

BIBLIOTECA DE AUTORES CRISTIANOS

SACRAE THEOLOGIAE
SUMMA

IIIA

ON THE
INCARNATE WORD



ON THE BLESSED
VIRGIN MARY

by
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Translated from Latin by
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KEEP THE FAITH

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THEOLOGICAL NOTES

USED IN THIS *SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA*

Divine faith (de fide divina): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *an error in faith (error in fide)*.

Divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica): what is contained in the word of God written or handed and is proposed by the Church either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium to be believed as divinely revealed. The opposite is: *heresy*.

Defined divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica definita): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down and is proposed by the Church by a solemn judgment, that is, by the infallible Magisterium, exercised in an extraordinary way, either in an ecumenical council or by the Roman Pontiff speaking “*ex cathedra*” and to be believed as divinely revealed. [N.B. Even the Chapter Titles in Trent and Vatican I are considered as true *definitions*.]

Proximate to faith (fidei proxima): a truth that by an almost unanimous agreement of theologians is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *proximate to error or heresy*.

Faith based on the authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica): a truth not formally revealed, which is proposed infallibly by the Magisterium of the Church. The opposite is: *error in ecclesiastical faith*. [Those who do not admit there is such a thing as ecclesiastical faith give a different theological note for such a truth.]

Catholic doctrine (doctrina catholica): a truth that is taught in the whole Church, but not always proposed infallibly (for example, what the Roman Pontiffs wish to teach explicitly in encyclical letters). The opposite is: *error in catholic doctrine*.

Theologically certain (theologie certa): a truth that in the theological schools is certainly recognized as necessarily connected with revealed truths; this connection can be either virtual or presuppositive or final. The opposite is: *error in theology*.

A doctrine to be so held that its contrary is temerarious (doctrina ita tenenda, ut contraria sit temeraria): a truth proposed by the Roman Congregations, which proposition however does not enjoy the special approbation of the Roman Pontiff.

Common and certain in theology (communis et certa in theologia): what by the common agreement of theologians is taught in the schools as well founded. The opposite is: *false in theology, temerarious*.

Probable (probabilis): a theological opinion with a lesser grade of certainty.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

AAS	Acta Apostolicae Sedis
ACO	Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, iussu Atque mandato societatis scientiarum Argentoratensis edidit Ed. Schwarz.
ActPontAcRomSTh.....	Acta Pontificae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq. et Religionis Catholicae
AmCl.....	L'Ami du Clergé
AnalBoll.....	Analecta Bollandiana
AnalGreg	Analecta Gregoriana
AnalSacraTarrac.....	Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia
Ang	Angelicum
Ant... ..	Antonianum
AntChr.....	Antike und Christentum
AnTh.....	L'Année Théologique
ArchFrPraed.	Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum
ArchHistDoctrLitMA.....	Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age
ArchLitKirchMA.....	Archiv für Literatur und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters
ArchPh.....	Archives de Philosophie
ArchTG.....	Archivo Teológico Granadino
ASS.....	Acta Sanctae Sedis
BAC	Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos
BeitrGPhMA.....	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie (und Theologie) des Mittelalters
BenedMschr.....	Benediktinische Monatsschrift
Bibl.....	Biblica
BibleZeitschr	Biblische Zeitschrift
BullLitEccl.....	Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique
BullSocFrançEtMar.....	Bulletin de la Société Française d'études Mariales
BullThAncMéd.....	Bulletin de Théologie ancienne e Médiévale
BullThom.....	Bulletin Thomiste
CathBiblQuart.....	The Catholic Biblical Quarterly
Cav.	F. Cavallera, S.I., Thesaurus Doctrinae Catholicae
CiencTom... ..	La Ciencia Thomista

CivCatt.....	La Civiltà Cattolica
CL.....	Acta et Decreta sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum. Collectio Lacensis.
CollatBrug.....	Collationes Brugenses
CollatGrand.....	Collationes Gandavenses
CollFranc.....	Collectanea Franciscana
CSEL.....	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Academiae.Vindobonensis
CTr.....	Concilium Tridentinum. Ed. Societas Goerresiana
D.....	H. Denzinger – Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum 2012 ⁴³
DACL.....	F. Carrol – H. Leclercq- H. Marrou, Dictionnaire d’Archeologie chrétienne et de Liturgie
DAFC.....	A. d’Alès, Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique
DB.....	F. Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible
DBS.....	L. Pirot-A. Robert, Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément
DivThom (Fr).....	Divus Thomas. Freiburg i. der Schweiz
DivThom (Pi).....	Divus Thomas. Piacenza
DocComm.....	Doctor Communis
DSpir.....	M. Viller, S.J. – Ch. Baumgartner, S.J. Dictionnaire de Spiritualité
DTC.....	A. Vacant-E. Mangenot-E. Amann, Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique
EchOr.....	Echos d’Orient
EccIRev.....	The Ecclesiastical Review
EchOr.....	Echos d’Orient
EphCarm.....	Ephemerides Carmeliticae
EphLitur.....	Ephemerides Liturgicae
EphThLov.....	Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses
Est.....	Estudios
EstBibl.....	Estudios Biblicos
EstEcl.....	Estudios Ecclesiasticos
EstFranc.....	Estudios Franciscanos
EstMar.....	Estudios Marianos
Et.....	Etudes
EtCarm.....	Etudes Carmelitaines
EtFranc.....	Etudes Franciscaines

FrancisSt	Franciscan Studies
FranzStud.....	Franziscanische Studien
GChS.....	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
GLeb.	Geist und Leben
Greg.	Gregorianum
Hrd	J. Harduini, S.I., Conciliorum Collectio regia maxima
IlustrCler.	Ilustración del Clero
IrishThQuart	The Irish Theological Quarterly
JahrPhTh.....	Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie
Kch.....	C. Kirch, S.I.-L. Ueding, S.I., Enchiridion Fontium historiae ecclesiasticae antiquae ⁵
LCienc.....	Las Ciencias
LScPhTh.	Les Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques (Antea et postea: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques)
LTK.....	M. Buchberger, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche
Manr.	Manresa
Marian.....	Marianum
MéIscRel	Mélanges de Science Religieuse
ML, MG.....	J. P. Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus Series prima latina. Series graeca.
MGH.....	Monumenta Germaniae historica inde ab Anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum, ed. Societas aperiendas fontibus rerum germanicum medii aevi. LL=Leges (s.3 Concilia). SS=Scriptores
MiscCom	Miscellanea Comillas
MiscFranc.....	Miscellanea Francescana
Msi	J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collection
NouvRevTh.....	Nouvelle Revue Théologique
Or... ..	Orientalia
OrCh.....	Orientalia Christiana
OrChP.....	Orientalia Christiana Periodica
Pens.....	Pensamiento
R.....	M. J. Rouët de Journel, S.I., Enchiridion

	Patristicum ¹⁴
RazFe.....	Razón y Fe
RechScRel... ..	Recherches de Science Religieuse
RechThAncMéd... ..	Recherches de Théologie ancienne et Médiévale
RelCul.....	Religión y Cultura
REPT.....	J.J. Herzog, Realencyclopädie für protes- Tantische Theologie und Kirche
RevApol.....	Revue Apologétique
RevAscMyst.....	Revue d'Ascétique et Mystique
RevBén.....	Revue Bénédictine
RevBibl.....	Revue Biblique
RevClerFr.....	Revue du Clergé Français
RevEcl.....	Revista Ecclesiastica
RevEspir.....	Revista de Espiritualidad
RevEspT.....	Revista Española de Teología
RevEtByz.....	Revue des Etudes Byzantines
RevHistDrFranç.....	Revue historique de droit français Et étranger
RevHistEccl.....	Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique
RevHistLittRel.....	Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuse
RevHistPhRel.....	Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses
RevMoeAgeLat.....	Revue du Moyen Age Latin
RevScPhTh... ..	Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques
RevScRel... ..	Revue des Sciences Religieuses
RevThom... ..	Revue Thomiste
RevUnivOtt... ..	Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa
RömQschr.....	Römische Quartalschrift
SalTer.....	Sal Terrae
Sap.....	Sapienza
ScEccl.....	Sciences Ecclésiastiques
Schol.....	Scholastik
ScuoCatt.....	Scuola Cattolica
SThS.....	Sacrae Theologiae Summa
Stimm.....	Stimmen (aus Maria-Laach; ab anno 1915: der Zeit)
StudAnselm.....	Studia Anselmiana
SyllExcerptDiss.....	Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad Gradum Doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel In Iure canonico consequendum con- Scriptis (Lovanii)

StudCath.	Studia Catholica
Temoign	Temoignages
ThGl.	Theologie und Glaube
ThPraktQschr.....	Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift
ThQschr.	Theologische Quartalschrift
ThRev	Theologische Revue
ThSt.....	Theological Studies
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
VerDom.....	Verbun Domini
VerVid.....	Verdad y Vida
VetTest	Vetus Testamentum
VieSpir	Vie Spirituelle
WissWeish	Wissenschaft und Weisheit
XenThom	Xenia Thomistica
ZAscMyst.	Zeitschrift für Ascese und Mystik
ZkathTh	Zeitschrift für KatholisdcheTheologie
ZNTWiss.....	Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche

TREATISE 1

ON THE
INCARNATE WORD

by
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INTRODUCTION

After St. Thomas considers God and the movement of the rational creature towards God, he directs his acumen and heartfelt affection in the third part of the *Summa Theologiae* to Christ who, as man, is the way for us to tend towards God. In the Prologue he proposes three points to be handled: the Savior himself, his sacraments, by which we obtain salvation, and finally the end of immortal life which we obtain through him because of his resurrection. In this treatise we are considering only the first point, namely the Savior himself. This part of theology has customarily been called “On the Incarnate Word.”

The order that St. Thomas follows is that the first consideration is about the mystery itself of the Incarnation, according to which for our salvation God became man, q. 1-26; the second consideration is about those things that were done and suffered by our Savior, that is, the incarnate God, q. 27-59.

However if we look at the historical or chronological order by which, because of the serious errors of the time, the fundamental truths of our treatise have been proclaimed by the supreme magisterium of the Church, the following overview of the matter can be established.

After the first two ecumenical councils in the 4th century, *Nicaea* and *Constantinople I*, defined the true and proper divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit, which was covered in the treatise *On the Triune God*, the council of *Ephesus*, the 3rd ecumenical council (5th century) against the *Nestorians*, who divided Christ, taught that in Christ there is only *one person*, namely, the person of the only-begotten Son of God, and therefore that Mary is truly the *Mother of God*. Against the exaggerated unity of Christ, which the Monophysites taught, the council of *Chalcedon*, the 4th ecumenical council (also in the 5th century), proclaimed the *two natures* of Christ, divine and human. On the occasion of the controversy over *The Three Chapters*, the council of *Constantinople II*, the 5th ecumenical council (6th century) condemned both the *Nestorians* and the *Monophysites* together. Finally, *Constantinople III*, the 6th ecumenical council (7th century) condemned the remnants of Monophysitism by defining that in Christ there are *two wills* and *two operations*, against what the Monothelitists affirmed.

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B O O K I

O N THE MYSTERY ITSELF OF THE INCARNATION

Michel, *Incarnation*: DTC 7, 1445-1539.

Id., *Jésus-Christ*: DTC 8, 1108-1301.

C H A P T E R I

O n the fitness of the incarnation

Thesis 1. The one primary motive of the incarnation was the redemption of the human race, so that in virtue of the present decree, if Adam had not sinned, the Word would not have become incarnate.

S.Th. III, q. 1, a. 3; DTC 7,1482-1507.

1. Connection. St. Thomas wisely begins from the question: Does it exist, that is, about the *fitness* of the incarnation, where he shows that it is very advantageous that God, as supreme Goodness, should communicate himself in the highest way to the creature by his personal union with a created nature.¹

He adds a question about the *necessity* or rather the fitness of the incarnation *in order to restore the human race*, presenting many arguments for this necessity (III, q. 1, a. 2 c). Since this question is proposed in almost the same way by St. Thomas where he treats the passion of Christ (III, q. 46, a. 1-3), and since many notions about sin and satisfaction would have to be handled here, if we want to consider this question now, we refer them to the section on soteriology.² Consequently in order to affirm such necessity of the incarnation for the salvation of men St. Thomas asks about the *motive* of the incarnation.³

2. Definition of terms. *Incarnation* or σάρκωσις. Etymologically it is the taking of “flesh,” although incarnation, from the biblical use of the

1. III, q. 1, a. 1 c. Why the holy Doctor does not begin with the question about the *possibility* of the incarnation, see in Cajetan, at this place, n. 2; there is a different view in Suarez, *De incarnatione* on q. 1 a.1 n.2.

2. See below th. 23.

3. See John of St. Thomas, *Isagoge ad D. Thomae theologiam*. The order of the third part, the Mystery of the Incarnation. Somewhat differently, Suarez, *In 3 q.1 a.3 n.1*.

word “flesh,”⁴ designates the taking *both of the body and the soul*. This word, as more biblical,⁵ has taken precedence over the other names for this mystery.⁶ In reality it is the joining together of the divine nature with the human nature in the one person of the Word.

Motive. Since *from the side of God* the reason why God does all things is his own goodness and glory, we are treating the motive *from the side of things*. For all acts in the divine will do not have among themselves the causality they have in our will, because in us those acts are really produced and are distinguished from each other so that one can flow from another. But in the divine will there is only one very simple act by which he wills everything. Nevertheless between the objects of that will there is order of end and means. Therefore God wills this because of this but not because of this does he will this.⁷

Primary motive. The question is about the reason that is to such an extent the motive of the incarnation that without it there would be no incarnation. Therefore other secondary motives are not excluded.

One primary motive. In order that the opinion, which will soon be explained about the *twofold primary* motive of the incarnation, can be excluded.

Redemption of the human race. Liberation of the human race from the state of perversion into which it was cast by Adam.

In virtue of the present decree. In virtue of the decree that God *de facto* had about producing the incarnation. Therefore the question is not about some possible decree.

3. Opinions. In virtue of the present decree God so willed the incarnation that *if Adam had not sinned, the Word would not have become incarnate*. St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, *most Dominican authors, and many others in different schools* defend this thesis as more probable.⁸

However they disagree mainly⁹ when it comes to explaining in what

4. Not only in the O.T. as in Gen. 6:12; Deut. 5:26; Ps. 56:4; but also in the N.T. as in Matt. 24:22; Rom. 3:20. For more on this see DTC 7,1447. On the same use among the holy Fathers, see DTC 7,1447-1450.

5. See John 1:14.

6. See Petavius, *De incarnat.* 2,1. More briefly, D'Ales, 128-130; Galtier, 1f.; DTC 7,1450.

7. S.Th. I, q. 19, a. 5 c. See Suarez, *De Deo* 1.3 c.7 n.12. Since the use of the word “motive” in the course of the centuries has been consecrated in the schools, I thought it should not be abandoned, even though the use of it was strongly criticized recently. See J. Fr. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., *Raison de l'incarnation et primauté du Christ. Réflexions sur une controverse*: DivThom (Pi) 46 (1943) 105f.; Id., ActPontAcRomSTh 10 (1945) 26-30.

8. S.Th. III, q. 1, a. 3. St. Bonav., *In 3 d.1 a.2 q.2*. See Salmanticenses, d.2 dub.1 n.8; Pohle-Gierens, 178. On the authors in the 12th and 13th centuries, see J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *La Question hypothétique “Utrum si Adam non peccasset...” au XIII^e siècle*: RevEspT 14 (1954) 327-368.

9. On the opinion of a few O.P. authors who make a distinction between *the order of intention and the order of execution*, see Gonet, d.5 a.1 § 5 n.49; Salmanticenses, d.3 dub.1 n.28.

sense Christ is the end of creation and the first-born of the predestined. For not a few say that Christ had only the primacy of *excellence*.¹⁰ The rest generally admit that Christ is the *final cause* of creation and the first of the predestined, because although there is no Christ-decree except for dependence on the prevision of sin, still, on the supposition of the decree of the incarnation, the whole universe is ordered to Christ.¹¹

4. There are different attempts to reconcile these two propositions: Christ does not come except *depending on the prevision of sin* and Christ is *the final cause of all creation*.

Cajetan distinguishes between *final causality* and *material causality*. In the genus of final cause we will first and more health than purgation; but in the genus of material cause it is the opposite, namely, first we will what disposes the matter, in this case our body, to receive the form, i.e., health, which is the final cause.¹² Therefore sin is considered as the matter about which the redemptive incarnation is concerned.

John of St. Thomas distinguishes between the general order of *providence* and the order of *predestination*. When God decreed by general providence to create the world and the order of grace, he intended only the end connatural to each order, and thus for that state there was not anything subject to Christ. However after this decree of general providence *efficacious predestination* began, which began first from the end, as reparative of man, and to this end he ordained *efficaciously* the whole universe, even according to its natural being, not considered absolutely but as introducing the idea of reparability.¹³

5. Gonet, Salmanticenses and many other authors add to the distinction given above from Cajetan, another distinction between the objective end (*finis qui*) or the purpose (*cuius gratia*) and the end *for whom* (*finis cui*). In the genus of an objective final cause God willed and saw Christ before other things; but in the genus of a material cause and in the genus of a final cause *for whom* he willed and saw the permission of sin before Christ. Given therefore the mutual dependence of causes, in the order of *intention* the decree of the incarnation was before the decree of the creation, while in the order of

10. See Gonet, *loc. cit.*, n.51.

11. See Salmanticenses, *loc. cit.*, n.26. Regarding more recent authors, see P. Chrysostome, O.F.M., *Le motif de l'incarnation et les principaux thomistes contemporains* (Tours 1921) 103 note 2. How this doctrine has now become fully common among modern Thomists, can be gathered from H.M. Féret, O.P., *A propos de la primauté du Christ*: RevScPhTh 27 (1938) 69-72. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., expressly attributes the permission of original sin to the divine will of accomplishing the incarnation: *Motivum incarnationis fuit motivum misericordiae*: Ang 7 (1930) 297f.; Id., *De motivo incarnationis*: ActPontAcRomSTh 10 (1945) 22.30.40; Botéssé, *Le Sauveur du monde. I. La place du Christ...* 88. Many things worthy of consideration see in A. Neumeyer, C.S.Sp., *De Christo angelorum capite iuxta F. Amicum, S.J., et P. de Godoy, O.P.* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Chevilly [Seine] 1938). Various "sociological" aspects of both speculative positions in this controversy are presented by: A.M. Knoll, *Thomismus und Skotismus als Standestheologen*, in *Abhandlungen über Theologie und Kirche. Festschrift für Karl Adam* (Düsseldorf 1952) 225-239.

12. In 3 q.1 a.3 n.9; see *ibid.*, n.6 where he treats the three orders of nature, grace and the hypostatic union.

13. In 3 q.1 d.3 n.48-52.

execution the decree of creation was first.¹⁴

Regarding the motive of the incarnation Molina denies that it is possible to distinguish in the divine will any priority or posteriority. Before God decides to create anything, with his knowledge of simple intelligence or with his middle knowledge he sees innumerable orders that he can create. Among others there is an order in which Adam appears as a sinner, but also Christ appears both as excellent in himself and worthy to have the primacy in all things and most suited for all men to be redeemed by him. God chose this order and in such a way that he willed both together—reparation or for the praise and honor of Christ, Christ himself and the incarnation in reparation for the human race as a part of the integral end for which the incarnation was willed and without which it would not have been willed: therefore together both were willed as absolutely future.¹⁵

Now Galtier and others agree with Molina.¹⁶

6. In virtue of the present decree God so willed the incarnation that *if Adam had not sinned the Word still would have been incarnated*. This opinion supposes that the decree that God de facto made about the incarnation did not have, even as a partial motive, the redemption of the human race. Therefore such a decree would have been given even if Adam had not sinned. Thus St. Albert the Great¹⁷ and especially Scotus¹⁸ with the Scotists and not a few others, especially more recent authors.¹⁹ Thus also St. Francis de Sales.²⁰

Suarez holds the so-called middle position. According to him there is a twofold adequate motive of the incarnation. The absolute one was the excellence of the mystery itself, to be obtained *in the most perfect way*; the other hypothetical one was our re-

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14. Gonet, d.5 a.1 § n.52-54. Salmanticenses, d.2 dub.1 n.29. Hugon, 31. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De motivo incarn.*: ActPontAcRomT 10 (1945) 15f.22f.44f.
15. *In 1* q.23 a.5 d.1 m.7.8. The opinion rejecting *simply* the different expressions or moments in the divine knowledge and will is falsely attributed to Molina: he rejects it only *in three cases*. See *loc.cit.*, m.8.
16. See Galtier, n.576f. and th.40f.
17. *In 3* d.20 a.4. This opinion is also usually attributed to Alexander of Hales, but undeservedly. See *S. Bonaventurae opera omnia* (Quaracchi 1937): *In 3* d.1 a.2 q.2, scholium. On some authors of the 12th and 13th centuries, see Chrysostome, *Le motif de l'incarnation et le Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*: EtFranc 34 (1922) 485-499; 35 (1923) 67-70.
18. *Reportata Parisiensia* 1.3 d.7 q.4. For more one this see J.M. Bissen, O.F.M., *De praedestinatione Christi absoluta secundum D. Scotum expositio dogmatica*: Ant 12 (1937) 27-36.
19. See D'Ales, 359f.; Minges, 1, n.450-452; Galtier, n.576; Pohle-Gierens, 180; Pohle-Gierens himself quite clearly holds this opinion, 180-182; J.Fr. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., *La place du Christ dans le plan divin de la creation*: MéIScRel 4 (1947) 257-284; 5 (1948) 39-62; Id., *Un essai récent sur le plan divin de la creation*: MiscFranc 52 (1952) 425-460. Already in the 7th century this opinion appears and it was strongly maintained outside the Catholic Church. See I. Hausherr, S.J., *Un précurseur de la théorie scotiste sur la fin de l'incarnation. Isaac de Ninive (VII^e siècle)*: RechScRel 22 (1932) 316-320.
20. *Traité de l'amour de Dieu* 1.2 c.4: Oeuvres (Annecy 1849) 4,99-102. On the different principles and method in the Thomistic and Scotistic positions, see H.M. Féret, *Creati in Christo Iesu*: LScPhTh 1 (1941-1942) 96-132; since it will be difficult to find this article, we recommend a summary in BullThom 6 (1940-1942) 452-457.

demption, if, that is, a sin of Adam should occur; but if Adam, left to his freedom, would not sin, nevertheless the Word would be incarnated. However, supposing the knowledge that God had about the fall of the human race, if he permitted Adam to be tempted and to fall, this permission of sin was the necessary means to achieve the incarnation *in the most perfect way* by which it was intended and loved through that decree, because in this way the attributes of God are made more manifest than in any other way. Therefore it can also be said: If Adam was not going to sin, God would not become man *in virtue of the present decree*. For if, given the foreseen conditional knowledge about Adam's future sin, if he were tempted in such a way, God would not will to permit that sin; then, if in fact the present decree regarding the incarnation has joined together with it the permission of that sin and in a certain way necessarily implies it, *a posteriori* and *consequently* we may conclude that there was no decree in God about the incarnation as it is *now*; for if there were such a decree, Adam would be permitted to sin and *de facto* would sin.²¹

7. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Nicaea*: "We believe...in one Lord Jesus Christ... who for us human beings *and for our salvation* came down, and became flesh..." (D 125). The same profession of faith is present in the eastern form of the *Apostles' Creed* (D 41), the *Creed of Epiphanius* (the longer form) (D 42), and in the *Nicene-Constantinople Creed* (D 150).

Although another motive of the incarnation is not excluded explicitly, it seems to be sufficient to affirm clearly redemption as the motive and that no other motive is indicated.

Theological Note. *More common and more probable.*

8. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. There are many texts in which the *redemption* of the human race is assigned *as the motive* of the incarnation and B. there is no other text in which another reason *independent of redemption* is assigned *as the motive* of the incarnation.

A. Since in the soteriological treatise the doctrine about Christ as the Redeemer is explained at length, here it will be sufficient to cite a few testimonies from the N.T. which clearly mention the *motive* of the coming of the Son of God into the world.²²

1) Matt. 20:28: *The Son of man came not to be served but to serve, and*

21. Suarez, d.5 s.4 n.7.17.19; s.5 n.7f.15-17. See P. Dumont, *Suarez*: DTC 14,2654-2660. Recently another way of conciliation has been proposed by P.P.G. Rocca and G. Roschini, O.S.M., in *Marian* 3 (1941) 3-31. See what seems to be a valid refutation in Bonnefoy, *Raison de l'incarnation...*: *DivThom* (Pi) 46 (1943) 103-120, where you will also find a recent bibliography. M. Corvez, O.P., proposes another middle way, *Le motif de l'incarnation*: *RevThom* 49 (1949) 103-121.

22. Many texts gathered together both from the O.T. and from the N.T. will be found in DTC 7,1483-1488. P.F. Ceuppens, O.P., *Theologia biblica. 3. De incarnatione*² (Turin-Rome 1950) 7-24.

to give his life as a ransom for many. Luke 19:10: *The Son of man came to seek and to save the lost.*

2) John 3:16-17: *For God so love the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life.* John 10:10: *I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly.* 1 John 3:5.8: *You know that he appeared to take away sins... The reason the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil.* 1 John 4:9-10: *In this the love of God was made manifest among us, that God sent his only Son into the world, so that we might live through him... and sent his Son to be the expiation for our sins.*

3) Gal. 4:4: *But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.* 1 Tim. 1:15: *The saying is sure and worthy of full acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners....*

Therefore in these texts the *redemption of men* is designated as *the motive of the incarnation* or the coming of the Son of God.

9. B. The principal texts quoted in order to prove that the *motive of the incarnation is independent of sin* and consequently *independent of the redemption* are these two: Prov. 8:22; Col. 1:15-17.²³

1) Prov. 8:22: *The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old.* In the first place this text seems to be speaking about *uncreated wisdom*, not about the incarnate Word. For this interpretation the *Bull "Ineffabilis Deus,"* can be adduced as the testimony of a strong precedent. In it we read: "And therefore the very words themselves with which the divine Scriptures speak *about uncreated wisdom* and represent its eternal origins, [the Church] was wont to use both in ecclesiastical documents and in the sacred liturgy and to transfer them to the origin of the Virgin, which by one and the same decree were applied to the incarnation of divine Wisdom."²⁴ Although Pius IX does not speak expressly about our text, Prov. 8:22, it can hardly be doubted that the words of the Pontiff apply to the text, since this is one of the few places in the wisdom books that both deals with the origin of eternal wisdom and is used in the liturgy as a Marian text.²⁵ Moreover, although because of the interpretation of the holy

23. See Chrysostome, *Le motif...* 59. See some other texts and their explanation in D'Ales, 362; Ceuppens, *ibid.*, 18ff.; U. Lattanzi, *Il primato universale di Cristo secondo le Scritture* (Lateranum, Nova series, a.3 n.1, Rome 1937).

24. Pius IX, *op. cit.*: CL 6,836 d.

25. See X. Le Bachelet, *Immaculée Conception*: DTC 7,864. He holds clearly that Prov. 8:22 is the text to which the Supreme Pontiff is referring, H. Lesetre, *La Sainte Bible* (Paris 1879) 91; Bonnefoy, *Raison de l'incarnation...*: DivThom (Pi) 46 (1943) 119.

Fathers it may be admitted that the text is about the incarnate Word,²⁶ this incarnate Word is only the *historical one*, that is, the one that was born of the Virgin, that died on the cross, for the holy Fathers who applied this text to the incarnate Word were speaking about him.²⁷ Indeed that the incarnate Word as *Redeemer* is the reason why God began to act *ad extra* is in perfect conformity with the Thomistic doctrine about Christ as *the final cause* of the universe.

10. Col. 1:15-17: *He [the Son] is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities—all things were created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.* Although it may be conceded that St. Paul is dealing in these verses with the incarnate Word as incarnate, and not rather with Christ according to his prior life, namely, inasmuch as he is the Word,²⁸ still it must be said that no other Christ is being considered in the eyes of St. Paul except the *historical* Christ, the Redeemer about whom explicit mention was made in v. 14²⁹ and about whom he will speak in v. 18.³⁰

Therefore no text is assigned in which another reason *independent of redemption* is proposed as *the motive of the incarnation*.

From our proof, the *one* motive of the incarnation that appears in Holy Scripture is the redemption of the human race. But those things that proceed from the will of God alone beyond every debt to creatures can be made known to us only through revelation. Therefore, at least according as the revelation of God is contained in Holy Scripture, it is more fittingly said that the work of the incarnation was ordained by God *as a remedy for sin*.

26. See A. Lapede, *Commentaria in Scripturam sacram* at this place; Lesetre, *op.cit.*, at this place; I. Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Proverbia* (Cursus Sacrae Scripturae, Paris 1910) at this place; Petavius, *De Trinit.* 1.2 c.1; Chrysostome, *Le motif...* 59-78.

27. The testimonies are presented immediately, n.11 ad 3.

28. See F. Prat, S.J., *La théologie de Saint Paul* 1¹¹ (Paris 1924) 343-349. Opposed, Chrysostome, *Le motif...* 78-81; P. Romualdus, O.F.M.Cap., *Christus der erstgeborene der Schepping*: Stud 18 (1924) 155-161; B. Brinkmann, S.J., *Die kosmische Stellung des Gottmenschen in paulinischer Sicht*: WissWeish 13 (1950) 6-33. On the Fathers in the 4th and 5th centuries interpreting this text about the divinity of Christ, see A. Spindeler, *Cur Verbum caro factum? Das Motiv des Menschwerdung und das Verhältnis der Erlösung zur Menschwerdung Gottes in den Christologischen Glaubenskämpfen des vierten und fünften christlichen Jahrhunderts* (Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur und Dogmengeschichte hrsgs. von Erhard-Kirsch, 18,2. Paderborn 1938) 79-86.

29. The words "by his blood" do not seem to be present in the original text. The idea however is contained either in "redemption" or in "the forgiveness of sins."

30. See M. Meinertz, *Der Kolosserbrief* (Bonnerbibel, Bonn 1917) 18; J. Huby, S.J., *Saint Paul. Les épîtres de la captivité* (Verbum Salutis, 8, Paris 1935) 35-43; I. Knabenbauer, *Epistola ad Colossenses* (Cursus Sacrae Scripturae, Paris, 1912) 297.

11. Proof from tradition. *The holy Fathers.* 1) Explicitly assign redemption as the *motive* of the incarnation. Thus St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Wait for him who is beyond time; he is a-temporal, invisible, *for our sake visible*, untouchable, for our sake touchable; he sustains things in every way for our sake" (R 66). St. Justin: "By the will of God, having become man for the human race, He (Jesus) endured all the sufferings which the devils instigated the senseless Jews to inflict upon him" (R 127. See R 130). St. Hippolytus: "For whereas the Word of God was without flesh, *He took upon himself the holy flesh by the holy Virgin*, and prepared a robe which He wove for Himself, like a bridegroom, in the sufferings of the cross, in order that by uniting His own power with our mortal body, and by mixing the incorruptible with the corruptible, and the strong with the weak, *He might save perishing men* (R 389).³¹

2) They clearly teach that redemption is the *exclusive* motive of the incarnation. Thus St. Irenaeus: "*For if flesh did not have to be saved, in no way would the Word of God have become flesh.* And if the blood of the just did not have to be tested, in no way would the Lord have had his own blood" (R 254).³² Origen: "If there were no sin, there was no necessity for the Son of God to become a lamb..., but he would have remained what he was in the beginning, God the Word" (R 254).³³ St. Athanasius: "For, though no works had been created, still 'the Word' of God 'was,' and 'the Word was God.' And His becoming man would not have taken place, had

31. That St. Hippolytus of Rome is the author of this document, *De Antichristo*, and of others attributed to him is shown very well by B. Capelle, O.S.B., *Hippolyte de Rome: RechThAncMéd* 17 (1950) 145-174. Many other testimonies of the tradition concerning the redemption as the *motive* of the incarnation, but not always of equal value, are presented in DTC 7,1489-1491. For a more extensive treatment, see Spindeler, *Cur Verbum....*

32. It seems to be astonishing how another text of St. Irenaeus is set in opposition to this one by the Scotists: "For since the savior pre-existed, it was necessary for that to exist which was to be saved, lest the saving be in vain" (*Adv. haer.* 3,22,3: MG 7,958 B; Harvey edition, 2,123; in this edition, *Adv. haer.* 3,32,1). For in this text Christ is supposed to be decreed precisely as *saving*, or as the *Redeemer*. See L. Escoula, S.J., *Le Verbe sauveur et illuminateur chez Saint Irenée: NouvRevTh* 66 (1939) 385-400. Although this author says that St. Irenaeus is as far from the Scotistic theory as he is from the Thomistic, nevertheless, from what he himself admits, Christ is conceived by God from the very beginning as a teacher and *Redeemer* (*loc.cit.*, 390); therefore substantially St. Irenaeus holds the Thomistic doctrine on the incarnation depending on the misery of men. For a contrary view, see D. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., *Christ's Role in the Universe according to St. Irenaeus: FranciscSt* 26 (1945) 3-20; 114-137.

33. Another text of the same Origen is opposed to this one, namely, *In Lev.* h.2 n.3 (MG 12,416; GChS Origenis t.6, 294); see G. Rocca-G. Roschini, O.S.M., *Intorno alla ragione primaria dell'esistenza de Cristo e della Madonna: Marian* 3 (1941) 317f.

not the need of men become a cause" (R 765).³⁴

St. Cyril of Alexandria: "The Only-begotten Son has the greatest concern for the faults of men and our sins. But he knows that the occasion was given to him to glorify God—the sins of humanity. *For if we had not sinned, he would not have been made like unto us...*" (R 2087).³⁵ St. Augustine: *If man had not perished, the Son of man would not have come* (R 1517).³⁶

3. The text itself of Prov. 8:22 on which the adversaries rely, the Fathers comment on, and they explain how there the text is talking about Christ the *Redeemer*. Thus St. Athanasius: "He will also perceive the cause [of those words, i.e., *The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old*; Prov. 8:22], that is, because when he willed to destroy our death, *he took to himself a body from the Virgin Mary*, that he might offer it for all as a victim to the Father, and so free all of us...."³⁷ St. Cyril of Alexandria: "*The Lord created me*, just as if he had said: the Father built a body for me *and he created me as a man for the salvation of men*."³⁸ St. Augustine: "That text is pertinent here: *The Lord created me at the beginning of his work*; for the beginning of his work is the Head of the Church, which is Christ become man; through him an example of living is given to us; this is the certain way by which we arrive at God. For we would not be able to return unless by humility,

34. See also *Adv. Arian*. orat.2,53: MG 26,259-262. He considers expressly the motives of the incarnation, and he assigns the first to raise man again regarding immortality and knowledge of the true God in *Orat. De incarnatione Verbi* 3-16: MG 25,104-125. See Cavallera, *Saint Athanase* (Paris 1908) 247-252. For the doctrine of St. Athanasius on the motive of the incarnation, see J.B. Berchem, *L'incarnation dans le plan divin d'après saint Athanase*: EchOr 37 (1934) 316-330. This doctrine is confirmed amply with what the same author has in: *Le rôle du Verbe dans l'oeuvre de la creation et de la sanctification d'après saint Athanase*: Ang 15 (1938) 201-232; 515-558. Spindeler, *Cur Verbum...* 44-55; P.Th. Camelot, O.P., *Athanase d'Alexandrie. Contre les païens et sur l'incarnation du Verbe* (Sources Chrétiennes, 18. Paris 1946) 56-73. On St. Ephrem, see E. Beck, O.S.B., *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem in seinen Hymnen über den Glauben* (Studia Anselmiana, 21, Rome-Vatican City 1949) 54.

35. See also *In Io* 1.5 and 1.9: MG 73,756; 74,273; *Thesaurus assert.* 15: MG 75,293-296. See H. Du Manoir de Juave, S.J., *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1944) 96,103-195. For more, see DTC 3,2508. Spindeler, *op.cit.*, 99-120. On a certain place on which the adversaries rely (MG 75,257) C, see D'Ales, 363. On other places, see I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J.: OrChP 14 (1948) 427.

36. For many more texts from St. Augustine see D'Ales, 351f.; Spindeler, *op.cit.*, 121-135. For other holy Fathers, see DTC 7,1491. On St. Leo, see D. Mozeris, *Doctrina Sancti Leonis Magni de Christo Restitutore et Sacerdote* (Fac. Theol. St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein [Illinois] 1940) 17f. On St. Hilary, see J.J. McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore doctrina sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis* (Fac. Theol. St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein [Illinois] 1947) 58-61. Another view, G. Giamberardini, *S.Hilarius Pictaviensis de praedestinatione Verbi Incarnati*: MiscFranc 49 (1949) 266-300; 514-533.

37. *De decretis Nicaenae Synodi* 14: MG 25,447.

38. *Thesaurus de sancta et consubstant. Trinitate* ass.15: MG 75,266.

since we fell because of pride...."³⁹

The majority of *theologians* by far holds that the motive of the incarnation is redemption.

12. Objections. 1. There are many texts of the holy Fathers in which the *incarnation* appears *independently of sin*. Therefore the argument from the holy Fathers either must be said to favor the Scotists or at least to make our thesis very weak.

I distinguish the antecedent. And these texts either concern Christ inasmuch as he is in the Word or they wish to speak about God in man before the fall, *but after the prevision of the fall*, to anticipate the restoration, or they say that everything is ordained to Christ the Redeemer, or finally they extol the great dignity of Christ against the Arians who said he was inferior to the Father, but without being subordinated to men, *conceded*; and these texts really prove that *the incarnation is independent of sin*, denied.⁴⁰

2. Christ is the *end* to whom men are ordained. But the end is intended before the *means* to that end. Therefore Christ is intended before men, and so *independently of sin*.

I distinguish the major. Christ is the end to whom men are ordained in an expression *following* the decree by which the redemption was decreed, *conceded*; in the expression *preceding* that decree, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor.* The end is intended before the means, if it is an end in every hypothesis, *conceded*; if it is an end only in some hypothesis, *denied*.

13. 3. A more excellent good cannot be ordered to an inferior good. But the Incarnation is a more excellent good than the redemption of the human race. Therefore the incarnation cannot be ordered to the redemption.

I distinguish the major. An excellent good cannot be ordered to an inferior good as to the last end, *conceded*; as to an intermediate end, *I subdistinguish*: if the intermediate end itself is not ordered to that more excellent good, *I bypass*; if it is ordered, *denied*. *I bypass the minor and distinguish the consequence.* The incarnation cannot be ordered to the redemption, as to its last end, *conceded*; as to the intermediate end, *denied*.

I explain. There is a classical example in this matter of the angels who are designated as guardians of men. Scotus himself must admit that the acts of Christ, which certainly have value transcending the value of the whole human race, are ordered to our salvation. In our explanation, however, the redemption itself is ordered to the glory of God and of Christ the man. I bypassed the minor, because a strict comparison

39. *De fine et symbol* 4,6: CSEL 41,9; ML 40,184f. On the exegesis of the Fathers during the 4th and 5th centuries regarding this text, see Spindeler, *Cur Verbum...* 70-78. Spindeler shows at length that the Fathers in those two centuries assign the *redemption* as the *one* motive of the incarnation, *ibid.*, 38-69; 87-162. On the argument from the Fathers against the Scotistic position, see Boëtessé, *Le Sauveur du monde. I. La place du Christ...* 161-301.

40. Many texts of the adversaries from the holy Fathers will be found in DTC 7,1491-1494. The solutions are in the same place, 1500f. and also in Thomassinus, 1.2 c.6.

between the incarnation and the redemption cannot be made, if in fact the redemption *includes* the incarnation.

14. 4. If the incarnation depends on Adam's sin, the incarnation would be an *occasional* good. But it seems to be repugnant that *such a great good* is occasioned. Therefore the incarnation does not depend on sin.

I distinguish the major. The incarnation would be an occasioned good, i.e., *beyond the intention* of the agent, *denied*; it would be an occasioned good, inasmuch as there would not be a incarnation except on the supposed occasion of sin, *conceded*. *I distinguish the major in the same way.*

5. A person willing properly, first wills what is closer to the end. But the soul of Christ is closer to the end. Therefore the soul of Christ is intended first. Scotus argues in this way.⁴¹

I distinguish the major. And this principle demands that God wills *what is best, denied*; it demands that, *among those things that God freely decrees*, he wills first what is closer to the end, *conceded*. I concede the minor. *I also distinguish the consequence.* The soul of Christ is intended first absolutely, *denied*; it is intended first *hypothetically*, i.e., in the hypothesis of the redemption by the incarnate Word, Christ is intended before the creature, *conceded*.⁴²

15. Scholium 1. *On the sins because of which the incarnation was accomplished.* Since in our soteriological treatise the universality of the redemption is treated (see below, th. 26 schol.1 n.659), here we will briefly treat the question whether the incarnation of Christ took place *primarily* to remove *original sin* or actual sin. St. Thomas replies: Christ came for the removal of sin primarily depending on the gravity of the sin: the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. Now actual sin is greater *intensively*; *extensively* original sin is greater because it is the sin of the whole human race. However original sin demanded a greater remedy and aroused greater mercy of God because it was the sin not of one or a few persons, but of the whole human race. Primarily therefore Christ came because of original sin.⁴³

Theologians ask further whether, if there were only original sin without any mortal sins, Christ still would have become incarnate. Quite generally they respond in the affirmative. On the other hand, according to almost all Thomists, in virtue of the present decree of providence the Word would not have become incarnate for actual sins alone.⁴⁴ Suarez distinguishes: if *a few* men actually sinned, Christ most likely would not have come to suffer; but if the major part of men had sinned, perhaps Christ would suffer for them. But these opinions are so uncertain that it is hardly possible for us to determine anything even as probable.⁴⁵

41. See Bisen, *De praedestinatione Christi...*: Ant 12 (1937) 11.

42. For a more lengthy treatment of these objections, see Galtier, n. 582-588.

43. S.Th. III, q. 1, a. 4. See Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place.

44. DTC 7,1506f.

45. Suarez, d.5 s.6 n.7.

Scholium 2. *On the suitable time of the incarnation.* St. Thomas proposes some apt reasons of suitability why the incarnation should not have taken place at the beginning of the world or immediately after sin, and why it should not be deferred to the end of the world.⁴⁶ Christ was incarnated *in the plan* (εἰς οἰκονομίαν) *for the fullness of time* (Eph. 1:10).⁴⁷

46. III, q. 1, a.5f.

47. See Prat, *La théologie...* 2,128f. On the coming of the Messiah already announced in the O.T., see DB 5,2079f; P. Heinisch, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Bonnerbibel, Ergänzungsband 1, Bonn 1940) 303-307. For the teaching about the computation of ancient times from the creation of the world to Christ, see s.1 in Suarez, d.6 a.1.

