith," to signify "entrance to the thing believed," because through hope we enter into the vision of that which is believed. Or it may be said that hope is the entrance to faith because by hope man enters into stability and perfection in faith (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHARITY PRECEDES HOPE.

NO.—In the order of generation, where the imperfect is prior to the perfect, hope is prior to charity; but in the order of perfection charity is naturally prior.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that hope, as the love of concupiscence, introduces us to charity, i.e., to perfect love; for one who hopes to be rewarded by God is fired to love God and observe His commandments.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, with the coming of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope most in our friends.—Thus not every hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, namely that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God as from a friend (Ad 2).

**QUESTION XVIII
THE SUBJECT OF HOPE**

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE WILL AS ITS SUBJECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive part; for its object is a good. Now the intellectual appetite, of which we are here speaking, is the will (I. P., q. lxxxii, art. 5).—But hope, which is in a lower, i.e., the irascible, appetite, is not a virtue, but a passion (I. P., q. lxxxii, art. 5, ad 1; and I-II, q. xxii, art. 3, ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE BLESSED.

NO.—THE REASON is that an arduous possible good falls under the aspect of hope only in so far as it is future; therefore, since beatitude is not future, but present, there can be in them no virtue of hope.

NOTE: Christ as comprehensor could not have hope; but as wayfarer, He could, as regards the passibility of nature, hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality; yet not so as to have the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body, but the enjoyment of God (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER HOPE IS IN THE DAMNED.

NO.—THE REASON is that the damned cannot apprehend beatitude as a possible good; for it belongs to the condition of misery in the damned that they know that they cannot possibly escape damnation and attain to beatitude.

NOTE: In purgatory there can be hope, since there the souls apprehend beatitude as a possible future (end of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE IS CERTAINTY IN THE HOPE OF THE WAYFARER.

YES.—Not essentially but by participation.

THE REASON is that hope tends with certainty to its end, as participating in the certitude of faith, which is in the cognitive power.

NOTE: Certainty is found essentially in the cognitive power; by participation it is found in everything that is moved by the cognitive power infallibly to its end (body of art.).

QUESTION XIX THE GIFT OF FEAR

(In 12 Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD CAN BE FEARED.

YES.—Not as the object of fear, which is evil; but as that from which evil can arise, either from Him or in relation to Him.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God is goodness itself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the evil of punishment can come to us from God. In relation to God, there can come to us the evil of sin, if we are separated from Him.

NOTE: Since good is subordinated to an end, whereas evil denotes the privation of this order, that is simply evil which excludes subordination to the last end, and this is the evil of sin. Now the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it deprives one of some particular good; it is, however, *good absolutely*, in so far as it depends on subordination to the last end, and it is evil relatively (body or art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER FEAR IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO FILIAL, INITIAL, SERVILE, AND WORLDLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that fear in the moral order or in relation to God, of which we are now speaking, exists in so far as it turns us to God or turns us away from Him. And in this way is the above named division. For the fear of the evils that turn us from God is a *human* or *worldly* fear; the fear whereby we turn to God either is the fear of punishment, and is called *servile*, or the fear of sin, which is *filial* fear: For it is proper to sons (*filii*) to fear offending their father. Now the fear that is both on account of punishment and on account of sin is called *initial* fear, and is midway between the two.

NOTE: 1. *Chaste* fear, which is properly the fear of a wife in relation to her husband (arg. 3), is the same as filial fear, which unites us to God through charity, according to II Cor. xi, 2: "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ" (Ad 3).

2. *Servile* fear regards punishment principally; *initial* fear regards it secondarily (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER WORLDLY FEAR IS ALWAYS EVIL.

YES.—THE REASON is that worldly fear is that which proceeds from worldly love, as from its root. For fear is born of love, since man fears to lose what he loves. Consequently, worldly fear is always evil.

NOTE: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. And it is worse to forsake justice than to suffer any punishment whatever (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SERVILE FEAR IS GOOD.

YES.—Not on the part of servility; but with reference to its substance.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that slavery is opposed to freedom. Hence slavery cannot act from love. And servile fear is opposed to charity.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that servile fear, which fears punishment as the principal evil, can be ordained to God, and not fear punishment as the principal evil, without destroying the species of a habit. For the species of a habit is not destroyed by the fact that its object or end is ordained to a further end. And therefore servile fear is good with respect to its substance.

NOTE: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love is always evil and is specifically distinguished from servile fear (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER SERVILE FEAR IS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS FILIAL FEAR.

NO.—THE REASON is that habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the object of servile fear is the evil of punishment, the object of filial fear is the evil of fault. Now the evil of fault is specifically distinct from the evil of punishment.

ART. VI.—WHETHER SERVILE FEAR REMAINS WITH CHARITY.

YES.—a) Fear, as servile, does not abide with charity; but b) the substance of servile fear can abide with charity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that servile fear fears punishment as the principal evil on account of one's own good, in which one places one's own last end; and such a fear of punishment is contrary to charity. But such a fear is not called servile except when punishment is feared as the principal evil.

ART. VII.—WHETHER FEAR IS THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM.

YES.—The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, not as its essential principle, but as its effective or operative principle.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the essential principle of wisdom, which is the knowledge of God as it directs human life according to the divine types, is an article of faith.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that with fear man begins to act according to wisdom—with servile fear, as disposing him to wisdom from without, according to Ecclus. i, 27: "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin;" and with chaste or filial fear, as with the first effect of wisdom, by which man reveres God and subjects himself to Him; and thus in consequence everything is regulated according to God, according to Ecclus. i, 25: "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for the branches thereof are long lived."

ART. VIII.—WHETHER INITIAL FEAR DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM FILIAL FEAR.

NO.—In so far as initial fear is taken as belonging to the state of beginners, in whom there is the beginning of filial fear resulting from the beginning of charity.

THE REASON is that in this way initial fear relates to filial as imperfect charity to perfect. Now perfect and imperfect charity do not differ in essence, but only in state.

NOTE: Initial fear is midway between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, for it is not composed of these. For thus initial fear, as to its substance, is the same as filial fear, and differs totally from servile fear as such, although it has connected with it something of servile fear, because it does not act perfectly from charity, but with an admixture of the fear of punishment (Ad 2 and Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER FEAR IS A GIFT OF THE HOLY GHOST.

YES.—Not servile fear, although such a fear is also from the Holy Spirit; but filial or chaste fear.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that servile fear can have annexed to it the will to sin. Now the gifts of the Holy Spirit cannot exist with the will to sin, because they are not without charity (I-II, q. lxxviii, art. 5).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by filial or chaste fear we revere God and shrink from withdrawing from Him; thus by this fear we are rendered pliable to the Holy Spirit, in respect to the habitual dispositions of the soul, which are called the gifts of the Holy Spirit.—Filial fear, therefore, has in a way first place in the scale among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: The gift of fear is given us against pride. For the beginning of man's pride is to fall off from God (Ecclus. x, 14). And it is the principle of humility; for the gifts of the Holy Spirit are principles of the intellectual and moral virtues; but the theological virtues are the principles of the gifts (I-II, q. lxxviii, art. 4 ad 3).

ART. X. — WHETHER FEAR DECREASES WHEN CHARITY INCREASES.

NO.—a) Filial fear increases with charity, as the effect increases when the cause increases; b) servile fear, in respect of its servility, is wholly removed by the coming of charity; yet there remains in substance the fear of punishment, and this fear decreases when charity increases, especially as regards act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the more one person loves another, so much the more does he fear to offend him and to be separated from him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, the more anyone loves God, so much the less does he fear punishment: First, because he is less attentive to his own good, to which punishment is opposed; second, because the more firmly he adheres the more does he trust in his reward.

ART. XI.—WHETHER FEAR REMAINS IN HEAVEN.

YES.—a) Servile fear, or the fear of punishment, will in no way be in heaven; b) but filial fear will be perfected, as will also charity; wherefore in heaven it will not have at all the same act that it has now.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such fear is excluded by the security of eternal happiness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the flexibility of free will, which is the cause of sin and separation from God, is not possible in the blessed; wherefore the blessed do not fear to be separated from God, but rather do they revere Him.—Similarly, fear in so far as it denotes a natural defect of the creature, inasmuch as he is infinitely distant from God, will remain even in heaven. And therefore fear will not be totally removed (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER POVERTY OF SPIRIT IS THE BEATITUDE CORRESPONDING TO THE GIFT OF FEAR.

YES.—THE REASON is that from the fact that one subjects himself to God he ceases to seek to be magnified in himself (through pride) or in any other thing (in honors and riches), but only in God. For poverty of spirit denotes either the voiding of a proud and puffed up spirit, or the renunciation of worldly goods, which is done by one's own will through the instigation of the Holy Spirit.

Thus the beatitude of poverty corresponds directly to fear, and the beatitude of mourning corresponds consequently, for the one who fears God is delighted only in God (Ad 2).

NOTE: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal things, or to abstinence therefrom; such as modesty, continence, and chastity (Ad 4).

QUESTION XX DESPAIR

Here we are to consider the opposing vices: 1) Despair; 2) presumption. On the first head are four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER DESPAIR IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that every appetitive movement conforming to a false intellect is in itself evil and sinful. Now despair conforms to a false opinion of God, namely that God denies pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by justifying grace. Against this stands Ezech. xviii, 23: "I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted and live."

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE DESPAIR WITHOUT UNBELIEF.

YES.—THE ANSWER is that a man, while retaining in the universal a true estimate of faith, namely that there is forgiveness of sins in the Church, can suffer a movement of despair, viz., that for him, being in such a state, there is no room to hope for pardon, his estimate being corrupted in regard to a particular matter. From the universal proposition we cannot infer a particular conclusion save by assuming the particular.

NOTE: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER DESPAIR IS THE GREATEST OF SINS.

YES.—a) Not in itself; b) but on our part despair is graver than unbelief and the hatred of God, which are the greatest sins.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that unbelief and the hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself; but despair is against Him in so far as His good is partaken of by us, inasmuch as man does not hope for a share in God's goodness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on our part despair is more dangerous, for when hope is taken away there is no curb on men's falling into vice, and they are withdrawn from good labors; wherefore Isidore says (*De Summo Bono*, lib. ii, cap. 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul; but to despair is to fall into hell."

ART. IV.—WHETHER DESPAIR ARISES FROM SLOTH.

YES.—Inasmuch as a man does not regard an arduous good as possible for him to obtain, either by himself or through another; but inasmuch as he does not regard the object of hope as an arduous good; and therefore does not care about it, this is owing to lust.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this arises from excessive dejection, which, when it dominates his affections, makes it seem to him that he can never rise to something good. Now sloth is a sadness that weighs down the spirit, and therefore in this way despair is born of sloth.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the fact that spiritual goods do not taste good to us, or do not seem to us like great goods, is chiefly due to the fact that our affections are infected by the love of bodily pleasures, among which venereal pleasures take the first rank.

NOTE: Just as men who enjoy good pleasures are made more hopeful, so also men in sadness more readily fall into despair.

QUESTION XXI PRESUMPTION

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION TRUSTS IN GOD OR IN OUR OWN POWER.

ANSWER: Presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit, trusts in God, and not in our own power.

THE REASON is that such presumption implies an immoderate hope relying on divine power; for it consists in a man's tending to a good as though it were possible by the divine power and mercy, whereas it is not possible; as when someone hopes to obtain pardon without repentance or glory without merits.—The presumption that relies on one's own powers lies in a man's tending to some good as possible for him, whereas it surpasses his powers.

ART. II.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that presumption, since it implies an inordinate hope, is an appetitive movement conforming to a false intellect; and this in itself is evil and a sin. For it is false that God grants pardon to those who persist in sinning and bestows heaven on those who give up good works.

NOTE: 1. Presumption does not imply an excess of hope because one hopes excessively in God; but because it hopes from God what is not suitable to Him.

2. To sin with a purpose of remaining in sin, with the hope of pardon, belongs to presumption, and this does not lessen, but increases, sin. But to sin with the hope of eventually receiving pardon, with the purpose of abstaining from sin, and repenting of it, is not presumption, but lessens this sin, because one thereby seems to have a less firm will to sin (*Ad 3*).

ART. III.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS MORE OPPOSED TO FEAR THAN TO HOPE.

ANSWER: Presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear.

THE REASON is that presumption and hope belong to one genus; for presumption denotes an inordinate hope in God. Now the things that are in one genus are more directly opposed than the things that are of different genera, for contraries are in the same genus.

NOTE: Presumption seems to have a manifest opposition to fear, especially servile fear, which regards the punishment coming from God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false resemblance it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God (in body).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION ARISES FROM VAINGLORY.

YES.—a) The presumption that relies on one's own power proceeds from vain-glory; b) the presumption that inordinately relies on divine mercy and power arises directly from pride.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that from the fact that someone greatly desires glory it follows that he attempts something beyond his powers, especially novelties, which call for greater admiration.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who hopes to obtain glory without merits, or forgiveness without repentance, seems to think so much of himself as to esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might be a sinner, and this is pride.

QUESTION XXII
THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR

(In Two Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A PRECEPT OF HOPE.

YES.—a) There should be precepts of the act of hope, even as there are precepts of the act of faith, as preambles to the Law by way of promise; b) after the first promulgation of the Law, it was right that precepts of hope should be given even by way of admonition or precept.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, unless man already believed and hoped, it would have been vain to propound the Law to him. But, just as the precept of faith was to be propounded by way of promulgation or commemoration (q. xvi, art. 1); so also the precept of hope to be proposed in the first legislation was by way of the promise of a reward.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, once the law was made, men were to be induced not only to observe the precepts, but also, much more, to maintain the foundation of the Law; therefore after the first promulgation of the Law in Sacred Scripture men were induced in many ways to hope, even by way of admonition or precept, and not only by way of promise as in the Law; as is evident from Ps. lxi, 9: "Hope in Him, all ye congregation of the people;" and in many other places in Scripture.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A PRECEPT OF FEAR.

YES.—Both of servile fear and of filial fear.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as someone is led to observe the Law by the hope of rewards, so also he is led to observe the Law by the fear of punishments—at first, not by way of precept but by the threat of punishments, and afterwards by way of admonition and precept, as was stated concerning hope (prec. art.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that filial fear, which shows reverence toward God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of all observances connected with reverence for God.—Hence, just as after the precept of charity precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity (Ad 2).

CHARITY

Here we are to consider: 1) Charity itself, 2) the gift of wisdom corresponding to it.—On the first head five things are to be considered: 1) Charity itself; 2) the object of charity; 3) its acts; 4) its opposite vices; 5) the precepts relating thereto. With regard to the first point there is a twofold consideration: 1) Charity considered in itself; 2) charity in relation to its subject. The first question consumes eight articles.

QUESTION XXIII
CHARITY CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

ART. I.—WHETHER CHARITY IS FRIENDSHIP.

YES.—THE REASON is that charity is the love of mutual benevolence between God and men, founded on the fellowship of eternal happiness. Now the love of friendship is the love of mutual benevolence; for it does not suffice for the notion of

friendship that someone wish well to his friend (in this it is distinguished from the love of concupiscence, which wishes another's good for oneself), but a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend.—It is said: "Founded on the fellowship of eternal happiness," because charity is a supernatural love, which here in this life is imperfect, and which in heaven is perfected (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHARITY IS ANYTHING CREATED IN THE SOUL.

YES.—Against the Master of Sentences (*Sent. lib. I, dist. 17*), who supposed that charity is the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in the mind.

THE REASON is that the movement of charity does not so proceed from the Holy Spirit moving the human mind that the human mind is merely moved, and is in no way the principle of this movement; for this is contrary to the nature of the voluntary act; and it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which would involve a contradiction, since love by its nature implies that it is an act of the will. Moreover, the principle of merit would thereby be removed, for the root of merit is the love of charity (I-II, q. cxiv, art. 4). Hence it follows that if the will is moved by the Holy Spirit to love, it is also the efficient cause of this act, namely by an infused form, which is the habit of charity.

NOTE 1: Unless charity were an infused habit in us, the act of charity would be more imperfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other virtues, nor would it be easy and pleasurable. This is evidently false, because no virtue has such an inclination to its act as has charity, nor does any other act with such pleasure. Whence it is most necessary that for the act of charity there exist in us some habitual form superadded to a natural power, inclining it to the act of charity and causing it to act with promptness and pleasure (at end of art.).

2.—Just as in the natural order the soul is the life of the body, so in the order of grace charity is formally the life of the soul. Wherefore, just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity immediately united to the soul. And thus God is effectively the life alike of the soul through charity and of the body through the soul (Ad 2).—The fact that charity unites the soul to God by justifying it demonstrates the infinity of divine power. For the efficacy of the form is according to the power of the agent that induces the form (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHARITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as a moral virtue is defined by its being "according to right reason," so also the attainment of God constitutes the essence of virtue, as was stated above concerning hope and faith (q. iv, art. 5, and q. xvii, art. 1).

Now charity, which is a participation of the Holy Spirit (here Ad 3), attains God by uniting us to God.

NOTE: Not every friendship is praiseworthy and good, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Nor is every friendship virtuous, but only that which is founded on the moral goodness of the virtues. Moreover there is no comparison with charity, since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHARITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the love of charity has for its object the divine good under a special aspect, in so far, that is, as it is the object of beatitude. Now wherever there is a special aspect of an object, there is a special habit (I-II, q. xviii, art. 2).

NOTE: Because charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz., eternal happiness, it extends to the acts of all human life by way of command, not as immediately eliciting all the acts of the virtues (Ad 2); and in this sense it is said in I Tim. i, 5: "The end of the commandment is charity."

ART. V.—WHETHER CHARITY IS ONE VIRTUE.

YES.—Charity is simply one virtue, not distinguished into several species.

THE REASON is that the end of charity, which is the friendship of man with God, is one, namely the divine goodness; it is also the fellowship of eternal happiness, upon which this friendship is based.

NOTE: 1. Friendship is divided into different species either according to the

diversity of the end (and thus friendship is useful, delightful, and virtuous), or according to the diversity of the fellowships on which friendships are based, such as is the friendship of kinsfolk, which is based on natural fellowship; the friendship of fellow-citizens or pilgrims, which is based on civil fellowship; or the fellowship of pilgrimage (in body of art.).

2.—God and the neighbor are not equally objects of charity. But God is the principal object, and the neighbor is loved by charity for the sake of God. Hence charity remains one (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHARITY IS THE MOST EXCELLENT OF THE VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that among the theological virtues, which are more excellent than the moral or intellectual virtues, that ranks first which attains God more, for God is the supreme rule of all the virtues. But this is charity, because it attains God Himself, not that something accrues from Him to us, as in the case of hope and faith, but that it rests in Him. Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another.

NOTE: Of the things that are beneath us, knowledge is nobler than love; hence Aristotle (*Ethics*, book vi, chap. 7 and 12) gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues. But of the things that are above us, and especially God, love outranks knowledge. Hence charity is more excellent than faith (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANY TRUE VIRTUE IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT CHARITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that true virtue simply is that which is ordained to the principal good of man. As Aristotle says (*Physics*, book vii, text 17): "Virtue is the disposition of the perfect in relation to the best." Now this ordination does not result without charity. For the last and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. lxxii, 27: "It is good for me to adhere to God."—The virtue that is ordained to some particular end, if such an end is a true good, is a true but imperfect virtue, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good. If it is not a true good, virtue is not true, but is a false semblance of virtue, as is, for example, the temperance of the miser.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHARITY IS THE FORM OF THE VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the acts of all the other virtues are ordained by charity to the last end. Now in morals the form of the act is regarded chiefly from the standpoint of the end. Hence charity is the form of all the virtues by way of being their efficient cause, in so far as it imposes the form on all the virtues by directing them to their end (Ad 1).

NOTE: Charity is called the foundation and root of the other virtues, in so far as by charity the other virtues are sustained and nourished (Ad 2); and it is called the mother of all the virtues, because a mother is one who conceives in herself by another. Even so, charity conceives, by our longing for our last end, the acts of the other virtues, by commanding them (Ad 3).

QUESTION XXIV THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY

(In 12 Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WILL IS THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the divine good, which is known through the intellect only. Hence the subject of charity is not the sensitive appetite, but the intellective appetite, that is, the will. Besides the sensitive appetite and the intellective appetite, there is no other appetite in man. For the concupiscible is a part of the sensitive appetite (Ad 1).

NOTE: Charity is not excluded from reason by being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by reason, but by God's wisdom, and surpasses the rule of human reason, according to Ephes. iii, 19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Wherefore charity is not in the reason, either as its subject, as prudence is, or as its

rule, as justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHARITY IS CAUSED IN US BY INFUSION.

YES.—Charity cannot be in us naturally, nor can it be acquired by our natural powers; but it is in us by the infusion of the Holy Spirit, which is the Love of the Father and the Son, of which the participation in us is created charity itself, as was stated above (prec. q., art. 2).

THE REASON is that charity is the friendship of man with God, founded on the communication of eternal happiness, which is not according to the natural but according to the gratuitous gifts, as is said in Rom. vi, 23: "The grace of God is life everlasting." Hence charity too surpasses the powers of nature. And, as the Apostle says, Rom. v, 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us."

Since charity is said to proceed in us from a pure heart and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith, this must be referred to the act of charity, which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the infusion of charity (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHARITY IS INFUSED ACCORDING TO THE CAPACITY OF OUR NATURAL GIFTS

NO.—**THE REASON** is that charity, since it surpasses the proportion of human nature (prec. art.), does not depend on any natural virtue, but solely on the grace of the Holy Spirit who infuses it. Hence the quantity of charity does not depend on the condition of nature, or on the capacity of natural virtues, but only on the will of the Holy Spirit, who distributes His gifts according as He wills (Ephes. iv, 7).

NOTE: The Holy Spirit as He moves the mind of man, either more or less, according to His will, precedes the disposition or previous preparation or effect of the one who receives grace. Hence the Apostle says, Coloss. i, 12: "Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light" (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHARITY CAN INCREASE.

YES.—The charity of the wayfarer.

THE REASON is that in this state of way we advance in so far as we approach nearer to God, who is approached, not by bodily steps, but by the affections of the mind. Now this approach is the work of charity, because it unites our mind to God. Hence it is of the essence of the charity of the state of way that it can increase. This increase depends on the intensity of the act (Ad 1).

NOTE: The increase of charity is not only according to its radication in its subject, or according to its fervor, but also according to its essence; because an essential increase in charity is nothing else than for it to be more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject, for, since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHARITY INCREASES BY ADDITION.

NO.—a) In no way does charity increase by the addition of charity to charity; b) but only by the subject's partaking more and more of charity, i.e., in so far as the subject is more reduced to the act of charity, and is more subject to it.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, if charity is added to charity, we must needs presuppose, at least in the mind, the distinction of one charity from another. Now the distinction consists in forms, either in species or in number. It is in species if the form (or habit, as in this case) extends to the objects to which it did not extend before; and this cannot be said of charity, because even the least charity extends to all the objects that are to be loved with charity.

Distinction in number is that which is according to the diversity of subjects; neither in this way can charity increase, because the subject of charity is only the rational intellect; now one rational intellect cannot be added to another; and even if it could, such an addition would not make one more loving, but only a greater lover. Therefore in no way is charity increased by the addition of charity.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this mode of increase is proper to each

form that is intended, inasmuch as the being of this form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject.

NOTE: The other habits can increase on the part of the objects, and thus they increase by addition, as do science and similar habits; but on the part of the accidental form they do not increase by addition, but by way of its intensity in its subject, as is evident in the case of things that rarify. Now charity can increase in this second way, though not in the first way (Ad 1). And this is what God does when He increases charity, that is, He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and He causes the soul to partake more perfectly of the likeness of the Holy Spirit (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHARITY INCREASES THROUGH EVERY ACT OF CHARITY.

NO.—But every act of charity disposes one for an increase of charity.

THE REASON is that by one act of charity man is rendered more ready to act again according to charity, and, this readiness increasing, man breaks out into a more fervent act of love, and strives to advance in charity; and then this charity increases actually. For in this grace imitates nature, which acts by disposing the subject to increase, and without causing an actual increase, and afterwards it brings into effect that to which it had actually disposed, whether in plants or in animals; as happens in the case of many drops of water that hollow out a rock (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER CHARITY INCREASES INDEFINITELY.

YES.—In the three ways in which a term can be fixed to the increase of any form.

THE REASON is that charity, in the wayfaring state, does not have a term of increase, either on the part of charity itself, because it is a participation of infinite charity, which is the Holy Spirit; on the part of the efficient cause, or God, because His power is infinite; or on the part of the subject, because whenever charity increases there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase.—Hence the increase of charity is directed to an end, but that end is not in this, but in the future life (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHARITY CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE.

YES.—a) Not on the part of that which is loved, or God; b) but on the part of the lover, and moreover not in so far as the whole heart of man actually always tends to God, as in heaven; c) but in so far as it habitually belongs to man in this life.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God is infinite goodness, and therefore in this way no creature's charity can be perfect, but only the charity of God, whereby He loves Himself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this life it is impossible, on account of the infirmity of human life, always actually to think of God and to be moved by love towards Him.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that it belongs to man in this life that he *habitually* places his whole heart in God, namely so that he thinks or wills nothing that is contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity. Indeed, it belongs to man to make an earnest endeavor to give his whole time to God and divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand; and this is the perfection of charity, which is possible in this life, though it is not common to all who have charity.

NOTE: Regarding the words of St. Augustine: "Where charity is perfect there is no cupidity;" and those of St. John (I John, i, 18): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," note that this is said in reference to venial sins; which are not opposed to the habit of charity but to its act, and so are not contrary to the perfection of the wayfaring state, but only to the perfection of heaven (Ad 2).

ART. IX.—WHETHER CHARITY IS RIGHTLY DISTINGUISHED INTO THREE DEGREES, BEGINNING, PROGRESS, AND PERFECTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as in corporeal movement there is first a recession from the starting term; second, an approach to the goal; and third, rest in the goal; so it is in the degrees of charity. First, man's chief concern must be to withdraw from sin and resist his concupiscences, which move him to the contrary

of charity; this is the duty of beginners, in which charity must be nourished and fostered lest it die, as is the case with life in man's infant state. Secondly, man must strive chiefly to become proficient in good, in order that charity may be strengthened through increase, parallel to what happens in the state of puberty, after reason is attained. Thirdly, man must tend chiefly to adhere to God, and enjoy Him; and this is the affair of the perfect, who long to be dissolved and to be with Christ. Analogous with this is man's adulthood and prime, in which he can beget other men.

ART. X.—WHETHER CHARITY CAN DECREASE.

NO.—Charity cannot directly decrease: a) Either by cessation from act, as is the case with the acquired virtues; b) or by another act, either by God or by some sin; c) or by venial sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the preservation of anything depends on its cause. Now charity is not caused by human acts, such as the acquired virtues, but by God alone. Therefore it is also preserved by God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God does not cause any defect in us save by way of punishment. Punishment, again, supposes sin. Now mortal sin does not decrease, but totally destroys charity itself, and that both effectively and by way of merit: Effectively, because every mortal sin is opposed to charity (art. 12 of this q.); by way of merit, because when someone acts against charity by sinning it is fitting that God withdraw charity from him.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that venial sin does not touch charity itself, either effectively or by way of merit: Not effectively, because charity is about the last end; but venial sin is deordination about the means to the end. And not by way of merit, because when anyone fails in a minor thing he does not deserve to suffer loss in a greater thing. Now the loss of the last end is greater than the loss of the things directed to the end. For God does not turn away from man more than man turns away from God.—Hence charity does not directly decrease; but indirectly, or dispositively, it can decrease either through venial sins or also through cessation from the exercise of works of charity.

ART. XI.—WHETHER CHARITY, ONCE HAD, CAN BE LOST.

YES.—a) Not on the part of the Holy Spirit, who moves the soul to love God; b) or on the part of charity itself; but c) on the part of the subject, and moreover on earth, and not in heaven.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Holy Spirit does infallibly whatever He wills. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be simultaneously true, that the Holy Spirit wills (efficaciously) to move someone to an act of charity, and that the same person loses charity by sinning.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that charity can do nothing except that which relates to the essence of charity.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that it is of the notion of a form that it be in the subject inseparably, when it does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, as is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted. Thus the charity of heaven, because it fills the whole potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed inseparably. But the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because it is not always actually directed to God; and thus there can be some motive for sinning, and, when this is consented to, it causes the loss of charity (Ad 4).

ART. XII.—WHETHER CHARITY IS LOST THROUGH ONE MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that every act of mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature. For it is of the essence of charity that it so loves God that it wishes to subject itself to Him in all things, and to follow His commandments in all things. Therefore, whatever is opposed to His commands is manifestly opposed to charity. Hence by its very nature it is capable of destroying charity.

NOTE: 1. Acquired habits are not contrary to acts; hence they are not at once taken away by one act; but charity, since it is an infused habit, depends on the action of God who infuses it; who in infusing and preserving charity stands in the same relation as the sun in the illumination of the air (in body of art.)

2. Charity is lost in two ways: 1) Directly, by actual contempt; 2) indirectly, when something is done contrary to charity, on account of some passion of concupiscence or fear (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXV THE OBJECT OF CHARITY

1) What must be loved with charity; 2) the order of the things to be loved. The first point is in 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE LOVE OF CHARITY STOPS AT GOD, OR EXTENDS TO OUR NEIGHBOR.

ANSWER: It extends to the neighbor.

THE REASON is that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God and whereby we love the neighbor. For the reason of loving the neighbor is God; since what we ought to love in the neighbor is that he may be in God. Now the acts of the same species belong to the same habit.

ART. II. — WHETHER WE SHOULD LOVE CHARITY OUT OF CHARITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that charity is that good which we wish to all whom we love out of charity. Now this good that we love out of charity is the very communication of spiritual life, by which we arrive at beatitude (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER IRRATIONAL CREATURES OUGHT ALSO TO BE LOVED OUT OF CHARITY.

NO.—a) Irrational creatures cannot be loved as a friend; but b) as goods, which are wished for a friend, they can be loved even out of charity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST IS THREEFOLD: THE FIRST REASON is that we cannot properly will good to an irrational creature, for it is not proper to him to possess good, but this is distinctive of the rational creature, which has control of the use of the good that it has, through free will.— THE SECOND REASON is that all friendship is based on some communication of life. But irrational creatures cannot have a share in human life, for this is rational. Hence there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, except perhaps in a metaphorical sense.—THE THIRD REASON is proper to charity: Because charity is based on the communication of eternal beatitude, of which the irrational creature is incapable.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we can wish blessings to others out of charity, in so far, namely, as we wish out of charity that they should be preserved for the honor of God and the service of men; and thus God loves irrational creatures even out of charity.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF OUT OF CHARITY.

YES.—a) Not in so far as charity is friendship; but b) according to the proper notion of charity, as it is the friendship of man for God primarily, and by consequence devotion to the things that are of God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that friendship is not properly had for oneself; but the love whereby anyone loves himself is something greater than friendship; it is the form and root of friendship.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that among the things that are of God is man himself, who has charity.

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS BODY OUT OF CHARITY.

YES.—In respect of its nature, but not in respect of its corruption of sin and punishment.

THE REASON is that in respect of its nature our body is from God, and we can and should use it for the service of God. Therefore, by virtue of the love whereby we love God, we ought also to love our body.—But we should aspire to remove corruption

and the infection of guilt by the longing of charity.—Likewise, because the body is in some way a partaker of beatitude, it can be loved with the love of charity (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE SINNERS OUT OF CHARITY.

YES.—As regards their nature, but not as regards their sin.

THE REASON is that, in respect of the nature that they have from God, they are capable of beatitude, upon the fellowship of which charity is founded. But their sin is contrary to God, and an obstacle to beatitude. Hence, in this respect, all sinners should be hated, according to Ps. cxxxviii, 22: "I have hated them with a perfect hatred." For hatred of a person's evil is equivalent to love of his good (Ad 1).

NOTE: We should not, says Aristotle (*Ethics* ix, 3), withdraw the benefits of friendship from our erring friends, as long there is hope of their being brought round to reason, but rather should we help them to recover their virtue. But when they fall into very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them the intimacy of friendship (Ad 2).—The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them, according to the example of Christ (Ad 5).

ART. VII.—WHETHER SINNERS LOVE THEMSELVES.

NO.—a) Sinners love themselves according to the common manner whereby each one loves himself; but not in respect of the principal thing that is in man.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to love the preservation of one's own being according to its nature is natural and common to all men.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the principal thing in man is a rational mind, or the *inner man*, as the Apostle calls him (II Cor., iv, 16), and according to this sinners do not live; but they regard the principal thing in man as sensible and corporeal nature, or the *outward man*, which is only secondary in man. Hence, not knowing themselves aright, they do not truly love themselves; but love that which they think to be themselves.

NOTE: As Aristotle proves (*Ethics*, book ix, chap. 4), there are five properties of friendship, which the good choose for themselves, and the contrary of which the evil choose for themselves. These are: a) The preservation in his integrity of the man (as the friend of oneself); b) the desire for him of spiritual goods; c) the doing of good services for him; d) the taking pleasure in his company, the having of good thoughts in the present, the sharing of the memory of past good things, and the hope of good things to come; e) and the desire not to suffer discord of will between themselves. Against these properties are sinners, who love themselves according to the corruption of the outward man (at the end of the article).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHARITY REQUIRES THAT WE SHOULD LOVE OUR ENEMIES.

YES.—a) Not in so far as they are enemies; b) but in respect of their nature, and thus in general; c) but in the particular case, namely as regards someone's being moved by the movement of love for his enemy, this is not demanded by charity absolutely; but d) is demanded by charity in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely that we should be prepared to love our enemies individually, should the necessity occur.

THE REASON OF THIS FIRST is that this love of enemies, as enemies, is perverse, and repugnant to charity; for this would be to love evil in another.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that one who loves God and the neighbor cannot exclude his enemies from the general law that commands the love of neighbor, for this love of neighbor pertains to the natural law.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that to be moved by a movement of love in particular to all men individually is not demanded by charity, nor indeed is it even possible.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that man must hold his mind prepared to love his neighbor in a particular case, should necessity require this.

NOTE: If without necessity man should actually do even this (mentioned in the

fourth reason), so as to love his enemy for the sake of God, this would pertain to the perfection of charity (in body of art.).

ART. IX.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION THAT WE SHOULD SHOW OUR ENEMIES THE SIGNS AND EFFECTS OF LOVE.

NO.—It is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemy the special signs and effects of love; but it is necessary for salvation that we show our enemy the common signs and effects of love, namely when we pray for all the faithful, or for the whole people, or when we show some favor to the whole community, as was said in the preceding article.

THE REASON is that the effects and signs of charity proceed from interior love, and are proportioned to it. Accordingly, just as we are bound to love our enemies in general, so also we are bound to show them the common signs of such love; for otherwise this would be a sign of spite and vengeance. The same thing must be said of love in the individual case, which is necessary for salvation only in the preparation of our mind, but which belongs to the perfection of charity.

ART. X.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE THE ANGELS OUT OF CHARITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the friendship of charity is based on the communication of eternal beatitude. In this communication both angels and men have a share (Matth. xxii, 30).

ART. XI.—WHETHER WE ARE BOUND TO LOVE THE DEMONS OUT OF CHARITY.

NO.—a) The demons, as spirits, we cannot love out of charity as our friends; but b) we can love them out of charity as we love irrational creatures (art. 3 of this q.).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since these spirits are eternally damned by God, we cannot wish them out of charity the good of eternal life, for this would be to resist the charity of God, by which we approve His justice.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we can wish out of charity that these spirits be preserved in their natural powers for the glory of God.

ART. XII.—WHETHER FOUR THINGS ARE RIGHTLY RECKONED AS TO BE LOVED OUT OF CHARITY, NAMELY GOD, OUR NEIGHBOR, OUR BODY, AND OURSELVES.

YES. THE REASON is that in the fellowship of beatitude, upon which charity is based, these four things come into consideration, namely God, as the principle influencing beatitude, or the cause of beatitude; man and the angel, who directly partake of beatitude; and the human body, to which beatitude passes by way of overflow. Thus there are four principal reasons for charity, according to these four objects that are loved out of charity. For the different relations between the lover and the various things loved make a different kind of loveliness (Ad. 1).

**QUESTION XXVI
THE ORDER OF CHARITY**

(In Thirteen Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS ORDER IN CHARITY

YES.—THE REASON is that, wherever there is a principle, it follows that there must also be an order. For an order is in respect of the before and after with reference to a principle. Now the principle of charity is God, to whom charity principally tends (prec. q., art. 12, and q. xxiii, art. 1). Therefore it follows that in those things that are loved out of charity there is some order with reference to the relations to the first principle of that love, which is God.

NOTE: Order refers to reason as that which orders, and thus faith has order, with reference to what is primarily about God, but only secondarily as concerns other things which are referred to God; whereas order refers to the appetitive power as to that which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity. It is, however, more appropriately in charity than in faith, because order is found more eminently in things themselves, and from them it passes to our knowledge (Ad 2 and 3, passim).

ART. II.—WHETHER GOD OUGHT TO BE LOVED MORE THAN OUR NEIGHBOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that friendship regards mainly the object in which we chiefly find the good upon the fellowship of which that friendship is based. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of beatitude, which consists essentially in God, as in its first principle, from whom it passes to all who are capable of beatitude. Hence God is the One to be chiefly and supremely loved out of charity.

NOTE: 1. It does not follow that that which is more visible is more to be loved, but only that it first is presented to our love. Therefore the neighbor, because he is more visible to us, first presents himself to us to be loved. Hence if anyone does not love the neighbor, it can be argued that neither does he love God (as Scripture says, I John iv, 20: "How can he who does not love his brother, whom he sees, love God, whom he does not see?").

2. Also by reason of likeness ought we to love God more than our neighbor. For the likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor; because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God we become like to our neighbor (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER, OUT OF CHARITY, MAN IS BOUND TO LOVE GOD MORE THAN HIMSELF.

YES.—Both in the natural order and, even more, in the order of grace.

THE REASON is that love is based on a fellowship of blessings. Now God is of all blessings in both the natural order, and, yet more, in the order of grace, the common principle and the fount. Therefore if in the natural order man ought to love God more than himself, with a natural love; much more ought he to love Him in the order of grace, with the love of charity.

ART. IV.—WHETHER, OUT OF CHARITY, MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIMSELF MORE THAN HIS NEIGHBOR.

YES.—With respect to the spiritual order, in which man is said rightly to love himself (q. xxv, art. 7); and in this regard man should love himself more, after God, than anyone else.

THE REASON is that man loves himself out of charity by reason of his being partaker of the divine good; his neighbor is loved with respect to his having fellowship in that good. Hence, just as unity is higher than union, the fact that man himself is a sharer of the divine good is a higher reason for loving than that anyone else be associated with him in that sharing. Hence man should not suffer any evil of sin, which is opposed to his sharing in beatitude, in order to free his neighbor from sin.

NOTE: Although a man's neighbor may be better than himself, and so nearer to God, yet because the neighbor is not so near to the one who has charity as is that one to himself, it does not follow that (on the part of the subject) one should love one's neighbor more than one loves oneself (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS NEIGHBOR MORE THAN HIS OWN BODY.

YES.—As regards the welfare of the soul.

THE REASON is that fellowship, which is the reason for loving the neighbor, is a higher reason for loving than the participation of beatitude by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one's body.

NOTE: Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency; wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to risk his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own accord offers himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE ONE NEIGHBOR MORE THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the inclination of grace, which is the effect of charity, is proportioned to the things that are to be externally done, just as happens with natural affection in the case of the things of nature. Thus we have an intenser movement

of charity to those toward whom it is proper that we should be more beneficent. Now the measure of this affection is regulated according to the nearness of the person loved to God and to the lover, who are the principle of love. Yet this difference in love is not on the part of the object, because in this respect we love all men equally out of charity, for we all desire the same good in general, namely eternal beatitude; but it is on our own part, namely with respect to the intensity of the act of love (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE THOSE WHO ARE BETTER MORE THAN THOSE WHO ARE MORE CLOSELY UNITED TO US.

NO.—a) By reason of the object and with respect to the species, a difference of love in respect to charity should be observed in regard to the love we give our neighbors according to their relation to God, so that we should, out of charity, wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; b) but, according to intensity of affection, those are more to be loved who are closer to us.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, although the good that charity wishes for all, namely eternal happiness, is one in itself, it has different degrees according to the different participations of beatitude.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the intensity of love is to be observed with respect to the man himself who loves.

Moreover, we can love those who are more closely connected with us than those who are better, because love for those who are close is more stable, being founded in nature. Moreover, those who are better can fall, so that those who are close can be better than they.—Likewise, we love those who are more closely connected with us in more ways, for example, in respect of their being relatives and fellow citizens, etc., where for those who are better we have only the friendship of charity (in body of art.).

As regards the words of Christ (Luke xiv, 26): "If any man comes to me, and does not hate his father . . ." it must be said that we are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between ourselves and God. In this respect they are not akin, but hostile to us, according to Mich. viii, 6: "A man's enemies are they of his own household." (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO LOVE MORE THOSE WHO ARE CONNECTED WITH US BY TIES OF BLOOD.

YES.—If the bond of one friendship be compared with the bond of another; but not if love is measured according to the very essence of such a bond.

THE REASON is that the bond of natural origin is prior and more stable than other bonds, for it is in respect to that which is substantial, whereas other bonds are supervenient and can be removed. Hence the friendship of kinsfolk is more stable; but other friendships can be more potent in respect to that which is proper to each friendship.

ART. IX.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT, OUT OF CHARITY, TO LOVE HIS CHILDREN MORE THAN HIS FATHER.

NO.—a) On the part of the object, the father should be loved more than the child; b) but, on the part of the lover, the child should be loved more than the father.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the father has a greater character of goodness than the child; for we love our father as our principle, and in this respect he is more like to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the child is closer to the parents than are the parents to the child.

NOTE: Four reasons are noted why parents love their children more than the children love their parents. The first is that the parents love their children as something of themselves, and this love is like the love whereby one loves oneself. The second is that the parents know better that some persons are their children than conversely. The third is that the child is closer to the parent, as being part of him, than the father to the child, to whom he has the relation of a principle. The fourth is that parents have lived longer, for the father at once begins to love the child, whereas the child only after some time begins to love the father.

2. Since our father is related to us as principle, even as is God, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children it belongs to be

provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless, in cases of necessity, the child is bound out of the favors he has received, to provide for his parents before all (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS MOTHER MORE THAN HIS FATHER.

NO.—The father, as father, i.e., the principle of generation, ought to be loved more than the mother, as mother.

THE REASON is that the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother; for the father is the active principle of generation, whereas the mother is the passive and material principle.

NOTE: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the formative power that is in the father's seed. And, though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body to receive that form (Ad 1).

ART. XI.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE HIS WIFE MORE THAN HIS FATHER AND MOTHER.

NO.—a) In respect of the good that is the object of love, parents should be loved more than the wife; b) in respect of the bond that unites them, the wife should be loved more.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that parents are loved under the aspect of their being the principle of our existence, and hence of more eminent goodness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the wife is united to the husband, and these two are one flesh, according to Matth. xix, 6: "Therefore now they are no longer two, but one flesh." Hence the wife is loved more intensely, but greater reverence should be shown to the parents.

NOTE: Regarding the words of Gen. ii, 24: "A man shall leave father and mother," it must be said that a man does not in all respects leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife, for in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does, however, leave all his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connection and cohabitation (Ad 1).

ART. XII.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO LOVE MORE HIS BENEFACITOR THAN ONE HE HAS BENEFITED.

NO.—a) The benefactor should be loved (especially by the one he has benefited) by reason of greater goods; b) but the one benefited should be loved more (by the benefactor), by reason of greater union.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the benefactor is the principle of goodness in the one benefited, and therefore has a higher character of goodness, as was said concerning a father.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS FOURFOLD: THE FIRST REASON is that the one benefited is as it were a kind of work of the benefactor. Now it is natural to everyone to love his own work, just as he loves his own being and his own life, which is most manifested in his actions.—THE SECOND REASON is that each person naturally loves that in which he sees his good. Now the benefactor sees in the one he benefits his virtuous good, and the one he benefits sees in his benefactor his useful good. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is longer lasting and also because we recall virtuous goods with greater pleasure than the profit we have derived from others.—THE THIRD REASON is that it is the lover's part to act, and therefore it is the part of the benefactor, who is the active partner in the relationship, to love more.—THE FOURTH REASON is that it is more difficult to bestow benefits than to receive them. Now the things that cost us labor we love more, and the things that come easily to us we might almost say that we despise.

NOTE: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act (Ad 2).

ART. XIII.—WHETHER THE ORDER OF CHARITY ENDURES IN HEAVEN.

YES.—The order of charity, whereby God should be loved above all things, necessarily endures in heaven. There, however, every one of the blessed a) loves, in respect of the goodness that is desired for another, his neighbor more than himself, b) but in respect of the lover he will love himself more intensely than his neighbor.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every one of the blessed wishes each one to have that which is due him according to divine justice, because of the perfect conformity of the human will to the divine. For the whole life of blessedness consists in the subordination of the mind to God; wherefore the whole order of the love of the blessed will be observed in relation to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that even the blessed man will love himself more than his neighbor, even if he is better than himself; for the intensity of the act of love arises with respect to the subject who loves, as was stated above (art. 7 and 9 of this q.).

NOTE: It will, however, be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be excluded from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nearness to God (at end of art.).

QUESTION XXVII

THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE

Here we consider the act of charity: 1) The principal act, which is to love; 2) the other acts, or effects consequent on this. The first head will be in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER TO BE LOVED IS MORE PROPER TO CHARITY THAN TO LOVE.

NO.—It is more proper to charity to love than to be loved.

THE REASON is that that is more proper to a person that belongs to him primarily and substantially than that which belongs to him by reason of something else. Now it is proper to charity to love, which is an act proper to oneself. But to be loved is not an act of charity proper to the one who is loved, but accrues to him on account of some good that is in himself, to which another is moved by the act of charity. Thus mothers, whose love is the highest, seek more to love than to be loved.

ART. II.—WHETHER TO LOVE, CONSIDERED AS AN ACT OF CHARITY, IS THE SAME AS GOOD WILL.

NO.—The act of charity adds to benevolence a union of affection between lover and beloved.

THE REASON is that the one who loves (with an intellectual love) esteems the beloved in some manner as one with himself, or belonging to himself, and thus is moved to him. Now benevolence is an act of the will, whereby we wish good to another; and thus it is the principle of friendship, but of itself it implies no affective union.

ART. III.—WHETHER OUT OF CHARITY GOD OUGHT TO BE LOVED FOR HIS OWN SAKE.

YES.—Since the term, "for His own sake," implies the relationship of a cause, it must be said a) that we love God for His own sake in respect of three causes, namely final, formal, and efficient; b) but in respect of the material or disposing cause (which latter is reduced to the material cause), we do not love God for His own sake, but on account of something else.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God is not ordered to anything else as an end, but is Himself the final end of all things; neither, again, is He informed by anything else in respect of His goodness, but His very substance is His goodness, in respect of which He is the type of all that is good; nor, finally, does goodness inhere in Him from another, but goodness inheres in all else because of Him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we are disposed by certain other things to our making advance in the love of God, for example by the benefits we have received from Him, or by the rewards we hope for, or even by the penalties that we seek

to avoid through Him; for the material cause of love is that which disposes us to love, such as benefits received, etc. But when we receive them we begin to love, no longer for the sake of the benefits, but on account of the virtue of our friend.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED IMMEDIATELY IN THIS LIFE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of the appetitive power is perfected by the fact that the appetite is inclined to the thing itself. Accordingly, love, which is an act of the appetitive power, even in the wayfaring state tends first to God, and from Him passes to others; and thus charity loves God immediately, and other things through God.

NOTE: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, for love is the term of knowledge, and, consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself that is known through another thing (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER GOD CAN BE LOVED WHOLLY.

YES.—a) In so far as He is wholly referred to the thing loved, inasmuch as He is the whole thing loved; b) in so far as He is wholly referred to the lover; c) but not by way of comparing the lover with the thing loved.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the man should love all that pertains to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man should love God with all his powers, and whatever man has he should direct to the love of God, according to Deut. vi, 5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, since God's goodness is infinite, and everything is lovable in so far as it is good, it follows that God is infinitely lovable. Now this surpasses all the power of a creature, whether natural or infused, which is always finite.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN LOVING GOD WE OUGHT TO OBSERVE ANY MODE.

NO.—Divine love has a mode in so far as the mode is in the measure, but not in so far as it is in the thing measured.

THE REASON is that the mode implies some determination of the measure. Now the determination of the measure is essentially in the measure itself, because it is not determined by anything else, but itself determines and modifies other things. Now the measure of the love of God is God Himself, who is the final end of love. Hence the determination of the love of God is essentially in God Himself. Hence in the love of God the mode cannot be taken as it is in the thing measured; but as the mode is found in the measure, in which there can be no excess. Hence, just as the nearer the rule is attained the better it is, so, the more we love God, the better is our love.—Thus in all things to be desired and to be done the measure is the end, and the end has a mode by itself, whereas the means take their mode from their being proportioned to the end.

NOTE: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another. Thus the goodness of the measure that has the mode essentially takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured (Ad 1).—So also there is a difference between the interior act of charity and the exterior acts. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul's cleaving to God, according to Ps. lxxii, 27: "It is good for me to adhere to my God;" whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE AN ENEMY THAN TO LOVE A FRIEND.

NO.—a) On the part of the neighbor love of friend takes precedence; b) on the part of the reason why the neighbor is loved out of charity, or on the part of God, the love of enemy takes precedence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a friend is better, and closer, than an

enemy; hence this is a matter more suitable for love. Whence it is that to hate a friend is worse than to hate an enemy.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS TWOFOLD. THE FIRST REASON is that there can be another reason for the love of a friend than God; but only God is the reason for loving an enemy.—**THE SECOND REASON** is that, supposing that both are loved for the sake of God, the love that extends man's mind to the remoter object is the stronger, namely even to the love of enemies, just as the power of fire is shown to be stronger by the fact that it diffuses its heat among remote objects. Yet for those close to us the fervor of charity is greater.

NOTE: The love of friends is not meritorious in God's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends. On the other hand, the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because they are our friends (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS MORE MERITORIOUS TO LOVE ONE'S NEIGHBOR THAN TO LOVE GOD.

NO.—a) If both loves are considered separately, then there is no doubt that the love of God is more meritorious; b) but it is more meritorious to love the neighbor out of charity, and for the sake of God, than to love God alone and not love the neighbor.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the love of God claims a reward for its own sake, because the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to which the movement of divine love tends; hence a reward is promised to him who loves God: "He who loves Me will be loved by My Father, and I will love him and manifest Myself to Him" (John iv, 21).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the perfect love of God is that which extends to the neighbor, according to I John iv, 21: "This commandment we have from Him, that he who loves God should love His brother also." Now the love of God, if it does not extend to the neighbor, is insufficient and imperfect.

NOTE 1.—Regarding the words of St. Paul (Rom. ix, 3): "I could wish to be anathema myself from Christ for the sake of my brethren," we should say that, according to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect. Or it can be said, as Chrysostom states (*Hom. 16 in Epis. ad Rom.*), that this means that the Apostle wished to be deprived for a time of the divine enjoyment, which pertains to love of oneself, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God (Ad 1).

2.—It does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better, for the good more than the difficult has to do with the reason of merit and virtue (Ad 3).

QUESTION XXVIII JOY

Here we consider the effects of charity that follow from its principal act, which is love: 1) The interior effects; 2) the exterior. The first calls for four points of consideration: 1) Joy, 2) peace, 3) mercy. The first head claims four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER JOY IS EFFECTED IN US BY CHARITY.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, just as joy as a passion is an effect of love, inasmuch as it arises from love or on account of the presence of the good that is love, or also because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it (I-II q. xxv, Art. 1, 2, 3). Even so, spiritual good is an effect of the love of God, whose good is immutable, since He is His own goodness, and by the fact that He is loved He is in the lover through His noblest effect, according to I John iv, 16: "He who abides in love abides in God, and God in him." Hence the spiritual joy that is had from God is caused by charity.

NOTE: The joy that is had in the divine good considered in itself is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly; the joy that is had in the divine good, in so far as it is participated in by us, and which proceeds also from hope, by which we expect the fruition of the divine goodness, is less good, as being obtained according to the measure of one's charity (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY, WHICH RESULTS FROM CHARITY, IS COMPATIBLE WITH AN ADMIXTURE OF SORROW.

NO.—a) The chief joy, or that whereby we rejoice in the divine good considered in itself, is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow; b) the joy of charity, whereby we rejoice in the divine good in so far as it is participated in by us, can have an admixture of sorrows.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that good, in which the chief joy is had, namely the good of God, cannot suffer any admixture of evil.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this participation of the divine good in us can be impeded by something contrary, which is opposed to the participation of the divine good, either in us, or in our neighbors, whom we love as ourselves. Thus also the deferment of the glory that will be ours in heaven pertains to the hindrance of the participation of the divine good; wherefore it is said in Ps. cxix, 5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!"

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SPIRITUAL JOY WHICH PROCEEDS FROM CHARITY CAN BE FILLED.

YES.—a) Not on the part of the thing in which joy is had, i.e., God; b) but on the part of the one who rejoices.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus only the joy of God in Himself is filled; for the joy of God is infinite; and this is condign to the infinite goodness of God; but for every creature joy must be finite.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that joy is then full when there now remains nothing to desire. When now we shall come to perfect happiness, nothing will remain to be desired, because there will be the full enjoyment of God, in which man will obtain whatever he desires, even as to other goods, according to Ps. cii, 5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Thus it will be that desire will have rest, not only in our desire of God, but also a rest of all desires.—And that joy that is altogether full and over-full, is not taken into man, but rather does man enter into it, according to Matth. xxv, 21: "Enter into the joy of thy Lord."

NOTE: When we shall come to happiness, we will reach the goal appointed for us by divine predestination, and nothing further will remain to which we may tend, although by reaching that goal some of us will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a fuller participation of the divine happiness (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER JOY IS A VIRTUE.

NO.—Joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but is an act or effect of charity.

THE REASON is that the virtue (charity) is defined and named from its first act, and not from later acts. Now the first act of charity is love, which is followed by desire and joy. Hence charity is not defined or determined by joy, but by love, which is the act of charity.—Likewise, joy on the part of the object, by which the virtue is specified, adds no special aspect to love that can give rise to a special virtue (Ad 2).

**QUESTION XXIX
PEACE**

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PEACE IS THE SAME AS CONCORD.

NO.—Peace includes concord, and adds something to it.

THE REASON is that concord (which is in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing) denotes a union of appetites among various persons; whereas peace, over and above this union, denotes also a union of the appetite of the one who seeks union; for there can be no peace in man if there is in him a clash of movements of the appetite.

NOTE: 1.—St. Augustine, in his *City of God*, book xix, chap 13, says that "peace among men is well-ordered concord." But the Holy Doctor is speaking here of that peace which is between one man and another; and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man's agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them.

For if one man concords with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is the tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements together in one man's being set at rest (Ad 1).

2.—A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL THINGS DESIRE PEACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that all things desire their good. Now every one who desires, desires to attain, tranquilly and without hindrance, to that which he desires, in which consists the good of peace, which Augustine defines (1. c) as "the tranquillity of order."

NOTE 1.—Even those who seek war and dissension desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For, as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore (Ad 2).

NOTE: 2.—Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. cxlvii, 3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for, though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without, which disturb the peace (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER PEACE IS THE PROPER EFFECT OF CHARITY.

YES.—a) Both in respect to the ordering of our own appetites to one thing and b) in respect to the union of our own appetite with the appetite of another.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that all our appetites are directed through charity to God, as to one object; for it pertains to charity that God be loved with our whole heart and that we should refer all that we have to Him.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by charity we love our neighbor as ourselves; from which it follows that man wishes to satisfy the will of his neighbor even as his own will, and on this account it is reckoned among the signs of friendship if people make choice of the same things; and Cicero says (*De Amicitia*) that "friends like and dislike the same things."

NOTE: 1.—Man in mortal sin does not cleave chiefly to his true final good, but only to his apparent good. And for this reason there can be no true peace without sanctifying grace, but only an apparent peace (Ad 1).

2.—Agreement in opinions is not essential to friendship, but only agreement in such goods as conduce to life, especially in such as are important, because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Accordingly, such dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer (Ad 2).

3.—Peace is the "work of justice" (Is xxxii, 17), not directly, but indirectly, insofar as justice removes the obstacles to peace. But it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love, as says Dionysius (*Divine Names*, iv), is a "unitive force," and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PEACE IS A VIRTUE.

NO.—Peace has no other proper virtue from which it proceeds than charity itself.

THE REASON is that all the acts proceeding from the agent in the same respect belong to the same virtue, just as in fire the power to melt and the power to rarify

are not two powers, but one. Even so, peace, which is the effect of charity flowing from the love of God and the neighbor, does not have another virtue of its own from which it proceeds than charity itself, as we said concerning joy (prec. q., art 4).

NOTE: Peace is ranked among the beatitudes, which are the acts of perfect virtue (I-II, q. lxxix, art. 1 and 3). Peace is also ranked among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness (Ad 1).

QUESTION XXX MERCY

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EVIL IS PROPERLY THE MOTIVE OF MERCY.

YES.—According to the threefold way in which man does not wish something, or has unhappiness.

THE REASON is, as says Augustine (*City of God*, book ix, chap 5), that mercy "is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can." Now unhappiness, which is opposed to happiness, consists in a man's suffering what he does not wish. This in turn can happen in three ways: 1) By something contrary to the natural craving of the will; 2) by something contrary to the deliberate choice; 3) by something contrary to the whole will; for example, if someone has always pursued good things, and bad things befall him. And these three evils are the specific motives of mercy as pertaining to misery, of which the last is greater than the second, and the second greater than the first.

NOTE: 1.—Fault as such does not have the character of misery, because it is voluntary. It too, however, is an object of mercy, in so far as it has something connected with it that is contrary to the will; and in this respect we have compassion and pity on sinners (Ad 1).

2.—Just as justice is not properly for ourselves, but for others, so also is mercy, which is sympathy for another's distress. But, because we regard those who are nearest to ourselves as something of ourselves, as parents do children, we do not properly pity their distress, but suffer with them (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE REASON FOR TAKING PITY IS A DEFECT ON THE PART OF THE PERSON WHO PITIES.

YES.—The reason for taking pity on the party of the person pitying is: a) Either the love of the person taking pity for the object of his compassion; or b) a defect or knowledge of the defectibility of the one taking pity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the lover counts as his own the evil of another person, whom he loves. And thus God has pity on us, inasmuch as He loves us as something of Himself (Ad 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who knows his own defectibility sees the possibility of his suffering ills like his neighbor's. For this reason the old and the wise, because they consider that they can incur misfortune, and also the weak and the fearful, are more inclined to pity.—Yet those who already are in infinite distress do not fear to suffer more; wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion that they pay no attention to the suffering of others (Ad 2).

3. The proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. in Ev., xxxiv*) that "false godliness," i.e., of the proud, "is not compassionate, but disdainful" (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER MERCY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—In so far as sorrow or compassion for another's misfortune denominates a movement of the intellectual appetite.

THE REASON is that such a movement can be regulated by reason, "namely when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant" (Augustine, *City of God*, bk. ix, chap. 5). And thus mercy is a virtue; for the reason of human virtue consists in the regulation of the emotions by reason (I-II, q. lix, art. 4 and 5).—But sorrow for another's misfortune, which denominates the movement of the sensitive appetite, is a passion, which, however, can also obey the virtue of mercy.

NOTE: 1. Nemesis is sometimes opposed to mercy, because the merciful man grieves for another's misery in so far as he considers someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices in so far as it esteems some to suffer deservedly, and is saddened if things go well with the undeserving. Both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character, as Augustine says (*ibid.*). Properly speaking, however, envy is opposed to mercy, as will be explained later (q. xxxvi, art. 3).—(Ad 2).

2. Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good that is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MERCY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—a) Considered in itself, mercy is the greatest virtue; b) but not in reference to the one who has it, unless the one who has it is the greatest.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it belongs to mercy (considered in itself) to bestow good on others, and, what is more, to relieve the wants of others; and this belongs especially to one who is higher. Wherefore mercy is regarded as proper to God; and in this especially His omnipotence is said to be revealed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that for one who has someone above himself it is better to be united to someone above him than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. And therefore, as regards man, who has God above him, charity, by which he is united to God, is higher than mercy, by which he supplies the defects of his neighbors.

But among all the virtues that pertain to the neighbor the greatest is charity, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of someone else, in so far as the latter is deficient.

NOTE: Mercy is more acceptable to God than is sacrifice. For by external sacrifices we worship God, not for His own sake, but for our own, and for the sake of our neighbors. For God does not need our sacrifices; but He wishes them to be offered to Himself to arouse our own devotion and for the benefit of our neighbors. Hence mercy, whereby we relieve the wants of others, is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well being, according to Heb. xiii, 16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."—Wherefore, as regards external works the sum and gist of the Christian religion consist in mercy (Ad 1 and 2).

QUESTION XXXI BENEFICENCE

Here we are to consider the external acts or effects of charity: 1) Beneficence; 2) almsgiving, which is a part of beneficence; 3) fraternal correction, which is in a way almsgiving. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS AN ACT OF CHARITY.

YES.—According to the general acceptance of the good that we do for someone.

THE REASON is that good according to the general notion of good pertains to the common aspect of beneficence, which is an act of benevolence. Now this is included in the act of friendship or charity. And thus beneficence is an act of charity.—If however beneficence is taken under some special aspect of good, it will be a special act of the virtue to which such a good especially belongs. Thus to do good to someone under the aspect of something due is an act of justice; if under the aspect of something gratuitous, it is an act of liberality; and so with the rest (in body and Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DO GOOD TO ALL.

YES.—a) Both by reason of beneficence itself b) and by reason of charity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that beneficence moves that which is higher to provide for that which is lower. Now men are subject to change; and thus they are, or can be, in respect to this or to that, reciprocally superiors and inferiors. And thus benefits should be given to all.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that beneficence is an act of charity; now charity extends to all men, as was said above (q. xxv and xxvi).

ART. III.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DO GOOD TO THOSE RATHER WHO ARE MORE CLOSELY UNITED WITH US.

YES.—a) Generally speaking, we should rather do good to those who are more closely united to us; b) yet the benefits dispensed should be according to different relations of union; c) and this can vary according to time, place, and business.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this respect grace and virtue imitate nature; now a natural agent bestows its action first and more abundantly on the things that are closer to it. Thus even God diffuses His gifts first and more abundantly on the substances nearer to Himself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that everyone should be rendered a greater benefit if he relates to that thing in respect of which he is more closely united to us. Thus we should benefit kinsmen in a natural relationship, fellow citizens in a civil relationship, fellow Christians in the spiritual relation, and so on.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in some cases a stranger should be rather succored, for example if he is in extreme need, than even one's father who suffers no such need.—Thus in war, other things being equal, a fellow soldier should be preferred to one who is united to us according to the flesh, for our country's good (Ad 2); and in extreme urgency it would be rather lawful to abandon one's children than one's parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as Aristotle says in *Ethics*, bk. viii, last chapter.—(Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER BENEFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the formal aspect of charity and beneficence is the same; for both regard the common aspect of good (art. 1 of this q.). Hence beneficence is not a virtue different from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

NOTE: From the fact that different precepts of charity and of beneficence are given, it does not follow that these are two different virtues, because precepts are given, not about virtues, but about the acts of the virtues (Ad 1).

QUESTION XXXII ALMSGIVING

(in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALMSGIVING IS AN ACT OF CHARITY.

YES.—through the medium of mercy.

THE REASON is that almsgiving is "a deed whereby something is given to a needy person out of compassion for the sake of God." Now this motive pertains to mercy (q. xxx, art. 1 and 2). Mercy, moreover, is an effect of charity (q. xxx, art. w and 3). Therefore to give alms is an act of charity, through the medium of mercy.

NOTE: 1. Almsgiving materially can exist without charity; but formally almsgiving, i.e., to give alms for the sake of God, cheerfully, promptly, and in every way one ought, is never without charity (Ad 1).

2. Almsgiving is a work of salvation, in so far as pity for the one in distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice. In the first case, almsgiving is commanded by justice, in the second, by religion. Yet it is always elicited by charity if it is truly Christian (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ALMSGIVING ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED.

YES.—There are seven deeds of mercy, or corporal works of mercy shown to the neighbor in his bodily defects; and as many kinds of spiritual works of mercy shown in his spiritual defects.

THE REASON is that there are seven bodily defects, and seven spiritual defects. The corporal defects are thus enumerated: Defects in life, and after life. In life, there are common defects, and others that are special. Of the common defects, some are interior and others exterior. The interior defects are hunger and thirst, which are succored by dry and liquid food. For the former defects the command to feed the hungry is given, and for the latter, to give drink to the thirsty. The common external defects are about shelter and clothing. As regards the former, we have the command to clothe

the naked; as regards the latter, to shelter the shelterless.—As regards the special corporal defects, these are owing to an intrinsic cause, such as illness, and about them is given the command to visit the sick; or to an extrinsic cause, and in this respect we have the command to redeem the captive.—After life there is rendered to the dead the burial of the body. These are the seven classes of corporal almsgiving.

Spiritual defects are succored by spiritual acts in two ways: By asking help from God, namely by prayer, by praying for others; and by bestowing human aid, thus: Against the defect of the speculative intellect, by teaching the ignorant; against the defect of the practical intellect, by counseling others; against the defect arising out of the passion of the appetitive power, by comforting the sorrowful. As regards inordinate human acts, provision thus is made. Against inordinate voluntary acts there is given the command to correct sinners; against inordinate acts committed against ourselves, there is the command to forgive the offense; against inordinate acts arising from frailty, we have the command to bear with the weak; and that not only as regards sins of weakness, but also in general, with regard to our neighbor's burdens, as is said in Gal. vi, 2: "Bear ye one another's burdens." And these are the seven kinds of spiritual almsgiving.

ART. III.—WHETHER CORPORAL ALMS ARE OF MORE ACCOUNT THAN SPIRITUAL.

NO.—Simply speaking, spiritual alms are higher than corporal.

THE FIRST REASON is in respect of the gift; for a spiritual gift that is rendered is nobler than a corporal gift.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of the one who is succored, for he who is succored by spiritual works, namely those of the spirit, is nobler.

THE THIRD REASON is on the part of the acts themselves whereby the neighbor is succored, for spiritual acts are nobler than corporal acts, which are, in a way, servile.—Yet in respect of any particular case a corporal alms may outrank a spiritual, for example, one who is dying of hunger should be fed rather than taught, and, as Aristotle says (*Topics*, bk. iii, chap. 2, 40): "A needy man needs money more than philosophy," although philosophy is better simply.

NOTE: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not detract from virtue. But compensation given in return for spiritual goods, even if it is intended does not detract from merit (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CORPORAL ALMSDEEDS HAVE A SPIRITUAL EFFECT.

YES.—a) Corporal almsdeeds, not in respect of their substance; b) but in respect of their cause; and c) on the part of the effect, have a spiritual effect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, in this respect, corporal almsdeeds have only a corporal effect, inasmuch, that is, as they supply the corporal defects of our neighbors.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to give corporal alms on account of the love of God and the neighbor bears spiritual fruit, according to Eccus. xxix, 13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandment of the Most High, and in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the neighbor who is succored by corporal alms is moved to pray for his benefactor. Hence it is added in the same place (v, 15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."

NOTE: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporeal thing, for he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporeal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER ALMSGIVING IS A MATTER OF PRECEPT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the love of neighbor cannot be retained without relieving his need. For it is said in I John iii, 18: "Let us not love in word, neither with the tongue, but in deed and truth."

Yet the act of charity that is commanded to be exercised through almsgiving is to be assessed both on the part of the giver and on the part of the receiver. On the part

of the giver it is commanded to give alms out of one's superfluous goods, according to Luke x, 41: "That which remains, give as alms." On the part of the receiver, it is required that he be in extreme need, according to Ambrose, *On Duties*, book i, c. 30: "Feed him that dies of hunger; if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him." For in other less urgent necessities he can be succored by others also.—Other almsgiving is a matter of counsel, even as counsels are given regarding any better good.

NOTE: 1. The temporal goods that God grants us are ours as to the ownership, but as to their use they belong, not to us alone, but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have over and above our needs (Ad 2).—Nor need we consider every case that may possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. vi, 34), but we should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur (Ad 3).

2. All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it (I Tim. iv, 8), where he says: "Godliness is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life, as well as of that which is to come." Under godliness is comprehended all almsgiving (Ad 4).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO GIVE ALMS OUT OF WHAT ONE NEEDS.

YES.—a) Not out of the necessary without which life cannot exist; b) but out of the necessary without which life cannot be becomingly supported according to one's state and that of other persons in one's care.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to give alms out of this necessary is to withdraw life from oneself and one's own.—But this I say without prejudice to a possible case where, by depriving oneself of essential necessities, one could give to some important person, essential to Church or State; for the relief of such a person it is praiseworthy to risk death for oneself and one's family; since the common good should be preferred to that which is personal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, after much of one's goods has been withdrawn, there yet remains the wherewithal becomingly to support life according to one's state. But this does not fall under precept, since no one ought live otherwise than becomingly; but it falls under counsel, and that in two cases: 1) When someone embraces evangelical perfection by entering the religious state; 2) when the goods that one withdraws can easily be restored.

ART. VII.—WHETHER ONE MAY GIVE ALMS OUT OF ILL-GOTTEN GOODS.

NO.—a) Goods unlawfully acquired, which are due to the one from whom they were taken, for example by robbery, theft, and usury, should not be given as alms; b) goods unlawfully acquired, which are not due to the one from whom they were taken, for example by simony, and other such goods, *must* be bestowed in alms; c) acquired goods that are lawful in themselves, but taken as the outcome of something immoral, such as prostitution, *can* be bestowed in alms.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that out of such ill-gotten gains man is bound to make restitution.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in these cases to give and to accept are contrary to law.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, although in this case the woman acts immorally and against the law of God, yet in accepting she does not act unjustly or against the law. Hence what is thus acquired unlawfully can be retained or it can be given in alms.

NOTE: 1.—Regarding the words of Christ (Luke xvi, 9): "Make friends for yourselves with the mammon of wickedness," i.e., by bestowing on the poor the gains of injustice, consider that wealth is called unjust because it easily leads to injustice, or also because "among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others unjustly, although you knew nothing about it," as Ambrose says (*De Quaest. Evang., lib ii*, q. xxxiv, at end).—(Ad 1).

2. In extreme need, all things are common. Therefore, in this case it is lawful to receive and give of another's goods. Yet if this can be done without risk, one must ask the owner's consent, and then provide for the poor man's wants (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ONE WHO IS UNDER ANOTHER'S POWER CAN GIVE ALMS.

NO.—As regards the goods in which the inferior is subject to the superior.

THE REASON is that in the natural order inferiors are ruled by superiors. Thus he who is under another's power must not give alms from the property in which he is subject to his superior without the superior's permission, whether expressly given or with probability presumed, unless perhaps in a moment of extreme need, in which it is lawful for a man to steal in order to give alms (Ad 1).

If however anyone has something in respect of which he is not subject to a higher power, he is not subject to his superior with regard to what is rightfully his; and thus he can give alms (at end of art.).

ART. IX.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO GIVE ALMS TO THOSE RATHER WHO ARE CLOSER TO US.

YES.—THE REASON is that it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look out for those who are more closely united to us.—Yet we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very great need.

ART. X.—WHETHER ALMS SHOULD BE GIVEN IN ABUNDANCE.

YES.—Both on the part of the given and on the part of the recipient.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that one who gives much according to the proportion of his means is praiseworthy, as appears in the case of the widow, whom the Lord praised (Luke xxi).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it is praiseworthy that alms should minister sufficiently to the need of the recipient, according to his personal and social condition (Ad 3).—Yet almsgiving should not be so excessive as to reach superfluities, but it is better to bestow alms on several of the needy.

**QUESTION XXXIII
FRATERNAL CORRECTION**

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION IS AN ACT OF CHARITY.

YES.—a) Fraternal correction, properly so called, which is that which regards sin as misfortune of the sinner, is an act of charity; b) but that regards sin as a misfortune of society is an act of justice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that fraternal correction thus properly so called is ordered to the amendment of the offender by the removal of his misfortune. Now to remove someone's misfortune is of the same character as to procure his good; and to procure a brother's good pertains to charity. And, just as the good of the soul outranks the good of the body, so fraternal correction outranks the care of bodily infirmity, or the succor that relieves external need.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, in this respect, fraternal correction is ordered to the preservation of the rectitude of the justice of one person to another.

NOTE: In fraternal correction prudence has a secondary part as directing and carrying out the act of charity (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION IS A MATTER OF PRECEPT.

YES.—It falls under precept in so far as it is necessary for a brother's amendment, which is the end of fraternal correction.

THE REASON is that the good of virtue is regarded in respect of the end itself.—Yet the character of end in affirmative precepts must be regarded chiefly in the circumstances of the virtuous act, namely so that it is done where, when, and in the circumstances that it should be done. For it can happen that the lack of any circumstance wholly takes away the good of virtue. Hence the precept of fraternal correction binds indeed always, but not for always, i.e., for every place and time.

NOTE: 1. We can omit fraternal correction in three ways: a) Meritoriously, when out of charity someone omits correction, because he seeks a favorable time, or because he fears that his brother will become worse as a result of his efforts; b) with mortal sin, when we fear the judgment of the crowd, or lest we suffer a painful death, provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such things that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity, and thus through fear or covetousness a man foregoes fraternal correction, when it can be presumed with probability that another may be withdrawn from sin; c) with venial sin, when fear or covetousness makes a man slow to correct his brother's faults. And in this way sometimes holy men neglect to correct those who are at fault (Ad 3).

2. Just as one who owes money to a creditor must seek him, when the time comes, in order to pay him, so he who has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, but all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be material or spiritual, but it suffices that we bestow them when the opportunity occurs (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER FRATERNAL CORRECTION BELONGS ONLY TO SUPERIORS.

NO.—a) The fraternal correction that is directed especially to the amendment of an offending brother by simple admonition is not the concern of superiors only, but also of all who have charity; b) but that correction which is also sometimes by way of punishment belongs only to superiors.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that fraternal correction is an act of charity; therefore whoever has charity can and should exercise this act of charity.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it belongs to superiors only, not only to admonish the brethren subject to them, but also to correct them by punishing them.—Hence the duty of superiors in fraternal corrections is graver than that of others.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO CORRECT HIS SUPERIOR.

YES.—By that fraternal correction which is an act of charity.

THE REASON is that this fraternal correction belongs to everyone with respect to any person towards whom one should have charity.—But, because a virtuous act must be governed by due circumstances, therefore in the correction by which subjects correct their superiors there must be observed a fitting measure, so that they should not be corrected harshly and impudently, but with meekness and respect, and moreover in secret, unless there is imminent danger to the faith, for in this case superiors may be rebuked by their subjects even in public (Ad 2).

NOTE: We must remember that when a man reproves his superior charitably, it does not follow that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger," as Augustine observes in his *Rule* (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER A SINNER OUGHT TO REPROVE A WRONGDOER.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that his previous sin has made him unworthy to reprove another.

THE SECOND REASON is that, if the sin of the reprovor should be exposed, scandal would ensue; for it seems that he who reproves does not reprove out of charity, but rather for the sake of appearances.

THE THIRD REASON is that the reprovor, thinking little of his own sins, puts himself before his neighbor in his heart, by judging his sins with severity, as if he himself were just.—Yet, if the sinner reprove the offender with humility, he does not sin, nor does he gain new condemnation for himself, although he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother's or his own conscience, on account of his past sin.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO FORBEAR FROM CORRECTING SOMEONE THROUGH FEAR LEST HE BECOME WORSE.

YES.—a) The correction that belongs to superiors should not be forborne on account of the disturbance of the one who is corrected; b) the fraternal correction

whose end is the amendment of the offender by simple admonition is, in the case above named, to be omitted.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is both that if he will not voluntarily amend he should be constrained by penalties to desist, and also that if he prove incorrigible, in this way the common good is safeguarded, the order of justice is preserved, and others are deterred by the example of one.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the means to the end must be governed as far as the reason of the end requires. Now the end of correction is the brother's amendment. If therefore anyone is made worse by admonition, the very reproof would rather hinder the end.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE PRECEPT OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION DEMANDS THAT A PRIVATE ADMONITION SHOULD PRECEDE DENUNCIATION.

YES.—a) Public sins should be publicly denounced; b) as regards secret sins, if these fall to the spiritual or corporeal injury of the neighbor—for example, if someone secretly negotiates an accord for the betrayal of the nation to the enemy, or if a heretic privately perverts religious faith—they should be denounced at once, unless perchance someone firmly believes that he can immediately stop such evils by secret admonition. c) But if the hidden sin is only the misfortune of the sinner and of the one who is sinned against, the admonition should be foregone, and this is of the necessity of precept.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such a remedy should not be used only for one who has sinned in order that he may become better; but also for others, who have come to a knowledge of this sin, in order that they may not be scandalized.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who thus sins in secret not only sins against himself, but also against others; it is thus necessary to proceed immediately to his denunciation, in order to prevent such an injury.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that one who desires the amendment of his brother must, if he can, amend in his conscience so that his reputation is preserved. This helps, first of all the sinner himself, not only in temporal matters, in which in many respects man suffers harm when his reputation is lost; but also with regard to spiritual things, since fear of infamy withdraws many from sin; whereas when they see themselves they sin without restraint.—If, however, the sinner, after admonition, will not cease from sin, then, without detriment to the order of charity and prudence, his conscience should be preferred to his reputation, for the Lord's will is then that a brother's conscience be freed from sin by public denouncement, even at the cost of reputation.

NOTE: A prelate who acts against this order established by the Lord sins gravely, and the one who obeys him also sins in this matter. For a prelate is not the judge of secret things, and ought to obey God rather than men (Ad 5).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER BEFORE THE PUBLIC DENUNCIATION WITNESSES OUGHT TO BE BROUGHT FORWARD.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that between the rebuke of hidden sins between brothers and public denunciation there suitably lies a middle way, namely the bringing in of witnesses, as the Lord commanded (Matth. xviii, 16). For in going from one extreme to another one suitably passes through a middle way. And this happens, in this case, in order that the brother might be amended without dishonoring him before the general public.—Nevertheless, as long as there is a probable hope of correction, one should proceed by secret admonition, unless there is a probable expectation that this would be useless for the brother's amendment, but on the contrary he would be made worse. In the latter case correction should be foregone entirely as was stated above (art. 6 of this q.).—(Ad 1).

QUESTION XXXIV HATRED

Here we consider the vices opposed to charity: 1) Hatred, which is opposed to love; 2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity; 3) discord and schism, which are opposed to peace; 4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction. The first head consumes six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO HATE GOD.

YES.—a) God seen in Himself can be hated by no one; b) Good seen in certain of His effects, namely in point of the existence, life, and understanding of creatures, can be hated by none; c) in respect of certain other effects God can be hated.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God in Himself is goodness itself; and it is of the nature of the good to be loved.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such effects can in no way be contrary to the human will; for existence, life, and understanding are things desirable and lovable by all.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that there are certain other effects that conflict with man's disordered will, such as the infliction of punishment and the restraint of sins by the divine law, and so on.

ART. II.—WHETHER HATRED OF GOD IS THE GREATEST OF SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the love of God cleaves of itself to God, so the hatred of God of itself turns the will away from God. But the other sins turn the will away through something else, to which the aversion is annexed, such as fornication through the pleasure to which the turning from God is annexed. But that which is of itself always outranks that which is according to something else.

NOTE: The hatred of God is most of all a sin against the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the sin against the Holy Spirit denominates some special kind of sin; it is not, however, reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Spirit, because it is found generically in every kind of that sin (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER HATRED OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR IS ALWAYS A SIN.

YES.—It is lawful to hate the sin in one's neighbor, and everything connected with the defect of divine justice; but the very nature and spiritual gifts of the brother one may not hate without sin.

THE REASON is that love is owed to the neighbor in respect to that which he has from God, that is, according to his natural and spiritual gifts; but love is not owed to him in respect to that which he has from himself and the devil, namely in respect of sin and the defect of justice.

NOTE: Parents should be honored by us with respect to the nature and relationship by which they are joined to us, according to the commandment of God, as Exodus xx shows. Yet they are to be hated as regards their offering an obstacle to us of approaching the perfection of divine justice (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HATRED OF OUR NEIGHBOR IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS SIN AGAINST OUR NEIGHBOR.

NO.—As regards the disorderliness of the will, hatred is the graver sin; as regards the injury done, external sins are the worse.

THE REASON is that by hatred the will of man is disordered, which is the chiefest thing in man, and from which sin takes root. Yet as regards the injury that is done to the neighbor, external sins are more grievous than internal hatred, inasmuch as they do more harm to the neighbor than hatred.

ART. V.—WHETHER HATRED IS A CAPITAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that hatred, since it is the gravest of evils, is not first and foremost in the destruction of virtue, which is the work of the vices, but the last; for in the things that are done against nature (as in the destruction of virtue), we lose first that which is less according to nature and lastly that which is most according to nature. Now love, especially the love of God and the neighbor, is most according to nature. Hence it is lost last of all by hatred. Consequently hatred is not a capital sin, such sins being those from which the other vices most frequently originate.

NOTE: We are speaking here of the hatred that is a sin, that is, not the hatred of true evil—for the hatred of true evil is a good, and has first place among the passions—but the object of hatred, of which we are speaking, is apparent evil, and is regarded as evil because of the corruption of our nature; and this hatred of evil must be in the last place (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HATRED ARISES FROM ENVY.

YES.—THE REASON is that envy is displeasure with our neighbor's good. Hence our neighbor's good is made hateful to us, for it causes in us the displeasure that we should by nature shun. Hence it is that hatred arises out of envy.

NOTE: 1. Since love causes desire and pleasure in good, and pleasure itself, in so far as it has the character of good, causes love, there is thus a circular movement between love and pleasure. So it is also with hatred and displeasure. For one is displeased by another's good because he does not love him, but hates him, and he hates him because he is saddened because of him (Ad 1).

2. Envy cannot be the cause of hatred for God; for we do not envy those who are farthest from us; but, since envy for the neighbor is the mother of hatred for the neighbor, the consequence is that it becomes a cause of hatred for God (Ad 2).

3. Hatred arises from anger also, but in a different way. For hatred arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing, and therefore hateful; but from anger hatred arises by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to certain measure, that is, in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance; but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively it is caused by anger (Ad 3).

**QUESTION XXXV
SLOTH**

Here we consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the divine good, and then contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Hence we must first consider sloth and then envy. Under the first head come four points.

ART. I.—WHETHER SLOTH IS A SIN.

YES.—Sloth, which is displeasure with spiritual good, can be evil in itself or in its effects, and in both cases it is a sin.

THE REASON is that there can be displeasure with an apparent good, and this in itself is truly good; for it is displeasure with an evil considered in itself; or there can be displeasure with a true evil, which however so oppresses man as to draw him away wholly from good deeds. Hence the Apostle says (II Cor. ii, 7) did not wish those who repented to be "overwhelmed by too much sorrow."

NOTE: 1. All corporal defects of themselves dispose to sorrow; and therefore those who fast are harassed by sloth towards midday, when they begin to feel the lack of food, and to be parched with the sun's heat (Ad 2).

2. It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man despises the good things he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful; and from such contempt results sloth, because we are displeased with things that we reckon evil and worthless (Ad 3).

3. The remedy against sloth is a consideration of spiritual goods, for the more we think of them the more do they become pleasing to us, and as a result sloth dies away (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER SLOTH IS A SPECIAL VICE.

YES.—a) That sloth which denotes displeasure with the divine good that should be loved out of charity; b) but not that whereby we are displeased because of the good of every virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that joy in a spiritual good about which sloth is saddened pertains specially to charity, which is the special virtue about the divine good; for all spiritual goods are ordained to the good of charity. Therefore displeasure with this good has a special character.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that that sadness whereby one is displeased with a spiritual good that is in each act of virtue does not pertain to any special vice, but to all vices.

ART. III.—WHETHER SLOTH IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that in respect of its genus sloth is opposed to charity, by which God dwells in us. For the proper effect of charity is joy in God (q. xxviii, art. 1); whereas sloth is displeasure with a spiritual good, in so far as it is a divine good. Hence in respect of its genus sloth is a mortal sin; that it, if this displeasure follows from its perfection by the full consent of the reason to shun it, and the horror, and detestation of the divine good, because the flesh prevails against the spirit, then it is a mortal sin. If however it goes no further than the sensual nature, on account of the flesh resisting the spirit, then it is a venial sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SLOTH SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED A CAPITAL VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that that is a capital vice from which other vices readily arise, as being their final cause. Now we do many things on account of sadness, either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. Wherever, since sloth is a kind of sadness, it is suitably reckoned a capital sin.

NOTE: Aversion from divine good, which arises immediately from the sadness of sloth, can refer to the end, and thus it denotes despair; or to the means to the end as arduous, and in this respect it is faint-heartedness; and in matters of common righteousness it is the effect of sluggishness about the commandments. Likewise, sloth sometimes struggles against men who have spiritual goods, and from this arises spite; or it struggles against the divine goods themselves, and thus there arises malice. Sloth also extends to external objects of pleasure, namely to wandering of mind about illicit things. These, according to Gregory (*Moralia*, lib. xxxi, chap. 17, in the middle) are the six daughters of sloth. Note, however, that here despair, malice, etc., have a particular meaning, as is evident from what has been said (Ad 2).

Likewise note that from the spite of sloth there arises bitterness and from sluggishness about the commandments there arise idleness and drowsiness, when one either forgets the commandments altogether, or negligently fulfills them. From wandering of mind there arise five other effects: Uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, and curiosity (Ad 3).

**QUESTION XXXVI
ENVY**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ENVY IS A KIND OF SADNESS.

YES.—Envy is sadness because of another's good, a) not insofar as it is harmful to us, as the prosperity of an enemy; but b) insofar as it lessens our own glory and excellence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus sadness is rather an effect of fear than anything else.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that men are especially envious of those goods in which there is glory and in which men love to be honored and esteemed, as Aristotle says (*Rhetoric*, chap. 10).

NOTE: No man envies those who are remote from him in place, time, or state, just as the commoner does not envy the king; but he envies those who are near to him, whom he aspires to rival or surpass. For when they surpass us in glory, this happens against our will, and from this sadness arises. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure, in so far as it is in agreement with the will (Ad 2).

2. Lovers of honor are more envious; and likewise even the faint-hearted are envious, because they hold all things important; and whatever good befalls someone they think they have been outdone in something great. Hence Job v, 2: "Envy slayeth the little one."

ART. II.—WHETHER ENVY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that envy properly grieves because of a neighbor's good, wherein there should be rejoicing.

NOTE: Envy must be distinguished a) from displeasure with an enemy's excellence, in so far as it is harmful to us, for such a displeasure is an effect of fear, as was said

(prec. art.); b) from the displeasure that arises from zeal, in so far as we wish to have a good as others have it, and it can be without sin—even at times a virtue; and c) from *nemesis*, which arises from anyone's being undeservingly honored. Yet this sadness need not be if the temporal goods, which fall to someone's lot, are considered to result from the order of divine justice (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER ENVY IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—In respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that in respect of its genus (which is considered according to the object) envy is contrary to charity, on which the life of the soul depends, according to I John iii, 14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." For envy is saddened by the same object in which charity rejoices, namely at the good of the neighbor, as was stated in the preceding article.—Envy is, however, a venial sin if the movement of envy is imperfect, namely, when it is a movement of the passion of the sensual part.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ENVY IS A CAPITAL VICE.

YES.—In the same way as is sloth.

THE REASON is that, just as sloth is displeasure with divine spiritual good, so envy is displeasure with the neighbor's good (see prec. art., art. 4).

NOTE: 1. The envy of a brother's spiritual gifts, when someone grieves because of the very increase of the grace of God, is reckoned among the gravest sins, as a sin against the Holy Spirit, because by this envy man in a way envies the Holy Spirit, who is glorified in His works (Ad 2).

2. The daughters of envy are thus enumerated, according to the beginning, middle, and term of the movement of envy. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have tale bearing, or openly, and then we have detraction.—The middle consists in exultation in another's misfortune, and in grief at another's prosperity; the term is hatred itself (Ad 3).

QUESTION XXXVII DISCORD

Here we are to consider the sins that are opposed to peace: 1) Discord, which is in the heart; 2) contention, which is on the lips; 3) those things that consist in deeds, namely schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. The first head takes two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER DISCORD IS A SIN.

YES.—a) The discord that is directly, i.e., knowingly and intentionally willed, is a mortal sin in respect of its genus; b) but that which is accidental, or besides one's intention, is not a sin, unless it be with respect to the things that are necessary for salvation, or with undue obstinacy.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such discord is directly contrary to the concord of charity, and hence is contrary to charity, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus; although the first movements of this discord are venial sins, because of the imperfection of the act.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as was said above (q. xxix, art. 1), concord, which is an effect of charity, is a union of wills, but not of opinions. Now discord, which is besides the intention, is not opposed to a union of wills, but of opinions.

NOTE: The concord of charity is chiefly directed to the divine good, secondarily, to the neighbor's (in beginning of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER DISCORD IS A DAUGHTER OF VAINGLORY.

YES.—THE REASON is that if a man's will stands fast to its own ground, against the will of another, this is owing to the fact that he prefers the things that are his own to those of others. If he does this inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory.

NOTE: In discord we may consider that which is the term *wherefrom*, i.e., another's will from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term *whither*, i.e., something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And, since in every moment the term *whither* is more important than the term *wherefrom* (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXXVIII CONTENTION

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONTENTION IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—In the complete notion of contention, i.e., if the word is taken in so far as it denotes an opposition to truth and an inordinate measure.

THE REASON is that in this sense contention is reckoned among the deeds of the flesh, mentioned in Gal. v, 21: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God" (Gal. v).—Nevertheless, if contention denotes opposition to falsehood, and in due measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy. But if contention is taken in so far as it denotes opposition to falsehood in an undue measure, it can be a venial sin, unless perhaps the deordination in contention is so great as to give rise to the scandal of others, for then it can be even a mortal sin.

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of St. Luke (xxii, 24): "There arose also a dispute among them, which of them was reputed to be the greatest," be it noted that the disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, viz., the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, and for this reason Our Lord checked them (Ad 1).

2. Catholics who defend the truth against heretics in an ordinate manner do not contend against them, but rather the reverse.

ART. II.—WHETHER CONTENTION IS A DAUGHTER OF VAIN-GLORY.

YES.—As is discord.

THE REASON is that, just as discord consists in the fact that each of two discordant parties holds to his own opinion on account of his own excellence, and one does not agree with the other, so it is with discord in a dispute of words.

QUESTION XXXIX SCHISM

Here we are to consider the vices opposed to peace, which belong to deeds. These are schism, quarrelling, sedition, and war. Under schism stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER SCHISM IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sin of schism has a special intention, viz., it intends separation from unity, which charity creates; for in the moral order the essential constitutes the species, and the essential is that which is intended.

NOTE: Those are properly called schismatics who voluntarily and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things, namely in the mutual connection or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church to one head. Now this head is Christ Himself, whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Hence schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who are subject to him (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER SCHISM IS A GRAVER SIN THAN UNBELIEF.

NO.—In its genus, unbelief is graver.

THE REASON is that in respect of its genus unbelief is opposed to a greater good than is schism. For unbelief is a sin against God Himself, in so far as He is the First Truth; whereas schism is against ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, and less than is God Himself.

NOTE: In comparing the gravity of sins it is not possible to base the comparison on a consideration of the circumstances, which may vary infinitely (in beginning of body).

ART. III.—WHETHER SCHISMATICS HAVE ANY POWER.

NO.—a) Sacramental power remains even in schismatics; b) but not that of jurisdiction.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sacramental power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church are immovable as long as the consecrated thing remains, even as an altar, once consecrated, is not consecrated again, unless it has been broken up. Wherefore a schismatic or heretic who returns to the Church is not again consecrated. Hence in schismatics (and in heretics) a sacramental power remains; but the use of such a power by them is unlawful [Tr. Note: St. Thomas is thinking of ancient heretics, such as the Nestorians, or medieval heretics who had retained valid consecrations.]

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that jurisdictional power, which is conferred by the simple human appointment; and such a power does not adhere to the recipient immovably, so that it does not remain with schismatics and heretics. And if they attempt anything through this power, nothing is done, but it is invalid.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS RIGHT THAT SCHISMATICS SHOULD BE PUNISHED WITH EXCOMMUNICATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that a schismatic separates himself from communion with the members of the Church; and in this respect a fitting punishment of schismatics is excommunication. Moreover, the schismatic refuses to be subject to the head of the Church; wherefore, since he is unwilling to be controlled by the spiritual power, it is just that he should be compelled by the temporal power, according to Wis. xi, 17: "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished." Thus the Holy Doctor justifies the laws of his time.

QUESTION XL WAR

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS A SIN TO WAGE WAR.

NO.—THE REASON is that war can be according to three requirements. These are: 1) The authority of the sovereign, by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war or to summon together the people. 2) A just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked deserve to be attacked for some offense. 3) Those who wage war must have a right intention. Therefore, as Augustine says (*Contra Faustum*, lib. xxii, cap. 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."

[Tr. Note: To these conditions of St. Thomas modern theologians add two others, implicit in the Holy Doctor's reasoning, viz., that the good to be achieved outweighs the evil of modern war, and the recourse to arbitration shall have failed.]

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR CLERICS AND BISHOPS TO FIGHT.

NO.—THE REASON is that warfare is especially repugnant to the offices of Bishop and cleric for two reasons: 1) The general reason that warfare creates great disturbance of mind, wherefore it greatly hinders the mind from contemplating divine things and from praising God and praying for the people, all things that belong to the office of cleric. 2) The specific reason is that all orders of clerics are ordained for the ministry of the altar, in which Christ's Passion is represented under the sacrament, according to I Cor. xi, 26: "As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord, until He comes."

And therefore it does not besem them to kill or shed blood, but rather to be prepared to shed their own blood for Christ, that they may actually imitate what they do in their ministry.—Yet prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO LAY AMBUSHES IN WAR.

YES.—a) To say something false or to break a promise, even in wartime, is always unlawful; b) to hide one's purpose from the enemy, so that he is deceived, is lawful and praiseworthy.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as Ambrose says (*De Officiis*, lib. 1., c. 29): "There are certain rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we are not obliged always to reveal our purpose or our mind to others. Hence sometimes we conceal even sacred things, especially from infidels, lest they deride them, according to Matt. vi, 9: "Give not that which is holy to dogs." Much more, therefore, should we conceal our plans to attack the public enemy.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO FIGHT ON HOLY DAYS.

YES.—If necessity demands.

THE REASON is that on holy days it is lawful to take care even of the bodily welfare of the neighbor, as Our Lord did several times; much more, therefore, is it lawful to safeguard the welfare of the state by fighting on holy days, for thereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils, both temporal and spiritual, are prevented.—But, when the need ceases, it is not lawful to fight on holy days for the reasons that make their violation generally unlawful.

QUESTION XLI PRIVATE FIGHTING

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PRIVATE FIGHTING IS ALWAYS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that private fighting (*rixa*) is a kind of private war among private persons, which is not waged by any public authority, but because of man's disordered will. Consequently, private fighting is always a sin.

In respect of one who unjustly attacks another it is a mortal sin, for to do harm to the neighbor, even if the deed be done by the hands, is not without mortal sin. But in the one who defends himself it can be without sin, or sometimes it can be with venial sin, or sometimes with mortal sin, according to his state of mind and his manner of defending himself. For if he defend himself only with the intention of repelling an injury done him, and with due moderation, there is no sin, nor can this properly be called private fighting, or quarreling, on his part. But if he defend himself with the intention of vengeance or hatred, or with excess of due moderation, it is always a sin, but a venial one when some slight motive of hatred or vengeance intervenes, or when he does not greatly exceed moderate self-defense. But it can be mortal when he rises against his attacker with a set mind to kill or gravely injure him.

NOTE: As Isidore says (Book x, *Etymologies*, at the letter R.): "The word *rixosus* (quarrelsome) is derived from the snarling (*rictu*) of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling and provokes contention" (Arg. 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRIVATE FIGHTING IS A DAUGHTER OF ANGER.

YES.—Private fighting arises from anger rather than from hatred.

THE REASON is that it is not enough for the angry man to hurt secretly the object of his anger, but he wishes him to feel the hurt and that he suffer something against his will in vengeance for what he has done. For the angry man intends to injure another when he knows it and resists him; whereas hatred intends absolutely another's hurt, either openly or in secret.

NOTE: Private fighting gives rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he who intends to sow discord among others causes them to quarrel among themselves (Ad 5).

QUESTION XLII SEDITION

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SEDITION IS A SPECIAL SIN DISTINCT FROM OTHER SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that sedition has a special good to which it is opposed, namely the peace and unity of the people of the same city.—For sedition differs from

war and private fighting in this, that war is properly against foreign enemies; private fighting is between one person and another, of a few against a few; but sedition is properly between factions of one people or state at disagreement between themselves.

ART. II.—WHETHER SEDITION IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—In respect of its genus, sedition is always a mortal sin.

THE REASON is that sedition is opposed to the unity of a group, that is, of a people, state, or kingdom, which unity is that of the law or the common good.

NOTE: 1. The sin of sedition belongs first and chiefly to those who instigate the sedition, who gravely sin, secondly, to those who follow them and disturb the common good (in body of art.).

2. A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler. Consequently, there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed, it is the tyrant rather who is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely: For this is tyranny, since it leads to the private good of the ruler and to the injury of the group (Ad 3).

QUESTION XLIII SCANDAL

It remains here to consider the vices that are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, namely those whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Hence we must here discuss scandal, which will be done in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER SCANDAL IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS BEING SOMETHING LESS RIGHTLY SAID OR DONE THAT OCCASIONS ANOTHER'S SPIRITUAL DOWNFALL.

YES.—Since in Greek *skandalon*—whence the word—signifies a stumbling.

THE REASON is that what is inordinately said or done by one man results in disposing another to his spiritual downfall, in so far, namely, as someone by his injunction, inducement, or example draws another into sin, and this is properly called scandal.

NOTE: 1. Nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or deeds can be only an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford, not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause (Ad 3).

2. Scandal can be taken in many ways, namely as *active scandal*, which directly, through the deed or word itself, or by the intention of the agent, affords the occasion of the neighbor's downfall; as *passive without active scandal*, when one rightly acts, and does not, in himself, afford an occasion of downfall for another, but this other one takes occasion of scandal from this action because of his own evil disposition; as *active scandal conjoined with passive*, for example, when one person induces another to commit sin; as *active scandal without passive*, as when someone provokes another to commit sin, and he does not consent (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER SCANDAL IS A SIN.

YES.—a) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who is scandalized; b) but it can exist without active scandal; c) likewise, active scandal is always a sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no one is scandalized save in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is always a sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is evident from what has been said in the preceding article, note 2.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that it is a sin in the one who scandalizes or does the deed itself; or, if it have only the appearance of sin, it should always be left undone on account of the charity due to the neighbor, by which each person is bound to look out for his neighbor's salvation; and thus he who does not forego the action acts against charity. Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as was stated above (prec. art., note 2).

NOTE: The words of the Lord: "It must needs be that scandals come," can be understood in divers ways: a) Not of the absolute necessity of scandal, since sin does not arise by absolute necessity; but by conditional necessity, in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly with such foreknowledge, as was explained above (P. I, q. xiv, art. 13, ad 2); b) by the necessity of end, in so far as scandals are useful in order that "they who are reproved may be made manifest" (I Cor. xi, 19); c) or scandals must needs occur in view of the condition of him who fails to shield himself from sin i.e., in view of this condition of negligence (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER SCANDAL IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—a) Passive scandal cannot be a special sin; b) nor can active scandal, accidentally; c) but active scandal can directly be a special sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that through another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that what is accidental (i.e., besides one's intention, as the word accidental is taken in moral science) it does not constitute a species of sin.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the scandal that is directly active intends the special injury of the neighbor; now the end specifies moral acts, and this sin is opposed directly to fraternal correction, in which the special removal of injury is intended.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SCANDAL IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—That is: a) Passive scandal is sometimes a venial sin, sometimes a mortal sin; b) active scandal that is accidental can be only venial, but sometimes it is mortal; c) active scandal that is direct is sometimes mortal, sometimes only venial.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that passive scandal sometimes denotes in the one who suffers it only a stumbling, and not a downfall, and sometimes a downfall also.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a man can commit accidental active scandal by something said or done that in itself is only a venial sin, or by a slight indiscretion in deed or word that in itself has no species of evil. But if active accidental scandal despises the salvation of the neighbor, so that to preserve it a man refuses to forego what he likes, it is a mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that he who commits direct active scandal, if he intends to induce his neighbor to sin mortally, commits a mortal sin; and similarly if he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially by an act of mortal sin. If, however, he intends to induce the neighbor to sin venially by an act of venial sin, it is a venial sin.

ART. V.—WHETHER PASSIVE SCANDAL MAY HAPPEN EVEN TO THE PERFECT.

NO.—That is: In those who adhere perfectly to God through love, scandal is not found, according to Ps. cxviii, 165: "Much peace have they who love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block."

THE REASON is that passive scandal denotes some unsettlement of the mind in its adherence to good. Now the perfect cannot be unsettled, for they adhere to God alone, whose goodness is unchangeable, according to Ps. cxxiv, 1: "They who trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion; he shall not be moved forever who dwelleth in Jerusalem." For no one is unsettled who firmly adheres to an unchangeable thing.

NOTE: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense) by the words or actions of others, although there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. lxxii, 2: "My feet were almost moved" (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ACTIVE SCANDAL CAN BE FOUND IN THE PERFECT.

NO.—THE REASON is that active scandal is such that in itself is of a nature to cause the downfall of another, and that is only when what he says or does is inordinate. But in perfect men nothing is so inordinately done that it affords an occasion of sin to others.

NOTE: Passive scandal is always owing to some active scandal; yet this active

scandal is not always in another, but in the very person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself (Ad 1).

2. The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in sudden movements, which, being hidden, cannot give scandal. If, however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL GOODS SHOULD BE FOREGONE ON ACCOUNT OF SCANDAL.

NO.—a) Spiritual goods that are necessary to salvation are not to be foregone in order to avoid scandal; b) other goods, which are not necessary for salvation, should not be foregone on account of Pharisaical scandal; c) there are, however, some goods that should be hidden, or sometimes postponed, on account of the scandal of the weak.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that spiritual goods whether they fall under precept or counsel, if they are necessary for salvation, cannot be foregone without mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Pharisaic scandal, which arises from malice, should be despised, according to the teaching and example of the Lord (Matt. xiii, 57; xv, 12).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the scandal of the weak does not arise from malice, but from weakness or ignorance. Hence, where danger does not threaten, the spiritual goods that are not necessary for salvation should sometimes be foregone, until, the matter being explained, the scandal ceases. But if after such an explanation the scandal continues, it now seems to arise from malice, and thus these spiritual acts should not be foregone because of it.

NOTE: 1. In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking when the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication (Ad 1).

2. Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen, however, that, on account of some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be so were it not for that circumstance. Thus an idle word is a venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful (Ad 5).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER TEMPORAL GOODS SHOULD BE FOREGONE ON ACCOUNT OF SCANDAL.

NO.—a) The temporal goods of the Church or the State that are entrusted to us should not be foregone on account of scandal; b) in the case of our own goods, however, we should forego them on account of the scandal of the weak, or first allay the scandal; c) but on account of the scandal arising from malice we should not forego them, but rather should seek them.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the retention of such goods, as of deposits held in trust, devolves on those to whom necessity entrusts them; and therefore they, like other things that are necessary for salvation, should not be foregone on account of scandal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as Augustine says (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte, lib. i cap. 20*, at the end): "You should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, as much as you can lend, and if you refuse what is asked, you must yet be just to him, indeed you will give him something better than he asks, if you reprove him who asks unjustly."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, if temporalities are foregone on account of the scandal of the Pharisees, this would injure the common good (for it would give the wicked occasion to rob), and it would injure the robbers themselves, who by retaining another's goods would remain in sin.

NOTE: The words of the Lord (Matth. v, 40): "If anyone would go to law

with thee and take thy tunic, let him take thy cloak as well," should be considered, according to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte, lib. i, cap. 19*), as meaning that that commandment of the Lord is to be understood according to the preparedness of the mind, namely that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer being harmed or defrauded rather than go to law. But sometimes it is not expedient (Ad 4), namely when this would turn to the detriment of the truth, of, life, and of justice (Ad 2).

QUESTION XLIV THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY PRECEPT SHOULD BE GIVEN ABOUT CHARITY.

YES.—The greatest precept.

THE REASON is that a precept implies the notion of something due; and a thing due is chiefly directed to the end, which is due for its own sake. Now the end of spiritual life is that man may be united to God through charity. Consequently the greatest precept is given about charity, as is said in Matt. xxii, 39.

The precepts about the acts of the other virtues are for the sake of something else, i.e., they are about the means to the end, that is, they are subordinated to the union of charity. And this union is effected by purity of heart, goodness of conscience, and truth of faith, according to the Apostle, I Tim. i, 5: "The purpose of this charge is charity, from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned."

NOTE: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled, save of one's own will, therefore it is not opposed to charity (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TWO PRECEPTS OF CHARITY.

YES.—One of the love of God, the other of the love of neighbor.

THE REASON is that not all men are capable of easily considering one of these precepts as contained under the other. For the love of God is the end of the precept, to which love of neighbor is subordinated.

NOTE: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER TWO PRECEPTS OF CHARITY SUFFICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since good is the object of dilection and love, and good is either an end or a means; it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity: One whereby we are induced to love God as our end, the other whereby we are led to love our neighbor for the sake of God, as for the sake of our end.

NOTE: There are no precepts about the love of self and one's own body, because, however far man strays from truth, there remains in him the love of himself and the love of his body. Yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving God and the neighbor (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS FITTINGLY COMMANDED THAT MAN SHOULD LOVE GOD WITH HIS WHOLE HEART.

YES.—THE REASON is that God should be loved as the last end, to which all else is to be referred. Hence some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept to love God.

NOTE: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart is always actually directed to God; this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that a man's whole heart should be habitually directed to God, so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the perfection of the way. Between these two ways there is a middle one, namely the perfection of charity, to which the counsels are directed, so that, to wit, man withdraws

as far as possible even from licit temporal things, which, by occupying his mind, hinder the actual movement of the heart to God (Ad 2 and Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER TO THE WORDS, 'THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH THY WHOLE HEART, 'IT WAS FITTING TO ADD, 'AND WITH THY WHOLE SOUL, AND WITH THY WHOLE STRENGTH.'

YES.—THE REASON is that the will, besides its own act, which is to love with the heart, moves also the intellect, which is expressed by the mind; the lower appetitive power, which is expressed by the soul; and the external executive power, which is expressed by strength, or power, or the powers.—Therefore we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, which is with the whole heart; and to subject our intellect to God, which is with our whole mind; and to regulate our appetite according to God, which is with the whole soul; and to make our external acts obedient to God, which is to love God with our whole strength, or power, or powers.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO FULFILL THIS PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD.

NO.—It cannot be fulfilled perfectly, but imperfectly.

THE REASON is that any precept is perfectly fulfilled when we attain to the end that the giver of the precept intended. Now God intends by this precept to unite man wholly to Himself, which is not done in this life, but will be done in heaven, when God will be "all in all," as is said in I Cor., xv, 28.—In this life it is fulfilled imperfectly, in so far as man tends to the end of the precept and does not recede from the direction to this end. Hence, just as a soldier who fights in a lawful war, though he does not conquer, is not thereby to be blamed, or to merit punishment, so also he who in this life does not perfectly fulfill this precept, though he does nothing against the divine love, does not sin mortally (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOR IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED.

YES.—In the words: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

THE REASON is that this precept fittingly indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason of loving is indicated by the word neighbor, that is, because he is near to us, viz., both as being a natural image of God and in his capacity for heaven. The mode is indicated by the words, "as thyself;" that is, with holiness, justice, and truth. With holiness, because of the end, inasmuch as, just as we love ourselves for the sake of God, so also we ought to love our neighbor; with justice, with respect to the rule of love, because, just as we love ourselves in good things, and not in bad, so we ought also to love our neighbor; and in truth, with respect to the reason for loving, because we ought to love our neighbor, not for our profit, but for his own.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE ORDER OF CHARITY IS INCLUDED IN THE PRECEPT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the order of charity is essential to the virtue. Hence the order of charity falls under the precept of the act of the virtue (of charity).

**QUESTION XLV
THE GIFT OF WISDOM**

Here we consider the gift of wisdom, which corresponds to charity: 1) Wisdom itself; 2) the opposite vice. The first head requires six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER WISDOM SHOULD BE RECKONED AMONG THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—That wisdom which knows the highest cause simply.

THE REASON is that this all-high cause is God, by the knowledge of whom we can judge and order everything that is proper to wisdom, according to I Cor. ii, 15: "The spiritual man judges all things," and, as it is said in the same place (v. 10): "The spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God." From this it is evident that wisdom is the gift of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: 1. The wisdom that knows the highest cause, not simply, but as belonging to some genus, indeed makes a man wise, but only in that genus; and this is not the gift of wisdom of which we are speaking. Such comparative wisdom can be found even in the wicked according to Jerem. iv, 22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they have no knowledge" (Ad 1).

2. Wisdom as a gift differs from the wisdom that is an acquired intellectual power, for the latter is acquired by human study; the former descends from above, as is said in James iii, 14. Similarly it differs from faith; for faith assents to divine truth considered in itself; but the judgment that is according to divine truth belongs to the gift of wisdom (Ad 2). Likewise, piety and the fear of God tend to manifest wisdom (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER WISDOM IS IN THE INTELLECT AS ITS SUBJECT.

YES.—The wisdom that is a gift has its cause in the will, namely, charity; but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to make right judgments.

THE REASON is that wisdom denotes some rectitude of judgment according to the divine law because of a certain connaturality with them, as Dionysius says (*De Div. Nom.*, cap. 2), in the middle, *lect.* 4): "Hierotheus is perfect in divine things, for he not only learns but is patient of divine things."

Now this sympathy or connaturality (or affinity) for divine things is the effect of charity, which unites us to God according to I Cor. iv, 17: "He who is joined to God is one spirit."

NOTE: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former. The gift of wisdom regards the latter, according to the divine ideas; the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER WISDOM IS MERELY SPECULATIVE, OR PRACTICAL ALSO.

ANSWER: It is practical also.

THE REASON is that the higher part of the reason, which is assigned to wisdom, is intent on the consideration and consulation of the heavenly, namely the divine ideas, as Augustine says (*De Trin.*, lib. xii, cap. 14). It considers them, in so far as it contemplates divine things in themselves, and it consults them in so far as it judges by divine things of human acts, by directing human acts according to divine rules. Thus therefore, wisdom, in so far as it is a gift, is not only speculative, but also practical, for by its bitterness in the human order is turned to sweetness, and labor to rest (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER WISDOM CAN BE WITHOUT GRACE, AND WITH MORTAL SIN.

No.—THE REASON is that wisdom, of which we are speaking, presupposes charity, as was said (art. 2 of this q.). Now charity cannot exist with mortal sin (q. xxiv, art. 12).

ART. V.—WHETHER WISDOM IS IN ALL WHO HAVE GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that no one who is without mortal sin lacks a right judgment in contemplation of divine things and in the ordering of human things according to the divine rules, as far as is necessary for salvation. This is the work of the gift of wisdom, according to I John ii, 27: "His anointing teaches you concerning all things."—But the gift of wisdom, which is a gratuitous grace, is not in all who have grace, but in those only to whom it has been given to direct others also, by revealing to them the divine truths, according to I Cor. xii, 8: "To one through the spirit is given the utterance of wisdom," etc.

NOTE: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, but they have not the act, on account of the bodily impediment that hinders the use of reason in them (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SEVENTH BEATITUDE CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF WISDOM.

YES.—The seventh beatitude, which is: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," fittingly belongs to the gift of wisdom, both as regards merit and as regards reward.

THE REASON is that peace is the tranquillity of order; now it belongs to a wise man to order. Hence, as regards merit, which is expressed by the words, "blessed are the peacemakers," i.e., as those who make peace, either in themselves or in others, the seventh beatitude suitably belongs to the gift of wisdom.—With regard to the reward, which is expressed by the words, "they shall be called the children of God," the congruity lies in the fact that those who are called the children of God are conformed to the image of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, because He is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains sonship with God.

QUESTION XLVI FOLLY, WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FOLLY IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM.

YES.—As its contrary.

THE REASON is that the foolish man has a blunted understanding, for Isidore says (*Etymologies*, book x) that a "fool is one who through dullness remains unmoved;" the wise man, on the contrary, has a subtle and perspicacious understanding. Moreover, fatuity, which lacks a sense of judgment, is the negation of wisdom.

NOTE: 1. A man seems to be foolish, especially through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment which is according to the highest cause, for if he fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool (Ad 1).

2. Regarding the words of the Apostle (I Cor. iii, 18): "If any one of you thinks himself wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may come to be wise," consider that, just as there is an evil wisdom, which is called the wisdom of the world, because it takes for the highest cause and last end some earthly good, so also there is a good foolishness opposed to this evil wisdom, by which a man despises earthly things, and of this foolishness the Apostle is speaking (Ad 2).

3. To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes owing to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly things; hence this does not refer to the folly of the world, but to the wisdom of God. Sometimes, however, it is the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly simply (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER FOLLY IS SIN.

YES.—Not all folly, however.

THE REASON is that there is a folly arising from the fact that a man sinks his understanding to the things of earth, whereby his mind is rendered unfit to consider divine things, according to I Cor. ii, 14: "The sensual man does not perceive the things that are of the spirit of God."—But that dullness of sense which arises from natural indisposition, as in the case of idiots, is not a sin.

NOTE: Folly, as a sin, is opposed to the precepts that are about the contemplation of truth, namely those that bind us to seek, as far as possible, the knowledge necessary for salvation (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER FOLLY IS A DAUGHTER OF LUST.

YES.—THE REASON is that lust chiefly plunges man's understanding to the things of earth, for lust is about the greatest pleasures that chiefly absorb the soul; hence the folly that is sin arises chiefly from lust.

QUESTION XLVII PRUDENCE CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

Next after the theological virtues we are to consider the cardinal virtues: 1) Prudence considered in itself; 2) its parts; 3) the gift corresponding to it; 4) the opposite vices; 5) the precepts thereto pertaining. Under the first head stand 16 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS IN THE COGNITIVE OR IN THE APPETITIVE FACULTY.

ANSWER: It is in the cognitive faculty.

THE REASON is that, as Isidore says (*Etymol.*, book x, at the letter P): "The prudent man is one who sees at it were from afar, for his sight is keen (*perspicax*) and he

foresees the event of uncertainties." For vision belongs to the cognitive faculty, and the prevision of uncertainties does not belong to the senses but to the reason.

NOTE: The worth of prudence consists not in our thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore, if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since the end, being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect that touches the end is the worst of all (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRUDENCE BELONGS TO THE PRACTICAL REASON ALONE, OR ALSO TO THE SPECULATIVE REASON.

THE REASON is that, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, iv, chap. 5): "A prudent man is one who is capable of taking right counsel." Now counsel is about things that should be done by us in relation to some end, and the reason that deals with the things that we should do for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

NOTE: Prudence is wisdom in human affairs; but it is not reason simply, because it is not about the highest cause simply, for it is about human good (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER PRUDENCE TAKES COGNIZANCE OF SINGULARS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the province of prudence is not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action. Now actions are in singular matters; and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

NOTE: Prudence does not reside in the external senses, whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean, however, that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason; yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense (whereby we judge also of mathematical matters).—(Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—It is a mortal virtue.

THE REASON is that the province of prudence is the application of right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence regards good under the formal aspect of good, i.e., in so far as it is the object of the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence not only has the nature of virtue that is possessed by the other intellectual virtues, but it also has the nature of virtue that is possessed by the other moral virtues, with which it is also numbered.

ART. V.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—Prudence is distinguished from the intellectual virtues, not only as regards the formal aspect of the object, but also according to a material difference; from the other moral virtues it is distinguished according to the formal aspect of the powers.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that wisdom, knowledge, and understanding are about necessary matters; whereas art and prudence are about contingent matters. Art is about things to be made, namely those things that are produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife, and so forth; whereas prudence is about things to be done, that is, about things that have their being in the doer himself (I-II, q. lvii, art 4).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that prudence is in the intellectual power, the other moral virtues, in the appetitive power.

NOTE: From the words of Aristotle (*Ethics*, book vi, c. 12), "moral virtue acts rightly to produce the end, and prudence acts rightly to produce the means," it follows that prudence aids all the virtues, and acts in all (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER PRUDENCE APPOINTS THE END TO THE MORAL VIRTUES.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is the work of prudence to apply the universal principles of the practical reason, which are the ends of the moral virtues, to the particular conclusions of practical matters, i.e., to the means. Thus it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end for the moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

NOTE: Natural reason appoints the end for the moral virtues, and this natural reason is called *synderesis* (P. I, q. lxxix, art. 12).—(Ad 1). Prudence prepares the way for the moral virtues, by regulating the means. Hence it follows that prudence is nobler than the moral virtues, and moves them; but *synderesis* moves prudence just as the understanding of principles moves science (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO PRUDENCE TO FIND THE MEAN IN MORAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although the attainment of the mean is the end of all the moral virtues, yet the mean is found by the right disposition of the means, and this is the work of prudence.

NOTE: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. But, because the mean, as the mean, is not found in all things in the same way, therefore the inclination of nature, which always operates in the same manner, is not sufficient for this, but the rule of prudence is required (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER COMMAND IS THE CHIEF ACT OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that to command is nearer to the end of the practical reason than is to take counsel, which belongs to discovery, and to judge of what one has discovered, which are acts prior to prudence.

NOTE: Simply to move belongs to the will; but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER SOLICITUDE BELONGS TO PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that according to Isidore a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd (*solers*) and alert (*citus*), in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is to command about what has already been counseled and decided in matters of action. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethics*, book vi, chap. 9) that "one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel."

NOTE: The words of Aristotle (*Ethics*, book vi, chap. 3): "The magnanimous man is said to be slow and leisurely," are not to be understood in the sense that the magnanimous man is solicitous about nothing, but in the sense that he is not over-solicitous about many things, but is trustful in matters in which he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER PRUDENCE EXTENDS TO THE GOVERNING OF MANY.

YES.—It does not extend only to one's own good, as some have supposed.

THE FIRST REASON is that this would be repugnant to charity, which "is not self-seeking" (I Cor. xiii, 5); wherefore the Apostle says of himself, I Cor. x, 33: "Not seeking what is profitable to myself, but to the many, that they may be saved."

THE SECOND REASON is that right reason judges the common good to be better than the good of one.

ART. XI.—WHETHER PRUDENCE ABOUT ONE'S OWN GOOD IS SPECIFICALLY THE SAME AS THAT WHICH EXTENDS TO THE COMMON GOOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that the good of one person, and the good of a family, and the good of a state and nation are different ends. Now the difference of the formal aspect of the object derives from the difference of the ends, and the species of habits differ according to different formal objects (I-II, q. lxiv, art. 2 ad 1). Thus we have prudence simply so called, which is directed to private good; another called domestic prudence, which is directed to the common good of the home or family; and a third, political prudence, which is directed to the common good of the state or nation.

NOTE: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit; thus, for instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically, although their ends are subordination to one another. In like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the

many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit that is directed to the last end is above the other habits, and commands them (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS IN SUBJECTS, OR ONLY IN THEIR RULERS.

ANSWER: It is in some manner even in subjects, namely, not in so far as they are subject, but in so far as they participate in reason.

THE REASON is that subjects do not rule, but are ruled. But, because every man, in so far as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Hence it is evident that "prudence indeed is in the ruler after the manner of a master craft," as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, book vi, chap. 8), "but it is in the subjects after the manner of a handicraft," for by prudence man not only commands others, but himself also, in so far, namely, as the reason is said to command the lower power (Ad 3).

ART. XIII.—WHETHER PRUDENCE CAN BE IN SINNERS.

NO.—a) A false prudence is in sinners only; b) a true but imperfect prudence is common to good and bad; c) a true and perfect prudence is only in the good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that false prudence is that which disposes things that have to be done in view of an evil end, as a prudent robber for the purpose of robbery. And this is the prudence of which the Apostle speaks (Rom. viii, 6): "The inclination {*prudencia*} of the flesh is death," namely that which sets the last end in the pleasure of the flesh.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a true but imperfect prudence has as its end a particular good, but not always the end of all human life, as for example prudence in a businessman or a sailor. Now if this prudence, which is natural diligence, and is called cleverness, is imperfect because of the lack of the principal act, then it consists only in evil things, because it does not carry counsel into effect (Ad 3).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that true and perfect prudence, or prudence simply so called, is that which takes counsel, judges, and commands aright with respect to the good end of a man's entire life, and this cannot be in sinners.

ART. XIV.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS IN ALL WHO HAVE GRACE.

YES.—We are speaking of infused prudence.

THE REASON is that the virtues are interconnected (I-II, q. lxxv, art. 1). Hence whoever has charity has also all the other virtues. Now whoever has charity has grace.

ART. XV.—WHETHER PRUDENCE IS IN US BY NATURE.

NO.—THE REASON is that prudence is not about ends, but about means, which are diversified in many ways according to the variety of persons and concerns. On the contrary, a natural inclination is always to some determinate thing.—Yet there can be a natural inclination with respect to ends, and thus prudence can be incipiently implanted in us by nature.

NOTE: 1. Prudence is more in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience (Ad 2).

2. Even in the brutes there are fixed ways of obtaining an end; wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars (Ad 3).

ART. XVI.—WHETHER PRUDENCE CAN BE LOST THROUGH FORGETFULNESS.

NO.—Prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but is rather corrupted by the passions.

THE REASON is that prudence does not consist in knowledge alone, whereas forgetfulness regards knowledge only; but prudence resides also in the appetite. For the chief act of prudence is to command, and this is to apply the knowledge had to the purpose of planning and execution.—Yet forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter's command depends on knowledge, which may be forgotten.

QUESTION XLVIII THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE

Here we are to consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry: 1) The parts of prudence; 2) its integral parts; 3) its subjective parts; 4) its potential parts.

SOLE ARTICLE: WHETHER THREE PARTS OF PRUDENCE ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—a) The integral parts (as a roof is part of a house); and such parts of prudence are *memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reasoning, foresight, circumspection, and caution*; b) the subjective parts (as an ox and a lion are parts of the genus animal), and such parts of prudence are: The prudence whereby a man governs himself, and the prudence whereby he governs a multitude, or directive prudence; c) and the potential parts (as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul); and such parts of prudence are: *Good counsel, synesis, and prudence*, in so far as it is preceptive.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such (integral) parts must needs concur in a perfect act of prudence. For in so far as prudence is cognitive there are required: a) With respect to knowledge itself, the memory of past things and the understanding of present things; b) with respect to the acquisition of knowledge, docility, and shrewdness, which is a part of *eustochia*, or a happy conjecture; c) with respect to the use of knowledge, reasoning, to which belong foresight, about the end; circumspection, that man may attend to the circumstances of the matter at hand; and caution, that he may avoid obstacles.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the subjective parts of a virtue are its species. Now the species of prudence are: The prudence whereby man governs himself; and the prudence whereby man governs a multitude. And this again is subdivided into *military, economic, and regnative* prudence, which is in superiors, and which in subjects is called *political* prudence.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the potential parts of any virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence are *good counsel*, which concerns counsel; *synesis*, which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence; *gnome*, which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law; and *prudence*, which is about the chief act—viz., that of commanding.

QUESTION XLIX EACH PART OF PRUDENCE AS QUASI-INTEGRAL (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MEMORY IS A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that experience, which is required for prudence, since it is about particular contingent matters, is the result of many memories (Aristotle: *Metaphysics*, book i, chap. 1).

NOTE: There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children.

Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another.

Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less is it liable to slip out of it.

Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence Aristotle says (*On Memory*, chap. 2) that "reflection preserves memory," because, as he remarks (*ibid.* ii.), "custom is a second nature" (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER UNDERSTANDING IS A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—In so far as understanding denotes some right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident.

THE REASON is that prudence is right reason applied to action; hence the whole process of prudence must have its source in understanding. Now such an understanding is a right estimate about some particular end (Ad 1); and it is called understanding inasmuch as its object is a principle, and sense, in so far as its object is a particular. But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER DOCILITY SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and, since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SHREWDNESS IS PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as docility consists in a man's being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself.

NOTE: Shrewdness is taken for *eustochia*, which is a happy conjecture about any matter, whereas shrewdness is an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER REASON SHOULD BE RECKONED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—For prudence it is necessary that a man to be an apt reasoner.

THE REASON is that the work of prudence is to take good counsel. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason.

ART. VI.—WHETHER FORESIGHT SHOULD BE ACCOUNTED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence; and each of these things (the future and the contingent) is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed.

ART. VII.—WHETHER CIRCUMSPECTION CAN BE A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that man needs to compare the means to the end with the circumstances. For, since prudence is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of circumstances.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CAUTION SHOULD BE RECKONED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that in contingent matters of action the true can be mingled with the false and the evil with the good. Hence caution is necessary for prudence, in order that the good may be accepted without the evil.

QUESTION I

THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE

Here we are to consider the subjective parts of prudence. And, because we have already spoken of the prudence by which one rules oneself (q. xlvii, art. 10 and 11), it remains now to speak of the species of prudence by which the multitude is governed, to which four articles are devoted.

ART. I.—WHETHER A SPECIES OF PRUDENCE IS REGNATIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that prudence in its special and most perfect sense belongs to a king, who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom, for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

NOTE: These two virtues—prudence and justice—belong most properly to a king. Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence that is directive, rather than to justice, which is executive (Ad 1).

ART. II — WHETHER POLITICAL PRUDENCE IS FITTINGLY ACCOUNTED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that men who are slaves or subjects in any sense are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.

NOTE: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we here speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER A PART OF PRUDENCE SHOULD BE RECKONED TO BE DOMESTIC.

YES.—The REASON is domestic prudence has a special object, which falls under government, namely a household, which is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since, just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom.

NOTE: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to good in general, as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MILITARY PRUDENCE SHOULD BE RECKONED A PART OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that art and reason imitate nature. Now nature has given the animals, not only the concupiscible faculty, which moves them to what is conducive to their well being, but also the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only *political* prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a *military* prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

NOTE: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander in chief, belongs to prudence (Ad 3).

QUESTION LI THE VIRTUES CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE

Here we consider the virtues connected with prudence, which are its potential parts. This will be in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER "EUBULIA" IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it makes an act proper to man good by good council. For *eubulia* is so called from the Greek prefix *eu*, meaning good, and *boule*, which is counsel, being a good counsel, or rather a disposition to take counsel.—Hence *eubulia* is not found in sinners, but only in virtuous men (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER "EUBULIA" IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM PRUDENCE

YES.—THE REASON is that *eubulia* makes man take good counsel, whereas prudence makes him command well. These two are distinct, so that they are sometimes found in separation from each other.—But if it belongs even to prudence to take good counsel, this belongs to prudence by commanding it, to *eubulia*, by eliciting it (Ad 1). *Eubulia* is subordinate to prudence, as a secondary virtue to its principal (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER "SYNESIS" IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—The reason is that, besides *eubulia*, which takes good counsel, prudence requires another virtue, which judges aright concerning the means to an end, and this is called *synesis*, from the Greek *synetoi*, that is, persons of sense, or *eusynetoi*, that

is, men of good sense. *Synesis* pertains to the common sense, *eubulia*, to invention or research.

NOTE: *Synesis* disposes to good judgment from the fact that the cognitive power, of which *synesis* is a part, is not imbued with wrong conceptions, but with those that are true and right, and thus it apprehends things as they are in themselves and as suitable to attain the end (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER “GNOME” IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it happens sometimes that something must be done that is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which *synesis* judges; and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called *gnome*, and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

QUESTION LII THE GIFT OF COUNSEL

Here we consider the gift of counsel, which corresponds to prudence; this will be in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER COUNSEL SHOULD BE RECKONED AMONG THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that God moves each thing according to the mode of that which is moved. Now it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Spirit is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel; wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: Prudence or *eubulia*, whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel, according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or *eubulia* makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things that may occur, the result is that “the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our councils uncertain” (Wis. ix, 14). Hence in the research of counsel man requires to be directed by God, who comprehends all things; and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves seek counsel from those who are wiser (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF COUNSEL CORRESPONDS TO THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE.

YES.—The gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as that which helps and perfects it.

THE REASON is that by the gift of counsel the Holy Spirit rules and moves human reason, and by this gift of counsel the rectitude of reason is chiefly perfected, and this is the province of prudence, for prudence is right reason about things to be done.

NOTE: Since in the gifts of the Holy Spirit the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel, for command and judgment do not belong to what is moved but to a mover (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF COUNSEL REMAINS IN HEAVEN.

YES.—The gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge of the things that they know and enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done.

THE REASON is that in the mind of the blessed there precedes no research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for, as Augustine says (*Super Gen. ad Litt., lib. v, cap. 19*): “The angels take counsel of God about things beneath them.”—For doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FIFTH BEATITUDE, WHICH IS THAT OF MERCY, CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF COUNSEL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the gift of counsel is properly about the things that are conducive to an end. Now especially conducive to an end is mercy, according to I Tim. iv, 8: "Godliness (*pietas*) is profitable in all respects" (*Pietas* has the connotation of pity, or mercy). Thus the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.

NOTE: Among the fruits of the Holy Spirit there is reckoned nothing corresponding to the gift of counsel. The reason of this is that among the fruits nothing is numbered that pertains to practical knowledge, but only what pertains to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find *goodness* and *benignity*, which correspond to mercy (Ad 3).

QUESTION LIII THE VICIES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE, AND FIRST CONCERNING IMPRUDENCE

We are now to consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (*Contra Julianum, lib. iv, cap. 4*) that "there are vices opposed to every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices that have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness."

Accordingly, we must first consider those vices that are in evident opposition to prudence, namely those that are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things that are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices that have a false resemblance to prudence, those namely that are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And, since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: 1) Imprudence; 2) negligence, which is opposed to solicitude.

Under the first head stand six points.

ART. I.—WHETHER IMPRUDENCE IS A SIN.

YES.—a) Imprudence taken as a negation can be without sin; b) taken as a privation, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence; c) taken as a contrary, imprudence is a sin considered in respect to prudence under its proper aspect, and sometimes it is a grave sin, sometimes a light one.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, taken as a negation, it is not properly called imprudence, for it implies only a lack of prudence, which can be without sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, taken as a privation, imprudence denotes the lack of that prudence which a man can and should have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, considered as a contrary, imprudence exists in so far as the movement or act of reason is contrary to prudence, for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions that require consideration in the act of prudence.

In this way man infringes on the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. If this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the divine teaching; whereas if he acts beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.

ART. II.—WHETHER IMPRUDENCE IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is opposed to prudence, which is a special virtue.

NOTE: Imprudence is a general sin in the absolute sense, not in its essence, because it is not predicated of all sins, as prudence is not predicated of all good acts, but by participation, as also is prudence. That is, just as all the virtues have a share in prudence, in so far as it directs them, so all vices and sins have a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.

Imprudence is also a general sin, with respect to certain vices, which are its species, that is, by opposition to the different subjective parts and the different potential parts of prudence, and by opposition to the things that are requisite for

prudence as its quasi-integral parts. These we shall discuss in subsequent articles (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER PRECIPITATION IS A SIN INCLUDED IN IMPRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that precipitation denotes disorderliness of counsel, which pertains to imprudence. For there is precipitation when someone is moved to act by an impulse of will or passion, without passing through the degrees by which one arrives at action in an orderly manner, by taking good counsel.

NOTE: 1. The degrees whereby one should descend from reasoning to external actions are: The memory of the past, the understanding of the present, shrewdness in considering the future outcome, reasoning, which compares one thing with another, and docility, by which one accepts the opinions of those of more weight than he (in body of art.).

2. Rashness, properly speaking, appears when one acts precipitately by despising the directing reason. Hence rashness arises from the root of pride; but it is included in precipitation (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THOUGHTLESSNESS IS A SPECIAL SIN INCLUDED IN IMPRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something, it belongs chiefly to judgment, which is an act of prudence. Hence also the defect of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, namely, as someone fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which right judgment depends. Consequently, thoughtlessness is a sin, and is included under imprudence.

NOTE: Regarding the words of Our Lord (Matth. x, 19): "Do not be anxious how or what you are to speak," it would be considered that the Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encouraged His disciples, so that, when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because, "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God," according to II Paral, xx, 12; else, if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER INCONSTANCY IS A VICE CONTAINED UNDER IMPRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that inconstancy is a withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, but it has its completion in a defect in the reason. Now all the defects of the practical reason belong to imprudence, just as all the rectitude of the same reason belongs to prudence.—Hence, just as precipitation derives from a defect about the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness, from a defect about the act of judgment, so inconstancy is owing to a defect about the act of command.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE AFORESAID VICIES ARISE FROM LUST.

YES.—They arise chiefly from lust, which wholly extinguishes the judgment of reason.

THE REASON is that, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, book iv, chap. 5): "Pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence;" and particularly that pleasure which is in sex, which absorbs the whole soul.

QUESTION LIV NEGLIGENCE

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER NEGLIGENCE IS A SPECIAL SIN.

THE REASON is that negligence signifies a lack of due solicitude. Hence, just as solicitude is a special act of reason, negligence must be a special sin. Now solicitude

is a special act of reason (q. xlvii, art. 9); and in this way negligence is a special sin, although it is found also to some extent in all sins (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER NEGLIGENCE IS OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the rectitude of solicitude pertains to prudence, whereas negligence is opposed to solicitude. Hence, by opposition negligence pertains to imprudence.—Likewise it belongs to prudence to choose the means to the end, for, as Isidore says (Etym., book x, at the letter N), “a negligent man is one who fails to choose” (*non eligens*). Hence negligence is opposed to prudence.

NOTE: The difference between negligence, laziness, and idleness is this: Negligence consists in the lack of the interior act, to which choice also belongs; laziness denotes slowness of execution; idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution (Ad 1).—Likewise, negligence, like inconstancy, is about an act of command. Yet the inconstant man fails in commanding as though hindered by something; whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER NEGLIGENCE CAN BE A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Both in respect of that which is omitted and in respect of the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which is omitted through negligence can be necessary for salvation, whether it is an act or a circumstance.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the will can be so remiss through negligence regarding the things that belong to God as to be wholly defective in charity to God; and this happens especially when negligence follows from contempt.

QUESTION LV

VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE.

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PRUDENCE OF THE FLESH IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that prudence of the flesh is properly so called when someone possesses the goods of the flesh as the last end of his life. It is evident that this is a sin.

NOTE: It is called prudence of the flesh, or of the world, because prudence implies direction to some appetible end; if therefore such an end is some incomplete good of the flesh or the world, it is called the prudence of the flesh or of the world, according to Rom. viii, 7: “The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God,” and that of Luke xvi, 8: “The children of this world are, in relation to their own generation, more prudent than are the children of light” (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRUDENCE OF THE FLESH IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—If prudence of the flesh is taken according to the absolute meaning of prudence, viz., that the last end of all life is placed in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin; but if it is taken by way of a particular prudence, it is a venial sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thereby man is turned from God, since there cannot be more than one last end (I-II, q. i, art. 5).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this way it happens that someone is inordinately affected by some delight of the flesh, without thereby being turned from God by mortal sin; hence he does not place the end of his whole life in a delight of the flesh.

ART. III.—WHETHER CRAFTINESS IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that craftiness consists in a man's using, to acquire an end, whether good or bad, not true but feigned and apparent means. Hence craftiness is distinguished from the prudence of the flesh, which occurs when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end that is good, not in truth, but in appearance.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GUILF IS A SIN PERTAINING TO CRAFTINESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that guile denotes some execution of craftiness. For to craftiness it properly belongs to devise counterfeit and apparent ways to achieve some end, whether good or evil; whereas to guile it belongs to adopt such ways with regard

to their execution, namely by words and deeds. Yet, just as craftiness is properly taken in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so also is guile, which is the execution of craftiness (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER FRAUD PERTAINS TO CRAFTINESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that fraud properly pertains to the execution of craftiness, which is done by deeds.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO BE SOLICITOUS ABOUT TEMPORAL MATTERS.

NO.—A superfluous solicitude about temporal matters can be unlawful in three ways.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is in respect of the object of solicitude, for it is unlawful to seek temporal things as an end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is in respect of the earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, which withdraws man from spiritual things, which he is meant primarily to serve; and thus it is said in Matth. xiii, 22, that "the care of this world . . . [chokes] the word."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is in respect of superfluous fear, for the Lord excludes such a fear, according to Matth. vi, 31: "Seek first the kingdom of God . . . and all these things will be given you besides."

ART. VII.—WHETHER ANYONE SHOULD BE SOLICITOUS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

NO.—Solicitude about the future, if inordinate or unfitting, is unlawful.

THE REASON is that, as is said in Eccles. viii, 6: "There is a time and opportunity for every business."—Hence Our Lord forbids such solicitude as superfluous in the words: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow . . . Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" (Matth. vi, 34), i.e., the burden of solicitude.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THESE VICIES ARISE FROM COVETOUSNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the prudence of the flesh, craftiness, guile, and fraud have a certain similarity with prudence in some particular use of the reason. Now an undue use of the reason especially appears in the ways opposed to justice, among which covetousness is especially found. Hence the aforesaid vices chiefly arise from covetousness.

**QUESTION LVI
THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE.**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED A PRECEPT OF PRUDENCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the precepts of the Decalogue, since they belong to natural reason, are mainly about the ends of human life. For the dictates of human reason are mainly about ends, which are in the practical order what naturally known principles are in the speculative order. Now prudence is not about an end, but about the means to the end. Hence there was no need to include directly a precept concerning prudence among the Commandments. Yet all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to prudence in so far as it is directive of all virtuous acts.

NOTE: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means; wherefore it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence (Ad 2).—The same thing is to be said of the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament, in which it was fitting that there should be precepts even with respect to the means (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PROHIBITIVE PRECEPTS RELATING TO THE VICIES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE ARE FITTINGLY PROPOUNDED IN THE OLD LAW.

YES.—The precepts forbidding craftiness.

THE REASON is that a precept especially requires the aspect of a thing due. Now this is what justice regards. Moreover craftiness, with regard to execution, is a sin chiefly committed in matters pertaining to justice (q. lv, art. 5), as when for example someone by guile and fraud calumniates another or steals his goods, which is forbidden in the Law: Levit. xix, 13: "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor;" and Deut. xxv, 13: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less."

NOTE: The prohibitive precepts are not given with regard to the vices that are directly opposed to prudence, because such have a manifest opposition to prudence, and thus do not pertain to injustice in the same as the execution of craftiness (Ad 1).

QUESTION LVII RIGHT

After considering prudence we must now consider justice, the consideration of which is fourfold: 1) Justice, 2) its parts, 3) the corresponding gift, 4) the precepts relating to justice. Concerning justice, there are four heads of consideration: 1) Right, 2) justice itself, 3) injustice, 4) judgment. The first point will be in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER RIGHT IS THE OBJECT OF JUSTICE.

YES.—Justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as *right*.

THE REASON is that that which is right in the acts of the other virtues is taken only with reference to the agent; but the right that is in the work of justice is set up, not only by its relation to the agent, but also by its relation to others.

ART. II.—WHETHER RIGHT IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO NATURAL RIGHT AND POSITIVE RIGHT.

YES.—THE REASON is that right, or the just, is a work adjusted to another according to some kind of equality. Now this can happen in two ways, viz., either by the very nature of the thing, and in this way right is called natural; or by agreement, namely when a man deems himself satisfied if he receive so much, and this is positive right or justice, which can exist between private persons or between persons who have public authority; and thus positive right is subdivided into private and public.

NOTE: If a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written in Is. x, 1: "Woe to them who make wicked laws."

2. The divine right too is divided into natural and positive. For the divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, and yet their justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree. Hence also divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as is human right. For the divine law commands certain things because they are good, and forbids others because they are evil, whereas others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RIGHT OF NATIONS IS THE SAME AS THE NATURAL RIGHT.

NO.—The right of nations is not the same as natural right in the absolute consideration of natural right.

THE REASON is that in its absolute consideration natural right is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another, [as for instance the male is by its nature commensurate with the female to beget offspring]; and this right, which denotes an absolute apprehension of a thing, is common to us and the other animals.—Another commensuration or right or the just is indeed natural but not absolute, inasmuch as it follows from nature itself according to man's natural reason, for example, the ownership of possessions. And such a right is common only to men, and is called the right of nations, as the jurist Gaius says (*Digest*, Bk. ix): "Whatever natural reason decrees among all men is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations."

NOTE: 1. Slavery, which belongs to the right of nations, and which is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in so far as it is useful for the slave to be ruled by a wiser man, and for the latter to be helped by the former, is natural in the second way, but not in the first (Ad 2).

2. Since natural reason dictates matters that are according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason itself (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PATERNAL RIGHT AND RIGHT OF DOMINION SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED AS SPECIAL SPECIES.

YES.—Paternal right and right of dominion must be distinguished from right or just simply so called.

THE REASON is that right or just simply so called is between one and another, in so far as it is simply other. Hence a father and his son and a master and his servant are not compared with each other simply, for the son is something of the father, and the servant is as it were an instrument of his master. Therefore between the father and the son there is a special just or right, which is called paternal; and similarly between a master and a servant there is what is called a dominative right.—Similarly, between a husband and wife there is a special right called domestic right [the wife is more distant from her husband than a son from his father, for she is received into a kind of social life]. For the wife and husband have an immediate relation to domestic life, in which a special right is founded.—In these special rights, evidently, there is lacking a perfect element of right or just; for the son is something of the father; the servant of the master; and the wife, of the husband (Ad 2).

NOTE: All other differences between one person and another in a state have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to its ruler; wherefore there is a just towards them in the perfect sense of justice. This just, however, is distinguished according to various offices; hence when we speak of military, or magisterial, or priestly right, it is not as though such rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of paternal right, or right of dominion, but for the reason that something proper is due to each class of persons in respect of his particular office (Ad 3).

**QUESTION LVIII
JUSTICE**

(in 12 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS FITTINGLY DEFINED AS BEING THE PERPETUAL AND CONSTANT WILL TO RENDER TO EACH HIS RIGHT.

YES.—The aforesaid definition is a complete definition of justice, except that the act is put for the habit, which is specified by the act.

THE REASON is that, since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, it follows that a virtue must be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to the virtue. Here the proper matter of justice is indicated by Isidore (*Etym.*, book x, at letter I): "A man is said to be just because he respects the rights of others." The goodness of the act is indicated by the fact that the act is called voluntary, stable, and firm, namely by the words, "the perpetual and constant will."

NOTE: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the personification of justice and the sovereign is its guardian (*Ethics*, book v, chap. 4 and 6); but the subjects render to each what is his own by way of execution (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS ALWAYS TOWARDS ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was said in the preceding question, art. 1 and 2, the name justice denotes equality; hence for this reason justice has its quality of a relation to another; for nothing is equal to itself, but to another.

NOTE: There is said to be justice in one and the same man, in so far as reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, both in so far as these obey reason, and in general, in so far as there is ascribed what is becoming to it. But this justice is only metaphorically speaking; for actions do not properly belong to powers, but to supposita and to wholes (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that we can apply to justice what is said of human virtue, namely that it renders the human act and man himself good. For justice rectifies

human actions. Hence, as Cicero says (*On Duties*, i, 7): "The luster of virtue appears above all in justice."

ART. IV.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS IN THE WILL AS ITS SUBJECT.

YES.—THE REASON is that justice is directed to rectifying the act of the will; for we are not called just from the fact that we rightly know something; but from the fact that we will something in relation to another, according to the proportion of one thing to another, which pertains to the rational appetite.

ART. V.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS A GENERAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the good of every virtue, whether as directing a man to himself or as directing him to some other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs, for the part belongs to the whole. Accordingly, the acts of all the virtues can belong to justice, in so far as justice directs man to the common good. And it follows that the justice that is in this way styled general is also called legal justice, because by it man is in harmony with the law that directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

ART. VI. — WHETHER JUSTICE, AS A GENERAL VIRTUE, IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS ALL VIRTUE.

NO.—THE REASON is that general or legal justice is not such by predication, as a genus that is predicated of the species and belongs to their essence; but it is such virtually [e.g., a universal cause in relation to its effects, the sun, in relation to all bodies it illuminates], in so far as it directs the acts of all the other moral virtues to the common good, as has been said (prec. art.); and in this way there is no need for that which is general to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same.

Accordingly, justice essentially is a special virtue; virtually, it is a general virtue.

NOTE: Every virtue commanded by legal justice can be called, according to Aristotle (*Ethics*, book v, chap. 1), legal justice; and in this way of speaking legal justice is the same in essence as any virtue; it differs only logically.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THERE IS A PARTICULAR, BESIDES A GENERAL, JUSTICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, beside legal justice, which directs man immediately to the common good, there must be other virtues, which direct man immediately in reference to particular goods. Now among these virtues there must be a particular justice, which directs man in regard to things that relate to another individual, for the aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER PARTICULAR JUSTICE HAS A SPECIAL MATTER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since justice is directed to another, and not properly to oneself, it is not about the whole matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, according to some special aspect of the objects, namely in so far as by them one man is related to another.

ART. IX.—WHETHER JUSTICE IS ABOUT THE PASSIONS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the subject of justice is the will, whose movement or acts is not the passions (I-II, q. xxii, art. 3).—Likewise, justice is about things that relate to another; but we are not immediately related to another by the internal passions. Hence justice is not about the passions.

NOTE: Legal justice, which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions, whereby man is in some sort disposed in himself, than particular justice, which is directed to the good of another individual (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE MEAN OF JUSTICE IS THE REAL MEAN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the matter of justice is an external operation, in so far as an operation of the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to

another person. Hence the mean of justice consists in a certain equality of proportion of an external thing to an external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less; wherefore justice observes the real mean.

NOTE: This real mean is also the rational mean; wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue (Ad 1).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE ACT OF JUSTICE IS TO RENDER TO EACH ONE HIS OWN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the act of justice is an external operation, in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is proportioned to another person, to whom we are related by justice. Now this is to render to each what is his own.

NOTE: To succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal or cardinal virtue. Mercy, liberality, and the like are secondary virtues annexed to justice, as will appear below (q. lxxx, art. 1) (Ad 1).

XII. — WHETHER JUSTICE STANDS FOREMOST AMONG ALL MORAL VIRTUES.

YES.—Both legal justice and particular justice outrank all other moral virtues.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the common good, which is the object of legal justice, is more glorious than the individual good of one person, which is the object of the other virtues. And in this sense Aristotle says (*Ethics*, book v, chap. 1, before the end) that "the most excellent of the virtues seems to be justice, and is more glorious than either the evening or the morning star."

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is twofold: First, on the part of the subject, because (particular) justice is in a nobler part of the soul, i.e., in the rational appetite, namely in the will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, to which belong the passions, which are the matter of the other moral virtues. [Abridger's note: The Holy Doctor does not here include prudence, which is not in the sensitive appetite, but in the intellect, and is simply more eminent than all the moral virtues (II-II, q. 123, art. 12)].

THE SECOND is on the part of the object: Whereas the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person's being well disposed towards another; and thus justice is in some way the good of another. Aristotle moreover says (*Rhetoric*, book i, chap. 1): "The greatest virtues should be those that are most profitable to others."

QUESTION LIX INJUSTICE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INJUSTICE IS A SPECIAL VICE.

YES.—a) The injustice that is opposed to legal justice is in its essence a special vice; b) in its intention, however, it is a general vice; c) the injustice that is opposed to particular justice is a particular vice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such an injustice regards a special object, namely the common good, which is despised.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the contempt of the common good man can be led to commit all sins, just as all vices, in so far as they are repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such injustice has a special matter, which is opposed to particular justice, namely inequality between one person and another, in so far as a man wishes to have more goods, e.g., wealth and honors, and less evils, e.g., toils and losses.

ART. II.—WHETHER A MAN IS CALLED UNJUST THROUGH DOING AN UNJUST THING.

NO.—THE REASON is that an act of injustice can be done besides one's intention, or out of passion; and this is for injustice to be done without the habit of injustice.

NOTE: He is properly unjust who does an unjust thing from choice, namely when the act of injustice is pleasing in itself. For then the act of injustice properly

proceeds from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit whatever is fitting to that habit is of itself pleasing to him (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER WE CAN SUFFER INJUSTICE WILLINGLY.

NO.—Properly and strictly speaking, no man can suffer injustice voluntarily; he can, however, suffer it accidentally, and as it were materially.

THE REASON is that, speaking strictly and formally, no one can do anything except willingly, or suffer anything except unwillingly. For, properly and strictly speaking, man does what he does willingly; and on the contrary man properly suffers against his will.—Accidentally, however, and speaking materially, as it were, one can do unwillingly that which is in itself unjust (as one does something besides his intention); or suffer something willingly, as when someone voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him.

ART. IV. — WHETHER WHOEVER DOES AN INJUSTICE SINS MORTALLY.

YES.—To do an injustice knowingly and willingly is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that every injury done to another is of itself repugnant to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. Hence, since injustice always consists in the injury of another, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

NOTE: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: For instance, if a man takes an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased (Ad 2).

QUESTION LX JUDGMENT

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER JUDGMENT IS AN ACT OF JUSTICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that judgment, which is so called because the judge asserts his right (*ius dicens*), is an act of a judge in so far as he is a judge, and denotes a right determination of that which is just, and this properly belongs to justice. For this reason Aristotle (*Ethics* book v, chap. 4) says that "men have recourse to a judge as to justice personified."

NOTE: The word judgment, from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter, whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment, and in this way judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice. Thus judgment is an act of justice, as inclining to right judgment; and of prudence, as pronouncing judgment: Hence *synesis*, as belonging to prudence, is said to judge rightly (q. li, art. 3). (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO JUDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that to judge is an act of judgment. Now that judgment may be an act of justice three things are required: 1) That it proceed from an inclination of justice; 2) that it proceed from him who is in authority; 3) that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If judgment is deficient in the first article, it will be perverse or unjust; if in the second, it will be usurped; if in the third, it will be suspicious or rash. And such judgments are harmful, and therefore forbidden by Our Lord, according to Matth. vii, 1: "Judge not, that you may not be judged."

NOTE: Those who are guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins. Above all does this held when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of the others. If however they are not public, but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the

judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS UNLAWFUL TO FORM A JUDGMENT FROM SUSPICION.

YES—When the suspicion proceeds a) from the fact that someone is evil in himself, and thus is inclined to think evil of others; or b) from the fact that someone is ill disposed towards another, it is a sin. But when the suspicion arises from long experience it diminishes the nature of suspicion.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such an experience leads to certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Hence Aristotle says (*Rhet.*, book ii, chap. 13): "Old people are very suspicious, because they have often experienced the faults of others."

NOTE: There are three degrees of suspicion: The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for it belongs to human temptation, without which no man can go through this life; the second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion. This pertains directly to injustice, which is about external actions (q. lviii, art. 9); and injustice is a mortal sin in respect of its genus (prec. q., art 4).—(in body of art. and ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER DOUBTS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED FOR THE BEST.

YES.—Doubtful judgments about the wickedness of another are always to be interpreted for the best; but in a judgment about things everyone must try to make his judgment accord with things as they are.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient reason, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause; and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that in a judgment in which we judge concerning things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm, no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judges truly, and of his evil if he judges falsely because the true is the good of the intellect and the false is his evil (Ad 2).

NOTE: It can happen that one who interprets a thing for the best is frequently deceived, but it is better to be frequently deceived, by thinking well of a wicked man than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of some good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former (Ad 1).

From the very fact that someone is judged good he is deemed worthy of honor; and if he is judged evil he is deemed worthy of contempt. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident reason to the contrary (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER WE SHOULD ALWAYS JUDGE ACCORDING TO THE WRITTEN LAW.

YES.—With regard both to the natural and to the positive law, which latter results from an agreement among men.

THE REASON is that laws are written in order to manifest both laws; otherwise judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.

NOTE: 1. The written law contains the natural law, but it does not establish it; the positive law both contains and establishes it, because it gives it strength and authority (in body of art.).

2. Just as the written law does not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right it is unjust and has no binding force (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER JUDGMENT IS RENDERED PERVERSE BY BEING USURPED

YES.—THE REASON is that to pass judgment is in some way to interpret the letter of the law, by applying it to a particular case. Now, it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law. Hence to pass judgment belongs to one who makes the law, i.e., to public authority. Therefore a judgment that is not passed by public authority, of which we are here speaking, is perverse; and this is an usurped judgment.

NOTE: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority, or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority (Ad 3).

**QUESTION LXI
THE PARTS OF JUSTICE**

We must here consider the parts of justice: 1) The subjective parts, which are species of justice, namely distributive and commutative; 2) the quasi-integral parts; 3) the quasi-potential parts, viz., the annexed virtues. On the first point there is a twofold consideration: 1) The parts themselves of justice; 2) the opposed vices. And, because restitution seems to be an act of commutative justice, we must first consider the distinction of commutative and distributive justice, and then restitution. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER TWO SPECIES OF JUSTICE ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED, NAMELY COMMUNICATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that justice is done either between two persons, and then we have the order of part to part, and this is commutative justice; or there is an order of the whole to the part, or the parts; and this order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately.

NOTE: The act of distributing the goods of the community belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom these goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MEAN IS TO BE OBSERVED IN THE SAME WAY IN DISTRIBUTIVE AS IN COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE.

NO.—THE REASON is that in distributive justice something is given to a private person in so far as that which belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons, in such a way that, even as one person surpasses another, so also that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethics*, book v, chap. 3) that this mean follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends, not on quantity but on proportion.

On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the arithmetical mean.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE IS A DIFFERENT MATTER FOR BOTH KINDS OF JUSTICE.

YES.—If we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same; but if we take as the matter of each kind of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and works, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is not the same.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of exchange between one person and

another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that distributive justice directs distributions (as of offices, honors, and benefits), whereas commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons.

NOTE: Of commutations between two persons, some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when someone uses another's property, person, or work against his will, and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence, as in the case of theft and robbery, homicide and mutilation, adultery and seduction, etc., which will be discussed later.—Commutations are called voluntary when someone voluntarily transfers his property to another by reason of something owed, as happens in the case of purchase and sale, in a loan, in hire and rent, etc., which we shall also discuss later in detail.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE JUST IS ABSOLUTELY THE SAME AS RETALIATION.

NO.—In commutative justice the just is the same as retaliation; not so in distributive justice.

THE REASON is that retaliation (*contrapassum*) denotes equal suffering repaid for previous action, and this is taken in three senses, viz.: 1) Most properly, as in the case of injurious actions and sufferings, whereby one injures the person of his neighbor, for instance if a man strike back when he is struck; 2) secondarily, in so far as a man who has inflicted a loss must also suffer loss in his property; improperly, when the word retaliation is transferred to voluntary exchanges.

Now in all these cases recompense must be made according to the principle of commutative justice on the basis of equality, so that the penalty meted out is equal to the action. In distributive justice retaliation has no place, because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression *contrapassum*), but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above (art. 2 of this q.).

NOTE: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXII RESTITUTION

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER RESTITUTION IS AN ACT OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that restitution seems to be nothing else than again to place (*statuere*) someone in possession or control of his property; and thus restitution depends on an equality of justice according to the recompense of thing for thing. This pertains to commutative justice.

NOTE: According to the etymology of the word, restitution denotes something done over again, and hence it would seem to be applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, just as the term commutation has passed from such things to those actions and sufferings that confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term restitution is applied to things which, though they are transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect, whether this touches his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious word (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER RESTITUTION OF WHAT HAS BEEN TAKEN AWAY IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION.

YES.—What has been unjustly taken away.

THE REASON is that to maintain justice is necessary for salvation. Now justice is maintained by restitution, in so far as to restore implies the return of that thing that has been unjustly taken away, for thus when a thing is given back equality is re-established.

NOTE: 1. If anything has been justly taken away, there will be equality, and thus it will not be necessary to make restitution, because justice consists in equality (in body of art.).

2. When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as Aristotle states (*Ethics*, viii, 14). Wherefore, when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent form, compensation should be made as far as possible, for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man (Ad 1).

3. As regards the restitution of reputation, observe that someone can destroy it in three ways: 1) By saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. 2) By saying what is untrue, and that unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. 3) By saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance, by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or, if he is unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him in other ways, as was stated above, in Ad 1. (Ad 2).

ART. III. — WHETHER IT SUFFICES TO RESTORE THE EXACT AMOUNT TAKEN.

YES.—Before he is condemned by the judge, no man is bound to restore more than he took; but, because of the fault of unjust taking of another's goods, he is bound to make restitution according to the sentence of the judge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus a remedy is afforded by restitution, in so far as equality is re-established through it; for this it suffices that one restore as much as one had of another's goods.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a remedy for the fault is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO RESTORE WHAT HE HAS NOT TAKEN.

NO.—If anyone injures another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way to possessing, e.g., a harvest from the seed he is to plant, or profit from money, he need not make restitution on the basis of equality; yet he is bound to make some recompense according to the condition of the persons and the business they are in.

THE REASON is that it is less to have something in expectancy than if fact; but one who is in a way to obtaining something has it only in expectancy or potentiality; and therefore, if he were to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for restitution (prec. art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER RESTITUTION MUST ALWAYS BE MADE TO THE PERSON FROM WHOM A THING HAS BEEN TAKEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the equality of thing with thing in commutative justice, which is produced by restitution, cannot be made save by supplying the lack to one who has less than his own.

NOTE: 1. When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely (Ad 1).

2. A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways: 1) Contrary to the law; and such a person deserves to lose what he gave, and the one who received it must not retain it, but must use it for some pious object. 2) A man gives unlawfully through giving for an unlawful purpose, although the giving itself is not unlawful; as when a man gives something to a prostitute for fornication. Hence the woman can retain what is given. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution (Ad 2).

3. If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living); but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his identity. If the person to whom restitution is due is dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he is very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it is of great value and can easily be sent; otherwise, it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owners should be advised of the fact (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HE WHO HAS TAKEN A THING IS ALWAYS BOUND TO RESTITUTION.

YES.—a) Whether by reason of the thing, b) or by reason of its being taken, if this becomes injurious, i.e., against the will of the one who owns the thing, or c) if the taking of the thing is for the benefit of the one who took it, as in a loan. d) But one is not always bound to restitution who has taken another's thing without injury, and not for his own benefit, as is evident in the case of deposits.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that what a person has that is not his own should be withdrawn from him and given to the one who has lost it, according to the notion of commutative justice.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this case he is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of an injurious action, even if the thing should not remain in his possession.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in this case the person who took the thing is bound to restore what he took, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of its taking, even if he has lost the thing, for he is bound to make good the losses of one who has done him this favor, something that would be impossible if that person incurred loss through his favor.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that in this case the person who took the thing is in no wise bound by reason of its taking—in fact, he did a favor by taking it—he is bound only by reason of the thing. And for this reason if the thing slips from him without his fault, he is not bound to restitution; it would be otherwise if he lost the thing deposited by his gross fault.

ART. VII.—WHETHER RESTITUTION IS BINDING ON THOSE WHO HAVE NOT TAKEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that a person is bound to restitution, not only by reason of another's thing, which he has taken, but also by reason of its injurious taking. Hence whoever is the cause of the unjust taking is bound to restitution.

NOTE: 1. The cause of unjust taking is either direct, and this can happen: a) On the part of the taker, by order or command, counsel, consent, and praise; b) on the part of the taker himself, i.e., by supplying shelter or aiding in any other way; c) on the part of the thing taken, by sharing in the theft or robbery;—or it is an indirect cause, when someone does not hinder the taking, when he could and should do so. All these ways are included in the lines:

By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by shelter, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing.

2. Of the foregoing, the following are considered as the efficacious causes of loss, and therefore always bind to restitution: 1) Command, which is the principal moving cause; 2) consent, without which a robbery could not have taken place; 3) shelter, when a man is a receiver of thieves and gives them his assistance; 4) participation; 5) he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so.—In the other cases enumerated, a person is not always bound to make restitution, for counsel, flattery, etc., are not always efficacious causes of robbery. Hence an adviser or flatterer is bound to restitution only when it can with probability be thought that the unjust taking resulted from these causes (in body of art.).

3. One who did not denounce, hinder, or rebuke the robber is not always held to restitution; this applies only when this is his duty by virtue of his office (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION, OR MAY HE PUT IT OFF?

YES.—He is bound to immediate restitution.

THE REASON is that, just as to take another's thing is a sin against justice, so also is it to keep that thing, for by the fact that someone keeps another's thing against the owner's will he prevents him from using the thing, and thus does him an injury. But if a person cannot make restitution, he must seek a remission or respite from the one to whom he owes it, either personally or through an agent (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXIII. RESPECT OF PERSONS

Here we consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice: 1) The respect of persons that is opposed to distributive justice; 2) the sins that are opposed to commutative justice. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER RESPECT OF PERSONS IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that nothing is opposed to virtue save sin. Now the respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, because it fails to observe due proportion. For the respect of persons consists in this, that something is allotted to a person, not for any reason that makes him worthy of it, but simply in view of his person, e.g., if someone is promoted to a prelacy because he is rich, or one's relative, or something of that sort. For any condition not contributing to the reason why a person is not worthy of this gift is respect of persons.

ART. II.—WHETHER RESPECT OF PERSONS TAKES PLACE IN THE DISPENSATION OF SPIRITUAL GOODS.

YES.—If the spiritual goods are conferred on one less worthy with a view to the common good.

THE REASON is that it is not respect of persons if in the dispensation of spiritual goods those who are simply less good should be preferred to those who are better, by reason of the common good, even as God sometimes grants His charismatic graces to those who are less good.

ART. III. — WHETHER RESPECT OF PERSONS TAKES PLACE IN SHOWING HONOR AND RESPECT.

YES.—If there is no aspect of virtue that is the cause of the honor.

THE REASON is that honor is a testimony to the virtue of the one who is honored, and therefore only virtue is a worthy cause of honor.—Yet it should be remembered that a person can be honored, not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of another's virtue, even as princes and prelates are honored, even if they are unworthy, in so far as they represent God and the community over which they rule.

NOTE: Parents and masters are to be honored on account of their participation of the divine dignity, for God is the Lord and Father of all. The old should be honored on account of the sign of virtue that is old age, although this sign may sometimes be wanting. The rich should be honored by reason of their holding a high place in the community. But if they are honored only by virtue of their wealth there will be a sin of respect of persons (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SIN OF RESPECT OF PERSONS TAKES PLACE IN JUDICIAL SENTENCES.

YES.—THE REASON is that respect of persons has a certain inequality, inasmuch as something is allotted to a person beyond his proportion, in which the equality of justice consists. Now such an inequality is reduced to equality by the judgment of the judge, which is an act of justice.

NOTE: When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (q. lviii, art. 10).—(Ad 2).

QUESTION LXIV OF THE VICIOUS OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE, AND FIRST OF MURDER

Now we are to consider the vices opposed to commutative justice.

1) Those that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; 2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will; and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed and by word: By deed, when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in order, and in the first place we shall consider murder, whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. This will take eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS UNLAWFUL TO KILL ANY LIVING THING.

NO.—THE REASON is that no one sins by using something for the purpose for which it is intended. Now certain more imperfect living creatures are for the benefit of the more perfect, namely plants for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men. Among other uses, it is especially necessary that animals use plants and men use animals for food. This is also evident from divine ordination, as expressed in Gen. ix, 3: "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO KILL SINNERS.

YES.—Not only is it lawful but it is necessary, if they prove gravely hurtful and dangerous to the community.

THE REASON is that every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. Now an individual person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole. Accordingly, just as the health of the whole human body sometimes makes it expedient to amputate some member that is corrupting the other members, so if any person is dangerous to the community, and tends to corrupt it on account of some sin, it is salutary and commendable to kill him, that the common good may be preserved, for it is said in I Cor. v, 6: "A little leaven ferments *{corruptit}* the whole lump."

NOTE: As regards the human dignity of the sinner, let it be noted that man in sinning departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his humanity, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. xlvi, 21: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." Hence it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and does more harm, as Aristotle says (*Politics*, I, ii).—(Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL TO KILL A MAN WHO HAS SINNED.

NO.—THE REASON is that to kill a malefactor is lawful in so far as this is directed to the welfare of the whole community; hence this belongs only to him who has been entrusted with the duty of protecting the community.

ART. IV. — WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR CLERICS TO KILL WRONGDOERS.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that clerics are chosen for the ministry of the altar, on which is represented the passion of the slain Christ, who, "when He was threatened, did not threaten" (I Pet. ii, 23).

THE SECOND REASON is that clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, in which the penalty of mutilation or death is not included. Hence, in order that they may be ministers of the New Testament, they must abstain from such.

NOTE: 1. God sometimes slays wrongdoers even physically; yet not all of us are to imitate Him in this, since each person must imitate God in what is specially fitting for him (Ad 1).

2. Prelates of the churches receive the office of earthly princes, not that they may exercise blood-judgment through themselves, but that it may be exercised by their authority through others (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO KILL ONESELF.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that by nature everything loves itself; and therefore everything naturally preserves itself in being, and resists, so far as possible, what

would destroy it. Hence that anyone should kill himself is contrary to natural inclination and against charity, whereby everyone should love himself.

THE SECOND REASON is that every part belongs to the whole. Every man is part of a community; hence in killing himself he injures the community.

THE THIRD REASON is that life is a gift given by God to man and is subject to His power. Hence he who deprives himself of life sins against God, to whom alone it belongs to give judgment on death and life, according to Deut. xxxii, 39: "I will kill, and I will make to live."

NOTE: To kill oneself is a most grievous sin, because it most grievously injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love; it is also most dangerous, because no time remains to expiate it by repentance (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL IN ANY CASE TO KILL THE INNOCENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the life of the just preserves and promotes the common good, because the good are the principal part of the multitude. Hence in no way is it lawful to kill the innocent. Only God can do this, for He has dominion over life and death (Ad 1).—A sinner can, however, be killed, not in so far as he is a man, but in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. Hence he who kills the innocent or just man commits a graver sin than he who, without the necessary authority, kills a sinner (Ad 2).

NOTE: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by false witnesses is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent. But if he cannot do this, he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he who puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He who carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs. If, however, it contains no manifest injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO KILL A MAN IN SELF-DEFENSE.

YES.—Provided one intends to defend oneself with moderate and justified resistance.

THE REASON is that there is nothing to prevent the same act from having two effects, one of which is only in one's intention, the other of which is besides one's intention, especially if the effect intended is to preserve one's life. Yet an act arising from a good intention can be made unlawful if it is not proportionate to the end.—Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man forego the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing another, for a man is bound to provide for his own life more than that of another.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ONE IS GUILTY OF MURDER THROUGH KILLING SOMEONE BY CHANCE.

NO.—Unless a man be occupied with an unlawful matter, or fails to take due care to avoid this.

THE REASON is that the things that are due to chance are not, simply speaking, intended or voluntary.—It may happen, however, that that which is in itself not willed or intended can be accidentally willed or intended, in so far as the accidental cause is said to remove an obstacle. Hence if a man engages in unlawful business, or even in lawful business without exercising due care, he does not escape the guilt of murder if a man's death follows from his act.

QUESTION LXV MUTILATION

(in four articles)

ART. 1.—WHETHER IN SOME CASES IT MAY BE LAWFUL TO MAIM ANYONE.

YES.—Either on one's own initiative, if some member is gangrened and threatens to corrupt the whole body, or by public authority, as a punishment.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a part of man's whole body is for the sake of the whole. Hence the human member should be disposed of as far as it is expedient for the whole.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the whole man is ordered, as to an end, to the whole community, of which he is a part. Now it may happen that the amputation of a member, though it result in the detriment of the whole body, is nevertheless ordered to the good of the community, in so far as it is inflicted as a punishment to restrain sins. Hence, just as by public authority a man is lawfully deprived of his life altogether on account of some major offenses, so also he may be deprived of a member on account of some minor ones.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR PARENTS TO STRIKE THEIR CHILDREN, OR MASTERS THEIR SLAVES.

YES.—For the sake of correction and discipline.

THE REASON is that the son is subject to the father's authority, and the slave to his master's. For no one justly punishes anyone except by way of punishment, for justice's sake. This belongs to the one to whose jurisdiction someone is subject.

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of the Apostle (Ephes. vi, 4): "And you, fathers, do not provoke your children to anger," be it noted that this does not forbid fathers from chastising their children for the sake of discipline, but only not to beat them immoderately (Ad 1).

2. Just as the state is a perfect community, so the ruler of the state has the perfect power of coercion, and hence can inflict irreparable punishments, namely those of death or mutilation. But a father or master, who rules a household, which is an imperfect community, has an imperfect power of coercion, in respect of lighter penalties, which do not inflict irreparable harm, and such is corporal punishment (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO IMPRISON A MAN.

YES.—Or in any manner to keep him under duress.

THE REASON is that the order of justice can demand this, either as a punishment or as a precaution against the commission of evil.

NOTE: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then; as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing, not only evil, but also good deeds (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SIN IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE AFORESAID INJURIES ARE PERPETRATED ON THOSE WHO ARE CONNECTED WITH OTHERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that when injury is done to any person in any way connected with another, that injury affects two persons; hence, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this circumstance.

NOTE: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon, both through being more opposed to mercy and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them, since they have no one to turn to for their relief (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXVI

THE SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE THAT ARE COMMITTED IN REGARD TO PROPERTY, AND FIRST IN REGARD TO THEFT AND ROBBERY.

(in nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS NATURAL FOR MAN TO POSSESS EXTERNAL THINGS.

YES.—a) Not as regards the nature of things; but b) as regards their use.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that nature is not subject to human but only to divine power, whose mere will all things obey.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that through his reason and will man can use external things for his own profit, as though they were made for his sake; for always the more imperfect are for the sake of the more perfect (q. lxiv, art. 1). Now such a natural dominion of man is founded on the fact that man, in respect of his reason, was created in the image and likeness of God, as is said in Gen. i, 26: "Let us make man in Our image and likeness, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea..."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO POSSESS A THING AS HIS OWN.

YES.—a) With regard to the power of procuring and dispensing it; b) but not with regard to its use.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is threefold: a) Because thus each man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than for what is common to all or to many; since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community; b) because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with the care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately; c) because a more peaceful state is assured to man if each one is contented with his own..

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, with regard to use, man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to share them with others in case of need. Hence the Apostle says (I Tim. vi, 17, 18): "Charge the rich of the world . . . [to give] readily, sharing with others . . ."

NOTE: 1. Regarding the maxim: "In nature all things are common," be it noted that a community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own; but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement, which belongs to positive law, as stated above (q. lvii, art. 2 and 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason (Ad 1).

2. A rich man would not act unlawfully if by prior occupancy of a possession which originally was common, he also gives others a share; but he sins if he indiscriminately debars others from the use of that thing. Hence Basil, in expounding Luke xii, 18, says: "Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?" (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF THEFT CONSISTS IN TAKING ANOTHER'S THING SECRETLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that theft is the secret taking of another's thing. For three things combine to constitute theft: 1) That one appropriate another's thing; and in this theft is contrary to justice; 2) that the object of the theft be a thing possessed, i.e., it is not against a person, as is murder and adultery; 3) that another's thing be secretly appropriated; for thus the proper notion of theft is that it is the secret taking of another's property. For such concealment is the cause of the sin, and constitutes its species. Another concealment, which is a simple circumstance of sin, namely that which is a sign of shame, or which is contrived to avoid scandal, diminishes sin (Ad 1).

NOTE: To keep back what is due to another inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: Wherefore, an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THEFT AND ROBBERY ARE SINS OF DIFFERENT SPECIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that robbery and theft have different aspects of sin; for theft and robbery have their aspect of sin from the fact that the taking on the part of the one from whom something is taken away is involuntary through ignorance; whereas in robbery it is involuntary through violence. Hence theft and robbery have the same remote end, namely the withdrawal of another's thing; but they have different proximate ends, inasmuch as one sin seeks to withdraw another's thing by secrecy and another by violence (Ad 2). Now the proximate end changes the species.

ART. V.—WHETHER THEFT IS ALWAYS A SIN.

YES.—It has a twofold character of sin.

THE REASON is that theft, inasmuch as it is the taking of another's thing, is opposed to justice; and inasmuch as it secretly withdraws another's thing it has the character of guile or fraud.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THEFT IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that by theft man does injury to his neighbor in his property; and if men generally were to steal from one another human society would perish. Wherefore theft, as being contrary to charity, which is the spiritual life of the soul, is a mortal sin.

NOTE: Regarding the words of Prov. vi, 30: "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen," it should be said that theft is said to be not such a great fault: 1) On account of the necessity inducing one to steal, which diminishes fault, or takes it away altogether. Hence it is added: "For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul." 2) Theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that "if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy his soul" (Ad 1).—Reason accounts as nothing that which is little. Yet if a man's intention is to rob and injure his neighbor there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere thought (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: The theft of \$75 is today reckoned absolute matter in the U. S., even if a millionaire or the government be the victim. St. Thomas does not here consider light matter in theft.]

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO STEAL THROUGH STRESS OF NEED.

YES.—If the need is clear and urgent, then a man can lawfully relieve his necessity from another's things, whether these are taken openly or in secret; this is not properly theft or robbery.

THE REASON is that this would not be against the natural or divine law. For according to the natural order established by divine providence inferior things are ordered to relieve man's need. Hence the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human law does not hinder man from relieving his need from these things. For human law cannot derogate from the natural or divine law.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ROBBERY MAY BE COMMITTED WITHOUT SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that in human society no one has coercive power save the public authority; hence whoever takes anything from another by violence, if he be a private person not exercising public authority, acts unlawfully, and commits robbery.

NOTE: If they who take spoils from the enemy are waging a just war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless, even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. If, however, those who take the spoil are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THEFT IS A MORE GRIEVOUS SIN THAN ROBBERY.

NO.—Robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, not only in point of involuntariness, but also in point of injurious taking.

THE REASON is that robbery is involuntary through violence; but theft, through ignorance, as was said above (art. 4); moreover, because by robbery not only is loss inflicted on a man in his things, but he is also humiliated and wronged; this is of graver import than fraud or guile, which comes under the head of theft.

QUESTION LXVII**THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE IN JUDGING.**

Here we are to consider the vices opposed to commutative justice, which consist

in words whereby the neighbor is injured: 1) Words connected with judicial proceedings; 2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.

Under the first head five points occur for consideration: 1) The injustice of a judge in judging; 2) the injustice of prosecutor in accusing; 3) the injustice of the defendant in defending himself; 4) the injustice of the witness in giving evidence; 5) the injustice of the advocate in defending. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER A MAN CAN JUSTLY JUDGE ONE WHO IS NOT SUBJECT TO HIS JURISDICTION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the sentence of a judge must have coercive force; otherwise, the judgment would not be efficacious. Now coercive power is lawfully possessed in human affairs only by one who holds a public office. But those who hold public office are considered the superiors of those over whom they receive power, as over subjects. Wherefore no one can justly judge anyone else unless he be his subject, whether by ordinary or by delegated power.

NOTE: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the judgment of others, although these be not his superiors; wherefore it is necessary that the arbitors be upheld by a penalty. Thus Christ voluntarily submitted to human judgment (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A JUDGE TO PRONOUNCE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE TRUTH THAT HE KNOWS, ON ACCOUNT OF EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

YES.—If, after close examination, the judge cannot legally reject the evidence adduced to the contrary, he must follow it in rendering his judgment.

THE REASON is that to judge belongs to a judge, not as a private person, but in so far as he exercises a public charge; and therefore he must inform himself in judging, not according to what he knows as a private person, but according to what becomes known to him as a public person, i.e., according to public laws and by witnesses and documents.

NOTE: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER A JUDGE MAY CONDEMN A MAN WHO IS NOT ACCUSED.

NO.—THE REASON is that justice does not relate to oneself but to another. Hence a judge must judge between one man and another. This is done when one party is the prosecutor and the other is the defendant. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethics*, V, 4): "Men resort to a judge as to justice personified."

NOTE: God in judging man proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth (Ad 3), and uses the conscience of the sinner as the prosecutor, according to Rom. ii, 15: "Conflicting thoughts accuse or defend them;" or also the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to Gen. iv, 10: "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth" (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE JUDGE CAN LAWFULLY REMIT THE PUNISHMENT.

NO.—Unless he be a supreme judge, and he who suffered the injury is willing to remit it.

THE FIRST REASON is on the part of the prosecutor, for the judge is bound to give each man his right.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of the state, for it is to be to the interest of the commonwealth that wrongdoers should be punished. Yet the supreme judge, or sovereign, since he has supreme authority in the state, can lawfully acquit the person accused, if the one who suffered injury is willing to remit it, and if this does not seem to be injurious to the public weal.

QUESTION LXVIII MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO ACCUSE.

YES.—If the accuser can show that the crime whereof someone is accused will

result in harm to the commonwealth, or in the physical or spiritual corruption of the multitude; otherwise, no one is held to accusation.

THE REASON is that we are all bound to procure the peace of the commonwealth, and this is done, among other things, by the punishment of sinners.—If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot prove the crime, a man is not bound to attempt accusation, for no one is held to do that which he cannot carry through.

NOTE: 1. The difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducting either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth, to which accusation is directed (in body of art.).

2. Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors—or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity (Ad 2).

3. It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person, but not if they be revealed for the good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence, it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good; and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE ACCUSATION TO BE MADE IN WRITING.

YES.—THE REASON is that what is expressed orally is easily forgotten; hence the judge, when he pronounces judgment, cannot be certain what has been said, and how it was said, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing.

NOTE: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs; wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation; and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER AN ACCUSATION IS RENDERED UNJUST BY CALUMNY, COLLUSION, OR EVASION.

YES.—THE REASON is that by charging the accused with a false crime, i.e., by calumny, a man acts unjustly against him, for no one ought to injure another unjustly in order to promote the common good; by collusion, i.e., by having recourse to fraud in helping the opposing party and betraying one's own side; and by evasion (*tergiversatio*), i.e., by withdrawing altogether from the accusation, as if by turning the back (*tergum vertere*), the good of the commonwealth, which is principally sought in accusation, is maliciously impeded when anyone with malicious intent hinders the punishment of retaliation on himself (Ad 1).

NOTE: It happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone because he believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; whereas, on the other hand, sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN ACCUSER WHO FAILS TO PROVE HIS INDICTMENT IS BOUND TO THE PUNISHMENT OF RETALIATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is just that he who by accusation endangers anyone with grave punishment ought himself to suffer similar punishment; this is required by the equality of justice between the accuser and the accused.—Nevertheless, should the judge know that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation (Ad 1).

NOTE: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. Now the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, though the accuser cannot condone the injury done to the commonwealth; this may however, be done by the ruler, who has charge of the commonwealth (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXIX SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE CAN, WITHOUT A MORTAL SIN, DENY THE TRUTH WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ONE'S CONDEMNATION.

NO.—If the judge demands the truth from him according to the form of the law.

THE REASON is that it belongs to the order of justice that a man obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (q. lxvii, art. 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth that the latter exacts from him according to the form of the law. Hence if he refuse to tell a truth that he is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously denies it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise; but it is not lawful for him to tell a lie.

NOTE: When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not bare his guilt, but his built is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey (Ad 1).

2. He who lies in court by denying his guilt acts both against the love of God, to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to prove his accusation (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: So St. Thomas, in view of medieval judicial procedure, which today is antiquated. In ancient times a culprit whose crime was partially proved was bound to confess the truth, and, if he refused, was tortured. Today it is never strictly demanded by civilized modern codes that the accused confess his crime. In a Roman Council of 1725, Benedict XIII commanded that no oath be exacted from the accused. Now if no oath may be imposed on the accused, this is a sign that the Church is unwilling to have the accused forced to confess his crime. Therefore, the principle imposed by all the ancient theologians: "The accused when lawfully and in due order interrogated by the judge is bound to tell the truth," though true even today, must be understood with the qualification that the judge cannot now, in the form of law, oblige the accused to confess his crime.

Noldin, *Theologia Moralis II*, N. 732, says that the very denial of crime by the accused is not a lie, but a broadly mental reservation, since it denies that the accused has committed a crime that he is bound to confess. Hence, there being no question of obedience to the judge in this case, there can be no lie.]

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACCUSED MAY DEFEND HIMSELF WITH CALUMNIES.

NO.—He may neither tell a falsehood nor omit a truth that he is bound to reveal; neither may be resort to fraud or deception—in brief, he may not defend himself with calumnies.

THE REASON is that all these things have the character of a lie. There are, however, times when he may omit a truth, for no one is bound to confess the whole truth, but only that which the judge may and should require from him according to due order of law, for instance when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already partially proved, i.e., on the testimony of one weighty witness, whose word cannot be discredited.

NOTE: If the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful. Yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful. For human laws leave many things

unpunished, which, according to divine judgment, are sins, as for example simple fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to direct (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR THE ACCUSED TO ESCAPE JUDGMENT BY APPEALING.

YES.—If the appeal is made in the confidence of the justness of the case; but if it is made so that a just sentence may not be passed against the accused, it is unjust.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this is to escape prudently, since the accused is unjustly condemned by the judge.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this is to use calumnies to defend oneself; for it does injury both to the judge, whose office it hinders, and to one's opponent, whose justice one disturbs as far as one is able.

NOTE: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance if the proconsul orders one thing and the emperor another. Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly to have recourse to the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN WHO IS CONDEMNED TO DEATH MAY LAWFULLY DEFEND HIMSELF IF HE CAN.

NO.—If he is justly condemned.

THE REASON is that it is lawful for the judge to combat the resistance of the accused, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he sins.

NOTE: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death. Wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself (Ad 2).

NOTE: According to a commonly accepted opinion, one who is justly sentenced to death can break prison, but he is not bound to do this, even if unjustly condemned, as can be seen in the case of the martyrs.—Paris.

**QUESTION LXX
INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO GIVE EVIDENCE.

YES.—a) If the evidence is required by the authority of the superior, to whom the administration of justice belongs, and this in manifest things; b) independently of the superior's authority, if evidence is required in order to free a man either from unjust death, or any other unjust punishment, or from unjust defamation, or other hurt, then a man is bound to give evidence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this case a man is bound according to the order of the law, namely in manifest things, and when ill report has preceded. If however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance on secret matters, and those of which no ill report has preceded, he is not bound to give evidence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this is a commandment of the Lord, for it is said in Ps. lxxxix, 4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner;" and Prov. xxiv, 11: "Deliver them who are led to death;" and Rom. i, 32: "They are worthy of death, not only they who do them, but also they who consent to them," of which a gloss says: "To be silent when one can disapprove is to consent."

NOTE: 1. In matters pertaining to a man's condemnation, no one is bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by a superior in accordance with the

order of justice; since if the truth of the matter is concealed no particular injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it matters not, since he risked the danger of his own accord. But it is different with the accused, who suffered the danger against his will (at end of art.).

2. As regards the giving of evidence on matters secretly committed to someone outside sacramental Confession, a man is bound to make them known either by giving evidence or by denunciation, if they involve the spiritual or physical corruption of the community, or will result in grave harm to an individual, or something else of the sort, for otherwise a man would break the faith he owes to another. But such secrets as one is not bound to make known, he is by no means bound to reveal, even by command of a superior, because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to go counter to natural right (Ad 2).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OF TWO OR THREE PERSONS SUFFICES.

YES.—If the witnesses are in substantial agreement.

THE REASON is that in human acts, which are about things contingent and variable, it is unnecessary to have demonstrative certitude, but a probable certitude suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases, though it may fail in the minority. For such is the certitude based on the testimony of two or three witnesses, which is confirmed by divine and human law (Deut. xix, 15: "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand.")

NOTE: As regards the agreement or disagreement of witnesses, if the point on which evidence is given does not touch the substance of the fact—e.g., whether the weather were cloudy or fair, whether the house were painted or not—such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, because men do not usually take much notice of such things. On the contrary, if the witnesses disagree about the time or place in which a thing happened they seem not to be speaking of the same event. If the witnesses for the same side disagree the judge ought to use his own discretion in deciding which side to favor. If one witness contradicts himself about a thing he has seen or heard his evidence should be rejected, but not if he is questioned about matter of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer differently according to the different things he has seen or heard (Ad 2).

Those who give evidence against those who have to judge other men should not be too readily believed, because they often have many enemies on account of their justice (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN'S EVIDENCE CAN BE REJECTED WITHOUT ANY FAULT OF HIS.

YES.—The evidence of any man can sometimes be rejected on account of the fault (of the witness himself), and sometimes without his fault.

THE REASON is that it is probable that on account of fault (of the witness) the evidence is weakened, as in the case of unbelievers and persons of ill repute, or public criminals. Sometimes the witness's deficiency is due to a defect in the reason, or to personal feeling, or to some external condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to give evidence against the truth.

Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either with or without fault of his.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN TO GIVE FALSE EVIDENCE.

YES.—On three counts.

THE REASON is that, first, false evidence is perjury, for witnesses are not admitted unless they are sworn; and this is always a mortal sin; secondly, because it is a violation of justice, which is generally a mortal sin; and thirdly, because it is a lie, which can be a mortal sin if it is gravely injurious, otherwise it is venial.

NOTE: To give false evidence, not directly and intentionally, but accidentally and contrary to the witness' intention, is not a mortal sin. If, however, the witness afterwards realizes that what he attested is false he is bound to retract it, unless this retraction cannot be made without grave inconvenience to himself. Otherwise he would

incur the burden of restitution if, when he could avert loss by his retraction he did not do so.

2. An unjust judgment is no judgment; hence the false evidence given in an unjust judgment in order to prevent injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment but only by reason of the oath violated (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXI

INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE COUNSEL

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AN ADVOCATE IS BOUND TO DEFEND THE SUITS OF THE POOR.

NO.—Unless the need of the poor is pressing at this present moment.

THE REASON is that, since no one can bestow works of mercy on all the poor, it suffices if a man bestow a work of mercy on the needy who meet him here and now, namely when it is not easy to see how he can be helped otherwise. For if it is easy to see how he can otherwise be aided, either by his own efforts or by another person who is more closely united to him or has greater means, he is not strictly bound to relieve the needy person, so that he would sin by not doing so; although if he did aid him without being bound he would do a praiseworthy deed.—The same thing can be said of a doctor, notary, agent, and all others who perform a public office.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT THE LAW SHOULD DEBAR CERTAIN PERSONS FROM THE OFFICE OF ADVOCATE.

YES.—Both on the ground of disability and on that of unbecomingness.

THE REASON is that a defect with respect to someone's being able becomingly to exercise the office of advocate can be either essential, or by reason of impossibility, as in the case of those who lack either understanding, as minors and the insane, or perception, as the deaf and dumb; or by reason of unbecomingness, or in regard to the fact that a person is bound by higher obligations, as in the case of monks and clerics, unless they should be chosen to represent certain churches; or because of the defect of the person, either bodily, as in the case of the blind, or spiritual, as in the case of those who have lost reputation, been condemned for grave crimes, or are unbelievers, for it is not becoming that one should plead for justice for another if he himself has despised justice in his own case.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN ADVOCATE SINS BY DEFENDING AN UNJUST CAUSE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it gives both aid and counsel to one whose cause he has espoused. Hence if he knowingly defends an unjust cause, he sins gravely without any doubt, and is bound to make good the loss that the other party incurred unjustly because of his help. For his is a co-operation in evil. But if he defended an unjust cause in ignorance, thinking it to be just, he is excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.

NOTE: If an advocate believes from the outset that his cause is just, and discovers afterwards, while the case is proceeding, that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR AN ADVOCATE TO TAKE A FEE FOR PLEADING.

YES.—If he takes a moderate amount, gauged by the economic status of his client, the matter at hand, the labor expended, and the custom of the country.

THE REASON is that what one is not bound to give to another one can justly receive as recompense for giving it. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always bound to donate his services. Hence, if he sells his services he does not act unjustly. The same reasoning applies to the physician and other professional persons.

QUESTION LXXII

VERBAL INJURIES OUTSIDE THE COURTS, IN RESPECT FIRST OF REVILING

Here we consider verbal injuries uttered extrajudicially: 1) Reviling; 2) backbiting; 3) tale bearing; 4) derision; 5) cursing. The first point takes four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER REVILING CONSISTS IN WORDS.

YES.—THE REASON is that it properly belongs to reviling when a man publishes something against another's honor, and thus brings it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This is done by means of signs, among which words hold the first place, "since they have the chief place for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives" (Augustine). Hence reviling strictly speaking consists in words. Hence Isidore says (*Etym.*, lib. X, at letter C): "A reviler is hasty, and bursts out in injurious words." Yet reviling in a wider sense extends even to deeds.

NOTE: Reviling properly consists in words that injuriously manifest another's fault; taunting, in words that injuriously reveal a defect of fault and punishment in general, or a physical defect; upbraiding manifests a defect of inferiority or indigence, and properly take places when someone injuriously reminds another that he has aided him when he was in need (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER REVILING OR RAILING IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—If reviling words are uttered with the intention of dishonoring.

THE REASON is that a man loves his honor no less than his material possessions. Hence properly and of itself taunting or reviling is no less a mortal sin than theft and robbery.—But if someone utters a taunting or reviling word to another for the sake of correction or something of the sort he does not commit a sin, unless he does this immoderately or incautiously; and in this case also there can be mortal sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO ALLOW ONESELF TO BE REVILED.

YES.—a) We are bound to hold ourselves in readiness to bear reviling, if this is expedient; b) sometimes, however, it behooves us to stand against being reviled.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this is according to the commandments of patience, as appears from Our Lord's words: "To him who strikes thee on the one cheek, offer to him the other also" (Luke vi, 29); that is, a man should be prepared to do this if necessary.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is twofold: 1) For the good of the one who does the reviling, so as to repress his audacity and so that he may attempt no further revilings. Hence when Our Lord received a blow He asked (John xviii, 23): "Why dost thou strike Me?" 2) For the good of the multitude, whose progress may be hindered by the revilings against us.

NOTE: One ought to repress the reviling of a detractor moderately, merely on account of a duty of charity, and not on account of a zeal for one's own honor. Hence it is said in Prov. xxvi, 4: "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him."

ART. IV.—WHETHER REVILING ARISES FROM ANGER.

YES.—It arises chiefly from anger.

THE REASON is that the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him; and thus reviling has a great affinity to the end of anger, which is revenge.

NOTE: Reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless, pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will (Ad 1).

**QUESTION LXXIII
BACKBITING**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER BACKBITING IS SUITABLY DEFINED AS THE BLACKENING OF ANOTHER'S CHARACTER BY WORDS.

YES.—By secret words.

THE REASON is that backbiting differs from reviling in two ways: 1) As regards the manner of uttering the words, inasmuch as the reviler speaks openly against someone, whereas the backbiter speaks secretly; 2) as regards the end intended, or the

injury done, because the reviler detracts from one's honor, and the backbiter from one's reputation.—(Hence backbiting is defined as the unjust blackening of another's reputation by means of secret words).

NOTE: 1. The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a person to his face (Ad 2).

2. A man is said to backbite (*detrabere*) another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: First, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER BACKBITING IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that to detract from anyone's reputation is a very grave sin, inasmuch as among temporal things reputation seems to be the most precious, since when it is lost a man is hindered from doing many good things. For this reason it is said in Ecclus. xli, 15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee more than a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.

NOTE: If anyone utter words that tarnish a man's reputation for some necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstance, it is not a sin, nor can it be called backbiting. The due circumstances are these: 1) That the revelation be made no further, and to no more persons, than is necessary to avoid evil or obtain a good; 2) that it be probable that the revelation will have a good effect; 3) that it be done from a right intention; 4) that the good to be obtained, or the evil to be averted, is of some importance.

2.) If anyone utter disparaging words out of lightness of heart, or for some unnecessary reason, there is no mortal sin, unless perchance the word that is said is so serious as to cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And in such a case one is bound to restore another's good name (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER BACKBITING IS THE GRAVEST OF ALL SINS COMMITTED AGAINST ONE'S NEIGHBOR.

NO.—Properly speaking, backbiting in respect of its genus is a greater sin than theft; yet it is a lesser sin than murder or adultery.

THE REASON is that a greater injury is done to a man by taking away a good of the body than by taking away his external goods. Hence among the other sins that are committed against the neighbor, murder is the gravest, by which the already existing life of the neighbor is taken away; next to this comes adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, which is the entrance-way to life. Among the external goods reputation ranks above riches, as being nearer to spiritual goods; hence it is said in Prov. xxii, 1: "A good name is better than great riches."—Accidentally, however, the gravity of the sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously if he sins deliberately than if he sins through weakness or carelessness.

NOTE: Anger, which seeks openly to be avenged, is the mother of reviling. But backbiting, which takes place in secret, is rather the daughter of envy than of anger. It is the characteristic of envy to lessen the neighbor's glory (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS A GRAVE SIN FOR THE LISTENER TO TOLERATE A BACKBITER.

YES.—One who induces another to backbite, or if he is pleased with the backbiting on account of his hatred for its object, sins no less than the backbiter, and sometimes more.

THE REASON is, as the Apostle says (Rom. i, 32): "Those who practice such things are deserving of death. And not only do they do these things, but they applaud others doing them."

NOTE: If anyone fails to withstand the backbiter through fear, negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule, venially. Sometimes, however, even this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to correct the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin (at end of art.).

2. One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convict him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth; rather ought one to remove him with words, inasmuch as he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least to show by one's pained demeanor that one is displeased with his backbiting, because, according to Prov. xxv, 23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue" (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXIV TALE-BEARING

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER TALE-BEARING IS A SIN DISTINCT FROM BACKBITING.

YES.—Tale-bearing and backbiting, though they agree in the matter and in the manner of speaking, differ in their ends.

THE REASON is that the backbiter and the tale-bearer both speak evil in secret of their neighbor; but the backbiter intends to blacken his reputation; the tale-bearer intends to break up friendship, according to Prov. xxvi, 20: "Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease." And again (Ecclus. xxviii, 11): "A sinful man will trouble his friends and bring in debate in the midst of them who are at peace."

NOTE: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer. For, since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. xxviii, 15): "The tale-bearer and the double-tongued is accursed," and adds, "for he has troubled men who were at peace" (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER BACKBITING IS A GRAVER SIN THAN TALE-BEARING.

NO.—Tale-bearing is a graver sin than backbiting, and even than reviling.

THE REASON is that a sin against the neighbor is so much the more grievous as it does more injury to the neighbor. Now the friendship that the tale-bearer seeks to destroy is better than honor, and it is better to be loved than to be honored. For among the other external goods a friend ranks first, because "no man can live without friends" (Aristotle: *Ethics*, book vii, chap. 1). Hence it is said in Ecclus. vi, 15: "Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend."

QUESTION LXXV DERISION

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DERISION IS A SPECIAL SIN DISTINCT FROM THOSE ALREADY MENTIONED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the end of derision is distinct from the others. For, even as someone by railing intends to injure the honor of the person at whom he rails; and by backbiting, to depreciate a good name; and by tale-bearing to destroy friendship; so also by derision he intends to bring shame on the one he derides.

NOTE: 1. Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the mouth, i.e., by words and laughter, whereas laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Ps. ii, 4: "He who dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Such a distinction does not differentiate the species (Ad 1).

2. Derision has a special character of malice in that it disturbs and confuses another's conscience. For a secure and calm conscience is a great good (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER DERISION CAN BE A MORTAL SIN.

Yes.—Derision in little matters is a venial sin; in important matters it is a

mortal sin, and more grievous in proportion to the reverence due the person who is mocked.

THE REASON is that a derision that is concerned with a slight misfortune or defect can be taken in sport, although it involves some contempt; but if the misfortune that is derided is great, then it is not taken in sport but seriously, and thus contempt is a grievous sin, indeed more grievous than reviling, inasmuch as the reviler seems to take another's misfortune seriously, and the reviler does so in jest, and so would seem more to despise and dishonor the other man.

QUESTION LXXVI CURSING

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO CURSE ANYONE.

YES.—Not strictly speaking, but accidentally, it is lawful to curse someone.

THE REASON is that in cursing taken accidentally the chief intention of the speaker is not directed to evil but to good, either under the aspect of justice, as when God and the Church curse; or under the aspect of utility, for instance when someone wishes a sinner to suffer illness in order that he may be made better.—Strictly speaking, however, to curse is to command or desire another's evil as intending the evil itself, and thus in either way, viz., by commanding or desiring, it is unlawful.

NOTE: To curse, which is to speak evil ill of another, considered in the indicative mood, belongs to detraction (in body of art).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO CURSE AN IRRATIONAL CREATURE.

YES.—a) To curse irrational creatures in so far as they are creatures of God is entirely unlawful; b) to curse them considered in themselves is also unlawful; c) to curse them in so far as they have a relation to men is lawful.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such cursing redounds on God, and therefore is blasphemy.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such cursing is idle and vain.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such cursing redounds on man. And this can happen in three ways: a) In so far as human need is relieved by irrational creatures; and in this way the Lord told man: "Cursed be the earth in thy work" (Gen. iii, 17), viz., that man might be punished by its barrenness; b) by way of signification; and thus the Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea; c) by way of something containing man, viz., time and place; and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of original sin, which he contracted by being born, and on account of the consequent penalties; and in this sense also it can be understood that David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in II Kings i, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

ART. III.—WHETHER CURSING IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Cursing, by which evil is pronounced against anyone, either by command or desire, is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that to wish another's evil, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is of its very nature contrary to charity.

NOTE: It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin, either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention (at end of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CURSING IS A GRAVER SIN THAN BACKBITING.

NO.—Considered in itself, and other things being equal, backbiting is a graver sin than cursing.

THE FIRST REASON is that backbiting, as also reviling, tale-bearing, and derision, speak the evil of fault; cursing, the evil of punishment.

THE SECOND REASON is that the above named vices bring injury to the neighbor, whereas cursing, as it is here taken only, desires injury to the neighbor.

But the cursing that takes place by way of command, when it has the aspect of cause, can be more or less grievous than detraction, if it inflicts greater or less injury than is the blackening of one's good name.

QUESTION LXXVII

CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING

We must now consider those sins that relate to voluntary exchanges: 1) Cheating, which is committed in buying and selling; 2) usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is found apart from robbery or theft. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO SELL A THING FOR MORE THAN ITS WORTH.

NO.—a) To use fraud to sell a thing for more than its just price is clearly a sin; b) to sell a thing more dearly, or buy it more cheaply, than it is worth is in itself unjust and unlawful; c) in so far as buying and selling tend accidentally to the advantage of one party and to the disadvantage of the other, a thing can be lawfully sold at more than it is worth in itself; d) but if someone is greatly helped by another's thing that he receives, and he who sells is not at a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is always a sin to deceive the neighbor to his disadvantage.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if the price exceeds the amount of a thing's value, or if conversely the thing exceeds the price, the equality of justice is destroyed.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing that is sold but also on the loss that the sale brings on the seller.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that the advantage that accrues to the buyer is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his own, although he may charge for the loss that is his.

On the other hand, if a man finds that he derives great advantage from something he has bought he may, of his own accord, pay the seller something over and above; and this pertains to his honesty.

NOTE: The just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER A SALE IS RENDERED UNLAWFUL THROUGH A FAULT IN THE THING SOLD.

YES.—Either if the defect of the thing be in respect of its substance, as when one thing is sold in place of what it purports to be; or if the defect is in respect of quantity; or if it is in respect of quality.

THE REASON is that in these cases, if the seller acts knowingly he commits fraud, and is held to restitution.—But if the seller does this in ignorance he does not sin; but he is bound, when the error comes to his knowledge, to make good the loss to the buyer (unless the seller declares to the buyer that he is unwilling to guarantee the thing against defect; for then the buyer buys the thing at his own risk).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SELLER IS BOUND TO STATE DEFECTS OF THE THING SOLD.

YES.—a) If the defect of the thing is hidden, and may occasion loss and danger to the buyer—of loss, if by reasons of this defect the goods are of less value, of danger if the defect hinders the use of the goods—then the seller is bound to state the defect of the thing. b) But if the defect is manifest, or if the goods, though useless to the seller, are useful to someone else, and if the seller makes the proper rebate on account of this defect, he is not bound to manifest the defect of the thing.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to give anyone occasion of loss and danger is always unlawful. Hence if such defects are hidden, and the seller does not reveal them

the selling will be unlawful and dishonest, and the seller is bound to make good the loss.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that perhaps such a defect would make the buyer want more taken from the price than should be taken; nor is it necessary that a man always give another help or advise to promote the other's interests.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN TRADING IT IS LAWFUL TO SELL A THING AT A HIGHER PRICE THAN WHAT WAS PAID FOR IT.

YES.—a) To sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid for it in order to obtain the necessaries of life is lawful and commendable; b) but it is unlawful for a tradesman to do this for the sake of gain, unless it is subordinate to some worthy end.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such an exchange serves a natural need, and is improperly called trading.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this kind of trading, considered in itself, satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and tends to infinity.—Nevertheless gain, which is the end of trading, although by its nature it does not imply anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue. Hence nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end; and thus trading becomes lawful (not done by reason of greed); as when a man devotes a moderate profit, which he seeks to acquire by trading, to the upkeep of his home.

NOTE: One is properly said to trade when one buys in order to sell at a higher price. Now such an exchange is natural and necessary for the needs of life, and is not properly called trading because it does not belong to tradesmen, but rather to house-keepers or civil servants, who have to provide the household or the state with the necessities of life (in body of art. and Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXVIII

THE SIN OF USURY, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN LOANS

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS A SIN TO TAKE USURY FOR MONEY LENT.

YES.—To take usury, i.e., a price for use, for money lent is unjust, considered in itself.

THE REASON is that money is reckoned among those things in which dominion is transferred by loan, inasmuch as the use of these things consist in their consumption. Hence to demand a price for the use of such things is to sell the same thing twice, or to sell what does not exist, as in the case of one who demands money both for the wine that he sells and for the buyer's consumption of the wine. For money, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, bk. v, c. 5; and *Politics*, bk. i, c. 5 and 6), was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchanges and thus the proper and primary use of money consists in its consumption, or alienation, whereby it is expended in exchange.—Hence the Philosopher is induced by natural reason to say (*Polit.*, bk. i, c. 7) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural" (Ad 3).

NOTE: Human law has permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: Usury as such is always illicit, and condemned by the Council of Vienne: 'If anyone falls into the error that presumes obstinately to affirm that to exact usury is not a sin, we decree that he should be punished as a heretic.']

Usury as the Holy Doctor defines it means the taking of money for a thing that does not exist, or charging for the consumption of a thing that has no value in itself. In his time money lent was not used generally to produce more wealth but for expenditure on things of immediate use, such as arms for the Crusaders. When opportunities for investment increased, money began to have a value of its own, and hence it became lawful to exact a price for money that one might otherwise turn to use by investment, or for the risk of the capital, or for the loss one sustains by depriving himself temporarily of capital.

The Code of Canon Law practically closes the controversy by stating that in the loan of a fungible thing, e.g., money, it is not in itself illicit to make an agreement about the legal interest. Can. 1543]

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ASK FOR ANY OTHER KIND OF CONSIDERATION FOR MONEY LENT.

NO.—It is not lawful to demand any consideration for money lent if it can be

measured by money. On the other hand, compensation can be exacted in respect of such things as are not measured by money, for instance, benevolence, love for the lender, and so on.

THE REASON is that anything is reckoned as money if its price can be measured by money. But it is unlawful to demand money for the loan of money (prec. art.).

NOTE. 1. A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money, because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having. [Tr. Note: This must be understood in reference to conditions in medieval times.]

2. To expect or exact for money lent, as though by agreement, tacit or expressed, repayment in the form of some remuneration of service or words is regarded as usury. But to expect or exact this, not as an obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money value, is lawful (Ad 3).

3. To sell at a higher price than is just, because the buyer will not immediately pay, is to commit usury, for this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan. The same thing must be said of the buyer, if he wishes to buy at a price cheaper than is just, on the ground that he pays his money sooner than the thing can be delivered, because even this anticipation of the payment of money has the character of a loan.

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: St. Alphonsus, de Lugo, Lessius, Toletus, Sanchez, and others hold that it is lawful for anyone to sell his goods more dearly because of a delay in payment, provided that this difference does not exceed the value of the thing.)

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO RESTORE WHATEVER PROFITS HE HAS MADE OUT OF MONEY GOTTEN BY USURY.

NO.—a) If what is extorted by usury is things whose use is their consumption, a man is bound to restore only what he took; b) but if these things are those whose use is not their consumption, a man is bound to restore, not only the thing itself, but also the fruits received therefrom.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the things whose use is their consumption do not admit of usufruct according to the law; for what is acquired from such a thing is not the fruit of that thing, but of human industry. Hence he is not bound to restitution, unless perchance another has suffered loss through the lender's retaining them, by losing something of his own goods; for then he is bound to make good the loss.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such fruits belong to things of which another is the owner, and thus they are due to him, as in the renting of houses or fields, and the like.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO BORROW MONEY UNDER A CONDITION OF USURY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although it is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet to turn another's sin to good use is lawful, for even God uses all sins for something good, since from every evil He draws some good. Hence, in the matter at hand, though it is by no means lawful to induce anyone to make loans at usury, it is lawful to accept a loan at usury from one who is prepared to make such loans, and who practices usury, if this is done for some good, such as the relief of one's own or another's need.

NOTE: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion for sin in the malice of his heart (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXIX THE INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE THAT ARE TO DO GOOD AND AVOID EVIL

Here we consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are to do good and avoid evil; and the opposed vices. The first question is in four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER TO AVOID EVIL AND DO GOOD ARE PARTS OF JUSTICE.

YES.—To do good and avoid evil, under the special aspect of good and evil, are integral parts of general and special justice.

THE REASON is that both are required for a perfect act of justice. For justice, as a special virtue, regards good under the aspect of what is due to the neighbor; and in this respect it belongs to special justice to do good under the aspect of what is due in relation to the neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, viz., what is harmful to the neighbor. It belongs to general justice to do a good that is due in relation to the community and to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.

Hence to do good and avoid evil are integral parts of both aspects of justice.

NOTE: 1. If we speak of good and evil in general, to do good and avoid evil belong to every virtue; and in this respect they cannot be reckoned parts of justice (at beginning of art.).

2. To avoid evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz., not to do evil; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term avoid (*declinare*) shows. This is meritorious, especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER TRANSGRESSION IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that it belongs to the proper character of transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt, just as it belongs to the proper notion of legal justice to consider a precept as binding.

THE SECOND REASON is that transgression properly so called is opposed to a negative precept, even as omission is opposed to an affirmative one.

ART. III.—WHETHER OMISSION IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—The omission of a good that is due.

THE REASON is that such an omission is opposed to a special part of justice, which is to do good.—Transgression is opposed to another part of justice, namely to avoid evil.

NOTE. Omission is actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it, but inasmuch as the negation of an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of action (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A SIN OF OMISSION IS MORE GRIEVOUS THAN A SIN OF TRANSGRESSION.

NO.—Simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a more grievous sin than omission, although some omission can be more grievous than some transgression.

THE REASON is that a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation. Now transgression is contrary to an act of virtue, whereas omission denotes the negation of the act; for instance, it is a sin of transgression if one fails to give one's parents due respect, and a sin of omission if one reviles them or injures them in any way.

NOTE: 1. Both omission and transgression are opposed to doing good; but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness; wherefore transgression is the more grievous sin (Ad 2).

2. Omission also deserves, not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, according to Matth. vii, 19: "Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire;" and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good, as does transgression (Ad 4).

QUESTION LXXX THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE

Here we are to consider the potential parts of justice, that is, the virtues annexed to it, and under this head there are two points of consideration: 1) What virtues are annexed to justice? 2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.

ART.—WHETHER THE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO JUSTICE ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED.

YES.—The following virtues: a) By reason of falling short of the aspect of equality: Religion, piety, and observance; b) by reason of falling short of the aspect of due: Truth, gratitude, vengeance, liberality, and friendship.

THE REASON is that the first group of annexed virtues are those that are annexed to a (cardinal) virtue, not only on account of a correspondence with it, but also, in order to supply, as far as possible, its deficiency. Now justice, whose property is to render to each his due, can fall short in two ways from the aspect of equality and from the aspect of due. From the aspect of equality: With regard to God, parents, and virtue. For whatever is rendered to God, or to parents, and to virtue, is by way of a debt of justice, but it can never be properly equal.

And thus the first three virtues are suitably assigned as though they were annexed to justice, namely religion to God, piety to parents, and observance to virtuous men, as Cicero says (*De Officiis*, bk. iv, chap. 3): "Men who excel in worth are rendered deference and honor."

Now the due of justice is twofold: Viz, legal, that which is according to the law; and moral, that which a man owes by reason of the rectitude of virtue. The legal due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. The moral due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and on the part of the one to whom it is due. In the first respect it is required that a man represent himself in words and in deeds such as he really is; and for this truth is annexed to justice. From the point of view of the person to whom it is due, we have gratitude for benefits, and vengeance for evil, that is, in the things that are necessary by way of what is due. In matters that conduce to greater rectitude there is added liberality, affability or friendship, or the like.

NOTE: *Epikeia* is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice; and would seem to be the same as that which goes by the name of *eugnomoſyne* (common sense) (Ad 5.

QUESTION LXXXI RELIGION

Here we are to consider each of the foregoing virtues in so far as our present scope demands: 1) Religion; 2) piety; 3) observance; 4) gratitude; 5) vengeance; 6) truth; 7) friendship; 8) liberality; 9) *epikeia*. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: 1) Religion considered in itself; 2) its acts; 3) the opposite vices. The first point takes eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER RELIGION DIRECTS MAN TO GOD ALONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that religion, whether it is derived from frequent reading over (*relectio*) (or meditation), or from the repeated choice (*re-electio*) of that which we have lost through neglect, or from being a bond (*religatio*) denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to whom we are primarily bound as to our unfailling principle.

NOTE: 1. Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration, and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of virtues that it commands, by directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue that is concerned with the end commands the virtues that are concerned with the means. Accordingly, "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from the world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or some similar virtue as eliciting (Ad 1).

2. *Latria* is that special kind of service of God which is given in a singular way, namely because He made all things and has supreme dominion over all (Ad 3).—A special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, for which reason a special kind of worship is due Him, which in Greek is called *eusebia* (lawful worship) or *theosebia*, or *theoseteia*. (divine worship) (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER RELIGION IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that every good human act pertains to virtue, for virtue

is that which makes him who has it good and renders his action good. Now to render honor to God, which belongs to religion, is good; for it is according to the order of justice. Therefore religion is a virtue.

NOTE: 1. Religion differs from the gift of the fear of God. For to pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (q. ix, art. 1 Ad 3).—Ad 1).

2. It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by divine or human law (*viz.* by divine or ecclesiastical laws).—(Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER RELIGION IS ONE VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that there is one formal aspect of the object of religion, namely to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely as the first principle of the creation and government of things.

ART. IV.—WHETHER RELIGION IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that it has a special aspect of good, namely to pay due honor to God. Now honor belongs to God by reason of His singular excellence, inasmuch as He infinitely surpasses all things and transcends them in every way.

NOTE: Religion is called a general virtue inasmuch as it commands all the other virtues, as was stated above (art. 1 of this q., Note 1).—(Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER RELIGION IS A THEORETICAL VIRTUE.

NO.—Religion is not a theological but a moral virtue.

THE REASON is that the object or matter of religion is not God Himself, as it is in the theological virtues, but the things that are directed to God as to their end, namely the offering of sacrifices and the like, whereby God is worshiped.—Thus faith, hope, and charity have an act in reference to God their proper object; wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER RELIGION SHOULD BE PREFERRED TO THE OTHER MORAL VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that religion approaches nearer to God than do the other moral virtues, inasmuch as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.

ART. VII.—WHETHER RELIGION HAS AN EXTERNAL ACT.

YES.—Religion involves internal acts as primarily and directly belonging to religion, and external acts as secondary, and ordained to the interior acts.

THE REASON is that the human mind in order to be united to God needs to be led by sensible things, according to the Apostle (Rom. i, 20): "His invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being understood through the things that are made." Hence in the divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts whereby he is united to God.

Regarding the words of Our Lord (John iv, 24) "God is a spirit, and they who adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth," note that Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER RELIGION IS THE SAME AS SANCTITY.

YES.—Religion is the same as sanctity essentially, but not logically.

THE REASON is that sanctity is that by which man's mind applies itself and its acts to God in purity and firmness; and this also belongs to the essence of religion.—For religion takes its name according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, etc.; whereas it is called sanctity according as man refers to God not only these but the works of the other vir-

tues, or according as man disposes himself through certain good works for divine worship; and in this respect religion differs logically from sanctity.

NOTE: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXII DEVOTION

We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly, we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer. The first subject has four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER DEVOTION IS A SPECIAL ACT.

YES.—An act of the will.

THE REASON is that devotion, which is so called from *devovere*, to vow, is nothing else than "the will to give oneself readily to the things that belong to the service of God," and this is a special act of the will.

NOTE: Since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God, who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER DEVOTION IS AN ACT OF RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as it belongs properly to religion to do those things that are ordained to divine worship, or service; so also it belongs to religion to have a ready will to perform those actions, and this is to be devout, for the object of both acts is the same.

NOTE: Charity both causes devotion, inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend, and feeds on devotion. Even so, all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CONTEMPLATION OR MEDITATION IS THE CAUSE OF DEVOTION.

YES.—On our part, or on the part of the intrinsic cause.

THE REASON is that every act of the will proceeds from some consideration: For good understood is an object of the will. Now devotion is an act of the will, as was stated. And thus meditation is the cause of devotion inasmuch as man conceives through meditating that he should give himself to the service of God.—The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God, who, as Ambrose says (commenting on Luke ix, 55): "And whom He wills He makes religious; the profane Samaritans, had He also willed, He would have made devout."

NOTE: We are led to the knowledge, and consequently to the love, of divine things by certain sensible things known to us, among which the chief is the humanity of Christ, as is said in the preface for Christmastide: "That through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible" (Ad 2).

2. A twofold consideration induces us to devotion: One on the part of God's goodness and benefits, the other on the part of man, who considers his own defects, because of which he needs to lean on God. The first arouses love, the other excludes presumption (in body of art.).

3. Science and anything else conducive to greatness is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion, whereas in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER JOY IS AN EFFECT OF DEVOTION.

YES.—The devotion that follows from a consideration of God's goodness first and directly causes joy; secondarily and accidentally, it causes sadness. Conversely, devotion,

which is a result of the consideration of our own defects, first and directly causes sadness, and accidentally, joy.

THE REASON is that the consideration of God's goodness, which is as it were the term of the movement of the will surrendering itself to God, is the direct cause of joy, according to Ps. lxxvi, 4: "I remembered God, and was delighted;" but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet fully enjoy God, according to Ps. xli, 3: "My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God;" and afterwards it is said (v. 4): "My tears have been my bread. . . ."—Contrariwise, a consideration of our own failings, which is as it were the term from which, of itself causes sorrow, and accidentally causes joy, on account of the hope and divine aid.

QUESTION LXXXIII

PRAYER

(in 17 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PRAYER IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER.

NO.—Prayer, as we are now using the term, inasmuch as it signifies a beseeching or petition, is not an act of the will, but of the practical reason.

THE REASON is that to seek or beseech, as also to command, denotes a certain ordering, inasmuch as man disposes something to be done by another. Now this belongs to reason, whose property is to order.

NOTE: 1. According to Cassiodorus (commenting on Ps. xxxviii, 13), prayer (*oratio*) is spoken reason (*oris ratio*). Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes, either by way of command or by way of petition or beseeching, i.e., of prayer (in body of art.).

2. God is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them before they put up a prayer (Ad 1).

3. In prayer what is chiefly to be sought is that we may be united to God, according to Ps. xxvi, 4: "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life" (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS REASONABLE TO PRAY.

YES.—Contrary to those who assert that a) human affairs are not governed by divine providence; b) that everything in the human sphere happens by necessity; c) that prayers change the ordering of divine providence.

(See, in the First Part, q. xix, a. 7 and 8, and q. xxii, art. 2 and 4, and q. cxv, art. 6, and q. cxvi).

THE REASON is that we do not pray in order to change the divine plan, which is impossible; but to obtain that which God has ordained should be fulfilled through our prayers, so that, namely, "by asking men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (*Dialogues*, bk. i, c. 8).

NOTE: God bestows many things on us out of His own liberality, even without being asked, but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us on our asking is for our good, that, namely, we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of all our blessings (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER PRAYER IS AN ACT OF RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that through prayer man shows reverence to God, inasmuch as he subjects himself to Him, and confesses in his prayer that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is manifest that prayer is properly an act of religion, by which religion moves man's intellect to God (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY TO GOD ALONE.

NO.—a) We direct our prayer to God alone that He may fulfill it; b) but we direct prayer to the holy angels and the saints by way of impetration.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that all our prayers must be directed to the

acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to Ps. lxxxiii, 12: "The Lord will give grace and glory."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that our prayers are made effective with God through the merits and prayers of the saints, according to Apoc. viii, 4: "And with the prayers of the saints there went up before God from the angel's hand the smoke of the incense." And this is evident from the practice of the Church.

NOTE: Whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word (Ad 2).—Those who are in purgatory do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or say, and so we do not ask their assistance by praying to them (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO ASK FOR SOMETHING DEFINITE WHEN WE PRAY.

YES.—There are certain goods that men cannot misuse, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it; and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, according to Ps. lxxix, 4: "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved."—With regard to other goods, the Holy Spirit helps our weakness, and, by inspiring in us holy desires, makes us ask for what is right (Rom. viii, 26).—(Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER MAN OUGHT TO ASK GOD FOR TEMPORAL THINGS WHEN HE PRAYS.

YES.—Not primarily, but as helps, whereby we are assisted in tending toward beatitude.

THE REASON is that bodily life is sustained by temporal goods, and they serve us as instruments in performing acts of virtue.

NOTE: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY FOR OTHERS.

YES.—By reason of charity.

THE REASON is that we ought to seek in prayer whatever we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things, not only for ourselves, but also for others; for this is essential to love, which we owe to our neighbor (q. xxv and xxvi).

[Tr. Note: Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv, in Matth.): "Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others; and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the outcome of necessity."]

ART. VIII.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO PRAY FOR OUR ENEMIES.

YES.—In the same way in which we ought to love them.

THE REASON is that to pray for others is an act of charity (prec. art).—Hence it is a matter of obligation that we not exclude our enemies in our common prayers, which we say for others. But that we pray specially for them is a matter of perfection, not of obligation, except in special cases, namely if an enemy is in need, or craves our pardon.

NOTE: The imprecations against enemies that are contained in the Holy Writ may be understood in four ways: First, according to the custom of the prophets to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation. Secondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of sin. Fourthly, by way of conforming our will to the divine justice, with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE SEVEN PETITIONS OF THE LORD'S PRAYER ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this

prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. Thus in the first petition: "Hallowed be Thy name," we desire the glory of God, which is our last end with respect to God. In the second: "Thy kingdom come," we ask that we may reach the end itself. Regarding the means to the end, we first ask for what primarily and directly leads to beatitude: "Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven." Secondly, we ask for what instrumentally helps us to merit: "Give us this day our daily bread;" whether this is understood of the Sacramental Bread, whose daily use is profitable to man, and in which all the other sacraments are also contained, or it is also understood of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food.

We next ask for the other things by which we are accidentally directed to beatitude, namely by the removal of obstacles, according to the three ways in which such obstacles exist: a) Sin—"Forgive us our trespasses;" b) that we be not overcome by temptation—"and lead us not into temptation;" c) that we may be delivered from evil, namely from the penalties of the present life, which is a kind of obstacle to the sufficiency of life—"Deliver us from evil."

NOTE: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask. This confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our regard, whereby He wills our good; and thus we say: "Our Father;" and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfill it—wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."

ART. X.—WHETHER PRAYER IS PROPER TO THE RATIONAL CREATURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that to pray is an act of reason, by which someone beseeches a superior. This properly belongs to the rational creation, namely angels and men, for angels are sometimes included under rational creatures (Ad 2).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN PRAY FOR US.

YES.—They pray for us better since they are in heaven than when they were in the body.

THE REASON is that prayer for others proceeds from charity (art. 7 and 8 of this q.). Now the saints in heaven have more perfect charity, and are more closely united to God. Hence wayfarers can all the more be helped by their prayers. And this is according to the divine order, which is that lower things should receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher.

NOTE: The prayers of the saints in heaven are efficacious in impetrating through their previous merits and through God's acceptance (Ad 1). Hence the saints pray for that which they deem will be granted through their prayers according to God's will (Ad 2).—Those who are in purgatory, though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer; and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but rather to be prayed for (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER PRAYER SHOULD BE VOCAL.

YES.—Both common or public prayer and, sometimes, individual or private prayer.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that common prayer, which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church representing the whole Christian people, should be made to the whole people for which it is offered; but this cannot be done unless it is vocal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that sometimes man's mind is moved by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, as regards apprehension, and consequently as regards the affections; b) that thus man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is, not only with his mind but also with his body; and this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory; c) on account of a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. xv, 9: "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."

ART. XIII.—WHETHER ATTENTION IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF PRAYER.

NO.—a) For merit it is not necessary that prayer be attentive throughout; b) for impetration the original intention suffices; c) for the spiritual refreshment of the mind actual attention is a necessary condition.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the force of the first intention, whereby someone sets about prayer, renders the whole prayer meritorious, as in the case with other meritorious acts (this is called a virtual intention).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God looks chiefly to this original intention.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, as is said in I Cor. xiv, 14: "If I pray in a tongue . . . my understanding is unfruitful."

NOTE: 1. There are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: One which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong (*superficial* attention); the second, which attends to the meaning of the words (*literal* attention); the third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely God, and to the thing we are praying for. This last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it (*spiritual* attention).—(At end of art.).

2. On account of the weakness of nature the human mind is unable to remain aloft for long, because human weakness thrusts down the soul to the level of inferior things, and hence it is that when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden it wanders off through weakness (Ad 2).—Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit (Ad 3).

ART. XIV.—WHETHER PRAYER SHOULD LAST A LONG TIME.

YES.—a) Considered in its cause, prayer should be continual and unintermittent; b) considered in itself, prayer cannot be continual.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the cause of prayer is the desire of charity, which ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for we ought to do all things for the glory of God (I Cor. x).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we must needs be occupied with other tasks.

NOTE: 1. The quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance, the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. Hence it is also fitting that prayer last as long a time as is helpful to arouse the fervor of interior desire. When it passes this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, prayer should be discontinued, whether it be individual or private, or common or public (in body of art.).

2. Noteworthy are these words of St. Augustine (*Ad Probam*, c. 10): "When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words, whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed, this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech" (Ad 1).

3. One is said to pray continually in these ways: a) On account of the continuation of the desire, as was stated above; b) through praying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; c) or by reason of the effect in the person who prays—because he remains more devout even after praying; d) when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying (Ad 4).

ART. XV.—WHETHER PRAYER IS MERITORIOUS.

YES.—In so far as it proceeds from the root of charity.

THE REASON is that eternal good, whose fruition we merit by the acts of the virtues, is the object of charity.

NOTE: 1. Prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer is an act, and with the concurrence of other virtues, namely humility and faith. Faith is necessary in reference to God, that we may believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary; but this belongs to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts. Prayer has its efficacy in impetrating from the grace of God, to whom we pray, and who instigates us to pray (in body of art.).

2. The prayer that impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace (i.e., actual grace) as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is a gift of God (Ad 1).

3. If that which is prayed for is useful for man's beatitude, through being con-

ductive to salvation, he merits it, not only by praying but also by doing other good works; and thus without any doubt he receives what he asks for, yet when he ought to receive it. But this may be hindered if he does not persevere in asking for it. Hence it is that four conditions are laid down: Namely to ask—*for ourselves—things necessary for salvation—piously—perseveringly*. When all these four conditions concur, we always obtain what we ask for.

In this way man can merit condignly through prayer eternal life and an increase of sanctifying grace (passim *ibid.*).

ART. XVI.—WHETHER SINNERS IMPETRATE ANYTHING FROM GOD BY THEIR PRAYERS.

YES.—a) God does not hear sinners, as sinners, through mercy, but sometimes through vengeance; b) He hears the sinner's prayer if it proceeds from a good desire of his nature, not out of justice but out of pure mercy.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God in anger can permit the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin, according to the sinner's own desire.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that God loves the sinner's nature but hates his sin.

NOTE: Although the sinners' prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace (Ad 2).

ART. XVII.—WHETHER THE PARTS OF PRAYER ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS SUPPLICATIONS, PRAYER, INTERCESSION, AND THANKSGIVING.

YES.—THE REASON is that three things are required for prayer commonly, one of which has two parts. It is required first that the person who prays should approach God, for prayer is "the raising up of one's mind to God;" and this part is called *prayer*. The second requisite is *petition*, which if it is definite is called *intercession*, and if it is indefinite is called *supplication*. If only a fact is stated in the prayer, it is called *insinuation* ("Behold, him whom Thou lovest is sick"); and this belongs to another part of prayer. The third condition is the reason for impetrating, which on the part of God is His sanctity, and to this belongs *supplication (obsecratio)*, which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say: "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord."

On our own part, the reason for impetration is *thanksgiving*, since through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits.

These four conditions can be noted in several collects of the Church. Thus, for example, in the Collect of the Feast of the Holy Trinity, which says: "Almighty eternal God," these words belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words: "Who hast given to Thy servants" refer to thanksgiving; the words: "Grant, we beseech thee," pertain to intercession; and the words at the end, "Through Our Lord . . ." belong to intercession.

QUESTION LXXXIV THE EXTERNAL ACTS OF LATRIA

In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria: 1) Adoration, by which we use our bodies to venerate God; 2) those acts whereby something is offered to God from external things; 3) the acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed. Under the first head stand four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ADORATION IS AN ACT OF LATRIA, OR RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that adoration is ordered to the reverence of the person adored. Now to show reverence to God is proper to religion, or latria.

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: Theologians distinguish three kinds of adoration: The first, which belongs to divine excellence, is called *latria*; the second, which is referred to supernatural created excellence, is called *dulia*; the third, which belongs to natural created excellence, is called *cultus*, whether civil or religious.

ART. II.—WHETHER ADORATION DENOTES AN ACTION OF THE BODY.

YES.—Inasmuch as that which is external to latria is referred to that which is internal and principal.

THE REASON is that, since we are made up of a twofold nature, namely the intellectual and sensible, we offer a twofold adoration to God, to wit, the spiritual, which consists in the interior devotion of the mind; and corporeal, which consists in the exterior humbling of the body.

ART. III.—WHETHER ADORATION REQUIRES A DEFINITE PLACE.

YES.—Not on account of the adoration of the mind, but on account of the adoration of the body.

THE REASON is that the mind apprehends God as not comprised in a place, whereas bodily signs must necessarily be in some definite place and position.

NOTE: A definite place is chosen for adoration for three reasons: 1) On account of the consecration of the place, from which fact the worshipers conceive a special devotion; 2) on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein; 3) on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matth. xviii, 20: "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them" (Ad 2).

**QUESTION LXXXV
THE THINGS THAT THE FAITHFUL GIVE TO GOD, AND
FIRSTLY SACRIFICE**

In due course we must consider the acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: 1) The things given to God by the faithful; 2) vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under the first head we are to consider sacrifices, oblations, first fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER TO OFFER SACRIFICE TO GOD IS OF THE NATURAL LAW.

YES.—Inasmuch as it is of the essence of sacrifice to offer God certain sensible things in sign of due subjection and honor to Him.

THE REASON is that, just as in the natural sphere things that are by nature lower are subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason, in accordance with man's natural inclination, that he should tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man, i.e., God, namely that he should make use of sensible signs to express this homage.

NOTE: The offering of sacrifice in general is of the natural law, but the determination of sacrifices is of human or divine institution (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER SACRIFICE SHOULD BE OFFERED TO GOD ALONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacrifice that is offered externally signifies the interior spiritual sacrifice whereby the soul offers itself to God. Now the soul offers itself to God in sacrifice as to the principle of creation, and as to the end of its beatification, and this belongs to God alone (I P, q. cxviii, art. 2, and I-II, q. ii and iii).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE OFFERING OF SACRIFICE IS A SPECIAL ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the offering of sacrifice is made for a special end, namely reverence to God; hence it belongs to a determinate virtue, to wit, religion.

NOTE: Certain acts that are directed to reverence for God, e.g., almsgiving or the subjection of one's body to affliction, are called sacrifices; but properly sacrifices are those acts of the virtue of religion that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God (in body).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO OFFER SACRIFICES.

YES.—a) All are bound to interior sacrifice, which is the first and principal sacrifice. With regard to exterior sacrifice, a distinction must be made: b) With

regard to the attestation of submission to God, not all are bound in the same way; c) with regard to the external acts of the other virtues that show reverence for God, not all are bound.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that all are bound to offer God a devout mind.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those of the Old and the New Law, or for those who are not under the law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer determinate sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law; but those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely this or that action.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that some of these acts fall under precept and some are works of supererogation.

QUESTION LXXXVI OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUI TS

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN ARE UNDER A NECESSITY OF PRECEPT TO MAKE OBLATION.

YES.—In four cases.

THE REASON is that a person may be bound: a) By a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of rent; b) by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeathes something to the Church, whether it is movable or immovable, to be delivered at some future time; c) on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her ministers were without means of support; d) on account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntarily, namely as regards the quantity or kind of the thing offered.

ART. II.—WHETHER OBLATIONS ARE DUE TO PRIESTS ALONE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that only priests are set apart and made mediators between the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. v, 5).

NOTE: The oblations are to be expended, partly on things appertaining to the divine worship, partly on the priests' own support (I Cor. ix, 13); partly for the good of the poor (at end of art.).—But oblations, once consecrated, cannot be granted for the use of the laity, as for instance, sacred vessels and vestments (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN MAY MAKE OBLATIONS OF WHATEVER HE LAWFULLY POSSESSES.

YES.—If the things be considered in themselves.

THE REASON is that in the New Law every creature of God is accounted clean (Tit. i, 15); hence, considered in itself, an oblation can be made of whatever one lawfully possesses.—Accidentally, however, it may happen that an offering cannot be made of what one lawfully possesses, e.g., if this will result in another's detriment; as when a son offers to God the means of supporting his father; or on account of scandal; or contempt; or something else of the sort.

NOTE: No oblation can be made of what is unjustly acquired and possessed, because, as is said in Eccclus. xxxiv, 21: "The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained."

ART. IV.—WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY FIRST FRUITS.

NOTE: First fruits are the first fruits of any kind of produce from the earth, which are offered to God in recognition that all the fruits of the earth come to us from Him.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that it is a point of the natural law that man should make an offering for God's honor out of the things he has received from God. But that such an offering should be made by such or such persons, or from such or such fruits, or in such quantity, was divinely established in the Old Law; but in the New it is defined by the determination of the Church, by which men are obliged to pay the first

fruits according to local custom and the needs of the ministers of the Church.—Yet the first fruits are offered by way of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXXXVII TITHES

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHES UNDER A NECESSITY OF PRECEPT.

YES.—Partly by the natural law and partly by the institution of the Church.

THE REASON is that it is a dictate of natural reason that the people should support those who are in the service of divine worship for the salvation of all the people; even as it is the people's duty to supply a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers, and so on. But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but was introduced by divine institution, as we read in Malach. iii, 10: "Bring all the tithes into My storehouse, that there may be meat in My house." The Church retains this practice.

(Tr. Note: Thus the Code of Canon Law, Can. 1502, declares: "The payment of the decimae and primitiae shall be governed by the special laws and commendable customs of each country." At present there is no general law demanding payment of tithes, but, if there is a special law or custom in some country requiring their payment, the Church insists on its observance. The *primitiae*, or first fruits, originally referred to the first crop obtained from new fields or gardens, the first offspring of animals, etc. Following the example of the Old Testament, the Christians in many places introduced the custom of offering first fruits.

NOTE: The ministers of the Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not demand them without scandal, on account of their falling into disuse, or for some other reason. Nevertheless, those who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER MEN ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHES OF ALL THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the Apostle (I Cor. ix, 11): "If we have sown for you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap from you carnal things?" Whatever man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things, and therefore tithes must be paid on whatever he possesses, namely according to the custom of the country and the need of the ministers, especially under the New Law, whose ministers are more strictly forbidden to engage in money-making employments (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER TITHES SHOULD BE PAID TO THE CLERGY.

YES.—Tithes, as such, should be paid only to the clergy.

THE REASON is that the right to receive tithes is something spiritual, as was stated above (A 1, ad 4).

NOTE: In the Old Law, special tithes were ear-marked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed, Church property, oblations, and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for the same purpose (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CLERGY ALSO ARE BOUND TO PAY TITHES.

NO.—The clergy as such, i.e. in so far as they possess Church property, are not bound to pay tithes; but from some other cause, namely through holding property in their own right, they are bound to the payment of tithes.

THE REASON is that it may happen on account of different causes, and from different points of view, that one and the same person is the giver and receiver, even as agent and patient.

QUESTION LXXXVIII
VOW, BY WHICH SOMETHING IS PROMISED TO GOD

(in 12 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A VOW CONSISTS IN A MERE PURPOSE OF THE WILL.

NO.—The reason is that a vow (defined as a deliberate promise made to God with the object of a higher good), denotes a certain obligation to do or omit something; now the purpose of the will in itself does not involve such an obligation, but a promise is needed over and above this. Hence three conditions are necessary for a vow: 1) Deliberation; 2) a purpose of the will; 3) a promise, in which the nature of a vow is completed. Sometimes two other things are added as a confirmation of the vow, namely pronouncement with the lips and the witnessing of others.

ART. II.—WHETHER A VOW SHOULD ALWAYS BE ABOUT A BETTER GOOD.

YES.—A vow properly is about a better good than that which is universally necessary for salvation.

THE REASON is that that most properly falls under a vow that is altogether voluntary; for a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else. Hence what is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, cannot be made the matter of a vow.

On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if salvation is unattainable without it—it is indeed the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity of doing it; hence it is not most properly the matter of a vow.

Similarly a promise whereby one would promise to anyone what he would not accept would be a vain promise. Consequently no vow can be made about anything unlawful or indifferent, but about some act of virtue acceptable to God.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL VOWS ARE BINDING.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that it belongs to man's fidelity to pay that which he promised. Now man owes fidelity chiefly to God. Hence man is especially obliged to fulfill the vows he made to God. But if that which anyone vows is rendered impossible, he must do what in him lies, so that at least he has the ready will to do what he can.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT TO TAKE VOWS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the promise we make to God we do not make for God's benefit, but for our own; for what is paid to God is added to the one who pays, as Augustine says (*in Epis. ad Armentarium et Paulinam*).—Likewise, by vowing we make our will immovably firm to do what is expedient.

NOTE: The necessity implied by a vow bears a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence Augustine says (l.c.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things" (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER A VOW IS AN ACT OF Latria OR RELIGION.

YES.—By way of command.

THE REASON is that a vow is a certain direction of the things that one vows to divine worship or homage.

NOTE: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also, and this very promise of good, which is made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one's superiors; so that the promise made to the saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfill what one has promised to the saints or one's superiors (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS MORE PRAISEWORTHY AND MERITORIOUS TO DO SOMETHING IN FULFILLMENT OF A VOW THAN WITHOUT A VOW.

YES.—For a threefold reason.

THE FIRST REASON is that a work of nobler virtue is better and more meri-

torious. Now the things that are done in virtue of a vow belong to latria, as was stated in the previous article. Thus, for example, to fast, which is an act of abstinence, and continence, which is an act of chastity, are better and more meritorious if they are done in virtue of a vow; because they thus belong to divine worship, as being a sort of sacrifice to God.

THE SECOND REASON is that he who vows something, and does it, subjects himself more to God than he who only does it; for he subjects himself to God, not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so, he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit than he who gives the fruit only.

THE THIRD REASON is that a vow fixes the will on the good immovably, and to do anything with a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin.

NOTE: Necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. If, however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary, after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfill it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfillment of a vow is an act of religion, which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER A VOW IS SOLEMNIZED BY THE RECEPTION OF HOLY ORDERS, AND BY THE PROFESSION OF A CERTAIN RULE.

YES.—THE REASON is that solemnities (which consist in a certain distinctive garb, as in the case of the enlistment of a new recruit in the army or in the nuptial ceremonies for the bride) are not wont to be employed save when a person gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. By receiving a Holy Order a man devotes himself wholly to the divine ministry; and by the profession of a certain rule he assumes the state of perfection by the renunciation of the world and his own will.

NOTE: Through being pronounced in public, vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE SUBJECT TO ANOTHER'S POWER ARE HINDERED FROM TAKING VOWS.

YES.—As regards that in which they are subject.

THE REASON is that whoever is subject to someone else does not, with respect to that in which he is subject, have the power to do what he wishes, but depends on the will of the other. Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER CHILDREN CAN BIND THEMSELVES BY VOW TO ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—a) If a boy or girl before the years of puberty does not yet have the use of reason, he can by no means bind himself by vow to do anything; b) but if he reaches the use of reason before puberty he can indeed (as far as depends on himself) bind himself; but the vow can be voided by his parents; c) before the years of puberty he can by no means be bound by a solemn vow of religion, even if he has the use of reason and is capable of guile.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is evident.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that children before the years of puberty are, according to human law, which respects what occurs in the majority of cases, always subject to their parents.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that a statute of the Church forbids this.—After the years of puberty children can bind themselves by a vow of religion, whether simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.

ART. X.—WHETHER VOWS ADMIT OF DISPENSATION.

YES.—According to the mode of dispensation in the observance of any law (I-II, q. xc, art. 2).

THE REASON is that he who vows in a manner makes a law for himself, binding himself to do something that is, considered in itself, and in the majority of cases, good. Consequently, if it happens that in any case it is either simply bad, or useless, or impedes a greater good, it should be decided that the vow is not to be observed, or should be changed to something else; it is within the power of the Church to do both.

ART. XI.—WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE DISPENSED FROM A SOLEMN VOW OF CONTINENCY.

NO.—In a solemn vow of continency annexed to the religious state, dispensation cannot be granted; in a vow of continency annexed to a sacred order, dispensation can be given by the Church.

THE REASON is that in the first case the vow is essentially annexed to the religious state; for chastity is annexed to the monastic rule. Hence, just as that which is consecrated to God, for example a chalice, cannot, as long as it remains entire, lose its consecration, so a man consecrated to God never ceases, as long as he lives, to be consecrated. Hence the Pope cannot cause one who has professed religion not to be a religious

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: St. Thomas, in Sent. iv, dist. 38, q. i, art. 4, ad 4, taught an opinion contrary to this, which St. Alphonsus, with Cajetan, the Salmanticenses, Scorus, St. Antoninus, Suarez, Lessius, Sanchez, and many others, hold to be more probable.—What is said here of the monastic life seems to be understood in the sense that the Pope cannot give a dispensation so that the monk can at the same time be married and remain a monk. [For, as St. Thomas remarks, in the same place, the monk takes his name from unity—Greek *monos*, meaning one and only]. In the other case, however, a solemn vow of continence is not essentially annexed to a Holy Order, but is by virtue of ecclesiastical statute; hence it would seem that it can be dispensed from by the Church.

NOTE: 1. The fact that dispensations cannot be given in a solemn vow is due, not to its being an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion (Ad 2).

2. Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, and therefore abstinence from it may be a direct source of danger. But, because sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the upkeep, not of the person but of the species, to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the person. So the reasons for dispensation in a vow of abstinence and in a vow of continence are not the same. If accidentally continency prove a source of danger to some person, this danger may be obviated by some other means than intercourse, for instance, by abstinence, or other corporeal remedies (Ad 3).

3. A religious who is made a Bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continence, since he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner, neither is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior (Ad 4).

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE AUTHORITY OF A PRELATE IS REQUIRED FOR THE COMMUTATION OR THE DISPENSATION OF A VOW.

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: A prelate here means one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external form over his subjects: Such are Bishops and other prelates inferior to Bishops who have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their religious, if they are exempt.

YES.—THE REASON is that a vow is a promise to God about something that is acceptable to God. Now a prelate in the Church takes the place of God. Hence the authority of a prelate is required for the commutation or dispensation of vows, for such a one declares in God's stead what is acceptable to God.

NOTE: A man who enters religion is not bound to fulfill the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough, without requiring the addition of other burdens (Ad 1).

[Tr. Note: Vows can be commuted to an equal good, in view of the circumstances of the vower, by the vower's own initiative, although this is easily subject to self-deception.]

QUESTION LXXXIX OATHS

Here we are to consider the external acts of religion, whereby something divine is taken by man; and this is either a sacrament or the name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the third part of this work; of the taking of God's name we shall treat now.

The name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one's own assertion; secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others; thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths. Under this head there are 10 articles of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER TO SWEAR IS TO CALL GOD TO WITNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is established as though it were a principle of law that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as true. Thus to swear is to call God to witness in confirmation of contingent facts regarding men, which cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason. If it is a question of present or past events the oath is called declaratory; if of some future event, the oath is called promissory.

NOTE: There are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, as when a man says: "God is my witness," or, "I speak before God," or "by God," which has the same meaning. The other is by cursing, and consists in a man's binding himself or something of his to punishment (to be inflicted by God) if what is alleged is not true (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO SWEAR.

YES.—When necessary, and when proper caution is used.

THE REASON is that an oath, considered in itself, is good and useful. This is evident from its origin and end: From its origin, since oaths are employed because of the faith whereby men believe God to have infallible truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things; from its end, inasmuch as oaths are employed to justify men and to put an end to controversy. Yet it is not lawful to swear for a slight reason, or without due caution; and in this way are to be understood the words of the Lord (Matth. v, 34): "I say to you, swear not at all;" for man easily offends in words, according to James iii, 2: "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man."

ART. III.—WHETHER THREE ACCOMPANYING CONDITIONS OF AN OATH ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED, NAMELY JUSTICE, JUDGMENT, AND TRUTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that two conditions are required for the good use of an oath: 1) That a man swear, not lightly, but discreetly and for necessary cause; and in regard to this a judgment is required, namely one of discretion on the part of the swearer; 2) with regard to what is confirmed by the oath, namely so that it is neither false nor anything unlawful; and this requires both truth, by which one confirms by an oath what is truthful; and justice, whereby he confirms what is lawful.—A rash oath lacks judgment; a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.

NOTE: The three above-named conditions are required for an oath more than for other human acts. For in swearing there is great danger, both on account of the greatness of God, who is called to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, whose words are confirmed by oath (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN OATH IS AN ACT OF RELIGION OR LATRIA.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the very fact that man swears by God he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and universal knowledge; and thus he in some manner pays reverence to God. Hence the Apostle says (Hebr. vi, 16) that "men swear by One greater than themselves," and Aristotle (*Metaph.* book i, chap. 3): "To swear is to give very great honor."

ART. V.—WHETHER OATHS ARE DESIRABLE AND TO BE USED FREQUENTLY, AS SOMETHING USEFUL AND GOOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that that which is sought only to support an infirmity

or defect is not reckoned among those things that are desirable in themselves, but among those that are necessary, as in the case of medicine, which is required to heal illness. Now an oath is sought to support some defect, whereby one man disbelieves another.

NOTE: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it is employed aright (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO SWEAR BY CREATURES.

YES.—Both in an oath that is made by simple contestation and secondarily, and in an oath that is made by cursing (art 1 of this q.).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that an oath that is made by contestation relies on the divine truth, as does faith. Now faith is in itself and chiefly about God, who is Truth Itself; secondarily, it is about creatures, in which God's truth is reflected (q. i, art. 1). Thus some creatures are adduced in swearing that God's truth may be manifested. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e., by God, whose truth is manifested in the Gospel.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the kind of oath that is made by cursing a creature is assumed that the divine judgment may be wrought therein. Thus man is wont to swear by his soul, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves.—As regards the words of the Lord (Matth. v, 34): "I say to you, swear not at all, either by the heaven . . . or by the earth . . ." God forbade us to swear by creatures, so as to give to them the reverence due to God (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER AN OATH HAS BINDING FORCE.

YES.—a) A declaratory oath (which is about the past or the present) has binding force, not as regards the thing itself, but as regards the act of swearing, namely so that one swear that which is now or was true; b) a promissory oath (which is about things that are to be done by the swearer) has binding force in respect to that which a man confirms by an oath.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no obligation can exist with respect to a thing that already exists or has existed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a man is bound to make true what he has sworn; otherwise his oath lacks truth.—But if the oath lacks the judgment of discretion—e.g., if its fulfillment is rendered impossible by some event; or if the oath lacks justice, inasmuch as it would be sinful to fulfil it, or this would result in the prevention of good—then the oath does not have binding force, because it lacks the accompanying conditions, namely judgment and justice.

NOTE: When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (*Moral.* xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such words in their natural outward sense, but the divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention" (Ad 4).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER AN OATH IS MORE BINDING THAN A VOW.

NO.—Of its nature, a vow is more binding than an oath.

THE REASON is that the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity that we owe to God, namely that we pay Him what we have promised; whereas the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence that we owe Him, by which we are bound to make good that which we promise in His name. Now infidelity implies irreverence; but not conversely.

ART. IX.—WHETHER ANYONE CAN DISPENSE FROM AN OATH.

YES.—For the same reason as one can dispense from a law or a vow.

THE REASON is that that which in itself, or universally considered, is useful and virtuous can become, according to some particular eventuality, morally evil and hurtful,

and in such a case, just as it cannot be made the subject of a law or a vow, neither can it be made the subject of an oath; for if it is morally bad it is repugnant to justice; if hurtful, it is repugnant to judgment.—We are here dealing, of course, with a promissory oath. For the matter of a declarative oath, which is about the past or the present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable (Ad 1).

NOTE: Sometimes what is promised under oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or in its circumstances. In this case any Bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. In such a case there would seem to be no room for dispensation or commutation, unless there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and who also has power of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: On this head Canon 1320 of the Code of Canon Law declares: "Persons who have the power to annul, dispense, or commute vows have the same power over promissory oaths; if, however, the dispensation from an oath involves an injury to others, and these persons refuse to remit the obligation, the oath can be dispensed from only by the Holy See on account of the necessity or interest of the Church.]

ART. X.—WHETHER AN OATH IS VOIDED BY A CONDITION OF PERSON OR TIME.

YES.—a) On the part of God, to whom reverence is shown by an oath, children before the age of puberty are excluded from swearing, as are also perjurers; b) on the part of man, persons of great dignity are excluded.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that children before the age of puberty generally do not have the perfect use of reason, whereby they can make an oath with due reverence for God. Perjurers are not admitted because it is presumed from their past conduct that they will not show due reverence by an oath.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man's word needs confirmation only when it is doubted, and this derogates in some degree from a person's dignity. Hence "priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Yet it is lawful for them to swear if there is need for it, or if any great good results therefrom, especially in spiritual matters.

NOTE: As regards the oaths of angels and God, it must be said that the angel's oath is adduced, not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition (Apoc. x, 6). Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing in order to show the unchangeable nature of what is said, as the Apostle says (Hebr. vi).—(Ad 4).

QUESTION XC

THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE A MAN.

YES.—a) Superiors can impose by adjuration a necessity of doing something on their subjects, by invoking the divine name or of any sacred thing. b) Inferiors can adjure their superiors, not indeed by commanding but by beseeching.

THE REASON is that, much as man can order himself to do anything, so too can he order others, by beseeching his superiors and commanding his inferiors, whom he can compel on the strength of an oath.

NOTE: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain thing (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE THE DEMONS.

YES.—a) Not by way of beseeching or inducement; but b) by way of compulsion, as our enemies.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this mode of adjuration would seem to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear toward demons.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we can repel the demons as our enemies

by the power of the divine name, so that they may not hurt us spiritually or bodily, according to Luke x, 19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy; and nothing shall hurt you."

Yet it is not lawful to adjure the demons in order to learn anything from them, or even to obtain something through them, because this would savor of some fellowship with them—except perhaps when certain holy men, by special divine inspiration or revelation, make use of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results.

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADJURE AN IRRATIONAL CREATURE.

YES.—a) Not in so far as the adjuration is referred to the irrational creature in itself; but b) in so far as it is referred to the director or mover of the irrational creature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it would thus be vain to adjure an irrational creature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that irrational creatures, in so far as they are subject to God, can be adjured by way of beseeching God, and this belongs to those who do miracles by invoking God. But in so far as irrational creatures are used by the demon for our hurt they are adjured by way of compulsion, as in the exorcisms of the Church.

QUESTION XC I

TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAYER OR PRAISE

Here we are to consider the taking of the divine name for the purpose of invoking it by means of prayer or praise. Prayer we have already discussed (q. lxxxiii). Hence it now remains to speak of praise, which will be done in two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER GOD SHOULD BE PRAISED WITH THE LIPS.

YES.—Not on account of God, but by reason of the one who praises Him.

THE REASON is that we speak words of God, not indeed to manifest our concepts to Him, who is the viewer of hearts, but to bring ourselves and others who listen to reverence Him, and to excite our affections to God.

NOTE: We praise a man before a man in order that he or others may have a good opinion of him whom we praise; so that in consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD SHOULD BE PRAISED WITH SONG.

YES.—THE REASON is that the human mind is disposed in various ways by the different melodies of sound. Thus the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.—Music, however, that is intended for purposes of ostentation or pleasure, rather than to excite devotion, is to be condemned (Ad 2).

QUESTION XC II

THE VICIES OPPOSED TO RELIGION, AND, FIRST, SUPERSTITION

(in two articles)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those that agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices that are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt to those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly, we must consider in the first place superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts. Under the first head come two points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER SUPERSTITION IS A VICE CONTRARY TO RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that superstition gives divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner in which it ought not. Hence superstition is opposed to re-

ligion, not by excess, or in point of the circumstance *how much*; but in point of other circumstances, as in the case of the vices opposed to magnanimity and magnificence.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION.

YES.—THE REASON is that superstition is diversified by both its mode and its object: In point of mode, superstition is diversified if divine worship is paid to the true God, but in an undue manner. In point of object, superstition is specified according to the different ends of divine worship, viz.: a) To give reverence to God; and against this is idolatry, which unduly gives the reverence due to God to a creature. b) The end of divine worship is, secondly, that man may be taught by God; and against this is divinatory superstition, which consults the demons. c) Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts; and against this is the superstition of certain observances.

QUESTION XCIII

SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat 1) of the superstition that consists in giving undue worship to the true God; 2) of the superstition of idolatry; 3) of divinatory superstition; 4) of the superstition of observances. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANYTHING PERNICIOUS IN THE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD.

YES.—A lie in the signification of a fact, either on the part of the thing signified or on the part of the worshiper.

THE REASON is that, as Augustine says (*On Lying*, chap. 14): “A most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to the Christian religion.” This lie is uttered: 1) On the part of the thing signified, through the worship’s signifying something discordant therefrom: For example, if anyone should declare by words or ceremonies that Christ has yet to suffer. 2) On the part part of the worship, as when someone on behalf of the Church should give worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church through divine authority, and customary therein.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANYTHING EXCESSIVE IN THE WORSHIP OF GOD.

YES.—Not according to absolute quantity but according to the quantity of proportion.

THE REASON is that according to absolute quantity man can do nothing that is not less than that which he owes to God. Nevertheless, there can be in divine worship something that is not proportionate to the end, e.g., if there is something that does not, considered in itself, contribute to the glory of God, or raise man’s mind to God. Hence it is said in Luke xvii, 21: “The kingdom of God is within you.” This is directed against those superstitious people who bestow their chief care on externals.

QUESTION XCIV IDOLATRY

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IDOLATRY IS RIGHTLY RECKONED A SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was stated in q. xcii, art. 1, it is distinctive of superstition to exceed the due manner of divine worship. This is especially done when divine worship is paid to one to whom it is not due. Now by idolatry divine worship, which is due to God alone, is paid to a creature (men, demons, or other creatures).

ART. II.—WHETHER IDOLATRY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is against those who supposed that divine reverence should be given to any higher nature, as being nearer to God, because, although we ought

to reverence all higher beings, the same reverence is not due to all; but something special is due to the Most High God, who uniquely surpasses all beings; and this is the worship of latria.

THE SECOND REASON is against those who considered that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as something good in itself, but as being in harmony with popular custom, and therefore that in time of persecution it was lawful to worship idols outwardly, as long as one kept the faith in one's heart.

But this is false. For since outward worship is a sign of inward worship, it is a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart. Hence Augustine condemns Seneca (*City of God*, vi, 10), "inasmuch as" his worship of idols was so much the more damnable as the things that he did dishonestly led the people to believe that he acted honestly."

ART. III.—WHETHER IDOLATRY IS THE GRAVEST OF SINS.

YES.—On the part of the sin itself; but not always on the part of the sinner.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the case of sins that are committed against God, which are the gravest of sins, the gravest seems to be when a man pays divine honor to a creature. One who, as far as he is concerned, sets up another God in the world lessens the divine sovereignty, and thus disturbs the whole order of society.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on the part of the sinner nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the fact they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolators who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the sinner's part.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CAUSE OF IDOLATRY WAS ON THE PART OF MAN.

YES.—As the dispositive cause; but not as the completive cause.

THE REASON is that men, by reason of inordinate affection for some man, or on account of the pleasure they took in representations, as in the case of some surpassing piece of sculpture or a painting; or on account of their ignorance of the true God—all three of which causes arise from man's disposition—can lead him to pay divine worship to creatures.

With regard to the completive cause, this was on the part of demons, who presented themselves to erring men as objects of worship by giving responses in idols and by doing things which to men seemed marvelous.

QUESTION XCV SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (in eight articles)

ART. II.—WHETHER DIVINATION IS A SIN.

YES.—Divination is always a sin—not that conjecture which predicts things that result from necessity, or in the majority of cases, which can be foreknown by human reason—or even when one knows other contingent future things through divine revelation—but that divination which presumes to reveal contingent future events by its own powers.

THE REASON is that the causes of such future contingent events have no determinate inclination to produce such effects. Hence these effects cannot be foreknown unless they are considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves, except while they are present, as when a man sees Socrates running or walking; but the consideration of such events in themselves before they occur is proper to God, who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present (I P. q. xiv, art. 13). Thus to practice divination is to usurp what is proper to God.

ART. II.—WHETHER DIVINATION IS A SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION.

YES.—THE REASON is that divination denotes a certain undue worship of the Divinity, inasmuch as it has recourse to the aid of the demons in order to know or do something. For all divination proceeds from the actions of demons, either because the demons are expressly invoked to manifest future events or because the demons thrust themselves into idle inquiries about future things in order to entangle men's minds in vanities.

ART. III. — WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DISTINGUISH SEVERAL SPECIES OF DIVINATION.

YES.—THE REASON is, as was stated in the prec. art, that in divination the demons are either expressly invoked, or they secretly interfere, beyond man's intention, to foretell certain future things. This happens, either when, with a view to obtain a knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things; or when to foreknow the future we observe certain things that are done seriously by men in seeking out the occult, as by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book.

Thus there are three main kinds of divination, the first of which belongs to necromancers, the second to augurs, the third to lotcasters. Each of these includes many others under them, as is shown in the body of the article, which is here briefly summarized.

To the first class belong prestigiation, the divination of dreams, necromancy, divination by means of pythons (i.e., mediums), geomancy, hydromancy, aeromancy, and pyromancy.—To the second class belong genethliacs (astrology), augury (so called from the chattering of birds), auspice, omens, chiromancy (divination of the palm of the hand), spatulamancy (by certain signs appearing on the shoulder-blades of animals).—To the third class belong geomancy (by the shapes that things assume or from hidden pieces of writing, etc.), all of which go by the name of sortilege.

ART. IV.—WHETHER DIVINATION PRACTICED BY INVOKING THE DEMONS IS LAWFUL.

NO.—It is altogether unlawful.

THE FIRST REASON is that this would be an express compact with the devil, which is absolutely unlawful.

THE SECOND REASON is that, even if the devil sometimes speaks the truth, his intention is always to seduce men to do something that is hurtful to their salvation. For this reason Our Lord rebuked the devil in the words: "Hold thy peace" (Luke iv, 35).

ART. V.—WHETHER DIVINATION BY THE STARS IS LAWFUL.

YES.—If anyone uses the observation of the stars to foreknow accidental or fortuitous events, or to know with certainty the future acts of men, this proceeds from a false and vain opinion, and thus the operation of a demon is intermingled here; hence this will be superstitious and unlawful divination. But if anyone uses the observation of the stars to foreknow future events that are caused by the heavenly bodies, e.g., drouths and rains and eclipses, this will not be unlawful or superstitious divination.

THE REASON is that there is one appointment of divine providence for the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies, and another appointment for contingent future events. The first are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they occur always and in the same way, as for example eclipses; the second are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable.

NOTE: The heavenly bodies cannot be in themselves a cause of the operations of the free will, for nobody can make an impression on an incorporeal thing; yet they can influence it dispositively, in so far as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers, which are acts of bodily organs, which influence human acts.

Yet because the sensitive powers obey reason no necessity is imposed in consequence on the free will; but man can act by his reason against the influence of the heavenly bodies (in body of art.).

Yet a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies; whereas there are few, namely the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences, which depend on the multitude. They however should be avoided, "lest the soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship" (St. Augustine, *Gen. ad Lit.* ii, 17).—(Ad 2).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas' theory of the influence of the heavenly bodies hardly differs in principle from what is today called "cosmic biology," chiefly exemplified in the hypothesis that spots on the sun affect weather conditions on earth.

According to medieval ideas of the cosmos, borrowed from Plato and the other ancient Greeks, the universe was enclosed by nine concentric circles, like the layers of an onion. The earthly corporeal world was moved by these discs, which were the paths of the stars and the planets, and these in turn were moved by the sphere-spirits of heavenly intelligences. Thus the stars, by influencing man's material environment, indirectly influenced his spiritual condition.]

ART. VI.—WHETHER DIVINATION BY DREAMS IS UNLAWFUL.

YES.—If anyone makes use of dreams to foretell future events insofar as dreams proceed from divine revelation, or from a natural intrinsic or extrinsic cause, and as far as the efficacy of the cause can extend, there is no unlawful divination. If, however, such a divination is caused by a revelation of demons, with whom express compacts are made—because they are invoked for this purpose—or implicit compacts, because such a divination extends beyond its possible limits—the divination is unlawful and superstitious.

THE REASON is evident from the preceding articles.

ART. VII.—WHETHER DIVINATION BY AUGURIES, OMENS, AND OTHER SUCH OBSERVATIONS OF EXTERNAL THINGS IS UNLAWFUL.

YES.—All such divination, if it extends beyond the limits set by the order of nature or divine providence, is superstitious and unlawful.

THE REASON is evident from what has been said before; for otherwise opinion would rest on false opinion, and opportunity would be given the devil to interfere in human affairs.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER DIVINATION BY DRAWING LOTS IS UNLAWFUL.

YES.—Divination by means of lots that are left to the disposition of the heavenly bodies is unlawful; but when the lots are referred to God, what is called divination of allotment can be rightly practiced.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the actions of men, or their outcomes, that are required for sortilege are not subject to the disposition of the stars; hence such divination is vain and false, and consequently involves demoniacal interference.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to await the decision of lots from God is not wrong in itself, provided: a) This is done in some necessity; b) with due reverence; c) when the divine oracles, the words of the Gospel or of Holy Writ, are not misapplied for earthly business; d) in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, no one has recourse to sortilege.—With regard to the election of Matthias by sortilege, this was done before Pentecost, when the fulness of the Holy Spirit was not yet in the Church. The choice of the deacons was not made by casting lots.

QUESTION XCVI SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS UNLAWFUL TO PRACTICE THE OBSERVANCES OF THE MAGIC ART.

NOTE: The magic art is (so to speak) a way of acquiring knowledge without human effort through the inspection of certain shapes or the utterance of certain unknown words—sometimes with the aid of fasting and prayers.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the art of magic does not make use of these means (the inspection of shapes, etc.) as causes, but as signs, which are moreover useless, and consequently pertaining "to a kind of covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," as Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.*, lib. ii, cap. 23).

ART. II.—WHETHER OBSERVANCES DIRECTED TO THE ALTERATION OF BODIES, AS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING HEALTH OR THE LIKE, ARE UNLAWFUL.

YES.—If such alterations have no natural connection with the so-called observances.

THE REASON is that these observances seem unable to produce that effect naturally. Consequently these observances are not used to produce these effects as causes, but only as signs; and thus they come under the head of compact by tokens entered into with the demons.

ART. III.—WHETHER OBSERVANCES DIRECTED TO THE PURPOSE OF FORTUNE-TELLING ARE UNLAWFUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that men note such observances, not as causes, but as signs of future events, good or evil. These signs are brought forward by human vanity with the co-operation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with such trifles. Thus it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful. If, however, one observes a presage of future events from its cause, it is not unlawful.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS UNLAWFUL TO WEAR DIVINE WORDS AT THE NECK.

YES.—If the words or signs are taken as incantations, which have no natural, divine, or ecclesiastical efficacy.

THE REASON is that such things savor of human vanity, and have no connection with reverence for God. Hence to utter divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if regard is had only to the reverence of God, from whom an effect is awaited, this is lawful; but if regard is had to some other thing, which is vainly observed, it is unlawful (Ad 1).

QUESTION XCVII THE TEMPTATION OF GOD

We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices pertaining to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: 1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; 2) vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things.—With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted; and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with irreverence.—Under the first head come four points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE TEMPTATION OF GOD CONSISTS IN ANY FACTS WHEREIN THE RESULT IS AWAITED FROM DIVINE POWER.

YES.—The temptation of God consists in certain acts (or words), in which the result is awaited, not from human but only from divine power (knowledge, goodness, etc.).

THE REASON is that to tempt is properly to make trial of the one who is tempted, and not of another. Hence the temptation of God consists in the probing of God's knowledge, power, or will, by words or deeds, openly or by stealth, explicitly or implicitly; i.e., when one, in order to test whether he can be delivered by God, uselessly or needlessly exposes himself to danger.

ART. II.—WHETHER TO TEMPT GOD IS A SIN.

YES.—To tempt God in order that one may know the divine power is a sin.

THE REASON is that to be ignorant or to doubt about the things that belong to God's perfection is a sin. For to tempt is to make trial of one about whom someone is not certain.—Hence to make trial of the things that pertain to the divine perfection, not because a person doubts them, but that the divine attributes may be manifested to others for their profit, as by miracles, is not a sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER TEMPTATION OF GOD IS OPPOSED TO THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION.

Yes.—THE REASON is that the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Now it is manifest that to tempt anyone pertains to irreverence for him.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE TEMPTATION OF GOD IS A GRAVER SIN THAN SUPERSTITION.

NO.—THE REASON is that a person acts more against the reverence due to God if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error (q. xcii); the one who tempts God expresses a doubt of the divine excellence.

QUESTION XCVIII**PERJURY**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR PERJURY THAT THE STATEMENT CONFIRMED ON OATH BE FALSE.

YES.—Primarily.

THE REASON is that, since moral acts take their species from the end, and the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion, it follows that perjury, which is perversity in swearing, takes its species chiefly from swearing. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, namely if what is asserted is not lawful; and when judgment is lacking, i.e., when someone swears indiscreetly (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL PERJURY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that all perjury implies either that God does not know the truth, or that He is willing to attest a falsehood; and this is always a sin.

A person who swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice, though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter for oath (Ad 1). Similarly, a person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give as alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: For the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of oath (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL PERJURY IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Perjury of its very nature is a mortal sin.

THE REASON is that perjury of its very nature implies contempt of God; for it has the character of fault from the fact that it is an act of irreverence to God.

NOTE: Coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force as regards that which can be done lawfully. Therefore he who does not fulfill an oath that he takes under coercion commits perjury and sins mortally (q. lxxxix, art. 7, ad 3). Nevertheless, the Sovereign Pontiff can by his authority absolve a man from an obligation even of a coerced oath (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HE SINS WHO DEMANDS AN OATH OF A PERJURER.

NO.—a) He who on his own account and of his own accord demands an oath does not sin if he is ignorant that the one from whom it is demanded will swear what is false; but this would be a human temptation; b) if he knows that he will swear falsely, such a person sins mortally; c) he who demands an oath on another's behalf, on account of the demands of a duty imposed on him does not seem to be at fault, even though he knows the other will swear falsely.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this is due only to a certain infirmity, whereby a person doubts that another will tell the truth.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he needlessly gives occasion for his neighbor's fall.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that seemingly it is not he who exacts the oath, but the person at whose instance he demands it.

NOTE: It is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods; for it is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil (Ad 4).

**QUESTION XCIX
SACRILEGE**

Here we are to consider the vices pertaining to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider 1) sacrilege; 2) simony.—The first head takes four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER SACRILEGE IS THE VIOLATION OF A SACRED THING.

YES.—THE REASON is that a thing is called sacred from the fact that it is di-

rected to God's worship. Hence everything that pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.

NOTE: Since the rulers of a commonwealth are in a manner the ministers of Divine Providence (Wisd. vi, 5), whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called a sacrilege by a kind of likeness (Ad 1).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas does not mean thereby to outlaw all criticism of government, as can be seen from II-II, q. xlii, a. 2, ad 3, and from II-II, q. civ, art. 6, ad 3.]

Similarly, that which is done to the injury of the Christian people, for instance, that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence to a sacred thing, and hence is reasonably called sacrilege (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER SACRILEGE IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it has a special deformity, namely the violation of a sacred thing by some irreverence.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SPECIES OF SACRILEGE ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE SACRED THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the object of sacrilege is a sacred thing; and therefore it follows that the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things that are treated irreverently, namely persons, places, and things, especially the Eucharist, which is ordered to the worship of God and to sanctity. For the grievousness of sacrilege is determined by the sanctity possessed by the sacred thing that is outraged.

NOTE: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally, as it were. Hence Jerome says that "a trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy" (quoted from St. Bernard, *De Consideratione, lib. ii, cap. 1*). But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his sacred character; for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT OF SACRILEGE SHOULD BE PECUNIARY.

YES.—(St. Thomas here speaks according to the customs of his time.)

THE REASON is that a sacrilegious person, having no reverence for sacred things, would seem to be insufficiently deterred from sin by having sacred things forbidden to him (through excommunication), since he has no care for them. Therefore, according to human laws, the penalty of death is applied against him, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death penalty, he is fined by a money penalty, so that at least by temporal punishments men may be deterred from sacrilege.

QUESTION C SIMONY

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SIMONY IS AN INTENTIONAL WILL TO BUY OR SELL SOMETHING SINFUL OR CONNECTED WITH A SPIRITUAL THING.

YES.—The sin of simony is committed by anyone who with an express will buys or sells something spiritual, or annexed to something spiritual.

THE REASON is that the sin of Simon Magus consisted precisely in this, that he wished to buy the grace of the Holy Spirit from the Apostles with money (Ad 1).—The word, "express will," is used to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice (Ad 2).

NOTE: A spiritual thing cannot be bought or sold, because it is unfit matter for purchase or sale. Now what is not fit matter is evil generically, in respect of morality. And this is for three reasons: a) Because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price; b) because a prelate of the Church is not the owner but the dispenser of spiritual things; c) because spiritual things flow from the gratuitous will of God; hence it is said: "Freely have you received, freely give" (Matth. x, 8).—(in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS UNLAWFUL TO GIVE MONEY FOR THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—To accept money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments is a sin of simony. On the other hand, to receive something for the support of those who administer the sacraments of Christ, according to the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, and no sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no price can be set on grace; and it is repugnant to its essence not to be given gratuitously.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this respect money is not taken as the price of a commodity, but as a payment for need of the ministers, in accordance with I Cor. ix, 12: "Do you not know that they who minister in the temple eat what comes from the temple, and that they who serve the altar have their share with the altar?"

NOTE: In no wise ought one to give money for the administration of the sacraments, and so neither should he give money for Baptism, even when he is at the point of death, but he should rather (if he is an adult) die without Baptism; for the Baptism of desire would supply for the lack of the sacrament (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO GIVE AND RECEIVE MONEY FOR SPIRITUAL ACTS.

No.—It is unlawful to give money (or whatever can be appraised at a money value) or to receive money for that which is spiritual in spiritual actions. But to receive or give something for the support of those who administer spiritual things, according to the statutes of the Church and approved custom, is lawful.

THE REASON is apparent from the preceding article.

NOTE: It is not lawful to use money to obtain for oneself or for others a clear way to a spiritual thing (by buying off opposition). But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right (prec. art., Ad 5).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO RECEIVE MONEY FOR THINGS ANNEXED TO SPIRITUAL THINGS.

NO.—a) Those things that are annexed to spiritual things, as dependent on them, and which can in no wise exist without spiritual things, it is never lawful for anyone to buy or sell. b) But those things that are annexed to spiritual things as being directed thereto, such as the right of patronage and sacred vessels, it is lawful for anyone to buy or sell, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since such things cannot be separated from the spiritual when they are sold, the selling of them implies that even spiritual things are subject to sale.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such things do not presuppose spiritual things, but rather precede them in the order of time; hence, as such, they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

NOTE: The material of sacred vessels can be sold for the needs of the Church and the poor, provided that they first be broken, after a prayer has been said over them; since when once broken they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels, but mere metal (Ad 2).—The same thing is to be said of the buying or selling of land on which a Church was formerly built (Ad 3).—The right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics for ecclesiastical benefices, cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted in fee; but it is transferred with the estate so sold or granted (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO GRANT SPIRITUAL THINGS IN RETURN FOR AN EQUIVALENT OF SERVICE OR FOR AN ORAL REMUNERATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that an equivalent service or oral remuneration, since it is directed to some kind of usefulness, can have a money value.—Thus, just as the sin of simony is contracted by accepting money, or any other external thing that comes under the head of real remuneration (*munus a manu*); so also this guilt is contracted by remuneration for service rendered or for oral remuneration (the latter term refers to intercession to obtain a benefit).

NOTE: A lawful service directed to spiritual things, for example to the good of

the Church or the benefit of her ministers, or to other good works, is not a case of remuneration for service rendered. On the contrary, if it be an unlawful service, or directed to carnal things, it is simoniacal (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE GUILTY OF SIMONY ARE FITTINGLY PUNISHED BY BEING DEPRIVED OF WHAT THEY HAVE ACQUIRED BY SIMONY.

YES.—THE REASON is that whoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration does this against the will of Our Lord, who ordered spiritual things to be given gratis: "Freely have you received, freely give" (Matth. x, 8).

NOTE: The laws today in force against simony are contained in the Code of Canon Law (727-730).

**QUESTION CI
PIETY**

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices apparent.—Regarding piety there are four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER PIETY EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR HUMAN INDIVIDUALS.

NOTE: Piety here means the virtue by which we render service and due honor to those bound to us by bonds of kinship and country.

YES.—To parents, kindred, fellow countrymen, and friends of our country.

THE REASON is that after God man is chiefly debtor to his parents and country, who are the principles of our existence and government. Hence, just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so in a secondary degree it belongs to religion to give worship to parents and country.—The worship of parents includes the worship of all our blood kindred, because they came from the same parents. The worship of country implies the worship of all our fellow citizens and of all the friends of our country.

ART. II.—WHETHER PIETY PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR OUR PARENTS.

YES.—Accidentally; for essentially reverence and service are owed to parents.

THE REASON is that to parents is owed what is befitting a father. Now to a father, since he is his son's superior, are essentially owed service and reverence from his son; accidentally, i.e., in respect of something accidental to him, support is also due, for instance if he be ill or poor.

ART. III.—WHETHER PIETY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM OTHER VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that where there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue pertaining to justice. Now to parents are owed reverence and service on account of a special aspect of justice, namely as to the connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle. Hence piety is a special virtue.

NOTE: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope, and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear toward our parents and country (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DUTIES OF PIETY TOWARDS ONE'S PARENTS SHOULD BE OMITTED FOR THE SAKE OF RELIGION.

NO.—Provided that the rendering of due services to our parents does not take us away from divine worship.

THE REASON is that if the worship of parents took us away from the worship of God, it would no longer be the virtue of piety, since it would insist on the worship of parents before God. Hence Jerome says (in his letter to Heliodorus): "Though you trample upon your father, though you spurn your mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter."

NOTE: He who is in the world, if he has parents who cannot be supported with-

out him, must not leave them and enter religion, on the plea that he is entrusting their care to God, for this would be to tempt God.

But he who already has made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world. Hence he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless, he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state, to make pious efforts for his parents' support (Ad 4).

QUESTION CII

OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND THE PARTS THEREOF

Here we must consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.—About observance there are three points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER OBSERVANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM OTHER VIRTUES.

NOTE: St. Augustine and Cicero define this virtue as: "That virtue whereby men who excel in some dignity are given a certain worship and honor."

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as beneath religion, whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity. Accordingly, just as piety properly so called is distinguished from religion; so observance properly so called is distinguished from piety (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO OBSERVANCE TO PAY WORSHIP AND HONOR TO THOSE WHO ARE IN POSITIONS OF DIGNITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that those who are in positions of dignity have both a certain excellence and the office of government, together with a certain power over their subjects. Accordingly by reason of their excellence honor is due to them, for honor is a recognition of the excellence of anyone. By reason of their office of government, worship is due to them, for worship consists in rendering them service, by obeying their commands and by repaying them, according to our means, for the benefits we have received from them.

NOTE: To those who are in a position of excellence are due: a) Honor, on account of their higher rank; b) fear, on account of their power to use compulsion; c) obedience, on account of their government; and d) tributes, which are a repayment of their labor (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER OBSERVANCE IS A GREATER VIRTUE THAN PIETY.

NO.—Piety is a greater virtue than observance.

THE REASON is that piety gives worship to persons in relation to the common good; whereas observance gives someone worship and honor on account of his personal honor or glory. Likewise, piety renders worship to persons who are more closely joined to us, namely our parents.

NOTE: Although virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship, to pay worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred (Ad 3).

QUESTION CIII

DULIA

We must next consider the parts of observance: 1) Dulia, which pays honor and other things pertaining thereto to persons in a higher position; 2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.—The first head takes four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER HONOR DENOTES SOMETHING CORPOREAL

YES.—As regards men.

THE REASON is that honor denotes a witnessing to anyone's excellence, which as regards God can consist simply in the interior movement of the heart, for instance

when a man acknowledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God.

But as regards men, one cannot witness only by means of external signs, i.e., by words or deeds or external things, such as gifts or statues.

NOTE: Reverence is not the same as honor. On the one hand reverence is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others (Ad 1).—Honor is said to be the reward of virtue inasmuch as it is a demonstrative sign of excellent virtue (Ad 2).—Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways: 1) Praise consists only in verbal signs, whence praise is included in honor, which is shown by all external signs. Secondly, praise bears on the excelling goodness of anyone in relation to some end, whereas honor witnesses to the excellence of his virtue absolutely.—Glory is an effect of honor and praise, since it is defined as "clear knowledge together with praise," from the Greek word *klarìa*. That is, honor and praise make one's virtue clear to all (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER HONOR IS PROPERLY DUE TO THOSE WHO ARE ABOVE US.

YES.—THE REASON is that in paying honor we properly consider the excellence, not of the person who honors but of the one who is honored; hence honor is always due to a person on account of some excellence or superiority.

ART. III.—WHETHER DULIA IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE DISTINCT FROM LATRIA.

YES.—THE REASON is that wherever there is a different aspect of that which is due there must be a different virtue to render that due. Now *dulia* pays due service to a human lord; whereas *latria* gives service due to the Divine Lord.

ART. IV.—WHETHER DULIA HAS VARIOUS SPECIES.

NO.—*Dulia* strictly taken, in so far as by it a servant gives reverence to his lord, has no other species under it; but taken in a wide sense it has other species.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that *dulia* signifies servitude; hence it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that *dulia* in its widest acceptance comprises piety and observance, and any other such virtue that pays reverence to man.

NOTE: *Hyperdulia* is the highest species of *dulia* taken in a wide sense; for the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity with God. Hence *hyperdulia* is assigned to the Blessed Virgin, in so far as she is the Mother of God (Ad 2).

QUESTION CIV OBEDIENCE

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE MAN IS BOUND TO OBEY ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as in natural things it behooves the higher to move the lower to their actions by excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God, so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority.

NOTE: The divine will is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated, and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER OBEDIENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it has a special character of praise from a special object, which is the tacit or express command of a superior, for, whereas subjects have many obligations to their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest.

NOTE: The will of the superior (as such), in whatever manner it becomes known, is a tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt inasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior's will (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER OBEDIENCE IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—That is: a) The theological virtues are superior to obedience; b) but obedience is the chief of the moral virtues; not even charity can be without obedience.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that those virtues whereby we adhere to God considered in Himself, namely the theological virtues, are higher than the moral virtues, whereby we despise something of the earth, that we may cleave to God. For the end is higher than the means to the end.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the highest human good that man can despise for the sake of God is his own will; and this is done by virtue of obedience.—Hence any other acts of the virtues derive their merit with God from the fact that they are done out of obedience to the divine will. For if anyone should suffer martyrdom, or bestow all his goods on the poor—unless he does this to fulfill the will of God, which belongs directly to obedience—this could not be meritorious.

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD OUGHT TO BE OBEYED IN ALL THINGS.

YES.—THE REASON is that God is the prime mover of all wills (I-II, q. ix, art. 6). Therefore, just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by natural necessity, so also by a certain necessity of justice (in the moral order) are all wills bound to obey the divine command.

NOTE: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is bound to obey God's command in all things (Ad 3).

ART. V. — WHETHER SUBJECTS ARE BOUND TO OBEY THEIR SUPERIORS IN ALL THINGS.

NO.—That is: Subjects are not bound to obey their superiors in all things for two reasons: a) On account of the precept of a higher power; b) if the superiors command their subjects in something in which the subjects are not subject to them. [For instance, servants are not bound to obey their masters, or children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity. For these are matters touching the nature of the body, and by nature all men are equal. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority.]

THE REASON is that in obeying one is moved to carry out the command of the superior by a certain necessity of justice [which, in the event, may not always exist].

NOTE: Obedience is threefold: 1) Sufficient for salvation, namely obedience given in matters to which we are obliged; 2) perfect, which obeys in all things lawful; 3) indiscreet, which obeys even in matters unlawful (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRISTIANS ARE BOUND TO OBEY THE SECULAR POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the order of justice demands that inferiors obey their superiors; otherwise the stability of human society could not endure. Now the order of justice is not taken away by the faith of Christ, but rather is strengthened, according to Rom. iii, 22: "The justice of God through faith in Jesus Christ."

NOTE: Those who are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound by earthly masters. For in the state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body (Ad 1).

2. Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by the order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, to avoid scandal or danger (Ad 3).

QUESTION CV DISOBEDIENCE

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DISOBEDIENCE IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—Not to obey the divine commandments and the precepts of our superiors is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that disobedience is opposed to charity. For to be disobedient to the divine commandments is contrary to the love of God.—The commandments of God also imply obedience to our superiors.—Disobedience is moreover contrary to love of neighbor, inasmuch as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.

NOTE: Disobedience arises from vain glory. For that a man is not subject to the commands of another arises from his craving to manifest his own excellence (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER DISOBEDIENCE IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS OF SINS.

NO.—THE REASON is that a sin that pertains directly to the contempt of God, such as blasphemy or the sort, is graver, even if disobedience be abstracted from sin, than would be the sin in which only the commandment of God is despised.

NOTE: One disobedience is graver than another, both on the part of the superior commanding, because the higher is the one who commands so much the more grievous is disobedience to him; and on the part of the things he prescribes, because the disobedience is graver in proportion as the precept that one sets aside is more in the intention of the person commanding; and, with respect to the commandments of God, the greater the good commanded the more grievous is its disobedience (in body of art.).

QUESTION CVI THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GRATITUDE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE, DISTINCT FROM OTHER VIRTUES.

YES.—Gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors, is a special virtue, distinct from religion, piety, and observance.

THE REASON is that gratitude is distinct from the above-named virtues just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof. For what we owe to God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity is not the same as what we owe a benefactor, from whom we have received some particular favor. It follows that, after religion, whereby we give due worship to God, and piety, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, is gratitude, which gives thanks to our benefactors.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE INNOCENT IS MORE BOUND TO GIVE THANKS TO GOD THAN THE PENITENT.

NO.—That is: By virtue of the quantity of the thing given, the innocent owes greater thanksgiving than the penitent. But by virtue of the fact that grace is more *freely* given him, the penitent owes more gratitude than the innocent, other things being equal.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a greater gift is given to the innocent by God, and also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that that which is given to the penitent by God is more freely given, for, whereas he was worthy of punishment, he was given grace.—And thus, although the gift that is given to the penitent is greater, absolutely considered, yet the gift that is given to the penitent is greater in relation to him; even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man.

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO GIVE THANKS TO EVERY BENEFACTOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that the natural order demands that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to this benefactor, to whom, as such he owes honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; and accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he should need it. For a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary; now every effect turns naturally to its cause.

NOTE: Since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too does gratitude depend chiefly on the heart (Ad 5).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO REPAY A FAVOR AT ONCE.

NO.—That is: As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once; but as regards the gift, one ought to wait until such time as will be convenient to the benefactor.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as Seneca says (*De Beneficiis, lib. ii*): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if, instead of choosing a suitable time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained, payment.

NOTE: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor; and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN GIVING THANKS WE SHOULD LOOK AT THE BENEFACTOR'S DISPOSITION OR AT THE DEED.

ANSWER: We should look at the benefactor's disposition.

THE REASON is that gratitude regards a favor in so far as it is freely given, and this pertains to the disposition. Therefore also does the repayment of the favor depend more on the disposition of the giver than on the deed. A kindly action consists formally and principally in the will (Ad 1).—A benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does a kindly action, for instance through his doing it cheerfully and readily (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE REPAYMENT OF GRATITUDE SHOULD SURPASS THE FAVOR RECEIVED.

YES.—THE REASON is that one who receives a favor is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received, because as long as he repays less or an equal amount he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.—Since the debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit (Ad 2).

QUESTION CVII INGRATITUDE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS ALWAYS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now everything that is contrary to virtue is a sin.

NOTE: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love; hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—That is: In so far as it is opposed to gratitude by deficiency (for the virtue of gratitude inclines to return something more).

THE REASON is that every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposed habit, even as blindness takes its species from sight, and deafness from hearing. Hence, just as gratitude is a special virtue, so also ingratitude is a special sin.

NOTE: Ingratitude is either by way of privation or by way of contraries. The degrees of private ingratitude are: a) when a man fails to repay a favor; b) when he hides his gratitude, as though declining to indicate that he has received a favor; c) when he does not recognize the favor received, whether by forgetfulness or in some way, and this is the highest degree of privative ingratitude.—The degrees of contrary gratitude

are: a) When someone repays evil for good; b) when he finds fault with a favor received; c) when he esteems kindness as though it were unkindness.—The degrees of gratitude are: a) When a man recognizes a favor received; b) when he expresses his appreciation and thanks; c) when he repays the favor at a suitable place and time according to his means (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER INGRATITUDE IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—Both privative and contrary ingratitude sometimes arises from a certain negligence, or from a certain disinclination to virtue. Sometimes, however, it is a mortal sin on account of interior contempt, or also on account of the kind of thing withheld, this being needed by the benefactor, either simply or in some case of necessity.—The gravity of contrary gratitude depends on the kind of thing that is done.

ART. IV.—WHETHER FAVORS SHOULD BE WITHHELD FROM THE UNGRATEFUL..

NO.—THE REASON is that the benefactor should not be too quick to judge a man ungrateful, for frequently a person who does not return a favor is grateful.—Likewise, a benefactor should try to turn his ingratitude to gratitude. But if, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors on him.—Note, however, with regard to the deserts of the ungrateful man, it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of favors.

QUESTION CVIII

VENGEANCE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER VENGEANCE IS LAWFUL.

YES.—If the intention of the one who takes vengeance is directed chiefly to the evil of the object of his vengeance, and there rests, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful. If, however, the avenger's intention is directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned, then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances are observed.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is opposed to charity. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. xii, 21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in that case vengeance is outside the order of the divine appointment (Ad 1).

NOTE: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church; and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this is expedient; for it is said in Rom. xii, 19: "Do not avenge yourselves, beloved, but give place to the wrath, for it is written: 'Vengeance is mine; I will repay, says the Lord.'" (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER VENGEANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Vengeance is a virtue perfecting the inclination of nature to remove harm. Hence Cicero in his *De Inventione Rhet.* ii, defines vengeance as that "whereby we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure (i.e., derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it."

NOTE: The punishment of sins, as far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; whereas as far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge (Ad 1).

2. Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own (Ad 2).

3. Two vices are opposed to vengeance: One by way of excess, namely the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing, whereas the other is a vice by way of deficiency, as when someone is too remiss in punishing. Hence it is said in Prov. xiii, 24: "He who spares the rod hates his son" (Ad 3).

ART. III. — WHETHER VENGEANCE SHOULD BE WROUGHT BY MEANS OF PUNISHMENTS CUSTOMARY AMONG MEN.

YES.—By death, flogging, and retaliation, or the loss of an eye for an eye; slavery and imprisonment, exile, fines, and ignominy, which are the eight classes of punishments according to Cicero, as Augustine quotes him (*City of God*, book xxi, chap. ii).

THE REASON is that vengeance is lawful and virtuous in so far as it tends to the restraint of evil. Now some are restrained from sinning who have not love of virtue, because they fear to lose some goods that they love more than what they get by sinning. These things that man especially loves are: Life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods, such as riches, his country, and his good name; and these are lost by the aforementioned penalties.

ART. IV.—WHETHER VENGEANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THOSE WHO HAVE SINNED INVOLUNTARILY.

NO.—That is: Punishment, as punishment, should be inflicted only on those who have sinned voluntarily. Sometimes, however, punishments, as medicinal, can be inflicted on the innocent and those who have sinned involuntarily.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that punishment, as punishment, is due only for sin; for punishment restores the equality of justice, in so far as one who by sinning has followed his own will to excess suffers something against his will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that medicine sometimes causes harm in lesser (namely temporal) things, in order that it may be helpful in greater (namely spiritual) things. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in the present life for our humiliation or probation.

NOTE: 1. Regarding temporal punishment, sometimes a man is punished for another's sin; and that for three reasons: 1) Because one man may be the temporal goods of another, as a child belongs to the father, a servant to his master, and subjects to rulers; 2) when one person's sin is transferred to another, either by imitation, as children copy the sins of their parents, or by way of merit, as the sinful subjects deserve a sinful ruler, according to Job xxxiv, 30: "Who maketh a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people" 3) since we are all one body in human society (Ad 1).

2. According to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death or mutilation. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause; and this is threefold: 1) Through a person's becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good, as when on account of an infectious disease a man is removed from the administration of his office; 2) because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property; 3) because the good of which he is deprived depends on another (as when a son loses his inheritance through his father's fault).

QUESTION CIX TRUTH OR VERACITY (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER TRUTH IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—Not insofar as something true is said in truth; but insofar as someone speaks the truth.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this sense truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue, namely a certain quality between the intellect or sign and the thing understood and signified, or again between the thing and its rule.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the very fact of speaking the truth is a good act. Now a virtue is "that which makes the one who has it good and renders his deed good."

NOTE: Truth, or veracity, is a moral virtue standing between excesses and deficiency. Excess consists in making one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency, in hiding them when one ought to make them known.

ART. II.—WHETHER TRUTH IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that by virtue of veracity man is perfected so that his external words or deeds are related in due order to something, as the sign to the thing

signified. Now wherever there is a special order there is a special reason of goodness, which makes a man good, and renders his actions good. For the nature of the good consists in order, mode, and species.

NOTE: Veracity excludes duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another. Accordingly truth is the same as simplicity, from which it is only logically distinguished (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER TRUTH IS A PART OF JUSTICE.

YES.—It is a part annexed to justice.

THE REASON is that truth or veracity is annexed to justice as a secondary virtue to its principal, since it has something in common with justice, though falling short of the perfect virtue thereof. It agrees with justice, first, inasmuch as truth also relates to another; secondly, inasmuch as it equates signs to the things that concern man himself. It falls short of the notion of justice inasmuch as truth does not regard a legal but only a moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH INCLINES RATHER TO THAT WHICH IS LESS.

YES.—By affirmation.

THE REASON is that to decline from truth by affirming is when a man does not manifest all the good that is in him, for example, knowledge or holiness, or something of the sort. This is done without prejudice to truth, inasmuch as the less is contained in the greater. In fact, men who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, inasmuch as they defer to others by their moderation; whereas the others, who make too much of themselves, are a source of annoyance to the rest, as desiring to excel the others. But to incline to what is less by denying, as when one denies that he has what he does have, does not belong to this virtue, inasmuch as this would imply a falsehood.

QUESTION CX

THE VICIES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING

We must next consider the vices opposed to truth: 1) Lying; 2) simulation or hypocrisy; 3) boasting and the opposite vice. On lying there will be four questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER LYING IS ALWAYS OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH.

YES.—Lying is directly and formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

THE REASON is that the notion of lying is taken from formal (but not from material) falsehood, namely from the fact that man has the intention of telling what is false. Hence if anyone formally says what is false, having the intention of telling a falsehood, even though what he says is true, yet such an act is voluntary and moral, contains falsehood essentially and truth only accidentally, and hence attains the specific nature of a lie.

NOTE: That anyone intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to the perfection thereof (at end of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER LIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO OFFICIOUS, JOCOSE, AND MALICIOUS LIES.

YES.—A lie, inasmuch as it has the character of fault according to what aggravates or diminishes the sin of lying, is rightly and sufficiently divided into mischievous, jocose, and officious.

THE REASON is that lying is thus divided on the part of the thing intended. For it aggravates the guilt of lying if anyone intends by his lie to hurt another, and this is called a malicious lie; the sin of lying is diminished if it is directed to some good, either of pleasure, and thus it is a jocose lie; or of usefulness, and thus it is an officious lie, which is intended to help someone or remove his injury.—According to its notion, however, lying is divided according as it goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to boasting; or according as it falls short of the truth, which belongs to irony.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL LYING IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that lying is an evil in respect of its genus; for it is an

action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind.

NOTE: In Holy Writ, as Augustine says (*On Lying*, c. 5), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virute; and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER EVERY LIE IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that a jocose lie, in which some slight amusement is intended, and in an officious lie, in which a neighbor's benefit is intended, there is only a venial sin.

NOTE: Lying can be considered: a) In itself, i.e., in its signification; and such a lie if it bears on divine matters is always a mortal sin, because it is opposed to charity. If it bears on a man's good in a grave matter, e.g., when it pertains to the perfection of science or moral conduct, it is a mortal sin, because it causes the neighbor the grave loss of false opinion.—b) By reason of the end intended, a lie can be sinful, and thus if it is spoken to the injury of God, it is always a mortal sin; likewise if it is spoken to the grave injury of man; and such a lie is a malicious lie.—c) Accidentally a lie can be a mortal sin, i.e., by reason of scandal, or some consequent loss (in body of art.).

QUESTION CXI DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL DISSIMULATION IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as it is contrary to truth that anyone should signify by external words anything else than he has in his mind, which is lying; so also it is contrary to truth that one should signify by means of signs of deeds or things anything the contrary of that which is in his mind, and this properly is dissimulation. Hence dissimulation is properly a lie consistng in the external signs of acts as, for example, when one who is sad pretends by external acts that he is gay.—Hence, when pretending refers to some signification it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth, as when Our Lord pretended to go further on the way to Emmaus, because He acted as though wishing to go further, in order to signify something figuratively (ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS THE SAME AS DISSIMULATION.

YES.—All hypocrisy is dissimulation, but not all dissimulation is hypocrisy, but only that whereby one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.

THE REASON is that the name hypocrite is taken from the appearance of those who come on the stage with a disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion.

NOTE: If a man puts on the garb of holiness with the intention of entering the state of perfection, he is not a hypocrite if he falls through weakness, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside his habit. If, however, he were to put on the garb in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS CONTRARY TO THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH.

YES.—Either directly or indirectly.

THE REASON is that, since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby one person pretends to have a different character than he has (prec. art.), it follows that it is directly contrary to truth.—Indirectly hypocrisy is contrary to truth in relation to some accident, for instance, a remote end, or an instrument of action, or something else of that kind.

ART. IV.—WHETHER HYPOCRISY IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—a) If by a hypocrite we mean one who does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy, it is clear that hypocrisy is a mortal sin; b) if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to dissemble holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, without, however, wishing to neglect his holiness, then such a dissimulation is not always a mortal

sin (as it would be if the hypocrite intended something seriously against charity, as the spreading of religious error).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no one is completely deprived of holiness except by mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although such a person is in mortal sin, by which he is deprived of holiness, such dissimulation is not always opposed to charity; but this must be determined by the end.

QUESTION CXII BOASTING

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying, according to the Philosopher (*Ethics*, book iv, chap. 7.). The inquiry about boasting is in two articles).

ART. I.—WHETHER BOASTING IS CONTRARY TO THE VIRTUE OF TRUTH.

YES.—By way of excess.

THE REASON is that it is properly called boasting when a man raises himself in words, either by speaking of himself above what he is in truth or by speaking of himself above what men believe of him.

NOTE: Arrogance, by which a man is raised above himself, is a kind of pride; it is not, however, the same as boasting, but is often its cause.

ART. II.—WHETHER BOASTING IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—Boasting considered in itself, as a lie, is sometimes a mortal, sometimes only a venial sin. Likewise, if it is considered in regard to its cause, namely pride, vainglory, or the desire of gain, it is sometimes mortal and sometimes venial.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such boasting can be against the glory of God, as is said of the person of the King of Tyre in Ezech. xxviii, 2: "Thy heart is lifted up; and thou hast said: I am God;" or also against charity to the neighbor, as when someone in boasting breaks into invectives against others, as is told of the Pharisees (Luke xviii, 11). Sometimes, however, boasting is neither against God nor against the neighbor.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that to boast out of pride, vainglory, or desire of gain can involve great harm to the neighbor.—Hence boasting, if it is comparable to a malicious lie, is in itself a mortal sin; if to a jocose or officious lie, it is a venial sin (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXIII IRONY

(in two articles)

[**NOTE:** Irony is here not taken in its common meaning of derisive speaking through the contrary of what is said, but for the dissimulation whereby a person either speaks meanly of himself, when he does not recognize anything mean in himself, or denies something great in himself, which he yet perceives as present.]

ART. I.—WHETHER IRONY IS A SIN.

YES.—Irony, whereby a person pretends to the existence of lesser things in himself, the presence of which he nevertheless perceives in himself, is always a sin.

THE REASON is that such a pretender swerves from truth. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.* lib. xxvi, cap. 3): "It is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."

ART. II.—WHETHER IRONY IS A LESS GRIEVOUS SIN THAN BOASTING.

YES.—On the part of the end, but not on the part of the matter.

THE REASON is that generally boasting proceeds from a lower motive, namely from the desire of gain or honor, whereas irony arises from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by extolling himself.—It may happen sometimes, however, that a man pretends less about himself from some other motive, e.g., to deceive, and then irony is a graver sin.—On the part of the matter the two vices are equal, because they lie about the same thing, i.e., about the condition of a person.

QUESTION CXIV FRIENDLINESS, WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY

We must now consider friendliness, which is called affability, and the contrary vices, which are flattery and quarreling. About friendliness there are two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER FRIENDLINESS IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON it is that it has a special character of good, which consists in the fact that men are fittingly ordered to other men in their mutual relations both in acts and in words, namely so as to conduct themselves becomingly to everyone.

NOTE: Friendliness, or affability, is distinguished from friendship, inasmuch as friendship properly so called consists chiefly in the affection, whereby one person loves another, and this has already been treated in the questions of charity (q. xxiii, xxv, and xxvi). Friendliness consists merely in outward words or deeds, inasmuch as it bears a certain similarity to friendship properly so called, insofar as a man behaves in a becoming manner toward those with whom he comes into contact (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS KIND OF FRIENDSHIP IS A PART OF JUSTICE.

YES.—It is an annexed part.

THE REASON is that in something it agrees with justice, namely inasmuch as it relates to another; and it falls short of justice in something else, namely in that it does not have the full character of a debt, as when one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, to whose payment the law constrains him, or even by a debt arising from some favor received; but it regards only a debt of equity, which is more on the side of the virtuous man himself than on the side of the other, so that, namely, he should do to another what is fitting for him to do.

QUESTION CXV FLATTERY

Here we consider the vices opposed to the previous virtue: 1) Flattery; 2) quarreling;: About flatter there are two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER FLATTERY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it exceeds in words or deeds the mode of pleasing. If this is done only with the intention of pleasing, it is called complacency; but if it is done with the intention of acquiring gain it is called blandishment or flattery.

NOTE: Although affability chiefly intends to please those with whom one comes into contact, yet where it is necessary to obtain some good or avoid some evil, it does not fear to offend (in body of art.).

NO—If anyone flatters from the mere desire to please others, or also to avoid some evil or to obtain something in necessity, it is only a venial sin.

THE REASON is that thus flattery is not against charity, but it exceeds only its measure (prec. art.).

NOTE: Flattery is opposed to charity in three ways: a) By reason of the matter, e.g., when someone praises another's sin; for this is contrary to the love of God and the neighbor; b) by reason of the intention, e.g., when someone flatters another in order that by deceiving him he may injure him; c) by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flattery, even when the flatterer does not intend it, becomes to another an occasion of sin (in body of art.).

QUESTION CXVI QUARRELING

ART. I.—WHETHER QUARRELING IS OPPOSED TO THE VIRTUE OF FRIENDSHIP OR AFFABILITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that quarreling, which consists properly in words, namely when one person contradicts the words of another, arises from one person's not fearing to offend the other; and this is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to live agreeably with others.

NOTE: The contradiction that arises on account of the person who speaks, the con-

tradictor refusing to agree with him from lack of that love that unites minds together, seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity (in body of art.).

ART. II. — WHETHER QUARRELING IS A MORE GRIEVOUS SIN THAN FLATTERY.

YES.—a) Considered in itself and in its species, quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery; b) accidentally, however, and in relation to the external motives, quarreling may be either more or less grievous than flattery.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that quarreling is more repugnant to the opposite virtue, i.e., friendliness or affability. For complacency or flattery is opposed to the virtue of affability in point of pleasing; whereas quarreling is opposed in point of offending, which is more contrary to friendship.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in respect of some exterior motives sometimes flattery is graver, e.g., when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain; whereas sometimes quarreling is graver, e.g., when a person intends to impugn the truth, or to bring the speaker into contempt.

QUESTION CXVII LIBERALITY

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER LIBERALITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to liberality to use well the things of this world, which were given to us for the support of life, and which we can use ill. For, as Augustine says (*Serm. 64 de Temp.*): "It belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill."

ART. II.—WHETHER LIBERALITY IS ABOUT MONEY.

YES.—Money is the proper matter of liberality.

THE REASON is that those things that are the subjects of a man's freehandedness toward others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term money.

NOT: It belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness (*largitas*). The term liberality also seems to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it (*liberat*) from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind free (*liberum*) of attachment thereto (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER USING MONEY IS THE ACT OF LIBERALITY.

YES.—The proper act of liberality is the good use of money.

THE REASON is that the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever can be measured by money. Now the species is taken from the object. Hence the proper act of liberality must bear on its object, which is money.

NOTE: To liberality it belongs not only to use money but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it. (Ad. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO A LIBERAL MAN CHIEFLY TO GIVE.

YES.—It is more proper for a liberal man to give than to receive or to spend on himself.

THE REASON is that the proper use of money consists in parting with it.

ART. V.—WHETHER LIBERALITY IS A PART OF JUSTICE.

YES.—a) Nor as its species but b) as an annexed virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that justice gives to another what is his; but liberality gives that which is its own.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that liberality has something in common with justice, and that in two respects: 1) Because, like justice, it relates chiefly to another; 2) because, like justice, it bears on outward things, although under a different aspect, as was stated in the previous articles.

ART. VI. — WHETHER LIBERALITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—THE REASON is that the good to which liberality is primarily and essentially directed is not the greatest good; for liberality tends to set in order one's own affection for the possession and use of money. This, however, is less than other goods.—Yet consequently liberality has a certain excellence, inasmuch as the fact of a man's not being a lover of money results in his readily using it both for himself and for the good of others and for the honor of God; and in this way liberality is useful in many ways.

QUESTION CXVIII THE VICIES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY AND IN THE FIRST PLACE COVETOUSNESS

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that covetousness is the immoderate love of ownership whereby someone unduly desires to acquire or keep outward things. The measure of this vice is here taken from the nature of the end of riches, namely in so far as they are necessary for life according to each person's condition.

NOTE: Covetousness, in so far as it signifies that a man acquires or keeps riches more than his due, is directly a sin against the neighbor, since one cannot have an excess of external riches without another man's lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time (in great amount). In so far as it signifies immoderation in the internal affection that a man has for riches—for example, that he loves riches immoderately—covetousness is a sin of man against himself, because his affections are disordered thereby. By consequence it is a sin against God, even as are all mortal sins, inasmuch as a man for the sake of temporal goods despises that which is eternal (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—Covetousness is a special sin inasmuch as it is the immoderate love of having possessions that are designated by the term money, i.e, under the aspect of useful good.

THE REASON is that covetousness accordingly has a special character of seeking good inordinately, as was stated in the preceding article.—But if the name of covetousness is extended to include all immoderate desire of having anything covetousness is not a special sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY.

YES.—Insofar as covetousness designates immoderation with regard to the interior affection for riches.

THE REASON is that such affections are moderated by liberality. But if covetousness signifies even the undue possession of another's thing it is then opposed to justice.

ART. IV.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—Insofar as it is opposed to justice covetousness is a mortal sin in respect to its genus; insofar as it is opposed to liberality, if it is not opposed to charity, it is only a venial sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus covetousness signifies robbery or theft.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that covetousness is opposed to liberality insofar as it denotes the inordinate love of riches. Hence if such a disordered love is opposed to charity, so that, namely, for the love of riches a man does not fear to act against the love of God and the neighbor, it is a mortal sin. If, however, this disordered love stops short of this, so that, although he loves riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, as not wishing to act against God and the neighbor for riches' sake, then covetousness is a venial sin.

ART. V.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS THE GREATEST OF SINS.

NO.—Covetousness is not simply the greatest of sins.

THE REASON is that the gravity of a sin is to be judged more on the part of the good that is corrupted than on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. For every sin consists formally in the privation or corruption of some good, and materially in a turning to a mutable good. Now on the part of the good that is corrupted, covetousness is the least of sins, since its object is the good of external things, which is the lowest of human goods. On the part of the good to which the appetite is unduly subjected, covetousness has in a way a greater deformity than other sins, because it is subjected to the lowest good, and in this subjection has a certain resemblance to idolatry. (Ad 4).

ART. VI.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A SPIRITUAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that covetousness is consummated in pleasures of the spirit. For the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as the possessor of riches.

NOTE: There is a mean between purely carnal pleasure and purely spiritual pleasure in the pleasure of the soul, namely that which belongs to the soul but by reason of the body. And such is covetousness, which is not purely carnal sin, nor yet a purely spiritual one, which would be about one's own excellence (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER COVETOUSNESS IS A CAPITAL SIN.

YES—Covetousness, which consists in the desire of money, is a capital vice.

THE REASON is that covetousness gives rise to other vices by reason of its end. Now the end of the covetous man is to be sufficient unto himself. This self-sufficiency is a condition of happiness. Now happiness is the most desirable end, and on account of a desire for it a man sets about doing many things, either good or bad.

NOTE: Money is directed to something else as its end; yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER TREACHERY, FRAUD, FALSEHOOD, PERJURY, RESTLESSNESS, VIOLENCE, AND INSENSIBILITY TO MERCY ARE DAUGHTERS OF COVETOUSNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that these vices arise from covetousness, and especially with respect to the desire of the end, namely to have riches on account of self-sufficiency and happiness.—For, from the fact that covetousness is excessive in keeping arises insensibility to mercy. In so far as it is excessive in receiving, it gives rise, as regards the thought, to restlessness; as regards the deed, it gives rise to violence (in acquiring other persons' things through force), falsehood (in words), perjury (if an oath is added), fraud (if deceit is committed that affects the things), and treachery (if deceit is committed against persons) as in the case of Judas, who out of covetousness betrayed Christ.