CHAPTER II

On the manner of the union of the incarnate Word

ARTICLE I

ON THE UNION ITSELF

Thesis 2. The union of the incarnate word was not made in the nature, but after the union the Only-begotten must be acknowledged to be in two natures without being mixed together.

S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 1.

16. Connection. Having answered the question whether it is and why it is, St. Thomas moves on to explain the *essence* itself of the incarnation, inasmuch as it is the *union* of the Word with human nature. First he considers the union *in itself* (q. 2), then the *two natures that are united* (q. 3-6). But union says a relation to a term produced by a unifying action and it seems to take its nature from this term. Therefore St. Thomas first considers in the six prior articles of question 2 the *integral terminus* produced by the unifying action and he shows that such a terminus is not one nature but one person.

17. Definition of terms. *Nature* or φύσις. Since *person* is easily grasped as what exists or acts, that is, the subject that possesses parts, powers and in general principles of acting, *nature* is grasped as the complex of powers, qualities and substances *by which* one can act or is placed in a certain species. Thus I (a person) have hands, a body, a soul (nature). I (a person) am a man (humanity, *nature*), not an angel.¹ This popular meaning agrees with the dogmatic meaning with which the word “nature” was understood at the Council of Chalcedon, namely, a concrete essence, after an abstraction is made from the subject or person in which this nature subsists.²

1. See Galtier, n. 83.

2. See M. Jugie, *Eutychès et Eutichianisme*: DTC 5,1596. On the relations between φύσις, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις in the Christological questioning among the Fathers, see A. Michel, *Hypostase*: DTC 7,385-407. On this question in the Alexandrian school (325-373), see E. Weigl, *Untersuchungen zur Christologie des heiligen Athanasius* (Forschungen zur Christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte, 12, 4, Paderborn 1914) 75-86. On the term „nature“ in the Christological teaching of Saint Ephraem, see Beck, *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem...* 56ff. On a more general treatment of this term, see R. Paniker, *El concepto de naturaleza. Análisis histórico y metafísico de un concepto* (Madrid 1951); however on this work see J. Iturriz, S.J., in *RazFe* 144 (1951) 414-417; J. Echarri, S.J., in *Pens* 8 (1952) 114-117.

In two natures, i.e., divine and human.

Without being mixed together. This expression is added because of the errors soon to be explained; they admitted a certain “mixing” of the natures in the incarnate Word.

18. Adversaries. *Real Monophysitism*³ holds that the incarnate Word is really *from* two natures, divine and human, but *not in* two natures. The Monophysites hold the personal unity of Christ, but they so exaggerate this unity that they also demand unity *in nature*. Monophysitism is also called *Eutychianism*. Eutyches (ca. 378-454) was the archimandrite of many monks in Constantinople. There is a major dispute over the *personal doctrine* of this man, although it cannot be denied that he truly represents the tendency that is called Monophysitism.⁴

19. There are many kinds of Monophysitism⁵ and all or almost all are prior to Eutyches. a) The humanity in Christ is said to be *absorbed* by the divinity; that was the source of “theopaschism” or the error of those who attributed suffering to the divine nature.

b) On the opposite side the divinity is said to *disappear* in the humanity, so that the Word ceases to be God so that he may become man. The followers of this old error are the ones who recently are holding the so-called “kenosis” or the exaggerated “emptying” of the Word (see Phil. 2:7).⁶

c) A *real* metamorphosis of the Word into flesh so that the Word did not take flesh from the Virgin, but the divine essence itself was made flesh, just as liquid water can be changed into ice. Therefore only the divine nature remains.

d) An *apparent* metamorphosis of the Word into flesh. For the Word did not really become flesh, as in c), but apparently. Therefore those heretics are called “phantasiasts”; actually they are docetists.

e) But the classical form of Monophysitism is different, namely, the divinity and humanity are *mixed together* to make a third something, some kind of theandric composite, which is neither properly God nor properly man.

f) Finally, a more subtle form of Monophysitism asserts that the Word and the hu-

3. On *verbal* Monophysitism, whether Catholic or schismatic, but also sometimes heterodox, see DTC 5,1597-1601; 10,2216-2250. Worthy of serious consideration is what is offered by the history of Monophysitism after the Council of Chalcedon such as that presented by J. Lebon, *La christologie du monophysisme syrien: Das Konzil von Chalkedon* 1,425-580.

4. See DTC 5,1597-1595; J.F. Rivera, *San León Magno y la herejía de Eutiques desde el sínodo de Constantinopla hasta la muerte de Teodosio II*: RevEspT 9 (1949) 36-41; P.Th. Camelot, O.P., *De Nestorius à Eutychès (Das Konzil von Chalkedon, A. Grillmeier, S.J.-H. Bacht, S.J., Würzburg 1951-1954)* 1,234-242; Xiberta, 1,124-128.

5. See on this whole question, DTC 5,1601-1609. On the philosophical roots of Monophysitism, see E. Ivánka, *Hellenisches und Christliches im Frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben* (Vienna 1948) 68-72, 95-98.

6. See Encycl. “*Sempiternus Rex*”: AAS 41 (1951) 637f. D’Ales, 170-172; P. Henry, *Kénose*: DBS 5,7-162. For a full treatment, see J. Rivière, *Le sacrifice du Père dans la redemption d’après saint Ambrose*: RevScRel 19 (1939) 1-23.

manity *are united* without mixing or confusion as a complete essence or nature. Neither a complete divinity nor a complete humanity remain. In this way some Arianists and Apollinarists explain the unity of the Word with human nature. Also ubiquitous Protestants, who attribute a divine property to the human nature, that is, to be everywhere,⁷ propose, at least logically a true Monophysitism.

20. Doctrine of the Church. In addition to many ancient documents,⁸ there is the dogmatic letter of St. Leo I the Great to Flavius (D 293)⁹ and especially the *Council of Chalcedon*: “We confess that one and the same Lord Jesus Christ... must be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion or change, without division or separation. The distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved” (D 302).¹⁰ The doctrine of this Council is explained in detail by Pius XII in the encyclical “*Sempiternus Rex*.”¹¹

Theological note. *Defined divine and catholic faith* (D 302).

21. Proof from Holy Scripture. Since in the treatise on the Holy Trinity the *divinity* of Jesus Christ is proved from Holy Scripture, and since it is very clear from the treatise on the One God that the divine nature cannot undergo *any change*, we have to show now that in the incarnate Word *a true human nature remained*. But this is proved by the whole life of Jesus Christ from the moment of his conception to his death, burial, resurrection and those things that followed in order to confirm the truth of the resurrection. There is more about this below in th. 7, n. 118-122. Now we will present a few other points.

1) Christ is subjected to various sufferings a) of his body and b) of his soul. a) John 4:6: *So Jesus, WEARIED as he was with his journey, sat down beside the well*; Matt. 8:4: *There arose a great storm on the sea... but he*

7. On ubiquitousness, see D’Ales, 155f.169.

8. See Index.

9. See Ph. Kuhn, *Die Christologie Leos I* (Würzburg 1894); C. Silva-Tarouca, S.J., *S. Leonis Magni epistulae contra Eutychis haeresim* (Texts and Documents, 15, Rome 1934); Rivera, *San León Magno y la herejía de Eutiques...*: RevEspT 9 (1949) 44-50.57f.; H. Rahner, S.J., *Leo der Grosse, der Papst des Konzils* (*Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Grillmeier-Bacht) 1,323-339; P. Galtier, S.J., *Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie et saint Léon le Grand à Chalcedoine* (*op. cit.*) 1,345-387.

10. On the Council of Chalcedon, see J. Bois, *Chalcedoine*: DTC 2,2190-2208; G. Bardy, *Le “brigandage d’Ephèse” et le Concile de Chalcedoine* in *Histoire de l’Eglise...* under the direction of A. Fliche and V. Martin, t.4 (Paris 1937) c.9. p. 211-240. On the theological and terminological preparation of the Council, see A. Grillmeier, S.J., *Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon: Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Grillmeier-Bacht, 1,5-202. On the creed itself of the Council, see I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., *Das Symbol von Chalkedon. Sein Text, sein Werden, seine dogmatische Bedeutung* (*op. cit.*) 1,389-418. On the whole Council, see the work referred to here, A. Grillmeier, S.J.-H. Bacht, S.J., *Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Würzburg 1951-1954), which consists of three volumes.

11. AAS 43 (1954) 625-640.

was ASLEEP; b) John 11:33: *When Jesus saw her weeping...he was deeply moved in spirit and TROUBLED*. See also John 11:38; 12:27; Matt.26:37f. Matt. 8:10: *When Jesus heard him, he MARVELED*; John 11:35: *And Jesus WEPT*. See Luke 19:41.

22. 2) *Acts of virtue* are predicated of Christ that can be attributed only to a man. Heb. 5:8: *Although he was a Son, he LEARNED OBEDIENCE through what he suffered*. In this text it is not only asserted that Christ was obedient (see Phil 2:8), but that he learned, i.e., by experiential knowledge, how difficult it is to obey.¹² Moreover, this difficult obedience *supposes a superior*, whom the Word as such cannot have. Heb. 4:15: *For we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weakness, BUT ONE WHO IN EVERY RESPECT HAS BEEN TEMPTED AS WE ARE, YET WITHOUT SINNING*. Acts of virtue that are *truly human* are asserted, because Christ is said to be *tempted* like us (although without seeds of sin: see below, th. 15 schol. 1 n. 356; th. 17 schol. 1 n. 442-447), and nevertheless he never gave in to temptation.¹³

23. Proof from tradition. As witnesses of the tradition it is sufficient to mention the holy Fathers *before* the Council of Chalcedon.

1) Jesus Christ, true God *and true man*. Already St. Ignatius of Antioch: “There is one Doctor active in both body and soul, begotten and yet unbegotten, God in man, true life in death, son of Mary and Son of God, first able to suffer and then unable to suffer, Jesus Christ, our Lord” (R 39).¹⁴ Origen: “Jesus, who died, is a man... the Word who is God did not die...” (R 482). St. Ephraem: “The one who from eternity is equal to the Father became an infant in the womb of Mary... in the womb of his mother he became man and he remains perfect God” (R 711).

2) *No mixing or conversion*. Tertullian: “For if the Word from the transfiguration and change of the substance became flesh, now there will be one substance of Jesus from two, from flesh and spirit, a certain mixture, like electrum or a mixed metal form gold and silver... We see a twofold status, not confused, but joined together, in one person, Jesus, God and man...”(R379).¹⁵ St. Epiphanius: “...who, not changed as to his nature,

12. See J. Bonsirven, S.J., *Saint Paul, Epître aux Hébreux* (Verbum Salutis, 12, Paris 1943) at this place; Spicq, *op.cit.*, 92ff.

13. See Bonsirven, *op.cit.*, at this place; Spicq, *op.cit.*, 92ff.

14. See M. Racel, *Die Christologie des heiligen Ignatius von Antiochien* (Freiburger Theologische Studien, 14, Freiburg i.Br. 1914) 284-289. For another reading of this cited text and the doctrine of St. Ignatius, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,30f.

15. Tertullian is called a leader in the doctrine of the two natures in Christ among the Western Fathers. See B.Altaner, *Patrologie* (Freiburg i.Br. 1950) § 30 p.132.

assumed humanity with the divinity... The Word itself became flesh, not ceasing to be God, not changing the divinity into humanity..." (R 1086). St. John Chrysostom: "For by a union and conjoining God the Word and the flesh are one, not by any confusion or obliteration of substances, but by a certain union ineffable, and past understanding" (R 1160).¹⁶

24. 3) *The two natures are expressly said to remain after the union.* St. Melito of Sardis: "For since the same God is at the same time a perfect man, he made known to us his two natures" (R 189). Origen: "In the first place, we must note that the nature of the deity which is in Christ in respect of his being the only begotten Son of God is one thing, and that human nature which he assumed in these last times for the purpose of the dispensation [of grace] is another" (R 453). St. Ephraem: "For the inferior nature did not exist alone nor was the higher nature alone... one sublime and the other humble..." (R 705).¹⁷ St. Amphilocus of Iconia: "Discern for me the natures one after the other of God and of man. For neither being separated from God was he made man, nor going forth from man was he made God. For I say he is both God and man" (R 1080).

25. Theological reasoning. It could happen in three ways that the two natures would come together as one: firstly, by way of *joining together or of order*; while the natures remain in themselves integral and perfect, but in such a way that they are so ordered or joined together that they compose one thing. Secondly, *by transformation* either of one nature into the other or of both into something distinct from both of them. Thirdly, by the *composition* of one perfect nature *from two imperfect ones*. But the divine and human natures in Christ are joined together *in none of these three ways*. Therefore in Christ there is no joining together of two natures into one new nature.

I prove the minor. The first way would produce in Christ a mere *accidental* union; but in the next thesis, n. 44f., it is proved that the union of the incarnate Word is substantial. The third way is easily rejected, because neither from the part of the divine nature, as is clear, nor from the part of the human nature, which is a complete substance, is there any *imperfection*. The second way is rejected especially from the *immutability of the divine nature*, in virtue of which neither the divine nature can be changed into

16. On St. Eiphanius, see E. Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius bis zum Ausbruch des Nestorianischen Streites* (Münchener Studien zur historischen Theologie, 4, Munich 1925) 43-47. On St. John Chrysostom, *ibid.*, 49f.

17. See Beck, *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem...* 57f. There are many more testimonies of the holy Fathers in D'Ales, 160f.165f.

another nor another into it, especially since in Christ the human nature remains integral.¹⁸

26. Objections. 1. There are many texts of the holy Fathers before the *Council of Chalcedon* in which they speak about “mixing together of God and man.” But this way of speaking smacks of Monophysitism. Therefore the argument from the Fathers is seriously defective.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. This way of speaking during the time of the Monophysite controversy was not suitable, *conceded*; but *before* the rise of this controversy *and in the mind of the Fathers, denied*.¹⁹

2. At least some Fathers, especially St. Cyril of Alexandria, seem to favor Monophysitism. But the authority of St. Cyril is very great. Therefore the witness of the Fathers is weakened.

I deny the major. The words of St. Cyril *de facto* were interpreted by the Monophysites in favor of this heresy, *conceded*; in the mind of St. Cyril they had this meaning, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequence.*

I explain. The statement of St. Cyril created a great difficulty: Μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη. One nature incarnated of the Word of God.²⁰ However, St. Cyril “used this formula as handed on by St. Athanasius, but with the proper understanding, since he transferred the word “nature” in order to signify the person itself.”²¹ The correct meaning is clear from the explicit teaching of St. Cyril. The *Council of Constantinople II* (D 429-430) presented in an authentic way the Catholic interpretation of this sentence.²²

27. Scholium. “*One of the Trinity suffered.*” This formula of the 5th and 6th centuries *historically* is connected with Monophysitism. Those who invented it seem to have extolled the divine nature of Christ to such an extent that the human nature almost disappeared and the sufferings were attributed to the divinity. Nevertheless among those who *attacked* it, there were not lacking those who seemed to favor Nestorianism, as if

18. See III, q. 2, a.1 c. Suarez, Comment. at this place. I. Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas v. Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenväter* (Forschungen zur Christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte, Ehrhard-Kirsch, Paderborn 1931, 17, 3-40 149-155.

19. See D'Ales, 161f.

20. See *De recta fide ad reginas*, 9: MG 76,1212 A. See many other places in D'Ales, 164f.

21. Encyclical, “*Sempiternus Rex*”: AAS 43 (1951) 636.

22. On this difficulty in Cyril, see D'Ales, 163-165; Galtier, n.113-119; Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille...*, 126.131f.505f.; Jvan den Dries, *The Formula of Saint Cyril of Alexandria* Μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη. (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana 1939). See also below, th. 17 notes 19 and 28. On St. Ephraem's use of the same formula, see Beck, *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem...* 56f.; A. Grillmeier, S.J.: Schol 26 (1951) 302. On the historical origin of this formula, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,108-111. On the same formula in St. Cyril, see *ibid.*, 1,169-182; Galtier, *Saint Cyrille... et saint Léon... à Chalcédoine* 1,345-387; Id., *L' "Unio secundum Hypostasim" chez saint Cyrille...*: Greg 33 (1952) 351-398. On difficulties from St. Hilary of Poitiers and St. Gregory of Nyssa see D'Ales, 162f. For St. Hilary, see also below th.15 note 35; th.6 note 12. For authors of the 5th and 6th centuries, see J. Tixeront, *Des Concepts de "nature" et de "personne" dans les Pères et les écrivains ecclésiastiques des I^{er} et VI^e siècle*: RevHist.LittRel 8 (1903) 582-592.

the Christ who suffered were not God. The Supreme Pontiff Hormisdas did not simply condemn the formula, but he disapproved of it as dangerous and as superfluous after the Council of Chalcedon. After a few years John II explained and proposed it in the correct meaning (D 401; see D 502).²³

23. See E. Amann, *Hormisdas*: DTC 7,171-175; W. Haacke, *Die Glaubensformel des Papstes Hormisdas im Acacianischen Schisma* (Analecta Gregoriana, 20 Rome 1939) 117-120; Lebon, *La christologie du monophysisme syrien: Das Konzil von Chalcedon* 1,571-575.

Thesis 3. The union of the incarnate Word was made in the person, so that after the union the Only-begotten Son of God is at the same time a true man.

S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 2; Galtier, th.6.

28. Definition of terms. *Person* or πρόσωπον or ὑπόστασις.¹ Person in the obvious sense is understood as a rational individual fully distinct from another individual. In this sense all know how to count *how many persons* are in some place. The person is easily grasped as something distinct from those things that are *of that person* and still they are not *that person*. Peter (a person) is said to have an intellect, hands, etc., this intellect, these hands surely belong to Peter but they are not Peter. “*Who*” is used in order to designate a person, but for the nature “*what*.” Person is said to be the principle *that* is or acts, while the nature is called the principle *by which* someone is or acts.²

29. The union was made in the person. Two natures, divine and human, that from the preceding thesis exist without confusion in Christ, belong to one Christ, to one person. The subject who possesses a divine nature and a human nature is one, namely, Christ. After the union, therefore, there is certainly in Christ *something and something*, but Christ is not *one and another* (see also below, th.16 schol.1 n.406). Consequently just as human nature is predicated truly of Peter and the angelic nature of Michael, so whatever pertains to his human nature and whatever pertains to his divine nature must be predicated truly of the one Christ. In a few words, the total terminus that is had by the union is *one person*.

So that after the union the Only-begotten Son of God is at the same time a true man. These words are added in order to reject more explicitly the

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1. The word πρόσωπον to designate what we now call a “person” is older than the word ὑπόστασις. Πρόσωπον is used in this sense in Holy Scripture. See D’Ales, 106f.195f.; DTC 7,367f. On the historical use of these words in tradition up to the end of the patristic age, see DTC 7,369-407. On the idea of person in the ancient Greek world, see E. des Places, S.J., *En marge du “Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament”*: *Conscience et personne dans l’antiquité grecque*: *Bibl* 30 (1949) 501-509; M. Nédoncelle, *Prosopon et persona dans l’antiquité classique*: *RevScRel* 22 (1948) 277-299. On this notion in the West up to Boethius, see E. Gutwenger, S.J., *Zur Ontologie der hypostatischen Union*: *ZkathTh* 76 (1954) 386-393. On the word ὑπόστασις, see M. Richard, *L’introduction du mot “hypostase”*...: *MéIscRel* 2 (1945) 5-32, 243-270; Galtier, *L’Unio secundum Hypostasim*...: *Greg* 33 (1952) 357-379; H. Dörrie, ‘Υπόστασις, *Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte*: *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* 1955, 35-92; E. Hamerschmidt, *Die Begriffsentwicklung in der altkirchlichen Theologie zwischen dem ersten allgemeinen Konzil von Nizäa (325) und dem zweiten allgemeinen Konzil von Konstantinopel (381)*: *ThRev* 51 (1955) 145-154. On ὑποστάναι which was introduced into theological discourse for the first time in the 3rd century, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,41ff.
 2. See Galtier, 82f.

error of Nestorius that we will consider next. For that “one” or “the same” that is had after the union and to whom divinity and humanity pertain, is not just the complex being that is called Christ, but it is really the eternal *Son of God* who, remaining what he was, became a true man.³

30. Adversaries. Diodorus of Tarsus (+ 392) and Theodore of Mopsuestia (+ 428), both from the school of Antioch, began to *divide* Christ.⁴ However the author of the heresy from whom it took its name was Nestorius (+ 451), the bishop of Constantinople who was also from the school of Antioch. Although he was not a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, he was certainly influenced by him.⁵

The teaching of Nestorius, about which recently there has been a lively dispute,⁶ in its objective presentation seems to be this.⁷ According to Nestorius, Mary was not θεοτόκος, the Mother of God,⁸ but θεοδόχος, the receiver of God, or better χριστοτόκος, the Mother of Christ. Also according to Nestorius it cannot be said that “God suffered.”⁹ Nestorius strongly insists on the fact that in Christ there are two natures but one πρόσωπον or

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3. See Galtier, n. 84-90; Id., *L'unité du Christ, Etre... Personne... Conscience* (Paris 1939) 29; Id., *Unité ontologique et Unité psychologique dans le Christ: BullLittEcll* 42 (1941) 162-171. For a more general treatment, see A. Sartori, *Il concetto di ipostasi e l'enois dogmatica ai concilii de Efeso e di Calcedonia* (Turin-Rome 1927).
 4. See D'Ales, 102f; Grillmeier expresses exactly various doctrinal aspects, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalcedon* 1, 135-155. The Christological teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia that is contained in his recently discovered “Catechesis,” is explained by E. Amann, *Théodore de Mopsueste: DTC* 15, 255-266, 277f; R. Devresse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* (Studi e Testi, 141, Vatican City 1949); but regarding this work, see I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J.: *OrChP* 15 (1949) 440-443 et Fr. A. Sullivan, S.J., *Some Reactions to Devresse's New Study of Theodore of Mopsuestia: ThSt* 12 (1951) 179-207; for another view, J.L. McKenzie, S.J., *The Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia on John 1, 46-51: ThSt* 14 (1953) 73-84. R. Tonneau, O.P., in collaboration with R. Devresse, *Les homélies catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste* (Studi e Testi, 145, Vatican City 1949); Camelot, *De Nestorius à Eutychès* 1, 215-219; K. McNamara, *Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy: IrishThQuart* 19 (1952) 254-278. On Leporius, a monk in France, who before Nestorius went down the same road of error in good faith, see D'Ales, 104; Galtier, *L'unité...* 31-36. On ancient Gnosticism already dividing Christ, see briefly 8, 1249.
 5. See E. Amann, *Nestorius: DTC* 11, 90f. This article is too much in favor of Nestorius. Some points along this line are justly made by M. Quera, S.J., *Un ebós d'história del Concili d'Efès: AnalSacraTarrac* 7 (1931) 3-55. Recently the same Amann wrote: *L'affaire Nestorius vue de Rome: RevScRel* 23 (1949) 5-37, 207-244; 24 (1950) 28-52, 235-265; prevented by death, the author was not able to complete this writing; de facto it is treated quite differently: see L. Ciccone, C.M., “*L'affaire Nestorius vue de Rome*” di Mons. E. Amann: *DivThom* (Pi) 28 (1951) 33-50. On the philosophical origins of Nestorianism, see Ivánka, *Hellenisches...* 68-94.
 6. See Galtier, n. 109-125; Id., *L'unité...* 16-23; Xiberta, 2, 679-684.
 7. For on the *merely subjective* meaning of the author the Church does not intend to make a judgment.
 8. Sometimes however he accepted the use of this word, but not without qualifications. See *DTC* 11, 143-146; Amann, *L'affaire Nestorius...: RevScRel* 24 (1950) 243. H.M. Diepen, O.S.B., *Les douze Anathématismes au Concile d'Ephèse et jusqu'en 519: RevThom* 55 (1955) 322. On this whole question, see Nilus A.S.B., O.C.D., *De Maternitate divina B. Mariae semper Virginis Nestorii Constantinopolitani et Cyrille Alexandrini sententia* (Rome 1944).
 9. See *DTC* 11, 92f., 141-143.

one person.¹⁰ The whole difficulty is in understanding what this *πρόσωπον* is—a word Nestorius often used but never explained.¹¹ According to him, each nature has its own *πρόσωπον*; from the union of both *πρόσωπον* there arises a third certain *πρόσωπον*, that is, the *πρόσωπον* of union.¹²

31. The authors agree that Nestorius himself did not know clearly what the meaning is of *πρόσωπον*.¹³ The union existing between the divine nature and the human nature is spoken of by Nestorius either like a *temple* with the divinity that dwells in it or a *voluntary* union, *κατ' εὐδοκίαν*, but not a *physical* union, *κατά φύσιν*, nor is it a *hypostatic* union, *καθ' ὑπόστασιν*.¹⁴

Even though there are many obscure points in the teaching of Nestorius, still the person, *πρόσωπον*, which as the consequence of the union he admits is unique in Christ, he clearly denies that it is the *Word itself of God*.¹⁵ Therefore Nestorius, contrary to the teaching of tradition denied that the eternal Son of God is the *same one* that deigned to be born of the Virgin Mary.¹⁶

32. The attacks of the Monophysites against the Council of Chalcedon as if this Council indulged in Nestorianism gave place to the famous controversy about The Three Chapters, *De tribus capitulis* (that is, about Theodore of Mopsuestia, about the writings of Theodoret of Cyrus, about the letter of Ibae of Edessa to the Persian bishop Marin). The *Council of Constantinople II* (D 432-438) dealt with this matter.¹⁷

A. Günther (1783-1863) posits only a *dynamic and moral* union of the natures in Christ. For a person, according to Günther, is constituted by

10. See DTC 11,142-149, 152.

11. Why it is almost impossible in this matter to obtain more clarity, see in DTC 11,151.

12. There is a copious bibliography in Galtier, *L'unité...* 20, note 1.

13. See Galtier, *L'unité...* 21f. Galtier himself offers this explanation: *πρόσωπον* consists in the communication of divine activity and human activity, in a certain neo-Platonic sense taken from the union "intelligible things": *ibid.*, 20 note 2. Amann has a different view (DTC 11,152f.), offering rather a psychological explanation.

14. See DTC 11,145,149-151. The sense in which these expressions are to be understood is pointed out in the same place.

15. See Galtier, n.123, p. 98.

16. See Galtier, *L'unité...* 70; Camelot, *De Nestorius à Eutichès* 1,219-229; Xiberta, 1, 112-117. For a brief exposition of the teaching of Nestorius made by the Roman Pontiff himself, see the encyclical of Pius XI "Lux veritatis": AAS 23 (1931) 496-499, 503-505.

17. See Galtier, n.73. More amply, J. Bois, *Constantinople (II^e Concile de)*: DTC 3,1231-1289. E. Amann, *Trois-Chapitres (Affaire des)*: DTC 15,1868-1924: but certain points are not to be accepted too easily; this article seems to neglect that the Roman Pontiff even with regard to *dogmatic facts* is infallible. Ch. Moeller, *Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VI^e siècle: Das Konzil von Chalkedon 1,637-720*; H.M. Diepen, O.S.B., *Les Trois Chapitres au Concile de Chalcédoine* (Oousterhout 1953) (on this work see with regard to our question, E.M. Llopart, O.S.B., *Una tesis de Dom Diepen...*: RevEspT 14 [1954] 72-75). In particular on Theodoret. See J. Montalverne, *Theodoretii Cyrensis doctrina antiquior de Verbo "inhumanato" a circiter 423-435*: (Studia Antoniana, 1, Rome 1948); Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,183-191; K. McNamara, *Theodoret of Cyrus and the Unity of Person in Christ*: IrishThQuart 22 (1955) 313-328.

consciousness of himself; therefore, because Christ has a twofold consciousness, divine and human, in him there are two physical persons that are joined together in a non-numerical-real unity, but a dynamic-formal unity.¹⁸

Rosmini (1797-1855) proposed a union of the natures not the way the Councils defined it, but an *accidental and moral* unity.¹⁹ This opinion was condemned by Leo XIII (D 3227).

33. Doctrine of the Church. It is present *in the creeds themselves*, inasmuch as he about whom it is said that he is the Only-begotten Son of God, it is also said that *he was born and suffered*. Thus the *Apostles' Creed*: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty and in Jesus Christ, his Only-begotten Son, our Lord, who *was born* of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, *was crucified... and was buried*" (D 11; see D 30).²⁰ The *Council of Nicaea*: "We believe... in one Lord Jesus Christ, *the Son of God, the only begotten* born of the Father, *God from God... who for us men and for our salvation came down, and became incarnate and was made man and suffered.*" It is even clearer in the Greek (D 125-126). Similarly in other creeds (D 44-45, 72, 74, 76, 150, 533-540).²¹

34. The Council of Ephesus: "And though the natures which are brought together into a true unity are distinct, from both there results *one* Christ and one *Son...* Thus [the holy Fathers] have unhesitatingly called the holy Virgin "Mother of God" (θεοτόκος)" (D 250). "If anyone does not confess that the Emmanuel is truly God and, therefore, that the holy Virgin is the Mother of God (θεοτόκος) (since she begot according to the flesh the Word

18. See A. Michel, *Hypostatique (union)*: DTC 7,554-556. Günther explains his doctrine in the work *Vorschule zur spekulativen Theologie des positiven Christentums* (Vienna 1829) 2. In a compendium this doctrine is summarized by J. Kleutgen, S.J., *Die Theologie der Vorzeit* (Münster 1870) 3,60-71. On the relations between the doctrines of Günther and Nestorius, see *ibid.*, 136-152. The doctrine of Günther was condemned: see D 2826. See also L. Orbán, *Theologia Güntheriana et Concilium Vaticanum* (Analecta Gregoriana, 50 Rome 1949) 2,60-110.

19. See A. Michel, *Rosmini*: DTC 13,2942; 7,557f. On some recent studies *explaining* the doctrines of Rosmini in a fully orthodox way, see D. Morando, *Rosmini* (Brescia 1945).

20. On the contemporary state of the investigation into the origin of the Apostles' Creed, see J. de Ghellinck, S.J., *Les origines du symbole des Apôtres après cinq siècles de recherches historiques*: NouvRevth 67 (1945) (786) 178-(809) 201. The same author treats the whole subject more fully in his excellent work: *Patristique et moyen âge. Etudes d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale*. Tome I. *Les recherches sur les origines du symbole des apôtres*² (Museum Lessianum, Section histor. a.6, Brussels-Paris 1949). J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (London 1950); P.Th. Camelot, O.P., *Les recentes recherches sur le symbole des Apôtres et leur portée théologique*: RechScRel 39 (1951-1952) (Mélanges Jules Lebreton, 1) 323-337.

21. On a certain difficulty in the creed of the Council of Toledo I (d 20, 26), see J.A. de Aldama, S.J., *El Simbolo Toledano I* (Analecta Gregoriana, 7 Rome 1934) 42, note. On St. Caecelstine I, condemning the doctrine of Nestorius, see Galtier, *L'unité...* 47-52. See J. de Pérez, *La Cristologia en los Simbolos Toledanos IV, VI y XI* (Rome 1939) 128-130.

of God made flesh), *anathema sit*." (D 252). "If anyone does not confess that *the Word and God suffered in the flesh*, and that *he tasted death in the flesh and became the first born from the dead* [Col. 1:18], being Life and giver of life as God, *anathema sit*" (D 263).²²

Confirmation of this doctrine is given in the documents with which it was determined against the Monophysites that the oneness of the person does not produce one nature and the duality of natures does not produce a duality of persons. Thus especially the *Councils of Chalcedon* (D 301-303) and *Constantinople II* (D 421-438).²³

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 250, 252, 263).²⁴

35. Proof from Holy Scripture. In order to refute directly the error of Nestorius, it is not sufficient to show that attributes both of the divine nature and of the human nature are predicated of one and the same *Christ*, for Nestorius also admitted this and therefore he called Mary *χριστοτόκος*, the Mother of Christ²⁵; but it must be shown how A. it is said *about the Son of God* that he was *born, suffered*, and B. *about the man Jesus* that he is *God*; also a direct proof against Nestorius is had if C. *Christ* is called

22. See M. Jugie, *Ephèse (Concile d')*: DTC 5,137-163; G. Bardy, *Les débuts du nestorianisme (Histoire de l'Eglise, Fliche and Martin, Paris 1937, t.4 c.7) 163-196*. Many things both about the history and the doctrine of this Council are treated by M. Quera, S.J., F. Segarra, S.J., I. Puig de la Bellacasa, S.J., J.M. Bover, S.J. in *AnalSacraTarrac 7* (1931). For some historical points, see G. Neyron, *Saint Cyrille et le Concile d'Ephèse (Kyrilliana, Seminarium Franciscale Orientale Ghizae Aegypti, Cairo 1947) 37-50*; Galtier, *L'unité...* 58-72; H. du Manoir, S.J., *Le Symbole de Nicée au Concile d'Ephèse*: Greg 12 (1931) 104-137. How from the words alone *πρόσωπο, ὑποστάσει, καθ' ὑπόστασιν, persona*, it is not possible to make an argument, but one must pay attention to the whole tenor of the controversy, see Galtier, n.113; Id., *L'unité...* 27-29. For an explanation of the anathemas of St. Cyril see Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille...* 491-510. On the formula "unio secundum hypostasim" see Galtier, n.91; Id., *L'"Unio secundum Hypostasim"...*: Greg 33 (1952) 351-398.

23. Many documents can be consulted in Galtier¹ (Paris 1926) n.80. On the agreement of the doctrine between the Council of Ephesus and St. Leo I and the Council of Chalcedon, see Galtier, *L'unité...* 72-88. In particular, on the formula of the Council of Chalcedon, see Richard, *L'introduction...*: MéIScRel 2 (1945) 265-270; Sartori, *Il concetto di ipostasi...* 131-139.

24. The Second Letter of St. Cyril to Nestorius (D 250; TCF 604-605) was read and approved during the first session of the Council of Ephesus. See ACO t.1 v.1 part 2,13-31; see *ibid.*, part 1,25; Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,161-164. But the anathemas of St. Cyril (D 252-263), although they do not seem to be *definitions of the Council of Ephesus*, nevertheless it can rightly be said that they are equivalently such because of their *subsequent confirmation by a solemn definition of the Church*. See A. Deneffe, S.J., *Der dogmatische Wert der Anathematismen Cyrills*: Schol 8 (1933) 64-88, 203-216. See P. Galtier, *Les Anathématismes de S. Cyrille et le concile de Chalcédoine*: RechScRel 23 (1933) 45-57; Diepen, *Les douze Anathématismes...*: RevThom 55 (1955) 300-338.

25. See above, n. 30. In our day there are not lacking defenders of Nestorius who think that the traditional formula is "*Christ incarnate*" (!) and not "*the Word incarnate*." See Galtier, *L'unité...* 51, note 2. An indirect argument from Holy Scripture could be made also in the same way; but in this case an argumentative deduction necessarily must be added. See about this, Galtier, n. 92f.

simply *God*; for then there is no reason for saying that *Christ* was born or suffered and that *God* was not born or suffered.²⁶

A. 1) John 1:1-14: *In the beginning was the Word (ὁ Λόγος), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God... and the WORD (ὁ Λόγος) became FLESH and DWELT among us, full of grace and truth; WE HAVE BEHELD his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father. Therefore the Word himself became man, lived among men, and was seen.*²⁷

2) Gal. 4:4: *But when the time had fully come, God sent forth HIS SON, BORN OF WOMAN, born under the law. A new way of being is predicated of the Son of God, namely, that he assumed a human nature from a woman.*²⁸ See also Acts 3:15; 20:28; 1 Cor. 2:8; 1 John 1:1-3.

36. B. 1) Rom. 9:5: *To them [Israelites] belong the patriarchs, and of their race, ACCORDING TO THE FLESH, IS THE CHRIST, WHO IS GOD OVER ALL, BLESSED FOREVER. AMEN.* The Jesus who was born of the Israelite race, the Christ about whose *human nature* (κατά σάρκα) St. Paul had spoken, is simply said to be *God* blessed forever.²⁹

2) John 3:13: *No one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man.* The man Jesus is said to have descended from heaven, because the *Word* was made man ((John 1:14). The force of this text would be still greater, if the reading of the Latin Vulgate, *who is in heaven*, were admitted.³⁰ See also Phil 2:9-11.³¹

37. C. 1) Phil. 2:6-8: *Have this mind among yourselves, which was in CHRIST JESUS, who, though he was IN THE FORM OF GOD, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped. Christ Jesus is said to be equal to God, that is, he is God.*³²

2) Tit. 2:13: *awaiting our blessed hope, the appearing of the glory of our GREAT GOD and Savior JESUS CHRIST. Christ here is called great God.*³³

26. In what concrete form the doctrine about Christ is presented in Holy Scripture you will find in E. Masure, *Aux Origines du Dogme Chrétien: Le mystère de l'Incarnation: RevApol* 39 (1924) 129-151, 203-222, 257-273, 321-339.

27. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,68ff.; M.-J. Lagange, O.P., *Evangile selon Saint Jean*¹ (Etudes Bibliques, Paris 1927) at this place.

28. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 67f.

29. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 61ff.; J. Huby, S.J., *Saint Paul. Epître aux Romains*¹¹ (Verbum Salutis, 10, Paris 1940) 326-329.

30. See Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Jean* at this place. Also recently Bover accepted this reading (J.M. Bover, S.J., *Novi Testamenti Biblia graeca et latina*², Matriti 1950).

31. See J.M. Bover, S.J., *Las estolas de San Pablo*² (Barcelona 1950) at this place.

32. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 58-61.

33. See Bover, *Las epistolas...* at this place; Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 63ff.

3) 1 John 2:22: *Who is the liar but he who denies that Jesus is the CHRIST? This is the antichrist, he who denies the Father and the SON.* From the parallelism it is clear that *Christ* is the *Son*.³⁴

38. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers transmit the tradition in many ways. For the sake of brevity, we will offer a few examples, which are presented in almost the same order as the testimonies of Holy Scripture.

1) *God* is said to have *suffered, to have been crucified and buried*. Thus St. Ignatius of Antioch: “We have been recalled to life by the *blood* of God.” “Allow me to be an imitator of *the passion of my God*.”³⁵ Tertullian: “Now answer me, you slayer of truth. Was not *God* truly *crucified*? Was he not truly dead and truly crucified? Was he not truly resurrected, namely, one who was truly dead?” (R 353).³⁶ St. Ephraem: “It is not so, as they say today, that only the body was nailed to the cross. But, as I believe, the *God-man was crucified*. He cried out with a loud voice and *died*, and he had his side pierced by a lance; he himself is the hidden *God*” (R 709). St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Therefore he was truly made man *through whom* God the Father *made the world*; and not, as some think, was he in man that man might be understood by us as having God dwelling within him” (R 2124). See R 394, 1859, 2171, 2183.³⁷

2) *The man Jesus* is called *God*. Thus St. Irenaeus: “But that He is Himself in His own right, beyond all men who ever lived, *God*, and Lord, and King Eternal, and the Incarnate Word, proclaimed by all the prophets” (R 222). St. Hilary: “This is the true faith of human blessedness: to acknowledge Him as God and man, to proclaim Him as the Word and as the flesh, to know of God that he is man, and to know of the *flesh* that it is the *Word*” (R 873).³⁸

39. 3) *Christ* is called simply *God*. Thus St. Ignatius: “There is one Doctor

34. See J. Bonsirven, S.J., *Epîtres de saint Jean* (Verbum Salutis, 9, Paris 1936) 138-140.

35. To the Ephesians 1,1: MG 5,643 (edit. Funk, 1,215). To the Romans 6,3: MG 5,691-694 (Funk, 1,261). See Rackl, *Die Christologie des hl. Ignat.* 163.289; P.Th. Camelot, O.P., *Ignace d'Antioche. Lettres* (Source Chrétiennes, Paris-Lyons 1944) 20-24; Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,31f.

36. See A. D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullian* (Paris 1905) 34; R. Favre, *La communication des idiomes dans l'ancienne tradition latine*: BullLitEccl 37 (1936) 130-137; Grillmeier, *op.cit.*, 1,43-54.

37. On St. Ephraem, see Beck, *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem...* 59ff. On St. Cyril, see Weigl, *Christologie...* 151-164, 176-192, 195-203; Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille...* 114-143; A. Hulsbosch, *De hypostatische vereinigung volgens den H. Cyrillus von Alexandrië*: StudCath 24 (1949) 65-94. On St. Augustine, see T.I. Van Bavel, O.E.S.A., *Recherches sur la Christologie de saint Augustin* (Fribourg S. 1954) 13-44, 57-63.

38. On St. Irenaeus, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,34-38; A. Houssiau, *La Christologie de saint Irenée* (Louvain-Gembloux 1955) 186-235. See R. Favre, S.J., *La communication des idiomes dans les oeuvres de saint Hilaire de Poitiers*: Greg 17 (1936) 481-514; 18 (1937) 318-336; McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore...* 50-53.

active in both body and soul, begotten and yet unbegotten, *God* in man, true life in death, son of Mary and Son of God, first able to suffer and then unable to suffer, *Jesus Christ*, our Lord” (R 39). “Our *God Jesus Christ* was carried in the womb by Mary” (R 42). St. Ambrose: “But for all there is this common faith, because *Christ* is the *Son of God*, both eternally from the Father and born of the Virgin Mary” (R 1288).³⁹ See R. 189, 218, 709.