NOTE: The above-mentioned vices, although they are not species of covetousness, are its daughters, as had been said. The following species of covetousness are enumerated: Parsimony, when the covetous man gives little; close-fistedness, when he gives nothing; skinflint action (Gr. *kymino-pristes*), as being a cumin seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. These are excesses in keeping. In receiving there are the following species of covetousness: In making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, or by making a profit where it is not necessary, i.e., by usury, or by laboring much to make little profit, or by stealing from the living, despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do (Ad 4).

QUESTION CXIX PRODIGALITY

ART. I.—WHETHER PRODIGALITY IS OPPOSITE TO COVETOUSNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that prodigality and covetousness differ in respect to excess and deficiency, for, where the covetous man exceeds, the prodigal is deficient; and, on the other hand, where the prodigal exceeds the covetous man comes short. For in affection for riches the covetous man exceeds, by loving them more than is their due; here,

however, the prodigal is deficient, since he takes less care of them than is their due. With regard to exterior things the prodigal exceeds in giving, but falls short in retaining; the covetous man, on the contrary, falls short in giving and exceeds in receiving and retaining.

NOTE: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures. More frequently, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods he seeks for himself pleasures of body (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRODIGALITY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the mean of virtue is corrupted, as by covetousness, so also by prodigality, as was shown in the previous article.

ART. III.—WHETHER PRODIGALITY IS A MORE GRIEVOUS SIN THAN COVETOUSNESS.

NO.—Prodigality considered in itself is a lesser sin than covetousness.

THE FIRST REASON is that covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue, namely liberality, which is a mean between covetousness and prodigality.

THE SECOND REASON is that the prodigal is of use to many people; the covetous man, to no one, not even to himself.

THE THIRD REASON is that prodigality is easily cured; but the covetous man is not easily cured. For covetousness has its incurability on the part of human deficiency, to which human nature is always prone, since the more deficient someone is the more does he need the help of external things, and therefore it falls more easily into covetousness (prec. q., art. 5, ad 3).

QUESTON CXX "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER "EPIKEIA" IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that *epikeia* is directed to this, that in cases where it is bad to follow a law as it stands, a person may set aside the letter of the law and follow what is demanded by justice and the common good, which is good.

ART. II.—WHETHER "EPIKEIA" IS A PART OF JUSTICE.

YES.—It is subjective part.

THE REASON is that *epikeia* is subject to justice (taken in a general sense) as to its genus.

NOTE: *Epikēia* corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the lawgiver, which is of more account, then *epikeia* is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then *epikeia* is a part, not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptance, and is conjoined with legal justice, as exceeding it.

QUESTION CXXI PIETY

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PIETY IS A GIFT.

YES.—THE REASON is that piety is an habitual disposition of soul by which we pay worship and duty to God as to our Father by an instinct of the Holy Spirit, according to Rom. viii, 15: "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba, Father."

NOTE: The piety that pays to a carnal father duty and worship is a virtue; but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as to a Father (Ad 1).—Likewise just as through the piety that is a virtue a man pays duty and worship, not only to his carnal father, but also to his kindred, insofar as they belong to the father; so also piety, according as it is a gift, not only pays duty and worship to God, but also to all men, insofar as they belong to God (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SECOND BEATITUDE, "BLESSED ARE THE MEEK," CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF PIETY.

YES.—According to the way the beatitudes are enumerated in the Gospel.

THE REASON is that, according to Augustine (*De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, lib. I, *cap.* 4), the first beatitude, "Blessed are the poor," corresponds to the gift of fear; the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," corresponds to piety, and so with the rest.—But according to the special nature of each gift and beatitude, there correspond to piety as a gift the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice," and the fifth, "Blessed are the merciful."

NOTE: Regarding the fruits of the Holy Spirit, goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; meekness may be indirectly ascribed, inasmuch as it removes the obstacles to acts of piety (Ad 3).

**QUESTION CXXII
THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE**

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the precepts of the Decalogue relate to one another under the aspect of something due. For the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the principal part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the other six precepts are about acts of justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the order of the generation of goodness, to which goodness the law has regard, the first part consists in the goodness of the will, whose object is its end. Hence in man who was to be directed to virtue by means of the law, it was first necessary to lay the foundation, as it were, of religion, by which man is duly ordered to God, who is the last end of the human will.—The second part is that contraries and obstacles should be removed. Now the principal obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to *Matth.* vi, 24: "You cannot serve God and mammon." Hence in the second part of the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is forbidden.

NOTE: All kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words: "Thou shalt have no strange gods" (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SECOND PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED.

NOTE: This precept is: "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain..'

YES.—THE REASON is that something is opposed to true religion in two ways, to wit, by excess, i.e., through superstition; and by defect, i.e., through irreligion. Since therefore in the first precept superstition is forbidden, fittingly forbidden (chiefly) in the second precept is perjury, which pertains to irreligion.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE THIRD PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED, I.E., THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE SABBATH.

YES.—THE REASON is that, the obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the Decalogue, it remained for the third precept to be given, whereby man is established in true religion. Now this is done by the institution of worship. Hence, just as man is induced to pay interior worship, which consists in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Spirit, so a precept of the Law had to be given about exterior worship, and moreover under the sign of a common boon, namely creation. Hence, after the precept regarding the sanctification of the Sabbath (*Exod.* xx, 11), a reason is assigned: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth.. and rested on the seventh day."

NOTE: 1. The precept about sanctifying the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. As a moral precept it is founded on the fact that man has

a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for every necessary thing. Hence to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with divine things is a matter of moral precept. As a ceremonial precept, it has three significations: 1) A sign of the creation of the world; 2) a sign of Christ's resting in the sepulchre; 3) a sign of the rest of the enjoyment of God in heaven (Ad 1).

2. Regarding the servile works forbidden on the Lord's Day, consider that there are three sorts of service, namely the service of sin, according to John viii, 34: "Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin;" the second is that whereby one man serves another, namely in corporal acts; and the third is the service of God, i.e., not only in spiritual but also in corporal acts, inasmuch as it is an office of latria or adoration. With regard to the service of God, it is lawful to violate the Sabbath, and that without guilt, according to Matth. xii, 5: "On the Sabbath days the priests in the Temple break the Sabbath," i.e., they do corporal labor on the Sabbath, "and that without blame;" since this is not contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance.

With regard to other services, because man is more hindered from devoting himself to the things of God by a work of sin than by a lawful work, although it be corporal, therefore one acts more against this precept who sins on a feast day than one who does another corporal work (on other days).

Regarding works that are properly service, it is to be noted that corporal (and thus not intellectual) labor is called service insofar as it refers to those who serve; but insofar as they are common to free men and slaves they are not so called (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FOURTH PRECEPT, ABOUT HONORING ONE'S PARENTS, IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED.

YES.—THE REASON is that this fourth precept stands immediately after the priests directing us to God. For, just as God is the universal principle, so are the parents our particular principle; and thus there is a certain kinship of this precept with the precepts of the first table.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE OTHER SIX PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE ARE FITTINGLY EXPRESSED.

YES.—THE REASON is that it was fitting that, after the precepts pertaining to justice considered in particular, according to which our debt is rendered through religion and to our parents through piety, as was stated in the previous articles, there should follow in order other precepts pertaining to justice properly and generally so called, which renders a debt to all indifferently.—Hence the last six precepts are negative, because man is bound in general to do no one any harm. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people; hence affirmative precepts were not to be included about these duties among the precepts of the Decalogue (Ad 1).

NOTE: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of the first movements of concupiscence, which go no farther than the bounds of sense reaction. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to need or pleasure (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXXIII FORTITUDE

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. 1) The virtue itself; 2) its parts; 3) the gift corresponding thereto; 4) the precepts that pertain to it.

Concerning fortitude three things must be considered: 1) Fortitude itself; 2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; 3) the vices opposed to fortitude. About the first point there will be 12 articles.

NOTE: St. Thomas defines fortitude as the virtue directing the movements of the mind regarding all things terrible, especially regarding the sustaining or repelling of the dangers of death.

ART. I.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that fortitude (of the mind) conforms man to reason, insofar, namely, as it removes the obstacle and resists the difficulties whereby the will

is disinclined to that which is according to reason. This is the formal part of the virtue of fortitude.

NOTE: 1. In order that man may be conformed to reason, and therefore be good according to virtue, three things are required: a) That his reason itself be rectified, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; b) that the very rectitude of reason be established in human affairs, and this is the work of justice; c) that the obstacles in the way of this rectitude to be placed in human affairs be removed, and this is done by temperance, which regulates pleasures, and by fortitude, as was stated in the response (in body of art.).

2. Certain acts are brave only by way of resemblance, namely those that do not proceed from the proper virtue of fortitude but from another cause, e.g., from the desire of honor, and the like (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—Insofar as it denotes firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm.

THE REASON is that, so defined, fortitude has its own determinate matter.—But insofar as it denotes a certain firmness of mind, which is required for every virtue in order that it may act firmly and immovably, fortitude is not a special but a general virtue.

ART. III.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS ABOUT FEAR AND DARING.

YES.—Fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.

THE REASON is that it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove the obstacle that holds the will from following reason. Now that anyone is withheld from anything difficult comes under the notion of fear. Therefore fortitude is chiefly about the fear of difficult things. Now it behooves us, not only firmly to bear the onset of such difficult things by curbing fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom in the future, and this would seem to come under the notion of daring.

ART. IV.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS ONLY ABOUT DANGERS OF DEATH.

YES.—THE REASON is that one who stands firm against the greater things will consequently stand firm against lesser things; but not conversely. And this also comes under the notion of virtue, that it should regard something extreme.

NOTE: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason; wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.

ART. V.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS PROPERLY ABOUT DANGERS OF DEATH IN BATTLE.

YES.—Either in battle commonly so called or in single combat.

THE REASON is that the dangers of death that occur in battle directly threaten man on account of some good, namely when as he defends the common good in a just war. On the other hand, the dangers of death that consist in illness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, or the like, do not seem directly to threaten man through his pursuing good, although even with regard to these dangers the brave man behaves well, since man may be in danger of death for the sake of any virtue.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ENDURANCE IS THE CHIEF ACT OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—Endurance, that is, is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them, is the chief act of fortitude.

THE REASON is that to attack belongs to fortitude insofar as the latter moderates daring; but to endure is the result of the repression of fear. Now fortitude is more concerned with the repression of fear than with the moderation of daring. Because it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, inasmuch as the very danger that is the object of daring and fear of itself contributes something to repress audacity, but operates to increase fear.

NOTE: Endurance is more difficult than aggression for three reasons: 1) Because

endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person; 2) because he who endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; 3) because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN ACTS FOR THE SAKE OF THE GOOD OF HIS HABIT.

YES.—The brave man acts for the good of his habit, as for his proximate end, so that, namely, he may express in act the likeness of his habit. But brave men act as for their last end for the sake of their happiness and the love of God.

THE REASON is that the proximate end of every agent is to impress the likeness of its form on something else. For example, the end of the builder is to impress the likeness of his art on the materials of building. Hence it is to be said that the brave man intends as his proximate end to express the likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit, or character.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN DELIGHTS IN HIS ACT.

NO.—The brave man on one side has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure; on the other side, he feels and is saddened by pain, namely on account of enduring things unpleasant and painful to which he is subjected.

THE REASON is that in reflecting on his act the brave man considers the good of reason, which affords him pleasure in the soul; but the principal act of fortitude is to endure things unpleasant according to the apprehension of the soul, and on this account the brave man has cause for grief, both in the soul and in the body. Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being absorbed by the sufferings of the body.

NOTE: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethics* iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end" (Ad 2).

The sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the divine things in which it delights than bodily pains have to afflict it (in body of art).

ART. IX.—WHETHER FORTITUDE DEALS CHIEFLY WITH SUDDEN OCCURRENCES.

YES.—Fortitude, as regards its choice, is not about sudden occurrences, although sudden occurrences better reveal that the habit of fortitude is strongly entrenched in the mind.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is, as Gregory says (*Hom. xxxv, in Evang.*): "The blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a habit acts after the manner of nature. Hence if a person does without forethought that which pertains to virtue when necessity threatens on account of sudden perils, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

ART. X.—WHETHER THE BRAVE MAN MAKES USE OF ANGER IN HIS ACTION.

YES.—He makes use of anger in a moderate way.

THE REASON is that according to the Peripatetics (for the Stoics considered the passions as an evil, i.e., as disorders of the soul) anger and the other passions of the soul should be employed by virtuous men; for the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of the reason to the end that it may co-operate by rendering actions more prompt.

NOTE: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body (Ad 2). In like manner fortitude does not employ anger for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act; but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, and thus it directly co-operates with fortitude in attacking (Ad 3).

ART. XI.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A CARDINAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the cardinal or principal virtues are those that have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness, which is a common condition of all the virtues.

ART. XII.—WHETHER FORTITUDE EXCELS AMONG ALL OTHER VIRTUES.

NO.—Among the cardinal virtues first place is held by prudence; second, by justice; third, by fortitude; and fourth by temperance.

THE REASON is that the good of reason, which is the good of man, is possessed essentially by prudence, which is the perfection of reason; to justice it belongs to effect this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs.

The other virtues tend to safeguard this good. And in the order of these virtues fortitude holds the chief place, because the fear of the dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason. After fortitude comes temperance, since the pleasures of touch surpass all others in impeding the good of reason.

NOTE: The words of St. Ambrose are quoted in the reply to obj. 3: "Fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready he is to oppress the weaker." Likewise the words of Aristotle in the reply to the fifth: "Just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and in peace."

QUESTION CXXIV**MARTYRDOM**

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is essential to martyrdom that a person stand firmly in truth and justice against the attacks of persecutors. Now this belongs to virtue. For it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason.

NOTE: The good of reason, as regards its proper object, consists in truth; as regards its proper effect, it consists in justice (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it belongs to fortitude to confirm man in the good of virtue, and especially against dangers, particularly the dangers of death, and more specifically the kind of dangers met with in warfare. Now it is manifest that in martyrdom man is firmly established in the good of virtue by not deserting faith and justice on account of imminent dangers of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors.

NOTE: Martyrdom is compared to faith as to its end, in which a man is strengthened; to fortitude it is compared as to the habit that elicits the act. Charity inclines to the act of martyrdom as the first and principal motive, by way of the virtue that commands the act. The fact that it is meritorious also results from charity, like any other act of virtue. Hence therefore without charity martyrdom is of no avail (Ad 2 and 3, passim).

ART. III.—WHETHER MARTYRDOM IS AN ACT OF THE GREATEST PERFECTION.

YES.—Not in respect of the species of the act; but by reference to its prime motive, which is the love of charity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus martyrdom consists in the patient endurance of death. Now to endure death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as this is directed to some good, consisting in an act of virtue, for example, to faith and the love of God. Hence this act of virtue, being the end, is better.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that martyrdom more than any other act of virtue best demonstrates the perfection of charity; since a man's love for a thing is so much the more clearly shown in proportion as that which he despises for the sake of that thing is the more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer is the more odious, according to John xv, 13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

ART. IV.—WHETHER DEATH IS ESSENTIAL TO MARTYRDOM.

YES.—THE REASON is that martyrs (*Gr. martyr, witness*) are so called as being witnesses, namely witnesses to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for things invisible, as is said in *Hebr. ix*. Now as long as bodily life remains to man he does not yet know by his acts that he despises all things of the body.—It nevertheless may happen sometimes that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ other tribulations inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these afflictions (*Ad 4*).

ART. V.—WHETHER FAITH ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF MARTYRDOM.

NO.—The profession of faith is not the sole cause of martyrdom.

THE REASON is that the outward profession of faith is not made by words alone, by which we profess our faith, but also by deeds, whereby we show that we have faith. Hence all virtuous deeds, insofar as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith, and thus can be a cause of martyrdom.

QUESTION CXXV**FEAR**

We have next to consider the vices opposed to fortitude: 1) Fear; 2) fearlessness; 3) daring. The first head takes four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER FEAR IS A SIN.

YES.—Inordinate fear has the character of sin.

THE REASON is that inordinate fear is had when the appetite refuses to face what the reason dictates we should endure, rather than forfeit other goods that we should seek after. But when the appetite by fearing shuns that which according to reason should be shunned, then the appetite is not inordinate, and is not sinful.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SIN OF FEAR IS OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE.

YES.—The chief fear, which is the fear of danger of death, is properly opposed to fortitude.

THE REASON is that fortitude bears on such dangers. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically opposed to fortitude. (*Antonomasia* is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual. Thus St. Paul is called the Apostle, and Aristotle the Philosopher.)

Inordinate fear commonly taken is included in every sin, as is also inordinate love, from which it proceeds. Thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, etc.

ART. III.—WHETHER FEAR IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—That is, it can be a mortal sin.

THE REASON is that a man on account of fear, whereby he shuns the danger of death or any other temporal evil, can be so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to forego something that is gravely commanded in the law of God; and such a fear is a mortal sin. Otherwise, it is venial sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER FEAR EXCUSES FROM SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that fear is a sin when it is voluntarily inordinate; but ordinate fear is not a sin. Thus whoever, in order to shun evils that according to reason are more to be avoided, does not avoid evils that are less to be shunned does not commit sin. Hence if anyone on account of fear should promise or give something to robbers, he would be excused from sin.

QUESTION CXXVI**FEARLESSNESS**

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FEARLESSNESS IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that fearlessness, or the inordinate state of being without fear, is the result either of a lack of love—for it is a natural instinct in everyone to

love in due measure his own life and the things subordinated thereto—or of exaltation, when pride of soul causes a man who presumes on himself and despises others to think that the evils contrary to the goods that he loves cannot be overcome—or dullness of mind, when the state of being without fear results from a deficiency of reason. Hence it is said in Prov. xiv, 16: "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."

ART. II.—WHETHER FEARLESSNESS IS OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE.

YES.—THE REASON is that moderate fear belongs to fortitude according to reason, so that, namely, a man fears what he ought to fear and when he ought. Hence, just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, inasmuch as a man fears what he ought not; so also fearlessness is opposed to it by deficiency of fear, inasmuch as a man does not fear what he ought to fear.—Thus fearlessness by its species corrupts the mean of fortitude, and thus is directly opposed to fortitude (Ad 2).

QUESTION CXXVII DARING, OR FOOLHARDINESS

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FOOLHARDINESS IS A SIN.

YES.—As a passion that sins by excess.

THE REASON is that as such daring lacks the moderation of reason.

ART. II.—WHETHER FOOLHARDINESS IS OPPOSED TO FORTITUDE.

YES.—THE REASON is that daring, insofar as it denotes a vice, signifies an excess of passion that is called foolhardiness (as an innominate vice). Hence it is manifest that foolhardiness is opposed to the virtue of fortitude, which is against excessive fear and excessive daring.

QUESTION CXXVIII THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE ARE SUITABLY ARRANGED.

YES.—The quasi-integral and the potential parts.

THE REASON is that the quasi-integral parts of any virtue are assigned to it with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of virtue. Now the acts of fortitude are twofold: Aggression and endurance. For the first, two things are required: Preparedness of mind, and under this comes confidence; and the accomplishment of the deeds that one confidently sets out to achieve, and under this comes magnificence.

For the second act of fortitude, which is endurance, two things are requisite; the first of which is that the mind may not be crushed by the difficulty of impending evils and fall from greatness; and under this comes patience. The second is that a man may not be discouraged by the long-continued bearing of difficulties to the point of his abandoning his deeds; and under this comes perseverance.

The potential parts of any virtue are assigned to it insofar as they practice the virtue in certain other less difficult matters of that virtue. Accordingly, the above-mentioned parts of fortitude, insofar as they relate to the dangers of death, are integral; but insofar as they practice the virtue in other matters that are less difficult they are potential parts, or annexed to fortitude, as the secondary to the principal.

NOTE: Insofar as fortitude is a special virtue, subjective parts cannot be assigned to it, inasmuch as it is not divided into many specifically different virtues, because it bears on a very special matter (namely the dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, even if some are greater than others.) (In body of art.).

QUESTION CXXIX MAGNANIMITY

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Cicero, while substituting for confidence magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider: 1) Magnanimity; 2) magnificence; 3) patience; 4) perseverance. The first point to be considered is magnanimity; the second, the opposed vices. Under the first head stand eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS ABOUT HONORS.

YES.—THE REASON is that a person is called magnanimous chiefly in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. For magnanimity, as its very name implies, signifies a certain stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now in outward things the greatest, absolutely and simply, is honor, both because it is the most akin to virtue, as being the attestation of someone's virtue, and because it is rendered to God and to the best men, and also because men to attain honor and avoid blame sacrifice everything else.—Thus magnanimity regards honor insofar as honor has the aspect of the great or the arduous (Ad 1).

NOTE: Those who despise honors in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in attaining these honors and to seek them in moderation are praiseworthy. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. And in this way magnanimity is about honors, in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man (Ad 3).

ART. II. — WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS ESSENTIALLY ABOUT GREAT HONORS.

YES.—THE REASON is that there is another virtue about ordinary honors, which has no name, but is denominated from its extremes, which are *philotimia*, i.e., the love of honor; and *aphilotimia*, i.e., without love of honor. For a man is sometimes praised who loves honor, and sometimes he is praised if he does not care for honor, insofar, namely, as both can be done in moderation. Now the magnanimous man aims at the things that are worthy of great honor. For the object of any virtue, by reason of its perfection, is the great and the difficult.

NOTE: Since virtue, which deserves to be honored by God, cannot be sufficiently honored by men, it follows that the magnanimous man is not lifted up by honors, even if they are great; because he does not consider them above him, but rather despises them. Similarly, he is not crushed by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that magnanimity observes the mode of reason in great honors. For the essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.

NOTE: Here are some of the qualities of the magnanimous man: The magnanimous man strives only for great things, which are few, and which also require great attention. Hence his movements are slow and he concerns himself only with great affairs. He deems himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts that he possesses from God, and despises others insofar as they fall away from God's gifts (Ad 3 and ad 4 passim). Likewise, the magnanimous man is not given to complaining because he does not give way to external evils (Art. iv of this q, ad 2). Neither is he *mikrokindynos*, endangering himself for small things; but he is *megalokindynos*, endangering himself for great things. Hence he readily exposes himself to dangers for the sake of things that are truly great (art. v of this q, ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely in respect to honors. Now honor considered in itself is a special good.

ART. V.—WHETHER MAGNANIMITY IS A PART OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—As a habit, magnanimity is annexed to fortitude as the secondary to the principal, i.e., as a potential or annexed part.

THE REASON is that a potential part of any virtue has something in common with the virtue of which it is a part, and something in which it falls short of it. Now magnanimity has in common with fortitude that it strengthens the mind in the face of something arduous, whereas it falls short of it in that it strengthens the mind in a point in which it is easier to maintain steadfastness, i.e., not in danger of death, which is the proper object of fortitude.

ART. VI.—WHETHER CONFIDENCE BELONGS TO MAGNANIMITY.

YES.—Confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, proceeding from some observation that gives one the strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good; it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity, because magnanimity is properly about the hope of something difficult (Art. 1 of this q.).

NOTE: Although the name confidence is taken from *fides*, faith, trust, yet confidence belongs to hope, according to Job xi, 18: "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Hence the name confidence seemingly signifies this principally, that a man conceives hope from the fact that he believes the words of someone who promises him help, or from observation of some strong trait, either in himself or in another. Hence it is that confidence belongs by consequence to fortitude as an integral part, unless it is taken for magnanimity, as Cicero does (*passim* in art. and in replies).

ART. VII.—WHETHER SECURITY BELONGS TO MAGNANIMITY.

YES.—Security belongs immediately to fortitude; indirectly it belongs also to magnanimity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that security is so called from the due removal of care, which fear inspires. Hence security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear. Now fear directly refers to fortitude; and thus security immediately belongs to fortitude.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that security banishes the cause of despair, namely fear; hence security indirectly strengthens hope, which directly and immediately belongs to magnanimity. Hence it is that security by consequence belongs to magnanimity.—On the contrary, confidence, which is hope strengthened by a firm opinion, belongs immediately to magnanimity, and indirectly to fortitude, because it makes use of daring.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER GOODS OF FORTUNE CONDUCE TO MAGNANIMITY.

YES.—That is, that it may operate more expeditiously.

THE REASON is that magnanimity has regard to two things: To honor as its matter and to the accomplishment of great things as its end. Now for both of these things the goods of fortune co-operate: For honor, because all men show greater honor to those who have the outward goods of fortune; and to achieve something good, since riches, power, and friends afford us the means of accomplishing meritorious deeds. Hence it is evident that the goods of fortune contribute to magnanimity.

**QUESTION CXXX.
PRESUMPTION**

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity, and in the first place those that are opposed to it by excess, which are three, namely presumption, ambition, and vain glory; and in the second place pusillanimity, which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. The first head requires two articles.

NOTE: Presumption as here treated is not that whereby one expects through excessive confidence in the divine mercy the forgiveness of sins without repentance, or glory without merits, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit; but the presumption whereby one undertakes, or seeks to undertake, what is beyond his strength.

ART. I.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that anyone should undertake to do what is beyond his power.

ART. II.—WHETHER PRESUMPTION IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY BY EXCESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the magnanimous man does not try for higher things than are suitable to him; for the mean of this virtue consists in being proportionate to one's ability. But the presumptuous man exceeds in proportion to his ability. And in this presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.

QUESTION CXXXI AMBITION

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AMBITION IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that ambition implies an inordinate thirst for honor.

NOTE: The desire of honor can be inordinate in three ways: 1) By desiring the recognition of an excellence that one does not have; 2) by the fact that a man desires honor for himself, and does not refer it to God; 3) by the fact that a man rests his desire in honor itself, and does not refer the honor to the good of others (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER AMBITION IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY BY EXCESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that magnanimity is about honors, and makes use of them as far as it ought; whereas ambition denotes an inordinate desire of honor, as was stated in art. 1.

NOTE: Presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess because of the end of magnanimity, which is some great work according to our ability. But ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess because of the matter with which it is occupied, namely honors, of which the ambitious man makes undue use (Ad 1).

QUESTION CXXXII VAINGLORY

(in five articles)

YES.—That is, the desire of glory in itself is not a sin; but the desire of vainglory denotes a vice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to be glorified, which is the same as to be clarified, is nothing else than that one's good is known and approved by many, and this, in itself, is not bad, for it is said in Matth. v, 16: "Let your light shine before men."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that every vain desire is sinful, according to Ps. iv, 3: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"

NOTE: Glory is called vain in three ways: First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: As when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance, when he seeks it for something frail and perishable; secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance, a man whose judgment is uncertain; thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, inasmuch as he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as the honor of God, or the spiritual welfare of the neighbor (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER GLORY IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY.

YES.—Directly opposed.

THE REASON is that magnanimity, which makes moderate use of honor, as has been stated (q. cxxix, art. 1 and 2), also makes moderate use of glory. For glory is an effect of honor and praise; for a man is rendered clear in the knowledge of others by the fact that he is praised, or reverence is shown him. Hence the inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.

ART. III.—WHETHER VAINGLORY IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that vainglory, considered in itself, is not contrary to the charity that is due to the neighbor.—Vainglory may, however, be contrary to the charity owed to God, and thus be a mortal sin. It can be contrary to the charity of God, either on the part of the matter—for instance, if a person glories in some deed that is contrary to the reverence owed to God, as when he glories in the gifts of God as if he had not received them from Him, according to I Cor. iv, 7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received it, why dost thou boast as if thou hadst not received it?" Or it may be a sin on the part of the one who glories, namely if he refers his intention to glory as his last end.

NOTE: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: Wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand, when a man loses the eternal

reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VAINGLORY IS A CAPITAL VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that glory is highly desirable. Hence it is that many vices arise from an inordinate desire of it, and thus vainglory is a capital vice.

NOTE: Some reckon pride as one of the capital vices, and do not rank vainglory among the capital vices. But Gregory declares that pride is the queen and mother of all the vices, and that vainglory, which immediately arises from it, he considers a capital vice. And reasonably so, since the ends of all the vices are directed to the end of pride, as will be explained later, q. clxii, art. 1 and 2 (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE DAUGHTERS OF VAINGLORY ARE SUITABLY RECKONED TO BE DISOBEDIENCE, BOASTFULNESS, HYPOCRISY, CONTENTION, OBSTINACY, DISCORD, AND LOVE OF NOVELTIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the vices that of their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a capital vice are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence. And to this manifestation the aforesaid vices conduce, either directly or indirectly. Directly, by words, and thus we have boastfulness; or by deeds; and if they are true and excite astonishment it is called love of novelties; if false, it is hypocrisy. Indirectly, when someone shows that he is not less than another, and this happens in four ways, viz., on the part of the intellect, by obstinacy, whereby we will not leave our own opinion for a better; on the part of the will, by discord; in words, by contention; and in acts, by disobedience.

QUESTION CXXXIII PUSILLANIMITY

(in two articles)

NOTE: Pusillanimity is the vice whereby one avoids undertakings or refuses to try what does not exceed his ability.

ART. I.—WHETHER PUSILLANIMITY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is contrary to the natural law, as is also presumption. For, just as by presumption a man acts out of proportion to his powers, by striving for greater things than he is able, so the pusillanimous man also falls short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to try for what is commensurate with his power.

NOTE: The fainthearted man is said not to be evil, because he does no one an injury, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be of benefit for others. Hence Gregory says (*Pastorale*, I, c. 5): "If they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring."—Likewise, pusillanimity can arise even from pride, namely when someone relies too much on his own feeling, whereby he considers himself insufficient for those tasks in which he has a sufficiency (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PUSILLANIMITY IS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY.

YES.—In its own nature pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.

THE REASON is that, just as the magnanimous man tends by the greatness of his soul to do great things, so the fainthearted man, because of smallness of soul, shrinks from great undertakings.

NOTE: The cause of pusillanimity on the part of the intellect is the ignorance of one's own qualification, which arises from sluggishness in observing one's abilities; on the part of the appetite it is the fear of failing in things that one falsely thinks to exceed his ability (in body of art.).

2. Pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption according to its proper species, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil, according to Aristotle's *Ethics*, bk. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be wicked on account of pride, whence it proceeds (Ad 4).

QUESTION CXXXIV MAGNIFICENCE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A VIRTUE.

NOTE: As the name implies, it belongs to magnificence to do anything great.

YES.—THE REASON is that to do anything great, from which magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the notion of a virtue. For we speak of virtue "in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power" (Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, i, 16).

ART. II.—WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

NOTE: Magnificence comes from *magna facere*—to do great things.

YES.—Magnificence is a special virtue in the strict sense of the verb *facere*; but not in the general sense.

THE REASON is that strictly *facere* means to do some work in external matter, for instance to make a house, or any other such external work. Now an external work is produced by art, in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

In general, however, *facere* denotes any action, whether it passes into external matter or remains in the agent, as to understand and to will. And in that way magnificence is not a special virtue, but is the perfect state of any virtue (Ad 1).—Thus, then, just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, so also does magnificence intend something great in some externally producible matter (Ad 2), especially for the honor of God (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF MAGNIFICENCE IS GREAT EXPENDITURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that in order that a great work may be suitably done proportionate expenditures are necessary, i.e., the outlay of a certain amount of money, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work.

NOTE: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an inordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditures), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay (Ad 2).

And, since the principal act of virtue is interior choice, which virtue can have without external fortune, it follows that even a poor man can be magnificent (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER MAGNIFICENCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—As a special virtue, magnificence cannot be ranked as a subjective part of fortitude; but it does rank as a potential part.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that magnificence does not have the same matter as fortitude.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a potential or annexed part of any virtue is that which agrees with that virtue in something, and in something falls short of it. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude, inasmuch as it tends to something arduous and difficult, namely to the sacrifice of treasure; but it falls short of fortitude in the point that there is much less difficulty in the sacrifice of treasure than in the danger that threatens a person, which danger is that to which fortitude tends.

NOTE: Magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as does magnanimity, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure; wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part. But liberality is in the concupiscible part, because it regards expenditures in reference to the love and desire of money (Ad 1).

QUESTION CXXXV MEANNESS

(in four articles)

NOTE: Meanness (*parvificentia*, doing little) can be defined as the vice whereby someone falls short of proportionately due expenses for a work, and thus intends to spend less than the dignity of the undertaking requires.

ART. I.—WHETHER MEANNESS IS A VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenses and work.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE IS A VICE OPPOSED TO MEANNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that little and great are relative terms. Accordingly, just as meanness is a vice whereby a man fails of proportionately due expenses for a work; so also the contrary vice is that a man should spend more than is proportionate to the work.—And this vice is called in Greek *banausia*, from a furnace, because, like the fire in a furnace, it consumes everything. Or it is also called *apyrokalia*, i.e., without good fire, because like fire it consumes everything but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin this vice can be called *consumptio* (waste).

QUESTION CXXXVI PATIENCE

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that patience is that by which the good of reason is protected against the onset of a passion, namely, sadness, so that reason does not give in to sadness. Hence Augustine says (*On Patience*, chap. 2): "A man's patience is that whereby he bears misfortunes with an equal mind," i.e., without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things."

NOTE: Patience as a habit is a virtue; but, as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from becoming overwhelmed by sorrow (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PATIENCE IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—THE REASON is that those virtues that are effective of the good of reason are greater than those that serve as a check on the things that withdraw man from good. Now patience is not a virtue that effects good but one that checks the obstacles to good. And among the virtues that serve as a check the last place is held by patience, namely after fortitude and temperance, which withdraw man from greater obstacles than does patience.

NOTE: In regard to the words of James i, 4: "Let patience have its perfect work," be it noted that patience has a perfect work in bearing adversities. For these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect. Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply (Ad 1).—In regard to Luke xxi, 19: "By your patience you will win your souls," it must be said that patience here means that a man will win his soul in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PATIENCE WITHOUT GRACE.

NO.—Perfect patience, or patience as a virtue, is impossible without habitual grace.

THE REASON is that patience, as it is a virtue, arises from charity. For patience, as a virtue, endures the loss of natural goods, which gives rise to sorrow, because it prefers supernatural goods to all natural goods. Now this belongs to charity, according to I Cor. xiii, 4: "Charity is patient."—Charity moreover "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given us" (Rom. v, 5). But the Holy Spirit is not given without grace.

NOTE: By patience man can bear temporal hardships for the sake of temporal goods, but this is not the patience of which we are here speaking, which bears all things for the love of God, and so as not to lose eternal life. This proceeds from a supernatural motive (in the replies, *passim*).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PATIENCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—A potential part, which is annexed to fortitude as a secondary virtue to its principal.

THE REASON is that of the evils inflicted by others the chief and most difficult to endure are those that relate to danger of death, on which fortitude properly and chiefly bears. Hence it is evident that in this matter fortitude holds the chief place; but patience is annexed to fortitude as a secondary virtue to its principal.

Hence it belongs to fortitude, not to endure any kind of hardships, but those that are supremely difficult to bear, namely the dangers of death. To patience it may pertain to endure any kind of evil (Ad 1), to the end, namely, that man be not inordinately saddened by them. For patience is chiefly about sorrow, and for this reason patience is in the concupiscible part, whereas fortitude, which is chiefly about fear, is in the irascible part (Ad 2).

NOTE: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death. (The integral parts of any virtue regard the act of that virtue). Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for the *Opus Perfectum* says in regard to Matth. iv, 10: "Begone, Satan . . ." that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked" (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER PATIENCE IS THE SAME AS LONGANIMITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that longanimity, which is the virtue whereby a man has a mind (*animus*) to tend to something a long way off, regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which regard evil. Hence longanimity seems to have more in common with magnanimity than with patience.—Yet patience agrees with longanimity, first in that patience endures evils on account of some good; but if that good be long delayed it is more difficult to endure present evils. Secondly, patience agrees with longanimity inasmuch as the very fact of the delay of the good hoped for is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. xiii, 12: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul."

QUESTION CXXXVII

PERSEVERANCE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PERSEVERANCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—It is a special virtue.

THE REASON is that the goodness and difficulty that are the objects of a virtue may arise from two counts: From the very species of the act, which is considered in relation to the proper object of that act; and from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Therefore to persist long in a good until it is accomplished, which is perseverance, belongs to a special virtue.

And, because the perfection of a virtue depends more on the aspect of the good than on the aspect of the difficult, it follows that perseverance, as a perfect virtue, consists in persisting in the more perfect good, even if persisting is less difficult (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER PERSEVERANCE IS A PART OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—It is a potential, or annexed, part.

THE REASON is that, since fortitude is the principal virtue in matters in which it is most difficult to stand firm (for it is about dangers of death), it follows that every other virtue that has a title to praise in firmly enduring something difficult is annexed to fortitude as a secondary virtue to the principal. Now to endure a difficulty arising from the length of time it takes to do a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise. Hence perseverance is annexed to fortitude as the secondary virtue to the principal, or as its potential part; and it is in the irascible appetite, like fortitude (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CONSTANCY PERTAINS TO PERSEVERANCE.

YES.—Perseverance and constancy agree in their end.

THE REASON is that it belongs to both to stand firm in some good. Yet they differ according to what offers a difficulty in persisting in good. For the virtue of perseverance properly makes a man stand firm in good against a difficulty arising from the very continuance of the act; whereas constancy makes a man stand firm in good against a difficulty arising from any other external obstacles.

NOTE: Constancy agrees also with patience as to those outward obstacles that cause a difficulty, because these cause sorrow, about which is patience. But, because the end is of most account, constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PERSEVERANCE NEEDS THE HELP OF GRACE.

YES.—Perseverance as an infused habit needs habitual grace; as an act of perseverance it also needs the gratuitous aid of God who preserves man in good until the end of life.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the infused virtues are not given without habitual grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as was stated in I-II, q. cix, art. 10, since free will is changeable in itself, and this changeableness is not taken away by habitual grace in the present life, it is not in the power of the free will, even repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this; for it is often in our power to choose, but not to accomplish.

QUESTION CXXXVIII
THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EFFEMINACY IS OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is of the essence of effeminacy (*mollities*) that a man should easily withdraw from good on account of something difficult; for a thing is called soft (*molle*) inasmuch as it easily yields to the touch. Now this is opposed to the good of perseverance, as is evidenced from what has been said on that virtue.

NOTE: A man is not considered effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (*Eth.*, bk. vii, c. 7): "It is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them." Yet Cicero says (*On Duties*, bk. i): "It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil to yield to pleasure."

2. Effeminacy can be caused in two ways: In one way, by custom; for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the philosopher says (l.c.). Wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were (Ad 1).—Against effeminacy is directed toil, which is opposed to bodily pleasure and hinders pleasures (Ad 2).—Ordinate relaxation from labor or amusement or rest belongs to eutrapelia; but inordinate fondness of play or any other relaxation belongs to effeminacy (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PERTINACITY IS OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a person is called pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious; he holds on to his own opinion more than he should. Hence, just as the effeminate man is reproved for falling short of the mean, so also is the pertinacious man for exceeding it. The persevering man is commended for observing the mean of reason.

QUESTION CXXXIX
THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FORTITUDE IS A GIFT.

YES.—That fortitude whereby man is led to eternal life, which is the end of all

good works, and the release from all perils.

The reason is that for the mind of man to be moved to reach the end of every work begun and to escape from all dangers that threaten surpasses human nature. This is the work of the Holy Spirit, who infuses into the mind a certain confidence and expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: In heaven the act of this virtue will be to enjoy full security from toil and evil (Ad 2).

ART. IIX.—WHETHER THE FOURTH BEATITUDE: 'BLESSED ARE THEY WHO HUNGER AND THIRST AFTER JUSTICE', CORRESPONDS TO THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE.

YES.—By reason of a certain congruity.

THE REASON is that it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice. Now fortitude is about difficult things.

NOTE: There are two of the fruits of the Holy Spirit that sufficiently correspond to the gift of fortitude; Namely patience, which regards the enduring of evils; and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of good things (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXL THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the precepts of the divine law respecting fortitude, as also the other virtues, are given with a view to directing the mind of man to God. Now this is suitable, because it is according to the end of the divine law, which is that man may adhere to God. For this reason it is said in Deut., xx, 3: "Fear ye them not; because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies;" likewise in the New Testament, Luke xii, 4: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, and after that have nothing more that they can do."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW.

YES.—Concerning patience and perseverance.

THE REASON is that in order to live aright man has need not only of the principal virtues, but also of the secondary and annexed virtues; and therefore just as the divine law gives suitable precepts concerning the acts of the principal virtues, so also it gives suitable precepts concerning the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.

NOTE: No precepts are given concerning magnificence and magnanimity, which are parts of fortitude, but only about patience and perseverance, because magnificence and magnanimity are about matters that pertain to excellence. Now things pertaining to excellence come under counsel rather than under precept. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of the precepts of patience and perseverance (Ad 1).

TEMPERANCE

In the next place we must consider temperance: 1) Temperance itself; 2) its parts; 3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must first consider temperance itself and secondly the opposed vices. About the first there are eight articles.

QUESTION CXLI TEMPERANCE ITSELF

ART. I.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that temperance inclines man into that which is according to reason; for its name implies a certain moderation or temperateness (from *temperare*, to mix), which reason causes.

NOTE: Since temperance is a virtue, it is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but agrees with it. Yet it is contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason (Ad 1).

Temperance also has a corresponding gift in fear, whereby man is restrained from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. cxviii, 120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear has for its principal object God, whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope. But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance; wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—Not according to the common signification of the word, but in so far as it is taken antonomastically (the use of the individual for the general, as the word city is taken to designate Rome).

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus temperance is a general virtue and signifies temperance or moderation, which reason establishes in human operations and passions, and this is common to every moral virtue.

THE REASON is that, antonomastically taken, temperance has a special matter, according to which it restrains the appetite from what is most seductive to man.

NOTE: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, for two reasons: Firstly, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion and this is what we understand by beauty. Secondly, because the things from which temperance restrains us hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature. Thus temperance takes away what brings most dishonor on man (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS ONLY ABOUT DESIRES AND PLEASURES.

YES.—Temperance is chiefly about the passions that tend to sensible goods, namely concupiscence and sensual pleasure, and consequently about sorrow, which arises from the absence of such pleasures.

THE REASON is that temperance denotes a moderation of the passions. Now the passions of the soul that need moderation are those whose appetite *pursues* sensible and bodily goods, i.e., desire and pleasure; for those passions whose appetitive movement shrinks from sensible evils are especially contrary to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight, for when a man flees from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Fortitude is chiefly about such passions, for it supplies steadfastness in good.

ART. IV.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS ONLY ABOUT DESIRES AND PLEASURES OF TOUCH.

YES.—Principally.

THE REASON is that temperance is principally about the desire of the greatest pleasures, just as fortitude is principally about the fear of the greatest evils. Now the pleasures of sense are chiefly those that result from the most natural operations. Now these are the pleasures by which nature is preserved, namely the pleasures of food and drink, which preserve the nature of the individual, and the pleasures of sex, which preserve the nature of the species. Such pleasures result from the sense of touch. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasures of touch, and secondarily and consequently about the pleasures of the other senses, chiefly taste (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS ABOUT THE PLEASURES PROPER TO THE TOUCH.

NO.—Temperance or intemperance is only secondarily about the pleasures of the taste (or smell or vision).

THE REASON is that the objects of these senses do not contribute to the use itself of the things necessary for the preservation of the individual and species; but

contribute to make the use more pleasurable. Yet, because taste is closer akin to touch than the other senses, temperance is more about taste than about the other senses.

NOTE: To taste belongs the discernment of flavors, which make food pleasant to eat, insofar as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE RULE OF TEMPERANCE DEPENDS ON THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT LIFE.

YES.—Temperance takes the needs of this life as the rule of the pleasurable objects that it uses, and uses them only as far as the necessity of this life requires.

THE REASON is that the rule of the means to the end is the end itself. Now all pleasurable objects, with which temperance is concerned, that are used by man are directed to some need of this life as to their end. Hence temperance takes the rule of the delectable objects of which it makes use from the needs of this life, and uses them only as much as the necessity of this life requires.

NOTE: The needs of this life denote not only that necessity that signifies that without which a thing cannot be at all, but also that which signifies that need without which a thing cannot becomingly exist, namely in consideration of all the circumstances of virtue, state, office, dignity, fortune, etc. (Ad 2 and ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS A CARDINAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now for the notion of (moral) virtue in general moderation in the delights of touch is requisite; for such pleasures are natural to us, and their objects are necessary to the present life. Now this moderation belongs to temperance; and hence temperance is a cardinal or principal virtue.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER TEMPERANCE IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—THE REASON is that the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does. This is evident from what has been said about justice and fortitude, for justice relates to another and fortitude is about the dangers of death, particularly in war. But temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures of the things that relate to man himself.

NOTE: Among the virtues first place is held by the theological virtues. Of all the moral virtues, prudence is the most excellent, justice being in second, fortitude in third, and temperance in the last place.

QUESTION CXLII THE VICIES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INSENSIBILITY IS A VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it pertains to the vice of insensibility to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation. But this is contrary to the order of nature, for nature has attached pleasure to the operations necessary for the life of man.—Hence pleasure should be shunned to avoid sin, yet not wholly, but to the extent of not seeking more than necessity requires (Ad 3).

Sometimes it is praiseworthy and even necessary to abstain from such pleasures, i.e., for the sake of some good end, as on account of bodily health or also the fulfilment of certain engagements. In like manner men abstain from pleasures to recover health of soul through penance; and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and divine things need much to refrain from carnal things.

ART. II.—WHETHER INTEMPERANCE IS A CHILDISH SIN.

YES.—Not that it belongs to a child, as if a child were properly intemperate; but by a kind of likeness.

THE REASON is, as the Philosopher says (Eth. iii, last chap.), that intemperance

has a similarity to childish faults, and this in three ways: 1) With regard to that which they desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful; and the reason of this is that the child, like concupiscence, does not observe the order of reason. 2) With regard to the result. For the child, if left to his own will, grows in his self-will. So also concupiscence, if satisfied, acquires greater strength. 3) With regard to the remedy that is offered to both. For the child is corrected by being coerced. So too by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the due mode of virtue.

ART. III.—WHETHER COWARDICE IS A GREATER SIN THAN INTEMPERANCE.

NO.—Intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice, both on the part of the object or matter and on the part of the sinner.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the more necessary the motive of sin seems to be the less grievous is the sin. Now cowardice inordinately shuns dangers of death for the purpose of saving one's life; but intemperance is about pleasures, the seeking of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, for intemperance is more about certain opposite pleasures or desires (as the dainty preparation of food, women's adornment, and the like) than about natural desires or pleasures.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) that grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the mind; not so pleasure, which is the motive of intemperance. Hence in cowardice the sin is less voluntary. b) That the acts that are done through fear originate in the compulsion of an external agent, hence are not simply voluntary, but mixed; whereas acts that are done through pleasure are simply voluntary.—Likewise, the acts of the intemperate man are more voluntary individually than generically; whereas, contrariwise in matters pertaining to cowardice, the particular action is less voluntary whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance, to save oneself by flight. Now what is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the action takes place is simply more voluntary. c) Because a remedy is more easily found against intemperance than against cowardice, which is about dangers of death.—Hence intemperance is simply a greater sin than cowardice.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SIN OF INTEMPERANCE IS THE MOST DISGRACEFUL OF SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now intemperance is most opposed to honor and glory. Hence the sin of intemperance is the most disgraceful. For intemperance is most contrary to the excellence to which honor is due and to the clarity or beauty that glory implies. For intemperance is about pleasures that are common to us and the brutes; wherefore the intemperate man "hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them" (Ps. xlvi, 21). This is against the excellence of man.

Intemperance is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty, inasmuch as the pleasures that are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arise. Hence these pleasures are described as being most slavish.—Hence it is that Gregory says (*Moral.*, lib. xxxiii, cap. 2): "The sins of the flesh, which are contained under intemperance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful" (Ad 1).

NOTE: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions in some manner conformed to human nature. But those vices that exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful (e.g., bestiality, sodomy, cannibalism); and are reduced to the genus of intemperance by way of excess (Ad 3).

QUESTION CXLIII THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE IN GENERAL

ART. I.—WHETHER CICERO RIGHTLY ASSIGNS THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE AS CONTINENCE, MILDNESS, AND MODESTY.

YES.—a) The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honesty; b) the subjective parts are abstinence and sobriety, chastity and purity; c) the potential

parts are continence, humility, and mildness; modesty (under which last come moderation and restraint); and lastly contentment, or frugality or simplicity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the integral parts of any principal virtue are conditions requisite for the complete exercise of an act of virtue. Now the office of temperance consists in two things, namely the flight from disgrace (which is done through shamefacedness) and the love of moral beauty (about which is honesty).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the subjective parts of any principal virtue are called its species, and species are differentiated according to matter or object. The genus of the matter of temperance is twofold: 1) About food; and thus there is abstinence, which moderates the pleasures of food, and sobriety, which modifies those of drink. 2) About procreation; and as regards the act of procreation there is chastity, and as regards the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kisses, touches, and embraces, there is purity.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the potential parts of any principal virtue are the virtues that are joined to the principal virtue as secondary, on account of some principal matter. Now it happens in three ways that thus the secondary virtues are annexed to temperance: 1) For the moderation of the interior movements of the soul; 2) for the moderation of external movements and acts of the body; 3) for the moderation of external things.

Connected with the first way there are three virtues: Continence, whereby the movement of the will stirred up by the impulse of passion is moderated so as not to be overcome by passion; humility, which moderates the movement of hope and daring; meekness or mildness, which restrains the movement of anger that tends to revenge.

Connected with the second is modesty, which again has three parts: To order aright what is to be done and not to be done, etc.—This last virtue is called *method*; to observe decorum, i.e., through *refinement*; and *gravity*, which a man observes in conversation with his friends or others.

Connected with the third there are two subordinate virtues: Lowliness or contentment, by which we do not demand superfluous things; and moderation or simplicity, by which a person is not too nice in his requirements.

QUESTION CXLIV THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE IN PARTICULAR SHAMEFACEDNESS

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SHAMEFACEDNESS IS A VIRTUE.

NO.—a) Shamefacedness is not a virtue properly so called; but b) it can be called a virtue in the broad sense.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that shamefacedness, being the fear of shame and disgrace, is not an elective habit, but denotes a passion, for it proceeds from some impulse of passion (Ad 1), and consequently falls short of the perfect character of virtue.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the broad sense a virtue is called anything that is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this sense shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

NOTE: From the fact that the opposite of shamefacedness is a vice it does not follow that shamefacedness is a virtue properly so called. For every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for a notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER SHAMEFACEDNESS IS ABOUT A DISGRACEFUL ACTION.

YES.—Shamefacedness, which is the fear of baseness, first and primarily regards reproach; secondarily, the disgrace inherent in vice.

THE REASON is that the disgrace inherent in vice consists in the deformity of the voluntary act. Now, since the voluntary act is in the will alone, it does not appear to be arduous and consequently is not apprehended as fearful. Hence shamefacedness, which is the fear of disgrace, does not regard the disgrace inherent in vice first and primarily. But reproach, which is as it were penal disgrace, has the character

of an arduous evil. And shamefacedness regards this directly and chiefly; it regards the disgrace inherent in vice consequently.

NOTE: Shamefacedness regards fault in two ways: 1) When anyone refrains from vicious acts on account of the fear of reproach; 2) when a person in the disgraceful things that he does avoids the public gaze on account of the fear of reproach. The first of these, according to St. Gregory of Nyssa (*Orth. Sid., lib. ii, c. 15*), belongs to blushing, the second to shame. Hence we say that a man who is ashamed acts in secret but a man who blushes fears to be disgraced (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER MAN IS MORE SHAMEFACED OF THOSE WHO ARE MORE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH HIM.

YES.—Both on account of the correctness of the judgment and on account of the effect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that persons closer to us observe our acts more closely. Hence children, strangers, and others who do not sufficiently know our acts inspire no one with shame.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a man's reproach carries with it continual harm among persons closely connected with us, with whom we must always associate.

ART. IV.—WHETHER EVEN VIRTUOUS MEN CAN BE ASHAMED.

NO.—Not perfect virtuous men.

THE REASON is that virtuous men, as such, are wholly immune from evil (Ad 1); they apprehend disgrace as impossible to them, or as easily avoidable. Yet they are so disposed that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it.

NOTE: 1. Men who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them (in body of art.).

2. The virtuous man is not much ashamed of ignominy and reproach, since he despises them as something he does not deserve. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason (Ad 3.).

QUESTION CXLV HONESTY

(in four articles)

NOTE: Honesty here denotes moral goodness; for beauty, understand moral beauty.

ART. I.—WHETHER HONESTY IS THE SAME AS VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a thing is said to be honest that is worthy of honor. Now honor is due to excellence, and this excellence of a man is mostly gauged by his virtue, which is "the disposition of the perfect man to the best," as Aristotle says in *Physics*, bk. vii, text 17 and 18). Hence honesty, properly speaking, refers to the same thing as virtue.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HONEST IS THE SAME AS THE MORAL- LY BEAUTIFUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that spiritual beauty or comeliness consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned according to the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which, as we have said (prec. art.), refers to the same thing as virtue, which moderates all human actions according to reason.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HONEST DIFFERS FROM THE USEFUL AND PLEASANT.

YES.—The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the honest is that which has a certain comeliness as a result of the ordering of the reason. Whatever is ordered according to reason is pleasing and useful to man: Pleasing, because it is naturally becoming to man; useful, because it is ordered to his end, namely happiness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the honest refers to whatever has an

excellence deserving of honor on account of spiritual beauty; the pleasant, to whatever satisfies the appetite; the useful, to whatever is referred to something else.

NOTE: Everything useful and honest is in some measure pleasant, but not the reverse, for something can be pleasant without being honest and useful; for a thing can be suited to man according to the senses, but not according to reason (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HONESTY SHOULD BE RECKONED A PART OF TEMPERANCE.

YES.—An integral part.

THE REASON is that, since honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty, which repels the base and unbecoming, it is a condition of temperance, and thus an integral part of it, since it concurs in the perfection of the act of temperance. For it is the office of temperance to moderate and temper evil desires, which, like animal lusts, are most disgraceful and unbecoming to man.

QUESTION CXLVI ABSTINENCE

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: 1) Those that are about pleasures of food; 2) those that are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.—With regard to abstinence, three points must be considered: 1) Abstinence itself; 2) its act, which is fasting; 3) its opposite vice, which is gluttony.—Under the first head come two points.

ART. I.—WHETHER ABSTINENCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—In so far as it is regulated by reason.

THE REASON is that, considered in itself, abstinence does not have a character of virtue but is indifferent, and does not pertain to the kingdom of God. For the Apostle says (I Cor. viii, 8): "Food does not commend us to God. For neither shall we suffer any loss if we do not eat, nor if we do eat shall we have any advantage," that is, spiritual advantage.

NOTE: Abstinence is regulated by reason when it is done with due regard for those among whom one lives, for one's own person, and for the requirements of health (in body of art.). And in this way it is said (II Pet. i, 5-6): "Strive . . . to supply your knowledge with self-control."

ART. II.—WHETHER ABSTINENCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, since a moral virtue preserves the good of reason against the assaults of passion, it follows that wherever we find a special motive whereby a passion withdraws from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now the pleasures of food are by their nature calculated to withdraw man from the good of reason by a special motive, namely the intensity of these pleasures and the necessity of food: For man needs them to maintain life, which man most desires. Hence abstinence is a special virtue.

QUESTION CXLVII FASTING

(n eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER FASTING IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that fasting is directed to some virtuous good, and this is proper to a virtuous act.—For fasting is directed to three things: First, to repress the lusts of the flesh. Whence the Apostle says (II Cor. vi, 5): "In fasting, in chastity . . ." And Jerome says (*cont. Jovin.*, lib. ii, cap. 6): "Venus grows cold without Cerus and Bacchus," i.e., lust is cooled by abstinence from food and drink.—Secondly, that the mind may rise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things; whence it is related (Dan. x) of Daniel that after fasting for three weeks he received a revelation from God.—Thirdly, to make satisfaction for sins; whence it is said in Joel ii, 12: "Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting, and weeping, and mourning."

NOTE: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting

until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting (lit., the fast of fasting), whereas the latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

ART. II.—WHETHER FASTING IS AN ACT OF ABSTINENCE.

YES.—Properly it is an act of abstinence.

THE REASON is that the mean of reason in the taking of food, in which fasting consists, is appointed by abstinence. Therefore fasting is an act of abstinence, for both agree in the same manner. In respect of the end, however, fasting can also belong to other virtues, for example, to religion or chastity (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER FASTING IS A MATTER OF PRECEPT.

YES.—That is: Fasting in general comes under a precept of the natural law, and is called a natural fasting; but the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people falls under a precept of the positive law, which is appointed by the prelates of the Church; and this is the ecclesiastical fast.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since fasting is useful for atoning for and preventing sin, and for raising the mind to spiritual things, everyone is bound by *natural dictate of reason* to practice fasting when necessary for the foregoing ends.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as it belongs to secular rulers to appoint legal precepts of the natural law to determine what pertains to the common good in temporal matters; so also it belongs to the ecclesiastical superiors to command by statute the things that pertain to the common good of the faith in spiritual goods.

NOTE: Fasting considered absolutely is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one who stands in need of such a remedy. And, since the commonalty of men needs this remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James iii, 2), and because "the flesh lusts against the spirit" (Gal. v, 17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO KEEP THE FASTS OF THE CHURCH.

NO.—THE REASON is that the lawgiver, in giving general precepts as they are suitable to the many, has regard to what is generally true and happens in most cases. If, then, anyone for a special reason is in such circumstances as make the observance of the statute incompatible, the lawgiver does not intend to bind him to the observance of the statute. Moreover, if the reason is evident a person can use his own judgment in omitting to fulfill the precept. But if the reason is doubtful he should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE TIMES FOR THE CHURCH FAST ARE FITTINGLY APPOINTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that fasting is directed to two ends, namely the deletion of sin and to the elevation of the mind to heavenly things. And thus it behooves fasts to be declared especially in those times in which men need particularly to be cleansed of sin and the minds of the faithful to be raised to God in devotion. These things are particularly requisite before the Feast of Easter and on the vigils of the principal feasts, in which we should prepare ourselves devoutly to celebrate the forthcoming festivities.—Likewise also ecclesiastical custom decrees the conferring of Holy Orders on each of the Ember days for the reception of which both the ordainer and those to be ordained, and even the whole people, for whose benefit they are ordained, need to fast.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS REQUISITE FOR FASTING THAT ONE EAT BUT ONCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that fasting was instituted by the Church in order to restrain concupiscence, yet so that nature is safeguarded. Now for this purpose it seems that one meal suffices, for by it man can satisfy nature, and yet withdraw some-

thing from concupiscence, by reducing the number of meals. Hence the Church in her moderation has ordained that on fast days only one meal a day be taken.

[NOTE: St. Thomas himself, with the other monks, ate literally only one meal a day. The evening collation, which today is allowed even by the Trappists, was not then the custom.—The Code of Canon Law give the general rules for fasting, which are made more specific by the Bishops and the interpretations of moral theologians.]

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE NINTH HOUR IS SUITABLY FIXED FOR THE FASTER'S MEAL.

[NOTE: The ninth hour is 3 p.m.]

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that the faster, who according to common custom eats about the sixth hour (i.e., at noon), feels some inconvenience for the satisfaction of his sins, without, however, nature's being greatly burdened thereby.

THE SECOND REASON is that this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His head, He gave up the ghost" (John xix, 30). For fasters, when they afflict their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ (Gal. v, 24).

[Tr. Note: This argument is of hardly more than historic interest today. Leo XIII decreed, in favor of the Trappists, that meals could be taken before 12 noon, since the conditions of modern life made the old discipline impracticable.]

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS SUITABLY ORDAINED THAT THOSE WHO FAST SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM MEAT, EGGS, AND MILK PRODUCTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Church forbids to fasters those foods that afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a great incentive to lust. Such foods are (by nature) the flesh of animals and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth and eggs from birds. For since such animals are more like man in body they afford greater pleasure as food and greater nourishment to the body, so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.

QUESTION CXLVIII GLUTTONY

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GLUTTONY IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire, i.e., that which departs from the order of reason; for the vice of gluttony consists in a desire for food and drink that is not regulated by reason.—Hence this is not a question of the natural appetite, to which hunger and thirst belong; but of the sensitive appetite, which is subordinated to reason (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER GLUTTONY IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—That is: When a man clings to the pleasure of gluttony as to his end, on account of which he despises God, that is, is prepared to go against the commandments of God in order to follow after these delights.

THE REASON is that thus the deordination of concupiscence in gluttony is taken according to the turning away from the last end, in which mortal sin consists.—But if such concupiscence is only with regard to the things that are directed to the end, because one is overfond of the pleasures of food, yet not to such a degree that he would contravene the law of God for this reason, it is a venial sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER GLUTTONY IS THE GREATEST OF SINS.

NO.—That is: Although gluttony gives occasion to many sins, it itself is not the greatest of sins, either on the part of the matter or on the part of the sinner.

THE REASON is that, on the part of the matter in which the sin is committed, the sins that are about the things of God are the greatest. From the point of view of the sinner, moreover, the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both

on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters and on account of the necessity of taking food.

NOTE: Sometimes the sins that are occasioned by gluttony are even more grievous than gluttony itself. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, since it is not necessary that a cause be more powerful than its effect except in the case of direct causes. Now gluttony is the cause of other vices, not directly but accidentally, and by supplying the occasion (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SPECIES OF GLUTTONY ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THESE FIVE CONDITIONS: HASTILY, SUMPTUOUSLY, TOO MUCH, GREEDILY, DAINTILY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the deordination of gluttony can be considered as bearing on both food itself and on the taking of food. The deordination with regard to the food itself can be in three ways: First, with regard to the substance and kind of food, namely when someone seeks *sumptuous* or costly foods; secondly, as regards the quality, when a man seeks foods prepared too *nicely*; thirdly, as regards the quantity, when a man exceeds by eating *too much*.

As regards the taking or consumption of food there can be deordination in two ways: Either because a man forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat *hastily*; or because he does not observe the due manner of eating, by eating *greedily*.

ART. V.—WHETHER GLUTTONY IS A CAPITAL VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a capital vice is so named from the fact that other vices arise from it as being their final cause, insofar, namely, as it has an especially desirable end. Now an end is rendered especially desirable by the fact that it has one of the conditions of happiness. But the pleasure of happiness pertains to reason. Thus the vice of gluttony, which is about pleasures of touch, which stand foremost among other pleasures, is appropriately ranked among the capital vices.

ART. VI.—WHETHER SIX DAUGHTERS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO GLUTTONY, NAMELY UNSEEMLY JOY, SCURRILITY, UNCLEANNES, LOQUACIOUSNESS, DULLNESS OF MIND AS REGARDS THE UNDERSTANDING, AND, ON THE BODY'S PART, UNCLEANNES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since gluttony is about immoderate pleasure in food and drink, its daughters arise from the immoderate enjoyment of food and drink. Now these are taken either from the standpoint of the soul or from the standpoint of the body. From the standpoint of the body they are taken in four ways: 1) As regards reason, which is blunted by immoderate indulgence in food and drink, and in this regard stands the daughter of gluttony called "dullness of mind as regards the understanding," so called on account of the toxicity of food disturbing the brain. 2) As regards the appetite, and in this way stands unseemly mirth, since all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy and sadness. 3) As regards inordinate speaking; and here stands loquaciousness. 4) With regard to inordinate actions, and so stands scurrility, i.e., jocularly arising from a deficiency of reason, which, as it cannot restrain words, so also cannot restrain outward actions.—on the part of the body there stands uncleanness, which can refer either to any inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or to the emission of the semen.

**QUESTION CXLIX
SOBRIETY**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF SOBRIETY IS DRINK.

YES.—Drink is the matter of sobriety properly so called.

THE REASON is that sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein to observe a measure is most worthy of praise; for the name sobriety comes from measure (Low Latin *bria*, a measuring cup). Now such matter is intoxicating drink, because its measured use is beneficial, whereas immoderate excess is most harmful; for it hinders the use of reason even more than excess of food.—In a general way the name sobriety can be applied to any matter.

ART. II.—WHETHER SOBRIETY IS BY ITSELF A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that sobriety is especially directed to safeguard the good of reason, namely by removing a special hindrance to reason, which results from immoderate indulgence in intoxicating drinks.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE USE OF WINE IS WHOLLY UNLAWFUL.

NO.—Considered in itself, the drinking of wine is not unlawful; it can, however, become unlawful according to circumstances.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is the sentence of Our Lord: "What goes into the mouth does not defile a man."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that sometimes a drinker is easily the worse for taking wine; sometimes a person is bound by a vow not to drink wine; and sometimes this becomes unlawful with respect to others, namely if they are scandalized by this drinking.

NOTE: Sometimes total abstinence from wine is demanded by the pursuit of (Evangelical) perfection, according to the conditions of persons and places (Ad 1 and 3 passim).

ART. IV.—WHETHER SOBRIETY IS MORE REQUISITE IN PERSONS OF GREATER STANDING.

NO.—a) To restrain lusts and remove vices sobriety is more requisite in young people and in women than in older persons of standing; b) but as regards the operation of virtue sobriety is more requisite in older people.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the young the enticements of concupiscence are more active on account of the heats of their age; whereas in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus (*Lib. ii, cap. 1*), among the Romans of the earliest age women did not drink wine.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the operation of virtue through sobriety is more necessary for the proper actions of persons of standing, namely elders, in whom the reason must be vigorous in order to instruct others, and Bishops or any ministers of the Church, who must have a devout mind for their spiritual offices; and rulers, who need wisdom to govern the people under them.

**QUESTION CL
DRUNKENNESS**

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DRUNKENNESS IS A SIN.

NOTE: Drunkenness is defined as voluntary excess in intoxicating drink to the point where the use of reason is lost.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as here taken, drunkenness denotes an inordinate desire for and immoderate use of wine (or any other intoxicating beverage).—Hence drunkenness as signifying the defect itself of a man, resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses his reason, does not signify a fault but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Secondly, insofar as drunkenness may denote the act whereby one falls into this defect, if this happens from the excessive strength of the wine unknown to the drinker, drunkenness may befall without sin, especially if it does not arise from the man's neglect, as for instance we believe was the case when Noe was intoxicated, as we read in Gen. ix.

NOTE: Drunkenness, and the other vices that are opposed to the various species of temperance by excess, have vices opposed to them by defect, which however remain unnamed, as was said concerning insensibility (q. cxlii).—(Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER DRUNKENNESS IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—If it happens that anyone is well aware that his drinking is immoderate and the drink intoxicating, and yet is willing to fall into drunkenness rather than to abstain from drinking.

THE REASON is that thus a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he acts virtuously and avoids sins; and thus he sins mortally,

by exposing himself to the danger of sinning. Hence drunkenness, absolutely speaking, is a mortal sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER DRUNKENNESS IS THE GRAVEST OF SINS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the sins that are directly against God, and therefore opposed to divine good, are more grievous than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.

ART. IV.—WHETHER DRUNKENNESS EXCUSES FROM SIN.

NO.—a) On the part of the consequent defect, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin; b) on the part of the preceding act, it excuses from sin if such an act was without fault; otherwise, no.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, on the part of the consequent defect, in which the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness causes the involuntary act through ignorance (considering this defect in itself).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if the preceding act was culpable the resulting sin becomes voluntary on account of the deliberate intent of the preceding act, inasmuch as one who indulges in an unlawful thing falls into the subsequent sin.—Yet the subsequent sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished.

QUESTION CLI CHASTITY

We must next consider chastity: 1) The virtue itself of chastity; 2) virginity, which is a part of chastity; 3) lust, which is the contrary vice. About the first, four questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHASTITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that chastity takes its name from the fact that reason *chastises* concupiscence, so that, namely, one may use his bodily members in sexual matters according to the judgment of reason and the choice of the will.

NOTE: Chastity is reckoned among the fruits of the Holy Spirit. For it is a virtue insofar as it works in accordance with reason, but insofar as it delights in its act it is reckoned among the fruits (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHASTITY IS A GENERAL VIRTUE.

YES.—a) Chastity properly so called is a special virtue; b) in the metaphorical sense, taken for spiritual chastity, it is a general virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that chastity so called has a special matter, namely the desire of the pleasure of sex.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that spiritual chastity, or chastity metaphorically so called, delights in spiritual union with God and refrains from delighting in a union with other things against the obligations of the divine order. Now it belongs to any virtue to prevent the human mind from delighting in union with unlawful things. And in this way chastity is a general virtue.—Against this spiritual chastity we have spiritual fornication, by which the mind delights in union with all other things against the requirements of divine order. (Spiritual fornication, however, specially denotes apostasy from the true faith.)

NOTE: As stated above (q. cxliii, art. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch, which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will grow very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised; and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such concupiscence, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of a strength of mind. (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHASTITY IS A DISTINCT VIRTUE FROM ABSTINENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that chastity is about the pleasures of sex; whereas

abstinence is about the pleasures of food. For the actions concerned with the use of food, drink, and sex differ generically. Hence they must be distinct virtues, although they refer to one sense, namely the touch (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PURITY BELONGS ESPECIALLY TO CHASTITY.

YES.—Purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct from it, but as expressing a certain circumstance of chastity. (Sometimes, however, one term is used for the other.)

THE REASON is that purity, which is so called from *pudor*, shame, modesty, feels special shame at venereal acts; and thus purity regards properly the external signs of venereal matters, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches; whereas chastity regards rather sexual union itself.

QUESTION CLII VIRGINITY

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER VIRGINITY CONSISTS IN INTEGRITY OF THE FLESH.

YES.—Virginity consists accidentally in integrity of the flesh; materially, it consists in freedom from the pleasure proceeding from the resolution of the semen; by way of form and complement, it consists in the standing purpose of abstaining from the delights of sex.

THE REASON is that the formal and completive element in morality consists in that which concerns the reason; for moral virtue stands in the rational mean. Now the preservation of the virginal seal, which on the body's part is requisite for virginity, is accidental; hence, if the virginal seal should be broken by violence, while the intention of not sinning remains firm in the soul, virginity itself will be accidentally violated but formally will remain incorrupt (Ad 3).

The pleasure in the resolution of the semen, which is the connecting link between something in the soul and something in the body, is the sensible part of passion; the passions being the matter of mortal acts. Hence such a pleasure, if it takes place outside the purpose of mind, as in sleep or in rape, to which the mind does not consent, does not diminish virginity except materially.

ART. II.—WHETHER VIRGINITY IS UNLAWFUL.

NO.—Virginity is only not unlawful but is praiseworthy.

THE REASON is that virginity is directed to this, that the soul may more freely have leisure for divine contemplation, according to the Apostle (I Cor. vii, 34): "The unmarried woman, and the virgin, thinks about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy in body and in spirit." Now divine contemplation is man's greatest good in this life, to which all other goods should be duly subordinate.

NOTE: Regarding the precept of the natural law expressed in Gen. i, 28: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," observe that this precept does not affect men individually, as does the precept about food and other such things, which are required for the maintenance of the individual life, but only the generality of men. The generality needs not only to multiply bodily but also to advance spiritually. Hence the human generality is sufficiently provided for if some engage in carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race, for not everything that is necessary to the generality needs to be done by the individual (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER VIRGINITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—It is a special virtue.

THE REASON is that virginity has a special matter of goodness, namely freedom from the experience of sexual pleasure; and in this is the special excellence of virginity. Virginity therefore differs from chastity, whose office it is to preserve man free from the *deordination* of sexual pleasure.

NOTE: One who by sinning has lost virginity, and then repents, does not recover the matter of virginity, but the purpose of virginity (Ad 3).—Even one who lacks the matter of virginity, namely the integrity of the flesh, can have that which is formal

in virginity, if his mind is so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so, just as a poor man by a like mental preparedness may have that which is formal in magnificence (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VIRGINITY IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN MATRIMONY.

NOTE: Jovinian of the fourth century made marriage equal to virginity; Luther raised marriage above it. Both errors were condemned by the Council of Trent (Sess. xxiv, can. 10).

YES.—THE REASON is both that the divine good is superior to a human good and that the good of the soul outranks the good of the body, and also that the good of the contemplative life is superior to the good of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which is to meditate on the things of God, whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, which is the bodily multiplication of the human race; and it belongs to the active life because a man and woman living in marriage must needs think of the things of the world, as is explained by the Apostle (I Cor. vii). Hence virginity is undoubtedly to be preferred to conjugal continence.

NOTE: 1. Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if, to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin; and because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue (Ad 2).

2. To the objection that the common good is better than a private good, observe that the common good is superior to a private good if it is of the same genus; but it may be that the private good is better generically. And in this way virginity dedicated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER VIRGINITY IS THE GREATEST OF VIRTUES.

NO.—a) In its genus, i.e., of chastity, virginity is the most excellent virtue; but b) simply speaking it is not.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that virginity excels the chastity both of widowhood and of the married state. For this reason beauty is ascribed to chastity antonomastically, surpassing beauty being ascribed to that virtue.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the end always excels what is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end the better it is. Now the end that makes virginity praiseworthy is leisure for divine things. Hence the theological virtues, and also the virtue of religion, whose act consists in being occupied with divine things, are preferred to virginity. Likewise martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God—since for this end they hold their very life in contempt—and those who dwell in monasteries—since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess—than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure. Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

QUESTION CLIII THE VICE OF LUST (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF LUST IS ONLY VENEREAL DESIRES AND PLEASURES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as Isidore says (*Etymol. lib. X*, at letter L): "A lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is above all concerned with such pleasures.—Secondarily, the word has reference to all excesses. Hence a gloss on Gal. v says that "lust is any excess."

ART. II.—WHETHER NO VENEREAL ACT CAN BE WITHOUT SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that in human actions sin is that which is contrary to the order of reason. Now the due use of sex, which is directed by nature to a virtuous end, is not against the order of reason. Accordingly, just as the use of food can be without sin, if this is done in due order and manner, as far as is consistent with help

of the body, so also the use of sex can be without sin if it is done in due mode and order, as far as is suitable for the end of human generation.—Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the exceeding pleasure attached to the venereal act, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by the pleasure (Ad 2).

NOTE: That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of the reason is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it. Hence it does not follow that the venereal act is a sin, but that in that act there is something penal left from the original sin (Ad 2 and 3, *passim*).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE LUST THAT IS ABOUT VENEREAL ACTS CAN BE A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that lust consists essentially in exceeding the mode and order of reason in venereal matters. Therefore lust is certainly a sin.

NOTE: Although the semen is something superfluous to the human body, yet it may not be emitted in any way, because it is needed. For it is said to be superfluous because it is a residue from the operation of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. Hence the semen must be emitted in a way suited to the end for which it is needed (Ad 1), i.e., according to the plan of God, who is the Author of nature. And by the fact that anyone inordinately uses his body through lust he wrongs God, who is the Supreme Lord of our body (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER LUST IS A CAPITAL VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the end of lust is very desirable, both on account of the vehemence of the pleasure and because such concupiscence is natural to man. Thus through desire for that end man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE DAUGHTERS OF LUST ARE FITTINGLY RECKONED, NAMELY BLINDNESS OF MIND, RASHNESS, THOUGHTLESSNESS, INCONSTANCY, SELF-LOVE, HATRED OF GOD, LOVE OF THIS WORLD, AND REPUGNANCE TO A FUTURE WORLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since by the vice of lust the lower appetite is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the passion and the pleasure, it follows that lust most of all disorders the higher faculties, namely the reason and the will. Now there are four acts of reason in matters of action. The simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good; and this act is hindered by lust; and with regard to this there is blindness of mind. The second act is counsel concerning the things that are to be done for an end. This is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. With regard to this stands rashness. The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust, more specifically by thoughtfulness, which proceeds from lust. The fourth act is the command of the reason about what is to be done, and this is hindered by inconstancy, which is caused by lust.

On the part of the will a twofold disorder follows. 1) The desire for the end, and in this respect stands self-love, namely with reference to the pleasure that a man seeks inordinately; and on the other hand there is hatred of God, by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. 2) The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end; and in this respect stands the love of this world, whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, and on the other hand there is despair of a future world, because through being held back by carnal pleasures a man does not care to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

NOTE: With regard to the effects of lust in speech, four disorders are noted: Obscene words, since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks" (Matth. xii, 34); scurrilous words, which are words uttered without weight and without giving thought; wanton words, i.e., those directed to pleasure; and foolish words, which arise from blindness of mind (Ad 4).

QUESTION CLIV THE PARTS OF LUST

(in 12 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SIX SPECIES ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO LUST, NAMELY SIMPLE FORNICATION, ADULTERY, INCEST, SEDUCTION, RAPE, AND UNNATURAL VICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that that which gives a moral act its species is taken from its object, which is the matter of the act. Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways: First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the vice against nature, which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow. As hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is simple fornication, which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman.

Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways: First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has relations, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is incest, which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed; and if she is under the authority of a husband, it is adultery, if under the authority of her father, it is seduction, in the absence of violence, and rape if violence is offered.

NOTE: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, q. 18, a. 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER SIMPLE FORNICATION IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that simple fornication, i.e., the intercourse of a single man with a single woman, results from the indeterminate union of sexes, which is against human nature and the life of the offspring. Now there is in human nature, as also in all birds, the characteristic that intercourse is not indeterminate, but that there should be a union of a male with a determinate female, with whom, for the sake of the life and good of the offspring, he remains, not for a short time, but for a long time, or even for life. For this reason Matrimony is said to be of the natural law.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman through fornication, makes sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child, because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

NOTE: Among the Gentiles fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason, whereas the Jews, taught by the divine law, considered it to be unlawful (Ad 1).—With regard to the so-called fornication of Osee with a prostitute, observe that this was done by God's command (Osee i, 2). Now what a man does by the will of God, in obedience to His command, is not against right reason, although it may seem to be against the common order of reason; even as it is not against nature that miracles should be done by divine power, although it is against the ordinary course of nature. Even so, Abraham did not sin by wishing to slay his innocent son, because he was obedient to God, although this, considered in itself, is contrary to right reason in general (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER FORNICATION IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS OF SINS.

NO.—THE REASON is that fornication is against the good of the child to be born, which is a lesser good than the divine good, or even than the good of the life of a human being already born. It is, however, a greater good than any other good external to man, such as property. Hence fornication, considered in itself and by reason of its species, is a graver sin than the sins that are against external goods, such as theft and the like.

NOTE: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a

greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (*De Agone Christiano*) that of all a Christian's conflicts the most difficult are those of chastity, wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE MORTAL SIN IN TOUCHES AND KISSES.

YES.—a) By reason of their species, kisses, embraces, or touches are not mortal sins; b) but if they are done for the sake of the pleasure of lust they are mortal sins, and are called lustful.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that these acts can be done without lust, as being the custom of the country, or on account of some need or reasonable cause.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that not only consent to the act, but also consent to the delectation, of mortal sin is a mortal sin. Therefore, when such kisses and embraces are done for the sake of such pleasure it follows that they are mortal sins; and only that way are they called lustful.—(Hence they are mortal sins if they are immediately directed to fornication.)

ART. V.—WHETHER NOCTURNAL POLLUTION IS A SIN.

NO.—a) Nocturnal pollution considered in itself does not have the character of sin; b) but it can be a sin in relation to its cause, if this is culpable.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a sleeping man does not have free judgment, on which all sin depends.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND appears from what has been said above on the voluntary in its cause (I-II, q. lxxvii, art. 7): Now there can be three causes of nocturnal pollution: One is bodily, namely resulting from an excess of seminal fluid in the body, or from the resolution of the fluid because of the excessive heat of the body, or from some other disturbance. The second cause is on the part of the soul and the inner man—for instance when pollution happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought.—The last cause is spiritual and external, for example when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result.—Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

ART. VI.—WHETHER SEDUCTION SHOULD BE RECKONED A SPECIES OF LUST.

YES.—THE REASON is that where there is a special deformity in the matter of any vice it must be reckoned a determinate species of that vice. Now seduction, which denotes the unlawful defloration of a virgin, has a special deformity of lust, both on the part of the girl, because by being violated without a previous compact of marriage she is both hindered from contracting a legitimate marriage and is placed on the road to a wanton life; and also on the part of the father, who had the girl in his care, according to Ecclus. xlii, 11: "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Hence seduction is a determinate species of lust.

ART. VII.—WHETHER RAPE IS A SPECIES OF LUST DISTINCT FROM SEDUCTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that for the essence of rape violence is requisite, which is not implied by the name of seduction. Hence according to St. Thomas rape can be defined as: "Force employed against any woman or her parents for the sake of satisfying lust."

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ADULTERY IS A DETERMINATE SPECIES OF LUST, DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER SPECIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that adultery has a special deformity with respect to venereal acts. For adultery, as the very name implies, is access to another's bed. Hence, besides the general sin against the Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," it denotes two other deformities, the first of which is against the certainty of one's own (legitimate) offspring, the other is against the good of another's off-

spring.—Likewise, adultery is especially contrary to marriage, inasmuch as it violates conjugal faith, which each spouse owes to the other (Ad 2).

ART. IX.—WHETHER INCEST IS A DETERMINATE SPECIES OF LUST.

YES.—THE REASON is that there must be a determinate species of lust wherever there is found something contrary to the right use of sex. Now in the association of relatives by blood or marriage there is found something incompatible with venereal intercourse; and this for three reasons: First, because man naturally has a certain respect for his parents; secondly, because persons bound by ties of blood must needs live together; hence if such persons were not restrained from venereal intercourse too much opportunity would be given to men for sexual intercourse; and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust; thirdly, because this would hinder the multiplication of friends. For when a man marries a woman outside his household, all the wife's kindred are united to him by special bonds of friendship, as if they were his relatives.

NOTE: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honor, and even some animals have by instinct this respect for their parents. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another, not directly but through their parents; and as to this becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom and human or divine law, because, as stated above (art. 2 of this q.), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (*City of God* xv, 16), "though the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it."

ART. X.—WHETHER SACRILEGE CAN BE A SPECIES OF LUST.

YES.—Insofar as lust may be directed to the violation of some sacred thing.

THE REASON is that the act of one virtue or vice if directed to the end of another virtue or vice takes on its species, as for instance theft, when committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Hence it is manifest that lust also, when it violates something pertaining to divine worship, belongs to the species of sacrilege, and accordingly sacrilege can be reckoned a species of lust.

NOTE: If anyone abuses a woman related to him by spiritual relationship, he commits sacrilege after the manner of incest. But if he abuses a virgin consecrated to God, this, inasmuch as she is a bride of Christ, is sacrilege after the manner of adultery. Insofar as she is under the care of a spiritual father, there is a kind of spiritual seduction; and if violence is offered her, there is spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others [under the ancient Code of Justinian].

ART. XI.—WHETHER UNNATURAL VICE IS A SPECIES OF LUST.

YES.—THE REASON is that in unnatural vice the venereal act has a special character of deformity and unbecomingness. For not only is the vice against nature contrary to right reason—which is common to every vice of lust—but in addition it is contrary to the natural order itself of the venereal act. This can occur in four ways: By solitary pollution, which is a sin of uncleanness, or effeminacy; by intercourse with something not of the same species, which is bestiality (and this is the greatest sin among the vices that are contrary to nature); by intercourse with the improper sex, e.g., of male with male, female with female, which is called the vice of sodomy; and finally by the failure to observe the natural mode of intercourse, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial modes of copulation.

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE VICE AGAINST NATURE IS THE GREATEST SIN AMONG THE SPECIES OF LUST.

YES.—THE REASON is that in every genus the corruption of the principle, on which the other things depend, is the worst of all, whether in speculative or in practical matters. Therefore, just as in speculative matters the gravest and most shameful error is about those things the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in man, so in practical matters, the most grievous and shameful action is against those things that are determined by nature. Now in the vices that are against nature man transgresses

that which has been determined by nature in regard to the use of venereal actions. Hence it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all.

Among these unnatural vices, the sin of uncleanness, which consists only in the omission of intercourse with another, is the least grievous. The most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because due species is not observed. After this is the sin of sodomy, since the due sex is not observed. After that comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the *vas* than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances (Ad 3).

NOTE: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself; wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLV CONTINENCE

We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: 1) Continnence, 2) clemency, 3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER CONTINENCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—a) Perfect continence, insofar as it signifies abstinence from all venereal pleasure, is a virtue; b) but if it signifies resistance to evil desires, as it is taken by the Philosopher (*Ethics*, bk. viii), it is a "mixed virtue."

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, thus taken, continence is identified with virginity, which we have discussed above (q. clii, art. 3); or with perfect widowhood.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that insofar as continence, thus taken, makes the reason steadfast against the passions, it has the character of a virtue; but insofar as the vehement passions rebel against the reason continence falls short of the character of a virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethics*, bk. iv) that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture."—If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

ART. II.—WHETHER DESIRES FOR PLEASURES OF TOUCH ARE THE MATTER OF CONTINENCE.

YES.—Continence and incontinence are properly said in reference to the desires of the pleasures of touch.

THE REASON is that continence denotes a certain curbing, inasmuch as a man restrains himself from following his passions. Now the passions urge a man forward the more they follow the inclination of nature, and nature inclines him principally to the things that are necessary to him, either for the preservation of the individual, such as is food; or (and more so) for the preservation of the species, such as are venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to touch. Therefore the proper matter of continence and incontinence is the desire of the pleasures of touch, not as being moderated by continence (which belongs to temperance) but as being resisted by them (art. following, ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF CONTINENCE IS THE CON- CUPISCIBLE POWER.

NO.—THE REASON is that the virtue in any subject makes that subject have a different disposition than what it has while it is subjected to the opposite vice. Now continence does not make this difference in the concupiscible power, because the concupiscible is in the continent man in the same way as it is in the incontinent man, because in both it breaks forth into vehement evil desires. Hence it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible power as in a subject.—But the difference between the continent and the incontinent man is in choice; for the continent, although he suffers vehement desires, yet *chooses* not to follow them on account of reason; whereas the incontinent man *chooses* to follow them despite the contradiction of reason. Therefore it follows that continence must be in that power of the soul whose act is choice, as in a subject; and this is the will, as was stated above (I-II, q. xiii, art. 1).

NOTE: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to

its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power; though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CONTINENCE IS BETTER THAN TEMPERANCE.

NO.—a) Continence considered as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires, when they are vehement in a man, is not greater than temperance; but temperance is far greater than continence. b) Perfect continence, considered as denoting cessation from all venereal pleasures, is greater than temperance considered absolutely.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the good of reason flourishes more in the one who is temperate, in whom even the sensitive appetite itself is subject to reason, than in the one who is continent, in whom the sensitive appetite vehemently resists the reason because of evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance as the imperfect to the perfect, and is annexed to temperance as the secondary to the principal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that perfect continence is identified with virginity, which has pre-eminence over chastity considered absolutely. For virginity abstains from all *use* of sex.

QUESTION CLVI INCONTINENCE

(n four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INCONTINENCE PERTAINS TO THE SOUL OR TO THE BODY.

ANSWER.—Incontinence pertains to the soul.—That is: The direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which does not resist the passions through reason; whereas the body only affords the occasion of incontinence.

THE REASON is that the passions, however vehement, that arise from the disposition of the body in the sensitive appetite are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but the occasion only; for as long as the use of reason lasts man can always resist his passions.—That the soul does not use reason to resist the passions can happen in two ways: 1) When the soul gives in to the passions before reason has given its counsel. This is called unbridled incontinence or impetuosity, as in the case of choleric and melancholic. 2) When man does not stand to what has been counseled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called weakness, and is characteristic of women, the effeminate, and the phlegmatic (Ad 1 and 2).

NOTE: Because woman has a rather weak bodily temperament, which influences even those operations of the soul that are accomplished without bodily instruments, the result is that whatever she holds to she holds to weakly, although in rare cases the opposite occurs (Ad 1). The same thing can be said of effeminate and phlegmatic persons, for the same reason (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER INCONTINENCE IS A SIN.

YES.—a) Incontinence properly and simply considered is a sin for two reasons; b) incontinence properly but relatively considered is a sin for one reason only; c) incontinence, speaking improperly and by analogy, is not a sin but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that incontinence properly and simply speaking is about the concupiscences of pleasures of the touch; hence it is a sin both because the incontinent man departs from what is according to reason and because he sinks himself in shameful delights. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethics*, bk. vii, chap. 8): "Incontinence is censurable, not only because it is wrong—i.e., strays from reason—but also because it is wicked," i.e., follows evil desires.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that incontinence properly but relatively speaking consists in a man's not observing the due mode of reason in the desire of things that may be sought in themselves.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that incontinence, not properly but only metaphorically speaking, is about the desires of things that a man cannot use badly,

e.g., about the desire for virtue. And such incontinence, which is only metaphorically incontinence, is not a sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE INCONTINENT MAN SINS MORE GRAVELY THAN THE INTEMPERATE.

NO.—THE REASON is that there is a greater inclination of the will to sin in the intemperate than in the incontinent. For in the man who is intemperate the will is inclined to sin from its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired by custom; whereas in the incontinent man the will is inclined to sin from passion. And, because passion soon passes, whereas a habit is a quality that is difficult to change, it follows that the incontinent immediately repents after the passion has passed. But this is not the case with the intemperant; in fact, he rejoices that he sinned, inasmuch as the sinful act has become natural to him, by reason of his habit. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethics*, bk. vii, c. 7) that the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, inasmuch as he retains the best principle, to wit, the right estimate of the end (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INCONTINENT IN ANGER IS WORSE THAN THE INCONTINENT IN DESIRE.

NO.—a) On the part of the passion, which occasions the downfall of reason, the incontinence of desire is more shameful; b) on the part of the evil into which one falls as a result of incontinence, the incontinence of anger is more grievous for the most part.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the movement of concupiscence has greater deordination than the movement of anger. For, in the first place, the movement of anger partakes to some extent of reason, inasmuch, namely, as the angry man tends to avenge an injury done to him; but the movement of concupiscence is wholly according to the senses, and is in no manner according to reason. Secondly, the movement of anger follows the disposition of the body more than the other, on account of the quickness of the movement of the bile, which tends to anger. Now what arises from a natural disposition of the body is considered more pardonable. Thirdly, anger seeks action openly, but concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure; but he who is subject to anger acts as though forced by a previous displeasure.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the incontinence of anger leads to things that are hurtful to the neighbor.

NOTE: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because it does not at all follow the judgment of reason; and for this reason is more disgraceful (Ad 2).

QUESTION CLVII CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE ABSOLUTELY THE SAME.

NO.—THE REASON is that clemency tends to moderate external punishment whereas meekness properly diminishes the passion of anger.—(Hence clemency is properly in those who have authority to punish; and thus meekness is of wider extension than clemency, since the latter regards only public persons, whereas the former looks also to private persons.)

NOTE: The passion of anger provokes a man to exact graver punishment than he ought. To clemency it belongs directly to mitigate punishment; and this might be prevented by excessive anger. Hence meekness, insofar as it restrains the onset of anger, concurs toward the same effect as clemency (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER BOTH CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE VIRTUES.

YES.—THE REASON is that clemency, by diminishing punishments, regards reason. Similarly, even meekness moderates anger according to right reason. Hence it is evident that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

NOTE: Properly speaking, severity is not opposed to clemency, since both are

according to reason, and are not about the same thing. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment, when right reason requires it; whereas clemency tends to mitigate punishment, also according to right reason, when and as this ought to be done. Likewise, severity is not directly opposed to meekness, because meekness is about anger; severity regards the external infliction of punishment (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE AFORESAID VIRTUES ARE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE.

YES.—THE POTENTIAL OR ANNEXED PARTS.

THE REASON is that both clemency and meekness are assigned to temperance as secondary virtues to the principle, which they imitate in secondary matters as regards the mode whence the virtue of temperance derives its principal praise. For temperance consists in a certain curbing, inasmuch as it curbs the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. On the other hand, clemency and meekness similarly consist in a certain curbing, inasmuch as clemency mitigates punishment and meekness mitigates anger.

NOTE: The mitigation of punishment that is made according to the intention of the lawgiver, although not according to the letter of the law, belongs to equity. The moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment, belongs properly to clemency (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS ARE THE GREATEST VIRTUES.

NO.—a) Clemency and meekness are not the greatest virtues simply; b) but nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues that resist evil inclinations.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that clemency and meekness owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw men from evil, inasmuch, namely, as they diminish wrath or punishment. But it is more perfect to obtain good than to be without evil. Hence the virtues that simply order men to good are simply greater.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that anger, which is mitigated by meekness, on account of its violence greatly hinders man's mind from freely judging the truth, and for this reason meekness most makes a man master of himself. Whence it is said in *Ecclus. x, 31*: "My son, keep thy soul in meekness." But clemency, in mitigating punishment, seems to approach nearest to charity, which is the greatest of the virtues.

NOTE: Clemency and meekness render man acceptable to God and men, inasmuch as they concur toward the same effect as charity, namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils (Ad 2).

QUESTION CLVIII ANGER

We have next to consider the opposite vices: 1) Anger, which is opposed to meekness; 2) cruelty, which is opposed to clemency. About anger there will be eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO BE ANGRY.

YES.—If one is angry with right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.

THE REASON is that the evil of anger's passion is not according to its species, as, for instance, in the case of envy, which is sadness because of others' good, and therefore is in itself contrary to reason; for anger is the appetite for revenge, which can be sought for either good or ill.—Now evil can be in anger according to quantity, because a man can be more or less angry than he ought. Hence Gregory says (*Moral.*, lib. v, cap. 30): "Anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice when it bows to the command of reason" (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER ANGER IS A SIN

YES.—Anger is a sin if it exceeds the measure of reason.

THE REASON is that a passion of the sensitive appetite is so far good as it is regulated by reason.

NOTE: Anger may be in a twofold relation to the order of reason: First, as regards the object to which it tends, which is revenge; and in this respect a man can

sin by anger if he seeks to punish one who does not deserve it, or more than he has deserved, or in violation of legitimate order, or inconsistently with the due end, which is the upholding of justice and the correction of sin. A man can sin in a second way by anger according to the mode of getting angry, when, namely, the movement of anger seethes immoderately, whether inwardly or outwardly.

2. Man is master of his own acts through the judgment of his reason; wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e., so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one if it does arise. Accordingly, it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man's power, to the extent, namely, that no such movement arises. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL ANGER IS A MORTAL SIN.

NO.—a) On the part of the object of anger, or revenge, anger can be a mortal sin in point of its genus, if the revenge is unjust; b) on the part of the movement, anger is contingently a mortal sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus anger is contrary to charity and justice. It can, however, happen that such appetite is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act, both on the part of the subject, when for example the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of reason; and on the part of the object, when for instance a man seeks to avenge himself in a trifling matter, which is to be regarded as of no account—for example, if he pulls a child slightly by the hair, or something of that sort.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that through the fierceness of his anger a man can fall away from the love of God and his neighbor.

NOTE: Regarding the words of Our Lord (Matth. v, 22): "Whoever is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment," note that Our Lord said this of anger by way of addition to the words of the Law: "Whoever shall murder shall be liable to judgment" (v, 21). Consequently Our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor; and should the consent of reason be given to this desire it will be undoubtedly a mortal sin (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ANGER IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS SIN.

NO.—a) On the part of its object, or revenge, anger agrees with those sins that seek a neighbor's evil, i.e., with hatred and envy, and among them it is the least sin; b) on the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man seeks the evil, anger agrees with the sin of concupiscence, and is the lesser sin; c) on the part of the mode of getting angry, anger has a certain pre-eminence over the others.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that anger seeks the evil of punishment under the aspect of the good of justice. Now hatred seeks the neighbor's evil under the aspect of evil; and envy, under the aspect of one's own glory or excellence, which another is thought of as diminishing.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the good that the angry man seeks, which is the good of justice, is better than the pleasurable or useful good, which the man subject to concupiscence seeks.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is on account of the fierceness and speed of its movement, according to Prov. xxvii, 4: "Anger hath no mercy, or fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence of one provoked?"

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PHILOSOPHER SUITABLY ASSIGNS THE SPECIES OF ANGER, TO WIT, WRATH, RANCOUR, AND SULLENNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the deordination of anger may be considered in relation to two things: First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards choleric persons, who are too easily excited to anger, for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, inasmuch as anger endures too long, and this can happen in two ways: 1) Because the cause of anger, to wit, the infliction of injury, remains too long in a man's memory; the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is grievous and sullen to himself.—2) It happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with stubborn desire; and this applies to ill-tempered or stern people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

NOTE: The aforesaid distinction can be referred also to the passion of anger, as was shown above, Ia-IIae, q. xlvi, art. 8.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ANGER SHOULD BE RECKONED AMONG THE CAPITAL VICIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that many vices may arise from anger; for revenge is sought by the angry man under the aspect of the just or the honest, which is attractive by its excellence; and also because of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all sorts of inordinate action.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER SIX DAUGHTERS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO ANGER, NAMELY QUARRILING, SWELLING OF MIND, CONTUMELY, CLAMOR, INDIGNATION, AND BLASPHEMY.

YES.—Insofar as anger is in the heart, in words, and in deeds.

THE REASON is that from the anger that is in the heart there proceeds indignation, viz., against the one whom a man is angry with insofar as he deems him unworthy of acting thus to himself; and swelling of the mind, on the part of the angry man, inasmuch as he fills his mind with thought of revenge.

From the anger that is expressed in words proceed clamor, inasmuch as a man demonstrates his anger in his mode of speaking, namely by disordered and confused speech, as when one who is angry says to his brother, Raca; and blasphemy and contumely, insofar as a man breaks forth into injurious words against God or the neighbor.—From the anger that is in deeds arises quarreling, by which we are to understand all manner of injuries on one's neighbor through anger.

NOTE: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby he lifts himself up against God, since, according to Eccles. x, 14: "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God," i.e., to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind proceeds from anger (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THERE IS A VICE OPPOSED TO ANGER RESULTING FROM LACK OF ANGER.

YES.—Whether anger be taken for the simple movement of the will or for the movement of the sensitive appetite.

THE REASON is that the lack of anger resulting from the right judgment of the reason is sinful, whether such a lack is in the will alone, or in the passion of anger, for the movement of anger cannot be wholly lacking in the sensitive appetite save by the withdrawal or weakness of the voluntary movement; for the appetite that is by nature lower follows the movement of the appetite that is higher, unless something opposes it. It follows from this that even the lack of the passion of anger can be sinful.

NOTE: When one is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion; and thus he is said to judge, not to be angry (with regard to the will).—(in body).—Hence he who is wholly without anger when he ought to be angry imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's punishing by judgment. (Ad 1).—Yet even as a passion, anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution of reason's dictate, for nature does nothing without purpose (Ad 2).

QUESTION CLIX CRUELTY

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CRUELTY IS OPPOSED TO CLEMENCY.

YES.—THE REASON is that clemency denotes a certain smoothness and sweetness of soul, whereby one is led to mitigate punishment. But cruelty, which takes its name from *cruditas* (rawness), indicates something disagreeable and bitter to the taste. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

NOTE: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, whereas the sweetness of soul that inclines one to this belongs to clemency; so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards

the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, it belongs to cruelty (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CRUELTY DIFFERS FROM SAVAGERY OR BRUTALITY.

YES.—Cruelty differs from savagery or brutality as human malice differs from bestiality, as the Philosopher says (*Ethics*, bk. vii, chap. 5).

THE REASON is that savagery or brutality properly pertains to animals, which injure men, not from any reason of justice, the consideration of which belongs to reason alone, but to devour their bodies. Hence savagery or brutality in reference to man is said insofar as a man in inflicting punishment does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but merely delights in inhumanity. For such pleasure is not human, but bestial. Cruelty, on the other hand, regards fault in the one who is punished, but exceeds the mode in punishing.—Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency, savagery or brutality, to the gift of piety. Aristotle called clemency “the god-like virtue,” and according to us it would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLX MODESTY

(in two articles)

AT. I.—WHETHER MODESTY IS A PART OF TEMPERANCE.

YES.—It is a potential or annexed part of temperance.

THE REASON is that modesty is annexed to temperance as to a principal virtue. For, wherever there is any virtue about matters of greatest import, there must logically be another virtue about matters of lesser import, inasmuch as man’s life requires to be governed by the virtues in regard to everything. Accordingly, just as magnificence, which is about great expenditures, has connected with it liberality, which is about lesser expenditures, so temperance must have annexed to it modesty, which moderates pleasure in lesser things.

NOTE: Modesty, so called from *modus*, mode, measure, is the same as moderation, and in this respect is required in all virtues (Ad 1 and 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER MODESTY IS ONLY ABOUT OUTWARD ACTIONS.

NO.—THE REASON is that modesty has under it various virtues, which are concerned with man’s inward acts (Ad 1). Thus Cicero assigned under modesty clemency, humility, and studiousness; Andronicus, meekness, simplicity, and other kindred virtues; and Aristotle, *eutrapelia*, which is pleasure in games. On the part of moderation, there is in such virtues only one virtue (Ad 2).—Regarding the outward actions of modesty, Cicero (*De Invent. Rhet.*, lib. ii) enumerates those that belong to the bodily movements and actions, i.e., those that require to be done becomingly and honestly, whether we act seriously or at play; and those that regard outward show, for instance in dress and the like (in body of art.).

QUESTION CLXI THE SPECIES OF MODESTY, AND FIRSTLY HUMILITY

We must next consider the species of modesty: 1) Humility, and pride, which is opposed thereto; 2) studiousness and its opposite, curiosity; 3) modesty as affecting words or deeds; 4) modesty as affecting outward attire. About humility there are six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER HUMILITY IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—It is a virtue that steadies the mind so that it is not inordinately lifted up.

THE REASON is that, as was shown above (I-II, q. xxiii, art. 2), in the question of the passions, an arduous good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of the good; and something repulsive to it, namely the difficulty of securing it. Hence with regard to the appetite of arduous good, a twofold virtue is needed: One that tempers and restrains the soul, so that it does not immoderately tend toward lofty things; and this belongs to the virtue of humility; another that steadies the mind against

despair, and impels it to pursue great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. And thus it is plain that humility is a virtue.

NOTE: As Isidore says (*Etymol.*, bk. x, at letter H): "Humility is so called as if *humili acclivis*, that is, inclined to the lowest place." This may happen in two ways: 1) Through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one person is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. 2) Through an intrinsic principle, and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place, according to his mode: Thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. xviii, 27: "I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue (Ad 1), and denotes a praiseworthy self-abasement, which is suitable to any man in comparison with God—indeed, for the sake of God one may commendably subject himself in humiliation to others.—Sometimes humility can be misconceived, for instance a man, not understanding his dignity, compares himself to senseless cattle, and becomes like to them (Ad 1, 2, 4, and 5 *passim*).

ART. II.—WHETHER HUMILITY HAS TO DO WITH THE APPETITE.

YES.—Humility has more to do with the appetite than with the judgment or estimate of reason.

THE REASON is that the knowledge of one's deficiency pertains to humility, as a rule directing the appetite. But humility has to do with the appetite essentially. For humility is an elective virtue, i.e., it chooses to repress itself, so as not to be borne above its capacities. Hence it must be said that humility properly guides and moderates the movement of the appetite.

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT, BY HUMILITY, TO SUBJECT ONESELF TO ALL MEN.

YES.—a) Any man, with respect to that which is his own, ought to subject himself to all his neighbors with respect to that which is of God in them; b) but humility does not require that anyone subject that which is of God in himself to that which appears to be of God in another; c) similarly, humility does not require anyone to subject that which is his own in himself to that which is of man in his neighbor.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that humility properly regards reverence, whereby man is subject to God. Now we ought to revere God, not only in Himself, but also that which is His in everyone else, although not in the same way as we revere God (in body of art. and Ad 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, without prejudice to humility, those who have received gifts of God can prefer them to the gifts of God that appear bestowed on others, as the Apostle says (Ephes. iii, 5): The mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed in His holy Apostles."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that otherwise each person would have to count himself more of a sinner than any other; yet the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal. ii, 15): "We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners."—A man can, however, regard something good in his neighbor, which he himself does not have, or something evil in himself, which is not in another, in respect of which he can subject himself in humility, at least according to the interior act of the soul (at the end of art. and Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HUMILITY IS A PART OF MODESTY, OR TEMPERANCE.

YES.—Humility is a part of temperance, as is modesty, under which it is contained.

THE REASON is that all the virtues that either restrain or repress, and the actions that moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned as parts of temperance. For temperance derives its praise from the fact that it restrains or represses the impetuosity of a passion. Now humility represses the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. And thus humility is reckoned a part of temperance. Again, humility, insofar as it is a moderation of spirit, is contained under modesty, as was stated (prec. q., art. 1). Hence humility is a part (namely potential part) of temperance, and is contained under modesty.

NOTE: Humility, since it is concerned with an arduous good, is in the irascible appetite, as in its subject; yet it is reckoned a part of modesty and temperance on account of its formal mode, according to which it agrees with these virtues. For the

(potential) parts are assigned to the principal virtues, not by reason of a sameness of subject or matter, but of formal mode (Ad 2).—Thus, although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER HUMILITY IS THE GREATEST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—After the theological and intellectual virtues, and after legal justice, humility stands before all the other virtues.

THE REASON is that the theological virtues have for their object the last end itself; and the order of reason, in which the good of human virtue consists, is regarded principally with respect to the end. Hence the theological virtues rank first. Other virtues are ordered in reference to the means to the end; and among these first rank is held by those that regard reason itself, in which ordination essentially consists, namely the intellectual virtues, for they outrank the virtues that regard the appetite, in which there is ordination by participation. Among these, the first place is held by justice, especially legal justice, which is the universal cause of this ordination. Then comes humility, which makes man a good subject of ordinance of all kinds, and in all matters, whereas every other virtue has this effect in some special matter.

NOTE: Humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice, because, in the acquirement of the virtues, it holds first place, as removing obstacles, inasmuch as it expels pride, which God resists, and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of divine grace. Hence it is said in James iv, 6 that "God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble." With regard to what is first among the virtues directly, because it is the first step to God, faith is reckoned the foundation of the spiritual edifice, and indeed in a nobler way than humility (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER 12 DEGREES OF HUMILITY ARE FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED IN THE RULE OF ST. BENEDICT.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that humility, as we said (art. 2 of this q.), consists essentially in the appetite; but it has its rule in the cognitive faculty, and the principle and root of both is the reverence that we have to God.

Now with regard to the root of humility the 12th degree is reckoned as "that a man fear God, and bear all His commandments in mind."

As regards the appetite, namely that a man shall not aim at its excellence inordinately, three degrees are reckoned: 1) That a man shall not follow his own will (the 11th degree); that he regulate it according to the judgment of his superior (the 10th degree); 3) that he be not deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come his way (the ninth degree).

In deference to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, three degrees are enumerated: 1) That he acknowledge and avow his own shortcomings (eighth degree); that he deem himself incapable of great things (seventh degree); 3) that in this respect he put others before himself (sixth degree).

All these refer to the inward signs of humility. With regard to the outward acts or signs, one of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart from the ordinary way (fifth degree). The other two have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak (fourth degree), and that one be not immoderate in speech (second degree).

The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

NOTE: 1. It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults that we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God that others have. Similarly without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency to God, according to II Cor. iii, 5: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (Ad 1).

2. Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in

plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees (inward and outward) of humility are here enumerated.—(Ad 2).

QUESTION CLXII PRIDE

Here we have to consider pride: 1) Pride in general; 2) the sin of the first man, which is reckoned to be pride. The first point is in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER PRIDE IS A SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that pride denotes something that is opposed to right reason; for pride (*superbia*) is so called from the fact that a person by his will aims at what is above (*supra*) him. Hence Isidore says (*Etym.*, bk. x, at letter S): "A man is said to be proud because he wishes to appear above what he is."

NOTE: Pride may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing (*supergreditur*) the rule of reason, and in this way we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate *super-abundance*, in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride; and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence Is. lx, 15 says: "I will make thee to be an everlasting pride, a joy unto generation and generation" (Ad 1).

2. In respect of superabundance, pride is opposed to magnanimity and humility on various accounts: To humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection; to magnanimity, inasmuch as it stretches forth inordinately to great things.—But because pride denotes a certain superiority, it is more directly opposed to humility (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER PRIDE IS A SPECIAL SIN.

YES.—Considered with regard to its proper object, it is a special sin but insofar as it implies a certain influence on other sins, it is not a special sin, but has a certain generic character.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this way pride has a special object, for it is the inordinate desire of one's own excellence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus pride can give rise to all sins, and in two ways: 1) Directly, insofar as the other sins are directed to the end of pride, which is one's own excellence, to which anything can be directed that a person can inordinately desire; 2) indirectly, and as it were accidentally, i.e., by removing an obstacle, inasmuch as a man through pride despises the divine law which forbids him to sin.—Yet it should be realized that this generic character of pride permits the possibility of all vices' *sometimes* arising from pride; but it does not imply that all vices arise from pride always; for sometimes the violations of God's law are done out of ignorance and sometimes through weakness.—Accordingly, he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself against God effectively—always—but not always affectively (i.e., intentionally).—(Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF PRIDE IS IN THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY.

YES.—The subject of pride is the irascible, not only properly taken, insofar as the irascible is a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in the broader sense, as it is found in the intellective appetite.

THE REASON is that the difficult thing which pride has in view—pride being the (inordinate) appetite of one's own excellence—is found both in sensible objects—and thus it is the object of the sensitive appetite—and properly belongs to the passion of anger; and in spiritual objects—and in this respect it belongs to the intellective appetite. It is in this broader sense that anger is said to be in both God and the angels. In this sense also pride is reckoned as being in the demons.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FOUR SPECIES OF PRIDE ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED BY GREGORY, NAMELY TO BELIEVE THAT THE GOOD THAT ONE HAS IS FROM ONESELF, TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS GIVEN FOR ONE'S OWN MERITS, TO BOAST THAT ONE HAS WHAT ONE HAS NOT, AND TO DESPISE OTHERS AND WISH TO BE SINGULARLY CONSPICUOUS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the excellence that the proud man inordinately

desires follows from the possession of some good. Now good can be considered in three ways: 1) In itself, and thus the greater the good that one has the greater the excellence that one derives from it. And thus we have the third species of pride, namely boasting that one has what one has not.

Secondly, pride may be considered with regard to its cause, insofar as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously; and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God, or when he believes that that which he has received from above is due to his own merits.

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, insofar as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.

NOTE: It pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good that is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride, and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself (Ad 1).

Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not; but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER PRIDE IS A MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the root of pride is found to consist in a man's not being subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that the fact of not being subject to God has the character of a mortal sin, for this is to be turned away from God; consequently pride in respect of its genus is a mortal sin. Hence some movements of pride are venial sins, namely if the reason does not completely consent to them.

ART. VI.—WHETHER PRIDE IS THE MOST GRIEVOUS OF SINS.

YES.—Not on the part of the turning to a mutable good; but on the part of turning away from the immutable good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the uplifting, which pride covets inordinately, is not in its essence the most incompatible with the good of virtue.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in other sins man is turned away from God either because of ignorance, or because of weakness, or by the desire of some other good; but pride has its aversion from God from the simple fact that it does not wish to be subject to God and His rule.—Hence to be turned away from God and His commandments, which is a consequence, as it were, in the other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And, because that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the gravest of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion, which is the formal complement of sin.

NOTE: 1. The sin of pride is difficult to avoid because of its being hidden, since it takes occasion even from good deeds. As says Augustine (in his *Rule*) "it even lies in wait for good deeds, that they may perish." Thus no great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason. But once discovered by reason it is easily avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Eccles. x, 9: "Why is earth and ashes proud?" and also from a consideration of the greatness of God, according to Job xv, 13: "Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" (Ad 1).

2. Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which, though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (*De Summo Bono* ii, 38) that "he who is in the clutches of pride, and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement" (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER PRIDE IS THE FIRST SIN OF ALL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the first thing in every genus is that which is

essential. Now it has been said above (prec. art.) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially and to other sins consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfills the conditions of a first (i.e., the most grievous) sin, and is also the principle of all sins, as was explained above (I-II, q. lxxxiv, art. 2).

NOTE: 1. Pride is said to be the beginning of all sin, not because every sin arises individually from pride, but because every kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride (Ad 1).

2. Pride is the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous, if they are done through pride. And, because that which is the first in causing sins is the last in withdrawal from sins, a gloss on Ps. xviii, 13, says: "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin, namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God and the first in those who withdraw from God" (Ad 4).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER PRIDE SHOULD BE RECKONED A CAPITAL VICE.

NO.—According to St. Gregory; according to others (such as Cassian, Evagrius, St. Nilus, and St. John Damascene, Yes).

THE REASON is that Gregory considers pride—and rightly—according to its universal influence on all sins. And in this way pride is the queen and mother of all sins. For, "when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith it delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."—Others, however, consider pride as a special vice. And thus according to Gregory there are seven capital vices; according to others, eight.

NOTE: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof; for pride covets excellence inordinately, whereas vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.

QUESTION CLXIII THE SIN OF THE FIRST MAN

We must now consider the sin of the first man, which was pride: 1) His sin; 2) its punishment; 3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin. About the first point there are four questions.

ART. I.—WHETHER PRIDE WAS THE FIRST MAN'S FIRST SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that among the movements that may concur towards one sin, that has the character of the first sin in which inordinateness is first found. Now inordinateness in moral matters (as also ordinateness) is found in the movement of the appetite towards its end before it is found in the movement toward that which is sought for the sake of the end. Hence the first sin of man was where there could be the first desire of an inordinate end. Now such inordinateness of the end could not be for some sensible good, because in the state of innocence there was no rebellion of the flesh (of concupiscence) against the spirit. It is left, therefore, that the first deordination of the human appetite was a result of its inordinately desiring some spiritual good, insofar, namely, as it desired a spiritual good above its measure, and this belongs to pride.—Whence it is evident that the first sin of the first man was pride, and, as Augustine says (*Ad Orosium, in Dialog.*, q. 65): "Man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting and scorned God's commandments" (Ad 1.—Hence disobedience was caused by pride; and the same thing is to be said of the sin of gluttony and the disordered desire of knowledge of the first parents (Ad 2 and 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE FIRST MAN'S PRIDE CONSISTED IN HIS COVETING GOD'S LIKENESS.

YES.—a) Th first man did not covet the likeness of equality with God; but b) the likeness of imitation, which is founded on the fact that the good in the creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such a likeness (of equality) with God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man in the first beginning of creation principally desired likeness to God with regard to the knowledge of good and evil, as the serpent suggested to him, namely that by the power of his own nature he should determine for himself what was good and what was evil for him to do; or again

that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondly, he sinned by desiring a likeness to God with regard to his own power of operation, namely that by the power of his own nature he might act so as to attain happiness. And thus man desired some spiritual good above his measure. It follows that he coveted some divine likeness inordinately.

NOTE: Spiritual good, according to which the rational creature partakes of the divine likeness, can be considered in three ways: First as to natural being, such a likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation both on man and the angel. Secondly, with regard to knowledge; and this knowledge was bestowed on the angel at his creation, namely in act; but on man only in potentiality. Thirdly, with regard to the power of operation; and this likeness was not yet actually attained either by the angel or by man in the very outset of creation, because there remained something for both to do whereby to obtain happiness.—Accordingly, since both (the devil and the first man) inordinately desired the divine likeness, neither of them sinned by desiring a likeness of nature, but by desiring a likeness of operation—the devil by desiring a likeness of God with respect to power, man by desiring chiefly the knowledge of good and evil, as we said above.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SIN OF THE FIRST PARENTS WAS MORE GRIEVOUS THAN OTHER SINS.

NO.—According to the species of the sin, the sin of the first parents was not more grievous than the rest, but in respect to the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin had the greatest gravity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, although pride in respect of its genus has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride by which someone denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one inordinately covets the divine likeness, such as was the pride of the first parents.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the state of the first parents before their sin was perfect.—Consequently, the severity of the punishment that resulted from that first sin did not correspond to it as regards its species, but as regards its being the first sin, because it destroyed the innocence of the primal state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder on the whole human reason (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ADAM'S SIN WAS MORE GRIEVOUS THAN EVE'S.

NO.—a) With regard to the circumstances of the person, Adam's sin was more grievous; b) but, with regard to the genus, the sin of either is considered to be equal; c) with regard to the species of the sin (namely pride), the woman's sin was more grievous.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the man was more perfect than the woman.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the sin of both was pride.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is: 1) That the woman was more puffed up than the man; for the woman believed the serpent, and her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain the likeness of God against God's will. Adam, however, did not believe the serpent (namely that God was unwilling to have them like Himself); but his sin of pride consisted in his desiring to obtain the divine likeness by himself, as was stated (art. 2);—Secondly, because the woman alone did not sin, but she also suggested sin to her husband; hence she sinned both against God and the neighbor;—Thirdly, Adam consented to the sin from a kind of friendly good will, as Augustine says (*Super Gen. ad Litt., lib. xi, cap. ult.*)

ABRIDGER'S NOTE.—Nevertheless, as Sylvius observes, the opinion of the Fathers is very probable that not only Eve but also Adam believed the lie of the serpent, "you shall be as gods," and was himself deceived and seduced.

QUESTION CLXIV THE PUNISHMENT OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DEATH IS THE PUNISHMENT OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was stated (q. xcv, art. 1, and q. xcvi, art. 1), death and other bodily defects followed from the rebellion of the carnal appetite

against the reason and from the lack of subjection of the body to the soul. For life and bodily soundness consist in the body's being subject to the soul, as the perfectible to its perfection. Hence, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all bodily defects are owing to the lack of subjection of the body to the soul. Consequently, it is evident that, just as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of the sin of the first parents, so also are death and all bodily defects.

NOTE: The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. On the other hand, with respect to the adaptibility of the body's matter to the form, which is the incorruptible soul, it would rather follow that the body should be incorruptible. Thus God conferred upon man in the primal condition the favor of being exempt from the necessity of dying as a result of such matter (namely for the sake of the form). Yet this favor was withdrawn through the sin of the first parents. And thus death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the divine favor preserving man from death (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PARTICULAR PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST PARENTS ARE SUITABLY APPOINTED IN SCRIPTURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the first parents were punished in two ways: First by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly paradise, which is indicated in Gen. iii, 23: "God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And, lest he return to the things that had belonged to his primal state, God placed before paradise cherubim and a flaming sword.

Secondly, they were punished by having appointed for them the things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor; and this both as to the body and as to the soul. As to the body, one punishment was appointed to the woman, another to the man. For the woman it was appointed with regard to the bearing of children and domestic life. As regards the first, she was punished in two ways: First in the weariness to which she was subjected in carrying a child after conception; and this is indicated in Gen. iii, 16: "I will multiply thy sorrows and conceptions;" and then in the pain that she suffered in bringing forth, and with regard to this it is said: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth . . ."

For the man was appointed punishment in the things that pertain to procuring the necessaries of life. And in this respect he was punished in three ways: First, through the barrenness of the earth, when it is said (v. 17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth. Hence it is said (v. 18): "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."—Similarly, on the part of the soul, a threefold punishment is indicated: First with regard to the confusion that they suffered as a result of the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Whence it is said (v. 7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, in the words: "Behold, Adam is become as one of Us." Thirdly by the reminder of their future death, in the words (v. 19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To this it also pertains that God made them garments of skins, as a sign of their mortality.

NOTE: The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to the man's headship (since even before sin the man was the head and governor of the woman), but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own.

If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLXV THE TEMPTATION OF THE FIRST PARENTS

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR MAN TO BE TEMPTED BY THE DEVIL.

YES.—It was fitting that God should permit man in the state of innocence both to be tempted by the bad angels and to be helped by the good.

THE REASON is that it is a condition attaching to human nature that one

creature can be helped or hindered by other creatures; for, as it is said in Ecclus. xxxiv, 11: "He who has not been tempted, what manner of things does he know?" Yet by a special favor of grace it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

NOTE: To the difficulty so commonly adduced, that it was not fitting for God to permit man to be tempted, since He well knew that man would fall into sin through the devil's temptation, the Holy Doctor replies that, just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so also He knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to him required that man should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. xv, 14: "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Hence Augustine says (*Sup. Gen. ad Litt.*, chap. ix, Bk. 4): "It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader" (Ad 2). Moreover, man in the state of innocence could without any difficulty resist temptation (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MANNER AND ORDER OF THE FIRST TEMPTATION WAS FITTING.

YES.—The manner and order by which the first man was tempted by the suggestion of the serpent and the instigation of Eve was fitting.

THE REASON is that, since man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive, it was fitting that he should be tempted by the devil, both on the part of the intellect, inasmuch as he promised a likeness with the Divinity through the acquisition of knowledge, which man naturally desires to have; and on the part of the senses, insofar as he used these sensible things that are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman, who was akin to him in the same species, partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus (namely the genus "living").

NOTE: 1. A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has, since by inward suggestion at least man's imagination is changed by the devil, but by outward suggestion a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion (Ad 2).

2. In the reply to obj. 4, St. Thomas expounds St. Augustine's interpretation of the words of God that cursed the serpent (i.e., the devil in the serpent, which did not understand the words of God, but was used as an instrument by the evil angel).

QUESTION CLXVI STUDIOUSNESS

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PROPER MATTER OF STUDIOUSNESS IS KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the various virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost, just as fortitude is concerned about dangers of death. Now studiousness is first and foremost about knowledge. For study properly denotes keen application of the mind to something. But the mind is not applied to anything save by knowing it. Ergo.

ART. II.—WHETHER STUDIOUSNESS IS A PART OF TEMPERANCE.

YES.—As a potential part of temperance, as a secondary virtue annexed to it as to a principal virtue.

THE REASON is that it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite lest it tend excessively to that which it naturally desires, whether in respect of the body or, as regards the soul, lest it desire excessively to know something, for "all men have a natural desire to know," as Aristotle says. Now the moderation of this appetite belongs to the virtue of studiousness; and in this respect it is included under modesty, for the reason aforesaid (q. clx, art. 2).

NOTE: On the part of the soul, man is inclined to desire a knowledge of things;

whereas on the part of his bodily nature man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness consists in restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. [Latin *studium* means primarily zeal, interest, partiality.] The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter; since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle (Ad 3).

QUESTION CLXVII CURIOSITY

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CURIOSITY CAN BE INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the desire or study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth can be perverse, and it is in that that curiosity properly consists. This perversity can be had: 1) When someone aims by his study for a knowledge of truth insofar as it is accidentally connected with evil, as in the case of those who study for a knowledge of the truth that they may derive pride from it. 2) When people study to learn something for the purpose of sinning. In another way there can be a vice in this pursuit arising from the very inordinateness of the appetite and study connected with learning the truth, and that in four ways: 1) When one allows less profitable study to distract one from his obligations; wherefore Jerome says (*Epis.* 146 to Damasus, on the Prodigal Son): "We see priests forsaking the Gospels and the prophets, reading stage plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idyls;" b) when someone studies to learn something from one from whom this is not lawful, as in the case of those who inquire into the future from demons—this is superstitious curiosity; c) when a man studies to know the truth about creatures without referring this knowledge to a due end, namely the knowledge of God; d) when a person studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error. Hence it is said in *Ecclus.* iii, 22: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee . . ."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE VICE OF CURIOSITY IS ABOUT SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—In two ways.

THE REASON is that the vice of curiosity can be about sensitive knowledge, first as sensitive knowledge is not directed to anything useful, but rather distracts man from some useful consideration; second, as sensitive knowledge is directed to something harmful, as for example when looking on a woman is directed to lust, and when a close inquiring into the things that are done by others is directed to detraction.—If, however, one be ordinally intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.

NOTE: The curiosity of the senses is called the concupiscence of the eyes, because the eyes are the chief instruments of knowledge among the senses, so that all sensible things are said to be seen (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLXVIII MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY VIRTUE REGARDS THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY.

YES.—Both as regards fittingness to one's own person and as regards fittingness to other persons, affairs, and places.

THE REASON is that man's outward movements are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Now a moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason.

NOTE: Outward movements are signs of an inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Hence the moderation of the outward movements requires the moderation of the inward passions. Now this moderation can be reduced to two virtues. Insofar as we are directed by external movements to others, it belongs to the virtue of friendliness or affability, which regards the pleasure or pain that may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes into contact. Insofar as the external movements are signs of an interior disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truth, according to which a person shows himself in word and deed to be such as he is inwardly (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE A VIRTUE ABOUT GAMES.

YES.—The virtue about games and jests, which are conducive to relaxation, is called *eutrapelia*.

THE REASON is that, just as bodily fatigue is relaxed by bodily rest, so also mental fatigue is relaxed by mental rest. The rest of the soul is pleasure (I-II, q. xxv, art. 2). Hence it follows that a remedy is applied against mental fatigue by means of a certain pleasure, which serves to break the intensity of the mind when applied to study, for man's mind would collapse if it never had relaxation from its intensity.

This relaxation is gained by words and deeds that are called playful or humorous. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethics*, iv, chap. 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games." And, when these words and needs of humorous turn are directed by the rule of reason, they are reduced to the virtue of *eutrapelia* (from Greek *eu*, well, and *trephein*, to turn), whereby a man gives his words or deeds a cheerful turn; and, inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is called modesty.

St. Thomas makes use of a story of St. John the Evangelist, who compared the mind to a bow, which if indefinitely made taut would break.

NOTE: Three things are especially to be avoided in games: 1) Pleasure must not be sought in indecent or injurious words or actions (horseplay); 2) one must not lose balance of mind altogether; 3) the pleasure must suit the person, time, and place and be duly directed according to other circumstances (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE SIN IN THE SENSE OF PLAY.

YES.—THE REASON is that excess in play is taken as exceeding the rule of reason, and this can happen in two ways: 1) By the very kind of actions that are employed at play, namely when for the sake of play one makes use of indecent words or deeds, or those that result in the neighbor's harm, which of themselves are mortal sins. 2) By the lack of due circumstances, e.g., when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter at hand, or the person. And this can sometimes be a mortal sin, for instance if someone is so strongly addicted to fun that for its sake he would prefer to do something against the will of God; otherwise, it is a venial sin.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE IS A SIN IN LACK OF MIRTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is contrary to reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. For such men are vicious and are said to be boorish or rude, as Aristotle says (*Ethic*, iv, chap. 8).

NOTE: These are the words of the philosopher in chap. 10 of *Ethics*, i: "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat" (at end of art.).

QUESTION CLXIX MODESTY IN OUTWARD APPAREL (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE VIRTUE AND VICE IN CONNECTION WITH OUTWARD APPAREL.

YES.—THE REASON is that a man can use outward apparel immoderately. This immoderation can manifest itself in two ways: 1) With reference to the custom of the people with whom one lives; 2) by reason of the inordinate attachment of the

one who uses it. This inordinate attachment can be both by way of excess and by way of defect. It can be on the side of excess in three ways: First, when a person seeks human glory from excessive attire, insofar as dress and such things are a kind of ornament. Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, insofar as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous in his attention to outward apparel, even if there is no inordinateness on the part of the end.

In point of defect there can be inordinate attachment in two ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward apparel; secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to apparel, for even in the slovenliness of mourning there can be ostentation, which is the more dangerous as it deceives under the guise of God's service.

NOTE: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and the mean therein are referable to the virtue of truthfulness, which the philosopher (*loc. cit.*) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with man's estate (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ADORNMENT OF WOMEN IS DEVOID OF MORTAL SIN.

YES.—a) A married woman, if she adorns herself to please her husband, can do this without sin; b) but those women who do not have or intend to have husbands, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to the men who see them.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as the Apostle says (I Cor. vii, 34): "She who is married thinks about the things of the world, how she may please her husband."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this is to give men provocation to sin. And if women adorn themselves with the intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; if they do this from frivolity, or from vanity, for the sake of ostentation, it is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial. And the same rule applies to men in this respect.—The rule governing women's adornment is given by the Apostle (I Tim. ii, 9): "I wish women to be decently dressed, adorning themselves with modesty and dignity, not with braided hair or gold or pearls or expensive clothing." Whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately, but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly (Ad 1).

NOTE: The painting or powering of the face, to give a ruddier or whiter appearance to the complexion, is a lying counterfeit, and is not without sin. When it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure, or out of contempt for God, it is not without mortal sin. Yet it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another thing to hide a disfigurement arising from some cause, such as sickness or the like, for this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (I Cor. xii, 23) "those that we think the less honorable members of the body we surround with more abundant honor" (Ad 2).

2. Outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person according to general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear men's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut. xxii), because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive (Ad 3).

[Tr. Note: Custom has a great deal to do with the presence or degree of sinfulness of modes of apparel. Within limits, custom reduces or eliminates sources of sin in this matter, since the ordinary and common is less enticing than the unusual or intermittent. St. Thomas can be interpreted rather broadly in some of his remarks.]

QUESTION CLXX THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW.

YES.—The precepts of the Decalogue had to include the precept of temperance,

especially as regards adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.

THE REASON is that "the end of the commandment is charity" (I Tim. i, 5), which is directed to the love of God and the neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore the precepts of the Decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought. This is according to the words of Christ, Matth. v, 27-28: "I have heard that it was said to the ancients: 'Thou shalt not commit adultery'. But I say to you that anyone who even looks with lust at a woman has already committed adultery with her in his heart."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PRECEPTS OF THE VIRTUE ANNEXED TO TEMPERANCE ARE SUITABLY GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW.

YES.—The annexed virtues, a) not considered in themselves, but b) considered according to their effects.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the annexed virtues of temperance considered in themselves have no direct connection with the love of God or the neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that considered in their effects the annexed virtues of temperance can regard the love of God or the neighbor. In this respect some of the precepts of the Decalogue are suitably included as pertaining to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus there the respect of meekness is included against anger, of which the effect is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (which is forbidden in the Decalogue), or that he proceeds to withdraw the honor due his parents.

NOTE: Inordinate outward movements are not injurious to one's neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the Decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (q. clxviii, art. 1, ad 1).—(Ad 3).

ACTS THAT PERTAIN TO CERTAIN CLASSES OF MEN PROPHECY

After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things that pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a threefold difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts: 1) In reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to I Cor. xii, 4, 7: "There are varieties of gifts. . . To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to another the utterance of knowledge . . ."

Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (*ibid.*) that there are "diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was worried about much serving," which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who seated herself at the Lord's feet and listened to His word" (Luke x, 39, 40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. iv, 11: "And He Himself gave some men as apostles, and some as prophets, others again as evangelists, and others as pastors and teachers;" and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (I Cor. xii, 5): "There are varieties of ministries."

With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under prophecy, since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those that are to be believed by all and are matters of faith, and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to wisdom. Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the discernment of spirits. Moreover, it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to knowledge, as we shall explain further on (q. clxxvii). Accordingly, we must first consider prophecy and rapture, which is a degree of prophecy.

Concerning prophecy, four things stand for consideration: 1) Its essence; 2) its

cause; 3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; 4) the division of prophecy. About the first there will be six articles.

QUESTION CLXXI THE ESSENCE OF PROPHECY

ART. I.—WHETHER PROPHECY PERTAINS TO KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—Prophecy consists first and foremost in knowledge; secondarily it consists in speech; thirdly, the working of miracles belongs to prophecy.

THE REASON is that prophets first and chiefly *know* things that are far off and removed from the knowledge of men. But because, as it said in I Cor. xii, 7, "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to everyone for profit," and later (xiv, 12) it is said: "Seek to have [spiritual gifts] abundantly for the edification of the Church;" hence it is that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, insofar as prophets declare for the instruction of others the things in which they have been instructed by God. Accordingly, Isidore says (*Etym.*, bk. vii, chap. 8) that prophets may be described as *prae-fatores* (foretellers), because they tell from afar (*porro fantur*), and foretell the truth about things to come.

Now those things above human knowledge that are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation of the divine power, according to Mark xvi, 20: "They . . . preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the preaching by the signs that followed." Hence in the third place the working of miracles belongs to prophecy, being as it were a confirmation of the prophetic utterances.

NOTE: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of the things of God. After the mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of God. Thus, as regards the raising of the mind, inspiration is requisite to prophecy, and revelation is requisite as regards the very perception of the things of God (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER PROPHECY IS A HABIT.

NO.—THE REASON is that prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form—otherwise it would follow that a prophet would always have the power of prophecy, which is evidently false. It is left, therefore, that the prophetic light is in the soul of the prophet by way of a passion or transitory impression, and this is indicated in III Kings xix, 11, where it is said to Elias: "Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth . . ." Now a habit is an abiding form. Hence it is manifest that prophecy, properly speaking, is not a habit.

Nevertheless, just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion—thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again—so too in the prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER PROPHECY IS ONLY ABOUT FUTURE CONTINGENCIES.

NO.—Prophecy is about all those things that can be known by divine light; but most properly it is about future events.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a divine light, to which are subject all things, both human and divine, both spiritual and corporeal. Accordingly, prophetic revelation extends to all these things.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since prophecy is about those things that are far from our knowledge, the more pertinent certain things are to prophecy, the farther are they from human knowledge. Now among these things the most removed from human knowledge are those the truth of which is not determined, and hence is remote from the knowledge of all men. Now these things are future contingencies. Hence prophecy is most pertinent to them.

ART. IV.—WHETHER BY THE DIVINE REVELATION A PROPHET KNOWS ALL THAT CAN BE KNOWN PROPHETICALLY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the principle of the things that are manifested prophetically by divine light is the first truth itself, which the prophets do not see in

itself. Accordingly, they do not need to know all possible matters of prophecy; but each one of them knows some of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PROPHET ALWAYS DISTINGUISHES WHAT HE SAYS BY HIS OWN SPIRIT FROM WHAT HE SAYS BY THE PROPHETIC SPIRIT

NO.—THE REASON is that the prophet does not know all things by an express revelation; but certain things he knows by divine instinct. About those things that he knows by an express revelation he has the greatest certitude, and has it for certain that these things are divinely revealed to him (Jer. xxvi, 15). On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived by divine instinct or by his own spirit; for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THINGS KNOWN OR DECLARED PROPHETICALLY CAN BE FALSE.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator, so the things that are prophetically known or declared are signs of divine foreknowledge. Now the same truth of knowledge is in the disciple and in the teacher. Hence it is impossible for anything false to come under prophecy.

NOTE: 1. The certitude of divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an impressed likeness or seal of the divine foreknowledge, does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things (Ad 1).

2. Sometimes prophetic revelation is a kind of impressed likeness of the divine foreknowledge, insofar as it regards future contingencies in themselves; and such things happen just as they are foretold, as for example this saying of Is. vii, 14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this we are to understand the saying of Jonas (iii, 4): "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed," i.e., its deserts demand that it be destroyed (Ad 2).

QUESTION CLXXII THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PROPHECY CAN BE NATURAL.

NO.—a) To know beforehand future events as they are in themselves cannot be from nature, but only from divine revelation; b) but future events can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge, even by man; c) this foreknowledge of the future, however, differs from the first, which is had by divine revelation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that to foreknow future events as they are in themselves is proper to the divine intellect, to whose eternity all things are present, as has been said (I, q. xiv, art. 13).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that men can acquire a knowledge of certain future events, namely in their causes, either by art, as a physician foreknows (prognosticates) health or future death in certain causes, whose relation to certain effects he foreknows by experience; or by means of experience, whereby men are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that a) the first form of foreknowledge can be about any events, and infallible, whereas the knowledge that can be had naturally is about some particular effects to which human experience can extend; b) the first kind of prophecy is according to unchangeable truth; not so the second, which can cover a falsehood. The first foreknowledge properly pertains to prophecy, but not the second;

for prophetic knowledge is about those things that naturally exceed human knowledge, although the prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER PROPHEPIC REVELATION COMES THROUGH THE ANGELS.

YES.—Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed to the prophets through the angels.

THE REASON is that the divine ordering is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels take a middle position between God and men. Accordingly, divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men through the angels.

NOTE: Charity, by which man is made a friend of God, is the perfection of the will, in which only God can form an impression; but prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which even the angel can form an impression, as the instrumental or ministerial cause of God (Ad 1 and 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER A NATURAL DISPOSITION IS REQUISITE FOR PROPHECY.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as God, who is the universal efficient cause, does not require matter or any disposition of matter in His corporeal effects—for He is able at the same instant to bring into being matter and disposition and form—so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A GOOD LIFE IS REQUISITE FOR PROPHECY.

NO.—a) With regard to the root of goodness of life, which is charity, prophecy can be without goodness of life; b) but with regard to goodness of life according to the passions and external actions, in this way a man is hindered from prophecy by evil life.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is, first, that prophecy belongs to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which is perfected by charity; second, that prophecy is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity, but is intended for the good of the Church, as are the other gratuitous graces. Hence prophecy can be without the root of goodness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that prophecy requires the utmost elevation of the mind for the contemplation of spiritual things, which is hindered by strong passions and the inordinate pursuit of external things.

NOTE: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind (as in the case of certain saints); and such are those whom divine wisdom, conveying itself by sanctifying grace to their minds, makes the friends of God, and prophets (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER ANY PROPHECY COMES FROM DEMONS.

NO.—Prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by divine revelation alone; but the revelation made by the demons can be called prophecy in a certain restricted sense.

THE REASON is that the things that God alone knows, which are the proper object of prophecy, are remote simply and most of all. But certain things, which are remote from the knowledge of men, are known to demons even by natural knowledge, and these they can reveal to men.

NOTE: The demons manifest the things they know to men, not indeed by enlightening the intellect, but by a kind of imaginary vision, or also by audible speech; and in this way their prophecy differs from true prophecy (Ad 2). Likewise, the prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from divine prophecy by certain and even outward signs, especially by their falsehoods (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PROPHETS OF THE DEMONS EVER FORE-TELL THE TRUTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as Bede says (*Comment. in Luc.*, cap. 17): "No

teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood." Hence even the teaching of the demons, whereby they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable, and thus the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth.

NOTE: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by divine inspiration. This was evidently the case with Balaam (Numb. xxii, 12); for God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLXXIII

THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PROPHETS SEE THE VERY ESSENCE OF GOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is proper to the blessed to see the very essence of God, according to Ps. cxxxix, 14: "The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance." Hence whatever things they see in God they see from near at hand. On the contrary it is said of the prophets (Hebr. xi, 13) that they "were beholding . . . afar off," as from a remote place.—Thus it must be said that the prophetic vision is not the vision of the Divine Essence Itself, nor do they see in the Divine Essence Itself the things they do see, but in certain images, according as they are enlightened by the divine light. This enlightenment can be called a mirror, insofar as a likeness of the truth of the divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called the mirror of eternity, as representing God's foreknowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him.

NOTE: St. Thomas says that it is not possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing the Essence Itself, because the Divine Essence is Itself the type of all things that are made. This type adds nothing to the Essence save a relationship to the creature. Now a knowledge of a thing in itself precedes a knowledge of that thing in its relation to something else.

ART. II.—WHETHER, IN PROPHETIC REVELATION, NEW SPECIES OF THINGS ARE IMPRESSED ON THE PROPHET'S MIND, OR MERELY A NEW LIGHT.

YES.—The gift of prophecy bestows on the human mind something over and above that which belongs to its natural power, both as regards the judgment, which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as regards the acceptance, or representation, of things, which is effected by certain species.

THE REASON is that prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the mind. Now about the knowledge of the human mind two things must be considered, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and judgment concerning the things represented. The gift of prophecy bestows something on the human mind in addition to what belongs to its natural faculty in respect to two things, as was stated in the answer.—Yet these two things are not always had simultaneously in prophecy; but, as Augustine says (*Sup. Gen. ad Litt.*, lib. xii, cap. 9), "especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so, namely, as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal and understand them by the quickness of his intellect."

NOTE: In prophecy judgment is superior to representation. Pharaoh (Gen. xli, 1-7) and Balthasar (Dan. v, 5), who received representations or bodily likenesses from God, were not prophets, because their mind was not enlightened for the purpose of judgment (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE PROPHETIC VISION IS ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY ABSTRACTION FROM THE SENSES.

NO.—THE REASON is that prophetic vision takes place in four ways: Namely by the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or co-ordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation of sensible images. Now in these cases only when the prophetic revelation is conveyed by pictures in the imagination it is necessary that there be abstraction from the senses; because then abstraction is necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken

for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses, and sometimes incomplete. This abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who are possessed or out of their senses, but is due to some well-ordered cause, either natural—for instance, sleep—or spiritual—for instance, the intensesness of the prophet's contemplation.

ART. IV.—WHETHER PROPHETS ALWAYS KNOW THE THINGS THEY PROPHECY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the prophet's mind is a defective instrument in relation to the principal agent, who is the Holy Spirit. Hence even true prophets do not know all the things that the Holy Spirit means by the things they see, or speak, or even do; but they know the things that the Holy Spirit gives them to know.—When, however, a man knows himself to be moved by the Holy Spirit to think or signify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct.

QUESTION CLXXIV THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PROPHECY IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO THE PROPHECY OF DIVINE PREDESTINATION, OF KNOWLEDGE, AND OF DENUNCIATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that this division is according to the different species of the object of prophecy; for in the moral order habits and acts are distinguished according to different species. Now the object of prophecy is the future events that exist in the divine knowledge above human power. The future, again, is in the divine knowledge in two ways: First, as in its cause, and thus we have the prophecy of denunciation, which is not always fulfilled, but which foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by supervening causes and effects. Second, God foreknows some things in themselves, or as to be done by Himself, and in this class belongs the prophecy of predestination, because according to the Damascene (*Orth. fid.*, lib. ii, cap. 30): "God predestines things that are not in our power," or as to be done by the free will of man; and thus we have the prophecy of foreknowledge, which can be of things good or evil, whereas the prophecy of predestination is of good things alone.

NOTE: The division of prophecy can also be taken according to the mode of prophesying, and thus it can be distinguished, either according to the cognitive power in man—the senses, imagination, and intellect—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic influence is received. In this latter way the kinds of prophecy are seven, as Isidore notes (*Etymol.*, lib. vii, cap. 8), namely ecstasy, vision, dreams, by a cloud, a voice from heaven, a parable received, and the fullness of the Holy Spirit (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE PROPHECY THAT IS ACCOMPANIED BY INTELLECTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE VISION IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THAT WHICH IS ACCOMPANIED BY INTELLECTIVE VISION ALONE.

NO.—The prophecy that is accompanied by intellectual vision only is the more excellent, according to intellectual truth.

THE REASON is that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision, whereby the truth is seen in God's essence.—Yet when some supernatural truth is to be revealed by means of corporeal similitudes, then the name of prophet is more properly applied to him who has both, namely intellectual light and imaginative vision, than to the one who has only one, since the prophecy is more perfect; and in reference to this Augustine says (*Super. Gen. ad Litt.*, lib. xii, cap. 9) that "he is most properly a prophet who excels in both" (Ad 1).

NOTE: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is

sufficient to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF PROPHECY CAN BE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE IMAGINARY VISION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, according to the degrees of prophecy, there are three kinds of prophecy: The first kind is that in which a man is directed by an intelligible light, without imaginary vision, to the knowledge of those things that relate to human conduct. The second is that in which supernatural truth is manifested through an imaginary vision. The third is that in which intelligible and supernatural truth is revealed without an imaginary vision. The first prophecy is beneath prophecy properly so called, because it does not reach to supernatural truth. The third goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as was said in the preceding article, reply to obj. 2. Hence the degrees of prophecy properly taken are distinguished according to imaginary vision. And these degrees are (beginning with the lowest): Dreams, visions (i.e., in the waking state), signs (by expressive objects and by words), and the vision of someone speaking or showing something to oneself, either under the appearance of an angel or under the appearance of God.

ART. IV.—WHETHER MOSES WAS THE GREATEST OF THE PROPHETS.

YES.—Although one or the other of the prophets of the Old Testament may have been greater than Moses in one respect, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all.

THE REASON is that, with respect to intellectual vision, Moses saw the very Essence of God, as Augustine says (*Super Gen. ad Litt.*, lib. xii, cap. 27). Hence it is written (Num. xii, 8), that "he saw God plainly, and not by riddles." With regard to imaginary vision, Moses had such a vision at his call, as it were, in all its perfections, according to Exod. xxxiii, 11: "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." As regards announcement, Moses spoke to the whole population of the faithful in the person of God, as if for the first time establishing the Law; the other prophets spoke to the people in the person of God, as if leading them to observe the law of Moses, according to Malachy iv, 4: "Remember the law of Moses My servant." With regard to the working of miracles, which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers (i.e., the Egyptians), as is said in Deuteronomy, at the end: "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses. . ."

NOTE: With regard to the knowledge of the Divinity, the prophecy of Moses was more excellent; but David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ's Incarnation (Ad 1). This can also be said of Isaias, who most plainly related the Passion of Christ.

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE IS A DEGREE OF PROPHECY IN THE BLESSED.

NO.—THE REASON is that prophecy denotes a vision of some supernatural truth as existing far off. Now this cannot regard the blessed, since they are completely united to God.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF PROPHECY CHANGE AS TIME GOES ON.

NO.—a) If we are speaking of prophecy insofar as it is directed to faith in the Godhead, prophecy indeed grew according to three divisions of time: Before the Law, under the Law, and under grace. b) With regard to faith in Christ's Incarnation, prophecy grew by succession of time. c) But as regards the direction of human acts, prophetic revelation was diversified, not according to the course of time, but according to circumstances.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, before the Law, Abraham and the other Fathers were prophetically instructed in the things that pertain to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. civ, 15: "Do no evil to My prophets," which words are especially said on behalf of Abraham and Isaac.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the nearer the prophets were to Christ, either before or after Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they instructed in

the Incarnation, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. iii, 5).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, as is said in Proverbs xxxix, 18: "When prophecy shall fail the people shall be scattered." Thus at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.

QUESTION CLXXV RAPTURE

(in six articles)

NOTE: Rapture here means an uplifting from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature, by force of a higher nature.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF MAN IS CARRIED AWAY TO THINGS DIVINE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a man can be raised by divine power to certain supernatural things by abstraction from the senses, according to Ezech. viii, 3): "The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem."—Thus rapture can be called a compulsion in regard to the manner in which it takes place, namely insofar as the mind is raised by God through rapture above the faculty of nature, but not in regard to the term of operation, because rapture is not against nature (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER RAPTURE PERTAINS TO THE COGNITIVE RATHER THAN TO THE APPETITIVE POWER.

ANSWER: a) As regards that to which a person is raised by rapture, rapture, properly speaking, cannot pertain to the appetitive power, but only to the cognitive power; b) with respect to the cause, it can have cause on the part of the appetitive power.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as has been said (prec. art.), rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt, whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Hence, properly speaking, in desiring something a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else.

NOTE: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order, whereas rapture denotes a certain violence in addition (Ad 1).—Man may become outside himself as regards the appetite in two ways: In one way, when a man's intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him. Thus Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv, cap. 4) that Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of divine love exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me." In another way, this may happen when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself;" and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture, because the higher appetite is more proper to many (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER PAUL, WHEN IN RAPTURE, SAW THE ESSENCE OF GOD.

YES.—He saw God in His essence, by way of a transitory passion (Ad 2). (The ecstasy is described in II Cor. xii, 1-6.)

THE REASON is that the words of the Apostle indicate that he saw the essence of God. For he says that he heard secret words, which are not granted to man to utter. Now these seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to Is. lxiv, 4: "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them who love Thee."—Such was also the rapture of Moses, and fittingly so, for, just as Moses was the first teacher of the Jews, so Paul was the first teacher of the Gentiles (Ad 1). Now this vision was not by way

of a permanent form, as in the case of the blessed, but by way of a certain transitory passion, and thus such a rapture belongs to prophecy (Ad 2).

NOTE: The name, a third heaven," as the gloss on II Cor. vii says, designates the spiritual heaven, where the angels and saints enjoy the contemplation of God (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PAUL, WHEN IN RAPTURE, WAS WITHDRAWN FROM HIS SENSES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the essence of God cannot be seen by any phantasm, or indeed by any created intelligible species, for the essence of God infinitely transcends, not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is lifted up to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that the whole attention of his mind should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understood naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man, while a wayfarer, to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.

NOTE: After the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured. Hence the comparison does not hold.

The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the divine essence much more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was "made a little lower than the angels" (Hebr. ii, 9), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of his intellect. Hence there is no comparison between him and other wayfarers (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN THIS STATE, PAUL'S SOUL WAS WHOLLY ALIENATED FROM HIS BODY?

NO.—THE REASON is that in rapture, of which we are here speaking, the divine power does not take away from the soul its natural disposition to understanding by means of turning to phantasms; for the soul's state is not changed in rapture; but its actual turning to phantasms and sensible things is taken from the soul, lest its elevation to that which transcends all phantasms be hindered, as has been said (prec. art.). Therefore in rapture it was not necessary that the soul be so separated from the body that it was not united to it as the body's form; but it was necessary that its intellect be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible objects.

ART. VI.—DID PAUL KNOW WHETHER HIS SOUL WERE SEPARATED FROM HIS BODY?

YES.—THE REASON is that we must gather the truth of this matter from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says that he knew he was swept up to the third heaven, but added: "Whether in the body, I do not know, or out of the body, I do not know; God knows" (II Cor. xii, 3). Now these words cannot mean, according to Augustine, *Super Gen. ad Litt., lib. xii, c. 2, 3, 4, and 28*, that his body also was rapt with his soul, because the body could not be swept up to the third, i.e., to the spiritual and incorporeal, heaven. But they must be understood according to another meaning, to wit, that the Apostle knew that he was rapt in soul and not in body, but did not know the relation in which his soul stood to the body, namely whether it was without the body or not. Hence it is left that the Apostle did not know whether his soul was united to the body as the form, or was separated from the body by death.

QUESTION CLXXVI THE GRACE OF TONGUES

Here we consider the gratuitous graces, which pertain to speech: 1) The grace of tongues; 2) the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head stand two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THOSE WHO RECEIVED THE GIFT OF TONGUES SPOKE IN EVERY LANGUAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it was not fitting that those who were sent to teach

others should need to be taught by others how they should speak to others, or how they should understand what others spoke, especially because those who were sent were of one nation, and moreover poor and powerless, and they could not easily find at first those who could faithfully translate their words, or explain their words, especially since they were being sent to unbelievers. Hence it was necessary that in addition God should provide them with the gift of tongues, as is said in Acts ii, 4: "They were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in foreign tongues, even as the Holy Spirit prompted them to speak."

NOTE: Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak but also to understand what was said by others. Hence Paul says (I Cor. xiv, 18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues" (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GIFT OF TONGUES IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE GRACE OF PROPHECY.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the gift of tongues regards the utterance of various words, which are signs of some intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms that appear in an imaginary vision. But the gift of prophecy consists in the actual enlightenment of the mind so as to know intelligible truth. Hence, just as prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than imaginary vision, so also prophecy is more excellent than the gift of tongues, considered in itself.

THE SECOND REASON is that the gift of prophecy, pertaining to a knowledge of things, is more noble than a knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains.

THE THIRD REASON is that the gift of prophecy is more useful, as the Apostle proves (I Cor. xiv).

NOTE: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand and explain any obscurities of speech. Hence the interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (I Cor. xiv, 5): "He who prophesies is greater than he who speaks in tongues, unless he can interpret so that the Church may receive edification" (Ad 4).

QUESTION CLXXVII

THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS

Here we consider the gratuitous grace consisting in words, of which the Apostle says: "To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge" (I Cor. xii, 8). This takes two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY GRATUITOUS GRACE ATTACHES TO WORDS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Holy Spirit cannot fail in anything that pertains to the good of the Church; hence He provides for the members of the Church even in matters of speech, so that not only may a man speak so as to be understood by different men, which pertains to the gift of tongues; but also that he may speak with effect, and this pertains to the grace of speech. Now this efficacy implies three things: That a man talk so as to teach, to please, and to sway his audience. To effect this the Holy Spirit uses the tongue of a man as an instrument; it is the man himself who completes the operation inwardly.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GRACE OF THE WORD OF WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE IS BECOMING TO WOMEN.

NO.—That is, so that women may speak publicly to the whole Church.

THE REASON is the grace of speech can indeed belong to women in order that they may speak privately to one or to few in familiar conversation. But it is not allowed to women to speak publicly to the whole Church, because they are by nature subject to man, as is evident from Gen. iii. Now to teach and persuade publicly in the Church does not belong to subjects, but to prelates. Secondly, this is forbidden, so that men may not be enticed to lust, for it is said in Ecclus. ix, 11: "Her conversation

burneth as fire." Thirdly, the reason is that as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.

QUESTION CLXXVIII THE GRACE OF MIRACLES

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS A GRATUITOUS GRACE OF WORKING MIRACLES.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the knowledge that a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of speech, so it is necessary that the word that is uttered be confirmed so as to be rendered credible. Now this is done by the working of miracles, according to Mark xiv, 20: "And [the Apostles] confirmed the preaching by signs that followed."

NOTE: 1. Since the cause of miracles is divine omnipotence, which can be communicated to no creature, it is impossible that the principle of working miracles should be any quality abiding as a habit in the soul. But it is possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect that God causes by His power (Ad 1).

2. Miracles are called virtues insofar as they are something surpassing the faculty of nature. They are called signs insofar as they manifest something supernatural. They are called wonders or prodigies as showing something from afar, namely on account of some excellence (Ad 3).

3. The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons: First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith; secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence, on which faith relies (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WICKED CAN WORK MIRACLES.

YES.—True miracles, which can be done only by God's power, can sometimes be done by the wicked to confirm a truth.

THE REASON is that, as Jerome says commenting on Matth. vii, 22: "Have not we prophesied in thy name?" Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded, not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking whom such great miracles are wrought."—Hence Augustine says (*QQ. lib. lxxxiii, q. 79*): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness [their holiness], evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness" (namely of divine truth). Ad 3.

QUESTION CLXXIX THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE

We must next consider active and contemplative life. The consideration will be fourfold: 1) The division of life into active and contemplative; 2) the contemplative life; 3) the active life; 4) the comparison between the active and the contemplative life. About the first there will be two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER LIFE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that that which is proper to a thing, and to which it is most inclined, is that which is most becoming to it from itself. Thus the life of plants consists in nourishment and generation; that of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Thus some men are intent chiefly on the contemplation of truth, and some are chiefly bent on external actions. Hence it is that man's life is suitably divided into active and contemplative.

ART. II.—WHETHER LIFE IS ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the operation most proper to man is that which is according to the intellect. Now the end of intellective knowledge either is the very knowledge of truth, which belongs to the contemplative intellect; or it is some external

action, which belongs to the practical or active intellect. Thus human life is also adequately divided into active and contemplative.

NOTE: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore, as Aristotle says (*Ethics*, bk. i, c. 5), it is the life of a beast. Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative (Ad 1).

QUESTION CLXXX THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AFFECTIONS, AND PERTAINS WHOLLY TO THE INTELLECT.

NO.—With regard to the essence of the action (or the operation that is called contemplation) it pertains to the intellect; but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action, it belongs to the will.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is patent, since contemplation is essentially an act of the intellect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the end is the object of the will, to which it belongs to move all the other powers, including the intellect, to their actions (I-II, q. ix, art. 1).

NOTE: The appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen. Wherefore Gregory (*Hom. xiv in Ezech.*) makes the contemplative life to consist in the love of God, inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And sometimes it is for the love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation (as is the case with philosophers). In the first case, contemplation terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense (at end of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES PERTAIN TO THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

NO.—They do not pertain to the contemplative life essentially; but only dispositively.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the end of contemplative life is the consideration of truth, as the Philosopher states (*Ethics* x, chap. 7). Wherefore he also states that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the moral virtues hinder the vehemence of the passions and quiet the tumult of external occupations, which hinder the acts of contemplation. Hence the moral virtues dispose man to the contemplative life.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE ARE VARIOUS ACTIONS PERTAINING TO THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

NO.—The contemplative life indeed has one act in which it is finally perfected, namely the contemplation of truth, from which it has its unity; but it has many acts by which it reaches this final act.

THE REASON is that there is this difference between man and angel, that the angel views truth by a simple apprehension, whereas man reaches the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Now of these acts some are those that belong to the reception of principles, from which man proceeds to contemplation (for this there is need of hearing, reading, and especially prayer); others belong to the deduction of principles (meditation, speculation, etc.), into the truth of which knowledge inquires; the last and crowning act is the very contemplation of truth.

NOTE: According to Richard of St. Victor (*De Contempl.*, lib. i, c. 4): "Contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth; and cogitation is the mind's glance, which is prone to wander" (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE CONSISTS IN THE MERE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD, OR ALSO IN THE CONSIDERATION OF ANY TRUTH WHATEVER.

ANSWER: The contemplative life consists principally in the contemplation of divine truth; and the contemplation of the divine effects belongs to the contemplative life secondarily.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this contemplation is the end of all human life, which is now imperfect, but in heaven will be perfect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by considering the divine effects man is led to the knowledge of God.

NOTE: Thus four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life: a) The moral virtues; b) other acts besides contemplation; c) the contemplation of the divine effects; d) the contemplation itself of divine truth (at end of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN THE PRESENT STATE OF LIFE THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE CAN REACH TO THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

NO.—a) With regard to the act of this life, contemplation can nowise attain to the vision of God's essence; b) but potentially, insofar as the soul is indeed united to the body as its form, yet so that it does not make use of the bodily senses, or the imagination, the contemplation of this life can attain to the vision of the divine essence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is impossible for anyone, by actually using the bodily senses, to see God's essence, as was said in the question on rapture (q. clxxv, art. 4 and 5) and in the first part (q. xii, art. 11).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this happened in the rapture of St. Paul, as was said (q. clxxv, art. 3).—Hence the supreme degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, according to which he was in the middle state between the present life and the life to come.

NOTE: In the present life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms. Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth; and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE OPERATION OF CONTEMPLATION IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO A THREEFOLD MOVEMENT, CIRCULAR, STRAIGHT, AND OBLIQUE.

YES.—In likeness to local movements, which come first and are more perfect in bodily movements.

THE REASON is that there are three different kinds of local bodily movements: One is circular, according to which a thing moves uniformly around the same center; another is straight, according to which a thing proceeds from one point to another; the third is oblique, being composed, as it were, of both the others. Now since intelligible operations are described as movements, and their difference is assigned according to the likeness of various movements, that which has uniformity simply is compared to circular movements. The intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to straight movement. The intelligible operation that unites something to uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement.

Now in contemplation that operation of the soul is called circular in which, laying all things aside, namely external movements by which it returns to itself, and the various reasonings whereby it passes from one thing to another, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone. This Dionysius expresses in these words (*De Div. Nom.* c. 4, p. 1, lect. 7): "Then, being thus made uniform unitedly," i.e., conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful."

The straight movement of contemplation is that by which the intellect in considering proceeds from one thing to another, i.e., from external sensible objects to a knowledge of intelligible objects.

The oblique movement is considered to be in the soul insofar as in reasoning it makes use of divine illuminations. In this respect the movement is composed of straight and circular (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THERE IS DELIGHT IN CONTEMPLATION.

YES.—In the contemplative life not only is there delight by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the divine love itself; and with regard to both its delight surpasses every human delight.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that everything finds delightful the operation that is suitable to itself according to its proper nature or habit. Now the contemplation of truth is suitable to man according to his nature, insofar as he is a rational animal; and still more does it become delightful to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that contemplation is rendered delightful even on the part of the object, insofar as someone contemplates the thing that is loved. Now the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, to which it is moved by charity.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that spiritual delight is superior to carnal delight (I-II, q. xxxi, art. 5); and the love itself whereby we love God out of charity surpasses all other love. Hence it is said in Ps. xxxiii, 9: "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet." Wherefore the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life is not only that the divine truth is seen, but also that it is loved (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS CONTINUOUS.

YES.—Both in itself and with regard to us, the contemplative life is continuous.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is a) that the contemplative life is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; b) because it has no contrary; for nothing can be contrary to the delight that consists in contemplation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is a) that the contemplative life is about incorruptible to us in respect of the action of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely according to the intellect; wherefore it can endure after this life. Likewise, because in the actions of the contemplative life we do not labor with our body; hence we are better able to persist continuously in these operations.

NOTE: No action can long endure at the highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of divine contemplation. Hence, although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts (Ad 2).

QUESTION CLXXXI
THE ACTIVE LIFE
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL THE ACTIONS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES PERTAIN TO THE ACTIVE LIFE.

YES.—The moral virtues pertain essentially to the active life.

THE REASON is that the moral virtues are directed chiefly to operation. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethics*, bk. ii, chap. 2): "For virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence Aristotle subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

ART. II.—WHETHER PRUDENCE PERTAINS TO THE ACTIVE LIFE.

YES.—If prudence is taken in the proper sense.

THE REASON is that the knowledge of prudence, which is "right reason applied to action," is of itself directed to the operations of the moral virtues; and thus it pertains directly to the active life. If, however, prudence is taken in the more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life.

NOTE: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But the third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with external things (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER TEACHING IS A WORK OF THE ACTIVE OR OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

ANSWER: a) With regard to the object of teaching on the part of speech, teaching sometimes pertains to the active life, and sometimes to the contemplative; b) with regard to the object of teaching on the part of audible speech, teaching belongs to the active life only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in speaking man can conceive some truth inwardly, so as to be guided by it in external action, and this pertains to the active life. When however he conceives inwardly some intelligible truth, in the consideration and love of which he takes delight, this pertains to the contemplative life.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on the part of audible speech the object of teaching is the listener himself; and with regard to this object all teachings pertains to the active life, to which outward actions belong.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE REMAINS AFTER THIS LIFE.

NO.—THE REASON is that in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there are any external actions at all, these will be referred to the end of contemplation. Hence Augustine says (at the end of his *City of God*): "There God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without surfeit—such will be the occupation, the love, the office of all."

QUESTION CLXXXII THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE CONTEMPLATIVE.

NO.—The contemplative life is better simply, and for nine reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and in respect of its proper objects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life is concerned with external things.

THE SECOND REASON is that the contemplative life can be more continuous, though not as regards the highest degree of contemplation.

THE THIRD REASON is that the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (*De Verbis Domini*, serm. 26, cap. 2): "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted."

THE FOURTH REASON is that in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it is said (Luke x, 41): "Martha, Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things."

THE FIFTH REASON is that the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, whereas the active life is directed to something else.

THE SIXTH REASON is that the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. xlv, 11: "Be still and see that I am God."

THE SEVENTH REASON is that the contemplative life is according to divine things, whereas active life is according to human things.

THE EIGHTH REASON is that the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely the intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers, also, which are common to ourselves and the brutes, have their part.

THE NINTH REASON is that the Lord Himself said: "Mary hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken from her." Expounding this, Augustine (loc. cit.) says: "Not that thou hast chosen badly but that she has chosen better. Why better? Listen: Because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee, whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal."—Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (*Topics* ii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, and yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich."

NOTE: Not only the active life concerns prelates; they should also excel in the contemplative life. Hence Gregory says (*Pastor*, ii, 1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifting than others in contemplation" (Ad 1).—Hence when a

person is called from the contemplative to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE IS OF GREATER MERIT THAN THE CONTEMPLATIVE.

NO.—THE REASON IS that the contemplative life directly and immediately pertains to the love of God; whereas the active life is more directly concerned with the love of neighbor; and therefore generically the contemplative life is of greater merit than the active; for the root of merit is charity (I-II, last q., art. 4).—Yet it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance, through excess of divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of divine contemplation for the time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. ix, 3): "I could wish to be anathema myself from Christ for the sake of my brethren."

NOTE: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with divine contemplation (Ad 1).—Hence the contemplation of the present life does not take away the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater divine charity (Ad 2).—And when Gregory says (*Super Ezech.*, Hom. xii) that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls" this does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul, and the souls of others, than any other external gifts. And this is chiefly done through contemplation (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS HINDERED BY THE ACTIVE LIFE.

NO.—a) With regard to the actual pursuit and practice of external actions, the active life hinders the contemplative life; b) but with regard to the fact that it quiets and directs the interior passions of the soul, the active life helps the contemplative.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is impossible that anyone should be simultaneously occupied with external actions and at the same time give himself to divine contemplation.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that contemplation is hindered by the in-subordination of the interior passions. Hence the exercise of the active life, by quieting the interior passions, from which phantasms proceed, conduces to the contemplative life.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ACTIVE LIFE PRECEDES THE CONTEMPLATIVE.

YES.—a) According to its nature, the contemplative life precedes; b) with regard to us, or in the way of generation, the active life precedes.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the contemplative life applies itself to things that precede and are better than others; wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason, which is assigned to contemplation, is compared to the lower reason, which is assigned to action, as the husband is compared to the wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (*De Trin.*, lib. xii, cap. 12).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the active life disposes one to the contemplative life (q. clxxxi, art. 1 ad 3).—For in the order of generation disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature.

NOTE: Those who are prone to yield to their passions on account of their impulse to action are simply more apt for the active life, by reason of their restless spirit. Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; and nevertheless those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation (Ad 3).

QUESTION CLXXXIII MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL

We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall consider: 1) Man's duties and states in general; 2) the state of the perfect in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE NOTION OF A STATE DENOTES A CONDITION OF FREEDOM OR SERVITUDE.

YES.—State by its very concept denotes a condition of freedom or servitude, either in the spiritual or the civil order.

THE REASON is that only that seems to belong to the state of a man that regards the obligation of the man's person, insofar as someone is his own master or subject to another; and this not from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established. For a state, properly speaking, signifies a kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility, either in the spiritual or the civil order.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT DUTIES OR STATES IN THE CHURCH.

YES.—a) On account of the perfection of the Church itself; b) on account of the necessity of the actions that belong to the Church; c) on account of the dignity and beauty of the Church.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as perfection, which is found in God simply and uniformly, cannot be found in the created universe except in a multi-form and manifold manner, so also the fullness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Ephes. iv, 11): "He Himself gave some men as apostles, and some as prophets . . ."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it is necessary for different men to be assigned to different actions in order that everything may be done more expeditiously and without confusion; and this is the meaning of the Apostle in Rom. xii, 4: "Just as in one body we have many members, yet all the members have not the same function, so we, the many, are one body in Christ, but severally members one of another."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that dignity and beauty consist in order. Wherefore the Apostle says (II Tim. ii, 20) that "in a great house there are vessels not only of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay."

NOTE: This diversity of states and offices in the Church does not hinder its unity, for this results from the unity of faith and charity and mutual service, according to the Apostle (Ephes. iv, 16): "From Him the whole body, being closely joined [by faith] and knit together [by charity] through every joint of the system according to the functioning in due measure of each single part," namely when one serves another (Ad 1). Hence the Apostle says (I Cor. xii, 24): "God has so tempered the body together in due portion as to give more abundant honor where it was lacking; that there may be no disunion in the body, but that the members may have care for one another."

ART. III.—WHETHER DUTIES DIFFER ACCORDING TO THEIR ACTIONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that people are said to have duties when they are appointed to various actions, not indeed according to the material diversity of actions, which is infinite, but according to the formal diversity, which is taken according to diverse species of acts (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DIFFERENCE OF STATES APPLIES TO THOSE WHO ARE BEGINNING, PROGRESSING, OR PERFECT.

NOTE: Those who are progressing are those who, having overcome the initial obstacles, are now on the way to progress. The perfect are those who, as far as the mortal condition of life allows, have attained perfection in this life.

YES.—The state of spiritual servitude or freedom is distinguished according to those who are beginning, are progressing, and are perfect.

THE REASON is that in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning,

a middle, and a term; and consequently the spiritual state, which is gained through human effort, namely the servitude of justice according to a good habit, or freedom from sin according as man is not overcome by the inclination to sin, is distinguished in three ways, namely according to the beginning, to which belongs the state of beginners; and the middle, to which belongs the state of the proficient; and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.

QUESTION CLXXXIV **THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL**

We have next to consider the things that pertain to the state of perfection, where-to the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of orders, of which we shall treat in the Third Part.

Concerning the state of the perfect, a threefold consideration presents itself: 1) The state of perfection in general; 2) things relating to the perfection of Bishops; 3) things relating to the perfection of religious. The first is in eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE CONSISTS CHIEFLY IN CHARITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that charity is that which chiefly unites us to God, who is the final end of the human mind; "for he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him" (I John iv, 16). Now a thing is said to be perfect insofar as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. And therefore the perfection of Christian life, which consists in perfect union with God, rests radically in charity. Hence the Apostle says (Coloss. iii, 14): "But above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection."

ART. II.—WHETHER ANYONE CAN BE PERFECT IN THIS LIFE.

YES.—a) Not according to absolute perfection; b) or according to absolute totality on the part of the lover; c) but in respect to the exclusion of the things that are opposed to the love of God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that absolute perfection depends not only on totality on the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God is loved as much as He is lovable; and such perfection is not possible to any creature, but belongs only to God, in whom good is found wholly and essentially.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the affection of the lover as regards his whole ability always tends actually to God; and such perfection is not possible in this life, but will be possible in heaven.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such perfection is possible in this life, and in two ways: 1) Insofar as man's affection excludes everything that is opposed to charity, such as is mortal sin, and this is essential to salvation; 2) insofar as man's affection excludes also everything that hinders the mind's affection from being wholly directed to God, without which perfection there can be no charity, for instance in those who are beginners and those who are proficient.

ART. III.—WHETHER PERFECTION CONSISTS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF THE COMMANDMENTS OR THE COUNSELS.

ANSWER: The perfection of charity consists primarily and essentially in the observance of the commandments, and secondarily and instrumentally in the observance of the counsels.

THE REASON is that the love of God and neighbor, in which charity consists, does not fall under a commandment to any measure, so that what is in excess of the commandment is the matter of counsel; and this is evident from the very form of the commandment, which points to perfection. The reason of this is that "the end of the commandment is charity," as the Apostle says (I Tim. i, 5). The end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are directed to the end.

NOTE: 1. Both commandments and counsels are directed to charity, but in different ways. For some commandments are directed by the precepts of charity to remove the things that hinder charity, namely those that are inconsistent with it; whereas the counsels are directed to remove the obstacles to the act of charity, which however are

not opposed to charity, such as marriage, occupation with worldly concerns, and the like (in body of art.).

2. Since that which is a matter of precept can be fulfilled in various ways, one does not break a commandment by not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough to fulfill it in any way whatever, provided that at least the degree is observed. The least degree of divine love is that nothing be loved above God, or against Him, or equally with Him (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER WHATEVER IS PERFECT IS IN THE STATE OF PERFECTION.

NO.—Nothing prevents some from being perfect who are not in the state of perfection, and some from being in the state of perfection who are not perfect.

THE REASON is that we are now speaking of the states insofar as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of states. Thus a man is properly said to be in the state of perfection, not from the fact that he makes an act of perfect love, but from the fact that he binds himself perpetually with a certain solemnity to the things that pertain to perfection. Now it happens that some bind themselves to that which they do not keep, as is the case with bad religious, who do not fulfill the works of perfection to which they have bound themselves with vows; and some fulfill that to which they have not bound themselves, as do certain Christians and ecclesiastics who eminently practice the virtues in this world.

ART. V.—WHETHER RELIGIOUS AND PRELATES ARE IN THE STATE OF PERFECTION.

YES.—Religious and Bishops bind themselves by a certain solemn profession.

THE REASON is that the state of perfection of which we are now speaking requires a perpetual binding of oneself to the things of perfection, by means of a certain solemnity. Now both of these things appertain to religious and Bishops. For religious bind themselves by a vow to abstain from the things of the world, which they could lawfully use, in order that they may serve God more freely.—Similarly, the Bishops bind themselves to the things of perfection by assuming their pastoral office, to which it pertains that a shepherd “lay down his life for his sheep” (John x, 15). With this profession there is also employed a certain solemnity of consecration, according to II Tim. i, 6: “Stir up the grace of God, which is in you by the imposition of my hands;” which the gloss ascribes to the grace of the Episcopate.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ALL ECCLESIASTICAL PRELATES ARE IN THE STATE OF PERFECTION.

NO.—Not all prelates are in the state of perfection, but only the Bishops.

THE REASON is that the character of a sacred order, which priests and deacons receive, does not consist simply in the state of perfection; for in the Western Church they take only the vow of continence. With respect to the care of souls, the Bishops and deacons are not bound by the bond of a perpetual vow. But the Bishops, because they are in the state of perfection (prec. art.), can leave their episcopal office only with the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff, to whom alone it also belongs to dispense from perpetual vows, and for certain reasons, as will be explained later (q. clxxxv, art. 4).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE RELIGIOUS STATE IS MORE PERFECT THAN THAT OF PRELATES.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as Dionysius says (*De Cael. Hier.*, c. 5), Bishops are in the state of action, religious, in the state of passion. Now the one who does is always higher than the one who receives, as Augustine says (*Super Gen. ad Lit.*, lib. xii, c. 16). Hence Bishops are in the position of perfection, whereas religious are in the position of being perfected.

NOTE: Perfection does not consist essentially in the actual renunciation of one's possessions, but in the preparedness of one's soul, so that, namely, a man is prepared, if need be, to leave or distribute all that he has, and Bishops are chiefly bound to despise, when necessary, all that they have for the love of God and the spiritual welfare of their flock, either by bestowing it on the poor of their flock, or by cheerfully suffering

their being stripped of their goods (Ad 1).—(Moreover, Bishops are bound to give their life for their sheep, which is the height of perfection, according to II Cor. xii, 15: "I will most gladly spend and be spent myself for your souls, even though, loving you more, I be loved less.")

ART. VIII.—WHETHER PARISH PRIESTS AND ARCHDEACONS ARE MORE PERFECT THAN RELIGIOUS.

NO.—Religious, by reason of the goodness of their state, are more perfect, other things being equal, than parish priests and deacons, but with respect to their Order and the care of souls the latter are more perfect.

THE REASON is that a religious, by reason of his state, binds his whole life to the pursuit of perfection, whereas the parish priest or archdeacon does not bind his whole life to the care of souls, as does the Bishop. Hence the comparison of the state of religion with the office of parish priests and archdeacons is as the universal with the particular, and as the holocaust with the sacrifice, which is less than the holocaust.—But if we regard the difficulty of leading a good life in religion and in the office of one having the care of souls, it is thus more difficult to lead a good life with the care of souls on account of external dangers, although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, on account of the strictness of the religious observance.—But if the religious is also without Orders, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of Order excels in point of dignity, for this requires a greater inward holiness than does the religious state. Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in Holy Orders sins more grievously if he does something contrary to holiness than a religious who is not in Holy Orders, although a religious who is not in Orders is bound to regular observance, to which persons in Holy Orders are not bound.

QUESTION CLXXXV

THE THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO DESIRE THE OFFICE OF BISHOP.

NO.—THE REASON is that, although to desire to help one's neighbors is in itself praiseworthy and virtuous, yet, because the episcopal act has annexed to it a loftiness of degree, it would seem presumption for anyone to desire to be set over subjects, unless there be manifest and urgent necessity for it.—Any one may, however, without presumption, desire to do such deeds, if he should happen to be in such an office, or also to be worthy of doing such deeds, so that the object of his desire is the good work, but not the precedence of dignity. Hence the pseudo- Chrysostom says (*Sup. Matth. hom. xxxv, in the Opus Perfectum*): "It is indeed good to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor were vanity. For primacy seeks one who shuns it, and abhors one who desires it."

NOTE: As regards the words of the Apostle: "If anyone is eager for the office of Bishop, he desires a good work" (I Tim, iii, 1), it must be said that, as Gregory states (*Pastor.*, part I, c. 8): "When the Apostle said this, he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom;" and thus there was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work" (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO REFUSE ABSOLUTELY AN APPOINTMENT TO THE EPISCOPATE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it pertains to deordination of will that a man should finally and absolutely, against his superior's legitimate appointment, refuse the aforesaid office of government; and this both because it is contrary to charity for our neighbors, for whose good one should expose oneself, according to place and time, and because it is opposed to humility, by which we subject ourselves to the commands of our superiors.

NOTE: A man can lawfully place an obstacle to his reception of the episcopal office before the commandment comes from the superior, provided such an obstacle is not one of the things that are necessary for salvation; otherwise, it would not be lawful for anyone to marry a second time, so as not to be hindered from receiving the episcopate or Holy Orders (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER HE WHO IS APPOINTED TO THE EPISCOPATE OUGHT TO BE BETTER THAN OTHERS.

NO.—On the part of the one who must designate the Bishop, whether by election or appointment, he is not bound to select one who is better simply, i.e., according to charity. Neither, on the part of the one who is designated, is it requisite that he consider himself better than others.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, on the part of the one who designates a Bishop, whether by election or appointment, it is requisite that he select someone who will faithfully dispense the divine mysteries, which must be dispensed for the good of the Church, according to I Cor. xiv, 12: "Seek to have them [spiritual gifts] abundantly for the edification of the Church," namely so as to be able to instruct and defend and peacefully govern the Church. Hence against certain opponents Jerome says, commenting on Tit. i, 5: "Some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone . . ." This pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is a grave sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this would be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that (the one who is designated) finds nothing in himself that would make it unlawful for him to assume the office of Bishop.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A BISHOP MAY LAWFULLY FORSAKE THE EPISCOPAL OFFICE IN ORDER TO ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—For a legitimate reason, with the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff.

THE REASON is that a Bishop is bound to retain his pastoral cure as long as he can advance the subjects committed to his care to salvation. This he may not neglect, either for the repose of divine contemplation, or for the avoidance of any hardships whatever, or for the acquiring of gain.—Yet it may happen sometimes that a Bishop is hindered from procuring his subjects' spiritual welfare on account of his own deficiency, either of conscience, or of body, or of mind, or also of irregularity; and sometimes this may happen on account of a defect in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit; and sometimes on the part of others, for instance when a scandal results from a certain person's being in authority, provided, however, that the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith, for the pastoral office is not to be resigned because of such a scandal, according to Matth. xv, 14: "Let them alone," namely those who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching, "they are blind, and leaders of the blind."—Yet, just as a man takes upon himself the burdens of authority at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons given. For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the episcopal office.

NOTE: A Bishop who is hindered from exercising his office may return to his bishopric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by proper instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony, of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to another see. On the other hand, if a man is deposed from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined to a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric according to Canon Law (Decretal 7 of Innocent III, q. 1). (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A BISHOP ON ACCOUNT OF BODILY PERSECUTION TO ABANDON THE FLOCK COMMITTED TO HIS CARE.

YES.—a) Wherever the salvation of his subjects demands the presence of the pastor, the pastor may not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, either for the sake of some temporal advantage, or even on account of some imminent personal peril. b) But if he can adequately provide for his subjects' salvation in his absence through another, then the pastor can leave his flock, either for some advantage of the Church, or on account of his own bodily peril.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as Augustine says (*In Ep. ad Honoratum* 228): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to another [according to the commandment of Our Lord, in *Matth. x*, 23] when one of them is specially sought out by the persecutors, in order that the Church may not be abandoned by others who are not sought for."—He who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling (*Ad 1*). If he who is surety for another is unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices if he fulfils it through another (*Ad 1*).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A BISHOP TO HAVE PROPERTY OF HIS OWN.

YES.—THE REASON is that Bishops in their ordination do not bind themselves to live without property of their own; neither is it required that they live without property of their own by the necessity of the pastoral office to which they bind themselves.

NOTE: 1. The perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater perfection: Indeed, the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (*Gen. xvii*, 1): "Walk before Me, and be perfect," is stated to have been rich (*ibid. xiii*, 2) (*Ad 1*).

2. Regarding the words of Our Lord (*Matth. x*, 9): "Do not possess gold . . ." and those of Peter (*Matth. xix*, 27): "Behold, we have left all things and followed Thee;" it must be said that, according to the explanation of Chrysostom, we are to understand that Our Lord laid these commands on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of their own. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy Bishops, as Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine, would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them (*Ad 2*).

ART. VII.—WHETHER BISHOPS SIN MORTALLY IF THEY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE TO THE POOR THE ECCLESIASTICAL GOODS THAT ACCRUE TO THEM.

NO.—If these goods are committed to their ownership; but otherwise if they are the dispensers or trustees of these goods.

THE REASON is that the Bishops have a true ownership of their goods. Hence, as regards those goods that are specially assigned to their use, the same reason seems to hold as that which governs their own goods, namely that a Bishop sins by way of immoderate attachment and use if he inordinately keeps them for himself, and does not relieve the need of others, as the duty of charity requires.—But if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is left to his good faith; for these goods should be bestowed on the poor, or also spent for the use of the ministers or for divine worship. And if what the Bishop keeps for himself is much in excess, there is no doubt that he acts against the faith of his trust and sins mortally, and is held to restitution.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER RELIGIOUS WHO ARE RAISED TO THE EPISCOPATE ARE BOUND TO RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES.

YES.—Whatever in religious observances do not hinder the episcopal office, but rather conduce to the safeguarding of its perfection, such as continence, poverty, and other things, the religious remains bound to them, even after he is made a Bishop, and consequently is bound to wear the garb of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.

THE REASON is that the religious state stands to the episcopal state as the disposition to the perfection, and as learning to the professorship. For the religious state is a way of tending to perfection, whereas the episcopal state pertains to perfection as a professorship of perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of perfection, except as regards what may be incompatible with perfection; whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection it is confirmed the more. Thus when the

scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Hence a monk who becomes a Bishop is released from the yoke of monastic profession, not as regards everything, but as regards those things that are incompatible with the episcopal office, such as solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings, which could render his body unfit to perform his episcopal office (Ad 1).

A monk who has been raised to the episcopate cannot make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament comes into force. If, however, by the Pope's permission he makes a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his death (Ad 3).

NOTE: All these conditions are confirmed by the present Code of Canon Law, canons 627, 629).

QUESTION CLXXXVI

THE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS

Here we must consider the things that pertain to the religious state. This consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, those things that are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the religious state. Under the first head stand 10 points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER RELIGION IMPLIES A STATE OF PERFECTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that antonomastically those are called religious who devote themselves wholly to the divine service, as though offering a holocaust of themselves to God. Hence Gregory says (*Hom. xx, in Ezech.*): "Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now this implies a state of perfection, for man's perfection consists in adhering wholly to God (q. clxxiv, art. 2).

NOTE: The religious state denotes a state of perfection from the intention of the end. Hence it is not necessary that everyone who is in religion should already be perfect, but that he tend to perfection. And thus not all are perfect in religion, but some are beginning and some are proficient (Ad 3). For the religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY RELIGIOUS IS BOUND TO KEEP ALL THE COUNSELS.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as the religious is not bound to have perfect charity, but to tend to and to endeavor to have perfect charity; so also he is not bound to fulfil all the counsels or exercises whereby perfection is reached, but to fulfil those things that are definitely prescribed by the rule that he has professed. As regards the other things, he is bound to intend to fulfil them; hence he does not sin if he omits them, but only if he contemns them.

There are some counsels that are about certain better particular actions, which can be omitted without a man's whole life being taken up with secular business. Hence there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfill all of them (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER POVERTY IS REQUIRED FOR RELIGIOUS PERFECTION.

YES.—To acquire the perfection of charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, so that one lives without anything of his own, according to *Matth. xix, 21*: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and come, follow Me."

THE REASON is that for the practice and discipline of the religious state, by which we arrive at the perfection of charity (prec. art.) it is necessary for a person to withdraw his attachments wholly from the things of the world. Hence Augustine says (*Confer., bk. 29*) that "the nourishment of charity is the lessening of greed; perfection is no greed at all." For by the possession of earthly things a man's soul is drawn to their love.

NOTE: Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and, since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of heaven. Hence Our Lord said (Matth. xix, 21): "Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven." Now riches, once they are possessed, are in themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is said in Matth. xiii, 22: "The care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the word of God." Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst riches; therefore Our Lord said (Matth. xix, 23) that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven." This we must understand as referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom (*Hom. lxiv, in Matth.*), when he adds: "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Ad 4).

With regard to the episcopal state, it is to be considered that such a state is not directed to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the perfection that he already has, a man may govern others, by administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated. Wherefore it is not required of Bishops, who make profession of governing Christ's flock, that they have nothing of their own, as it is required of religious, who make profession of learning to obtain perfection (Ad 5).

ART. IV.—WHETHER PERPETUAL CONTINENCE IS REQUIRED FOR RELIGIOUS PERFECTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the religious state requires the withdrawal of the things whereby man is hindered from tending wholly to the service of God. Now the use of sex withdraws the soul from tending wholly to God's service, both on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, by the experience of which concupiscence is increased, and on account of the solicitude imposed on a man by the direction of a wife and children and temporal goods sufficient for their support.

NOTE: The perfection of continence was introduced by Christ, who said (Matth. xix, 12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake;" and then He added: "Let him accept it who can." And, lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, He admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands could not without committing injustice forsake their wives. Wherefore Peter, whom He found married, He did not sever from His wife (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER OBEDIENCE BELONGS TO RELIGIOUS PERFECTION.

YES.—It behooves religious to be subject to the instruction and command of another in the things that pertain to the religious life.

THE REASON is that the religious state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now whoever are instructed or exercised in order to reach a certain end must follow the direction of another, under whose control they are instructed or exercised, in order to reach that end, as disciples under a master.

NOTE: 1. The vow of obedience pertaining to religion extends to the ordering of all one's life, and in this way it has a certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts, some of which do not belong to religion, and some of which are even contrary to religion (Ad 4).

2. The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity that is consequent upon obedience is a necessity, not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore, since by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God than by subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake.

Hence in the conferences of the Fathers (*Coll. 18, cap. 7*), it is said: "The Sara-

baitai are the worst class of monks, because through providing for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in work than those who live in monasteries" (Ad 5).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS REQUISITE FOR RELIGIOUS PERFECTION THAT POVERTY, CONTINENCE, AND OBEDIENCE SHOULD COME UNDER A VOW.

YES.—THE REASON is that the state of perfection requires an obligation to the things that belong to perfection. Now poverty, continence, and obedience belong to perfection, as has been said (art. 3, 4, and 5 of this q.). Now an obligation consists of binding oneself by means of a vow, by which the unwavering following of Christ is made fast (Ad 1).

NOTE: To the objection that the things that it is lawful for us not to render, yet we render for love's sake, are dearer than those that fall under a vow, it is answered: Among other services that we lawfully give is our liberty, which is dearer to men than anything else. Consequently when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (*Ex. cxvii, ad Paulin. et Arment.*): "Repent not of your vow; rejoice rather that you can no longer do lawfully what you might have done lawfully but to your cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things" (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO SAY THAT RELIGIOUS PERFECTION CONSISTS IN THESE THREE VOWS

YES.—The religious state is rightly made up of these three vows.

THE REASON is that the religious state is constituted, first by its being an exercise of tending to the perfection of charity; secondly, by its quieting the mind from outward solicitude; thirdly, by its being a kind of holocaust, by which a man wholly offers himself and what he has to God. Now each of these three ends is reached by three vows, namely, poverty, continence, and obedience.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE VOW OF OBEDIENCE IS THE CHIEF OF THE THREE RELIGIOUS VOWS.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that by the vow of obedience a man offers something greater to God, namely his very will, which is of more account than his own body, which he offers to God by continence, and than external goods, which he offers to God by the vow of poverty. Hence that which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done by one's own will.

THE SECOND REASON is that the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not vice versa.

THE THIRD REASON is that the vow of obedience properly extends to those acts that are closely connected with the end of religion. Now the nearer a thing is to its end, the better it is. Hence it is that the vow of obedience is more essential to religion.

NOTE: If a man, without taking a vow of obedience, were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity, observed even by vow (in body).

ART. IX.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SINS MORTALLY WHENEVER HE TRANSGRESSES THE THINGS CONTAINED IN HIS RULE.

NO.—a) With regard to the things that belong to the end of the rule, their transgression involves mortal sin in respect to the things that commonly come under the precept, but not in respect to the things that commonly go beyond the obligation of the precept, except by reason of contempt.—b) With regard to those things that pertain to the external exercise of religion, their transgression of the rule to which the religious is bound by this vow of profession involves mortal sin; but the transgression of the other things does not involve mortal sin, save by reason of the contempt of the rule, or on account of a precept.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as was said above (art. 2 of this q.), the

religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such a transgression is directly contrary to the profession by which a person vows himself to the religious life.—Hence one who professes a rule does not vow to observe everything that is in the rule, but vows the regular life, which consists essentially in the three things aforesaid. Hence also in certain religious communities precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule, i.e., to tend to form one's conduct in accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set at nought by contempt (Ad 1).

An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when a person's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or some other cause. Nevertheless, the frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SINS MORE GRIEVOUSLY THAN A SECULAR BY THE SAME KIND OF SIN.

YES.—The sin that is committed by religious can be more grievous than the sin of seculars that is of the same specious, and for three reasons.

THE REASON is that: a) The same sin can be, not only against the precept of the divine law, but also against a vow, for instance, if a religious commits fornication or theft; b) the sin can be one of contempt, for then the religious seems to be more ungrateful for the divine favors by which he has been raised to the state of perfection; c) the sin can be greater on account of scandal, because many take note of his religious life.—But if, not out of contempt, but out of weakness, or out of ignorance, a religious commits some sin that is not against the vow of his profession, and does this without scandal, for instance in secret, he sins less grievously by the same kind of sin than does a secular, because, his sin, if light, is as it were absorbed by the many good works that he does, and if it is mortal he more easily rises from it: First, because of the right intention that he has toward God, which, though it be interrupted for the moment, is easily restored to its former object; secondly, because he is assisted by his fellow religious to rise again, according to Eccles. iv, 10: "If one fall he shall be supported by the other; woe to him who is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up."

QUESTION CLXXXVII THE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO TEACH, PREACH, AND THE LIKE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that to teach, preach, and to do other such things has nothing incompatible in itself, either by reason of a precept, for it is not opposed to the rule, or by reason of sin, for religious are not rendered less fit by any sin committed for these duties, but rather they are made more fit by reason of the practice of holiness that they have taken upon themselves; for the more perfect a man is the more effective is he in spiritual works.—Nevertheless, because the religious state does not give them the power to do such things, it is not lawful for monks and other religious to do them unless they receive either Orders or ordinary jurisdiction, or unless matters of jurisdiction are delegated to them.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO OCCUPY THEMSELVES WITH SECULAR BUSINESS.

YES.—For the sake of charity, with due moderation, and with the superior's permission; but not for reasons of covetousness.

THE REASON is that the religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of charity, to which the love of God is related primarily, and secondarily, the love of the neighbor. Therefore religious should chiefly and essentially bend their efforts to this end. If, however, there is urgent need to succor the neighbor, they

should occupy themselves with secular business for the sake of charity, according to Gal. iv, 2: "Bear one another's burdens, and you will fulfil the law of Christ."

ART. III.—WHETHER RELIGIOUS ARE BOUND TO MANUAL LABOR.

NO.—Religious are no more bound to manual labor than are seculars, who must engage in this labor to earn a living, to banish idleness, to restrain concupiscence, or to support others.

THE REASON is that the precept concerning manual labor is imposed on all in general, as is evident from II Thess. iii, 6-16.

NOTE: 1. Insofar as manual labor is directed to earning a living it falls under the obligation of a precept, as being necessary to this end. And this is signified by the words of the Apostle when he says: "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," as if to say: A man is bound to work with his hands by the same obligation whereby he is bound to eat. With regard to the banishing of idleness, or the mortification of the body, manual labor is not the matter of a precept considered in itself, because the flesh can be mortified in many ways, and idleness dispelled, than by manual labor, namely by fasts and watchings and by meditations on the Sacred Scriptures and by the divine praises. Insofar as manual labor is directed to giving alms, it does not come within the obligation of a precept except perhaps in a certain case, in which a man is under obligation to give alms and cannot otherwise help the poor (in body of art.).

2. Under manual labor come all human pursuits by which men gain a legitimate living, whether with the hands, the feet, or the tongue. For policemen and messengers, and other such men who live by their labor are understood to live by the work of their hands. Because the hand is the instrument of instruments, we understand by manual labor every employment by which a person can gain an honest living (in body of art.).—In this way is understood the precept of the Apostle (I Thess. iv, 11): Work "with your own hands, we have charged you," which is a precept of the natural law (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO LIVE ON ALMS.

YES.—THE REASON is that everyone may lawfully live from that which is his own, or is due to him. Now something comes to religious from the liberality of donors, namely so that the religious may more freely devote themselves to religious acts. And something is due to religion, both on account of the need of the religious themselves and on account of the benefits that they render to the neighbor.

NOTE: On the other hand, in default of any necessity, or of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Augustine (*De Oper. Monach*, xxii) criticizes those who enter religion to evade a life of want and toil (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO BEG.

YES.—For the sake of humility and good example, but not, obviously, to encourage idleness or for the sake of gain, or other such ends.

THE REASON is that the act of begging has a certain abasement attaching to it, since of all men those would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to receive their food from others. In this way some deserve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride, which they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their example.—Likewise, it is lawful to beg for reasons of necessity or usefulness: For reasons of necessity, as when a man can find sustenance in no other way than begging; and for reasons of usefulness, as when a person aspires to do something useful, which he cannot do without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are sought for the building of a bridge or a church, and scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to wisdom.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR RELIGIOUS TO WEAR COARSER CLOTHES THAN OTHERS.

YES.—As a sign of penance and contempt of riches and worldly pomp, but not as a sign of sorrow, or by reason of avarice, or false humility, as is obvious.

THE REASON is that religion is a state of penance and contempt for worldly glory.

QUESTION CLXXXVIII THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE RELIGIOUS ORDER.

NO.—Although all religious orders agree in this, that in them a man must give himself wholly to the service of God (Ad 1), religious institutes are diversified by the end and practice proper to each.

THE REASON is that the practice and works of charity to the perfection of which the religious state is directed can be diverse. Such diversity is taken chiefly from the diversity of the ends to which the orders are directed. For example, one order is devoted to sheltering strangers, another to the visiting or ransoming of captives, and so on. A second distinction in the orders is observed from the diversity of their exercises. Thus in one order the body is chastised by abstinence from food, in another by the practice of manual labor, and so on.

NOTE: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order. Accordingly, the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE WORKS OF THE ACTIVE LIFE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the perfection of charity, to which the religious state is directed, extends to the love of God and the neighbor. Therefore, just as the contemplative life directly belongs to the love of God, since in it there is one desire to devote oneself to God alone, so the active life directly relates to the love of neighbor, since it serves one's neighbor's needs. Just as out of charity the neighbor is loved for the sake of God so also the services we do for our neighbors overflows to God, according to Matth. xxv, 40: "As long as you did it for one of these, the least of my brethren, you did it for Me." In this way religious in the active life are not deprived of all fruit of the contemplative life (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER CAN BE DIRECTED TO SOLDIERING.

YES.—THE REASON is that military duty can be directed to the succor of the neighbor, not only as regards private persons, but also in respect to the defense of the entire nation. It also can be directed to the preservation of divine worship. Hence soldiering for some worldly end is contrary to every religious order, but not soldiering done in the service of God (Ad 2). As to Our Lord's saying (Matth. v, 39): "I say to you not to resist the evildoer; on the contrary, if someone strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also," observe that this is said of the condonation of injury done to oneself, which pertains to perfection, but not of the sinful tolerance of the injuries of others, especially of God, which to overlook were impious (Ad 1).

[Tr. Note: St. Thomas has in mind the Knights Templars and other military orders of the middle ages. Canon law forbids clerics to do military service without permission.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER CAN BE ESTABLISHED FOR PREACHING OR HEARING CONFESSIONS

YES.—It is altogether fitting that a religious order should be established to preach and to do the other things that relate to the salvation of souls.

THE REASON is that the neighbor's good is procured more by the things pertaining to his spiritual welfare than by the things pertaining to the relief of his bodily needs. And this also more closely relates to the service of God, to whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than a zeal for souls.—Such offices do not, however, belong to religious by their own authority, but by the authority of the higher and lower superiors, to whom they belong in virtue of their office. Consequently, to assist one's superiors in such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSES OF STUDY.

YES.—THE REASON is that study befits both the active and the contemplative

religious orders. It befits the contemplative life directly, by aiding contemplation, i.e., by enlightening the intellect; and indirectly by removing the dangers to contemplation, namely the errors that frequently occur in the contemplation of divine things in those who are ignorant of the Scriptures.

For the active life, the study of letters is necessary for religious institutes in order to preach, and other such exercises. Lastly, the study of letters is befitting a religious order in regard to that which is common to every religious order; for it helps to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says to Rusticus a monk (Ep. cxxv): "Love the science of the Scriptures, and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice." For study directs the mind from the thought of lust, and mortifies the flesh, on account of the labor of study.—Study also helps to remove the greed for riches, according to I Mach. xii, 8: "We needed none of these things," namely external aids, "having for our comfort the holy books, which are in our hands."—Study also helps to teach obedience (since in the sacred books many examples, lessons, and rewards of prompt obedience are found.)

NOTE: It belongs to religious chiefly to study the writings in reference to the doctrine that is "according to godliness" (I Tit. i, 1). It does not become religious to seek for other learning, unless it is directed to sacred doctrine, for their whole life is given over to the service of God (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER A RELIGIOUS ORDER THAT IS GIVEN TO THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN ONE THAT IS GIVEN TO THE ACTIVE LIFE.

YES.—a) The active life that proceeds from the fullness of contemplation outranks simple contemplation; b) the active life that consists wholly in exterior occupation is less excellent than the contemplative life.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as it is greater to enlighten than merely to shine, so also it is more excellent to give the fruits of one's contemplation to others than merely to contemplate.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is evident from what has been said in q. clxxxii, in our discussion of the comparison of the active with the contemplative life.

Thus therefore the highest degree in the religious orders is held by those that are directed to teaching and preaching, which is nearest to the perfection of Bishops. The second degree is held by the orders that are directed to contemplation. The third degree is held by those that are employed in outward actions.

ART. VII.—WHETHER RELIGIOUS PERFECTION IS DIMINISHED BY POSSESSING SOMETHING IN COMMON.

NO.—THE REASON is that if external goods are not sought or possessed save in moderate quantity, such as suffices for simple sustenance, this solicitude does not much hold a person back from the things that are required for perfection. Hence neither is it inconsistent with the perfection of Christian life. For not every solicitude is forbidden by God, but only what is excessive and harmful. In fact, the solicitude that is employed in the administration of common goods can belong to charity.

NOTE: 1. The more a solicitude for temporal things hinders a religious order the more requisite is a solicitude for spiritual things for the order. Hence to the three degrees of religious orders a threefold degree of poverty is befitting. For it belongs to those orders that are directed to the bodily actions of the active life to have an abundance of riches in common; to those orders that are directed to contemplation it is more fitting to have moderate possession, unless it behooves such religious to receive guests, either themselves or through others, and to relieve the poor. To those orders that are directed to transmitting to others the fruits of contemplation it is fitting to have a life as far as possible free from external cares, and this is done by their laying up the necessities of life procured at a fitting time (in body of art.).

2. With regard to the words of the Lord (Matth. vi, 34): "Do not be anxious about tomorrow," these words are not to be understood in the sense that nothing should be laid up for the future, for Our Lord Himself had purses (John xii); but they are thus explained by Jerome upon this passage: "It is enough that we think of the present; the future, being uncertain, let us leave it to God" (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THOSE WHO LIVE IN COMMUNITY IS MORE PERFECT THAN THAT OF THOSE WHO LEAD A SOLITARY LIFE.

NO.—a) Just as that which is already perfect surpasses that which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of solitaries, if duly practiced, surpasses the community life. b) But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid practice it is fraught with great danger, unless the grace of God supplies that which others acquire by practice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that which is solitary should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one that lacks nothing, and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already attained to perfection.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a man is assisted in this practice by which he reaches perfection by the fellowship of others, and in two ways: First, as regards the intellect, to the effect of being instructed in that which he has to contemplate; second, as regards the affections, since a man's objectionable affections are restrained by the example and reproof that he receives from others.

NOTE: 1. The perfect who lead a solitary life are most useful to mankind, on account of their prayers to God, to whom they cleave with pure hearts (Ad 4).

2. A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (*Polit.* i, 1) that "he who associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i.e., a godly man (Ad 5).

QUESTION CLXXXIX THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE (in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE NOT PRACTICED IN KEEPING THE COMMANDMENTS SHOULD ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—To enter religion is expedient not only to those who are practiced in keeping the commandments, so as to attain to higher perfection; but also to those who are not practiced, so that they may more easily avoid sin and attain perfection.

THE REASON is that the observances of religion take away not only the obstacles to perfect charity, but also the occasions of sin; just as it is evident that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like withdraw man from the sins of gluttony and lust, and all other sins.—Hence sinners are more easily converted to religion than those who presume on their innocence, as did the young man who was invited by the Lord Himself (Matth. xix). To them the Lord addressed the words (Matth. xxi, 31): "Publicans and harlots are entering the kingdom of God before you."

ART. II.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO BE BOUND BY A VOW TO ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—To be bound by a vow to enter religion is praiseworthy in itself.

THE REASON is that, as was said above (q. lxxxviii, art 6), to vow is an act of religion, which has a certain excellence among the virtues; and also because a vow strengthens man's will to do good; and, just as a sin is more grievous if it proceeds from a will hardened in evil, so a good work is more praiseworthy if it proceeds from a will confirmed in good by a vow.

NOTE: The compulsion arising from the obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation unless one fulfills that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided—indeed, as Augustine says (*Ep. cxxvii, ad Armentar. et Paulin.*), happy is the necessity that compels us to do better things (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE WHO IS BOUND BY A VOW TO ENTER RELIGION IS UNDER OBLIGATION TO ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that a vow is a promise made to God about things that pertain to God. Now it is evident that entry into the religious life pertains very much to God, because man thereby wholly devotes himself to God's service.

ART. IV.—WHETHER HE WHO HAS VOWED TO ENTER RELIGION IS BOUND TO REMAIN IN RELIGION IN PERPETUITY.

NO—THE REASON is that the obligation of a vow extends as far as the will and intention of the one who takes the vow.—If, however, in vowing, a man thought merely of entering religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form prescribed by the common law.

NOTE: He who enters religion with the purpose of leaving forthwith does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not bound to remain forever (Ad. 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHILDREN SHOULD BE RECEIVED IN RELIGION.

YES.—a) As regards simple vows, i.e., those consisting in a mere promise made to God, and preceding from the interior deliberation of the mind, children can make a vow to enter religion before the age of puberty, which for boys is generally about the 14th year, and for girls about the 12th year. This supposes that they have the due use of reason and are capable of guile, provided the consent of their parents is added thereto.—B) As regards solemn vows, which make a person a religious, children are not admitted to profession before the age of puberty.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, if they have the due use of reason before the age of puberty, children are capable of making a vow; but they are still under the authority of their parents with regard to the disposition of their life.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a solemn vow, which makes a monk or religious, is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the solemnity that is attached to it. And because the Church considers what happens in the majority of cases, before the age of puberty, though the use of reason may be complete, and one may be capable of guile, profession does not have its effect, so as to make the one who makes profession a religious.

NOTE: Although children cannot be professed before the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into religion to be educated there. This is most fitting, according to Lament. iii, 27: "It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth" (at end of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM ENTERING RELIGION THROUGH DEFERENCE TO ONE'S PARENTS.

NO.—Unless the parents are in such need that they cannot be adequately provided for otherwise than by the service of their children.

THE REASON is that in such a case of need it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by their children. We say "accidentally," because, as was stated above (q. ci, art. 2, ad 2), when we were discussing piety, parents as such have the character of a principle; wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their children.

ART. VII.—WHETHER PARISH PRIESTS MAY LAWFULLY ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the obligation of a perpetual vow outranks every other obligation. Now parish priests and archdeacons are not bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain their cure of souls; and they may freely renounce in the hands of their Bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the special permission of the Pope, who alone can dispense in perpetual vows.—Bishops, however, being bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to the cure of souls, may not forsake their charge for any reason, without the permission of the Roman Pontiff.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO PASS FROM ONE RELIGIOUS ORDER TO ANOTHER.

YES.—a) To pass from one religious order to another is not commendable, save for reasons of great advantage or necessity. b) One may, however, commendably pass from one order to another for three reasons.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that those who are left in the order generally

suffer scandal when this happens; and also that (other things being the same) a person makes progress more easily in an order to which he is accustomed than in one to which he is not accustomed.

THE REASONS OF THE SECOND are: First, through zeal for a more perfect life, which excellence depends, not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end;—secondly, on account of an order's falling away from the perfection it ought to have; for instance if in a more severe religious order the religious begin to live less strictly, one may commendably pass even to a less severe religious order, if the observance is better;—thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more severe religious order, but can observe those of one less strict.

ART. IX.—WHETHER ONE OUGHT TO INDUCE OTHERS TO ENTER RELIGION.

YES.—THE REASON is that those who induce others to enter religion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward, according to James v, 20: "He who causes a sinner to be brought back from his misguided way will save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins."

ART. X.—WHETHER IT IS PRAISEWORTHY TO ENTER RELIGION WITHOUT TAKING COUNSEL OF MANY, AND PREVIOUSLY DELIBERATING FOR A LONG TIME.

YES.—THE REASON is that lengthy deliberation and the advice of many are required in great matters of doubt; but in matters that are certain and fixed advice is unnecessary. For, with regard to entering religion, there is no doubt that it is the greater good.

In relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter religion, there is also no room for doubt, because those who enter religion do not trust in their own strength to be able to persevere, but in the help of divine power. If however there is some special obstacle (for example, bodily weakness or the like), this requires deliberation and consultation with those who it is hoped will help one and not stand in one's way. In those matters, however, no lengthy deliberation is needed.—With regard to the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, one can also take counsel with those who will not hinder one.

NOTE: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God" (cf. Benedict, in his rule) applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits are of God; thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers himself to religion is led by the spirit of God, or is moved by hypocrisy. Wherever they must try the postulant whether he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be no doubt that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart has given forth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit "that leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps. cxli, 10). Hence the purpose of entering religion does not need to be tried (by the one who enters) whether it be from God, because it requires no further demonstration, as a gloss says on I Thess. v, 21: "Prove all things" (Ad 1).

For religion is a sweet yoke of Christ, since as Gregory says (*Moral., lib. iv, cap. 30*): "What burden does He lay on the shoulders of our mind who commands us to shun every troublesome desire, who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this world?"

To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their souls, to which may He who made this promise bring us, namely Jesus Christ Our Lord, who is over all things God blessed. Amen. (Ad 3).

**SUMMA
PART IV (III)**

Summa Abridged III

THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENTS OF THE ARTICLES OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS THIRD PART

Total Number of Questions, 192—Total Number of Articles, 1,001.

PROLOGUE

Inasmuch as Our Savior, Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His people from their sins" (Matth. i, 21), as the angel announced, showed unto us, in His own Person, the way of truth, where we may attain to the bliss of life everlasting by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that, after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow a consideration of the Savior of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.

Concerning this we must consider: 1) The Savior Himself; 2) the sacraments, by which we attain to our salvation; 3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the final resurrection.

Concerning the first, a twofold consideration occurs—the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; then the second, about such things as were done and suffered by Our Savior—i.e., God Incarnate.

QUESTION I FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION

Concerning the first, three considerations occur: First, the fitness of Christ's Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word Incarnate, thirdly, what follows this union. About the first there will be six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD BECOME INCARNATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the very nature of God is the essence of goodness. Whatever, therefore, belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. Now it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is evident from Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.*, cap. 4). Hence it belongs to the essence of the sovereign good to communicate itself in the highest way to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul, and flesh," as Augustine says (*De Trin.*, lib. xiii, cap. 17). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting for God to become incarnate.—The Incarnation, however, was not fitting on the part of human nature, because this was above its dignity; but on the part of God, in respect of the infinite excellence of His goodness, it was fitting that He should unite human nature to Himself for man's salvation (Ad 2).

NOTE: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed through God's being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His uniting Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through uniting it to Himself (Ad 1). [Thus is answered the oldest and most fundamental philosophical objection to the Incarnation.—Tr.].

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE HUMAN RACE THAT THE WORD OF GOD SHOULD BECOME INCARNATE.

YES.—a) Not by absolute necessity, as it is necessary to take food to maintain life; b) but by the necessity of convenience, when the end is attained better and more conveniently; as, for example, a horse is necessary for a journey.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God by His omnipotent power could restore human nature in many other ways.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that man is thereby furthered in good and removed from evil. He is furthered in good, with regard to faith, hope, and charity. He is furthered in faith, because the Incarnation of the Word makes faith more certain by the fact that man believes God Himself when He speaks. He is furthered in hope, because this greatly raises hope, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* lib. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope than to show how much God loved us." He is furthered in charity, because this greatly enkindles charity. Hence Augustine says (*De Catechizendis Rudibus*, c. 4): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show

God's love for us?" and later he adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return."

The Incarnation, again, furthered our salvation in regard to good conduct, because God Incarnate set us an example; and in regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and the end of human life, because this is bestowed on us by Christ's humanity for Augustine says (*In Serm. de Nativ. Domini*): "God was made man, that man might be made God."

The Incarnation withdrew us from evil: First, because man is thereby taught not to prefer the devil to himself, or to honor him who is the author of sin. Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is the dignity of human nature, so that we will not defile it by sin. Hence Pope Leo says (in his sermon on the Nativity): "Learn, O Christian, thy dignity; and, being made a partner of the divine nature, refuse to return by base conduct to your former unworthiness." Thirdly, because "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says on the Trinity, bk. xiii, c. 17. Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great" (*loc. cit.*) Fifthly, to free man from bondage to sin, which, as Augustine says on the Trinity, xiii, 13, "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ."

And there are many other advantages that resulted, which are above man's apprehension.

NOTE: 1. Neither a mere man nor many men together could make perfect satisfaction for sin, both because all nature has been corrupted by sin and also because a sin committed against God has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty.

[We can destroy infinite goodness as far as we are concerned]. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Imperfectly, however, a mere man could make satisfaction, namely in the acceptance of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign. And, because everything imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that the satisfaction of every mere man has its efficacy from the satisfaction of Christ (Ad 2).

2. God, by taking flesh, did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER, IF MAN HAD NOT SINNED, GOD WOULD HAVE BECOME INCARNATE.

NO.—It is more reasonable to say that, if man had not sinned, God would not have been incarnate.

THE REASON is that such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in Sacred Scripture, in which the divine will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been.

[NOTE: St. Thomas, however, adds: "And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate." This is a question much debated in his day and this, and is insoluble by reason.—Tr.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER GOD BECAME INCARNATE IN ORDER TO TAKE AWAY ACTUAL SIN, RATHER THAN TO TAKE AWAY ORIGINAL SIN.

YES.—Christ came principally to take away original sin, and secondarily to take away actual sin.

THE REASON is that the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. Now original sin, which infects the whole human race, is *extensively* a greater sin than any actual sin, which is proper to an individual person, although *in-*

tensively, i.e., by reason of its voluntariness, it could be greater than the original sin.—Yet the sin of nature is perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one (Ad 3).

NOTE: The penalties that we suffer in this life through the senses, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, proceed from original sin. Hence Christ, in order to make full satisfaction for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD BECOME INCARNATE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE HUMAN RACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that before sin it was not fitting that God should become incarnate; for medicine is given only to those who are already sick. Hence Our Lord Himself said (Matth. ix, 12): "It is not the healthy who need a physician, but they who are sick. . . . For I have come to call sinners, not the just."

But not even immediately after sin was it fitting for God to become incarnate: First, that man might be humbled and know he stood in need of a deliverer. Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, according to which we proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the Incarnate Word, because on the words of Gal. iv, 4, "when the fullness of the time was come," a gloss (Aug., tract 31 on John) says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him." Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world (Luke xviii, 8).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE INCARNATION OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PUT OFF TO THE END OF THE WORLD.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is taken from the union of the divine and the human nature, for in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, the imperfect precedes in time; but in that which is the efficient cause of perfection the perfect in time precedes the imperfect. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not fitting that the Incarnation should have taken place at the beginning of the human race. But the Incarnate Word Himself is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to John i, 16: "Of His fullness we have all received;" and therefore the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world; but the perfection of glory, to which human nature was raised by the Word Incarnate, will be at the end of the world.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the effect of man's salvation, for, since already the Gentiles had spurned the Law of Moses, if this remedy of the Incarnation should have been put off until the end of the world all knowledge of and reverence for God, and all moral rightness, would have been swept from the earth.

THE THIRD REASON is taken from the Incarnation's fitness to manifest the divine power, for the divine power has saved men in several ways— not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.

QUESTION II

THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE

Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the nature assumed. Under the first head come 12 points.

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: The name nature is taken from *nascendo*, being born. Hence this name was first used to signify the generation of living things. Then it was transferred to signify the principle of that generation, and then further to signify every intrinsic principle of movement. Thus Aristotle says (*Phys.* ii, 3): "Nature is the principle of movement in that in which it is essentially, and not accidentally." Afterwards it denoted the essence of the species that the definition denotes. Thus Boethius (*On the Two Natures*): "Nature is the specific difference informing each thing." It is thus that we now speak of nature.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD TOOK PLACE IN THE NATURE.

NO.—Speaking as we here do of nature, insofar as it denotes essence, or what a thing is, or the quiddity of the species, it is impossible for the union of the Incarnate Word to have taken place in the nature.

THE REASON is that one thing is made up of two or three in three ways: 1) From two complete things, which remain in their perfection; and in this way the Incarnation would have been impossible, because it would follow that the union of the Incarnation would not have been essential, but accidental; nor would the form of such things have been a nature, but rather an art, like the form of a house.

2) In the second way, one thing is made of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements. But this cannot be said of the union of the Word Incarnate: First, because divine nature is altogether immutable (P. I, q. ix, art. 1 and 2). Secondly, because what is thus mixed is of the same species with none of its elements (thus flesh is not the same as any of its components); and thus Christ would not have been of the same nature as His Father or Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart, for the species of one of them is absorbed—for instance when one puts a drop of water into a jar of wine. Accordingly, since the divine nature infinitely surpasses human nature, there can be no mingling, but only the divine nature will remain.

3) In a third way a thing is made up of things not mixed or changed, but imperfect, as man is made up of body and soul, and similarly one body is made up of different members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because each nature, the divine and the human, is perfect in its way. Secondly, because the divine and the human nature cannot constitute something after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body, because the divine nature is incorporeal; or after the manner of form and matter, because the divine nature cannot be the form of anything, especially corporeal; for it would then follow that the resulting species would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nor in the divine nature. For any difference varies the species, as unity varies number.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD TOOK PLACE IN THE PERSON.

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: Nature, as has been said, signifies here the essence of the species, which is signified by the definition. *Suppositum* is the individual subsisting in that nature. In the things in which something can be found that does not belong to the essence of the species, namely accidents and individuating principles, nature and suppositum differ in reality, as especially appears in the things that are composed of matter and form. Hence in them the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. If there is a thing (as is the case with God) in which absolutely nothing exists besides the species or its nature, suppositum and nature are not really distinct in it, but only according to our mode of understanding, inasmuch as it is called nature as it is an essence and a suppositum as it is subsisting. What is said of the suppositum can also be understood of the person in a rational or intellectual creature; because a person is nothing else than "the individual substance of a rational nature."

YES.—THE REASON is that, if the human nature is not united to the Word of God in the person, it is not united to Him in any way, and thus belief in the Incarnation is wholly done away with, and the whole Christian faith is overturned. Thus, since the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His divine nature, it follows that the Union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature; for everything that inheres in any person, whether it belongs to his nature or not, is united to him in the person.

NOTE: Although this human nature of Christ is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it does not have its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz., in the Person of the Word of God. And thus the union took place in the person (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE TOOK PLACE IN THE SUPPOSITUM OR HYPOSTASIS.

YES.—It is a heresy, condemned by the Church (at the Fifth Council of Constan-

tinople), to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or **suppositum**.

THE REASON is that person adds nothing to hypostasis but a determinate, namely a rational, nature, since as Boethius said (*On the Two Natures*): "A person is the individual substance of rational nature;" and thus it is the same thing to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person.

Secondly, if it is granted that person adds something to hypostasis, this is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity. If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union took place only in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned.

Thirdly, if there were any other hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it would follow that what pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g., that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, and buried. And this was also condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (loc. cit., can. 4). For only to the hypostasis are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that *this* man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal.

NOTE: In created things it does not happen that numerically the same thing can subsist in different essences or natures. But one and the same Christ subsists in two natures. Hence, just as when we speak of otherness in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum but only diversity of accidental forms, so when we speak of the otherness of Christ we do not signify diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature (Ad 1).

And, although the human nature in Christ is a particular substance, nevertheless it cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, since it is in union with a completed thing, namely the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AFTER THE INCARNATION THE PERSON OR HYPOSTASIS OF CHRIST IS COMPOSITE.

YES.—a) The person or hypostasis considered, not as it is in itself; but b) according to the aspect of person or hypostasis, to which it belongs to subsist in some nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the person or hypostasis of Christ, considered as it is in itself, is absolutely simple, as is the nature of the Word.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence, although there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, inasmuch as one being subsists in two.

ART. V.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE IS ANY UNION OF SOUL AND BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ is called univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. ii, 7), "being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity.

In Christ, however, soul and body are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the body and soul in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor for this reason does it follow that the union of soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth (Ad 1).

NOTE: To the question how Christ's body is quickened by the Word of God, it is answered that there are two principles of corporeal life: One the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (*On the Soul*, bk. ii, text 37), just as everything exists formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul; and in this way a body could not live by the Word, which cannot be the form of a body (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE HUMAN NATURE WAS UNITED TO THE WORD OF GOD ACCIDENTALLY.

NO.—The Catholic Church teaches that the union of God and human nature took place neither in the essence or nature, nor in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis.

THE REASON is that the Fifth Council (Constantinople II, *gener. 5, coll. viii, can. 5*) declares: "Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together [i.e., destroying both natures] confess a union by fusion; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose [insofar as the will of this man Christ is always conformed to the will of the Word of God]. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh by composition, which is in subsistence."

NOTE: The Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; whereas in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed into one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE DIVINE NATURE AND THE HUMAN IS ANYTHING CREATED.

YES.—This union of which we are speaking is not in God really, but only in our way of thinking. But in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Hence we must say that it is something created.

THE REASON is that the union of which we are speaking is a relation, which we consider between the divine and the human natures, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. In the creature, this relation is brought into being by a change in the creature, and it is real; but in God it is not brought into being by a change in God, and therefore it is not real, but only according to our way of thinking.—Thus God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD IS THE SAME AS ASSUMPTION.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the union of which we are speaking denotes a relation, as was said in the preceding article; whereas assumption denotes the action, inasmuch as someone is said to assume; or the passion, by which something is said to be assumed.

THE SECOND REASON is that assumption implies becoming, whereas union implies having become; and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption to the divine hypostasis, and we do not say that the Son of God is human nature.

THE THIRD REASON is that a relation, especially where the relations are equal, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. Hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither. But union determines none of these things; hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human.

NOTE: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatever Divine Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed (Ad 2).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN CHRIST IS THE GREATEST OF ALL UNIONS.

YES.—In respect to that in which the two natures are united; but not in respect to the things (i.e., the natures) that are united.

THE REASON is that the two natures are united in the Divine Person, whose unity

is the greatest; but the extremes that are united (namely the divine and the human natures) are infinitely far apart, since one is infinite, the other finite.

NOTE: 1. The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. Hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it (Ad 1).

2. The human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father, namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of God;" whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE UNION OF THE TWO NATURES IN CHRIST TOOK PLACE BY GRACE.

YES.—Insofar as grace is taken for the will of God gratuitously doing something, or reputed something as well pleasing or acceptable to Him; but not if grace be taken as that habitual grace by means of which the union of the saints with God is effected by knowledge and love.

THE REASON is that human nature needs the gratuitous will of God to be raised to God, since this is above the faculty of its nature. Now human nature is raised to God in two ways: In one way by operation, as the saints know and love God; in another way by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit.

ART. XI.—WHETHER ANY MERITS PRECEDED THE UNION OF THE INCARNATION.

NO.—a) Neither did Christ Himself merit such a union; b) nor did other men merit it condignly; c) but the holy Fathers merited it congruously, by desiring and beseeching the Incarnation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that every operation of Christ resulted from the union; for the man Christ was truly the Son of God from the beginning of His conception, as having no other hypostasis than that of the Son of God, according to Luke i, 35: "The Holy One to be born will be called the Son of God."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude. Now the union of the Incarnation, since it is in personal being, transcends the union of the blessed mind with God; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, grace cannot fall under merit, since it is the principle of merit. Hence much less does the Incarnation fall under merit, which is the principle of grace, according to John i, 17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, the Incarnation of Christ is for the reformation of all human nature, and therefore does not fall under the merit of any individual man (or of one who has only human nature).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that it was fitting that God should hear the holy Fathers, who obeyed Him.

NOTE: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that degree of purity and holiness that fitted her to be the Mother of God (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE GRACE OF UNION WAS NATURAL TO THE MAN CHRIST.

YES.—The grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural, as though caused by the principles of the human nature in Christ; but it can be called natural as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature.

THE REASON is that both graces are called natural in Christ inasmuch as He had them from His nativity (i.e., inasmuch as nature is so called from nativity); because from the beginning of His conception human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace, for he was so conceived by the Holy Spirit as to be at once the natural Son of God and of man.—According to His Divine Nature, grace is natural to Christ insofar as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace (Ad 3).

QUESTION III
THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING
 (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS BEFITTING FOR A DIVINE PERSON TO ASSUME CREATED NATURE.

YES.—It is more properly befitting to a Person to assume a nature.

THE REASON is that to assume, which is to take something to oneself, implies the principle and the term of the act. Now these belong properly to a Person—the principle of the act, because it belongs properly to a person to act, and this taking of flesh was accomplished by divine action; and the term, because, as we said above (prec. q, art. 1 and 2), the union took place in the Person, not in the Nature.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS BEFITTING TO THE DIVINE NATURE TO ASSUME.

YES.—a) It is befitting to the Divine Nature to be the principle of assumption considered in itself; b) but it is not befitting to it to be the term of the assumption considered in itself, but by reason of the Person, in whom it is considered.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that assumption took place by the power of the Divine Nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is plain from what has been said in the previous article. Hence first and most properly the Person is said to assume; secondarily it can be said that even the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person.

NOTE: The Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to itself. But, although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one; and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE NATURE, ABSTRACTED FROM THE PERSONALITY, CAN ASSUME.

YES.—a) Not insofar as the intellect knows God as He is; but b) insofar as it knows after its own manner, namely manifoldly and separately, that which is one in God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God, so that nothing besides remains; for everything that is in God is one, save the distinction of the Persons; and as regards these if one of Them is removed the Others are taken away; since They are distinguished only by relations, which must be together at the same time.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this way our intellect can understand God's goodness and wisdom, and other things of the sort, which are called essential attributes, and not understand Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect we may still understand the Nature assuming.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ONE PERSON WITHOUT ANOTHER CAN ASSUME A CREATED NATURE.

YES.—One Person can assume a created nature without Another's assuming, not in respect of the assuming principle, but in respect of the term.

THE REASON is that the act of the Person assuming proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the three Persons; accordingly, that which has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but the term of assumption

is the Person, as was stated in the previous article. Hence what pertains to the nature of the term belongs to one Person, in such manner as not to belong to Another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

ART. V.—WHETHER EACH OF THE DIVINE PERSONS COULD HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN NATURE.

YES.—The Father or the Holy Spirit could have assumed flesh as well as the Son.

THE REASON is that the nature of Personality is common to the three Persons, although the personal properties are different. Thus the divine power could unite a human nature to the Person of the Father or the Holy Spirit, as it united it to the Person of the Son.

ART. VI.—WHETHER SEVERAL DIVINE PERSONS CAN ASSUME ONE AND THE SAME INDIVIDUAL NATURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one of Them does not exclude the Other from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person; for union takes place by the power of the Divine Person, which is common to the three Persons, as was said in the previous article. Thus it is not impossible for two or three Divine Persons to assume one human nature; yet it would be impossible for Them to assume one hypostasis or one human person.

NOTE: On the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would *one* imply the unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER ONE DIVINE PERSON COULD ASSUME TWO HUMAN NATURES.

YES.—Whether we consider the Divine Person according to His power, which is the principle of union, or according to His Personality, which is the term of union, we must say that the Person could assume numerically another nature than the human nature that He did assume.

THE REASON is that the divine power, being infinite, cannot be limited to anything created; nor can the uncreated be comprehended by the created. (Therefore, just as the Divine Person assumed one human nature, He can assume numerically other natures.)—But with regard to the nature of the suppositum, it must be considered that in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of form and matter, that is, of body and soul, did not constitute a new suppositum, as was stated in the previous article. And therefore there could be a multitude numerically on the part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without distinction of supposita (Ad 1).—Hence if the Divine Person should assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two human natures (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT WAS MORE FITTING THAT THE PERSON OF THE SON RATHER THAN ANY OTHER DIVINE PERSON SHOULD ASSUME HUMAN NATURE.

YES.—It was most fitting for the Person of the Son to become incarnate.

THE FIRST REASON is on the part of union; because, just as by the participation of the likeness of the Word, which is the eternal concept of God, creatures are established in their proper species, though movably; so by the non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature it was fitting that the creature should be restored in relation to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman, by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the fact that the Word is the concept of the eternal wisdom, from which all human wisdom is derived; for, just as man is perfected in wisdom by participating in the Word of God, so it was fitting for his consummated perfection that the very Word of God should be united personally to human nature.

The reason of this fitness can also be taken from the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predestination; for it was fitting that by Him who is the natural Son men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption, for predestination is due only to sons, according to Rom. viii, 17: "If sons, heirs also."

Thirdly, the reason of this fitness can be taken from the sin of the first parent, to which the Incarnation supplied a remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking knowledge (Gen. ii). Hence it was fitting that man should be led back to God by the Word of true wisdom, since he had withdrawn from God by an inordinate thirst for knowledge.

QUESTION IV

THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE

We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About this we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.

Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption. About the first there will be six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER HUMAN NATURE WAS MORE ASSUMABLE BY THE SON OF GOD THAN ANY OTHER NATURE.

YES.—a) Both in respect of dignity; b) and in respect of the need of human nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that human nature, being rational and intellectual, was fitted by nature to attain in some manner the Word Himself through its operation, namely by knowing and loving Him. Accordingly, it was more assumable than any irrational creature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that human nature needed to be restored when it was subjected to original sin. And in this way it was more assumable than the angelic nature. For, although the angelic nature is subject in some things to sin, its sin is irremediable, as was explained in the First Part (q. lxiv, art. 2).—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A PERSON.

NO.—THE REASON is that what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption; rather it is the term of assumption, as was said (prec. q., art. 1 and 2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union—and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false (and in fact heretical).

NOTE: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature, but through the addition of something that is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DIVINE PERSON ASSUMED A MAN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the name man signifies human nature as it is in a suppositum. And therefore it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis.—Certain phrases of holy doctors are not to be taken literally, but are to be loyally explained, so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed, and because the assumption terminated in this—that the Son of God is man (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED

HUMAN NATURE ABSTRACTED FROM ALL INDIVIDUALS.

NO.—a) Whether human nature be considered as abstracted from all individuals, as having being of itself, as the Platonists supposed; b) or it be considered as existing in the divine mind; c) or insofar as it is in the human intellect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is included in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence such an abstract nature cannot subsist by itself.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that thus human nature would be nothing else than the divine nature, and in this way human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that this would be nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED HUMAN NATURE IN ALL INDIVIDUALS.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the multitude of supposita of human nature would thus be taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming.

THE SECOND REASON is that this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, for then all men would be of equal dignity.

THE THIRD REASON is that it is fitting that, as one divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR THE SON OF GOD TO ASSUME HUMAN NATURE OF THE STOCK OF ADAM.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends. And hence from the nature that he had corrupted by his sin there should be assumed that by which satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature.

THE SECOND REASON is this also pertains man's greater dignity, that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil.

THE THIRD REASON is that God's power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.

QUESTION V THE MODE OF UNION IN RESPECT OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED A TRUE BODY.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that otherwise He would not have assumed a true human nature.

THE SECOND REASON is that if it was not a true body that the Word assumed, but only an imaginary one, it would follow that He neither underwent a true death, nor did a true salvation of man follow, since the effect must be proportionate to the cause.

THE THIRD REASON is that, since the Person assuming is Truth Itself, it was not fitting to have anything fictitious in His work.—Hence Our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke xxiv, 37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Feel Me and see; for a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see I have."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED A CARNAL OR EARTHLY BODY, NAMELY FLESH AND BLOOD.

YES.—For the same reasons that we explained in the previous article. Because otherwise the truth of human nature would not have been maintained in Christ; because the assumption of a heavenly body would have lessened the truth of the things that Christ did in the body; and because this would also have detracted from God's truthfulness.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A SOUL.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that the contrary is counter to the authority of Scripture,

in which the Lord mentions His soul (Matth. xxvi, 38): "My soul is sad, even unto death;" and (John x, 18): "I have power to lay down My life" (soul). And the Evangelists relate that Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry and thirsty. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept, and was weary shows that He had a true human body; otherwise, if these things are a metaphor (as Appollinaris contended), because the like is said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined.

THE SECOND REASON is that the aforesaid error of Appollinaris lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man's liberation, for this liberation is more in respect to the soul, in which there is sin, than in respect to the body.

THE THIRD REASON is that the contrary position would be against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man acquire human species through the soul. Hence, when the soul leaves the body, there are no bones or flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (*On the Soul*, ii, text 9).

NOTE: To the objection that it would be superfluous for the soul to be in Christ, when the Word was present, since the Word is the fountain of life, let it be considered that the Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body possessed a soul, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A HUMAN MIND OR INTELLECT.

NOTE: This article is directed against the Apollinarists, who in the question concerning the soul of Christ, being vanquished by the Gospel texts, said that Christ's soul had no mind and held that the Word took its place.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that, as we said in the previous article, to say the contrary is counter to the Gospel narrative, which mentions that Christ wondered, etc.

THE SECOND REASON is that the contrary is inconsistent with the utility of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin, or of justifying grace, except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed.

THE THIRD REASON is that to hold the contrary is inconsistent with the truth of the Incarnation. For, since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by a human, i.e., a rational soul. Hence if Christ had a soul without a mind He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone.

NOTE: The human intellect or mind is like a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed (Ad 2).

QUESTION VI THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED FLESH THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SOUL.

YES.—a) Not in order of time, but of nature, and moreover b) both according to the order of dignity c) and according to the order of causality.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear later (q. xxxiii, art. 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the soul is midway between God and flesh; and in this way it can be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself through the medium of the soul.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the soul itself is in some degree (i.e., in aptitude and congruity) the cause of uniting the flesh to the Son of God. For flesh would not be assumable save by the relation that it has to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh.

NOTE: To the objection that when Christ's soul was separated by death the union

of the World with the flesh still remained, as will appear later (q. 1, art. 2 and 3), let it be said that nothing prevents one thing's being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because, although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it; just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone. Similarly, when Christ's soul was separated the union of the Word with flesh still endured (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD ASSUMED A SOUL THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SPIRIT OR MIND.

YES.—a) By reason of congruity; and b) by reason of dignity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the soul is congruously assumable only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His image, which is in respect of the mind that is called spirit, according to Ephes. iv, 23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and most like to God. For the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect, as Damascene says (*Orth. Fid., lib. iii, cap. 6*).

NOTE: The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOUL WAS ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD BEFORE THE FLESH.

NO.—THE REASON is that Christ's soul was not created before it was infused into the body (as Origen taught concerning all souls, including that of Christ: *Periarch. lib. i, cap. 7 and 8*); otherwise, it would follow that that soul had at one time its own subsistence without the Word, and thus, since it was not assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted.—Likewise, it would follow that Christ's soul would not be of the same nature as our own, which are created at the same time as they are infused into our bodies.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FLESH OF CHRIST WAS ASSUMED BY THE WORD BEFORE BEING UNITED TO THE SOUL.

NO.—THE REASON is that flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh, and this happened when the rational soul was united to it. Therefore, just as the soul was not assumed before the flesh, because it is against the nature of the soul to exist before it is united to the body; so the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, because human flesh does not exist before it has a rational soul.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE WHOLE HUMAN NATURE WAS ASSUMED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE PARTS.

NO.—The Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, i.e., a body and soul, through the medium of the whole, in the order of nature, and moreover on the part of the agent, or in respect of intention, and not on the part of the matter.

THE REASON is that, in respect of the intention of the doer, what is complete precedes the incomplete, and consequently the whole precedes the parts. Thus, just as the Word assumed a body on account of the relation that it has to the rational soul, so it assumed a body and a soul on account of the relation that they have to human nature. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must particularly be considered, because, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Volustanum, 137, al. 3*): "In such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer."—On the part and in the way of operation the assumption of the parts is prior in the intellect, but not in time (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE HUMAN NATURE WAS ASSUMED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF GRACE.

NO.—Grace cannot be understood as the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace.

THE REASON is that the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to human nature in the Person of the Word; whereas the habitual grace per-

taining to the spiritual holiness of that man is an effect following from the union.—But if by grace is understood the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, then the union took place through grace, not as a means but as an efficient cause.

QUESTION VII THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN

Here we must consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what belongs to defect.

Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: 1) The grace of Christ; 2) His knowledge; 3) His power.

With regard to His grace we must consider two things: 1) His grace as He is an individual man; 2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken (q. ii). About the first point there are 13 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST THERE WAS ANY HABITUAL GRACE.

YES.—It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is on account of the union of Christ's soul with the Word of God: For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God. Hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of divine grace.

THE SECOND REASON is on account of the dignity of Christ's soul, since it was to attain so closely to God by knowledge and grace, to which it is necessary that human nature be raised by grace.

THE THIRD REASON is on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the "Mediator of God and men" (1 Tim. ii, 5); hence it behooved Him to have grace that would overflow upon others, according to John i, 16: "And of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace."

NOTE: Christ is true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet, because together with unity of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated above (q. ii, aa. 1 and 2), the soul of Christ is not by its essence divine. Hence it behooves it to be divine by partition, which is by grace (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WERE VIRTUES.

YES.—Christ had most perfectly, beyond the common mode, the intellectual and moral virtues (Ad 2).

THE REASON is that, as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Therefore, since Christ's grace was most perfect, it follows that there flowed from it the virtues that perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.

ART. III.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS FAITH.

NO.—THE REASON is that Christ from the first instant of His conception fully saw God in His Essence, as will be explained later (q. xxxiv, art. 4). Hence faith could not have been in Him.

NOTE: Regarding the merit of faith, it consists in this—that man through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Philip. ii, 8: "Becoming obedient unto death." And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit that He did not fulfill more perfectly Himself (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS HOPE.

NO.—Christ did not have hope with regard to the enjoyment of God, but He had hope as regards such things as He did not fully possess.

THE REASON is that Christ from the beginning of His conception fully possessed the divine fruition, as will be explained later (q. xxiv, art. 4); hence He did not have the virtue of hope. Yet He had hope with respect to some of the things that He did not possess, although He did not have hope with respect to all; for, although He fully knew everything, wherefore faith was wholly excluded from Him, yet He did not fully possess everything pertaining to His perfection that He could hope for.

ART. V.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WERE GIFTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch as these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Spirit. Now Christ's soul was most perfectly moved by the Holy Spirit. Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts existed in the highest degree.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE GIFT OF FEAR.

YES.—Inasmuch as Scripture attributes to Him the fullness of the fear of the Lord. THE REASON is that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, or as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but as it regards the divine pre-eminence itself, insofar as Christ's soul was borne towards God by the Holy Spirit in an act of reverence. Hence Hebr. v, 7 says that in all things "He was heard because of His reverent submission." For Christ as man had this act of reverence for God in a fuller sense and beyond all others.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE GRATUITOUS GRACES WERE IN CHRIST.

YES.—In Christ all the gratuitous graces existed in pre-eminent degree.

THE REASON is that the gratuitous graces are directed to manifest faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the things by which his teaching is manifested; otherwise, his teaching would be useless. Now the first and principal teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith is Christ. Wherefore in Christ all the gratuitous graces existed in the highest degree, at least in habit (Ad 3), as in the first and principal teacher of faith.—And, whereas in the other saints such graces are divided, inasmuch as the saints receive particularly an efficacy to perform these or those acts, in Christ they are not divided, but exist all at once (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE GIFT OF PROPHECY.

YES.—There was prophecy in Christ, not as a *comprehensor*, but as a *wayfarer*.

THE REASON is that Christ touched our state before His Passion, insofar as He was not only a *comprehensor* but also a *wayfarer*. Hence it was prophetic in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of other wayfarers. And in this way it is said that prophecy was in Him. It can therefore be said that, although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a *comprehensor* but also a *wayfarer* (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE FULLNESS OF GRACE.

YES.—Christ had grace in the highest degree according to the capacity of a creature (Ad 3): a) Both as regards the most perfect way in which grace can be had; b) and as regards the virtue of grace.

THE REASONS OF THE FIRST are: 1) Because of the closeness of Christ to the cause of grace, because, as was said (art. 1 of this q.), the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more abundantly does it receive. Therefore Christ's soul, which is united more closely to God than all rational creatures, receives the greatest inflowing of His grace.—2) In his relation to the effect of grace; for Christ's soul so received grace that in a manner it was poured out from it to others. And thus it behooved Him to have the greatest grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ possessed grace for all the operations or effects of grace, which are the virtues, gifts, and the like.

ART. X.—WHETHER THE FULLNESS OF GRACE IS PROPER TO CHRIST.

YES.—a) The fullness of grace on the part of grace itself is proper to Christ; b) the fullness of grace on the part of the one who has grace, or on the part of the subject, is not proper to Christ.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that there is said to be fullness of grace on the part of grace itself when one reaches the limit of grace, both as to essence and as to power; because, namely, he has grace both in the highest excellence in which it can be

had and in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And such is the fullness of grace proper to Christ.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, on the part of the subject, one is said to have fullness of grace when one has grace fully according to his condition, either according to intensity, insofar as grace is intense in him up to the limit fixed for him by God, according to Ephes. iv, 7: "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ;" or else according to power, insofar as he has means of grace for everything that pertains to his office or state, as the Apostle said (Ephes. iii, 8): "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to enlighten all men." And such a fullness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others through Christ. Thus it is said concerning the Blessed Virgin that she was the Mother of Christ, and of St. Stephen that he was a worthy minister and witness of God, for which he was chosen. And the same thing is to be said of the other saints (Ad 1).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST IS INFINITE.

NO.—a) The grace of union is infinite; b) habitual grace, insofar as it is a being, is not infinite; c) the habitual grace of Christ, considered according to the proper nature of grace, can be called infinite.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the grace of union is the very fact of being united personally with the Son of God; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, since the Person of the Word is infinite.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's soul, in which habitual grace resides, has a finite capacity. Hence the being of grace, since it does not exceed its subject, cannot be infinite.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that habitual grace is bestowed on the soul of Christ as on a universal principle, so that it has whatever can pertain to the nature of grace, without limit and without fixed measure.

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST COULD INCREASE.

NO.—a) Neither on the part of grace itself, as the form; b) nor on the part of the subject, could the grace of Christ increase.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that on the part of grace itself the excellence of grace, like that of a form, is taken from the end. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. Now there cannot be, nor can there be conceived, a greater union of the rational creature with God than that which is in the person. And thus the grace of Christ reaches the highest measure of grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on the part of the subject grace is increased in relation to the end to be attained. Now Christ from the first instant of His conception was a true and full comprehensor. Hence in Him there could be no increase of grace, as there could not be in the other blessed, whose grace cannot increase, since they have attained their end.

NOTE: Regarding the words of St. Luke (ii, 52), that the boy "Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men," observe that a person can advance in wisdom and grace in two ways: 1) Inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in this way Christ did not increase; 2) as regards the effects, i.e., inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man (Ad 3).

ART. XIII.—WHETHER THE HABITUAL GRACE OF CHRIST FOLLOWED AFTER THE UNION.

YES.—Not in order of time, but in order of nature and thought.

THE FIRST REASON is with reference to the order of the principles of both natures, for the principle of union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature. But the principle of habitual grace, which is given together with charity, is the Holy Spirit. Now the mission of the Son, according to the order of nature is prior to the mission of the Holy Spirit. Therefore also the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son is understood, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Spirit is understood.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the relation of grace to its cause, for grace is caused in man by the presence of the Divinity, just as light is caused in the air by the presence of the sun. Now the presence of God in Christ is understood according to the

union of the human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood as following from this union, as light follows from the sun.

THE THIRD REASON is taken from the end of grace: For grace is directed to well-doing, and actions belong to supposita and individuals. Therefore action, and consequently the grace that directs one to it, presupposes an operating hypostasis. Now the hypostasis is not presupposed in the human nature before the union (q. iv, art. 2). Hence the grace of union precedes in thought habitual grace, which follows from it as a natural property (Ad 2).

QUESTION VIII

THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH.

YES.—Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head, for three reasons.

THE REASON is that in the human head three things can be considered, which belong after a certain likeness to Christ in His relation to the Church, namely order, perfection, and power. Order, indeed; for just as the head is the first part of man, beginning with the higher part, so also it is that every principle is commonly called a head. Thus Christ is the head of the Church according to His nearness to God; and hence it is that all have received grace on account of His grace.—Perfection, inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch. Even so, in Christ there is the perfection of headship, because He has the fullness of all graces, according to John i, 14: "We saw Him full of grace and truth."—Power, inasmuch as the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling. Just so is power in Christ, who has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to John i, 16: "Of His fullness we have all received." And thus it is evident that Christ is appropriately called the Head of the Church.

NOTE: 1. To give grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Spirit instrumentally or ministerially, according to Gal. iii, 5: "He . . . who gives to you the Spirit. . . ." (Ad 1).

2. Just as Christ is likened to the head of the Church, according to His visible nature, by which man is set over man; so the Holy Spirit is likened to the heart, which invisibly quickens and unites the Church (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF MEN AS TO THEIR BODIES OR ONLY AS TO THEIR SOULS.

ANSWER: Even as to their bodies.—Christ's humanity influences men both as to body and as to soul.

THE REASON is that the manhood of Christ has the power to influence insofar as it is united with the Word of God, to whom the body is united through the soul, as was explained (q. vi, art. 1). Hence Christ's whole humanity, namely in body and in soul, influences men both as to their bodies and as to their souls, but principally as to their souls, and secondarily as to their bodies. It influences the body, first, insofar as the members of the body are presented as instruments of justice in the soul that lives through Christ, according to the Apostle (Rom. vi, 13): "Present yourselves to God as those who have come to life from the dead and your members as weapons of justice for God." Secondly, insofar as the life of glory flows from the soul to the body, according to Rom. viii, 11: "Who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will also bring to life your mortal bodies because of His Spirit who dwells in you."

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF ALL MEN.

YES.—If we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but in different degrees.

THE REASON is that Christ is first and principally the head of those who are actually united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by

charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly of those who are united to Him only in potentiality, not yet reduced to act, but to be reduced to act according to the divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act. Such are the men living in this world who are not predestined, who however on departing from this world wholly cease to be members of Christ, because they are no longer in potentiality to be united to Him.

NOTE: The ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments as images and shadows of the future sacraments, tended to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also tend to Him; for it is the same movement to the image, as it is an image, and to the reality, as is explained by the Philosopher (*On Memory and Reminiscence*, c. 2). Thus the ancient Fathers belonged to the same body of the Church to which we belong (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF ANGELS.

YES.—Christ as man is also Head of the angels.

THE REASON is that the Mystical Body of the Church, whose head is Christ, consists not only of men, but also of angels; for both angels and men are ordained to one end, which is the glory of the divine fruition. Therefore, from the fact of Christ's being close to God and most perfectly partaking of His gifts, it follows that not only men but also angels receive of His influence; for it is said in Ephes. i, 20 that God the Father set Him, namely Christ, "at His right hand in heaven above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination—in short, above every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And all things He made subject under His feet."

NOTE: The humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual, i.e., the divine, nature, can cause something not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e., by personal union (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH, IS THE SAME AS HIS HABITUAL GRACE, INASMUCH AS HE IS MAN.

YES.—Personal grace, by which Christ's soul was justified, is the same in essence as His grace by which He is Head of the Church and justifying others; yet there is a distinction of understanding between them.

THE REASON is that grace was received in the soul of Christ in the highest degree; hence, by reason of that eminence of grace that He received, it belongs to Him that that grace should flow to others, and this is competent to the nature of head.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO CHRIST TO BE HEAD OF THE CHURCH.

YES.—a) With reference to interior influence, it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church; b) with reference to external influence or government, it is common to Christ and others to be head of the Church; c) yet in a different way than is Christ.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the interior influence of grace is from no one but Christ alone; whose humanity, by being united to Divinity, has the power to justify.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that influence on the members of the Church in regard to external government can belong to others; and in this way some can be called heads of the Church, according to Amos vi, 1: "Yet great men, heads of the people."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, firstly, Christ is Head of all those who belong to the Church in any place and time and state; other men are called heads with reference to certain special places (the Bishops) or with reference to certain times (the Popes), or with reference to a determined state, namely as they are in the wayfaring state. Secondly, Christ is Head of the Church by His own power and authority; other men are called heads insofar as they take Christ's place.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE DEVIL IS THE HEAD OF ALL THE WICKED.

YES.—According to external government only.

THE REASON is that it pertains to government that those whom anyone gov-

erns should be led to their end by him. Now the end of the devil is the turning away of the rational creature from God; hence he tried from the beginning to draw man away from obedience to the divine command. Now this very aversion from God has the character of an end, insofar as it is sought under the appearance of liberty. And insofar as some are led to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, according to Job xli, 25: "He is king over all the children of pride."

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ANTICHRIST MAY BE CALLED THE HEAD OF ALL THE WICKED.

YES.—a) Antichrist is not called the head of all the wicked according to the order of time; b) or on account of his influencing power; c) but on account of the perfection of his wickedness.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that his sin did not precede all other sins, as did that of the devil.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion, yet those who were before him were not led into evil by him, nor did they imitate his wickedness. Hence in this respect he cannot be called the head of all the wicked, but only of some.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, as a gloss says on II Thess. ii, 4: "Gives himself out as if he were God," the meaning is as follows:

"As in Christ dwelt the fullness of the Godhead, so in Antichrist dwells the fullness of wickedness;" not indeed as his humanity is assumed by the devil into the unity of the person, as Christ's humanity was assumed by the Son of God; but because the devil by suggestion more copiously infused his own wickedness into him than into all the others. And in this respect all the wicked men who preceded him are as it were the figure of Antichrist, according to II Thess. ii, 7: "For the mystery of iniquity already is at work."

NOTE: The devil and Antichrist are not two heads, but one; since Antichrist is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence on II Thess. ii, 4: "Gives himself out. . ." a gloss says: "The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride, will be in him" (Ad 1).—For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it (Ad 3).

QUESTION IX CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE BESIDES THE DIVINE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Son of God assumed a complete human nature; that is, not only a body, but also a soul; and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge for three reasons: First, on account of the soul's perfection—otherwise, Christ's soul would be more imperfect than the souls of other men.—Secondly, because, since everything is for the sake of its operation, it would have been useless for Christ to have an intellectual soul if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge.—Thirdly, since we are here raking knowledge broadly for any cognition of the human intellect, which is a natural perfection. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature.

NOTE: 1. Christ knew all things with the divine knowledge by an uncreated operation, which is the very essence of God. Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing (Ad 1).

2. The light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the divine knowledge, just as the light of that which is illuminated, for example, air, increases more with the light of that which illuminates it, namely the sun (Ad 2).

3. On the part of what is united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His divine and as to His human nature—not, however, on the part of the union itself; for this union is in a personal being, and knowledge belongs to a person only by reason of a nature (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE BLESSED OR COMPREHENSORS HAVE.

YES.—The knowledge of the blessed belongs to Christ as man in the most excellent way.

THE REASON is that the cause ought always to be more efficacious than its effect. Now Christ's humanity is that by which men are raised to beatitude, according to Hebr. ii, 10: "For it became Him for whom are all things and through whom are all things, who had brought many sons into glory, to perfect through sufferings the Author of their salvation."—Hence it was necessary that the knowledge of the blessed should belong to Christ as man in the most excellent way.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD AN IMPRINTED OR INFUSED KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—Besides beatific knowledge, there is in Christ another knowledge, which is imprinted or infused, inasmuch as the Word of God imprints on Christ's soul, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality.

THE REASON is that everything that is in potentiality is imperfect until it is reduced to act. Now the human nature assumed by the Word of God was not imperfect. Hence Christ's possible intellect, which was in potentiality to all intelligible things, needed to be reduced to act, namely by intelligible species, which are its completive forms. This is done by the Word of God, even as in the beginning of creation it was done for the angels, as is clear from Augustine (*Gen. ad Litt., lib. c. 8*).—Accordingly, just as in the angels, according to the same Augustine (*loc. cit., lib. iv, cap. 22*), there is a twofold knowledge, namely morning knowledge, by which they know things in the Word, and evening knowledge, by which they know things in their own nature through species impressed on them, so besides the divine and uncreated knowledge, there is in Christ according to His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their own nature through intelligible species proportioned to the human mind. (This knowledge, moreover, extended to things supernatural and natural.)

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD ANY ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—There was also in Christ an acquired or experimental knowledge.

THE REASON is that such knowledge is planted in Christ according to the light of the active intellect, which is connatural to the human soul, insofar, namely as there were in Christ certain intelligible species, by the action of the active intellect on phantasms received in His passive intellect.

NOTE: There are two ways of acquiring knowledge, namely by discovery and learning. The mode of knowing by discovery is higher; that by learning is secondary. Hence it belongs to Christ rather to have knowledge by discovery than by learning; especially since He was given by God to all as a teacher, according to Joel ii: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a Teacher of justice" (Ad 1).

**QUESTION X
THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL**

Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the divine knowledge in the first part (q. 14), it now remains to speak of the three others: 1) Of the beatific knowledge; 2) of the infused knowledge; 3) of the acquired knowledge.

But, again, because much has been said in the First Part (q. 12) of the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under this head come four points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST COMPREHENDED THE WORD OR THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

NO.—Christ's soul in no wise comprehended the divine essence.

THE REASON is that the union of natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused. Now Christ's soul is something created and finite. Now the finite does not comprehend the infinite, as was

shown in the First Part (q. xii, aa. 1, 4, and 7). Hence Christ's soul saw the whole essence of God, but did not comprehend it, because it did not wholly see it, that is, not so perfectly as it can be seen (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S SOUL KNEW ALL THINGS IN THE WORD.

YES.—If we but take "all things" as standing for all that in any way whatever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time; but not if we take it in the wider sense, as extending also to everything that is in potentiality, and never has been or ever will be reduced to act.

THE REASON is that every created intellect knows in the Word of God, not all things simply, but more things in proportion to the perfection with which it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect can fail to know in the Word everything that pertains to it. Now there pertain to Christ and His dignity in some manner all things, insofar as all things are subject to Him, insofar as He is the judge of all men. But to comprehend everything that God *can* do would be to comprehend the divine essence.

NOTE: Regarding the words of Christ, Matth. xiii, 32: "Of that day or hour no man knows, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father," note that He is said not to know the day and hour of the judgment, inasmuch as He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the Apostles (Acts i, 7), He was unwilling to reveal it. The words of Acts i, 7: "It is not for you to know the times or dates which the Father has fixed by His own authority," are in this sense, for, as Chrysostom argues (*Hom. lxxvii in Matth.*), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge—which is greater—much more is it given to Him to know the less—the time of judgment (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST CAN KNOW THE INFINITE IN THE WORD.

YES.—a) Christ's soul does not know the infinite in the Word, insofar as the infinite is in act; but b) as it is in potentiality.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that an infinite number is never in act, even if we were to reckon all that is in act at any time whatever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last forever. Consequently there are a set number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's soul knows all things that are in the potentiality of the creature, as was said in the previous article. Hence, since creatures are infinite in potentiality, in this way Christ's soul knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, but not by a knowledge of vision.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST SEES THE WORD OR THE DIVINE ESSENCE MORE CLEARLY THAT DOES ANY OTHER CREATURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the vision of the divine essence belongs to all the blessed according to their participation of the light flowing to them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Eccles. i, 5: "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom." But to this Word of God Christ's soul is more closely united (since it is united to the Word in the Person) than is any other creature. Hence it receives more fully the inflowing of light, in which God is seen by the Word Himself, than does any other creature. And therefore it sees more perfectly than all other creatures the First Truth Itself, which is the essence of God, although, absolutely considered, there could be some higher and loftier degree by the infinity of the divine power (Ad 3).

QUESTION XI

THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER BY THIS IMPRINTED OR INFUSED KNOWLEDGE CHRIST KNEW ALL THINGS.

YES.—All things, whether in respect of the natural potentiality of His soul or in respect of its obediential power.

THE REASON is that, as was said (q. ix, art. 1), it was fitting that Christ's soul

should be altogether perfect by having each of its powers reduced to act.

Now in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: One natural, in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the prime agent; and this is usually called the obediencial power in a creature. Now both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge.—First, it knew everything that can be known by man by the power of the light of the active intellect, e.g., whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, it knew everything that is made known to men by divine revelation.

NOTE: Christ before His Passion was not only a wayfarer, but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separated substances in the manner in which they are known by a separated soul (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST COULD USE THIS KNOWLEDGE BY TURNING TO PHANTASMS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the soul of man as wayfarer needs to turn to phantasms by the fact of its being bound to the body. Now Christ in the state before the Passion was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, as will appear more clearly later (q. xv, art. 1). Now it is the condition of the comprehending soul to be in no wise subject to the body, or to depend on it, but to rule it utterly. Hence beatified souls even before the resurrection, and afterwards, can understand without turning to phantasms, although not without intelligible species (Ad 1). And this also must be said of Christ's soul, which fully had the faculty of a comprehensor.

NOTE: Although the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but also for the need of animal life (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS COLLATIVE.

YES.—It was collative (arriving at knowledge by comparing one thing with another), or discursive (passing from one thing to another): a) Not with regard to the acquirement of this knowledge; but b) with regard to its use, just as at times those who know reason from cause to effect, not in order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge that they have.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this knowledge of which we are speaking was divinely infused in Christ, not acquired by a process of reasoning.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ could reason from one thing to another, as He pleased.

NOTE: Regarding the objection that the angels do not have discursive or collative knowledge, as is clear from Dionysius (*De Div. Nom.*, c. 7), it must be said that the blessed are conformed to the angels as regards the gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, but not to angels (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS GREATER THAN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS.

NO.—a) On the part of the influencing cause this knowledge of Christ was impressed in a far more excellent manner than the knowledge of the angels, both with regard to the multitude of objects known, and with regard to the certitude of knowledge; b) but on the part of the receiving subject, i.e., with regard to the manner of knowing, this knowledge of Christ is below the angels' knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the light of spiritual grace, which is imprinted in the soul of Christ, is far more excellent than the light that belongs to the angelic nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the manner of knowing of this knowledge, which is by turning to phantasms and by collection and discursion, is natural to the human soul.

ART. V.—WHETHER THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS HABITUAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's infused knowledge was univocal with our own, for what is received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now the mode connatural to the human soul is to receive knowledge by way of a habit. And

therefore it must be said that the knowledge impressed on Christ's soul was habitual; and He could use it when He wished.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THIS KNOWLEDGE WAS DISTINGUISHED BY DIFFERENT HABITS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the knowledge impressed on Christ's soul had the mode connatural to the human soul. Now it is connatural to the human soul to receive species of a lesser universality than the angels receive, so that it knows different specific natures by different intelligible species. But so happens that we have different habits of knowledge, inasmuch as there are different classes of knowable things. Hence the knowledge impressed on Christ's soul was distinguished by different habits.

QUESTION XII THE ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST KNEW ALL THINGS BY THIS ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as for the perfection of the passive intellect, by which all things are in potentiality, we hold to be in Christ's soul an infused knowledge, whereby it knew everything to which the passive intellect is in any way in potentiality; so for the perfection of the active intellect, whereby all things are in act, it was fitting that there should be in Christ's soul an acquired knowledge, by which it knew everything that can be known by the action of the active intellect.

NOTE: Although all sensible things were not subjected to Christ's bodily senses, yet some sensible things were subjected to His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the most excellent force of His reason. And therefore by this knowledge Christ's soul did not know all things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences of separate substances, or past, present, or future singulars, which, nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above (in body of art, and previous q.),—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST ADVANCED IN ACQUIRED KNOWLEDGE.

YES.—Christ advanced in this acquired knowledge both in the essence or habit of this knowledge and in the effect.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ. Now, since to extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural action of man's active intellect, it seems fitting to place even this action in Christ. And from this it follows that in Christ's soul there was a habit of knowledge, which could increase by this abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract others and others again.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, as He did in age, since as His age increased He wrought greater deeds, which showed greater knowledge and grace.

NOTE: This acquired knowledge in Christ was always perfect for the time being, although it was not always perfect simply, and in comparison to the nature; hence it could increase (Ad 2).

[It is of faith that the beatified and infused knowledge in Christ did not advance, but as regards the acquired knowledge the matter is in controversy among theologians.]

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST LEARNED ANYTHING FROM MAN.

NO.—THE REASON is that Christ was established by God as Head of the Church—indeed, of all men—as was said (q. viii, art. 3), so that not only might all men receive grace through Him, but also that all might receive from Him the doctrine of truth. Hence it did not befit His dignity to be taught by any man; and if sometimes He questioned others, He did this, not in order to learn something, but to teach by questioning (Ad 1). And if sometimes He lent His ear to the words of others, He did

this because what He did was fitting to His age, for the Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST RECEIVED KNOWLEDGE FROM THE ANGELS.

NO.—a) Neither as to empiric knowledge; b) nor as to infused knowledge.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that for empiric or acquired knowledge the angelic light is not requisite, but the light of the active intellect suffices, and this knowledge was perfect in Christ.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that impressed or infused knowledge was also perfect in Christ. For, just as the soul of Christ was united to the Word in the unity of the Person, above the common mode of the creature; so His knowledge and grace were filled with the very Word of God above the common mode of men. Now in the beginning the angels received their knowledge of things from the influence of the Word.

NOTE: This strengthening by the angel, of which we read in Luke xxii, 43, was not for the purpose of instructing Him, but to prove the truth of His human nature, and to strengthen our belief in the Incarnation (Ad 1).

QUESTION XIII THE POWER OF CHRIST'S SOUL

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S SOUL HAD OMNIPOTENCE SIMPLY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the active power of anything follows from its nature. Now the divine nature is no less than the uncircumscribed being of God; hence it is that it has active power with respect to all things that can have the character of being, and this is to have omnipotence. Since, then, Christ's soul is part of human nature, it is impossible that it should have omnipotence.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE WITH REGARD TO THE TRANSMUTATION OF CREATURES.

NO.—THE REASON is that, if we are speaking of Christ's soul in its proper nature and its power of nature or grace, it had power to produce those effects proper to a soul, e.g., to direct the body and to order human acts, and also, by the fullness of grace and knowledge, to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its perfection, in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is to "re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth" (Eph. i, 10). But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they are brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ did not have omnipotence with respect to the transmutation of creatures.

NOTE: The grace of mighty works or miracles was bestowed on Christ's soul in a most excellent manner, in order not only that He might do miracles, but also transmit this grace to others (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN BODY.

NO.—Christ's soul, according to its proper nature and power, could not change its own body from its natural disposition, just as it could not make external bodies swerve from the course and order of nature.

THE REASON is that Christ's soul, in its proper nature, has a determinate relation to its body.—Moreover, just as Christ's soul is an instrument united in person to God's Word, so every disposition of His body was wholly subject to His power. Yet this omnipotence is rather attributed to the Word of God than to Christ's soul, inasmuch as the power of action is not properly attributed to the instrument but to the principal agent.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SOUL OF CHRIST HAD OMNIPOTENCE AS REGARDS THE EXECUTION OF HIS WILL.

YES.—The soul of Christ could do everything by His own power that He willed to do through it.

THE REASON is that it did not befit the wisdom of Christ's soul that He should will to do by Himself what was not subject to His power. Now certain things, such as the resurrection of His own body and other such miraculous deeds, He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said (art. 2 of this q.).

NOTE: With regard to the things that were done by men against the will of Christ, e.g., when they announced His miracles, it can be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be done by it, but what was to be carried out by others, which did not come under His human will (Ad 1). Secondly, this command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to John viii, 50: "I seek not My own glory." Yet He wished absolutely, and especially by His divine will, that the miracle wrought should be published for the good of others (Ad 2).

QUESTION XIV THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SON OF GOD IN HUMAN NATURE OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED DEFECTS OF BODY.

YES.—It was fitting that the body assumed by the Son of God should be subject to human defects and infirmities; and chiefly for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is on account of the end of the Incarnation, because the Son of God, assuming flesh, came into the world in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race. Now one satisfies for the sin of another by taking upon himself the punishment for the other's sin. Hence Is. liii, 4 says of Christ that "He has borne our infirmities."

THE SECOND REASON is for the sake of belief in the Incarnation, because if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, it would seem that He was not true man, or did not have true flesh, but only imaginary flesh, as the Manicheans supposed.

THE THIRD REASON is for the sake of example: Because by valiantly enduring the sufferings and defects of men, He set us an example of patience. Hence it is said, Hebr. xii, 3: "Consider, then, Him who endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, so that you may not grow weary and lose heart."

NOTE: Regarding the difficulty of how Christ's body could have suffered if His soul was blessed, it should be noted that from the natural relationship that is between the soul and the body glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a passible nature. Thus Damascene says (*Orth. Fid., lib. iii, c. 15*) that "it was by the consent of the divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it" (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST ASSUMED THE NECESSITY OF BEING SUBJECT TO THESE DEFECTS.

YES.—a) He did not assume the necessity of constraint, according as such a necessity is repugnant to the divine will or Christ's human will absolutely; but b) He assumed such necessity (of constraint) inasmuch as it is repugnant to the natural movement of the will; c) He also assumed the natural necessity that follows from matter, to wit, that of the body of Christ.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the necessity in Christ of being subjected to defects followed His deliberate reason.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the natural movement of Christ's will naturally shrinks from death, and also bodily hurt.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other such defects; because, as has been said (previous art., ad 2), "it was by the consent of the divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it." This necessity is caused by the principles of human nature.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST CONTRACTED THESE DEFECTS.

NO.—THE REASON is that that is properly said to be contracted that is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and these defects in human nature is sin. But Christ took human nature without sin in the purity in which it stood in the state of innocence; and in like manner He could have assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is evident that Christ did not contract these bodily defects, as if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.

NOTE: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: The first is remote, and results from the material principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is said not to have contracted these defects but to have assumed them (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST OUGHT TO HAVE ASSUMED ALL THE BODILY DEFECTS OF MEN.

NO. a) —Christ did not assume the defects of knowledge and grace, e.g., ignorance, proneness to evil, and difficulty in doing good; b) nor did He assume those defects that follow from certain particular causes, such as leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; c) but He assumed those defects that are found in all men in common as a result of original sin, such as death, hunger, thirst, and the like.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that perfection of knowledge and grace was required in Christ to satisfy for the sin of human nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such defects are sometimes caused by the fault of man, for instance from inordinate eating; sometimes also from a defect of the formative power. Neither of these applied to Christ, because His flesh was conceived by the Holy Spirit, who is of infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and Christ did nothing inordinate in regulating His life.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that Christ ought to have assumed those defects that flow from the common sin of the whole human nature (Ad 2), and therefore they are called natural and indetractable, because they follow from the whole human nature in common, and imply no defect of knowledge and grace in Christ.

QUESTION XV
THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST
(in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE WAS SIN IN CHRIST.

NO.—Christ in no wise assumed the defect of sin, either original or actual, according to the words of I. Pet. ii, 22: "Who did no sin; neither was deceit found in His mouth."

THE REASON is that Christ took our defects upon Himself in order to satisfy for us, to prove the truth of His human nature, and to set us an example of virtue. For these three reasons it is plain that He could not have assumed the defect of sin, as is obvious.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS 'FOMES' OR TINDER OF SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that there belongs to the very nature of the *fomes* an inclination of the sensual appetite to that which is against reason, and therefore to that which is against the nature of virtue. Now in Christ virtue existed in the highest degree. Hence in Christ the *fomes* did not exist. Neither is this defect (of the *fomes*) ordainable to satisfaction, but rather it inclines to the contrary of satisfaction.

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE WAS IGNORANCE IN CHRIST.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as in Christ there was fullness of grace and virtue, so in Him there was fullness of all knowledge, as is clear from the foregoing (q. vii, art. 9, and q. ix, art. 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S SOUL WAS PASSIBLE.

YES.—a) Both in bodily passion; b) and in animal passion, or according to the operation of the soul, which either is proper to the soul, or is of the soul more than of the body.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since the soul is the form of the body, it follows that the being of the soul and the body is one; and therefore when the body is disturbed by some bodily passion, the soul must accidentally be disturbed, namely with regard to the being that it has in the body.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that there were in Christ affections of the sensitive appetite, which are most properly called passions, as are the other things pertaining to human nature.—Yet it must be understood that these passions were different in Christ than in us, and that for three reasons: First, with regard to the object, for in us such passions often tend to what is unlawful; not so in Christ. Secondly, with regard to the principle, for these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all the movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of reason. Thirdly, with regard to the effect, for in us these movements sometimes do not stay in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; not so in Christ.

ART. V.—WHETHER THERE WAS SENSIBLE PAIN IN CHRIST.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that for truth of sensible pain there are required an injury of the body and a feeling of hurt. Now Christ's body could be hurt, because it was passible and mortal; nor did it lack the feeling of hurt, since Christ's soul possessed in perfection all the natural powers. Wherefore there was undoubtedly true pain in Christ.

NOTE: Yet pain was not in Christ on account of the necessity of the guilt of sin; this necessity was not in Christ, but only the necessity of natural principles (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THERE WAS SORROW IN CHRIST.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the object and motive of sorrow is evil apprehended interiorly, either by the reason or the imagination, as was explained in the Second Part (I-II, q. xxxiii, art. 2), as when someone is saddened by the loss of grace or money. Now the soul of Christ could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as was His Passion and death, or to others, as was the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews who killed Him. And thus, just as in Christ there could be true pain, so there could be in Him true sorrow; yet in a different way than in us, according to the three ways above stated (Art. 4 of this q.).

NOTE: Sorrow was not in Christ as a perfect passion, namely as turning man away from what is reasonable; but it was in Him as a *propassion*. Hence it is said (Matth. xxvi, 37): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad." For "it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome says (on Matthew, loc. cit.).—(Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THERE WAS FEAR IN CHRIST.

YES.—In Christ there was fear: a) With respect to imminent future evil; b) but not as regards the uncertainty of the event.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in Christ the sensitive appetite naturally shrank from bodily injury—by sadness if an injury was present, by fear if it was future. This fear, like sadness, Christ voluntarily assumed to prove the truth of His human nature (Ad 2).—Yet this fear was in Christ, not as a perfect passion, but as a *propassion*, as was said concerning sadness (Ad 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since Christ knew everything, there could be in Him no uncertainty as to the outcome.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THERE WAS WONDER IN CHRIST.

YES.—In Christ there was wonder according to His empiric knowledge, but not according to His beatific or even His infused knowledge.

THE REASON is that according to His empiric knowledge He was capable daily of meeting some new things. Hence, although Christ was ignorant of nothing, nevertheless new things could occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder might be caused (Ad 1). But according to His divine, and even His infused, knowledge, there could be nothing in Christ that was new and unwonted.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANGER IN CHRIST.

YES.—There was zealous anger in Christ, according to Ps. lxxviii, 10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten Me up;" but sinful anger was not in Him.

THE REASON is that zealous anger arises from sorrow and a right desire of revenge, i.e., it follows reason and is according to the order of justice. Now these were in Christ. But sinful anger was not in Christ, for this arises from a desire of revenge that goes beyond the order of reason, and thus is a sin.

ART. X.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS AT ONCE A WAYFARER AND A COMPREHENSOR.

YES.—Christ had beatitude with regard to that which is proper to the soul, and thus was a comprehensor; but with regard to other things beatitude was lacking to Him, and thus He was a wayfarer.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Christ fully saw God before His Passion in His mind, and thus He had beatitude with regard to that which is proper to the soul.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that His soul was passible and His body passible and mortal, as was explained above (art. 4 of this q., and q. xiv, art. 1 and 2).

QUESTION XVI

THE THINGS THAT FOLLOW FROM THE UNION WITH REGARD TO WHAT BELONGS TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING, OR THE COMMUNICATION OF IDIOMS, OR THE MANNER OF SPEAKING OF THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

We must next consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us.

Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity. Under the first head there are 12 points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: 'GOD IS MAN.'

YES.—Supposing, according to the truth of Catholic faith, that true divine nature was united with true human nature, not only in person but also in suppositum or hypostasis, we say that this proposition is true and proper: "God is man," not only by the truth of its terms, namely inasmuch as Christ is true God and true man, but also by the truth of the predication.

THE REASON is that a word signifying the common nature in the concrete can stand for any of the things contained under the common nature, as this word *man* can stand for any individual man. And thus this word *God*, from the very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was explained in the First Part (q. xxxix, art. 4). Now of any suppositum of any nature it is possible truly and properly to predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete. Thus of Socrates and Plato we may truly and properly predicate the word *man*. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God, for whom the word *God* stands, is the suppositum of human nature, the word *man* may truly and properly be predicated of the word *God*, when it is used for the Person of the Son of God.—Hence it is said in the Athanasian Creed: "Perfect God and perfect man, consisting of a rational soul and human flesh."

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: 'MAN IS GOD?'

YES.—Supposing the truth of both natures, namely the divine and the human, and their union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: "Man is God," just as this is true: "God is man."

THE REASON is that the word *man* can stand for any hypostasis of human nature and thus can stand for the Person of the Son of God, which we say is an hypostasis of human nature. Now it is evident that the word *God* is truly and properly predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was declared in the First Part (q. xxxix, art. 3 and 4). Hence it is left that this is a true and proper statement: "Man is God."

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST CAN BE CALLED A LORDLY MAN.

NO.—THE REASON is that *God* and *Lord* are predicated essentially of the Person of the Son of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively (and participatively) since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say "lordly" denominatively from *Lord*, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man

is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. On the other side, the human nature is not called *divine* by essence, but *deified*—not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis.

ART. IV.—WHETHER WHAT BELONGS TO THE HUMAN NATURE CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD.

YES.—Contrary to Nestorius, who placed two hypostases in Christ.

THE REASON is that, since it is the same hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis stands for the name of both natures. Therefore, whether we say *man* or *God* the hypostasis of divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

Nevertheless, the things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and the things that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Wherefore, if the things that pertain to defect were attributed to God according to the Divine Nature, it would be blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER WHAT BELONGS TO THE SON OF MAN (THE HUMAN NATURE) CAN BE PREDICATED OF THE DIVINE NATURE, AND WHAT BELONGS TO THE SON OF GOD (THE DIVINE NATURE) BE PREDICATED OF THE HUMAN NATURE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the things that belong to one nature cannot be predicated of another nature, if they are taken in the abstract. Consequently, the things belonging to the Divine Nature are said of the human nature, not as they belong essentially to the Divine Nature, but as they flow by participation to the human nature. Wherefore the things that cannot be participated by the human nature (such as uncreated being or omnipotence) can in no wise be said of the human nature. Again, the Divine Nature receives by participation nothing from the human nature; and therefore the things that belong to the human nature can in no wise be said of the Divine Nature (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: 'GOD WAS MADE MAN'.

YES.—THE REASON is that a thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above (art. 1 of this q.), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature.

NOTE: To be man does not belong to God, absolutely, as is obvious, but relatively, namely by reason of the union. And therefore to be man is predicated newly of God, without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And therefore, when it is said: "God became man," we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: 'MAN WAS MADE GOD'.

NO.—a) This proposition, "Man was made God," is false if the word "made" determines absolutely either the subject or the predicate; b) it is true if the word "made" determines the composition; c) and it is false if it is understood in the proper sense, i.e., as the participle "made" attaches making to man in respect to God, as the term of the making.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this man of whom God is predicated was not made, nor was he made God, as will be explained later (art. 8 and 9 seq.); and in the same sense this is false: "God was made man."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this sense would be: It was brought about that by this assumption of Incarnation Man is God. And in this sense both are true, viz. that Man was made God and that God was made Man.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in this sense, when it is said: Man was made God, the word man has a personal supposition. Now to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now this suppositum of the

human nature, of which to be God is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, who always was God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, that He became God, or that He was made God. But if there were a different person or hypostasis of God and man, so that to be God is predicated of the man, and conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, either of personal dignity, or of affection, or of indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e., joined to God, and that God was made Man, i.e., joined to Man.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: ‘CHRIST IS A CREATURE.’

NO.—It cannot be said absolutely that Christ is a creature, or less than the Father; but with a qualification, i.e., according to His human nature.

THE REASON is that such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature. Thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died, and was buried. Things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply, i.e., without qualification; but we attribute them to the whole, with a qualification, in order that there may be no confusion, and no occasion given to heretics who say that Christ is less than the Father even in His Divine Person.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: ‘THIS MAN, I.E., CHRIST, BEGAN TO BE.’

NO.—It cannot be said that this Man, i.e., Christ, began to be, if nothing is added.

THE FIRST REASON is that in saying “this Man,” i.e. Christ, we designate a suppositum, namely the eternal suppositum, for there is but one suppositum in Christ. Now it is inconsistent with eternity to begin to be.

THE SECOND REASON is that, even if it were true, yet it would not do to use it without a qualification, in order to avoid the heresy of Arius; because Arius ascribed to the Person of the Son of God that He was a creature, and that He was less than the Father, and thus attributed to Him that He began to be, and said that at one time He was not, i.e., that there was some duration when He was not yet the Son of God.

NOTE: This word Man, as it is taken for Christ, although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum, which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false: *This Man Christ began to be*; but this is true: *Christ began to be Man*.

ART. X.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: ‘CHRIST AS MAN IS A CREATURE’?

YES.—a) If in this proposition the word man is added in the reduplicative, by reason of the suppositum, it is false; b) if it is added by reason of the human nature, it is true.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by reason of His human nature, or in His human nature, it belongs to Christ to be a creature, as was stated above (art. 8 of this q.).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: ‘CHRIST AS MAN IS GOD’?

NO.—Even taken in the reduplication of the suppositum, this proposition is rather to be denied than affirmed.

THE REASON is that, although it is true that Christ, as man, is God by reason of His suppositum; yet the term man placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum; for it is added as a predicate and not as a subject. But the human nature of Christ is not God.

ART. XII.—WHETHER THIS IS TRUE: ‘CHRIST AS MAN IS A HYPOSTASIS OR PERSON’?

NO.—a) When it is said: Christ as Man is a person, if it be taken as referring to

the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person; b) if it be taken as referring to the nature, so that it is understood that it belongs to human nature to be a person, in this way also it is true; c) but if the word man is taken as referring to the nature so as to understand that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature, it is false.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is nothing else than the Person of the Son of God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that whatever subsists in human nature is a person.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that Christ's human nature does not exist by itself apart from the divine nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.

QUESTION XVII CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING

We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail. Thus we concluded (q. ix) that there is not only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (q. 35, a. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.

Hence we must consider Christ's unity: 1) Of being; 2) of will; 3) of operation. About the first there are two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST IS ONE OR TWO.

ANSWER: Christ is not two, but one. Christ is not only one in the masculine gender, but also one in the neuter gender.

THE REASON is that in Christ there are one Person, and accordingly Christ is one (in the masculine); and one suppositum, and accordingly He is one (in the neuter). The neuter gender (suppositum) designates something that is unformed and imperfect; whereas the masculine gender (Person) designates something that is formed and perfect. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. But, because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the suppositum that *one* or *two* are predicated of Christ.

ART. II.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE IS ONLY ONE BEING.

YES.—THE REASON is that the human nature is not united to the Son of God accidentally, as some heretics have supposed, but hypostatically, or personally, as was stated above (q. ii, art. 5 and 6). It follows that no new personal being accrues to Him according to the human nature, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist, not merely in the divine, but also in the human nature.

QUESTION XVIII THE THINGS PERTAINING TO CHRIST'S UNITY OF WILL (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE ARE TWO WILLS.

YES.—We must say that in Christ there are two wills, one divine, the other human.

THE REASON is that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (q. ii, art. 5). Now for the perfection of human nature a will is essential, for a will, like an intellect, is a natural power of that nature, as is patent from what has been said in the First Part. Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a will with His human nature.

NOTE: Besides the divine will, we must place in Christ a human will, not only as it is a natural power, or as it is a natural movement, but also as it is a rational movement (Ad 3). Yet whatever was in the human nature of Christ was always moved by the movement of the divine will; it does not, however, follow that there was not in Christ a movement of will proper to His human nature, for even in the other saints their pious wills are moved according to the will of God, who works in them both the will and the performance (Philipp. ii).—(Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS A WILL OF SENSUALITY BEFORE THE WILL OF REASON.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Son of God assumed human nature with everything that is essential to the perfection of human nature. Now human nature includes animal nature, just as the genus is included in the species. Hence it follows that the Son of God assumed, together with the human nature, also all that is essential to the perfection of animal nature, among which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the will of sensuality, insofar as its nature is to obey reason; and it is called will by participation.

NOTE: By sensuality we do not here understand the appetitive power that is vicious, or rebels against reason, but the natural faculty itself.

ART. III.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WERE TWO WILLS AS REGARDS THE REASON.

NO.—If we are speaking of the power of the will, there is in Christ but one human will, in the essential and not the participative meaning of the word. But if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called *thelesis*, and is borne to the end; and a will as reason, which is called *boulesis*, or the counseling will.

THE REASON is that the act of the will according as it is borne toward something that is willed in itself, such as health, is called by Damascene *thelesis*, i.e., simple will, and by the masters is called *will as nature*. This will is distinct from the act of will, according as it is borne toward something that is willed only in relation to something else, such as the taking of medicine, which act of will Damascene calls *boulesis*, i.e., counseling will, and by the masters is called *will as reason*. This diversity of act does not, however, diversify the power, because both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS FREE WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the proper act of the free will is choice, or *will as reason* (*boulesis*), as was stated above (q. lxxxiii, art. 3 and 4). Hence when we place in Christ a will as reason, i.e., a counseling will, we must also place in Him choice, and consequently free will.

NOTE: Christ's will, although it is determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free will confirmed in good (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST'S HUMAN WILL WAS ALTOGETHER CONFORMED TO THE DIVINE WILL IN THE THING WILLED.

NO.—Christ according to the will of sensuality, and according to the will of reason, which is considered after the manner of nature, could will something other than God; but, according to the will that is considered after the manner of reason, He always willed what God willed, as is evident from the fact that He said: "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt" (Matth. xxvi, 39).

THE REASON is that by virtue of a dispensation the Son of God before His Passion permitted His flesh to do and suffer what was proper to it; similarly He also permitted all the powers of His soul to do and suffer what was proper to it, as was stated before (q. xiv, art. 1). Yet He willed, by His reason, to fulfill the divine will, although He said that He willed something else by another will.

NOTE: By His rational will Christ willed the divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God—or by His will considered as nature, which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the divine will (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS CONTRARIETY OF WILLS.

NO.—Although the natural will and the will of sensuality in Christ willed something else than the divine will and the will of reason, there was not in Him any contrariety of wills.

THE REASON is that neither the natural will (i.e., as nature) nor the will of

sensuality repudiated that reason—that is, the divine will—and the will of human reason in Christ willed the Passion. For in Christ even the absolute will (i.e., considered absolutely and in itself, as nature) willed the salvation of the human race, but it did not belong to it to will this in relation to something else. Now the movement of sensuality could not extend to this. Likewise, neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was thwarted or held back by the natural will, or by the appetite of sensuality. So too, on the other hand, neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His divine will and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature. Hence it is evident that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

NOTE: 1.—The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the divine will proceeded from the divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements (Ad 1).

2.—The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason's considering one thing, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His Passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial (Ad 3).

QUESTION XIX THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S OPERATION (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE IS ONLY ONE OPERATION OF THE GODHEAD AND MANHOOD.

NO.—THE REASON is that, wherever the mover and the thing moved have different forms, or operative powers, there must be operation for the mover and another proper to the thing moved, although the thing moved partakes of the operation of the mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the thing moved; and consequently each acts in communion with the other.

Thus in Christ the human nature has its own form and power, by which it acts, and so also has the divine nature. Hence the human nature has its own operation, distinct from the divine nature, and conversely. And yet the divine nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the divine nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (*Ep. ad Flavianum* xxxviii): "Both forms (i.e., both the divine and the human nature in Christ) do what is proper to each in union with the other, i.e., the Word operates what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to the flesh."

Hence when Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i.e., a God-manlike or divino-human, operation, this operation is not by any confusion of the operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His divine operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the power of the divine, as has been said (Ad 1).—Neither is plurality of operations inconsistent with personal unity (Ad 4), because each of the operations at one and the same time is numerically one, as one walking and one healing (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE ARE SEVERAL HUMAN OPERATIONS.

NO.—Far more than in any other man, there is but one (human) operation in Christ.

THE REASON is that in every man there are, besides the operation that is properly human, i.e., that which proceeds from the reason through the will, other operations, namely the elemental operation (or the operation of the elements) of the body, as to be borne downwards; and the operation of the vegetative soul, such as nutrition and growth, which do not proceed from the will and reason, and hence are not simply human; and there are also operations of the sensitive soul that in some manner only are

rational and human, inasmuch, that is, as they obey reason. Contrariwise, there was in the man Jesus Christ no movement of the sensitive part that was not ordered by reason. The natural and bodily operations themselves in some manner belonged to His will, insofar as it was His will that His flesh should do and suffer what was proper to it, as was said before (preceding q., art. 5).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HUMAN ACTION OF CHRIST COULD BE MERITORIOUS IN HIM.

YES.—Christ merited neither grace, nor knowledge, nor the beatitude of His soul, nor His Godhead; but He did have by merit the glory of His body, and the things that pertain to His outward excellence, such as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest.

THE REASON is that to have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it from another. Hence what is had by merit is more excellent than that which is had without merit. Now since every perfection and nobility must be ascribed to Christ, it follows that He had by merit what others have by merit, unless this be such that the lack of it would have diminished Christ's dignity and perfection more than it would have increased it by merit. Hence Christ merited neither grace nor knowledge and the rest, because, since merit regards only what is not yet possessed, it would be necessary for Christ at one time to have been without these, and to be without them would lessen Christ's dignity more than merit would have increased it. But glory of body, or anything similar, is less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity.

NOTE: The first cause of whatever good we possess by authority is God. Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, of having certain good things, inasmuch as he co-operates with God in the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a manner, of himself (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST COULD MERIT FOR OTHERS.

YES.—As the Head of the Church.

THE REASON is that in Christ grace existed not only as it does in every individual man, but also as in the Head of the Whole Church, to which all are united, as members to the head, from which members one Mystical Person is constituted. Hence it is that Christ's merit extends to others, insofar as they are His members; even as in a man the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.

QUESTION XX CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER

We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father, e.g., that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's relation to Him, e.g., that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him.

Hence we must consider 1) Christ's subjection to the Father; 2) His prayer; 3) His priesthood; 4) adoption—whether it was becoming to Him; 5) His predestination. Under the first head come two points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER WE MAY SAY THAT CHRIST IS SUBJECT TO THE FATHER.

YES.—Christ was subject to the Father, not simply, but according to His human nature; and that in respect to goodness, subservience, and obedience.

THE REASON is that by virtue of its condition human nature has a threefold subjection to God. One subjection regards the degree of goodness, insofar, namely, as the divine nature is the very essence of goodness. Now created nature has a certain participation of the divine goodness, as being subject, so to say, to the rays of goodness. Secondly, created nature is subject to God as regards His power, insofar, that is, as human nature, like any other creature, is subject to the operation of divine ordinance. Thirdly, it is subject as regards its own act, insofar, namely as by its own will it obeys God's commands.

And this threefold subjection to the Father Christ professes of Himself. The first is found in Matth. xix, 17: "Why dost thou ask me about what is good? One there is who

is good, that is, God." By these words He gave us to understand that He Himself, of His human nature, did not attain to the height of divine goodness.

The second subjection (of subservience) is attributed to Christ inasmuch as all that befell Christ as regards His manhood is believed to have happened by divine appointment. Hence Dionysius says (*Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 4) that Christ was subject to the ordinances of God the Father. And this is the subjection of subservience, according as every creature serves God, being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. xvi, 24: "The creature serving Thee, the Creator." And in this way the Son of God is said to have taken the form of a servant (Phil. ii, 7).

The third form of subjection Christ ascribed to Himself (John viii, 29), in the words: "I do always the things that please Him." And this is the subjection of obedience to the Father even unto death. Hence it is said (Phil. ii, 8) that He became obedient to the Father even unto death.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST IS SUBJECT TO HIMSELF.

YES.—According to the diversity of natures in one Person or hypostasis of Christ, it can be said that Christ was subject to Himself, according to His human nature.

THE REASON is that Christ according to His divine nature, in which He agrees with the Father, presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He is subject to the Godhead, and serves.

QUESTION XXI

THE PRAYER OF CHRIST

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS BECOMING TO CHRIST TO PRAY.

YES.—THE REASON is that in Christ, besides the divine will, there is also a human will. But the human will is not by itself effective to execute whatever He wishes by it, except by the divine power. Hence it is that to Christ, as one who is a man and possessing a human will, it belongs to pray; for prayer is as it were an explanation of our will to God, that He may fulfill it. Moreover, Christ prayed for our own instruction, that He might give us an example of prayer (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT PERTAINS TO CHRIST TO PRAY ACCORDING TO HIS SENSUALITY.

NO.—a) Christ did not pray according to His sensuality, if prayer be taken for that act of sensuality; b) He did, however, pray according to His sensuality in the sense that in praying His prayer proposed to God what was in the desire of His sensuality.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in Christ the sensuality was of the same nature and species as in us. Now in us the sensuality cannot pray, both because the movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and because prayer implies a certain ordering, inasmuch as we desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is proper to the reason alone.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this sense His prayer expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of the sensuality, as when He said (Matth. xxvi, 39): "Let this chalice pass from Me."

ART. III.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD PRAY FOR HIMSELF.

YES.—It was fitting that Christ should pray for Himself, not only by expressing the desire of His sensuality, or also the desire of His simple will, which is considered as nature, as when He prayed that the chalice of His Passion should pass from Him, as has been said (prec. art.), but also by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is considered as reason, as when He sought the glory of His resurrection.

THE REASON is that it was fitting that Christ should set us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that He possesses in the human nature. Hence, just as He gave thanks to the Father for the good things that He had already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as can be seen in Matth. xxvi and John xi, 41, so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His

body, and the like. And in this too He gave us an example, that we should give thanks for benefits received, and ask in prayer for those we have not as yet.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PRAYER WAS ALWAYS HEARD.

YES.—a) Every absolute will of Christ, or the will of reason, was fulfilled; b) but not everything that He willed according to His sensuality, or the will considered as nature, was fulfilled.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the will of reason, which is will simply so called, is that according to which we will absolutely; and this, in Christ, was always conformed to God; consequently every prayer of His was heard.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the will of sensuality, or even of the simple will, which is considered as nature, is not properly to be called will, but *velleity*, because one would will (*vellet*), if there were no obstacle.

QUESTION XXII THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE A PRIEST.

YES.—It is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.

THE REASON is that it is properly the office of a priest to be a mediator between God and the people, insofar, that is, as He transmits the things of God to the people; hence He is called a priest (*sacerdos*) as one who gives sacred things (*sacra dams*); and insofar as He offers to God the prayers of the people and in some manner makes satisfaction to God for their sins. Hence the Apostle says (Hebr. v, 1): "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Now this is most befitting Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to II Petr. i, 4: "By whom He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature."—Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God, according to Coloss. i, 19: "In Him [Christ] it hath well pleased [the Father] that all fullness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things."

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BOTH PRIEST AND VICTIM.

YES.—Christ, as Man, not only was a priest but also a perfect victim, at one and the same time being the victim for sin, a victim for a peace-offering, and a holocaust.

THE REASON is that by His humanity, which Christ immolated to God for us, our sins were blotted out, for He was "delivered up for our sins" (Rom. iv, 25). Moreover, we have received the grace of salvation through Him, according to Hebr. v, 9: "He became to all who obey Him the cause of eternal salvation."—And, finally, through Him we have acquired the perfection of glory (Hebr. x, 19): "We have a confidence in the entering into the Holies [i.e., heavenly glory] through His blood."

Now all this has the character of a perfect victim: for it is for these three reasons that a sacrifice is offered to God: 1) For the forgiveness of sin, by which we are turned from God; 2) that we may be preserved in the state of grace, always adhering to God, in whom His peace and salvation consist; and 3) that the spirit of man may be perfectly united to God, which will especially be true in heaven.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF CHRIST'S PRIESTHOOD IS THE EXPIATION OF SINS.

Yes.—Christ's priesthood has full power to expiate sins.

THE REASON is that the priesthood of Christ not only blots out the stain of sin, e.g., through grace, whereby our hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. iii, 24: "They are justified freely by His grace through the redemption, which is in Christ Jesus, whom God has set forth as a propitiation by His blood through faith;" but also the debt of punishment is wholly taken away by His making full satisfaction for us, insofar as "He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows" (Is. liii, 4).

NOTE: Although Christ was a priest, not as God but as man, yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore insofar as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins (Ad 1).

Sins are commemorated in the New Law, in regard to those who either are not

willing to be participators in His sacrifice, or who, after taking part in the sacrifice, fall away from it by any kind of sin (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF CHRIST'S PRIESTHOOD PERTAINED NOT ONLY TO OTHERS BUT ALSO TO HIMSELF.

NO.—THE REASON is that Christ could approach God by Himself, according to Hebr. vii, 25: "He is able at all times to save those who come to God through Him, since He lives always to make intercession for them." Hence He did not need a mediator. Now a priest is so called from His being appointed a mediator between God and man. Hence it was not fitting for Christ to receive the effect of His priesthood. This also appears from the fact that the agent in every genus is such that it receives nothing in that genus. The sun, for example, gives but does not receive light. Now Christ is the fountain of the whole priesthood.

NOTE: Other priests partake of the effect of their priesthood, not as priest, but as sinners, as will be explained later (foll. art., first argument). But Christ, simply speaking, had no sin, though He had the likeness of sin in His flesh, as is said in Rom. viii, 3. Hence we must not say simply that He partook of the effect of His priesthood, but with this qualification—in respect to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore the Apostle adds pointedly, "that was able to save Him from death" (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST ENDURES FOREVER.

YES.—Not by reason of the offering of the sacrifice, but by reason of its consumption.

THE REASON is that the consumption of the sacrifice consists in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now such an end is the eternal good that we acquired through Christ's death. Hence it is said in Hebr. ix, 12 that Christ is "a high priest of the good things to come," by reason of which Christ's priesthood is called eternal.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST WAS ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF MELCHISEDECH.

YES.—Christ's priesthood is said to be according to the order of Melchisedech on account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the Levitical priesthood foreshadowed by the Law.

THE REASON is that the excellence of Christ's priesthood was foreshadowed in the priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed.

NOTE: The legal, or Levitical, priesthood, which was a foreshadow of the priesthood of Christ, neither cleansed from sin nor was eternal, and in this it fell far short of the priesthood of Christ (in body of art.).—But as regards the offering made by Christ, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech, in which there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ's priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, and thus signified, as Augustine says (*Tract xxvi, in Joan.*), ecclesiastical unity, which is established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXIII

THE ADOPTION OF CHRIST

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD ADOPT SONS.

YES.—THE REASON is that a man adopts someone as his son inasmuch as out of goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely good; for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things, i.e., to the enjoyment of Himself, by which God also is blessed.

NOTE: Divine exceeds human adoption, inasmuch as God, by bestowing His

grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy (at end of art.).—Likewise, as by the work of creation the divine goodness is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men, according to Rom. viii, 29: "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT THE WHOLE TRINITY SHOULD ADOPT.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although to beget in the Godhead is proper to the person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in creatures is common to the whole Trinity, on account of the unity of the divine nature. For wherever there is one nature there must be one virtue and one operation. Hence Our Lord says (John v, 19): "Whatever He [the Father] does, this the Son also does in like manner."

Although adoption is common to the whole Trinity, it is appropriated to the Father as author, to the Son as exemplar, and to the Holy Spirit as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO THE RATIONAL NATURE TO BE ADOPTED.

YES.—By grace and charity.

THE REASON is that in adoption the creature is likened to the Word of God according to the unity that the Word has with the Father. This results through grace and charity, according to John xvii, 22: "That they may be one in us . . . as We also are one." And this likeness perfects the adoption; for to those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. Hence (Rom. viii, 5) the Holy Spirit is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons."

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST AS MAN IS THE ADOPTED SON OF GOD.

NO.—Christ, who is the natural Son of God, can in no wise be called the adoptive Son.

THE REASON is that sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; for sonship is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other person or hypostasis than the uncreated Person, to whom it belongs to be Son by nature. But adoption is the participated likeness of natural sonship. Hence, as sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption (but it belongs to the person).—(Ad 1).

NOTE: Habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but it is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to John i, 14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

QUESTION XXIV
THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST
(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS BEFITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE PREDESTINATED.

YES.—By reason of the union of the natures of the Person of Christ, which took place in time.

THE REASON is that predestination is properly taken as a divine foreordination from eternity concerning the things that are to be done in time through the grace of God. Now the union of the natures, which took place in the Person of Christ through the grace of union in time, was foreordained by God from eternity—otherwise it would follow that something would come anew into the divine mind.

NOTE: The predestination of Christ is not to be understood in respect of His human nature, but in respect of His Person; for we do not say that anyone's nature is predestinated, but his suppositum. Yet predestination is ascribed to the Person of Christ, not considered in itself, or as subsisting in the divine nature, but as subsisting in the human nature (Ad 2), because, namely, that Person, although it was from eternity the Son of God, yet it was not always the Son of God as subsisting in the human nature; for

there was a time when it began to be true that One existing in human nature was the Son of God (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS PROPOSITION IS FALSE: CHRIST AS MAN WAS PREDESTINATED TO BE THE SON OF GOD.

NO.—Predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of the human nature alone, and this both on the part of eternal predestination, according to which it implies a certain precedence in respect of that which falls under predestination, and on the part of the temporal effect, which is a gratuitous gift of God.

THE REASON is that the human nature was not always united to the Word, and by the grace bestowed on it it was united in Person to the Son of God. Hence only by reason of His human nature does predestination belong to Christ. In this way it must be said that "Christ, as man, is predestinated to be the Son of God."—We say also that Christ was predestinated in respect of His human nature; because predestination is referred to the exaltation of human nature in Him (Ad 2). But the words, "as man," are not to be taken materially, so that the meaning is that it was predestined that Christ, as man, should be the Son of God, for this would be clearly false (Ad 1).

NOTE: Because this assumption comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to be the Son of God. Yet because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God, it is more proper to say that Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God, than that Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PREDESTINATION IS THE EXEMPLAR OF OUR OWN.

YES.—Not on the part of the act itself of predestination; b) but on the part of that to which a man is predestined, i.e., on the part of the term and the effect of predestination, and in respect of the manner of obtaining this good.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God has predestined us and Christ in one manner and by the same act.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that He [Christ] was predestinated to be the natural Son of God; whereas we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, which is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Hence it is said in Rom. viii, 29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son." And this is in respect to the good effect to which we are predestinated. Regarding the manner of obtaining that good, which comes through grace, the predestination of Christ is also the exemplar of our predestination, because the human nature in Christ was united to the Son of God without any preceding merits of its own, as is evident; for of the fullness of His grace we have all received, as is said in John i, 16.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PREDESTINATION IS THE CAUSE OF OURS.

YES.—Not in respect of the act, but in respect of the term of predestination.

THE REASON is that, in respect of the very act of predestinating, God predestinated Christ and ourselves by one and the same act. But, in respect of the term, because there falls under eternal predestination not only that which is to be done in time, but also the manner and order in which it is to be accomplished in time, Christ's predestination is the cause of our own.

QUESTION XXV

THE ADORATION OF CHRIST

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S HUMANITY AND GODHEAD ARE TO BE ADORED WITH ONE AND THE SAME ADORATION.

YES.—a) on the part of that which is adored, one and the same is the adoration of Christ's Divinity and His humanity; b) but the causes of the adoration and honor due to Christ are two.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in Christ there is only one Person for the divine and the human nature. Now honor and adoration are not properly shown to

parts, but to the whole of a subsisting thing; for we do not honor the foot or the garment, save by reason of him to whom the foot or the garment belongs.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in Christ there are two operations (Ad 2), which are two causes of the same honor and adoration; for there are due to Christ honor and adoration, both on account of the excellence of His uncreated wisdom and on account of the excellence of His created wisdom.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S HUMANITY SHOULD BE ADORED WITH THE ADORATION OF LATRIA.

YES.—a) Christ's humanity is adored with the adoration of latria by reason of that to which the humanity belongs; b) it is adored by the adoration of dulia, and indeed of hyperdulia, by reason of the humanity itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the Word of God Incarnate, just as to adore the King's robe is nothing else than to adore the King robed. And in this respect the adoration of Christ's humanity is the adoration of latria.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's humanity has excellence and is perfect in every gift of grace. Hence to the humanity of Christ, thus understood, is due the adoration of dulia—not any kind of dulia, such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher adoration, called hyperdulia (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE IMAGE OF CHRIST SHOULD BE ADORED WITH THE ADORATION OF LATRIA.

YES.—a) To the image of Christ, insofar as it is a certain thing (e.g., a piece of carved wood or a picture) no reverence is due; but b) reverence is due to it as it is the image of Christ.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that reverence is due only to a rational nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the same reverence is due to an image of Christ as to Christ Himself. For the movement to the image, insofar as it is an image, is one and the same as that which is to the thing, as Aristotle says (*On Memory and Reminiscence*, c. 2). Since therefore Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that His image should be adored with the adoration of latria.

NOTE: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of latria were shown to the rational creature in which the image of God is, there might be an occasion of error—namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, whose image he is. This cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible material (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S CROSS SHOULD BE WORSHIPED WITH THE ADORATION OF LATRIA.

YES.—Both the cross on which Christ was crucified and any other representation of the cross of Christ is to be adored with the adoration of latria.

THE REASON is that the cross on which Christ was crucified presents us with the figure of Christ extended on it; and moreover it has contact with the members of Christ, and was bathed with His blood. Now the representation of the Cross of Christ in any other material, for example, stone, or wood, silver or gold, is an image of Christ, which we venerated with the adoration of latria, as was said before (prec. art.).

NOTE: The Cross of Christ, although it was not united to the Word of Christ in Person, was united to Him in some other manner, namely by representation and contact (Ad 2). And by reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we worship not only the Cross, but all that belongs to Christ, namely the nails, the garments, and the lance; and His sacred tabernacles, which are the manger, the cave, and the like. Yet these things do not represent the image of Christ, as does the Cross, which is called the sign of the Son of Man. Hence it is that we venerate the Cross of Christ in any material, but not the image of the nails, or of any such thing (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE MOTHER OF GOD SHOULD BE WORSHIPED WITH THE ADORATION OF LATRIA.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that the worship of latria is due to no mere rational creature. Since, then, the Blessed Virgin is a pure rational creature, the adoration of latria is not due to her, but only the veneration of dulia; but this is due to her more eminently than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God; and therefore it is said that there is due to her, not any sort of dulia, but the worship of hyperdulia.

NOTE: The Cross, considered in itself, is not an object of veneration, as stated above (prec. art.), but the Blessed Virgin is in herself an object of veneration; hence there is no comparison (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ANY KIND OF WORSHIP IS DUE TO THE RELICS OF THE SAINTS.

YES.—In a fitting manner.

THE REASON is that he who has a certain affection for anyone venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but also external things, such as his clothes, and the like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner; especially their bodies, which were temples and organs of the Holy Spirit dwelling and working within them, and which are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles in their presence.

QUESTION XXVI

CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MEN

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO CHRIST TO BE THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN.

YES.—To Christ it belongs to be the mediator simply and perfectly; to others, dispositively and ministerially.

THE REASON is that it properly belongs to a mediator to join and unite those between whom he mediates. Now to unite men to God perfectly belongs to Christ, through whom men are reconciled to God through His death. Hence the Apostle, after saying: "Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus," added: "Who gave Himself a redemption for all." Some persons co-operate in the union of men with God dispositively or ministerially, insofar as they are ministers of the true Mediator, by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men (Ad 1).

NOTE: The good angels are not rightly called mediators between God and men, because they do not have, in common with men, either miseries or mortality. Yet they are called mediators ministerially and dispositively, insofar as they are, in the order of nature, established below God and above men, and exercise the office of mediator. As to the demons, they have unhappiness, unhappiness with men, and desire to lead them to immortal unhappiness; and thus the demon is a wicked mediator, who separates friends. But Christ had mortality in common with men, in order that, after His mortality had passed, He might make us who once were mortal immortal (which He proved by rising again), and make those who once were unhappy happy. Wherefore He never forsook us. Consequently He is the good mediator, who reconciles enemies (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST, AS MAN, IS THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MEN.

YES.—Christ is most truly called the mediator as man.

THE REASON is that for the character of mediator two things are requisite—to be distant from both extremes, and to unite the things that belong to one by communicating them to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For as God He does not differ from the Father, nor does the Father have anything that is not the Son's. As man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man, in the dignity of grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men.

QUESTION XXVII

THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN

After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to Him. This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider 1) those things that relate to His coming into the world; 2)

those things that relate to the course of His life in this world; 3) His departure from this world; 4) those things that concern his exaltation after this life.

The first of these offers four points of consideration: 1) The conception of Christ; 2) His birth; 3) His circumcision; 4) His Baptism. Concerning His conception there are some points to be considered: 1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; 2) as to the mode of His conception; 3) as to the perfection of the offspring conceived.

On the part of the Mother, four points offer themselves to our consideration: 1) Her sanctification; 2) her virginity; 3) her espousals; 4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception. Concerning the first point there are six heads of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN MOTHER OF GOD WAS SANCTIFIED BEFORE HER BIRTH FROM THE WOMB.

YES.—It is reasonably believed that the Blessed Virgin Mary was sanctified in the womb.

(NOTE: After the dogmatic definition of the year 1854 it is of faith that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified, not only before her birth, but in the very instant of her conception, and that by a special privilege, and on the strength of the foreseen merits of Christ, as is expressly declared in the dogmatic definition.)

THE REASON is that, although in the canonical Scriptures nothing is handed down concerning this, yet it is reasonable to believe that she who brought forth "the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," received greater privileges of grace than all others. Hence we read in Luke i, 28 that the angel addressed her in the words: "Hail, full of grace!" Moreover, we find that it was granted to others, by way of a privilege, to be sanctified in the womb, as for instance to John the Baptist, of whom it is written (Luke i, 15): "He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from His Mother's womb." Hence it is with reason that we believe that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN WAS SANCTIFIED BEFORE ANIMATION.

NO.—THE Blessed Virgin was not (and could not be) sanctified before, but was sanctified afterwards.—Note that according to St. Thomas the preposition *after* can pertain either to nature or time. The opinion of St. Thomas would seem to be capable of interpretation according to the sense of the dogmatic definition, by taking *after* as signifying the after of nature, that is, *together with*, as may be seen in the subsequent note.

THE FIRST REASON is that sin cannot be cleansed save through grace, the subject of which is only the rational creature. (Now a creature becomes rational by animation, i.e., by the infusion of a soul into the body, and in the act of animation). Hence *before* the infusion of a rational soul the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified.—(That the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the very act of animation, the Holy Doctor by no means denies. In fact, in his reply to objection three he says that the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin is not to be wholly reprobated because it is not known at what time she was sanctified.)

THE SECOND REASON is that, since only the rational creature is capable of sin, *before* the infusion of the rational soul the offspring conceived was not subject to sin.

THE THIRD REASON is that if, *before* her animation, the Blessed Virgin was in any manner sanctified, she would never have incurred the stain of original sin (even as regards bodily conception), and thus would not have needed redemption and salvation, which is through Christ. The Blessed Virgin was conceived (we do not say *animated*) according to the concupiscence of the flesh from the mingling of male and female. Now Augustine says (*De Nuptiis et Concup.*, lib. I, c. 12): "All flesh born of carnal intercourse is sinful" (Ad 3).