4) It is denied that there is in Christ some third thing, different from God and from man. Thus Tertullian: “But if there were some third thing [God and the man Jesus], something confused from both, like electrum, the documents would not bear witness so distinctly to the substance of both...” (R 379).⁴⁰

5) Mary is called *the Mother of God*. Thus St. Alexander of Alexandria: “...Our Lord Jesus Christ, who really received his flesh, taken from Mary, *the Mother of God*” (R 680). St. Gregory Nazianzen: “If anyone does not believe that Holy Mary is the Mother of God, he is severed from the Godhead” (R 1017).⁴¹ St. Athanasius: “But that the Word above from the Father in an ineffable way... was eternally generated, the very same in time here below was generated from the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God” (R 788).⁴² See R 711, 1086, 1400, 2125, 2171, 2241, 2364, 2379.⁴³

40. Theological reasoning. Everything that *is in some person*, pertains either to his specific essence or to his members/parts or to his accidents; as such it is united to him in the person, that is, it is in that person in such a way that a new person does not result from the union. For it is the person that has color, hands, human nature. Therefore if the human nature is not united to the Word of God in the person, *it is not in it*, that is, *it is not united to it in any way*. However the faith of the incarnation demands precisely

39. See K. Schwerdt, *Studien zur Lehre des hl. Ambrosius von der Person Christi* (1937); J. Gapp, M.S.C., *La doctrine de L'Union Hypostatique chez saint Ambroise* (Issoudum 1938); M. Drzenick, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii de Christo Deo-Homine* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Maribor 1938) 1-20.

40. D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullian* 198; Galtier, n.96 note 7. For the words “(de Christo enim differo)” (R 379), see D'Ales, *ibid.*, 78.

41. See Weigl, *Christologie...* 56-67.

42. See Weigl, *Untersuchungen zur Christologie...* 171-181. On the teaching of St. Athanasius regarding the personal unity of Christ, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,99-102.

43. The word itself θεοτόκος, Mother of God, appears for the first time, so far as we know, about 220 in a work of Hippolytus of Rome or perhaps in a contemporary who lived a little later. See H. Rahner, S.J., *Hippolyt von Rom als Zeuge für den Ausdruck θεοτόκος*; ZkathTh 59 (1935) 73-81; Id., *Probleme der Hippolytüberlieferung*; ZkathTh 60 (1936) 577-590. However see C. Viaggini, O.S.B., *Maria nelle opere di Origene* (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 131, Rome 1942) 105-107. There are many testimonies of the holy Fathers for our thesis about the one person of Christ in D'Ales, 109-116; Xiberta, 1,137-143; for ancient witnesses of the word θεοτόκος, see *ibid.*, 132-135; 162f. On the importance and the nature of the argumentation from the Fathers in the Nestorian controversy, see Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille...* 454-490.

union between the Word and the human nature. Therefore human nature is united to the Word *in the person of the Word*.⁴⁴

41. Objections. 1. There are many texts of Holy Scripture in which Christ is said to be, in one way or another, the *temple* of God (John 2:19; 2 Cor. 5:19; Col. 2:9). But between God and his temple there is not union *in the person*. Therefore the union of the incarnate Word was not made in the person.

I distinguish the major. These namings are affirmative but not exclusive, *conceded*; they are exclusive, *I subdistinguish*: if Holy Scripture itself did not teach us that in Christ the human nature is united in the person of the Word, *I bypass the major*; if this is taught by Holy Scripture, *I deny the major and distinguish the minor*.

I explain. Even after a centuries-long affirmation of the personal union in Christ, the recent Litany of the Sacred Heart of Jesus says: "Heart of Jesus, holy *temple* of God." This metaphor is true, although it does not exhaust the whole reality. Moreover St. Paul himself in Col. 2:9 speaks about the incarnation in the same sense that St. John had said (1:14): *And the Word became flesh*.⁴⁵

2) Christ by saying on the one hand: *I and the Father are one* (John 10:30) and on the other hand: *The Father is greater than I* (John 14:28), seems to distinguish in himself *two Egos*. But there are as many persons as there are *Egos*. Therefore in Christ there are *two persons*.

I distinguish the major. Christ by saying these things shows that in himself there is *something double*, so that he himself is God, and at the same time a man inferior to God by reason of his humanity, *conceded*; he shows that in himself there are precisely a doubleness *persons*, *I subdistinguish*: if the doubleness of natures brought with them *two persons*, *conceded*; if they do not do that, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way*.

42. 3. Ecclesiastical authors are accustomed to speak about the *man* in Christ. But this is what the Nestorians defended, namely, that there is in Christ *both the Word and man*. Therefore the tradition does not think correctly about the personal unity in Christ.

I admit the assertion and explain. With those statements they were signifying that the Word united to himself *a true and integral human nature*, *conceded*; they meant that that human nature in Christ is a *true person*, so that there was in him a human person and

44. It seems that St. Thomas must be interpreted in this way contrary to many other views. See A.M. Rohner, O.P., *Die unio in persona* (S. Thomas, S.Theol. P. III q.2 a.2): JahrbPhTh 23 (1909) 414-418. See Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 175-192, 212-217.

45. See Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,182-184.

the person of the Word, *denied. I distinguish the minor in the same way.*⁴⁶

43. Scholium. 1. *On the composed person or hypostasis of Christ after the incarnation.* St. Thomas treats this question in article 4, and he responds to it with a distinction, namely, if the person or hypostasis of Christ is considered *in itself*, it must be said to be *absolutely simple* like the nature of the Word; but if the hypostasis is considered inasmuch as it is proper for it *to subsist in some nature*, it must be said that the person of Christ is *composite*, inasmuch as one subsisting person subsists *in two natures*.

There cannot be a controversy among Catholics *about the reality involved*. However, *regarding the way of speaking*, a distinction must be made. For while the ancient Fathers loved to say that the hypostasis of Christ is composite, the *scholastics* preferred to avoid this expression.⁴⁷

44. Scholium. 2. *On the substantial union in Christ.* That the union of the Word with human nature is *substantial*, not accidental, means that what results from such union is something one *in the genus of substance*. From our thesis it is established that the union was made *in the person*; now the question is whether it was done substantially or accidentally, for accidents are also united in the person. St. Thomas replies in article 6 that this union is substantial and not merely accidental or moral, because by reason of it something *substantial* is predicated about the Word, namely, that he is a man, and *in a substantial way*, that is, it would not be correct to say that the Word is *clothed with humanity* as with some kind of garment, but it must be said that the Word is a *man* simply according to the truth of the matter. All these points are clearly established from the proved theses against the Monophysites and against the Nestorians.

45. Nevertheless a step must be taken here, because if the union is substantial in the way explained, the human nature is united to the Word not only *in the person* and substantially but properly *according to the person or*

46. See Galtier, n.101-108. On the theological importance of this saying of the Fathers, see A. Gaudel, *Chronique de théologie dogmatique: La théologie de l' "Assumptus homo."* *Histoire et valeur doctrinale:* RevScRel 17 (1937) 64-90, 214-234; 18 (1938) 45-71, 201-217. On the tendency of the "Word-man" in opposition to the tendency of "Word-flesh" among the Fathers, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,120-159. On the early scholastics, see A.M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 2.^a part, 1 (Regensburg 1953) 111. For further theological consequences of this doctrine, see L. Seiller, O.F.M., *L'activité humaine du Christ selon Duns Scot* (Etudes de Science Religieuse, 3, Paris 1944); Id., *La psychologie humaine du Christ et l'unicité de personne:* FranzStud 1948-1949; however regarding this article see the Decree of the Holy Office: AAS 43 (1951) 561. On the matter itself, see P. Galtier, S.J., in Greg 31 (1950) 457f.; 32 (1951) 531-568. Seiller himself wrote later: "*Homo Assumptus*" *bei den Kirchenvätern:* WissWeish 14 (1951) 84f.169ff. (florilegia patristica absque commentario); *Quelques réflexions sur l' "assumptus homo" et la Christologie Traditionelle* (Rennes 1951). On the position of St. Thomas, see BullThom 5 (1939) 674-679. See also below, n. 137.

47. See Galtier, n.210-212; D'Ales, 183-186; Franzelin, th.36; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.7 s.4: DTC 7,521-524.

according to the hypostasis.

On the one hand the Son of God subsists *from* the human nature *and in* the human nature (see above n.18). But on the other hand the human nature in Christ lacks a human subsistence; because, since it is a *complete* being in the genus of *nature* (see below, th.7 where we treat the *perfect* human nature of Christ), it would have to be united to the Word of God accidentally, unless it were drawn to the communion of the complete being of the Word according as it is the being of the *hypostasis or person*. Therefore the human nature subsists *by the proper subsistence of the Son of God* and not by itself. Therefore the union is *by way of subsistence* between the person of the Son of God and the human nature, and this union is called *according to the hypostasis (secundum hypostasim)*.⁴⁸

46. Scholium. 3. *On the circuminsession of the natures in Christ.* As in the Trinity the three *Persons* are said to dwell in each other (*circuminsedere*), the same things holds for the two *natures* in Christ. This circuminsession (περιχωρήσις) of the natures does not differ from a *commingling* of natures, about which some Latin authors speak. Therefore *the perfect distinction of natures* is preserved, like the distinction of persons between the three divine Persons who dwell in each other; but at the same time the *very close joining together of the natures* is expressed. The foundation of this circuminsession is the unity of the person in both natures. Hence it is not possible to think about God in Christ without the fact that he is a man, nor to think about the man without the fact that he is God. The importance of this circuminsession will be pointed out below in thesis 16, n. 374.⁴⁹

47. Scholium. 4. *On the modern doctrine concerning the person.* Although the opinions of the scholastics about the idea of the person are quite diverse, still all agree in the fact that the person is something in the *ontological* order. In Christ there is one person, because the Word alone possesses both natures, the divine and the human. On the other hand, *modern non-scholastic philosophy* teaches, as a certainly acquired truth, that the person is nothing other than the *consciousness of oneself*—therefore something in the *psychological* order. In this sense Christ would have to be said to be a *human person*, since he has a *human consciousness*.

For the scholastic theologians consciousness or the Ego *does not constitute the person*, but *supposes* a nature ontologically determined as a hypostasis, either in a proper

48. See Cajetan, on S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 6 Comment. n.9; Suarez, at this place, Comment. n.2. See Galtier, L' "Unio secundum Hypostasim" . . . : Greg 33 (1952) 351-398. E. Schiltz, C.I.C.M., *De usu vocis "substantificari" in Theologia Incarnationis apud Doctores Scholasticos*: DivThom (Pi) 26 (1949) 179-186.

49. See Petavius, 1.4 c.14; Scheeben, 1.5 § 233; Stenstrup, 2, th.38, 666-676; D'Ales, 138f.; Lercher, n.142. On the history and meaning of this word, see A. Deneffe, S.J., *Perichoresis, circumincesso, circuminsessio. Eine terminologische Untersuchung*: ZkathTh 47 (1923) 497-532.

sense (generally) or in an exceptional sense (in the case of the incarnation).⁵⁰

Scholium. 5. *On the psychological unity of Christ.* The mystery of the hypostatic union brings with it that the one divine person has two consciousnesses, one divine and one human. Recently theologians have been considering how the *psychological unity* of Christ is to be explained, or what is the principle of this unity in the incarnate Word.

In this highly disputed matter the way proposed by Galtier seems to be more correct. Christ, namely, in his human nature has consciousness of the beatific vision, by which he sees himself as he really is. With this kind of vision the human nature of Christ appears both really distinct from the person of the Word to whom this human nature belongs and also substantially united to this divine person according to the hypostasis. Therefore that "Ego" that the mouth of Christ utters looks not at this human nature alone in which this word is formed, but it looks at the whole theandric composite, whose one person is the Only-begotten of the Father subsisting in two natures.

Therefore the center of the psychological unity of Christ is located in his human consciousness, but the beatific vision explains this unity, since by this vision that total personal reality that is Christ is more present to his intellect than any other person is present to his own consciousness.⁵¹

50. See DTC 7,429-431; Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 123-141. On the person considered ontologically, psychologically and morally Garrigou-Lagrange (93-99) offers many insights with his serious consideration for the contemporary understanding of this truth. See also G. Cruchon, S.J., *Genèse et structure du moi humain à la lumière des Sciences biopsychologiques modernes*: *NouvRevTh* 73 (1951) 261-274, 364-384. A true "summary" about the human person is had in the work *Semaines Sociales de France, Clermont-Ferrand 29^e Session* (1937). *La personne humaine en peril. Compte rendu in extenso des Cours et Conférences* (Paris). On this week, see Descoqs, *Autour de la Personne...*: *ArchPh* 14 (1938) cahier 2,46-58 [280]-[292]. D.M. de Petter, O.P., *Personne et personnalisation*: *DivThom* (Pi) 26 (1949) 161-178.

51. See Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 235-371; Id., n.339-343; Id., *La conscience humaine du Christ. Épilogue*: *Greg* 35 (1954) 225-246. You will find a bibliography on this whole controversy in Xiberta 2,709-711 and in A. Perego, S.J., *Il "lumen gloriae" e l'unità psicologica di Cristo*: *DivThom* (Pi) 32 (1955) 307-310 (Perego having followed the way of Fr. Galtier, intends to complete his opinion). The following should be added: J.M. Delgado Varela, O. de M., *El tema del "Yo de Cristo" en la teología contemporánea española*: *RevEspT* 14 (1954) 567-581; J. Maritain, *Sur la notion de Subsistence*: *RevThom* 54 (1954) 254-256; P. Inchaurrega, *La unidad psicológica de Cristo en la controversia Galtier-Parente*: *Lumen* 3 (1954) 215-239; Gutwenger, *Zur Ontologie...*: *ZkathTh* 76 (1954) 385-410; Fr. Lakner, S.J., *Eine neuantiochenische Christologie?*: *ZkathTh* 77 (1955) 212-228; M. Cuervo, O.P., *Comentarios. El Yo de Jesucristo...*: *CiencTom* 82 (1955) 105-123; Fr. De P. Sola, S.J., *Una nueva explicación del Yo de Jesucristo*: *EstEcl* 29 (1955) 443-478; P. Parente, *L'Yo di Cristo?* (Brescia 1955); K. McNamara, *The Psychological Unity of Christ: A Problem in Christology*: *IrishThQuart* 23 (1956) 60-69. On the type of psychic life and the consciousness of Christ, see J. Ternus, S.J., *Das Seelen- und Bewusstseinsleben Jesu...*: *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*. Grillmeier-Bacht, 3,81-237.

Thesis 4. The human nature in Christ therefore is not a human person because it lacks the substantial mode of subsistence which is really distinct from the nature.

A.Michel, *Hypostase*: DTC 7,407-437.

48. Connection. The defined doctrine of the Church on the hypostatic union must be questioned further by the theologian in the speculative penetration of this dogma. St. Thomas already touched on some points in the articles in the second Question which we have considered; there are still other points to be covered in this Question, and even more in Questions 3, 4, 17.

In a scholium of the preceding thesis we explained that the human nature is united to the Word not only in the person, but properly *according to the person* or *according to the hypostasis*. Therefore the human nature lacks a human personality, and subsists by the subsistence of the Word.

This fact supposes some kind of difference between the nature and its subsistence. Our thesis is concerned with this difference. In the next thesis we will consider the hypostatic *union* in itself.

49. Definition of terms. *The human nature in Christ is understood* as a complex of substances, powers, qualities by which Christ is constituted as a true *man*.¹ In this sense nature is the same thing as essence or substance. *Philosophically*, however, these names have different definitions. *Essence* is that by which any being is *what it is*; it is also called the *quiddity*. A *substance* is the essence according as it is that by which any being *consists* and *stands in itself*. *Nature* is the essence *according as it is the principle of operating*. In the thesis we take nature in the more general sense in which it is not distinguished over against essence and substance.

Person. In the scholastic sense it is defined with Boethius: “an individual substance of a rational nature.”² *Substance* is used so that accidents may be excluded, since they are beings *in another*. *Individual* is the same as *incommunicable*; therefore all *communication* is excluded from the notion of a person, that is, of accidents in a subject, parts in a whole; of a universal

1. See above n. 17.

2. *De persona et duabus naturis* c.3: ML 64, 1343 D. We prescind from the historical question about the meaning this definition had for Boethius himself (cf. M. Nédoncelle, *Les variations de Boèce sur la personne*: RevScRel [1955] 201-238); we interpret it in the sense in which the *scholastics* understand it with St. Thomas (I, q. 29, a. 1-2; q. 30, a. 1) (DTC 7,409-411 and see Gutwenger, *Zur Ontologie...*: ZkathTh 76 [1954] 392-396). On the distinction between *singular unity and individual unity*, see Descoqs, S.J., *Metaphysica generalis* (Paris 1925) 1,327f. On the false distinction between *individual and person*, see P. Descoqs, S.J., *Individu et personne*: ArchPh 14 (1938) cahier 2, 1-34 [235]-[268].

nature to particular or singular things through a real communication, of a singular incomplete nature to a complete substance, of a singular complete nature either to many persons by identity (in the Holy Trinity) or to one more noble suppositum (in the incarnation). It is a *rational nature*, because irrational natures constitute a *suppositum*, but not a *person*. Person is also defined: a singular rational substance totally complete in itself.³

50. Subsistence. It can be taken in a double sense, concrete or abstract. In the *concrete* sense it is the same as a subsisting thing, a suppositum, a person, a hypostasis. The word “subsistence” was understood in this way in ancient times. In the *abstract* sense it is the *form* or formality in virtue of which the suppositum is conceived as existing totally in itself. In this sense subsistence can be accepted in a double way: *adequately*, that is, as the form by which a *being* is thought to exist totally in itself; *inadequately*, that is, the form which is thought to come to a *singular complete substance* so that it can exist totally in itself.⁴

Subsistence is also taken in another essentially different sense for *to exist in itself*, and it is applied to any *substance* whether complete or incomplete.⁵ In this thesis we do not take subsistence in this sense, but in the *abstract* and also *inadequate* sense.

51. Mode. Taken *broadly* it signifies any determination. Taken *strictly*, that is, as a *real* or *physical* mode, it is a positive entity, distinct from the subject, independently of the mind’s consideration; its whole being consists in the final formal determination of a thing in order to perform some task, or in order to have actually some real determination, without which determination, at least in individual cases, the same thing can exist absolutely. It is called the *ultimate* determination, because a mode is not a directing or demanding determination, such as absolute accidents are, whose essence *requires* some determination. On the contrary, a mode in its whole reality is an *actual* determination, which consequently is said to be *ultimate*, because a mode does not require any further determination to exercise its function, while, for example, quantity, as an absolute accident, in order to quantify a subject requires a further determination, that is, union or inherence. But this determination is said to be *formal*, because a mode

3. For more about the general notion of a suppositum and a person, see J.J. Urráburu, S.J., *Institutiones philosophicae, Ontologia* (Vallisoleti 1891) 833-844; D.J. Mercier, *Cours de philosophie Métaphysique générale ou ontologie* (Louvain-Paris 1923) 303-306. For an explanation of incommunicability, see Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* d.34 s.5 n.53-62.

4. Especially for the historical question, see DTC 7,391-393.408.

5. See D. Mingoja, O.P., *De unione hypostatica* (Catanae 1926) n.20f.

by the communication of itself produces its effect.

A mode is a most subtle entity that cannot be separated from a subject even by God; therefore it is called *the being of a being* (*ens entis*). The whole *being* of a mode consists in the ultimate formal determination of another thing. A mode, according to some, adds *hardly any perfection* to the modified thing; according to others, it adds *no new perfection*, but to the perfection that is already present it adds only a new way possessing itself.⁶

Substantial mode. It is a mode that looks to the constitution of the substance itself, like the union of body and soul. It is opposed to an *accidental* mode that modifies a substance *accidentally*.

Subsistence certainly pertains to the constitution of a substance itself, because it is precisely the ultimate termination or ultimate complement of a substance in the notion of *existing by itself*. Therefore a mode of subsistence is a substantial mode.

52. Really distinct from the nature. We understand a real distinction to be one that is given antecedent to and independently of the mind's consideration. Many want a distinction of a mode from nature that is not real but a middle something between real and logical, because a mode is such a subtle entity that it does not seem to merit being called a *thing*. More correctly this distinction is called real indeed, but a *minor reality*, which is also very generally called a *modal* distinction.⁷

53. Opinions. A. Between human nature and its subsistence there is only a logical distinction.

The Scotists. Subsistence is a *negation* of actual and aptitudinal dependence on another hypostasis. There is a threefold dependence: *actual*, which really exists, as in Christ's humanity, that is *actually* united to the Word; *potential*, which is pure potency and in itself says nothing else but non-repugnance; all creatures have this potential dependence, if indeed there is no created entity for whom dependence on the Word is absolutely repugnant; *aptitudinal*, which is the middle between actual and potential, because it is a true aptitude, as in the human soul separated from the body, which has an *aptitude* to be re-united to its body. *The negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence* is required and is sufficient for the nature of a person.

6. See J.I. Alcorta, *La teoría de los modos en Suarez* (Madrid 1949) 95-150; this is handled briefly in a compendium by J. Hellin, S.J., *La teoría de los modos en Suarez*: Pens 6 (1950) 216ff. See also Urráburu, *Institutiones...*, *Ontologia* 377-386; J. Donat, S.J., *Summa philosophiae Christianiae*, *Ontologia*⁹ (Innsbruck 1940) 195f.

7. See Alcorta, *op.cit.*, 115-134; Urráburu, *ibid.*, 376.386-388.

A real distinction is not given between the nature and its subsistence, since subsistence is a *negation*.

Therefore the human nature of Christ is not now a person, because it has *actual* dependence on the Word. However it seems to retain the negation of an *aptitudinal* dependence, which negation is proper to any complete nature.

Beside the Scotists, almost all authors hold this position, including Molina, A. Mayr, Muncunill and others. This opinion is attributed by some to Durandus, Ockham and other *Nominalists*.⁸

54. Tiphanus. Subsistence is not a *negation*, but something *positive* and in the area of being and substance subsistence is perfect in the highest degree. This perfection is *totality* and substantial integrity, opposed to the imperfection both of an accident or of a universal or a part; thus the suppositum is the first substance, whole and integral, essentially independent and standing by itself.⁹

A real distinction between nature and its subsistence is not given, but *only a logical distinction*. Subsistence is indeed a *mode of nature*—not a physical mode but a *metaphysical* one, such for example, that “from its nature it does not differ from that of which it is a mode, since it is *itself of the thing*, of which it is the mode—an *entity* conceived differently and only under another reason.”¹⁰

The human nature of Christ is not a person, because it is in Christ “by way of a part, and it is not his, and because outside of him there is something, namely the Word, to which it is so really and substantially united that in the nature of substance and perfection it has less proportion to it than the thousandth part of a drop has to the whole ocean.”¹¹

This opinion is also held by Thomassinus, Franzelin, Stentrup, Hurter,

8. See Minges, 1 n.491; Urráburu, *ibid.*, 849-851; Muncunill, n.151-165; DTC 7,411f. On the opinion of Scotus himself, see P. Descoqs, S.J., *Métaphysique. Systèmes et questions*. Art.3 *La nature métaphysique de la Personnalité*: ArchPh 14 (1938) cahier 3, 125-138 [547]-[560]. P.M. Migliore, O.F.M., *La teoria scotistica della dipendenza ipostatica in Cristo*: MiscFranc 50 (1959) 407-480. On the opinions in the 12th century and the beginning of the 13th century, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte... 2.* part 1,70-115.

9. C. Tiphanus, *Declaratio ac defensio scholastica doctrinae sanctorum Patrum Doctoresque Angelici de Hypostasi et persona ad augustissima sanctissimae Trinitatis et stupendae incarnationis mysteria illustranda?* (Paris 1881) c.18f.

10. Tiphanus, *ibid.*, c.49 n.3 p.269. Tiphanus explains through many chapters that the distinction is only logical, namely from chapter 21 to 32, and similarly where he talks about modes.

11. Tiphanus, *ibid.*, c.12 n.15 p.67.

Pesch, Dalmau, Galtier, Pohle-Gierens and many others.¹²

55. B. Between human nature and its subsistence there is a *real distinction*.

This opinion is attributed to Capreolus¹³ and it was made well known by Billot. The subsistence of some thing is its substantial *existence* or its own proper existence of substance. The nature or essence is really distinct from its existence; but the act of existence, because in nature it is received as in its own proper potency, makes the nature or essence at the same time to exist and to subsist per se. In other words, “*the being by which it is subsisted adds nothing else...beside the substantial act of existing.*”¹⁴

Therefore between nature and subsistence there is a *real distinction*, just as there is a real distinction between essence and existence.

The human nature of Christ is not a person, because it lacks *its own existence*. *The existence itself of the Word supplies for the proper existence of the humanity.*¹⁵

This opinion is held by Zumel, Terrien, Janssens, Van Noort, De la Taille, D’Ales, and others.¹⁶

56. Cajetan. Subsistence is an act or substantial, positive mode, terminative of substance, receptive of existence. It is called an act or substantial mode, because subsistence is not an accident, nor is it properly a substance, because it is not form or matter; *reductively*, however, it pertains to the genus of substance, since it terminates it. This positive substantial act is from its own perfection the ultimate determination of an individual substance in the line of substance. An act of this kind is said to be receptive of existence, because *first of all* subsistence determines the nature, but

12. Pohle-Gierens, 79-84; Galtier, n. 220-268. For the other authors mentioned, see DTC 7,413f. or D’Ales, 200-205. Among recent philosophers in favor of this opinion one must mention P. Descoqs, S.J. See *La nature métaphysique de la Personnalité* § 2. *Autour de la théorie Tiphaine-Franzelin*: ArchPh 14 (1938) cahier 3, 114-122 [536]-[544]. Many believe that there is only a verbal difference between the Scotist opinion and the opinion of Tiphanius. See DTC 7,414. Galtier also supposes this, n.221-238.

13. F.P. Muñiz, O.P., says that this opinion is attributed to Capreolus falsely, *El constitutivo formal de la persona creada en la tradición tomista*: CiencTom 68 (1945) 5-89. E. Quarello, S.D.B., contends that Capreolus has certain elements truly similar to the opinion of Cajetan, *Il problema scolastico della persona nel Gaetano e nel Capreolo*: DivThom (Pi) 55 (1952) 34-46. In the work of Muñiz authors are mentioned who among the Dominicans themselves hold that Capreolus truly taught this opinion. See *loc.cit.*, 7, note 6. This opinion is defended against Cajetan by G. Fraile, O.P., *El constitutivo formal de la persona humana según Capreolo*: CiencTom 67 (1944) 129-199. The first advocate and perhaps author of this theory is said by Muñiz to be Aegidius Romanus; see *El constitutivo...*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 261f.288.

14. Billot, 139. He explains this teaching in thesis 7.

15. This opinion is extensively explained by Muñiz, *El constitutivo...*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 201-211.

16. M. de la Taille, S.J., *Entretien amical d’Eudoxe et Palamède sur la grâce d’union*: RevApol 48 (1929) 1.25, 129-145. For the others, see DTC 7,423f. or D’Ales, 211-271.231. Many Thomists are mentioned in favor of this opinion, but few really support it. See Muñiz, *El constitutivo...*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 205-207, 260-288.

afterwards existence comes to the subsistent nature, so that existence is received *firstly and immediately* in the subsistence, and, *by its mediation*, in the nature.

Between the nature and subsistence there is a *real distinction*, because an act of this kind or a substantial mode is really distinct both from the individual nature (even a complete one) and from the existence.¹⁷

This opinion is held by Aegidius Romanus, Thomas of Argentina, John of St. Thomas, Báñez, Salmanticenses, and *many other Thomists*.¹⁸

57. Suarez. He proposes the doctrine that we explained in the definition of terms. The difference from Cajetan's opinion consists especially in the fact that Suarez holds that the essence is *not* really distinct from the existence; therefore the mode of subsistence in no way can be said to be receptive of existence, but it comes to an *already-existing* substance. Subsistence, therefore, is not properly the terminus or the mode of nature *according to the being of the essence, but according to the being of the existence of the nature itself (secundum esse essentiae, sed secundum esse existentiae ipsius naturae)*. But there is a great difference in the very concept of "mode" between Suarez and Cajetan; this is a result of their different philosophical systems.¹⁹

This opinion is held by Lugo, Vázquez, Conimbricenses, Lossada, Ruiz de Montoya, Urráburu, and others.²⁰

Theological note. *More probable.*

58. Argument. Subsistence is a substantial mode really distinct from the nature, if a) it is something positive, b) really distinct from the nature,

17. See Mingoja, *De unione hypostatica* n.49-89; Quarello, *Il problema scotistico della persona...DivThom* (Pi) 55 (1952) 47-63.

18. Muñiz shows that Aegidius was the inventor of the mode of substantial personality, *El constitutive...*: *Cienc-Tom* 68 (1945) 58-78. See D. Trapp, O.E.S.A., *Aegidii Romani de doctrina modorum*: *Ang* 12 (1935) 440-501. For the others, see DTC 7, 415-417 or D'Ales, 205-209.

19. See Alcorta, *op.cit.*, 39f.

20. See DTC 7,418-421 or D'Ales, 209-211. On the opinion of Fr. Suarez, see J. Iturriz, S.J. *La noción de subsistencia y supposito en Suarez*: *EstEcl* 17 (1943) 33-74. D. Garcia offers his own opinion, *De rebus metaphysice perfectis seu de natura et supposito secundum primum totius philosophiae principium* (Barcinone 1930). He indicates briefly on page 4 where he agrees and disagrees with other scholastics. Against the new opinion proposed by Philip of the Holy Trinity, see Descoqs, *La nature métaphysique...*: *ArchPh* 14 (1938) cahier 3, 103-113 [525]-[536]. Xiberta holds a rather peculiar opinion, 1,264-267. L. de Raymaeker presents many things about different opinions of personality, *Metaphysica generalis* 2² (Louvain 1935) 426-448. M. Febrer, O.P., has attempted to revisit the whole question about the notion of person, *El concepto de persona y la union hipostatica. Revisión tomista del problema* (Biblioteca de Tomistas Españoles, 13, Valencia 1951): nevertheless the end does not seem to have been obtained, as we explain in the review of this work in *Pens* 9 (1953) 240ss.

and c) this something is precisely a substantial mode. But subsistence is a) something positive, b) really distinct from the nature, and c) this something is precisely a substantial mode. Therefore subsistence is a substantial mode really distinct from the nature.

The minor. a) 1) That subsistence is something *simply negative* is not held even by all Scotists, since they indeed think that it is expressed with negative words, namely, “with a negation of dependence,” but that it is a positive reality or at least not simply a negative one.²¹ Among those authors who call themselves Scotists, there are those who support as evident in this opinion that subsistence is a positive perfection expressed with negative words.²² Indeed, those who openly defend the view that subsistence is a negation, later speak in such a way that they seem to attributed some true reality to this negation.²³

2) Actually personality, as the ultimate complement of a substance, is a great perfection and not just in the moral order but also in the physical order, since the substance must be physically constituted by the person. But it seems to be contradictory that a great perfection is something merely negative or a non-being. Therefore subsistence cannot be placed in what is negative.

The minor. b) 1) If the subsistence were really identified with the nature, then wherever that nature is, there will also be its subsistence. But in Christ there is a concrete human nature. Therefore there is also the subsistence of this nature, which is repugnant. This *major* seems certain: for if that subsistence could be separated from that nature, *it would not be really identified with it*, since separability is a clear sign of a *real distinction*. The adversaries themselves seem to confirm this principle, because the examples they offer in proof of their position either are not to the point or have validity only for *relative* and *negative* things.²⁴

2) If subsistence is really identified with nature, nature in itself, regarding its entity, is posited as *fully completed*. But from two fully completed beings, namely, from the Word and the human nature thus identified with its own subsistence, there cannot be *essentially* one reality. Therefore if subsistence is really identified with nature, the unity of Christ seems to be

21. See in Matrium, *In Metaph.* d.11 q.4 n.62; Z van de Woestyne, O.F.M., *Cursus philosophicus.... Ontologia*² (Mechlin 1933) 248.

22. See Galtier, n.238.

23. Thus, for example, Muncunill, n.155: “something negative is lacking in Christ’s humanity.” How can a mere negation truly *be lacking* to someone?

24. See Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* d.7 s.2 n.9f.; d.34 s.2 n.5; Urráburu, *Institutiones... Ontologia* 316f. Many examples in favor of his own opinion are set forth by Tiphanus, *Declaratio ac defensio...* c.23.50-53. The same by Pesch, n.93.

established as merely accidental or moral and extrinsic.²⁵

59. *The minor.* c) 1) *It is not substantial existence.* If the human nature of Christ exists by the existence itself of the Word, it does not appear, firstly, how this nature is *truly and really existing*; secondly, how this nature is *created*; thirdly, it does not appear how *the Son alone is incarnated* and not rather the whole Holy Trinity. But these three truths must be retained. Therefore the human nature of Christ does not seem to exist by the existence itself of the Word.

The major. Firstly. The existence of the Word, as infinite, cannot truly *inform* a created nature. But a human nature that is not truly informed and that does not receive the act of existing *in itself as in a potency*, cannot be a nature *truly and really existing*. Therefore if the human nature of Christ exists by the existence itself of the Word, it does not appear how this nature is truly and really existing.

60. Secondly. It is at least very difficult to understand a being composed of potency and act, which can be said to be created, if only the potency is created, but the act is uncreated. Moreover, according to St. Thomas, creation does not look to the nature or essence except *through the act of being*, which is the first terminus of creation.²⁶ Therefore if the *act of being* of the human nature is uncreated, the nature is not created.

Thirdly. According to the adversaries, “the relations or divine Persons do not have their own relative existences, but they exist *with one absolute existence* of the essence.”²⁷ On the other hand, the subsistence is said to be the existence itself. Hence we argue: The hypostatic union consists formally and primarily in the communication of *existence*. But this existence is only *one* and *absolute*. Therefore for two reasons it seems that the whole Trinity is incarnate, that is, because that existence is *common* to the three Persons and because that existence is something *absolute*; for the absolutes are common to the whole Trinity.²⁸ Indeed these are strong arguments against Billot, who not only denies relative *existences* in divine things, but also the relative *subsistences*, and posits *one* subsistence.²⁹

25. See Salmanticenses, d.3 dub.2 n.20.

26. In 3 d.11 q.1 a.2 ad 2.

27. Billuart, *De Ss. Trinitate* diss.3 a.4.

28. On this whole argument, see Galtier, .250-255. A new way of defending this theory proposed by P. de la Taille (see *RechScRel* 18 [1928] 253-268; *RevApol* 48 [1929] 1-26, 129-145) is refuted briefly by Descoqs, *La nature métaphysique...*; *ArchPh* 14 (1938) cahier 3, 120f. [542]f., note.

29. See Billot, th.11, answer to objection 1. In opposition, see Galtier, n.186-191, 256-260. On this whole question, see Suarez, d.11, *De esse existentiae humanitatis Christi*; he treats the question explicitly in d.36.

61. 2) There is a substantial mode. That positive entity, which is not the substantial existence, is a *modal* entity, because this modal distinction *suffices* to save everything the faith teaches about the mystery of the incarnation, because a *thing* can be separated from a *mode* that is naturally distinct, and thus the humanity of Christ can exist without its own proper mode of subsistence. Moreover *it can hardly be conceived* what the nature is of some entity wholly distinct or how it is united to a nature. Indeed, if subsistence were an absolute entity, it would be a true *nature*, because an absolute substantial act that is not the first principle of the operations and consequently a *nature* is generally thought to be repugnant.

This mode is *substantial*, because it completes the substance in the realm of what is *substantial*, namely, as the ultimate and pure terminus of the nature in the realm of *being in itself*. Moreover a substance cannot formally receive its fullness from an accident.³⁰

62. **Objections.** 1. The holy Fathers and the Councils, when they give a reason why in Christ there is no human person, do not propose something *positive*, which is in addition to the nature itself, but only whether it exists separate from itself, by means of something distinct, or with another, by means of a part. But authority of this kind must have greater value than philosophical reasons. Therefore *only a logical distinction* between the nature and its subsistence must be admitted.³¹

I distinguish the major. The Fathers and the Councils want to give the *ultimate metaphysical reason* why the human nature of Christ is not a person, *denied*; they want to express the *fact*, that is, that the nature of Christ is not a person because it subsists in the Word, *conceded*. *I also distinguish the minor.* If the Fathers and the Councils were considering *our metaphysical question*, *conceded*; if they are only proposing a dogma, *denied*.

63. 2. This is a solemn proposition among the Fathers: *That which he has not assumed he has not healed* (see R 1018, 1254).³² But if the human subsistence were something *positive* and *really distinct* from human nature, there would be something that the Word did not assume and therefore that he did not heal. Therefore human subsistence is not distinguished *really* from its nature.

I distinguish the major. The meaning of this statement is that the Word assumed whatever pertains to perfect human *nature*, *conceded*; the meaning is that the Word assumed whatever positive reality is had in man whether it looks to the order of nature or to the order of the person, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

I explain. The Fathers use this expression in order to teach the *true and perfect*

30. See Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* D.34 s.4 n.32-41, where several arguments for this truth are given. Urráburu, *Institutiones... Ontologia* 865f.

31. See Galtier, n.223-229; J. Puig de la Bellacasa, S.J., *De ratione allata ab ephesino Concilio cur Christi humanitas propriam personalitatem non habeat*: *AnalSacraTarrac* 7 (1931) 81-93.

32. For more, see Petavius, 1.5 c.11 n.11-13.

humanity of Christ, especially against the Docetists, Arians and Apollinarists.³³ How absurd it is to argue from this expression in the sense of the adversaries is clear, because it would also follow that the Word did not heal all human *individualities*, or all that by which one individual is distinguished from another.

64. 3. Many very learned Fathers say that the proper form of the hypostasis or of the person is “a mode of existing.” But with this formula they signify that subsistence is a *substantial* existence. Therefore subsistence is a *substantial existence*.

*I concede the major*³⁴ *and deny the minor.* For “a mode of existing” is, according to those Fathers, a personal property, which is, for example, υἰότης or “filiation.” And they place precisely this type of difference between the divine persons. Therefore it would have to be admitted that the divine persons differ among themselves *by reason of existence*. The Fathers certainly did not take the word “existence” in that sense in contradistinction to the essence.³⁵ In order that it might appear how cautiously one must proceed in this matter, it should be noted in Boethius and also in the following authors up to St. Bonaventure that “to be” (*esse*) and “that by which it is” (*quo est*) almost always signify the *essence* or *being as such (tale esse)*, but not the existence.³⁶

65. 4. The authority of St. Thomas is very great. But St. Thomas openly teaches that subsistence is substantial existence. Therefore it seems that subsistence must be said to be substantial existence.

I concede the major and deny the minor. The status of contemporary research on this point is so loosely defined, that Galtier, S.J., in 1926, in 1939, and in 1947 could deny that this is the teaching of St. Thomas; D’Ales, S.J., in 1930 affirmed it. Likewise, Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., in 1945 and Muñiz, O.P., in 1946 not only deny that this was the real opinion of St. Thomas, but they also deny that this teaching can be reconciled with Thomism; Fraile, O.P. in 1944 and Gazzana, S.J., in 1946 say that the opinion of putting subsistence in a substantial mode is “an invention” foreign to Thomism.³⁷

33. See Petavius, *ibid.*, n.1.11-13; Galtier, n.5.

34. See Petavius, 1.3 c.14 n.1: DTC 7,404f.424.

35. See Petavius, 1.3 c.16 n.14; *De Trinit.* 1.4 c.8, especially n.6; Galtier, *L’unité du Christ...* 150-165.

36. See H.J. Brosch, *Der Seinsbegriff bei Boethius* (Innsbruck 1931); F. Pelster, S.J.,: Schol 3 (1928) 264-266; 5 (1930) 455; Id., *Die Quaestio Alberts des Grossen über das Eine Sein in Christus nach Cod. Vat. lat. 4245: DivThom (fr) 26 (1948) 20f.*

37. Galtier¹ n.259-264; Id., *L’unité du Christ...* 166-234; Id., n.260-268. D’Ales, 222-228, 234-237. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., in a review of the work by D. Giacon, S.J., *La seconda scolastica...*: Ang 22 (1945) 84-88. Muñiz, *El constitutivo...*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 201-293. Fraile, *El constitutivo...*: CiencTom 67 (1944) 129-199. H. Gazzana, *De formali constitutivo personae iuxta Caietanum*: Greg 27 (1946) 319-326. Indeed, E. Schiltz contends that both Capreolus and Cajetan and Billot are “on the margin” of patristic and scholastic tradition, *Si Christus humanam naturam quam assumpsit deponeret*: DivThom (Pi) 16 (1939) 3-16. On the mind of St. Thomas, see also H. Ruding, *Het Begrip persoon in de leer omtrent de hypostatiese vereniging*. Bijdragen... der Noord. En Zuit-Nederlandse Jezuïeten 7 (1946) 231-273 (briefly in BullThAncMéd 5 [1947] n.652). The right method for the interpretation of St. Thomas seems to be that which keeps in mind the meaning and the stating of the problem among the previous theologians and especially in the work of his teacher, St. Albert the Great; on the teaching of St. Albert, see Pelster, *Die Quaestio Alberts...*: Divthom (fr) 26 (1948) 3-25.

66. 5. According to the opinion of Billot, the whole Trinity would have to be incarnated to the extent that the human nature of Christ would exist with the *one* and absolute divine existence. But the human nature of Christ exists indeed with this one and absolute divine existence, but it is done *in the relative mode proper to the Son*. Therefore according to the opinion of Billot there is no reason why the whole Trinity must be said to be incarnated.³⁸

I concede the major and deny the minor. This solution seems to be inadmissible. Everything *absolute* that is in God, even if it is considered in a definite person, *remains common* to all three Persons; thus, for example, the omnipotence of the Son is *identical* with the omnipotence of the Father. Logically Billot must admit that in God there is *nothing common*, since all things are had de facto according as they are in the Father or in the Son or in the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless all Catholics must grant that those things objectively that are not *common*, in the opinion of Billot, are objectively *identical*. For in God everything is *one* where there is no opposition of relationship (D 1330).