ABRIDGER'S NOTE: It is well to consider, for an understanding of the mind of St. Thomas in this extremely important article, that the Holy Doctor clearly distinguishes between conception and animation. For he says that "our flesh is conceived before it is animated" (P. III, q. vi, art. 4, ad 2), i.e., "before it is animated by a rational soul. Hence the Holy Doctor seems to admit that the Blessed Virgin incurred sin dispositively, as it were, in the act of conception according to the concupiscence of the flesh, namely from the intercourse of her parents, but not in her animation. For

he says in this article, ad 4; "The Blessed Virgin contracted original sin when she was conceived according to the concupiscence of the flesh from the intercourse of male and female." Now the human soul, immediately upon being created by God and simultaneously infused into the body, is not, certainly, subject to sin, but becomes so subject in the first instant of the animation of the corrupted body, or in the sin of the person conceived. The Blessed Virgin, by a special divine privilege, did not incur sin in her bodily animation. In the dogmatic definition the word animation does not occur, but the word conception is found. It seems to me certain that the word conception in the dogmatic definition signifies the same thing as animation; for it does not seem correct to say that the Blessed Virgin was preserved immune before the creation and infusion of her soul; for the Blessed Virgin did not exist before the creation of her soul. If, then, according to St. Thomas, we hold in mind the distinction between conception and animation, as has been said, there seems to be nothing in him to militate against the dogmatic definition.

This distinction of St. Thomas between conception and animation appears more and more in two articles, namely in the first and second of question xxxiii, in this Third Part. In the first article he asks: "Whether the body of Christ was animated in the first instant of His conception." Now, there appears a distinction between conception and animation in the mind of the Angelic Doctor. There are three things in bodily conception: The local movement of the blood to the place of generation (art 1 of this q.), and this movement results from the intercourse of male and female; and has the impurity of lust (q. xxxi art. 5, ad 3); secondly, the formation of the body from this particular matter; thirdly, the increase by which it is brought to full growth (q. xxxiii, art. 1). Now the proper notion of conception is contained in the middle process.

But in order that the soul may be infused into the body due quantity in matter is requisite (loc. cit., ad 2). This is all done before animation, i.e., before the soul exists.—

Likewise, the Holy Doctor admitted a succession of souls in the formation of a human being. For he says (q. xxxiii, art. 2, ad 3): "In the generation of other men [save Christ] there applies what the Philosopher says, namely that in human generation there are required a before and after, inasmuch as the body is successively formed and ordered to receive the soul. Consequently, the body first receives an imperfect soul (as being itself imperfectly disposed), and afterwards, when it is perfectly disposed, it receives a perfect soul, that is, a rational soul."

Hence according to St. Thomas there is in human generation—therefore also in the generation of the Blessed Virgin—a succession of animations, in which there is the corruption of the lust of original sin before we come to the infusion of the rational soul, which alone is capable of grace and redemption. The Holy Doctor, however, by no means denies that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the first instant of her perfect animation, since in that first instant her soul was capable of grace; for the Blessed Virgin was sanctified afterwards, that is, when she was entirely completed, namely as to both body and soul, as he says in our article (q. xxvii, art. 2, in *Sed contra*).

Thus it would seem that we can retain the opinion of St. Thomas, unless in the dogmatic definition we understand by the words "in the first instant of her conception," a conception before perfect animation, as if it were said that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation, by a rational soul; or that by the word "conception" we understand the actual animation, as if it were said that the rational soul is immediately infused in that first instant of conception, that is, of the fecundation of the womb.

This does not seem likely; for in the first case it would be of faith that the Blessed Virgin was capable of grace before the creation of her rational soul; in the second case, it would be of faith that her perfect animation took place in the very first instant of fecundation: But this is not of faith, as is obvious, because to say otherwise would be heretical.

As far as we know, this question about the moment of the infusion of a rational soul into the body is still free. Hence by the word "conception," as expressed in the dogmatic definition, it is reasonable to understand "animation," i.e., the infusion of a rational soul, and then there is nothing in the opinion of St. Thomas, which he expounds in the *Summa Theologica*, that is against faith, but rather is the dogma explained. This is our brief defense of St. Thomas, which, of course, we sincerely and humbly subject to the final judgment of the Church.

When, however, the Holy Doctor says that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified *after* her animation, he by no means denies that she was sanctified in her actual animation; for *after* the word of *nature* he indicates a simultaneousness of cause and effect, as the sun and its ray (Cf. P. III, q. xxxiv, art. 2, ad 1).

That this was the mind of the Holy Doctor seems to be evident from the following: 1) In the *Sed contra* of this article he says: "The Blessed Virgin was not sanctified until after everything in her was perfected, namely body and soul." Now this "everything was perfected" was in the first instant of her animation, as is evident. Therefore, according to the Holy Doctor, the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in that first instant of her animation.

2) In other passages the Holy Doctor expressly teaches that the Blessed Virgin was immune from original sin. Thus, for instance, in *Sent., lib. I, Dist. 44, q. 1*, where he says: "Such was the purity of the Blessed Virgin that she was immune from actual and original sin." Nor does the Holy Doctor seem to have ever retracted this opinion.—

3) The Holy Doctor clearly teaches that, if other saints were sanctified before their birth, the Blessed Virgin, to whom, under Christ, "there belonged the greatest purity," should more than they have had this grace—and indeed a greater grace.—

4) In his reply to 3 in this article he says that "it is not known when she was sanctified;" and therefore the Feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin is not, he says, to be entirely rejected. (He does not speak here of animation but of conception; if, then, the celebration of the Feast of the Conception is not to be wholly rejected, how much more is the celebration of the feast of her animation to be admitted?)

5) If the Holy Doctor had decided against the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin in the first instant he would have cited the authority of doctors of the Church to corroborate such an opinion—of doctors such as St. Bernard, who held a different opinion.—Hence the words of the Holy Doctor in the reply to 2, namely that "the soul of the Blessed Virgin was stained by the contagion of original sin, otherwise she would lessen the dignity of Christ, according to which He is the universal Savior of all men," are to be understood according to the distinction of St. Thomas (if these are actually his words, for this is greatly in doubt), namely that the Blessed Virgin's soul was dispositively stained by sin by reason of her conception, "according to the concupiscence of the flesh arising from the intercourse of male and female."

For in this sense, she would have to incur sin; yet she did by no means incur it, since she was sanctified in her actual animation. Thus, then, although in this article the Holy Doctor seems at first sight to teach a contrary opinion to that which the Church has afterwards defined, after six centuries, yet, upon a due consideration of all points, it must be said that the words of the Holy Doctor, if a distinction is made between conception and animation, can and should be interpreted conformably to the dogmatic definition. This our humble opinion concerning the teaching of St. Thomas would seem to be confirmed by the subsequent articles of this question.—Paris

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN WAS CLEANSED FROM THE INFECTION OF THE FOMES.

YES.—The *fomes* remained in essence in the Blessed Virgin after her sanctification; yet it was suspended as regards exercise and operation until the conception of the Son of God, at which time it was wholly taken away.

THE REASON is that freedom from damnation according to the flesh should first have appeared in the actual incarnation of Christ, and not before. For, just as before the immortality of Christ's risen flesh no one attained the immortality of the flesh, so it would seem unfitting to say that, before Christ's flesh, in which there was no sin, the flesh of His Virgin Mother, or of anyone else, was without the *fomes*, which is called the law of the flesh or its members.

(NOTE: Recall that the Holy Doctor taught that the Blessed Virgin's flesh was conceived in sin *before* the creation and infusion of her soul; in the actual animation she was sanctified, and the *fomes* of the flesh was suspended.)

Hence it would seem better to say that by her sanctification in the womb the *fomes* was not removed from the Blessed Virgin in its essence, but that it remained suspended—not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy men, for she did not immediately have the use of free will while in her mother's womb, for this is a special privilege of Christ; but by the abundance of grace that she received in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by divine providence, which kept her sensitive soul from all inordinate move-

ment. Afterwards, in the actual conception of Christ's flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother.

ART. IV.—WHETHER BY BEING SANCTIFIED IN THE WOMB THE BLESSED VIRGIN WAS PRESERVED FROM ALL SIN.

YES.—It must be strictly admitted that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, either mortal or venial; that thus might be fulfilled what was spoken in Cant. iv, 7: "Thou art all fair, my beloved, and there is not a spot in thee."

THE REASON is that otherwise the Blessed Virgin would not have been worthy to be the Mother of God, if at any time she had sinned. For the honor of the parents reflects on the child; consequently, on the other hand, the Mother's shame would have reflected on her son (This, incidentally, seems a good proof that the Holy Doctor did not admit original sin in the Blessed Virgin.—Paris). There is also the reason that she had a singular affinity with Christ, who received flesh from her. Now it is said in II Cor. vi, 15: "What concord hath Christ with Belial?"—Thirdly, the Son of God, who is the Wisdom of God, dwelt in her in a singular manner, not only in her soul but also in her womb. And it is written (Wisd. i, 4): "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."

ART. V.—WHETHER BY HER SANCTIFICATION IN THE WOMB THE BLESSED VIRGIN RECEIVED THE FULLNESS OF GRACE.

YES.—By this sanctification the Blessed Virgin beyond all others obtained from Christ a fullness or perfection of grace.

THE REASON is that the Blessed Virgin was most close to Christ in His humanity; for He received from her His human nature. For the more closely something approaches the principle in any genus the more does it partake of the effect of that principle.

NOTE: 1. The Blessed Virgin Mary received such a fullness of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace; so that she received within herself Him who is full of all grace; and by bringing Him forth she in a manner dispensed grace to all (Ad 1).

NOTE: Here is the fullness of grace that the Blessed Virgin received in the first instant of her animation, or, in the words of the dogmatic definition, "in the first instant of her conception."—Paris.

2. There was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was made worthy to be the Mother of Christ; and this was the perfection of her sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory.

In the first perfection she was delivered (He says "delivered," not "cleansed."—Paris) from original sin. In the second she was entirely cleansed from the *fomes*. In the third she was also delivered from all affliction. (Ad 2).

3. There is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin received in a high degree the gift of wisdom and the grace of miracles and even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive them as to put them and such like graces to every use, as did Christ; but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER AFTER CHRIST IT WAS PROPER TO THE BLESSED VIRGIN TO BE SANCTIFIED IN THE WOMB.

NO.—To be sanctified in the womb after Christ was not proper to the Blessed Virgin.

THE REASON is that it is said of John the Baptist (Luke i, 15): "He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb," and of Jeremias it is expressly said (Jer. i, 5): "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee." In these words it seems we must assert that they were sanctified in the womb.

The Blessed Virgin, however, who was chosen by God as His Mother, received a fuller grace of sanctification than John the Baptist and Jeremias, who were chosen to foreshadow in a special way the sanctification effected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was granted to the Blessed Virgin thenceforth never to sin either mortally or venially, whereas to the others who were thus sanctified it was granted thenceforward not to sin mortally, through the protection of God's grace (Ad 1).

QUESTION XXVIII

THE VIRGINITY OF THE MOTHER OF GOD

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MOTHER OF GOD WAS A VIRGIN IN CONCEIVING CHRIST.

YES.—It must strictly be affirmed that the Mother of Christ conceived as a virgin.

THE REASON is that the contrary belongs to the heresy of the Ebionites and Cerinthus, who held Christ to be a mere man, and declared that He was born of both sexes.

The reasons of fitness are four: 1) To maintain the dignity of the Father who sent Him. For since Christ is the true and natural Son of God it was not fitting that He should have another father than God, lest the dignity of God the Father be transferred to another. 2) On account of the dignity of the Son, who is the Word of God. For, as the Word was conceived without interior corruption, so it was proper that the flesh of God's Word should be conceived without the corruption of the Mother. 3) On account of the dignity of Christ's humanity, in which there could be no sin, since by it the sin of the world was taken away. It was not possible, in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born from sexual intercourse without incurring the defect of original sin. 4) On account of the very end of Christ's Incarnation, for the Incarnation took place that men might be born again as sons of God (John i, 13). Now the exemplar of this regeneration had to appear in the very conception of Christ. Hence Augustine says (*Lib. de Sancta Virg.*, cap. 6): "It behooved that Our Head, by a notable miracle, should be born after the flesh of a virgin, that He might thereby signify that His members would be born, after the Spirit, of a virgin Church."

NOTE: As Bede says on Luke i, 33: Joseph is called the father of the Savior, not that he really was His father, as the Photinians pretended; but that He was considered by men to be so, for the safeguarding of Mary's good name. Wherefore Luke adds (iii, 23): "Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph" (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S MOTHER WAS A VIRGIN IN HIS BIRTH.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Prophet (Is. vii, 14) not only says: "Behold the virgin shall conceive;" but also adds: "And shall bear a son."—This was befitting for three reasons: 1) Because a word is not only conceived in the mind without corruption, but also proceeds from the mind without corruption. Hence, in order to show that body to be the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that it should be born of an incorrupt virgin. 2) Because Christ came for the purpose of taking away our corruption. Hence it was not fitting that in His birth He should corrupt His Mother's virginity. 3) Because it was fitting that He who commanded us to honor our father and mother should not in His birth lessen the honor due to His Mother.—Hence it must be said that all this was miraculously done by divine power (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S MOTHER REMAINED A VIRGIN AFTER HIS BIRTH.

YES.—Just as God's Mother conceived as a virgin, and as a virgin brought forth, so also she remained a virgin forever after the birth.

THE FIRST REASON is that this befitted the perfection of Christ; for, just as He was the Only-Begotten of the Father according to His divine nature, being thus His Son in every respect perfect; so it was fitting that He should be the Only-Begotten of His Mother, as being her perfect offspring.

THE SECOND REASON is that to say the contrary would be an insult to the Holy Spirit, whose shrine was the virginal womb, in which He formed the flesh of Christ; wherefore it was unbecoming that it should be desecrated by intercourse with man.

THE THIRD REASON is that this was also befitting the dignity and sanctity of Christ's Mother, who would seem to be most ungrateful were she not content with such a Son; and were she, of her own accord, by carnal intercourse to forfeit that virginity, which had been miraculously preserved for her.

THE FOURTH REASON is that it would be tantamount to an imputation of extreme presumption in Joseph to assume that he attempted to violate her whom by the angel's revelation he knew to have conceived by the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of Matthew i, 18: "Before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Spirit," this was said, not that they came together

afterward, but that, when it seemed that they would come together, this was forestalled through her being conceived by the Holy Spirit, the result being that afterwards they did not come together (Ad 1).

2. With regard to the words of Matthew i, 24-25: "And he did not know her till she had brought forth her first-born son," St. Jerome (*Against Helvidius*, c. 3) concedes that the knowledge refers to carnal knowledge, but says that "until" in Scripture can be understood in two ways: For sometimes it designates a certain time, according to Gal. iii, 19: "The Law was enacted on account of transgressions . . . until the offspring should come to whom the promise was made." But sometimes it indicates an indefinite time, according to Psal. cxxii, 2: "Our eyes are unto the Lord Our God, until He have mercy on us." From this it is not to be gathered that our eyes are turned from God after we have obtained mercy. "In this sense those things are indicated of which we might doubt if they had not been written down. The rest is left to our understanding. Thus the Evangelist says that the Mother of God was not known by her husband until she gave birth, that we may be given to understand that still less did he know her afterwards" (Ad 3).

As to the fact that Jesus is called the "first-born" son of Mary, it must be said that it is Scriptural usage to designate as the first-born, not only a child who is followed by others, but also him who is born first; otherwise, if a child were not first-born unless followed by others, the first-fruits would not be due as long as there was no further produce (Jerome, *Against Helvetius*); which is clearly false, since according to the Law the first-fruits had to be redeemed within a month (Num. xviii, 16).—(Ad 4).

3. With regard to the so-called "brethren of the Lord" (John ii, 12), observe that there are four ways of using the word in Scripture, namely according to parents; nation, family, and common affection. Hence the brethren of the Lord are so called, not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by relationship, as being blood relations of His. But Joseph, as Jerome says (*Against Helvidius*, c. 9), is rather to be believed to have remained a virgin, since he is not said to have had another wife, and a holy man does not live otherwise than chastely (Ad 5).

(The purpose of the sacred writer at this point was especially to tell us that Jesus was not born of the seed of Joseph, but from God. Accordingly, the words, "he did not know her until she had brought forth a son," are to be understood in this sense; but this does not mean that afterwards he did know her. What was done afterwards Scripture does not say, as though this were secondary; but the rest is left to our understanding, as the Holy Doctor says.—Paris).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MOTHER OF GOD VOWED VIRGINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that the works of perfection are more commendable if they are performed in fulfillment of a vow. Now virginity had a special place in the Mother of God. It was therefore fitting that her virginity should be consecrated to God by a vow. Yet the Mother of God is not believed to have taken an absolute vow of virginity before being espoused to Joseph, although she desired to do so, yet yielding her own will to God's judgment. Afterwards, however, having taken a husband, according as the customs of the time required, she took a vow of virginity together with him.

QUESTION XXIX

THE ESPOUSALS OF THE MOTHER OF GOD

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN BORN OF AN ESPOUSED VIRGIN.

YES.—It was fitting for Christ to be born of an espoused virgin, both for His own sake, and for ours, and for that of His Mother.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST (for the sake of Christ) is fourfold: 1) Lest He should be rejected by unbelievers as illegitimate. 2) In order that in the customary way His genealogy might be traced through the male line. Wherefore Ambrose says (*On Luke*, c. iii): "He who came into the world, according to the custom of the world had to be enrolled. Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required, because they represent the family in the senate and other courts." 3) For the safety of the new-born Child, lest the devil should plot serious hurt against Him. 4) That He might be fostered by Joseph, who is therefore called His father, as breadwinner.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND (for His Mother's sake) is threefold: 1) Be-

cause she was thereby rendered exempt from punishment, "lest she should be stoned by the Jews as an adulterous" (Jerome). 2) That she might be safeguarded from ill fame. 3) That Joseph might administer to her needs.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD (for our sake) is fivefold: 1) Because Joseph is thus a witness to Christ's being born a virgin. 2) Because thereby the very words of the Virgin are rendered more credible, by which she asserted her virginity. 3) This adds strength to our faith. 4) Because by this the universal Church is typified, which is a virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, Christ, as Augustine says (*In Lib. de Sancta Virginitate*, c. 12).

A fifth reason may be added: Since the Lord's Mother was espoused and a virgin, both virginity and wedlock are honored in her person, in contradiction to those heretics who disparaged one or the other.

NOTE: By his natural power the devil could know that the Mother of God did not know man, but he was prevented by God from knowing the manner of the divine birth (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE WAS A TRUE MARRIAGE BETWEEN MARY AND JOSEPH.

YES.—With regard to the first perfection of marriage, which is according to the form of Matrimony, and consists in an indivisible union of souls, it was a true marriage; but it was not a true, i.e., a perfect, marriage, with regard to the second perfection, which consists in the act relative to the end of Matrimony, i.e., the procreation of children, except with regard to the upbringing of the child.

THE REASON is that both (the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph) consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. Hence the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph when he said to Joseph (Matt. i, 20): "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife." But with regard to the second perfection, which is attained by the marriage act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are begotten, this marriage was not consummated. But this marriage had the second perfection, as to the upbringing of the child.

QUESTION XXX

THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO ANNOUNCE TO THE BLESSED VIRGIN THAT WHICH WAS TO BE DONE TO HER.

YES.—It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ.

THE FIRST REASON is that thus a becoming order was maintained in the union of the Son of God with the Virgin—named that she should be informed in mind concerning Him, before conceiving Him in the flesh.

THE SECOND REASON is that thus the Blessed Virgin might be a more certain witness of this mystery, being instructed therein by God.

THE THIRD REASON is that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience, which she proved herself willing to do in the words: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord."

THE FOURTH REASON is in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin's consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ANNUNCIATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY AN ANGEL TO THE BLESSED VIRGIN.

YES.—**THE FIRST REASON** is that thus in this might be maintained the order established by God, by which divine things are brought to men by means of the angels.

THE SECOND REASON is that this was becoming to the restoration of the human race, which was to be effected by Christ; for an angel was the first cause of perdition.

THE THIRD REASON is that this befitted the virginity of God's Mother; because virginity is always akin to the angels. Surely to live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is not an earthly but a heavenly life, as Jerome says (*In Serm. Assump.*).

THE FOURTH REASON is that the Blessed Virgin was not under man's power, who in her spotless womb conceived Christ by the Holy Spirit (Ad. 2).

NOTE: 1. The Mother of God was above the angels as regards the dignity to which she was chosen by God; but as regards the state of the present life she was below the angels, for Christ Himself, by reason of His passible life, "was made a little lower than the angels" (Hebr. ii, 9).—(Ad 1).

2. Some say that Gabriel was of the highest order of angels. But the Church calls him an archangel. It is therefore credible enough that he was the highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory says (*in Hom. de Centum Ovis*), "this name agrees with his office; for Gabriel means Power of God. This message therefore was fittingly brought by the 'Power of God,' because the Lord of hosts and mighty in battle was coming to overcome the powers of the air" (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGEL OF THE ANNUNCIATION SHOULD HAVE APPEARED TO THE VIRGIN IN A BODILY VISION.

YES.—The angel of the Annunciation appeared to God's Mother in a bodily vision; and this was fitting: a) As regards that which was announced; b) as regards the dignity of God's Mother; c) as regards the certainty of that which was announced.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the angel came to announce the Incarnation of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that, in order to make this known, an invisible creature should assume a form in which to appear visibly.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Blessed Virgin was to receive the Son of God, not only in her mind, but in her bodily womb; wherefore it behooved not only her mind, but also her bodily senses, to be refreshed by the angelic vision.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that we apprehend with greater certainty that which is before our eyes than what is in our imagination.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANNUNCIATION TOOK PLACE IN A BECOMING ORDER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the angel in the Annunciation in a becoming order first drew her attention by a new and unwonted salutation; and afterwards instructed her concerning the mystery in the words: "Behold, thou shalt conceive in the womb . . ." and finally he led her mind to consent by adducing the example of Elizabeth and the argument from divine omnipotence.

QUESTION XXXI

THE MATTER FROM WHICH THE SAVIOR'S BODY WAS CONCEIVED

1) The matter from which the body was conceived; 2) the Author of conception; 3) the mode and order of conception. About the first there are eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S FLESH WAS DERIVED FROM ADAM.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ assumed human nature, that He might cleanse it from corruption. But human nature needed cleansing only insofar as it was infected by the vitiated origin whereby it was descended from Adam. Wherefore it was fitting that He should take flesh from matter derived from Adam, that the nature itself might be healed by the assumption.

NOTE: Christ's body was in Adam in respect of bodily substance—that is, the corporal matter of Christ's body was derived from Adam. But it was not there by reason of seminal virtue, because it was not conceived from the seed of man. Thus it did not contact original sin, as do others, who are descended from Adam by man's seed (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST TOOK FLESH OF THE SEED OF DAVID.

YES.—Christ is said to have been the son especially of two of the Patriarchs, Abraham and David, as is evident from Maath. i. For this there are several reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that to them especially was the promise made concerning Christ (Gen. xxii, 18; Gal. iii, 16; Ps. cxxxii 2; Matth. xxi, 9).

THE SECOND REASON is that Christ was the king, prophet, and priest. Now Abraham was a priest, as is evident from the fact that the Lord said to him (Gen. xv, 9): "Take thee a cow of three years old . . ." He was also a prophet, according to Gen. xx, 7: "He is a prophet, and he shall pray for thee." David, moreover, was both king and prophet.

THE THIRD REASON is that in Abraham circumcision had its origin, and in David God's election was most clearly made manifest, according to I Kings, viii, 14:

"The Lord hath sought Him a man according to His own heart." Consequently, Christ is called in a most special way the Son of both, in order to show that He came for the salvation both of the circumcised and of the elect among the Gentiles.

NOTE: The Manicheans tried to prove that Christ was not the Son of David, because He was not conceived by Joseph, in whom Matthew's genealogy terminates. But, as Jerome says, on Matth. i: "Joseph and Mary were of the same tribe; wherefore he was bound by law to marry her as she was his kinswoman. Hence it was that they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being descended from the same stock." Mary was also of the family of David; wherefore it is said that Christ is of the seed of David (Rom. i, 3). On account of the dignity of her husband, however, the order of generations is traced to Joseph, as Augustine says (*Against Faustus*, bk. xxiii, c. 8).—(Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S GENEALOGY IS SUITABLY TRACED BY THE EVANGELISTS.

YES. THE REASON is that, as is said in Tim. iii, 16: "All Scripture is inspired of God." Now what is done by God is done in perfect order, according to Rom. xiii, 1: "Those who exist have been appointed [Vulgate, ordained] by God." Wherefore Christ's genealogy was written in becoming order by the Evangelist (Luke i).

[TR. NOTE: St. Thomas in the reply to objections gives the answers to the Fathers to objections drawn from the discrepancies of the two genealogies in Luke and Matthew. He gives as truest the solution of Augustine, based on that of Julius Africanus (160-240), who states that he had it from some relatives of Jesus. It is based on the Levirate Law (Deut. xxv, 5-10), according to which, when an Israelite died without a male heir, his brother must marry the widow in order to perpetuate the line of the deceased. The son born of this union had two genealogies: One the natural one through his real father, the other a legal one, which gave him the same ancestors as the deceased. There could also be other ways by which legal genealogy could deviate from natural genealogy.—Prat, *Life of Christ*, 1, 478-2)]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF CHRIST'S BODY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM A WOMAN.

YES.—Although the Son of God could have taken human flesh from any matter He wished, yet it was most fitting that He should take flesh from a woman.

THE FIRST REASON is that in this way the whole human race was ennobled. Wherefore Augustine says (*In Lib. 83, Quaest.*, q. 11): "It was fitting that man's liberation should be made manifest in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming that the liberation of the female sex should be manifested in that man's being born of a woman."

THE SECOND REASON is that thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident.

THE THIRD REASON is that in this fashion the begetting of man is accomplished in every variety of manner. For the first man was made from the slime of the earth, without the concurrence of man or woman; Eve was made of man but not of woman; and other men are made from both man and woman. Thus this fourth manner remained as it were proper to Christ, that He should be made of a woman without the concurrence of a man.

NOTE: Because the male sex is nobler than the female, for this reason He took human nature in the male sex. But lest the female sex should be despised, it was fitting that He should take flesh of a woman (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FLESH OF CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED OF THE VIRGIN'S PUREST BLOOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that just as it belongs to the supernatural mode of Christ's generation (namely insofar as He is born of a virgin) that the active principle in that generation should be the supernatural power of God; so it belongs to the natural mode of His generation (namely insofar as He is born of a woman) that the matter from which His body was conceived should be similar to the matter that other women supply in the conception of offspring. Now this matter, according to Aristotle (*The Generation of Animals*, bk. I, chap. 19), is the woman's blood, not any kind of blood, but that brought to a more perfect stage of secretion by the mother's generative power, so as to be apt matter for conception. And therefore of such matter was Christ's body conceived.

NOTE: In the conception of Christ's body there was no woman's seed. For such seed is not apt for generation, but is something imperfect in the seminal order. Consequently this semen is not the necessary matter of conception. Hence it was not in the conception of Christ's body, especially since, though it is imperfect in the seminal order, a certain concupiscence accompanies its emission, as also that of the male semen. But in that virginal conception there could be no concupiscence. Wherefore Damiscene says (*Orth. Fid., lib. I, cap. 18*) that Christ's body was not conceived seminally. But the menstrual blood, the flow of which is subject to monthly periods, has a certain natural impurity of corruption, like other superfluities, which nature does not need, and therefore expels. Of such menstrual blood, infected with corruption and repudiated by nature, the conception is not formed; but from a certain secretion of the pure blood which by a process of elimination is prepared for conception, being, as it were, more pure and more perfect than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless, it is tainted with the impurity of lust in the conception of other men, inasmuch as by sexual intercourse this blood is drawn to a place apt for conception. This, however, did not take place in Christ's conception, because this blood was brought together in the Virgin's womb and fashioned into a child by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For this reason Christ's body is said to be formed of the most chaste and pure blood of the Virgin (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY WAS IN ADAM AND THE OTHER PATRIARCHS, AS IN SOMETHING SIGNATE.

NO.—Christ's body was not in Adam and the other Patriarchs as in something signate, namely so that some part of Adam's body or of any other man could be designated determinately, so that it could be said that Christ's body was formed determinately from this matter; but it was there in respect of origin, as is he flesh of other men.

THE REASON is that Christ's body is related to Adam and the other Patriarchs through the medium of His Mother's body. Now His Mother's body was not in the Patriarchs according to a signate matter; as neither were the bodies of other men. Hence neither was Christ's body in the Patriarchs according to signate matter.

NOTE: The expression that Christ was in Adam according to bodily substance does not mean that Christ's body was a bodily substance in Adam; but that the bodily substance of Christ's body, that is, the matter that He took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in its active principle, but not as in its material principle; in other words, by the generative power of Adam and his descendants down to the Blessed Virgin, this matter was prepared for Christ's conception. But this matter was not fashioned into Christ's body by the seminal power derived from Adam. Therefore Christ is said to have been in Adam by way of origin, according to bodily substance, but not according to seminal virtue (Ad 1). Through the medium of the Blessed Virgin, Christ is said to be of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by way of origin (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER CHRIST'S FLESH IN THE PATRIARCHS WAS INFECTED BY SIN.

YES.—Although the whole flesh of the Patriarchs was subject to sin, yet the flesh of Christ was free from sin, not by virtue of the seminal power but by the operation of the Holy Spirit.

THE REASON is that human flesh is infected by sin from the fact of its being conceived through concupiscence. Therefore, just as the whole flesh of a man is conceived through concupiscence, so also it is defiled by sin. Hence the whole flesh of the ancient Patriarchs was subjected to sin. And in this respect Christ's flesh in the Patriarchs was infected by sin. Yet Christ is not derived from the Patriarchs according to the law of concupiscence, or according to the seminal principle (prev. art., ad 1); and hence Christ did not assume the flesh of the human race that was subjected to sin, but flesh that was cleansed of all infection of sin.

NOTE: The word "cleansed" is used relatively to the flesh as such as generally taken, for thus it can be said to be cleansed from sin, since it had none of the common infection in Christ. But relatively to this individual flesh, which precisely existed in Christ, it should rather be said to be *clean*, because in the individual flesh it had no need to be cleansed.—Paris.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHRIST PAID TITHES IN ABRAHAM'S LOINS.

NOTE: The paying of tithes as here taken means nothing else than the foreshadowing of a need of deliverance.

THE REASON is that the fact that Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech foreshadowed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who were numbered with him, as contracting original sin, needed healing. Now this cannot be said of Christ, who was in Abraham, not according to the seminal principle, but according to bodily substance only. Consequently, He was not in Abraham as needing healing, but rather as balm for the wound. And therefore He did not pay tithes in Abraham's loins.

QUESTION XXXII

THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT WAS ACTIVE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION.

YES.—The whole Trinity accomplished the conception of Christ's body, as well as all other operations that are called transient. This is, however, attributed to the Holy Spirit for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that this befits the cause of the Incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Spirit is the Love of the Father and the Son, as was explained in the First Part (q. xxxvii, art. 1). Now it was due to the exceeding love of God that God's Son took flesh in the womb of the Virgin. Hence it is said in John iii, 16: "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son."

THE SECOND REASON is that this befits the cause of the Incarnation on the part of the nature assumed. For by this we are given to understand that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of Person, not by reason of its merits, but through grace alone, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

THE THIRD REASON is that this is befitting to the term of the Incarnation. For the term of the Incarnation was that that man, who was being conceived, should be the Holy One and the Son of God. Now both of these are attributed to the Holy Spirit. For by Him men are made to be sons of God, according to Gal. iv, 6. Therefore, just as other men are sanctified spiritually by the Holy Spirit, so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ conceived in sanctity by the Holy Spirit, so as to be the natural Son of God, according to Luke i, 35: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee," and it concludes: "Therefore the Holy One to be born shall be called the Son of God."

NOTE: Just as the power of the soul, which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men, so the power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to I Cor. i, 24: "Christ, the Power of God," through the Holy Spirit formed the body that He assumed (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT SHOULD BE SAID THAT CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—Inasmuch as the preposition of (*de*) indicates a relation to the body of Christ and to Christ Himself by reason of His body.

THE REASON is that the Holy Spirit has for the body of Christ the relation of efficient cause; and for the Son of God Himself, who is said to be conceived, He has the relation of consubstantiality. And thus the efficient action of the Holy Spirit is referred to the assumed body, and the consubstantiality to the Person assuming.

NOTE: Because Christ's body is not consubstantial to the Holy Spirit it cannot properly be said to be conceived of (*de*) the Holy Spirit, but rather from (*ex*) the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose says (*De Spir. Sancto*, lib. ii, c. 5): "What is from someone is either from his substance or from his power: From his substance, as the Son who is from the Father; from his power, as all things are from God, just as Mary conceived from the Holy Spirit" (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT SHOULD BE CALLED CHRIST'S FATHER IN RESPECT OF HIS HUMANITY.

NO.—Christ should in no wise be called the Son of the Holy Spirit, or even of the whole Trinity.

THE REASON is that Christ, although created and justified according to His human nature, must not be called the Son of God either by reason of creation or by reason of justification, but only by reason of His eternal generation, according to which He is the Son of the Father alone. For Christ is the Son of God according to the perfect sense of sonship, on account of His perfect likeness to the Father by whom He was

begotten Now what is said in its perfect sense of something should not be said of it in an imperfect sense. Now Christ, as man, was conceived by the Holy Spirit as by an active principle, yet not according to the likeness of species, as a man is born of his father; and therefore Christ is not called the Son of the Holy Spirit.—He is, however, called the Son of the Virgin Mary, because He was conceived by her who supplied the matter of His conception unto the likeness of species (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN CO-OPERATED ACTIVELY IN THE CONCEPTION OF CHRIST'S BODY.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as is clear from the natural order, the whole active power in generation is on the part of the male, and the passive power from the woman. Accordingly, because the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's father, but His Mother, it follows that she did not receive an active power in the conception of Christ, or that she lacked something that would have made her the father of Christ, but supplied only the matter. She did, however, co-operate actively in the preparation of the matter, so that it was apt for the conception.

QUESTION XXXIII

THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST'S CONCEPTION

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY WAS FORMED IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF CONCEPTION.

YES.—a) Not as regards the movement of blood to the place of generation, which is a preamble to conception; or with regard to the increase that follows conception; b) but the actual formation of Christ's body, in which the notion of conception chiefly consists, was in an instant.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that local movement takes place only in time.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a) the power of the agent (i.e., the Holy Spirit) is infinite. For the greater the power of an agent the more quickly can it dispose matter. Wherefore an agent of infinite power can in an instant dispose matter to its due form; b) it was unbecoming that the Son of God should take to Himself a human body yet unformed; for if some time for conception preceded before perfect formation the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God, for it is attributed to Him only by reason of the assumption.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY WAS ANIMATED IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF ITS CONCEPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the first instant of its conception Christ's body was assumed by the Word of God. Now the Word of God assumed the body by means of the soul (q. vi, art. 1 and 2). Hence in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must needs have been animated by the rational soul.

NOTE: According to Aristotle (*Generation of Animals*, bk. ii, can. 3), in human generation the embryo is first living, then animal, and afterwards human, inasmuch as the body is successively formed and disposed for the soul. But Christ's body, on account of the infinite power of the Agent, was perfectly disposed in an instant; hence it immediately, in the first instant, received a perfect form, i.e., a rational soul (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S FLESH WAS FIRST OF ALL CONCEIVED AND AFTERWARD ASSUMED.

YES.—Christ's flesh was not conceived and afterwards assumed; but it was assumed in the first instant of its conception.

THE REASON is that, if Christ's flesh had been conceived before it was disposed by the Word it would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis. Nor was it becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S CONCEPTION WAS NATURAL OR MIRACULOUS.

YES.—Christ's conception must be called simply miraculous and supernatural; in a sense, however, it was natural.

THE REASON is that, if we consider that which is conceived on the part of the matter that the Mother supplied, it is all natural. But if we consider that which is on the part of the active power it is all miraculous.—But, because a thing is judged according to its form rather than of its matter; and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its passiveness, Christ's conception should be described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain respect it was natural.

QUESTION XXXIV

THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED

(In Four Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS SANCTIFIED IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the abundance of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the Word. Now it was shown above (prev. art.) that in the first instant of its conception Christ's body was animated, and assumed by the Word of God. It follows that in the first instant of His conception Christ had the fullness of grace sanctifying His soul and body.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST AS MAN HAD THE USE OF FREE WILL IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ in the first instant of His conception had, on account of the perfection of the human nature that He assumed, that operation of the soul that can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and the intellect, in which the use of free will consists. For the operation of the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous—much more so than bodily vision, inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel are not movements that may be described as acts of an imperfect being (which attains perfection successively) but an act of an already perfect being, as is said (Arist., *On the Soul*, bk. iii, text 28).

NOTE: 1. Christ, in the first instant of His conception, had the fullness of sanctifying grace, and in like manner the fullness of known truth, according to John i, 14: "Full of grace and truth." Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty about all things, He could choose at once in an instant (Ad 2).

2. It was possible for Christ, in the first instant of His conception, to have an operation of the senses, especially as to the sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before it has received the rational soul, as is said (Arist., *Generation of Animals*, bk. ii, chap. 3). Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant of His conception, through His body's being already fashioned and endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST COULD MERIT IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since Christ in the first instant of His conception was so sanctified that He might sanctify others, His sanctification was more perfect in the same instant. For the sanctity that one acquires by his own act is more perfect than that which he acquires through the act of others. Consequently, Christ, in the first instant of His conception, was sanctified according to His own movement of free will to God, which movement indeed of the free will is meritorious.

NOTE: Christ was able by subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality, which He also merited in the first instant of His conception—not, indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so that it was due to Him from more causes than before (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS A PERFECT COMPREHENSOR IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION.

YES.—By seeing God in His Essence more clearly than the rest of creatures.

THE REASON is that in the first instant of His conception Christ received grace,

“not by measure,” as did the other saints (q. vii, art. 9, 10, 12). Hence it is manifest that in the first instant of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And, because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than any other creature.

NOTE: Christ did not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came through His Passion (Ad 1).

QUESTION XXXV

THE NATIVITY OF CHRIST

We must next treat of Christ’s nativity: 1) The nativity itself; 2) the manifestation of the nativity. About the first there will be eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER NATIVITY REGARDS THE NATURE RATHER THAN THE PERSON.

ANSWER: Nativity, as in the subject being born, is properly attributed to the person or hypostasis; as in the term it is attributed to the nature.

THE REASON is that to be born is to be generated. Therefore, as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so it is born in order for it to be. Now to be, properly speaking, belongs to that which subsists. Hence nativity is attributed to the person or hypostasis, as designating something as subsisting, as to the proper subject of being born. But the term of every nativity is the form. Now nature designates something as a form; for the purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species. In this sense, nativity is attributed to nature.

ART. II.—WHETHER A TEMPORAL NATIVITY SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO CHRIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that the nativity is attributed to the nature, namely as to the term (prec. art.). Now in Christ there are two natures, a divine and a human, of which He received one from eternity from His Father, the other in time from His Mother. Consequently we must needs ascribe to Christ two nativities, one by which He was born eternally from the Father, the other by which He was born in time from His Mother.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN CAN BE CALLED CHRIST’S MOTHER IN RESPECT OF HIS TEMPORAL NATIVITY.

YES.—The Blessed Virgin is the true and natural Mother of Christ.

THE REASON is that Christ’s body was not brought down from heaven, as the heretic Valentinus assumed; but was taken from His Virgin Mother, and formed from her purest blood, as was explained (q. v, art. 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE BLESSED VIRGIN SHOULD BE CALLED THE MOTHER OF GOD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis (q. ii, art. 2 and 3), it is clear that the name *God* can stand for the hypostasis that has a human and a divine nature. Consequently, whatever belongs to the divine or the human nature can be attributed to that Person. Now to be conceived and to be born are attributed both to the person and the hypostasis, according to the nature in which that person is conceived and born. It follows that it can truly be said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin, according to His human nature. Hence it follows that the Blessed Virgin can truly be called the Mother of God.—For it must be said that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God, not because she is the Mother of the Divinity, but because she is the Mother, according to the humanity, of the Person having Divinity and humanity (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE ARE TWO FILIATIONS.

NO.—a) If we regard the cause of filiation, which is nativity, it is necessary to place two filiations in Christ; b) but if we regard the subject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, we say that in Christ there is but one filiation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Christ was not by one and the same nativity

born eternally from the Father and in time from His Mother; nor is His nativity of one species. Hence, as regards this, it must be said that in Christ there are two different filiations, one temporal, the other eternal.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the subject of filiation is not the nature or part of the nature, but only the person or hypostasis. Now in Christ there is only an eternal Person or hypostasis; hence there can be in Christ only the filiation that is in the eternal hypostasis.

NOTE: When every relation in time is spoken of God it does not place in the eternal God anything that is real, but only something according to our way of thinking. Now the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation (on the part of God), but only on the part of His Mother. Thus Christ is said really to be the Son of a Virgin Mother by the real relation of her maternity to Him (at end of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BORN WITHOUT HIS MOTHER'S PAIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the pains of childbirth are caused by the opening of the passages through which the child is born. Now it was said above (q. xxviii, art. 2) that Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother (which happened miraculously—q. xxviii, art. 2, Ad 3); and thus there was no violence in the opening of the birth passages. And for this reason there was no pain in that birth, or any corruption; on the contrary there was much joy therein, because the God-Man was born into the world, according to Is. xxxv, 2: "Like the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise."

ART. VII.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN BORN IN BETHLEHEM.

YES.—Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ was born of the seed of David according to the flesh, as is said in Rom. i, 3, to whom also was a special promise made concerning Christ (II Kings xxiii, 1). Therefore in Bethlehem, where David was born, He too wished to be born, that by the very birthplace the promise made to David might be shown to be fulfilled.

THE SECOND REASON is that, as Gregory says (*in Hom. viii, in Evang.*): "Bethlehem is interpreted 'the house of bread'. It is Christ Himself who said: 'I am the living Bread, which came down from heaven.'"

NOTE: Jesus Christ wished to be born in Bethlehem away from home; in Nazareth, which is interpreted as flower, He wished to be fostered and brought up; in Jerusalem, which was the royal and priestly city, He wished to suffer and die (*passim ad 1 and ad 2*). At the end, that He might show forth more plainly His power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in order that from that city the faith might spread over the whole world (*Ad 3*).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BORN AT A FITTING TIME.

YES.—According to Galat. iv, 4: "When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law."

THE REASON is that Christ's birth was not subject to the restrictions of time, as is that of other men, but, as the Lord and Creator of all times, He chose for Himself the time in which He was to be born, as He chose His Mother and His birthplace. And, since "what is of God is well ordered," and becomingly arranged, it follows that Christ was born at the most fitting time.

NOTE: The particular reasons contained in the responses can thus be briefly explained: 1. He wished to be born at the time of the census, that He might be enrolled in **Caesar's** census, and for our deliverance might be subjected to servitude.—2. Because in that time, when the whole world was living under one ruler, there was the greatest peace in the world.—3. Because it was fitting that Christ should be born when the Law of God was under the power of an alien prince; for a great and desperate illness demanded a more skilled Physician.—4. Christ was born on that day of December because then the light of day begins to lengthen; for He came to those who sit in the darkness and in the shadow of death" (Luke i, 79).

QUESTION XXXVI**THE MANIFESTATION OF THE NEWLY BORN CHRIST**

(In Eight Articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BIRTH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ALL.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that this would have hindered the redemption of mankind, which was accomplished on the Cross, for, as is said in I Cor. ii, 8: "If they had known it they would never have crucified the Lord of glory."

THE SECOND REASON is that if Christ's birth had appeared to all by evident signs, this would have destroyed the very nature of faith, which is "the evidence of things not seen" (Hebr. xi, 1).

THE THIRD REASON is that thus the reality of His human nature would have come into doubt.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BIRTH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO SOME.

YES.—According to the order of divine wisdom, Christ's birth should not have been revealed to all, but only to some witnesses foreordained by God.

THE REASON is that it belongs to the order of divine wisdom that the gifts of God and the secrets of His wisdom should not pass equally to all, but come immediately to certain persons and through them pass to others, as is said of the mystery of the Resurrection: "God raised Him . . . to be plainly seen, not by all the people, but to witnesses designated beforehand" (Acts x, 40).

NOTE: Regarding the words of Matth. ii, 3: "King Herod was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him," note that the very disturbance that resulted from the manifestation of Christ's birth befitted the birth of Christ: First, because this manifested Christ's heavenly dignity. Secondly, because this foreshadowed Christ's judicial power—wherefore Augustine says (in a sermon on Epiphany, 30 *de Tempore*): "What will He be like in the judgment seat, since from His cradle He struck terror into the heart of a proud king?" Thirdly, because this foreshadowed the overthrow of the devil's kingdom, for, as Pope Leo says (in a sermon on Epiphany): "Herod was not so much troubled in himself as the devil in Herod" (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THOSE TO WHOM CHRIST'S BIRTH WAS MADE KNOWN WERE SUITABLY CHOSEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that whatever is done according to God's wisdom is suitably done. Thus Christ's birth was made known to all men of all conditions, because salvation through Christ was to be for all men. For the shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were Gentiles: The first were lowly and simple, the second, wise and powerful. It was also made known to the just, namely Simeon and Anna, and to sinners, namely the Magi. It was made known to men and to women, so as to show no condition of men to be excluded from Christ's salvation.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST HIMSELF SHOULD HAVE MADE HIS BIRTH KNOWN.

NO.—THE REASON is that it did not behoove Christ's birth to be thus manifested, so that the revelation of His Divinity might not be prejudicial to faith in the human nature. Now this took place while Christ presented a likeness of human weakness, and yet, by means of God's creatures, He showed the power of the Godhead in Himself.

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BIRTH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANIFESTED BY MEANS OF THE ANGELS AND THE STAR.

YES.—Christ's birth was suitably manifested to the shepherds by the angels, to the Magi by the star, and to the just by inspiration.

THE REASON is that the Jews were wont to receive divine messages through angels; the Gentiles, and especially astrologers, were wont to study the course of stars; and it was the wont and practice of the just to be taught by the inward prompting of the Holy Spirit, as was the case with Simeon and Anna.

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BIRTH WAS MADE KNOWN IN A BECOMING ORDER.

YES.—The birth of Our Savior was made known in a most becoming order, first to the shepherds, then to the Magi, and lastly to the just, namely Simeon and Anna.

THE REASON is that the shepherds represent the Apostles and other believers of the Jews, to whom the faith of Christ was made known first, among whom "were not many mighty, but many noble," as is said in I Cor. i, 26. Secondly, the faith of Christ came to the fullness of the Gentiles, which is foreshadowed by the Magi. Thirdly, it came to the fullness of the Jews, which is foreshadowed by the just. Wherefore also Christ was manifested to them in the Jewish Temple.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE STAR THAT APPEARED TO THE MAGI BELONGED TO THE HEAVENLY SYSTEM.

NO.—It does not seem reasonable that it was one of the stars in the heavenly system, but that it was created by God especially for this purpose.

THE FIRST REASON is that no other star approaches from the same quarter as this star, for this star traveled from north to south, these being the relative positions of Persia, whence the Magi came, and Judea.

THE SECOND REASON is that it did not appear only at night, but also at midday, and no star can do this, not even the moon.

THE THIRD REASON is that it sometimes appeared and sometimes was hidden.

THE FOURTH REASON is that it had no continuous movement but when the Magi had to proceed it went, and when they had to stop, it stopped.

THE FIFTH REASON is that it indicated the virginal birth, not by remaining aloft, but by coming down below. But it could not have pointed out the house distinctly, unless it were near the earth. Consequently, it seems that this was some invisible force, made visible under the form of a star. And it seems more probable that it was a newly created star, not in the heavens, but in the air near the earth, and was moved by divine will.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT WAS BECOMING THAT THE MAGI SHOULD COME TO ADORE CHRIST.

YES.—It is to be believed that the Magi, inspired by the Holy Spirit, wisely came to adore Christ at His birth.

THE REASON is that the Magi are the first fruits of the Gentiles who believed in Christ, because their faith was a presage of the faith and devotion of the nations that were to come to Christ from afar. And therefore, as the devotion and faith of the nations is without any error through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the Holy Spirit, did wisely (acted without error) in paying homage to Christ.

QUESTION XXXVII

THE LEGAL OBSERVANCES IN REGARD TO THE CHRIST CHILD

We have now to consider the circumcision of Christ. And, because circumcision is a kind of profession of observance of the Law, according to Galat. v, 3: "I testify again to every man who has himself circumcised that he is bound to observe the whole law," together with this we must ask concerning the other observances of the Law as they affected the Child Jesus. Hence four questions will be asked.

ART. 1.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN CIRCUMCISED

YES.—**THE REASON** is that this was highly fitting: First, because thus He showed the truth of His human flesh, against the Manicheans, who said that He had an imaginary body; and against Apollinarius, who said that Christ's body was consubstantial with His Divinity; and against Valentinus, who said that Christ brought His body down from heaven.—Secondly, in order to show His approval of circumcision, which was once instituted by God—Thirdly, in order to show that He was of the race of Abraham.—Fourthly, to remove all excuse from the Jews for not receiving Him, if He were uncircumcised.—Fifthly, to commend to us by His example the virtue of obedience.—Sixthly, that He who had come in the likeness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy by which sinful flesh was wont to be healed.—Seventhly, that, by taking on Himself the burden of the Law, He might deliver others from the burden of

the Law, according to Gal. iv, 4: "God sent His Son . . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law."

NOTE: Circumcision by the removal of the piece of skin in the member of generation signified the passing away of the old generation, from the decrepitude of which we are freed by Christ's Passion, in whom, as the Apostle says (Colos. ii, 11), "you are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (Ad 1 and 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER HIS NAME WAS SUITABLY GIVEN TO CHRIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that names should correspond to the properties of things, since "a name is but an expression of a definition" (Aristotle), which designates a thing's proper nature. Because, therefore, this gift of grace was bestowed on Christ that through Him all might be saved, His name was thus appropriately called Jesus, that is, Savior, the angel having foretold this name, not only to His Mother, but also to Joseph, who was to be His foster father.

NOTE: All these names in some way mean the same as Jesus, which means salvation. For the name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is "God with us," designates the cause of salvation, which is the union of the divine and human natures in the Person of God's Son, the result of which union being that God was with us, as a partaker of our nature. And so with the other names (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BECOMINGLY PRESENTED IN THE TEMPLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ willed to be made under the Law, that He might redeem those who were under the Law, and that the justification of the Law might be spiritually fulfilled in His members.

NOTE: As the Son of God became man, and was circumcised in the flesh, not for His own sake, but that He might make us to be God's through grace, and that we might be circumcised in the spirit; so, again, for our sake He was presented to the Lord, that we may learn to offer ourselves to God (St. Athanasius); and, after His circumcision took place, that He might show that no one who is not circumcised from vice is worthy of divine regard (Bede).—(Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT THE MOTHER OF GOD SHOULD GO TO THE TEMPLE TO BE PURIFIED.

YES.—Not because she needed this, but on account of a precept of the Law.

THE REASON is that, just as the fullness of grace flows from Christ to His Mother, so it was fitting that His Mother should be conformed to her Son's humility. Therefore, just as Christ, although He was not subjected to the Law, nevertheless wished to undergo circumcision and the other burdens of the Law, in order to set an example of humility and obedience, and that He might give approval to the Law and remove from the Jews any occasion of calumny—for these reasons He willed that His Mother should fulfill the observances of the Law, to which, however, she was not subjected.

QUESTION XXXVIII

THE BAPTISM OF JOHN

Here we are to consider the Baptism whereby Christ was baptized; and, because Christ was baptized by the Baptism of John, we must first consider the Baptism of John in general; and secondly the baptizing of Christ.—About the first there will be six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT JOHN SHOULD BE BAPTIZED.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that it was fitting that Christ should be baptized by John, that He might sanctify Baptism, as Augustine says (On John, Tract xiii).

THE SECOND REASON is that Christ might be manifested, as John says (John i, 31); for He announced Christ when the multitude thronged together for Baptism.

THE THIRD REASON is that by His Baptism He might accustom men to the Baptism of Christ.

THE FOURTH REASON is that by leading men to repentance He might prepare them worthily to receive the Baptism of Christ.

NOTE: The Baptism of John was not in itself a sacrament, but a sort of sacramental disposing for the Baptism of Christ; and therefore it in some degree belonged to the law of Christ, but not to the law of Moses (Ad 1). For John was the term of the Law and the beginning of the Gospel (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE BAPTISM OF JOHN WAS FROM GOD.

YES.—With regard to the rite it was from God, but not with regard to the effect.

THE REASON is that God by an interior revelation of the Holy Spirit sent John to baptize (as is evident from the words of Luke iii, 2-3: "The word of God came to John . . . and he went . . . preaching a Baptism of repentance").

But as regards the effect, nothing was effected in that Baptism that man could not do (since the effect of that Baptism consisted only in the outward washing of the body). Hence it was not from God alone, except insofar as God works in man.

ART. III.—WHETHER GRACE WAS GIVEN IN THE BAPTISM OF JOHN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the whole doctrine and action of John was preparatory to Christ, just as it is the work of a servant and an under-craftsman to prepare the matter for the form, which is accomplished by the head craftsman. Now grace was to be conferred on men by Christ, according to John i, 17: "Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ."

NOTE: The Baptism of John prepared for grace in three ways: 1) by the teaching of John, which led men to the faith of Christ; 2) by accustoming men to the rite of Christ's Baptism; 3) by preparing men through repentance to receive the effect of Christ's Baptism (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER OTHERS BESIDES CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN BAPTIZED WITH THE BAPTISM OF JOHN.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that, if only Christ were baptized by the Baptism of John, there would have been some who would say that John's Baptism, by which Christ was baptized, was nobler than the Baptism of Christ, by which others are baptized.

THE SECOND REASON is that it was necessary by the Baptism of John to prepare others for the Baptism of Christ.

ART. V.—WHETHER JOHN'S BAPTISM SHOULD HAVE CEASED AFTER CHRIST WAS BAPTIZED.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that, if John had ceased to baptize after Christ was baptized, it would have been thought that he did this through jealousy or anger, as Chrysostom says (*Hom. xxviii, in Joan.*).

THE SECOND REASON is that, if John had ceased to baptize when Christ was baptizing, he would have given his disciples a motive for yet greater jealousy.

THE THIRD REASON is that, by continuing to baptize, John sent his listeners to Christ.

THE FOURTH REASON is, as Bede says (gloss on John iii), "there still remained a shadow of the Old Law; nor should the forerunner withdraw until the truth be made manifest."

THE FIFTH REASON is that Christ was not yet fully manifested when He was baptized; and therefore it was still necessary that John baptize (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THOSE WHO HAD BEEN BAPTIZED WITH JOHN'S BAPTISM HAD TO BE BAPTIZED WITH THE BAPTISM OF CHRIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that John's Baptism neither conferred grace nor imprinted a character, but was only in water, as he himself said (Matth. iii, 11). Hence the faith or hope that the person baptized had in Christ could not supply this defect. Moreover the imposition of hands was required that the Holy Spirit might be given to them; for it is essential to the Baptism of Christ that it be performed not only in water, but also in the Holy Spirit, according to John iii, 5: "Unless a man be born of water and the Holy Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."

QUESTION XXXIX

THE BAPTISM OF CHRIST

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE BAPTIZED.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that, as Ambrose says (On Luke iii): "Our Lord was baptized because He wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, that, being purified by the flesh of Christ that knew no sin, they might have the virtue [or right] of Baptism;" and, as Chrysostom says, (*Hom. iv, in Matth.*), "that He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who were to be baptized afterwards."

THE SECOND REASON is that, as Chrysostom says, on Matthew, "although He Himself was not a sinner, yet He took a sinful nature and the likeness of sinful flesh. Therefore, although He needed no Baptism for Himself, yet carnal nature in others had need thereof."

THE THIRD REASON is that, as Augustine says (sermon on Epiphany), Christ wished to do what He commanded all to do."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO BE BAPTIZED WITH JOHN'S BAPTISM.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is that John baptized in water alone, and not in the Spirit; and thus Our Lord, after being baptized with water, baptized in the Spirit.

THE SECOND REASON is that, as Bede says (chap. iv on Mark): Our Lord "was baptized with the Baptism of John, that by His own Baptism He might show His approval of John's Baptism."

THE THIRD REASON is that, as Gregory Nazianzen says (*In Orat. 39*): "Christ by going to John to be baptized sanctified Baptism." (For then He gave the waters the power of regenerating souls.)

THE FOURTH REASON is that "no one might decline the laver of grace, since Christ did not refuse the laver of penance," as Ambrose says (On Luke, chap. iii).—(Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BAPTIZED AT A FITTING TIME.

YES.—Christ was fittingly baptized in the 30th year of His age.

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ was baptized as though for the reason that He was about forthwith to begin to teach and preach, for which purpose perfect age is required, such as is the age of 30. Hence we read (Gen. xli, 46) that "Joseph was 30 years old" when he undertook the government of Egypt. Likewise we read (II Kings v, 4) of David that he was 30 years old when he began to reign. Ezechiel also in his 30th year began to prophesize, as is said in Ezech. i.

THE SECOND REASON is that, as Chrysostom says (On Matth., hom. x), "the Law was about to pass away after Christ's Baptism. And therefore Christ came to be baptized at this age, which admits of all sins; in order that by His observing the Law no one might say that because He Himself could not fulfill it He did away with it."

THE THIRD REASON is that by Christ's being baptized at the perfect age we are given to understand that Baptism brings forth perfect men, according to Ephes, iv, 13: "Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ."

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN BAPTIZED IN THE JORDAN.

YES.—This was becoming on account of its figurative character.

THE REASON is that, just as it was through the river Jordan that the Children of Israel were crossing to reach the Promised Land, so it is the prerogative of Christ's Baptism over all Baptism that it is the entrance to the Kingdom of God, which was foreshadowed by the Promised Land. Hence it is said in John iii, 5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."

NOTE: The name Jordan signifies a going down, and this is well said, because Baptism requires the going down of humility and going up through the progress or grace, according to James iv, 6: "He giveth grace to the humble" (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE HEAVENS SHOULD HAVE BEEN OPENED UNTO CHRIST AT HIS BAPTISM.

YES.—As the Sripture says (Luke iii, 21): “Jesus, being baptized and praying, heaven was opened.”

THE FIRST REASON is that it might be shown that henceforth heavenly power would sanctify Baptism.

THE SECOND REASON is to show that the faith of the Church and of the one who is baptized works toward the efficacy of Baptism. For by faith we view heavenly things which transcend the senses and reason of man.

THE THIRD REASON is that by Christ’s Baptism the gate to the heavenly kingdom is especially opened to us, which was closed to the first man on account of sin.

NOTE: After Baptism it is necessary for man to pray continually in order to enter heaven; for, though sins are remitted through Baptism, there still remains the *fomes* of sin, assailing us from within, and the world and the devils assailing us from without. And therefore it is said pointedly (Luke iii, 21) that “Jesus being baptized and praying heaven was opened;” because, to wit, the faithful after Baptism stand in need of prayer.—Or else, that we may be led to understand that the very fact that through Baptism heaven is opened to believers is in virtue of the prayer of Christ (in body of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING TO SAY THAT WHEN CHRIST WAS BAPTIZED THE HOLY SPIRIT CAME DOWN TO HIM IN THE FORM OF A DOVE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the dove is a simple animal, it was fitting that the Holy Spirit should appear over the baptized Christ in the form of that animal, in order to signify that all who are to be baptized with the Baptism of Christ, if they approach with a simple and unfeigned heart, will receive the grace of the Holy Spirit.

NOTE: Besides this principal reason, which is at the conclusion of the article, the Holy Doctor, in his reply to four, thus diffusely expounds four other reasons of congruency: 1) On account of the disposition requisite in the one baptized, namely that he approach in good faith, because, as is said in Wisdom i, 5: “The holy spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” For the dove is an animal of a simple character, void of cunning and deceit; wherefore it is said in Matthew x, 16: “Be as simple as doves.” —2) To designate the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, which the dove symbolizes by these properties (mentioned in Ad 4).—3) On account of the effect of Baptism, which is the remission of sins and reconciliation with God. For the dove is a gentle animal, and, as she appeared in the Deluge, bearing the olive branch and announcing calm, so also she appeared in the Baptism of Christ showing to us our Deliverer.—4) To designate the common effect of Baptism, which is the building up of ecclesiastical unity (Eph. v, 25). For of the Church it is said (Cant. vi, 8): “One is my dove.” For the dove is a friendly and gregarious animal.

2. This dove came suddenly into existence, to fulfill the purpose of its signification, and afterwards ceased to exist, just as did the flame in the burning bush, which appeared to Moses (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE DOVE IN WHICH THE HOLY SPIRIT APPEARED WAS REAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as it was not fitting that the Son of God, who is the Truth of the Father, should employ any deceit, and thus He assumed a real and not an imaginary body, so, because the Holy Spirit is called “the Spirit of Truth” (John xvi, 13), He also formed a true dove, in which He appeared, although He did not assume it into unity of Person. For it is said that the Holy Spirit descended in the form or likeness of a dove, not in the sense that the dove was not real, but in order to show that He did not appear in the form of His substance (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT WAS BECOMING, WHEN CHRIST WAS BAPTIZED, THAT THE FATHER’S VOICE SHOULD BE HEARD, BEARING WITNESS TO THE SON.

YES.—THE REASON is that, in the Baptism of Christ, which was the exemplar of ours, that should be manifested which is accomplished in our own Baptism. Now our own Baptism is accomplished in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Matth. xxxviii, 19). Therefore “in the Baptism of Christ the mystery of

the Trinity is manifested. For Christ was baptized in His human nature; the Holy Spirit descended in the form of a dove; and the voice of the Father was heard bearing witness," as Jerome says (On Matth. iii). And, because it is proper for the Father to produce the Word, which is to speak or utter, therefore it was most proper for the Father to be manifested by a voice (Ad 2).

NOTE: As Hilary says (On Matth., can. 1): "The Holy Spirit descended on Jesus at His Baptism, and the voice of the Father was heard, saying: "This is My beloved Son;" that we might know, from what was accomplished in Christ, that after being washed in the waters of Baptism the Holy Spirit comes down upon us from on high, and the Father's voice declares us to have become the adoptive sons of God" (Ad 3).

QUESTION XL

CHRIST'S MANNER OF LIFE

After what pertains to Christ's entry into the world, or to His beginning, it remains to consider the things that belong to the process of His life: 1) The mode of His life; 2) His temptation; 3) His teaching; 4) His miracles. The first point takes up four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE ASSOCIATED WITH MEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's association with men was in keeping with the end of the Incarnation, by reason of which Christ came into the world. Now He came into the world for three reasons: 1) To publish the truth (John xviii, 37); 2) to free men from sin (I Tim. i, 15); 3) to give us access to God (Rom. v, 2). Therefore Christ could not fittingly have hidden Himself, by leading a solitary life, but it behoved Him to go out in public by public preaching and association with men.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD LEAD AN AUSTERE LIFE IN THIS WORLD.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is most fitting that he who associates with men should conform to their manner of living, according to the Apostle (I Cor. ix, 22): "I become all things to all men." Thus it was most fitting that Christ should conform to others in the matter of eating and drinking.

NOTE: Both manners of living are lawful and praiseworthy, to wit, to withdraw from human society and practice abstinence; and to associate with other men, and live like them (Ad 1.). Wherefore Bede says (On Mark ii): "Christ fasted, that thou mightest not disobey the commandment; He ate with sinners, that thou mightest discern His sanctity and acknowledge His power" (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE LED A LIFE OF POVERTY IN THIS WORLD.

YES.—It was fitting that Christ should lead a life of poverty in this world.

THE FIRST REASON is that this was becoming to His office of preaching, on account of which He says He came (Mark i, 38). For it behoves preachers of the Word of God to devote themselves utterly to preaching—in fact, to cut free from the care of secular concerns; this cannot be done by those who possess wealth.

THE SECOND REASON is that, just as He assumed bodily death, that He might give to us spiritual life, so He took upon Himself bodily poverty, that He might bestow on us spiritual wealth, according to II Cor. viii, 9: "He became poor for our sakes, that through His poverty we might become rich."

THE THIRD REASON is that the more lowly He seemed by reason of His poverty the greater might the power of His Godhead be shown to be.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST CONFORMED HIS CONDUCT TO THE LAW.

YES—Christ in all things conducted Himself according to the precepts of the Law.

THE REASON is that by His conduct toward the Law Christ wished: a) To give approval to the Old Law; b) by observing it, to consummate and terminate it in Himself, so as to show that it was ordained to Him; c) to deprive the Jews of an occasion of slander; d) to free men from its subjection, according to Galat. iv, 4: "God sent His Son . . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law."

NOTE: With regard to the objection of the Jews that Christ did not keep the

Sabbath (John ix, 16), note first that the precept of Sabbath sanctification does not forbid works that are needed for even bodily health. Now the miracles that Christ did related to both bodily and spiritual health. Thirdly, this precept does not forbid works pertaining to the worship of God. That Christ commanded the paralytic to take up his bed on the Sabbath pertained to the worship of God, that is, to the praise of God's power (Ad 1).

QUESTION XLI

THE TEMPTATION OF CHRIST

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS BECOMING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE TEMPTED.

YES.—Christ willed to be tempted for four reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that He might help us in our temptations.

THE SECOND REASON is that no one, however holy, might think Himself safe and free from temptation, especially if he comes for the service of God (Ecclus., ii, 1).

THE THIRD REASON is for example's sake, that He might teach us how to overcome the devil's temptations.

THE FOURTH REASON is that He might give us confidence in His mercy; wherefore it is said, Hebr. iv, 15: "We have not a high priest who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, but one tempted in all things as we are, without sin."

NOTE: It was also fitting for Christ to be tempted by the devil:

a) That, by learning Christ's human weakness, the devil might doubt, as far as Christ willed, concerning His Divinity (Ad 1).

b) Because Christ willed to conquer the devil by righteousness, but not by power (Ad 2).

c) Because temptation by an enemy, since it takes place by merely outward suggestion, can be without sin (Ad 3). But the temptation of the flesh cannot take place without sin (at least by reason of the cause of the deordination, which is original sin).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE BEEN TEMPTED IN THE DESERT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the devil tempts a man more when he is alone; for it is said in Eccles. iv, 12: "If a man prevail against one, two shall withstand him." Hence it is that Christ went out into the desert, as to a field of battle, to be tempted here by the devil. Likewise, this was done that He might show that the devil envies those who strive to do better things.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S TEMPTATION SHOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE AFTER HIS FAST.

YES.—Christ reasonably willed to be tempted after His fast, for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON was to set an example: Because, since we are all in urgent need of strengthening ourselves against temptation, by fasting before His temptation He taught us that by fasting we ought to forearm ourselves against temptations.

THE SECOND REASON is to show that the devil attacks even fasters to tempt them, as he does others who are engaged in good works.

THE THIRD REASON is that after fasting hunger followed, which gave the devil the audacity to assail Him.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MODE AND ORDER OF THE TEMPTATION WERE BECOMING.

YES.—THE REASON is that the order of temptation by the devil is not to tempt the spiritual man immediately with grave sins, but to begin gradually with the lighter ones, and work up to the more grievous. And such was the temptation of Christ. For he first tempted Him in that which men desire, however spiritual they be, namely the support of the bodily nature by food. Secondly, he proceeded to that in which spiritual men are sometimes found wanting, inasmuch as they do certain things for show, which pertains to vainglory. Thirdly, he led the temptation on to that in which no spiritual men, but only carnal men, have a part—namely to desire worldly riches and fame, to the extent of holding God in contempt.

NOTE: 1. This same order was observed by the devil in the temptation of the first man. For he first enticed his intellect, concerning the eating of the forbidden tree.

Secondly, he enticed his vanity when he said: "Your eyes will be opened." Thirdly, he carried temptation to the extreme height of pride when he said: "You will be as gods, knowing good and evil" (in body of art.).

2. When Christ suffered the injury of temptation, when the devil said to Him: "If Thou be the Son of God, cast Thyself down," He was not troubled, nor did He rebuke the devil. But when the devil usurped the honor of God by saying: "All these things will I give Thee, if Thou wilt fall down and adore me," He was exasperated, and repulsed him, saying: "Begone, Satan!" in order that He might teach us by His example to bear our own injuries with patience, but not so much as listen to the injuries aimed at God (Ad 6).

QUESTION XLII

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD HAVE PREACHED ONLY TO THE JEWS AND NOT TO THE GENTILES.

YES.—It was fitting for Christ's preaching to be presented in the beginning to the Jews alone, both by Himself and by His Apostles; and that for four reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that He might show that by His coming the promises made of old to the Jews, but not to the Gentiles, were fulfilled.

THE SECOND REASON is that His coming might be shown to be from God. For the things that are of God are appointed by God (Rom. xiii, 1). Now due order demanded that Christ's doctrine is proposed first to the Jews, who were closer to God by their belief in and worship of the one God, and by them be transmitted to the Gentiles.

THE THIRD REASON is that He might deprive the Jews of any ground of slander, so that they would have no good excuse for saying that they rejected Our Lord because He sent the Apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans.

THE FOURTH REASON is that Christ by the victory of the Cross merited power and dominion over the Gentiles; and thus before His Passion He did not will to preach His doctrine to the Gentiles; but after His Passion He told the disciples (Matth. xxxix, 19): "Go and make disciples of all nations."

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE PREACHED TO THE JEWS WITHOUT OFFENDING THEM.

NO.—THE REASON is that when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and teacher should not fear to offend these men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now the Scribes and Pharisees and Jewish leaders were by their malice a considerable hindrance to the salvation of the people, both because they opposed themselves to Christ's doctrine, which was the only way to salvation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals of the people. For this reason Our Lord, undeterred by their taking offense, publicly taught the truth that they hated, and condemned their vices.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE TAUGHT ALL THINGS OPENLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that there was no place for envy in Christ (Wisd. vii, 13): and His doctrine was not of error or of uncleanness, but of truth and virtue; and therefore it was proposed either to the whole multitude or to all His disciples in common.—But with regard to the manner of His teaching, Christ spoke certain things to the multitude in secret, by employing parables in teaching them spiritual things that they were not able or worthy to grasp; and yet it was better for them to be instructed in spiritual things under the guise of parables than to be deprived of them altogether. Nevertheless, Our Lord expounded the open and unveiled truth of these parables to His disciples, so that they might hand it down to others who were worthy of it.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE COMMITTED HIS DOCTRINE TO WRITING

NO.—It was not fitting for Christ to have written His doctrine, for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is on account of His dignity, for the more excellent the teacher the more excellent should the manner of His teaching be. Consequently, it was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of

teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers (immediately). For writings are ordained, as to an end, to imprinting doctrine on the hearts of hearers (mediately).

THE SECOND REASON is on account of the excellence of Christ's doctrine, for such is the excellence of Christ's doctrine that it cannot be expressed in writing. Now if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears on the surface of the writing.

THE THIRD REASON is on account of a certain order, namely that His doctrine should come to all men from Him in a certain order, that is, by His teaching His disciples immediately, who afterwards taught others by word and writing.

NOTE: Because the Old Law was given in sensible figures, so it was suitably written in sensible signs. But Christ's doctrine, which is "the law of the spirit of life," was not to be written "with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart," as the Apostles says (II Cor. iii, 3).—(Ad 2).

QUESTION XLIII

THE MIRACLES WORKED BY CHRIST

1) The miracles in general; 2) specifically, each kind of miracle; 3) in particular, the Transfiguration.—About the first there will be four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE WORKED MIRACLES.

YES.—THE REASON is that God vouchsafes miracles to man for two reasons: First and principally, to confirm the truth of faith that a man teaches in the name of God; secondly, to show forth the presence of God in man through the grace of the Holy Spirit. Now both of these were to be manifested to men in respect to Christ, namely that God was in Him through grace, not the grace of adoption, but that of union, and that His supernatural doctrine was from God. And thus it was most fitting that He should work miracles, as He said (John x, 3; v, 36).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST WORKED MIRACLES BY DIVINE POWER

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was declared in the First Part (q. cx, art. 4), true miracles can be worked only by the divine power, because only God can change the order of nature; and this belongs to the order of miracles.—Christ's human nature was an instrument of the divine action, and His human nature received power from His divine nature, as was said before (q. xiii, art. 3).

NOTE: Because it was to be believed that Christ is from the Father, and that He is equal to Him, therefore in order to show both facts He did miracles, now with authority, now with prayer; in the lesser things, indeed, He looks up to heaven—for instance, in the multiplication of the loaves; but in the greater, which belong to God alone, He acts with authority, for example, when He forgave sins and raised the dead.

When it is said that in raising Lazarus He lifted up His eyes (John xi, 41), this was not because He needed to pray, but because He wished to teach us how to pray. Wherefore He said: "Because of the people who stand round, I have said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me" (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST BEGAN TO WORK MIRACLES WHEN HE CHANGED WATER INTO WINE AT THE MARRIAGE FEAST.

YES.—Christ began to work miracles at the marriage feast of Cana, not to confirm His teaching, but to show the divine power in Him.

THE REASON is that it was unbecoming for Him to work miracles before He should begin to teach; and it was unfitting for Him to begin to teach before the perfect age. But as to the second, it was right that He should so manifest His Godhead by miracles that the truth of His manhood should be believed.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MIRACLES THAT CHRIST WORKED WERE A SUFFICIENT PROOF OF HIS GODHEAD.

YES.—The miracles that Christ worked were sufficient to manifest His Divinity, for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is by reason of the works He did, for the works that Christ did transcended every kind of created power; and thus they could be wrought only by

divine power. For this reason the blind man who was made to see declared (John ix, 32): "Not from the beginning of the world has it been heard that anyone opened the eyes of a man born blind. If this Man were not from God, He could do nothing."

THE SECOND REASON is on account of the manner of doing miracles, because He did miracles as by His own power, and not by praying, as others did; wherefore it is said in Luke vi, 19 that "a power went forth from Him, and healed all."

THE THIRD REASON is from the very teaching whereby He called Himself God; for unless it were true it would not be confirmed by miracles wrought by divine power; and thus it is stated, Mark i, 27: "What new doctrine is this? For with authority He commands even the unclean spirits, and they obey him."

QUESTION XLIV

CHRIST'S MIRACLES CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY

1. The miracles Christ did in spiritual substances. 2. The miracles He worked in heavenly bodies. 3. The miracles He worked in man. 4. The miracles He worked in irrational creatures.

ART. I.—WHETHER THOSE MIRACLES WERE FITTING THAT CHRIST WORKED IN SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES.

YES.—It was fitting that among other miracles He should also deliver the possessed from demons.

THE REASON is that the miracles that Christ worked were proofs of the faith that He taught. Now He was by the power of His Godhead to drive the power of the demons from the men who were to believe in Him, according to John xiii, 31: "Now will the prince of the world be cast out." Hence it was fitting that among His other miracles He should also deliver the possessed from the demons.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD WORK MIRACLES ON THE HEAVENLY BODY.

YES.—Both when the new star appeared at His birth and when darkness ensued at His death.

THE REASON is that the miracles of Christ had to be such as to show sufficiently that He was God. Now this is not clearly shown by the changes wrought in the inferior bodies, which can also be produced by other causes, as by the changes in the courses of the heavenly bodies, which have been established by God alone in an unchangeable order. Thus it was fitting that Christ should do miracles even in the heavenly bodies, especially at the time when His weakness according to His human nature chiefly appeared, as at His birth, when the new star appeared in the heavens, and at His Passion, when He wrought miracles in the principal luminaries of the universe (Ad 3).

NOTE: According to some, among whom Jerome is one (On Matth., chap. xxii), this darkness or eclipse of the sun that occurred at Christ's Passion was caused by the sun's withdrawing its rays. According to Origin (On Matth., tract. 32) this happened by clouds coming between the sun. On this point, however, credence is rather to be given to Dionysius, who [is thought to have been] an eye witness of this occurring by the moon's coming between us and the sun; and this was miraculous from several aspects, for at that time the moon was full, and naturally in opposition with the sun, it being the 15th day since the Jewish Passover. Now all these things Dionysius relates as an eyewitness in his letter to Polycarp.—(Ad 2).

[Tr. Note: The writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius do not date beyond the fifth century, and so St. Thomas is led here into historical error.]

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST WORKED MIRACLES FITTINGLY ON MEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that it was fitting that Christ should work miracles particularly on men, particularly by healing them, and thus show that He was the universal and spiritual savior of men.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST WORKED MIRACLES FITTINGLY ON IRRATIONAL CREATURES

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's miracles were directed to acquainting men with the power of Divinity in Himself. Now all creatures are subject to the power of

the Divinity. Hence it was right that He should work miracles in all kinds of creatures, and not only in men, but even in irrational creatures.

QUESTION XLV

THE TRANSFIGURATION OF CHRIST

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE TRANSFIGURED.

YES.—THE REASON is that it was fitting that He should show His disciples the glory of His clarity, which is to be transfigured, that He might lead them to follow His Passion. For in order that anyone go straight along a road he must have some knowledge of the end; and this was especially necessary when the way is hard and rough, and the going heavy, but delightful the end.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S CLARITY WAS THE CLARITY OF GLORY.

YES.—The clarity that Christ assumed in the Transfiguration was the clarity of glory as to essence, but not as to the mode of its being.

THE REASON is that clarity overflowed in the Transfiguration from Christ's Divinity and soul to His body, not by way of an immanent quality affecting the body itself, as is the case with the glorified body, but rather by way of a transient passion, as when air is illuminated by the sun. Wherefore that radiance then appearing in Christ's body was miraculous, as was His walking on the waves of the sea. For Christ's body miraculously possessed those qualities that belong to the properties of the glorified body; for Christ's body was not yet immortal (Ad 1).

NOTE: Just as the clarity that was in Christ's body represented the future clarity of His body; so the clarity of His garments designated the future clarity of His saints, which was surpassed by the clarity of Christ, as the whiteness of snow is surpassed by the splendor of the sun (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WITNESSES OF THE TRANSFIGURATION WERE FITTINGLY CHOSEN.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ wished to be transfigured in order to show His glory to men and to arouse men to desire it. Now the men who are brought to the glory of eternal beatitude by Christ are not only those who were after Him, but also those who preceded Him. Hence it was fitting that there should be witnesses from those who preceded Him, namely Moses and Elias; and from those who followed Him, namely Peter, James, and John, that this word might stand in the mouth of two or three.

NOTE: As Chrysostom says (On Matth., hom. lvii), Moses and Elias are brought forward for many reasons, among which the first and chief is that "the multitude said He was Elias or Jeremias or one of the Prophets. He thus brings the leaders of the prophets with Him, that hereby at least they might see the difference between the servant and the Master."—As regards the disciples, He took them, as being superior to the rest. For Peter was outstanding in love; John, in the prerogative of virginity and evangelical doctrine; and James, in the prerogative of martyrdom (Ad 3 and ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF THE FATHER'S VOICE WAS FITTINGLY ADDED IN THE TRANSFIGURATION.

YES.—Both in the Baptism and in the Transfiguration it was fitting that Christ's natural filiation should be manifested by the testimony of the Father, in order to designate our own adoption as sons of God.

THE REASON is that by Baptism we acquire the grace of the wayfaring state, which is the imperfect conformity of image to the natural Son of God; by the Transfiguration the clarity of our future glory was shown beforehand, the glory that will be a perfect conformity, as is said in I John iii, 2. For adoption as sons of God is by way of a certain conformity to the natural Son of God.

NOTE: In the Baptism wherein the mystery of the first regeneration was proclaimed the operation of the whole Trinity was made manifest, because the incarnate Son was there, the Holy Spirit appeared under the form of a dove, and the Father was there proclaimed in the voice. So also in the Transfiguration, which is the mystery

of the second regeneration, the whole Trinity appeared—the Father in the voice, the Son in the man, the Holy Spirit in a bright cloud, which signified the brightness of future glory and refreshment from all sorts of evil (Ad 2).

QUESTION XLVI

THE PASSION OF CHRIST

Here we consider what pertains to Christ's going out of the world: 1) His Passion; 2) His death; 3) His burial; 4) His descent into hell. About the Passion three things must be considered: a) The Passion itself; b) its efficient cause; 3) its fruit. About the first there are 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST TO SUFFER FOR THE DELIVERANCE OF THE HUMAN RACE.

YES: a) It was necessary for Christ to suffer, not by the necessity of compulsion; but b) by the necessity of the end, and that both on our part, and on the part of Christ, and on the part of God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that God determined that Christ should suffer, not under compulsion, but freely; and Christ suffered voluntarily.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) on our part, because we have been delivered by the Passion of Christ (John iv, 14);—b) on the part of Christ Himself, because Christ by the lowliness of His Passion merited the glory of being exalted (Luke xxiv, 26);—c) on the part of God, because His determination regarding Christ's Passion, foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had to be fulfilled (Luke xxii, 22, and xxiv, 44, 46).

NOTE: That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice: With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice; and with His mercy, for, since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature, as was said above (q. I, art. 2), God gave him His Son to satisfy for him, according to Rom. iii, 24; and this came of more abounding mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction, as is said in Ephes. ii, 4.

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER POSSIBLE WAY OF HUMAN DELIVERANCE BESIDES THE PASSION OF CHRIST.

YES.—a) Simply and absolutely speaking, it was possible for God to deliver man in another way than by the Passion of Christ; but b) but if a supposition is made on the part of God, it was impossible to deliver man in any other way.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that "nothing shall be impossible with God" (Luke i, 37).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since it is impossible for God's foreknowledge to be deceived, and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, supposing God's foreknowledge and ordinance regarding Christ's Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not to suffer and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by His Passion.

NOTE: If God had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For God has no one higher than Himself, since He is the sovereign and common good of the universe. Consequently, if He forgives sin, which has the character of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one, just as anyone else who pardons a personal offense without satisfaction acts mercifully, and not unjustly (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MORE SUITABLE WAY OF DELIVERING THE HUMAN RACE THAN BY CHRIST'S PASSION.

NO.—It was more suitable that we should be delivered by Christ's Passion than by the mere will of God.

THE REASON is that the fact of man's being delivered by the Passion of Christ includes many things pertaining to man's salvation besides deliverance from sin.—First, because by this fact man knows how much God loves him, as the Apostle says (Rom. vi, 8).—Secondly, because by this He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues shown forth in the Passion of Christ, as is said in I Pet. ii, 21.—Thirdly, because Christ by His Passion not only freed man from sin,

but also merited for him sanctifying grace and the glory of beatitude, as will later be explained (q. xlvi).—Fourthly, because it lays a greater obligation on man of keeping himself free from sin, when he reflects that he was redeemed from sin by the blood of Christ, as the Apostle says, I Cor. vi, 29: "You have been bought at a great price. Glorify God and bear Him in your body."

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST OUGHT TO HAVE SUFFERED ON THE CROSS.

YES.—It was most fitting that Christ should suffer death on the cross, and that for seven reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is the example of virtue, for, though there are men who do not fear death in general, yet they shrink from some particular kind of death. Accordingly, it needed the cross of that man to show that no right-living man need fear any kind of death. For among all the kinds of death none was more execrable and fearful than that kind on the cross.

THE SECOND REASON is that it was fitting that, to satisfy for that sin of Adam, which consisted in his taking fruit from the forbidden tree, Christ should allow Himself to be nailed to a tree, as restoring that which Adam took away.

THE THIRD REASON is that, as Chrysostom says (in his sermon on the Passion), He suffered on a tree on high, and not under a roof, that even the element of air might be cleansed. But even the earth received a similar boon, being cleansed by the blood that kept trickling down from His side."

THE FOURTH REASON is that by dying on high He prepared for us our ascent into heaven.

THE FIFTH REASON is that this befits the universal salvation of the whole world [for the cross stretches in all directions].

THE SIXTH REASON is that this kind of death symbolizes different virtues. (Augustine says that the breadth of the Cross signifies good works, since the hands are stretched out upon it; the length has the note of longanimity; the height symbolizes that Christ is the supreme desire of souls. The part of the tree that is hidden from view in the ground denotes the depth of gratuitous grace.)

THE SEVENTH REASON is that this kind of death corresponds to numerous figures in the Old Testament, such as the Ark of the Deluge, Moses' rod, the Ark of the Covenant, and such like, which were made of wood.

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST ENDURED ALL SUFFERINGS.

NO.—a) As regards the species, it did not behoove Christ to endure all suffering; but b) as regards the genus He endured every human suffering.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that many kinds of suffering are mutually exclusive, such as burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from without, since it was not befitting for Him to endure those arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as was already stated (q. xiv, art. 4).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is a) on the part of men, from whom He suffered: For He suffered something both from the Gentiles, and from the Jews; from men and from women, as is evident in the case of the maidservants who accused Peter. He suffered also from the rulers of the people and their ministers, and from the populace; He suffered from His friends and intimates, as is plain from the case of Judas, who betrayed Him, and Peter, who denied Him;

b) On the part of the sufferings which man can endure: For Christ suffered from friends, who abandoned Him; in His reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He was stripped of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings;

c) In regard to His bodily members: For Christ suffered in His head from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastenings of the nails; in His face from slaps and spittle; and in His entire body from the scourges He received;

d) As regards all His bodily senses: For He suffered in touch, by being scourged and nailed; in taste, by being given gall and vinegar to drink; in smell, by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of corpses, which is called Calvary; in hearing, by being tormented with the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight,

by beholding the tears of His Mother and of the disciples whom He loved.—And therefore, just as He was raised above all others by the gifts of grace, so He was lowered beneath all others by the ignominy of His sufferings (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PAIN OF CHRIST'S PASSION WAS GREATER THAN ALL OTHER PAINS.

YES.—Both sensible pain, which is caused by bodily hurt, and interior pain, which arises from the apprehension of some harm, and is called sadness, was in Christ supreme among the pains of this life, and that for four reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is on account of the sources of His pain: For, as regards sensible pain, the death of the crucified is most bitter; for they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive places, namely in the hands [wrists] and feet, and the very weight of the hanging body constantly augments the pain. Add to this the length of suffering, for they do not die at once, as do those who are slain by the sword.—

Of the interior pain the causes were, first, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; secondly, and especially, the fall of the Jews and others who sinned in His death, and particularly the disciples, who suffered scandal at His Passion; thirdly, the loss of bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.

THE SECOND REASON is on account of the sensitivity of the sufferer, both in soul and in body: For in body He possessed a most excellent constitution, since it was formed miraculously by the operation of the Holy Spirit. His soul also, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness.

THE THIRD REASON is on account of the singleness of His pain and sadness: For in other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, or by some derivation or overflow from the higher powers into the lower; but for the suffering Christ it was not so, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function," as Damascene says (*Orth. Fid., lib. iii, cap. 15*).

THE FOURTH REASON is from the fact that suffering and pain was assumed by Christ voluntarily; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit that resulted therefrom—From all these causes weighed together, then, it manifestly appears that Christ's pain was the very greatest.

NOTE: Such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's life, no matter for how long. Hence Aristotle says (*Ethics iii*) that the man of virtue loves his life, all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in like manner Christ laid down His most loved life for the good of charity, according to Jer xii, 7: "I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies" (Ad 4).

ART. VII.—WHETHER CHRIST SUFFERED IN HIS WHOLE SOUL.

YES.—a) In respect of its essence, Christ's whole soul suffered; b) in respect of its powers, Christ's soul suffered in all the lower powers; c) but not in the higher reason, except on the part of the subject, i.e., the soul.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the whole essence of the soul is united to the body, so that it is wholly in the whole body, and wholly in each part of the body. And therefore, when His body suffered and was prepared for separation from the soul, His whole soul suffered.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in each of the lower powers of the soul, which act on temporal things, there was found something that was a cause of Christ's pain, as is clear from the preceding article.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the object of the superior reason in Christ's soul, namely God, was not a cause of pain to the soul of Christ, but of joy and delight. But on the part of the subject, i.e., the soul, all the powers of the soul of Christ suffered, since all the powers of the soul are rooted in its essence, which is accessible to suffering when the body suffers, for the soul is the act of the body.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHRIST'S ENTIRE SOUL ENJOYED BLESSED FRUITION IN THE PASSION.

Yes.—a) Christ's entire soul in its essence enjoyed blessed fruition, insofar as it

is the subject of the superior part of the soul; b) but in respect to all its powers His entire soul did not enjoy blessed fruition, either directly or by way of overflow; yet c) the superior part of the soul had perfect enjoyment while Christ was suffering.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is proper to the higher part of the soul to enjoy the Godhead; but in respect to this superior part fruition is attributed to the essence of the soul; just as, conversely, suffering is also attributed to the higher part of the soul by reason of the essence of the soul. And in this respect Christ's whole soul enjoyed fruition in its essence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that fruition cannot be the act of every part or power of the soul; and therefore not all the powers of Christ's soul directly had enjoyment. Likewise, as long as Christ was a warfarer, there was no overflow of glory from the superior part to the inferior part of the soul, or from the soul to the body.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the higher part of the soul was not hindered by the lower part in respect to that which is proper to it.—And thus in the Passion itself the higher part of Christ's soul had enjoyment of eternal life. For the joy of fruition is not opposed directly to the grief of the Passion, for they have not the same object. Now nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not in the same respect. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the higher part of reason by its proper act; but the grief of the Passion, according to the subject. The grief of the Passion belongs to the essence of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the joy of fruition belongs to the soul by reason of the faculty in which it is subjected (Ad 1).

ART. IX.—WHETHER CHRIST SUFFERED AT A SUITABLE TIME.

YES.—THE REASON is that in Christ suffering was subject to His will. Now His will was governed by divine wisdom, which orders all things conveniently and sweetly (Wisd. iii, 1). And thus Christ suffered on the day "on which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed" (Luke xxii, 7), and in His most perfect stage of life (Ad 1 and ad 4).

ART. X.—WHETHER CHRIST SUFFERED IN A SUITABLE WAY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as all times were in His hand, so also were all places. Therefore, just as Christ suffered at a suitable time, so also He suffered at a suitable place.—And thus Christ suffered most suitably at Jerusalem, which was the place chosen by God for the offering of sacrifices to Himself (Ad 1); He suffered outside the city gates, but not in the Temple, because the sacrifice was universal and an oblation for all the world (Ad 2); He suffered in the place of Calvary, which took its name from those who are beheaded (the skull), that He might rear the standard of martyrdom where once was the field of the condemned (Ad 3).

ART. XI.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO BE CRUCIFIED WITH THIEVES.

YES.—THE REASON is, as Augustine says (On John, tract. 31), that "the very Cross was a judgment seat; for the judge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered, the one who mocked Him was condemned. Already He has signified what He shall do to the living and the dead: Some He will set on His right, others on His left hand."

ART. XII.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION IS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO HIS GODHEAD.

NO.—THE REASON is that the Passion must be attributed to the suppositum of the divine nature, i.e., to the Word of God, not by reason of the divine nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature assumed, which is passible.

QUESTION XLVII THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF CHRIST'S PASSION (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS SLAIN BY ANOTHER OR BY HIMSELF.

ANSWER: a) The direct cause of Christ's death were His persecutors; b) but the indirect cause of His Passion and death was Christ Himself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it was His persecutors, by direct action, who inflicted on Him the cause of His death, with the intention of killing Him, and with the ensuing result, inasmuch as death followed from that cause.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ could, if He willed, have prevented His Passion and death, namely by holding His adversaries in check, so that they would not wish to kill Him, or would be unable to do so; or by protecting His fleshly nature from the infliction of any injury. Christ's soul had this power because it was joined to the Word of God in the unity of His Person.

NOTE: In order for Christ to show that the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud voice; and hence His death should be computed among His other miracles (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST DIED OUT OF OBEDIENCE.

YES.—It was most fitting that Christ should suffer out of obedience, and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that this befitted the justification of men, that, "as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of many, many shall be made just" (Rom. v, 19).

THE SECOND REASON is that it befitted the reconciliation of men with God, that the sacrifice of Christ's Passion and death should proceed from obedience to the Father: For "obedience is better than sacrifices" (1 Kings xv, 22).

THE THIRD REASON is that this befitted His victory, whereby He triumphed over death and its author. For the Man-Christ obtained the victory through being obedient to God, according to Prov. xxi, 28: "An obedient man shall speak of victory."

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FATHER DELIVERED UP CHRIST TO THE PASSION.

YES.—God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion in three respects:

THE FIRST REASON is that God the Father foreordained Christ's Passion for the deliverance of the human race, according to Is. liii, 6: "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all."

THE SECOND REASON is that God the Father inspired in Christ the will to suffer for us, by infusing charity into Him. Hence we read in the same passage: "He was offered because it was His own will" (v. 10).

THE THIRD REASON is that God the Father did not protect Him from the Passion, but abandoned Him to His persecutors. Thus we read in Rom. viii, 32: "He . . . has not spared even His own Son, but has delivered Him for us all;" and Matth. xxvii, 46 says that, hanging on the Cross, Christ said: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" namely inasmuch as He abandoned Him to the power of His persecutors.

NOTE: Christ, as God, delivered Himself to death by the same will and action whereby the Father also delivered Him; but as man He delivered Himself by virtue of the will inspired by the Father (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO SUFFER AT THE HANDS OF THE GENTILES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the very manner of Christ's Passion foreshadowed the effect of the Passion: First, because Christ's Passion wrought its effect among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized in the death of Christ, as is evident from Acts ii, 41 and iv, 4. Afterwards, by the preaching of Jews, Christ's Passion passed on to the Gentiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the Gentiles.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SIN OF THOSE WHO CRUCIFIED CHRIST WAS MOST GRIEVOUS.

NO.—a) The elders or principal men of the Jews, as also the demons, knew that He was the Christ promised in the Law; yet they were ignorant of the mystery of His Divinity; b) those of lesser degree, or the people, did not fully know that He was either the Christ or the Son of God.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the elders saw the signs in Him, which the Prophets said would come to pass. But their ignorance of His Godhead did not excuse them from sin, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance, for they saw evident signs of His Divinity, but out of hatred and envy for Christ they perverted these signs, and refused to believe His words whereby He declared Himself to be the Son of God. Wherefore He says of them (John xv, 22): "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would have no sin. But now they have no excuse for their sin." And later he adds: "If I had not done among them works such as no one else has done, they would have no sin." And so the expression employed by Job xxi, 14 can be accepted on their behalf: Who "said to God: Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that those of lesser degree, or the people, did not know the mysteries of Scripture. For, though some of them believed in Him, the multitude did not believe; and if sometimes they doubted whether He was the Christ, on account of the multitude of signs and the efficacy of His doctrine, as is declared in John vii, yet afterwards they were deceived by their leaders, so that they did not believe Him to be either the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter says to them (Acts iii, 17): "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers," because, namely, they were misled by their rulers.

NOTE: Affected ignorance does not excuse from guilt, but seems rather to aggravate it: For it shows that a man is so strongly attached to sin that He wishes to incur ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, but also as crucifiers of God (for they slew the Lord of glory, as the Apostle says, I Cor. ii, 8).—AAd 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SIN OF THOSE WHO CRUCIFIED CHRIST WAS MOST GRIEVOUS.

YES.—a) The sin of the rulers was most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin and in respect of the malice of their will; b) the sin of the lesser sort was most grievous in respect of the kind of the sin; although it was diminished somewhat on account of their ignorance.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the lesser Jews did not know that He was Christ, as was stated in the previous article; yet their sin was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ from fear of Caesar (Ad 2).

QUESTION XLVIII CHRIST'S PASSION AS REGARDS ITS EFFECT

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION CAUSED OUR SALVATION BY WAY OF MERIT.

YES.—Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but also for all His members.

THE REASON is that, as was stated above (q. viii), Christ was given grace, not only to Him as an individual, but also as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might flow from Him to His members; and therefore in this way whoever suffers for justice's sake, provided that He is in the state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Matth. v, 10: "Blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice' sake."

NOTE: Christ from the beginning of His conception merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some obstacles, which hindered us from obtaining the effect of His preceding merits; consequently, in order to remove those hindrances, "it was necessary for Christ to suffer" (Ad 2). And thus Christ's Passion had a special effect, which His preceding merits did not possess, not on account of greater charity, but because of the nature of the work, which was suitable for such an effect, as is clear from the arguments advanced above on the fittingness of Christ's Passion (q. xlvi).—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION BROUGHT ABOUT OUR SALVATION BY WAY OF ATONEMENT.

YES.—Christ's Passion was not only the sufficient but also the superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race.

THE REASON is that Christ, by suffering out of charity and obedience, gave

more to God than was required to compensate for the sins of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity with which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life, which He lay down for atonement, which was the life of God and of man; thirdly, on account of the universality of the Passion and the magnitude of the suffering He took on Himself, as was stated above (q. xlvi, art. 6).

NOTE: The head and members are as one Mystic Person; and therefore Christ's satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION OPERATED BY WAY OF SACRIFICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that a sacrifice is properly called anything (sensible and external) that is done for the honor properly due to God, in order to appease Him. Now Christ offered Himself to God in the Passion for us; and the very fact that He voluntarily endured the Passion was most acceptable to God, as proceeding from the greatest charity. Hence it is evident that Christ's Passion was a true sacrifice.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION WROUGHT OUR SALVATION BY WAY OF REDEMPTION.

YES.—According to Galat. iii, 13: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, becoming a curse for us."

THE REASON is that by sin man was subject both to the devil's bondage and to the punishment of God's justice, which is also a kind of bondage, because by punishment man suffers what he does not will. Now Christ's Passion was a kind of price, whereby we were freed from both obligations. For Christ satisfied for us, not by giving money or any such thing, but by giving what was of greatest price—Himself. Hence Christ's Passion is said to be our redemption, or ransom.

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO CHRIST TO BE THE REDEEMER.

YES.—It is proper to Christ, as man, to be the Redeemer immediately; although the Redemption itself can be attributed to the whole Trinity as its first cause.

THE REASON is that the price of our redemption is the blood of Christ, or His bodily life, which was in the blood that Christ immediately shed. But this redemption belongs to the whole Trinity as to its first and remote cause, to whom Christ's life belong as to its first author, and from whom Christ received the inspiration to suffer for us. Hence the Redemptor immediately belongs to the Man-Christ, but principally to God, as to its original author (Ad 1 and 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S PASSION WROUGHT OUR SALVATION BY WAY OF EFFICIENT CAUSE.

YES.—Christ's Passion wrought our salvation by way of an efficient instrumental cause.

THE REASON is that, since Christ's humanity is the instrument of the Godhead, consequently, all Christ's actions and sufferings operated instrumentally in the power of the Godhead for human salvation. And in this way Christ's Passion efficiently caused human salvation. But the principal efficient agency of our salvation is God, as we said above (prev. art.).

NOTE: Christ's Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner; but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ's soul it acts in a meritorious manner. Considered as being within Christ's very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; and, inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption. But in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice, as we shall show farther on (next q., art. 4).—(Ad 3).

QUESTION XLIX THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST'S PASSION

ART. I.—WHETHER WE WERE DELIVERED FROM SIN THROUGH CHRIST'S PASSION.

YES.—Christ's Passion is the proper cause of the remission of sins in three ways:

THE FIRST REASON is by way of exciting us to charity, for Christ's Passion excites charity in us. Now by charity we obtain the forgiveness of sins, according to Luke vii, 47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much."

THE SECOND REASON is by way of Redemption, because by His Passion, which He endured out of charity and obedience, Christ delivered us from sins as His members, as by the price of His Passion, just as if a man, by some good work of his hands, should redeem himself from a sin that he had committed with his feet. For we are mystically as one Person with Christ, who is the Head of the Church.

THE THIRD REASON is by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ's flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with divine power to expel sin.

NOTE: By His Passion Christ freed us from sins causally, that is, by placing the cause of our deliverance, by which all sins, at whatever time, past, present, or future, could be forgiven; just as if a doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all sicknesses can be cured even in future (Ad 3). This is done by Baptism and Penance and the other sacraments, which have their power from the Passion of Christ, as will appear later (q. lxii, art. 5).—(Ad 4). By the faith quickened by charity, Christ's Passion is applied to us, that we may share in its fruits (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER WE WERE DELIVERED FROM THE DEVIL'S POWER THROUGH CHRIST'S PASSION.

YES.—By Christ's Passion we were delivered from the threefold power of the devil.

THE REASON is that before Christ's Passion men were under a threefold power of the devil. First, on the part of man, because by his sin man deserved to be delivered over to the power of the devil, by whose temptation he was overcome; and from this power of the devil did Christ deliver us by His Passion, inasmuch as He is the cause of the remission of sins. Secondly, on the part of God, because by sinning man offended God, who in His justice abandoned man to the devil's power; and from this Christ delivered us, inasmuch as by His Passion He reconciled us to God, as will be explained later (art. 4 of this q.). Thirdly, on the part of the devil himself, who by his most wicked will prevented man from obtaining salvation; and from this did Christ deliver us by His Passion, inasmuch as in Christ's Passion the devil exceeded the limit of power assigned to him by God, by conspiring to bring about Christ's death, who, being sinless, did not deserve to die. Hence it is just that the debtors whom he held captive should be set at liberty, since they believed in Him whom the devil slew, though He was no debtor, as Augustine says (*De Trin., lib. xiii, cap. 14*).

NOTE: The devil can even now, God so permitting, tempt men's souls and harass their bodies; yet there is a remedy provided for man through Christ's Passion, whereby he can safeguard himself against the enemy's assaults, so as not to be dragged down into the destruction of everlasting death (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER MEN WERE FREED FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF SIN THROUGH CHRIST'S PASSION.

YES.—By Christ's Passion we were freed from the debt of punishment in two ways, directly and indirectly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that when sufficient satisfaction is paid the debt of punishment is directly taken away.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's Passion is the cause of the remission of sin, upon which the debt of punishment rests.

NOTE: In order to secure the effects of Christ's satisfaction, we must be likened to Him. Now we are likened to Him in Baptism sacramentally, according to Rom. vi, 4: "For we are buried together with Him by Baptism into death." Hence no punishment of satisfaction is imposed on men who are baptized, because they are entirely freed by the satisfaction of Christ. But because Christ died but once for our sins (I Pet. iii, 18), therefore a man cannot a second time be likened to Christ's death by the sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those who sin after Baptism be likened to Christ suffering by some form of punishment or suffering which they endure in their own person; yet by the co-operation of Christ's satisfaction a much lighter punishment suffices than one that is proportionate to the sin (Ad 2).—The saints endure punishments, and sometimes most grievous punishments, both because they suffer for others

and because they are more incorporated with Christ, for the members must be conformed to the Head (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER WE WERE RECONCILED TO GOD THROUGH CHRIST'S PASSION.

YES.—AS the Apostle says, Rom. v. 10: "We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son," and that in two ways:

THE REASON is that Christ's Passion removes sin, by which men are made enemies of God; and it is a sacrifice most acceptable to God.

NOTE: The charity of the suffering Christ surpassed the wickedness of His slayers. Accordingly, Christ's Passion prevailed more in reconciling God to the whole human race than in provoking Him to wrath (on the part of Christ's slayers).—(Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST OPENED THE GATE OF HEAVEN TO US BY HIS PASSION.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that Christ by His Passion delivered us both from the universal sin of the first parent, which shut to man the gates of the heavenly kingdom (Gen. iii, 24), and from the special sin of each person, which is committed by the personal act of every human being, for all men share in His Passion by faith, charity, and the sacraments of faith.

NOTE: Elias was taken up into the atmospheric heaven, but not into the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the saints; and likewise Enoch (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER BY HIS PASSION CHRIST MERITED TO BE EXALTED.

YES.—In four respects.

THE REASON is that, when anyone by a just will withdraws from Himself what he ought to have, he deserves to have something further be added to him, as the reward of his just will. Now Christ in His Passion lowered Himself beneath His dignity in four respects: First, as to His Passion and death, to which He was not bound; secondly, as to the place, since His body was laid in a sepulchre and His soul in hell; thirdly, as to the shame and mockeries He endured; fourthly, as to His being delivered up to man's power.

And therefore by His Passion did He merit exaltation in four respects: First, as to His glorious resurrection; secondly, as to His ascension into heaven; thirdly, as to His sitting on the right hand of the Father and the manifestation of His Divinity; fourthly, as to His judicial power.

QUESTION I THE DEATH OF CHRIST (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD DIE.

YES.—For five reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is to satisfy for the human race; for the human race was sentenced to death on account of sin (Gen. ii, 17). Now it is a fitting way to make satisfaction for another when someone subjects himself to the penalty that the other deserved.

THE SECOND REASON is to show forth the truth of the nature assumed, because, as Eusebius says, in his eulogy of Constantine, chap. 15: "If, after dwelling among men, Christ were suddenly to disappear from men's sight, as though shunning death, then by all men He would be likened to a phantom."

THE THIRD REASON is that by dying Christ delivered us from the fear of death.

THE FOURTH REASON is that Christ, by dying bodily to the likeness of sin, that is, to its penalty, set us an example of dying spiritually to sin.

THE FIFTH REASON is that Christ by rising from the dead both demonstrated His power, by which He overcame death, and gave us the hope of rising from the dead.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GODHEAD WAS SEPARATED FROM THE FLESH WHEN CHRIST DIED.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that what is granted by the grace of God is never with-

drawn except through fault. If, then, the affective union with God, which is by the grace of adoption, is never lost without fault; much less is the union of the Godhead with the flesh of Christ dissolved, for it is a personal union, and therefore more abiding. Now in Christ no sin was possible. Hence, just as before His death Christ's flesh was united, in Person and hypostasis, to the Word of God, so it remained united after death.

NOTE: 1. The Word of God is said to be united with the flesh through the medium of the soul, inasmuch as it is through the soul that the Son of God intended to assume; but not as though the soul were the medium linking them together. It is due to the soul that the flesh is human even after the soul has been separated from it—namely inasmuch as by God's ordinance there remains in the dead flesh a certain relation to the resurrection. And therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh is not taken away (Ad 2).

2. The Godhead has not the life-giving energy formally, but effectively, because It cannot be the form of the body. And therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to be living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh remains, since God does not act of necessity but of His own will (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IN CHRIST'S DEATH THERE WAS A SEVERANCE BETWEEN HIS GODHEAD AND HIS SOUL.

NO.—THE REASON is that the soul was united to the Word of God immediately, and more primarily than the body is. Therefore, since the Word of God was not separated from the body in the death of Christ, much less was it separated from the soul.

NOTE. In Christ's death the soul was separated from the flesh, but one hypostasis was not divided into two, because both soul and body in the same respect had their existence from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and in death, though severed from each other, each one continued to have the same hypostasis of the Word; as Damascene says (*Orth. Fid., Lib. III, cap. 27*).—(Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS A MAN DURING THE THREE DAYS OF HIS DEATH.

NO.—THE REASON is that it belongs to the truth of the death of man or animal that by death the subject ceases to be man or animal; for the death of the man or animal results from the separation of the soul, which is the formal complement of the man or animal. Consequently, to say, simply and without qualification, that Christ was a man during the three days of His death is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was a *dead man* during those three days.

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS IDENTICALLY THE SAME BODY LIVING AND DEAD.

YES.—a) He was the same body simply and absolutely, i.e., with nothing added; b) but He was not simply and altogether, or totally, the same.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that something is said to be simply and absolutely the same identically, when it is identical in its suppositum, with no other suppositum added; for Christ's body, living and dead, did not have any other hypostasis than the hypostasis of the Word of God, as was said above (Art. 2).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's body, living and dead, was not totally the same, since life is of the essence of the living body, for it is an essential and not an accidental predicate; hence it follows that the body that ceases to be living does not remain totally the same.—And therefore in the dead Christ there did not remain a body identical in human species, though it did remain identical in the suppositum of the Word of God (Ad 2).

NOTE: Christ's body was corrupted by the corruption of death, i.e., of the separation of the soul from the body; but it was not corrupted by the complete dissolving of the body into the elements; for in this respect Christ's body, by reason of the divine hypostasis remaining, was incorruptible (at end of art. and ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S DEATH CONDUCTED IN ANY WAY TO OUR SALVATION.

YES.—Christ's death, in the very face of death, i.e., by the separation of the

soul and the body, was the cause of our salvation, not by way of merit, as is evident, but by way of efficient cause.

THE REASON is that the Godhead was not separated from Christ's flesh by death; and therefore whatever happened to Christ's flesh, even when the soul departed, was conducive to our salvation by virtue of the Godhead united. And thus by Christ's death the death of the soul in us is said to be destroyed, and also the death of the body, which consists in the separation of the soul. For, although Christ's death was of the body, yet that body was the instrument of the Godhead united to Himself, and operating in Its power even when dead (Ad 3).—Christ's death *in becoming* is the same as His Passion, of which we have already spoken (q. xlix).

QUESTION LI THE BURIAL OF CHRIST

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO BE BURIED.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that by burial the truth of Christ's death was proved.

THE SECOND REASON is that Christ's rising from the grave gave the hope of rising through Him to those who are in the grave, according to John v, 28: "All who are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they who hear shall live."

THE THIRD REASON is that Christ's burial is like an example to those who die spiritually to sins by the death of Christ, namely those who are hidden from the disturbance of men (Ps. xxxi, 21).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS BURIED IN A BECOMING MANNER.

YES.—With regard to three points:

THE REASON is that the manner of Christ's burial was suitable to confirm belief in His death and Resurrection; to commend the piety of those who gave Him honorable burial; and to confirm the mystery whereby those are molded to Him who are buried with Christ unto death.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY WAS REDUCED TO DUST IN THE TOMB.

NO.—It was not fitting for Christ's body to be decomposed, or in any degree to be reduced to dust.

THE REASON is that the putrefaction of any body comes from that body's infirmity of nature, which can no longer hold the body together. And therefore Christ, lest His death might be ascribed to the infirmity of nature, did not wish His body to be putrified or dissolved in any way, no matter how; but to demonstrate His divine power He wished the body to remain incorrupt.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS IN THE TOMB ONLY ONE DAY AND TWO NIGHTS.

YES.—It was fitting that Christ should be in the tomb only one day and two nights.

THE REASON is that by Christ's death we were freed from a twofold death, namely the death of the soul and the death of the body; and this is signified by the two nights in which Christ remained in the tomb. Now His death, since it was not due to sin, but to freely undertaken charity, did not have the character of night, but of death; and thus it is symbolized by one entire day during which Christ was in the tomb.

QUESTION LII CHRIST'S DESCENT INTO HELL

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO DESCEND INTO HELL.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that by sin man incurred, not only the death of the body,

but also descent into hell. And therefore, just as it was fitting for Christ to die, that He might deliver us from death; so it was fitting that He should descend into hell, that He might free us from descent into hell. Wherefore it is said in Osee xiii, 14: "O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite!"

THE SECOND REASON is that it was fitting that, by overcoming the devil by His Passion, He should rescue those whom the devil overcome, who were being kept in hell, according to Zach. ix, 11: "Thou also by the blood of Thy Testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit."

THE THIRD REASON is that, just as Christ showed His power by living and dying, so it was fitting that He should show His power in hell, by visiting and enlightening it.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST WENT DOWN INTO THE HELL OF THE LOST.

NO.—a) Christ's soul descended in its essence only to the place of hell in which the just were detained; b) in the soul's effect, however, Christ descended into every part of hell.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it was fitting that those whom He visited interiorly through grace according to His Godhead, He should also visit them in His soul and in their place.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as He suffered in one place of the earth, but delivered the whole world by His Passion, so while He was in one part of hell He made His power flow in some manner to all the parts of hell, though in different ways. For going down into the hell of the lost He wrought this effect, that by descending thither He put them to shame for their unbelief and wickedness; but to them who were detained in purgatory He gave hope of attaining to glory, whereas upon the holy Fathers detained in hell solely on account of original sin He shed the light of glory everlasting.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WHOLE CHRIST WAS IN HELL.

YES.—By reason of the divine hypostasis, but not entirely.

THE REASON is that the masculine gender is referred to the hypostasis or person. And therefore in those three days of Christ's death it must be said that the whole person was there united to Him by the body; and similarly He was wholly in hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there by reason of the soul united to Him, for the whole Christ was even then everywhere by reason of the divine nature.

NOTE: Christ's Person is whole in each single place, but not wholly, because it is not circumscribed by any place—indeed, all places put together could not comprise His immensity; rather is it His immensity that embraces all things. But it happens in those things that are in a place corporeally and circumscriptively that if a whole be in some place, then no part of it is outside that place. But this is not the case with God (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST MADE ANY STAY IN HELL.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as His body remained in the tomb for a whole day and two nights, in order to prove the truth of His death, so also it is so believed that His soul was in hell, that it might be brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body from the tomb.—In the time in which Christ was in hell, the just, and the soul of the good thief with them, enjoyed the Godhead of Christ, who enlightened them with the light of glory (Ad 1 and 3 passim).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST DESCENDING INTO HELL DELIVERED THE HOLY FATHERS FROM THENCE.

YES.—Christ, descending into hell released the saints, by the power of His Passion, from the debt of punishment due for original sin, whereby they were excluded from the life of glory.

THE REASON is that Christ in descending into hell operated by the power of His Passion, whereby the human race was freed, not only from sin but also from the debt of punishment, as was stated above (q. xlix). Now the holy Fathers were detained in hell on account of the debt of punishment for original guilt.

NOTE: The holy Fathers, while yet living, were delivered from original as well

as from actual sin through faith in Christ; also from the penalty of actual sins, but not from the penalty of original sin, whereby they were excluded from glory, since the price of man's redemption was not yet paid. And therefore before Christ's descent into hell they were not subject to pain; but were blessed in hope, although not yet fully blessed in fact (Ad 2 and 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST DELIVERED ANY OF THE LOST FROM HELL.

NO.—THE REASON is that Christ's descent into hell brought the fruit of deliverance to those only who were united to Christ's Passion through faith enlivened by charity, by which sins are taken away. Now the lost do not have charity, and cannot have it, since they are confirmed in evil (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE CHILDREN WHO DIED IN ORIGINAL SIN WERE DELIVERED BY CHRIST.

NO.—THE REASON is that the children who died in original sin were in no wise united to Christ's Passion through faith and love; for they could not have personal faith, because they did not have the use of free will, and they were not cleansed from original sin by the faith of their parents, or by any sacrament of faith (i.e., by Baptism).

NOTE: Just as Adam's sin passed to those only who descended from him carnally through the seminal principle, so grace of Christ comes to them only who are made His members by spiritual regeneration; and this does not apply to the children who die in original sin.—(Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHRIST BY HIS DESCENT INTO HELL DELIVERED SOULS FROM PURGATORY.

No.—THE REASON is that Christ's Passion, in virtue of which souls are delivered, did not then have a greater efficacy than it has now. And therefore those who were such as are now those who are detained in purgatory were not delivered from purgatory by Christ's descent into hell.—If, however, any were found such as are now set free from purgatory by virtue of Christ's Passion, then there was nothing to hinder them from being delivered from purgatory by Christ's descent into hell.

Note: Christ's power operates in the sacraments by way of healing and expiation. Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist delivers men from purgatory inasmuch as it is a satisfactory sacrifice for sin. But Christ's descent into hell was not satisfactory, though it operated in virtue of the Passion, which was satisfactory, as stated above (q. xlix, art. 1, 2, 3), but the Passion was satisfactory in general, since its virtue had to be applied to each individual by something specially personal. Consequently, it does not follow of necessity that all were delivered from purgatory by Christ's descent into hell.

QUESTION LIII THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST

We have now to consider those things that concern Christ's exaltation: 1) His Resurrection, 2) His Ascension, 3) His sitting at the right hand of God the Father, 4) His judiciary power.—Under the first head there are four points for consideration. The first of these concerns Christ's Resurrection; the second, the quality of the risen Christ; the third, the manifestation of the Resurrection; the fourth, its causality.—With regard to the first, there are four points of inquiry: The necessity of Christ's Resurrection, the time, the order, the cause.

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR CHRIST TO RISE AGAIN.

YES.—For five reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ's Resurrection commends divine justice, to which it belongs to exalt those who humble themselves for God's sake (Luke i, 52). Therefore, because Christ humbled Himself from love of and obedience to God, even to the death on the cross, it behoved Him to be raised by God to a glorious resurrection, according to Ps. cxxxviii, 1: "Thou hast known [i.e., approved] My sitting down [i.e., My humiliation] and My resurrection," i.e., My glory in the resurrection.

THE SECOND REASON is that Christ's resurrection was for our instruction in

the faith, since our belief in Christ's Divinity is confirmed by the Resurrection, because, as is said in II Cor. xiii, 4, "although He was crucified through weakness He lives by the power of God." Hence in I Cor. xv, 14, it is said: "If Christ be not risen again, vain then is our preaching, vain too is your faith."

THE THIRD REASON is that Christ's resurrection raised our hope; for when we behold Christ rise again, who is our Head, we hope that we too shall rise again, as is said in I Cor. xv, 12 and Job xix, 25.

THE FOURTH REASON is that Christ's resurrection confirms the life of the faithful, according to Rom. vi, 4: "Just as Christ has risen from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life;" and further on: "Christ, having risen from the dead, dies now no more; death shall no longer have dominion over Him. . . . Thus do you consider yourself also as dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus."

THE FIFTH REASON is that Christ's resurrection completes the work of our salvation, for just as for this reason He endured evil things in dying, that He might deliver us from evil, so was He glorified in rising again in order to advance us towards good things, according to Rom. iv, 25: "He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO RISE AGAIN ON THE THIRD DAY.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that to manifest the truth of Christ's death it was sufficient that His resurrection be deferred to the third day, for within that time some signs of life appear in a man who is believed dead but is still alive.

NOTE: 1.—The head and members are likened in nature, but not in power: Because the power of the head is more excellent than that of the members. Accordingly, to show forth the excellence of Christ's power, it was fitting that He should rise on the third day, whereas the resurrection of the rest of the world is put off until the end of the world.—(Ad 1).

2. Christ rose early when the day was beginning to dawn, to denote that by His Resurrection He brought us to the light of glory; just as He died when the day was drawing to its close, and nearing darkness, in order to signify that by His death He would destroy the darkness of sin and its punishment (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS THE FIRST TO RISE FROM THE DEAD.

Yes.—Speaking of a perfect resurrection, Christ was the first of all to rise again.

THE REASON is that by rising He was the first to attain life utterly immortal, according to Rom. vi, 9: "Christ, rising from the dead, dies now no more." But by an imperfect resurrection, some others have risen before Christ, so as to be a kind of figure of His Resurrection. (This imperfect resurrection retains the necessity, or at least possibility, of dying.)

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST WAS THE CAUSE OF HIS RESURRECTION.

YES.—Christ was the cause of His Resurrection by the power of His Divinity, but not by the power of His created nature.

THE REASON is that death did not dissever Christ's Divinity from either His soul or His flesh. Therefore according to the virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back again the soul that it had laid aside, and the soul took back again the body that it had abandoned; and thus Christ rose by His own (divine) power. Consequently it was by the divine power that the body and soul mutually resumed each other, but not by the power of their created nature, for by such uncreated power it was necessary for Christ to be raised up by God (Ad 3).

QUESTION LIV THE QUALITY OF CHRIST RISING AGAIN (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD A TRUE BODY AFTER HIS RESURRECTION.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that in order for the Resurrection to be true, the same body of Christ had to be again united to the same soul.

NOTE: Christ's body after the Resurrection entered in to His disciples through closed doors, not by miracle but because of the condition of glory, as some say (Ad 1).—Likewise, it is said that Christ vanished from the eyes of the disciples, not by being corrupted, or being resolved into invisible elements, but because by His will He ceased to be seen by them, either when He was present or by swiftly becoming absent through the gift of agility (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY ROSE AGAIN ENTIRE.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's body in the Resurrection was of the same nature, but of another glory. Hence, whatever belongs to the nature of a human body was all in the body of the risen Christ. Now it is evident that to the nature of a human body there belong the flesh, bones, blood, and the like. Therefore all this was in Christ's risen body, and integrally, without any diminution; otherwise there would not have been a perfect resurrection, if whatever was lost by death had not been restored.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY ROSE GLORIFIED.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ's resurrection was the exemplar and cause of our own, as is declared in I Cor. xv, 43. Now the saints in the resurrection will have glorified bodies, as is said in the same place: "It is sown in dishonor; it will rise in glory." Hence, since the cause is superior to the effect, and the exemplar to the exemplar, much more was Christ's risen body glorified.

THE SECOND REASON is that by the holiness of His Passion He merited the glory of His Resurrection, as was said above (q. xlix, art. vi).

THE THIRD REASON is that, as was declared above, q. xxxiv, art. 4, Christ's soul from the beginning of its conception was glorified by the perfect fruition of the Godhead. But, as was said above (q. xiv, a. 1, ad 2), it was owing to the divine economy that the glory did not pass from His soul to His body, in order that by the Passion He might accomplish the mystery of our Redemption. And therefore, after the mystery of the Passion and death of Christ, the soul immediately communicated its glory to the body resumed in the Resurrection; and so that body was made glorious.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY OUGHT TO HAVE RISEN WITH SCARS.

YES.—It was reasonable that Christ's soul should resume the body in the Resurrection with scars, and that for five reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that this was for Christ's own glory. For Bede says on Luke xxiv, 40, that He kept His scars, not from inability to heal them, but to wear them as an everlasting trophy of His victory.

THE SECOND REASON is that this was fitting to confirm the hearts of the disciples in belief in His Resurrection.

THE THIRD REASON is that, when He pleads for us with the Father, He may always show what manner of death he died for men.

THE FOURTH REASON is that He might convince those redeemed in His blood how mercifully they have been helped.

THE FIFTH REASON is that in the Judgment He may upbraid them who are damned with the justice of their damnation.

QUESTION LV THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESURRECTION (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST' RESURRECTION OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MANIFESTED TO ALL.

NO.—Christ's Resurrection, as it is for the common salvation of all men, so also came to the knowledge of all, not indeed so that it was immediately made known to all, but to some, by whose testimony it should be brought to all.

THE REASON is that the things that pertain to future glory surpasses the common knowledge of men. And therefore such things are not known by man save as divinely revealed. Now among these things is Christ's glorious Resurrection; and therefore His Resurrection was not made known to all people, but to some, by whose testi-

mony it was brought to the knowledge of others, according to Acts x, 4: "Him God raised on the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God."

NOTE: Christ appeared first to women, in order that a woman, who first brought to man the tidings of death, should be the first to announce the life of Christ risen in glory (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING THAT THE DISCIPLES SHOULD SEE CHRIST RISE AGAIN.

NO.—It was not fitting that Christ's Resurrection should be announced immediately by men, but to them by the angels.

THE REASON is that this is the divinely established order, that the things that are above men should be revealed to men by the angels. Now the risen Christ did not return to the common life known to men, but to an immortal life, and Godlike condition, according to Rom. vi, 10: "For in that He lives; He lives unto God." And therefore the Resurrection of Christ was not fittingly announced to men immediately, but to them by the angels.—But the Apostles were able to attest Christ's Resurrection even by sight, because they saw Christ after the Resurrection, whom they knew to be dead, even by the testimony of their own eyes (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST OUGHT TO HAVE LIVED CONSTANTLY WITH HIS DISCIPLES AFTER THE RESURRECTION.

NO.—THE REASON is that to manifest the truth of the Resurrection it sufficed that He appear several times, talk with them in intimate converse, and eat and drink with them, and let them feel His flesh.—On the other hand, constant association could have led them into error, so that they might have believed that He rose to a life that was similar to that which He had before. Yet by His constant presence He promised them comfort in another life (John xvi, 22).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE APPEARED TO THE DISCIPLES IN ANOTHER SHAPE.

YES.—THE REASON is that divine things are made known to men in various ways, according to the various ways in which they are affected. For those who have well-disposed minds perceive divine things according to truth; those, however, who do not have well-disposed minds perceive the things of God with a certain confusion of doubt or error. Thus Christ appeared in His own shape to certain men who were disposed to believe; to others, however, who seemed to be lukewarm in faith He appeared in another shape. And thus He appeared in the shape of a stranger to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus who doubted concerning His Resurrection, according to Luke xxiv, 21: "We hoped that it was He who should have redeemed Israel."

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST SHOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE TRUTH OF THE RESURRECTION BY PROOFS.

YES.—a) Christ proved His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, not as proof is taken for any argument confirming a doubtful thing; but b) as proof is taken for some sensible sign employed to manifest some truth.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles, and if these were not known to the disciples nothing would thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown. And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason, for principles must be assumed that are of the same order. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis of faith, when He said: "All things must needs be fulfilled that are written in the Law, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me" (Luke xxiv, 44).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ showed by certain evident signs that He had truly arisen. Now Christ showed these signs for two reasons: First, because their hearts were not disposed so as to accept readily the faith in the Resurrection. Hence He "upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart" (Mark

xvi, 14). Secondly, that their testimony might be rendered efficacious through the signs shown them, according to I John i, 1: "That which we have seen, and have heard, and our hands have handled . . . we declare."

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PROOFS THAT CHRIST MADE USE OF MANIFESTED SUFFICIENTLY HIS RESURRECTION.

YES.—Christ demonstrated His Resurrection by testimonies and signs (or proofs) that were sufficient in their kind.

THE REASON is that, as regards the testimonies, Christ made use of a twofold witness to manifest His Resurrection to His disciples, neither of which could be refuted. The first was the witness of the angels, who announced the Resurrection to the woman, as appears from all four Gospels; the second is the testimony of the Scriptures, which He advanced to prove His Resurrection, as is said in the last part of Luke.—Now with regard to the proofs or signs, even these were sufficient to demonstrate His true and glorious Resurrection. For these proofs are both on the part of the body and on the part of the soul. On the part of the body He showed three things: First, that His body was true and solid, not imaginary or rarified, like the air. Hence He told the disciples (Luke xxiv, 39): "Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have."—Secondly, He showed that His body was human, by showing them a true shape, which their eyes could view.—Thirdly, He showed them that it was the identical body that He had before, by showing them the scars of His wounds; wherefore, as we read in the last chapter of Luke, He told them: "See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself."—On the part of the soul reunited to the body, He showed that it was real, first by the operations of the nutritive life, by eating and drinking with His disciples, as we read in the last part of Luke. Secondly, by the operations of the sensitive life, in His answering the questions put to Him by the disciples, and greeting those who were present, in which acts He showed that He could see and hear. Thirdly, by the operations of the intellective life, by His speaking to them, and discussing the Scriptures. And, lest anything be wanting to the completeness of the demonstration, He showed them also that He had the divine nature by the miracle that He did in the catch of fishes, and later by His ascending into heaven in their sight, because, as is said in John iii, 13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He who descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven."—He also showed the glory of His Resurrection to His disciples by entering to them through closed doors. All these proofs taken together perfectly demonstrate Christ's Resurrection (Ad 1).

QUESTION LVI THE CAUSALITY OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST'S RESURRECTION IS THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION OF OUR BODIES

YES.—THE REASON is that in the order of true (perfect) resurrection, the resurrection of Christ was the first, as is clear from what has been said (q. liii, art. 3). Now what is first in any order is the cause of all that come after, as is said in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, bk. ii). Hence it follows that Christ's Resurrection was the cause of our own, and this is said by the Apostle (I Cor. xv, 20): "Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them who sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead."—Thus, the Word of God, who is the principle of human life-giving, first gave immortal life to the body naturally united to Himself, and by this effected resurrection in all the rest of men.

NOTE: The first cause of our resurrection is the justice of God; the Resurrection of Christ is the secondary and, as it were, the instrumental cause (Ad 2), and yet also the efficient and exemplar cause: It is the efficient cause, inasmuch as Christ's humanity, in which He rose, is in a way the instrument of His Godhead, and works in Its power, as was shown above (q. xiii, art. 2 and 3). It is moreover the exemplar cause, because the resurrection of Christ's body, as it is first in time, so also is first in dignity and perfection (Ad 3). The meritorious cause of our resurrection is the Passion of Christ (Ad 4, and q. xlviii, art. 1).

2. Since the primary cause of human resurrection is the divine justice, from which

Christ has the power to pass judgment, insofar as He is the Son of Man, the effective power of His Resurrection extends not only to the good, but also to the wicked, who are subject to His judgment (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S RESURRECTION IS CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION OF SOULS.

YES.—a) It is the effective; and b) exemplar cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the divine power, in which Christ's Resurrection acts, is that by which both the soul lives by grace and the body by the soul. And therefore Christ's Resurrection has instrumentally effective power, not only in respect of the resurrection of bodies but also in respect of the resurrection of souls.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that we must also become like to the risen Christ in soul, as the Apostle says (Rome. vi, 4).

NOTE: The efficiency of Christ's Resurrection reaches souls, not by the proper power of His risen body, but by the power of the Divinity, to which He is personally united (Ad 2).

**QUESTION LVII
THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST
(in six articles)**

ART. I.—WHETHER IT WAS FITTING FOR CHRIST TO ASCEND INTO HEAVEN.

YES.—It was not fitting that Christ should remain on earth after the Resurrection, where is the place of generation and corruption; but it was fitting that He should ascend into heaven, where is the place of incorruption.

THE REASON is that a place should be proportionate to that which is in the place. Now Christ by His Resurrection began an immortal and incorruptible life.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST'S ASCENSION INTO HEAVEN BELONGED TO HIM ACCORDING TO HIS DIVINE NATURE.

NO.—When taken to express the condition of the one ascending, the Ascension cannot belong to Christ according to the condition of His divine nature, but according as He is man, yet by divine power.

THE REASON is that there is nothing higher than the divine power to which He can ascend; and because ascension is local motion, a thing not in keeping with the Divine Nature, which is immovable and outside all place. Yet the Ascension is in keeping with Christ according to His human nature, which is limited by place, and can be the subject of motion.

NOTE: It is said of God that He descended from heaven, not according to local movement, but by emptying Himself, whereby, though still in the nature of God, He took the form of a slave; for, just as He is said to have emptied himself, not because He lost His fullness, but because He took on Himself our littleness, so He is said to have descended from heaven, not that He abandoned heaven, but because He assumed earthly nature in union of person (Ad. 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST ASCENDED BY HIS OWN POWER.

YES.—Christ ascended into heaven by His own power—first indeed by His divine power, secondly, by the power of His glorified soul moving Him as he wished.

THE REASON is that the soul is made blessed by participating in God; and on the part of the glorified soul there is a redundance whereby the body is glorified, and the glorified body will be so submissive to the glorified soul that, as Augustine says (*City of God*, xxii), wherever the spirit wills, there the body will be in an instant; nor will the spirit desire anything unbecoming to the soul or the body." For it is becoming for the glorified and immortal body to be in a heavenly place, as was said (art. 1 of this q.). And therefore by the power of the soul that willed it Christ's body ascended into heaven.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST ASCENDED ABOVE ALL THE HEAVENS.

YES.—It was most fitting for Christ's body to be established on high above all other bodies.

THE REASON is that the more perfectly certain bodies participate in the divine goodness, the higher they are in the corporeal order, which is the local order. And the body partakes of the divine goodness through glory more than any natural body by the form of its nature; moreover, it is plain that Christ's body shines with greater glory than all other glorified bodies.

NOTE: That cloud afforded no support as a vehicle to the ascending Christ, as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi on the Gospel), but appeared as a sign of the Godhead, just as God's glory appeared to Israel in a cloud over the Tabernacle (Ad 4).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY ASCENDED ABOVE EVERY SPIRITUAL CREATURE.

YES.—By a certain fittingness.

THE REASON is that Christ's body, although, considering the conditions of corporeal nature, it is below spiritual substance, yet in consideration of the dignity of divine union, by which it is personally united to God, it excels the dignity of all spiritual substances.

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S ASCENSION IS THE CAUSE OF OUR SALVATION.

Yes.—Both on our part and on the part of Christ Himself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that by Christ's Ascension our minds are moved to Him. For Christ's Ascension fosters faith, hope, and charity; and our reverence for Him is thereby increased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly man, but the God of heaven.

THE REASON of the second is that Christ in ascending for our salvation first prepared the way for us to ascend into heaven, as He Himself said (John xiv, 2): "I go to prepare a place for you." And in sign of this the souls of the saints, which He brought out of hell, He translated to heaven. Secondly, as the high priest under the Old Testament entered the sanctuary that he might stand before God for the people, so also Christ entered heaven to make intercession for us, as is said in Hebr. vii, 25. For the very showing of Himself in the human nature, which He took with Him to heaven, is a pleading for us; so that for the very reason that God so exalted human nature in Christ, He may take pity on them for whom the Son of God took human nature. Thirdly, that, being established in His heavenly seat as God and Lord, He might send down gifts upon men, according to Eph. iv, 10: "He ascended above all the heavens, that He might fill all things"—that is, with gifts, according to the gloss.

NOTE: Christ's Ascension is the cause of our salvation by way, not of merit, but of efficiency, as was stated above regarding the Resurrection (prec. q., art. 1). But Christ's Passion is the cause of our ascension into heaven properly speaking, through the removal of the hindrance that is sin, and by way of merit; for Christ's Ascension is directly the cause of our ascension (by way of efficiency), as though beginning it in our Head, to whom it belongs to have the members united to Him (Ad 1 and 2).

QUESTION LVIII CHRIST'S SITTING AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD SIT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD THE FATHER.

YES.—It is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of the Father both in the sense of abiding and in the sense of kingly and judiciary power.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Christ eternally abides unchangeable in the Father's bliss, which is termed His right hand, according to Psal. xv, 10: "At Thy right hand are delights even to the end."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ reigns together with the Father, and from Him has judiciary powers just as He who sits at a king's right hand helps him in reigning and judging. Hence Augustine says (On the Creed, bk. ii, chap. 7): "By the expression 'right hand,' understand the power that this Man, chosen by God, received, that He might come to judge, who before had come to be judged."—We also call the right hand of the Father the glory and honor of the Divinity (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO CHRIST AS GOD TO SIT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that to sit at the right hand of the Father is nothing else than at once to have the glory of Divinity with the Father, and beatitude, and judiciary power, and that unchangeably and royally. But this belongs to the Son as God. Hence it is manifest that Christ as God sits at the right hand of the Father; yet so that this preposition “at,” which is transitive, implies merely personal distinction and order of origin, but not degree of nature or dignity, for there is no such thing in the Divine Persons.

NOTE: The Son of God is called the Father’s right hand by appropriation, just as He is called the Power of the Father (I Cor. i, 24). But right hand of the Father, in its three meanings given above, is something common to the three Persons (Ad.1).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO CHRIST AS MAN TO SIT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER.

YES.—Both in point of royal and judiciary power and by reason of His suppositum.

THE REASON is that approach to the Father, which is designated by the preposition *at*, can be understood as habitual grace, which is more abundant in Christ than in all other creatures, inasmuch as the human nature in Christ is more blessed than all other creatures, and has kingly and judiciary power above all other creatures.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the preposition *at* denotes also the grace of union, which implies a distinction of nature and a unity of Person. And in this way Christ, as man, is the Son of God, and consequently sits at the right hand of the Father, yet so that the expression *at* does not denote condition of nature, but unity of suppositum.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO CHRIST TO SIT AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ is said to sit at the right hand of the Father inasmuch as according to His divine nature He is equal to the Father, and according to His human nature He is in the possession of divine goods that excel all other creatures. Now both these things belong to Christ. Consequently, it belongs to no one else, either an angel or a man, to sit at the right hand of the Father, but Christ alone.

NOTE: Since the right hand is divine blessedness, to sit at the right hand does not signify simply being in blessedness, but having blessedness with a kind of dominative power, as a property and part of one’s nature. This belongs to Christ alone, and to no other creature. Yet it can be said that every saint in bliss is placed on God’s right hand; hence it is written (Matth. xxv, 33): “He shall set the sheep on His right hand” (Ad 2).

QUESTION LIX CHRIST’S JUDICIARY POWER (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER JUDICIARY POWER IS TO BE SPECIALLY ATTRIBUTED TO CHRIST.

NOTE: *Specially* in this question means *by appropriation*.

YES.—THE REASON is that to pass judgment requires three things: First, the power to coerce subjects; second, an upright zeal, so as to pass judgment not out of hatred or envy, but out of love of justice; thirdly, it requires wisdom, according to which judgment is formed. Now the first two are required for judgment; but on the third the very rule of judgment is based, since the standard of judgment is the law of wisdom or truth, according to which judgment is passed. And, because the Son is Wisdom Begotten, and Truth proceeding from the Father, and His perfect Image, consequently judiciary power is properly attributed to the Son of God.

NOTE: The authority to judge is attributed to the Father insofar as He is the principle of the Son, but the very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son, who is the art and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so He judges all things through the Son, inasmuch as He is wisdom and truth (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER JUDICIARY POWER BELONGS TO CHRIST AS MAN.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although the primary authority of judging rests with God, nevertheless the power to judge is committed to men with regard to those subject to their jurisdiction. Now Christ even in His human nature is Head of the entire Church, and God has put all things under His feet. Hence it belongs to Him, even according to His human nature, to have judiciary power.

NOTE: It belongs to Christ to judge by judiciary power for three reasons: First, on account of His likeness and kinship with men; for, as God works through intermediary causes, as being closer to the effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ, that His judgment may be sweet to men.—Secondly, because in the final judgment, as Augustine says (On John, tract 23), there will be the resurrection of dead bodies, which God will raise through the Son of Man; just as through the same Christ He raises up souls, insofar as He is the Son of God.—Thirdly, because, as Augustine says (in his book on the words of the Lord, last sermon, chap. 7), "it was but right that those who were to be judged should see their judge. But those to be judged were the good and the bad. It follows that the form of a servant should be shown in the judgment to both good and wicked, whereas the form of God should be kept for the good alone" (at end of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST ACQUIRED THE JUDICIARY POWER BY HIS MERITS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, although the judiciary power is owed to Christ on account of His Divine Person and dignity of Head, and the fullness of His grace, yet He obtained it from merit, so that, in accordance with God's justice, He should be judge who fought for God's justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned.

ART. IV.—WHETHER JUDICIARY POWER BELONGS TO CHRIST WITH RESPECT TO ALL HUMAN AFFAIRS.

YES.—Whether we are speaking of Christ according to His divine nature, or of Him according to His human nature.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, just as the Father does all things by His Word, so also He judges all things by His Word.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS THREEFOLD: First, because of the relationship of Christ's soul to the Word of God; for if "the spiritual man judges all things" (I Cor. ii, 15), insofar as His mind clings to the Word of God, how much more does Christ's soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word of God, pass judgment upon all things!—Secondly, this appears from the merit of His death, because, as is said in Rom. xiv, 9: "To this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living." And therefore He has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (ibid. 10) "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ."—Thirdly, this is evident from comparison of human affairs with the end of human salvation. For, to whomever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is eternal salvation, to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ's judgment (Matt. xxv). And therefore it is manifest that all human affairs belong to the judiciary power of Christ.

NOTE: Christ, although established King by God, did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly kingdom; consequently He said (John xviii, 36): "My kingdom is not of this world." In like manner He did not wish to exercise judiciary power over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to divine things (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER AFTER THE JUDGMENT THAT TAKES PLACE IN THE PRESENT TIME, THERE REMAINS YET ANOTHER GENERAL JUDGMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of his life, because of certain effects that he has left, such as reputation, children, works, and the like. And therefore there needs to be a final judgment on the last day, that that which belongs in any manner to each man may be perfectly and manifestly judged.

NOTE: As regards the things of the soul, man acquires a certain unchangeable

state; and therefore with regard to the reward of the soul judgment need not be put off. But, because there are other things belonging to man, which go on through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the end of time. For, although in regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or punishment. Consequently, all these things must be weighed in the final judgment (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S JUDICIARY POWER EXTENDS TO THE ANGELS.

YES.—The angels are subject to Christ's judiciary power, not only as to His Divine Nature, according as He is the Word of God, but also by reason of His human nature, and that for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is owing to the closeness of the assumed nature to God, for, as is said in Hebr. ii, 16, "nowhere does He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He takes hold." And therefore Christ's soul is more filled with the truth of the Word of God than any angel; hence He also enlightens the angels, and passes judgment on them.

THE SECOND REASON is on account of His exaltation, because by the lowliness of His Passion Christ's human nature to be exalted above the angels, so that, as is said in Phil. ii, 10, "in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth." And therefore Christ has judiciary power over all the angels also, both good and bad, in sign of which it is said in Apoc. vii, 11 that "all the angels stood round about the throne."

THE THIRD REASON is on account of what they do to men, of whom Christ in a special way is the Head.

NOTE: Christ judges, not only the angels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii), the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ's soul, which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Hebr. ii, 5): "For God has not subjected to angels the world to come," subject, namely, to Christ, "of whom we speak." Nor does it follow that God set another over the earth, since one and the same Person is God and Man, Our Lord Jesus Christ.

Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for the present (Ad 3).

QUESTION LX THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

After considering those things that concern the mystery of the Incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church, which derive their efficacy from the Word Incarnate Himself. First we shall consider the sacraments in general, secondly, each sacrament in particular.

Concerning the first, our consideration will be fivefold: 1) What is sacrament? 2) The necessity of the sacraments. 3) The effects of the sacraments. 4) Their cause. 5) Their number. About the first there will be eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER A SACRAMENT IS IN THE NATURE OF A SIGN.

YES.—THE REASON is that a sacrament can be called something, either because it has in itself some hidden sanctity, and in this sense a sacrament is the same as a sacred secret (*sacrum secretum*); or because it has some relation to this sanctity, either of cause, or of sign, or in respect to any other relationship. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a special sense, as implying the nature of a sign; and in this sense a sacrament is a kind of sign.

NOTE: According to the ancients, anything was called holy or sacrosanct that it was unlawful to violate, such as even a city's walls and persons of rank; and therefore these secrets, whether divine or human, that it was not lawful to violate by revealing them to anybody were called sacred things, or sacraments (Ad 2). So also an oath is called in Latin a sacrament, inasmuch as it has a certain relationship to sacred things, and in this sense is analogically called a sacrament (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY SIGN OF A HOLY THING IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—Not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament, but only that sign of a sacred thing insofar as it sanctifies men.

THE REASON is that that is properly called a sacrament which is a sign of a sacred thing belonging to men; so that, namely, it is properly called a sacrament in the way we are now speaking of sacraments, which is "the sign of a sacred thing, insofar as it sanctifies men."

ART. III.—WHETHER A SACRAMENT IS A SIGN OF ONE THING ONLY.

YES.—A sacrament is a sign that recalls the Passion of Christ, and points out a divine grace, and offers a prognostic of future glory.

THE REASON is that a sacrament is properly called that which is ordained to signify our sanctification, in which three things can be considered, viz., the cause itself of our sanctification, which is the Passion of Christ; the form of our sanctification, which consists in grace and virtues; and the last end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. All these things are signified by sacraments.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A SACRAMENT IS ALWAYS SOMETHING SENSIBLE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is connatural to man to arrive at the knowledge of intelligible things through sensible objects. Now a sign is that by which one arrives at the knowledge of something else. Hence, since the sacred things that are signified by sacraments are the spiritual and intelligible goods by which man is sanctified, it follows that the signification of a sacrament is achieved by certain sensible things.

ART. V.—WHETHER DETERMINATE THINGS ARE REQUIRED FOR A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is not for everyone to determine what is in the power of another, but only that which is in his power. Now the sanctification of man, which is by the sacraments, is in the power of God who sanctifies. And therefore it is not for man, by his own judgment, to choose the things by which he is sanctified; but this must be determined by divine appointment. And therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, whereby men are sanctified, according to I Cor. vi, 11: "You are washed, you are sanctified," things must be used that are determined by divine appointment.

ART. VI.—WHETHER WORDS ARE REQUIRED FOR THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—THE FIRST REASON is on the part of the sanctifying cause, which is the Word Incarnate, for by the fact that a word is employed for a sensible thing a sacrament is in a sense conformed to the Word Incarnate, which is united to sensible flesh.

THE SECOND REASON is on the part of man, who is sanctified: For the sacramental medicine is proportioned to man, who is composed of body and soul, since by a visible thing the sacrament touches the body, and by faith in the words it touches the soul. And thus, as Augustine says (Tract 80 on John): "Whence has water this great power, to touch the body and wash the heart, but by the word doing it, not because it is spoken, but because it is believed?"

THE THIRD REASON is on the part of the sacramental signification itself: For it was necessary for the complete signification of the sacrament that the signification in sensible things be determined by certain words. For by words we can more distinctly express what we conceive in the mind. Thus water can signify both washing, on account of its humidity, and refreshment, by reason of its being cool; but when we say: "I baptize thee," it is made known that we are using water in Baptism to signify a spiritual cleansing.—And thus from words and things one thing is formed in the sacraments, as from the union of form with matter, insofar, namely, as the signification of things is completed by words (Ad 2).

Note: The sacraments of things present should be different from sacraments of things to come. Now the sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming of Christ; consequently, they did not signify Christ so clearly as the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Himself, and have a certain likeness to Him (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER DETERMINATE WORDS ARE REQUIRED IN THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since sacraments require determinate sensible things, which are in the sacraments as the matter, much more do they require a determinate form of words. For in all things composed of matter and form the principle of determination is on the part of the form, which is as it were the end and goal of the matter.

NOTE: 1. As Augustine says (Tract 80 on John): "The word operates in the sacraments not because it is spoken," i.e., not by the outward sound of the voice, "but because it is believed," in accordance with the sense of the words that are held with faith. And this sense is the same for all men, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently, no matter in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete (Ad 1).

2. If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the sacramental words does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: And thus the sacrament seems to be defective. Even if he do this through error or slip of tongue, but he so far mispronounces the words as to deprive them of sense, the sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case especially if the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a word, for instance, if one were to say *in nomine matris*, instead of *in nomine Patris*. If, however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this mispronunciation, the sacrament is complete. This would be the case principally if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if one were to say *patrias et filias*. For, although the words thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an accommodated meaning, corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ADD ANYTHING TO THE WORDS IN WHICH THE SACRAMENTAL FORM CONSISTS.

YES.—a) On the part of the one who utters the words, whose intention is required for the sacrament, if he intends by such addition or diminution to introduce another rite, which is not received by the Church, the sacrament does not seem to be complete;—b) but on the part of the signification of the words we must consider whether such a change destroys the essential sense of the words.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this case it does not seem that he intends to do what the Church does.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since the words operate in the sacraments in reference to the meaning they express, if such a change destroys the essential sense of the words, it is manifest that it destroys the truth of the sacrament.—With regard to an addition or subtraction of words that does not add to or subtract from the essential meaning, and therefore does not destroy the species of the sacrament, it can happen that he who adds or omits sins from negligence or contempt.

QUESTION LXI THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SACRAMENTS ARE NECESSARY FOR MAN'S SALVATION.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is because of the condition of human nature, for it is proper to human nature to be led to the spiritual and intelligible through the corporeal and sensible. And therefore Divine Wisdom fittingly bestows on man the helps of salvation under certain corporeal and sensible signs, which are called sacraments.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the state of man: For man by sinning has subjected himself by his affections to corporeal things: Thus it was fitting that God should apply a spiritual remedy to man through certain corporeal signs; for if man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind, being taken up with the material world, would be unable to apply itself to them.

THE THIRD REASON is taken from the fact that man is prone to direct his activity chiefly towards material things. Lest, therefore, it should be too hard for man to be drawn away entirely from bodily actions, bodily exercise was offered to him in the

sacraments, by which he might be trained to avoid superstitious practices, consisting in the worship of demons, and all manner of harmful action which consists in sinful deeds.

NOTE: Christ's Passion is a sufficient cause of man's salvation. But it does not follow that the sacraments are not also necessary for that purpose: Because they obtain their effect through the power of Christ's Passion; and Christ's Passion is, so to say, applied to man through the sacraments according to the Apostle (Rom. vi, 3): "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death" (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER BEFORE SIN SACRAMENTS WERE NECESSARY TO MAN.

NO.—In the state of innocence man did not need sacraments, not only insofar as sacraments are ordained as a remedy for sin, but also insofar as they are ordained for the perfection of the soul.

THE REASON is that before sin man was in a state of rectitude, and, just as his mind was subject to God, so the lower powers of his soul were subject to his mind, and his body to his soul. Now it would be contrary to this order if the soul were perfected, either as to knowledge or as to grace, by anything corporeal, as is the case with the sacraments.

NOTE: Man in the state of innocence needed grace; not that he needed to obtain grace by means of sensible signs, but in a spiritual and invisible manner (Ad 1). After sin, the soul, even as regards the higher part, needed to receive something from corporeal things for its perfection (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SACRAMENTS AFTER SIN, BEFORE CHRIST

YES.—THE REASON is that no one can be sanctified after sin except by Christ (Rom. iii, 25). Therefore before the coming of Christ there needed to be certain visible signs, by which man could attest his faith in the future coming of a Savior. And such signs are called sacraments (which, however, as the Council of Trent, sess. vii, can. 2, defined, differed essentially from the sacraments of the New Law).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AFTER CHRIST THERE NEEDED TO BE CERTAIN SACRAMENTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that future, past, and present need to be signified by different signs. And therefore, besides the sacraments of the Old Law, which foreshadowed what was to come, certain other sacraments were needed in the New Law, to signify the things that proceeded from Christ.

NOTE: The sacraments of the Old Law neither contained nor caused grace; and therefore the Apostle (Galat. iv, 6) calls them "weak and needy elements," because, namely, they were none other than the elements of this world. But our sacraments contain and cause grace (Ad 2). The sacraments of the Old Law were fitting to prefigure grace, whereas those of the New Law are fitting to signify the presence of grace (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXII

THE PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS, WHICH IS GRACE

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS ARE THE CAUSE OF GRACE.

YES.—The sacraments of the New Law: a) Cause grace; b) by producing something, i.e., physically; c) yet instrumentally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the sacraments of the New Law incorporate us with Christ (Galat. iii, 27); but man is not made a member of Christ save through grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that otherwise the sacraments of the New Law would be nothing else than signs of grace; and yet we have it from the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but cause, grace.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the principal cause operates by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened, just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace, since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature (II Pet. i, 4). Now the sacraments are instruments of grace, since by divine ordinance they are applied to men to produce grace in them.

NOTE: 1. The instrumental cause does not work by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent, so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent; for instance, the couch is not likened to the ax, but to the art, which is in the craftsman's mind. And in this way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace (in body of art.).

2. The instrumental cause, if it be manifest, can be called the sign of a hidden effect, because it is not only a cause but also in a manner an effect, insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacraments of the New Law are at once causes and signs; and thus it is that, as is commonly said, "they effect what they signify." From this it is clear that they perfectly fulfill the conditions for a sacrament, inasmuch as they are ordained to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER SACRAMENTAL GRACE CONFERS ANYTHING IN ADDITION TO THE GRACE OF THE VIRTUES AND GIFTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the virtues and gifts add to grace commonly so called a certain perfection determinately ordained for the proper acts of the powers, so it bestows a sacramental grace in addition to grace commonly so called, and, in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain divine help to attain the end of the sacrament, namely with regard to certain special effects, which are required in Christian life (Ad 1), just as the water of Baptism, by washing the body by its own power, so also washes the soul, insofar as it is an instrument of divine power (Ad 2 of prec. art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW CONTAIN GRACE.

YES.—a) As in a sign; b) as in a cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a sacrament is a sign of grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental cause of grace (art. 1 of this q.).—Hence grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, not indeed according to likeness of species, as an effect is in a univocal cause; or even in respect to some proper and permanent form, which is proportionate to such an effect, such as are the effects in causes not univocal, for example as things generated are in the sun, but in respect of a certain instrumental power, which is transient and incomplete in its natural being, as will be explained later (following art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THERE ARE IN THE SACRAMENTS A POWER OF CAUSING GRACE.

YES.—THE REASON is that if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must also allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of producing the sacramental effects. And this power is proportionate to the instrument; i.e., it has its being passing from one thing to another, and incomplete, just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.

NOTE: A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body, insofar as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect: Thus in the very voice that is perceived by the senses there is a certain spiritual power (inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept) of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God to the production of a spiritual effect (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW DERIVE THEIR POWER FROM CHRIST'S PASSION.

YES.—The sacraments of the Church derive their power especially from Christ's Passion, the virtue of which is in some way united to us when we receive the sacrament.

THE REASON is that Christ's humanity is as an instrument united to His Godhead, which is the principal efficient cause of grace, and through the humanity the sacraments are produced, as separate instruments. And therefore the saving virtue passes from Christ's Divinity through His humanity into the sacraments, insofar, namely as Christ's Passion obtains two chief effects, viz., the remission of sins and the perfection of the soul in the things that pertain to the worship of God according to the Christian re-

ligion. For Christ by offering "Himself—an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Ephes. v, 2), not only delivered us from our sins, but also initiated the rites of the Christian religion. And in this way the sacraments of the New Law have their power from Christ's Passion.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD LAW CAUSED GRACE.