67. 6. A singular complete nature *by the very fact* that it is not assumed by another suppositum is already a suppositum. Therefore for a nature to be a suppositum *non-union alone* with another is sufficient, without the requirement of any substantial mode.

I distinguish the antecedent. By that very fact it is *formally* a suppositum, *denied*; *in an illative or inferring way, conceded.* *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

Theologians admit that such a non-assumed nature is a suppositum. But the further metaphysical question concerns the *formal reason* that constitutes a non-assumed nature as a person.

7. If wood is divided, *by the division alone*, without the addition of a new reality, there are as many suppositums as there are pieces of wood. On the other hand, if God unites the pieces again into one piece of wood, these parts *by their union alone* cease to be suppositums. Therefore subsistence is only the negation of union.

I distinguish the antecedent. The *senses* do not detect a new reality coming in the division and leaving in the union, *conceded*; the *intellect* does not require such a reality, *denied.* *I distinguish the consequence the same way.*

68. 8. A substantial mode is said to be a most subtle entity. But personality is a great perfection. Therefore personality cannot be a substantial mode.

I distinguish the major. But in such a way that this most subtle entity *determines* the other great entity, namely, the nature, and for this reason a great perfection is the result, *conceded*; but in such a way that a great perfection is attributed to this most subtle entity *by reason of itself and independently of the nature* that it determines, *denied.* *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*³⁹

9. A complete nature existing by its own existence is something *finally complete in the area of substance*. But if anything is added to a being that is finally complete in the

38. Billot, th. 7. objection 7.

39. Urráburu solves many other difficulties raised against the substantial mode, *Institutiones... Ontologia* 388-391, 866-870.

area of substance, it is united with it *accidentally* only. Therefore a complete nature *does not exist by its own existence*.

I distinguish the major. Finally complete in the substantial area of nature, *conceded*; in the substantial area of a *hypostasis*, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* If it is finally complete in the substantial area *both* of nature *and* of the hypostasis, *conceded*; if it is finally complete in the substantial area of nature *and not* of the hypostasis, *denied*.

I explain. What comes to something after it is a complete being is united to in accidentally, unless it is drawn into communion with the *complete being*. This being (*esse*) is understood by the adversaries to be existence, but by us, for the reasons given, it is personal being (*esse personale*).⁴⁰

40. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2.

Thesis 5. The union of the human nature with the person of the Word implies in the humanity a certain substantial mode, from the nature of the matter distinct from the humanity; this mode is the foundation of the real predicamental relation of the union.

S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 7; Suarez, d.8 a.3; Salmanticenses, d.4 dub.1; Muncunill, n.192-216.

69. Connection. After St. Thomas considered the *integral terminus* produced by the unifying action, he now asks *about the union in itself* what it is. But the union is taken here for the *relation* existing between the Word and the human nature united to the Word.¹

St. Thomas proves that this union is something *created*, because really this relation does not exist except in the human nature which is a creature.

On this occasion a twofold question is proposed by theologians: first, whether between the Word and the humanity there is a *predicamental relation of union*; second, what is the *proximate foundation* of such a predicamental relation, that is, whether it is some reality independently different from the consideration of the mind or is not different from the united extremes. This second question is *per se* independent of the first one, and it could also be proposed like this: whether the hypostatic union is something *naturally distinct* from the extremes and produced by the action of the Incarnation.

70. Definition of terms. *Union* can be considered: *actively*—it is an *action* of uniting, properly called *uniting*; in our case it is an action common to the Holy Trinity, to which in human nature *passion* responds, in the predicamental sense of Aristotle; *passively*—it is the actual joining together; this is what we call simply a “union.” A union is *mediated*, if it is effected by a medium in the proper sense, for example, the union of two stones by the use of cement; it is *immediate*, if between the extremes there is nothing present as *that which* joins together the two extremes.² We are considering here this immediate union.

In a union the following can be distinguished: 1) *The union itself*

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1. At first sight St. Thomas would seem to be treating the relation between *natures*, human and divine, united to each other; we will have a few things to say about this relation below. Although we omit some other points, both from the context of this second question, in which he deals with the mode of the union of the incarnate Word, and from the 7th article itself (in the body of the article and ad 1 and ad 3), and from the well-known terminology of St. Thomas, according to which the “divine nature” is accepted as being a suppositum (“suppositata”) (see for example III, q. 3, a. 2), it is clear that the holy Doctor in this place is talking about the relation between the *Word* and the *human nature* united to the Word.
 2. See L. de Lossada, S.J., *Cursus Philosophicus, Physica* (Barcinone 1883) 5,76; Urráburu, *Institutiones... Cosmologia* 631.

according as it is a joining together; in our case it is a substantial joining of the human nature with the person of the Word; 2) union *formally* considered, according as it is *that by which* the extremes are formally joined together; there is a dispute about this—whether it is some reality distinct from the extremes before the consideration of the mind, which is thought of as a bond formally uniting the extremes together, or whether it is a reality that is not added to the extremes but is identical with them; 3) union considered *relatively*, according as it is a *relation* which results from united extremes³; regarding this relation, the question is asked whether it is predicamental or transcendental.

71. Substantial mode. The explanation is given in the preceding thesis on the constitutive element of personality, n. 51.

From the nature of the matter distinct from the humanity. Although the distinction of a mode from a thing, of which it is the mode, in the preceding thesis (n. 52) was called *real*, in this thesis we prefer to speak about a distinction *from the nature of the matter*, lest we seem to teach that the medium of union between the Word and the humanity is a medium in the proper sense (see n. 70). For the distinction we are making is a *real minor one or modal*; therefore it is not the distinction of *one thing from another thing*, although of course a real distinction has that meaning, inasmuch as it is given *independently of the mind's consideration*.

72. Relation is the reference of one thing to another. A *real* relation is such a reference that exists in things *independently of the mind's consideration*. A *relation* of reason or logical relation is such a reference that *happens through the activity of the mind*, inasmuch as some of the things required for a relation are present only through the operation of the mind.

A real relation is either *transcendental* / essential or *predicamental* / accidental. A *transcendental* relation is one that is *essential* to the subject to which it is attributed, for example, a creature is essentially related to God, an accident to a substance, union to united extremes. A *predicamental* relation is one that is *contingent* to the subject to which it is attributed, for example, a white wall is accidentally referred to another white wall.⁴

73. Opinions. A. For philosophical reasons about the way of speaking

3. Union *relatively* is called union *formally* by Mingoja, *De unione hypostatica* n.346ff.

4. J. Donat, S.J., *Ontologia*⁹ n.381-394; Urráburu, *Institutiones... Ontologia* 966-1015; Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* d.47. See A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas* (Paris 1952).

in reference to relations, Lugo denies this predicamental relation of union. Durandus, Scotus and Vázquez mention only the *transcendental* or essential relation.⁵ B. The foundation of the predicamental relation: *Many Dominicans*, Suarez, Salmanticenses, J. Müller assign for the foundation a substantial mode of *union* naturally distinct from the extremes.⁶ More commonly, however, the *Dominicans*, Valencia, Pesch and Galtier reject such a mode.⁷ For they say that the foundation of the relation of union is sufficiently established on the part of the humanity through *dependence* or a passive drawing of the human nature to the Word.⁸ A passive drawing of this kind, for the major part of these authors, is some kind of *superadded real mode*⁹; but for others it is a *metaphysical mode or one that places nothing absolute* in the thing.¹⁰

We hold: A. Between the human nature and the person of the Word there is a real *predicamental relation of union*. B. The *foundation* of this relation in the humanity is a *certain substantial physical mode of union by the nature of the matter distinct from the humanity*.

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5. Lugo, d.11 s.1 n.8-12. Durandus, *In 3 Sent.* d.5 q.2 n.8. On the teaching of Durandus on relations, see Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin 1928) 2,521f.; J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P., Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14 Jahrhunderts*: BeitrGPhMA 26 (1927) 193f.; J. Koch, *Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.*: Arch-HistDoctrLittMA 4 (1929) 208-210. Scotus, *In 3 Sent.* d.1 q.1 a.1 and response to doubt cont. 3. See Frassen, 7 d.1 a.2 s.1 q.1 concl.2. On the teaching of Scotus on relations, see E. Longpré, O.F.M., *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot* (Paris 1924). Directly on our question, see Déodat de Basly, O.F.M., *Scotus docens...* Supplement to the France Franciscaine 17 (1934). Vázquez, d.18 a.7 c.3. As Suarez correctly noted about Durandus and Scotus (d.8 s.3 n.19), these authors consider only *the substantial mode itself of the union* and they rightly affirm that it includes an essential relation to the Word. Concerning the *final predicamental relation of the union* between the humanity and the Word they seem to remain silent rather than to deny it.
 6. On the Dominicans, see Salmanticenses, d.4 dub.1 § 1. Suarez, d.8 s.3 n.19-22; see n.8f. Salmanticenses, d.4 dub.1. For other authors see Muncunill, n.193. Müller, th.14 n.12.17f. If one abstracts from the question whether this mode is or is not the *foundation* of the predicamental relation of union, Durandus, Scotus and Vázquez (mentioned in the previous paragraph) also hold for the existence of some *new reality* different from the united extremes. Similarly others, like L. Lessius, S.J. (*De perf. div.* 1.12 c.6). For further differences among the authors on this opinion, see Muncunill, *loc.cit.*
 7. *Dominicans*, v.gr., John of St. Thomas, d.4 a.3 n.16ff. Valencia, d.1 q.2 punct.5. Pesch, n.99ff. In the same place other authors in favor of this opinion are mentioned. Galtier, n.271f.
 8. See Billuart, d.4 a.3, where objections are answered. Mingoja gives some more distinctions, *ibid.*, n.357-359. Beware however lest you confuse the union of the *human nature* with the *person of the Word* (which is the main and only point in our thesis) with the union of the *natures*, divine and human, *among themselves*; we will treat this below in scholium 1, n. 79.
 9. Thus John of St. Thomas, d.4 a.3 n.34; Billuart, d.4 a.3 objection 1; Mingoja, *ibid.*, n.357f. Since Suarez explicitly defends the mode of union admitted by him to be *identified* with the suppositional dependence of the humanity on the Word (d.8 s.3 n.27-29), there hardly seems to be a *real difference* between the cited Dominican authors and Suarez himself, unless by reason of a *different conception* of the same thing. However a difference would remain with regard to the notion itself of a physical mode, as we pointed out in the preceding thesis in n. 57.
 10. Wirceburgenses, n.260; Pesch, 103-105. Galtier, n. 272 accepts a mode *virtually* distinct from the nature itself.

Theological note. A. *More common among theologians.* B. *More probable.*

74. The argument. A. By the hypostatic union the Word and the humanity are really united. But through this union there arises in the humanity a real predicamental reference of union to the Word. Therefore between the Word and the humanity there is a real predicamental relation of union.

The minor. Such a real reference either is essential or predicamental. But it cannot be said to be essential, since for human nature it is *contingent* to be united to the Word. Therefore it is a real predicamental reference.¹¹

75. B. The union of the humanity with the Word is something real and substantial in the humanity, which can be in the humanity and can also be separated from it. But separability is a sign naturally of a distinction. Therefore the union of the humanity with the Word is something real and substantial in the humanity, but naturally distinct from the latter. Indeed this real and substantial something, naturally distinct from the humanity, cannot be understood as *that which unites*, because that would make the union *mediated*; therefore nothing remains but for it to be conceived as *the actual exercise of uniting*, which is what we call the substantial mode of the union.¹²

76. Objections. 1. By the fact that the hypostasis of the infinite Word of power determines the human nature, the latter remains united to the Word without requiring anything else. Therefore any superadded mode of union is superfluous.

I distinguish the antecedent. So that this termination does not imply in the humanity any reality caused by the action of the Holy Trinity, *denied*; so that it implies some reality, *I distinguish again*: which reality is nothing but the same reality of the humanity considered relatively, *denied*; which reality is substantial and naturally distinct from the humanity, *conceded*.

I explain. The question is proposed precisely about the passive actuation of the humanity: what it is *in itself*. Certainly it must be something real, since even the adversaries admit that it is the foundation of a real relation. Therefore the question remains whether it is something really distinct or not distinct from the humanity. We respond to this as a result of the proof proposed in the thesis. Nor would it help to say that it is something real but relative; for the real question here is about what is the *foundation* of

11. See Donat, *Ontologia*⁹ n.385, b). Very significantly, Suarez, d.8 s.3 n.24; see Id., *Disp. Metaph.* d.47 s.1 n.10-15; s.14 n.7f.

12. See Suarez, d.8 s.3 n.8-27; Muncunill, n.194-203. The philosophical foundations have been explained in the preceding thesis on personality, n. 58.

the relation.¹³

77. 2. The reason for admitting a mode of union is the real necessity of a foundation in the humanity for the predicamental relation of union with the Word. But such a foundation, *without any mode*, is the humanity alone, not indeed taken simply but according as it is referred to the Word. Therefore there is no reason for admitting a mode of union.

I pass over the major and distinguish the minor. And in order that the humanity could be considered *according as* it is referred to the Word, a real change in the humanity is *presupposed*, which is a true substantial mode, *conceded*; such a real change is not presupposed, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequence in the same way.*

78. 3. A mode superadded to the humanity *after the fashion of the passion* sufficiently explains the real change of the humanity, which is the real foundation of the relation of union. Therefore another substantial mode *of union* is useless.

I distinguish the antecedent. If this mode is understood after the fashion of a mere *reception* or of passion in the predicamental sense, *denied*; if it is understood to be like a quality or form, *I distinguish further*: it explains it sufficiently *regarding the reality* itself of the change, *conceded*; regarding a more perfect way *of conceiving* this reality, *denied*.

I explain. Passion can be taken either inasmuch as it is opposed to action and as it constitutes a proper Aristotelian predicament, and in this sense it is *receptive* of a new form produced in the subject, or inasmuch as it signifies the terminus, that is, the *form* itself or the quality received. Passion as reception says a transcendental relation to the form or to the quality received and it cannot be understood without such a form. For one who receives or suffers, receives or suffers something. As long as it is admitted that this form or this terminus, concretely the dependence of the humanity on the Word or the attraction to the subsistence of the Word, is a substantial mode naturally distinct from the humanity, *according to the matter itself* our thesis stands.¹⁴

We add however that this mode is *conceived* more perfectly as a mode of *union* than as a mode of *dependence* or of passion. For Catholic tradition is accustomed to explain the mystery of the incarnation by the *union* of the humanity with the Word and for a further explanation of this mystery St. Thomas finds nothing so similar to this union as the *union* of the rational soul with the body.¹⁵ Moreover, although in the case of the hypostatic union suppositional dependence and union in fact coincide, still the *concept* of dependence is one thing and the *concept* of union is something else.¹⁶

13. See Salmanticenses, d.4 dub.1 § 1-§ 5.

14. See above, note 9.

15. 4 CG 41. See P. Galtier, S.J., *L'union hypostatique et l'entre deux de saint Thomas*: EphThLov 7 (1930) 444-448; Id., n.215f. In the same place also the correct meaning is given according to which St. Thomas made use of this similarity in order to illustrate the mystery of the incarnation. For how classical this similarity is among theologians, see E. Schiltz, C.I.C.M., *Aux sources de la théologie du mystère de l'Incarnation. La christologie de saint Augustin*: NouvRevTh 63 (1936) 711-713. On this comparison in St. Augustine: *ibid.*, 689-713; Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie*... 30-32. E. Schiltz, *La comparaison du symbole Quicumque vult*: EphThLov 24 (1948) 440-454.

16. See Suarez, d.8 s.3 n.29.

Many objection are given by Muncunill, n.207-215; Salmanticenses, d.4 dub.1 § 6-§ 8.

79. Scholium 1. *The relation of the two natures, divine and human, among themselves.* In the proper sense this relation is not one of union, except mediately. However it is a relation of *unity*, inasmuch as both the divine nature and the human nature are terminated by one and the same subsistence of the Word. Rightly therefore it is said that the foundation of this relation that exists between the two natures is the unity of the subsistence of the two natures. This is a relation of reason, since the foundation is the same in both extremes.¹⁷ If this relation of *unity between natures* is carefully distinguished from the relation of the *union between the human nature and the subsistence of the Word*, one of the main sources of ambiguity is excluded and the different ways of speaking about this matter can be reconciled with each other.

80. Scholium 2. *The formal terminus of the incarnating action.* By the name of “formal terminus” it seems that one must understand that which is introduced proximately by the incarnating action and takes place in the real order.¹⁸ Therefore if this action is considered as the uniting of extremes, from which there results the composite of the God-man, the formal terminus of such an action will be *a mode of union taken in the real order.*¹⁹

Scholium 3. *Union and assumption.* Union, as we said above in n. 70, implies a *relation*, but assumption implies either an *action*, according to which someone is said to be assuming, or it implies a *passion*, according to which something is said to be assumed. Moreover assumption is said regarding something *becoming*, but union regarding what has *already happened*. Finally, union implies only the *joining together of extremes*; therefore it is indifferent to say that the human nature is united with the Word or vice versa. But assumption determines *the terminus from which and to which*. Hence the Word is not said to be assumed by the human nature but just the opposite. And the Father is not said to have assumed the human nature but only the Word, although the Father surely *unites* (actively) the human nature with the Word.²⁰

81. Scholium 4. *The union of natures in Christ, the greatest union.* Taking union for a relation, the question is now raised about relation, not by reason of itself but by reason of its foundation. In other words, the union is now taken for the substantial joining together, and the question is asked whether this union is the greatest in the area of union.

A distinction must be made. Union considered *on the part of the extremes* that are united, is not the greatest, because the divine nature and the human nature, according as they are apt to be joined and actually are joined are greatly distant from each other; for the *natures* in the proper sense are not united among themselves, since from them

17. See *ibid.*, n.23.

18. See *ibid.*, n.13; Cajetan, *In 3* q.2 a.8 n.11.

19. See Suarez, *ibid.* For more, see Suarez, *loc.cit.*, n.10-13. Opposed is, John of St. Thomas, d.4 a.2.

20. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 8; Suarez, at this place.

as such nothing as *one* is produced. But union considered *on the part of him in whom they are united*, is truly greatest, since on the part of the person of the Word, inasmuch as he is the person of both natures, the greatest *unity* is had. For the natures are united substantially in the divine person, without the imperfection of parts and in a very simple substantial personal unity that is common to both natures.²¹

82. Scholium 5. *On the efficient cause of the incarnation.* St. Thomas says that it is the divine will, not operating in just any manner but as elevating the nature above everything due to it and beyond its merits.²²

It is a matter of Catholic faith that the *whole Trinity* produced the incarnation of the Son of God, since the works of the Trinity are inseparable (D 535, 801). Holy Scripture itself attributes the incarnation now to one Person and then to another (Gal. 4:4; Phil. 2:7). But in a special way it is *appropriated* to the Holy Spirit.²³

Therefore all *activity* in the incarnation, that is, the making of the body, the creation of the soul, the joining together of both, the unity resulting from it of the nature with the person of the Word—all of these *were produced equally by the whole trinity*. However the actual union itself terminates *in the Son alone*. In the order of *efficient cause* everything is common to the whole Trinity; in the order of the *quasi-formal cause* the incarnation is proper and exclusive to the Son.²⁴

83. Scholium 6. *On the meritorious cause of the incarnation.* The theologians are wont to distinguish between the *substance* and the *circumstances* of the incarnation. Regarding the substance all surely agree that *Christ* the Lord did not merit his incarnation. Holy Scripture indicates this by attributing the beneficence of the incarnation to the divine mercy and love alone (Luke 1:78; John 3:16). The reason is because Christ was not first a man and afterwards by his merit obtained to be the Son of God, but from the beginning of his conception he was truly the Son of God. For the principle of merit, which is here the hypostatic union, does not fall under merit.

Regarding the absolute power of God there is a dispute about whether Christ could merit the *execution* of the incarnation because of his foreseen merits. Suarez and others affirm it, but most generally theologians deny it for the reason given above. Suarez himself concedes that what he proposes is an exception to the argument: the principle of

21. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 9; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.9 s.1.

22. III, q. 2, a. 10. For more on the "grace of union," see A. Vugts, M.S.C., *La grâce d'union d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin. Essai historique et doctrinale* (Tilburg 1946).

23. See S.Th. III, q. 32, a.1; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 226-228; Galtier, n.172; D'Ales, 239-242. On the various statements of the Fathers, see G. Giamberardini, O.F.M., *De incarnatione Verbi secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem*: DivThom (Pi) 24 (1947) 38-40; P. Galtier, S.J., *Le Saint-Esprit dans l'Incarnation du Verbe d'après saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie*: AnalGreg 68 (1954) 383-392. J.M. Bover, S.J., *La acción del Espíritu Santo en la encarnación del Hijo de Dios según el cardenal Toledo*: ArchTG 9 (1946) 69-101.

24. See J. Solano, S.J., *Algunas tendencias modernas acerca de la doctrina de las apropiaciones y propiedades en la Santísima Trinidad*: EstEcl 21 (1947) 5-34. For further information on the possible cooperation of a creature by way of *at least an instrumental cause* in order to produce this union, and likewise *on a possible dispositive cause* towards this union, see Suarez, d.10f. 1f; DTC 7,1509f; I. Brinktrine, *Estne B.M.V. causa physica instrumentalis Incarnationis Verbi?*: DivThom (Pi) 25 (1948) 319-324.

merit does not fall under merit and that it brings with it a certain imperfection.²⁵

84. *No other person* among the ancient Fathers to whom a special revelation of the Messiah was given, nor even the Blessed Virgin Mary merited *condignly* the incarnation nor could they merit it. The reason is because the union of the incarnation is *in a personal being*; but the merits of the just are ordered to beatitude, that is, to the union of the blessed mind with God, which takes place by an act of enjoying. A personal union is of an essentially higher order. In every case proportion would be lacking between the merits and the incarnation itself.

Congruously no one merited the predestination of the incarnation, because there was no merit of the just that was independent of the incarnation. However the ancient Fathers merited the execution of the incarnation congruously “for it was congruous that God should hear those who obeyed him.”²⁶

85. *Regarding the circumstances of the incarnation.* Christ the Lord did not merit the circumstances which *precede* or *accompany* the incarnation, since these circumstances precede merit, at least in the order of nature. However Christ did merit the circumstances that follow the incarnation, which is more in conformity with his dignity. Likewise he merited that this hypostatic union should not certainly be multiplied, but rather that the same incarnation should be repeated as it were again and again in the course of nature, which takes place by the august mystery of the Eucharist.²⁷

The Blessed Virgin Mary, and in their own way *the ancient Fathers*, merited *congruously* many circumstances of place, time, race, for example, that the Messiah should be born of their race, that the time of his coming should be shortened.²⁸

25. See Suarez, d.10 s.4 n.11. He proposes his opinion *ibid.*, n.1-9. On this question see, Salmanticenses, d.7 dub.2. On whether the *humanity* of Christ merited or could merit the incarnation, see Suarez, d.10 s.3. On the meritorious cause of the incarnation, see DTC 7,1526-1530.

26. S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 11 c. For more on this, see Suarez, d.10 s.5f.

27. See Suarez, d.10 s.4 n.12-27.

28. See *ibid.*, s.6. On the *divine maternity* itself in the order of execution, see below, II, 20. On the whole question, see G. Koksa, *Die Lehre der Scholastiker des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts von der Gnade der alttestamentlichen Gerechten* (Rome 1955).

ARTICLE II

ON THE PERSON ASSUMING

Thesis 6. Although the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit could have become incarnate, the Son alone became incarnate.

86. Connection. Having explained the union in itself, St. Thomas next considers *the united extremes*. First of all he treats the *assuming* extreme, which is the person for whom the assumption takes place.

87. Definition of terms. *They could have.* We are dealing with a possibility of another order, or about the possibility of something *antecedent* to the actual divine decree in virtue of which only the Son was to be incarnate.

88. Adversaries. *Many heretics* denied the second part of the thesis regarding the *exclusive* sense, that is, that the Son alone was incarnated. Generally they are called *Monarchianists*, for they wanted to preserve the whole divine *monarchy*, confessing that the *Father* alone is God.

The first one who said that the *Father* was incarnated was Noetus towards the end of the 2nd century in Asia. At Rome Praxeas taught almost the same doctrine and then he went to Carthage. In the first half of the 3rd century Sabellius proposed another form of the same error, so that he also retained in God only one person. These authors are also called *modalists*, because they admit in God not a plurality of persons, but many *modes* of one and the same person; they are also called *patripassionists*, because they say that the Father suffered.¹

89. Doctrine of the Church. Beside the fact that *in the creeds* the incarnation is attributed to the Son and not to the Father or the Holy Spirit, there are many documents in which the incarnation either a) is attributed to the Son in opposition to the Father and the Holy Spirit, or b) it is expressly said that it pertains to the Son *alone*.

a) *The Council of Constantinople II*: “If anyone does not confess that there is one nature of the Father and of the *Son* and of the Holy Spirit... For there is one God and Father... and one Lord Jesus Christ... and one Holy Spirit...” (D 421). *The Council of Constantinople III*: “...defining... that *our Lord Jesus Christ*, our true God, one of the holy... Trinity... before

1. See G. Bardy, *Monarchianisme*: DTC 10,2193-2209.

ages, indeed, begotten *of the Father* according to Godhead, in the last days however the same...*of the Holy Spirit* and of the Virgin Mary... according to his humanity” (D 554-555). See D 503, 801.

90. b) *The Council of Toledo XI*: “Likewise, we believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance; we do not, however, say that the Virgin Mary gave birth to the unity of this Trinity, but only to the *Son* who alone assumed our nature in the unity of his person” (D 535).² *The profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians* by Innocent III: “We heartily believe and proclaim that the incarnation of the Godhead has taken place, not in the Father or in the Holy Spirit, but *only in the Son* (D 791).

Theological note. *It is an opinion common and certain in theology that any person of the Trinity could have become incarnate. It is defined divine and Catholic faith that only the Son became incarnate.*

91. **Proof from Holy Scripture.** It is proposed that the Son alone was incarnate: A. because the incarnate divine person is *distinguished a) from the Father* and b) *from the Holy Spirit*; B. because it is expressly asserted that the *word* or the *Son* was incarnate.

A. a) *He is distinguished from the Father.* 1) In the Gospels. Matt. 11:27: *All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.* John 17:24: *Father, I desire that they also, whom thou hast given me, may be with me where I am, to behold the glory which thou hast given me in thy love for me before the foundation of the world.* Mark 1:11: *And a voice came from heaven, “Thou art my beloved (υἱός ἀγαπητός: as it seems, “only son”) Son; with thee I am well pleased.* In these texts the topic is about Jesus as a divine person. But this divine person is placed *in opposition to the Father*. Therefore Jesus is not the Father. Moreover the whole gospel proclaims this truth from beginning to end. Mark 1:1: *The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.* Jesus speaks very often about *his Father*; he is said to be sent by the Father (v.gr., John 5:23.36f.; 6:39f.44.58; 8:16; 20:21).³

92. 2) In the epistles. The greeting formulas show a diversity of the Son from the Father, if we pay attention to the whole apostolic teaching, by the

2. Pérez, *La cristología en los símbolos toledanos...* 116-124.

3. On the cited texts there is much discussion about the divinity of Christ. See, for example, Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,28-31. On Mark 1:11, see also D’Ales, 54f. There is more in DTC 7,1514-1516.

union and at the same time by the opposition of both persons. Rom. 1:7: *Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.* 1 Cor. 1:3; 2 Cor. 1:2, etc. Many texts prove the same thing in which the Father and Jesus Christ are juxtaposed. 1 Thess. 1:1: *Paul... to the church of the Thessalonians in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.* 1 John 1:3: *and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ.*⁴

93. b) He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Since almost all the texts by which the *personality* of the Holy Spirit is proved in the treatise on the Trinity can be used here, it will be sufficient to indicate the contrariety that *Jesus* places between himself and the Holy Spirit during the discourse at the Last Supper. John 14:16: *And I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Counselor, to be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth.* John 14:25f.: *These things I have spoken to you, while I am still with you. But the Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you.* John 15:26: *But when the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father....* See John 16:7-15. The Holy Spirit is said to be someone *other* than Jesus, sent in the name of Jesus or sent by Jesus. But these things cannot be said, if Jesus and the Holy Spirit are one and the same. Therefore Jesus, a divine incarnate person, is distinguished over against the Holy Spirit.⁵

94. B. Expressly the Word or Son is said to be incarnate. John 1:14: *And the WORD became flesh.* 1 John 1:1f.: *That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and touched with our hands, concerning the WORD OF LIFE... we proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father and was made manifest to us.* Gal. 4:4: *But when the time had fully come, God sent forth HIS SON, born of woman, born under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.* See Heb. 1:2.⁶

95. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers, witnesses of the tradition, with many testimonies affirm that the *Son alone* is incarnate.

4. For more, see DTC 7,1514-1516.

5. See Ceuppens, *op. cit.*, 2. *De Sanctissima Trinitate*² (1949) 264-274.

For more, see DTC 7,1517f.; J. Musger, *Dicta de Paraceto. Inquisitio exegetico-dogmatica in quinque textus Evangelii S. Ioannis (cap. 14-16)* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1938).

6. On 1 John 1f., see Bonsirven, *Épîtres de saint Jean...* at this place. On Gal. 4:4, see Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,191-193. On Heb. 1:2, see J. Bonsirven, S.J., *Saint Paul. Épître aux Hébreux...* at this place; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux 2*, at this place. For all this matter, see J. Lebreton, *Le Dieu vivant. La révélation de la Sainte Trinité dans le Nouveau Testament* (Paris 1924) especially 97-127, 144-160.

1) They say that the *Son*, in opposition to the other persons of the Trinity, became incarnate. Thus St. Justin: “And since we find it recorded in the memoirs of His apostles that [Christ] is the Son of God, and since we call Him the Son, we have understood that He proceeded before all creatures from the Father by His power and will... and he became man by the Virgin” (R 141).⁷ St. Irenaeus: “The Church... received this faith... in one God, the Father Almighty... and in one Jesus Christ, *the Son of God*, who became incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of God, and the advent, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion... of the beloved Jesus Christ, our Lord, and His manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father” (R 191). St. Athanasius: “For the *Word* from above...who was born of the Father, he himself in time here below was born of the Virgin Mary, Mother of God” (R 788). See R. 218, 290, 907, 1518, 2059f.

96. 2) They say explicitly that the Son *alone* became incarnate. Thus St. Justin: “For they who affirm that the Son is the Father, are proved neither to have become acquainted with the Father, nor to know that the Father of the universe has a Son; who also, being the first-begotten Word of God is even God. And of old he appeared in the shape of fire and the likeness of an angel to Moses and to the other prophets; but now in the times of your reign, having, as we before said, become Man by a virgin, according to the counsel of the Father...” (R 127). But those who fought against the *Monarchianists* insist very much on this truth. St. Hippolytus, against Noetus: “But let us also look at the subject in hand,-- namely, the question, brethren, that in reality the Father’s power, which is the Word, came down from heaven, and not the Father Himself” (R 393). Tertullian, now a Montanist, against Praxeas: “We do indeed definitively declare that two are God, the Father and the Son, and, with the addition of the Holy Spirit, even Three, according to the principle of the[divine] economy, which introduces number, in order that the Father may not, as you perversely infer, be Himself believed to have been born and to have suffered, which it is not lawful to believe, forasmuch as it has not been so handed down” (R 377).⁸

97. Theological reasoning. A. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit *could have become incarnate*. The assumption of humanity implies

7. See A. Puech, *Histoire de la littérature grecque chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à la fin du IV^e siècle* (Paris 1928) 2, 163-167. On the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the incarnation, see Puech, *ibid.*, 149, note 2.

8. On Hippolytus, see D'Ales, *La Théologie de saint Hippolyte* (Bibliothèque de Théologie historique, Paris 1906) 8-35.67.102. On Tertullian, see D'Ales, *La Théologie de Tertullien*, 67-81.

two things, namely, the *act* itself of assuming and the *term* of the assumption. But regarding both, each Person of the Holy Trinity is related to it in the same way. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit could have become incarnate.

I prove the minor. The principle of the act of assuming is the *divine power*, which in a common and indifferent way pertains to all three Persons; the term of the assumption, or that which becomes assumption, is a *person*. Now of course the basic idea of personality is common to the three persons, although their personal properties are different.⁹

98. B. *The Son alone* became incarnate. St. Thomas presents three main reasons by which it is shown that it was most suitable for the person of the Son to become incarnate.

First, *on the part of the union*. Similar things are fittingly united. But the Person of the Son and human nature a) both according to the common notion of a *creature* b) and according to the proper notion of *human nature* are similar. Therefore it is most fitting that the Son became incarnate. *The minor regarding a)*. The Word of God is the *exemplary* likeness of all *creatures*, because the word or the concept of the craftsman is an exemplary likeness of those things that are made by him. *The minor regarding b)*. The Word of God is the concept of the eternal *wisdom*, from whom all *man's wisdom* is derived. Indeed the proper perfection of man, as he is rational, is his perfection *in wisdom*. Hence for the *consummate* perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be *personally united to human nature*.¹⁰

99. Secondly, *on the part of the union*. The end of this union is fulfilling of predestination to the heavenly *inheritance*. Indeed this *inheritance* is bestowed only on *sons*. Hence it was fitting that by him who is the *natural Son*, men should share this likeness of *sonship by adoption*.

The third reason of this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent, for which the *incarnation* supplied the *remedy*. For he sinned by seeking knowledge (see Gen. 3:5; 2:9.17). Hence it was fitting that by the word of *true wisdom* man might be led back to God.

100. Objections. 1. The divine nature of the Son is really *identical* with the nature of the Father and the nature of the Holy Spirit. But the Son became incarnate. Therefore also the Father and the Son became incarnate.

9. See T.Th. III, q. 3, a. 5 c; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 218-220.

10. See S.Th. III, *ibid.*, a.8 c; Cajetan, at this place. For other congruities, see Suarez, d.12 s.1 n.3.

I distinguish the major: But in such a way that the Son is really *distinct* from the Father and from the Holy Spirit, although they have *one* nature, *conceded*; in such a way that the Son is *really identical* with the Father and the Holy Spirit by reason of their one nature, *denied*. *I concede the minor and also distinguish the consequence.* The Father and the Holy Spirit would be incarnate, if the Son were *identical* with them, *conceded*; if he is really *distinct*, although they have one nature, *denied*.

I explain. We are involved in one of the greatest *mysteries* of our holy Christian religion. Therefore it suffices if no contradiction manifests itself. But there is no manifest contradiction, if we say that union of the human nature with the Word terminates *primarily* or in the proper sense in the *person*, and *secondarily* in the nature. For even though the three Persons have one nature, still they are *really distinct from one another*. Therefore a contradiction does not appear in the fact that the human nature can be united with one Person and it does not therefore have to be united with the other Persons, just as no contradiction is evident in the fact that the three Persons have *one* nature and nevertheless they are three really distinct Persons. On this very point the *Council of Toledo XI* said: "However, only the Son took the form of a servant *in the singleness of person*, not *in the unity of the divine nature*; he took it into what is *proper* to the Son, not into what is *common* to the Trinity" (D 535).¹¹

101. 2. *The Shepherd of Hermas* in his work holds for the *identity* between the Son, "suffering many trials" and therefore incarnate, and the Holy Spirit (R 89, 91). But the authority of Hermas in the early Church was very great. Therefore the consensus of the Fathers regarding the incarnation of the *Son alone* is very much weakened.

I distinguish the major: He holds this so clearly and openly that there is no room for other interpretations, *denied*; he holds it in such a way that this interpretation is probable, *conceded*. *I concede the minor and also distinguish the consequent.* If Hermas taught this so clearly and openly, *I bypass the consequent*; otherwise, *denied*.

I explain. The mind and way of speaking of Hermas in his work open the door to great confusion. Therefore, although we admit that he *really* did identify the Son with the Holy Spirit, it may be well explained that the Christians of the early Church, who for other reasons venerated this book, did not shudder at the opinions not in harmony with tradition.¹²

102. Scholium 1. *It is most fitting for the person to assume a created nature, but secondarily for the nature.* Surely it is fitting for the *person*, for the person in such an assumption is both the principle and the terminus. It is the *principle*, for it is really fitting for the person *to act*, but the assumption of flesh took place by divine *action*. It is the *terminus*, because the union was made *in the person*, not in the nature, as we saw above in theses 2 and 3. Therefore it is *most properly* fitting for the *person* to assume a nature.

11. See Suarez, d.12 s.1 n.4-11; s.2; Salmanticenses, d.8 dub.2.

12. On the authority of Hermas in the primeval Church and on his teaching, see G. Bareille, *Hermas*: DTC 6,2278-2281. Already in 1934 D'Ales wrote: "You will work in vain trying to explain that Christology [of Hermas]," (*De Deo trino* [Paris] 99). On a certain objection from Hilary of Poitiers, see Giamberardini, *De incarnatione*...: DivThom (Pi) 24 (1947) 37f.

It is also *fitting* for the nature, because to be the *principle* of assumption is fitting for the divine nature according to itself, since *by its power* the assumption is made. But to be the *terminus* of assumption is fitting to the divine nature by reason of the person in whom it is considered. But *secondarily* it is fitting for the nature, because to be a terminus is not fitting for the nature *according to itself*, but only *by reason of the person* in whom it is considered.¹³

103. Scholium 2. *On the assuming divine nature, abstracted by the intellect from the divine personality.* These words and St. Thomas, from whom they are taken, can be understood in a twofold sense. The first sense is *conditioned* and indeed from an impossible hypothesis, that is, if the divine relations are abstracted not only from the act of incarnation but also *from the divinity itself*; so that thus the sense of the question is, whether, if the divine nature is understood to be in itself without the relations, this divine nature would still be able to assume.

The response must be that the nature in this case could assume. Now indeed it is fitting for the nature to assume by reason of the *relative* person; but if the relations are abstracted, an *absolute* person would remain, for, “in God what is (*quod est*) and by what it is (*quo est*) are the same thing,” and thus by reason of that absolute person a nature could be assumed.

104. The second sense is *absolute*, by abstracting the relations not from the divinity itself, but only *from the act of incarnation*; so that thus the sense of the question is, whether, since God exists as he is, that is, one in substance and three in persons, this God could, inasmuch as he is this God, *according to himself*, not by reason of the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, assume, that is, both make and terminate an assumption. In other words, whether, while the nature is existing joined to the relations, it could nevertheless assume through those things that precisely agree with it *so that it might be abstracted from the relations*.

The response here is also affirmative. In this sense, the persons not according to themselves, but by reason of the subsisting nature, that is, inasmuch as they are *this God*, primarily per se would terminate the assumption. The common opinion of theologians runs along this line.¹⁴

105. Scholium 3. *Several divine persons assuming one human nature.* St. Thomas and other theologians generally hold that this is possible. The reason is because the three divine personalities, inasmuch as it depends on them, can determine the same nature, as is clear in *the divine nature*. Indeed, on the part of the nature to be assumed, that is, on the part of the human nature, there is no special repugnance. In such a case, as it seems, it would be true to say that the three divine persons are *one man* because of the one human nature.¹⁵

13. See S.Th. III, q. 3, a. 1f.

14. See S.Th. III, *ibid.*, a. 3; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.13 s.1; Salmanticenses, d.8 dub.4.

15. See S.Th. III, *ibid.*, a. 6; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.13 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.8 dub.6.

106. Scholium 4. *One divine person assuming two human natures.* The theologians along with St. Thomas generally admit this possibility. For its impossibility is not apparent *on the part of the natures*, since both are thought to be assumable and between them there is no formal repugnance with regard to the same person. Nor is its impossibility apparent *on the part of the person* assuming, since it is infinite and therefore it has infinite power of determining.

However there is a controversy whether in such a case that person subsisting in several humanities should be said to be *one man* or *several men*. St. Thomas with the Thomists holds *that there is one man*. It seems that this must be affirmed, because in this case out of both natures only *one suppositum* is constituted. Indeed, according to the common way of speaking, no suppositum is said to be simply many under some name or form, even though it may have several forms or reasons by which such a denomination could be had. Thus Christ the Lord, although he has two substantial natures, is simply one substance and not several; so also one man is one craftsman, even though he possesses many different skills.¹⁶

107. Scholium 5. *A created person assuming another nature.* St. Thomas and the Thomists say it is repugnant that a created person or personality should terminate in another nature, that is, that God cannot unite hypostatically *a created suppositum* with another nature. The reason for this seems to be derived especially from the nature of a created personality. This, as we saw above in thesis 4, is a *substantial mode*. However the mode of one thing cannot be really distinct from that thing, as it seems, unless it modifies *that thing*, but not some thing distinct. For the condition of an essential mode is that it have with that thing an intrinsic adaptation in producing its effect or its quasi-formal effect.¹⁷

108. Scholium 6. *The Father and the Holy Spirit are in Christ in a special way.* By reason of the hypostatic union of the Son, the Father and the Holy Spirit are in that humanity in a singular and higher way than they are in all other creatures. The main argument in favor of this assertion is sought from the connection that exists between the divine persons according to their real presence *because of their unity in nature*.

This special presence of the Father and the Holy Spirit in the humanity of Christ is called by some an improper *circuminsession* of these persons with the humanity of Christ. However circuminsession of this kind is only *analogous* with the circuminsession of the three persons in God. For between the humanity of Christ and the persons, who are said to dwell in it, there is no *identity of nature* on which primarily the mutual circuminsession of the three Persons in God depends.¹⁸

16. See S.Th. III, *ibid.*, a. 7; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.13 s.3; Salmanticenses, d.8 dub.5.

17. See S.Th. III, *ibid.*, a. 1 ad 2; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, d.13 s.4; Salmanticenses, d.7 dub.7.

18. See Suarez, d.12 s.1 n.12-19; Galtier, n. 185.

ARTICLE III

ON THE ASSUMED NATURE

Thesis 7. The Son of God assumed a true carnal body and a rational soul substantially united with each other.

S.Th. III, q. 3; Galtier, th. 1.