No.—The sacraments of the Old Law did not have in themselves any power by which they operated to bestow sanctifying grace; but only signified the faith by which we were justified.

THE REASON is that, if the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace by themselves, that is, by their own power, the Passion of Christ would not have been necessary, according to Gal. ii, 21: "If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain." But neither can it be said that they had power from Christ's Passion of bestowing sanctifying grace, for the effect of the sacraments requires, besides faith, also the use of external things. Now that which is not yet in the nature of things does not cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. Consequently the efficient cause cannot in point of time come into existence after causing movement. On the other hand, faith, which is produced by an act of the soul, can respect the future, as does a final cause. Hence it is manifest that a power of justification suitably passes from Christ's Passion, which is the cause of human justification, to the sacraments of the New Law, but not to the sacraments of the Old Law. And yet the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ's Passion, just as we are. The sacraments of the Old Law were certain protestations of that faith, insofar as they signified Christ's Passion and its effects.

NOTE: Circumcision, like the other sacraments of the Old Law, was only a sign of justifying grace. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. iv, 11) that Abraham "received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith." And thus grace was conferred in circumcision in so far as it was a sign of Christ's future Passion, as will be made clear later, in q. lxx, art. 4 (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXIII

THE EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS THAT IS THE CHARACTER

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A SACRAMENT IMPRINTS A CHARACTER ON THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is that whoever is deputed to a certain service is wont to receive some sign therefor: For example soldiers, who were anciently enrolled in military service, were wont to be marked with certain characters on the body, because they were deputed to a certain bodily service. And therefore, since men are deputed through the sacraments to some spiritual service pertaining to the worship of God, as was stated above (prec. q., art. 1 and 5), it follows that through them the faithful are marked by some spiritual character.

NOTE: The character imprinted on the soul is a kind of sign, insofar as it is imprinted by a sensible sacrament, since we know that a certain one has received the baptismal character through his being cleansed by the sensible water (Ad 2). But the sacraments of the Old Law did not have in themselves a spiritual power to produce any spiritual effect, and therefore these sacraments did not require any spiritual character, but bodily circumcision was sufficient for them, which the Apostle (Rom. iv, 11) calls a seal (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER A CHARACTER IS A SPIRITUAL POWER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the divine worship of the Christian religion, to which the character is ordained, consists either in receiving certain divine things, or in transmitting them to others. Now for both these purposes a certain power is required, for to transmit something requires a certain active power, and to receive it requires a passive power. Hence the character denotes a certain spiritual power ordained to the things that belong to divine worship.

NOTE: 1. Just as the virtue that is in the sacraments is not in itself a genus, but is reducible to a genus, for the reason that it is of a transitory and incomplete nature; so also a character is not properly in a genus or species, but is reducible to the second species of quality (at end of art.), which is power.

2. A character has the nature of a sign by comparison with the sensible sacrament by which it is imprinted; but considered in itself it has the nature of a principle, in the manner already said (Ad 4), that is, as a power. And therefore the sacramental character does not belong to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition, for it has the character of a principle; neither does it belong to the third species, which is passion and sensible quality, because a character is not a sensible light (Ad 2); neither does it belong to the fourth species, which is form and figure, because a character is not properly in a genus or species (Ad 1), as form and figure need to be; but it belongs to the second species of quality, as was said above (Note 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER IS THE CHARACTER OF CHRIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that the whole rite of the Christian religion, to which a sacramental character is properly deputed, is derived from the priesthood of Christ. Consequently it is evident that the sacramental character is especially the character of Christ, to whose priesthood the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of the priesthood of Christ, flowing from Christ Himself.

NOTE: The sacramental character is a thing as regards the exterior sacrament, and a sacrament in regard to the ultimate effect. Consequently, something can be attributed to a character in two ways. First, if the character be considered as a sacrament: And thus it is a sign of the invisible grace that is conferred in the sacrament. Secondly, if it is considered as a character. And thus it is a sign conferring on a man a likeness to some principal person in whom is vested the authority over that to which he is assigned: Thus soldiers who are assigned to military service are marked with their leader's sign, by which they are, in a fashion, likened to him. And in this way those who are deputed to the Christian worship, of which Christ is the author, receive a character by which they are likened to Christ. Consequently, properly speaking, this is Christ's character (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER IS SUBJECTED IN THE POWERS OF THE SOUL.

YES.—THE REASON is, as was said (prec. art.), that the character is a kind or seal whereby the soul is marked so that it may receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to divine worship. Now the divine worship consists in certain actions; and the powers of the soul are properly ordained to actions, just as the essence is ordained to existence. Consequently, the character is not subjected in the essence of the soul, but in the power; and moreover in the cognitive power, in which faith resides; for divine worship, to which the character is ordained, is a certain protestation of faith expressed by outward signs (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER A CHARACTER CAN BE BLOTTED OUT FROM THE SOUL.

NO.—THE REASON is that every sanctification produced by the priesthood of Christ, which remains forever (Ps. cix, 4), is perpetual, as long as the consecrated thing remains. Now the sacramental character, which is a participation of the priesthood of Christ, is in the intellective part of the soul (prec. art.), which is perpetual and incorruptible. Hence the character remains indelibly in the soul.

NOTE: 1. It does not become Christ to have a character, but the power of His priesthood is compared to a character, just as that which is full and perfect is compared to a participation of Himself (in body of art.).

2. Both grace and character are in the soul, but in different ways. For grace is in the soul as a form having complete existence therein; whereas a character is in the soul as an instrumental power. Now a complete form is in its subject according to the condition of the subject. And, since the soul, as long as it is a wayfarer, is changeable in respect of the free will, it results that grace is in the soul in a changeable manner. But an instrumental power follows rather the condition of the principal agent; and consequently a character exists in the soul in an indelible manner, not from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of Christ's priesthood, from which the character flows like an instrumental power (Ad 1). Consequently, however much

the will is moved in the contrary direction, the character is not removed, by reason of the immobility of the principal mover (Ad 2).

3. Although after this life external worship does not remain, yet its end remains. Consequently, after this life the character remains, both in the good as adding to their glory, and in the wicked as increasing their shame; just as the character of the military service remains in the soldier's after the victory, as the boast of the conquerors, and the disgrace of the conquered (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER A CHARACTER IS IMPRINTED BY EACH SACRAMENT OF THE NEW LAW.

NO.—THE REASON is that, although all the sacraments are ordained as a remedy for sin, yet not all are ordained directly for divine worship, but only three, namely Baptism, because by it man receives the power to receive the other sacraments of the Church; Order, by which men are deputed to transmit the sacraments to others; and Confirmation as, will be explained in the proper place (q. lxxii, art. 7).—The Eucharist, as is evident, is not ordained to something else, because it is "the end and consummation of all the sacraments." The sacrament of Penance does not give man anything new pertaining to divine worship, but restores him to his original state.

QUESTION LXIV THE CAUSE OF THE SACRAMENTS

(in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ONLY GOD WORKS INWARDLY TO PRODUCE THE SACRAMENTAL EFFECT.

YES.—a) By way of principal agent, only God works to produce the inward effect of the sacrament; b) by way of instrument, man can work to produce the inward effect of the sacrament, inasmuch as he works as the minister.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that only God can enter the soul, wherein the sacramental effect takes place; and no agent can operate immediately where it is not. Likewise, grace, which is an interior effect of the sacraments, is from God alone, as was stated (I-II, q. cxii, art. 1). The character also, which is an interior effect of certain sacraments, is an instrumental power, which flows from the principal agent, which is God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that minister and instrument are of the same nature; for the action of both is given outwardly, but achieves an inward effect by the power of the principal agent, which is God.—Wherefore the effect of the sacrament is not better by a better minister. Yet something in addition may be impetrated for the receiver of the sacrament through the devotion of the minister; but this is not the work of the minister, but the work of God, who hears the minister's prayer (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS ARE INSTITUTED BY GOD ALONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacramental power, which is spiritual, is from God alone; nor can it be from the one who makes use of the sacraments, because he operates only as a minister. Hence only God is the instituter of the sacraments.

NOTE: 1. Human institutions observed in the sacraments are not essential to the sacrament. But those things that are essential to the sacrament are instituted by Christ Himself, who is God and man. And, though they are not all handed down by the Scriptures, yet the Church holds them from the intimate tradition of the Apostles, according to the sayings of the Apostle (I Cor. xi, 34): "The rest I will set in order when I come" (I Cor xi, 34).

2. The Apostles and their successors are God's vicars in governing the Church, which is built on faith and the sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just as they may not institute another Church, so neither may they deliver another faith, nor institute other sacraments; on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the sacraments that flowed from the side of Christ while hanging on the Cross.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST AS MAN HAD THE POWER OF PRODUCING THE INWARD SACRAMENTAL EFFECT.

NO.—Christ as God operates in the sacraments by authority; as man, Christ operates instrumentally to produce the interior effects of the sacraments meritoriously and efficiently.

THE REASON is, as was stated (q. xlvi and q. xlix), that Christ's Passion, which belong to Him according to His human nature, is the cause of our justification both meritoriously and effectually, not indeed as the principal agent, or by authority, but as the instrument, insofar as His humanity is the instrument of His Godhead. Yet, since it is an instrument united to the Godhead in the unity of Person, that humanity has a certain headship and causality with respect to the extrinsic instruments, which are the ministers of the Church (art. 1 of this q.). Consequently, Christ, as God, has a power of authority in the sacraments; as man He has the power of minister-in-chief, or the power of excellence.—Now this power of excellence consists in four things: Firstly in this, that the merit and power of His Passion operates in the sacraments, as stated above (q. lxii, art. 5). Secondly, it belongs to the power of excellence, which Christ has in the sacraments, that the sacraments should be sanctified in His name. Thirdly it belongs to this power of Christ that He who gave the sacraments their power could institute the sacraments. Fourthly, He could confer the effect of the sacraments without the exterior sacrament.

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHRIST COULD COMMUNICATE TO MINISTERS THE POWER THAT HE HAD IN THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—a) The power of authority could be communicated to no creature; b) but the power of excellence Christ could communicate to ministers, by giving them so much fullness of grace that their merits could conduce to the sacramental effect—that by the invocation of their names the sacraments might be sanctified—and that they themselves might institute sacraments, and by their mere will confer the sacramental effect without reserving the sacramental rite.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the power of authority in the sacraments belongs to Christ as God, and such power He could not communicate to any creature, just as He could not communicate the Divine Essence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a united instrument, the more powerful it is, is all the more able to lend its power to the separated instrument; as the hand can to a staff.

NOTE: Christ forebore to communicate to ministers His power of excellence for the good of the faithful, lest they should put their trust in men, and lest there be various kinds of sacraments, giving rise to division in the Church (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTS CAN BE CONFERRED BY WICKED MINISTERS.

YES.—THE REASON is, as was stated (art. 1 and 3 of this q.), that the ministers of the Church act in the sacraments as instruments. Now an instrument does not act by its own form or power, but by the power of him by whom it is moved. And thus it is accidental to the instrument, as it is an instrument, what form or virtue it has, in addition to that which it has as an instrument; just as a pipe through which water passes may be gold or lead.

ART. VI.—WHETHER WICKED MEN SIN IN ADMINISTERING THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—And such a sin is mortal in respect of its genus.

THE REASON is that ministers must be conformed to the Lord, according to Levit. xix, 2: "Be you holy as I am holy." Consequently there is no doubt that wicked men sin by exercising the ministry of God and the Church in the dispensation of the sacraments. And, because this sin is one of irreverence to God and a contamination of holy things, as far as the sinner is concerned (though the sacraments in themselves are uncontaminable), it follows that such a sin is mortal in its genus.

NOTE: A man who is in mortal sin is not perplexed simply [i.e., does not think that he is bound to sin] if by reason of his office it be his bounden duty to minister sacraments, because he can repent of his sin and so minister lawfully. But there is nothing unreasonable in his being perplexed, if we suppose that he wishes to remain in sin.

Nevertheless, in a case of necessity, when even a lay person might baptize, he would not sin in baptizing. For it is evident that he does not exercise the ministry of the Church, but succors the need of the recipient of the sacrament. It is otherwise, however, in the other sacraments that are not so essential as Baptism, as will appear hereafter (q. lxvii, art. 3).—(Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE ANGELS CAN ADMINISTER SACRAMENTS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the whole power of the sacraments flows from the Passion of Christ, which belongs to Christ as man, to whom men are likened in nature, but not angels, but in His Passion He is rather called "a little lower than the angels" (Hebr. ii, 9). Consequently, it belongs to men to dispense the sacraments and to minister in them, but not to the angels.—If however some sacramental ministry be performed by the good angels, it should be considered valid, since it must be evident that this is performed by the will of God; just as certain churches are said to be consecrated by angelic ministry. But if demons, who are lying spirits, perform any sacramental ministry, it could not be accounted valid (at end of art.).

NOTE: The saints in heaven can be ministers of the sacraments, since the sacramental character is indelible. For they are like angels with regard to their participation of glory, but not as regards the condition of their nature, and consequently not as to the sacraments (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE MINISTER'S INTENTION IS REQUIRED TO MAKE THE SACRAMENT COMPLETE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, when anything bears a relation to many things, it follows that something must determine it to one thing, if that must be effected. Now what is done in the sacraments can be done in different ways, just as bathing with water, which takes place in Baptism, can be directed both to bodily cleanliness and to bodily health, and for recreation, and for many things beside; and therefore it must be determined to one thing, that is, to the sacramental effect by the intention of the one who performs the washing; and this intention is expressed by the words that are spoken in the sacraments, for example, when the minister says: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father . . ."—Now no actual intention is required, "because when a man tries to intend many things, he begins to think of other things besides his intention;" but a virtual intention suffices, which was first had and was not interrupted by a contrary action; this orders and directs the action (see Ad 2).

NOTE: To the objection that one man's intention cannot be known to another, it is answered that the minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, and this suffices for the intention of the sacrament, unless the contrary is outwardly expressed on the part of the minister, or the recipient of the sacrament (Ad 2).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE FAITH OF THE MINISTER IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the minister works in the sacraments as an instrument, and hence not by his own power, but by that of Christ. Therefore, just as it is not required for the validity of a sacrament that the minister be in charity (art. 5 of this q.), so it is not required for its validity that he have faith; but an unbeliever can administer a true sacrament, provided the other things necessary for the sacrament are present.—Hence, notwithstanding his unbelief, a minister can intend to do what the Church does, even though he esteems that nothing. And such an intention suffices for the sacrament, because, as has been said, the minister of the sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose faith supplies what is lacking to the faith of the minister.

ART. X.—WHETHER A RIGHT INTENTION IN THE MINISTER IS REQUIRED FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SACRAMENT.

NO.—a) A perverse and evil intention with respect to the sacrament destroys the truth of the sacrament; b) but not if it be a wicked intention with respect to the things that follow the sacrament, for instance, if the priest intends to baptize a woman in order to abuse her, or if he intends to consecrate the body of the Lord to use it for the black arts.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this case the minister does not intend

to confer a sacrament, especially when he manifests his perverse intention outwardly.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that what comes first does not depend on what comes later; consequently, the perversity of such an intention does not take away the truth of the sacrament; but the minister himself gravely sins by such an intention.

QUESTION LXV THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS (in seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE OUGHT TO BE SEVEN SACRAMENTS OF THE CHURCH.

YES.—a) Both insofar as the sacraments are directed to perfecting man in the things pertaining to God's worship according to the Christian religion; b) and insofar as the sacraments are ordained as a remedy against the defect of sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the spiritual life has some conformity with bodily life. Now in bodily life a man is perfected in two ways: 1) As regards his own person; 2) with respect to the whole community of the society in which he lives. With respect to His own person man is perfected in this bodily life in two ways: 1) Directly, by acquiring a certain perfection of life; 2) accidentally, by removing the obstacles to life, e.g., sickness and the like. Bodily life is directly perfected in three ways: First by generation, by which man begins to exist and live; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life is Baptism, which is spiritual generation. Secondly, by growth, whereby a man is brought to complete size and strength; and corresponding to this in spiritual life is Confirmation, in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength. Thirdly, by nutrition, which maintains life and strength in man; and corresponding to this in spiritual life is the Eucharist.—

A cure from infirmities is twofold: One is healing, which restores health; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life is Penance, according to Psal. xi, 5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee." The other is the restoration of former health by means of proper diet and exercise; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life is Extreme Unction, which removes the remains of sins, and prepares man for final glory.

Now man is perfected in relation to the whole community in two ways: 1) By receiving the power to rule the multitude, and to exercise public acts; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life is the Sacrament of Order. Secondly, as regards natural propagation; and this is done by Matrimony, both in spiritual and in bodily life, inasmuch as it is not only an office of nature but also a sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND appears thus: For Baptism is ordained against the lack of spiritual life; Confirmation, against infirmity of soul, which is found in the very young; the Eucharist, against the proneness of the soul to slip into sin; Penance, against actual sin committed after Baptism; Extreme Unction, against the remains of sins, namely those that are not sufficiently taken away by Penance, either through negligence or through ignorance; Order, against division in the community; Matrimony, as a remedy against personal concupiscence and against the losses that result from death.

NOTE: 1. The same principal agent makes use of different instruments to produce different effects, according as the work performed demands. Likewise, God's power and Christ's Passion work in us by means of different sacraments, as by different instruments (Ad 1).—The sacraments of the Old Law were more numerous, on account of the diversity of sacrifices and ceremonies (Ad 4).

2. Blessed water and other consecrations are a kind of disposition to the sacraments, either by removing an obstacle, as for instance blessed water is ordained against the snares of demons and against venial sins; or also by making things suitable for the conferring and reception of the sacraments; thus altar and vessels are consecrated out of reverence for the Eucharist (Ad 6).

ART. II. — WHETHER THE ORDER AFORESAID IS A SUITABLE ORDER FOR THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as one person is prior to a multitude, so the sacraments that are ordained for the perfection of one person naturally precede what is ordained for the perfection of the community. Consequently, Order and Matrimony are placed last among the sacraments. Among the things that are ordained for the perfection of one person, those that are directly ordained for the perfection of the spiritual

life precede by nature those that are ordained accidentally, namely to remove a harmful supervening obstacle, as are Penance and Extreme Unction. Among the other three, it is manifest that Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration, is prior; and then comes Confirmation, which is ordained for the formal perfection of virtue; and afterwards comes the Eucharist, which is ordained for the perfection of the end.

NOTE: Penance is not required of necessity as preparatory to the Eucharist. For if anyone is without mortal sin he does not need Penance to receive the Eucharist; and thus it is clear that accidentally Penance prepares for the Eucharist, namely if sin be supposed. Hence it is said in II Paralip.: "Thou, O Lord of the righteous, did not impose penance on righteous men" (Ad 4).

ART. 111.—WHETHER THE EUCHARIST IS THE GREATEST OF THE SACRAMENTS.

YES.—Simply speaking, the Eucharist is the greatest of the sacraments, and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is taken from that which is contained in it, for in the sacrament of the Eucharist Christ Himself is contained, in His own substance; in the other sacraments there is contained a certain instrumental power, which is a share of Christ's power.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the relation of the sacraments to one another; for all the other sacraments seem to be ordained to this sacrament, as to their end.

THE THIRD REASON is taken from the rites of the sacraments, because almost all the sacraments terminate in the Eucharist, as is evident when those who have been ordained receive Communion; as do also those who have been baptized, if they are adults.

NOTE: 1. In the line of necessity, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments; in the line of perfection, the sacrament of Order; in between is the sacrament of Confirmation. The sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction are a step lower than the aforesaid sacraments, because they are ordained as a remedy against a supervening lack. Among these Penance is of greater necessity, but Extreme Unction is of greater perfection (at end of art.).—Matrimony is placed last, because it has the least element of spirituality (prec. art. ad 1). Yet by reason of its signification, i.e., of union between Christ and the Church, it has first rank (Ad 4).

2. By Order and Confirmation Christ's faithful are deputed to certain special offices, which pertain to the office of a prince; and thus to dispense these sacraments belongs to a Bishop alone, who is as it were a prince in the Church (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL THE SACRAMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that three sacraments are essential to salvation: Baptism, absolutely; Penance, when there is mortal sin; and Order, with respect to the Church. The other sacraments are so far necessary as by them we obtain more conveniently the effect of salvation, for Confirmation in a manner perfects Baptism; Extreme Unction perfects Penance; and Matrimony maintains the multitude of the Church by propagation.

QUESTION LXVI THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM

We must now consider the sacraments individually: 1) Baptism, 2) Confirmation, 3) the Eucharist; 4) Penance; 5) Extreme Unction; 6) Order; 7) Matrimony. Regarding the first, two points occur for consideration: First, concerning Baptism itself; second, concerning the preparations for Baptism.—With regard to the first, four considerations offer themselves: 1) The things pertaining to the sacrament of Baptism; 2) the minister of this sacrament; 3) the recipients; 4) the effect. About the first there are 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER BAPTISM IS THE WASHING ITSELF.

YES.—The *sacrament-only* in Baptism is not mere water, as some have held; but the washing.

THE REASON is that the *sacrament-only* is something visibly, externally existing,

namely that which is the sign of an interior effect; for this belongs to the nature of a sacrament: For that which is externally subjected to the senses in Baptism is the water itself, and its use, which is a washing. Now, since the sacraments of the New Law effect a certain sanctification, the sacrament is perfected where the sanctification is perfected. Now in water sanctification is not perfected, but there is in it a certain instrumental power of sanctification, not permanent, but passing into man, who is the subject of true sanctification; consequently, the sacrament is not perfected by the water alone, but by the application of the water to man, which is the washing.—The *effect* and *sacrament* is the baptismal character, which is the thing signified by the external washing; and it is the sacramental sign of interior justification, which is the *effect only* of this sacrament, namely that which is signified, and does not itself signify.—That which is the sacrament alone in Baptism is transitory; but there remain both that which is the *sacrament-and-effect-only*, namely the character, and that which is the *effect-only*, namely interior justification. But the character remains indelibly; justification remains, but with possibility of loss (Ad 1).—Baptism is a certain protestation of faith, and in this way is called “the sacrament of faith” (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER BAPTISM WAS INSTITUTED AFTER CHRIST’S PASSION.

NO.—a) Baptism, as a sacrament, was instituted in Christ’s Baptism; b) yet its necessity was proclaimed to men after the Passion.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a sacrament seems to be instituted when it receives the power to produce its effect. Now Baptism received this power when Christ was baptized. Hence Baptism was truly instituted, as regards the sacrament itself, at that time.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ’s Passion put an end to figurative sacraments, which were succeeded by Baptism, and the other sacraments of the New Law; likewise, because by Baptism man is likened to the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, insofar as he dies to sin, and begins a new life of righteousness. Consequently Christ had first to suffer and rise again before the necessity of conforming oneself to His death and Resurrection could be proclaimed.

NOTE: Even before Christ’s Passion Baptism had efficacy from the Passion, insofar as it prefigured it, yet in a different way than did the sacraments of the Old Law. For in the Old Law there were figures only; whereas Baptism had its power to justify from Christ Himself, by whose power the Passion also brought salvation (Ad 1). Yet before His Passion, Christ did not place the Baptism He had instituted under precept, but wished men to become accustomed to its practice, and especially among the Jewish people, for whom all things were figurative. After His Passion and Resurrection, He imposed the necessity of Baptism, not only on the Jews but also on the Gentiles, in the words (Matth. xxviii, 19): “Go, make disciples of all nations. . . . (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER WATER IS THE PROPER MATTER OF BAPTISM.

YES.—By divine institution, water is the proper matter of Baptism, and rightly so, for four reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is taken from the very nature of Baptism, for Baptism is a regeneration unto spiritual life, which is most befitting water. Wherefore also the seeds from which all living things are engendered, namely plants and animals, are humid and depend on water.

THE SECOND REASON is taken from the effects of Baptism, for they have a relation to the properties of water, which washes by its moistness. This makes it suitable to signify and cause the washing away of sins. By its coolness it also tempers excess heat, and this makes it proper to mitigate concupiscence; by its transparent quality it is receptive of light, wherefore it befits Baptism insofar as it is the sacrament of faith.

THE THIRD REASON is taken from water’s aptness to represent the mysteries of Christ by which we are justified, for, as Chrysostom says, on John iii: “Unless a man be born again,” (*Hom.* xxiv on John): “When we dip our heads under the water as in a kind of tomb, our old man is buried, and, being submerged, is hidden below, and thence he rises again renewed.”

THE FOURTH REASON is that by reason of its universality and abundance water is a convenient matter for the needs of this sacrament.

ART. IV.—WHETHER PLAIN WATER IS REQUIRED FOR BAPTISM.

YES.—a) Water modified artificially does not lose its purity or simplicity, and hence Baptism can be performed with such water; b) but the change of water produced by nature sometimes destroys the plainness of water, sometimes not.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that nature gives the substantial form, which art cannot do; but all artificial forms are accidental, unless when art applies a proper agent to its proper matter, as fire to fuel. Whatever change, therefore, is wrought in water by art, whether by mixture, or by alteration, does not change the species of water. Hence Baptism can be performed in such water, unless perhaps such a small quantity of water is mixed artificially with a body that the compound is something other than water: Thus mud is earth rather than water, and diluted wine is wine rather than water.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a natural change sometimes destroys the species of water; and this is done when the water by a natural process enters into the substance of a mixed body: Thus water changed into the juice of the grape is wine, wherefore it has not the species of water. Sometimes a change is naturally wrought in water without destroying its species; and this happens both by alteration, as is plain in the case of water heated by the sun, and also in the case of mixture, as happens when the water of a stream has become muddy by being mixed with the particles of earth.

We may therefore say that any water may be used for Baptism, no matter how much it may be changed, provided the species of water is not destroyed; but if the species of water is destroyed, no Baptism can take place.

Hence the Holy Doctor teaches that Baptism is valid with sea water, lye, the waters of sulphur baths, or water in which meat is boiled; but note that such water is not to be used indiscriminately, save in case of necessity (*passim* in the responses).

ART. V.—WHETHER THIS IS A SUITABLE FORM OF BAPTISM: I BAPTIZE THEE IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER, AND OF THE SON, AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

YES.—THE REASON is that this form suitably expresses both the principal and the instrumental cause. For the principal cause, from which Baptism has its power, is the Holy Trinity Itself; the instrumental cause is the minister, who externally transmits the sacrament. In the words: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," both causes are expressed.—In our Latin form the word *ego* is added, for the clearer expression of the intention, but it is not essential to the form. Among the Greeks, the words: "Let the servant of Christ be baptized, N, in the name of the Father . . ." expresses the act externally performed by the minister with the invocation of the Trinity; and therefore a true sacrament is performed (*Ad 1*).

NOTE: 1. Several cannot be baptized at the same time, for an action is multiplied according to the number of the agents, if it be done perfectly by each. And thus if two were to combine, of whom one was a mute, and unable to utter the words, and the other were without hands, unable to perform the action, they could not both baptize at the same time, one saying the words and the other performing the action.

On the other hand, in a case of necessity, several could be baptized at the same time; for no single one of them would receive more than one Baptism. But it would be necessary, in that case, to say: "I baptize ye" (or "all of you.") Nor would this be a change of form, because *ye* is the same as *thee and thee*. On the other hand, *we* does not mean *I and I*, but *I and thou*; so that this would be a change in form.

Likewise it would be a change of form to say: "I baptize myself." Consequently no one can baptize himself. For this reason Christ chose to be baptized by John (*Ad 4*).

2. Although there are three personal names of the three Persons, there is but one essential name (of the substance). Now the divine power, which operates in Baptism, belongs to the Essence, and therefore it is said "in the name," and not "in the names" (*Ad 6*).

ART. VI.—WHETHER BAPTISM CAN BE GIVEN IN THE NAME OF CHRIST.

NO.—Unless this is done by a special dispensation of Christ, who did not bind His power to the sacraments.

THE REASON is that Christ appointed the sacrament of Baptism to be given with the invocation of the Trinity. Hence whatever is lacking to the full invocation of the Trinity destroys the integrity of Baptism. Nor does it matter that we understand by the

name of one Person the other names (as in the name of the Father we understand the Son), or that He who names only one Person can have a right faith in the Three; for, just as the sacrament demands a sensible matter, so it demands a sensible form; hence it is not enough to imply or to believe in the Trinity, unless the Trinity be expressed in sensible words. Hence also in Christ's Baptism, which was the origin of the sanctification of our Baptism, the Trinity was present in sensible signs, namely the Father in the voice, the Son in the human nature, and the Holy Spirit in the dove.

ART. VII.—WHETHER IMMERSION IN WATER IS NECESSARY FOR BAPTISM.

NO.—Although it is safer to baptize by immersion (because, in St. Thomas' time this was the more common custom), Baptism can be performed by sprinkling, or also by pouring, according to Ezech. xxxvi, 25: "I will pour upon you clean water."

THE REASON is that a washing by water, which Baptism essentially demands, can be performed not only by immersion, but also by sprinkling or pouring.

NOTE: 1. Immersion more expressly represents the figure of the burial of Christ; and hence this mode of Baptism is more common and more commendable. But in the other modes of Baptism it is represented in some manner, although not so expressly; for, in whatever way the washing is made, the body of a man, or some part of it, is put under water, as Christ's body was put under the earth (Ad 2).

2. Under the Old Law the remedy against original sin was affixed to the member of generation, because He through whom original sin was yet to be removed was yet to be born of the seed of Abraham, whose faith was signified by circumcision, according to Rom. iv, 11 (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER TRINE IMMERSION IS ESSENTIAL TO BAPTISM.

NO.—THE REASON is that Baptism of itself requires a washing with water, which is essential to the sacrament; but the manner of washing is accidental to the sacrament. Nevertheless, for diverse reasons, according to the direction of the Church, sometimes one mode was appointed, and sometimes another.

ART. IX.—WHETHER BAPTISM CAN BE REPEATED.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that Baptism is a spiritual regeneration (John iii, 5). Now there is only one generation for each man. Consequently, Baptism, like carnal generation, cannot be repeated.

THE SECOND REASON is that Christ, in whose death we are baptized, died but once. Now the sacrament represents the Lord's Passion and death. Therefore Baptism must not be repeated.

THE THIRD REASON is that Baptism impresses a character, which is indelible, and is given with a certain consecration. Therefore, just as other consecrations are not repeated in the Church, so neither is Baptism.

THE FOURTH REASON is that Baptism is conferred chiefly against original sin. And therefore, just as original sin is not repeated, so neither is Baptism.

NOTE: Both sacraments, viz. Baptism and the Eucharist, are representative of Our Lord's death and Passion, but in different ways. For Baptism is a commemoration of Christ's death insofar as man dies with Christ, that he may be born again into a new life. But the Eucharist is a commemoration of Christ's death insofar as the suffering Christ Himself is offered to us as the Paschal banquet, according to 1 Cor. v, 7, 8: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us feast." And, inasmuch as man is born once, whereas he eats many times, so is Baptism given once, but the Eucharist many times (Ad 5).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE CHURCH OBSERVES A SUITABLE RITE IN BAPTIZING.

YES.—For the solemnity of this sacrament, the Church fittingly makes use of ceremonies, for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that these ceremonies arouse the devotion of the faithful and reverence for the sacrament. For if there was a plain washing with water, without rites, it would easily come to be considered by some as a common washing.

THE SECOND REASON is that thereby the faithful are instructed. For simple and unlettered folk must be instructed by certain sensible signs.

THE THIRD REASON is that by prayers and blessings and the like the power of the devil is restrained from hindering the sacramental effect.

NOTE: The use of water in Baptism is part of the substance of the sacrament; but the use of oil or chrism is part of the solemnity. For the candidate is first of all anointed with holy oil on the breast and between the shoulders, as "one who wrestles for God," as Ambrose expresses it *De Sacramentis, lib. 1, chap. 2*): Thus boxers are wont to smear themselves with oil.

But after Baptism, as Rabanus says (*Lib. Institut. Cleric., cap. 28*), he is forthwith anointed on the head by the priest with holy chrism, followed by a prayer that he may have a share in Christ's kingdom and be called a Christian after Christ;" or, as Ambrose says (*loc. cit., lib. iii, cap. 1*), "his head is anointed because the senses of a wise man are in his head, so that he may be ready to satisfy every one who asks him to give an account of his faith" (Ad 2).

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE THREE KINDS OF BAPTISM ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED.

YES.—Baptism of water, of blood, and of the Spirit, or repentance. For both of these other Baptisms, namely of blood and the Spirit, is called Baptism inasmuch as it supplies Baptism of water, for they are not sacraments.

THE REASON is that Baptism of water has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, to which a man is molded by Baptism, and moreover from the Holy Spirit as from the first cause. Consequently, besides Baptism of water, a man can obtain the effect of the sacrament from the Passion of Christ, insofar as he is conformed to it, by suffering for Christ, both by the power of the Holy Spirit, insofar as one's heart is moved by the Holy Spirit to believe and love God and to repent of sins; wherefore it is also called Baptism of penance. For, although the effect depends on the first cause, the cause surpasses the effect, and does not depend on the effect. Wherefore Our Lord told the thief who was not baptized: "This day you will be with Me in paradise."

ART. XII.—WHETHER BAPTISM OF BLOOD IS THE MOST EXCELLENT OF THESE THREE BAPTISMS.

YES.—Baptism of blood has pre-eminence: A) Not only on the part of Christ's Passion; but b) also on the part of the Holy Spirit.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the Baptism of blood Christ's Passion operates by the imitation of the action, whereas in the Baptism of water it operates by a symbolical representation; and in the Baptism of the Spirit, or repentance, by way of desire.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the power of the Holy Spirit operates in the Baptism of water by way of latent power; in the Baptism of the Spirit, by changing the heart; but in the Baptism of blood He operates by the most excellent fervor of love and desire, according to John xv, 13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

QUESTION LXVII THE MINISTERS BY WHOM THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM IS CONFERRED

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS PART OF A DEACON'S DUTY TO BAPTIZE.

NO.—It is no part of a deacon's office to confer the sacrament of Baptism, but it is his office to assist and serve his elders in the conferment of this and other sacraments.

THE REASON is that, as is clear from the name itself (deacon means administrator, steward in Greek), it is no part of the deacon's or minister's office to be the chief and official celebrant in the administration of the sacraments.—It also belongs to the deacon to read the Gospel in church, and to preach it as one catechizing, to exclude the unclean or to dispose them for the reception of the sacrament (Ad 1 and 2. passim).

ART. II.—WHETHER TO BAPTIZE IS PART OF THE PRIESTLY OFFICE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as it is the province of a priest to consecrate the Eucharist (for which the priesthood was principally ordained), so it is his province to confer Baptism, whereby a man is made a partaker of ecclesiastical unity, and receives the right to approach the Lord's table; for it would seem to belong to one and the same to produce the whole and to dispose the part in the whole.

NOTE: In Baptism the merit of the minister has no influence on the effect, as they have in teaching. And therefore to teach and preach the Gospel is an office proper to the Apostles (wherefore the Apostle says, I Cor., i, 17: "Christ sent me, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel"), and of the Bishops, who are their successors. Baptism is, however, administered through others, who are lesser officials of the Church, i.e., priests, who take the place of the 72 disciples of Christ, as a gloss says on Luke xx. For by Baptism one acquires only the lowest degree among the Christian people (Ad 1 and 2, *passim*).

ART. III.—WHETHER A LAYMAN CAN BAPTIZE.

YES.—THE REASON is that it pertains to the mercy of the One who willed all man to be saved that in those things that are essential for salvation man can easily find a remedy. Now of all the sacraments that of greatest necessity is Baptism, which is man's regeneration unto spiritual life. And therefore, lest man should have to go without so necessary a remedy, it was appointed that the matter of Baptism should be something common, namely water, and that the minister should be anyone, even not in Orders, lest from lack of being baptized man should suffer loss of his salvation.—Consequently, if a layman were to baptize even outside a case of urgency he would sin, yet he would confer the sacrament; nor would the person thus baptized have to be baptized again (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A WOMAN CAN BAPTIZE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since Christ is the chief Baptizer, it follows that, just as a layman can baptize, as Christ's minister, so also can a woman.—Because, however, "the head of the woman is the man," and "the head of . . . man is Christ" (I Cor. xi, 3), a woman should not baptize if a man is available, as neither should a layman in the presence of a cleric, or a cleric, in the presence of a priest.

(NOTE: Unless, as the Roman Ritual notes, it is more fitting, for modesty's sake, for a woman to baptize a child not yet fully born than a man; or unless the woman knows better the form and manner of baptizing.—Paris.)

ART. V.—WHETHER ONE WHO IS NOT BAPTIZED CAN CONFER THE SACRAMENT.

YES.—Provided he baptizes in the form of the Church.

THE REASON is that, just as on the part of the matter any water suffices as far as the necessity of the sacrament is concerned, so also any person suffices on the part of the minister. And therefore even an unbaptized person can baptize in case of necessity.—For Baptism does not belong to the baptizers, but to Christ (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER MORE THAN ONE CAN BAPTIZE AT THE SAME TIME.

NO.—THE REASON is that the form, "We baptize thee," expresses the intention that several concur in conferring one Baptism; and this seems contrary to the notion of a minister; for a man does not baptize save as a minister of Christ and as standing in His place; wherefore, just as there is one Christ, so should there be one minister to represent Christ.

On the other hand, if each of two ministers should say: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," either would signify his intention as though he were conferring Baptism independently of the other. It is then clear that the one who should utter the words first would confer the sacrament of Baptism, and the other, whatever be his right to baptize, would do nothing. But if both uttered the words absolutely at the same time, and at the same time immerse or sprinkle the man, both, so far as he is concerned, would baptize. Nor would they confer different sacraments; but the one Christ, who is baptizing interiorily, would confer one sacrament by means of both.

NOTE: As was said above (q. lcvii, art. 3 and 5), the integrity of Baptism consists in the form of the words and in the use of the matters. And therefore neither he who utters only the words would baptize, nor he who did the immersing. For if there are two persons, one of whom writes one part of the book, and the other, another, it would not be a proper form of speech to say: "We wrote this book," but the figure of synecdoche, in which the whole is put for the part (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IN BAPTISM IT IS NECESSARY FOR SOME-ONE TO RAISE THE BAPTIZED FROM THE SACRED FONT.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as in carnal generation a new-born child needs nourishment and guidance, so in the spiritual generation of Baptism there is needed one to take the place of nurse and tutor, by forming and instructing one who is yet a novice in the faith concerning the things that pertain to Christian faith and life, which the clergy have not time to do, being busy with the care of the people generally.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER HE WHO RAISES ANYONE FROM THE SACRED FONT IS BOUND TO INSTRUCT HIM.

YES.—THE REASON is that he who raises anyone from the sacred font takes upon himself the office of tutor; and therefore he is obliged to take care of him in urgent necessity.—There should be one principal sponsor, but others can be allowed as assistants (Ad 3).

**QUESTION LXVIII
THOSE WHO RECEIVE BAPTISM
(in 12 articles)**

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO RECEIVE BAPTISM

YES.—THE REASON is that without Baptism men cannot attain salvation. For by Baptism we are incorporated in Christ, in whom alone is salvation (Acts ii, 12). Wherefore Galat. iii, 27 says: "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ."

NOTE: 1. Before the coming of Christ men were incorporated in Christ by faith in His future coming, of which faith circumcision was a seal (Rom. iv, 11); whereas before circumcision was instituted men were incorporated by faith alone, as Gregory says (*Moral., lib. iv, c. 3*), together with the offering of sacrifices, by means of which the Fathers of old made profession of their faith. And therefore, although the actual sacrament of Baptism was not always necessary for salvation, yet faith, of which Baptism is a sacrament, was always necessary (Ad 1).

2. Those who are sanctified in the womb receive indeed grace that cleanses them from original sin, but they do not therefore receive the character, by which they are conformed to Christ. Consequently, if any were to be sanctified in the womb now, they would need to be baptized, in order to be conformed to Christ's other members by receiving the character (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER A MAN CAN BE SAVED WITHOUT BAPTISM.

NO.—a) Those to whom Baptism is lacking in both realization and in desire cannot attain salvation; b) those to whom Baptism is lacking in realization only, but not in desire, can be saved.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such persons are neither sacramentally nor mentally incorporated in Christ, through whom alone is salvation.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that these persons have a desire for Baptism, which proceeds from faith operating through love, by which God interiorly sanctifies man, for His power is not bound to visible sacraments.

NOTE: No one reaches eternal life unless he is free of all sin and debt of punishment. Now this plenary release from sin and punishment is given in the reception of Baptism and in martyrdom. If then any catechumen possesses a desire of Baptism (else he could not be said to die in his good works, which cannot be without faith that works by charity), such a person were he to die would not immediately come to eternal life, but would suffer punishment for his past sins; yet he "will be saved, yet so as by fire," as is stated in I Cor. iii, 15 (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER BAPTISM SHOULD BE DEFERRED.

NO.—a) If children are to be baptized their Baptism should not be put off;

b) adults, however, do not ordinarily have the sacrament conferred on them immediately upon their conversion, but it should be conferred at some fixed time.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in children better instruction or fuller conversion is not expected, and also the danger of death is a reason, since they cannot be helped by another remedy than the sacrament of Baptism.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS THREEFOLD: a) As a safeguard to the Church, lest she be deceived through baptizing those who come to her under false pretenses; b) for the good of those who are baptized; namely that they may be fully instructed in the faith and exercised in those things that pertain to Christian life; c) out of a certain reverence for the sacrament, when men are admitted to Baptism on the principal feasts, namely Easter and Pentecost, and thus receive the sacrament with greater devotion.—If however the one to be baptized appears already instructed in faith and ready for Baptism, or if he is in danger of death, Baptism should not be deferred.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SINNERS ARE TO BE BAPTIZED.

NO.—a) Those who are called sinners on account of a stain and debt of punishment incurred in the past should be baptized; b) but those who are called sinners because of a will to sin, and a purpose of persisting in sin, should not be given Baptism.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the sacrament of Baptism was instituted especially to cleanse the filth of sins, according to Ephes. v, 26: [The Church] “cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.”

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is threefold: a) Because as long as one has the will to sin he cannot be united to Christ; b) because no one having the will to sin can at the same time be cleansed from sin, for which Baptism was ordained; c) because there can be no falsehood in the sacramental signs. But when someone offers himself to be washed by Baptism, it is signified that he disposes himself to an interior washing; and this is not the case with one who has the purpose of remaining in sin.

NOTE: Although an obstinate sinner, if he receives Baptism, has the baptismal character impressed on him, yet he is not disposed to grace by the impression of the character as long as the will to sin remains (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER WORKS OF SATISFACTION SHOULD BE ENJOINED ON SINNERS WHO HAVE BEEN BAPTIZED.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that man is incorporated by Baptism in the death of Christ, which is sufficient satisfaction for sins—“not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world” (I John ii, 2). And therefore to impose any satisfaction on the one who is baptized would be to insult the Passion and death of Christ, as if it were not sufficient for full satisfaction for the sins of the baptized.

ART. VI.—WHETHER SINNERS WHO ARE GOING TO BE BAPTIZED ARE BOUND TO CONFESS THEIR SINS.

NO.—a) Interior confession, which is made to God, is needed before Baptism; b) but the exterior confession of sins, which is made to a priest, is not needed before Baptism.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that no one can begin a new life unless he repents of his old life. Now interior confession consists in a man’s thinking over his sins, and being sorry for them.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND IS THREEFOLD: a) Because such confession, since it regards the person of the minister, belongs to the sacrament of Penance, which is not required before Baptism, because it is the door to all the sacraments. b) Because exterior confession, which is made to a priest, is ordained to this, that a priest absolves one from sins and binds him to works of satisfaction, which are not to be imposed on the baptized, as has been said (prec. art.); nor yet do the baptized need the remission of sins by the keys of the Church, for all their sins are remitted by Baptism. c) Because particular confession made to a man is painful, on account of the shame of the one who confesses. But on the baptized no external punishment is imposed.—And therefore no special confession of sins is required from the baptized; but a general one suffices, which they make when according to the rite of the Church they renounce Satan and all his pomps.—If however there are any to be baptized who wish to confess their sins out of devotion, their confession should be heard, not that satisfaction might be imposed

on them, but to instruct them in the spiritual life as a remedy against their sinful habits.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE INTENTION OF RECEIVING THE SACRAMENT IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE ONE BAPTIZED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as in one who has the use of free choice, a will is required by which he may repent of his old life, so a will is required by which he may intend a new life, the beginning of which is precisely the reception of the sacrament; and therefore on the part of the one baptized it is necessary for him to have the will or intention of receiving the sacrament.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER FAITH IS REQUIRED ON THE PART OF THE ONE BAPTIZED.

NO.—a) A right faith is necessary for Baptism with regard to the gaining of grace, which is the last effect of the sacrament; b) but a right faith is not necessary for the impression of the character, just as it is not required on the part of the baptizer.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as is said in Rom. iii, 22: "The justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the sacrament is not perfected by the rightness of the minister or the recipient, but by the power of God.

NOTE: Even he who has not right faith on other points can have right faith about the sacrament of Baptism, and thus is not hindered from having the intention of receiving the sacrament. But, even if he lacks a right idea about this sacrament, it is enough, for the receiving of the sacrament, that he should have a general intention of receiving Baptism, according as Christ instituted and as the Church confers it (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER CHILDREN SHOULD BE BAPTIZED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as through Adam children incur damnation by being born, so through Christ they acquire salvation by being reborn, according to the Apostle, Rom. v, 17: "If by one man's offense death reigned through the one man," namely Adam, "much more will they who receive the abundance of the grace and of the gift of justice reign in life through the one Jesus Christ."—Moreover, it was fitting that children should be baptized, in order that, being reared from infancy in what pertains to Christian life, they might more firmly persevere therein, according to Prov. xxii, 6: "A young man according to his way, even when he is old, he will not depart from it."

NOTE: Spiritual regeneration, which takes place through Baptism, is in a manner similar to carnal birth, with respect to the fact that, as children in their mother's womb do not nourish themselves, but are nourished by the mother's nourishment; so also children who do not yet have the use of reason, as though being in the womb of Mother Church, do not receive salvation independently, but by the action of the Church (Ad 1).

ART. X.—WHETHER CHILDREN OF JEWS OR OTHER UNBELIEVERS SHOULD BE BAPTIZED AGAINST THEIR PARENTS' WILL.

NO.—a) The children of Jews or other unbelievers, who already have the use of reason, can be admonished and persuaded to receive Baptism, even against their parents' will; b) but if they have not yet the use of reason, the Church is not accustomed to have such children baptized against their parents' wish.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that children who have the use of reason already begin to control their own actions in things that are of divine and natural law; and therefore they can by their own will receive Baptism, against the will of their parents, as they can also contract marriage.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, if they do not yet have the use of free will, they are, according to the natural law, under their parents' care as long as they cannot provide for themselves. And therefore it were against natural justice if such children were baptized against their parents' will. Nor should anyone violate the order of the natural law, whereby a child is under its father's care, in order to free it from the danger of eternal death (Ad 1). It would also be dangerous thus to baptize the children of unbelievers, because they would easily return to unbelief, on account of their natural affection for their parents.

ART. XI.—WHETHER CHILDREN CAN BE BAPTIZED IN THE MOTHER'S WOMB.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is essential to Baptism that the body of the one to be baptized be in some manner washed by water, since Baptism is a washing, as was said above (q. lxvi, art. 1). Now the body of an infant, before it is born from the womb, can in no way be washed with water (Note: According to modern medical experience, it can be washed and touched with the hand.—Paris)—Such infants can, however, be subject to the operation of God, in whose sight they live, so as to receive sanctifying grace by a privilege, as in the case of those who were sanctified in the womb (Ad 1).

ART. XII.—WHETHER MADMEN AND IMBECILES SHOULD BE BAPTIZED.

YES.—a) Those who are imbecilic from birth, and who have no lucid intervals, should be baptized in the faith of the Church, as stated concerning children who have not the use of reason (art. 9 of this q.);—**b)** those who once were sane, but fell into insanity, should be judged according to the intention they had when they were of sound mind;—**c)** those who have some lucid intervals can be baptized if they wish;—**d)** as for those who, although they are not wholly of sound mind, have the use of reason to the extent that they can reflect on their salvation and understand the power of the sacrament, the same judgment applies to them as to those of sound mind—they are to be baptized if they wish, but not if they do not wish.

The reasons for this are evident from the foregoing in the preceding articles of this question.

QUESTION LXIX THE EFFECTS OF BAPTISM (in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL SINS ARE TAKEN AWAY BY BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that even sin belongs to the primitive oldness, to which man dies by Baptism. Hence the Apostle says, Rom. vi, 3: "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized into His death;" and afterwards he concludes: "Thus do you consider yourselves also as dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus" (v. 11).

NOTE: No sin can be forgiven save by the power of Christ's Passion; wherefore the Apostle says, Hebr. ix, 22, that "without shedding of blood there is no remission." Hence the movement of the human will that is in the penitent would not suffice for the remission of sin unless there were faith in Christ's Passion, and a purpose of sharing in it, either by receiving Baptism or by subjecting oneself to the keys of the Church (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER MAN IS FREED BY BAPTISM FROM ALL DEBT OF PUNISHMENT DUE FOR SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's Passion, in which one is incorporated by Baptism (Rom. vi, 8), is sufficient satisfaction (prec. q., art. 5); and therefore he who is baptized is freed from the debt of the whole punishment due to him for his sins, as if he himself had made sufficient satisfaction for all his sins.

ART. III.—WHETHER BAPTISM SHOULD TAKE AWAY THE PENALTIES OF SIN THAT BELONG TO THE PRESENT LIFE.

NO.—Baptism has the power of taking away the penalties of the present life, but it does not take them away in the present life, but they are taken away from the just by its power in the resurrection, when "this mortal body puts on immortality" (I Cor. xv, 54); and rightly so, for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that it is fitting that that be done in the incorporated member which was done in the Head, i.e., His Passion and death. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. viii, 17): "Heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so, if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him."

THE SECOND REASON is that this is suitable for our spiritual exercise, viz. that, God helping, man by fighting against concupiscence and the other defects to which he may be subject may gain the crown of victory.

THE THIRD REASON is that this was fitting, lest men approach Baptism for the sake of escaping the sufferings of the present life, and not for the sake of the glory of life eternal.

NOTE: Although the penalties of the present life, such as death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are not here taken away by Baptism, yet both concupiscence and proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good are diminished (next art., ad 3). For such penalties regard the nature, from whose principles they rise, inasmuch as it is deprived of original justice; and therefore they are not taken away save in the last restoration of nature by the glorious resurrection (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER GRACE AND VIRTUES ARE BESTOWED ON MEN BY BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ's fullness of grace and virtue pass from the Head to all the members, according to John i, 16: "Of His fullness we have all received."

NOTE: Just as the water of Baptism signifies by its washing a cleansing from sin, and by its refreshing action signifies deliverance from punishment, so by its natural clearness it signifies the splendor of grace and virtues (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER CERTAIN ACTS OF THE VIRTUES ARE FITTINGLY SET DOWN AS EFFECTS OF BAPTISM.

YES.—As effects of Baptism are attributed enlightenment by Christ, as regards knowledge of the truth, and the fructification of good works by the infusion of grace.

THE REASON is that, just as sensation and movement pass from a natural head to the members, so from the spiritual Head, which is Christ, there passes spiritual sensation, which consists in the knowledge of the truth, and spiritual movement, which is by way of the influx of grace. Hence it is said in John i, 16: "And of His fullness we have all received."

NOTE: Adults who already believe in Christ are incorporated in Him mentally. But afterwards, when they are baptized, they are incorporated in Him corporally, as it were, i.e., by the visible sacrament, without the desire of which they could not have been incorporated in Him even mentally.

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHILDREN RECEIVE GRACE AND VIRTUES IN BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that children, like adults, are in Baptism made members of Christ; hence it follows that they receive an inflow of grace and virtue from the Head—otherwise, children who die after Baptism would not gain eternal life, because, as is said in Rom. vi, 23, "the grace of God is life everlasting;" and thus their Baptism would not have benefited them for salvation.

NOTE: The inability of children to act is not due to the absence of habits, but to an impediment on the part of the body: Thus when a man is asleep, though he may have the habits of virtue, yet he is hindered from doing virtuous acts through being asleep (at end of article).—Children believe, not by their own acts, but by the faith of the Church, which is applied to them; by the power of this faith, grace and virtues are bestowed on them (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF BAPTISM IS TO OPEN THE GATES OF THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM.

YES.—THE REASON is that the obstacle that hinders entrance into the heavenly kingdom is sin and the debt of punishment. By Baptism all guilt and all debt of punishment are taken away.

NOTE: When Christ's Passion was not as yet consummated actually, but only in the faith of believers, Baptism proportionately caused the gates to be opened, not in fact but in hope. For the baptized who died then looked forward, with a sure hope, to enter the heavenly kingdom (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER BAPTISM HAS AN EQUAL EFFECT IN ALL.

YES.—All children receive equal effects in Baptism, but not all adults.

THE REASON is that all children are in the same position as regards Baptism, for they are baptized, not in their own faith, but in that of the Church. But adults,

since they do approach Baptism by their own faith, are not in an equal position as regards Baptism; for some approach the sacrament with greater, and some with lesser, devotion; and therefore some receive more, and some less, of the grace of renewal, just as those receive more of heat from the same fire who approach it more closely, though the fire, of itself, diffuses its heat equally among all.—Moreover, such effects as are miraculously wrought in Baptism relate accidentally to Baptism and are not the same for all, even if they all approach with equal devotion; such effects are dispensed according to the order of Divine Providence.

ART. IX.—WHETHER INSINCERITY HINDERS THE EFFECT OF BAPTISM.

NOTE: Insincerity (*fictio*) is the simulation whereby one externally shows himself to will what he actually does not will, either because he has not the will to receive Baptism or because he does not have the disposition necessary for baptismal grace.

YES.—THE REASON is that in order that anyone may be justified by Baptism it is necessary that the person's will embrace Baptism and its effects. Now one is said to be insincere because his will contradicts either Baptism or its effect. Hence it is evident that insincerity impedes the effect of Baptism.

NOTE: Even those who insincerely receive Baptism put on Christ through being configured to Him by the character, but not through being conformed to Him by grace (Ad 1).

ART. X.—WHETHER BAPTISM PRODUCES ITS EFFECT WHEN THE INSINCERITY CEASES.

YES.—THE REASON is that when something is engendered it receives, together with the form, the effect of the form, unless there is an obstacle. But when this obstacle is removed, the form of the thing generated produces its effect. Even so, when someone is baptized, he receives the character, which is like a form; and he receives in consequence its proper effect, which is grace whereby all sins are remitted. But this effect is sometimes hindered by insincerity. Wherefore, when this obstacle is removed by Penance, Baptism forthwith produces its effect.

NOTE: The effect of Baptism is to take away, not future, but present and past, sins. And consequently, when the insincerity passes, subsequent sins are indeed remitted, but by Penance, not by Baptism. Wherefore they are not remitted like the sins that preceded Baptism, as to the whole debt of punishment (Ad 3).

QUESTION LXX CIRCUMCISION, WHICH PRECEDED BAPTISM

Here we are to consider the things preparatory to Baptism: 1) That which preceded Baptism, i.e., circumcision; 2) those that accompany Baptism, viz., catechism and exorcism. About the first there will be four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CIRCUMCISION WAS A PREPARATION FOR, AND A FIGURE OF, BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that circumcision was a kind of protestation of faith; wherefore it is said in Rom. iv, 11, that Abraham "received the sign of circumcision as the seal of . . . faith," just as Baptism is also a profession of faith and is called the sacrament of faith, since our faith and that of the Fathers of old is one. Now all things came to the Fathers of the Old Covenant in figure, as is said in I Cor. x, 11, their faith being about things to come.

NOTE: Circumcision was like Baptism as to the spiritual effect of the latter. For, just as circumcision removed a carnal pellicule, so Baptism strips man of carnal behavior (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CIRCUMCISION WAS INSTITUTED IN A FITTING MANNER.

YES.—Circumcision was fittingly instituted in Abraham.

THE REASON is that among the Fathers of old Abraham first received the promise about the Christ who was to be born, when it was said to him (Gen. xxii, 18): "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." Moreover, he was the first

to cut himself off from the society of the unbelievers, in obedience to the commandment of God, who said (Gen. xii, 1): "Go forth out of thy country and from thy kindred."

NOTE: Immediately after the sin of our first parent, on account of the knowledge possessed by Adam, who was fully instructed about divine things, both faith and natural reason flourished in man to such an extent that there was no need for any signs of faith and salvation to be prescribed to him, but each one was wont to make protestation of his faith by outward signs of his profession, according as he thought best. But about the time of Abraham faith was on the wane, many being given over to idolatry. Moreover, by the growth of carnal concupiscence natural reason was clouded even in regard to sins against nature. And therefore it was fitting that then, and not before, circumcision should be instituted, as a profession of faith and a remedy against carnal concupiscence (Ad 1).

2. Baptism contains in itself the perfection of salvation, to which Christ calls all men. Wherefore Baptism is offered to all nations. On the other hand, circumcision did not contain the perfection of salvation, but signified it as to be achieved by Christ, who was to be born of the Jewish nation. For this reason circumcision was given to that nation alone (Ad 3).

Likewise, the institution of circumcision is as a sign of Abraham's faith, who believed that he himself would be the father of Christ, who was promised to him; and for this reason it was suitable that it should be for males only. Again, original sin, against which circumcision was specially ordained, is contracted from the father, and not from the mother, as was said in I-II, q. lxxxii, art. 5. But Baptism contains the power of Christ, who is the universal cause of the salvation of all men, and of the remission of all sins (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RITE OF CIRCUMCISION WAS FITTING.

YES.—THE REASON is that circumcision is a sign of faith, which was instituted by God, of whose wisdom there is no number.

NOTE: It was fitting for circumcision to be performed on the genital organ: First, because it was a sign of that faith whereby Abraham believed that Christ would be born of his seed. Secondly, because it was to be a remedy against original sin, which is contracted through the act of generation. Thirdly, because it was ordained as a remedy for carnal concupiscence, which thrives principally in those members by reason of the abundance of venereal pleasure (Ad 1).—Circumcision, moreover, was performed on the eighth day, and under obligation of precept (John vii, 23), both on account of the mystery, since Christ by taking away from the elect not only guilt but also all penalties will complete the spiritual circumcision in the eighth age (which is the age of those who rise again—as it were, on the eighth day). Secondly, on account of the tenderness of the infant before the eighth day. Wherefore even as regards the animals the Law demanded seven days before its sacrifice (Levit. xxii, 37).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CIRCUMCISION BESTOWED SANCTIFYING GRACE.

YES.—In circumcision, a) sanctifying grace was bestowed; b) and that for all the effects of grace; c) yet in a manner different from Baptism.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as is commonly held by all, circumcision remitted original sins; now guilt is remitted only by grace, according to Rom. iii, 24: "Being justified freely by His grace. . ."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the least grace can withstand any concupiscence, and avoid all mortal sin that is committed by transgressing the commandments of the Law.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that in Baptism grace is bestowed by virtue of the Baptism itself, which Baptism contains, inasmuch as it is an instrument of Christ's Passion already consummated; whereas in circumcision grace was bestowed, not by virtue of circumcision, but by virtue of the faith in Christ's Passion, the sign of which was circumcision. And, because Baptism works instrumentally by the power of Christ's Passion, but circumcision does not, therefore Baptism imprints a character that incorporates man in Christ and confers a more abundant grace than does circumcision. Hence when adults were circumcised, they obtained a remission, not only of original sin, but also of actual sins, yet not so that they were freed from all debt of

punishment, as in Baptism, in which grace is bestowed more abundantly (Ad 5). For the effect of a present thing is greater than the effect of hope.

QUESTION LXXI THE PREPARATIONS THAT ACCOMPANY BAPTISM (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CATECHISM SHOULD PRECEDE BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that Baptism is a profession of faith. Now in order that anyone may receive faith he must be instructed in faith. And therefore catechism rightly precedes Baptism.—Hence also Our Lord, in giving the disciples the precept of Baptism, preceded Baptism by teaching, in the words (Matth. xxviii, 19): “Go, teach all nations, baptizing them. . .”

ART. II.—WHETHER EXORCISM SHOULD PRECEDE BAPTISM.

YES.—THE REASON is that all who are not baptized are subjected to the power of demons, at least on account of the debt of original sin (Ad 1). Consequently it is fitting that Baptism be preceded by exorcism, by which demons are driven out, so that they cannot hinder the salvation of man, insofar as they hinder man from receiving this sacrament.

NOTE: The expulsion of the devil is symbolized by the priest's breathing upon the candidate. The blessing, with the imposition of hands, bars the way to the return of him who was cast out. The salt, which is put on the mouth, and the anointing of the nose and ears with spittle signify the receiving of doctrine, as to the ears; consent thereto, as to the nose; and confession thereof, as to the mouth. The anointing with oil signifies man's ability to fight against the demons (at end of art.).

NOTE: The breathing is mentioned by Ambrose (chap. 1, book on those who are initiated) and Augustine (on original sin, chap. 40).—The imposition of hands is mentioned by Dionysius (*Eccles. Hierar.*, c. 11); Council of Carthage IV (c. 85), and Council of Seville II (can. 7).—The use of salt can be found in Isidore (*Off. Lib.*, II, c. 20), Augustine (*Confess.*, bk. I, c. 11). Council of Carthage III, can. 5).—The anointing of the ears and nostrils is found in Ambrose (*On the Sacraments*, bk. I, c. 1).—The anointing with oil is mentioned by Ambrose (*Sacraments*, bk. I, c. 2, and bk. III, chap. 1), and by Cyril of Jerusalem (*Catech.* 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER WHAT IS DONE IN THE EXORCISM EFFECTS ANYTHING.

YES.—a) What is done in exorcism not only signifies but also effects; b) yet differently from Baptism itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Church in exorcisms uses imperative words to expel the devil's power, e.g., when she says: “Therefore, depart from him, accursed demon.” Consequently, it must be said that they have some effect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Baptism gives man grace for the full remission of sins, but what is done in exorcism excludes only two obstacles to the receiving of the grace of salvation. One of these is external, insofar as demons attempt to hinder man's salvation, and this impediment is removed by breathings. The other is internal, insofar as man, by the infection of original sin, has his senses barred to the reception of the mysteries of salvation, and this obstacle is excluded by the symbolic spittle and the touch of the priest, by which God's wisdom and power produce the salvation of the catechumen, namely so that the nostrils are opened to receive the sweet odor of the knowledge of God, the ears are opened to hear the commandments of God, and the senses are opened in the inmost heart to respond, as Rabanus says (*De Instit. Cleri.*, lib. i, c. 27, at end).

NOTE: Although exorcism is not essential to Baptism, yet it should not be omitted, save in case of necessity; and then, when the danger causes, it should be supplied, in order to retain uniformity in Baptism. Nor is it useless to supply it after Baptism, because, just as the effect of Baptism is hindered before it is received, so it can be hindered after it is received (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS THE DUTY OF THE PRIEST TO CATECHIZE AND EXORCISE THE PERSON TO BE BAPTIZED.

YES.—Primarily it is the office of the priest; ministerially, catechism belongs also to the lectors, and exorcism, to the exorcists.

THE REASON is that a secondary agent does not act without the principal agent, but co-operates with the principal agent in what he does. Hence Isidore says (in his epistle to Laudefred) that it belongs to the lower ministers to co-operate with the priests in the things that are preparatory to the sacrament. Such ministers are the lectors in catechism and the exorcists in exorcism.

**QUESTION LXXII
THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION**

(in 12 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONFIRMATION IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—Confirmation is a special sacrament.

THE REASON is that, where some special effect of grace is needed, a special sacrament is ordained thereto. Now, just as in bodily life, there is, besides the movement of generation, whereby a man receives bodily life, a movement of growth, whereby he is brought to perfect age, in which a man can perform a man's perfect actions; so too in the spiritual life, there is, besides Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration, Confirmation, by which man receives, as it were, the perfect age of the spiritual life. Hence Confirmation is a special sacrament, distinct from Baptism.

NOTE: 1. Since the institution of a new sacrament pertains to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, it must be said that this sacrament was not instituted by the Apostles, as some have said, but by Christ Himself, not by bestowing but by promising it, according to John xvi, 7: "If I do not go, the Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you." And this was so because in this sacrament the fullness of the Holy Spirit is bestowed, which was not to be given before Christ's Resurrection and Ascension, according to John vii, 39: "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified" (Ad 1).

2. Because Confirmation is a sacrament of the fullness of grace, it could not have anything corresponding to it in the Old Law, because "the Law brought nothing to perfection," as is said in Hebr. vii, 19 (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRISM IS A FITTING MATTER FOR THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that oil designates the grace of the Holy Spirit; whence Christ is said to be "anointed with the oil of gladness" (Ps. xlv, 8), by reason of the fullness of the Holy Spirit, which He had. Consequently, oil belongs to the matter of this sacrament, which is the sacrament of the fullness of grace.—Mixed with oil is balsam, by reason of the fragrance of its odor, which spreads to others; wherefore the Apostle says (II Cor. ii, 15): "We are the good odor of Christ. . ." And, although many things are fragrant, yet balsam is particularly chosen, on account of its prominent fragrance, and also because it is a preservative against corruption.

NOTE: In the time of the Apostles no sensible sacramental matter was necessary, where God sent sensible signs miraculously. Yet the Apostles commonly made use of chrism in bestowing the sacrament, when such visible signs were lacking. For Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.*, c. 4): "There is a certain perfecting operation which our guides," i.e., the Apostles, "call the sacrifice of Christ" (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS SACRAMENT THAT THE CHRISM BE PREVIOUSLY CONSECRATED BY A BISHOP.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ did not make use of visible anointings, so as not to slight the invisible anointings, whereby He was anointed above His fellows (Ps. xlv, 8). Consequently, both chrism and holy oil of the sick are blessed before they are applied to the purposes of this sacrament. Now Christ used the matter of Baptism and the Eucharist; and consequently by this very use of Christ the matters of these sacraments received an aptitude to the perfection of the sacrament. And for this reason it is not essential to these sacraments that the matter first be blessed, because Christ's blessing suffices. If a blessing should be employed, it belongs to the solemnity of the sacrament,

not to its necessity.—The matter of the sacrament of Confirmation is consecrated by a Bishop, who represents Christ in the Church (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PROPER FORM OF THE SACRAMENT 'I SIGN THEE WITH THE SIGN OF THE CROSS. . . .'

YES.—THE REASON is that the form of the sacrament contains whatever is essential to the species of the sacrament. Now for the species of this sacrament, in which the Holy Spirit is given for strength in spiritual combat, three things are required, which are contained in the aforesaid form: a) The cause bestowing fullness of spiritual strength, which is the Blessed Trinity, and this is expressed when it is said: "In the name of the Father . . ."; b) the spiritual strength itself that is bestowed on man through the sacrament of visible matter for his salvation, and this is touched upon when it is said: "I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation;" c) the sign that is given to the one engaged in combat: Thus even in bodily combat soldiers are marked with the signs of their leaders, and regarding this it is said: "I sign thee with the sign of the cross," on which Our King triumphed, as is said in Coloss. ii, 15.

NOTE: Regarding the objection that we read neither that Christ instituted this form nor that the Apostles made use of it, note that sometimes the effect of this sacrament, namely the fullness of the Holy Spirit, was given through the ministry of the Apostles, by means of certain visible signs miraculously wrought by God, and then neither the matter nor the form of this sacrament was necessary. On the other hand, sometimes they bestowed this sacrament as ministers of the sacraments. And then they used both matter and form according to Christ's command. For the Apostles, in conferring the sacraments, observed many things that are not handed down in those Scriptures that are in general use, as Dionysius remarks at the end of his treatise on ecclesiastical hierarchies (last chapter, between middle and end).—(Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION IMPRINTS A CHARACTER.

YES.—THE REASON is that a character is a kind of spiritual power ordained for the performance of certain sacred actions. Now it is evident from the analogy of bodily life that the action of a human being just born and the action that befits him in adulthood are different. Consequently in Baptism man receives the power to do those things that belong to his own salvation, insofar, namely, as he lives in and for himself; but in Confirmation man receives the power to do those things that pertain to spiritual combat against the enemies of faith, as is evident from the example of the Apostles. Hence it is evident that in the Sacrament of Confirmation a character is imprinted, for the public profession of the faith of Christ, as it were, *ex officio* (Ad 2).

NOTE: The sacraments of the Old Law are called "justice of the flesh" (Hebr. ix, 10), because, to wit, they wrought nothing inwardly. Consequently, in circumcision a character was imprinted in the body only, but not in the soul. But in Confirmation, since it is a sacrament of the New Law, a spiritual character is imprinted at the same time, together with the bodily character (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER OF CONFIRMATION PRESUPPOSES, OF NECESSITY, THE BAPTISMAL CHARACTER.

YES.—The character of Confirmation of necessity presupposes the baptismal character, so that if anyone were confirmed without being baptized he would receive nothing, but he must be confirmed after Baptism.

THE REASON is that Confirmation stands to Baptism as growth to generation (art. 1 of this q.). Now it is evident that no one can be advanced to perfect age unless he has first been born.

ART. VII.—WHETHER SANCTIFYING GRACE IS BESTOWED IN THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—For the special effect to which this sacrament is ordained.

THE REASON is that this sacrament confers on the baptized the Holy Spirit for his strength (art. 4 of this q.). Now it was shown in the First Part (q. xliii, art. 3) that the sending or bestowing of the Holy Spirit is only with sanctifying grace. Hence it is manifest that sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament. For not only is sanctifying grace given for the remission of sin, but also for the increase and firmness of right-

eousness (Ad 1).—Yet, as is evident from the name itself, this sacrament is given to confirm what it already finds; consequently, it must not be given to those who do not have grace; but if any adult is in sin, of which he has no consciousness, or if again he approaches the sacrament without being perfectly contrite, he obtains, through the grace bestowed in this sacrament, also a remission of sins (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ALL.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as it is nature's intention that all who are corporately born should come to perfect age, so, much more, is it the intention of God that the soul, to which belongs spiritual birth through Baptism, should come to perfect spiritual age, which is effected by Confirmation.

NOTE: Because the soul, to which spiritual age belongs, is immortal, it follows that this sacrament should be given even to the dying, so that they may stand forth perfect in the resurrection. Wherefore Hugo of St. Victor says (*De Sacram., lib. ii, part. 7, cap. 3*): "It would be quite perilous to pass from this life without Confirmation;" not because one would be damned, save perhaps on account of contempt, but because he would suffer loss of perfection. Consequently even children who die after being confirmed receive greater glory, just as here below they receive more grace (Ad 4).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MAN ON THE FOREHEAD.

YES.—For two reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that, of all the places of the human body, the forehead is most conspicuous, for it is hardly ever covered; and therefore the confirmand is anointed with chrism on the forehead, that thus he may manifestly show himself to be as Christ, as also the Apostles, who had been concealed in the Upper Room, manifested that they had received the Holy Spirit.

THE SECOND REASON is that a man is hindered from the free confession of Christ's name for two reasons, fear and shame. Now the sign of both these things appears most conspicuously on the forehead; hence those "who are ashamed blush, and those who are afraid turn pale;" as is said in Aristotle's *Ethics*, bk. iv, last chap. Consequently chrism is signed on the forehead, that neither from fear nor from shame may he omit to confess the name of Christ.

ART. X.—WHETHER HE WHO IS CONFIRMED NEEDS ONE TO STAND FOR HIM.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as a new-born child needs an instructor in what pertains to the maintenance of life, so those who are taken for combat need instructors, to teach them what belongs to the mode of warfare.

ART. XI.—WHETHER ONLY A BISHOP CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—This sacrament is reserved to the Bishops.

THE REASON is that, just as the preparation of the matter belongs to the lower craftsmen, whereas the higher gives the form; so in any work the final consummation is reserved to the supreme art or power. Now this sacrament of Confirmation is as it were the final consummation of the sacrament of Baptism. Consequently, the bestowing of this sacrament is reserved to the Bishops, who hold the highest power in the Church, just as in the primitive Church the fullness of the Holy Spirit was given by the imposition of the hands of the Apostles, in whose place the Bishops stand (Acts viii).—Nevertheless, the Pope, who in the Church has the fullness of power, can permit simple priests to confer this sacrament, as long as scandal is removed, just as he gives certain priests permission to confer minor orders, which belongs to the episcopal power (Ad 1).

(NOTE: On Sept. 14, 1946, the faculty was granted to pastors and their assistants to dispense this sacrament in urgent cases, in which the sacrament of Extreme Unction is wont to be conferred.)

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE RITE OF THIS SACRAMENT IS APPROPRIATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the ordinations of the Church are directed by the Wisdom of Christ, according to Matth. xviii, 20: "Where there are two or three

gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." And for this reason it follows that it is certain that the rites that the Church observes in this and in other sacraments are appropriate.

THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

Next, we take up the sacrament of the Eucharist: 1) The sacrament itself; 2) the matter; 3) the form; 4) the effects; 5) those who receive this sacrament; 6) the minister; 7) the rite.

QUESTION LXXIII

THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE EUCHARIST IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacraments of the Church are ordained to help man in the spiritual life. Now the spiritual life is likened to the bodily life, as we said (q. lxi, art. 1). Since therefore there is required for bodily life, besides generation and growth, whereby man is brought to the perfection of life, also nourishment, whereby man is maintained in life; so for the spiritual life there is needed, besides Baptism, which is spiritual generation, and Confirmation, which is spiritual growth, also the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual nourishment.

(NOTE: A sacrament is so called from the fact that it contains something sacred. Now the Eucharist contains something sacred absolutely, namely the very body of Christ; whereas the other sacraments contain something sacred in relation to something else, namely power to sanctify. Wherefore the sacrament of the Eucharist is perfected in the very consecration of its matters; whereas the other sacraments are perfected in the application of the matter to the sanctification of man. From this it also follows that that which is the effect-and-sacrament of the Eucharist is in the matter itself, namely the very body of Christ; and that which is the effect-only, namely the grace that is bestowed, is in the recipient. In Baptism, on the other hand, both things are in the recipient, namely the character, which is the effect-and-sacrament, and the grace of the remission of sins, which is the effect-only. And the same principle holds for the other sacraments (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IS ONE OR SEVERAL.

ANSWER: This sacrament is many materially, but formally and perfectly it is one.

THE REASON is that a thing is called one, not only when it is indivisible. or when it is continuous, but also when it is perfect, as we say that a house is one or a man is one. Now something is one in perfection when it is complete through the presence of all that is needed for its end. Thus this sacrament is said to be one. For just as for one and the same refreshment two things are required, namely food, which is dry nourishment, and drink, which is liquid nourishment; so also to complete this sacrament two things concur, namely spiritual food and spiritual drink, according to John vi, 56: "My flesh is food indeed, and My blood is drink indeed." Hence perfectly and formally this sacrament is one.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE EUCHARIST IS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that that which is essential to salvation in this sacrament is the effect of this sacrament, which consists in grace and the unity of the Mystical Body, without which there can be no salvation. Now it was said (q. lxxviii, art. 2) that the effect of any sacrament can be had before the reception of the sacrament by the very desire of receiving the sacrament. Wherefore, before the reception of this sacrament a man can have salvation by the desire of receiving this sacrament, just as before Baptism he can have the effect from the desire (q. lxxviii, art. 2). There is this difference, however: That the reception of Baptism is necessary to begin the spiritual life, whereas the reception of the Eucharist is necessary to consummate it, not that it may simply be possessed (as was said of Baptism), but it suffices to have it in desire, just as the end is had in the desire and intention.

(NOTE: 1. Regarding the words of John vi, 54: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you," note that these words,

as Augustine says (*Tract 26* on John), refer to the fellowship of the Body of Christ and His members, which is the Church in His predestinated." Hence, as he says in his epistle to Boniface: "No one should entertain the slightest doubt that every one of the faithful becomes a partaker of the body and blood of the Lord when in Baptism he is a member of Christ's body" (Ad 1).

2. Baptism is the sacrament of Christ's death and Passion, according as a man is born anew in Christ in virtue of His Passion; but the Eucharist is the sacrament of Christ's Passion according as a man is made perfect in union with Christ who suffered. Hence, as Baptism is called the sacrament of faith, which is the foundation of the spiritual life, so the Eucharist is termed the sacrament of charity, which is the bond of perfection (Col. iii, 14).—(Ad 3).

ART. IV. WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IS SUITABLY CALLED BY VARIOUS NAMES.

YES.—It is called the Sacrifice, Communion or the Synaxis, the Eucharist, and Viaticum.

THE REASON is that this sacrament has a threefold signification: One in respect to the past, insofar as it is commemorative of Our Lord's Passion, which was a true sacrifice (q. xlvi, art. 3), and in this respect it is called the Sacrifice. Another signification it has in respect to a present thing, namely ecclesiastical unity, to which men are added by this sacrament, and in this respect it is called Communion or *Synaxis* (a gathering together). The third signification it has in respect to the future, insofar as this sacrament foreshadows the divine fruition in heaven, and in this respect it is called the Eucharist, that is, good grace, because "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rom. vi, 23). It is also called in Greek *Metalepsis*, that is, Assumption, because, as Damascene says (*Orth. Fide., lib. iv, c. 14*), "we thereby assume the Godhead of the Son."

ART. V.—WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THIS SACRAMENT WAS APPROPRIATE.

YES.—It was most appropriate to institute this sacrament at the Supper, in which Christ last conversed with His disciples, and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ Himself is contained in the Eucharist as in a sacrament. And therefore when Christ was about to leave His disciples in His own species, He left Himself with them under the sacramental species; as the Emperor's image is set up to be revered in His absence.

THE SECOND REASON is that, without faith in the Passion, there never could have been salvation (Rom. iii, 25). Consequently it was necessary that there should be at all times among men something to show forth Our Lord's Passion, the chief sacrament of which in the Old Law was the Paschal Lamb. Hence it was appropriate that when the hour of Passion was come Christ should institute a new sacrament after celebrating the old, that in the future it might be a memorial of the Lord's Passion, according to I Cor. xi, 25: "As often as you do this. . ." (Ad 3).

THE THIRD REASON is that last words, chiefly such as are spoken by parting friends, are committed most deeply to memory; since then especially affection for friends is more enkindled, and the things that affect us most are impressed the deepest on the soul. Wherefore Augustine says in his book of answers to Januaris: "In order to commend more earnestly the depth of this mystery, Our Savior willed this last act to be fixed in the hearts and memories of the disciples, whom He was about to quit for the Passion."

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PASCHAL LAMB WAS THE CHIEF FIGURE OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Paschal Lamb represents this sacrament, not in one respect only, as did the oblation of Melchisedech, which represented it as regards the effect-and-sacrament-only, or as the manna, which represented it as regards the effect only; but in all these respects together. As regards the sacrament-only (which is the bread and wine), for the Paschal Lamb was eaten with unleavened bread (Ex. xii, 8); and with regard to the effect-and-sacrament (which is the true body of Christ), because it was immolated by the whole multitude of the Children of Israel on the 14th day of the moon, and this was a figure of Christ's Passion, for He is called a Lamb by reason of His innocence; and with regard to the effect-only (i.e., the effect of grace),

because by the blood of the Paschal Lamb the Children of Israel were protected from the destroying angel, and brought out of bondage to Egypt. Hence the principal figure of this sacrament was the Paschal Lamb.

QUESTION LXXIV **THE MATTER OF THE EUCHARIST AS REGARDS THE SPECIES**

We have next to consider the matter of this sacrament: 1) The species of the matter; 2) the conversion of bread and wine into the body of Christ; 3) the mode of existence of Christ in this sacrament; 4) the accidents of bread and wine that remain in this sacrament. About the first point there are eight articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT IS BREAD AND WINE.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ instituted this sacrament under the species of bread and wine, as is evident from Matth. xxvi. Hence bread and wine are appropriate matter of this sacrament. And this accords with reason on four accounts: 1) As regards the use of this sacrament, which is an eating, because, just as water is employed in the sacrament of Baptism for the use of spiritual washing, so bread and wine, by which men are more commonly refreshed, are employed in this sacrament for the use of spiritual eating. Secondly, with regard to Christ's Passion, in which His blood was separated from His body; consequently in this sacrament, which is the memorial of the Lord's Passion, bread is taken separately as the sacrament of the body, and wine as the sacrament of the blood. Thirdly, with regard to the effect considered in each of the receivers, for, as Ambrose says, upon Epistle I to the Corinthians, "this sacrament avails for the defense of soul and body; and therefore "Christ's body is offered" under the species of bread "for the health of the body, and the blood" under the species of wine is offered "for the health of the soul." Fourthly, with regard to the effect in respect to the whole Church, which is made up of different faithful, "just as bread is made of different grains, and wine flows from different grapes," as a gloss says on I Cor., x, 17: "We being many are . . . one body . . ."

ART. II.—WHETHER A DETERMINATE QUANTITY OF BREAD AND WINE ARE REQUIRED FOR THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the end of this sacrament is the use of the faithful. Hence it follows that the quantity of the matter of this sacrament is determined in relation to its use by the faithful, namely absolutely; because the number of the faithful is indeterminate.

ART. III.—WHETHER WHEATEN BREAD IS REQUIRED FOR THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that such matter is adopted for the sacraments as is commonly made use of among men. Now among all breads men most commonly make use of wheaten bread. Consequently, Christ is believed to have instituted the sacrament with this kind of bread. For other breads seem to be introduced when this fails. Yet from such grains, which cannot in any way be generated from wheaten grain, bread cannot be made such as to be the proper matter of this sacrament (Ad 2).

(NOTE: A moderate mixing does not alter the species of wheaten bread; but if the mixing be notable, for instance half-and-half, or almost so, such a mixture changes the species; hence bread made therefrom will not be the proper matter of this sacrament (Ad 3).

Likewise, if the corruption of the bread is so great that the species of bread is destroyed, as when the continuity of its parts is destroyed, and its taste, color, and other accidents are changed—from such matter the body of Christ cannot be confectioned. When, however, the corruption is not such as to destroy the species, but is a certain disposition to corruption, as is made manifest by a certain change in taste, the body of Christ can be made from such bread; but the one who consecrates it sins by reason of irreverence for the sacrament (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE MADE OF UNLEAVENED BREAD.

YES.—Although it is fitting that each person retain the rite of his own church in

the celebration of the sacrament, yet the custom of celebrating Mass with unleavened bread is more reasonable than of celebrating it with leavened bread, as among the Greeks; and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ instituted this sacrament "on the first day of the Unleavened Bread" (Matth. xxvi, 17; Mark xiv, 12; Luke xxii, 7), on which day there ought to be nothing fermented in the houses of the Jews, as we read in Ex. xii, 15, 19).

THE SECOND REASON is that bread is properly the sacrament of the body of Christ, which was conceived without corruption, rather than of His Godhead, as will appear later (q. 1, art. 1).—The Greek churches offer the Sacrifice in leavened bread, inasmuch as the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, just as leavened bread is mixed with flour.

THE THIRD REASON is that this is more in keeping with the sincerity of the faithful, which is required for the use of this sacrament, according to I Cor., v. 7: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth."

ART. V.—WHETHER WINE OF THE GRAPE IS THE PROPER MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—Only from wine of the grape can this sacrament be confected, and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ instituted this sacrament in wine of the grape, as is clear from the fact that He said, regarding the institution of this sacrament (Matth. xxvi, 29): "I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine."

THE SECOND REASON is that, as has been stated (art. 3 of this q.), that is adopted as matter of the sacraments which is properly and universally considered as such. Now wine is properly called that which is taken from the vine.

THE THIRD REASON is that the wine of the vine is more in keeping with the effect of this sacrament, which is spiritual gladness, since it is written, Ps. ciii, 15, that "wine may cheer the heart of man."

(NOTE: 1.—Just as this sacrament cannot be made from bread wholly corrupted, so neither can it be made from vinegar. Yet it can be made from wine in the process of turning to vinegar, as also it can be made from bread on the way to spoiling, though one who would thus confect it would sin, as has been stated before (art. 3).—(Ad 2).

2. The juice of unripe grapes is at the stage of incomplete generation, and therefore it has not yet the species of wine; on which account it may not be used for this sacrament. Must, however, has already the species of wine, for its sweetness indicates fermentation, which is the result of its natural heat; consequently, this sacrament can be made from must. Nevertheless, entire grapes ought not to be mixed with this sacrament, because then there would be something else besides wine. It is furthermore forbidden to offer must in the chalice, as soon as it has been squeezed from the grapes, since this is unbecoming, on account of the impurity of the must. But in case of necessity it may be done; for it is said by Pope Julius (Decr. 7): "If necessary, let the grape be pressed into the chalice" (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER WATER SHOULD BE MIXED WITH WINE.

YES.—For four reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that it is believed with probability that Our Lord instituted this sacrament in wine tempered with water according to the custom of the country; wherefore it is said in Prov. ix, 5: "Drink the wine that I have mixed for you."

THE SECOND REASON is that in Christ's Passion we read that there flowed forth from His side, not only blood, or water alone, but a mixture of both.

THE THIRD REASON is that this is in keeping with the signification of the effect of this sacrament, which is the union of the Christian people with Christ, for, as Pope Julius I declares (Decr. 7), "we see that the people are signified by the water, but Christ's blood, by the wine. Therefore, when water is mixed with the wine in the chalice, the people is made one with Christ."

THE FOURTH REASON is that this is in keeping with the ultimate effect of this sacrament, which is entry into life eternal; wherefore Ambrose says (*De Sacram. lib.*, v, c. 1): "The water flows into the chalice, and springs forth into life everlasting."

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE MIXING WITH WATER IS ESSENTIAL TO THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the adding of water to the wine is for the purpose of signifying the sharing of this sacrament with the faithful. Now use of the faithful is not essential to the sacrament, but is something consequent to it. Hence the adding of water is not essential to the sacrament.

NOTE: The outflow of blood from the side of Christ directly referred to Christ's Passion, for it is natural to the wounded human body that blood should flow from it. But the outflowing of water was not essential to the Passion, but was to demonstrate the effect of the Passion, which is a washing clean of sins, a refreshment against the heats of concupiscence (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER WATER SHOULD BE ADDED IN GREAT QUANTITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that, since the water added is converted into wine, and the wine into the blood of Christ, it is always safer to add a little water, particularly if the wine is weak, because if the water were added in such quantity as to destroy the species of wine the sacrament would not be perfected.

(NOTE: If water were added in a cask, it would not suffice for the signification of this sacrament, but the water must be added to the wine at the actual celebration of the sacrament—Ad 3).

QUESTION LXXV

THE CHANGE OF BREAD AND WINE INTO THE BODY AND THE BLOOD OF CHRIST

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BODY OF CHRIST ARE IN THIS SACRAMENT IN VERY TRUTH.

YES.—That Christ's true body and blood are in this sacrament can be detected by neither senses nor intellect, but by faith alone, which relies on divine authority, which said (Luke xxii, 19): "This is My body, which shall be delivered up for you." And this is appropriate, for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that this is in keeping with the perfection of the New Law. For the sacrifices of the Old Law contained this true sacrifice of Christ's Passion only in figure. Consequently, it behooved that something more should be possessed by the sacrifice of the New Law, which was instituted by Christ, so that it would contain the suffering Christ Himself, not only in signification or foreshadow, but also in literal truth. Consequently, this sacrament, which really contains Christ Himself, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier.*, c. 3), is perfective of all the sacraments, in which Christ's power is shared.

THE SECOND REASON is that this is in keeping with the charity of Christ, by virtue of which He took a true body of our nature for our salvation. For it is most proper to friendship that friends should live in converse one with another; and that He should not deprive us in our pilgrimage of His bodily presence. Consequently by the truth of His Body and Blood He united us to Himself in this sacrament. Wherefore He said (John vi, 37): "He who eats My flesh, and drinks My blood, abides in Me, and I in him."

THE THIRD REASON is that this is in keeping with the perfection of faith; for, just as there is faith in Christ's Godhead, so there is (here) faith in His manhood. And, because faith is of things invisible, just as Christ shows His Godhead to us invisibly, so also in this sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner.

NOTE: Christ's body is not in this sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner, which is proper to this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ's body is upon many altars, not as in different places, but sacramentally; and therefore we do not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament is a kind of sign; but that Christ's body is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament (Ad 3); i.e., spiritually, or in an invisible manner, and after the manner and virtue of the spirit (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THIS SACRAMENT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BREAD AND WINE REMAINS AFTER THE CONSECRATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that, in the first place, Christ's body does not begin to be in this sacrament by way of local movement; for a) it would follow that it would cease to be in heaven; for what is locally moved does not come anew to some place unless it quits the former one; b) because every body locally moved passes through all the intermediary spaces, which cannot be said here; c) because it is impossible for one movement of the same body locally moved to be terminated in different places at the same time, whereas the body of Christ begins at the same time to be in several places under this sacrament.

Consequently, it remains that Christ's body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing no longer remains after this change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of bread cannot remain after the consecration.—

Likewise, this position would be contrary to the form of this sacrament, in which it is stated: "This is My body," a thing that would not be true if the substance of bread remained there; for the substance of bread is never the body of Christ; but rather it would have to be said: "Here is My body."—Likewise, it would be contrary to the veneration owed to this sacrament if any created substance should be there that could not be adored by the adoration of *latria*.—And, finally, it would be contrary to the rite of the Church, according to which it is not lawful to take the body of Christ after bodily food, though it is lawful to take one consecrated host after another. Hence this position must be avoided as heretical.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BREAD OR WINE IS ANNIHILATED AFTER THE CONSECRATION OF THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—The substance of bread and wine after consecration a) is neither resolved into prime matter; b) nor into the former pre-existing matter of the elements; c) nor annihilated.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the matter that is reduced to prime matter would exist without form; but without form there can be no matter.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that if this resolution into the original matter of the elements should take place, this would be by local movement, which could be perceived by the senses.—Likewise, the substance of bread and wine remains until the last instant of the Consecration; but in the last instant of the Consecration there is already present the substance of the body and blood of Christ. Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be there.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, if the substance of bread and wine were annihilated after the Consecration, there would not be there the change of the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ.—Likewise, no moment could be assigned when such an annihilation is caused in this sacrament, since the effect of the sacrament is signified by the form; for neither of these (i.e., neither resolution nor annihilation) is signified by these words of the form: "This is My body."

ART. IV.—WHETHER BREAD CAN BE CONVERTED INTO THE BODY OF CHRIST.

YES.—by divine power, the whole substance of the bread is converted in this sacrament into the whole substance of the body of Christ, and the whole substance of the wine is converted into the whole substance of the blood of Christ; and this change is not formal, as in natural things, i.e., by a change of the form; but substantial. Neither is it included among the kinds of natural movement, but it can be called, by a name of its own, Transubstantiation.

THE REASON is that, since in this sacrament there is the true body of Christ, and it does not begin to be there anew by local movement, since the body of Christ is not there as in a place, as is evident from what has been said (art. 2 of this q.), it is necessary to say that it begins to be present by the change of the substance of bread into itself. Wherefore in this sacrament it is rightly said that bread is *changed* into the body of Christ.—Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is altogether supernatural, being produced by the power of God alone. For God is infinite act, and therefore His action extends to the *whole nature* of being. Therefore He can produce not

only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that the whole substance of one thing is changed into the whole substance of another. Moreover, in the change of a whole substance, no subject is possible (Ad 2).

NOTE: Form cannot be changed into form, or matter into matter, by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the Author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the other, by withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE ACCIDENTS OF THE BREAD AND WINE REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT AFTER CHANGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, after the Consecration, all the accidents of bread and wine remain. And this is reasonably done by Divine Providence, for three reasons. First, because it is not customary to men, but horrible, to eat the flesh of a man, and to drink his blood. Secondly, to avoid subjecting this sacrament to the ridicule of unbelievers, which would follow if we ate Our Lord under His own species. Thirdly, that, while we receive Our Lord's body invisibly, this may redound to the merit of our faith.

NOTE: As is said in the book On Causes (Prop. 1), an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by God's power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away. (Thus, by God's power there remain in this sacrament the accidents of bread, while the substance of bread is removed).—(Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF THE BREAD REMAINS IN THIS SACRAMENT AFTER THE CONSECRATION.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that, if the substantial form of bread should remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into the body of Christ, save only the matter; and thus it would follow that it would not be changed into the whole body of Christ, but into its matter, and this is consistent with the form of the sacrament, in which it is said: "This is My body."

THE SECOND REASON is that, if the substantial form of bread should remain, it would remain either in the matter or separated from the matter. If it remained in the matter of the bread, then the whole substance of the bread would remain, but this is contrary to what has been said (art. 2 of this q.). If it should remain separated from the matter, it would then be an actually intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated from matter are such.

THE THIRD REASON is that it would be unbefitting this sacrament: Because the accidents of the bread remain in this sacrament in order that the body of Christ may be seen under them, and not under the proper species, as was said in the preceding article.

NOTE: Although the substantial form of Christ's body is Christ's own soul, yet the substantial form of bread is not changed into the soul of Christ, save insofar as Christ's soul gives to Christ's body corporeal being; but not according as it bestows animated being (Ad 2).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THIS CHANGE IS WROUGHT IN AN INSTANT.

YES.—Both on the part of the form, which is the term of the change; and on the part of the subject; and also on the part of the agent, this change is wrought instantaneously.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in this change is no subject that could be successively prepared, as was said (art. 4 of this q.).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that this change is wrought by the infinite power of God, whose action extends to the whole nature of being (art. 4).

NOTE: Because the change of bread into the body of Christ follows from the utterance of the words (of Consecration), therefore it follows that between any two signant instants corresponding to this change there must be a mid-time. Since, however, time is not composed of instants following one another (as is proved in the *Physics*, bk. vi), therefore a first instant can be assigned in which Christ's body is present in this sacrament; but a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is there,

but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds true in natural change (Ad 1, passion).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THIS PROPOSITION IS FALSE: THE BODY OF CHRIST IS MADE OUT OF BREAD.

NO.—THE REASON is that that from which anything is made sometimes indeed denotes at the same time a subject, with one of the extremes of conversion, as when it is said: "White becomes black;" and in this respect it would be false to speak of bread's becoming the body of Christ; since there is no subject of this conversion, as has been said. But sometimes it denotes only the opposite or extreme, as when it is said: "Out of morning comes the day." And thus it is not conceded that morning becomes day.

And so also in the matter in hand, although it may be said properly that *the body of Christ is made out of bread*, yet it is not said properly that *bread becomes the body of Christ*, save by way of similitude, namely by reason of the accidents that remain after the Consecration, when the name bread does not denote the substance of bread, but, in general, that which is contained under the species of bread, under which the substance of bread was contained before, and later the body of Christ is contained.

NOTE: Because in this sacrament a whole substance is changed into a whole substance, for this reason this conversion is properly called Transubstantiation. Now this conversion has this in common with creation, that it does not take place in any subject; yet it differs from creation inasmuch as it does not result from nothing. Similarly, it has this in common with natural change that in both changes one of the extremes passes into the other, as the bread passes into the body of Christ, and white passes into black; and in both something remains the same, namely, in natural change there remains the matter, and in this sacrament there remain the same accidents; yet they are different, inasmuch as in this sacrament the whole substance of bread passes into the whole body of Christ, whereas in natural change the matter of one receives the form of the other, while the former form is discarded (in body, passim).

QUESTION LXXVI THE MANNER IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WHOLE CHRIST IS CONTAINED UNDER THIS SACRAMENT

YES.—a) In this sacrament the whole Christ is contained directly, as regards the body and blood; but concomitantly as regards the soul and Divinity.—b) The totality of the body and blood are not in this sacrament by way of dimensive quantity, but by way of substance.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, by force of this sacrament, there is under the species that into which the original substance of bread and wine is directly converted, which is signified by the words of the form, which are effective of what they signify; consequently, in this sacrament, by force of words of the form, the whole Christ is contained in both body and blood. Yet by reason of natural concomitance there is in this sacrament also that which is really united to that in which the aforesaid conversion terminates. Now the conversion of bread and wine terminates in the body and blood of Christ, with which His soul and Godhead are really united. For after the Resurrection the soul of Christ is always really united to the body, according to Rom. vi, 9: "Christ rising from the dead dies now no more;" and His Godhead, which assumed a body, never discarded it; hence, wherever the body of Christ is, it follows that there must be His Divinity also (in body of art. and Ad 1, passim).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's Body is in this sacrament by way of substance, and not by way of quantity. Now, properly speaking, the entirety of the substance is contained indifferently in small or large quantity; just as the whole nature of man is contained in a big or a little man. Hence the whole substance of the body and the blood of Christ is contained in this sacrament after the Consecration, just as before the Consecration the whole substance of the bread and wine was there contained (Ad 3).—Note, however, that, although the substance of Christ's body is there by the power of the sacrament, yet as dimensive of quantity it is there by force of real concomitance; and therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament in the manner in which substance is under dimensions; but not after the manner of dimensions, that is, not in the way in which

the quantity that measures any body is under the quantity that measures a place (below, art. iii, of this q.).

NOTE: if this sacrament had been celebrated within the three days of His death, the soul of Christ would not have been there either by force of the sacrament or by the real power of concomitance (Ad 1).—Likewise, by the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but also the entire body of Christ, that is, the bones, the nerves, and the like. And this is apparent from the form of this sacrament; wherein it is not said: "This is My flesh," but "This is My body." Accordingly, when Our Lord said (John vi, 56): "My flesh is food indeed," there the word flesh is put for the entire body, because, according to human custom, it seems to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on the bones or the like (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WHOLE CHRIST IS CONTAINED UNDER EACH SPECIES OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—It must be held with entire certainty that the whole Christ is under both species of this sacrament; yet each species in a different way.

THE REASON is that the body of Christ is indeed contained under the species of bread, by the power of the sacrament, and His blood is contained by force of real concomitance, as was said above (prec. art.) concerning the soul and Godhead of Christ; the blood of Christ is indeed contained under the species of the wine by the power of the sacrament; and His body is contained by virtue of real concomitance, as are His soul and Godhead.

NOTE: Although the whole Christ is under each species, yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is made of its being shed. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this sacrament that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food, and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in which sense it was stated above (q. lxxiv, art. 1) that the body is offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul.

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST IS ENTIRE UNDER EVERY PART OF THE SPECIES OF THE BREAD AND WINE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the nature of the substance is wholly under every part of the dimensions under which it is contained, just as the whole nature of the bread is under every part of the bread; and that indifferently, whether they are dimensions actually divided (as when the bread is cut) or whether they are undivided, and only potentially divisible. Consequently, it is plain that the whole Christ is under each part of the species of bread, even while the Host remains entire, and not only when it is broken.—Yet, as long as the quantity remains actually undivided, the substance of the thing is also not contained several times under its own dimension; for number follows division (Ad 1).

NOTE: The distance of the parts of Christ's body in this sacrament is compared to the mode of its substance; for properly and directly Christ's body is in this sacrament according to the mode of its substance, in which the conversion of the substance of the bread directly terminates (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WHOLE DIMENSIVE QUANTITY OF CHRIST'S BODY IS IN THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—Not by the power of the sacrament, but by force of real concomitance.

THE REASON is that by the power of this sacrament there is in this sacrament that in which the conversion directly terminates, namely the substance of Christ's body. Yet because the substance of Christ's body is not really divided from its dimensive quantity and from the other accidents, hence it is that by force of real concomitance there are in this sacrament the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body, and all its accidents.—This dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament according to its proper manner (namely that the whole is in the whole, and the individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the whole in every part (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY IS IN THIS SACRAMENT AS IN A PLACE.

NO.—Christ's body in this sacrament is not in a place after the manner of its own dimensive quantity, but after the manner of substance, i.e., in the manner in which substance is contained by dimensions not its own.

THE REASON is that the substance of Christ's body is compared to that place (of the species) through the medium of foreign dimensions, i.e., of bread; for the substance of Christ's body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread. Conversely, the proper dimensions of Christ's body are compared to that place through the medium of substance, and this is contrary to the nature of a located body.—Hence Christ's body has a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through the medium of its own accidents, but through the medium of the sacramental species (Art. vii, of this q, Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY IS IN THIS SACRAMENT MOVABLY.

NO.—Not of itself, but only accidentally, is Christ's body movably present in this sacrament.

THE REASON is that what is not in a place is not moved of itself locally, but only in relation to the movement of that in which it exists. Hence we say that Christ is moved in this sacrament according to the being that He has in this sacrament (Ad 1).

NOTE: 1. Since Christ has of Himself unailing and incorruptible being, He does not cease to be under this sacrament either by ceasing to be, or by local movement of His own, as is clear from the preceding article, but only by the fact that the species of this sacrament ceases to exist; even so, God, whose being is unailing and immortal, ceases to exist in a corruptible creature by the fact that the corruptible creature ceases to exist (in body of art.).

2. Just as all other consecrations remain immovably while the consecrated objects remain, so Christ's body remains in this sacrament, not only until tomorrow, but also in the future, as long as the sacramental species remain: and when they cease Christ's body ceases to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the relationship of Christ's body to those species is taken away, in the same manner as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature that ceases to exist (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE BODY OF CHRIST, AS IT IS IN THIS SACRAMENT, CAN BE SEEN BY ANY EYE, AT LEAST BY A GLORIFIED ONE.

NO.—a) By no bodily eye can the body of Christ be seen as it is in this sacrament; b) it can, however, be seen by the intellect itself, which is called the spiritual eye, and in a supernatural manner.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Christ's body is in this sacrament after the manner of substance. Now substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any of the senses, or even the imagination, but under the intellect alone, whose object is what a thing is, as Aristotle says, *On the Soul*, bk. iii, text 26.—Likewise, as has been said (art. v), the accidents of Christ's body in this sacrament do not have an immediate relationship, either to this sacrament, or to the surrounding bodies, but only to the substance itself; and therefore they cannot change the medium in which they exist, so as to be seen by a bodily eye.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the mode of existence in which Christ is in this sacrament is wholly supernatural; and therefore in Himself He is visible to a supernatural intellect, namely the Divine, and consequently to the beatified intellect, either of man or of angel, who by sharing in the clarity of the divine intellect sees the things that are supernatural through seeing the Divine Essence.—But by the intellect of wayfaring man the sacramental Christ cannot be seen, save by faith, as is true of other supernatural things. Neither does the angelic intellect, by its natural powers, suffice to see this Body.

NOTE: Christ's bodily eye sees Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under the sacrament, for this belongs to the intellect alone. But it is not the same with any other bodily eye, because Christ's eye is under this sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed to it (Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER CHRIST'S BODY IS TRULY THERE WHEN FLESH OR A CHILD APPEARS MIRACULOUSLY IN THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—Christ's body remains truly there when this apparition occurs on the part of the viewers only, when their eye is altered by the action of God; and also when this apparition occurs, not merely by the alteration of the witnesses, but by an appearance that is seen as really existing outwardly, as when it is seen by everyone under that appearance (of flesh, a child, etc.), and it remains, not for an hour, but for a considerable time.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this way no change is wrought on the part of the sacrament, but on the part of the beholders only; hence Christ does not cease to exist under this sacrament when the apparition takes place. Nor is there any element of deception in this, as happens in the case of magical feats, because this appearance is formed by God in the eye in order to represent some truth, namely, for the purpose of showing that Christ's body is truly under this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that Christ's body cannot be seen in its proper species except in one place, in which it is definitively contained. Hence, when it is seen in its own species, and adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. Consequently, Christ's body does not cease to exist under this sacrament when an apparition takes place in the second way.—Likewise, remember that a glorified body, which appears as it wills, disappears after the apparition when it wills. But that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament continues for a long time—indeed, one reads of its being sometimes enclosed, and, by order of many Bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it were impious to think of as Christ under His proper semblance.

Consequently, it must be said that, while the dimensions remain the same as before, there takes place a miraculous change in the other accidents, such as shape, color, and so on, so that flesh or blood, or a child, is seen. And, while these dimensions, which are the foundations of the other accidents, remain (next q., art. 2), Christ's body truly remains in this sacrament; but a change is wrought on the other accidents, as was said (q. lxxv, art. 5).—(Ad 3).

QUESTION LXXVII

THE ACCIDENTS THAT REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE ACCIDENTS REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT WITHOUT A SUBJECT

YES.—The accidents remaining in this sacrament do not exist as in a subject, a) either in the substance of bread and wine, b) or in the substance of Christ's body.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that after the Consecration the substance of bread and wine does not remain, as was said above (q. lxxv, art. 2 and 6); nor even does the substantial form remain, and, if it did remain, it would not be the subject of the accidents, as it clearly explained by Boethius (*De Trin., lib. 1*).

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that the substance of a human body can in no wise be affected by these accidents; nor is it even possible for Christ's glorified and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these qualities.

NOTE: 1. It cannot be said that the accidents remain in the surrounding air as in a subject; for air is not capable of receiving such accidents. But they remain without a subject, as indeed is possible by divine power; for God, who is the first cause of substance and accidents, can by His infinite power maintain an accident in existence, while withdrawing the substance by which it was maintained in existence as by its proper cause, just as He can produce other effects of natural causes without the agency of natural causes: Thus He formed a human body in the Virgin's womb without the co-operation of a man (in body of art.).

2. As long as the substance of the bread and wine remained, these accidents had no being of their own or other accidents; but their subjects had *such* being through them, just as snow is *white* through whiteness. But after the Consecration the accidents that remain have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence, as was said of the angels in the First Part (q. 1, art. 2, Ad 3), and besides they have composition of quantitative parts (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THIS SACRAMENT THE DIMENSIVE QUANTITY OF THE BREAD OR WINE IS THE SUBJECT OF THE OTHER ACCIDENTS.

YES.—It must be said that the other accidents remaining in this sacrament exist in the dimensive quantity of bread and wine, which remains, as in a subject, and that for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that in this sacrament something appears having quantity, which is colored, and affected by other accidents; nor are the senses deceived in this.

THE SECOND REASON is that the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity. And, because the first subject is matter, it follows that all the other accidents relate to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity, and because, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being that they had before, it follows that all the accidents remain as founded upon dimensive quantity.

THE THIRD REASON is that, since the subject is the principle of the individuation of the accidents, it follows that the subject of some accidents is accounted to be in some way a principle of individuation. Now dimensive quantity is a principle of individuation. For division is an accident in substance by reason of quantity; wherefore numerically different forms are in different parts of the matter by reason of dimensive quantity, which is by way of a kind of individuation. Consequently the dimensive quantity of bread and wine is in this sacrament the subject of the other accidents.—For when God gives an accident the power to exist in itself, it can also be the subject of another accident (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SPECIES IN THIS SACRAMENT CAN CHANGE EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

YES.—THE REASON is that each thing acts insofar as it is actually existing; it follows that everything relates to act as it relates to being. Now the sacramental species were given by divine power the ability to remain in the being that they had when the substance of bread and wine existed. Hence, it is that they also remain in their act; and therefore when the substance of bread and wine passes into the body and blood of Christ they can do every action that they could do while the bread and wine existed. Consequently, just as by divine power the sacramental species are given the ability to exist without a substance, so they are given by divine power the ability to act without a form. This is done by the power of God, on whom as on the Prime Agent, depends every action of a substantial and accidental form (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTAL SPECIES CAN BE CORRUPTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was said above (prec. art.), the sacramental species retain the same being that they had before, when the substance of bread and wine existed. Accordingly, just as the being of those accidents could be corrupted, while the substance of bread and wine existed, so also it can be corrupted, when the substance departs.

NOTE: 1. As regards the corruption of the species of this sacrament, be it noted that this can be done of themselves, i.e., by addition or division—because the dimensive quantity remaining can receive division and addition; and, since there is a subject of sensible qualities, it can also be the subject of their alteration, for example, if the color or taste of the bread and wine is altered. And it can be done accidentally, i.e., by the corruption of the subject, for, although in this sacrament no subject remains, yet the being that such accidents had in their subject remains and this indeed is proper and conformable to the subject. Consequently such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as the substance of bread and wine was corrupted, which also was not corrupted save by a preceding alteration in the accidents. Hence if there is such a change in the species, either on the part of quality or that of quantity, that the substance of bread and wine would have been corrupted, the body and blood of Christ do not remain under this sacrament. On the part of the quality, the species of this sacrament is changed by color and taste and the like, if they are in no wise compatible with the nature of bread and wine. On the part of the quantity it is charged, for example, if the bread is reduced to fine particles, or the wine is divided into such minute particles that the species of bread and wine do not remain (in body of art.).

2. The corruption of the species is not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle that is wrought in the consecration, namely that those sacramental species retain without a subject the same being that they had in a subject, just as a blind man, to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER ANYTHING CAN BE GENERATED FROM THE SACRAMENTAL SPECIES.

YES.—THE REASON is that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another; and therefore, since the species in this sacrament are corrupted, as was said in the previous article, something must be generated from them, for they are not so corrupted that they altogether disappear, as though annihilated; but plainly something sensible succeeds them.

NOTE: With regard to that which is generated by the corruption of the species, it seems better to say that this happens by the fact that in the Consecration there is miraculously given to the dimensive quantity of bread and wine everything that belongs to the matter; accordingly, whatever can be generated from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of bread and wine is not by a new miracle but by force of the miracle previously wrought (in body of art.).—For the dimensive quantity of bread and wine retains its proper nature and receives miraculously the power and property of substance; and therefore it can pass into both, i.e., into substance and dimension (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTAL SPECIES CAN NOURISH

YES.—THE REASON is that food nourishes by being converted into the substance of the one nourished, as is said in Aristotle's book *On the Soul* (bk. ii, text 45 and 46). Now it was said in the preceding article that the sacramental species can be converted into the human body in the same way as they can be changed to ashes or worms. Hence it is manifest that they nourish. For, although the sacramental species are not a substance, they have the power of a substance (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENTAL SPECIES ARE BROKEN IN THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that in this sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with regard to the proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is a breaking, whereby from one thing arise many; and these are common sensibles. Such breaking, however, does not affect the body of Christ, which is incorruptible and impassible, but it is made in the quantitative dimension of the bread, like the other accidents. And, just as the sacramental species are the sacrament of the true body of Christ, so the breaking of these species is the sacrament of the Lord's Passion, which was in the true body of Christ.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER ANY LIQUID CAN BE MINGLED WITH THE CONSECRATED BREAD.

YES.—THE REASON is that the species remaining in this sacrament, as they acquire by virtue of the Consecration the mode of being of substance, so also receive the mode of acting and suffering, so that they can do and receive whatever substance would do or receive if it were there present. Now it is manifest that, if the substance of wine were there, some liquid could be mingled with it.

NOTE: 1. As was said above (in art. 4 of this q.), Christ's body and blood remain in this sacrament as long as those species remain numerically the same; for *this* bread and *this* wine are consecrated. Hence, if so great a mingling of any liquid takes place as to permeate the whole consecrated wine, and become mixed with it throughout, the result will be something numerically distinct, and the blood of Christ will remain there no longer. But if the quantity of the liquid added be so light as not to permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of the species, Christ's blood will cease to be under that part of the consecrated wine, yet will remain under the rest (at end of art.).

2. The liquid added to the consecrated wine is in no way mixed with the substance of Christ's blood. Nevertheless, it is mixed in the sacramental species, yet so that, after the mixture, the aforesaid species are corrupted either in whole or in part, according to the manner aforesaid (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXVIII
THE FORM OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THIS IS THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT: ‘THIS IS MY BODY; AND THIS IS THE CHALICE OF MY BLOOD.’

YES.—Since this form denotes only the consecration of the matter, which consists in transubstantiation, and is uttered as in the person of Christ Himself, it is appropriate to this sacrament of the Eucharist.

THE REASON is that this sacrament differs from the others in two respects: First, as regards the fact that it is perfected in the consecration of the matter; whereas the other sacraments are perfected in the use of consecrated matter. Hence the form of this sacrament must denote the consecration of the matter alone, i.e., when it is said: “This is My body,” or: “This is the Chalice of My blood.” Secondly, because in the other sacraments the consecration of the matter consists only in a certain blessing, by which the matter consecrated receives instrumentally a certain spiritual power, which through the minister, who is an animate instrument, can proceed to inanimate instruments; but in this sacrament the consecration of the matter consists in a kind of miraculous conversion of substance, which can be done by God alone; hence the minister in perfecting this sacrament has no other act than the utterance of the words. Consequently, whereas in the other sacraments the formulae are uttered in the person of the minister, either in his exercise of the act, as when he says: “I baptize thee,” or “I conform thee,” etc.; or by way of command, as when in the sacrament or Order he says: “Receive the power,” etc.; or by way of prayer, as when in the sacrament of Extreme Unction he says: “By this anointing and our intercession. . . ,” in this sacrament the form is rightly uttered as in the person of Christ Himself who is speaking, so as to make it understood that in perfecting this sacrament the minister does nothing but utter the words of Christ.

NOTE: In the words: “Take and eat,” the use of the consecrated matter is indicated, which is not of the necessity of this sacrament, as stated above (q. lxxiv, art. 7). Consequently, these words do not belong to the substance of the form. Yet all these words express the whole perfection of the sacrament (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS IS THE PROPER FORM FOR THE CONSECRATION OF THE BREAD: ‘THIS IS MY BODY.’

YES.—THE REASON is that this form most appropriately signifies that which is effected in this sacrament, namely the conversion of the substance of bread into the body of Christ. Now in conversion three things are considered, namely the conversion itself, and the term *from which* and the term *to which*. Now the conversion in this sacrament is rightly expressed, not as *in becoming*, but as *in being*; because this conversion is not successive, but instantaneous. The term *from which* is appropriately expressed by the demonstrative pronoun, *this*, referring to the sensible accidents that remain. And the term *to which* (My body) is appropriately expressed by a name signifying the nature of that into which the conversion is made, and that is the whole body of Christ, and not only His flesh, as was stated in q. lxxvi, art. 1 and 2. Hence this form is most appropriate: “This is My body.”

NOTE: The conjunction *for* is added in this form according to the custom of the Roman Church, derived from the Blessed Apostle Peter; and this on account of the sequence with the words preceding; and therefore it is not part of the form, just as the words preceding the form are not (Ad 5).

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS IS THE PROPER FORM FOR THE CONSECRATION OF THE WINE: ‘THIS IS THE CHALICE OF MY BLOOD . . .’

YES.—The appropriate form of the consecration of the wine does not consist only in the words: “This is the Chalice of My blood,” as some contend; but consists also in the other words up to the words “remission of sins,” and this is of the substance of the form.

THE REASON is that the words that follow, namely “of the new and eternal testament . . .” are determinations of the predicate, that is, Christ’s blood; consequently, they belong to the integrity of this expression.

(NOTE: About this question there is controversy among theologians: The affirmative is held by many noted Thomists; and the negative, also by Thomists; and among

them they dispute concerning the mind of St. Thomas, which seems to favor both opinions.—Paris)

The words that follow: "As often as you shall do this . . ." belong to the use of this sacrament; hence they are not of the substance of the form.

NOTE: 1. The words: "This is the Chalice of My blood," signify the conversion itself of the wine into the blood, in the manner stated (prev. art.), as holding in the form of the consecration of the bread; the words following designate the power of the blood that was shed in the Passion, which power operates in this sacrament, and is ordained for three purposes. First and principally for securing our eternal heritage; hence it is said: "Of the new and eternal Testament";—secondly, for justifying by grace, which is by faith; and in regard to this it is added: "The mystery of faith;"—thirdly, to remove obstacles, namely sins; and in regard to this it is added: "Which for you and for many will be shed unto the remission of sins" (in body of art.).

2. When it is said: "This is the Chalice of My blood," it is a figurative expression, and can be understood in two ways: 1) By metonymy, which consists in putting the container for the thing contained; 2) metaphorically, so that Christ's Passion is understood by the chalice by way of comparison, so that the meaning is: "This is the Chalice of My Passion" of which mention is made in the blood apart from the body consecrated; because it was by the Passion that the blood was separated from the body (Ad 1).

3. The Evangelists did not intend to hand down the forms of the sacraments, which in the primitive Church had to be kept concealed; their object was to write the story of Christ. Yet almost all these words can be gathered from different passages of Scripture. For the words: "This is the chalice," are found in Luke xxii, 20, and I Cor. xi, 25; in Matth. xxvi, 28 it is said: "This is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins." The words added, namely "eternal" and "mystery of faith," were handed down to the Church by the Apostles, who received them from Our Lord, according to I Cor. xi, 23: "I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you" (Ad 9).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN THE AFORESAID WORDS OF THE FORM THERE IS ANY CREATED POWER, WHICH CAUSES THE CONSECRATION.

YES.—In the words of the form of this sacrament there is a created power to cause the conversion of this sacrament; yet it is instrumental, as in the other sacraments.

THE REASON is that, as was said (q. lxii, art. 1, 2, and 3), just as the other deeds or words of Christ derive their saving power instrumentally from Christ Himself, so, since these words are uttered in Christ's Person, it is from His command that they receive their instrumental power from Him; and especially in this sacrament, which is nobler than the others.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE AFORESAID EXPRESSIONS ARE TRUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that these expressions have the power to cause the conversion of bread into the body of Christ, and of wine into His blood, as was said (prev. art.). Consequently, they do not have significative power only; since in the sacraments what is signified is effected. Hence by the demonstrative word "this," we are not given to understand "this bread," as if the sense were: "That which is signified by this is My body;" or that "this," namely My body, is My body; but the expression is general, namely: "This is My body," without any noun added on the part of the subject, but only a pronoun, which signifies substance in general, without quality, that is, a determinate form; so that the sense is: "This, which is contained under these species, is My body."

NOTE: On account of the infinite power of Christ, just as through contact with His flesh the regenerative power entered not only into the waters that came into contact with Christ, but into all waters throughout the world and during all future ages, so likewise from Christ's uttering these words they derived their consecrating power, by whatever priest they are uttered, as if Christ present were saying them (in body of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE FORM OF THE CONSECRATION OF THE BREAD ACCOMPLISHES ITS EFFECT BEFORE THE FORM OF THE CONSECRATION OF THE WINE IS COMPLETED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was said (art. 2 and 5 of this q.), for the truth

of the phrase: "This is My body," wherein the verb is in the present tense, it is required for the thing signified to be present simultaneously in time with the signification of the expression used; otherwise, the phrase would not be true. Hence also the Church adores the body of Christ immediately after the utterance of the words. Yet, as was said (q. lxxiii, art. 2), this sacrament is one in perfection, insofar as it is constituted of two things, namely food and drink.

QUESTION LXXIX THE EFFECTS OF THIS SACRAMENT

(in eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GRACE IS BESTOWED THROUGH THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—For four reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that in this sacrament Christ Himself, who is the Author of grace, is received. Accordingly, just as by coming visibly into the world He bestowed on the world the life of grace, according to John i, 17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," so by coming sacramentally to man He produces the life of grace, according to John vi, 58: "He who eats Me, he also shall live because of Me."

THE SECOND REASON is that by this sacrament the Passion of Christ is represented (and applied); and therefore the effect that Christ's Passion produced in the world is by this sacrament produced in man.

THE THIRD REASON is that this sacrament is transmitted by way of food and drink. Consequently every effect that material food and drink produce as regards bodily life—namely, its power to sustain, give, increase, restore, and delight—all this is produced by this sacrament with regard to spiritual life. Wherefore the Lord Himself says (John vi, 56): "My flesh is food indeed, and My blood is drink indeed."

THE FOURTH REASON is that, as the species themselves indicate, namely the species of bread, which "is made one thing out of many grains;" and the species of wine, which "from many grapes flows into one wine," this sacrament of piety is "a sign of unity" and "a bond of charity," as St. Augustine says (on John, tract. 26). Now charity cannot exist without grace.

NOTE: 1. This sacrament has of itself the power to confer grace; nor does anyone have grace before receiving this sacrament except from some desire thereof: From his own desire, as in the case of the adult; or from the Church's desire in the case of children, as stated above (q. lxxiii, art. 3). Hence it is due to the efficacy of its power that even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual life (as in Baptism). It remains, then, that when the sacrament itself is really received, grace is increased, and the spiritual life perfected; yet in different fashion from the sacrament of Confirmation, in which grace is increased and perfected for resisting the outward assaults of Christ's enemies. But by this sacrament grace receives increase, and the spiritual life is perfected, so that man may stand perfect in himself by union with God (Ad 1).

Likewise, this sacrament confers grace spiritually, together with the virtue of charity. And, because "the love of God is not idle, for it does great things wherever it is," as Gregory says in his homily on Pentecost, therefore it is that by the power of this sacrament, not only is the habit of grace and virtue conferred, but it is also excited to act, according to II Cor. v, 14: "The love of Christ impels us." Hence it is that by the power of this sacrament the soul is spiritually nourished by being spiritually gladdened, and as it were inebriated with the sweetness of the divine goodness, according to Cant. v, 1: "Eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly beloved" (Ad 2).

2. Because the sacraments operate according to the similitude by which they signify, therefore by way of assimilation it is said that in this sacrament the body is offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul, although each works for the salvation of both, since the entire Christ is under each, as stated above (q. lxxvi, art. 2). And, although the body is not the immediate subject of grace, still the effect of grace flows into the body while in the present life we present our members as "weapons of the justice of God" (Rom. vi, 13), and in the life to come our body will share in the incorruption and the glory of the soul (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ATTAINING OF GLORY IS AN EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—Both on the part of Christ Himself, who is contained in this sacrament; and

on the part of His Passion, which is represented in this sacrament; and on the part of the use of this sacrament and the unity denoted by its species.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Christ Himself, who is in this sacrament, by His Passion opened to us the gates of eternal life, as is said in Hebr. ix, 15.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the nourishment of spiritual food and the unity signified by the species of bread and wine are indeed possessed in the present, but imperfectly; they are possessed perfectly in the state of glory.

ART. 111.—WHETHER THE FORGIVENESS OF MORTAL SIN IS AN EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—a) The power of this sacrament, considered in itself, remits all sins; b) considered in correlation to the one who receives this sacrament, not only does it not produce remission of sins in the one who is conscious of mortal sin, but rather it aggravates his sins; c) but in the one who is in mortal sin, but has no consciousness of and love for sin, it does remit the sin.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that the power of this sacrament is derived from the Passion of Christ, which is the source and cause of the remission of all sins.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that he who has a consciousness of mortal sin has an obstacle to the reception of the effect of this sacrament, inasmuch as he is no fit recipient of this sacrament, both because he does not have spiritual life, and thus should not receive spiritual nourishment, which is only for the living; and because he cannot be united to Christ (which is the effect of this sacrament) while he retains an attachment for this sin. For such a person "eats and drinks judgment to himself," as the Apostle says (I Cor. xi, 28).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that perhaps at first he was not sufficiently contrite, but by devoutly and reverently approaching the sacrament he receives through it the grace of charity, which, in this case, will perfect contrition and work the remission of sin.

NOTE: This sacrament received in desire by one who was first justified from sin, as when someone who believes in Christ seeks Baptism, also remits mortal sin (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE FORGIVEN THROUGH THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—Both on the part of the sacrament itself and on the part of the effect of this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this sacrament is taken under the species of nourishing food, whose action is to restore that which is lost spiritually in us every day, namely the fervor of charity, from the heat of concupiscence through venial sins. Hence Ambrose says (*On the Sacraments*, bk. v, c. 4) that "this daily bread is taken as a remedy against daily infirmity," just as material bread is taken to restore that which is daily lost by the action of natural heat.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the effect of this sacrament is charity, not only as regards its habit, but also as regards its act, which is kindled in this sacrament; and by this means venial sins are forgiven.

ART V.—WHETHER THE ENTIRE PUNISHMENT DUE FOR SIN IS FORGIVEN THROUGH THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—a) Considered as a sacrament, which produces its effect in the one who receives it, not directly, but consequently, by a kind of concomitance with the principal effect, this sacrament produces remission of the punishment, not entirely, but according to the measure of the devotion and fervor of the recipient; b) considered as a sacrifice, this sacrament has satisfactory power according to the fervor of the offerer.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, although this sacrament was directly instituted, not for satisfaction, but for spiritual nourishment through union with Christ, yet this unity is the effect of charity, by the fervor of which a man receives the remission, not only of the sin, but also the punishment.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although this obligation suffices of its own quantity to satisfy for every punishment, yet it becomes satisfactory for them for whom it is offered, or even for the offerers, according to the measure of their devotion, and not for the whole punishment.

ART.—VI.—WHETHER MAN IS PRESERVED BY THIS SACRAMENT FROM FURTHER SINS.

YES.—By this sacrament man is preserved from future sin as from future death, and that in two ways.

THE REASON is that, just as the life of the body is preserved internally from death through food, which counteracts interior corruptive forces, and externally by means of weapons against external attacks, so by this sacrament is man preserved from spiritual death, first insofar as this sacrament is spiritual medicine and food, according to Ps. ciii, 5: "Bread strengthens man's heart;" secondly, insofar as it is a sign of Christ's Passion, whereby the demons were overcome, and their attacks repelled. Wherefore Chrysostom says (On John, hom. 45): "Like lions breathing fire, thus do we depart from that table, being made terrible to the devil."

NOTE: Although the sacrament, considered in itself, has the power to preserve one from sin, yet it does not take from man the possibility to sin, because man in the wayfaring state is of such condition that his free will can be bent to good or evil. Yet this sacrament directly strengthens man's heart in good, by which man is also preserved from sin; indirectly, and by a kind of consequence, it diminishes the fomes of concupiscence, insofar as it increases charity, because, as Augustine says (*Quaest., lib. lxxxiii, q. 36*): "The increase of charity is the lessening of concupiscence" (in responses, passim).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT BENEFITS OTHERS BESIDES THE RECIPIENTS.

YES.—a) It benefits those who receive this sacrament, both as sacrament and as sacrifice; b) those who do not receive it, it benefits as a sacrifice, insofar as it is offered for their salvation.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that this sacrament is offered for all who receive it. For it is said in the Canon of the Mass: "May as many of us as, by participation at this altar, shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son, be filled with all heavenly blessings and grace."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, according to the words of Christ Himself, His blood is shed "for you," i.e., for those who receive, "and for many," namely the others, "for the remission of sins." Hence it is also said in the Canon of the Mass: "Be mindful, O Lord, of Thy servants, men and women . . . for whom we offer, or who offer up to Thee, this sacrifice of praise for themselves and for all their own, for the redemption of their souls, for the hope of their safety and salvation."—Yet this sacrament, which is the memorial of the Lord's Passion, has its effect only in those who are united to this sacrament through faith and charity (Ad 2).

NOTE: This sacrament has the character of a sacrament insofar as it is received, and invisible grace is bestowed in it under a visible species. It has the character of a sacrifice, insofar as it is offered, and in this sacrament Christ's Passion is represented, whereby Christ "offered Himself a Victim to God" (Ephes. v, 2).—(in body of art.).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN HINDERS THE EFFECTS OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—a) Past venial sins in no way hinder the effect of this sacrament; b) venial sins in the act of being committed do not hinder the effect of this sacrament wholly, but only in part.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it can happen that someone, after committing many venial sins, devoutly approaches this sacrament, and receives in full degree the effect of this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the effect of this sacrament is not only the reception of habitual grace or charity, but also an actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness, which indeed is hindered, if one approaches this sacrament while mentally distracted by venial sins; but the increase of habitual grace or charity is not taken away.

NOTE: The habitual effect of this sacrament is an increase of grace and charity. But the actual effect is the fervor of charity, and actual sweetness, for it is a refreshment (Ad 1 and 2, passim).

QUESTION LXXX
THE USE, OR RECEIVING, OF THIS SACRAMENT IN GENERAL

(in 12 articles)

We have now to consider the use or receiving of this sacrament, and first in general; secondly, how Christ used this sacrament. With regard to the first there are 12 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE ARE TWO WAYS TO BE DISTINGUISHED OF EATING THE BODY OF CHRIST.

YES.—As perfect and as imperfect eating.

THE REASON is that this sacrament can be received with its effect, by which man is spiritually joined to Christ through faith and charity; and this is the perfect eating of this sacrament;—or it can be received without its effect, and this is imperfect eating.

NOTE: Just as the effect of the sacrament can be received by a person if he has the sacrament in desire, even if he does not receive it in fact, as we said concerning the Baptism of desire (q. lxxiii, art. 3); so also this sacrament can be eaten by someone spiritually, in desire, and not sacramentally. Nor yet is the sacramental eating in vain, because it produces more fully the effect of the sacrament than does the desire thereof, as stated above on Baptism (q. lxix, art 4).—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT BELONGS TO MAN ALONE TO EAT THIS SACRAMENT SPIRITUALLY.

YES.—As He is in this sacrament, Christ is not eaten by the angels, but only by man.

THE REASON is that in this sacrament Christ Himself is contained, not indeed in His proper species, as He is in heaven, but in the sacramental species. And therefore, although the angels eat Christ spiritually, yet it does not belong to them to eat spiritually this sacrament. This sacrament is called "the bread of angels," because it belongs first and primarily to the angels, who enjoy Him in His own species; and secondarily to men, who receive Christ under the sacrament (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONLY THE JUST MAN MAY EAT CHRIST SACRAMENTALLY.

NO.—Against those who believed that Christ's body ceases to be under the sacramental species as soon as it touches the lips of a sinner.

THE REASON is that this is incompatible with the truth of this sacrament, to which it belongs that, as long as the species remain, Christ's body does not cease to exist under them (q. lxxvi, art. 6).

(NOTE: Hence in the Office of the Venerable Sacrament it is sung: "It is received by good and bad, with unequal results, one of life, one of death. It is death to the bad, life to the good; behold how unequal is the result of the same reception."—Paris)

NOTE: 1. If anyone, receiving Christ's body, does not use that which he receives as a sacrament, but as simple food, he would not eat Him sacramentally, except on the part of That which is eaten (Ad 2).

2. Even if a mouse or a dog were to eat a consecrated host, the substance of Christ's body would not cease to be under the species as long as those species remain, that is, as long as the substance of bread remains; just as if it were to be cast into the mud. Nor does this turn to any indignity regarding Christ's body, since He willed to be crucified by sinners without detracting from His dignity; especially since the mouse or dog does not touch Christ's body in its proper species, but only as to its sacramental species (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE SINNER SINS IN RECEIVING CHRIST'S BODY SACRAMENTALLY.

YES.—Whoever receives this sacrament in mortal sin commits a lie against this sacrament; and therefore incurs sacrilege, as a violator of the sacrament, and for this reason mortally sins.

THE REASON is that, whoever receives this sacrament, by that very fact he thereby signifies that he is united with Christ and incorporated with His members; but this is done by living faith, which no one has while in mortal sin.

(NOTE: In *Sentences* iv, *dist.* 9, q. 1, art. 3, St. Thomas says: "If anyone, after

diligent, though perhaps not sufficient, examination of his conscience, approaches Christ's body, while some mortal sin remains in him, which escapes his knowledge, he does not sin, and in fact receives the remission of his sin by force of the sacrament."—Paris)

ART. V.—WHETHER TO APPROACH THIS SACRAMENT WITH CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN IS THE GRAVEST OF ALL SINS.

NO.—a) Of itself and on the part of the object, this sin is not the gravest of all; b) accidentally, and on the part of the recipient, it can be graver in one and less grave in another.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that, on the part of the object, the greater is that which is sinned against, the graver is the sin. And, because Christ's Divinity is greater than His humanity, and the humanity itself is superior to the sacraments of the humanity, hence it is that the gravest sins are those that are committed against the Divinity Itself, such as the sin of infidelity and blasphemy (and, in general, all the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues). Secondarily grave are the sins that are committed against Christ's humanity; and after these come the other sins against mere creatures.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that a sin that arises from ignorance or weakness is less grave than a sin arising from contempt, or from certain knowledge; and the same rule holds for the other circumstances.

NOTE: The sin of unbelief, which utterly separates man from the unity of the Church, simply speaking, makes him utterly unfit for receiving this sacrament, because it is the sacrament of the Church's unity, as stated above (q. lxxiii, art. 4). Hence the unbeliever who receives this sacrament sins more grievously than the believer who is in sin. In a certain sense, however, the sin of fornication renders man more unfit to receive this sacrament, insofar as this sin enslaves the spirit to the flesh, which is a hindrance to the fervor of love required for this sacrament (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PRIEST OUGHT TO DENY THE BODY OF CHRIST TO THE SINNERS WHO SEEK IT.

NO.—a) Holy Communion should not be given to notorious sinners; b) but if they are not notorious, but secret, Holy Communion cannot be denied to those who seek it.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that this is inconsistent with both the divine majesty and evangelical discipline for the Church's modesty and honor to be defiled by such shameful and infamous contagion, as St. Cyprian says (Epist. 10, bk. 1).

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that, since every Christian, by the very fact of his Baptism, is admitted to the Lord's Table, he may not be deprived of his right save for some notorious cause.—Yet a priest who knows of a sin can secretly warn a secret sinner, or even all generally in public, not to approach the Lord's Table before they repent of their sins and are reconciled to the Church.

NOTE: The body of Christ should never be given to anyone suspected of crime for the purpose of testing him, because in all such attempts there would seem to be a temptation of God; hence this cannot be done without sin. and it would seem more grievous, if in this sacrament, which was instituted as a remedy for salvation, one should incur sentence of death (Ad 3).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER NOCTURNAL POLLUTION HINDERS ANYONE FROM RECEIVING THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—According to the seriousness of the cause of pollution.

THE REASON is that, although nocturnal pollution, considered in itself, cannot be a mortal sin, nevertheless, by reason of its cause it sometimes is connected with mortal sin. Consequently, the cause of nocturnal pollution must be considered: If it is with mortal sin, it hinders Communion of necessity; and by reason of a certain decency it hinders it with regard to two things, one of which always happens, namely a certain bodily defilement, with which, on account of reverence for the sacrament, it is not fitting to approach the altar; the other is a wandering of mind, which follows nocturnal pollution, especially when it happens with impure imaginings. And, although by contrition and Confession the debt of sin be taken away, yet the bodily uncleanness, and the distraction of mind resulting from pollution, is not taken away (Ad 4).

[NOTE: It is not very often that nocturnal pollution is a grave sin. It can always

be called grave, according to Aertnys-Damen, *Theologia Moralis* I, N. 621, only when someone places a cause before going to sleep, with the deliberate hope and intention that pollution will follow. In other cases it is more or less culpable according to the frequency with which it follows from gravely immodest actions while awake. In any case, if mortal, it would generally be connected with another mortal sin.]

ART. VIII.—WHETHER FOOD OR DRINK TAKEN BEFOREHAND HINDERS THE RECEIVING OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—On account of a prohibition of the Church, and that for three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is for the honor of this sacrament, so that, namely, this sacrament may enter the mouth of man before it has been defiled by any food or drink.

THE SECOND REASON is on account of its signification, namely that it is given to understand that Christ, who is the reality of this sacrament, and its charity, must be the first to come into our hearts, according to Matth. vi, 33: "Seek first the kingdom of God."

THE THIRD REASON is on account of the danger of vomiting and intoxication, which sometimes results from the inordinate use of food, as the Apostle says (I Cor. xi, 21): "One indeed is hungry, and another is drunk." From this general rule are excepted the sick who must communicate forthwith, even after food, if there is doubt as to their danger whether they will die without Communion, for necessity knows no law.

NOTE: 1.—The Lord gave this sacrament last to His disciples, after the Supper, in order to impress on them more deeply the profundity of this mystery. He did not, however, command in what order it should afterwards be received, so as to reserve this manner to the Apostles, by whom the Church was to be ruled, as Augustine says (Epist. 54, al. 118, cap. 6).—(Ad 1).

2. The fast that is required for this sacrament on account of the foregoing is a natural fast, which means the privation of anything previously taken by way of food or drink (Ad 4), from the beginning of the day on which it is taken, which, according to the Roman Church, begins with midnight (Ad 5).—The remnants of food remaining in the mouth, if swallowed accidentally, do not hinder the reception of this sacrament, because they are not swallowed by way of food, but by way of saliva, and the same holds good for the remains of water or wine with which the mouth is rinsed, provided they are not swallowed in large quantity, but mixed with the saliva, a thing impossible to avoid (Ad 4).—There ought to be some interval between the reception of this sacrament and taking other food (at least until the species are consumed).—(Ad 6).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THOSE WHO HAVE NOT THE USE OF REASON OUGHT TO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—a) It should not be denied to those who have some slight use of reason; b) to those who have no use of reason at all, and never did have, this sacrament is not to be given; c) if previously, when they were of sound mind, a devotion to this sacrament appeared in them, this sacrament should be given them at the point of death, unless perhaps a danger of vomiting or spitting out the sacrament is feared.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such people can conceive some devotion for this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in such persons there could be no present or past devotion to this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that this devotion of theirs is considered as their final disposition, as we said above concerning those who receive Baptism (q. lxxviii, art. 12).

ART. X.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT DAILY.

YES.—Both on the part of the sacrament itself and on the part of the one who receives it, if he is properly prepared.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the power of this sacrament is salutary to men, and therefore it is useful to receive it every day, that man may daily enjoy its fruit. Hence Ambrose says (On the Sacraments, bk. iv, chap. 6): "If, whenever Christ's blood is shed, it is shed for the forgiveness of sins, I who sin often should receive it often: I need a frequent remedy."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on the part of the one who receives it

it is required that he approach this with great devotion and reverence. Consequently, if anyone finds himself daily prepared for this, he commendably receives it daily. Wherefore Augustine, when he said: "Receive daily, that it may benefit you daily," added: "So live that every day you may deserve to receive it." But, because many times in many men there are many obstacles to this devotion, on account of indisposition of body or soul, it is not expedient for all men daily to approach this sacrament, but as often as a man comes prepared to it.

NOTE: Reverence for this sacrament has connected with it a fear united with love: Love excites a desire to receive, fear gives rise to the humility of reverence. And therefore both acts pertain to the reverence of this sacrament, to wit, that it is daily received and that it is sometimes abstained from. Yet love and hope, to which always the Scriptures call us, outrank fear. Hence when Peter said: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord," Jesus answered: "Fear not" (Ad 3).—By receiving the sacrament once a day one represents the unity of Christ's Passion (Ad 4).

ART. XI.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO ABSTAIN ALTOGETHER FROM COMMUNION.

NO.—Not only because of a law of the Church, but because of the commandment of the Lord, who said (Luke xxii, 19): "Do this in remembrance of Me," man is bound to receive this sacrament.

THE REASON is that without a desire to receive this sacrament no one can be incorporated with Christ, according to John vi, 54: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you," as was stated above (q. lxxiii, art. 3). Now a desire were vain unless it were fulfilled when opportunity presented.

ART. XII.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL TO RECEIVE THE BODY OF CHRIST WITHOUT THE BLOOD.

YES.—a) The priest may in no wise receive Christ's body without the blood; b) in certain churches it is a prudent custom that the blood should not be given to the people. (In St. Thomas' time there was still the custom in some churches of receiving the Eucharist under both species.)

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is the duty of the priest to consecrate and perfect this sacrament; now for the perfection of this sacrament it is required that both be taken, namely the body and the blood.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the reception of the blood the blood may easily be spilled, especially if it is administered to the old and the very young, some of whom have not enough discretion to observe due caution in the use of this sacrament.

NOTE: The perfection of this sacrament does not lie in the use of the faithful, but in the consecration of the matter. And hence there is nothing derogatory in the perfection of this sacrament; if the people receive the body without the blood, provided that the priest who consecrates receives both (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXXI

THE USE WHICH CHRIST MADE OF THIS SACRAMENT AT ITS INSTITUTION

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST RECEIVED HIS OWN BODY AND BLOOD.

YES.—He was the first to receive His body and blood, and afterwards He gave them to His disciples.

THE REASON is that Christ, in instituting what was to be observed by others, Himself observed them first. Whence He willed that He Himself should be baptized before imposing Baptism on others, according to Acts i, 1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." Wherefore when He said to the disciples: "Take and eat," and again: "Take and drink," it should be understood that He Himself ate and drank when He received.

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST GAVE HIS BODY TO JUDAS.

YES.—THE REASON is that Christ was to be an example of justice for us; and therefore it did not befit His teaching office to sever Judas, a hidden sinner, from Com-

munion with the others without an accuser and evident proof; lest the Church's prelates might have an example for doing the like, and lest Judas himself, being exasperated, might take occasion to sin.—Yet without doubt Judas did not receive Christ's body in the dipped bread, but received simple bread. For, as Augustine says (On John, tract. lxxii), the Lord had already distributed the sacrament of His body and blood to all the disciples, among whom was Judas also, as Luke narrates; and after that we come to this, where, according to the relation of John, Our Lord, by dipping and handing the morsel, declared His betrayer (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER CHRIST RECEIVED AND GAVE TO THE DISCIPLES HIS IMPASSIBLE BODY.

NO.—a) The body itself that Christ gave then to His disciples was passible; b) but insofar as it was under the sacramental species it was impassible.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the same true body of Christ was what was seen by the disciples then in His proper species, and was taken in the sacramental species. Now it was not impassible according as it was seen in its proper species, and in fact was being made ready for the Passion. Hence neither was the body of Christ itself, which was being given in the sacramental species, impassible.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, the body of Christ, insofar as it is under the sacrament, as was stated (q. lxxvi, art. 4, 5, and 6), is not compared to the surroundings through the medium of its own dimensions, by which bodies touch one another, but through the medium of the dimensions of the species of bread and wine; and therefore it is those species that are passible and visible, but not the body itself of Christ.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IF THIS SACRAMENT HAD BEEN RESERVED OR CONSECRATED AT THE TIME OF CHRIST'S DEATH CHRIST HIMSELF WOULD HAVE DIED THERE

YES.—Because, since the body of Christ is the same in substance in this sacrament, and in its proper species, hence it is that whatever pertains to Christ as He is in Himself can be attributed to Him, both in His proper species and as He exists in the sacrament, such as living, dying, feeling pain, being animate or inanimate, and the like.—Hence if this sacrament had then been consecrated or perfected, when the soul was really severed from the body, the soul of Christ would not have been under this sacrament (Ad 3).

NOTE: Suffering belongs to a body that suffers, not as it is a body, but in relation to some intrinsic agent. Consequently, Christ, as in this sacrament, cannot suffer; yet He can die (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXII THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (in 10 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CONSECRATION OF THIS SACRAMENT BELONGS TO THE PRIEST ALONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that whoever does anything in the person of another ought to do this by the power granted by that other. Now this sacrament, of such dignity, is performed only in the Person of Christ, as was said (q. lxxviii, art. 1 and 4). Consequently it belongs only to priests to perform this sacrament, who at Ordination are put on the level of them to whom it was said by Our Lord (Luke xxii, 19): "Do this in remembrance of Me."

NOTE: The Bishop receives power to act on Christ's behalf upon His Mystical Body, that is, upon the Church; but the priest receives no such power in his consecration, although he may have it by commission from the Bishop. Consequently all such things as do not belong to the Mystical Body are not reserved to the Bishop, such as the consecration of this sacrament. But it belongs to the Bishop to deliver, not only to the people, but likewise to the priests, such things as serve them in the fulfillment of their respective duties. And, because the blessing of the chrism, and of the holy oil, and of the oil of the sick, and other consecrated things, such as altars, churches, vestments, and sacred vessels, makes such things fit for use in performing the sacraments, which belong to the priestly office, therefore such consecrations are reserved to the Bishop as the head of the whole ecclesiastical order (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER SEVERAL PRIESTS CAN CONSECRATE ONE AND THE SAME HOST.

YES.—Provided they utter the same words at the same time, and the intention of all is directed to the same instant of Consecration.

THE REASON is that, just as the Apostles supped together with Christ, as He supped; so newly ordained priests celebrate together with the ordaining Bishop; for the priest consecrates only in Christ's Person, and therefore many are one in Christ. Consequently, it makes no difference whether this sacrament is consecrated by many or one, except that the rite of the Church must be observed (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DISPENSING OF THIS SACRAMENT BELONGS TO A PRIEST ALONE.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that Christ Himself, just as He consecrated His body in the Supper, so also gave it to the others to receive. Wherefore, just as the consecration of Christ's body belongs to the priest, so does its dispensation belong to him.

THE SECOND REASON is that a priest is made a mediary between God and the people; wherefore, just as it belongs to him to offer the gifts of the people to God, so it belongs to him to deliver what has been sanctified by God to the people.

THE THIRD REASON is that for the reverence owed to this sacrament it is not touched by anything that is not consecrated; wherefore both the corporal and chalice, and likewise the hands of the priest, are consecrated in order to touch this sacrament; wherefore nothing else is allowed to touch it, save in case of necessity, e. g., if it should fall to the floor, or in some other case of necessity.

NOTE: The deacon may dispense the blood, which, being contained in a vessel, does not need to be touched, but not the body, save in necessity. Moreover, because deacons are between priest and people, the dispensing of the blood is in the competency of deacons, rather than the dispensing of the body (Ad 1, *passim*).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CONSECRATING PRIEST IS BOUND TO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice (q. lxxix, art. 5 and 7). Now whoever offers a sacrifice must become a partaker of the sacrifice, because the external sacrifice that is offered is a sign of the interior sacrifice, whereby one offers himself to God. Now by this fact of partaking of the sacrifice one has a share in it, according to I Cor. x, 18: "Are not they who eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" And therefore it is necessary that the priest, whenever he consecrates, receive this sacrament in its integrity.

NOTE 1: Hence a priest would gravely sin if he should reserve the one host in his Mass for a procession, and receive an old one, for then he would not complete the sacrifice in its integrity.—Paris)

NOTE 2: If Christ's body appears miraculously upon the altar under the guise of flesh, or the blood under the guise of blood, it is not to be received. Nor does the priest transgress on that account, for miraculous events are not subject to human laws. Nevertheless, the priest would be well advised to consecrate again and receive the Lord's body and blood (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER A WICKED PRIEST CAN CONSECRATE THE EUCHARIST.

YES.—THE REASON is that the priest consecrates this sacrament, not by his own power, but as the minister of Christ, in whose Person he consecrates this sacrament. But not by the fact that he is wicked does he cease to be a minister of Christ. And this pertains to the excellence of Christ, who, as true God, is served not only by the good but also by the bad, which are directed by His providence to His glory.—Hence the blessing of a sinful priest, insofar as it is done by him unworthily, is worthy of cursing, and is reputed as an infamy, or blasphemy, and not a prayer; but, inasmuch as it is pronounced in the Person of Christ, it is holy and efficacious. Hence it is said significantly: "I will curse your blessings" (I King xxv, 27).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE MASS OF A SINFUL PRIEST IS LESS WORTHY THAN THE MASS OF A GOOD PRIEST.

YES.—Insofar as the prayers that are said in Mass have efficacy from the devotion

of the priest who prays, but not on the part of the sacrament itself, or insofar as prayer is offered by the priest in the person of the Church.

THE REASON is that, with regard to the sacrament itself, the priest, whether good or bad, performs the same sacrament. Now prayers that are said by a sinful priest in the name of the Church are of no less avail, for the ministry remains even in sinners (prev. art.). But the devotion of the priest himself makes the Mass of a better priest more fruitful, as is evident.

ART. VII.—WHETHER HERETICS, SCHISMATICS, AND EXCOMMUNICATED PRIESTS CAN CONSECRATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the consecration of the Eucharist is an act resulting from the power of Order. And therefore those priests who are separated from the Church by heresy or schism or excommunication can indeed consecrate the Eucharist, which on being consecrated by them contains Christ's true body and blood. But they act wrongly, and sin by doing so; wherefore they do not receive the fruit of the sacrifice, which is a spiritual sacrifice.

(NOTE: If a priest celebrates while cut off from the unity of the Church, he consecrates Christ's true body and blood, because he does not lose the power of Order; but, because he is separated from the unity of the Church, his prayers have no efficacy (Ad 3).)

ART. VIII.—WHETHER A DEGRADED PRIEST CAN CONSECRATE THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the power of consecrating the Eucharist belongs to the character of the priestly Order, which, since it is indelible, is not lost by degradation. —Yet the one degraded loses the exercise of the power, as though condemned in perpetuity (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO RECEIVE COMMUNION FROM HERETICAL, EXCOMMUNICATE, OR SINFUL PRIESTS, AND TO HEAR MASS SAID BY THEM.

NO.—THE REASON is that whoever communicates with another who is in sin shares in his sin. Now heretical, etc., priests, who are declared such by sentence of the Church, do not rightly use the power of consecrating the Eucharist, but sin in so using it. And therefore it is not lawful to receive Communion from them and to hear their Masses.—With regard to sinful priests, it is lawful to receive Communion from them, and to hear their Masses, until the sentence of the Church; for, although they are suspended as regards themselves by divine sentence, yet they are not suspended with regard to others by the sentence of the Church; unless their sin is notorious and is impossible to conceal by any subterfuge (Ad 3).

ART. X.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A PRIEST TO REFRAIN ENTIRELY FROM CONSECRATING THE EUCHARIST.

NO.—It is not lawful for a priest, even though he has not the care of souls, to refrain altogether from celebrating Mass; but it would seem that he is at least bound to celebrate on the principal feasts, and especially on those days on which the faithful are wont to communicate.

THE REASON is that everyone is bound to use the grace given to him at opportunity, according to II Cor. vi, 1: "We exhort you that you receive not the grace of God in vain." Now the opportunity to offer the sacrifice is considered not merely in relation to the faithful of Christ, to whom the sacraments must be administered, but chiefly with regard to God, to whom the sacrifice of this sacrament is offered by consecrating.

QUESTION LXXXIII THE RITE OF THIS SACRAMENT

(In six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST IS SACRIFICED IN THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—a) Both if this sacrament is considered as an image representative of Christ's Passion b) and as regards the effect of Christ's Passion, of which we are made sharers in the celebration of this sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as Augustine says (*Ad Simplicianum*, lib. ii, q. 3): "The images of things are called by the names whereof they are images." Now the celebration of this sacrament, as was stated above (q. lxxix, art. 1), is an image representative of Christ's Passion, which is the true sacrifice of Himself. Therefore the celebration of this sacrament is called the sacrifice of Christ; and in this way it could be said that Christ is sacrificed, even in the figures of the Old Testament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that this sacrament makes us sharers of the Lord's Passion, and in this way it belongs to this sacrament alone that Christ should be sacrificed in its celebration. Hence, as Ambrose says (on Hebr. x, 1): "One is the Victim," which Christ offered, and we offer, "and not many, because Christ was offered up once for all." Now this latter sacrifice is the pattern of the former (Ad 1).

NOTE: As the celebration of the sacrament is an image representing Christ's Passion, so the altar represents His Cross, on which Christ was sacrificed in His own species (Ad 2). Likewise, for the same reason, the priest also bears Christ's image, in whose Person and by whose power he pronounces the words of consecration. And thus in a measure the priest and victim are one and the same.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE TIME FOR CELEBRATING THIS MYSTERY HAS BEEN PROPERLY DETERMINED.

YES.—a) By the daily celebration of this sacrament, and b) by its solemn celebration from the third to the ninth hour.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that we daily need the fruit of Our Lord's Passion on account of daily defects. Hence in the Church this sacrament is offered daily according to rule. Hence the Lord teaches us to pray (Luke xi, 3): "Give us this day our daily bread."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the Lord's Passion is celebrated from the third to the ninth hour. Hence this sacrament is regularly celebrated in the Church in that part of the day.

NOTE: At Passion-tide Christ's Passion is recalled inasmuch as it was wrought in Him who is our Head. This took place but once; whereas the faithful receive daily the fruits of His Passion: Consequently, the former is commemorated but once in the year, whereas the latter takes place every day, both that we may partake of its fruit and in order that we may have a perpetual memorial (Ad 1). On the day on which the Lord's Passion is recalled as it was really accomplished, this sacrament is not consecrated, as being a figure of the Lord's Passion, for when the truth comes the figure ceases.—Lest the Church should on that day be left without fruit of the Passion offered to us by this sacrament, Christ's body, consecrated on the previous day, is reserved to be received on this day; but not the blood, on account of danger, and because the blood is more specially the image of Our Lord's Passion.—On Christmas day plural Masses are celebrated, on account of the threefold birth of Christ. One of these is eternal; the second is temporal but spiritual, wherein Christ arises, "as the day-star in our hearts" (II Pet., i, 19); the third is Christ's temporal and bodily nativity (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE CELEBRATED IN A HOUSE AND WITH SACRED VESSELS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, both on account of the reverence for this sacrament and to represent the effect of the sanctity that flows from Christ's Passion, consecrations are appropriately applied to the things that surround this sacrament.—Now the house in which this sacrament is celebrated signifies the Church, and is called a church.—The altar signifies Christ Himself, of whom the Apostle says (Heb. xiii, 15): "Through Him we offer a sacrifice of praise to God." Hence the consecration of the altar signifies the holiness of Christ. For this reason a church is never consecrated without an altar. Yet an altar is sometimes consecrated without a church, together with the relics of the saints, whose lives are hidden with Christ in God (Coloss. iii, 3). (Ad 2).—Now the church, altar, and other such inanimate objects are consecrated, not because they are capable of receiving grace, but because they acquire special spiritual virtue from the consecration, whereby they are rendered fit for the divine worship, so that man derives devotion therefrom, and thus is made more fit for divine functions, unless this be hindered by want of reverence (Ad 3).