109. Connection. After St. Thomas dealt with the assuming term, he next considers the *assumed term*. But the Son of God assumed a human nature and its parts. Therefore a triple consideration presents itself: the first is, regarding human *nature itself* (q. 4); the second is, regarding *its parts* (q. 5); the third is, regarding *the order of the assumption* (q. 6). We will present the main points made by St. Thomas in q. 4 in a scholium, since they are not included in the thesis. We will treat q. 6 in the following thesis.

110. Definition of terms. *Assumed*, that is, he united it to himself.

Body. The *material* part of man or this quantified and resisting being that we bring about with us and that we sense to be our own.

A true body. Christ did not have the mere *appearance* of a body, but a real body.

Earthly body. Christ did not assume just some kind of body, for example, a *heavenly* body, but a true body of flesh and blood. Therefore Christ's body was of the same matter and nature as our body.

Soul. The *first* or *substantial* principle of life in living bodies that is different from the matter.

Rational soul. This substantial principle inasmuch as it is the first principle of understanding or thinking.

Substantially united with each other. The soul is so united to the body that it constitutes with it a *human nature* that is composed of matter and a spiritual substance, but also it is really *one* thing.

111. Adversaries. A. *Docetism* (from $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, to appear, to seem) denied that Christ had a *true body*; according to this view Christ moved about in a merely *apparent* or imaginary humanity. What the gospels and the Church teach about the birth of Christ, his life, passion and death, are thought to be a mere illusion or a false appearance. *Docetism*, rather than being the name of a particular sect, is a definite doctrinal position defended by many Gnostic systems during the first two centuries of Christianity.

Docetism appears already in the time of the Apostles. The main Gnostics

who embraced this view are Simon Magus and Saturninus and especially Marcion; Basilides and Valentinus also belong here. After the *Gnostics*, the Manicheans held this error.¹

112. In some way Appelles among the *Gnostics* denied that Christ had a carnal body, since he said that Christ's flesh was not formed from Mary but *from the stars* and from substances of a superior world, and he attributed to his heavenly body certain heavenly properties, at least logically. Valentinus more clearly denied to Christ a carnal body and proposed some kind of spiritual flesh of Christ.²

113. B. Arianism and Apollinarism denied the *soul* of Christ. *Arianism* could not understand the unity of Christ, if *two spirits*, the Word and the soul, *were present in him at the same time*. Therefore the Word was united immediately to the *flesh* or body, taking the place of the soul. Apollinaris himself (ca. 310-390) denied a human soul in Christ at the beginning of his activity.

Afterwards the same Apollinaris denied a *rational soul* in Christ, and this is the error that is signified by the word "Apollinarism." There would be in Christ an animal soul (*ψυχή*) but no intellectual soul (*νοῦς, πνεῦμα*). Above all *Apollinarism* desired to save the *unity* of Christ; according to this view, from two *complete* beings it is not possible that something truly *one* should arise; therefore something in the humanity of Christ must be lacking. What is lacking in him is that which was about to impede the unity of the whole and especially the work itself of redemption, namely, *the intellectual and free soul*. Consequently the Word became *flesh* but not *man*. The Word himself took the place of the mind in the flesh.³

114. C. Some older scholastics denied that Christ assumed a body and

1. See G. Bareille, *Docétisme*: DTC 4,1484-1493. The same author shows that the heretics, who are called docetists among the philosophers, belonged to a certain Gnostic sect in which docetism does not occupy the first place. See however, Camelot, *Ignace d'Antioche...* 19, not 1.
2. See de Appelle, Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 6-9: ML 2,762-773 (edit. Oehler, 2,435-445); D'Ales, *La Théologie de Tertullien* 188f.; E. de Faye, *Gnostique et Gnosticisme. Etude critique des documents du gnosticisme chrétien aux II^e et III^e siècles*² (Paris 1925) 173-188. On Valentinus, see Tertullian, *ibid.*, 15: ML 2,779f. (Oehler, 2,451f.); D'Ales, *ibid.*, 191, 193-195.
3. See J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes dans l'Antiquité Chrétienne* 2⁸ (Paris 1924) 94-108; F. Cayré, A. A., *Precis de patrologie et d'histoire de la théologie* (Paris 1931) 1²,436-440; Weigl, *Christologie...* 6-18. On Arianism, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,68-77. On Apollinaris, the father of Monophysitism, see D'Ales, *Apollinaire. Les origines du monophysisme*: RevApol 42 (1926) 131-149. On the historical theology of "Word-flesh" in opposition to the later theology of "Word-man," see Grillmeier, *p.cit.*, 67-20; on Apollinaris himself, *ibid.*, 102-120. And there were not lacking those who, after admitting a rational soul in Christ, said that it knew things *by uncreated knowledge*: see Suarez, d.24 s.2 n.3; Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 278.

soul *substantially united with each other*. For, they saw a human person resulting *from the union of soul and body*. Therefore they feared that a human person would be placed in Christ, if it were admitted that he assumed a body united with the soul.⁴

115. Doctrine of the Church. A. *Regarding the true and carnal body of Christ*. In addition to the clear doctrine of the *creeds*,⁵ the *Council of Toledo I* hands on expressly this truth: “Not an *imaginary* body or one constituted of form alone, but a firm one. And this one [Christ] hungered and thirsted and grieved and wept and felt all the pains of the body” (D 189). Innocent III *in the profession of faith proposed to the Waldensians*: “true man from a mother, with *true flesh taken* from the womb of his mother... he was born of the Virgin Mary by a true birth in the flesh” (D 791). *Lateran Council IV*: “Jesus Christ... conceived from Mary ever Virgin... made true man, composed of a rational soul and a *human body*” (D 801). See D 852.

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Jacobites teaches both points expressly: “It, moreover, anathematizes, execrates, and condemns every heresy that suggests contrary things... It anathematizes also Manichaeus with his followers, who, thinking vainly that the Son of God had assumed not a true but an ephemeral body, entirely do away with the truth of the humanity of Christ. And also Valentinus who asserts that the Son of God took nothing from the Virgin Mary, but assumed a *heavenly* body and passed through the womb of the Virgin just as water flows and runs through an aqueduct” (D 1339-1346).

116. B. Regarding the rational soul. See D 76, 159. *The Council of Ephesus*: “a complete man composed of *soul* and body. Rather, we say that the Word, hypostatically uniting to himself the flesh animated by a *rational soul*” (D 250). *The Council of Chalcedon*: “...truly man composed of rational soul and body” (D 301). *The Council of Constantinople II*: “...but does not confess that the union of God the Word with the flesh animated by a *rational and intellectual soul*..., let him be anathema” (D 424). *The Council of Florence*: “She anathematizes... also Arius, who by his assertion that the body taken from the Virgin *had no soul*, wanted the Deity to take the place of the soul. And Apollinarius, who, realizing, that if the soul informing the body were denied there would be no true humanity in

4. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 5 ad 1; E. Portalié, *Adoptionisme au XII^e siècle*: DTC 1,414 ad 3; Galtier, n.218f.; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*..., 2.^e part, 1,273-319; F. Pelster, S.J., *Der Oxforder Theologe Richardus Rufus O.F.M. über die Frage: "Utrum Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo"*: RechThAncMéd 16 (1949) 264-272.

5. See DTC 8,1246f.11262.1265.

Christ, posited only a sensitive soul and indeed held that the deity of the Word *took the place of the rational soul*" (D 1342-1343).⁶

117. C. Regarding the body and soul *substantially united*. *The Council of Ephesus*: "... we say that the Word, hypostatically uniting to himself *the flesh animated by a rational soul*" (D 250). See D 424, 502. *The Council of Vienne*: "... we openly confess... that the only begotten Son of God... became true man: namely, (with) a *human body* capable of suffering and an intellectual or *rational soul informing, through itself and essentially, (his) very body* (D 900).⁷

Theological note. The thesis in its three parts is *defined divine and Catholic faith* (A. B. D 1339-1346; C. D. D 900).⁸

118. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. Regarding *the true carnal body of Christ*.

1) Texts that *narrate the properties of a true carnal body* of the same nature as our body. a) Various positions of his body are mentioned: to sit (Matt. 5:1), to stand (John 7:37), to recline (Matt. 26:7), to walk (Matt. 4:18), to pray on bended knees Luke 22:41), to lie on the ground (Mark 14:35).

b) There is explicit language about Christ's head (John 19:30), eyes (John 11:41), mouth (Matt. 5:2), voice (Matt. 2:46), hands (Matt. 19:15), arms (Mark 10:16), feet (Luke 7:38), blood (26:28), side (John 19:34).

c) Christ is said to be conceived (Luke 1:31), born and wrapped in clothes (Luke 2:7), to grow and to be comforted (Luke 2:40), to be thirsty (John 19:28), to be weary (John 4:6), to eat and drink (Luke 7:34).

Certainly all of these things clearly manifest that the evangelists spoke about the body of Christ, just like the body of any other man. But if all of these things were to be taken in some kind of *apparent* or *spiritual* sense, the truth of the gospels would be destroyed.

6. For more, see DTC 8,1266-1270.

7. See DTC 8,1270. For the Council of Vienne, see E. Müller, O.F.M., *Ds Konzil von Vienne, 1311-1312. Seine Quellen und seine Geschichte* (Vorreformationsgeschichtliche Forschungen, 12, Münster i. W. 1934); for the sense of our definition, especially 352-384. Moreover, on the double sense that the definition of the Council of Vienne can have for our question, see C. Boyer, S.J., *Tractatus de Deo creante et elevante*³ (Rome 1940) 165f. For our thesis the more general meaning suffices, about which the theologians of Vatican I said: "... only this is declared, that the soul is joined to the body so that it constitutes with it a human nature, composed out of matter and a spiritual substance, but it is truly and really one. This is the very thing that the formula of the ancient Councils proclaimed: CL 7,554 c.

8. On the value of the *definition* of that part of the Decree for the Jacobites in which those things are contained that are presented for the proof, see J. de Guibert, S.J., *Le décret du Concile de Florence pour les Arméniens. Sa valeur dogmatique*: BullLittEccl 10 (1919) 154f.

119. 2) Texts that explicitly intend to prove a true body. a) *Jesus himself* Luke 24:39: *See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me, and see; for a spirit has not flesh and bones as you see that I have.* b) *The Apostles.* 2 John 7: *For many deceivers have gone out into the world, men who will not acknowledge the coming of Jesus in the flesh (ἐν σαρκί); such a one is a deceiver and the antichrist.*

3) Texts that say explicitly that Christ is a true man. a) *Jesus calls himself* “the Son of man,” which openly expresses his human quality, although at the same time it gives a hint of his messianic dignity.⁹ b) *The Apostles* say that Jesus was born of woman (Gal. 4:4),¹⁰ both a true man like Adam (Rom. 5:12-21), and a true man like us, whose mediator he is (1 Tim. 2:5).

120. B. Regarding the rational soul of Christ. 1) Texts that narrate the properties of a rational soul. The passion of anger is attributed to Christ: Mark 3:5: *And he looked around at them with anger; of reprehension or rebuke: But turning and seeing his disciples, he rebuked Peter, and said: Get behind me, Satan; of zeal: His disciples remembered that it was written: Zeal for thy house will consume me; of sadness, fear, weariness: Matt. 26:37: he began to be sorrowful and troubled; Mark 14:33: he began to be greatly distressed and troubled.* But these emotions, as spiritual, produced in the will by some object known by the intellect, suppose the presence of a rational soul, just as in other men to whom they are attributed (see below, thesis 15). Most of all, the emotions of sadness, fear, etc. cannot be present in the *Word*, which some suppose takes the place of the rational soul in Christ.

121. 2) Texts that speak explicitly about the soul of Christ. a) ψυχή. John 12:27: *Now is my soul (ψυχή) troubled.* Matt. 26:28: *My soul (ψυχή) is very sorrowful, even to death.*

b) πνεῦμα. Mark 2:8: *And immediately Jesus, perceiving in his spirit (πνεῦματι) that they thus questioned within themselves, said to them.* John 11:33: *Jesus therefore... deeply moved in spirit (πνεῦματι).* Luke 23:46: *Jesus said: Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit (πνεῦμα).* See Matt.

9. See P. Joüon, S.J., *L'Évangile de Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ* (Verbum Salutis, 5, Paris 1930) Appendix A, 601-604; F. Roslaniec, *Sensus genuinus et plenus locutionis "Filius hominis" a Christo Domino adhibitae* (Rome 1920); DTC 8,1202-1205; Cl.M. Henze, C.S.S.R., *Quis sit genuinus sensus locutionis ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*: DivThom (Pi) (1947) 69-80; J. Dupont, O.S.B., *Filius meus es tu...*: RechScRel 35 (1948) 524f.; A. Feuillet, P.S.S., *Le Fils de l'homme de Daniel...*: RevBibl 60 (1953) 344f.; Id., *Jésus et la Sagesse divine...*: RevBibl 62 (1955) 195f.

10. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,67f.

27:50.¹¹ That this *πνεῦμα* is the *Word* is sufficiently excluded by the fact that the Word cannot “cry out” nor can he be “committed” to the Father or “emitted” from Jesus by death (Matt. 27:50).

3) The texts that *say explicitly that Christ is a true man*, which we just quoted, also prove that Christ *had a truly human and rational soul*. For a *man* is composed not only by a body but also and especially by a soul.

122. C. Regarding the body and soul *substantially united with each other*. All the texts affirming that Christ was a *true man* prove this. For if in Christ the body and soul did not constitute *one* principle and *one* substance, as they do in other men, in no way could Christ be said to be a *true man*.¹²

123. Proof from tradition. A. *Regarding the real carnal body.* St. Ignatius: “But he suffered all these things for us that we might obtain salvation: and he *truly* suffered, just as he also truly raised himself from the dead, not, as some of the *infidels* say, did he suffer only *according to appearance*; they are the ones existing only apparently. Just as they think so it also happens to them, for they are without a body and like the demons” (R 63). See R 51, 62, 64. St. Melito of Sardis: “It is not necessary, for those who possess reason, from the actions of Christ after his baptism to build up and demonstrate the truth of his soul and *body* and human nature which are in agreement with us and removed from all fiction” (R. 189). Tertullian: “The Christ [of Marcion]... was not what he appeared to be, and feigned himself to be what he was not—incarnate without being flesh, human without being man, and likewise a divine Christ without being God! But why should he not have propagated also the phantom of God?... The sufferings of Christ will be found not to warrant faith in Him. For He suffered nothing who did *not truly* suffer; and a phantom could not truly suffer. *God’s entire work, therefore, is subverted*” (R 336). See R 343, 353, 357.¹³

124. B. *Regarding the rational soul.* 1) *The fact is simply affirmed.*

11. See DTC 8,1155f.

12. For more on the true body of Christ and his humanity, see DTC 8,1141-1155, 1219-1223, 1226-1230, 1237f., 1241-1246.

13. On St. Ignatius, see G. Bareille, *Ignace d’Antioche (Saint)*: DTC 7,704f. More extensively Rackl, *Die Christologie des hl. Ignatius...* 127-144. See also Camelot, *Ignace d’Antioche...* 18-20: on the place quoted from Smyrna 2.3 1, see *op.cit.* 122f. note 3f. On Tertullian, see D’Ales, *La Théologie de Tertullien* 185-200. On the many *names* with which St. Augustine designates Christ and with which he shows that Christ assumed a true body and is a true man, see in J. Mohan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustini christologicam et soteriologicam exponentibus* (Fac. Theol. S. Mariae ad Lacum, Mundelein, Ill. 1936) 19-23; on St. Augustine, see also Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie...* 52. For the many testimonies of the Fathers, see R, Index Theolog. 376f.; see DTC 4,1493,1501.

St. Clement of Rome: “Our Lord Jesus Christ by the divine will handed over his blood for us, his flesh for our flesh, and *his soul for our souls*” (R 26). St. Hippolytus: “Let us believe then, dear brethren, according to the tradition of the Apostles, that God the Word came down from heaven, [and entered] into the holy Virgin Mary, in order that, taking the flesh from her, and assuming also a *human*, by which I mean a rational *soul* (ψυχὴν λογικὴν)” (R 394). Didymus of Alexandria: “How could we know that he [Christ] became truly *animated* flesh, and not just imaginary, since the Manicheans think that he had a body only apparently, the Arians think that he lacked a soul, unless he had said: *My soul is sorrowful*, and showed fear, and took food and drink and sleep?” (R 1076). St. Epiphanius: “...he assumed flesh and a *human soul* and... he was incarnate among us not in appearance, but in truth, and he took to himself a perfect man from Mary, the Mother of God, by the Holy Spirit... I say he was a perfect man, that is, whatever is present in man and constitutes him” (R. 1086).

125. 2) The fact *is proved* from the principle of the Fathers: the Word was united to the flesh *through the mediation of the soul*. St. Gregory Nazianzen: “Mind is joined to mind, as closer and more connected, and *through it* to the flesh, intervening between the divinity and the burden of flesh.”¹⁴ St. John Damascene: “Therefore the Word of God was united to the flesh by the mediating mind, that is, it was interjected between the purity of God and the crassness of the flesh.”¹⁵

3) The fact *is proved* from another principle of the Fathers: What was not assumed was not healed.¹⁶ St. Gregory Nazianzen: “If anyone has put his trust in Him without a human mind, he is really bereft of mind, and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which He has not assumed He has not healed”(R 1018). St. Gregory of Nyssa: “...he rose from the dead... with this purpose that, remaining in both parts of his nature and manifesting their properties, he might heal the nature of bodies by his body and the nature of souls *by his soul*” (R 1055). St. Augustine: “If man had not fallen, the Son of man would not have come... For our flesh is not of a different nature than his flesh, and our soul is not of a different nature than *his soul*.

14. *Epist. 101 ad Cledonium*: MG 37,187 A.

15. *De fide orthod.* 1.3 c.6: MG 94, \1006 B. For more, see Petavius, 1.4 c.13, where he also explains the meaning of this principle. See below, n. 157f.

16. On the right understanding of this principle, see above, thesis 4, obj. 2, n. 63.

He took up this nature which he judged needed *salvation*” (R 1517).¹⁷

126. C. Regarding the body and soul *substantially united*. 1) There is *explicit* reference to the *animated flesh* of Christ. St. Cyril of Alexandria: “With a most holy body assumed from the holy Virgin and *animated by an intellectual soul* (σώμα... ψυχωθέν ψυχῇ νοερά...)” (R 2138). St. Sophronius: “and they did not move about [in the incarnate Word of God] without the flesh being *rationaly animated* (σαρκὸς λογικῶς ἐψυχωμένης)” (R 2289). Indeed, *the intimate and substantial union of the body and soul* could not be expressed more vividly than it is in this formula.

127. 2) This substantial union is asserted *implicitly* whenever Christ is said to be *a true and perfect man* and to be *consubstantial with us*. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Therefore we believe that our Lord Jesus Christ... is a *perfect man* composed of a rational soul and a body... and that he is *consubstantial* with us according to his humanity” (R 2060). St. Vincent of Lérins: “There is one and the same Christ, God and man... the same born of his mother in time, perfect God, perfect Man... in man, *perfect humanity*...” (R 2170). St. John Damascene: “Confessing, then, the same Jesus Christ, our Lord, to be perfect God and *perfect man*, we hold that the same has all the attributes of the Father save that of being ungenerated, and all the attributes of the *first Adam*, save only his sin, these attributes being body and the intelligent and rational soul” (R 2365).¹⁸

128. Theological reasoning. Regarding this whole thesis the reasons are persuasive that St. Thomas treats again and again in the 5th Question of the *Summa*. Having supposed the fittingness of the assumption of human nature, it was necessary for the Word to assume those things that pertain to *human nature*, namely, a true carnal body and a rational soul substantially

17. For more, see Petavius, 1.5 c.11 n.11-13. On the rational soul of Christ there are many testimonies of the Fathers in F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi...* (Münster i.W. 1907) in the index of names and subjects, p. 361. On the doctrine of St. Gregory of Nyssa, see J. Lenz, *Jesus Christus nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (Trier 1925). On the doctrine of St. Athanasius, see I. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., *L'anima umana di Cristo secondo S. Athanasio*: OrChP 20 (1954) 27-43; P. Galtier, S.J., *Saint Athanase et l'âme humaine du Christ*: Greg 36 (1955) 553-589. On St. Ambrose, see Gapp, *La doctrine de l'union...* 19-26. On St. Augustine, see Van Bavel, *Recherches...* 50-52, 119-145.

18. On St. Cyril, see Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 172f. On the previous works of St. Cyril, see J. Liébaert, *La doctrine christologique de saint Cyril d'Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne* (Lille 1951); but on this work, see J. Daniélou, in *RechScRel* 38 (1951) 270ff.; P. Galtier in *Greg* 33 (1952) 644-649. Otherwise than Liébaert, see G. Ioussard, *Une intuition fondamentale de S. Cyrille d'Alexandrie en christologie dans les premières années de son épiscopat*: *RevEtByz* 11 (1953) 175-186. There is more on this whole thesis in DTC 8, 1247-1262.

united with each other.

This is proved not only because otherwise it would be false to say that the Word became *man* and by his *passion* redeemed us, but also because it looks *towards the dignity of the assuming person* in order that, since he himself is the Truth, nothing fictional might be found in his work.¹⁹

129. Objections. 1. In Holy Scripture of the O.T. a soul is attributed explicitly to *God himself* (Prov. 6:16; Isa. 1:14). But this attribution can be understood only *metaphorically*. Therefore also from the cited texts of the N.T. it is not proved that *Christ truly* had a soul.

I distinguish the major. In the O.T. a soul and emotions of the soul are so attributed to God himself that they *must be* understood in the proper sense about the soul, *denied*; that they *can be* so understood, *I subdistinguish*: if these locutions are considered in themselves, *I bypass*; if they are considered in the context of the O.T. in which the simplicity and spirituality of God are extolled, *denied*.²⁰ *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* If in the N.T. there are texts that *can be* understood only about the true soul of Christ, *I bypass the consequent*; if such texts are given so that they *must be* understood as we show in the argument of the thesis, *denied*.

130. 2. The Holy Scripture of the N.T. explicitly says that Christ was sent *in the likeness* of sinful flesh (Rom. 8:3), being born in the *likeness* (σχήματι) of men (Phil. 2:7). But these words show that Christ did not have true flesh and that he was not a true man. Therefore Christ did not have true flesh nor was he a true man.

I concede the major and deny the minor. 1) Regarding Rom. 8:3. St. Paul does not say simply in the likeness of the *flesh*, but of *sinful flesh*. The meaning is that the flesh of Christ is only apparently *sinful flesh*. *Apparently indeed*, because it was flesh like the flesh of other men, which is sinful flesh. *Apparently only*, because he has in himself neither the heredity of sin nor the instrument of sin.

2) Regarding Phil. 2:7. St. Paul in this text *is not looking at the truth* of the human nature of Christ, but because of the connection of the ideas he explains that Christ *appeared* as a man. This *appearance* of a man, who is a servant and dying, has importance for the contrast with the *glorious recognition* that he praises in verses 9-11. Therefore it contains nothing against our thesis. Moreover not only in the other texts quoted in n. 119, but in this same text St. Paul openly professes that Christ is a true man who could *obey and die*.²¹

131. 3. In the Holy Scripture of the O.T. we read about certain *angels* that they ate, walked, were seen by men, and so forth. But in spite of this, it is certain that the angels

19. For more, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 137-144, 207-212.

20. See Heinisch, *Theologie des alten Testaments* 29-32. On the anthropomorphisms of the O.T., see *ibid.*, 32f.

21. For Rom. 8:3, see Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,197. More profoundly, it seems, A. Hulsbosch, O.F.S.A., *Passibilitas et mors Christi in doctrina soteriologica S. Pauli: DivThom (Pi) 21-23 (1944-46) 213f.* For Phil. 2:7, see Huby, *Les épîtres de la captivité* at this place: DBS 5,30-32.

assumed only *apparent* bodies. Therefore the argument of the N.T for the thesis is very much weakened.

I distinguish the major: But so that either from the admission of the angels (Tob. 12:14-19) or from the context, in which very diverse properties also appear that are different from those proper to men, one can deduce that *they are not true men, conceded*; so that this cannot be deduced, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the major in the same way.*²²

132. 4. The ancient Fathers often say that Christ is composed of *flesh and spirit* (σάρξ, πνεῦμα). But under the word "spirit" these Fathers were thinking about the *divinity*. Therefore these Fathers admit in Christ only flesh and *divinity*.

I distinguish the major: So that by the word "flesh" they understand the flesh *alone* in opposition to the soul, *denied*; so that under this word they understand the flesh *animated* in opposition to the *divinity, conceded*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*²³

5. St. Paul expressly says Christ is *from heaven, heavenly* (1 Cor. 15:47). But this must be taken as being *about the origin of Christ's body*. Therefore Christ had a *heavenly body*.

I concede the major and deny the minor. In this text the allusion is to what in Christ is divine and heavenly, but not to the nature and origin of his body. For Christ in verse 45 had been proposed as a *life-giving spirit* which belongs to Christ the man inasmuch as by reason of his divinity he has the fullness of the life-giving Holy Spirit. But Christ does not fully exercise this office of life-giving except after his resurrection, in which the "spiritual body" appears (v. 44).²⁴

133. Scholium 1. *On the Adamitical origin of Christ.* Although many testimonies cited in the thesis clearly say that Christ is *from Mary* and therefore takes his origin *from Adam*, nevertheless we propose this question expressly because it contributes greatly to the completion of the thesis. Indeed, *historically* Christ is a true man inasmuch as he was truly born of Mary. By this origin Christ is flesh of our flesh and bone of our bones.

There were certain ones among the Paulicians (7th century) who said that Christ took his body from the heavens, for it would be impossible for him to take it from the evil earth (see also above, n. 112). Some *pseudomystics* in the 16th century likewise held that Christ was not truly born of Mary.²⁵

134. This truth is nevertheless a *dogma of faith*, as will be proved abundantly in the treatise on Mariology, where the topic will be about Mary, the Mother of God. Mean-

22. On the doctrine and apparitions of angels in the O.T., see Heinisch, *Theologie...* 100-107.

23. See Pohle-Gierens, 37f.

24. For more, see Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,165; 2,204-209.

25. See R. Janin, *Pauliciens*: DTC 12,56-62; H. Grégoire, *Précisions géographiques et chronologiques sur les pauliciens*: Bulletin de l'Académie R. de Belgique (Classe des Lettres [1947] 5^e série, t.33) 289-324; Id., *Pour l'histoire des églises pauliciennes*: OrChP 13 (1947) 509-514. On those pseudomystics, see Pohle-Gierens, 41.

while, see D 791, 1341 (against Valentinus).

In the O.T. the Messiah was promised as the seed of the woman (Gen. 3:15), the offspring of David (Jer. 23:5), conceived and born of a virgin (Isa. 7:14).²⁶

In the N.T. in one way or another Christ is called the son of David (Luke 1:32; Rom. 1:3; see Rom. 9:5); his genealogy is presented back to David, Abraham and Adam (Matt. 1:1-17; Luke 3:23-38); also the explicit reason of his origin from Adam is given, since the Christ “who sanctifies” is of the same nature as those “who are sanctified” (Heb. 2:11).²⁷

Of the many testimonies of the Fathers it will suffice to say that they strongly insist on the formula of St. Paul: *born of woman* (Gal. 4:4). Thus, for example, Tertullian and St. Basil.²⁸ Similarly, they stress the formula: *the child to be born will be called holy* (Luke 1:35). Thus Adamantius, Eutropius, St. Ephraem.²⁹

The reason generally given for this is soteriological. Thus St. Irenaeus: “So that another fashioning might not happen, nor that there would be another fashioning that is healed, but the very same is recapitulated, while preserving the likeness.”³⁰

135. Scholium 2. *On the fittingness of assuming a human nature and also from the stock of Adam.* St. Thomas derives the fittingness, which human nature had for assumption in preference to other natures, both from the *dignity*, inasmuch as a rational being is suited to attain in some way the Word by knowing and loving him, and *from necessity*, inasmuch as man needed restoration. But these two pertain to *human nature alone*, because the sin of the angels is irreparable according to St. Thomas, as is explained at length in the treatise On the Angels.³¹

If the question does not concern the intrinsic congruity, but simply its *non-repugnance*, the more common opinion of theologians holds that not only the angelic nature but also the irrational nature can be united to God hypostatically. And there would not be lacking in God the manner or reason because of which he might assume an irrational nature decently and wisely--in order to manifest, for example, his power and to confound human wisdom.³²

136. *From the stock of Adam* the Word more fittingly assumed a human nature, “that God might assume a man from the race that was conquered, through whom he might conquer the enemy of the human race.” This was better both for the sake of *justice*, that he might satisfy who had sinned, and for the sake of *the greater dignity of man*, since the conqueror of the devil is born from the race that was conquered by the devil,

26. See Heinisch, *Theologie...* 300-303.

27. On this text in Heb. 2:11, see Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* 2,40f. For more on the Davidic origin of Christ, see DTC 8,1142-1144.

28. Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 20: ML 2,785-787 (edit Oehler, 2,457-459). St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto* c.5 n.12: MG 32,86.

29. See O. Bardenhewer, *Mariä Verkündigung* (Biblische Studien, 10,5, Freiburg i.Br. 1905) 144.

30. *Adv. haer.* 3,21,10: MG 7,955 (edit. Harvey, 2,121). For more, see Pohle-Gierens, 44; Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum...* in the Index of names and subjects, p. 361.

31. III, q. 4, a. 1.

32. See Suarez, d.14 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.9 dub.3. For more, see Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, dub.4f.

and for the sake of a greater *manifestation of God's power*, who assumed from a corrupt and weak nature that which was promoted to such great power and dignity.³³

137. Scholium 3. *On the assumed man.* St. Thomas in the same q. 4 asks whether the divine person assumed a *man*. Since the word "man" signifies human nature with a *suppositum* or as a person, and since what is assumed is not the *terminus* of the assumption, but is understood as *before* the assumption, it is clear that it is not possible with propriety to say that the Word assumed a *man*: for this would be to place in Christ two suppositums or persons or at least to suppose that the assumed nature existed before the assumption determined by a human personality.

However there are many statements of the Fathers which in one way or another say that the Word *assumed a man* or *carried about a man*.³⁴

These sayings must be understood in such a way that not two suppositums are admitted in Christ, but that, by using the concrete word for the abstract, the reality of Christ's *human nature* is extolled.³⁵

Therefore it is not surprising that *some of the older scholastics*, having badly understood this way of speaking of the Fathers, held that a *certain man* composed of body and soul from the beginning of his conception was assumed by the Word of God. This however, if it is taken strictly, is only to fall into the Nestorian heresy, although those old scholastics explicitly denied that there are two persons in Christ.³⁶

138. Scholium 4. *On the three substances in Christ.* Against the *Apollinarists* the formula "*three substances* in Christ, the Son of God" made good sense in order to designate body, soul and divinity. In this sense the formula was used by the Father at the *Council of Toledo XIV* with St. Julian, the archbishop of Toledo. However, Benedict II did not approve this formula, until, after a correct explanation of it was given by the *Council of Toledo XVI* (D 567), Sergius I acknowledged it as orthodox. The Council of Frankfurt again rejected this formula (D 613).³⁷ St. Thomas however uses it without any hesitation.³⁸

Three substances are affirmed correctly in order that expressly in Christ beside the divinity not only the body, but also the soul is posited. But three substances would be affirmed falsely, if the body and soul in Christ were *not* posited as *substantially united*.

139. Scholium 5. *On the assumed integrating parts.* It is an absolutely certain conclusion that the Word assumed all the parts that pertain to the *integrity* of the human body, for example, two hands and two ears; on this point all the Fathers and theologians

33. S.Th. III, q. 4, a. 6; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 222.225f.

34. See above, n. 42.

35. See S.Th. III, q. 4, a.3; Galtier, n.106f.

36. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 6; Galtier, n. 218f.; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 192-206.

37. See J. Forget, *Julien de Tolède (Saint)*: DTC 8,1941; Galtier, n.9, note; J. Madoz, S.J., *Le symbole du XI^e Concile de Tolède* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Etudes et Documents, fasc.19, Louvain 1938) 88ff.; F.X. Murphy, C.S.S.R., *Julian of Toledo and the Condemnation of Monothelitism in Spain*: Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck, S.J. (Museum Lessianum, Sect. hist., n.13f. [1951]) 1,369-372.

38. *In Sent.* d.6 q.1 a.3; 4 CG 34, at the beginning.

agree who speak about this matter. For Christ, as we saw in the thesis, is said to be a *perfect* man. Nothing else would be fitting both for the majesty of the Word of God, to whom that body was to belong, and the omnipotence of the Holy Spirit by whose power that body was fabricated.³⁹

140. Scholium 6. *On the assumed blood.* There is no doubt that the body of Christ had blood just like our body. But the question asked by theologians was whether the Word properly *assumed the blood so that the divine subsistence determined the blood.*

There are very few ancient theologians who think that the blood was not really assumed, but only existed *in the assumed body* and that therefore it was *assumed only mediately.*

However the most common opinion of the theologians teaches that the blood was assumed by the Word. And in order to express this point more clearly, they say that the blood was united to the Word *immediately* or not only in the hypostasis but *according to the hypostasis.*

141. The reason for this is independent from the controversial question about the information of the blood by the soul.⁴⁰ The *speculative* reason is taken from the fact that the blood truly and properly pertains to the truth of human nature.

However there are many *positive* arguments. Holy Scripture in the same way attributes the forgiveness of sins to the blood of Christ and to his body (Luke 22:19f.). Note the words of Clement VI: "...he shed not merely a drop of his *blood*—although this would have sufficed for the redemption of the whole human race *because of the union with the Word...*" (D 1025). In other documents the body and soul, regarding their union, are placed on the same level (D 256). In the Council of Trent the body and the blood in the same way are called "the parts of Christ the Lord" (D 1640). A similar argument could be made from the holy Fathers.⁴¹

142. Scholium 7. *On the assumed hair, nails, tears, sweat, etc.* Just as we said about the blood, there is no doubt that the Word had all of these. The question is whether *he assumed these things in the proper sense or not*, that is, whether he assumed these things *immediately or according to his hypostasis* and not just *mediately or in the hypostasis.*

It must be said that the Word terminates in those things to which the human hypostasis in other men terminates. Tears and sweat, for example, do not now subsist with human subsistence, although they are in man.

From this principle many consequences can be deduced, but they are not approved in like manner by all the ancient authors because of diverse and less perfect ideas about the constitution of the human body.⁴²

39. See Suarez, d.15 s.5.

40. See on this question, A. Michel, *Forme du corps humain*: DTC 6,585.

41. See Suarez, d.15 s.6; Salmanticenses, d.10 dub.1; DTC 7,521. On the distinction between the double species of blood, see Suarez, *ibid.*, n.414f.; Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, dub.2.

42. See Suarez, d.15 s.7; Salmanticenses, d.10 dub.3 n.58-60; DTC 7,521.

143. Scholium 8. *On the assumed accidents.* Much more commonly the theologians deny that an accident can be *assumed by the Word in the proper sense or in the hypostasis*. The reason is because an *accidental* form seems to be totally incapable of subsistence, since “to subsist” implies to exist essentially (*esse per se*) not only negatively but also positively, that is, *with repugnance* for existing in a subject of sustentation or dependence. Indeed, if an accident is *incapable of subsistence*, it is impossible for it to be united *according to subsistence*.

However it is clear that the Word had human accidents. But the Word was united with them *mediately* only, that is, they were *in the hypostasis of the Word*, but in the proper sense they were not *determined* by the hypostasis.⁴³

144. Scholium 9. *On the physical aspect of Christ.* Rightly it is generally affirmed by theologians that Christ had perfect beauty of his body, which it is fitting to have in a human and manly body. Therefore the opinion of a few ancient authors must be rejected who said that the appearance of Christ was despicable and ignoble.⁴⁴

43. See Suarez, d.14 s.4; d.15 s.8; Salmanticenses, d.9 dub.5.

44. See Suarez, d.32 s.2 n.3f.; Fr. Prat, S.J., *Jésus Christ. Sa vie, sa doctrine, son oeuvre*² (Paris 1933) 1,529-532; Pohle-Gierens, 45, where he also considers the apocryphal images of Christ; DTC 8,1272; L. Ferretti, O.P., *De Christo Deo et Homine pulchritudinis prototipo iuxta doctrinam D. Thomae Aquinatis*: XenThom 2,319-333. On the image of Christ, see G. de Jerphanion, S.J., *L'image de Jésus-Christ dans l'art chrétien*, in *La voix des monuments* (Etudes d'Archeologie, Nouvelle Série, Rome-Paris 1938) 1-26. Under the form of an article without the illustrations these appeared shortly before in *NouvRevTh* 65 (1938) 257-283; H. Leclercq, *JésusChrist*: DACL 7,2397-2462; G. Bardy-A. Tricot, *Le Christ*. Encyclopédie populaire des connaissances christologiques (Paris 1932) 879-975.

Thesis 8. The body and soul of Christ did not exist before they were assumed by the Word.

S.Th. III, q. 6, a. 3; q. 33, a. 3; Galtier, n.192-194; 200-203.

145. Connection. After St. Thomas treats the assumed elements, he moves on to consider the *order* of this assumption (q. 6). But there is a double order: one of *time* and the other of *nature*. We will deal with this twofold order in the assumption below in Scholium 2, n. 157f.

This question is intimately connected with what St. Thomas says in question 6, namely, whether the human body or the human soul, which the Word united with himself hypostatically, already existed *before* the Word assumed them.

146. Definition of terms. They are sufficiently clear from the explanations in the previous thesis, n. 110, and from the wording of the thesis itself.

147. Adversaries. To Origen the opinion is attributed affirming that “the *body* of our Lord Jesus Christ was *first* formed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, and *afterwards* God the Word was united with it” (D 405).¹

Origen taught that the *soul* of Christ pre-existed its assumption. According to him, the soul of Christ, just like all other souls, was created at the beginning of the world or from eternity. However this soul of Christ *alone* remained fully faithful to God. The Word united to himself this soul and, by its mediation, a perfect body.²

148. That the *body and soul* constituting a *man* pre-existed their assumption was taught by the *heretics* who said that Christ was first of all a mere man and then the Word descended into him. On this matter it is not necessary to add anything to what is explained in the thesis about the divinity of Christ.

149. Doctrine of the Church. *The body* was not formed before it was assumed by the Word. This error was *explicitly* condemned at the Synod of Constantinople under Menas the Patriarch in 543: “If anyone says or holds that the *body* of our Lord Jesus Christ was *first* formed in the womb of the holy Virgin and that after this God, the Word... was united to it, let him be

1. On the strength of the attribution of this opinion to Origen, see G. Fritz, *Origenisme*: DTC 11,1578.

2. G. Bardy, *Origène*: DTC 11,1541. On the eternity of creation in Origen, see DTC 11,1529f.

anathema” (D 405).³ *The Council of Toledo XI*: “...Mary conceived by the overshadowing of the same Holy Spirit... *In this wonderful conception* by which Wisdom built herself a house, *the Word became flesh*” (D 533f.). The Word is said to become a man *in the very conception* of Mary; therefore Mary did not *first* conceive and *then* the body was assumed by the Word. St. Gregory I the Great: “The *flesh*, however, was not first conceived in the womb of the Virgin and *afterward* the divinity entered into the flesh” (D 479).

150. The *soul* was not created before it was assumed. This error of Origen was *explicitly* condemned in the same *Synod of Constantinople*: “If anyone says or holds that the soul of the Lord preexisted... *before* his Incarnation and birth from the Virgin, let him be anathema” (D 404).

151. That *at least the body* did not exist before it was assumed by the Word, the Creeds and Councils implicitly affirm when they say that the *Word* was *born* from the Virgin or *conceived* or when they say that Mary is *the Mother of God*. Thus the *Creed of Epiphanius*: “We believe in... *the Son of God*... *generated* from God the Father... *he* was completely *begotten* of the holy, ever-virgin Mary by the Holy Spirit” (D 44). The *Word* cannot be said to be *generated* from Mary, if the human body of Christ was *first generated* and *then the Word* united it to himself. St. Gregory I the Great: “Nor was he first conceived and afterward anointed; rather, being conceived by the Holy Spirit from the flesh of the Virgin was the same as being anointed by the Holy Spirit” (D 479).

The Council of Ephesus: “For this was not an ordinary man who was at first begotten of the holy Virgin, and then the Word descended upon him; rather, (the Word) united flesh to himself from his mother’s womb and is said to have undergone begetting in the flesh in order to take to himself flesh of his own... For this reason [the holy Fathers] have not hesitated to speak of the holy Virgin as the Mother of God (θεοτόκον)” (D 251). Concerning this matter there is more in the thesis on Mary as the *Mother of God*.

152. Theological note. Related to the *body*, it is *catholic doctrine* (D 479) and it seems to be *implicitly defined* (D 251). Related to the *soul*, it is

3. On this synod, see F. Diekamp, *Die Origenistischen Streitigkeiten im sechsten Jahrhundert* (Münster i.W. 1899) 47-50; DTC 11,1577f.

at least Catholic doctrine (D 404).⁴

We assign greater theological value to the truth about the *body* of Christ that did not exist before it was assumed by the Word. For the documents of the creeds and ecumenical councils implicitly do not necessarily seem to assert more than this: *what* was provided by Mary in the conception of Jesus—*this* was assumed by the Word in the conception itself, since otherwise Mary could not properly be said to have conceived the *Word*. However this divine maternity of the Blessed Virgin essentially and absolutely would still be able to stand, even if the soul that animated the ovum provided by Mary had existed from the beginning of the world, according to the mind of Origen.

153. Proof from Holy Scripture. The argument proceeds almost in the same way as it does for the doctrine of the Church (n. 149f.). However it has its own place in the thesis about the divine maternity of Mary.

154. Proof from tradition. The main witnesses of this tradition are the *holy Fathers* who *explicitly* profess this truth. Thus St. Gregory Nazianzen: “If anyone does not believe that Holy Mary is the *Mother of God* (θεοτόκον), he is severed from the Godhead... If any assert that the *Manhood* was formed and *afterward* was clothed with the Godhead, he too is to be condemned. For this were not a *Generation of God*, but a shirking of generation” (R 1017). St. Augustine: “For he himself is the one Christ and Son of God by nature, and the Son of man who was assumed in time by grace: and he was not assumed in such a way that first he was created and then assumed, but *he was created in the very assumption*.”⁵

St. Sophronius of Jerusalem in his synodal letter to Sergius of Constantinople: “Therefore the Word who is God is incarnate... he is not joined to a *pre-made flesh*, or defiled with a preformed body that at one time subsisted in itself, nor is he joined to a preexisting soul: but then they were joined to subsistence, when the Word itself and God was joined to them... and they never existed *before* the most true union of the Word himself in them.”⁶

155. Theological reasoning. 1. From a correct understanding of the

4. On the doctrinal authority of the Synod of Constantinople, see Diekamp, *ibid.*, 50. It does not seem possible to attribute infallibility to this condemnation, even though it was approved by Pope Vigilius. On a similar case in the year 553 see, DTC 11,1587. That *both the body and the soul* did not preexist their assumption is said by Galtier (n. 200) to be a matter of Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium of the Church. And this is asserted not without a good foundation.

5. *Contra serm. Arian.* 8: ML 42,688.

6. Msi II 474 CD: MG 87,3162 B. For other testimonies of the Fathers, see Galtier, n.192-194; R. Index Theol. 386.

incarnation. If the flesh of Christ had been conceived before it was assumed by the Word, it would have had previously another hypostasis, in addition to the hypostasis of the Word of God. Therefore either the union was made *in the unity of the hypostasis* or the Word of God by his assumption *would have destroyed* the preexisting hypostasis of human nature. The first alternative is clearly contrary to what was said above in thesis 3. The other seems to be said contrary to the proper understanding of this mystery as handed down by tradition, according to which the Word by his assumption *did not destroy* any part of human nature, but only *assumed it*.⁷

2. From the fact that otherwise Mary would not be *the Mother of God*. What Mary really did in the conception of Christ was to provide the human material which, fecundated by the Holy Spirit, required that it be informed by a rational soul. However, if when the Bl. Virgin prepared this matter, or in other words, if when the Bl. Virgin *conceived*, that offspring was not assumed by the Word, it cannot be said that Mary conceived the *Word*.

156. Scholium 1. *On the immediate animation of the body of Christ.* Even though the ancient theologians were wont to admit that the human body was not informed by the soul until a certain time after conception, regarding the body of Christ they held unanimously that it was informed *in the very instant of its conception*.⁸

157. Scholium 2. *On the order of nature in the assumption.* This priority is considered either *on the part of the thing assumed* or *on the part of the agent* or *of the one assuming*.

On the part of the thing assumed. One part before another is found, as the soul before the body, both in dignity and causality; for it makes the flesh informed and consequently human. Likewise one part is found before another in dignity, not in causality, as the spirit before the soul.

158. *On the part of the agent.* Order must be observed both *in intention* and *in execution*. In the order of *intention* he assumed *the whole human nature* before its parts, that is, the body and soul. For he intends the complete reality before the incomplete, and consequently the whole before the parts. The *soul* was assumed before the body, since it is more fundamental and the quasi end or purpose of the body. *The union of the soul with*

7. See S.Th. III, q. 33, a. 3; Cajetan, at this place; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 144,146; F. Malmberg, "*Ipsa assumptione creatur.*" *Een poging tot scholastick theologische geloofsinterpretatie: Jubileum bundle Prof. Mag. Dr. G. Kreline* (1953) 63-84.

8. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 2; Backes, *op.cit.*, 231-233; A Chollet, *Animation: DTC* 1,1308-1310.1319. For more about the principles of modern biology that apply to dogma, see A. Breitung, S.J., *De conceptione Christi Domini inquisitio physiologica-theologica: Greg* 5 (1924) 391-423, 531-568; A. Mitterer, *Dogma und Biologie der heiligen Familie*. Nach dem Weltbild des hl. Thomas von Aquin und dem der Gegenwart (Vienna 1952), but in this work what is said about the virginity of the B.V.M. in giving birth, from the point of view of dogma seems to us not to be correct.

the body and the union of the body with the soul are intended before the union of the soul or body with the Word: for the body and soul are not assumed except according as they constitute the *humanity*, and therefore according as they are united *between themselves*.

But in the order of *execution* the situation is reversed, because in the execution one begins with the imperfect before the perfect is formed as a whole and completed. Therefore the assumption started with the parts.⁹

9. See S.Th. III, q. 6; Backes, *op.cit.*, 223-225; Cajetan, *In 3 q.6*; John of St. Thomas, *Isagoge*, at this place; Suarez, d.17; Salmanticenses, d.11. Several more subtle questions will be found treated in this cited references. See also Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...* 2.^a pars, 1,150-171; A. Grillmeier, S.J., *Der Gottessohn im Totenreich*: ZkathTh 71 (1949) 50f.202.

Thesis 9. The flesh and soul of Christ cannot be separated from the divinity, nor were they separated in the death of Christ; moreover, the Word remained hypostatically united even to the blood poured out in his passion.

S.Th. III, q. 50, a. 2f.

159. Connection. Although St. Thomas considers the question about the separation of the divinity from the body and soul of Christ in q. 50, where he treats the death of Christ, nevertheless we will now explain it as a certain *property* of the hypostatic union that we have considered so far. We are departing from the order of St. Thomas, because the problems that the holy Doctor treats in the questions about the mysteries of Christ, to which question 50 pertains, now more generally are handled *by the exegetes of the New Testament*.

160. Definition of terms. *To the blood poured out in his passion.* In the thesis we avoid the question whether *all* the blood poured out in the passion remained hypostatically united to the Word. We assert it about the blood *that Christ had again in his resurrected body*. According to this thesis, therefore, it would not be excluded that *some drops* of blood, if perhaps the resurrected Christ did not have them again, lost their union with the Word; moreover it seems that this must also be conceded regarding his blood shed in the circumcision.¹

161. Adversaries. A. Beside the absurd error of the *Seleucians*, according to whom Christ in his Ascension left his body on the sun, Marcellus of Ancyra (+ ca. 374) denied the indissolubility of the hypostatic union. He, among other errors, seems to have taught that the reign of Christ would have an end, because *the union of the Word with the flesh would cease* at the end of the world. The *Origenists* also thought that Christ would put off his body on the last day.²

B. *Not a few of the holy Fathers* are cited who asserted the separation of body from the divinity *in the death of Christ*. However this matter is still

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1. Gonet (d.9 a.7 § 4 n.155) holds that *some drops* of the blood shed in the passion were not *re-assumed* again in the resurrected body of Christ. St. Thomas holds that they were re-assumed, III, q. 54, a. 3 ad 3. Suarez seems to deny it, *De mysteriis...* d.47 s.3 n.8f.
 2. On the Seleucians, see DTC 14,1790 and G. Bareille, *Hermias*: DTC 6,2306. On Marcellus, see M.-D. Chenu, *Marcel d'Ancyre*: DTC 9,1993-1998; J.M. Fondevila, S.J., *Ideas cristológicas de Marcelo d'Ancyra*: EstEcl 27 (1953) 56-64. On the Origenists, see DTC 11,1583.

not perfectly clear.³

C. The question *about the blood poured out in the passion* stirred up a sharp controversy among the scholastics in the 15th century. The *Franciscans* held against the *Dominicans* that the most holy blood of Christ poured out in the passion *was separated from the divinity*.⁴

162. Doctrine of the Church. B. The Nicene-Constantinople Creed: “I believe in... one Lord Jesus Christ... and his kingdom will have no end” (D 150). This expression must be referred not to the Word as such, but *to the incarnate Word*, Jesus Christ, just like the preceding statements: “crucified... buried... rose again... ascended into heaven, he is seated at the right hand of the Father, and will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead.” *The Council of Toledo XI*: “In this Son of God we believe that there are two natures, one divine, the other human, which the one Person of Christ has so united in himself that the divinity *can never be separated* from the humanity nor the humanity from the divinity” (D 534).⁵ The Synod of Constantinople in the year 553 condemned the *Origenists* and was approved by Pope Vigilius in canon 10.⁶

163. B. An *express* declaration of the Church is not given, except *in the common opinion of theologians for centuries* and *in the Roman Catechism*.⁷ However it is deduced from the way of speaking of the creed: “who [Jesus Christ, *the Son of God*] died and was *buried*; he descended into hell” (D 30). Surely if the *body* was not united to the Word, *the Son of God* could not be said to be *buried*, and if the soul was not united to the Word it could not be said that *the Son of God descended into hell*. ”

C. Pius II forbade anyone to say that it is heretical or a sin “to hold or

3. See R. Favre, S.J., *Credo... in Filium Dei... mortuum et sepultum*: RevHistEccl 33 (1937) 687-724. There an article is mentioned by J. Lebon (RevHistEccl 23 [1927] 5-43; 209-241) who attributes this opinion to St. Athanasius, St. Hilary and others. According to Favre others must be added, such as St. Ambrose, Leporius, St. Jerome, St. Gaudentius of Brixen, St. Augustine. See also Grillmeier, *Der Gottessohn im Totenreich*: ZkathTh 71 (1949) 23-53. But this matter is not perfectly clear, as is well pointed out by D’Ales, 141. In particular, concerning St. Ambrose, see Gapp, *La doctrine de l’union...* 90-95; Drzecznic, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii de Christo...* 20-27. On St. Athanasius, see Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,88ff. On St. Augustine, see Van Bavel, *Recherches...* 67-73.
4. See DTC 7,538f.; M.-D. Chenu, *Sang du Christ*: DTC 14,1094-1096; Salmanticenses, d.10 dub.3 n.48-51.
5. On the Nicene-Constantinople Creed, see C.A. Maly, S.S., *De verbis Symboli Nicaenae-Constantinopolitano “cuius regni non erit finis”* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Munich 1939). Also usually cited are the Councils of Chalcedon (D 301-303) and of Rome (D 548), in which Jesus Christ is said to be “in two substances... *inseparably*.” However this expression in the context is referred to the fact that the two natures of Christ are not separated *in him* but are united *in the unity of the person*, contrary to the heresy of Nestorius. *Perhaps* also the idea of the non-separation of the Word from his own body during the triduum is implied: see Ortiz de Urbina, *Das Symbol von Chalkedon...* 1,409.
6. See Diekamp, *Die origenistischen...* 88-98; DTC 11,1580-1587.
7. 1,5,6.8.

believe that the most sacred blood itself... in the three days of the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, was or was not divided or separated in some manner from the divinity itself" until the matter is decided by the Holy See (D 1385).

164. Theological note. A. Against the doctrine of Marcellus of Ancyra—*defined divine Catholic faith*; against the doctrine of the Origenists—*defined implicitly* (D 150).⁸ B. *Common and certain in theology*. C. *More probable and much more common*.⁹

165. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. To *Jesus* is ascribed an eternal kingdom. Luke 1:33: *and of his kingdom [Jesus] there will be no end*. It is explicitly stated that *Jesus Christ* will remain forever. Heb. 7:24: *but he [Jesus] holds his priesthood permanently, because he continues forever*. Heb. 13:8: *Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and for ever*.¹⁰ Since *Jesus* is not mentioned except as the *incarnate* Word, it is clear that these statements cannot be referred to the Word *except as incarnate*.

B. The argument, which we deduced from the way of speaking of the creeds, can be made almost in the same way from 1 Pet. 3:19: *In which [in his spirit] he went and he [Christ] preached to the spirits in prison*. The discourse in this text is about the descent of Christ into the underworld during the three days of his death.¹¹ Certainly it can hardly be said that Christ descended into hell, if *only his soul* descended. Therefore the *Word united with the soul* descended and the soul during the three days was separated from the body, since Christ was truly *dead*.

166. Proof from tradition. A. The holy Fathers, witnesses of the tradition, in many ways propose the indissolubility of the hypostatic union. 1) *Both natures*, the divine and the human, are said *to remain in Christ forever*. St. Vincent Lerins: "For the conjunction has not changed the one nature into the other... but rather has in such wise compacted both into one, that while there always remains in Christ the singularity of one and the

8. The Nicene-Constantinople Creed is expressly cited and approved in its *definition of the faith* by the Council of Chalcedon, act.5. ACO T.2 vol.1 part 2 p. [324] 128.

9. See Salmanaticenses, d.10 dub.3 n.36-38; DTC 11,1580-1587.

10. See Lagrange, *Evangile selon saint Luc*, at this place; Bonsirven, *Epître aux Hébreux*, at this place; Spicq, *L'epître aux Hébreux*, at this place. On some difficulty from 1 Cor. 15:24-28, see Maly, *De verbis Symboli...* 49-59.

11. See U. Holzmeister, S.J., *Commentarius in epistulas SS. Petri et Iudae apostolorum* (Cursus sacrae Scripturae, Paris 1937) at this place. The whole problem of the descent of Jesus into the underworld is explained at length, 306-354. See also Bo Reicke, *The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism* (Acta Semin. N.T. Upsaliensis, ed. A. Fridrichsen, 13, Copenhagen 1946) at this place.

self-same Person, *there abides eternally the characteristic property of each nature*" (R 2170). St. Leo I the Great: "...because, although one [God] remains from eternity, the other [man] begins in time; but they are joined together in unity, and they cannot have any *separation* or *end*" (R 2199).¹² St. John Chrysostom: "He dwells forever in this tabernacle; for he clothed himself with our flesh, not in order to abandon it, but *to have it with himself forever*."¹³

2) *The error of Marcellus is explicitly condemned*. St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "But if perhaps you hear someone saying that the kingdom of Christ will have an end, denounce this as a heresy. It is another head of the dragon that recently has been moving about in Galatia."¹⁴

167. B. 1) In the death of Christ his *body* is not separated from the divinity. *The Writing against Apollinaris* which is attributed to St. Athanasius: "Therefore if the Word departed from the *body*, and thus death occurred, the Jews became strong against God, since they dissolved the indissoluble mixing... But how could a body separated from the incorruptible God remain incorruptible?" (R 800).

2) In the death of Christ *neither the body nor the soul* was separated from the divinity. St. Leo I the Great: "In the resurrection of the Savior neither the *soul* lingered in hell nor the *flesh* stayed a long time in the tomb... since the *deity*, which *did not depart from both substances of the assumed man*, what it divided by its power, by its power also joined together" (R 2210). St. Fulgentius: "... and although in the death of Christ the *soul* departed from the dying flesh, still the *divinity* of Christ could not be separated from either the assumed soul or the flesh" (R 2248). St. John Damascene: "Therefore although Christ as man suffered death, and his holy soul was separated from his immaculate body, still the divinity was separated *from neither*, that is, it was not separated in any way *either from the soul or the body*."¹⁵ See R 1055.

168. 3) It is expressly denied that the words of Christ dying on the cross: *My God, my God...* indicate a separation of the divinity from the humanity. St. Leo I the Great: "...we bade the simple and unthinking hearer not to

12. See Kuhn, *Die Christologie...*

13. *In Ioan. hom.* 11.2: MG 59,80. For many testimonies of the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.12 c.18 n.8-12.

14. *Catech.* 15,27: MG 33,910. On the vacillations of some of the older Fathers, not in condemning this error, but in judging the *personal* opinion of Marcellus, see DTC 9,1994-1996. For more on the Fathers, see Maly, *De verbis Symboli...* passim.

15. *De fide orthod.* 1.3 c.27: MG 94,1098. For more about the cited *Writing against Apollinaris* and about a certain fragment of Pseudo-Hippolytus, see Grillmeier, *Der Gottessohn im Totenreich: ZkathTh* 71 (1949) 185-197.

take the words: *My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?*, in a sense as if, when Jesus was fixed on the wood of the cross, the Omnipotence of the Father's Deity had gone away from Him; seeing that God's and Man's Nature were so completely joined in Him that the union could not be destroyed by punishment nor by death" (R 2208).¹⁶

169. Theological reasoning. A. There is no apparent reason why the Word in his glorious life should relinquish his humanity in which and with which he triumphed. The whole economy of divine providence, in which *Christ* is the one to whom all creation is ordered, requires that *Christ* should remain forever. But the *Christ* is the Word *with his humanity*.

B. St. Thomas argues in this way for the *body*: The grace of union was given by God to the body of Christ. But God deprives no one of the grace granted to him without some fault. Therefore just as before death the flesh of Christ was united according to the hypostasis to the Word, so also it remained united after death.¹⁷

But for the *soul* the argument is even stronger, because the soul is united to the Word more immediately and more primarily than the body. For the body was united to the Word *through the medium of the soul*, as we explained above in n. 157f.¹⁸

170. C. Whatever the Word assumed it never lost and it was necessary that the Word have habitually *in life* the integrity morally the same as the integrity it had *from the moment of the resurrection*. But the Word assumed blood, as we explained above in n. 140f., and that poured out blood was necessary during the time of the passion so that the body of Christ *from the moment of the resurrection* would have the same integrity. Therefore the Word did not lose the blood poured out in the passion.

171. The strength of the argument is based on the principle: "What the Word once assumed, he never lost."¹⁹ This principle, generally accepted by theologians, is valid for the *soul* of Christ *absolutely*. For the *body* it is valid in this sense, that Christ always had the same body in his earthly life as he now has in heaven. But this *identity* of the body must not be said to be precisely physical, but the same as is had in *our* bodies, which is a

16. On the history of the exegesis concerning this text of the gospels, see L. Mahieu, *L'abandon du Christ sur la croix*: MéIScRel 2 (1945) 209-242. On the text itself of Matt. 27:46 and the threefold interpretation of the Fathers—this whole matter is treated more extensively by R.T. Murphy, O.P., *The Dereliction of Christ on the Cross* (Pontificum Institutum "Angelicum," Washington 1940). For more on the testimonies of the Fathers about the non-separated divinity, see Petavius, 12, 19, 5-10.

17. See S.Th. III, q. 50, a. 2 c; Cajetan, Suarez, at this place; Backes, *Die Christologie des h. Thomas...* 233f.

18. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 3 c.

19. On the uncertain origin of this principle, see W. Schiltz, *Le problème théologique du Corps du Christ dans la mort*: DivThom (Pi) 12 (1935) 372, note 34f.

moral identity. Moreover this principle does not hold for those parts that were separated *definitively* from his sacred body, such as his tears and sweat.

Therefore certain conditions had to be added to the preceding syllogism, lest this principle be falsely applied.

172. Objections. 1. When Peter died, he is said to be buried and to be in heaven by reason of his two constitutive parts, but without the person of Peter remaining joined to the body. But the same statements are made about Christ, on which our argument is based. Therefore from the fact that it is said that Christ was buried and descended into hell, it does not follow that the *person of Christ* remains joined to the body and the soul.

I distinguish the major. This can be said truly about Peter, because the *person of Peter* in the proper sense *is nowhere, conceded*; if this person of Peter, by an impossible supposition, were *at the same time* living, *denied*. *I concede the minor and also distinguish the consequent:* if this person of Christ is *at the same time* living, *denied*.²⁰

2) If the uniting medium is removed, the two extremes are separated. But the body is united to the Word *through the medium of the soul*. Therefore when the soul is removed from the body, also the Word and the body are separated.

I pass over the major and distinguish the minor. The soul is united by a medium, in the sense that the soul is something *binding* the body to the Word, *denied*; in the sense that the soul, informing the flesh, makes it *human* and therefore suitably made assumable by the Word (see above n. 157f.), *conceded*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* If the soul were a medium truly *binding, conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

173. 3. The soul and the body are *separated* from each other by *two* hypostases. But the Word is said to have remained united with both the body and the soul *separately*. Therefore the Word, during the time of the death of Christ, was not one but *two* hypostases.

I distinguish the major. There are two *hypostases* in other living beings, *I bypass the major*; in Christ, *denied*. *I concede the minor and also distinguish the consequent.* If the separation of the body and soul would introduce regarding the body and soul of *Christ* that they are two hypostases, as with other living beings, *I bypass the consequence*; if it does not introduce this *into Christ, denied*.

In the death of Christ the body and soul are really separated *from each other*. But both remain united to the *one* hypostasis of the Word which, since it has infinite power, finds it no more difficult to determine the body and soul separated than when they are united. Therefore the body and soul even separated during the triduum of death must be said to be not two hypostases, but *one* hypostasis.²¹

174. 4. To say that the Word was *poured out in the earth* is offensive to Christian ears. But with equal right this must be said, just as it is said that the Word was *buried*, if the Word was united *with the blood poured out in the passion*. Therefore the Word was

20. See Galtier¹, n. 200.

21. See S.Th. III, q. 50, a. 3 ad 4.

not united with the blood poured out in the passion.

I bypass the major and deny the minor. In these statements it is necessary to pay close attention to how they are used. Concerning the *living Christ*, no one says that the *Word* is moved because the blood in his body is moved, even though the blood is believed to be united to the *Word immediately according to the hypostasis* (see above, n. 140f.). On the contrary, all say that the *Word* is moved, if his *body* is moved. For the blood, leaving aside other considerations, is a *part* of the body, about which properties are not predicated as they are wont to be predicated of the *whole body*. Similarly, when someone moves a finger, we are not so much accustomed to say: Titius is moved, as to say that Titius moves his finger. But when someone moves his whole body, for example, in games or in walking, then the *person himself* is properly said to be moved. Also the use of speaking about a *dead* man is that expressions, which are suitable *to the soul alone* or *to the body alone* when they are separated, are usually attributed *to the whole man*. Therefore St. Peter is said to be *buried* in Rome, but *to be living in heaven*. However the use of speaking does not extend this *exception* to the lesser parts (for the exception is that the *parts* are predicated about the suppositum); thus if it happens that the *arm* of Titius is buried in a place different from where the *body* of Titius is buried, no one says about the place where the arm of Titius is buried: Here is Titius; but he uses this expression only for the place where the body is located. Therefore it can be said correctly: *God was buried*, and not: *God was poured out*. For his *body was buried*, but *only his blood* was poured out.²²

175. 5. Many famous Fathers held that the *body of Christ was separated from the divinity during the three days of his death*. But this testimony of the Fathers manifests a tradition contrary to our thesis. Therefore at least the strength of our argument from tradition for this part is greatly weakened.

1) *I ask for proof of the major*, since this matter up until now is not clearly apparent. See above n. 161, at B.

2) *I pass over the major and deny the minor.* For the very authors who recently have held that these Fathers actually taught the separation of the divinity from the body say explicitly that this fact lacks importance *for the theological value* of this doctrine.²³

176. Scholium 1. *On the cadaverous form of Christ's body during the three days of death.* The scholastics disputed a great deal over the question whether in Christ's dead body a *new substantial form* was united to that matter, that is, a cadaverous form. More generally it has been affirmed, and rightly so, as it seems. For as a consequence of the Aristotelian doctrine about matter and form, and as a consequence of the doctrine of *one form* in a man, in the death of other men a new form of the cadaver is introduced into the matter of the body. However, the Scotists deny this; according to them when the soul

22. See Galtier, n. 199, note.

23. See J. Lebron, *Une ancienne opinion sur la condition du corps du Christ dans la mort*: RevHistEccl 23 (1927) 238f.; Favre, *Credo...*: RevHistEccl 33 (1937) 723f.

leaves the body the *form of corporeity* remains, which suffices to preserve the matter.²⁴

177. Scholium 2. *Whether Christ could be said to be a man or the Christ during the three days of his death.* Regarding the truth of the death of any man or animal it should be noted that the man or animal *ceases to be* a man or animal, because death takes place from the separation of the *soul*, which completes the nature of being a man or an animal. Therefore to say that Christ during the three days of his death was a *man*, absolutely speaking is erroneous. Some scholastics however have spoken in this erroneous way.²⁵ But during the three days of his death Christ can be said to be a *dead man*.

Properly and in the strict sense during the triduum he cannot be said to be *Christ*, inasmuch as “Christ” signifies subsistence in a twofold integral nature. Nevertheless by synecdoche, by attributing the name of the whole to one part, he is said to be *Christ* during the three days of death, with much more justification than St. Peter is now said to be in heaven.

He could also be said to be *Christ* during the three days, inasmuch as Christ signifies the person of the divine Word according to the disposition that it actually had during those three days, namely, because the person of the Word was united to the soul and body of Christ that were separated from each other.²⁶

178. Scholium 3. *On the adoration of the blood of Christ by chance remaining after the passion.* Blood of this kind would not now be united hypostatically to the Word, since it is not a part of the humanity of Christ either actually or potentially. However that blood would merit a very special type of adoration because of its previous union and contact with the Word and also because of its contact with the flesh of Christ.²⁷

24. See Cajetan, *In 3* q.50 a.5; Suarez, *De mysteriis...* d.38 s.3; Schiltz, *Le problème théologique...*: DivThom (Pi) 12 (1935) 361-378, 481-501.

25. See S.Th. III, q. 50, a. 4; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 234; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*, 2.^a part, 1,273-319; Pelster, *Der Oxforder Theologe Richardus Rufus...*: RechThAncMéd 16 (1949) 259-280.

26. See Cajetan, Suarez, Billuart *In 3* q.50 a.4.

27. See Suarez, *De mysteriis...* d.47 s.3 n.9f. There he also speaks about the *historical question* of the relics of Christ's blood. On this matter, see also Pohle-Gierens, 104; DTC 14,1096f.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE MYSTERIOUS NATURE OF THE HYPOSTATIC UNION

Thesis 10. The hypostatic union is a mystery in the strict sense, and therefore it cannot be demonstrated that it is repugnant.

4 CG 40f.49; Suarez, d.9 s.1; d.8 s.4.

179. Connection. Before we present an explanation of the hypostatic union itself, some special difficulties directed against this truth of the Catholic faith must be examined. But lest too much be demanded for the solution of the difficulties, we will first set forth what the powers of reason can achieve regarding this dogma.

180. Definition of terms. *Hypostatic union.* It is the substantial joining together of the Word with human nature, in virtue of which the Only-begotten Son of God is at the same time a true man, while both natures, the divine and the human, remain unconfused. We have proved this notion in the preceding theses 2 and 3.¹

A mystery in the strict sense. It is a truth that transcends not only human philosophy but also the angelic natural intelligence. Even if it is made known by divine revelation and has been accepted by an act of faith, still regarding its intrinsic possibility it remains impervious to the human intellect (see D 2856-2857, 3016).² These points are sufficiently explained in the treatise *On the True Religion*, where the existence and revelation of mysteries are considered.

181. *And therefore it cannot be demonstrated that it is repugnant.* Two points are included in these words. One, that the hypostatic union is not *something absurd*. The other, that this non-repugnance can be proved by us not positively, but only *negatively*, that is, by showing that the reasons of those opposing this dogma do not evidently prove their case. We say *and therefore*, because from the very notion of a mystery in the strict sense both its non-repugnance follows, since it is a truth revealed by God, and the merely negative way of showing this non-repugnance. For if we were

1. On other names given in the tradition to designate this truth, see DTC 7,440-443.

2. P. Descoqs, S.J., shows excellently with the almost unanimous consent of theologians that the knowledge of the *intrinsic possibility* of a mystery cannot be separated from the knowledge of its *essence*, *Le Mystère de notre élévation surnaturelle* (Paris 1938) 94-103. On a special distinction, see G. de Broglie, S.J., *Le Mystère de notre élévation surnaturelle. Réponse au R.P. Descoqs*: *NouvRevTh* 65 (1938) 1153f., note 2.

able to show it positively, we would already have grasped the intrinsic possibility of this reality, which in mysteries in the strict sense cannot be obtained even after their revelation by God.

182. Adversaries. A. The *Semi-rationalists* deny that the hypostatic union is a mystery in the strict sense. They hold that reason, given the revelation of mysteries, can, at least with the progress of philosophy, fully understand their essence. For example, Frohschammer (see D 2851-2852) expressly affirmed this about the incarnation.³

B. *Some adversaries* hold that the hypostatic union is repugnant only to the *Christian faith*. Logically those authors also would be adversaries who conceive this union only in a heretical way, like the Monophysites and Nestorians. We have already considered this in theses 2 and 3.

183. Doctrine of the Church. A. Pius IX against Frohschammer teaches that the hypostatic union is a mystery in the strict sense: “For the author teaches especially... that the most holy mystery of the Incarnation of the Lord belongs to the province of human reasoning and philosophy; and that reason, when this object is presented[to it], can by its own proper principles arrive at those [dogmas] with understanding” (D 2851). And after he presents some testimonies of Holy Scripture, which have a close connection with the Incarnation, he adds: “those mysteries are revealed to us in Christ that transcend not only human philosophy but even the natural intelligence of *angels*...” (D 2856).

Vatican Council I defined that there are mysteries in the strict sense (D 3015 and especially 3016). Indeed as we will immediately prove, tradition testifies to the fact that the Incarnation pertains to mysteries in the *strict* sense.

B. It is taught by the Church in *Vatican Council I* that it is not possible to demonstrate that the hypostatic union is repugnant. There it is defined that no true discrepancy is ever possible between faith and reason (see D 3017). Actually, the hypostatic union is a dogma of faith. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that this union is repugnant to or opposed to reason.

184. Theological note. A. Regarding a mystery in the strict sense. It is *at least a doctrine common and certain in theology*, so that the contrary is false and temerarious (see D 2851, 2854). Indeed rather, *it seems to be Catholic doctrine* (D 2851 together with 2856), and perhaps even

3. Sere G. Fritz, *Semi-rationalistes*: DTC 14,1853f.

theologically certain as a conclusion from Vatican I (D 3015f.).⁴

B. Regarding the impossibility of demonstrating that the hypostatic union is repugnant. It seems to be a truth of *implicitly defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 3017). For it seems that the case about the hypostatic union is implicitly contained in the general affirmation of Vatican I. Others however say that this truth is *proximate to faith* from the same D 3017⁵ or *theologically certain*.⁶

185. Proof from Holy Scripture. It does not seem possible from Holy Scripture to prove that the hypostatic union is a mystery in the strict sense. The text that comes closest to it is 1 Cor. 2:7f.: *But we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification. None of the rulers of this age understood this.* But in order that this text could prove the point, it would have to be expressed in it not only that men but also that angels could not naturally attain the *possibility* of the Incarnation, and also not even *after* the revelation of this mystery. But this hardly seems to be contained in the text.⁷

186. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers, as a consequence of their distinction between naturally known truths and truths closed to every created intellect, even after they have been revealed (see D 2856-2857 with the note), teach quite openly that the hypostatic union pertains to these mysteries in the strict sense.

1) They say that this union is *ineffable or beyond thought*. St. John Chrysostom: "For by a Union and Conjoining God the Word and the Flesh are One... *by a certain union ineffable, and past understanding*" (R 1160). St. Cyril of Alexandria: "The manner of the incarnation is admirable and *beyond the mind and prayer*. This is a great and august mystery" (R 2138). "...in the very same way, then, in the case of the divine and ineffable dispensation, *exceeding all thought and comprehension*, I mean

4. Lugo during his time wrote: "It is certain or nearly certain that it is not possible for natural reason evidently to establish the possibility of the Incarnation" (*De Incarn.* d.1 s.1 n.1). After the documents of Pius IX and Vatican Council I this can no longer be sustained: for it is now *absolutely certain* and not just *nearly certain*.
5. For example, Galtier, th.8 at the beginning, where the proposition about which this theological qualification is concerned, is expressed thus: "that it is not repugnant that a mystery can to a certain extent be demonstrated."
6. For example, Pesch, prop.5.
7. However many theologians have used this argument; see DTC 7,1455. On the meaning that "mystery," about which the discussion is here, has in St. Paul, see Prat, *La Théologie...* 2, 3-9.50 467f.; Bover, *Las epistolas...* on Rom. 16:25-27 and on 1 Cor. 2:7. More extensively, Id., *Teología de San Pablo* (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 1946) 84-123. On the semantic evolution of this word also in the writings of the New Testament, see Jos. C.M. Fruytier, S.J., *Het woord MYΣTEPION in de Catechesen van Cyrillus van Jerusalem* (Nimegue 1950) in the introduction. On "the rulers of this age," see J. Huby, S.J., *Saint Paul, Première Epître aux Corinthiens* (Verbum Salutis, 13 Paris 1946) at this place.

the Incarnation of the One God” (R 2362). See R 910, 1014, 1103, 1953, 2134, 2219, 2281.

2) *It is expressly excluded that we can comprehend the manner of this union.* St. Gregory of Nyssa: “... *we are not capable of detecting* how the divine and human elements are mixed together” (R 1031). St. Leo the Great: “*For language does not explain, unless faith believes,* how both substances [in Christ] come together in one person” (R 2198). St. John Damascene: “Just as the Lord took on Himself flesh that subsisted in Him and was born of the holy Mother of God through the Spirit. And we know nothing further save that the Word of God is true and energizes and is omnipotent, but the manner of this *cannot be searched out*” (R 2371). See R 2048, 2054.⁸

187. Theological reasoning. It is clear that a created intellect cannot comprehend the internal possibility of the Incarnation 1) both from the divine immutability, 2) and from the infinite distance that separates God from creatures.

1) *From immutability.* Every substantial created union brings with it a certain mutation in both extremes, which seems to pertain *to the essence of such a union.* Therefore the intellect cannot at least clearly accept as possible a substantial union that recognizes *no* mutation in one of the extremes that are united.

2) *From the infinite distance.* The intellect sees the greatest difficulty in the fact that from two beings infinitely distant from each other, as are a Being from itself and a creature, there should be made something *essentially one.* Therefore it is not able, at least clearly, to understand the possibility of this union.

The history of Christological heresies, which we considered in theses 2, 3, 7, 8, abundantly proves the difficulty involved in grasping correctly what the faith teaches.

Moreover in the second part of the thesis it will be made clear how difficulties arise concerning this union that can be solved only in a negative way.

188. B. It cannot be demonstrated that the hypostatic union is repugnant. *A priori.* Truth cannot contradict truth, since the same God is the author of the light of faith and the light of reason. Therefore something revealed by God, such as the hypostatic union, cannot contradict truths known by

8. For other witnesses, see DTC 7,1456; Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum...* in the Index of names and subjects, p. 361. On the strength of this argument from the Fathers, see Suarez, d.3 s.1 n.3 at the end.

the light of natural reason.

A posteriori, by the solution of the main reasons that are adduced as proofs for such a contradiction. Those reasons are sought a) from the side of the Word, b) from the side of human nature, c) from the side of the whole composite.

189. a) *From the side of the Word.* 1. The Word was substantially united with human nature. But what is substantially united, is changed. Therefore the Word was changed.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. In things that are substantially united some change takes place *at least in one of the extremes, conceded; in both extremes, I distinguish further:* if both extremes have a natural order to each other or if they *mutually* complete each other, *conceded; otherwise, denied.* And *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

In perhaps all substantial unions that we know about naturally, one extreme is ordered to the other and they mutually complete each other. But the hypostatic union is not simply on the same level as these natural unions. For reason and faith show that one of the extremes of this union, namely the Word, *is incapable* of any real ordination or of any perfectibility in reference to the other extreme. By what right therefore is an argument taken from these created unions applied to this *unique* union?

Indeed we do not explain *positively* how God without any change provides that which creatures provide only with a change. Nevertheless Theodicy teaches that this is so where it explains the free act of creation.⁹

190. What *begins to exercise true formal causality* towards another thing, is changed. But the Word exercises true formal causality towards human nature, which it causes to subsist by its own divine personality. Therefore the Word is changed by the hypostatic union.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The Word causes the human nature to subsist by its own divine personality *by merely determining* this nature, *conceded; by really informing it, denied.* And *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

If Catholic doctrine asserted that the Word really *informs* the human nature, that would be absurd. For information in the proper sense brings it about that the form through information fulfills *its order or relation* to the matter. But the absurdity does not clearly appear in the fact that the *infinite* personality of the Word, without any change in itself, merely *determines* the human nature, or that it is the *terminus* of the union.

9. See Suarez, d.8 s.4 n.19-23; Galtier, n. 148-150.

Nevertheless all the change is in the humanity, “which is added to the Word, while the Word itself remains united but unchanged.”¹⁰

St. Thomas explains this matter by saying that union implies or connotes a *relation*: “therefore to be a man is predicated in a new way about God without his change *by the change of the human nature* that is assumed by the divine person; and therefore when it is said, “God became a man,” no change is understood on the part of God, but *only on the part of the human nature.*”¹¹

191. 3. That the Word is a man is an *intrinsic denomination* of the Word. But an intrinsic denomination cannot come *by the change alone of the other*. Therefore the Word was truly changed by the incarnation.

I distinguish the major. This denomination intrinsic in the same way as in creatures an intrinsic denomination is said from an inhering form or from an inhering mode, *denied*; it is an intrinsic denomination inasmuch as it is taken from a nature substantially united to the Word, *I subdistinguish*: so that this substantial union takes place without any change of the Word, *conceded*; with a change of the Word, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

Whether this expression “intrinsic denomination” should really be used in this case or not, has no great importance. Generally it is called an *intrinsic* denomination. Suarez prefers to call it a *medium* between extrinsic and intrinsic. For this denomination is taken from the human nature, which on the one hand is *really distinct* from the Word, but on the other hand it is *substantially united* to it.¹²

192. b) *From the side of the human nature.* The human nature that the Word assumed is said to be *substantially complete*. But from two substantially complete beings there cannot result *one substantial being* which is Christ. Therefore it is repugnant that a human nature was assumed by the Word.

I distinguish the major. Substantially complete in the realm of *nature*, *conceded*; in the realm of the *person*, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.* From two substantially complete beings in the realm of nature there cannot result one substantial being *in this realm of nature*, *conceded*; from two substantially complete beings in the realm of nature there cannot result one substantial being *in the realm of the person*, *denied*.

The explanation according to diverse opinions was given in thesis 4,

10. Suarez, d.8 s.4 n.19.

11. III, q. 16, a.6 as 2. See Cajetan, at this place.

12. See Suarez, d.8 s.4 n.21. See also Lugo, d.11 s.7 n.83f.

especially in n. 68, objection 9.¹³

193. c) *On the side of the whole composite.* Between those things that are *infinitely distant* from each other there is no proportion. But between those things that are united a certain *proportion* is required. Therefore the Word and human nature, which are infinitely distant from each other, *cannot be united*.

I distinguish the major. There is no *entitative* proportion, *conceded*; there is no proportion of relation, *denied*. *And I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

An entitative proportion is the same as a proportion in being; that is, a proportion that makes those things truly able *to be compared* in their being, so that being A can by augmentation be made equal to being B. Such a proportion between the *infinite* God and creatures is certainly not given. But from that it does not necessarily follow that the infinite *cannot be united* with the finite or that they cannot have a *relation* between themselves. Human imagination increases the difficulty when it imagines an infinite *material* distance between the Word and human nature, which no one is able to transgress. But in reality an infinite distance indicates only a defect of proportion *in being*, as we recently explained.

A proportion of *relation* of this kind in no way involves a certain natural *exigency* for union. But it is a pure *obediential* proportion *or one of non-repugnance* on the part of the human nature so that it may be assumed by the Word.¹⁴

It is better to avoid the statement that the Word is a *part* in this composition, for every part has the nature of being something imperfect.¹⁵

Other difficulties are handled in their own theses.

194. Objections. Against the *mysterious* character of the hypostatic union. 1. Something strictly supernatural can be demonstrated. But everything supernatural is of the same genus. Therefore also the hypostatic union can be demonstrated.

I deny the major.

Where the question concerns the true *demonstration* of mysteries, not about a certain probable or persuasive knowledge of their intrinsic possibility, it seems that it must be held absolutely that anything *strictly* supernatural cannot be demonstrated naturally. For Pius IX wrote against Frohschammer: "And surely, since these dogmas are *above nature*, they cannot, therefore, *be reached by natural reason and natural principles*"

13. For more on this, see Suarez, d.8 s.4 n.2-17, where it is also shown how the human nature of Christ has a natural *capacity*, but not a *passionate longing*, for its own personality, and so it does not remain *in a violent way* in the Word.

14. On the *verbal* distinction and on the *real* distinction among theologians regarding the nature of the obediential potency, but which pertains only indirectly to our thesis, see Urráburu, *Institutiones... Ontologia* 605-612.

15. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, at this place, n.6.

(D 2854).¹⁶ Therefore the major of the syllogism must be denied. There were some theologians who taught that angels, by their own natural power, comprehend the mysteries of *grace*, after they are revealed.¹⁷ In our own times the natural demonstrability of the possibility of the vision of God has been affirmed, as was explained at length in the treatise *On the One God*. Whatever must be said historically about the opinion of those older theologians, a theologian must pay attention to the healthy progress in the understanding of dogmas, and such progress has certainly been given regarding the notion of the *supernatural*.¹⁸ However the opinion of contemporary authors, who indicate the demonstrable possibility of the beatific vision, seemingly cannot be saved by the obvious meaning of the document of the Church nor does it have a firm foundation in the tradition.¹⁹ However these authors do not deny that the *Incarnation is a mystery in the strict sense* nor do they say regarding the Incarnation that a created intellect is naturally able to demonstrate *the possibility of this mystery*. Therefore they do not admit the consequent of the objection given above.

195. 2. *Naturally* it can be known that a divine person is *infinite in the nature of subsisting*. But *naturally* it is also known that the infinite in the nature of subsisting can do everything that *finite subsistences* do. Therefore *naturally* it is known that a *divine person* can do what a *human subsistence* does.

I concede the major and I distinguish the minor. *Naturally* it is known that the infinite in the nature of subsistence *contains at least eminently* every perfection that finite subsistences have, *conceded*; *naturally* it is known that the infinite in the nature of subsistence can *do formally or quasi formally* what finite subsistences do, *I subdistinguish*: if for other reasons, which we explained above in the second part of the thesis, no great difficulty appears, *I pass over this point*; if such a difficulty appears, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequence in the same way.*

196. 3. The argument from a fact to its possibility is valid. But the *devils* acknowledge Christ to be *the natural Son of God*. Therefore the hypostatic union can be known *naturally*.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The devils knew the *essence or intrinsic possibility* of the hypostatic union, *denied*; they knew the *fact* of this union, *I subdistinguish*: *naturally* they knew this, *denied*; by the mediation of the *supernatural* manifestations of God, *I pass over*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

Among theologians there is a dispute about whether the devils really knew *for certain* that Christ was God. This question is raised especially about the time of his public life *before the resurrection*.²⁰ However it seems that we must affirm that the devils knew

16. On this principle considered *theologically*, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *An supernaturalia possint naturaliter cognosci*: Ang 13 (1936) 241-248.