NOTE: Since the consecration of the altar signifies Christ's holiness, and the consecration of a house, the holiness of the entire Church, therefore the solemnity of a

church dedication is observed for eight days, in order to signify the happy resurrection of Christ and of the Church's members (Ad 4).—Altars, if not of stone, are not to be consecrated with the anointing of chrism, because the altar signifies Christ, according to I Cor. x, 3: "But the rock was Christ;" also because Christ's body was laid in a stone tomb (Ad 5).—The chalice is not made of wood, on account of its being porous; or of glass, on account of fragility; but of pure gold, or silver (for the sake of reverence and security).—(Ad 6).—The corporal is made of linen cloth, in which Christ's body was wrapped, on account of its cleanness, to signify purity of conscience (Ad 7).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WORDS SPOKEN IN THIS SACRAMENT ARE PROPERLY FRAMED.

YES.—THE REASON is that whatever is done in the Mass touching the sacrament of the Eucharist was instituted for a weighty reason.—Since it would take too long to detail the reasons for all the particular parts of the Mass that the Holy Doctor minutely expounds in this article, the reader is referred to the original text of the *Summa*.)

ART. V.—WHETHER THE THINGS THAT ARE DONE IN THE CELEBRATION OF THIS SACRAMENT ARE APPROPRIATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that all the ceremonials in this sacrament were instituted for a certain reason, viz., to represent Christ's Passion (as when in the Mass the priest makes signs of the cross with the words, "bless, ratify, accept," etc.); or to increase devotion and reverence (as in the washing of the hands, in the incensing, in the joining of the thumb and forefinger after the Consecration, with which the priest had touched Christ's consecrated body, and the like).—(For more detailed reasons, see the principal text.)

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE DEFECTS OCCURRING DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THIS SACRAMENT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY MET BY OBSERVING THE CHURCH'S STATUTES.

YES.—THE REASON is that certain defects occurring in the celebration of this sacrament can be prevented; others that follow can be corrected, either by applying a remedy or at least by repentance for what the priest has done negligently in this sacrament.—For the particular defects, see the original text of the *Summa*.)

QUESTION LXXXIV THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

We must now consider the sacrament of Penance; 1) Penance itself; 2) its effect; 3) its parts; 4) the recipients of this sacrament; 5) the power of the ministers, which pertains to the keys; 6) the solemnization of this sacrament. The first of these considerations will be twofold: 1) Penance as a sacrament; 2) Penance as a virtue. Under the first head there are 10 points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER PENANCE IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that in Penance something is done so that something holy is signified both on the part of the penitent sinner and on the part of the absolving priest, because the penitent sinner, by deed and word, shows his heart to have renounced sin, and in like manner the priest, by his deed and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work of God who forgives his sins. "A sacrament," says Gregory (in Isidore's *Etymologies*, bk. V), "consists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that we understand it to signify the holiness that it confers." Hence Penance, as practiced in the Church, is a sacrament.

NOTE: 1. By corporeal things, taken in a wide sense, we may understand also external sensible actions, which are to this sacrament what water is to Baptism. For, in those sacraments that have an effect corresponding to that of some human act, the sensible human act itself takes the place of matter, as in the case of Penance and Matrimony, even as in bodily medicines some are applied externally, such as plasters and drugs, whereas others are acts of the person who seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises (Ad 1).

2. The sacrament-only in Penance is the acts performed outwardly, both by the repentant sinner and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is effect-and-sacrament

is the sinner's inward repentance; that which is effect-and-not-sacrament is the forgiveness of sin. The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second, and the first and second together are the cause of the third (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER SINS ARE THE PROPER MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as has been stated (prev. art.), the matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent. Now the matter of these acts is the sins for which the penitent grieves and which he confesses, and for which he makes satisfaction. Hence it is left that the remote matter of Penance is sins, not for approval but for detestation and destruction. (The proximate matter is the acts of the penitent, proceeding from an internal inspiration; consequently the matter is applied by God Himself working interiorly; the sacrament is completed by the minister when he absolves the penitent).—(cf. Ad 2, prev. art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT IS 'I ABSOLVE THEE.'

YES.—It is a most appropriate form.

THE REASON is that, since the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify, it follows that the form of the sacrament signifies that which is done in the sacrament proportionately to the matter of the sacrament. Now this sacrament of Penance consists in the removal of a certain matter, namely sin, insofar as sins are said to be the matter of Penance, as appears from the foregoing (prev. art.). Now such a removal is signified by the priest when he says: "I absolve thee." For sins are like bonds (Prov. v, 22). Hence it is evident that this is the most appropriate form of this sacrament: "I absolve thee."

NOTE: In this sacrament the priest says: "I absolve thee," rather than: "I forgive thee thy sins," because this better befits the words that the Lord spoke to Peter, when He gave him the power of the keys, by which priests absolve. Because, however, the priest absolves as the minister, something is appropriately added that belongs to the primary authority of God, so that it is said: "I absolve thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," or by the power of Christ's Passion, or by the authority of God. Because, however, this is not determined by the words of Christ, as in Baptism, such an addition is left to the discretion of the priest (consistently with the custom of the Church).

NOTE: The words: "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," are not essential to the sacramental form; some, however, think that this would be a grave omission. But St. Alphonsus and others, according to the common opinion, say that it is venial.—Paris.

ART. IV. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF THE HANDS OF THE PRIEST IS REQUIRED FOR THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the sacrament of Penance is not ordered to obtain any excellence of grace, as is Confirmation or Order, but to remove sins; consequently this sacrament does not require the imposition of hands, as this is also not required for Baptism, in which, however, a fuller remission of sins is made. Wherefore, just as in the Eucharist the priest perfects the sacrament by the utterance of the words alone over the matter, so also do the words alone of the priest who absolves the penitent perfect the sacrament of Absolution. And, if any bodily act is on the part of the priest, this is not essential to the sacrament, as it is not essential to the Eucharist (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO SALVATION.

YES.—Not absolutely, but by supposition.

THE REASON is that the sacrament of Penance is necessary, not to all, but to those in sin. For it is necessary for the salvation of the sinner that his sin be removed from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of Penance, in which the power of Christ's Passion works through the absolution of the priest, together with the act of the penitent.

NOTE: As soon as a man falls into sin, charity, faith, and mercy do not deliver

him from sin without Penance. For charity demands that a man should grieve for the offense committed against his friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his friend; faith requires that he should seek to be justified from his sins through the power of Christ's Passion, which operates in the sacraments of the Church; and well-ordered pity makes it necessary that man succor himself by repenting of the miserable condition into which sin has brought him, according to Prov. xiv. 34: "Sin maketh nations miserable;" wherefore Ecclus. xxx, 24: "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER PENANCE IS A SECOND PLANK AFTER SHIPWRECK.

YES.—Penance takes second place with respect to the state of integrity that is conferred and preserved by the other sacraments, namely by Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist.

THE REASON is that Penance is ordained for the salvation of man, not of itself, as the other sacraments above treated, but accidentally, and by supposition of sin.—Consequently, just as the first recourse for those crossing the sea is to keep themselves safe in a sound ship; so, after the shipwreck, the second recourse is for someone to cling to a plank (and this is the second plank). Thus also the first recourse on the sea of this life is for man to preserve his soundness of soul; the second recourse, if he loses that soundness by sin, is to return to it by Penance.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT WAS SUITABLY INSTITUTED IN THE NEW LAW.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the Lord determined the kinds of acts necessary for this sacrament. For, though it is of the natural law that anyone should repent of the evil he has done, Penance received its determination by the establishment of a divine law, according as it befits the imperfection of the Old Law and the perfection of the New Law. Hence also Penance was determined in the Old Law, insofar as in some way the Jews confessed their sins to the ministers of God, at least in general, by making an offering for their sins (Prov. xxviii, 13). In the New Law Penance received its determination under the power of the keys, which is derived from Christ's Passion (in body of art. and Ad 2).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER PENANCE SHOULD LAST TILL THE END OF LIFE.

YES.—a) Interior Penance should last till the end of life; b) but exterior Penance should not last till the end of life, but until a determinate time, according to the measure of the sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that interior Penance is that whereby one grieves for sin committed: Now man ought always to be displeased that he has sinned; for if he took pleasure in having sinned, he would commit sin by that very fact, and lose the fruit of pardon.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that exterior Penance is that whereby man shows external signs of sorrow and verbally confesses his sins to the priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction according to the priest's decision.

ART. IX.—WHETHER PENANCE CAN BE CONTINUOUS.

YES.—In habit.

THE REASON is that it is impossible for man to be in the continual act of repentance, because it is necessary for the penitent's acts to be interrupted, at least by sleep. But in habit a man ought to be continually repentant, both in the sense that he never does anything contrary to repentance, by which the habitual disposition of the penitent would be taken away, and in the sense that man should resolve that his past sins should be forever displeasing to him.

NOTE: The sorrow that arises in the penitent's sensitive appetite from the displeasure of his will is a passion; wherefore it should be moderated according to virtue, and if it is excessive it is sinful, because it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches: "Lest such a one be swallowed up by too much sorrow" (II Cor. ii, 7).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE MAY BE REPEATED.

YES.—Contrary to those who say that charity, once had by first repentance, i. e., by Baptism, can never be lost; and contrary to those who thought that the sin one commits after Baptism is so grave that it is impossible to be forgiven.

THE REASON is that charity can be lost on account of our freedom to sin; and, once lost, it can be obtained again by impetration from the infinite mercy of God, which is greater than any number and magnitude of sins. Hence the words of Cain were blameable when he said (Gen. iv, 13): "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Hence it is said in Matth. xviii, 21, when Peter asked: "How often shall my brother offend against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?" Jesus answered: "I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy times seven times." Therefore also God over and over again, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially when He teaches us to pray (Matth. vi, 12): "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us" (in body of art. and in the ad Contra).—"For physicians," says Augustine (On Penance), "would heal a patient, if necessary, a hundred times one hundred times" (Ad 3). For "it is evident that sin displeases God exceedingly, for He is always ready to destroy them, lest what He created should perish, and what He loved should be lost," i.e., by despair (Ad 6).

**QUESTION LXXXV
PENANCE AS A VIRTUE**

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PENANCE IS A VIRTUE.

YES.—Insofar as the sorrow or sadness for sin consists in the will, but not as a passion.

THE REASON is that, insofar as sorrow consists in the will, it implies choice, and if it be right it must necessarily be an act of virtue. Now this rectitude is had when the penitent assumes a moderated grief for past sins, with the intention of removing them.—Sorrow or sadness insofar as it is a passion of the sensitive appetite, is not a virtue, but a passion.

NOTE: In the sacrament of Penance human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, Penance, rather than the other sacraments, is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER PENANCE IS A SPECIAL VIRTUE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that in Penance is found a special reason for a praiseworthy act, namely because it aims at the destruction of past sin insofar as it is an offense to God, which does not apply to any other virtue. Hence we must conclude that Penance is a special virtue.

NOTE: If in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity (and this virtue is Penance.—Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE IS A SPECIES OF JUSTICE.

YES.—It is a part of potential justice.

THE REASON is that the correction of an offense committed against someone, which correction the penitent intends, is not effected solely by ceasing from the offense; but there is demanded in addition a certain recompense, which has place in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does. The only thing is that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Hence it is clear that Penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice, i.e., a potential part, since it is reducible to justice as the imperfect to the perfect (Cf. II-III, q. xlviii).

NOTE: 1. The just that is had in Penance is not the just simply, i.e., between equals, but dependently, i.e., as it exists between those of whom one is under the power of the

other. Hence in such matters he who is in the other's debt must do what he can. Yet this were insufficient simply, and sufficient only by the acceptance of the superior; this inequality is signified by the excess that is attributed to Penance, according to Jeremias vi, 26: "Make the mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation" (Ad 2).

2. Although Penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for, inasmuch as there is a justice of man toward God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues, and the other cardinal virtues (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE WILL IS PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF PENANCE.

YES.—Penance, insofar as it is a virtue, is in the will as its subject.

THE REASON is that Penance, as a virtue, is a species of justice (prec. art.).

Now justice has for its subject the appetite of the reason, which is the will (I-II, q. lvi, art. 6). Hence Penance, as a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending that which was committed against God.—As a passion, however, Penance is in the concupiscible appetite as its subject.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF PENANCE ARISES FROM FEAR.

YES.—a) Penance as a habit arises from God; b) Penance as an act, insofar as it is the first movement of the appetite directed to Penance, is servile fear; whereas the proper and immediate principle of the act of Penance is filial fear.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that Penance as a habit is immediately infused by God without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments that servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which belongs to charity (Ad 1).—The act of Penance proceeds thus: The first principle is the action of God converting the heart, according to Lament v, 21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted;" the second act is a movement of faith; the third is a movement of servile fear, whereby one is withdrawn from sins by the fear of punishment; the fourth act is a movement of hope, whereby one makes a purpose of amendment, with the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth act is a movement of charity, whereby sin displeases the sinner for its own sake, and no longer for the sake of punishment; the sixth act is a movement of filial fear, whereby one voluntarily offers to make amends to God through fear of Him (in body of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER PENANCE IS THE FIRST OF THE VIRTUES.

NO.—a) Penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time or in the order of nature; b) but in a certain respect and in the order of time it is the first of the moral virtues.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that some praiseworthy acts can precede in time the act and habit of Penance, such as the acts of dead faith and hope, and the act of servile fear; whereas the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of Penance. Yet of these two acts the first naturally precedes the second; for the act of the virtue of Penance is against sin from the love of God; hence the first act is the cause and principle of the second.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the justification of the ungodly there take place at the same time a movement of the free will to God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the free will against sin, which is an act of Penance. Hence the act of Penance first occurs in the justification of the ungodly. And in this way Penance is the first virtue among the other moral virtues in the order of time. But in the order of nature the other virtues seem to take precedence, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; for the other virtues seem of themselves to be necessary for the good of man; whereas Penance is necessary only if something be presupposed, namely pre-existing sin.

QUESTION LXXXVI

THE EFFECT OF PENANCE AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN

Here we consider the effects of Penance: 1) Regarding the remission of mortal sins; 2) regarding the remission of venial sins; 3) regarding the return of sins that have been pardoned; 4) regarding the recovery of the virtues. About the first there will be six articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL SINS ARE TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE.

YES.—Both on the part of the wayfaring penitent and on the part of Penance itself.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the appetite of wayfaring man is not confirmed in sin, as is the case with the damned; but his free will can be turned to good or evil, and therefore can be converted by God's grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it would be erroneous to say that any sin cannot be forgiven by true Penance, for God would in a way be bested by man if man wanted a sin blotted out, and God did not. Hence it is said in *Ezech. xviii, 22*: "I will not remember all the iniquities that he hath done." Likewise, this would be derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance produces its effects, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (*I John ii, 2*): "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world."

NOTE: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Spirit (*Matth. xii, 32*) is final impenitence, as Augustine states (*Book on the Lord's Words, Sermon xi, c. 12*), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended there is no pardon of sins. Or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Spirit is unpardonable, i.e., not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the Second Part (II-II, q. xiv).—(Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER SIN CAN BE PARDONED WITHOUT PENANCE.

NO.—It is impossible for actual mortal sin to be pardoned without Penance, speaking of Penance as a virtue.

THE REASON is that the offense of mortal sin proceeds from the fact that man's will is turned from God by being turned to some mutable good. Hence it is necessary for the remission of the offense against God that man's will be changed, so as to turn to God with a detestation of the fact of its formerly being turned to creatures, and a purpose of amendment. This pertains to Penance as it is a virtue. And, because God is the cause of all created good, God cannot remit sin without effecting the conversion of the penitent.

ART. III.—WHETHER BY PENANCE ONE SIN CAN BE PARDONED WITHOUT ANOTHER.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that no sin can be pardoned without grace; now every mortal sin is opposed to grace, and excludes it. Hence it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another.

THE SECOND REASON is that no one can be truly penitent who repents of one sin, and not of another. For if that sin displeased him because it is against God, who is supremely lovable (as is necessary for true Penance), it would follow that he repents of all his sins.

THE THIRD REASON is that, on the part of God, it would be against the perfection of the divine mercy if He should not wholly have mercy on one whom He does have mercy.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DEBT. OF PUNISHMENT REMAINS AFTER THE GUILT HAS BEEN FORGIVEN THROUGH PENANCE.

YES.—The debt of eternal punishment does not remain; yet the debt of some temporal punishment can remain.

THE REASON is that the debt of eternal punishment follows (grave) sin, insofar as sin denotes a turning away from the Immutable Good: For it is just that he who has sinned against his Eternal Good should be punished eternally. Hence when sin is wiped

away by grace, the debt of eternal punishment is also taken away.—But temporal, and not eternal, punishment is due for the turning to a mutable good that also takes place in sin, since this good is finite; for it is just that he who indulged his will more than he ought should suffer something against his will; for this will be equality. Hence Apoc. xviii, 7 says: "As much as she has glorified herself, and lived in wantonness, so much torment and mourning give to her."

NOTE: 1. In venial sin there is no turning away from God, but only an inordinate turning to creatures; and therefore venial sin is not punished by eternal, but by temporal, punishment (in body of art.).

2. The turning away from God in mortal sin is the formal element, the turning to creatures is the material element (Ad 1). The first is taken away by operating grace; the second, by co-operating grace (Ad 2); and the debt of all the punishment is paid when all the acts of Penance are completed, which are in the matter of Penance as water is in Baptism, as was stated (q. lxxxiv, art. 1 and 3).—(Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE REMNANTS OF SIN ARE REMOVED WHEN A MORTAL SIN IS FORGIVEN.

NO.—Nothing prevents the dispositions caused by the preceding acts from remaining after the sin is forgiven. Yet they remain in a weakened and diminished form, so that they do not dominate man, and this more after the manner of dispositions than of habits, just as the *fomes* also remains after Baptism.

THE REASON is that, when that which is on the part of the turning away from God is removed by grace, there may nevertheless remain that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to creatures; for inordinate turning to creatures can remain without a turning from God, just as when the formal element of sin is removed the material element may remain, as was said in the previous article.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS IS AN EFFECT OF PENANCE.

YES.—The forgiveness of sins is an effect of Penance as it is a virtue, yet it is more of an effect as it is a sacrament.

THE REASON is that Penance as a sacrament, namely on the part of the minister, who applies the power of the keys, is as the form; but the acts of the penitent, which proceed from the virtue of Penance, stand in relation to the keys of the Church as the matter. Now form is superior to matter, although one sacrament is the effect of both (q. lx, art. 6).

NOTE: To the objection that the pardon of sin can come from God without the sacrament of Penance, though not without Penance as it is a virtue, be it said that from this it can be concluded only that grace is the cause of the remission of sin more than is the sacrament of Penance (reply to objections).

QUESTIONS LXXXVII THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE FORGIVEN WITHOUT PENANCE.

NO.—Since both sins, mortal and venial, disorder man's will by immoderate turning to created good, so both sins ought to be pardoned by Penance, yet in different ways.

THE REASON is that by mortal sin the mind (on account of being turned to creatures) is turned altogether from God, as acting against charity; whereas by venial sin man's will is hampered from promptly tending to God. Therefore for the remission of mortal sin a more perfect Penance is demanded, namely that man actually detest the mortal sin he has committed so far as this lies in him, namely so that he use diligence to recall each mortal sin, that he may detest all of them. But for the remission of venial sins it suffices to have a virtual displeasure, e.g., when someone so tends in his will and affections to God and the things of God that whatever he meets that might hamper him in this movement would displease him, and he would grieve for committing it, even if actually he did not think of it. This, however, is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, save as regards sins not remembered after diligent inquiry.—The habitual displeasure that is included in the habit of charity or the virtue of Penance does not suf-

fice to remit venial sins, because thus charity would be inconsistent with venial sin, which is false.

ART. II.—WHETHER INFUSION OF GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SINS.

NO.—THE REASON is that venial sin is not opposed to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, insofar as man adheres overmuch to a created good, though not in opposition to God, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, q. lxxxviii, art. 1). Consequently, for taking away venial sin it is not necessary that any habitual grace be infused, but it suffices to have some movement of grace or charity for its remission.—Yet whenever grace is infused anew venial sins are forgiven.

NOTE: Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e.g., the right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e.g., mud or dust; so, too, a stain is put on the soul in one way by the privation of the beauty of grace through mortal sin, in another by the inordinate inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin it is necessary to have a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to the temporal thing (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER VENIAL SINS ARE REMOVED BY THE SPRINKLING OF HOLY WATER AND THE LIKE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sprinkling of holy water, a Bishop's blessing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and anything else of the kind, are performed with some movement of reverence to God, and contain, at least implicitly, a detestation of venial sin. And this suffices for the remission of venial sin.—Now all these things, so far as they are concerned, conduce to the remission of all venial sins; but the remission may be hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which the mind is still actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of Baptism (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER VENIAL SIN CAN BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT MORTAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the remission of sin, mortal or venial, never takes place save by the power of grace. Now he who is in mortal sin lacks grace. Hence no venial sin is forgiven him.

QUESTION LXXXVIII THE RETURN OF THE SINS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY THROUGH PENANCE

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SINS ONCE FORGIVEN RETURN THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT SIN.

NO.—a) Sins once forgiven, considered on the part of the turning to a created good, do not return through subsequent sin; **b)** likewise, the stain and debt of eternal punishment, insofar as they were caused by the acts of sins previously forgiven, do not return through subsequent sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, on the part of the turning to a created good, mortal sins are diverse, and sometimes opposed. Hence it is plain that on this side subsequent mortal sin does not make mortal sins return, once they are blotted out—otherwise it would follow that a man would be reduced by the sin of prodigality to the habit or disposition of avarice, which had formerly been blotted out—and thus one contrary would be the cause of its opposite, which is impossible.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the work of God cannot be frustrated by the work of man. Now the remission of previous sins (as also the remission of the stain and debt of eternal punishment) was the work of God's mercy; hence it cannot be made vain by a man's subsequent sin, according to Rom. iii, 3: "Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?"—Likewise, the remission of sins by grace and the sacraments of grace is made absolutely; for if it were not made absolutely, but with a condition depending on the future, it would follow that grace and the sacraments of

grace were not the sufficient cause of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as being derogatory to God's grace. Therefore it is no wise possible that any stain or debt of previous sins should return, caused by those acts.

NOTE: The sin that follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due for the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven, but as caused by this last sin being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin (at end of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER SINS THAT HAVE BEEN FORGIVEN RETURN THROUGH INGRATITUDE, WHICH IS SHOWN ESPECIALLY IN FRATERNAL HATRED, APOSTASY FROM FAITH, REJECTION OF CONFESSION, AND REGRET FOR PREVIOUS Penance.

YES.—They return in the sense explained in the previous article.

THE REASON is that, as was said in the previous article, sins forgiven through Penance are said to return insofar as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now there are four kinds of ingratitude directly opposed to the benefit of the remission of sins (Ad 1); and therefore from these greater ingratitude follows. For there are four species of the movement of ingratitude. The first is the movement on the part of the benefactor, who must forgive his brother when he craves pardon; against this is fraternal hatred. The others are on the part of the penitent: First there is a movement to God through living faith, against which is apostasy; the second movement is against sin, against which is regret for Penance; and the third movement is the subjection of the penitent to the keys of the Church, against which is rejection of Confession.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT THAT ARISES THROUGH INGRATITUDE IN RESPECT OF A SUBSEQUENT SIN IS AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE SINS PREVIOUSLY PARDONED.

NO.—THE REASON is that the debt of previous sins does not return because of subsequent sin. Hence it follows that the measure of the returning debt is according to the gravity of the subsequent sin. Yet, since the measure of the ingratitude is proportionately equal to the measure of the benefit, it follows that, the more numerous and serious are the sins previously pardoned, the greater proportionately must the debt of punishment return because of any subsequent mortal sin. Absolutely, it is not necessary that the measure of the ingratitude be equal to the measure of the benefit received, according to the remission of past sins; because, other things being equal, there can be greater contempt, or greater subsequent guilt, in one person than in another.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE INGRATITUDE WHEREBY A SUBSEQUENT SIN CAUSES THE RETURN OF PREVIOUS SINS IS A SPECIAL SIN.

NO.—The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin, but not always.

THE REASON is that, although with every sin God is despised in His precepts, yet not every sin results from contempt. Hence, if any sinner commits any sin in contempt of God and of the favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingratitude. But if any person, intending to commit some sin, for example, murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt for God, the ingratitude will not be a special sin, but it is drawn to the species of another sin, as a circumstance of it.

QUESTION LXXXIX
THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF Penance
 (in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE RESTORED THROUGH Penance.

YES.—THE REASON is that through Penance grace is again infused, from which follow all the gifts of grace, as the powers follow from the essence of the soul, as has been said (I-II, q. cx., art. 4).

NOTE: Penance causes grace insofar as it is a sacrament, for insofar as it is a virtue it is rather an effect of grace (Ad 1). And, because the formal force of this sacra-

ment depends on the power of the keys, therefore the power of the keys effectively, though instrumentally, causes grace and virtues; and the first act of the penitent is as the last disposition to the reception of grace, namely contrition (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER, AFTER PENANCE, MAN RISES AGAIN TO EQUAL VIRTUE.

NO.—He may rise again to greater or lesser grace.

THE REASON is that the forms that admit of being more and less become intense and remiss according to the different disposition of the subject (I-II, q. lii, art. 1). Hence it is that, according as the movement of free will in Penance is more intense or remiss, so far does the penitent receive more or less grace; and the same reason holds for the virtues that follow from grace.

ART. III.—WHETHER BY PENANCE MAN IS RESTORED TO HIS FORMER DIGNITY.

YES.—a) With regard to God, man recovers through Penance his dignity of sonship; b) but not of innocence, though sometimes he may receive something greater; c) with regard to an ecclesiastical dignity, he does not always recover it.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in Luke xv we are told of the prodigal son that upon his repentance his father ordered restored to him his best robe, and ring, and sandals for his feet, all signifying eminent dignity, whereby the prodigal son was reckoned among the sons of God through grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, as Gregory says (*Hom. de centum ovibus*): "Those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed from God make up for their past losses by subsequent gains; so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, just as in battle the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, if the sinner does not repent, or does penance negligently, he does not recover his former ecclesiastical dignity: The same reasoning applies in the case of irregularity and scandal, according to the canons of the Church.

ART. IV.—WHETHER VIRTUOUS DEEDS DONE IN CHARITY CAN BE DEADENED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the effect of virtuous deeds done in charity is to lead to life everlasting; and this is impeded by subsequent mortal sin, which takes away grace. And in this way works done in charity are said to be deadened by subsequent mortal sin.

ART. V.—WHETHER DEEDS DEADENED BY SIN ARE REVIVED BY PENANCE.

YES.—Meritorious works, even after they are deadened by sin, revive through Penance, as far as they are concerned.

THE REASON is that these works, insofar as they were done, will always be accepted by God, and the saints will rejoice because of them, according to Apoc. iii, 11: "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one receive thy crown." Hence deeds previously mortified recover, through Penance (after the obstacle has been removed), their efficacy to bring the one who did them to eternal life, which is to revive them.—For deeds done in charity are not deadened in themselves, but only on account of a supervening obstacle on the part of the agent (Ad 2).

NOTE: He who rises through Penance in a lesser degree of charity receives indeed the essential reward, according to the measure of charity in which he is found; but he will have greater joy for the works he has done in his former charity than for those that he did in his subsequent charity; and this joy belongs to the accidental reward (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT PENANCE IS TO MAKE EVEN DEAD WORKS LIVING.

NO.—Neither works that are called *effectively* dead, i.e., those that cause the death of the soul, and which are also called *deadly* or *mortal*; nor those that are called *priva-*

tively dead, i.e., those that are not done out of charity, are made living by Penance.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that such works, since they are mortal, are not revived, but removed by Penance, according to Hebr. vi, 1: "Not laying again a foundation of Penance from dead works."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the difference between life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed. Now works cannot again proceed from their principle, because they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be repeated. Hence it is impossible for dead work to become living through Penance.

NOTE: God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, i.e., those that are done in charity, but by a temporal reward; or again by judging the sinner less severely (Ad 3).

QUESTION XC **THE PARTS OF PENANCE IN GENERAL** (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PARTS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO PENANCE.

YES.—On the part of the matter.

THE REASON is that, as was said above (q. lxxxiv, art. 2 and 3), in the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as the matter. And therefore, since several human acts are required for the perfection of Penance, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as will appear later (foll. art.), it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.

NOTE: Parts are not assigned to Penance as a virtue, because the human acts, of which there are several in Penance, are related to the habit of virtue, not as to its parts, but as to its effects (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONTRITION, CONFESSION, AND SATISFACTION ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED AS PARTS OF PENANCE.

YES.—On the part of the penitent, whose acts stand as the matter of this sacrament.

THE REASON is that in this sacrament not only is the restoration of the equality of justice sought, as in vindicative justice; but, more, the reconciliation of friendship, which results when the offender makes amends according to the will of the person offended. Thus there are required, on the part of the penitent, first a will to make amends, and this results through contrition; second, that he subject himself to the will of the priest acting in the place of God, and this is done in confession; thirdly, that he make atonement according to the will of God's minister, and this is the work of satisfaction. Hence contrition, confession, and satisfaction are reckoned as the parts of Penance.

Because more things are required for good, "which proceeds from a cause that is entire, than for evil, which results from a single defect" (Dionysius), thus, although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with confession in word and satisfaction in deed (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FOREGOING THREE ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF PENANCE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the entire power of Penance is not present in each of these parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but it is present in all of them together at the same time; and this is the proper nature of integral parts. —In the case of subject parts, the entire power of the whole is present in all equality and at the same time, just as the entire power of an animal is present in every species of the animal. In the case of potential parts, the whole is present in all of them according to its whole essence, just as the whole essence of the soul is present in each of its powers.

NOTE: One integral part can include the whole, though not as to its essence, because the foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole Penance (Ad 2).

ART. IV. WHETHER PENANCE IS FITTINGLY DIVIDED INTO PENANCE BEFORE BAPTISM, PENANCE FOR MORTAL SINS, AND PENANCE FOR VENIAL SINS.

YES.—Considering Penance as a power.

THE REASON is that the species of Penance are taken according to the various changes intended by the penitent. Now the change intended by the penitent is threefold: First, by regeneration for a new life, and this belongs to the Penance which is before Baptism; the second change is by reforming one's past life after it has been corrupted, and this belongs to Penance for mortal sins after Baptism; the third change is for a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to Penance for venial sins, which are remitted by a fervent act of charity.

[Here ends whatever has come down to posterity of the Third Part of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas, which he left uncompleted at his death.]

SUPPLEMENT OF THE THIRD PART OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The remainder of the *Summa*, known as the *Supplement*, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas' commentary on the Fourth Book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. The commentary was completed 20 years before the last lines of the *Summa* proper, which appear above, and St. Thomas had made notable advances in his thought in the meantime. This must be borne in mind for the rest of this work, since Fra Piperno was probably not well acquainted with the *Summa*. The *Supplement* shows less maturity than the *Summa* proper.

SUPPLEMENT TO III

QUESTION I

THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION

Here we must consider each of the parts of Penance: 1) Contrition; 2) confession; 3) satisfaction. On contrition come five points of consideration: 1) What it is; 2) what it should be about; 3) how great it should be; 4) its duration; 5) its effect. About the first there are three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CONTRITION IS AN ASSUMED SORROW FOR SINS, TOGETHER WITH THE PURPOSE OF CONFESSING THEM AND OF MAKING SATISFACTION FOR THEM.

YES.—Taking contrition for the substance of the act, insofar as it is an act of the virtue of Penance, and a part of the sacrament of Penance.

THE REASON is that in the foregoing definition contrition is manifested as it is an act of virtue, namely by stating its genus, i.e., sorrow; and object, in the words, "for sins;" and choice, which is required for an act of virtue, in the word "assumed." Insofar as it is part of the sacrament, it is manifested by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words, "together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction."

The other definitions are given according as contrition is considered under other aspects. Thus, according as it is an act of virtue only, it is defined as: "Voluntary sorrow for sin, whereby a man punishes in himself what he grieves to have committed."—The other definition is taken from the words of Augustine, on Psal. xlvii: "Contrition is the sorrow that takes away sin." The third is taken from the words of Gregory (Hom. xxii, on Ezech.) which runs thus: "Contrition is humility of the soul, which crushes sin between hope and fear."

NOTE: Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it; but as to the substance of the act it is from the free will and from God, who operates in all works both of nature and of will (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONTRITION IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that contrition, particularly taken, implies a rectitude of will, insofar as the will detests and destroys past sin committed by the will. Now the rectitude of the will is an act of virtue.—Materially taken, contrition denotes a corporeal passion.

NOTE: 1. In contrition there is a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For, just as the virtue of Penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz., the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless, this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things.—The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else than displeasure for some evil. Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of Penance (Ad 1).

2. Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition; wherefore in corporeal matters things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent but not altogether crushed to pieces; whereas they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed (*tritae*) minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ATTRITION CAN BECOME CONTRITION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the act of contrition supposes the infusion of grace, which is not supposed by attrition. For the principle of contrition is filial fear, and that of contrition is servile fear.

QUESTION II THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION

(in six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN SHOULD BE CONTRITE ON ACCOUNT OF THE PUNISHMENT, AND NOT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE SIN.

ANSWER—There can be sorrow for the evils of punishment, but not contrition, which is only for sin.

THE REASON is that contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole, and is found metaphorically in the evil of sin. For the will is the cause of the evil itself; and displeasure with this evil is called contrition by analogy. Hence contrition is only for the fault, and not for the punishment, which can exist jointly with contrition.

ART. II.—WHETHER CONTRITION SHOULD BE ON ACCOUNT OF ORIGINAL SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that contrition regards and, so to speak, crushes the hardness of the will; consequently, it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. For original sin we can have displeasure and sorrow, but not contrition.

ART. III.—WHETHER WE SHOULD HAVE CONTRITION FOR EVERY ACTUAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that in every actual sin there is a certain hardness of will; consequently, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition, which crushes it.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN IS BOUND TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR HIS FUTURE SINS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the proper object of contrition is sin committed. Yet, because contrition is an act of the virtue of penance, and every virtue has, together with its own movement, something of the movement of prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues, hence it is that contrition implies a caution for the future, which is a part of prudence annexed to contrition.

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN OUGHT TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR ANOTHER'S SIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the same thing is crushed (*conteritur*), which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject as the hardness of sin was in it hitherto; so that there is no contrition for the sins of others, but only sorrow.

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE CONTRITION FOR EACH SIN.

YES.—With regard to the origin of contrition, there should be contrition for each sin that is remembered but with regard to the term of contrition it suffices that there be one general contrition for all.

THE REASON is that the origin of contrition is the process of thought whereby a man thinks of his sin, and is sorry for it. And thus a man ought to think on and grieve for every single mortal sin he has committed. Now the term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace; and in this way it suffices that there be one general contrition for all; for then the movement of contrition acts by force of all the preceding dispositions.

QUESTION III

(in three articles)

THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION

ART. I.—WHETHER CONTRITION IS THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SORROW IN THE WORLD.

YES.—Contrition essentially taken, as it is in the will (or appreciatively), is sorrow that surpasses all other sorrows.

THE REASON is that the more pleasing a thing is the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last is above all things pleasing; wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing.—Insofar, however, as it is in the sensitive part, sorrow for sin is not the greatest, because the lower powers are moved more strongly by their proper objects than by redundancy from the higher powers.

(NOTE: The joy that the penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure, for it is not contrary to it; but it increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight that it causes. Thus he who delights in learning a science learns all the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure is the more intensely displeased. But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that overflows from the reason into the sensitive part (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SORROW OF CONTRITION CAN BE TOO GREAT.

YES.—a) Contrition on the part of the sorrow that is in the reason, namely the displeasure which finds sin displeasing insofar as it is an offense to God, cannot be too great; b) but with regard to sensible sorrow it can be too great, just as the external affliction of the body can be too great.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the offense done to God is against charity; consequently, just as the love of charity, which intensifies the displeasure at sin the greater it becomes, cannot be too great; so neither can this displeasure be too great.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in all this the safeguarding of the subject, and the general well-being that suffices for the fulfillment of one's duties, should be taken as the measure; hence it is written (Rom. xii, 1): "Let your sacrifice be reasonable."

ART. III.—WHETHER SORROW FOR ONE SIN SHOULD BE GREATER THAN FOR ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the reason for sorrow is greater in one person than in another, namely the offense against God. For, although every mortal sin turns one away from God, and takes away grace, one mortal sin removes one farther than another, insofar as through its inordinateness it becomes more out of harmony with the order of the divine goodness than another does (Ad 3).

QUESTION IV THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WHOLE OF THIS LIFE IS THE TIME FOR CONTRITION.

YES.—With regard to both sorrows, i.e., of the reason and the sensitive part.

THE REASON is that the detestation of sin that is in the reason should always remain in the time of this life; for the time spent in sin, which was given us for the race of life, cannot be recovered, as neither can innocence. Hence there always remains a reason for sorrow. It is likewise so as regards sensible sorrow, which is assumed as punishment by the will; for, since man in sinning deserved eternal punishment, and sinned against the eternal God; consequently the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity, i.e., during the whole of the state of this life.

NOTE: We must distinguish between satisfaction and sorrow. Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there is no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature, whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT TO GRIEVE FOR SIN CONTINUOUSLY.

YES.—On the part of the reason, but not on the part of the appetite.

THE REASON is that the displeasure that is in the appetite of the reason is an act of the virtue of Penance; now in the acts of the virtues excess and defect are not possible (*Ethics*, bk. ii, chap. 6 and 7). Consequently, neither as to intensity nor as to duration can there be excess in rational sorrow, save insofar as the act of one virtue impedes the act of another, which is more urgent for the time being.—But the passion can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man should fall into despair, cowardice, and other such vices.

ART. III.—WHETHER OUR SOULS ARE CONTRITE FOR SINS EVEN AFTER THIS LIFE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the souls of the blessed have no sorrow, on account of the fullness of their joy. The souls of the damned, although they have sorrow, lack contrition, because there is in them no grace that would quicken sorrow. The souls in purgatory have a sorrow for sins that is quickened by grace, but not a meritorious sorrow, since they are not in the state of gaining merit; and thus they have not the efficacy of contrition; wherefore their sorrow is not properly that of contrition (Ad 2).

QUESTION V THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE FORGIVENESS OF SIN IS THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION.

YES.—Both as part of the sacrament and as part of the virtue of Penance, contrition is the cause of the remission of sin, but in different ways.

THE REASON is that, as it is part of the sacrament, contrition aims at the remission of sin instrumentally, as is clear in the case of the other sacraments; but, insofar as it is an act of the virtue of Penance, it is as it were the material cause of the remission of sin, inasmuch as a disposition is as it were a necessary condition for justification, and this disposition is reduced to a material cause.—For the principal efficient cause of the remission of sin is God alone (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONTRITION CAN TAKE AWAY THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT ENTIRELY.

YES.—Both on the part of charity and on the part of sensible sorrow.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the intensity of contrition on the part of charity can be such that the contrition resulting merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of the entire punishment.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the sensible sorrow, which the will arouses in contrition, is a kind of punishment, and may be so intense as to suffice for the blotting out of guilt and punishment. For, although the sorrow of contrition is infinite, yet it has its power from charity, which quickens it, and accordingly can avail to wipe out guilt and punishment (Ad 3).

THE REASON is that the sorrow of contrition, however slight it be, as long as it is enough for contrition, always implies greater displeasure on account of one's being severed from the last end, even though it implies less displeasure in sin than it should.—Hence, as in Baptism, which absolves from sins many and great, so it is with contrition, provided it fulfills the necessary conditions of contrition (Ad 1).

QUESTION VI CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY

Here we are to consider Confession, about which six points are to be dealt with: 1) The necessity of Confession; 2) its essence; 3) its minister; 4) its quality; 5) its effect; 6) its seal. Under the first head come six articles:

ART. 1.—WHETHER CONFESSION IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacraments that are ordained against sin, with which salvation cannot coexist, are essential to salvation; consequently, just as Baptism, which blots out original sin, is essential to salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance,

whose minister can use this fitting remedy only if he knows the sin, which he knows through the sinner's confession. Hence Confession, at least in purpose and desire, is necessary to the salvation of the one who has fallen into actual mortal sin.

NOTE: 1. The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but to obtain the infusion of grace the sacraments of grace were instituted, and before he receives them, either actually or in purpose, a person cannot receive grace, as he cannot in the case of Baptism; and the same thing applies to Confession. For, on the part of being turned away from God, sin has a character of infinity, and in this respect the remission of sin must begin with another, namely God (Ad 2). Moreover, by the shame of Confession, and the power of the keys, to which the penitent subjects himself, and the satisfaction enjoined, which the priest moderates according to the quality of the sins made known to him by Confession, the temporal punishment is expiated (Ad 1). Therefore Confession is necessary.

2. Although we do not read of Magdalene, Paul, and the others that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover, Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments, so that He could bestow the effect of the sacrament without using the things belonging thereto (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER CONFESSION IS OF THE NATURAL LAW.

NO.—a) The Confession made to God in acknowledgement of sin is of the natural law; b) but sacramental Confession is not of the natural, but of the positive divine law.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that is natural to a thing that is imposed on it by its Creator; properly, however, those things are called natural that arise from the principles of nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since the sacraments are like protestations of faith, and faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, therefore the sacraments are of divine law, which is supernatural.

(**NOTE:** Although there was a kind of confession in the Mosaic law, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, or as in the natural law; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sins inwardly before God; whereas under the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL ARE BOUND TO CONFESS.

YES.—a) By divine law not all are bound to confess, but those only who sin mortally; b) by ecclesiastical law, all are bound, even those who do not sin mortally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, by divine law, the sacrament of Penance is a remedy necessary to recover spiritual life; accordingly, not all are bound to confess, but those only who commit mortal sin after Baptism.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although by force of the sacrament one is not bound to confess his venial sins, he is bound by the precept of the Church to confess, both that he may approach the Eucharist with greater reverence and also that their subjects may be made known to their pastors, lest a wolf hide among the flock.—Yet to fulfill the ecclesiastical precept it suffices that one present himself to the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin; and this will count for his Confession (Ad 3).

[Translator's Note: Although Canon 906 requires Confession once a year, this is to be understood of mortal sins, so that if one is conscious only of venial sins he need not confess during that time. There is no longer an obligation to make Easter Confession in one's own parish.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO CONFESS A SIN THAT HE HAS NOT COMMITTED.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that he who speaks of himself to the priest in a manner different from his conscience, whether this be good or bad, does not manifest himself to the priest, but rather hides himself; consequently, his Confession is not worthy. For worthiness, it is necessary that the lips agree with the heart, so that the lips accuse only what the conscience has.

(**NOTE:** 1. A just man does not confess sin as regards the act, which he has not

committed; but as regards the condition of the act, because in the act, which of itself is good, he fears some defect on his part. Hence it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear, which he holds in his thoughts (Ad 1).

2. When a person doubts whether a certain sin is mortal, he is bound to confess it as long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger if he neglects to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not (Ad 3).

[Translator's Note: Modern manuals of moral theology impose no obligation to confess doubtful mortal sins, though they recommend the following of St. Thomas' rule for peace of mind.]

ART. V.—WHETHER ONE IS BOUND TO CONFESS AT ONCE.

NO.—a) As regards the purpose of confessing, one is bound to have this purpose in having contrition; b) as regards the actual making of Confession, one is not bound to do so at once, save incidentally.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the purpose of confessing is annexed to contrition. Now one is bound to have contrition when sins come to mind, especially when he is in danger of death, or he is so circumstanced that, unless his sin be forgiven, he would have to fall into another sin.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that affirmative precepts do not bind at once, but for a determinate time; for the fulfillment of an affirmative precept binds always, but not for always (at every moment)—(Ad 3).—One may be accidentally bound to confess at once, i.e., when one is bound to do something that he cannot do without sin unless he has confessed, as, for instance, when he must receive Communion when no priest is available and the necessity is urgent.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE CAN BE DISPENSED FROM CONFESSION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the precept of Confession was not primarily given by man, although it was promulgated by James (v, 16), but it had its institution from God. Consequently, just as the Pope cannot give anyone a dispensation so that he can be saved without Baptism, so neither can he make it possible for him to be saved without Confession, insofar as this is binding by the very force of the sacrament, but he can dispense from Confession insofar as it is binding by the precept of the Church, so that he can put off Confession longer than the Church has provided for.

NOTE: Although the express institution of sacramental Confession is not mentioned, yet some foreshadowing of it is found in the fact that those who were being prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent lepers to the priests, and, though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them (Ad 2).

QUESTION VII THE NATURE OF CONFESSION

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AUGUSTINE FITTINGLY DEFINES CONFESSION.

YES.—“Confession is that whereby the hidden disease is laid bare with the hope of pardon.”

THE REASON is that in Confession five things are to be considered, all of which are touched on in the foregoing definition. These are: 1) The substance of the act, or its genus, which is a certain manifestation, and this is expressed in the words “laid bare;” 2) that about which Confession is made, namely sin; and this is included in the words, “hidden disease;” 3) the cause of Confession, included in the words, “with the hope of pardon.” Then there are two other things implicitly involved in Augustine's definition, namely the one to whom Confession is made, i.e., the priest, and the effect, or release from part of the punishment, and an obligation to pay the other part.

ART. II.—WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, for a thing to be called an act of virtue, it suffices that it involve in its notion some condition pertaining to virtue. Now this condition pertains to virtue, that a person confess with his lips what he has in his mind, and this is done in Confession. Therefore, although Confession does not denote everything that is required for virtue—for it can be made badly—yet it is good in respect of its genus, and is an act of virtue.

(NOTE: The natural law inclines a man to Confession, by means of the divine law, which determines the circumstances, as in the case with all matters pertaining to the positive law (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER CONFESSION IS AN ACT OF THE VIRTUE OF PENANCE.

YES.—a) Absolutely speaking confession belongs to the virtue of truth; b) but the confession of sins belongs as an elicited act to the virtue of Penance; c) as a commanded act, it can belong to many virtues.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that it is the confession of something true.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, when to the object of virtue is added a special aspect of the good and difficult, a special virtue is required. Therefore the confession of sins to obtain their remission does not belong, as an elicited act, to the virtue of truth, but to the virtue of Penance.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that the act of Confession can be drawn to the end of many virtues.

QUESTION VIII THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (in seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO CONFESS TO A PRIEST.

YES.—Sacramental Confession can be made only to a priest, who is a minister of the Church.

THE REASON is that in the sacrament of Penance grace is conferred. Now the sole minister of the sacraments, in which grace is conferred, is the minister alone, who has ministry over the body of Christ, i.e., a priest, who can consecrate the Eucharist. For minister and instrument, by which grace is conferred, are the same, as was stated above (q. lxiv, art. 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS EVER LAWFUL TO CONFESS TO ANOTHER THAN A PRIEST.

YES.—Not in virtue of office, but by reason of necessity, even a layman can take the place of a priest, so that Confession can be made to him.

(NOTE: This custom of confessing to laymen, which had existed long before St. Thomas and was still active in his times, has long ago deservedly past out of use. Theologians today hold that it is now inexpedient, partly because this would, in appearance, lend countenance to modern heretics, and partly because there is no need of such confession, and no precept for it; nor is it expedient to manifest sins, especially those that are hidden and grave, outside the sacrament.—Paris.)

THE REASON is that Penance, like Baptism, is a sacrament of necessity. Therefore, just as Baptism has a twofold minister, namely one by virtue of office, i.e., a priest, another by reason of necessity, i.e., any man, so also has Penance. For, when there is urgent necessity the penitent should do what is on his part, namely confess, and confess to whom he can. Although the one to whom he confesses cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to do that which is on the part of the priest, i.e., absolve, yet the Supreme Priest, Christ, supplies the lack of a priest. Nevertheless, confession made to a layman from want of a priest is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, because it lacks that which is on the part of the priest.—And therefore, a man must again confess to a priest when he has opportunity (Ad 1 and ad 3, passim).

ART. III.—WHETHER OUTSIDE A CASE OF NECESSITY, ANYONE WHO IS NOT A PRIEST MAY HEAR THE CONFESSION OF VENIAL SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that venial sin separates man neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church. Consequently, he does not need a new bestowal of grace

for its remission, nor does he need to be reconciled with the Church. Hence venial sins need not be confessed to a priest. And, because Confession made to a layman is a kind of sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water.

NOTE: As Sylvius says, since there is no necessity to confess venial sins, it is better never to confess them to a layman, although one may seek advice about them from one or several, as with mortal sins.—Paris.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE TO CONFESS TO ONE'S OWN PRIEST.

YES.—To a priest who has jurisdiction over the person in question.

THE REASON is that he alone can absolve who can bind someone by command to do something. Now he alone can command someone in Confession to do something who has jurisdiction. For the power to command someone belongs to no one save the one who has jurisdiction over him. Consequently, it is essential to this sacrament, not only that the minister have the power of Order, as in the other sacraments, but also that he have jurisdiction.

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR ANYONE TO CONFESS TO ANOTHER THAN HIS OWN PRIEST, IN VIRTUE OF A PRIVILEGE OF A COMMAND GIVEN BY SUPERIOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that whatever an inferior can do a superior can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Therefore all the more can his superior do this. Nor is the proper priest prejudiced in his rights in this matter. For the power of jurisdiction is not committed to any person for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and the honor of God. Hence if it seems expedient to the higher superior, to delegate to others, for the furtherance of the salvation of the people and the honor of God, what is under their jurisdiction, no prejudice is done to the lesser superiors, unless they be such as seek what is their own, and not what is of Jesus Christ (Philip. ii, 21), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it but by feeding on it (Ad 1). [Tr. Note: This is perhaps the unique example of sarcasm in Aquinas.]

ART. VI.—WHETHER A PENITENT, AT THE POINT OF DEATH, CAN BE ABSOLVED BY ANY PRIEST.

YES.—THE REASON is that any priest, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, has the power indifferently over all men, and in regard to all sins; the reason he cannot absolve all men from all sins is that, by the ordination of the Church, he has limited jurisdiction, or none at all. But, because necessity knows no law, therefore, in case of necessity he is not hindered by the ordination of the Church from absolving. In fact, a priest can then absolve, not only from sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever imposed, because this absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction, which by the ordination of the Church is confined within certain limits.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE TEMPORAL PUNISHMENT IS IMPOSED ACCORDING TO THE DEGREES OF THE FAULT.

YES.—a) As regards the debt, the degree of punishment must radically correspond to the degree of guilt, before anything can be remitted from it; b) as regards the remedy, sometimes a greater penance should be imposed for a lesser sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the more punishment is remitted by contrition the less remains to be omitted by Confession.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the sin of one person may be harder to resist than the sin of another, and, therefore, a greater penalty should be imposed on a young man for fornication than for an old one, although the former may have sinned less; or else because in one person the sin is more dangerous, as in the case of a priest, than in another; or because a community is more prone to one particular sin, so that it becomes necessary to deter the others by the punishment of one.

(NOTE: Other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism and the more powerful blessings bestowed on the human race (Ad 2).

QUESTION IX THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION

(in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONFESSION CAN BE LACKING IN FORM.

YES.—Not insofar as confession is an act of virtue, but insofar as it is part of the sacrament.

THE REASON is that an act of virtue is a properly meritorious act; and thus confession is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But, insofar as it is part of the sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest, who has the keys of the Church, and who through the confession knows the conscience of the penitent. Accordingly, confession can be even in one who is not contrite, because he can disclose his sins to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church; and, even though he then does not receive the fruit of absolution, yet when the insincerity is withdrawn, he will begin to receive it, as in the case of the other sacraments. Wherefore one is not bound to repeat the confession made in insincerity, but one is bound afterwards to confess his insincerity.

(NOTE: The old Thomists concluded from these words of St. Thomas that the sacrament of Penance can be lacking in form and still valid; but this opinion was tacitly retracted by the Holy Doctor in q. xxix, art. 8, and is today absolutely rejected by all theologians.—Paris)

ART. II.—WHETHER CONFESSION SHOULD BE ENTIRE.

YES.—It is essential to Confession that man confess all the sins that he remembers; if he does not do this, there is no Confession, but the pretense of Confession.

THE REASON is that, even, as in bodily medicine the physician must know, not only one disease, against which he must supply a remedy, but also the general constitution of his patient, because one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine that would be adapted to one disease would be harmful to another; just so in regard to sins, the priest must know all the mortal sins of the penitent, because one is aggravated by the addition of another, and what would be a suitable remedy for one sin might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says in his *Pastorale*, part iii, c.3. Likewise, just as there would not be contrition for all the sins that come to his mind, so there would not be confession unless one confessed all that he remembered (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONE MAY CONFESS THROUGH ANOTHER, OR BY WRITING.

NO.—The confession of sins, insofar as it is a part of the sacrament, must be made with one's own lips, unless there is some obstacle of nature.

THE REASON is that as an act of virtue confession would suffice in whatever way it was made; but as part of the sacrament it is the proper determinate matter of this sacrament insofar as it is manifested by the penitent's own words. In one who has not the use of speech, it suffices that he confess by writing or by signs or through an interpreter, because it is not demanded of man that he do more than he can. [Tr. Note: In those in whom speech is impossible writing or an interpreter is never demanded. It is sufficient that one manifest by signs at least that one is a sinner. If the use of speech is restored integral confession must be made.]

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE 16 CONDITIONS USUALLY ASSIGNED ARE NECESSARY FOR CONFESSION.

YES.—Confession, as an act of virtue, should be discreet, voluntary, pure, courageous, full of shame, tearful, humble, true, faithful, open, simple, entire; as part of the sacrament it must be an accusation, manifest willingness to obey, and secret. The well-being of confession requires that it should be frequent, and not delayed.

THE REASON is that confession, as an act of virtue, must be, firstly, according to the nature of virtue in general; accordingly, it must be discreet, according to prudence; voluntary, as respects choice; pure, as respects intention; and courageous, so that it is not abated from a feeling of shame.—Secondly, as an act of Penance. According to this, confession must be full of shame, insofar as it begins in horror at the wickedness of sin; tearful, insofar as it progresses to sorrow for sin committed; humble, insofar as

it terminates in self-abasement.—Thirdly, according to the proper notion of this act, confession must be: Faithful, that is, true, insofar as it manifests sin; open, insofar as it is not wrapped up in vague words; simple, insofar as it relates only such matters as affect the gravity of sin; entire, so that nothing is taken from what should be manifested.—As part of the sacrament, confession should be: On the part of the penitent, an accusation; in relation to the priest, prepared to obey; as regards the nature of the court, secret.—For the well-being of confession, confession should be frequent and not long delayed, i.e., the sinner should confess at once.—(These 16 qualities can be reduced to four, namely, integrity, simplicity, humility, and charity.)

QUESTION X THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONFESSION DELIVERS ONE FROM THE DEATH OF SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the sacrament of Penance grace is infused only through confession, at least in desire; for through confession man subjects himself to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments.—Hence confession delivers man from the death of sin in the same way as was said of Baptism. For Baptism delivers man from the death of sin, not only insofar as it is actually received, but also insofar as it is had in desire, and, if one offers no obstacle, he receives from the very bestowal of Baptism grace that remits sins, if they had not been remitted previously. Even so, it must be said of the confession that is joined to absolution that, if it previously existed in the desire of the penitent, it delivered him from sin; afterwards, in the act of confession and absolution, grace is increased, if the penitent offers no obstacle to grace, and, if the previous sorrow for sins was not sufficient for contrition, remission of sins is also given.

ART. II.—WHETHER CONFESSION DELIVERS FROM PUNISHMENT IN SOME WAY.

YES.—a) Both by force of absolution b) and by force of the very nature of the act of confession.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that though the temporal punishment that remains to be expiated after the removal of the eternal punishment by the remission of sin be disproportionate to the powers of the penitent living in this world, yet through the power of the keys, i.e., by the merits of Christ, enough is diminished that it remains proportionate to the strength of the penitent, so that by making satisfaction he can purge himself in this life.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the act of the penitent has a penalty annexed to the shame; consequently, the more often one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment diminished thereby.

ART. III.—WHETHER CONFESSION OPENS PARADISE.

YES.—THE REASON is that confession removes the obstacles, namely sin and the debt of punishment, that keep a person out of paradise.

(NOTE: Contrition, which involves a purpose of confession, indeed opens paradise, but the obstacle of the debt of punishment is not wholly removed before confession and satisfaction (Ad 2).)

ART. IV.—WHETHER CONFESSION GIVES HOPE OF SALVATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that by confession man subjects himself to the keys of the Church, which derive their power from Christ's Passion, by which we have the hope of the forgiveness of our sins.

ART. V.—WHETHER A GENERAL CONFESSION SUFFICES TO BLOT OUT FORGOTTEN MORTAL SINS.

YES.—THE REASON is that more cannot be required of man than he remembers. Hence general confession blots out forgotten mortal sins; but if one should remember any mortal sin, a special confession is necessary.

QUESTION XI THE SEAL OF CONFESSION

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IN EVERY CASE THE PRIEST IS BOUND TO HIDE THE SINS THAT HE KNOWS UNDER THE SEAL OF CONFESSION.

YES.—For the priest to conceal the confession is of the necessity of the sacrament, and he sins as a violator of the sacrament who reveals the confession.

THE REASON is that sacramental confession is a sign of interior subjection, whereby one is subject to God. Now God conceals the sin of the one who subjects himself through Penance. Wherefore this ought not to be revealed in the sacrament of Penance.—Besides this, there are other advantages of such concealment, because thereby men are more inclined to go to Confession and confess their sins more simply and freely.

NOTE: Just as Baptism is a sacrament, even though one approaches it in insincerity, and nothing is changed on this account of the essentials of the sacrament, so Confession does not cease to be sacramental, even though the one who confesses proposes no amendment. Hence it must nonetheless be kept concealed (Ad 1). For the precept against revealing a Confession follows from the sacrament itself. And therefore, just as the precept of making sacramental Confession is of divine law, and no man can be released from it by any dispensation or human command, so no one can be forced or permitted by any man to reveal a Confession. For what a priest knows from Confession he does not know as man, but as God (Ad 2). Hence without offense to conscience he can swear that he knows not what he knows only as God; for man is not called upon to testify save as man. Similarly also a superior can, without violating his conscience, leave a sin unpunished that he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy save according as it comes to his knowledge (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SEAL OF CONFESSION EXTENDS TO OTHER MATTERS THAN THOSE THAT HAVE REFERENCE TO CONFESSION.

NO.—Save indirectly.

THE REASON is that the confessional seal extends directly only to the things that sacramental Confession is about; indirectly that which does not fall under sacramental Confession is affected by the confessional seal, as for example those things that may betray the sinner or the sin. Even these things must be concealed with the greatest care, both on account of scandal and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

(NOTE: Hence there fall under the seal, not only all mortal and venial sins, and their objects, accomplices, and other circumstances, but also, as Billuart says, the penance imposed, the indisposition of the penitent, the denial of absolution, and the defects, both natural and moral, and the scruples known from Confession alone, the revelation of which might offend the penitent.—Paris.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THE PRIEST ALONE IS BOUND BY THE SEAL OF CONFESSION.

YES.—Properly speaking only the priest has the seal of Confession.

THE REASON is that the confessional seal is of necessity annexed to the sacrament of Penance, the minister of which is a priest only. Yet if anyone should know anything of a Confession, he also in some manner shares in the act of the seal, and is bound to conceal it, although, properly speaking, he does not have the seal of Confession.

ART. IV.—WHETHER BY THE PENITENT'S PERMISSION A PRIEST MAY REVEAL TO ANOTHER A SIN THAT HE KNOWS UNDER THE CONFESSIONAL SEAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the penitent can let the priest know what he knew not only as God knew it also as man knows it, which he does by giving him permission to speak; and therefore if he speaks he does not break the confessional seal. Yet he must avoid scandal in speaking, lest he be thought a violator of the seal.—Moreover, the one to whom the knowledge of the sin comes by means of the priest through the penitent's

consent shares in one of the acts of the priest, and the same thing applies to him as to an interpreter, unless the penitent wishes him to know it unconditionally and freely (Ad 4).

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN MAY REVEAL THAT WHICH HE KNOWS THROUGH CONFESSION AND THROUGH SOME OTHER SOURCES BESIDES.

YES.—THE REASON is that what a man knows in some other manner, whether before Confession or afterwards, he is not bound to conceal with regard to that which he knows as a man; for he can say: "I know that, because I saw it." He is bound, however, to conceal it insofar as he knows it as God knows it; for he cannot say: "I heard this in Confession." Yet, to avoid scandal, he should refrain from speaking about this, unless there is urgent necessity, i.e., by reason of justice and truth.

QUESTION XII

SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE

Here we are to consider satisfaction, of which four points are to be discussed: 1) Its nature; 2) its possibility; 3) its quality; 4) the things whereby man makes satisfaction to God. The first point will be in three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER SATISFACTION IS A VIRTUE OR AN ACT OF VIRTUE.

YES.—Satisfaction is formally an act of virtue.

THE REASON is that in the very name of satisfaction satisfaction has the implicit form and aspect of virtue. For it implies the notion of a mean (which is the formal element of every moral virtue), in that it implies equality, for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to something.

NOTE: Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, insofar as the deed is done voluntarily, by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER SATISFACTION IS AN ACT OF JUSTICE.

YES.—a) Sacramental satisfaction is an act of justice formally; b) and moreover an act of vindicative justice.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the name of satisfaction denotes an equation between thing and thing, according to a certain proportion, as is clear from the word *satis*, enough.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that no part of justice respects a previous offense, save vindicative justice, which establishes equality with respect to a previous offense in the agent, i.e., the penitent, when the penitent receives punishment.

NOTE: Just as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And, since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DEFINITION OF SATISFACTION GIVEN IN THE TEXT IS SUITABLE.

YES.—Satisfaction, insofar as it preserves one from future fault, "is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof" (Augustine).

THE REASON is that satisfaction, which is an act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving one from future sins. As regards the first, it is necessary to uproot the causes; as regards the second, it is necessary that there be a refusal of the free will. Now these two things are included in the foregoing definition.—With respect to past fault, which satisfaction heals by compensation, satisfaction is thus defined: "The compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice;" and the definition of St. Anselm comes to the same thing, for he said that "to make satisfaction is to pay the honor due to God," so that a thing is considered due by reason of the fault committed.

QUESTION XIII THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MAN CAN MAKE SATISFACTION TO GOD.

YES.—Not according to the quality of measure, but according to the equality of proportion.

THE REASON is that, as by reason of the benefit received it is impossible for man to render measure for measure in giving honor to his parents and God, but it suffices that a man render what he can, because friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible; so also, by reason of sin committed, in the matter of satisfaction man cannot pay his debt to God, save according to a certain proportion, which consists in man's paying to God what man can pay to himself.

NOTE: 1. Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infinity of divine mercy, insofar as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to pay is acceptable (Ad 1).

2. Although man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz., the fulfillment of God's commandments, over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER ONE MAN CAN FULFILL SATISFACTORY PUNISHMENT FOR ANOTHER.

YES.—a) Insofar as the satisfactory punishment is ordained to the payment of what is owed; b) but not insofar as it is ordained as a remedy for avoiding sin.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, through charity, by which we are all one in Christ (Gal. iii, 29), the act of one can be made the act of another (Ad 1), and can merit for another, at least by congruous merit (Ad 3).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that by the fast of one man the flesh of another is not subdued; nor by the acts of one man is another wont to act well, save accidentally, namely insofar as one man by his good actions merit an increase of grace for another, which is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than by way of satisfaction.

NOTE: Because greater charity appears in one man's making satisfaction for another than if he himself made satisfaction, therefore a lesser penalty is required in the one who satisfies for another than in the principal (in body of art.).

QUESTION XIV THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A MAN CAN SATISFY FOR ONE SIN WITHOUT SATISFYING FOR ANOTHER.

NO.—THE REASON is that the taking away of the offense is the restoration of friendship. Hence if anything hinders the restoration of friendship, even among men, there can be no satisfaction.

ART. II.—WHETHER, WHEN DEPRIVED OF CHARITY, A MAN CAN MAKE SATISFACTION FOR SINS FOR WHICH HE WAS PREVIOUSLY CONTRITE.

NO.—If anyone who has been rightly absolved of his sins falls into sin before he has made satisfaction, and makes satisfaction while still in sin, such satisfaction does not avail him.

NOTE: If it is a question of sacramental satisfaction, the more general opinion allows it to be made in the state of mortal sin, but, as St. Alphonsus, Layman, Suarez, and other theologians say, sin may be present because the sacrament of Penance is deprived of an integral part.—Paris.

THE REASON is that satisfaction is acceptable to God, not by reason of equality,

but rather according to His acceptance, insofar as satisfactory works are done in charity. Hence without charity the works done are not satisfactory.

ART. III.—WHETHER PREVIOUS SATISFACTION BEGINS TO AVAIL AFTER MAN IS RESTORED TO CHARITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the works that are not done in charity are not pleasing to God; consequently neither does the previous satisfaction avail, even if it is followed by charity

NOTE: Some satisfactions are such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction has been done. Thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsgiving results in a diminution of a person's substance, etc. In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done in a state of sin, because through Penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person who does satisfaction it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are in no wise made living, and must be repeated (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER WORKS DONE WITHOUT CHARITY ARE MERITORIOUS OF ANY GOOD.

NO.—a) Works done outside charity do not merit condignly either an eternal or a temporal good with God; b) yet one is said to merit by congruous merit some good by good works done outside charity.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since in all those things that are given gratuitously the first reason of giving is love, it is impossible that anyone should, properly speaking, lay claim to a gift if he lacks charity. And therefore, since all temporal goods and eternal goods are given us by the divine liberality, no one can acquire a claim to any of them save by charity towards God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that it befits the divine bounty to add a perfection wherever it finds the disposition.

NOTE: 1. Just as justice is used in a twofold sense, one properly, which regards something due on the part of the recipient, the other by analogy, which regards something due on the part of the giver, insofar as it befits the giver to give it; so also merit is twofold: One is called the merit of condignity, which implies an act by which the agent himself has a claim to receive something; the other is called the merit of congruity, and implies an act as the result of which there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness. Thus Anselm says (*Prosologicum*, c. 10) that "God is just when he spares sinners, because this befits Him" (in body of art.).

2. By good works done without charity a person can merit by the merit of congruity the attainment of temporal goods, a disposition to grace and habituation to good works (in body of art.).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE AFORESAID WORKS FOR THE MITIGATION OF THE PAINS OF HELL.

YES.—Insofar as the demerit of punishment is hindered, and that for two reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is that a man who performs such works escapes being guilty of omitting them.

THE SECOND REASON is that such works in some way dispose him to good, so that a man commits sins from less contempt, and even is drawn away from many sins thereby. [Tr. Note: This, obviously, is mitigation only in an accidental sense.]

QUESTION XV THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SATISFACTION MUST BE MADE BY MEANS OF PENAL WORKS.

YES.—Satisfaction by means of penal works is demanded with respect both to a past offense and to future guilt, from which it preserves us.

THE REASON is that the sinner, although he can withdraw nothing from God as far as He is concerned, yet he, for the sinner's part, deprives Him of something by sinning, as has been said (q. xii, art. 3). Hence in order that work may be satisfactory it must be penal, so that by its means something is withdrawn from the sinner by way of justice.

NOTE: The diminution of the difficulty on the part of the promptitude of the will does not diminish merit, but increases it; and similarly the diminution of the penalty on the part of the promptitude of the will, which charity causes, does not diminish the efficacy of the satisfaction, but increases it (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SCOURGES OF THE PRESENT LIFE ARE SATISFACTORY.

YES.—If the sufferer accepts them for the purging away of his sins, by patiently taking advantage of them.

THE REASON is that thus the scourges inflicted by God for sins are in some way made the act of the sufferer, and receive the character of satisfaction—If however he refuses to accept them patiently, they are in no wise made his own act, and therefore do not have the character of satisfaction, but only of punishment.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WORKS OF SATISFACTION ARE SUITABLY ENUMERATED.

YES.—Almsgiving, fasting, and prayer.

THE REASON is that satisfaction must be such as to withdraw from us something for the honor of God. Now we have only three goods, viz., the goods of soul, the goods of body, and the goods of fortune; and to these there correspond, respectively, prayer, by which we submit to God; fasting, whereby we withdraw some good of the body; and almsgiving, by which we diminish something of our goods of fortune.—Also, these three are against the three roots of sins, viz., fasting, against the lusts of the flesh; almsgiving, against the lusts of the eyes; and prayer, against the pride of life.—Likewise prayer, almsgiving, and fasting order us aright against the sins that are respectively committed against God, the neighbor, and ourselves.

QUESTION XVI THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER PENANCE CAN BE IN THE INNOCENT.

YES.—In the innocent, in the state of innocence, penance cannot exist as regards the act, but it can exist as regards the habit.

THE REASON is that in the state of innocence the matter of penance is lacking; for they have no sins. Yet they can have sins, and in this regard they can have the habit of penance, which is midway between potentiality and act, and therefore can exist without act. Therefore the innocent who have grace, together with the other habits, also receive the habit of penance.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF PENANCE.

YES.—They have penance, but not in respect of the act that they now have.

THE REASON is that the virtue of penance is part of justice, which is a cardinal virtue. Now the cardinal virtues will remain in heaven according to the acts that they have in their end (q. lxxvii, art. 1). Hence whoever has the habit of penance in this life will have it in the next; but he will not have the same act as he now has, but another, namely thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning sins.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN ANGEL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF PENANCE

NO.—a) Neither a good nor a bad angel can be the subject of the virtue of penance; b) but penance is in the bad angel as a passion or act by way of comparison with the passion that is in the concupiscible part.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in the blessed angels no sins were committed, and they cannot sin. Consequently there is in them no room for the habit of

penance. In the wicked angels sin is unforgivable or inexpiable; hence it is not a proper matter of the virtue of penance.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in no creature is the natural order or inclination to good wholly destroyed by sin; and therefore even in the damned the detestation of evil remains, and consequently the passion of penance, or something similar to it, as is said in Wisdom, v. 3: (saying) "within themselves repenting . . ."

QUESTION XVII THE POWER OF THE KEYS

We must next consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to the matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: 1) The nature and meaning of the keys; 2) the use of the keys; 3) the ministers of the keys; 4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised. Under the first head there are three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE KEYS IN THE CHURCH.

YES.—The power that is metaphorically called the key, and is the ministry of the key.

THE REASON is that in the sacraments of the Church, which flowed from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross, the efficacy of Christ's Passion remains, whereby an obstacle is removed, that is, the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, whereby the gates of the Kingdom are closed to us.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE KEY IS THE POWER OF BINDING AND LOOSING, ETC.

YES.—The key is the power of binding and loosing, whereby "the ecclesiastical judge must receive those who are worthy and exclude from the Kingdom those who are unworthy," as a gloss of Jerome says on Matth. xvi ("I shall give to you the keys").

THE REASON is that in the aforesaid definition everything is included that pertains to the signification of a key. For in this definition are given the genus, namely the power; and the subject of the power, namely the ecclesiastical judge; and the act, namely to exclude and receive. After the analogy of the two acts of a material key, which are to open and close, the object of this power is included in the words "from the Kingdom;" and the mode in the words "worthy" and "unworthy;" for account is taken of the worthiness and unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

NOTE: All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the Order; yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e., a people subject through jurisdiction, so that, until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And, since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THERE ARE TWO KEYS OR ONLY ONE.

ANSWER: There are two:—One for judgment of the fitness of the one who is to be absolved, which is called the knowledge of discernment, the other pertaining to the absolution itself, which is called the power of judgment.

THE REASON is that in every act that requires a fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary to him who must exercise this act, namely judgment as to the recipient's worthiness and the fulfillment of the act. And, because the act of the key requires fitness in the one on whom it is exercised, because the ecclesiastical judge receives by the key those who are worthy, and excludes those who are unworthy, so he needs the judgment of discernment, whereby he judges fitness by the act of the recipient. And in this way there are distinguished the two keys above said, which however are not distinguished in the essence of the authority because both belong to them by virtue of office, but in relation to the acts, one of which presupposes the other.

QUESTION XVIII THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE POWER OF THE KEYS EXTENDS TO THE REMISSION OF GUILT.

NO.—Only God remits the guilt directly; the priest does this ministerially, by vir-

ture of the power of the keys, which is in some manner ordained to the remission of guilt.

NOTE: St. Thomas here seems to think that the sacraments do not cause grace, save dispositively, and Penance only shows that absolution is given; but here he is expounding the opinion of Master Lombard rather than his own; for he taught the contrary doctrine in P. III, q. lxxxiv, art. 3, and in his essay on the form of absolution, cap. 1, 2, and 3, and *lect.* ix on chap. xx of John.—Paris.

THE REASON is that, just as the sanctification or consecration that is required in the sacrament of Baptism is with water, and is not required in the minister; so also the sacrament of Penance is regarded as a sanctification in the minister, but not in the matter. And therefore the cause of grace by the water of Baptism and by the priest who uses the keys has the same reason. Accordingly, just as Baptism does not act as the principal agent, but as the instrument, not by causing the reception of grace, even instrumentally, but by disposing to grace, by which the remission of the guilt takes place, so it is with the power of the keys. And thus it is evident that the power of the keys is ordained in some fashion to the remission of the guilt, not as causing it but as disposing to it.

ART. II.—WHETHER A PRIEST CAN REMIT SIN AS TO THE PUNISHMENT.

YES.—Even if the power of the keys does not remit the whole punishment, yet something of the temporal punishment can be remitted by the priest.

THE REASON is that in Penance man is not changed for another life, as happens in the reception of Baptism, by which the whole temporal punishment is also remitted; for Penance is not a regeneration but a healing. Hence by the power of the keys, which operate in the sacrament of Penance, the whole punishment is not remitted, but something of the temporal punishment, the debt of which could remain after absolution from eternal punishment. Nor does this remission apply only to the punishment that the penitent owes at the time of confessing, as some say; because then confession and sacramental absolution would be only a burden, which does not befit the sacraments of the New Law; but also something is remitted from that punishment that is due in purgatory, so that a person absolved who dies before satisfaction is punished less in purgatory than if he had died before absolution.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE PRIEST CAN BIND THROUGH THE POWER OF THE KEYS.

YES.—With regard to the guilt, the priest can bind indirectly, insofar as he does not loose; but with regard to the punishment he directly looses and binds.

THE REASON is that the operation of the priest in the exercise of the keys is conformed to the operation of God, whose minister he is. Now God has an operation over both the guilt and the punishment; but He has it over the guilt to loose from it directly, and to bind indirectly insofar as He is said to harden when He withholds His grace; but over the punishment His operation extends directly with regard to both, because He both spares punishment and inflicts it.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PRIEST CAN BIND AND LOOSE ACCORDING TO HIS OWN JUDGMENT.

NO.—This judgment must be regulated by divine instinct.

THE REASON is that the priest acts in the exercise of the keys as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument has an efficacious act save insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. Therefore the gift of the Holy Spirit, whereby the sons of God are led (Rom. viii, 14), is mentioned before power was given to the Apostles to forgive sins (John xx, 22). Hence, if anyone should presume to use his power beyond that divine motion, he would not achieve his effect, as Dionysius says (at the end of his book on the ecclesiastical Hierarchy), and besides this he would be turned from the divine order, and thus incur guilt.

NOTE: Just as a physician sometimes prudently refrains from giving an efficacious medicine, sufficient to cure the disease, lest greater danger arise on account of the weakness of nature, so the priest, moved by divine instinct, does not always impose the whole penalty that is due for a sin, lest the patient despair because of the magnitude of the punishment, and turn away altogether from repentance (at end of art.).

QUESTION XIX THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PRIEST OF THE LAW HAD THE KEYS.

NO.—The priests of the Old Law had not the keys, but the keys were foreshadowed in them.

THE REASON is that the power of the priesthood of the Old Law did not extend to heavenly things, but to the figures of heavenly things. Hence the Apostle (Hebr. ix, 11-12): "It is impossible that sins should be taken away with blood of bulls and of goats."

ART. II.—WHETHER CHRIST HAD THE KEY.

YES.—He had the key of excellence.

THE REASON is that Christ opens and shuts, not as a minister, but as the direct agent for our salvation. He does this by authority, as God, and by way of merit, as Man.

NOTE: In the priests of the New Covenant the power of the keys, which passed to them from Christ, follows the character whereby they are conformed to Christ; but in Christ it does not follow a character, but a principal form (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER ONLY PRIESTS HAVE THE KEYS.

YES.—The key of Order belongs only to the priests; the key of jurisdiction belongs also to other ecclesiastics, such as archdeacons, Bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the key of Order is that which extends to heaven immediately, by removing the obstacles to its entry by means of the remission of sin; and this is had only by the priests, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things that relate directly to God.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the key of jurisdiction does not extend directly to heaven, but through the Church militant, namely by excommunication and absolution; and this even those who are not priests can have, such as archdeacons and Bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But this is not properly called the key of heaven, but a certain disposition to it.

NOTE: 1. Porters have the key for taking care of those things that are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; this judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but pursuant to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power (Ad 1).

2. Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the keys of the Heavenly Kingdom, but only in temporal matters, which also can come only from God, as is clear from Rom. xiii, 1 (Ad 2).—A woman also does not have either the key of Order or that of jurisdiction, because she is in the state of subject. But a certain use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under the same roof (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER HOLY MEN WHO ARE NOT PRIESTS HAVE THE KEYS.

NO.—A holy man who is not a priest can be neither the principal agent in the act of the keys nor the instrumental agent.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the principal agent in the act of the keys is Christ alone; for He alone has the form (of grace), which He can transfer to another—as God by way of authority, and as Man by way of merit, by reason of the fullness of divine goodness in Him, and by reason of the perfection of grace.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that he who receives the effect of the keys by way of instrumental agent is not likened to the user of the keys, but to Christ. Hence no one can be the minister of the keys save by the receiving of Order, by which the merits of Christ are applied.—Holy men however co-operate in the remission of sins, not by the power of the keys, but by the merit of congruity (following art., Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER WICKED PRIESTS HAVE THE USE OF THE KEYS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that it is not required for the nature of an instrument that

the instrument participate in the form to be induced into an effect by the principal agent. Hence the minister of the keys, even if not in the state of grace, remains a minister, although he does not fittingly exercise his power.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE SCHISMATIC, HERETICAL, EXCOMMUNICATE, SUSPENDED, OR DEGRADED HAVE THE USE OF THE KEYS.

NO: In all the above named the power of the keys remains as to essence, but its use is hindered by want of matter.

THE REASON is that the proper matter over which the use of the keys is exercised is a subject. Hence, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics, and other such men of authority, by withdrawing from them their subjects, either altogether or in some certain respect, in so far as they are thus deprived they cannot have the use of the keys.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: There are some who think that the Church does not wish to deprive modern Oriental schismatics of the power of the keys in Penance, a fact borne out by the custom of not requiring converts from the Eastern Schism to confess previous sins.

QUESTION XX

THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED

ART. I.—WHETHER A PRIEST CAN USE THE KEY THAT HE HAS ON ANY MAN.

NO.—Unless he has authority over all.

THE REASON is that the use of the keys requires some power of authority whereby the one on whom the keys are used becomes the proper matter of that act; therefore he who has indiscriminately power over all, such as the Sovereign Pontiff, can use the keys over all; whereas those who have received power over distinct persons cannot use the keys on all, but only on those over whom they are appointed, save in case of necessity, when the sacraments should be denied to no one.

ART. II.—WHETHER A PRIEST CAN ALWAYS ABSOLVE HIS SUBJECT.

YES.—By the power of Order, but not the power of jurisdiction, any priest can absolve from all sins.

THE REASON is that the power of Order, as far as it is concerned, extends to the remission of all sins. But, because the use of this power requires jurisdiction, which descends from superiors to inferiors, a superior can reserve some powers for himself, over which he does not delegate judgment to an inferior.

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN CAN USE THE KEYS WITH REGARD TO HIS SUPERIOR.

YES.—THE REASON is that he (the superior) who has limited his jurisdiction can extend it to whomever he wishes; and for this reason he can also give power over himself. For, although the superior whom a simple priest absolves is superior to him absolutely speaking, he is subject to the inferior insofar as he submits himself as a sinner to him.

QUESTION XXI

THE DEFINITION OF EXCOMMUNICATION

We must now treat of excommunication: We shall consider: The definition, congruity, and cause of excommunication; who has the power to excommunicate; 3) communication with excommunicated persons; 4) absolution from excommunication. About the first there are four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER EXCOMMUNICATION IS SUITABLY DEFINED AS SEPARATION FROM THE COMMUNION OF THE CHURCH AS TO FRUIT AND GENERAL SUFFRAGES.

YES.—That is, major excommunication.

THE REASON is that, just as by Baptism a man becomes enrolled in the assembly

of the faithful, and is made capable of participating in the sacraments, so he can be expelled from the Church, both as regards exclusion from the sacraments, and this is minor excommunication, and as regards exclusion from both, i.e., the sacraments and communion with the faithful, and this is major excommunication, which is here defined. The foregoing definition implies exclusion from the sacraments in the words "as regards fruit;" and from communion with the faithful as regards spiritual matters in the words, "and the general suffrages of the Church."

NOTE: No one may be justly excommunicated save for mortal sin, by which a man is separated from charity, even if he is not excommunicated. Unjust excommunication cannot remove anyone from charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CHURCH SHOULD EXCOMMUNICATE ANYONE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Church in her sentence of excommunication imitates divine judgment. For insofar as she separates a man from communion with the faithful, so that he is ashamed, she imitates the divine judgment, whereby it punishes man by scourges. Insofar as she deprives a man of suffrages and other spiritual benefits, she imitates God's judgment, whereby He leaves man to Himself, so that, knowing himself in humility, He may return to God.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANYONE SHOULD BE EXCOMMUNICATED FOR INFLECTING TEMPORAL HARM.

YES.—THE REASON is that in damaging anyone in the body, or in temporal goods, a man sins mortally, and acts against charity. Therefore the Church can excommunicate him for the temporal damage he has done. But, because excommunication is one of the gravest of penalties, and penalties are remedies, it is the part of a wise physician to begin with the less stringent and less dangerous remedies; therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for mortal sin, unless the person is contumacious. For then, after he has been warned, and scorns to obey, he is accounted contumacious, and must be excommunicated by the judge, who is not able to proceed otherwise against him.

NOTE: The modern law on excommunications is contained in the Code of Canon Law, canons 2257-67.

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN EXCOMMUNICATION UNJUSTLY PRO- NOUNCED HAS ANY EFFECT.

YES.—a) Excommunication, if it is unjust on the part of the one who inflicts it, either through hatred or anger, has its effect; b) if it is unjust on the part of the excommunication itself, so that the error produces no sentence, then it is ineffective.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the hatred or anger of the one who excommunicates does not hinder the excommunication from taking effect; hence the one excommunicated suffers it justly, although the judge acts unjustly, and sins.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such an excommunication, being null and void, is no excommunication. But if the error does not annul the sentence, the excommunication is effective, and the object of it must humbly obey (and it will be to his merit), and either recur to a superior judge or seek absolution from the excommunication. If however he should scorn to do so, by that fact he would sin mortally. It happens sometimes that there is a due reason on the part of the excommunicator, which is not due on the part of the object of excommunication; as when someone is excommunicated for a false crime, which has been proved against him; and then, if he humbly suffers it, the merit of humility will compensate for the loss incurred by excommunication.

QUESTION XXII

THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED **ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY PRIEST CAN EXCOMMUNICATE.**

NO.—THE REASON is that excommunication belongs to the forum of external judgment; hence only those can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial forum. And for this reason only Bishops and major superiors, according to the more

common opinion, can excommunicate; but parish priests can excommunicate only by delegated authority.

ART. II.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE NOT PRIESTS CAN EXCOMMUNICATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that excommunication does not directly regard grace, but indirectly, insofar as a person is deprived of the suffrages of the Church, which dispose him for grace or maintain him in it. Hence even those who are not priests, can excommunicate, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court.

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN WHO IS EXCOMMUNICATED OR SUSPENDED CAN EXCOMMUNICATE ANOTHER.

NO.—THE REASON is that every excommunicated person is separated from the communion of the faithful; and therefore the excommunicate is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. If a person is suspended from Order only, then he cannot exercise the powers of Order, but he can exercise those of jurisdiction; and on the other hand if he is suspended from jurisdiction, and not from Order, he cannot exercise the powers of jurisdiction, but can exercise those of Order; —if he is suspended from both, then he can do neither.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN CAN EXCOMMUNICATE HIMSELF, HIS EQUAL, OR SUPERIOR.

NO.—THE REASON is that jurisdiction establishes a man in a degree of superiority in respect to the one over whom he has jurisdiction, because he is his judge; and therefore no one has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal.

ART. V.—WHETHER SENTENCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION CAN BE PASSED ON A BODY OF MEN.

NO.—THE REASON is that an act of sin does not belong to a community but to individuals. For it is incredible that a whole body of men should be bound together in wickedness. Hence individuals of a community can be excommunicated but not the community itself. And in this the Church imitates the judgment of God, whose will is not to judge all the earth, so as to condemn the just with the wicked, as is said in Gen. xviii.—But the same reason does not apply to suspension and interdict, because those under suspension and interdict are not deprived of the suffrages of the Church, as are excommunicates (Ad 2).

ART. VI.—WHETHER A MAN CAN BE EXCOMMUNICATED WHO IS ALREADY UNDER SENTENCE OF EXCOMMUNICATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that there can be a new reason for a fresh excommunication.—For the privation of excommunication, although it is in itself incapable of greater and less, is capable of greater and less in respect of its cause; and in this way excommunication can be repeated; and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further away from the prayers of the Church than one who has been excommunicated only once (Ad 2).

**QUESTION XXIII
COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS**

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL, IN PURELY CORPORAL MATTERS, TO COMMUNICATE WITH AN EXCOMMUNICATED PERSON.

NO.—If it is a question of major excommunication, it is not lawful, properly speaking, to communicate with an excommunicated person; in some cases, however, his communication is permitted.

THE REASON is that major excommunication excludes a man from the sacraments of the Church, and from the communion of the faithful. Hence such excommunication forbids one to communicate with the excommunicated. But, because the Church exercises excommunication for a remedy, and not for destruction, some exceptions are made from this general rule. These are contained in the verse:

Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity.

Utility is referred to the words of salvation (the preaching of the Gospel); law, to marriage, so that a wife and children and servants can communicate with the excommunicated person; lowliness, to subjection. The other cases are evident.

ART. II.—WHETHER A PERSON INCURS EXCOMMUNICATION FOR COMMUNICATION WITH ONE WHO IS EXCOMMUNICATED.

YES.—One who communicates with an excommunicated person is also excommunicated, sometimes by major, and sometimes by minor excommunication.

THE REASON is that, if excommunication strikes even those who communicate with its object, then, evidently, every such person incurs excommunication.—Likewise, if a person communicates with him in crime, by affording him counsel, aid, and comfort. In this case, he again incurs the major excommunication. But if he communicates in other matters, as in words, greeting, or eating, then he suffers the minor excommunication.

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS ALWAYS A MORTAL SIN TO COMMUNICATE WITH AN EXCOMMUNICATED PERSON IN OTHER CASES THAN THOSE IN WHICH IT IS ALLOWED.

NO.—THE REASON is that it seems very hard that a man should sin mortally by uttering a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by communicating a person should lay a snare of damnation for many, which might turn to one's own hurt. Hence it seems more probable that one does not sin mortally, but only when he communicates with the excommunicated person in a criminal act, or in act of divine worship (i.e., in the sacraments and in the offices that are celebrated in the public name and ministry in the churches), or through contempt of the Church.

**QUESTION XXIV
ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION
(three articles)**

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY PRIEST CAN ABSOLVE HIS SUBJECT FROM EXCOMMUNICATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that in absolving from excommunication one is required to have jurisdiction in the external forum, which a priest does not always have over his subjects, unless the excommunication is reserved to no one; for it belongs to the same power to excommunicate and to absolve from excommunication.

ART. II.—WHETHER ANYONE CAN BE ABSOLVED AGAINST HIS WILL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the evil of punishment does not originate in the will of the sufferer; hence, just as excommunication can be inflicted on an unwilling person, so also an unwilling person can be absolved from it.

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN CAN BE ABSOLVED FROM ONE EXCOMMUNICATION WITHOUT BEING ABSOLVED FROM ALL.

YES.—THE REASON is that excommunications are not connected together in any way; hence it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and to remain in the other.

**QUESTION XXV
INDULGENCES CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES**

Here we are to treat of indulgences: 1) In themselves; 2) those who grant them; 3) those who receive them. The first head will be in three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER AN INDULGENCE CAN REMIT ANY PART OF THE PUNISHMENT DUE FOR THE SATISFACTION OF SINS.

YES.—Indulgences avail, both as regards the forum of the Church and as regards the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment remaining after contrition, confession, and absolution, whether this punishment has been enjoined, or not.

THE REASON is that, as was said above (q. xiii, art. 2), by reason of Christ's

Mystical Body one person can satisfy for another; and thus this great store of merits of Christ and the saints are the common property of the whole Church. Now the goods that are common to a multitude are distributed to each of the members of the community according to the judgment of the one who presides over the community.

NOTE: Those who gain indulgences should be advised not on this account to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER INDULGENCES ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS THEY CLAIM TO BE.

YES.—It can be simply stated that indulgences have the value that is claimed for them, provided that on the part of the grantor there is authority and on the part of the recipient there is charity; and that on the part of the cause of granting there is piety, which includes the honor of God and the advantage of the neighbor.

THE REASON is that the cause of the remission of the punishment in indulgences is not to be gauged by another standard than the abundance of the merits of the Church. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person, so does he obtain remission.

But in order that they may be applied to this person authority for dispensing this treasure is required; and also union between the recipient and Him who merited it (and this is brought about by charity); and a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention of those who wrought these meritorious works be safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence, whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting indulgences.

NOTE: 1. Because the effects of the sacraments are determined not by man, but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of Confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of Orders from the punishment due; it is God who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the other hand, the key of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. Hence it is that legates, even though they are not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently, the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who wants that indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully (Ad 1).

2. When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone who helps toward the building of a church, we must understand this to mean a help proportionate to the giver; and insofar as he approaches to this he will gain the indulgence more or less fully. Consequently, a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence; not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work, just as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him an obel (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER AN INDULGENCE OUGHT TO BE GRANTED FOR TEMPORAL HELP.

YES.—THE REASON is that temporal things can be ordered to spiritual uses; hence in this there is no simony, because a spiritual thing is not given for a temporal thing, but one spiritual thing for another.

QUESTION XXVI THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY PARISH PRIEST CAN GRANT INDULGENCES.

NO.—Parish priests and Abbots or other such superiors cannot grant indulgences.

THE REASON is that such persons are not properly prelates, for only a Bishop is properly called a prelate of the Church. Hence he alone receives the ring of the Church, like a bridegroom. Consequently, full power in the dispensation of the sacraments and jurisdiction in the public tribunal belong to him alone as a public person, and to

others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants; hence, in consecrating priests, the Bishop says: "The more fragile we are the more we need these assistants."

ART. II.—WHETHER A DEACON OR ANOTHER WHO IS NOT A PRIEST CAN GRANT AN INDULGENCE.

YES.—Not by his own power, but by delegated authority.

THE REASON is that the power to grant indulgences follows jurisdiction, as was said above (prec. q., art. 2). And, because deacons, and others who are not priests, can have jurisdiction, either delegated, as have legates, or ordinary, as Bishops elect, so they can grant indulgences even though they are not priests, although they cannot absolve in the forum of Penance, for this is the work of Order.

ART. III.—WHETHER A BISHOP CAN GRANT INDULGENCES.

YES.—The power of granting indulgences resides fully in the Pope. But in Bishops the power resides within fixed limits, subject to the Pope's ordination.

THE REASON is that the Pope has the fullness of pontifical power, as a king in his kingdom. But Bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, as judges over each city. For this reason the Pope in his encyclicals calls only them brethren; the rest he calls sons.

ART. IV.—WHETHER INDULGENCES CAN BE GRANTED BY ONE IN MORTAL SIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that by sin man does not lose jurisdiction; for man does not remit the punishment by force of his own merits, but by force of the merits stored in the treasury of the Church.

QUESTION XXVII
THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL
(four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AN INDULGENCE AVAILS THOSE WHO ARE IN MORTAL SIN.

NO.—a) Neither for the remission of the punishment, b) nor to acquire grace, c) unless the indulgence is applied in some particular form.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that he who has not been reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church, either by indulgences or in the tribunal of Penance.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, although those merits that are applied by means of indulgences can avail to merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet they are not dispensed for this reason, but are applied for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail for those who are in mortal sin. Consequently in all indulgences mention is made of those who are truly contrite and have confessed.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, if the application were made in this form: "I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church, or of one congregation, or of one particular person," then they could have value to merit something for one who is in mortal sin.

ART. II.—WHETHER INDULGENCES AVAIL FOR RELIGIOUS.

YES.—THE REASON is that religious are no less capable of being helped by the merits of others than are laymen.—For, although religious are in the state of perfection, yet even they cannot live without sin; and therefore, if sometimes they are subject to punishment because of some sin committed this can be expiated by indulgences (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER AN INDULGENCE CAN EVER BE GRANTED TO ONE WHO DOES NOT FULFILL THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED.

NO.—THE REASON is that an indulgence cannot be applied to anyone save with the intention of the one who grants the indulgence. If therefore he who grants the indulgence does so under certain conditions the one who does not fulfill that condition does not gain the indulgence.

ART. IV.—WHETHER AN INDULGENCE AVAILS THE PERSON WHO GRANTS IT.

YES.—a) It does not avail him if he grants it only for himself; b) he can, however, take advantage of an indulgence that he grants for others.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a prelate to whom the care of the Church's good and the furthering of God's honor is entrusted does not need to entice himself therefor (he already has this by the commission given him).—Likewise, no one can exercise an act of jurisdiction over himself (Ad 1).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that for some persons there is a reason for granting an indulgence, and therefore the prelate can take advantage of it, like the others.

**QUESTION XXVIII
THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE****ART. I.—WHETHER A PENANCE SHOULD BE PUBLISHED OR SOLEMNIZED.**

Yes.—For four reasons:

FIRST, that a public sin may have a remedy; SECONDLY, because one who has committed a very grave offense is also deserving of the greatest confusion in this world; THIRDLY, that this may be a deterrent to others; FOURTHLY, that he may be an example of penance, lest those should despair who have committed grievous sins.

NOTE: Solemn penance, as regards the imposition, does not go outside the secret tribunal, because, just as one confesses in secret, so a penance is imposed on him in secret; but the execution goes outside the secret tribunal; and this is not unreasonable. (The Holy Doctor here supposes the sin to be public. For no public penance is ever given save for a public sin.)

ART. II.—WHETHER A SOLEMN PENANCE CAN BE REPEATED.

NO.—A solemn penance should not be repeated, for three reasons.

1. Lest its frequency bring it into contempt. 2. Because it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which was done only once. 3. Because it is as it were a profession of continual repentance. If, however, the person sins later opportunity for penance is not closed to him, but no solemn penance should again be imposed.

ART. III.—WHETHER SOLEMN PENANCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON WOMEN AND CLERICS, AND WHETHER ANY PRIEST CAN IMPOSE IT.

ANSWER: a) Solemn penance should be imposed even on women, but this should not involve the cutting off of her hair; b) it should not be imposed on clerics; c) nor can it be imposed by any priest, but by a Bishop only.

THE REASONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND are that no solemn penance is imposed on clerics, namely that which is done on the first day of Lent according to the ritual, on account of scandal, and lest Holy Orders be brought into contempt. But this reason does not hold for women, or for laymen. As regards the cutting off of the hair, note that a woman has her hair in sign of subjection, but not a man. And, therefore, it is not fitting that the penance of a woman be the cutting off of her hair, as it is for a man (Ad 1).

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that such a solemn penance is not imposed save for very grave sin, which has disturbed the whole city; hence it is reserved to a Bishop alone.

NOTE: Public and not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing solemnity. And this can be repeated, and imposed by a simple priest, and can be imposed even on a cleric (at end of art.).

**QUESTION XXIX
THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE
AND INSTITUTION**

Now we are to consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction, about which five points are to be treated: 1) Its essentials and institution; 2) its effect; 3) its minister; 4) the one on whom it should be bestowed, and on what part; 5) its repetition. About the first point there are nine articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that Extreme Unction is not subordinated to another sacrament, as though annexed to it, as the sacramentals are subordinated; but it reaches (directly) to the effect principally intended in the administration of the sacraments, namely the healing of the disease of sin, as is clear from the words of James, v, 14-15: "Is any one among you sick? Let him bring in the presbyters of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall save the sick man, and the Lord will raise him up, and if he be in sinns they shall be forgiven him." Therefore Extreme Unction is not a sacramental, but a sacrament.

NOTE: This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because "the Law brought nobody to perfection" (Heb. vii. 19), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament as by a figure of the same kind. Nevertheless, it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by all the healings related in the Old Testament (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION IS ONE SACRAMENT.

YES.—Not by reason of indivisibility, as a point, or unity; or by reason of being continuous, as a line; but by reason of completion, insofar as something is constituted from any parts, as a house.

THE REASON is that the several actions, or anointings, of this sacrament are essential for its perfection; for they are ordained to signify or cause one thing, namely the healing of the inner wounds, which cannot be perfectly signified save by the application of medicine to the various sources of the wounds.—Therefore, just as the Eucharist, although it has diversity of matter and form, yet is one sacrament; so also is this sacrament of Extreme Unction (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT WAS INSTITUTED BY CHRIST.

YES.—In fact, all the sacraments were instituted by Christ Himself.

THE REASON is that the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law; wherefore their institution pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which efficacy was given them by God alone.—If no mention is made of this sacrament in the Gospel, it must be said that the Lord did and said much that is not contained in the Gospel. For the Evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly those things that are essential for salvation and pertain to the ordering of the Church. Hence they recorded the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist, and Order, rather than of Extreme Unction or Confirmation, which are neither essential to salvation nor necessary for the ordering or division of the Church. As a matter of fact, however, an anointing done by the Apostles is mentioned in the Gospel of Mark, vi, 13, where it is said that the Apostles "anointed the sick with oil" (Ad 1).

ART. IV.—WHETHER OLIVE OIL IS SUITABLE MATTER FOR THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that anointing with oil, which has a softening effect and penetrates to the very heart of a thing and spreads over it, excellently corresponds to a final spiritual, and therefore to a perfect, healing. And, because the name oil is primarily given to the liquid extracted from olives, whereas other liquids are called oil only by analogy with it, therefore olive oil should be that which is employed as the matter of this sacrament.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE OIL OUGHT TO BE CONSECRATED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacraments that are not perfected in the very consecration of the matter, as the Eucharist is perfected, but in their use, as in the other sacraments, have their matter sanctified, either by the use or contact of Christ Himself, as in the water of Baptism, or by the consecration of the Church, as in this sacrament. For Christ did not use this sacrament, or any bodily anointing, because it did not befit Him (since He is the Author of grace and sanctity); and therefore the consecration of the matter is required in all anointings.

NOTE: Theologians ask whether this consecration is of the necessity of precept or of the sacrament: The opinion affirming the latter is more probable and in practice must be followed.—Paris.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT NEED BE CONSECRATED BY A BISHOP.

YES.—THE REASON is that in all the sacraments that need a consecrated matter the first consecration of the matter is performed by a Bishop, and the application thereof sometimes by a priest, to show that the priestly power is derived from that of the Bishop.

ART. XII.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT HAS A FORM.

YES.—THE REASON is that the signification of the matter of the sacraments cannot be determined to any particular effect (since it is indifferent to many things), save by a verbal form. Now James (v, 14-15) would seem to have established the whole force of this sacrament in a prayer, which is the form of this sacrament, as will be explained (in replies of art. 8 and 9, seq.).

NOTE: Holy Writ is proposed to all alike. And hence the form of Baptism, which can be bestowed by all, should be expressed in Holy Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament expressed faith, which is necessary for salvation. But the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the Apostles, who received them from the Lord, as the Apostle says (I Cor., xi, 23): "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered to you. . ." (Ad 1).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED BY WAY OF ASSERTION OR OF PETITION.

ANSWER: It should be uttered in a prayer of petition, as is evident from the words of James (v, 14), and from the custom of the Church; and this for three reasons:

THE FIRST REASON is that the one who receives the sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers.

THE SECOND REASON is that this sacrament is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the court of the Church and resting in the hands of God alone; they are committed to Him in prayer.

THE THIRD REASON is that the effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, as is the case with the character in Baptism. Hence in this sacrament the form cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the other sacraments. Now certain words, viz.: "I anoint these eyes with oil blessed in the name of the Father," etc., which were used in certain churches in bestowing this sacrament, are not the form of this sacrament, but are a preparation for the form, insofar as these words determine the intention of the minister for this act (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE FOREGOING PRAYER IS A SUITABLE FORM FOR THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that it includes the sacrament by the words: "By this holy unction," and that which works in the sacrament, viz., "the mercy of God;" and the effect, namely "the remission of sins."

NOTE: According to the Council of Trent (Sess. xiv, cap. 1), the form of this sacrament is: "By this holy unction may God forgive you whatever sins you may have committed by sight. . . ."

**QUESTION XXX
THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT**

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER EXTREME UNCTION AVAILS FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS.

YES.—The principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sins, as to its remnants, and consequently even as to its guilt, if it find it.

THE REASON is that the principal effect of a sacrament is what it signifies. Now this sacrament is applied by way of a kind of medicament or healing. Moreover, just as bodily medicament presupposes bodily life in the patient, so this spiritual medicament presupposes spiritual life. Consequently this sacrament is not given as a remedy for the defects that destroy spiritual life, namely original or mortal sin; but against those defects that *weaken* man spiritually; and this defect is nothing else than a certain weakness and unfitness, which are left in us as a result of actual or original sin, and which are called the remnants of sin. But, because grace is incompatible with sin, therefore, as a consequence, if this sacrament finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as to the guilt, provided no obstacle is interposed on the part of the recipient, as was also said of the Eucharist and Confirmation. Hence James too speaks conditionally of the remission of sin, in the words: "If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him."

ART. II.—WHETHER BODILY HEALTH IS AN EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT.

YES.—The anointing of this sacrament causes even bodily healing, not by any natural property, but by divine power, and therefore does not always produce it.

THE REASON is that bodily healing, which is a secondary effect of this sacrament, follows only insofar as it is expedient for the principal healing, which is spiritual; and then it always produces bodily health, provided there is no obstacle on the part of the recipient; for this sacrament, for its part, has efficacy for bodily healing, as is patent from the form itself (Ad 3)

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT IMPRESSES A CHARACTER.

NO.—THE REASON is that this sacrament is only for a remedy; and it does not depute a man to perform or receive any sacred action.—Now the unction that is employed in this sacrament is not one of consecration, as that which is performed in Order and Confirmation, but is an anointing of medicament (Ad 2).

NOTE: In Extreme Unction the sacrament-only is the anointing together with the form; infused grace is the effect-only; spiritual devotion, relief, and comfort are the effect-and-sacrament.—Paris.

QUESTION XXXI
THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT
(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A LAYMAN CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that, although at the point of death Baptism can be conferred even by a layman, so that the way of salvation may not be cut off, yet not so Extreme Unction, the necessity of which is not so great as to need a dispensation.

ART. II.—WHETHER A DEACON CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that a deacon has the power to cleanse, but not to enlighten. And, because enlightening comes through grace, therefore a deacon cannot confer by virtue of his office any sacrament in which grace is bestowed.

ART. III.—WHETHER ONLY A BISHOP CAN CONFER THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—Even simple priests can administer this sacrament.

THE REASON is that those sacraments are reserved to be dispensed only by the Bishops that place the recipient in some state of perfection over others. Now this is not so in this sacrament, since it is given to all.—With respect to Confirmation, which is administered only by a Bishop by virtue of his office, note that this impresses a character whereby a man is placed in a state of perfection. But this is not so in this sacrament. And therefore the cases are not alike (Ad 1).

QUESTION XXXII
ON WHOM THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE CONFERRED, AND ON
WHAT PART OF THE BODY.
(seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE CONFERRED ON THOSE IN GOOD HEALTH.

NO.—THE REASON is that this sacrament is a kind of spiritual healing, as was

said (q. xxx, art. 1 and 2), which is signified after the manner of physical healing. Hence this sacrament cannot be conferred on those not subject to bodily healing, i.e., the well.

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN IN ANY SICKNESS.

NO.—THE REASON is that this sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can confer, as immediately preparing one for glory. And therefore it should be given only to those who are so ill as to be in a state of departure, because illness is apt by its nature to cause death, or fear of its danger.

ART. III.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO MADMEN AND IMBECILES.

NO.—THE REASON is that, since the form of this sacrament is one of petition, as was said (q. xxxix, art. 8), therefore the devotion of the recipient is of the greatest avail to receive the effect of this sacrament, and this is not found in madmen and imbeciles, unless they should have lucid intervals, in which they can recognize the sacrament; and thus it can be conferred on them in this state.

NOTE: No present or actual devotion is required, but it suffices to have had a past devotion, provided there is no danger of irreverence to the sacrament. Hence Extreme Unction should be administered to those who have lost the use of reason by disease, even if they were suddenly attacked by it and die without Confession.—Paris.

NOTE: On account of the form of this sacrament, it avails much to receive its effect that there should be personal merit in those who bestow it, and the general merits of the whole Church (in body of art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CHILDREN.

NO.—It should not be given to children who do not yet have the use of reason.

THE REASON is that this sacrament demands actual devotion in the recipient, as does the Eucharist. Hence, just as the Eucharist should not be given to children, so neither should this sacrament.—Likewise, because this sacrament is given against those infirmities especially that are caused by actual sin, being as it were, the remnants of sin, which are not in children (Ad 1 and 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE WHOLE BODY SHOULD BE ANOINTED IN THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that this sacrament is given after the manner of healing. Now bodily healing need not be administered by means of a remedy applied to the whole body, but only those parts where the disease has its source. Consequently, the sacramental unction also should be applied only on those parts in which the spiritual infirmity has its source.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE PARTS TO BE ANOINTED ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—The five organs of sense, the loins and feet, the first five of which are essential to the sacrament.

NOTE: The anointing of the loins, as the Ritual prescribes, is always omitted in the case of women, and even in that of men, when the sick man cannot be conveniently moved.

THE REASON is that the places nearest to the principles of sinning, which are the principles of action, are suitably anointed. Now these are the directive principle, which is in the cognitive power; the commanding principle, which is in the appetitive power, and the principle of movement, which is in the motive power. Now knowledge has its life from sense, and therefore the five places of sense are anointed, namely the eyes, on account of sight; the ears, on account of hearing; the nostrils, on account of smell; the mouth, on account of taste; and the hands on account of touch, which is keenest at the finger tips.—On account of the appetitive power the loins are anointed; the feet are anointed on account of the motive power, for they are its chief instrument.

And, because the principle of human operation is the cognitive power, therefore the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THOSE WHO ARE DEFORMED IN THOSE PARTS SHOULD BE ANOINTED.

YES.—The mutilated or deformed should also be anointed, as near as possible to those parts in which the anointing should have been made.

THE REASON is that, although they do not have these members, yet the mutilated have the powers of the soul, which are due to these members, at least in their sources; and they can sin interiorly by the things that belong to those parts, although not exteriorly.

QUESTION XXXIII THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT SHOULD BE REPEATED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the effect of this sacrament, which is healing of mind and body, is not perpetual, but can be lost, after being produced by the sacrament; therefore this sacrament can be repeated without injury to it.

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO BE REPEATED DURING THE SAME ILLNESS.

YES.—Those who suffer from the same illness, not in the same but in a different crisis, can be given Extreme Unction a second time.

THE REASON is that if the patient suffers a relapse there will be another illness; and therefore another anointing can be made, since the patient has again come close to the point of death.

QUESTION XXXIV

THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS

We have now to consider the sacrament of Order: 1) Order in general; 2) the different Orders; 3) the ministers of Order; 4) the impediments of candidates for Orders; 5) what is annexed to the Orders.—About Order in general three things are to be studied: 1) Its essence and parts; 2) its effect; 3) those who receive it. About the first point five questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ORDER IN THE CHURCH.

YES.—The REASON is that God, that He might be portrayed in His works, not only as He is in Himself, but also according as He acts on others, has so ordered that last things should be reduced and perfected by middle things, and middle things by the first. And therefore, that this beauty might not be wanting to the Church, He established Order in her, so that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God, even as in the natural body some members act on others.

ART. II.—WHETHER ORDER IS PROPERLY DEFINED.

YES.—Order, insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church, is defined as “a kind of seal of the Church, whereby spiritual power is transmitted to the one ordained.”

THE REASON is that this definition contains two things, which are essential in this sacrament, namely an outward sign (“a kind of seal,” that is, a kind of sign) and an interior effect (“whereby a spiritual power. . .”).

NOTE: The word “order” is used in two ways: Sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the inferior and in the superior, and it is not thus that it is used here. Sometimes, however, it denotes the degree that results in the order taken in the first sense. And, since the notion of order as relation is observed where we first meet with something higher than another, it follows that this degree of pre-eminence is called Order (Ad 4).

NOTE: This sacrament can be more fully defined as: The seal whereby a spiritual power is transmitted and grace conferred for the proper discharge of ecclesiastical offices.—Paris

ART. III.—WHETHER ORDER IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that a sacrament, as is clear from what has been said (q. xxix, art. 1), is nothing else than a sanctification given to man with a certain visible sin. Hence, since in the reception of Order a certain consecration is given to man by means of visible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament.

NOTE: The anointing of kings is not a sacrament, because it is not ordained for the dispensation of the sacraments of God, as is the anointing of Order (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT IS SUITABLY EXPRESSED.

NOTE: The form of this sacrament is not an agreed point among theologians. Some hold that it consists in the words recited by the Bishop while imposing hands; others say that the form is the words that the Bishop utters in the delivery of the instruments, and this is more in harmony with St. Thomas' opinion.—Paris.

YES.—The form that the Church uses in this sacrament is suitable.

THE REASON is that it expresses the transmission of power, in which this sacrament principally consists, and the use of the power itself, by which the power becomes known, for powers are made known by their acts.

ART. V.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT HAS ANY MATTER.

YES.—a) This sacrament has a matter, like the other sacraments, except Penance; b) yet it has it in a way different from the other sacraments that have a matter.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the proper effect of this sacrament, namely the character, is not received by any operation of the one who approaches the sacrament, as is the case in Penance; but it comes altogether from without; and therefore it belongs to it to have a matter, like the other sacraments.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that which is conferred in the other sacraments is derived only from God, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament. But that which is delivered in this sacrament, namely spiritual power, is derived also from the one who confers the sacrament, as imperfect power from perfect. And therefore the efficacy of the other sacraments consists chiefly in the matter, which signifies and contains a divine power, given through the sanctification applied by the minister; but the efficacy of this sacrament resides principally in him who dispenses it. Hence the delivery of the matter is more essential to this sacrament than contact with it. Yet the words of the form seem to show that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament, because it is said: "Receive" this, or that (Ad 3).

NOTE: The author does not deny that the matter together with the form has the power to confer the effect, but he attributes this principally to the minister, in relation to the matter.

By the words in Ad 3 the Holy Doctor signifies that this opinion is probable; wherefore if anyone should in fact not touch the matter, the sacrament would have to be repeated conditionally.

QUESTION XXXV THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SANCTIFYING GRACE IS CONFERRED IN THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as sanctifying grace is necessary for man to receive the sacraments worthily, so also it is necessary that he may dispense them worthily. Now God, whose works are perfect (Deut. xxxii, 4), when He gives a power gives also what is suitable to the execution of that power. Wherefore the Apostle (I Tim. iv, 14): "Do not neglect the grace that is in thee, granted to thee by reason of prophecy with the laying on of hands of the presbyterate."

NOTE: The worthy exercise of Orders requires, not any kind of goodness, but

eminent goodness, in order that, as they who receive Orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so they may be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are required to have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ's people, but when they receive Orders they are given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater things (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER IN THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER A CHARACTER IS IMPRINTED IN CONNECTION WITH ALL THE ORDERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that any Order places a man above the people in some degree of a power ordained for the dispensation of the sacraments. Hence, since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted in every Order, the sign of which is that they remain forever, and are never repeated.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER OF ORDER PRESUPPOSES THE BAPTISMAL CHARACTER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the baptismal character makes a man capable of receiving the other sacraments. Hence he who does not have the baptismal character cannot receive any other sacrament.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER OF ORDER NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSES THE CHARACTER OF CONFIRMATION.

NO.—The character of Confirmation is presupposed as congruous, but not as necessary.

THE REASON is that as a matter of congruity every perfection is required by which a man is rendered fit for the execution of Order; and one of these is that he be confirmed. Hence those who have not received Confirmation would be ordained validly, but illicitly.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER OF ONE ORDER NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSES THE CHARACTER OF ANOTHER ORDER.

NO.—THE REASON is that powers are distinct, and one, for its part, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the primitive Church some were ordained as presbyters who had not previously received the lower Orders; yet the Church has determined by statute that no one may enter the major Orders who has not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. Hence it is that those who are ordained without going through the lower orders are not, according to the canons, reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding orders.

QUESTION XXXVI

THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER GOODNESS OF LIFE IS REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE ORDERS.

YES.—Holiness of life is required for Order by the necessity of precept, but not by the necessity of the sacrament.

THE REASON is that, since in every order a man is set as leader over others in divine matters, he who would approach Orders in the consciousness of mortal sin would sin mortally by presumption, as it were.

NOTE: Because Order makes spiritual ministers mediators between God and the people, therefore they must shine with a good conscience before God, and with good reputation among men (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL HOLY WRIT IS REQUIRED.

NO.—Knowledge of all Holy Writ is not required, but as much of this knowledge as suffices to direct oneself in the act of that Order.

THE REASON is that those who are set over others by receiving the care of souls must know the things that pertain to the doctrine of faith and morals, and which regard

the carrying out of the duties of their Order. Now it belongs to the higher priests, namely the Bishops, to know the points of the law that can present a difficulty, to know them the more perfectly the higher the degree in which they are placed (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER A MAN OBTAINS THE DEGREES OF ORDER BY THE MERIT OF HIS LIFE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the ministers of the Church are not constituted in the degrees of Order by the fact of their having grace, but by the fact of their partaking of a sacrament of grace, which is Order.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN WHO RAISES UNWORTHY PERSONS TO ORDERS SINS.

YES.—By raising unworthy men to Orders he commits a mortal sin, as being unfaithful to the sovereign Lord, especially since this turns to the hurt of the Church and the honor of God.

THE REASON is that whoever raises the unworthy to Orders becomes guilty of unfaithfulness, since he would give divine things above measure, contrary to Luke xii, which describes the faithful servant who was set over his master's household to give them their ration of grain.

ART. V.—WHETHER A MAN WHO IS IN SIN CAN WITHOUT SIN EXERCISE THE ORDER HE HAS RECEIVED.

NO.—THE REASON is that whoever exercises any sacred office in mortal sin does this unworthily; for it is of the natural law that holy things should be treated holily.

**QUESTION XXXVII
THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING
OF THE CHARACTER**

(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO DISTINGUISH SEVERAL ORDERS.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is to show forth the wisdom of God, which is reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual.

THE SECOND REASON is to succor human weakness, because it would be impossible for one man, without being heavily burdened, to fulfill all the things pertaining to the divine mysteries.

THE THIRD REASON is to give men a broader way for advancing in perfection, seeing that the various duties are divided among many men, so that all become the co-operators of God, than which there is nothing more God-like, as Dionysius says (*Eccles. Hier. iii*).

NOTE: The division of Order is not that of an integral whole into its parts, or of a universal whole, but of a potential whole, the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation thereof. Thus it is here: For the entire fullness of the sacrament is in one Order, namely the priesthood, whereas in the other sacraments it is a participation of Order. And therefore all Orders are one sacrament (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE ARE SEVEN ORDERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the distinction of Orders, which are degrees ordained for the Eucharist, are derived from their relation to the Eucharist, and in this way there are seven degrees of the power of Order. For the power of Order is either for the consecration of the Eucharist itself, or for some ministry ordained to this sacrament of the Eucharist. In the first case, we have the Order of priests, in the second, there is a co-operation of ministers, which is either in relation to the sacrament itself or in relation to the recipients. In the first there is a threefold co-operation: The first is in relation to the dispensation of the sacrament itself, and this belongs to a deacon, who dispenses the blood of Christ.

The second is the ministry directed to the disposal of the sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament itself, and this belongs to a subdeacon.

The third is the ministry directed to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs to the acolyte, who prepares the cruet with wine and water. And thus in relation to the sacrament itself there are three degrees, namely the diaconate, the subdiaconate, and the acolytate.

In relation to these who receive this sacrament, there are three degrees or orders, distinguished according to the three classes of the unclean, namely, first, the unbelievers, who refuse to believe, and who are to be altogether debarred from beholding divine things and from the assembly of the faithful; and this belongs to the porters.

Secondly, the degree of those who wish to believe, but are not yet instructed, namely the catechumens; and for their instruction is directed the Order of lectors.

Thirdly, the degree of those who are believers and instructed, yet lie under an impediment through the power of the devil, namely those who are possessed; and to this ministry the Order of exorcists is directed. This makes clear the reason and number of the degrees of Orders.

NOTE: In the primitive Church, on account of the scarcity of ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius says (*Eccl. Hier. cap. 3*): "Some of the ministers stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise occupied in the exercise of their own Order; others place the sacred bread and the chalice of Benediction on the altar and offer them to the priests." Nevertheless, all the power to do all these things was included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the divine worship developed, and the Church committed expressly to several persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly to one Order (*Ad 2*).

ART. III.—WHETHER ORDERS SHOULD BE DIVIDED INTO THOSE THAT ARE SACRED AND THOSE THAT ARE NOT.

YES.—a) Not considered in themselves, but b) by reason of the matter about which they exercise their act.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus every Order is sacred, since it is a sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that three Orders, namely the priesthood, the diaconate, and the subdiaconate, exercise their act with regard to something consecrated; whereas the other Orders do not. For the priesthood and diaconate exercise their act on the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate exercises its act on the consecrated vessels; wherefore continence is enjoined even on these ministers, that those who handle holy things may themselves be pure and holy.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE ORDERS ARE RIGHTLY ASSIGNED IN THE TEXT.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the text the principal act is assigned to each Order, insofar as each of the Orders is most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist.

NOTE: The text referred to is *Sentences* IV, dist. 24.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE CHARACTER IS IMPRINTED ON THE PRIEST WHEN THE CHALICE IS HANDED TO HIM.

YES.—THE REASON is that the bestowal of power comes to the candidates for Orders by the fact that something is given to them that pertains to their proper and principal act. Now the principal act of the priest is to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. Hence the sacerdotal character is impressed in the very giving of the chalice with the paten under a determinate verbal form, to wit: "Receive the power to offer the sacrifice to God and to celebrate Mass, both for the living and for the dead."

NOTE: 1. The blessing, the imposition of hands, and the anointing are performed as the proximate preparation for the reception of Order; the conferring of power is effected by the bestowal of the instruments, and this is essential to the proper act; for it belongs to the same agent to produce the form and to give the matter its proximate preparation for the form.—The blessing, by which the candidates are enlisted in the divine service, is given to all. The imposition of hands is performed only for the deacons and priests, to whom the dispensation of the sacraments belongs, for this signifies the fullness of grace. The anointing is done to the priests alone, for by it they are consecrated for the purpose of handling the sacrament (*passim* in body of art.).

2. Since the principal act of the diaconate is to carry the body of Christ on the paten, and to dispense the blood with the chalice, and because such an act cannot be expressed by the giving of the vessel only, or by the giving of the matter, therefore this power is expressed by a secondary act, namely by the bestowal of the book of Gospels, and this power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is impressed at the handing over of the book (Ad 5).—The acolyte receives the character when he is given the cruet, by which the acolyte chiefly performs his ministry. He however takes his name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper to him (Ad 6).

NOTE: Because priests need the most ample grace, the priests with the Bishop lay hands on candidates for the priesthood, but only the Bishop lays hands on the deacons (next q., art. 1, ad 1).

St. Alphonsus holds as more probable the opinion declaring that the character is impressed by the imposition of hands alone. [This is confirmed by the Apostolic Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis*, issued Nov. 30, 1947].

QUESTION XXXVIII THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A BISHOP ALONE CONFERS THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER.

YES.—THE REASON is that the care of the community belongs to the Bishop. Therefore, just as civil offices in states are distributed by the one who has the superior power, like the king, so it belongs to the Bishop to establish others in all the divine ministries. Hence he alone administers Confirmation; he alone blesses virgins, who symbolize the Church that is espoused to Christ; he alone consecrates the candidates for the ministries of the sacred Orders; and he it is who determines by his consecration the vessels that they must use.

NOTE: The Pope, who has the plenitude of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a Bishop with things pertaining to the episcopal dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission such a one can confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders, which bear an immediate relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the Pope's power is no greater than that of a simple priest (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER HERETICS AND THOSE WHO ARE CUT OFF FROM THE CHURCH CAN CONFER ORDERS.

YES.—a) Heretical Bishops, who are cut off from the Church, can confer sacred Orders, as they can confer the other sacraments; b) but those ordained by them receive no grace or power to exercise the Orders they have received.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in no case can power conferred with consecration, actually remaining, be lost; just as an altar or chrism, once consecrated, remains consecrated forever.

THE REASON FOR THE SECOND is that those who receive the sacraments from heretics receive them contrary to the prohibition of the Church, and therefore receive them unlawfully, and sin thereby.

NOTE: When a man is raised to the Episcopate he receives a power that he retains forever. This however cannot be called a character, since a man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to Christ's Mystical Body. Nevertheless, it remains indelibly, even as to the character, because it is given by consecration (Ad 2).

QUESTION XXXIX THE IMPEDIMENTS OF THIS SACRAMENT (six articles)

YES.—THE REASON is that the female sex cannot signify eminence of degree, which Order signifies; for a woman is in a state of subjection. Hence it is essential to the sacrament that those who receive Order be of the male sex.—Hence, although in the things that are of the soul woman does not differ from man—and in fact is sometimes

better than many men—and although she can receive the gift of prophecy and other such offices, yet she cannot (by natural law) receive the sacrament of Order.

ART. II.—WHETHER BOYS AND THOSE WHO LACK THE USE OF REASON CAN RECEIVE ORDERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that Order does not require the act of the recipient as essential to the sacrament; but in it a spiritual power is given by God. Hence boys and others lacking the use of reason can indeed receive Order, yet with this distinction: In the minor Orders years of discretion are required out of respect for the sacrament, but not for its lawfulness or its validity. Major Orders require the use of reason, both out of respect for the sacrament and for lawfulness, both on account of the vow of continency that is annexed to them, and because the duty of handling the sacraments is entrusted to them. But for the Episcopate, whereby a man receives power also over the Mystical Body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; Wherefore the use of reason is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration.

ART. III.—WHETHER SLAVERY IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE RECEPTION OF ORDERS.

YES.—As to the act.

THE REASON is that a slave has no power over himself. If, however, he is raised to Orders, he receives the sacrament, since liberty is not essential to the sacrament, although it is required for lawfulness, since slavery does not hinder the power, but only its exercise.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MAN SHOULD BE DEBARRED FROM ORDERS ON ACCOUNT OF HOMICIDE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the sacrament of the Eucharist, to which all the Orders are referred, is the sacrament of peace, given to us by the shedding of the blood of Christ. Now homicide is most of all contrary to peace, and homicides are more like to the slayers of Christ than to the slain Christ, to whom all the aforesaid ministers of the sacrament should be molded. Therefore,, it is required by law that no homicide should be raised to Orders.

ART. V.—WHETHER THOSE OF ILLIGETIMATE BIRTH SHOULD BE DEBARRED FROM ORDERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that those who are ordained are set over others in a certain dignity, and therefore a certain splendor of good character and repute is required of them. Now in illegitimate sons this splendor is tarnished by their sinful origin; hence they are debarred from the reception of Orders, unless they are dispensed; and the dispensation will be the more difficult in proportion to the shamefulness of their origin.

ART. VI.—WHETHER LACK OF MEMBERS SHOULD BE AN IMPEDIMENT TO ORDER.

YES.—If such mutilation causes a notable deformity, e.g. the absence of a nose.

THE REASON is that such a deformity obscures personal comeliness, or can be a danger in the exercise of Order.

QUESTION XL
THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER
(seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THOSE ORDAINED SHOULD WEAR THE TONSURE.

YES.—THE REASON is that those who are assigned to the divine ministries receive a kingly dignity, and ought to be perfect in virtue. For tonsure, being circular, is a sign of royalty and perfection.—Lay brothers are tonsured because they renounce temporalities; but they are not shaved, because they are not employed in divine ministries, so as to have to contemplate divine things with the mind (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE TONSURE IS AN ORDER.

NO.—It is not an Order, but is a preamble to Order.

THE REASON is that no power of Order is conferred by tonsure, but one is deputed to the office that is exercised in common by the whole body of ministers, such as the singing of the divine praises.—This deputation does not impress a character, but it should be performed by a Bishop, who blesses the vestments and vessels and all the others things that are employed in divine worship. (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER BY RECEIVING THE TONSURE A MAN RENOUNCES TEMPORAL ORDERS.

NO.—THE REASON is that the possession of earthly things is not opposed to divine worship, to which clerics are deputed; only the excessive concern for them is so opposed, because, as Gregory says (*Moral.*, lib. x, cap. 17), "it is not wealth, but the love of wealth, that is sinful."

ART. IV.—WHETHER ABOVE THE PRIESTLY ORDER THERE OUGHT TO BE AN EPISCOPAL POWER.

YES.—There ought to be an episcopal power above the priestly as regards the secondary act of the priest, but not as regards the first act.

THE REASON is that, with regard to the first act of the priest, which is to consecrate the body of Christ, the power of the priest does not depend on any higher power, save the divine.—But as regards the second act, which is to prepare the people of God for the reception of the sacrament of Christ's body, the priest depends on a higher, namely a human, power, by which he can proceed to the act of loosing and binding. Hence this power presupposes, as to this, the jurisdiction of prelacy, by which those whom he absolves are subject to him.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE EPISCOPOATE IS AN ORDER.

NO.—a) Insofar as Order is a sacrament directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, the Episcopate is not an Order; b) it is, however, an Order insofar as it is an office in respect to certain sacred actions.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a Bishop does not have a power superior to the priest with respect to Christ's body (prev. art.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that a Bishop has power in hierarchical actions with respect to the Mystical Body that is above that of the priest.—Hence, although some spiritual power is given to the Bishop in his consecration, with respect to certain sacraments, yet that power does not have the nature of a character (Ad 2).—Yet the episcopal power, since it is related to certain sacred actions, is not one of jurisdiction merely, but also of Order (Ad 3).

NOTE: There are nine actions proper to Bishops: To ordain clerics, to bless virgins, to consecrate other Bishops, to impose hands, to dedicate churches, to depose clerics, to participate in Church councils, to bless the chrism, to consecrate vestments and vessels (*infra*, art. vii, in body of art.).

ART. VI.—WHETHER IN THE CHURCH THERE CAN BE ANYONE ABOVE THE BISHOP?

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the whole Christ is one body, it follows that, if this unity is to be preserved, there must be some power to rule in relation to the whole Church that is above the episcopal power, whereby each particular church is ruled; and this is the power of the Pope. And therefore those who deny this power are called schismatics, as rending the unity of the Church.

NOTE: The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is surpassed by the Papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a Bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas a priest cannot perform every act that a Bishop can in conferring the sacraments. Wherefore, as regards matters pertaining to the episcopal Order, all Bishops are equal, and for this reason any Bishop can consecrate another Bishop (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE MINISTERS' VESTMENTS ARE FITTINGLY INSTITUTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the ministers' vestments, insofar as the Church,

taught by the Holy Spirit, has assigned them conformably to each minister, designate the fitness required in them for handling divine things (For particular congruencies see the original text).

QUESTION XLI

THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE

We have now to consider Matrimony; 1) As directed to an office of nature; 2) as a sacrament; 3) considered absolutely and in itself. The first head will include four articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER MATRIMONY IS OF NATURAL LAW.

YES.—Insofar as that is called natural to which nature inclines, but it finds its completion in the exercise of free will.

THE REASON is that natural reason inclines naturally to Matrimony; and that in two ways: 1) As regards its principal end, which is the good of offspring, which consists in the being, nourishment, and upbringing of the child; for nature intends, not only the procreation of children, but also their education and development until they reach man's full estate, insofar as he is man. Secondly, as regards the secondary end of Matrimony, which is mutual help rendered to each other by the spouses in the affairs of the household.

NOTE: As regards the principal end of Matrimony, man's nature inclines him in respect to his generic nature; wherefore Aristotle says (*Ethics*, bk. viii, 11 and 12) that the procreation of offspring is common to all animals. But as regards the second end nature inclines man on the part of the specific difference, which is proper to the species.—On the part of man's generic nature, nature inclines to this, not in the same way in all animals, but insofar as the offspring is in need of support. In man, however, since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, there is a very strong tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER MATRIMONY FALLS UNDER PRECEPT.

NO.—THE REASON is that the natural inclination to Matrimony is not necessary for the perfection of one person (or personal perfection), but for the perfection of the many, which is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals, working for the perfection of the community. Now for the perfection of the human community, it is necessary that some be employed in the contemplative life, which is most hindered by Matrimony; and therefore nature's inclination to Matrimony does not bind by way of precept, even according to the philosophers, save at times, as in the primitive age of the world, in which the fewness of men required that each one betake himself to the begetting of children (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MARRIAGE ACT IS LAWFUL.

YES.—Against that foul heresy and madness according to which corruptible things were created by an evil God.

THE REASON is that the inclination to the procreation of offspring, to which the marriage act is directed, is of nature, and is essential to the preservation of the species. Hence it is impossible to say that such an act is unlawful in every case, so that no mean of virtue can be found in it.

NOTE: The shamefulfulness of concupiscence, which always accompanies the marriage act, is a shamefulfulness, not of guilt, but of punishment, inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and members do not obey reason (Ad 3).—Since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin (Ad 4).—The intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was previously directed by his reason (Ad 6).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MARRIAGE ACT IS MERITORIOUS.

YES.—It can be—nay, should be—meritorious, not by virtue of the difficulty of the act, but by virtue of charity.

THE REASON is that the motive of the marriage act can, and indeed should, be a virtue, either of justice, in order to render the debt, or of religion, in order that children may be procreated for the worship of God. Now if lust be the motive, though within the bounds of the goods of marriage, i. e., so that the man would in no wise be willing to go to another woman, it is a venial sin; but if it goes beyond the bounds of the goods of marriage, so that he would intend to do the same thing with any woman, it is a mortal sin.

NOTE: The difficulty required to merit the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.

QUESTION XLII MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT

(four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MATRIMONY IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that Matrimony implies a sanctifying remedy against sin, which is applied to man by means of sensible signs. And this is of the essence of a sacrament.

NOTE: 1. The form of this sacrament is the words whereby the marriage consent is expressed, and not the priest's blessing, which is a sacramental (Ad 1).—Such an act (mutual consent), which is subject to the senses, has the character of the matter of this sacrament, as does the act of the penitent in the sacrament of Penance (Ad 2). Although Matrimony is not formed to Christ's Passion as regards the pain (as the other sacraments are), it is so conformed as regards charity, whereby He suffered for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse (Ad 3).

2. The thing signified in this sacrament is Christ's union with the Church. The effect-and-sacrament is the bond between husband and wife resulting from those acts; and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, namely the particular grace that this sacrament confers on those who receive it (Ad 5).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS SACRAMENT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED BEFORE SIN WAS COMMITTED.

YES.—Not as a sacrament, but as an office of nature.

THE REASON is that even if sin did not exist Matrimony would be ordered by nature to the procreation of offspring. But insofar as marriage is a sacrament, because it is the nature of a sacrament to be a sign and a remedy, Matrimony has its institution in the New Law, as representing the mystery of the union of Christ and the Church, and as affording a remedy or help of grace against carnal concupiscence.

NOTE: According to the determination of persons (between whom marriage should not be contracted, Matrimony had its institution in the Law of Moses. As regards the other benefits flowing from Matrimony, such as friendship and the mutual help rendered each other by the spouses, it has its institution in the civil law (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER MATRIMONY CONFERS GRACE.

YES.—Matrimony, insofar as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, has the power to confer a grace that helps one to do the things that Matrimony requires.

THE REASON is that, wherever God gives some faculty, He gives also the helps whereby man can suitably use that faculty. Hence, since in Matrimony God gave man the faculty to use his wife for the begetting of children, He also gives him the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as was said of the faculty of Orders (q. xxxv, art. 1). And so this grace that is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.

NOTE: The sanctification of Matrimony does not flow principally from the blessing of the priest, but from the fact that Christ represented it by His Passion (Ad 1).

2. Just as the water of Baptism with the form of words does not operate immediately to produce grace, but the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly produce a bond, which is the sacrament of Matrimony; and this bond by virtue of divine appointment works dispositively to infuse grace (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS SACRAMENT.

NO.—It is not an integral part in respect to the primal perfection of marriage, but it is an integral part in respect to its secondary perfection.

THE REASON is that the first perfection consists in the very being of the thing; the second, in its operation. Now carnal intercourse is an operation, or the use of Matrimony, which gives the faculty for this purpose; and therefore carnal intercourse belongs to the secondary and not the primal integrity of marriage.

QUESTION XLIII MATRIMONY AS REGARDS BETROTHAL

Here we are to consider Matrimony absolutely: 1) Betrothal; 2) the nature of Matrimony; 3) its efficient cause, namely consent; 4) its blessings; 5) the impediments thereto; 6) second marriages; 7) certain things annexed to marriage. Under the first head come three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER A BETROTHAL IS A PROMISE OF FUTURE MARRIAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as the word betrothal (*sponsalia*) indicates, it is derived from plighting one's troth (*spondere*). The consent to the marriage union by words concerning a future event does not make Matrimony, but the promise of Matrimony.

NOTE: Such a promise binds both parties to contract marriage; and one sins mortally by not keeping the promise, unless a legitimate hindrance intervenes (Ad 2). If however the promise was made under an immoral condition, which is contrary to the blessings of Matrimony, as when I say: "I accept you, if you promise means of sterility, then such a promise is null and void; but if it is not contrary to the blessings of Matrimony, as if I say: "I accept you if you consent to my thefts," then the promise stands; but the condition must be removed (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER SEVEN YEARS IS FITTINGLY ASSIGNED AS THE AGE FOR BETROTHAL.

YES.—At the end of the first seven years man can contract betrothal, but not so as to bind himself by a perpetual obligation.

THE REASON is that, since betrothal is a promise concerning the future, as was said (prev. art.), it follows that it must be about things that can in some way be promised; and this can be only about things that imply some foresight for the future, and this requires the use of reason.—At the end of the first seven years man begins to be fit to make some promises for the future, especially concerning those to which natural reason inclines him more; but not to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because he does not yet have a firm will.

NOTE: If before the years of puberty the parties are betrothed by another person, either of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case the betrothal does not result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between certain persons by some other takes effect insofar as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the proper age; whence they are understood to consent to what others have done (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER A BETROTHAL CAN BE DISSOLVED.

YES.—In different ways.

THE REASON is that when one party enters religion, and the other contracts marriage with someone else by words expressive of the present, the betrothal is automatically dissolved; but in other cases this must be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church.

[NOTE: It may safely be given as a general rule that the obligation to execute the promise of marriage will very probably not be a happy one. The present Code lays down no conditions for the breaking of engagement.]

QUESTION XLIV THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MATRIMONY IS A KIND OF JOINING.

YES.—Insofar as the joining implies a bond whereby a man and a woman are obligated to each other.

THE REASON is that, since Matrimony directs persons to one generation and upbringing of offspring, and again to one domestic life, it follows that in Matrimony there is a kind of joining, according to which a man and a woman are called husband and wife; and such a joining, by the fact that it is directed to some one thing, is Matrimony; the joining of bodies and souls results from Matrimony.

ART. II.—WHETHER MATRIMONY IS FITTINGLY NAMED.

YES.—By reason of its effect.

THE REASON is that in respect to its essence Matrimony is called the conjugal union; in respect of its cause, which is the wedding, it is called a nuptial union, from *nubo*, meaning "I veil," since in the wedding ceremony, which completes the marriage, the heads of those who are wedding are covered with a veil; in respect of its effect it is properly called Matrimony, because, as Augustine says (Answer to Faustus, bk. xix, c. 26): "A woman's sole purpose in marrying should be to be a mother."—As regards the etymology of the word Matrimony various interpretations are given, to wit: It signifies *matris munium*, the office of a mother; or *matrem muniens*, protecting a mother, because Matrimony places a woman under the protection of a husband; or *matrem monens*, admonishing a mother, i.e., not to leave her husband and cleave to another; or Matrimony is so called as though it were *materia unius*, the joining together for the purpose of providing the matter for one offspring; or again from *mater* and *natus*, because Matrimony makes a woman the mother of a child.

NOTE: Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. Or we may say that woman was made chiefly in order to be man's helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER MATRIMONY IS FITTINGLY DEFINED IN THE TEXT.

NOTE: The definition alluded to is: "Marriage is the marital union of man and woman, involving legitimate persons and their living together in undivided partnership."

YES.—THE REASON is that this definition in the text (IV *Sent.*, D. 27) is in accord with the essence of Matrimony, namely a joining together, and adds a determinate subject, in the words, "involving legitimate persons;" it also includes the specific difference of the contractors in the word, "marital;" and moreover expresses the power of this union, because it is indissoluble, in the words, "undivided partnership."—Other definitions are proposed according to the cause or effect.

NOTE: Matrimony as a sacrament can be defined as the marital union or contract of a legitimately empowered Christian man and woman, involving the living together in undivided partnership, and having the power to confer sanctifying grace on the spouses.—Paris.

QUESTION XLV THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

We have next to consider the marriage consent: 1) The consent in itself; 2) the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; 3) compulsory and conditional consent; 4) the object of the consent.—Under the first stand five articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER CONSENT IS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF MATRIMONY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way. This joining is spiritual, insofar as Matrimony is an office of nature and civil life; wherefore by means of the material joining the spiritual joining is produced by divine power, for the nature of the sacraments demands that where there is a spiritual operation it should be signified and effected by means of a material operation through divine power.

NOTE: The direct object of consent is not a husband, but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CONSENT NEEDS TO BE EXPRESSED IN WORDS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the consent in material contracts, after the manner of which the matrimonial joining takes place, as was said (prev. art.), can be effected only if the contractors express their will to each other in words. Hence it is also necessary that the consent that produces Matrimony be expressed in words, so that the expression of words stands to Matrimony as the outward washing stands to Baptism.—Those who cannot express in words their mutual consent, such as deaf-mutes, or a pair speaking different languages, can express this by means of signs, which count as words (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER CONSENT GIVEN BY MEANS OF WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF THE FUTURE MAKES A MARRIAGE.

NO.—THE REASON is that when anyone expresses his consent by means of words regarding the future he does not signify that he is contracting marriage, but promises that he will do so; hence such an expression of consent does not contract Matrimony, but the promise of it, which is called betrothal.

ART. IV.—WHETHER, IN THE ABSENCE OF INWARD CONSENT, A MARRIAGE IS MADE BY CONSENT GIVEN IN WORDS OF THE PRESENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as the outward washing stands to Baptism, so stands the expression of words to this sacrament, as was said (art. 2 of this q.). Hence if anyone should receive an outward washing, without the intention of receiving the sacrament, but does this in sport or deceit, he would not be baptized. Even so, the expression of words without interior consent does not produce a marriage.—Yet it can be believed with probability that there is no deception unless evident signs of deception appear, because good is to be presumed of everyone, unless the contrary is proved (Ad 2). Accordingly, the Church judges according to what appears in the courts; nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she be deceived in the fact (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER CONSENT GIVEN SECRETLY IN WORDS OF THE PRESENT MAKES A MARRIAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that consent not given in secret is not essential to this sacrament, but to its solemnization. For it is of the essence of Matrimony that consent be expressed by words of the present, and that it be given between persons legitimately qualified to contract. The other things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, by which Matrimony is more becomingly performed. Hence if these are omitted the marriage is valid, although the contractors sin, unless they are excused by some legitimate reason.

NOTE: Canon 1094 et seq. deals with the question of clandestine marriages. They are generally invalid today.

QUESTION XLVI

THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED

(two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER AN OATH ADDED TO THE CONSENT THAT IS EXPRESSED IN WORDS OF THE FUTURE TENSE MAKES A MARRIAGE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the oath only confirms what is signified in the words, nor does it change what is signified. Hence, since words of the future do not have by their very signification the power to make a marriage, the marriage is not yet made.

NOTE: An oath to the purpose does not create a new obligation, but confirms what is already done, and thus he gravely sins who violates it (culpably). (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER CARNAL INTERCOURSE AFTER CONSENT EXPRESSED IN WORDS OF THE FUTURE MAKES A MARRIAGE.

NO.—a) In the forum of the conscience such carnal intercourse does not make the marriage, unless interior consent is present; b) in the forum of the Church such intercourse is judged to make the marriage.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that even words of the present that are expressive of consent, if mental consent be wanting, would not make a marriage, as was said above (prev. q, art. 4).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the external tribunal nothing can more expressly signify consent than carnal intercourse; hence, according to the judgment of the Church, carnal intercourse following betrothal is deemed to make a marriage, unless express signs of fraud or deception appear.

NOTE: Carnal intercourse no longer signifies consent, after the Council of Trent.

QUESTION XLVII COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT

(six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A COMPULSORY CONSENT IS POSSIBLE.

YES.—a) Not by compulsion or violence simply, b) but by mixed compulsion.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that that is called violent simply when someone by bodily strength forces a person to move. But this does not apply to the will.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that mixed compulsion, or "mixed violence," is that which creates a conditional necessity, as when someone throws overboard a cargo to save his ship, and in this kind of violence, although what is done is not of itself voluntary, yet, in consideration of the circumstances here and now, it is voluntary. And, because actions are about particulars, it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in some particular respect. Hence this violence, or compulsion, can be present in consent, which is an act of the will; as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same.

ART. II.—WHETHER A CONSTANT MAN CAN BE COMPELLED BY FEAR.

YES.—THE REASON is that a constant man is not obstinate, but midway between inconstant and obstinate. Hence a man, however constant, can be compelled by fear of greater evil to suffer a less evil, as in the case of the one who throws his cargo overboard in a storm at sea.—The inconstant man, on the contrary, is compelled to do a greater evil on account of the fear of a less evil, i.e., to sin on account of the fear of corporal punishment. The obstinate man cannot be compelled to do or to suffer even a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil.

ART. III.—WHETHER COMPULSORY CONSENT VOIDS A MARRIAGE.

YES.—Consent forced by grave fear.

THE REASON is that the fear that affects a constant man voids the perpetuity of the contract; for its complete recission can be demanded. Therefore this compulsion of fear, which affects a constant man, voids a marriage; but not other kinds of compulsion, i.e., the trifling compulsion that affects the inconstant man.

NOTE: For marriage not every kind of voluntariness suffices: It must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual, and consequently it is invalidated by violence of of a mixed nature. (Ad 2).

ART. IV.—WHETHER COMPULSORY CONSENT MAKES A MARRIAGE AS REGARDS THE PARTY WHO USES COMPULSION.

NO.—THE REASON is that marriage is a relation that cannot arise in one of the extremes without arising in another; therefore it is impossible for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband; and therefore it is a common adage that marriage does not limp.

ART. V.—WHETHER CONDITIONAL CONSENT MAKES A MARRIAGE.

YES.—a) If the condition is of the present, and contrary to the goods of Matrimony, it makes the marriage; b) if it is about a necessary future event the condition makes the marriage; c) if it is about a future contingent event, e.g., the giving of money or parental consent, it does not make the marriage.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as long as the condition stands, the marriage stands.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that future necessary events are present in their causes, as that the sun will rise tomorrow.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that a judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it makes no marriage, but only a promise.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE CAN BE COMPELLED BY ONE'S FATHER'S COMMAND TO MARRY.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, to which the son, being of free condition, cannot be compelled.—Yet the father can induce the son for a reasonable cause, and then if the cause is compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his father's command will compel him in the same measure; otherwise, not.

QUESTION XLVIII
THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT
(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CONSENT THAT MAKES A MARRIAGE IS A CONSENT TO CARNAL INTERCOURSE.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that, as was said above (q. xlv, art. 1), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a kind of association of man and wife in relation to carnal intercourse, and further consequent union between man and wife, insofar as they each receive power over each other in reference to carnal intercourse, and this association is called the conjugal bond. Hence to consent to a marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly, but not explicitly.

ART. II.—WHETHER MARRIAGE CAN RESULT FROM ONE PERSON'S CONSENT TO TAKE ANOTHER FOR A BASE MOTIVE.

YES.—Provided the base motive does not affect the essential final cause of marriage, which is the procreation of offspring.

THE REASON is that such a base motive is the accidental final cause of the marriage, from which the marriage itself does not become good or evil, but only the contractors, for whom this cause is the essential end. And, because accidental causes are numberless, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in Matrimony, some good, some bad.

QUESTION XLIX
THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE
(six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CERTAIN BLESSINGS ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO EXCUSE MARRIAGE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that no wise man should sustain any loss save for some compensation in the form of an equal or better good. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, which absorbs reason, and also on account of the tribulation of the flesh, which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things (I Cor. vii, 28). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate save by certain compensations whereby that same union is righted; and these are the goods that excuse marriage and make it good and right.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE GOODS OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENTLY ENUMERATED.

YES.—Offspring, faith, and sacrament are the primary and superior goods, which make Matrimony right.

THE REASON is that Matrimony was instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. Now insofar as it is an office of nature it is directed by two things, like any other act of virtue. One of these is demanded on the part of the

agent himself, and this is the intention of the due end; and thus the good of Matrimony is the offspring; the second is demanded on the part of the act itself, which is good generally through being about a due matter; and thus there is faith, whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and with no other. Further, it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word sacrament.

NOTE: In the good of offspring we understand not only its procreation, but also its upbringing, as was said (q. xli, art. 1).—Faith is not here taken as theological faith, but as a part of justice, according as faith takes its name from the fact that one's word is observed (*fides*, from *fiant*) in the keeping of promises. Now it belongs to the faith of Matrimony that the parties render to each other the debt; for this follows from the mutual power they give to each other.—As regards the good of the sacrament, we here understand, not only indivisibility, but everything that results from marriage, by the fact that it is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church (*passim* in the replies).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SACRAMENT IS THE CHIEF OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS.

YES.—a) As being nobler, the sacrament is simply the chief; b) as more essential, the sacrament is chief by reason of inseparability; c) by reason of nature the offspring and faith, to preserve the due end of marriage, are chief.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the sacrament belongs to Matrimony insofar as it is a sacrament of grace; the other two goods belong to it insofar as it is an office of nature; but the perfection of grace is nobler than the perfection of nature.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the offspring and faith belong to the use of Matrimony, whereas indivisibility, which the sacrament demands, belongs to Matrimony considered in itself, because by the very fact that the spouses give each other in perpetuity power over themselves in the conjugal pact it follows that they cannot be separated; hence it is that Matrimony is never found without inseparability; but it is found without faith and offspring, because the being of a thing does not depend on its use.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that, thus understanding faith and offspring, namely in their principles, as arising from the conjugal pact, we see clearly that the offspring is the most essential good in Matrimony, and second comes faith, and thirdly comes the sacrament; just as for man the being of nature is more essential than the being of grace, although the being of grace is nobler.

NOTE: Although the consent that makes a marriage is not perpetual materially, i.e., in regard to the substance of the act, since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless, formally speaking, it is perpetual, because it is a consent to a perpetual bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes the species from its object; and thus it is that Matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE MARRIAGE ACT IS EXCUSED BY THE AFORESAID GOODS.

YES.—By the aforesaid goods the marriage act is excused on the part of the act itself, so that the act itself is not evil, but is good and holy.

THE REASON is that this act, insofar as it is performed with faith and offspring, has the goodness of virtue, and insofar as it has the goodness of the sacrament, which signifies the union of Christ and the Church, it is called holy.—Now the evil that inseparably accompanies the marriage act is not the evil of sin, but of punishment, which is the insubordination of concupiscence to reason (Ad 2).—Shame follows the act, because man naturally feels shame at any defeat (Ad 4).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE MARRIAGE ACT CAN BE EXCUSED WITHOUT THE MARRIAGE GOODS.

NO.—In two ways only do the spouses come together without sin, namely for the purpose of procreating children and for rendering the debt; otherwise, there is always sin, at least venial.

THE REASON is that these two goods (offspring and faith), which regard the act of marriage itself, make the rightness of Matrimony, insofar as they are in actual intention. Another third good, which is the sacrament, is good in habit, though it does

not belong to the use of Matrimony but to its essence, as has been said (art. 3 of this q.).

[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: As long as children are not positively excluded, and other excesses are absent, the marriage act is without even venial sin, according to modern authors.]

ART. VI.—WHETHER IT IS A MORTAL SIN FOR A MAN TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS WIFE WITH THE INTENTION, NOT OF A MARRIAGE GOOD, BUT MERELY OF PLEASURE.

NO.—Unless a man treats his wife, not as she is a wife, but only as a woman, and is prepared to use her in the same way if she were not his wife; but if pleasure is sought within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that thus pleasure is sought outside the bonds of lawful marriage; and therefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such a pleasure, although it excludes the goods of marriage, is still within the bounds of Matrimony, but it is not so good as it should be.

QUESTION L THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE IN GENERAL

(one article)

WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT IMPEDIMENTS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as in the other sacraments, certain things are of the essence, and certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, so impediments are suitably assigned to Matrimony, some of which are contrary to the solemnization, which however do not invalidate the contract, such as a prohibition of the Church, and the forbidden times; and others are opposed to the essence of Matrimony, and void the contract.

These latter impediments are either on the part of the marriage contract itself, or on the part of the contractors. As regards the first, there are force, that is, compulsion, and on the part of ignorance error, both of which vitiate voluntariness. With regard to the second there are impotence and servile condition, which hinder the act of marriage, and the impediment of Order and vow. These void the contract simply, so that marriage can be contracted with no one. The other impediments are with respect to some particular person, such as the marriage bond, on account of one's being already bound to another person; disparity of cult, on account of excessive difference (of worship); kinship, affinity, and public honesty, on account of excessive closeness; and the crime of adultery, on account of undue union.—These impediments are contained in the following verses:

Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,
Difference of worship, force, Holy Orders,
Marriage bond, public honesty, affinity, impotence.

All these forbid marriage and annul it though contracted.

NOTE: Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the divine law; as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently, a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for they are sacraments only. And, since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind, and the positive law also varies according to the different renditions of men in various times, hence it is that the Master (*Sent.* iv, dist. 34) asserts that at various times persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage (Ad 4).

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The modern canon law declares three impediments to be prohibitive, i.e., to render marriage illicit but not invalid: Simple vow, legal relationship (adoption), and mixed religion between Catholic and baptized non-Catholic.—(cc. 1058, 1060). In legal relationship, the impediment is diriment or prohibitive according to the law of the country (c. 1080).

Diriment impediments regard only those moral or physical conditions of the contracting parties that render them either absolutely or relatively unable to contract a valid marriage. These are age, impotency,

previous marriage, disparity of cult, Holy Orders, solemn vow, abduction, crime, and both natural and civil kinship, or a relationship similar to this, namely public propriety, either spiritual or legal. The Church cannot dispense from the impediment of impotency, because it invalidates marriage by the law of nature itself (can. 1068, par 1). So also does the law of nature void a marriage between kindred in the first degree of the direct line, and very probably in the other degrees of the same line also. A previous marriage bond invalidates by the divine law.