17. See Suarez, *De angelis* 1.2 c.29 n.7. On the question in itself, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *La possibilité de la grace est-elle rigoureusement démontrable*: RevThom 19 (1936) 194-217.

18. See H. Lennerz, S.J., *Kann die Vernunft die Möglichkeit der beseligenden Anschauung Gottes beweisen?:* Schol 5 (1930) 102f.

19. See Descoqs, *Le mystère de notre élévation...* especially 7f.21f.34-103; SThS 2, tr.1 n.60.

20. See Suarez, *De mysteriis...* d.31 s.3; Gonet, d.2 n.73; Muncunill, n.15.

for certain, at least after the resurrection of Christ, that he is the natural Son of God. For the accepted opinion of theologians teaches that the angels, during their time of trial, had some revelation of supernatural mysteries, in particular of the mystery of the Trinity, and more probably also of the *incarnation* itself.²¹ Therefore given the messianic prophecies of the O.T., Christ's explicit affirmations of his divinity, his miracles and his whole holy life, even against his will the devil had to recognize that Jesus is the natural Son of God.²² However this knowledge, obviously, was not *natural*, but supposed many *supernatural* manifestations of God and *revelation* itself.

Hence in no way does it follow that devils knew the *essence* itself or the *intrinsic possibility* of this truth. For the divine mysteries not only exceed the human intellect but also any *created* intellect (see D 3016).²³

197. Scholium 1. *On a certain probable natural knowledge concerning the possibility of the incarnation.* Some theologians have thought that the possibility of the incarnation could be known naturally with *probable* reasons. Generally however theologians are inclined to deny even this merely probable knowledge. Therefore the created intellect, left to its own resources, "either will never have any knowledge of such a mystery, or certainly, if we imagine that it happens upon such a question and wishes to consider it with its own mental power, either would refuse assent or remain in doubt, or rather it would fall into error."²⁴

198. Scholium 2. *The incarnation, a specifically Christian truth.* From what was said above, it is clear enough that no religion beside Christianity has an idea of a *true incarnation*, since this is a truth naturally surpassing every created intellect and its full revelation was given only the incarnate Word himself.²⁵ Analogies that are often derived from the history of religions are proved not to be true analogies but only apparent ones.²⁶

Rightly St. Thomas extols the incarnation: "This indeed [the mystery of the incarnation] among the divine works *greatly* exceeds reason. For nothing can be thought more wonderful, among the things done by God, than that the true God, the Son of God, should become a true man. And because it is the most wonderful of all things, it follows that all other miracles are ordered to faith in this most amazing work."²⁷

21. See S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4. For more about St. Thomas, see P. Benoist D'Azy, *Le Christ et ses Anges dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas*: BullLittEccl (1943) 94-97. Suarez, *De angelis* 1.5 s.5f. More generally, see P. Benoist D'Azy, O.S.B., *Les anges devant le mystère de l'incarnation*: BullLittEccl (1948) 87-106, 129-147.

22. See Suarez, *De mysteriis*... d.31 s.3 n.6-13.

23. For other objections, see Muncunill, n.10-15.

24. Suarez, d.3 s.1 n.4 at the end. See Pesch, n. 50f.; DTC 7,1455f.

25. On the prediction of the incarnation implied in the O.T., see Galtier¹, n.156-174. For a further explanation of individual texts, see P.F. Ceuppens, O.P., *De Prophetiis messianicis in Antiquo Testamento* (Rome 1935).

26. See DTC 7,1457f.; E. Hocedez, S.J., *L'Idée d'Incarnation et les religions non-chrétiennes*: NouvRevTh 53 (1926) 401-408; Id., *Le mystère de l'incarnation est-il spécifiquement chrétien?*: *ibid.*, 481-499. W. Staerk collects much information, but his conclusions are weak and far removed from Catholic doctrine, *Die Erlösererwartung in den östlichen Religionen* (Stuttgart 1938) (see RevBibl 54 [1947] 152-154). On the doctrine of individual religions, see Fr. König, *Christus und die Religionen der Erde* 3 vol. (Vienna 1951).

27. 4 CG 1.4 c.27. Likewise, Suarez, d.3 s.1 n.4.

199. Scholium 3. *Analogies that illustrate this mystery.* A theologian tries to obtain some small understanding of this mystery, zealously, carefully and piously seeking analogies among those things he knows naturally (see D 316). St. Thomas teaches that nothing can be found more like the hypostatic union than the union of the rational soul with the body (see above n. 78). But this union is also compared with the grafting of a young shoot into a tree, with a certain unction, with a spiritual marriage between the Word and humanity.²⁸

28. See Lercher, n. 78; DTC 7,539-541. On anointing, there will be much later, n. 217ff.

CHAPTER III

On the things co-assumed by the Word in human nature

ARTICLE I

ON THE THINGS THAT PERTAIN TO PERFECTION

Thesis 11. In the soul of Christ there was sanctifying grace that can rightly be said to be infinite and which by the ordinary power of God cannot be increased.

S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 9-12; Suarez, d.18 and d.22; Salmanticenses, d.13 and 15.

200. Connection. Up to this point St. Thomas has dealt *with the union itself* of the incarnate Word and *with the two assumed extremes*. Now he considers those things that were *co-assumed* by the Son of God in human nature. First of all he treats the things co-assumed that pertain *to perfection*; and among these, the first consideration is about the *grace* of Christ, which is the greatest perfection of the soul and is *closer* to the grace of union.¹

The grace of Christ can be looked at in two ways, namely, according as Christ is *an individual man* and according as Christ is *the head of the Church*. In the thesis we treat the grace of Christ according as he is *an individual man*.

201. Definition of terms. *Sanctifying grace*. It is a created supernatural gift, internal to a man, that is given by God not by way of an act or of a temporary help, but by way of a habit or *of a physical quality really permanent*, which makes a man just or accidentally holy.

In the soul of Christ. For sanctifying grace inheres *in the soul* like an accident in a subject. There will be more about this in the treatise, *On Grace*.

202. That can rightly be said to be infinite. The infinite in general is that which lacks an end or limit or terminus. The infinite can be such *simply* or outside its genus and *in a certain respect* (*secundum quid*) or in some genus. *Simply infinite* is what is *essentially* infinite and therefore it contains in itself every possible perfection in the area of being. God alone is infinite

1. How the notion of "things co-assumed" and the notion of those things that "follow" the hypostatic union agree and at the same time differ, see in L.-B Gillon, O.P., *La notion de consequence de l'union hypostatique dans le cadre de III^e qq. 2-26*: Ang 15 (1938) 17-34.

in this sense. *Infinite in a certain respect* is that which lacks limits only *in some particular area or in some genus*, for example, in extension, intention or duration.

The *infinite in a certain respect* can be such either *positively*, which some say also is *simply*, or *negatively*, which is also called *in a certain respect*. *Positive* is that which, in the genus in which it is infinite, *excludes every limit*. *Negative* is that which, although it is absolutely finite and enclosed within definite limits, nevertheless in its own area *has whatever it can have*.

This negative infinite can be twofold. One is *absolute* and with respect to any potency whatever, that is, what in some area has the perfection which, although positively finite, in that area is *all* the perfection possible and no other perfection *can be given* in that area. In this way the nature of each angel is negatively infinite in its own species, in the opinion of St. Thomas and of those who think that each angel constitutes his own individual species. For it is repugnant that there should be another nature in such a species. A second negative infinite can be *not completely absolute* but *only through a relation to the present providence*, namely, what in some area has that level of perfection that pertains to this grade that *according to the present providence* is the highest and surpasses all other grades that are actually existing.²

203. The habitual grace of Christ can be considered in two ways: in one way, according as it is *a certain being*; in another way, according to the *proper nature of grace*. According as grace is *a certain being*, the grace of Christ is not infinite, because nothing beside God is infinite in its essence.³ Therefore grace *in the nature of being* is finite. But the question raised in this thesis concerning grace *in the nature of grace* is whether it was finite or infinite in the soul of Christ *according to its own physical intensity*. If one were dealing with infinite whiteness in an intensive way, it would be evident that it is finite in the realm of being, since it is an accident; but one could ask whether it is infinite *in the nature of whiteness*.⁴

We assert that grace understood in this sense was infinite in the soul of Christ, not indeed positively but *negatively and only through a relation to the present providence*. In other words, the grace of Christ's soul is said to be infinite inasmuch as *it is not limited* according to any created measure, but *everything* was given to him that is *possible in this economy of providence*.

2. See Salmanticenses, d.16 dub.unic. n.16.28.

3. See S.Th. I, q. 7, a. 2. This is the common opinion of theologians: see Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.6.

4. This distinction is clearly explained by Cajetan, *In 3 q.7 a.11*.

For the grace of Christ has whatever can pertain to the nature of grace and it was given to Christ as to a universal principle of gratification in human nature.

204. *The grace of Christ cannot be increased by the ordinary power of God.* Two points are indicated. One is a corollary of the preceding assertion. For if the grace of Christ in the present economy of providence is infinite, it cannot be increased in this providence.

The other affirms that the grace of Christ can be increased by *the absolute power of God*. For something to become possible by *the ordinary power of God* signifies that it can become such, if the order established by divine wisdom remains in *the present economy of providence*. But what is done by *the absolute power of God* can be whatever *does not involve any repugnance or contradiction*.⁵

205. Adversaries. A. *Some old theologians* denied habitual grace to Christ, as something superfluous for the effect of sanctification.⁶

B. *A few ancient authors* are opposed to our thesis *through excess*; they admitted that the grace of Christ is *positively or simply infinite*, since it does not imply a contradiction that there be an intensively infinite grace in being of quality. But *some important authors* are to be mentioned here as adversaries *through defect*; they say that the grace of Christ is *only finite*, like Scotus, St. Albert the Great and Durandus.⁷ However, *regarding the matter itself* there does not seem to be any difference; these authors differ from us only because *they do not call* that perfect grace of Christ infinite.⁸

C. *St. Bonaventure, along with some other great theologians, even some Thomists*, teaches that the grace of Christ cannot be increased by *the absolute power of God*,⁹ *contrary to the more common opinion* establishing that the grace of Christ cannot be increased *only by the ordinary power of God*, but that it can be increased by the absolute power of God.¹⁰

206. Theological note. A. That Christ had *sanctifying grace* is a

5. On the history of this notion, see E. Borchert, *Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik...* (BeitrGPhMA [Münster 1940] 35,4/5) 46-74.

6. See Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.1 n.20.

7. See Suarez, d.22 s.1 n.1.

8. Minges says this expressly about Scotus, l n.524. But Durandus writes: "And so he is said not to have had grace according to measure, not because his grace was infinite, but because he had it *according to its total fullness both intensively and extensively*" (*In 3 d.13 q.1, the third*).

9. See the scholium of the editors of the Quaracchi Edition, *In 3 Sent. d.13 q.2*; Suarez, d.22 s.2 n.6f. For more on the opinion of Cajetan, see Garrigou-Lagrange, 219f.

10. For many authors on this point, see Salmanticenses, d.15 dub.unic. n.11. For an explanation of the controversy, see Schwalm, O.P., *Le Christ d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1910) 90-98.

doctrine that is *at least common and certain in theology*. And there are not lacking those who say that this doctrine is *a matter of faith (de fide) or at least proximate to faith*.¹¹

B. That this grace is *infinite* and cannot be increased by the ordinary power of God is *the more common and more probable opinion*.

207. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) John 1:14-16: *And the Word became flesh... and we have beheld his glory, glory as the only Son from the Father, FULL OF GRACE and truth... AND FROM HIS FULLNESS WE HAVE ALL RECEIVED, GRACE UPON GRACE* (χάριτι ἀντί χάριτος) (according to the Greek it is read more correctly: grace responding to grace).¹² We take from biblical theology, especially of the New Testament, that *grace* is a complex of supernatural gifts that God confers on man through Christ.¹³

That being the case, we argue. We accept the grace *that we have*, from Christ in whom *grace* exists and indeed it is there *fully*. But *sanctifying grace* pertains *essentially and fundamentally* to the grace *that we have*. Therefore there is in Christ, and indeed fully, sanctifying grace. The *minor* is clear both from the biblical theology of the New Testament and from the theological treatise, *On Grace*.¹⁴

208. 2) Isa. 11:2: *And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord. And his delight shall be in the fear of the Lord.* In this text there is a prophecy about the Messiah and it is affirmed that the Messiah will have certain created gifts of the Spirit of the Lord for the perfect fulfillment of his mission. But these gifts in the present economy are not granted by God *except with sanctifying grace*. Therefore one must conclude that the soul of Christ had not only the gifts of the Holy Spirit but also *sanctifying grace*.¹⁵

209. Proof from tradition. This doctrine appears especially in places in which *our* grace in one way or another is compared with the *grace of*

11. See Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.1 n.8; DTC 8,1280f.; Galtier, n. 318.

12. See I.M. Bover, S.J., χάριτι ἀντί χάριτος (Ioh. 1,16): Bibl 6 (1925) 454-460; P. Jouon: RechScRel 22 (1932) 206. Another view, D. Frangipane, *Et gratiam pro gratia* (Io 1,16): VerDom 26 (1948) 3-17. On the word "πλήρης" *indeclinable*, see M. Zerwick, S.J., *Analysis philologica Novi Testamenti graeci* (Rome 1953) at this place.

13. See P. Bonnetain, *Grâce*: DBS 3,701-1391. In particular on the writings of St. John, see *ibid.*, 1106-1147. On the grace of *Christ*, see moreover, *ibid.*, 1205-1214.

14. On this argument, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,74f.; Maldonatus, Toletus, at this place.

15. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 75f. On messiahship and the interpretation of this text of Isaiah, Id., *De prophetiis messianicis...* 246-248, 255-274; R. Koch, C.SS.R., *Der Gottesgeist und der Messias*: Bibl 27 (1946) 241-268; Id., *Geist und Messias* (Vienna 1950).

Christ. Thus St. John Chrysostom: “There [in the temple of Christ] is the fullness of grace, but *in men* there is just a small amount—it is but a drop from that grace” (R 1208). St. Augustine: “The Lord Jesus Christ Himself not only gave the Holy Spirit as God, but also *received it as a man*, and therefore he is said to be *full of grace*, and of the *Holy Spirit*. And in the Acts of the Apostles it is more plainly written of Him, ‘*Because God anointed Him with the Holy Spirit.*’ Certainly not with visible oil but with *the gift of grace* which is signified by the visible oil wherewith the Church anoints the *baptized*” (R 1680). St. Cyril of Alexandria: “For he [the Son] sanctifies us, since he is holy according to his nature inasmuch as he is God; but he is sanctified *with us* according to his humanity” (2088).¹⁶

210. Theological reasoning. A. St. Thomas proves that the necessity of habitual grace in the soul of Christ was not absolute, but only according to the order in conformity with things or according to the ordinary power of God.¹⁷ Three excellent reasons are adduced for this necessity.

1) The first reason is derived from the fact that the soul of Christ is *very close* to the principle of grace, namely, the Word; and therefore it receives from it the maximum influx of grace. For the closer something receptive is to the influencing cause, the more it participates in its influence. This argument *supposes* that Christ could have sanctifying grace, that is, that there was nothing unsuitable in the fact that Christ should have sanctifying grace. In our answers to the objections it will become clear how this truth could rightly be supposed by St. Thomas. From this first reason alone it will be evident how rightly it is said that the grace of union *precedes* habitual grace in Christ, not in the order of time but of *nature*.¹⁸

211. 2) The second reason is sought in the great dignity of Christ’s soul, and therefore his operations must attain God very closely through knowledge and love. This supreme propinquity is obtained by *supernatural*

16. It is clear that St. John Chrysostom is talking about sanctifying grace from what follows immediately, where the word is about “what is received in baptism is grace” (MG 55,186). On the nature of this grace of baptism, see J. Solano, S.J., *La παλιγγενεσία (Mt 19,28; Tit 3,50 según San Juan Crisóstomo: MiscCom 2 (1944) 91-138, especially 101-122. On St. Augustine, see Van Bavel, Recherches sur la Christologie..., 96-99. On the testimony of St. Cyril, see Galtier, n. 319. For more on St. Cyril, see E. Weigl, Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyril von Alexandrien (Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur-und Dogmengeschichte. Ehrhard-Kirsch, Mianz 1905) 89-92.101f.; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde. 2. Le Mystère...* 241-245. For other testimonies of the Fathers, see DTC 8,1279f. On the difficulty of some Fathers who seem to attribute the anointing by the Holy Spirit to Christ at *last in his baptism*, see Petavius, 1.11 c.9-14; Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.1 n.18.*

17. See Cajetan and Suarez, *In 3 q.7 a.1*.

18. See S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 13; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 252f. More fully, Gillon, *La notion de conséquence...*: Ang 15 (1938) 17-30. On the mind of Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, see also the scholium (ed. Quaracchi) at 3 *Sent.* d.2 q.2. Sanctifying grace does not seem to flow from the grace of union *physically*, but only *morally*. See Salmanticenses, d.13 dub2. More briefly, Suarez, d.18 s.3 n.5-16.

operations. But in order to elicit these supernatural operations the soul needs *connaturally* some internal principle elevating it *physically*, namely, sanctifying grace.

3) The third reason is taken *from Christ's relation to the human race*. For, Christ, as man, is the *mediator* between God and men and he bestows sanctifying grace on men. Therefore much more does he have it in himself. For a perfection that is communicated to an effect, pre-exists in the cause, especially if it is a *perfection simply* and the cause is also *perfect*.¹⁹

212. B. This grace is rightly said to be *infinite*. The grace of Christ is negatively infinite in the nature of grace both because *of the dignity of the divine person of the Word*, which requires that his soul be as pleasing to God even accidentally as is possible in this economy of providence, and because *of the universality in the nature of the principle of grace*, which requires that in Christ grace should not be present according to some measure, but that there be found in him whatever can pertain to the nature of grace.²⁰

213. C. The grace of Christ *by the ordinary power of God cannot be increased*. Not *from the part of grace itself*. For the measure for each form is fixed in reference to its end. But the end of grace is the *union* of the rational creature with God. However a greater union cannot be thought than that which is *in person*. Therefore the grace of Christ pertains to the highest measure of grace.

And *not from the part of the subject* or of the one receiving grace, because Christ from the first instant of his conception was a true and complete comprehensor.²¹

214. The grace of Christ *by the absolute power of God can be increased*. For this increase is not repugnant, as it seems, either from the part of grace or from the part of the subject. *From the part of grace* it would be repugnant either from the general nature of some *finite* form or from the special nature of *this* form. Indeed not every move towards infinity is repugnant *for a finite form*, because the form itself does not therefore have infinite perfection, but is always finite. *The special nature of grace* rather favors its intensity without limit, since grace is a participation in the *infinite* divine nature and so it is never equal to it.

19. S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 1; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.18 s.1; Backes, *op. cit.*, 253f.

20. S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 11; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.22 s.1; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde*, 2. *Le mystère*... 274-290.

21. S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 12; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and D.22 s.2; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas*... 254f.

From the part of the subject it does not seem that the increase of grace is repugnant, because the obediencial potency of the soul of Christ is surely finite in a categorical way and in act, but it is infinite in a syncategorematic manner and in potency.²²

215. Objections. 1. The humanity of Christ is sanctified perfectly and infinitely by *the Word*. Therefore *other sanctification* by habitual grace is superfluous.

I distinguish the antecedent. The humanity of Christ is sanctified by the Word in the area of substantial sanctity, *conceded*; accidental, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* It would be superfluous, if it were sanctified by the Word in the area of substantial sanctity and in the area of accidental sanctity, *conceded*; if it is sanctified only in the area of substantial sanctity, *denied*.

Certainly sanctifying grace is not required for Christ to be absolutely holy, since he is formally sanctified substantially by the hypostatic union of the humanity with the Word, as will be explained in thesis 12. But sanctifying grace is certainly required so that Christ may be holy *in all ways* both to elicit connaturally supernatural operations and to merit a supernatural reward *in a connatural way*. For human nature in itself does not have the principle for eliciting supernatural acts. Therefore at least, in order to elicit them connaturally, some *formal* principle elevating created nature is required. Actually sanctifying grace is an accident inhering in the soul and it forms with the soul *one* principle of supernatural operation.²³

216. 2. If the humanity of Christ has sanctifying grace *it would be deified*. But it is repugnant in Christ, who is God *by his essence*, that his humanity be deified *by participation*. Therefore the humanity of Christ does not have sanctifying grace.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It would be repugnant, if the distinction of natures did not remain with the hypostatic union, *conceded*; if such a distinction remains and therefore the soul of Christ is not divine *by its essence*, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

217. 3. The proper effect of sanctifying grace is to constitute *an adopted son of God*. But Christ is not the adopted Son of God. Therefore in Christ there is no sanctifying grace.

I distinguish the major. The proper and primary effect of sanctifying grace is to make man to participate in the divine nature, *conceded*; precisely by participating by adoptive filiation, *I subdistinguish*: in a person who is already *a natural son*, *denied*; in other persons, *I subdistinguish again*: as the primary effect, *denied*; as a secondary effect, *conceded*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

22. See Suarez, d.22 s.2 n.10; Salmanticenses, d.15 dub.unic n.34-39. On the mind of St. Thomas, *ibid.*, n.30-33.

23. Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.4 n.60-62; Suarez, d.18 s.1 n.16-20. On the question whether sanctifying grace was necessary for Christ only to act *connaturally* and to merit in the supernatural order, or was also *absolutely* necessary for him for such operations and merit, see Salmanticenses, who with the Dominicans and others defend the absolute necessity, d.13 dub.4 n.63-99.

A further explanation will be given in the thesis on Christ being *in no way* the adopted son of God, below in thesis 19.

You will find more objections against the possibility of increasing Christ's grace *by the absolute power of God*, along with their answers, in Salmanticenses, d.15 dub. unic n.30-39.

218. Scholium 1. *On the moment in which Christ has this infinite grace.* St. Thomas clearly teaches that Christ *from the first moment of his conception* had the totality of grace, but that the grace of Christ could not be increased in the course of his life (III, q. 7, a. 12). Suarez said that this opinion is *common among the scholastics*. The Salmanticenses found *no* authors opposed to this opinion. Galtier calls this opinion certain from the common doctrine.²⁴ The reason for this seems to be evident. For the grace of Christ flowed *from the hypostatic union* which took place at the first moment of Christ's conception.

Recently however P. Mingès wrote: "But according to the *Scotistic* opinion this argument [by the *cooperation* of Christ with grace] seems to require acceptance, even though Scotus himself seems to be opposed to it."²⁵ But since no other authors are adduced in favor of this opinion and the supporting reasons are not sufficiently probable, we think that the common opinion of theologians should in no way be abandoned.

219. The difficulty that can come from Luke 2:52: *And Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man*; with St. Thomas this text is usually explained by distinguishing between the *habits* of wisdom and grace and between their *effects*. In the first way there was no increase in Christ. But in the second way Christ increased, "because in the course of time *He did more perfect works*, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man."²⁶

However if we pay special attention to the use of the word *χάρις* in St. Luke's Gospel, it is obvious to say that by this word in our place is meant that Christ grew in *amiability or favor* (beauty, charm). Thus also there is even more reason in this context, which is about his growth in age or stature and in wisdom (i.e., acquired: see below, n. 285), to understand it in the sense of some *real* progress.²⁷

220. Scholium 2. *On the intensity of the grace of Christ compared to creatures.* This grace of Christ seems to be so great that whatever levels of grace are found dispersed *in all creatures*, in angels and in men, that much and even more is found united in the unique grace of Christ. This is what serious theologians generally teach.

Two main reasons can be offered for this. According to St. Thomas, "In the first

24. Suarez, d.18 s.3 n.1; Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.1 n.19f.; see d.15 dub.unic n.4; Galtier, n. 321.

25. Mingès, I n.529f. Not only Scotus but also St. Bonaventure explicitly hold the common opinion: *In 3* d.13 a.1 q.3. The Editors of St. Bonaventure's works note (Schol. *bid.*, q. 2) that *all* the ancients were in agreement on this matter.

26. S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 12 ad 3. See Salmanticenses, d.15 dub.1 n.19; DTC 8,1284; Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,76. A further bibliography is given by Knabenbauer (Cursus sacrae Scripturae) at this place.

27. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 76f.; J.E. Renie, S.M., "Et proficiebat sapientia et aetate et gratia apud Deum et homines": StudAnselm 27-28 (1951) 340-350.

instant of his conception Christ received not only as much grace as comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have” (III, q. 34, a. 4 c). And at least for the same reason the grace of Christ had to exceed the grace also of all *wayfarers*, for St. Thomas argues from the principle that he received grace *without measure*. The same is proved from universality in the nature of the principle of grace (see above, n. 212).²⁸

221. Scholium 3. *On the specific identity of Christ’s grace with our grace.* Theologians generally hold that Christ’s grace does not differ *specifically* from ours, but that it is of the same species and essential nature. But this seems to be demanded by almost all the reasons both speculative and positive that we presented in the thesis in order to prove that Christ had habitual grace.²⁹

Recently however this doctrine has been denied, but undeservedly so, as it seems.³⁰

Among the ancients the consensus was not so absolutely common regarding the *more general* question about *the impossibility of different species* of sanctifying grace.³¹

Morally or in the area of prudent judgment it is correct to say that the grace of Christ *is to be distinguished essentially* from our grace. For the grace of Christ was of *infinite* dignity by reason of the divine person to whom it belonged.³²

222. Scholium 4. *On the fullness of grace in the B.V. Mary and in the other saints.* Since St. Thomas distinguishes a double fullness of grace—one *on the part of grace itself*, and this is proper to Christ, the other *on the part of the subject*, that is, the subject has all the grace that is required *according to its condition or status*. In this sense not only Christ, but also the B.V. Mary, St. Stephen and the Apostles are said to be full of grace or filled by the Holy Spirit (III, q. 7, a. 10).

Therefore the grace of Christ was as great as it can be in this order of providence. The grace of the other saints, which we just spoke about, was as great as was necessary *for their status*, but not as great as it could be *in itself* and *absolutely*, for this was proper to the grace of Christ alone.³³

223. Scholium 5. *On the other supernatural gifts of Christ’s soul.* Together with sanctifying grace other supernatural habits of virtues and gifts, which are in other just persons, were infused into the soul of Christ.

Regarding the virtues, the reason is because just as in man it is not just the essence

28. See Suarez, d.22 s.2 n.12; Salmanticenses, d.15 dub.unic.n.3f. Concerning the question whether the grace of the wayfarer is in its essence quantitatively less than the grace of comprehensors or not, the authors differ: Cajetan says yes and Suarez says no. See these authors in commentary on III, q. 34, a. 4. Suarez treats this question more at length in his treatise, *De caritate*, d.3 a.4.

29. See Suarez, d.18 s.2 n.8; Salmanticenses, d.13 dub1 n.11f. The question is more difficult *about the modal diversity* between the grace of Christ and our grace: see Suarez, *loc. cit.*, n.9; Salmanticenses, *loc.cit.*, n.13-15.

30. See A. Ceccato, *La specie della grazia abituale di Cristo secondo San Tomaso*: DivThom (Pi) 17 (1940) 193-214, 289-309, where P. Mattiussi and Cardinal Billot are refuted.

31. See DTC 8,1283.

32. See Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.1 n.16, against the Scotists.

33. See Salmanticenses, d.15 dub.unic. n.25.

of the soul but also there are the powers of the soul, so in the supernatural order there is not just *grace*, which is added to the *nature*, but also there must be *virtues*, which are added to the powers. However the grace of Christ was perfect, and therefore from it flowed the virtues to perfect the individual powers of the soul with regard to all the acts of the soul (III, q. 7, a. 2).³⁴

224. He had all the *virtues* that are not in conflict with the hypostatic union and the status of a comprehensor. He did not have theological *faith*, because he was always blessed. This is the common opinion of the scholastics.³⁵ Christ did not have *hope*, because hope is a virtue looking towards God as an object *not yet possessed*.³⁶ Christ received *the per se infused moral virtues* at the beginning of his conception, but without the imperfections which either suppose sin or are repugnant to the state of beatitude. For what is granted to other just persons, it would be bad to deny to Christ. Much more commonly theologians deny that Christ had *penance*; but perhaps a type of penance can be placed in him which concerns *not his own sin* but sin absolutely *as an offense against God*.³⁷ Christ also had *per se acquired virtues*; but it is disputed whether he accepted them as *per accidens infused* or *he acquired them by his own proper acts, just as other just persons do*.³⁸

225. Scholium 6. *On charismatic graces (gratiis gratis datis).* With St. Thomas it must be held that in Christ all the excellent charismatic graces were present. For these graces are ordered to the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. Christ is the first and principal teacher of the faith.³⁹

226. Scholium 7. *On actual grace.* Christ received *helping actual grace* in order to elicit supernatural acts. Whether the beatific *vision* itself for him took the place of *antecedent grace (gratia excitans)* is a point that is not sufficiently clear.⁴⁰

227. Scholium 8. *On the grace of the Head.* From the eminence of the habitual grace that Christ received, it belongs to him that that grace should be communicated to others. But this is what pertains to the nature of a *Head*, and therefore according to its essence his personal grace as that by which the soul of Christ is justified is the *same as the grace according to which he is the Head of the Church justifying others*; however the

34. See Suarez, d.20; DTC 8,1287f.

35. See S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 3; Salmanticenses, d.14 dub.2 n.31f.

36. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 4. Further questions about hope depend on the doctrine one holds in the treatise on the virtues. See Suarez, *in 3 q.7 a.4*; Salmanticenses, d.14 dub.2 n.33f.; DTC 8,1285f.; P. Charles, S.J., *Spes Christi*: NouvRevTh 61 (1934) 1009-1021; 64 (1937) 1057-1075.

37. See Suarez, d.19 s.1; Salmanticenses, d.14 dub.2 n.29f.34-51; P. Galtier, S.J., *De paenitentia* (Paris 1923) n.33.

38. See Suarez, d.19 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.14 dub.1 n.6-28; DTC 8,1285.

39. See S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 7; Suarez, d.21; Salmanticenses, *In 3 q.7 a.7* (after d.14). In the same place, there is more about the *individual charismatic graces* and in particular about the graces of *prophecy*. See M.A. Van den Oudenrijn, O.P., *Summae Theologicae de Christo propheta doctrina*: XenThom 2,335-347. For the teaching of Holy Scripture, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,77f.

40. See Suarez, d.18 s.4 n.1-3; Salmanticenses, d.13 dub.4 n.100-105. For another opinion, DTC 8,1289.

difference is only a logical one.⁴¹

The point here concerns *Christ, according as he is a man* or according to his humanity *in a specific way*. In other words, *according to* his humanity not taken *in a reduplicating way*, as if the humanity were the *cause* why Christ is constituted as Head of the Church, but it is taken *in a specifying way* inasmuch as the humanity is the *instrumental* subject of the grace by which Christ is established as the Head (see below, thesis 19, n. 493-496). The dignity of the divine person is like the root of this dignity which is exercised in the humanity and through the humanity.

228. Christ is said to be the *Head*, like a natural head, by reason of the *order* involved, because the grace of Christ is *higher and prior* not just in time but also as the intended end; by reason of its *perfection*, because the grace of Christ possesses all *fullness*, as we proved in the thesis; by reason of its *power*, because Christ has the *power* to communicate his grace to all members of the Church. This last property supposes a *double influx of grace* in Christ. One is properly and *physically effective* and pertains to the power of performing supernatural works (more about this in thesis 14); the other influx is by way of *merit* (this will be considered in the treatise on soteriology, thesis 24). On Christ the Head, regarding external government (III, q. 8, a. 6 c), will be covered in thesis 29.

The Church is understood not only as a congregation composed of men but also of angels.

This whole doctrine about Christ as the Head of the Church, his Mystical Body, is explained in the treatise on the Church.

229. There can be some doubt about how Christ is said to be the Head of the *angels*. The difficulty, which could come from the fact that Christ does not seem to have merited grace for the angels, later will be understood better when we consider *the merits of Christ* in thesis 24, Scholium 4, n. 612. Nevertheless those who do not admit such merit of Christ, still hold that Christ is the Head of the angels; they say that it is sufficient that Christ has some influence on them pertaining to their accidental glory or supernatural knowledge. Christ *according to his humanity* can be the Head of the angels, since the influence of Christ even on men has mainly to do with their *souls*, according to which men agree with angels in a generic way, although not in a specific way.⁴²

41. S.Th. III, q. 8, a. 5 c. See Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.23 s.2 n.2-5.

42. See S.Th. III, q. 8, a. 1-6; Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.23; Salmanticenses, d.16; DTC 8,1349-1355; Benoist D'Azy, *Le Christ et ses anges...* BullLittEccl (1943) 101-117; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde. 2. Le mystère...* 297-368.

Thesis 12. The humanity of Christ is formally holy not only accidentally by sanctifying grace, but also substantially by virtue of the grace of union.

Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1; Lercher, th. 7.

230. Connection. St. Thomas does not have a special question on *substantial* holiness, but expressly deals only with *accidental holiness by sanctifying grace*, as we just explained. However, in many ways he indicates that the *grace of union* sanctifies the humanity,¹ and theologians are accustomed to consider this substantial sanctification together with the question about the accidental grace of Christ.

We are proposing this question after treating the *accidental* grace of Christ, so that we can move from what is more known to what is less known.

231. Definition of terms. *Holy* (שְׁדִיף, ἅγιος). *Etymologically* the word seems to mean “torn away,” or “separate.”² *Really:* a) if it is said *about God*, it signifies in Holy Scripture and tradition 1) that God is the subsistent, infinitely elevated *Goodness* and therefore for himself and for all other beings he is the last end and the supreme object of the moral and supernatural order. This holiness of God is called *ontological, objective, entitative, physical*.

This notion of sanctity considers in God his dignity and infinite majesty, by which he stands out above all created things, in virtue of which he is totally intangible and inviolable. But at the same time it indicates a special quality because of which this dignity is not simply called his majesty, but also his *holiness*. The reason for this is his subsistent *goodness*, which is the foundation of the whole manifestation and communication of God to external things.³ In this way the frequent and not completely easy notion of

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1. Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.6-14. However on the place in the S.Th. III, q. 22, a. 2 ad 3, it should be noted that the Leonine edition does not accept this passage in the critically restored text. There is dissent from the traditional interpretation of St. Thomas by J. Eichinger, *Die Heiligkeit der menschlichen Seele Jesu (nach dem hl. Thomas)*: ThQschr 129 (1949) 101-111.
 2. See G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Stuttgart 1932) 1,88.98; Heinisch, *Theologie des alten Testaments* 39. Differently, S. Cavalletti, *L'etimologia di q-d-sh tratta dai suoi sinonimi e dai suoi oppositi*: Ant 25 (1950) 501-512. But on ἅγιος and other Greek words, see A.M. Horvath, O.P., *Formale und objective Heiligkeit*: DivThom (Fr) 17 (19390) 263-270.
 3. See J. Müller, S.J., *Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit und deren Ausnahmstellung unter den göttlichen attributen in Bezug auf die Mitteilbarkeit an die menschliche Natur Christi*: Zkathth 20 (1896) 491-501; see 489f. On the meaning and history of the word שְׁדִיף ἅγιος Kittel has much to say about the pagans and in Holy Scripture and in rabbinic Judaism, *ibid.*, 87-112. On the Latin word “*sanctus*” in profane and Christian use, see H. Delehaye, S.J., *Sanctus. Essai sur le culte des saints dans l'antiquité* (Brussels 1927) 1-59.

holiness seems to be determined.⁴

232. Moreover the word “*sanctus*” or “holy” means, when it is said of God, 2) that God is absolutely perfect *in the moral order*, since no shadow of sin can be found in Him. The reason for this infinite perfection is that, for example, the *affection* of God always remains indefectibly joined to his infinite *Goodness*, and actually *it is identified with it*. This holiness of God is called *moral, subjective, operating*. It follows necessarily from the ontological holiness of God.⁵

233. b) Holy, when it is predicated of *creatures*, signifies 1) that the creature is objectively *united* with God, the author of the supernatural order, and participates in the divine dignity and inviolability; for example, in the temple in Jerusalem there was a part that was called “the holy of holies” (Exod. 26:34); the vestments of the priests (Exod. 42:14), the land in which God appeared (Exod. 3:5), the books of Scripture (1 Macc. 12:9), the sword by which the enemies of the people of God were vanquished (2 Macc. 15:16), and many other things are called *holy*. In like manner, persons, for example, angels (Rev. 14:10), Aaron the high priest (Ps. 106:16), any high priest (Exod. 28:36), priests (Lev. 21:6), the whole people (Exod. 19:6), all Christians (Eph. 1:1; Phil 4:21f.) are called *holy*.⁶ We say that the creature is united with God, *the author of the supernatural order*, because not just any type of union with God, *the Creator*, makes a creature holy, but what is required is union with God as subsisting *Goodness*, that *communicates* itself to men and communicates itself *actually* in the supernatural order.⁷ This holiness is called *ontological, objective, entitative, physical*.

234. In addition, the word “holy” means, when it is predicated of *rational creatures* 2) that they are perfect *in the moral order*, as remote as possible from all sin. This holiness is obtained by free acts truly ordered to God, who is infinite Goodness and the last end. This holiness is called *moral, subjective, operating*.

4. The distinction of the *moral* holiness of God from his physical or *ontological* holiness was not in use among the ancients. The first one to propose it seems to be Scheeben (see Müller, *Ueber den Begriff der Heiligkeit...: ZkathTh 20* [1896] 473.481.491). More recent theologians are won to use this distinction. A further explanation of ontological holiness indicated by us is held more or less, for example, by Lercher, n.90, note 3; J. Gummersbach, S.J., *Unsündlichkeit und Befestigung in der Gnade nach der Lehre der Scholastik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Suarez* (Frankfurt 1933) 14. See also P.Van Imschoot, *La Sainteté de Dieu dans l’A.T.: VieSpir* (1946) 30-44.
5. See Müller, *Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit...: ZkathTh 20* (1896) 500f.
6. See Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 1,89-96, 107-112; A. Michel, *Sainteté: DTC* 14,841f.; Müller, *Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit...: ZkathTh 20* (1896) 482f.
7. See Müller, *ibid.*, 486-490.

235. *The humanity of Christ is holy.* We are *not* dealing here directly with *moral* holiness; for this is treated in the thesis about Christ's impeccability. Therefore we assert that the humanity of Christ, his soul and his body, are *ontologically* holy. In other words, we affirm that the humanity of Christ objectively is united with God, the author of the supernatural order, and that it participates in the divine dignity and inviolability.

236. We would however look in vain for this notion of holiness in the older theologians. Therefore lest we have a different state of the question than they had, we should speak *also* about the holiness of the humanity of Christ which we can call *gratifying*. For the common opinion of theologians holds that formal holiness consists in the fact that man is made *pleasing* to God.⁸

But the *characteristics* of this holiness are sought in the concept of *accidental* holiness which is had through sanctifying grace. Therefore that the humanity of Christ is holy signifies that Christ *as man* is a) a participator in the divine nature, b) the Son of God (in what sense we must understand the words "as man," when we talk about the divine sonship of Christ, will be made more clear below in thesis 19, especially in n.492-494.496), c) pleasing to God, d) rightly adorned with an eternal inheritance.⁹

It is easily apparent that this *gratifying* holiness flows from the holiness that we have called *ontological*, since in the present order of providence the objective *union* of the rational creature with God (*ontological holiness*) is directed to this, and *perfect* union necessarily includes these four characteristics in man.¹⁰

237. *Not only accidentally but also substantially holy.* The *union* with God, in which ontological holiness consists, can be either accidental or substantial. A creature is sanctified *accidentally*, when between God and the creature they become *one accidentally* (*per accidens*). Concretely this union takes place in the just man by the means of *sanctifying grace*, which is a physical accident of the soul that makes a man formally a participator in the divine nature.

A creature is sanctified *substantially*, when between God and it the result is *substantially one*. Such is the case with the *hypostatic* union, in which the human nature of Christ is united with the Word by a substantial

8. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.6. On the notion of the holiness of God and Christ in St. Thomas, see. A.M. Horvath, O.P., *Heiligkeit und Sünde im Lichte der thomistischen Theologie* (Thomistische Studien [Freiburg in Switzerland 1943] t.1).

9. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.10; Suarez, d.18 s.1 n.4.

10. See Müller, *Über den Begriff der heiligkeit...*: ZkathTh 20 (1896) 504.

union according to the hypostasis, as we explained above in n. 44f.

238. Formally holy. Regarding *ontological* holiness, it signifies that the humanity of Christ is sanctified by the holiness of the Word as by a *quasi-formal* principle or as by an intrinsically *determining* form. For as a just man is ontologically holy, because he is united to God by means of sanctifying grace that inheres in the soul and is the physical *form* of the soul, in a similar way the humanity of Christ is ontologically holy, because it is united to God *immediately*, so that the Word and the ontological holiness of the Word is the *quasi-formal* principle of that holiness.¹¹

239. Regarding holiness understood in another sense, one that was used by the older theologians, namely, as *gratifying* holiness. *In the controversy with the Scotists* the word “formally” means the same thing as *actually, intrinsically, causally, radically, exigitively*. When therefore in this sense we say that the humanity of Christ is *formally* holy substantially, we want to say only that *in virtue of its union* with the Word it is sanctified substantially. In other words, “formally” *with reference to this controversy* wishes to say this: even if the humanity of Christ did not have sanctifying grace, it would be *actually holy*; for it is sanctified independently and antecedently to that grace.¹²

240. The grace of union. The substantial union of the human nature with the Word is called *the grace of union*, because actually it was accomplished by the will of God producing such a union *gratis*, without any previous merits, and because it makes the man Christ *most pleasing* to God.¹³ St. Thomas defines the grace of union thus: “it is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption” (III, q. 6, a. 6 c).¹⁴

Theologians are accustomed to consider this grace of union as sanctifying the humanity of Christ with a holiness that we call *gratifying*.

However we must add, as a result of the notion of *ontological* holiness, that the *ontological holiness* of Christ consists in the hypostatic union and therefore that the grace of union sanctifies the humanity of Christ with a holiness that is *also ontological*.