QUESTION LI THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS RIGHT TO RECKON ERROR AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—The error that hinders knowledge.

THE REASON is that, since consent is an act of the will, which presupposes an act of the intellect, defect follows in the consent itself from an error that hinders knowledge, and consequently the defect follows in the marriage.

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERY ERROR IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MATRIMONY.

NO.—THE REASON is that the error that is an impediment to Matrimony must pertain to the essence of Matrimony. Now Matrimony includes two elements, namely two persons who are joined together, and mutual power over each other, in which Matrimony consists. The first is taken away by an error as to the person; the second, by an error as to his condition, because a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another without consent of his master. Hence there are two errors that are impediments to Matrimony: One is about the person, whereby a person is thought to be one who he is not, the other is about the condition of slavery, whereby the slave cannot freely deliver to another power over his body without the consent of his master.

NOTE: Error as to rank does not, as such, void a marriage, for the same reason as an error as to quality does not. But if the error as to rank or station amounts to an error about the person it is an impediment to marriage. Hence if the woman consents directly to marry this particular person, her error about the rank does not forbid the marriage. But if she intends directly to consent to marry the son of a king, whoever he may be, then if another is represented to her as the king's son, this is an error about the person, and constitutes an impediment to marriage (Ad 5).

QUESTION LII THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MATRIMONY.

YES.—If such condition is not known, but not if it is known.

THE REASON is that, just as impotence that is unknown is an impediment to marriage, but not if it is known (as will appear later, q. lviii), so the condition of slavery, if unknown, is an impediment to Matrimony, but not if the slavery is known. For slavery is opposed to marriage as regards the act, to which one is bound to another in marriage, which he cannot freely exercise, and with regard to the good of offspring, which is made of worse condition by the slavery of one parent. But, because anyone can voluntarily suffer some detriment in that which is due to him, if one of the spouses knows the slavery of the other, the marriage nevertheless holds (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER A SLAVE CAN MARRY WITHOUT HIS MASTER'S CONSENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that slavery, which is of the positive law, cannot prejudice the things that belong to the natural law. For a slave is a chattel of his master with regard to the things that are added over and above his natural rights, but in natural things all are equal (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER SLAVERY CAN SUPERVENE TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—a) The man, even without the wife's consent, can give himself to another as a slave; b) but the marriage is not dissolved on this account.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the man is subject to the wife only in the things that belong to the act of nature, in which they are equal, and to which the subjection of slavery does not extend.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that no impediment supervening to a marriage can dissolve it.

NOTE: As regards the management of the household, and other such additional things, the man is the head of the wife, and must correct her; but not conversely; and therefore the wife cannot give herself as a slave without the husband's consent (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER CHILDREN SHOULD FOLLOW THE CONDITION OF THEIR FATHER.

NO.—The children should follow, as regards slavery, rather the condition of the mother than of the father.

THE REASON is that the condition of slavery is a condition of the body; for the slave is as it were an instrument of his master in his work. Now the offspring have the substance of their body from their mother; whereas from the father they have its formal complement. Therefore the offspring follow the mother in freedom and in slavery; but in matters belonging to dignity, as proceeding from the form of the thing, they follow the father, for instance, in honors, the franchise, inheritance, and so on.

QUESTION LIII THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOW AND ORDER (four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER MARRIAGE ALREADY CONTRACTED SHOULD BE ANNULLED BY THE OBLIGATION OF A SIMPLE VOW.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one's body looking to the effect of continence for the sake of God. Therefore after a simple vow man still remains the master of his own body; hence he can give it to another, namely his wife, in which giving the sacrament of Matrimony consists, which is indissoluble. And for this reason a simple vow, although it is an impediment to the contraction of marriage, because the contractor sins by contracting marriage after a simple vow of continence, yet, because it is a true contract, the marriage cannot be voided for that reason.—After the marriage is consummated, however, the obligation of the vow does not extend to his not rendering the debt at the demand of his wife (Ad 3). As regards the matters in which he was not rendered unable to keep the vow of continence, he is still bound to keep them after marriage; hence he cannot ask the debt without sin; and when his wife dies he is bound to continence altogether (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER A SOLEMN VOW DISSOLVES A MARRIAGE ALREADY CONTRACTED.

YES.—Not because of a statute of the Church, but by its very nature a solemn vow voids the marriage contract.

The reason is that by a solemn vow a man loses power over his body, transferring it to God for the effect of lifelong continence. Hence he cannot surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage.

ART. III.—WHETHER ORDER IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MATRIMONY.

YES.—Holy Orders of their nature have a certain becomingness, as a result of which they should be an impediment to marriage.

THE REASON is that those in Holy Orders must handle sacred vessels and sacraments; hence it is becoming that they maintain cleanliness of body through continence.

NOTE: 1. Holy Order among the Greeks is an impediment to the contraction of marriage only by virtue of Order, but among the Latins it is an impediment by virtue further of the vow of continence, which is annexed to sacred Orders. Hence among the Greeks and the other Orientals Holy Order is an impediment to the contraction of marriage; yet it cannot hinder the use of marriage already contracted; for they can use a marriage already contracted, although they cannot again contract marriage. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to Matrimony and its use (in body of art.).

2. Those in minor Orders are not debarred, by force of their Order, from contracting marriage; for, although these Orders are assigned to certain spiritual acts,

yet they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as are those in major Orders. But according to the ordinance of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the office of the Church (Ad 4).

ART. IV. — WHETHER A SACRED ORDER CAN SUPERVENE TO MATRIMONY

YES.—THE REASON is that, if one who is bound to marriage approaches sacred Orders, even against the protest of his wife, he nevertheless receives the character of Order, but lacks the exercise of Order. If, however, he does this with his wife's consent, or after her death, he receives the Order, and its exercise.

NOTE: The reason that an Order previously received can be an impediment to Matrimony, but on the contrary a preceding marriage cannot be an impediment to Order is that marriage has for its cause our consent, whereas Order has a sacramental cause determined by God; and the power of the sacraments is immutable, whereas human acts can be impeded (passim, Ad 5).

QUESTION LIV THE IMPEDIMENTS OF CONSANGUINITY (in four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CONSANGUINITY IS RIGHTLY DEFINED.

YES.—Consanguinity is the bond of those descending from the same common ancestor and is contracted by carnal procreation.

THE REASON is that this definition contains and explains the genus, subject, and principle of consanguinity.—The genus, in the word "bond," which indicates a communication of friendship, the subject, or quasi-subject, in the words, "persons descending from a common ancestor," and the principle in the words, "by carnal procreation."

NOTE: 1. In the definition of consanguinity, we must not understand the remote ancestor, but a close one, because the power of the begetter, which is less perfect in the grandson than in the son, is weakened by subsequent generations (passim Ad 1).

2. We do not say "carnal procreation" but "consanguinity," because that which is immediately converted into seed is blood, as is proved by Aristotle, *On Animals*, bk. xv; and the reason that sometimes one blood-related person is said to be the flesh of another is that the blood which is transformed into the man's seed or into the menstrual fluid is potentially flesh and bone (Ad 4).

ART. II. — WHETHER CONSANGUINITY IS FITTINGLY DISTINGUISHED BY DEGREES AND LINES.

YES.—By degrees or lines of people descending from one common principle, either ascending to the same ancestor, or collateral with him.

THE REASON is that the communication of consanguinity is threefold: One according to the relationship between cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son; the other corresponding to the relationship of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father; the third corresponding to the mutual relationship between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, who are said to be born of the same parents.—Other degrees are taken according as these lines are more extended, and are computed according to either civil or canon law.

ART. III.—WHETHER CONSANGUINITY IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE BY VIRTUE OF THE NATURAL LAW.

YES.—a) Consanguinity with regard to certain persons, i.e., between father and daughter and between mother and son, is an impediment to marriage by natural law; b) as regards others, i.e., between persons of the same household, as between brother and sister, it is an impediment by virtue of divine law; c) as regards still others, i.e., the blood relations of a wife and husband, it is an impediment according to human laws and the ordinance of the Church.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the end of marriage of itself and primarily is the good of offspring, which is impeded by consanguinity between father and daughter, or between son and mother—not, indeed, that it is wholly made impossible, because

a daughter can conceive a child by her father, but because it is inordinate that a daughter should be joined to her father in marriage as a companion for the sake of bearing and bringing up children, for she ought in all things to be subject to her father, as proceeding from him; and the same is even more true of a mother than a father, because more of the reverence that is due to parents is taken away if a son should marry his mother, since the wife should in some way be subject to the husband.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the secondary end of marriage is of itself the repression of concupiscence, which end would be lost if any woman related by ties of blood could be married, because a wide avenue would be afforded for concupiscence unless carnal intercourse were forbidden among persons who must live together in the same household. And this reason is assigned by the divine law, which says (Levit. xviii, 10): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness" of such a one, "because it is thy own nakedness."

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that accidentally the end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship, whereas a man relates to the kindred of his wife as to his own. Hence the extension of this friendship would be prejudiced if a man should marry a woman of his kindred, since no new friendship would accrue to anyone as a result of this marriage.

NOTE: Into no sort of animal save man has nature instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents. Hence even in certain animals the son abhors copulation with the mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her, as Aristotle says in bk. ix, chap. 47 of his treatise, in speaking of the horse and camel (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF CONSANGUINITY THAT ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE COULD BE FIXED BY THE CHURCH.

YES.—THE REASON is that the precept of the Church has the firmness of a commandment of God, according to Luke x, 16: "He who hears you, hears Me." Therefore, just as formerly the degrees of consanguinity impeding marriage were determined by civil laws, so this can be done also by Church ordinance.

NOTE: 1. The reason that the Church restricts the degrees of consanguinity that are impediments to marriage to the fourth degree is fitting, because men are accustomed to live to the fourth generation, so that the memory of consanguinity is not blotted out; hence God threatens to visit the sins of the parents on the children to the third and fourth generation (in body of art.).

2. In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection (Ad 7). Hence in the New Law, which is that of the Spirit and love, more degrees of consanguinity are prohibited (in body of art.), than in the Old Law, which in its prohibitions had regard chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation, and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together (Ad 7).

QUESTION LV THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (in 11 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A PERSON CONTRACTS AFFINITY THROUGH THE MARRIAGE OF A BLOOD RELATION.

NOTE: According to the Code of Canon Law now in force, affinity arises from a valid marriage, whether only ratified, or ratified and consummated. It exists only between the man and the blood relatives of the woman, and likewise between the woman and the blood relatives of the man. And thus it is reckoned that those who are the blood relatives of the man are in the same line and degree the relatives by affinity of the woman, and vice versa (Can. 97).

YES.—Affinity, which is the relationship of a man with the blood relatives of his wife, and that of the wife with the blood relatives of the husband, arises from marriage and carnal intercourse, whether lawful or unlawful (carnal intercourse does not now create this impediment).

THE REASON is that in marriage and intercourse man and woman are made

one flesh; and therefore, just as the man according to the flesh shares in the common stock with all his blood relatives, so also the woman shares in the common stock with the blood relatives of the man, yet in another order, namely as being united from without, for this other order of connection is called affinity.

NOTE: Matrimony causes affinity, not only by reason of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of conjugal association, according to which marriage is also natural. Hence also affinity is contracted by the very contract of marriage by words of the present before carnal intercourse, and similarly by betrothal, in which a contract is made to live in conjugal fellowship, something is contracted that is similar to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty (art. iv of this q., Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER AFFINITY REMAINS AFTER THE DEATH OF HUSBAND OR WIFE.

YES.—THE REASON is that affinity does not arise from the fact that certain persons are joined in marriage, but from the fact that they were so joined. And therefore as long as those persons between whom affinity was contracted remained, the affinity is not voided, even though the person by reason of whom it was contracted dies. For the aptitude for movement, and for being moved, is transitory, whereas the fact of once being moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been except through the corruption of the subject.

ART. III. — WHETHER UNLAWFUL INTERCOURSE CAUSES AFFINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that Matrimony caused affinity insofar as it was a carnal intercourse; and therefore even intercourse by fornication causes affinity, insofar as it has something of carnal union (before the Code).

ART. IV.—WHETHER AFFINITY IS CAUSED BY BETROTHAL.

YES.—Affinity is not properly caused, but only something similar to affinity, which is the justice of public honesty.

THE REASON is that, just as betrothal does not have the perfect character of Matrimony, so betrothal does not cause affinity; but a relationship arises that is called the justice of public honesty, which impediment was instituted by the Church by reason of its honesty.

ART. V.—WHETHER AFFINITY IS A CAUSE OF AFFINITY.

NO.—THE REASON is that affinity does not arise by carnal propagation, in which the same species always remains, but by matrimonial union, according to another kind of relationship, namely by something externally added. Hence if this kind of procession is repeated it will not be affinity but another kind of relationship, which, like affinity, hinders marriage.

ART. VI.—WHETHER AFFINITY IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—Affinity preceding marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as consanguinity.

THE REASON is that, just as there is a certain need for blood-relatives to live together, so is there for those connected by affinity.—Without the impediment of affinity, the extension of friendship and the repression of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage, would be hindered (Ad 1).

ART. VII.—WHETHER AFFINITY IN ITSELF ADMITS OF DEGREES.

NO.—Affinity in itself admits of no degrees, but all degrees of affinity are caused by degrees of consanguinity.

THE REASON is that the degrees of relationship are distinguished by carnal propagation. Now carnal propagation bears an essential relation to consanguinity, but not to affinity, save through consanguinity, which is its cause. Hence to find the degrees of affinity it is a general rule that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree I am related to the wife.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF AFFINITY EXTEND IN THE SAME WAY AS THE DEGREES OF CONSANGUINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must be the same in number as those of consanguinity.

NOTE: In the Old Law a man could not take his deceased brother's wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person, as it were, but as supplying the place of his brother (Ad 2).

ART. IX. — WHETHER A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY PERSONS WITHIN THE DEGREES OF AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY SHOULD ALWAYS BE ANNULLED.

YES.—THE REASON is that consanguinity and affinity are impediments to its contraction, and void it when contracted. Therefore, if affinity or consanguinity is proved, the couple should be separated (or the impediment should be removed by dispensation or otherwise, and a new consent exchanged), even if in fact they contracted marriage. For blood-relatives and affines cannot be united in the flesh without incest.

ART. X.—WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED BY WAY OF ACCUSATION FOR THE AMENDMENT OF A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY PERSONS RELATED TO EACH OTHER BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that accusation was instituted to the end that no one should be regarded innocent, who actually is not, or that nothing should be accounted lawful, when it is not. And thus a marriage is accused when on account of the ignorance of the impediment it is thought legitimate, when it is not.

ART. XI.—WHETHER IN A SUIT OF THIS KIND ONE SHOULD PROCEED BY HEARING WITNESS IN THE SAME WAY AS IN OTHER SUITS.

YES.—As in other suits.

THE REASON is that in this, as in other suits, in which a doubt is raised, witnesses are called in in order to give the judge evidence, for a judge should not proceed hastily in judging what is not evident. Yet, as jurists say, this suit has many things peculiar to it: Namely that "the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken on oath of calumny, since it is a quasi-spiritual suit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the names of the witnesses." All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union.

QUESTION LVI
THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP
(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—By ordinance of the Church.

THE REASON is that, just as by carnal propagation man receives natural being, which is the cause of the bond of fleshly relationship, insofar as it is a thing of nature, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace, which is the cause of the bond of spiritual relationship, insofar as he is a member of the Church. And therefore, just as carnal relationship impedes marriage by the very nature of the thing, so does spiritual relationship by virtue of an ordinance of the Church.

NOTE: 1. If spiritual relationship does not precede, but follows, marriage, then it does not void the marriage bond; but as regards the act of marriage, if spiritual relationship results intentionally, outside the case of necessity, then the one by whose act it is

induced loses the right to ask the debt; but he must pay it if it is asked from him, because no one should reap advantage from his own fault (in body of art.).

2. Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the principal blessings of Matrimony, it hinders something of its secondary blessings, which is the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship of itself is a sufficient reason of friendship; wherefore intimacy and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP IS CONTRACTED BY BAPTISM ONLY .

NO.—It is also contracted by the sacrament of Confirmation.

THE REASON is that spiritual birth which is had by Baptism, is completed and confirmed by the sacrament of Confirmation, just as the first carnal birth, which is in the mother's womb, is perfected and confirmed by the second, which takes place outside. Hence, just as spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism, so also it is contracted by the Sacrament of Confirmation.

NOTE: Spiritual relationship is not contracted as a result of other spiritual acts than Baptism and Confirmation, because, just as carnal relationship is not contracted save by a complete act of generation, and affinity is not contracted unless there be a mingling of seeds, from which carnal generation can follow; so spiritual generation is not perfected save by a certain sacrament. Wherefore it seems unfitting that spiritual relationship should be contracted save by a sacrament (in body of art.).

ART. III.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP IS CONTRACTED BETWEEN THE PERSON BAPTIZED AND THE PERSON WHO RAISES HIM FROM THE SACRED FONT.

YES.—THE REASON is that he who raises the baptized from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation, bears the person of the Church, as a mother.

NOTE: A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church, whom the godparent in Baptism represents. And yet he cannot contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life, to which man is first born by receiving Baptism (Ad 3).

ART. IV. — WHETHER SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP PASSES FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE.

NOTE: The affirmative response of St. Thomas no longer holds, after the Council of Trent.

YES.—a) If the man carnally knew his wife; b) and by his own act lifted another's child from the sacred font.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that affinity requires that the man and woman be made one flesh.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that when he who baptizes, or receives his child in Baptism by another's act, spiritual relationship does not pass from the husband to the wife.—But if the wife is not baptized, spiritual relationship will not pass to her, because she is not a fit subject (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP PASSES TO THE GODFATHER'S CARNAL CHILDREN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the child is something of the father; hence the father's spiritual relationship passes to his carnal children. (Thus according to the old law. This was abolished by the Council of Trent.)

QUESTION LVII LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ADOPTION IS RIGHTLY DEFINED.

YES.—Adoption is the act whereby a person lawfully takes for his child or grand-child, and so on, one who does not belong to him.

THE REASON is that the aforesaid definition includes the genus of adoption,

in the words, "lawfully takes;" the term wherefrom, in the words, "of a person who does not belong to him;" and the term whereto in the word, as a child or grandchild." And thus it rightly expresses adoption, since adoption is a kind of legal generation, which bears an analogy with natural generation, in which the term whereto is the form or end of generation, and the term wherefrom is the opposite form.—Now adoption is directed to hereditary succession; wherefore those alone are competent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Hence he who is not his own master, or who is less than 25 years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, save by special permission of the sovereign (Ad 3).—(Thus according to the law in St. Thomas' day.)

ART. II.—WHETHER A BOND THAT IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE IS CONTRACTED BY ADOPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that adoption gives rise to kinship. For the child adopted lives in the house of the adopting father, as does a natural child. Hence human laws forbid such person to contract marriage; and such prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal relationship is an impediment to Matrimony.

ART. III. — WHETHER LEGAL RELATIONSHIP IS CONTRACTED ONLY BETWEEN THE ADOPTING FATHER AND THE ADOPTED CHILD.

NO.—THE REASON is that legal relationship is contracted also between the adopting father and the adopted child, the latter's child, the adoptive grandchild, and so on. It is contracted secondly between the adopted child and the naturally begotten child. It is contracted thirdly, by way of a certain affinity, between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted father. The first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage; the second is not, except as long as the child remains under the authority of the adoptive father. Hence, when the father dies, or the child comes of age, marriage can be contracted between them.

QUESTION LVIII THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST, AND DEFECTIVE AGE (five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IMPOTENCE IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES: THE REASON is that impotence makes it impossible to fulfill the obligation to pay the carnal debt, which arises from marriage.

NOTE: 1. If impotence is only for a time, then it does not void the marriage; but if it is perpetual (and antecedent to marriage), then it voids the marriage (in body of art.).—If impotence should hinder carnal intercourse for three years, then, according to the practice of the Church, the impotence is judged perpetual (Ad 2). But in this the Church cannot err (in body of art.).

2. Although the carnal act is not of the essence of Matrimony, yet the power to perform the act is of its essence, because marriage gives to each of the spouses power over the body of the other in relation to carnal intercourse (Ad 1).

3. Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed to marry, insofar as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not benefit them, as fulfilling an office of nature (Ad 3).

4. If the other party to the marriage, with whom the impotent person contracts, knows of this impotence, and nevertheless contracts, this shows that he seeks another end from the contract, and therefore the contract stands. But if he is ignorant of it, then the contract is null and void (Ad 4).

5. Impotence on the part of the woman does not proceed from frigidity, because she is passive; but from stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of frigidity in the man (Ad 6).

ART. II.—WHETHER A SPELL CAN BE AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—If the impotence resulting from the spell is perpetual; otherwise, if it is only for a time.

THE REASON is plain from what has been said in the previous article.

NOTE: There is a difference between spell and frigidity, because he who is impotent on account of frigidity is indifferently impotent to one person or another; and therefore when the marriage is voided permission is not given him to be joined to another; but a spell can make a man impotent as regards one woman, and not as regards another; hence when the marriage is voided by a judgment of the Church permission is given to both to seek another marriage (in body of art.).

NOTE: Sorcerers are those people who induce demons to do by the subtility of their nature the things that we cannot do.

ART. III. — WHETHER MADNESS IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—If the madman contracts marriage when he has lucid intervals he makes a marriage; otherwise, not.

THE REASON is that, if he has lucid intervals, then, although it is not safe to contract marriage while he is in that interval, because he could not rear his children; yet if he does contract, the marriage exists, because of the possibility of consent.

ART. IV. — WHETHER MARRIAGE IS ANNULLED BY THE HUSBAND'S COMMITTING INCEST WITH HIS WIFE'S SISTER.

YES.—If the incest took place before the marriage was contracted.

THE REASON is that affinity is thus contracted through incest.—If however the incest was committed after the marriage was contracted and consummated, the marriage should not be completely dissolved, but the husband loses the right to ask the debt, and cannot ask it without sin; yet he must render the debt on demand, because the wife ought not be punished by her husband's sin. But after the wife's death he must remain altogether without hope of marriage, unless he be dispensed on account of his frailty, when unlawful intercourse is feared. If however he contracts without a dispensation, he sins by thus acting against the Church's ordinance, yet not on this account is the marriage to be annulled (thus according to the ancient law).

ART. V.—WHETHER DEFECTIVE AGE IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the contract of marriage, like other contracts, is subject to the ordination of the positive law. Hence it has been determined by the laws that before the age of discretion, which will permit both parties to deliberate sufficiently concerning marriage, and render each other the debt, marriages cannot be contracted; and if they are contracted they are null and void. This age, for most cases, is the 14th year in males and the 12th in females. If however anyone reach due maturity before the time aforesaid, so that the vigor of nature and reason counteracts defective age, the marriage is not annulled.

QUESTION LIX DISPARITY OF CULT AS IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE

(six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A BELIEVER CAN MARRY AN UNBELIEVER.

NO.—THE REASON is that if those who contract marriage are of different faith, then the intention of the one, as regards the upbringing of the children, will be contrary to the intention of the other; and thus there can be no suitable marriage between them.

NOTE: In the Old Law, it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, where there could be no fear of being drawn to idolatry. Thus Joseph and Moses and Esther married unbelievers. But in the New Law, which is diffused throughout the world, the same prohibiting rule holds for all unbelievers (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THERE CAN BE MARRIAGE BETWEEN UNBELIEVERS.

YES.—THE REASON is that marriage was chiefly instituted for the good of the offspring, not only as regards generation, because this is possible even without marriage, but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, whether of nature or of grace. Now between unbelievers marriage can attain the first perfection, which is common to believers and unbelievers; this however is imperfect and material in comparison to the

second perfection, namely of grace.—Between unbelievers there can be marriage as it is an office of nature, yet subject to determination by the positive law, as has been said (prev. q, art. v).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HUSBAND, BEING CONVERTED TO THE FAITH, MAY REMAIN WITH HIS WIFE IF SHE BE UNWILLING TO BE CONVERTED.

YES.—If there is hope of her correction, or conversion.

THE REASON is that infidelity and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of offspring. Wherefore, just as an innocent man can freely remain with an adulterous spouse with the hope of correcting her, but not if she is obstinate in the sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her shameful conduct, though he may put her away even when he has hope of her amendment; likewise the converted spouse can remain with the unbeliever if he has hopes of converting her, if he does not see that she is obstinate in infidelity, and he does well in this, yet he is not bound to remain. And this is the counsel of the Apostle (I Cor. vii, 10).

ART. IV.—WHETHER A BELIEVER CAN, AFTER HIS CONVERSION, PUT AWAY HIS UNBELIEVING WIFE IF SHE BE WILLING TO COHABIT WITH HIM WITHOUT INSULT TO THE CREATOR.

NOTE: This question is covered by Canon Law.

YES.—THE REASON is that he who approaches Baptism is regenerated in Christ, and dies to his former life, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another; hence he is freed from the obligation whereby he is bound to pay the debt to his wife, and he is not bound to live with her when she is unwilling to be converted; for one of the spouses is not bound to the other as his possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of fellowship, which does not fittingly apply to a believer and an unbeliever, as is clear from II Cor., vi.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE BELIEVER WHO LEAVES HIS UNBELIEVING WIFE CAN TAKE ANOTHER WIFE.

YES.—If the unbelieving party is unwilling to live with him without insult to the Creator, i.e., if he makes use of blasphemous words and refuses to hear Christ's name, and attempts to draw him into unbelief.

THE REASON is that, if the unbeliever is willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator, the believer can freely depart, but his departure gives him no right to marry another.—But the sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from his ties to his wife, yet so that he cannot marry another during her lifetime; but it does not yet dissolve the marriage, since if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the second marriage, which the believing husband would be unable to accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault (Ad 2).

It is the punishment of the unbelieving wife, rather than by virtue of the previous marriage, that she is forbidden to marry again. But if she is converted afterwards, a dispensation can be given her to marry another if her husband marries another wife (Ad 3).

NOTE: The marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, as stated above (art. 2 of this q.); but the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified afterwards by Christ's faith (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER OTHER SINS DISSOLVE MARRIAGE.

NO.—a) As regards a ratified marriage, the marriage bond is not dissolved, even by unbelief, or by fornication, or adultery; b) as regards a non-ratified marriage, the bond is dissolved if the one party remains in unbelief and the other, who is converted, marries again; c) yet the aforesaid bond is not dissolved by adultery; d) as regards the act (but not the bond), even a ratified marriage can be dissolved, both by infidelity and by fornication, but not by other sins, unless perhaps for a time, when the innocent party

decides to withdraw from fellowship with the other party for his punishment, by withdrawing from him the comfort of his or her presence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that a ratified marriage is dissolved only by a new marriage, as was said above (prev. art.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is evident from the previous article.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that otherwise the unbeliever could freely give a bill of divorce to an adulterous wife, and, by putting her away, marry another, which is false.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that if even for other sins (i.e., besides infidelity and fornication or adultery) a marriage could be dissolved, divorces would be going on all day, since there is rarely found a marriage in which one of the spouses does not fall into sin, and therefore it is said (Matth. v, 32): "He who puts away his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her to commit adultery."

QUESTION LX WIFE-MURDER

(in two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A MAN TO KILL HIS WIFE IF SHE IS DISCOVERED IN THE ACT OF ADULTERY.

NO.—It is not lawful to kill her by himself, but only by a civil judgment, according to the laws of the country.

THE REASON is that a man moved by a zeal for justice, and not by vindictive anger or hatred, can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery against his wife, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law, just as he may lawfully accuse a person of murder or of any other crime. (Yet such an accusation may not be made in an ecclesiastical judgment, because the Church does not have the material sword.)

ART. II.—WHETHER WIFE MURDER IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that in whatever way a person sins, he should be punished correspondingly. But he sins against marriage who murders his wife. Therefore he must be punished, so as to be deprived of marriage. Yet with this distinction: If the husband kills the wife on account of adultery, or even on account of hatred, then wife murder is an impediment to the contraction of marriage, but it does not void the contract; but if he slays his wife that he may marry her with whom he has committed adultery, then wife murder voids the marriage, because then he is rendered simply unfit by law to marry her.

QUESTION LXI

THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW

Here we must consider, first the impediment that affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow; secondly, the impediment affecting a consummated marriage, namely fornication. About the first there will be three articles.

ART. I. — WHETHER ONE PARTY, AFTER THE MARRIAGE HAS BEEN CONSUMMATED, CAN ENTER RELIGION WITHOUT THE OTHER'S CONSENT.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that no one can make an offering to God of something that does not belong to him. Now by a consummated marriage the body of the man already belongs to his wife; therefore he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.

ART. II.—WHETHER BEFORE THE MARRIAGE HAS BEEN CONSUMMATED ONE SPOUSE CAN ENTER RELIGION WITHOUT THE OTHER'S CONSENT.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that before carnal intercourse there is between the spouses only a spiritual tie. Hence, just as after carnal intercourse marriage is dissolved by a

carnal death, so by entering religion the tie that exists before carnal intercourse is loosed, because religion is a spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

NOTE: Before consummation the parties are not bound to pay the marriage death after marriage contracted by words of the present; but a time of two months is given them for three reasons: 1) That they may deliberate meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding; thirdly, lest the husband think little of a gift he has no longer to possess (Ad 2). (This custom no longer exists.)

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WIFE MAY TAKE ANOTHER HUSBAND IF HER HUSBAND HAS ENTERED RELIGION BEFORE CONSUMMATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the bodily death of the man dissolves the marriage bond in such wise that the woman can marry whom she will, according to the Apostle's statement (I Cor. viii, 39), so too after the husband's spiritual death by entering religion she can marry whom she will.

QUESTION LXII

THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION

(six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A HUSBAND TO PUT AWAY HIS WIFE ON ACCOUNT OF FORNICATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the Lord allowed the woman to be put away on account of fornication as a punishment of the one who broke faith, and in favor of the one who kept faith, so that he who did not keep faith is not bound to pay the debt. Excepted are the cases in which it is not lawful for the man to put away a wife for fornication, namely those in which the wife was free of fault or both parties were equally guilty

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HUSBAND IS BOUND BY PRECEPT TO PUT AWAY HIS WIFE WHEN SHE IS GUILTY OF FORNICATION.

NO.—THE REASON is that the putting away of a fornicating wife was introduced to correct the wife's crime by such a punishment. Hence if the woman repents of the sin the husband is not bound to put her away; but if she does not repent he is bound, lest he seem to consent to her sin by not adding due correction.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HUSBAND CAN ON HIS OWN JUDGMENT PUT AWAY HIS WIFE ON ACCOUNT OF FORNICATION.

NO.—As regards bed and cohabitation he cannot put her away save by a judgment of the Church. (Now, however, a verdict of civil judges is required.)

THE REASON is that no one is judge and prosecutor in the same case. Yet with regard to bed only, he can put her away by his own decision, as soon as he is sure of his wife's fornication.

ART. IV.—WHETHER HUSBAND AND WIFE BE JUDGED ON A PAR IN A CASE OF DIVORCE.

YES.—With regard to the good of faith, but not as regards the good of the offspring.

THE REASON is that, as regards the good of faith, the spouses are bound equally to each other; hence the adultery of the one sins as much against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is sufficient cause for separation for both. But as regards the good of offspring the wife's adultery offends more than the man's, and therefore the cause of divorce is greater in the wife than in the man.

ART. V.—WHETHER A HUSBAND CAN MARRY AGAIN AFTER A DIVORCE.

NO.—THE REASON is that adultery does not make a true marriage not a marriage, for nothing supervening to marriage can dissolve it. As regards the words of the

Lord (Matth. xix, 9), they do not refer to the bond, but only to the putting away of the wife (Ad 4).

ART. VI.—WHETHER HUSBAND AND WIFE CAN BE RECONCILED AFTER BEING DIVORCED.

YES.—THE REASON is that the husband can decide not to put her away after fornication. Therefore for the same reason he can reconcile her to himself after divorce, if she amends and does penance for her sin (I Cor. vii, 11).

QUESTION LXIII SECOND MARRIAGES

(two articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER A SECOND MARRIAGE IS LAWFUL.

YES.—Not only a second, but a third, and so on.

THE REASON is that the marriage bond lasts only until death, as is clear from Rom. vii, 2.

ART. II.—WHETHER A SECOND MARRIAGE IS A SACRAMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that in a second marriage are found all the things that are of the essence of the sacrament of marriage, namely due matter and due form, that is, the expression of interior consent by words of the present.

NOTE: Yet, if we consider it in relation to the first marriage, a second marriage is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. For this reason the blessing is omitted in the second marriage on the part of the bride (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXIV THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST THE PAYMENT OF THE DEBT

(seven articles)

We have next to consider the things annexed to marriage: 1) The payment of the debt; 2) the plurality of wives; 3) bigamy; 4) the bill of divorce; 5) illegitimate children. About the first there are 10 articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER ONE OF THE SPOUSES IS BOUND TO PAY THE DEBT TO THE OTHER.

YES.—With due regard, however, for the person's own welfare.

THE REASON is that the wife has power over the man as regards the generative power, but not as regards the things ordained for the preservation of the individual. Hence if the wife demands the debt in excess there is no asking of the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to satisfy her (Ad 2).

NOTE: A wife is bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband; yet she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And, though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not to be at all (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER A HUSBAND IS BOUND TO PAY THE DEBT IF HIS WIFE DOES NOT ASK FOR IT.

YES.—If his wife does not expressly ask for it.

THE REASON is that sometimes through shame the wife does not expressly, but only interpretatively, ask for it, since some signs appear in her of a willingness to pay the debt.

NOTE: A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS ALLOWABLE FOR A MENSTRUOUS WOMAN TO ASK FOR THE MARRIAGE DEBT.

YES.—a) If the menstrual flux is unnatural, because of some infirmity, then the husband can ask for the debt; b) if the flux is natural, such as healthy women suffer at certain times, it is not allowable to ask the debt.

THE REASON FOR THE FIRST is that this flux is continuous and lasting, so that the man would have to abstain for always. Nor is there danger to the offspring in this, because a woman in such a state cannot conceive.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such an intercourse frequently causes injury to the offspring, and again such a flux lasts only a short time.

ART. IV.—WHETHER A MENSTRUOUS WOMAN SHOULD OR MAY LAWFULLY PAY THE MARRIAGE DEBT IF HER HUSBAND ASKS FOR IT.

YES.—If the man does not desist from asking.

THE REASON is that otherwise this would derogate from the marriage, by which the husband is given entire power over his wife's body with regard to the marriage act.—And although harm to the offspring can follow from this intercourse, yet this injury cannot be compared to the woman's infirmity, since if the wife is ailing it is more certain that danger would beset her as a result of the marriage act, but this is not so certain in the case of the offspring, which perhaps would not be forthcoming.—Likewise, in this case the woman must pay the debt, both on account of the danger of the husband's incontinence and so that he may not for this reason entertain a revulsion to her.

NOTE: The two preceding articles are not in the Leonine edition and are possibly spurious.

ART. V.—WHETHER HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE EQUAL IN THE MARRIAGE ACT.

YES.—a) Not in the equality of quantity, but b) in the equality of proportion.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as regards the marriage act, that which is nobler is due to the husband; and as regards the management of the household the husband is the one who rules, and the wife is ruled.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as the husband is bound to the wife in the marriage act and the management of the household in all things pertaining to the husband, so the wife is bound to the husband as regards that which pertains to the wife. And in this way it is said that they are equal in paying and asking the debt.

ART. VI.—WHETHER HUSBAND AND WIFE CAN TAKE A VOW CONTRARY TO THE MARRIAGE DEBT WITHOUT THEIR MUTUAL CONSENT.

NO.—THE REASON is that there can be a vow only with regard to those goods that are subject to our will, such as those goods are not in which one party is subject to the other. Hence, since the spouses are bound to each other in the payment of the debt, which is an obstacle to continence, one cannot vow continence without the consent of the other; and, if he does vow, he sins; but he must not keep the vow, but do penance for a vow badly made.

NOTE: Regarding a vow not to ask the debt there are two opinions. Some say that one can vow without the other's consent not to demand the debt, not, however, not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their rights, but not in the second. But because if one were never to ask for the debt the marriage would become too burdensome to the other, who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other's consent (Ad 3).

ART. VII.—WHETHER IT IS FORBIDDEN TO DEMAND THE DEBT ON HOLY DAYS.

YES.—It is not lawful to ask for it, but it is not forbidden to pay it. (See art. ix of this question).

THE REASON is that, although the marriage act would lack guilt, yet it depresses the reason, on account of the carnal pleasure; and therefore renders man unfit for spiritual things.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER IT IS A MORTAL SIN TO ASK FOR THE DEBT AT A HOLY TIME.

NO.—THE REASON is that to ask for the debt on a holy day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another kind of sin; hence it cannot aggravate infinitely. And therefore wife or husband does not sin mortally if he or she asks the debt on a feast day.

NOTE: The more common opinion denies that this is unlawful, and this is held by St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Cajetan, Soto, and many others. If the canons and the Holy Fathers seem to forbid the use of marriage expressly on these days, this is to be understood of a counsel, not of a precept (St. Alphonsus, bk. vi, n. 25).

ART. IX.—WHETHER ONE SPOUSE IS BOUND TO PAY THE DEBT TO THE OTHER AT A FESTAL TIME.

YES.—With due regard for the decorum required in such matters, one party is bound to pay the debt to the other at any time, and at any hour.

THE REASON is that the wife has power over the body of the husband as regards the act of generation, and vice versa.

ART. X.—WHETHER WEDDINGS SHOULD BE FORBIDDEN AT CERTAIN TIMES.

YES.—In the times in which the faithful must prepare for Communion according to the practice of the Church, that is, in the seasons of Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost.

THE REASON is that in these seasons men should especially rise to spiritual things; whereas in weddings signs of unrestrained rejoicing are apt to be shown.

NOTE: Art. X is not in the Leonine edition.

QUESTION LXV PLURALITY OF WIVES

(five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IT IS AGAINST THE NATURAL LAW TO HAVE SEVERAL WIVES.

YES.—a) To have several wives is not against the good of offspring; but b) it is in a measure against the good of faith; and c) it is wholly against the good of the sacrament.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that plurality of wives neither altogether destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one husband suffices to beget children of several wives and to rear them.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that plurality of wives, although it does not wholly destroy, does greatly hinder the interchange of services that is necessary to domestic life; for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot easily satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and also because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: Thus potters quarrel with one another; and in like manner the several wives of one husband.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that marriage between Christians signifies the union between Christ and the Church. Now, just as Christ is one, and the Church is one, so one man should have one wife.

NOTE:—It is not against the first principles of the natural law for one man to have several wives, as was said. But for one wife to have several husbands is against the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*, vii, 4), it is nevertheless considerably hindered, inasmuch as this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetuses or to one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away with, because as a result of one woman's having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in

relation to his father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore no law or custom has sanctioned the marriage of one wife with several husbands, though the converse is true (Ad 8).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WAS EVER LAWFUL TO HAVE SEVERAL WIVES.

YES.—By divine ordinance.

THE REASON is that the law prescribing one wife was of divine and not of human institution, and was never transmitted orally or in writing, but imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently, a dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone, through an inward inspiration, given originally to the Patriarchs and by their example continued to others, at a time in which it behooved the aforesaid precept of nature not to be observed, to insure the greater multiplication of offspring for the worship of God; for it is not unreasonable if for the good of offspring something is withdrawn from the other two blessings, namely faith and the sacrament (Ad 5).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS AGAINST THE NATURAL LAW TO HAVE A CONCUBINE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the name concubine expresses that union whereby only intercourse is sought for its own sake, and not for the good of offspring, to which marriage is ordained by its nature.—And, if sometimes one seeks offspring from such intercourse, it is not suitable for the good of the offspring, which implies not only its procreation, by which the offspring receives being, but also its education and upbringing. Now, since the parents must impart education and upbringing for a long time, the natural law demands that father and mother remain for a long time to help the offspring in common. Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain together for a long time constitutes marriage. Therefore it is evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT IS A MORTAL SIN TO HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH A CONCUBINE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, since the intercourse of fornication (which is the same as to have intercourse with a concubine) destroys the due relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature's aim in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin, even if there were no written law.

ART. V.—WHETHER IT WAS EVER LAWFUL TO HAVE A CONCU- BINE.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that, as was said above (art. 3 of this q.), intercourse with one who is not joined with oneself in marriage is not a suitable action for the good of the offspring, which is the chief end of marriage. Consequently it is against the first principles of the natural law, which do not admit of dispensation.

NOTE: Wherever it is read in the Old Testament that some men had concubines, whom it is necessary to excuse from mortal sin, we must understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they had something of the character of a concubine. Insofar as marriage is directed to the principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above (art. 1 of this q.), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But as regards the secondary end, which is the management of the family and a community of works, the wife is bound to the husband as a partner. And this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is a secondary end of marriage (in body of art.).

QUESTION LXVI BIGAMY AND THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER IRREGULARITY ATTACHES TO BIGAMY.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that bigamy destroys the perfect signification of the

sacrament, namely the union of Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Now the minister of the sacraments, who must dispense the sacraments to others, should suffer no defect in the sacraments. Hence bigamy induces irregularity.

NOTE: 1. According to the Holy Doctor, there are four kinds of bigamy, which induce irregularity. The first is when a man has in law several wives in succession; the second, when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several wives successively, one in law, the others in fact; the fourth when a man marries a widow (digamy)—(in body of art.).

2. The multitude of several successive wives is a multitude relatively; wherefore it does not entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void the sacrament in its essence, but in its perfection, which is required in those who are dispensers of the sacraments (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER IRREGULARITY RESULTS FROM BIGAMY, WHEN ONE HUSBAND HAS TWO WIVES, ONE IN LAW, THE OTHER IN FACT.

YES.—Whether he has several wives at once or in succession, one in fact, the other in law.

THE REASON is that, although with the one bigamy there is no sacrament, there is a certain likeness to the sacrament.

ART. III.—WHETHER IRREGULARITY IS CONTRACTED BY MARRYING ONE WHO IS NOT A VIRGIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the division of the flesh, which ensues from corruption, is a defect of the sacrament of Matrimony; for in the union of Christ and the Church there is unity, and indeed on both sides. Hence if a woman could receive Order, she would become irregular if she married a man who is not a virgin, just as the man becomes irregular if he marries a woman who is not a virgin.

NOTE: Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally (Ad 3). For it is not sin that causes irregularity, but the imperfection of signification (Ad 3 of prev. art.).

ART. IV.—WHETHER BIGAMY IS REMOVED BY BAPTISM.

NO.—THE REASON is that Baptism removes sins, but not marriages. Hence since irregularity follows from the marriage itself, it cannot be taken away by Baptism.

ART. V.—WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR A BIGAMIST TO RECEIVE A DISPENSATION.

YES.—THE REASON is that irregularity is not annexed to bigamy by the natural law, but by the positive law. For in matters that are of Apostolic institution, since the Church now has the same power of setting up and putting down as she had then, she can grant a dispensation through the one who holds the primacy in the Church (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXVII THE BILL OF DIVORCE

(seven articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER INSEPARABLENESS OF THE WIFE IS OF NATURAL LAW.

YES.—THE REASON is that Matrimony is ordered by the intention of nature to the education of the offspring, not only for a time, but for the whole life of the offspring. Hence it is of the natural law that the parents should lay up treasure for their children, and the children should be heirs of the parents.

NOTE: As regards the other laws that permit dissolubility, note that only the law of Christ has brought the human race to perfection, by bringing it back to the state of newness of nature. Hence neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that was congruent to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to the law of

the spirit of life (Ad 1). For indissolubility belongs chiefly to marriage, insofar as it is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ and the Church (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER IT MAY HAVE BEEN LAWFUL BY DISPENSATION TO PUT AWAY A WIFE.

YES.—a) If indissolubility is contained in the first principles of nature, it could come only under divine dispensation; b) but if it is contained among the secondary principles of the natural law, a dispensation for dissolution could come also under a natural cause.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the first principles of the natural law concern those things that are ordained, not only to happen frequently, but also those things that are ordained to happen always; and such principles fall only under divine, that is, supernatural dispensation, as in the case of the standing still of the sun at the time of Josue, or by way of signifying or showing some divine mystery, as in the case of the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the matter of slaying his innocent son.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the second principles of the natural law concern only those things that happen, not always, but frequently; and such are they whose course can be hindered by any natural cause. Hence to put away a wife can be lawful by dispensation.

NOTE: The good of the offspring, insofar as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law (Ad 1). Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage, as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to the first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IT WAS LAWFUL TO DIVORCE A WIFE UNDER THE MOSAIC LAW.

NO.—It was not lawful, by a command of God, under the Mosaic law to divorce a wife, but on account of the hardness of heart of the Jews this was permitted to them in order to avoid worse evil.

THE REASON is that some good can be foregone, not only to receive a greater good, in which there is virtue; but also to avoid a worse evil; and then, if this is done by the authority of the one who can dispense, the foregoing of such a good does not have the character of guilt, but also it does not acquire virtue. And thus the indivisibility of Matrimony under the Mosaic law was foregone in order to avoid a worse evil, namely wife murder. For, although a deordination remained in divorce, by reason of which it is called sin, yet it was not subject to the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, inasmuch as it was done by divine dispensation (Ad 5).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IT WAS LAWFUL FOR A DIVORCED WIFE TO HAVE ANOTHER HUSBAND.

NO.—Unless she was put away by divine dispensation.

THE REASON is that marriage was not dissolved by divorce. Now the wife could not have several husbands at the same time. If, however, the cause of dispensation was God, the indissolubility of marriage was taken away; for then the woman cannot be said to be bound to the law of her husband (Rom. vii, 2).

NOTE: Because it was lawful for a man to have several wives at the same time by divine dispensation, therefore, when one was put away, even though the marriage was not dissolved, he could marry another (Ad 1).

ART. V.—WHETHER A HUSBAND COULD LAWFULLY TAKE BACK THE WIFE HE HAD DIVORCED.

NO.—THE REASON was that the man might not be too ready to divorce his wife.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE REASON FOR DIVORCE WAS HATRED FOR THE WIFE.

NO.—The proximate cause of divorce is hatred, but it is necessary to suppose other remote causes, which were the cause of hatred.

THE REASON is that hatred, like love, arises from some cause. Hence, says Augustine in the Gloss (*Ordin. sup. illud: Si acceperit homo, lib. 1 de Serm. Dom. in Monte, c. 14*): "In the Law there were many causes for divorcing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication; and He commands other grievances to be born for conjugal fidelity and chastity." Such causes are understood as imperfections in the body, for example, sickness, or some notable deformity hindering the good of the offspring; or in the soul, as fornication, or the like, which amounts to moral depravity.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE CAUSES OF DIVORCE HAD TO BE WRITTEN IN THE BILL.

NO.—The causes of divorce were not particularized in the bill, but indicated in a general way.

THE REASON is that a general indication in writing sufficed in order to show that the divorce was just. The causes were not particularized in order that they might not bar the way to a second marriage for the woman, which the law permitted her.

NOTE: Some things that were unlawful in the Old Law were by many thought lawful by an inaccurate exposition of the precepts, as in the case of the hatred of an enemy; and so it is also with divorce, namely that a divorced woman could have another husband (art. iv, of this q., Ad 3).

QUESTION LXVIII ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHILDREN BORN OUT OF TRUE MARRIAGE ARE ILLEGITIMATE.

YES.—THE REASON is that those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. For, although those who are born of illicit intercourse are born according to nature, which is common to man and all animals, yet they are born contrary to the law of nature, which is proper to men, because fornication, and adultery, and the like are against the law of nature. Hence such persons are not legitimate by any law (Ad 1).

NOTE: Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful marriage; some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children; some are neither legitimate nor natural, such are those born of adultery or incest, for those are born, not only against the positive law, but also against the express natural law (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER CHILDREN SHOULD SUFFER ANY LOSS THROUGH BEING ILLEGITIMATE.

YES.—By virtue of the fact that something is not due to them, which might have been due otherwise.

THE REASON is that illegitimate children are not admitted to certain legitimate acts, namely to offices or dignities that require some public respectability in those who exercise them; likewise, they incur some law because they do not succeed to their father's estate. Nevertheless, natural sons can inherit a sixth part only.

ART. III.—WHETHER AN ILLEGITIMATE SON CAN BE LEGITIMIZED.

YES.—Insofar as the losses that the illegitimate son incurs are withdrawn by authority of law.

THE REASON is that what is caused by the positive law can also be revoked by the positive law. Now the illegitimacy of children is caused by the positive law.

QUESTION LXIX

MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, FIRSTLY OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH

After this we are to treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection; for after speaking of the sacraments, whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection, whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers three points for consideration, namely the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak 1) of those things that partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; 2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances; 3) of the things that follow it.

Among the things that precede the resurrection we must consider 1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; 2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; 3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living; 4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; 5) the signs preceding the general judgment; 6) the fire of the world's final conflagration, which will precede the appearance of the Judge.—About the first point seven questions will be asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER PLACES ARE APPOINTED TO RECEIVE SOULS AFTER DEATH.

YES.—According to a certain congruity, whereby in Scripture corporeal things are metaphorically transferred to spiritual things.

THE REASON is that, although no bodies are assigned to souls after death, of which they are the forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are determined for them by way of a certain fitness according to their degrees of nobility, whereby they are in a place after the manner in which incorporeal things can be in a place, insofar as they more or less approach the First Substance, to which the highest place is fittingly assigned, namely God, whose seat Scripture proclaims heaven to be. Hence we hold that those souls that have a perfect share of the Divinity are in heaven, and that those souls that are deprived of that share are consigned to the opposite place.

ART. II.—WHETHER SOULS ARE CONVEYED TO HEAVEN OR HELL IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEATH.

YES.—As Scripture teaches.

THE REASON is that merit and demerit, by which souls receive reward or punishment, which are the ends of their actions, are related to each other as heaviness and lightness are in corporeal things. Wherefore, just as a body immediately moves to its place by its heaviness or lightness, unless there is an obstacle; so souls after the bodily tie has been loosed, which held them in the wayfaring state, immediately receive reward or punishment, unless something hinders. Sometimes the obstacle to receiving the reward is venial sin, which must first be purged away; from this it follows that the reward may be put off.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOULS WHO ARE IN HEAVEN OR HELL ARE ABLE TO LEAVE.

YES.—a) For a time; b) not in the natural course of things; c) but according to the disposition of Divine Providence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as will be explained later (q. lxxi, art. 5), no one who has been finally assigned to hell or paradise can go from thence.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in the course of nature men living in mortal flesh cannot be immediately united to separated substance; for all their knowledge arises from the senses alone; and therefore in the natural course of things separated souls assigned to their respective abodes are wholly secluded from intercourse with the living.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is evident from facts narrated by credible authors, such as Augustine (in his book *De Cura pro Mortuis*, xvi) and Gregory (*in lib. Dial.*).

NOTE: 1. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints, when they wish, can appear to the living; not so the damned. For, just as the saints living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work

miracles, which can be done miraculously only by the divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear miraculously to the living when they will, whereas others are unable to do so unless they are sometimes permitted (at end of art.).

2. Although sometimes the souls of the saints or the damned are sometimes actually present where they appear, we must not believe that this always happens. For even living men sometimes appear to others, and say many things to them in dreams, though it is evident they are not present, as Augustine proves by many examples (Ad 6).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE LIMBO OF HELL IS THE SAME AS THE BOSOM OF ABRAHAM.

YES.—Before the coming of Christ Abraham's bosom and the limbo of hell were the same, but accidentally, and not essentially.

THE REASON is that, since after death mens' souls cannot reach their rest save by the merit of faith, and since in Abraham the first example of faith was given to men, therefore that rest which is given to holy men after their death is called Abraham's bosom. But before the coming of Christ this rest did not involve the rest of desire through the attainment of the end, for the end was not yet received; but it involved immunity from punishment.

as it involved rest, and thus it is called Abraham's bosom; and it can also be considered insofar as it lacked rest, and thus is called the limbo of hell. After Christ's coming, however, nothing prevents Abraham's bosom from being altogether different from limbo, just as the state of perfect fruition is different from the state of immunity from punishment.

Hence the state of the saints before Christ's coming can be considered both insofar

ART. V.—WHETHER LIMBO IS THE SAME AS THE HELL OF THE DAMNED.

NO.—a) The Limbo of the Fathers is distinct from hell; b) as regards location, however, it is probable that it is the same place, or that they are continuous, as it were.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in hell there is sensible punishment, which did not exist in the Limbo of the Fathers; also that in hell there is eternal punishment, but in the Limbo of the Fathers the saints were kept for a time only.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that those in hell receive different punishment according to the difference in their guilt. Therefore, the graver are the sins in which the damned are enmeshed, the darker and deeper the place they have in hell. Wherefore the Holy Fathers, in whom there was the least element of guilt, had a higher and less dark place than all who were to be punished; accordingly, Christ is said to have "bitten" hell and to have descended into hell, insofar as He delivered the Fathers from limbo by His descent (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE LIMBO OF THE CHILDREN IS THE SAME AS THE LIMBO OF THE FATHERS.

NO.—The Limbo of the Fathers and the Limbo of the Children differ without doubt, according to the quality of reward or punishment.

THE REASON is that the children have no hope of the blessed life, which the Fathers had in limbo, in whom the light of faith and grace shone forth.—But as regards situation the probable belief is that the place of both was the same, unless it be that the Limbo of the Fathers was in a higher place than the Limbo of the Children, as we

THE REASON is that the soul after death is either in the state of receiving its said concerning limbo and hell.

ART. VII.—WHETHER SO MANY ABODES SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED.

YES.—Five: Paradise, the Limbo of the Fathers, purgatory, hell, and the Limbo of the Children.

final retribution, and it is accordingly either in paradise, or in hell because of actual sin, or in the Limbo of the Children by reason of original sin; or it is in the state in which the soul is hindered from receiving its final reward; and this is either on account

of a defect of the person, and thus it is purgatory, or on account of a defect of nature, and thus it is the Limbo of the Fathers, in which the Patriarchs were hindered from receiving glory on account of the guilt of human nature, which could not yet be expiated.—As regards the murky atmosphere, this is not assigned to the demons as a place in which they receive retribution for their demerits; but as belonging to their office, insofar as they are appointed for our trial (Ad 4).

QUESTION LXX

THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SENSITIVE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SEPARATED SOUL.

NO.—a) The sensitive powers do not remain simply in the separated soul; b) but they remain in a restricted sense, that is, as in their root.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, as long as their proper subject remains, the proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they are corrupted; hence it is necessary for those powers that do not use a bodily organ in their actions to remain in the separated soul; whereas those that do use a bodily organ are corrupted when the body is corrupted; and such are all the powers that belong to the sensible and vegetative soul.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that there remains in the separated soul an efficacy to influence again these powers, if it is again united to the body; nor does it follow that this efficacy is something superadded to the essence of the soul, for otherwise we should have an infinite regress.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE SENSITIVE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SEPARATED SOUL.

NO.—THE REASON is that these acts are not operations of the soul insofar as the soul moves itself, as Plato said, who held the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis, as Aristotle notes (*On the Soul*, bk. i, 45), because the soul actually does not move itself, nor is it in any wise moved by these acts; but they are acts only of the composite of body and soul. Wherefore the acts of the sensitive powers in no wise remain in the separated soul, save perhaps as in a remote principle.—As regards the images of things in the imagination, they remain in the separated soul intellectually, but not imaginatively (Ad 3).—Similarly, memory, insofar as it is a power of the sensitive faculty, namely insofar as its gaze extends back to the past, does not remain. But insofar as it is a part of the imagination belonging to the intellective faculty, namely insofar as it abstracts from all difference of time, it thus remains (Ad 4).

[Translator's Note: In this last observation St. Thomas saves Aristotle from the charge often made against him, that he denied the immortality of the soul. The basis for this was his remark in the book *On the Soul*, i, 4, that "when this body is corrupted, the soul no longer remembers."]

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL CAN SUFFER FROM A BODILY FIRE.

YES.—Supposing that the fire of hell is not a metaphorical expression, or an imaginary fire, but a true corporeal fire, it must be said that the soul will suffer punishment from a bodily fire.

THE REASON is that the Lord asserts (Matt. xxv, 41) that that fire was prepared for the devil and his angels. Now the devil and his angels are incorporeal, as is the separated soul.—Yet no bodily fire can act on a separated soul according as it is a bodily thing, but according as it is an instrument of divine justice punishing, or as acting with the power of the principal agent, that is, God, insofar as bodily fire has superadded to it the power to hold and fetter a spirit, by keeping it from the exercise of its own will, so that it cannot act where it will and as it will; for the order of divine justice demands that the soul, which in sinning subjected itself to bodily things, also be subject to them in punishment. Hence Augustine says (*City of God*, bk. xxix, 12) that just as the soul in man's condition is united to the body, as giving it life (although the one is spiritual and the other corporeal), and from this union it conceives a great love

for the body, it is therefore bound to the fire, as receiving punishment from it; and from this union it conceives a loathing.—For the fire acts on the soul, not as bestowing on it, but as detaining it (Ad 4); and the soul, by seeing the fire as hurtful to it, is afflicted (Ad 5).

QUESTION LXXI
THE SUFFRAGES OFFERED FOR THE DEAD
(14 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SUFFRAGES OF ONE PERSON CAN PROFIT OTHERS.

YES.—a) The action of one person can in no wise avail another to obtain his state by way of merit, so that, namely, by the things that I do someone else merits eternal life; b) but by way of prayer, even as regards obtaining a state, the act of one person, while in the wayfaring state, can avail another.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the reward of glory is rendered according to the measure of the recipient; now each person is disposed by his own act, and not by that of another; and I speak of the disposition of being worthy for a reward.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God who is prayed to, the impetration of prayer can extend to everything that is ordinately subject to divine power.

NOTE: As regards what is consequent or accessory to the state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer, but also by way of merit, both on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works, and through the intention of the doer, who does some works especially for the purpose that they may benefit certain persons, so that they can avail them either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DEAD CAN BE AIDED BY THE WORKS OF THE LIVING.

YES.—Charity, which is the bond of the Church uniting its members, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who depart in charity.

THE REASON is that charity, which is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body, does not end: "Charity never fails" (I Cor. xiii, 8). Hence the suffrages of the living benefit the dead in two ways, as also the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention directed in them. That is, they avail for the diminution of punishment, or something similar, which does not change the state of the dead person.—For, although souls after death are not simply in the wayfaring state, yet in regard to something they are in the wayfaring state, namely insofar as their progress is still being hindered from its final reward. And therefore simply speaking their way is hedged in, so that they cannot be further changed by any works, according to their state of happiness and misery; but their way is not so hedged in as regards their being hindered from receiving their final reward that they cannot be helped by the others, because in this respect they are still in the wayfaring state (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES PERFORMED BY SINNERS PROFIT THE DEAD.

YES.—As regards the good work done, as for instance the sacrifice of the altar; but not as regards the act of the doer, unless it is done by reason of another, who is in grace.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that our sacraments have efficacy of themselves, without the work of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomever performed. On the part of the doer who is in sin, however, they are in no way works meritorious either for the dead or for others, unless they be done in the name of the whole Church, or as the instrument of another, as when someone who dies in charity commands suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribes them, because the work of the instrument is rather that of the chief agent. Hence those suffrages avail the departed, although those by whom they are performed be in sin. Yet they would avail more if they were in charity, because then these works would be meritorious on two counts.

ART. IV.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES OFFERED BY THE LIVING FOR THE DEAD PROFIT THOSE WHO OFFER THEM.

YES.—a) Not insofar as the work of suffrage is performed as the other's satisfaction, but b) insofar as it is meritorious of life eternal.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that in this way the work of suffrage, which is reckoned as belonging to him for whom it is performed, thus releases him from the debt of punishment, but does not release the one performing it from the debt of his own punishment, because in such compensation we have to consider the equality of justice; and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the work of suffrage is meritorious of eternal life, insofar as it proceeds from the root of charity; and in this way it benefits not only the one for whom it is offered, but the doer still more.

ART. V.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES PROFIT THOSE WHO ARE IN HELL.

NO.—It is safer to say absolutely that suffrages are of no benefit to the damned.

THE REASON is that the damned, having received the retribution of their merits, have arrived at the last term of life, and are devoid of charity, by which the works of the living are in touch with those of the dead.

NOTE: Of certain of the damned, who were restored to life miraculously, as we read of the Emperor Trajan, whom St. Gregory called back to life, it is said that they were not finally consigned to hell, but as was actually due for their merits according to justice; and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.—Or it should be said, according to some, that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment; but his punishment was suspended for a time, namely until the day of judgment (Ad 5).

ART. VI.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES PROFIT THOSE WHO ARE IN PURGATORY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as was said (art. 1 of this q.), the works of one person can avail another for satisfaction, whether he be living or dead (but in charity).—Hence it is not unfitting if, after multiplied suffrages, the punishment of those in purgatory is canceled (Ad 2).

NOTE: Suffrages performed by virtue of the action done are not only the sacraments of the Church but also those effects incidental to that action. Thus from the giving of alms there follow relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. Likewise, suffrages on the part of the principal agent immediately avail for the efficacy of the suffrage (act of agent); hence, as soon as a dying person provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, he receives the full measure of those suffrages even before they are discharged; but as regards the efficacy of the suffrages (action alone), he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged (Ad 4).

ART. VII.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES AVAIL THE CHILDREN WHO ARE IN LIMBO.

NO.—THE REASON is that unbaptized children are kept in limbo only because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since by the works of the living the state of the dead cannot be changed, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot profit children in limbo.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES PROFIT THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the saints in heaven are free of all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God's house.

NOTE: Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow that if our joys be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the joy of the saints, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in whom they cannot rejoice more or less (Ad 3).

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE PRAYERS OF THE CHURCH, THE SACRIFICE OF THE ALTAR, AND ALMS PROFIT THE DEAD.

YES.—The prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar, and almsgiving profit especially the departed: The sacrifice of the altar and almsgiving on the part of the union of charity, and prayers on the part of the intention.

THE REASON is that the sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly pertains to the communication of charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical union, containing that in which the whole Church is united and consolidated, namely Christ. Hence the Eucharist is as it were the spring or bond of charity. But among the effects of charity the work of almsgiving is chief. Therefore these two benefit the dead chiefly on the part of charity, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving.—But on the part of the intention directed to the dead prayer chiefly avails, because prayer by its nature indicates a relation, not only to the one who prays, as do the other works, but more directly to that for which prayer is offered.

NOTE: 1. The Eucharist is a sign of the union of the Church, and therefore by the very action done its efficacy can pass to another; this is not true of the other sacraments (Ad 3).

2. The suffrage of the Mass contains two things: Prayer and the sacrifice. Therefore on the part of the sacrifice offered the Mass equally benefits the departed, of whatever Mass we speak, whether that of the saints or that of the dead, and this is the chief thing that is done in the Mass. But on the part of the prayers that Mass is of greater benefit in which the prayers are determined to this one thing. Yet this defect can be compensated by the greater devotion, either of the one who says the Mass, or of the one who orders it to be said, or again by the intercession of a saint whose suffrage is implored in the Mass (Ad 5).

ART. X.—WHETHER THE INDULGENCES OF THE CHURCH PROFIT THE DEAD.

NO.—Indulgences do not benefit the dead primarily but only secondarily.

THE REASON is that an indulgence principally profits the one who receives the indulgence, namely the one who does this for which the indulgence is given, as one who visits the shrine of some saint. Since, however, the dead cannot do any of the things for which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot directly avail them. Secondarily, however, and indirectly, they profit the one for whom a person does that which is the cause of the indulgence, and this may or may not occur, according to the different forms of indulgences according to the intention of the Church.

ART. XI.—WHETHER THE BURIAL SERVICE PROFITS THE DEAD.

NO.—The burial service, which is for the seemliness of burial, does not profit the dead directly, but only incidentally.

THE REASON is that such ceremonies indeed profit the living, insofar as they afford the solace, and are a kind of profession of faith in the resurrection of the dead; but they benefit the dead insofar as they excite men to compassion, and consequently to prayer; or also insofar as either the burial expenses benefit the poor or aid in the adornment of the church; it is thus that the burial of the dead is counted among the works of mercy.

NOTE: Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according to Eph. v, 29: "No man ever hated his own flesh." Hence, in accordance with this natural affection, a man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body after death; and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his body with loving care; and in this way it is said that one does a work of mercy for him (Ad 3).

ART. XII.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES OFFERED FOR ONE DECEASED PERSON PROFIT THE PERSON FOR WHOM THEY ARE OFFERED MORE THAN FOR OTHERS.

YES.—a) On the part of charity, the suffrages avail him more who is more full of charity than the one for whom they are offered; b) on the part of the intention and

the remission of punishment, they avail more him for whom they are offered, and in fact they avail him only.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that charity makes all goods common; accordingly, they share more fully in suffrages who are richer in charity; just as a candle that is lit for one person no less benefits those who are with him, but rather more, if they have keener sight. Thus the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of punishment.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, by reason of the intention, the satisfaction of one person counts for the other. Now satisfaction is properly directed to the remission of punishment. Hence, as regards the remission of punishment the suffrage chiefly avails the one for whom it is offered.

NOTE: Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off, as the Lord Himself said (Luke vi, 20): "Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Ad 3).

ART. XIII.—WHETHER SUFFRAGES OFFERED FOR SEVERAL ARE AS MUCH VALUE FOR EACH ONE AS IF THEY HAD BEEN OFFERED FOR EACH IN PARTICULAR.

NO.—a) Suffrages, insofar as they avail by virtue of the charity uniting the members of the Church, even if they are offered for several, avail each one of many as much as if they were offered for one only; b) but suffrages insofar as they are satisfactions transferred by the intention of the offerer to the dead, then avail the one for whom they are particularly offered more than those that are offered for him in common with many others.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that charity is not diminished if its effect is divided among many—in fact, it is rather increased; and likewise also joy increases the more it is shared, as Augustine says (*Confess.*, bk. viii, c. 4). And thus many in purgatory rejoice no less in one good deed than does one.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the effect of suffrage is divided by divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered.

ART. XIV.—WHETHER GENERAL SUFFRAGES AVAIL THOSE FOR WHOM SPECIAL SUFFRAGES ARE NOT OFFERED, AS MUCH AS SPECIAL SUFFRAGES AVAIL THOSE FOR WHOM THEY ARE OFFERED IN ADDITION TO GENERAL SUFFRAGES.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that, as was said (art. xii, of this q.), suffrages offered for one person do not benefit all indifferently, but they profit more the one for whom they are offered, and therefore there is no doubt that common and special suffrages together avail a person more than common suffrages only. Yet the one for whom special suffrages are offered receives speedier absolution, but not a fuller one than he for whom only common suffrages are offered; because both will be finally freed from all punishment.

NOTE: Although the power of Christ, who is contained in the sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect to which that statement is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of the altar. Even so, by the one sacrifice that a man offers he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if anything from special suffrages be left over for those for whom they are offered (as when they do not need them), we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to others, for whom these suffrages are not offered, if they need them. This is evident from the words of the Damascene (in his Sermon on Those who Sleep): "Truly God, inasmuch as He is just, will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for the exchange of deficiencies" and this exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another (Ad 2).

QUESTION LXXII PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN

(in three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE SAINTS HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PRAYERS.

YES.—The saints in heaven know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of men who have recourse to their assistance.

THE REASON is that it is required for the perfection of beatitude that man should have whatever he will. Now everyone wills with a right will to know the things that pertain to him. Hence, since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they desire to know the things that pertain to them; and therefore it follows that they know these things in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation; for thus they are made co-operators of God, "than which nothing is more divine," as Dionysius says (*Caelest. Hier.*, cap. 3). Hence it is evident that the saints have a knowledge of the things that are required for this end.

NOTE: The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to the divine will even as regards the things willed; and consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in accord with the disposition of divine justice. Nevertheless it is to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding for him to God (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER WE OUGHT TO CALL UPON THE SAINTS TO PRAY FOR US.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the saints in heaven are most close to God, the order of the divine law requires that they who, while we remain in the body are exiled from the Lord, be led back to Him by the saints, who are between us and Him; and this happens when through them the divine goodness pours forth its effect upon us. And thus it is that we make them our intercessors for us to God, and as it were mediators, when we ask them to pray for us.

NOTE: It is not on account of any defect in God's power that He works by means of second causes, but for the perfection of the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His goodness on things, through His bestowing on them, not only the goodness that is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even so, it is not through any defect in His mercy that we need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be observed (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE PRAYERS THAT THE SAINTS POUR FORTH TO GOD FOR US ARE ALWAYS GRANTED.

YES.—a) The express prayer of the saints, namely when by their prayers they seek a hearing for us from the divine mercy, are always granted; b) but the interpretative prayer of the saints, i.e., that which is offered through their merits, as the blood of Christ poured out for us is said to seek pardon, is not always granted.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the saints will only what God wills, and ask only what they will to be done; and what God wills is always fulfilled—unless we speak of His antecedent will, whereby He wishes all men to be saved, which is not always fulfilled. Hence no wonder if that also which the saints will by this kind of will is sometimes not fulfilled.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that on our part they may fail, so that we do not obtain the fruit of their prayers, insofar as they are said to pray for us by reason of their merits' availing us.

NOTE: From the fact that the saints ask for nothing else than what they see in the divine will it does not follow that their prayer is unfruitful. For the prayers of the saints profit the predestined, because perhaps it is foreordained that they should be saved by the prayers of those who intercede for them; and thus even God wills that what the saints see that He wills should be fulfilled by their prayers (Ad 5).

QUESTION LXXIII THE SIGNS THAT PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY SIGNS WILL PRECEDE THE LORD'S COMING TO JUDGMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that it pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to reverence and subjection. Hence many signs will precede the coming of Christ to judgment, that the hearts of men may be brought into subjection to the Judge who is to come, and they may be prepared for the judgment by being warned by these signs.

ART. II.—WHETHER TOWARDS THE TIME OF THE JUDGMENT THE SUN AND MOON WILL BE REALLY DARKENED.

NO.—In the very moment of Christ's coming it is not to be believed that the sun and moon will be darkened by the privation of their light; yet it could be that this will be done in a time near the judgment to inspire fear in men.

THE REASON is that the whole world will be renewed at Christ's coming, and the saints will rise again.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE VIRTUES OF HEAVEN WILL BE MOVED WHEN THE LORD COMES.

YES.—Whether the name of virtues is taken for an order of angels or for all the heavenly spirits.

THE REASON is that in the first case that order of angels to which it belongs to move the heavenly bodies will cease producing its effect. Even so, the angels who are assigned to guard men will vacate the office of further guardianship. In the second case, the virtues of heaven are said to be moved on account of the wonder at the newness of the world, which will then be.

NOTE: The virtues of heaven, says Sylvius, can mean the heavens themselves, and their firmness and stability, which will be moved by unwonted movements and tremors, and in a similar sense we rightly take Job xxvi, 11: "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck."—Paris.

QUESTION LXXIV THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION

(nine articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE WORLD IS TO BE CLEANSED.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the world was in a way made for man, it is right that when man will be glorified in the body the other bodies of the universe will also be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place for him, and more pleasant to the sight by the removal of corruption and the infection of sin.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CLEANSING OF THE WORLD WILL BE BY FIRE.

YES.—THE REASON is that fire has of all the elements the greatest efficacy to cleanse and to separate by the process of rarification. By this final cleansing things will be reduced to the purity in which they were created (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE FIRE WHEREBY THE WORLD WILL BE CLEANSED WILL BE OF THE SAME SPECIES WITH ETERNAL FIRE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as Augustine says (*City of God*, bk xx, c. 16), just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly flames." Now this conflagration is nothing else than the assembly of all causes, inferior and superior, which have by their nature the power to ignite. This gathering together will not be effected by the natural course of things, but by the divine power; and from all these causes thus assembled fire will be generated, which will burn the face of this world.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THAT FIRE WILL CLEANSE ALSO THE HIGHER HEAVENS.

NO.—THE REASON is that no disposition contrary to the perfection of glory, such as is found in the world, is not found in the heavenly bodies. There is, however, local movement in the heavenly sphere, and this local movement, which will cease by God's will, and this rest that will follow, will be in lieu of cleansing for them.

ART. V.—WHETHER THAT FIRE WILL CONSUME THE OTHER ELEMENTS.

NO.—The elements will remain with regard to substance and their proper qualities, but they will be cleansed from the infection that they contracted from the sins of men and from the impurity that is incident to them as a result of mutual action and passion.

THE REASON is that, once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible. Hence the fire that will act as the instrument of Providence and the divine power will not act on the other elements until their consumption, for it is not probable that this final consumption will take any natural perfection from the elements; but it will only act to cleanse (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER ALL THE ELEMENTS WILL BE CLEANSED BY THAT FIRE.

YES.—THE REASON is that the fire can consume the impurities of the elements, arising from their mingling together. These impurities are chiefly around the earth as far as the middle of the air. Wherefore the fire of the last conflagration will cleanse the elements up to that point.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION IS TO FOLLOW THE JUDGMENT.

NO.—That conflagration will precede the judgment as regards the cleansing of the world; but as regards a certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.

THE REASON is that that conflagration will be a preparation for the renewal of the world, which precedes Christ's coming; hence the saints also, rising again for the judgment of Christ, will assume a glorified body (i.e., a body purified by fire).

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THAT FIRE WILL HAVE SUCH AN EFFECT ON MEN AS IS DESCRIBED.

YES.—Namely as described by the Master of Sentences in bk. iv, dist. 47: The fire will act naturally before the judgment on both the good and the wicked who will be found alive, by reducing them to ashes; but the wicked will be tormented by the action of that fire, whereas the good will be free of all pain.

THE REASON is that that fire, which will act as an instrument of divine justice, will retain its nature, and thus will operate even by its natural power. Therefore, as regards its natural power it will act similarly on the good and the wicked who are found alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But insofar as it will act as an instrument of divine justice it will act in different ways on both as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will be tormented by the action of the fire, but the good in whom nothing will be found to be cleansed will feel no pain at all from the fire, even as the Hebrew children felt nothing in the fiery furnace. The good in whom something will be found to be purged will feel the torment of pain from that fire more or less, according to the diversity of their merits. But as regards the action that that fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned only; because all the good will have impassible bodies.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THIS FIRE WILL ENGLUF THE REPROBATE.

YES.—That is, the fire of conflagration.

THE REASON is that, as regards whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter, this will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect, according to a gloss on Dan. vii, 10: "A swift stream of fire issued forth from before Him," which adds: "To punish the wicked and cleanse the good."

QUESTION LXXV RESURRECTION

(three articles)

In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third, its time and manner; the fourth, its term *wherfrom*; the fifth, the condition of those who will rise again. Under the first head stand three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE WILL BE A RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that man cannot, by reason of the vicissitudes of fortune, the infirmities of the body, and the imperfections and instabilities of knowledge and virtue, attain his last end in this life, that is, happiness, which he naturally desires. Hence it follows that he will attain this happiness after this life, not in his soul alone, but also in his body, of which the soul is the substantial form. Therefore it is necessary to hold a resurrection of the body after this life, as Scripture often declares. And thus man, who acts through the body, in the body also will receive his reward.

II.—WHETHER THE RESURRECTION WILL BE FOR ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that the things the reason of which comes from the nature of a species must be found likewise in all the members of the same species. Now such is the resurrection. For the soul in the final perfection of the human species cannot be separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain forever separated from the body. Hence it follows that one and all must rise again, as Scripture says (John v, 28, 25): "All who are in the tombs shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and those who hear shall live."

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RESURRECTION IS NATURAL.

NO.—The resurrection, simply speaking, is miraculous; only in a restricted sense is it natural.

THE REASON is that nature cannot be the principle of the resurrection, although the resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For no active principle of resurrection is in nature, either with respect to the union of soul and body or with respect to the disposition that is necessary for such a union, for such a disposition cannot be caused by nature, save in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Hence, even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to union with the soul, it is not such as suffices for the conditions of natural movement. Hence resurrection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural, except in a restricted sense, namely in respect of its term.

NOTE: The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence, just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art; so the last end that the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for this reason the attaining thereto is not natural (Ad 4).

QUESTION LXXVI THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST IS THE CAUSE OF OUR OWN.

YES.—Christ's Resurrection is both the efficient and univocal and the instrumental cause of our own resurrection.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the same thing that wrought the Resurrection of Christ, namely the power of Christ's Divinity, which is common to Him and the Father, is the efficient cause of our own resurrection. Wherefore it is said (Rom. viii, 11): "He who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will also bring to life your mortal bodies."

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that divine operations were exerted through the medium of Christ's flesh, as an instrument, so to speak.—Hence Christ's Resurrection was caused by the Godhead immediately; the resurrection of the others, by means of the Christ-Man rising again (Ad 3).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SOUND OF THE TRUMPET WILL BE THE CAUSE OF OUR RESURRECTION.

YES.—The manifestation of divine will whereat the resurrection will take place is nothing else than the sign given by Christ Himself, whom all nature will obey at the resurrection of the dead; and this sign is the same as the voice of the trumpet, so called on account of its capacity to spread sound.

THE REASON is that in the resurrection of the bodies Christ must needs cause the resurrection by giving a common corporeal sign. This sign, as some say, will be literally the voice of Christ commanding the resurrection, as He commanded the seas, and the tempest ceased. Some say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world.

NOTE: This voice, whatever it is, will have instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ANGELS WILL DO ANYTHING TOWARDS THE RESURRECTION.

YES.—THE REASON is that, in all that is done corporeally by God, God uses the ministry of angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the body, namely the gathering together of the remains, and their preparation for the restoration of the human body. Hence as regards this God will employ the angels' ministry in the resurrection. But the soul, as it was immediately created by God, so will be immediately reunited to its body by God, without any operation of the angels.

QUESTION LXXVII
THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION
(four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE TIME OF OUR RESURRECTION SHOULD BE DELAYED 'TILL THE END OF THE WORLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the whole matter of the inferior bodies is subject to variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, it would be against the order established in things by Divine Providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorporation while movement in the higher bodies remained. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to Christ, according to Rom. vi, 9: Who, "rising again from the dead, dies now no more;" the resurrection of the bodies will be delayed until the end of the world, when the movement of the heavens will cease.—As to certain persons' being granted the grace that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general resurrection, this is by way of a special privilege (Ad 2).

NOTE: Apoc. xx, 4: "I saw the souls of those who had been beheaded because of their witness to Jesus;" and v. 5: "And they came to live and reigned with Christ a thousand years. The rest of the dead did not come to life until the thousand years were finished."

These words have given certain heretics occasion to assert that there will be a first resurrection of the dead, that they may reign with Christ on earth a thousand years. Hence they were called chiliasts, or millenarians. Hence Augustine says (*City of God*, bk. xx, chap. 7) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace; whereas the second resurrection is of bodies. The number of a thousand years denotes, not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 denotes universality, as for example it is said in Ps. civ., 8: "The word which He commanded to a thousand generations," i.e., to all (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE TIME OF OUR RESURRECTION IS HIDDEN.

Yes.—According to Acts i, 7: "It is not for you to know the times or dates, which the Father has fixed by His own authority."

THE REASON is that the exact length of future time cannot be known save either by revelation or by natural reason. Now the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous, as stated in the preceding article. Now it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to calculate its end, for, since it is circular, it is for this very reason naturally fitted to endure forever. Hence natural reason cannot calculate the time until the resurrection. Similarly also this cannot be determined by revelation, as is clear from the words of the Lord (Acts i, 7).

NOTE: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in Apoc. xii denote all the time during which the Church endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason for this is that the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again, the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE RESURRECTION WILL TAKE PLACE AT NIGHT TIME.

YES.—The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (*Sent.* iv, dist. 43). Nevertheless some assert, with probability, that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the west and the sun in the east.

THE REASON is that the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said of Christ that He rose at such an hour.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE RESURRECTION WILL HAPPEN SUDDENLY OR SUCCESSIVELY.

ANSWER: It will happen suddenly, according to I Cor. xv, 51-52: "We shall all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye."

THE REASON is that this will be done by the immediate action of divine power, and therefore suddenly, namely at the end of time, wherein the work of the angels will be completed.

NOTE: The same thing seems to apply to the sound of the trumpet and the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in the last instant (Ad 3). The gathering of the ashes, which cannot be without local movement, will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time, though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation, which is peculiar to the angels (Ad 4).

QUESTION LXXVIII THE TERM 'WHEREFROM' OF THE RESURRECTION (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER DEATH WILL BE THE TERM WHEREFROM OF THE RESURRECTION IN ALL CASES.

YES.—All men, without exception, are to die before the final resurrection, as Scripture attests and as befits the natural order.

THE REASON is that the contagion of original sin has made all men debtors to death. Hence Scripture foretells that all will rise again. This is also in harmony with the natural order, for what has been corrupted and spoilt is not reduced to its original state save by means of corruption. Thus vinegar is not restored to wine unless the vinegar be dissolved. Therefore, since human nature has been reduced to the defect of the necessity to die, there will be no return to immortality save through death. It also befits the natural order for another reason: When the heart's movement ceases all the members become dead; even so, when the movement of the heaven ceases nothing living can remain in that life that was maintained by the influence of that movement.

NOTE: As to what we read in the Creed, that "the Lord will come to judge the living and the dead," this distinction between living and dead is not to be referred to the time of judgment, or to the whole past time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time; but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, namely, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN FROM ASHES.

YES.—Unless a contrary privilege shall be granted to some as a special grace, such as the hastening of their resurrection.

THE REASON is that Holy Writ, just as it foretells the resurrection, so also foretells the reformation of bodies, according to Philip. iii, 21: "We eagerly await a Savior, Our Lord Jesus Christ, who will refashion the body of our lowliness." Therefore, just as all die, that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish, that they may be able to be refashioned, according to Gen. ii, 19: "Earth [vulgate, dust] thou art, and into earth thou shalt go."—This is also demanded by the order of nature, for, when the movement of the heaven ceases, all that is mixed will be resolved into pure elements.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ASHES FROM WHICH THE HUMAN BODY WILL BE RESTORED HAVE ANY NATURAL INCLINATION TOWARDS THE SOUL WHICH WILL BE UNITED TO THEM.

NO.—In these ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the order of Divine Providence, which ordains that these ashes shall be united to the soul.

THE REASON is that the body, after the soul's separation, does not remain in the same nature that it had; and therefore after the body has been reduced to ashes there does not remain in them a natural inclination to the aforesaid union.

QUESTION LXXIX**THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST THEIR IDENTITY**

Subsequently we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: 1) Those that concern the good and wicked in common; 2) those that concern the good only; 3) those that concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality; and we shall inquire 1) about their identity, 2) about their integrity, 3) about their quality.—Under the first head there are three points of inquiry.

ART. I.—WHETHER IN THE RESURRECTION THE SOUL WILL BE REUNITED TO THE SAME IDENTICAL BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that there cannot be said to be a resurrection unless the soul returns to the same body; for resurrection is a second rising (resurrection). Now it belongs to the same to rise and to fall. Hence resurrection more regards the body, which falls after death, than the soul, which lives after death. And therefore, if it is not the same body that the soul resumes, there could not be said to be a resurrection, but rather the assumption of a new body. And this conforms to Holy Writ, e.g., Job xix, 26, where it is said: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior."

ART. II.—WHETHER IT WILL BE IDENTICALLY THE SAME MAN THAT WILL RISE AGAIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the same identical thing should reach its end which was made for the end. Now, lest he might seem to be made in vain, it is necessary that the same identical man rise again; and this happens when the same soul is united to the same identical body; for otherwise there would properly be no resurrection unless the same man were restored. Hence to affirm that identically the same person will not rise again is heretical, and derogates from the truth of Scripture, which foretold the resurrection.

[NOTE: The declaration of Innocent III in the Lateran Council, Can. I, affirms: "All mortals will rise again with their own bodies, which they now bear." This is also evident from Job xix, 26: "I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh. . ." And I Cor. xv, 53: "This corruptible body must put on incorruption."—Paris]

NOTE: The form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being that accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from each other, otherwise the union of soul and body would be

accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it impossible for the selfsame man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form does not remain, and their matter remains under another being (Ad 1).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE ASHES OF THE HUMAN BODY MUST, BY THE RESURRECTION, RETURN TO THE SAME PARTS OF THE BODY THAT WERE DISSOLVED INTO THEM.

NO.—The dust of the same homogeneous part need not return to the same part as regards position; but the dust of one part cannot return to another part that is specifically different.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that change only in position does not produce a change in species. And thus if the matter of one part should return to another part, this would not prejudice the identity of the whole. But, speaking according to congruities, it is more probable that even the identity of the position of the parts will be retained in the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as the hair and nails.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, if the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, there will of necessity be a change, not only of the position of the parts, but also of their identity; yet so that the whole matter, or something that was of the truth of human nature in one part, is transferred to the other. Now if identity of parts be destroyed the identity of the whole is destroyed, if we are speaking of essential parts.

QUESTION LXXX
THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION
(in five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN BODY WILL RISE AGAIN.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since the soul, in its relation of efficient causes, stands to the body as art to the product of art, as Aristotle says *On the Soul* (bk. ii, text 36 and 37), whatever appears in parts of the body is all originally and in some manner implicitly contained in the soul; just as whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in art. Therefore, for the perfection of the soul, the body must correspond to it in full proportion. Now in the resurrection the body will not rise again save according to the order which it has to the rational soul. Consequently man must rise again perfect, i.e., with all the members that are in the body, since the whole man is restored to his final perfection, according to the Apostle (Phil. iii, 21): "Jesus Christ . . . will refashion the body of our lowliness, conforming it to the body of His glory."

NOTE: Although after the resurrection there will be lacking the operation of the members of the body, it does not follow from this that the bodily members will be useless; for an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show forth its power. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God may be glorified thereby (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE HAIR AND NAILS WILL RISE AGAIN IN THE HUMAN BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that man will rise again in all the perfection of His nature; consequently, the hair and nails will rise again in him. For the hair and nails and other such things are in man to protect the other vital parts. Hence the hair and nails, although not of the first perfection, are of the second perfection, like leaves to cover fruit.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE HUMORS WILL RISE AGAIN IN THE BODY.

YES.—Not all the humors that are now in the body will rise again with the body, but only those that have a determinate form, such as the integral parts of the body, like the blood, the black and yellow bile, and phlegm and *gluten*.

THE REASON is that whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in the risen man will arise in its entirety for the above-mentioned reason (art. 1 and 2, preceding). Hence it follows that those humid parts of the body will rise again in man which belong to the integrity of human nature.

ART. IV.—WHETHER WHATEVER IN THE BODY BELONGED TO THE TRUTH OF HUMAN NATURE WILL RISE AGAIN IN IT.

YES.—THE REASON is that something is said to be of the truth of human nature insofar as it properly belongs to the being of human nature; and this is that which shares in the form of human nature; just as that is called true gold which has the true form of gold, by reason of which it is the proper being of gold. Hence, just as human nature will rise again as it is in the individual, it is necessary that everything in the body of the individual that is of the truth of human nature rise with him, especially that in which the body comes nearest to the perfect sharing of the power of the species.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: St. Thomas quotes an opinion comparing man's body to the body politic: The parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the state is said to remain the same. Even so, while certain parts of the body are ebbing and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species, and nevertheless the selfsame man remains (in body).

In the case of cannibalism, the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten; and thus it will rise again in the latter, but not in the former.

According to another opinion, if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second; otherwise, what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; in the second, its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or, if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by divine power. This does not derogate from numerical identity, any more than do the ebb and flow of the parts of the body.

ART. V.—WHETHER WHATEVER WAS MATERIALLY IN A MAN'S MEMBERS WILL ALL RISE AGAIN.

NO.—THE REASON is that the totality of matter in the human members does not belong to the truth of human nature as regards what it has of the species (in the individual). For the whole matter that was in man from the beginning of his life to the end, would exceed the quantity due to the species. Therefore the whole that is in man will rise again, considering the totality of the species, which is considered according to the quantity, figure, position, and order of the parts; but the whole will not rise again if we consider the totality of the matter.

NOTE: The nature of the species has some quantity, which it neither exceeds nor fails without error; and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure, as quantity is taken in the individual. For every individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude. Therefore not all will rise again in the same quantity, but each will rise in the quantity that would have been theirs at the end of their growth if nature had not erred or failed; and the divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man (next q., art. 2).

QUESTION LXXXI THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN

(four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN OF THE SAME AGE.

YES.—In youthful age, as Christ rose again, which beings about the 30th year, as Augustin says (*City of God*, bk. xxii, c. 15).

THE REASON is that God, who created human nature without defect, will repair

it without defect. Now the state of the final perfection of human nature in man is in youthful age, at which the movement of growth ends and at which the movement of decline begins.

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN OF THE SAME NATURE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the resurrection human nature will not be restored only as regards identity in species, but also as regards numerical identity.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN IN THE MALE SEX.

NO.—THE REASON is that, as in consideration of the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, even so, in consideration of the nature of the individual a different sex is due to different men; and this diversity belongs to the perfection of the species, the degrees of which are completed by the aforementioned difference of sex or quantity.

NOTE: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits (Ad 2); hence woman, as such, will not be subject to man.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ALL WILL RISE AGAIN TO ANIMAL LIFE.

NO.—THE REASON is that resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of animal life, which he receives in this life, but to accomplish his final perfection, which consists in reaching his last end Wherefore it is said (Matth. xxii, 30): "In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married."

NOTE: When Christ partook of that meal after His resurrection, His eating was an act, not of necessity, as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature that He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. This proof will not be necessary in the general Resurrection because it will be known to all (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXII

THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION

Here we are to consider the conditions of the blessed who rise again: 1) The impassibility of their bodies; 2) their subtlety; 3) their agility; 4) their clarity.—About the first four questions are asked.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE SAINTS WILL BE IMPASSIBLE AFTER THE RESURRECTION.

YES.—Taking passion in the proper meaning as it is "the movement of the heart contrary to nature," there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the risen saints.

THE REASON is that all passion results from the agent's overcoming the patient; for the immoderate movement of heart that is caused by the agent's drawing the heart to its own bounds is called passion. Now it is impossible for anything to master the patient save insofar as the dominion of the patient's form over his matter is weakened. Now the human body, and whatever is in it, will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, just as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Consequently in the glorified body there will be no change contrary to that disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and thus these bodies will be impassible.

NOTE: In corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, and therefore cannot perfectly tie it down, so as to prevent its receiving sometimes a disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection the soul will have complete mastery over the body (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER ALL WILL BE EQUALLY IMPASSIBLE.

NO.—That impassibility will be in one more than in another according to the dominion of the soul over the body.

THE REASON is that dominion arises from the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God; hence in one who enjoys God more perfectly there is a greater cause of impass-

sibility. Considered in itself, however, there will be equal impassibility in all the blessed, and accordingly nothing possible will remain in any (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER IMPASSIBILITY EXCLUDES ACTUAL SENSATION FROM GLORIFIED BODIES.

NO.—THE REASON is that otherwise the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be more clearly like the sleeping than the waking state. But this is inconsistent with that perfection, for in sleep the sensible body is not in the last act of life. For this reason sleep is called "half-life;" hence all maintain that some sensation is in the bodies of the blessed. As regards the mode of sensation, however, be it said that the sensations of the glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul, insofar, namely, as the sensible quality is received according to spiritual being, that is, the species, or the intention of quality, and not the quality itself; just as the pupil of the eye receives the species of whiteness, and yet is not itself made white. Hence the very reception produces of itself actual sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.

NOTE: Since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else, will in no wise hinder the contemplation of God, or conversely. Likewise, in the saints all the powers will be most perfect. Thus one will be able to operate intensely without hindering the operation of another power, as was true of Christ (Ad 4).

ART. IV.—WHETHER IN THE BLESSED AFTER THE RESURRECTION ALL THE SENSES WILL BE IN ACT.

YES.—THE REASON is that after the resurrection there will be a medium and object for all the senses. For air is the medium of sight, hearing, and smell. Taste has the medium in contact, as also does touch; for taste is a form of touch. As regards the object, there will be, besides the object of sight and hearing, also that of smell, since the Church sings that bodies of the saints will have a most sweet odor. Vocal praise will be in heaven; wherefore it is said in a gloss on Psalm cxlix, 6: "The high praises of God shall be in the mouth," that "hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God." But taste will not be in act, so as to be changed by any food or drink that is taken, as is evident from what has been said (q. lxxxii, art. 4), unless, perhaps, we say that there will be taste in act by the tongue's being affected by the contact of something humid.—As regards touch in glorified bodies, from which impassibility excludes natural alteration, there will be only spiritual alteration by means of tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXIII THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED

(six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER SUBTLETY IS A PROPERTY OF THE GLORIFIED BODY.

NOTE.—Subtlety is the quality whereby the soul, as the form of the body, will have perfect dominion over it, so as fully and perfectly to exercise its actions by it, without any hindrance of sleep, food, drink, or anything of that sort.

YES.—Subtlety must be assigned to the glorified bodies, as being called subtle on account of the fullest perfection of the body.

THE REASON is that the body will be most perfectly mastered by the glorified soul, which is the body's form; by reason of which the glorified body is called spiritual, as being completely subject to the spirit.

ART. II.—WHETHER BY REASON OF THIS SUBTLETY A GLORIFIED BODY IS ABLE TO BE IN THE SAME PLACE WITH ANOTHER BODY NOT GLORIFIED.

NO.—THE REASON is that that which hinders our bodies now from being in the same place at the same time with another body can in no wise be removed from

it by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from being situated simultaneously with another body in the same place save the fact that it requires a different position in it; for nothing is an obstacle to identity save what is the cause of diversity. Now this distinction of position is not required by any quality of the body, because no position is due to the body by reason of its quality; hence when we remove from a sensible body what is warm, cold, heavy, or light, the necessity of the above-named distinction remains, as is clear from Aristotle (*Physics*, bk. iv), and also is self-evident. Therefore the glorified body will not have by reason of its subtlety the power to be together at the same time with another body (in the same place).—Yet by divine action, that is, miraculously, a body can be together with another body in the same place, as was the case with Christ's body in its renewal, when He came forth from the Virgin's womb, and after the Resurrection, when He entered to the disciples through closed doors (Ad 1).

YES.—THE REASON is that, as appears from what has been said in the previous article, one body cannot be together with another body in the same place, because this would destroy the distinct existence of both, and both would acquire one indistinct being, as in the case of mixture. Now the distinct being of anything depends on the essential principles of the thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on its first cause. And, because the first cause can maintain a thing in being when the secondary causes cease, hence divine power, and it alone, can cause a being distinct from another body to remain in the body, although its matter is not distinct in position from the matter of another body; and thus it is possible, by miracle, for two bodies to be together in the same place, just as it is thus possible for an accident to be without a subject.

NOTE: Supposing that two bodies are together in same place by miracle, nothing follows either against the common conceptions of the soul or against the definition of a line, or against some conclusions of geometry; because dimensionive quantity has the special character of individuation and distinction, namely from the position of parts, besides the character of individuation and distinction that is common to it and all other accidents, because of the matter that is its subject (Ad 2). Consequently, it is not contradictory that the dimensions of two bodies should be the dimensions of one place, for this is nothing else than for two bodies to be in the same place (Ad 1). But it would be contradictory if one body should be locally in two places at the same time, and this would not be possible even by miracle (for Christ's body is not on the altar locally), since to be in several places at the same time is incompatible with the individual, by reason of its being undivided in itself; for it would follow that it would be distinct as to place. But to be in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as distinct from everything else (Ad 4), though this would not be incompatible with divine power, on account of the reason aforesaid.

ART. IV.—WHETHER ONE GLORIFIED BODY CAN BE IN THE SAME PLACE WITH ANOTHER GLORIFIED BODY.

NO.—By divine power this can be done, as is evident from the preceding article; but it is not fitting.

THE REASON is that in the glorified bodies due order will be maintained, and this requires distinction; and, because one glorified body is not opposed to another (so as to obstruct its path or transit). And thus never will two glorified bodies be simultaneously in the same place.

ART. V.—WHETHER BY VIRTUE OF ITS SUBTLETY A GLORIFIED BODY WILL NO LONGER NEED TO BE IN AN EQUAL PLACE.

NO.—THE REASON is that a body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions. Consequently, it is impossible for a body to be in a place smaller than its quantity, either on the part of the matter itself, because the glorified body is impassible and incorruptible, or by reason of the variation of its position, namely so that the parts of the glorified body are one within the other, and thus be reduced in quantity, however small it may become, because this would be incompatible with the right disposition of the human body, which requires a fixed place and separation of parts. Wherefore not even by miracle will this ever be done.—And therefore it must be said that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GLORIFIED BODY, BY REASON OF ITS SUBTLETY, WILL BE IMPALPABLE.

NO.—THE REASON is that that is palpable that resists the touch, and that is tangible which alters the sense of touch. Thus air is tangible, but not palpable. Accordingly, the glorified body, as is true of Christ's glorified body, is tangible and palpable; but by supernatural power it has the faculty, when it will, to be neither tangible nor palpable to a non-glorified body.

QUESTION LXXXIV
THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED
 (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE GLORIFIED BODIES WILL BE AGILE.

NOTE: Agility is the disposition of the body, proceeding from the soul, by which it will be so perfectly subject to the soul as a motor that it can without toil and weariness, or any other difficulty, be moved by it to any distance, and that in a very brief and almost imperceptible time.

YES.—THE REASON is that the soul is united to the body, not only as the form, but also as the motor, and in both ways it behooves that the glorified body be subject to the glorified soul to the utmost. Wherefore, just as by the gift of subtlety it is subject to the soul utterly, insofar as the soul is the form of the body, by giving it its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to it insofar as it is a mover, so, namely, that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

NOTE: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order to signify the reverence that both angels and all creatures will show them (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE SAINTS WILL NEVER USE THEIR AGILITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MOVEMENT.

NO.—The glorified bodies will move at times, as we must necessarily hold.

THE REASON is that even Christ's body moved in the Ascension; and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will rise again from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean heaven (cf. P. I, q. lxvi, art. 3, for meaning of "empyrean"); but even after they have ascended to heaven, it is likely that they will sometimes move according to the pleasure of their will, in order to glorify the divine wisdom by exercising in act what they have in potentiality, and that also their sight may be refreshed by the beauty of different creatures, in whom God's wisdom will be eminently reflected.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF THE SAINTS WILL BE INSTANTANEOUS.

NO.—The glorified body will move in time, but in time so brief as to be imperceptible.

THE REASON is that if the glorified body moved in an instant it would follow that the glorified body would be in the same instant in two places at the same time, or in many places, namely in the last term and in all intermediate places, which is possible. Hence, just as the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, so never will it be able to move in an instant (Ad 3).

NOTE: Although after the resurrection there will be no time that is the measurement of the movement of the heaven, yet there will be time arising from the measurement of the before and after in any movement (Ad 5).

QUESTION LXXXV
THE CLARITY OF THE BLESSED BODIES
 (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CLARITY IS BECOMING TO THE GLORIFIED BODY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, as clear from the authority of Scripture (Matth. xiii, 43), the glory of the soul will overflow to the body in the form of brightness, or clarity.—Now clarity, which in the soul is spiritual, is received in the body as bodily. And

therefore, insofar as the soul will be of greater clarity according to greater merit, so also will be the difference of clarity in the body, as is clear from the Apostle (I Cor. xv, 43).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE CLARITY OF THE GLORIFIED BODY IS VISIBLE TO THE NON-GLORIFIED EYE.

YES.—The clarity of the glorified body can be seen naturally by the non-glorified eye.

THE REASON is that clarity does not express something equivocal, for what is said equivocally gives us no information. For instance, one who says the dog (i.e., the dog-star) is in heaven gives no information to one who knows only that a dog is an animal. Hence that clarity, like light itself, has a natural aptitude to move the sight; and sight, by its essence, has a natural aptitude to perceive it.

NOTE: The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will, and thus is subject to the will, so that it can be seen or not according to its command, and therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity, or to conceal it (Ad 3).

ART. III.—WHETHER A GLORIFIED BODY WILL BE NECESSARILY SEEN BY A NON-GLORIFIED BODY.

NO.—**THE REASON** is that it will be in the power of the glorified soul to be seen or not, just as any other action of the body will be in the soul's power; otherwise, the glorified body would not be an instrument supremely obedient to the principal agent. Now this action of the soul does not change the body intrinsically; wherefore it is not incompatible with the body's impassibility.

QUESTION LXXXVI

THE CONDITIONS OF THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED THAT WILL RISE AGAIN

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN WITH THEIR DEFORMITIES.

NO.—a) The bodies of the damned will not rise again with the deformities of their members, e.g., with mutilations; and whatever defect, whether of shame, as the result of corruption, or of weakness of nature or natural principles, was in the body, will be altogether removed in the resurrection. b) But the defects that follow naturally from the natural principles in the human body, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the Creator who made nature will in the resurrection restore entirely the nature of the body. And this is even by reason of justice, because if he who had deformities in this life should rise again with them, it is evident that another, to be more grievously punished, will rise again without them, because he did not have them in this life. Therefore the manner of punishment would not correspond to the amount of the guilt, but one would rather seem to be punished on account of the pains that he suffered in this world, which is absurd.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that such natural defects are excluded from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

NOTE: Since punishment is inflicted in every tribunal according to the jurisdiction of that tribunal, the punishments that in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and do not extend beyond the term of this life. Hence, although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world; but the divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity (Ad 1).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL BE INCORRUPTIBLE.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that the principle leading them to corruption is wholly taken from them, namely the movement that alters towards corruption. For, since the heaven is the first principle of alteration by virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof, and as though moved by it, it follows that when

the movement of the heaven ceases there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural property. Hence the bodies of the damned cannot be corrupted; and this serves divine justice, that, living forever, they will be punished forever, as divine justice requires, as will be explained later (next art.).—But the bodies of the blessed will be incorruptible, not only on account of the aforesaid cessation of movement, but also because the overflow of grace and glory will hinder corruption.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL BE IMPASSIBLE.

NO.—a) As regards natural passion, whereby a form is received in a subject materially according to natural being, no body will be able to suffer after the resurrection; b) but as regards the passion of the soul, whereby something is received in another spiritually, by way of a certain intention, just as the likeness of whiteness is received in the air and in the pupil of the eye, the bodies of the damned are passible.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, after the resurrection, when the movement of the heaven ceases, no body can be altered from its natural quality, as was said (previous art.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, when the movement of the heaven ceases, there will still remain the passion that is by means of the soul; because air is both illuminated by the sun and conveys different colors to the sight. Thus the species that is materially in the fire is received spiritually in the bodies of damned, and thus the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned itself, yet not consume them (Ad 2).—The glorified bodies, although they will receive something, and in a manner are patient to sensation, will not be passible, because they will receive nothing that could distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned.

[NOTE: Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire they are not tormented by the fire, because a sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the senses it pleases, and when not, displeases (Ad 3)]

QUESTION LXXXVII THE KNOWLEDGE THAT RISEN MEN WILL HAVE IN THE JUDGMENT AS TO MERITS AND DEMERITS

In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the resurrection. The first consideration will be the knowledge that risen men will have at the judgment concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly, we shall treat of the form wherein the Judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who will have risen again.—About the first point there are three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER AFTER THE RESURRECTION EVERYONE WILL KNOW THE SINS HE HAS COMMITTED.

YES.—THE REASON is that in every judgment the witness, accuser, and defendant have a knowledge of the things that are transacted in the judgment; and therefore in that general judgment, in which all the deeds of men will appear, it follows that each will then have a knowledge of all his deeds. Hence it is said (II Cor. v, 10): "All of us must be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, so that each one may receive what he has won through the body, according to his works, whether good or evil." And again, Rom. ii, 15: "Their conscience bears witness to them, even when conflicting thoughts accuse or defend them. This will take place on the day when, according to my Gospel, God will judge the hidden secrets of men through Jesus Christ."

NOTE: Although many merits and demerits will have been forgotten, yet there will be none of them but will remain somehow in its effect, because those merits that are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded to them, whereas those that are deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits that are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, whereas those that have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance which

they will recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds.—And yet, as Augustine says (*City of God*, bk. xx, chap. 14), the divine power will especially conduce to this end (*Ad 1*).

ART. II.—WHETHER EVERYONE WILL BE ABLE TO READ ALL THAT IS IN ANOTHER'S CONSCIENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as judge and jury must know the merits of the case that they may pass just sentence, so, in order that the sentence may appear just, the merits must become known to all who know the sentence. Wherefore even the sins that were blotted out by Penance will be disclosed to others in the judgment; otherwise it would follow that neither would repentance for those sins be perfectly known, which would detract greatly from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

ART. III.—WHETHER ALL MERITS OR DEMERITS — ONE'S OWN AND THOSE OF OTHERS — WILL BE SEEN BY ANYONE AT A SINGLE GLANCE.

YES.—a) Of the blessed it can be easily believed that they will see all merits and demerits in an instant; b) but the damned will not see all of them in an instant, but in a very brief time.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the blessed will see everything in the Word.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in every space of time, however small, there is potentially an infinite number of instants.

QUESTION LXXXVIII

THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE
(four articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE WILL BE A GENERAL JUDGMENT.

YES.—There will be two judgments according to the twofold operation of God, one corresponding to the operation whereby God acts in the government of creatures, and this judgment will be immediately after the death of the individual, though it will not be total; the other corresponding to the operation of God whereby He originally brought things into being, and this will be the last, namely the universal, judgment.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that government cannot be without judgment, by which each person is judged individually according to his deeds, and that not only as adapted to himself but also as adapted to the government of the universe.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that, just as everything proceeded immediately from God, so then the final completion will be given to the world, each person receiving finally what is due to him according to his conduct. Hence even in that judgment the divine justice will manifestly appear in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, inasmuch as sometimes some persons are dealt with for the profit of others otherwise than their manifest acts would seem to require. Consequently, there will then be a general separation of the good from the bad, because there will no longer be a motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good, for the sake of which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked as long as the state of this life is governed by divine providence.—Hence the sentence proper to this general judgment is the universal separation of the good from the bad, which will not precede that judgment (*Ad 2*).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE JUDGMENT WILL TAKE PLACE BY WORD OF MOUTH.

NO.—THE REASON is that if deeds were told by word of mouth an incalculably long time would be required for this. Wherefore it is probable that the things told in *Matth. xxv* will be fulfilled, not by word of mouth, but mentally.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE TIME OF THE FUTURE JUDGMENT IS UNKNOWN.

YES.—THE REASON is that the end of the world, at which the day of judgment will be, is subject to the divine power alone, and in this no creature co-operates with

Him. For the world will not end by any created cause, just as it took its beginning immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God alone. And this reason seems to be assigned by Our Lord: "It is not for you to know the times or dates which the Father has fixed by His own authority" (Acts i, 7), as if to say: "Which are reserved to His authority alone." Hence Mark xiii, 32 declares: "Of that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father only." The Son is said not to know insofar as He does not impart the knowledge to us.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE JUDGMENT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE VALLEY OF JOSAPHAT.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as Christ ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet, so also it is probable that He will descend about that place, that it may be shown that it is the same who descended and who ascended.

NOTE: It suffices that we hold that there be a space, however great, in the neighborhood of that locality to hold the multitude of those to be judged; provided they can see Christ from that space, since, being raised in the air and shining with exceeding glory, he will be visible from a great distance (Ad 1).

QUESTION LXXXIX THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT

(eight articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY MEN WILL JUDGE TOGETHER WITH CHRIST.

YES.—a) To judge, properly speaking and by proper authority, belongs to God alone; **b)** to judge, properly speaking but not by proper authority, but to bring the sentence passed to the knowledge of others, belongs to perfect men.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that he is said to judge, properly speaking, who passes judgment on another. Now to judge by proper authority belongs to one who has dominion and power over others, to whose government those who are judged are subject. And thus to judge in the general judgment belongs to God alone.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that perfect men will lead others to the knowledge of divine justice, that they may know what is justly due to them for their merits; and this very revelation of justice is called a judgment.

NOTE: In an improper sense one may be said to judge in several ways, to wit: Causally, and in this sense some are said to judge by comparison, insofar as some are said to be deserving of judgment by comparison with others, as is seen in Matth. xiii, 41: "The men of Niniveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it." To rise in judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked.—Equivalently, for we interpret some one as acting who consents to the one acting, i.e., in this case to judgment of the One who does the judging, i.e., Christ; wherefore it is said, Wisd. iii, 8: "The just . . . shall judge nations."—Assessorily and by similitude, and in this way some are said to judge, namely by honorary sitting with the judge (an assessor is one who thus sits), because they will appear above others at the judgment and go forth to meet "Christ in the air." The fourth mode of judging will be competent to perfect men, insofar as in them are contained the decrees of divine justice, by which men will be judged. Thus a book containing the law might be said to judge (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE JUDICIAL POWER CORRESPONDS TO VOLUNTARY POVERTY.

YES.—For three reasons.

THE FIRST REASON is one of fitness, because voluntary poverty belongs to those who, holding in contempt all the things of the world, adhere only to Christ; and therefore there is nothing in them that could cause their judgment to swerve from justice above all the rest.

THE SECOND REASON is that of merit: For exaltation for merit corresponds to humility. Now among all the things that make a man despised in this world the chief is poverty. Wherefore the judicial excellence of power is promised to the poor, that thus he who humiliated himself for Christ's sake might be exalted.

THE THIRD REASON is that of disposition: For voluntary poverty is the first disposition for the acquirement of perfection; wherefore it is placed first among the beatitudes.—Hence it is that the aforesaid power is not promised to all who are even voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all things and follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life.

ART. III.—WHETHER ANGELS OUGHT TO JUDGE.

NO.—The angels will not judge, save by the approval of the sentence.

THE REASON is that the assessors of the judge should be conformed to the judge. Now judgment is assigned to the Son of Man because He will appear in His human nature to all men, both the good and the wicked, although the whole Trinity judges by authority. Therefore it also follows that the assessors of the judge will have human nature, in which they can be seen by all the good and the bad. And thus it is not competent to the angels to judge.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DEMONS WILL CARRY OUT THE SENTENCE OF THE JUDGES ON THE DAMNED.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that thus will order be preserved even in punishments, so that men will be punished by demons, lest the divine order, which places the angels midway between the human and the divine nature, be destroyed. Nor does this diminish anything of the demons' punishment, for in the very fact that they torment others themselves will be tormented; for the fellowship of miseries will not diminish misery, but will increase it.

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL THE MEN WILL APPEAR IN THE JUDGMENT.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that Christ died for all men, and was appointed judge of all men. Consequently, it is fitting that all men should be assembled in judgment to see His exaltation in human nature.

NOTE: By the 12 tribes of Israel all the other nations are signified, because they were called by Christ to take the place of the 12 tribes (Ad 1).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE GOOD WILL BE JUDGED AT THE JUDGMENT.

YES.—a) All the good will be judged as regards the payment of rewards; b) but as regards the discussion of merits, not all the good will be judged, but those only who have a notable admixture of good with evil merits.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that everyone will receive by divine sentence the reward corresponding to his merit, and therefore each one must be judged accordingly.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that those who build upon the foundation of faith "gold, silver, and precious stones" (I Cor. iii, 12) by devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, and have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not subject to the discussion of merits. Such are those who, having entirely renounced the things of the world, are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God; and thus they will be saved, but not judged. But those who build upon the foundation of faith "wood, hay, stubble," namely those who love wordly things and are involved in earthly concerns, yet so that they prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins by alms, have an admixture of good merits with bad; and therefore the discussion of merits will apply to them; wherefore on this account they will be judged, and yet will be saved.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE WICKED WILL BE JUDGED.

YES.—a) The judgment that is a retribution of punishments for sins is competent to all the wicked; b) but the judgment that is a discussion of merits is competent to the faithful alone, and not to unbelievers.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is evident from what was said about the good (previous art.).

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that in unbelievers there is no foundation of faith, without which all subsequent works are deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there is no admixture of good and evil works requiring dis-

cussion. But the faithful, in whom the foundation of faith remains, at least have a praiseworthy act of faith, which, though it is not meritorious without charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently they will be subject to the discussion of merits.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER AT THE COMING JUDGMENT THE ANGELS WILL BE JUDGED.

NO.—a) As regards the judgment of discussion neither good nor bad angels are in any way subject to it; b) as regards the judgment of retribution, speaking directly, this judgment will not be on the part of the angels, either good or bad, but on the part of men.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that neither in the good angels can anything bad be found nor in the bad will any good liable to the judgment appear.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the good angels will have a fuller joy in the salvation of those whom they led to merit, and the wicked will have increased torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited to evil deeds. Wherefore indirectly this judgment will regard the angels, insofar as they were associated with the acts of men.

QUESTION XC **THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO JUDGMENT** (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER CHRIST WILL JUDGE UNDER THE FORM OF HIS HUMANITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that it is competent to Christ to judge insofar as He was dominion over men. Now He is Our Lord, not only by reason of creation; but also by reason of Redemption, which belongs to Him according to human nature. In fact, Christ by His Passion merited dominion and judicial power, not only over men, but over all creation, Math. xxviii, 18: "All power is given to Me, in heaven and in earth" (Cf. Part III, q. lix).

ART. II.—WHETHER AT THE JUDGMENT CHRIST WILL APPEAR IN HIS GLORIFIED HUMANITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that in the second coming Christ will come to execute the justice of the Father on men; and therefore He will have to reveal His glory, which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father.

NOTE: The scars that will appear in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity (Ad 2).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE GODHEAD CAN BE SEEN BY THE WICKED WITHOUT JOY.

NO.—The Godhead as apprehended by the wicked cannot be seen by them without joy.

THE REASON is that created things are pleasurable through their sharing in goodness, which is the reason of appetibility and pleasurable in that thing; and therefore they cannot be apprehended without joy; but that which is good in its essence cannot possibly escape giving pleasure when its essence is apprehended.

NOTE: The wicked (in the judgment) will manifestly know that Christ is God, not, however, by seeking His Godhead, but by reason of the most manifest signs of His Godhead (Ad 1).

QUESTION XCI **THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT**

We have next to consider the quality of the world and those who rise again after the judgment. Here a threefold matter occurs for consideration: 1) The state and quality of the world; 2) the state of the blessed; 3) the state of the wicked. About the first five questions are asked.

ART. 1.—WHETHER THE WORLD WILL BE RENEWED.

YES.—All the creatures of this world will need to receive a greater inflow from

the divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory; and such will be the renewal of the world.

THE REASON is that the body's glorified eye will be correspondingly strengthened in the vision of the Divinity, so as to behold the Divinity in Its corporeal effects, in which manifest signs of divine majesty will appear; and especially in the flesh of Christ, and after this in the bodies of the blessed, and then in all other bodies.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES WILL CEASE.

YES.—The movement of the heaven will cease in that renewal of the world, not indeed as the result of a natural cause, but by the action of the divine will.

THE REASON is that, as faith teaches, the begetting of human beings is not to last forever, and consequently for the same reason neither will the other things that are directed to human generation, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the elements; but movement does not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which substance will remain (Ad 4).

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BRIGHTNESS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES WILL BE INCREASED AT THIS RENEWAL.

YES.—THE REASON is that the renewal of the world is directed to the end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in their light. And therefore as regards their brightness the heavenly bodies will be bettered.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ELEMENTS WILL BE RENEWED BY AN ADDITION OF BRIGHTNESS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as in the last consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spirits (for men will be "as the angels in heaven."—Matt. xxii, 30), so the lower bodies will receive the properties of the heavenly bodies. Now the lower bodies have nothing in common with the heavenly bodies save the nature of light and transparence, as Aristotle says, *On the Soul*, bk. ii, text. 68. Therefore it follows that the lower bodies are to be perfected chiefly as regards brightness.—Wherefore all the elements will be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according to their mode: For it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be as transparent as glass; water, as crystal; the air, as heaven; fire, as the lights of heaven.

NOTE: Even if the whole earth be glorified, nevertheless the wicked will be in outer darkness, because even the fire of hell, though shining for them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE PLANTS AND ANIMALS WILL REMAIN IN THIS RENEWAL.

NO.—THE REASON is that, just as man in that last renewal will be transferred to incorruptibility and quiet, so also the world, which will be renewed for the sake of man, will be directed to incorruption. But the animals and plants, as also mixed bodies, have no relation to incorruption, because on the part of the matter they lose their form, and their form does not actually remain. Wherefore in that renewal they will not remain. For the world, having put off all corruption, will remain forever at rest.—And therefore there will remain only the heavenly bodies, the elements, and men.

QUESTION XCII

THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED

We have next to consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment: 1) Their vision of the Divine Essence, wherein their bliss chiefly consists; 2) their bliss and their mansions; 3) their relations with the damned; 4) their gifts, which are contained in their bliss; 5) the crowns that perfect and adorn their happiness.—About the first there will be three articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THE HUMAN INTELLECT CAN ATTAIN TO THE VISION OF GOD IN HIS ESSENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since understanding is an operation most proper

to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of the Divine Essence, but to something else, we should have to say that something else than God is the object of man's happiness; and, since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it would follow that something other than God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to us.—Now this happens, not by the abstraction of the quiddity of material things, by which we come to the knowledge of separated substances, because from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material things and knows them it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of the separated substance, and especially the Divine Essence, which most of all is of a different nature from any created quiddity. Nor does this occur by means of impressions of separated substance or of the Divine Essence in our souls, for by no likeness received in a created intellect can God be understood, so that His Essence is seen immediately; but this happens by the fact that the separated substance itself is united to our intellect as the form, so that it is what is understood and that by which it is understood. Now whatever may be said of other separated substances, we must admit that this is our way of seeing God in His Essence, because, by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led by it to the Divine Essence. This must not be understood as if the Divine Essence were a form of our intellect, or that from its union with our intellect there resulted one being simply; but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine Essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine Essence, though they are not received in the same way, the Divine Essence will be to the intellect as form to matter. And in this way the Divine Essence is both that which is understood and that whereby it is understood, for the Divine Essence is supremely intelligible, being infinitely removed from all the properties of matter; for it is pure act. And therefore, although the Divine Essence will be received into our intellect as the medium whereby God will be seen as He is, yet this knowledge is not called mediate, because the Divine Essence does not fall between the knower and the thing known. but is that which is known giving the power of knowing it to the knower (Ad 15).

ART. II.—WHETHER AFTER THE RESURRECTION THE SAINTS WILL SEE GOD WITH THE BODY'S EYES.

NO.—a) The glorified bodily eye will not see the Divine Essence as directly visible; b) but it will see it as visible indirectly.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the senses, as senses, perceive magnitude, and sight, as such a sense, perceives color. It is impossible for sight to perceive anything that is not color or magnitude, unless the sense of sight were named equivocally. Since therefore the sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body as they were in the non-glorified body, it is impossible for it to see the Divine Essence as directly visible.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that bodily sight will behold the glory of God only in bodies, especially the glorified, and above all in the body of Christ, and the intellect will see God so clearly that God will be perceived in things seen with the body's eye, as life is perceived in speech. For although then our intellect will not see God through creatures, yet it will see God in creatures corporeally seen, and this is to see the Divine Essence indirectly.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SAINTS, SEEING GOD, SEE ALL THAT GOD SEES.

NO.—a) No created intellect can know all the things that God Himself knows with His knowledge of simple understanding, i.e. the things that God can do, although He has never done them and never will. b) Christ's soul knows everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision, i.e., everything that is, was, and will be. c) The other saints do not know all this knowledge now, but d) it is possible that after

the day of judgment all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet so that not all will see everything in the Divine Essence. But Christ's soul will there fully see everything, even as it now sees; but the other saints will there see more or fewer things, according to the degree of clarity whereby they know God; and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning the things that it sees in the world beyond all the rest.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that, since the extent of the divine power is measured by what it can do, if any intellect should see in the Divine Essence all that God can do, there would be the same extent of perfection in understanding the effects as the extent of the divine power in producing them; and thus it would comprehend the divine power; which is impossible to any created intellect.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is taken from what has been said in P. III, q. xvi, art. 2.

THE REASON OF THE THIRD is that it is not necessary that one who knows the cause know all its effects, unless it comprehends the cause; and this does not belong to the created intellect. Consequently, each of those who see God in His Essence sees in His essence so much the more things according as He sees the Divine Essence more clearly; and thus it is that one can instruct another concerning these things.

THE REASON OF THE FOURTH is that thus the knowledge of the angels and the holy souls can increase up to the judgment day, as can anything else that pertains to the accidental reward. But it will not advance further, because then will be the last state of things, and in that state it is possible for all men to know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.

NOTE: 1. Although the Divine Essence, which is the type of all things, is united to the intellect of one who sees God, it is united thereto, not as the type of all things, but as the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the Divine Essence more fully (Ad 4).

2. The desire of the saints to know all things will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God, just as their desire to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For, as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by possessing Him we possess all goods, as it were, so does the vision of Him suffice the intellect: "Lord show us the Father, and it is enough for us" (John xiv, 8).—(Ad 7).

QUESTION XCIII

THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS, AND THEIR MANSIONS

(three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS WILL BE GREATER AFTER THE JUDGMENT THAN BEFORE.

YES.—Both extensively and intensively.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that beatitude will then be not only in the soul but also in the body; and even the beatitude of the soul will increase extensively, insofar as the soul will not only rejoice in its own good, but also in the good of its body.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the body is naturally perfectible by the soul; and therefore the soul is more perfect in its natural being since it is in the whole, namely in the man composed of body and soul, than when it is a separated part. Likewise, the glorified body will be altogether subject to the soul, so that the operation of the soul will be more perfect, and after its union with the body it tends more intensely to God; for, as Augustine says (*Sup. Gen. Ad Litt., lib. xii, c. 25*), "on account of the body's desire it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good."

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DEGREES OF BEATITUDE SHOULD BE CALLED MANSIONS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, just as the end of local movement is a place, and when anything reaches that place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein, so, since the term of movement is transferred to the acts of the appetite and will, the very attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establishment in an end. And therefore the different ways of attaining the last end are called different mansions; so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude, which is found in beatitude on the part of the blessed.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE VARIOUS MANSIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE VARIOUS DEGREES OF CHARITY.

YES.—The charity of heaven will be the proximate distinctive principle; the remote distinctive principle is merit, or the charity of the way.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the more perfect the charity of heaven will be in anyone, the more will it render him capable of the divine clarity, and thus by its increase the perfection of the divine vision will be increased.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.

QUESTION XCIV
THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARD THE DAMNED
 (three articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE BLESSED IN HEAVEN WILL SEE THE SUFFERINGS OF THE DAMNED.

YES.—THE REASON is in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them, and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it; for everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed side by side they become more conspicuous.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE BLESSED PITY THE MISERIES OF THE DAMNED.

NO.—THE REASON is that in the blessed there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason's choice. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's choice when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled. But after death it will not be possible for sinners to be removed from their misery; hence their miseries cannot be an object of compassion according to the right choice of reason. Consequently the blessed, who will be in glory, will have no compassion on the damned.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE BLESSED REJOICE IN THE PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

YES.—Not directly, but indirectly.

THE REASON is that one rejoices at something directly when he rejoices at it in itself; and thus the saints will not rejoice in the pains of the wicked. Indirectly, however, that is, by reason of something annexed, the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering in them the order of divine justice and their own deliverance, because of which they will rejoice.

QUESTION XCV
THE GIFTS OR DOWRIES OF THE BLESSED
 (five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER ANY GIFTS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS DOWRY TO THE BLESSED.

YES.—THE REASON is that God gives some gifts to the blessed when they enter into glory for their adornment, according to Is. lxi, 10: "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a bride adorned with her jewels;" and these ornaments are called dowries by the masters of the school.

[NOTE. In carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling, hence the name (in body).]

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DOWRY IS THE SAME AS BEATITUDE.

NO.—They have a real difference.

THE REASON is that beatitude is called the perfect operation whereby the blessed soul is united to God; but the dowries are called habits, or dispositions, or any other qualities that are directed to this perfect operation; and the dowries are directed to beatitude, rather than being in beatitude as parts of it.

ART. III.—WHETHER IT IS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD RECEIVE A DOWRY.

NO.—THE REASON is that in that union by which Christ is united to the Father by the consent of love, even as He is God, nothing is said to be a marriage, because there is not therein any subjection, such as is required of the bride to the bridegroom. Similarly, neither is there subjection in the union of the human nature with the divine, because there a distinction of persons is demanded: Now the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word. As regards the union of Christ with the Church, Christ is united as the Bridegroom, and a dowry is given to the bride as regards property and dominion, although it is given to the bridegroom as to use. Wherefore the notion of dowry in no wise befits Christ, save improperly, but the things that are called dowries befit Him in the most excellent degree.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE ANGELS RECEIVE THE DOWRIES.

NO.—The notion of dowry does not properly belong to angels, as to men.

THE REASON is that for the notion of dowry it is demanded that there be conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride, so that they are of the same species. Now in this way men agree with Christ, insofar as He assumed human nature. But He is not conformed to the angels according to the divine nature. In a broad sense, however, even the angels may be said to possess the dowries, according to the union that they have with Christ (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER THREE DOWRIES OF THE SOUL ARE SUITABLY ASSIGNED.

YES.—Vision, comprehension, and fruition, insofar as they are habits whereby the soul is immediately disposed to the operation of beatitude, and which correspond to faith, hope, and charity.

THE REASON is that, as has been said (art. 2 of this q.), the dowry is something inhering in the soul, by which it is directed to the operation of beatitude. Now for this operation, which is beatitude itself, there are required the substance itself of the operation, which is vision, and its perfection, which is delight. Now some vision is delightful in two ways: In one way on the part of the object, insofar as that which is seen is delightful; in another way on the part of the vision, insofar as to see it is delightful. And thus that operation in which final beatitude consists must be most perfect, and therefore it is required that that vision be delightful in both ways. Now in order that that vision may be delightful on the part of the vision it is required that it be made connatural to the beholder through some habit, which elicits the vision; and thus there is one dowry that is called by all *vision*. But on the part of the visible object two things are required, namely suitability, which regards the affections, and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, and union is required, according to which some reckon fruition.

NOTE: Fruition (or, according to others, love) corresponds to hope, insofar as it includes comprehension, which will take the place of hope, since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the beloved; and for this reason it will not remain in heaven, but will be succeeded by comprehension (Ad 2).

QUESTION XCVI THE AUREOLES

(13 articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE AUREOLE IS THE SAME AS THE ESSENTIAL REWARD, WHICH IS CALLED THE AUREA.

YES.—THE REASON is that the aureole is the accidental reward that is added over and above the *aurea* or crown; for the aureole of which we are speaking is nothing else than a joy of the blessed in the deeds done by them, which have the character of a signal victory; and this is a different joy from that whereby one rejoices in union with God, in which the essential reward consists, and which is called *aurea*.—The aureoles belong to the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness thereto (Ad 1).

NOTE: The essential reward, which is the enjoyment of God perfectly seen and loved, is metaphorically called a *crown*, or *aurea*, both on the part of merit, which is won with a certain combat, for the life of man on earth is a warfare (Job vii, 1), and

also on the part of the reward, by which man is made in some way a partaker of the Divinity, and consequently of royal power (Apoc. v, 10): "Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom. . . ." For a crown is the proper sign of royal power (in body of art.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE AUREOLE DIFFERS FROM THE FRUIT.

YES.—Taking fruit here, not only insofar as it refreshes, as is said of the fruit of the virtues, or inasmuch as it is the last thing awaited from labor, but inasmuch as it refreshes as the last end, and because it springs from seed, in the sense of the fruit of the word of God, according to Matth. xiii, 23, where Our Lord divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold.

THE REASON is that the *aura* consists in the joy that is had in God; the *aureola*, in the joy that is had in the perfection of works; whereas the *fruit* consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of God's word, and these three are really distinct from one another.

ART. III.—WHETHER A FRUIT IS DUE TO THE VIRTUE OF CONTINENCE ALONE.

YES.—Fruit, as it is here taken, that is, as the reward that is due to man as the result of the disposition in which he passed from carnal to spiritual life.

THE REASON is that the virtue of continence is what chiefly frees man from the subjection of the flesh.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THREE FRUITS ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED TO THE THREE PARTS OF CONTINENCE.

YES.—THE REASON is that different fruits are distinguished according to the various manners of the spiritual or spirituality, which arises from continence by withdrawing from carnal things. Now carnal things are rejected, first by conjugal continence, which is necessary lest the rectitude of the spirit be perverted by the delights of the flesh, and to this corresponds fruit thirtyfold; secondly, by the continence of widows, whereby a person altogether withdraws from the delights that stifle the spirit during the time of widowhood, and to this corresponds fruit sixtyfold; thirdly, by virginal continence, by which a person, for all time, past, present, and future, withdraws from the pleasures of sex, and to this corresponds fruit a hundredfold.

NOTE: The distinction of the fruits is to be taken according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess in point of quantity we may find an explanation. For the married man abstains only from one that is not his, the widow, from both hers and not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 plus 40, which latter number is the product of four times 10, and the number four is the first solid and square number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE ON ACCOUNT OF VIRGINITY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, where there is a signal character of victory, there is due a special crown therefor. Therefore, since by virginity a person gains a singular victory over the flesh, against which war is continuously waged, as is evident from Galat. v, 17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit. . . ." a special crown is due for virginity, which is called the *aureole*.

NOTE: The aureole is properly due only to those virgins who had a purpose of preserving virginity forever, whether they confirmed this purpose by a vow or not; and this I say insofar as the aureole is properly taken as a reward for merit, although this purpose may have been interrupted at times, while the integrity of the flesh remained, provided that it is found at the end of life, for virginity of mind can be repaired, although virginity of the flesh cannot (in body of art.).

[NOTE: The aureole is not due to virginity except as adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, since in that case the marriage bed would not have been dishonored by lust (Ad 3).]

ART. VI.—WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO MARTYRS.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as a special crown is due for the most perfect victory, by which a triumph is gained over the lusts of the flesh, namely to virginity, which special crown is called the aureole, so also an aureole is due for the most perfect victory that is won over external assaults, i.e., martyrdom borne for the sake of Christ.

[NOTE: The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inasmuch as the works that Christ perfects in us bear witness to His goodness (Ad 9).—But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever (Ad 10).—Some say that the Holy Innocents had the use of reason, like John the Baptist while yet in his mother's womb. Others say that they were martyrs in act only. Thus they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, insofar as they rejoice to have been slain in Christ's service—Ad 12]

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE AUREOLE IS DUE TO DOCTORS.

NOTE: By the name of doctors are here understood those who explain holy doctrine by word or writing, whether they bear the title of doctors, or are pastors, or preachers, or writers.—Paris.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as by martyrdom and virginity a person gains the most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so also the most perfect victory is gained against the devil when a person not only does not yield to the devil's assaults, but also expels him, not only from himself but also from others. Now this is done by preaching and teaching. And therefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as it is due to virginity and martyrdom. Hence Dan. xii, 3: "They that instruct many to justice shall shine as stars for all eternity."

ART. VIII.—WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS DUE TO CHRIST.

NO.—Although the notion of *aurea* or crown befits Christ, the notion of aureole does not befit Him.

THE REASON is that, being by name a diminutive, aureole implies something possessed by participation and not in its fullness. But in Christ the notion of victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory all others are made victors, as is clear from John xvi, 33: "Have confidence, I have overcome the world."

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE AUREOLE IS DUE TO THE ANGELS.

NO.—For the reason by which the aureole is due to men it is not due to the angels.

THE REASON is that the things that pertain to the perfection of merit in men are connatural to the angels, or also belong to their common state, or again to the essential reward.

ART. X.—WHETHER AN AUREOLE IS ALSO DUE TO THE BODY.

NO.—The aureole is principally in the mind, but it shines forth in the body by a kind of overflow.

THE REASON is that joy in those works for which an aureole is due is in the mind. Yet, even as from joy in the essential reward, which is the *aurea*, there results a certain comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy in the aureole there results a certain comeliness in the body.

ART. XI.—WHETHER THREE AUREOLES ARE FITTINGLY ASSIGNED, THOSE OF VIRGINS, OF MARTYRS, AND OF DOCTORS.

YES.—THE REASON is that the aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional victory; and therefore three aureoles are assigned according to the exceptional victories in three conflicts, which beset every man. Now these three conflicts are against the flesh, and especially against venereal pleasure, over which the chief victory is gained by the virgin; against the world, where the principal victory is that of the martyr; and against the devil, who is principally repelled by teaching and preaching, which are properly the office of doctors and preachers.—Others again distinguish the

three aureoles insofar as they correspond to the acts of the three powers of the soul, namely, reason, the irascible power, and the concupiscible power; or insofar as we are most signally conformed to Christ, according as He was a doctor, a martyr, and a virgin.

ART. XII.—WHETHER THE VIRGIN'S AUREOLE IS THE GREATEST OF ALL.

NO.—a) On the part of the conflict and victory the martyr's aureole takes precedence simply and in a certain way, and in a certain way, the virgins' aureole; b) from the point of view of the things about which the battle is fought, the doctors' aureole takes precedence.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the proper character of the aureole respects conflict and victory; now the difficulty of the conflict from the point of view of the conflict itself is greatest in martyrdom, because the martyrs' battle is more strenuous in itself and more intensely painful; but the battle of the flesh is more dangerous, insofar as it lasts longer and besets us at closer quarters.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the conflict of the doctors is waged about intelligible goods; and the other conflicts are about sensible passions.—But the eminence from the point of view of conflict is more essential to the aureole.

ART. XIII.—WHETHER ONE PERSON HAS AN AUREOLE MORE EXCELLENTLY THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—THE REASON is that, since merit is in some manner the cause of the reward, it follows that the rewards are diversified according as the merits are diversified. Now the merit of the aureole can be greater and less. Wherefore the aureole itself can be greater or less. We must observe, however, that the degree, not of the aureole but of the *aurea*, corresponds to the degree of merit derived from its root, or charity; whereas the degree of the aureole corresponds to the degree of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in martyrdom, as regards the essential reward, to have a greater aureole for his martyrdom.

QUESTION XCVII THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED

We have next to consider the things concerning the damned after the judgment: 1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be tormented; 2) matters relating to their will and intellect; 3) God's justice and mercy in regard to the damned. About the first there are seven articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER IN HELL THE DAMNED ARE TORMENTED BY THE SOLE PUNISHMENT OF FIRE.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is in accordance with divine justice that sinners, just as they departed from One through sin, and place their end in material things, which are many and various, so should they be tormented in many ways and from various sources. Yet, because fire is most painful, because it abounds in active force, the name of fire is given to any torment, if it be intense (Ad 1).—In purgatory the affliction is by means of fire alone, because the punishment of purgatory is not intended principally to torment, but to cleanse (Ad 2).

ART. II.—WHETHER THE WORM OF THE DAMNED IS CORPOREAL.

NO.—THE REASON is that, after the day of judgment, there will not remain in the renewed world any animal or any mixed body (save the body of man only), because such a body is not directed to incorruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be, not of a corporeal, but of a spiritual, nature; and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm, insofar as it arises from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm bred of corruption torments by gnawing.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE WEEPING OF THE DAMNED WILL BE CORPOREAL.

NO.—a) There can be no corporeal weeping insofar as it implies the actual shedding of tears in the damned; b) but there can be corporeal weeping in respect of a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that after the day of judgment, when the movement of the first movable ceases, there will be no generation or corruption or bodily alteration.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that the bodies of the damned are not only tormented from without but also from within, insofar as the body is altered, according to the passion of the soul, for good or evil. And, in this regard, weeping corresponds to the delight in sin that was in the soul and body.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DAMNED ARE IN MATERIAL DARKNESS.

YES.—Simply speaking, the place of the damned is dark. Yet by divine disposition there is some light there, as much as suffices for seeing those things that can torment the soul.

THE REASON is that in hell the place must be so dispersed for seeing as regards light and darkness that nothing there can be clearly seen; and that only such things can be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart; for hell will be so arranged as will be most conducive to the misery of the damned.

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL WILL BE CORPOREAL.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that whatever is said of the fire that torments separated souls, we must say of the fire whereby the bodies of the damned are tormented after the resurrection that it is corporeal, because punishment is not suitably applied to a body unless that punishment itself is bodily.

NOTE: Because that fire will be the instrument of divine justice inflicting punishment, therefore its action is regulated by the ordering of divine justice according to the measure of the sin. Even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires (Ad 3).

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL IS OF THE SAME KIND AS OURS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, just as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as they now are, so also the fire that will torment the damned in hell will be of the same species as the fire that is with us, although it has certain properties that are different. For it will not need lighting or fueling, for it was lit by God. Wherefore it will be of the same nature as the fire of this world, but might be of a different matter.—And, although the fire of hell gives no light, that is not sufficient proof that it is not of the same species; for to shine does not belong to fire according to every mode of existence, because in its own matter it gives no light (Ad 4).

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF HELL IS UNDER THE EARTH.

YES.—Although no one, unless taught by the Holy Spirit, can know with certainty where hell is, yet from its name and arguments of congruency it is reasonably believed that hell is under the earth.

THE FIRST REASON is that if we call hell *infernus* (the nether regions) for the reason that it is beneath us (*inferius*), what earth is in relation to heaven such must hell be in relation to earth. Wherefore Apoc. v, 3 declares: "No man was able, either in heaven, or on earth, or under the earth, to open the book."

THE SECOND REASON is that, since the souls of the damned sinned by the love of the flesh, it is reasonable that they should be treated as dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth.

THE THIRD REASON is that, just as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned, for, just as joy suggests lightness of spirit, so sadness suggests heaviness.—Wherefore it is not unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned (Ad 3).

QUESTION XCVIII THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED

ART. I.—WHETHER EVERY ACT OF WILL IN THE DAMNED IS EVIL.

YES.—a) The natural will even in the damned is good; b) but every deliberative will of the damned is evil.

THE REASON OF THE FIRST is that the natural will is theirs, not of themselves, but of the Author of nature, and in this way the natural inclination that is called will can be good even in the damned.

THE REASON OF THE SECOND is that no will can be good save by relation to the final end of the right will; but the damned are completely turned away from this end. Hence the deliberate will in them is always evil. Hence even if they willed something good, they do not will it well, so that one could call their will good on that account.

ART. II.—WHETHER THE DAMNED REPENT OF THE EVIL THEY HAVE DONE.

YES.—They do not repent directly of their sins, but indirectly.

THE REASON is that they do not repent of their sin insofar as it is sin, because consent to the malice of sin will remain in them; but they do repent indirectly, that is, by reason of some circumstance, insofar as they are tormented by the punishment they suffer for sin.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE DAMNED BY RIGHT AND DELIBERATE REASON WOULD WISH NOT TO BE.

NO.—The damned cannot wish not to be, considering *not to be* in itself, but they can wish not to be insofar as this would terminate their misery.

THE REASON is that *not to be* considered in itself is in no wise desirable, since it has no aspect of good; but insofar as it is a relief from a painful life, or misery, it takes on the aspect of good. Wherefore we are told in Matth. xxvi, 24: "It were better for him if that man had not been born."

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE DAMNED IN HELL WOULD WISH OTHERS WERE DAMNED WHO ARE NOT DAMNED.

YES.—They would wish all the good to be damned.

THE REASON is that, just as the blessed in heaven will have the most perfect charity, so the damned will have the most perfect hatred. Wherefore, just as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so also the wicked will grieve for all goods. Consequently even the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them great pain.

NOTE: The damned will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich man (Luke xvi) prayed that his brethren might be saved from damnation. For he knew that some are guarded therefrom (Ad 1). Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one's punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone (Ad 3).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE DAMNED HATE GOD.

YES.—Not as He is in Himself, but by reason of His effects on the damned.

THE REASON is that God as He is in Himself is Supreme Goodness, and accordingly cannot displease any will; but the damned, seeing God in the effect of justice, which is punishment, hate Him, as they hate the punishments they suffer.

ART. VI.—WHETHER THE DAMNED DEMERIT.

NO.—After the day of judgment there will be no merit or demerit.

THE REASON is that after the judgment day there will be a final consummation of good and evil, so that there will be no further addition of good or evil. But before the judgment day both the merit of the blessed and the punishment of the damned can increase as regards the accidental reward or punishment.

NOTE: This opinion was at least tacitly retracted by St. Thomas; for afterwards he taught that neither the blessed nor the damned could merit anything after death (cf. P. I., q. lxii, a. 9, ad 3, and II-II, q. xiii, art. 4 ad 2).— Even in this article he does not assign any particular reason as regards the second part.—Paris.

ART. VII.—WHETHER THE DAMNED CAN MAKE USE OF THE KNOWLEDGE THEY HAD IN THIS WORLD.

YES.—THE REASON is that nothing that can pertain to sadness will be lacking

to the damned, so that their misery may be consummate. Consequently their sadness will be both on the part of objects of knowledge and on the part of knowledge itself, insofar as the damned will consider both the evil they have done, as a result of which they were damned, and the delightful good they have lost, and will be tormented by both considerations. Similarly they will consider that the knowledge that they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection, which they might have acquired.

ART. VIII.—WHETHER THE DAMNED WILL EVER THINK OF GOD.

NO.—They will not think of God in Himself, but indirectly.

THE REASON is that in no wise is it possible to think of God in Himself, that is, according to that which is proper to Him, viz., that He is the principle of all goodness, without experiencing delight. Consequently, in no wise will the damned think of God thus; but they will think of Him in His effects, as punishing, or something of the sort; and in this way the thought of God will cause sadness.

ART. IX.—WHETHER THE DAMNED SEE THE GLORY OF THE BLESSED.

YES.—At the judgment or before the judgment, but not clearly; and not after the judgment.

THE REASON is that this will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for their happiness and because they have lost this glory. Wherefore it is said in Wisdom v, 2 of the wicked: "Seeing it," they "shall be troubled with great fear." But after the judgment day they will be deprived altogether of the sight of the blessed; yet not for that reason will their punishment diminish, but it will increase, because they will have before them the memory of the glory of the blessed, which they saw at the judgment or before the judgment; and this will be a torment to them; they will be further tormented in that they will see that they are deemed unworthy even to see the glory that the saints merit to have.

QUESTION XCIX GOD'S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARD THE DAMNED (five articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER BY DIVINE JUSTICE AN ETERNAL PUNISHMENT IS INFLICTED ON SINNERS.

YES.—**THE REASON** is that, just as in human justice it sometimes happens that one who has committed some offense in a city is by that very offense rendered worthy of being cut off wholly from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death, so also by divine justice sin renders a person wholly worthy of being excluded from the fellowship of the City of God; and this is done by every sin that is gravely against charity, which is the bond uniting this city.

NOTE: 1. There are also other reasons advanced by the saints why some are justly punished by eternal punishment for a sin committed in time. One is that they sinned against eternal good by despising eternal life (St. Aug., *City of God*, bk. xxi, chap. 11). Another reason is that man sinned in his own eternity. For he who falls into mortal sin by his own will places himself in a state from which he cannot be rescued, unless he is helped by God. Wherefore, by the very fact that he wills to sin it follows that he wills to remain in sin forever. Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there forever, whatever else he might have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin he places his end in a creature; and, since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity (St. Gregory, *Moralia*, bk. xxxiv, c. 16). Still another reason may be given: Sin is committed against God, who is infinite. Consequently, since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is not capable of an infinite quality, it must be at least infinite in duration (in body of art.).

2. Although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God, the Author of his being, yet in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being

lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin; and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due for any sin (Ad 6).

ART. II.—WHETHER BY GOD'S MERCY ALL PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED, BOTH MAN AND DEMON, COMES TO AN END.

NO.—THE FIRST REASON is that the contrary opinion, which was that of Origen, as we learn from Augustine (*City of God*, bk. xxi, c. 17), is incompatible with Scripture (Apoc. xx, 9): "The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone where both the beasts and the false prophets shall be tormented day and night forever and ever;" and this is the Scriptural expression of eternity.

THE SECOND REASON is that the contrary opinion exaggerated God's mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore, just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their punishment, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.

NOTE: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. But, because His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people, who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness (Ad 1). And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, inasmuch as they are punished less than they condignly deserve (Ad 1).

[St. Thomas adds that it is unbecoming the divine goodness that a whole genus of creature should fail of its end, but that there is no reason why some men or angels should not perish forever, because the intention of the divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.—Ad 3.—Translator.]

ART. III.—WHETHER GOD' MERCY SUFFERS AT LEAST MEN TO BE PUNISHED ETERNALLY.

YES.—THE REASON is that, just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness, and so are eternally punished, so also are the souls of men who die without charity.—Wherefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will always be fulfilled in them (Ad 3).

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT OF CHRISTIANS IS BROUGHT TO AN END BY GOD'S MERCY.

NO.—THE REASON is that not all who persevere in faith till the end will be saved from eternal punishment, unless they are free from other sins at the end. For Our Lord said (Matth. vii, 21): "Not everyone who says to me: Lord, Lord, will enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father who is in heaven;" and in many other places Holy Writ threatens sinners with eternal punishment.

ART. V.—WHETHER ALL THOSE WHO PERFORM WORKS OF MERCY WILL BE PUNISHED ETERNALLY.

NO.—Those will be punished eternally who die in mortal sin, that is, without charity.

THE REASON is that without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor without it can anything profit for eternal life, as may be gathered from I. Cor. xiii, 3. Consequently only those will be saved who repent and by works of mercy obtain complete forgiveness from the Lord, who is blessed forevermore. Amen.

APPENDIX

(The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Sentences* and included by him in the supplement between Questions 70 and 71)

QUESTION I

Here we must consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective states: 1) We shall treat of the souls that depart this life with original sin only.—There will be two articles.

ART. I.—WHETHER THOSE SOULS THAT DEPART WITH ORIGINAL SIN ALONE SUFFER FROM A BODILY FIRE AND ARE PUNISHED BY FIRE.

NO.—THE REASON is that the defect that is transmitted through our origin, and which has the character of sin, does not result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but by the withdrawal or corruption of something that had been superadded by nature. Consequently no other punishment is due to him besides the privation of that end to which the gift withdrawn destined him. Now this end is the vision of God. Consequently the lack of this vision is the proper and the sole punishment of original sin after death; for punishment must be proportioned to guilt.

NOTE: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion to creatures denoted by actual sin, whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment (Ad 4).

ART. II.—WHETHER THESE SAME SOULS SUFFER SPIRITUAL AFFLICTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE STATE IN WHICH THEY ARE.

NO.—THE REASON is that if one is guided by right reason one does not grieve for being deprived of something that is beyond his power to attain, just as no sensible man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or because he is not a king or an emperor, since this is not due to him. Now dead unbaptized children were never adapted to the possession of eternal life, because this was neither due to them by the principles of nature, since it surpasses every faculty of nature, nor did they have command of their own acts, by which they might have attained so great a good. Consequently, they will grieve not at all for the loss of the divine vision—nay rather they will rejoice at having so large a share in the divine goodness and in natural perfections.—Wherefore, although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: In fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love (Ad 5).

QUESTION II
THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY.

(Six articles)

ART. I.—WHETHER THE PAINS OF PURGATORY SURPASS ALL THE TEMPORAL PAINS OF THIS LIFE.

YES.—The least pain of purgatory, whether of loss or of sense, exceeds the greatest pain of this life.

THE REASON is that the desire with which the holy souls crave the Sovereign Good after this life is most intense, both because their desire is not held back by the weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would already have reached the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good. It follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is the greater the pain caused by that which hurts it; wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself.

NOTE: That fire is a punishment of purgatory is evident from the authority of the Fathers, both Greek and Latin. Among the Latins Augustine says (*In Ps.* xxxvii): "In this life You will purge me, and render me such as not to need the fire of purgation."—(likewise, the Homilies, bk. i, hom. xvi; and *De Genesi contra Manich.*, lib. ii, c. 20).—Ambrose (*In Ps.* cxviii, conc. 3): Here [or in the present life] must be purified there [after this life], "the one who is justified so that each of us, being scorched by that fiery sword, but not consumed, may enter that pleasant paradise and may give thanks to God. . ." Jerome also indicates that the deeds of sinful "will be tried and cleansed by fire." In his commentary on Isaias he implies this is purgatory by contrasting it with the pains of those who are to be tormented forever. Similarly Gregory (*Dial. lib.* ii, c. 20): "It is to be believed that there will be a purgatorial fire

for certain light sins before the judgment.”—Among the Greeks Basil (*In Is., cap. 9*) compares the sin that is bared in Confession to dry grass, and says that it is such as “easily to be devoured by purgatorial fire.” Gregory of Nyssa (or his brother, in *Orat. pro Mortuis*): “After leaving the body no one can be made a sharer in the Godhead unless the purgatorial fire has removed his stains.” Similarly Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat. de Baptism., seu in Sancta Lumina*), and Eusebius Emyssenus [as Bellarmine holds, according to Perronius Eucherius, hom. iii of Epiphany]. Hence almost all the same Fathers explain the passage of Luke iii: “He will baptize you in fire and the Holy Spirit”) and I Cor. iii: “He will be saved, yet so as by fire,” in addition to certain interpretations of their own, as both referring to “the fire of purgatory.” (Note after art. vi of this q.).

ART. II.—WHETHER THIS PUNISHMENT IS VOLUNTARY.

NO.—It is not voluntary absolutely, but conditionally.

THE REASON is that no punishment whatever is voluntary; for it is the very nature of punishment to be contrary to the will. But the souls in purgatory know that without punishment they cannot attain to beatitude. Consequently they neither assume punishment nor wish to be freed therefrom, but they endure it; and in this respect it is said to be voluntary.

ART. III.—WHETHER THE SOULS IN PURGATORY ARE PUNISHED BY THE DEMONS.

NO.—THE REASON is that it is unjust that he who triumphed over someone should be subjected to him after the triumph. Now those who are in purgatory triumphed over the demons, since they died without mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them by being punished by them; but will be cleansed only by divine justice. Yet it is possible that the good angels may lead them to places of punishment, and even the demons themselves, who rejoice at the punishments of men, accompany them and stand by at the cleansing, both that they may be sated with their pains and that when these leave their bodies they may find something of their own in them.

ART. IV.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF PURGATORY DELIVERS FROM THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT.

YES.—Venial sin in one who dies in grace is discharged after this life by the purgatorial fire.

THE REASON is that the punishment is in some manner voluntary; by the power of grace it will have power to expiate every sin that can consist with grace.

(NOTE: In his essay *De Malo*, q. vii, art. 2, ad 9 and 17, the Holy Doctor thus retracts what he wrote in *Sent. IV*: “The guilt is not remitted by punishment but venial sin is remitted in purgatory as regards the guilt by the power of grace, not only as regards what is in habit, but according as it proceeds to an act of charity, detesting venial sin.”—Paris).

NOTE: Because venial sin can be remitted in purgatory it does not follow that the soul in purgatory can sin venially, because venial sin results from the corruption of concupiscence, which will no longer be in the separated soul that is in purgatory; wherefore this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be in the separated soul. Therefore the comparison fails (Ad 2).

ART. V.—WHETHER THE FIRE OF PURGATORY DELIVERS FROM THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT.

YES.—THE REASON is that the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment; and therefore a person is freed from that obligation by undergoing the punishment that he owed; accordingly, the punishment of purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.

ART. VI.—WHETHER ONE PERSON IS DELIVERED FROM THIS PUNISHMENT SOONER THAN ANOTHER.

YES.—Some are tormented in purgatory longer than others inasmuch as their affections were more steeped in venial sins.

THE REASON is that the things that cling more persistently are more slowly cleansed.

TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY

ART. I.—WHETHER THERE IS A PURGATORY AFTER THIS LIFE.

YES.—Even by reason it can be proved that purgatory exists after this life.

THE REASON is that the debt of punishment is not always paid in full after the sin has been blotted out by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sin is remitted; and justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment. Hence it follows that one who, after contrition for his sin and after receiving absolution dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. And therefore those who deny purgatory speak against divine justice.

ART. II.—WHETHER IT IS THE SAME PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE CLEANSSED AND THE DAMNED PUNISHED.

YES.—By the ordinary law, the place in which souls are cleansed is adjacent to that in which the damned are punished.

THE REASON is that, according to the common or ordinary law the place of purgatory is a lower place, close to hell, so that it is the same fire that torments the damned in hell and cleanses the just in purgatory, although the damned, being lower in merit, are consigned to a lower place. There is another place of purgatory according to divine ordinance, and thus sometimes we read that some are punished in different places, either for the instruction of the living or for the relief of the dead, so that, their punishment being made known to the living, it may be mitigated by the suffrages of the Church.

—THE END—

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