11. See Müller, *ibid.*, 485f.501-508.

12. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.1; DTC 8,1276. On the substantial holiness of Christ, in the sense of the older theologians, see J. Rohof, S.C.J., *La sainteté substantielle du Christ dans la théologie scolastique*, [Studia Friburgensia, 5. Freiburg in Switzerland 1952].

13. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 10; *Compend. Theol.* c.214.

14. On this grace, see Vugts, *La grace d'union d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin...*

241. Adversaries. If one is considering *ontological* holiness, it seems that no one can deny that it belongs to Christ's humanity. But if the question concerns *gratifying* holiness, in general the *Scotists* say that Christ's humanity is sanctified by the grace of union only *radically* or *exigitive*ly or *as a last disposition (in actu primo)*.¹⁵ Even though this question for the most part is a debate about words, still there is a certain *real* foundation for the opposition between the so-called Scotistic opinion and the more common opinion among theologians which we have defended in our thesis. The basic root of this controversy is to be placed in the different way of conceiving the *suppositum*, as will become clear later in the thesis on the satisfaction of Christ (thesis 26, n. 650, 660).

242. Theological note. Regarding substantial *ontological* holiness, it *seems to be theologically certain*. For the notion of ontological holiness seems to be what Holy Scripture presents; that being so, one can *deduce* necessarily from revelation that the humanity of Christ is holy in this way. Indeed it would seem that this is contained *formally* in Holy Scripture and Tradition, and that therefore perhaps an even higher theological note should be assigned to it.

Regarding substantial *gratifying* holiness or *the characteristics* sought in the concept of *accidental* holiness: *the more common and much more probable* opinion is that all of them are had *formally* in virtue of the hypostatic union.

243. Proof from Holy Scripture. *Ontological holiness.* A double aspect especially must be attended to lest the argument lack any force, that is, it must be proved a) that the *humanity* of Christ or Christ *as a man*, b) has *ontological substantial* holiness; therefore the texts are not pertinent that deal with the holiness of the incarnate *Word* or that properly express the *moral* holiness, and much less the *accidental* holiness of Christ.

1) Texts that say Christ is *anointed*. *Anointing* in Holy Scripture is intimately connected with *holiness*, so that even the oil of the anointing is called holy (see, v.gr., Exod. 30:25.31), which moreover appears expressly in the case of the Messiah: Dan. 9:24: *and let the Holy of holies be anointed*.¹⁶ But this anointing is referred to the *humanity* of Christ, since it

15. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.15; DTC 8,1276; Minges, 1, n.518-521. The editors of the works of St. Bonaventure (Quaracchi), Scholium, *In 3 Sent.* d.13 q.1 a.1.

16. On anointing in Holy Scripture, see H. Lesetre, *Onction*: DB 4,1805-1809. On the text of Daniel, see L. Linder, S.J., *Commentarius in librum Daniel* (Cursus sacrae Scripturae, Paris 1939) at this place. Opposed, but undeservedly, it seems, Ceuppens, *De prophetiis...* 493f.506f.521. On the name itself of Christ or the anointed one, see H. Lesetre, *Messie*: DB 4,1032-1034; Lercher, n. 78.

can hardly be said that *the divinity is anointed*,¹⁷ and this anointing signifies *ontological* holiness, as elsewhere in Holy Scripture where it means by anointing a *consecration* to God.¹⁸ It also signifies *substantial* ontological holiness, because the office of Savior and the primacy over all creatures, for which the humanity was assumed, is had by his *personal* union with the Word (see above, thesis 3, n. 35ff.). Therefore Christ with regard to his humanity is ontologically holy.

244. 2) Texts that speak explicitly about the *holiness* of Christ. Among others,¹⁹ John 6:69 seems to stand out: καί ἡμεῖς πεπιστευκάμεν... ὅτι σὺ εἶ ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ (*and we have believed... that you are the Holy One of God*; the reading here is less correct: ...*that you are the Christ, the Son of God*). The phrase “the Holy One of God” from the way of speaking of Holy Scripture signifies someone chosen by God and consecrated for some mission of salvation.²⁰ But this holiness and consecration seemingly must be understood only about the *humanity* of Christ, and on the other hand such a consecration is that objective or *ontological* holiness that we explain in the definition of terms, and it is also *substantial*, as we said in the preceding number. Therefore Christ with regard to his humanity is ontologically holy. As is apparent, this is another form of the argument presented under 1).²¹

245. Proof from tradition. Many texts of the holy Fathers are wont to be adduced in order to prove the *substantial* holiness of Christ. With difficulty however in these texts it appears that the discussion is about *both the humanity* of Christ and *about his substantial holiness*; rather, a doubt remains lest perhaps the question is about *the person of Christ* or about his *accidental* holiness through sanctifying grace, infused at the same time with the hypostatic union and derived from it.²²

Nevertheless there are so many places of the Fathers in which they talk about the *anointing* of the humanity of Christ by the divinity, in which the concepts of anointing and of ontological holiness in Holy Scripture are so clearly united, that the Fathers could hardly not understand this anointing as the *ontological* consecration of the humanity of Christ and therefore as

17. See however some individual statements of the Fathers in Petavius, 1.11 c.8 n.9-13.

18. See DB 4,1805f.; Bonsirven, *Epîtres de saint Jean* in 1 John 2:20.

19. All the texts are gathered together by Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 1,102-104.

20. See F. Tillmann, *Das Johannesevangelium* (Bonnerbibel 1916) at this place; Knabenbauer, Lagrange, at this place.

21. On some other less valid arguments, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,72f.

22. See Galtier, n. 309f.; DTC 8,1277. Substantial holiness appears clearly in St. Cyril of Alexandria: see Weigl, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrill...* 84-89.

a *holiness* that is *substantial*, as we recently explained.²³

246. Theological reasoning. Regarding *ontological* holiness itself. This ontological holiness consists in union with God, the author of the supernatural order, and consequently in participating in the divine dignity and inviolability, as we explained above in n. 233-235. But the humanity of Christ assumed by the Word is *in the unity of the person* and indeed *with the purpose* that the reparation of the *supernatural* order should take place. Therefore the humanity of Christ is holy *with ontological holiness* and it participates in an eminent way in the dignity and inviolability of God.

It is clear that this ontological holiness is given in Christ's humanity a) *substantially* and b) *formally*, because a) this humanity is united to the Word with a *substantial* hypostatic union and b) the ontological holiness of this humanity has the Word as its *quasi-formal* or determining principle, since the union *terminates* in the Word.

247. Regarding *gratifying* holiness. The characteristics of this holiness are: a) participating in the divine nature, b) divine sonship, c) being pleasing to God, d) the right to an eternal inheritance. Surely all of these are present in Christ *as man substantially and independently and antecedent* to sanctifying grace. Therefore it must be said that the humanity of Christ is *substantially in virtue of the grace of union and formally holy*.

It is not necessary to prove further that this holiness, if it happens to be given, is *substantial*; for it is clear that it does not arise from an *accidental* union of the soul with God because of sanctifying grace, but from the *substantial* union of the humanity with the Word.

248. Thus it can be proved by its special characteristics, *in virtue of the grace of union*, that the humanity of Christ is sanctified.

a) *Participation in the divine nature.* By sanctifying grace a certain participated likeness of the divine nature is communicated to man; but by the hypostatic union human nature is not said to participate in some *likeness* of the divine nature, but it is said to be united to the divine nature itself in the person of the Son. Now the *thing itself* is greater than a participated likeness of it.²⁴ Therefore Christ's human nature is *more perfectly a participator in the divine nature through the hypostatic union* than it is through sanctifying grace.

23. Many text are gathered together by Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.2; Petavius, l.11 c.8f.

24. See S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 10 ad 1; Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.10.

249. b) *Divine sonship.* By sanctifying grace we are made sons of God but *adopted* sons; *through the hypostatic union* Christ the man is so truly the *Son of God* and also the *natural* Son, that in no way can he be said to be the *adopted Son of God*. This will be proved later in thesis 19.

c) *Being pleasing to God.* Since the love of God is infusing and creating goodness in things,²⁵ it cannot be said that God does not love and is not pleased with a man to whom he has communicated a good so great that it is a personal union with the Word. Therefore *this substantial gift* constitutes that humanity as incomparably *more pleasing to God* than any habitual grace is able to make its subject pleasing to God.

250. d) *The right to an eternal inheritance.* This right is granted to man by sanctifying grace, inasmuch as by it a man is made a child of God; *and if children, then heirs* (Rom. 8:17). Now if *adoptive* sonship confers such a right, a strictly *natural* sonship confers it much more perfectly. Therefore the works of Christ are *meritorious in the supernatural order*, for this is the order of eternal inheritance in which God, as he is in himself, communicates himself to his children by the beatific vision. However this does not exclude the necessity of sanctifying grace, which *intrinsically elevates* the human nature of Christ to the supernatural order. For the hypostatic union of Christ dignifies his works as the *efficient cause (principium quod)*, because the *suppositum* is divine; however by itself it does not confer anything physical on the humanity by which the *human nature* is elevated intrinsically as the *formal cause (principium quo)*.

251. That these four characteristics of holiness are *formally* present in the humanity of Christ in virtue of the grace of union has already been explained partly in our argument, and it can be shown partly by comparison with the holiness that is conferred by habitual grace. This grace, according to all authors, formally sanctifies by conferring on the soul those four characteristics of holiness. But we have proved that these qualities are possessed *by a more excellent reason* in the soul *from the hypostatic union alone*. Therefore *formally* the humanity of Christ is sanctified by its *substantial* holiness.²⁶

252. Objections. 1. If the humanity of Christ were rendered *formally holy* in virtue of the hypostatic union, it would also be rendered *formally eternal, formally omnipotent...* But this would be the error of Monophysitism. Therefore the humanity of Christ is not made *formally holy* in virtue of the hypostatic union.

25. See S.Th. I, q. 20, a. 2 c; see I-II, q. 110, a. 1 c.

26. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.11-14, 16-20; Galtier, n. 308-314; Suarez, d.39 s.1 n.5f.

I distinguish the major. If the reason for participating in holiness were the same as the reason for participating in the other attributes of God, *conceded*; if the reason for participating in holiness is very different from the reason for participating in the other attributes of God, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

253. As is apparent from the definition of terms, *ontological holiness* consists precisely in *union* or relation with God. By this union the creature participates in the holiness and consequently in the dignity and inviolability of the holy God himself. Therefore not only the humanity of Christ, but any creature consecrated to God, which therefore is *united* with God, is made according to its level *holy* in virtue of this consecration or union with God.

On the other hand, the eternity and omnipotence of God are not participated in by *union* alone with him. For no one says that some thing is *eternal*, because it is *joined* with the eternal God. But the basic reason for this is because “to be eternal” means to have an unchanged duration without a beginning and without an end. Therefore in order for the humanity of Christ to be said to be eternal, it would be required not that it be *united* with God but that it be *identical* with him. This would involve an absurd Monophysitism.²⁷

In human affairs something similar takes place. Because someone becomes *the friend of a wise man* by that fact he is not made *wise* by the wisdom of the friend. But if someone is taken into the immediate service of the king, by this union or relationship with the king he becomes a man of great *dignity* and *estimation* through the dignity of the king.

Regarding *gratifying* holiness with its four characteristics, the difficulty is not so serious. For by it *the holiness of God in itself* is not conceived in the same way to be participated in, but, with the concept of holiness taken from *accidental* holiness, a man is constituted *pleasing* to God in the supernatural order.

254. 2. Nothing properly *divine* can be predicated of a being that is *not divine*. But the humanity of Christ is a being that is not divine. Therefore the humanity of Christ cannot be holy *formally with the holiness of God*.

I distinguish the major. Nothing properly divine can be predicated of a being that is not divine *by identity, conceded*; by a *hypostatic union, denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* If *identity* between the human nature of Christ and the holiness of God were required in order to participate in the *ontological* holiness of God, *conceded*; if only the *hypostatic union* is required, *denied*.

255. The Word *de facto* by his own subsistence is the quasi-formal or determining principle of Christ’s *human nature*. But the Word is also the quasi-formal principle of the *ontological holiness* of this nature, because *ontological holiness* consists in the *union* itself. Therefore the quasi-formal *union* must also be the quasi-formal principle of the *ontological holiness*.

27. See Müller, Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit...: ZkathTh 20 (1896) 505f.

Therefore Christ's human nature is ontologically holy *through the holiness of God*, but it has this holiness in a participated way. The whole difficulty in this matter comes from the fact that this ontological holiness of God is thought of as *a certain accidental property* of Christ's human nature. But that is impossible. The right idea here is this—that the holiness of Christ's humanity is conceived as a *substantial union* with the holiness of God. There is no difficulty with this, given the supposition of the hypostatic union.²⁸

256. 3. The primary effect of sanctifying grace is to *sanctify formally*. But the primary effect of some form cannot be provided formally by some other thing. Therefore the humanity of Christ is not sanctified formally except by sanctifying or habitual grace.

1) *I distinguish the major*. The primary effect of sanctifying grace is to sanctify formally with *substantial holiness, denied*; with *accidental holiness, conceded*. *I bypass the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way*. Formally with *substantial holiness, denied*; formally with *accidental holiness, conceded*.

2) *I bypass the major and distinguish the minor*. The primary effect of some form cannot be provided formally by some other thing *under the same reason, conceded*; *under another higher and more eminent reason, denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent*. The humanity of Christ would not be sanctified formally except by sanctifying grace, if the primary effect of some form could not be provided formally by some other thing *neither under the same reason nor under a more eminent reason, conceded*; if the effect... could be provided formally by some other thing, but only *under the same reason, denied*. The primary effect of the vegetative form is to confer vegetative life; nevertheless this same effect is given formally to animals by the sensitive form, and to man by the rational form.²⁹

257. 4. If by the hypostatic union alone the assumed human nature were rendered formally holy, and if God assumed an *irrational nature*, this nature would be made formally holy. But this is absurd. Therefore by the hypostatic union alone an assumed human nature is not rendered formally holy.

I distinguish the major. This irrational nature would be made formally holy by *ontological holiness, conceded*; with those characteristics of holiness sought from the notion of *sanctification by accidental grace, I subdistinguish*: and this sanctification is hindered by some defect *on the part of the hypostatic union, denied*; by some defect *on the part of the subject*, which, for example, is absolutely incapable of such sanctification essentially ordered to the beatific vision, *conceded*. *I distinguish the minor also*. It is absurd that an irrational nature be sanctified with *ontological holiness, denied*; with those characteristics, *conceded*.³⁰

258. Scholium 1. *On the formal cause (principium quo) or the formal reason that the efficient cause (principium quod) constitutes in the reality of formally sanctifying.*

28. See *ibid.*, 502.506f.

29. See Muncunill, n. 499; Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.1 n.15f.

30. Suarez, d.18 s.1 n.18-20.

From our thesis it is established that the humanity of Christ was formally sanctified by its assumption by the Word. Therefore in this assumption there is *something* sanctifying, or an efficient cause that sanctifies.

However in this assumption many things are involved, namely, the created mode of the hypostatic union, the personality of the Word, the divine nature really identified with this personality. The question is, therefore, which one of these was the *formal reason* that constituted the sanctifying *cause*.

Suarez says rightly that the Word and the created mode existing in the humanity are so joined together and inseparable that they can hardly be compared and as it were separated in the effect. For the created union would not be sufficient to confer such sanctification, unless because it is determined by the Word; also, the Word could not confer this sanctification, unless, by the intervening union, it determined the humanity.³¹

259. Although we wish to attribute to each thing what is *most proper* to it, the more common opinion of theologians rightly holds that not the mode but the Word is the quasi-form sanctifying the humanity. However the mode is the quasi way to this sanctification or the condition necessary for it.³²

260. The question debated among theologians is more difficult to answer as to whether the formal reason of sanctification is the personality of the Word, or the divine nature, or the personality and nature taken *together*, or finally both the personality and the nature considered *separately*. This last opinion seems more probable. For the *personality* of the Word, infinitely pleasing to God, is what properly determines the humanity, and it cannot not render it pleasing to God. On the other hand, the *divine nature* or the divinity is extolled by the Fathers as *anointing* the humanity or sanctifying it. Moreover, since habitual grace has the power of sanctifying because it is a *participation* of the divine *nature*, a fortiori the divine nature *itself* will sanctify formally the rational subject to which it is united.³³

261. Scholium 2. *On the infinite, substantial holiness of Christ.* Regarding *ontological* holiness. It seems that it must be said to be *simply infinite*, in the way in which St. Thomas says that the *grace of union* is infinite, namely, “as the Person of God is infinite” (III, q. 7, a. 11 c). Thus in our case the *quasi-formal principle* sanctifying the humanity of Christ is simply infinite. This way of speaking is confirmed from the fact that the human nature of Christ, as we will prove later in thesis 20, must be adored *with one and the same absolute worship of latria* as the divinity of the Word is. But worship corresponds precisely to *holiness*. Therefore it must be said that the holiness of Christ’s human nature is the holiness of the Word, in which that nature participates, in the sense

31. Suarez, d.18 s.1 n.10.

32. See Suarez, *ibid.* (but he also seems to teach the contrary, d.53 s.3 n.17); Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.2 n.26-33.

33. See Muncunill, n.502-504; Salmanticenses, who however think that the divine nature applied by the personality of the Word was the formal reason for the sanctification of Christ, d.12 dub.3f. On this whole scholium, see DTC 8,1278.

explained above in n. 254f.³⁴

262. From this way of arguing regarding the *infinite holiness of the man Christ* it would be false to conclude that *every union* with God renders that subject united to God *infinitely holy*. For in other cases God is united to the creature either through the medium of something *created*, for example, sanctifying grace, or at least *accidentally*. But the humanity of Christ is united to God *substantially*, so that truly one substantial being results, in which the *quasi-formal principle of the union* is God himself or the holiness of God himself.

However if the question is raised about the ontological holiness of the humanity of Christ precisely *according as it is participated in by this nature*, then it must be said, just as we say about the hypostatic union inasmuch as this is a real created relation in the humanity, that the holiness of the Word is participated in *in a finite way* by the human nature.

263. Regarding *gratifying* holiness. This holiness also must be termed *infinite*, in the way in which theologians more commonly hold that the works of Christ were of *infinite value* because of the infinite dignity of the *Person*, which we will treat below in thesis 26, n. 660-663. The human nature of Christ was infinitely pleasing to God, because of the amiableness communicated to it by the divine Person. The contrary is not to be deduced from the fact that the love by which God is inclined to the human nature of Christ as substantially holy is not as great as the love by which God is inclined to the sanctity itself of the Word. Since in thesis 26 on the satisfaction of Christ these points will be explained at greater length, here it may suffice to recall that the satisfactory works of Christ are not loved by God as much as his internal operations are loved by God, for example, with a *necessary* love. Nevertheless these operations of Christ are thought to be of *infinite* value.³⁵

264. Scholium 3. *Whether the holiness of Christ the man is something in the physical or the moral order.* Regarding the *ontological* holiness, there cannot be any doubt that it is something *physical*, just as the hypostatic *union* is physical.³⁶ It is also something in the *moral* order or the order of prudent evaluation because of the *dignity* corresponding to this holiness.

Regarding *gratifying* holiness. The humanity of Christ is without doubt physically pleasing to God because of its union with the Word. But from this physical amiableness of Christ's nature there are also perfections *in the moral order*; we will consider these in the thesis on Christ's impeccability.³⁷

34. See Müller, *Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit...*: ZkathTh 20 (1896) 503.513f.

35. See Salmanticenses, d.12 dub.4 n.65. For the various opinions of the theologians, see DTC 8, 1279; A. Morán, S.J., *La santidad sustancial de la humanidad de Cristo en la Teología de los ss.XVI y XVII*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 41-62.

36. See Müller, *Über den Begriff der Heiligkeit...*: ZkathTh 20 (1896) 490.511. See *ibid.*, 485f.501-508.

37. DTC 8,1279 refers to the controversies of the theologians on this question, but it supposes a different state of the question. See also Morán, *La santidad sustancial...*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 35-41.

Thesis 13. In addition to his divine knowledge, Christ had human knowledge, which includes beatific knowledge, knowledge per se infused of supernatural and natural things, and true knowledge acquired by his own acts.

S.Th. III, q. 9-12; Salmanticenses, d.17-22; A Michel, *Science de Jésus-Christ*: DTC 14,1628-1665.

265. Connection. Among the things co-assumed by the Son of God in his human nature that pertain to *perfection*, we have considered the grace of Christ that perfects the soul and the will. Now we will treat the *knowledge* of Christ that perfects the *intellect*. With St. Thomas we will consider the knowledge of Christ on two levels: first, *in general*, inasmuch as there is *created* knowledge in Christ; then, *in particular*, by examining this created knowledge in three different forms, namely, inasmuch as in Christ there is *beatific knowledge*, *infused knowledge*, and finally *naturally acquired knowledge*.¹

266. Definition of terms. *In addition to his divine knowledge.* We suppose that Christ, as true God, had the knowledge proper to God. While presupposing this knowledge, there is a question about whether *in addition to it*, he *also* had *created* knowledge.

267. Knowledge. The word is taken here in the wide sense for “any type of knowledge of the human intellect.”² This knowledge is understood here both as potential and as actual, or in other words, both as the faculty and the act of understanding.

Human knowledge. This is the name given to knowledge that *men* have or can have whether in this life or in the future life.

Beatific knowledge. This is the knowledge of the *blessed*, which consists in the vision of God. Christ of course by his *divine* intelligence sees God; but the question here is whether he also sees God with his *human* intelligence, just as the saints in heaven see God with their *human intellect*.

268. Infused knowledge. In general this is knowledge that is not acquired by the investigation of reason, but it is communicated to man by species caused by God in the human intellect.

Knowledge per se infused. This type of knowledge not only is not acquired by the investigation of reason, but it cannot be so acquired. Thus

1. See John of St. Thomas, *Isagoge*... at this place.

2. S.Th. III, q. 9, a. 1 c.

knowledge per se infused would be had, if the human soul while still existing in its mortal body, should understand things that are purely spiritual by their own proper notions or as a whole should know the essences of things *as they are in themselves*. These species are not *abstracted* from things but are participated in immediately by the influence of the divine light.³ Since in their *origin* these species are independent of phantasms or sensible representations, in his *use* of them a man does not depend necessarily on his sense, as we will indicate below in scholium 2, n. 304. This type of knowledge is proper to the soul separated from the body or to angels. That also would be knowledge per se infused by which a rational creature would foresee future free contingent acts.

269. *Knowledge per se infused of supernatural and natural things.* Knowledge per se infused of *supernatural* things is that which terminates in all supernatural mysteries or in the thoughts of hearts and future free acts. But knowledge of *natural* things is that which terminates in separate substances and other objects to which man's natural knowledge reaches or can reach.

Knowledge per se infused in itself is always *supernatural* by reason of the *light*. For such *light* that is able to know *strictly supernatural* things is something coming from the specifically *divine order*, and therefore is conferred by God in a way totally above the condition of the human soul, one both joined to the body or separated from it. Therefore in knowledge per se infused not only supernatural things are known, but also natural things *in a supernatural way*.⁴

270. *Knowledge infused per accidens.* This knowledge is said to be that which de facto is not acquired by the work of reason, but it can be so acquired. This knowledge is of the same nature as our human natural knowledge of things, and therefore by *abstracted* species, but these species are infused without man's own effort. Although in their origin these species de facto were not acquired by man from sensible things, nevertheless, since they are abstracted species, in his *use* of them man depends on his senses.

271. *Acquired knowledge.* This is knowledge that man can acquire naturally by the use of his intellect, by abstracting intelligible species from phantasms.

3. See S.Th. I, q. 89, a. 1 ad 3; B. Beraza, S.J., *Tractatus de Deo create* (Cursus theologicus Oniensis, Bilbao 1921) n. 478.

4. See Suarez, d.30 s.1 n.5; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.1 n.1-8, where other aspects of the supernaturality of knowledge per se infused are considered.

Knowledge acquire by his own acts. Acquired knowledge can be had sometimes *per accidens* by infusion, as was the case with Adam. This recently was said by us to be knowledge *infused per accidens*. Essentially however acquired knowledge is had by one's own natural acts of the intellect. This is the acquired knowledge that men generally have.

272. *True knowledge acquired by one's own acts.* Knowledge is said to be *true*, in order to distinguish it from intellectual *experimental* knowledge.⁵ For the adversaries easily concede that Christ, by the use of his senses, acquired with his intellect some new *experimental* knowledge and the intelligible species necessary for it, which he did not have from the beginning.⁶

The question therefore is whether *in addition to this experimental* knowledge, Christ had as infused by God perfect habits of knowledge and of the intellectual virtues with the species necessary for their use or whether he acquired them by his own activity. In other words, the question can also be proposed in this way: Did Christ have knowledge, the kind that can be acquired naturally, infused *per accidens* with regard to the habit and the species necessary *for the demonstration* of things, although not with regard to experimental cognition.⁷

273. If Christ had the habits of the sciences infused by God, his intellect by its own activity would acquire nothing new, but would be only a new conversion to the species that were already in the phantasm. This would be just like the case of someone who has the habit of knowing with respect to those things that he imagines or sees.⁸ Therefore the progress would not be *in the knowledge itself*, but only *in the exercise of the knowledge*, so that what was first known *theoretically* afterwards is known *practically*.⁹

We affirm therefore in this part of the thesis that Christ did not have acquired knowledge infused *per accidens*, but that *he acquired it by his own acts of intellect*. The knowledge of Christ was of the same nature as our knowledge and it was acquired by Christ *in the same way as our knowledge is acquired*.

274. Adversaries. A. Those who refused to admit that Christ assumed

5. In the meantime we can prescind from the question whether this *experimental* knowledge must be said to be *truly intellectual* or not. See Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.62.

6. See Suarez, d.30 s.2 n.9.

7. See Gonet, d.18 a.2 n.14.

8. S.Th., 3 d.14 q.1 a.3; q. 5 sol. Ad 3.

9. See St. Bonaventure, *In* 3 d.14 a.3 q.2 ad 3.

a rational soul also denied the existence of *human* knowledge in Christ. We considered them in thesis 7.

B. Some *Catholics* during the time of illuminism in the 19th century, and especially Schell, either denied the existence of beatific knowledge in Christ or had serious doubts about it.¹⁰

C. *The Nominalists and some Franciscans* seem to have denied the existence of per se infused knowledge in Christ; they admitted only *per accidens* infused knowledge in Christ.¹¹

Related to the *extension* of per se infused knowledge in Christ, *not all theologians* admit what we said in the definition of terms (above, n. 268f.). But our assertion is much more common, as we will explain at length below in scholium 1, n. 301f.¹²

275. D. *Many theologians* denied in Christ *true knowledge acquired by his own acts*; among them were St. Thomas junior, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Suarez.¹³ For they thought that this acquired knowledge was in Christ more perfectly *as infused from the beginning*, rather than that Christ should acquire this knowledge of things *progressively* by his own acts.

Some theologians proposed opinions in the middle.¹⁴

276. Doctrine of the Church. A. The Church teaches that Christ had *human knowledge*, on the one hand saying that Christ had a true rational soul (see above, n. 116), and on the other hand affirming against the *monothelists* that Christ had two natural *operations* (see below, n. 415f.). Therefore not only is his intellect affirmed but also his *human intellectual operation*.

B. The condemnation of the following proposition teaches the *beatific* knowledge of Christ: “It is not certain that there was in *the soul of Christ*, while he was living among men, the knowledge possessed by the blessed or those who have the beatific vision” (D 3645). Pius XII: “But this most

10. See DTC 14,1660f. B. Stattler (+ 1797) does not seem to have been the first to deny beatific knowledge in Christ, although he did prepare the way for this negation. See H. Weisweiler, S.J., *Hat Benadikt Stattler die Gotteshau Christi geleugnet?*: Schol 5 (1930) 573-578. On other adversaries, see E. Gutwenger, S.J., *Das Menschliche Wissen des irdischen Christus*: ZkathTh 76 (1954) 171.

11. See DTC 14,1654; Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.53.

12. See Suarez, d.27 s.1-3; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.1-3.

13. S.Th., 3 d.14 q.5 a.3 ad 3; d.18 q.1 a.3 ad 5. See G. de Gier, M.S.C., *La science infuse du Christ d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin. L'évolution de sa doctrine* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Tilbourg 1941). St. Bonaventure, *In 3 d.14 a.3 q.2*. Scotus, *In e d.14 q.3*; Suarez, d.30 s.2. On others, see Salmanticenses, d.22 dub.1 n.9; P. Mascarucci, O.P., *L'onniscienza del Cristo in S. Alberto Magno (Studio comparativo con i teologi del suo tempo)*: Sap 3 (1950) 251-256.

14. See Muncunill, n.674; Salmanticenses, *ibid.*; Stenstrup, th.71,1093-1095. On the early scholastics, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*, 2.^a part, 2,44-131.

14^a Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*”: AAS 48 (1956) 328.

loving knowledge of our Divine Redeemer, of which we were the object from the first moment of his Incarnation, exceeds all that the human intellect can hope to grasp. For hardly was he conceived in the womb of the Mother of God, when he began to enjoy the beatific vision, and in that vision all the members of his Mystical Body were continually and unceasingly present to him, and he embraced them with his redeeming love” (D 3812).

C. Pius XII likewise speaks about his *beatific* and *infused* knowledge: “...and his act [of love infused into the soul of Christ] is illustrated and directed by a twofold perfect knowledge, that is, his beatific and innate or infused knowledge.”^{14a}

277. Theological note. A. The existence of human knowledge in Christ is a truth, as is clear, that is *implicitly defined divine and Catholic faith*. For it has been defined that Christ has a *rational* and *intellectual* soul (see above, n. 117); likewise it has been defined that the form or *human* nature of Christ *does what is proper to it* (see below, n. 415f.). Therefore the existence of human knowledge in Christ, it seems, must be said to be a truth that is *implicitly defined*.

B. It is *an opinion common and certain in theology* that the soul of Christ had *beatific* knowledge,¹⁵ and so it would seem to be *Catholic doctrine* (D 3812).

278. C. It is an *almost common opinion and it seems certain* that Christ had *per se infused knowledge*.

Regarding the determination of the objects to which this knowledge attains, it is *by far the more common opinion* that it includes natural things and among the supernatural things both thoughts of the heart and future contingent acts, created supernatural beings and the mystery of the Holy Trinity and other mysteries connected with it.

D. *The true knowledge of Christ acquired by his own acts* is a truth, especially among more recent authors, that is *more common*.

279. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. On the *human* knowledge in general we have nothing in particular to say, since it is abundantly certain partly from thesis 7 against the *Apollinarists* and from thesis 17 against the *monothelists*, and partly from the proof of the various types of knowledge of Christ.

B. *Beatific knowledge*. Many texts are usually cited for this point.
1) John 1:14.16: *And the Word became flesh... full of grace and truth...*

15. Why this truth cannot be said to be *theologically certain* or a theological conclusion, see Galtier¹, n. 316 at the end; but the author weakens this argumentation by what he says in the new edition of the same work, n. 328 A).

And from his fullness we have all received. Although the words χάρις and ἀλήθεια correspond to these words of the Old Testament ואמתה הוּד,¹⁶ from the immediate context of v. 17f. it is clearly apparent that the word “truth” also involves the sense of some intellectual knowledge ordered to the manifestation of the things we call “truths” or certain propositions. But such fullness of truth seems to signify the *full* knowledge of God. Indeed from 1 Cor. 13:9-12, *full* knowledge of God is not given unless, when faith has faded away, there is *vision*. Therefore the *fullness of truth* in Christ says the same thing as *vision*.

Since from thesis 11 (see above, n. 207) *grace* is understood in this text for the grace of the *humanity* of Christ, the same things must be said about *truth*.

280. 2) John 1:18: *No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.* John 3:31-32: *He who comes from above is above all... He bears witness to what he has seen and heard.* See John 8:38.¹⁷ In a less proper sense these words are restricted to the vision of the divine intellect alone of Christ, for the vision is also possible for his human intellect, and the Evangelist presents Christ *the man* speaking as one speaking and testifying, “therefore *in his human nature* he wishes to give immediate testimony from the direct vision of God.”¹⁸

281. C. *Knowledge per se infused.* Heb. 10:5-9: *Consequently, when Christ came into the world, he said, Sacrifices and offerings thou hast not desired... Then I said, Lo, I have come to do thy will, O God, as it is written of me in the roll of the book.* In this text Christ appears *from the moment of his entrance into the world* as offering himself to the will of the Father for men.¹⁹

Theologians rightly offer proof from this text. For more commonly they say that this act of Christ was *meritorious*. But merit presupposes proportionate *knowledge*. Certainly this knowledge was independent of bodily organs and phantasms, since it takes place *at the first moment* of the life of the infant Christ. On the other hand, such knowledge does not seem

16. See Jotūn, *L'Évangile de Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ*, at this place; Lagrange, *Évangile selon Saint Jean*, at this place. On the words of the O.T., see F. Asensio, S.J., *Misericordia et veritas* (Analecta Gregoriana, 48, Rome 1949).

17. For other texts, see DTC 14,1651; D'Ales, 261; B. Leeming, S.J., *The Human Knowledge of Christ: the Beatific Vision*: IrishThQuart 19 (1952) 237ff.

18. Knabenbauer, at this place. See Lagrange, at this place; Leeming, *loc. cit.*, 239-246. The same force is not given to this argument by Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,98ff.; Galtier, n. 329.

19. See Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux*, at this place; H.M. Esteve, O.Carm., *De caelesti mediatione sacerdotali Christi iuxta Hebr. 8,3-4* (Matriiti 1949) 86-90. On the relation with the *sacrifice of Christ*, see *ibid.*, 77f.104.

to have been beatific knowledge, because the purpose of vision is to rest in God and to enjoy him, but not to direct acts *in the order of merit*. Therefore nothing remains except to say that Christ had *knowledge per se infused*.²⁰

282. D. *True knowledge acquired by his own acts.* 1) Jesus often asks questions. Mark 6:38: *And he said to them: How many loaves have you? Go and see.* Mark 9:21: *And Jesus asked his father: How long has he had this?* Mark 11:13: *And seeing in the distance a fig tree in leaf, he went to see if he could find anything on it.* Luke 8:30: *Jesus then asked him: What is your name?* See Mark 5:30²¹; John 11:34, etc.

283. An argument cannot be deduced from all the questions that Jesus is said to have asked. For sometimes *the form of interrogation* does not suppose a *real* question, as also happens in our ordinary conversation (v.gr., Matt. 8:6; 9:4f.; Mark 7:18). Sometimes the Evangelist himself says that Jesus asked a question, not as if he did not know the answer, but as it were testing in a friendly way (v.gr., John 6:5f.). And it must not be forgotten that Christ knew all things from his beatific and *per se* infused knowledge (see, v.gr., Mark 2:8; John 2:25).

Nevertheless there are so many occasions in which Jesus asks for something, and he does it spontaneously in the same way as we ask questions, that it would be a matter of forcing the texts, if all of these questions asked by the Lord are said to be *merely simulated*. This is a fortiori true when the Evangelist himself seems to point out expressly the *intention* that Jesus had of seeking some knowledge. An example of this is the text quoted above in Mark 11:13.

284. 2) Jesus *marveled*. Matt. 8:10: *When Jesus heard him he marveled, and said to those who followed him: Truly, I say to you, not even in Israel have I found such faith.* Mark 6:6: *And he marveled because of their unbelief.* Surely astonishment that Jesus knew *something new and unexpected*. But that cannot be said about beatific and *per se* infused knowledge. Therefore it must be said that there is in Christ another kind of knowledge, which *he*

20. See Suarez, d.25 s.3 n.4; Galtier, n. 333 at B); Ceuppens, *ibid.*, 100f. In a different way, Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde. 2. Le Mystère...* 384. We do not consider here the question, considered in the treatise on grace, whether the intrinsic supernaturality of his acts is derived necessarily from the formal object or rather from the efficient principle. See, v.gr., G. Huarte, S.J., *Tractatus de gratia Christi* (Rome 1923) 189-214; H. Lange, S.J., *De Gratia* (Friburg i. Br. 1929) 212-220, 585-589.

21. See Lagrange, at this place.

*acquired gradually by his own acts.*²²

285. 3) The gospel testifies expressly that Jesus *progressed* in wisdom. Luke 2:52: *And Jesus increased in wisdom.* Progress however is not scientific or real, where nothing is acquired by one's own effort. But to reduce this progress to *merely experimental* knowledge, as the adversaries wish, hardly seems to be in conformity with statement of the gospel and especially with the word "wisdom" (σοφία) (see on the *wisdom* of Christ, v. gr., Matt. 13:54; Mark 6:2).

286. 4) *The popular way* in which Christ spoke, learned from the special customs of his hearers and from the circumstances of that region and people, shows clearly enough that Christ acquired a knowledge of things in the same way that we do, that is, by intellectual effort concerning those things that are proposed to the mind by the senses.²³

287. Proof from tradition. A. On the human knowledge *in general* there is nothing in particular to say, as we pointed out above in n. 279 concerning the argument from Holy Scripture.²⁴

B. *Beatific knowledge.* 1) Theologians see an affirmation of the beatific knowledge of Christ in the *full and perfect* knowledge that the Fathers rightly attribute to Christ while he was living on earth.²⁵

288. 2) *Explicit testimonies.* St. Augustine seems to be the only one not doubtful about attributing this knowledge to Christ explicitly: "But how great the difference is between the man whom the wisdom of God generated and by whom we have been freed, and other men, can be understood from the fact that Lazarus unless he exits from the tomb is not released; that is, even his reborn soul cannot be free from all sin and ignorance except by the unbinding of his body, as long as he sees God in a mirror and in darkness. But the linen cloths and face cloth of the one who committed no sin and

22. For more on the astonishment of Christ, see J. B. Manyà, *De ratione admirationis in Christo. Commentarius theologicus in Matthaeum, VIII, 10: AnalSacraTarrac 2 (1926) 431-459.* However less correctly, it seems, the same author *denies any true admiration* in Christ. See also by the same author, *Theologoumena III. De Christo beato simulque patiente* (Detrosae 1951) 74.

23. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,102.

24. You can find many texts arranged in chronological order in D'Ales, 256-259. On the teaching of the Fathers, see E. Schulte, O.F.M., *Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom menschlichen Wissen Christi bis zum Beginn der Scholastik* (Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte, 12, 2, Paderborn 1914); B.M. Schwalm, O.P., *Les controverses des Pères grecs sur la science du Christ: RevThom 12 (1904) 12-47, 257-297.*

25. See Galtier, n. 328. For more on this argument in the Fathers, see J. Knabenbauer, S.J., *Ein Kapitel aus dem Leben Jesu: Stimm 16 (1879) 1-21.*

was ignorant of nothing, were found in the tomb. For he alone in his flesh not only was not held by the tomb, because some sin was found in him, but he was not held by the wrappings that something might hold him or delay his journey.”²⁶ Therefore on this point Christ would be different from other just persons, because these in their mortal life see God *only analogically*, but Christ is different: *He sees God already* while on earth.²⁷

Although the cited text is classic in this matter, another would seem to be more explicit: “But what he said: *Not that any one has seen the Father except him who is from God; he has seen the Father* (John 6:46), can be referred to men because he said “any one.” And because it was the man himself who was then speaking in the flesh, he spoke it in such a way as if to say: Not because any one among men has seen the Father, but I....”²⁸

289. *The consensus of the theologians of all schools*, especially in a doctrine that suffers grave difficulties and also is not found clearly and explicitly proposed in Holy Scripture and the Fathers, is a *certain* argument for the truth of the matter. The reasons on which the theologians rely will be considered below where we offer the theological reasoning for it, n. 291f.

290. Theological reasoning. A. Human knowledge. St. Thomas offers three reasons why Christ had to have some human knowledge *in addition to his divine knowledge*.²⁹ The foundation of his argumentation is the *integrity* of the assumed nature.

Because of the soul's perfection. The soul is in potency to understand intelligible things. Therefore, in order for his soul to be *perfect*, as was proper for the head and the restorer of *human nature*, he had to be perfected by some knowledge that would be *properly his own perfection*. However that was not divine but *human* knowledge. It is true that *not a few of the early scholastics* thought that the soul of Christ knew God and other things in God with his uncreated knowledge which, by reason of the hypostatic

26. *De diver. quaest.* 83 q.65: ML 40,60.

27. The authors generally acknowledge the strength of this argument. See Galtier, n. 328 B); he assails other texts cited from the Fathers. See also A. Caron, O.M.I., *La science du Christ dans saint Augustin et saint Thomas*: Ang 7 (1930) 501f.; Mohan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustini*...36f. Nevertheless after a study made by A. Dubarle the matter became doubtful. See A.M. Dubarle, O.P., *La connaissance humaine du Christ d'après saint Augustin*: EphThLov 18 (1941) 6-14. On the texts that can be collected in favor of knowledge per se infused and knowledge acquired by his own acts, see Caron, *loc.cit.*, 507-514.

28. *Contra Maxim.* 2,9,1: ML 42,763. On this text, see Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie*... 166-168. The same author explains the whole question about omniscience and the beatific knowledge of Christ, *op.cit.*, 146-175.

29. See III, q. 9, a. 1 c. On all this matter about the knowledge of Christ, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas*... 255-260; E.M. Bosco, O. Carm., *La scienza umana del Cristo in San Tommaso e San Bonaventura: divergenze e concordanze* (Naples 1954); P. Mascarucci, O.P., *Il progresso di Cristo nella scienza in Sant'Alberto Magno. Studio comparativo con i teologi del suo tempo*: DivThom (Pis) 51 (1948) 217-250.

union, was communicated to him.³⁰ But that opinion has deservedly been abandoned, since it has the smell of *Monophysitism*. For a *vital* act, which is what knowledge is, cannot be attributed to some nature unless it proceeds formally from what is intrinsic to it. Therefore either it is asserted with the Monophysites that human nature is formally the divine nature or it is absurdly claimed that it is a certain *human vital action* proceeding from a *non-human* nature.³¹

291. B. *Beatific knowledge.* Although from the very *notion* of the hypostatic union it is not shown to be *contradictory* that the nature is subsisting in the Word but still knows God only *analogically*, yet with great suitability one discerns in it that the humanity of Christ should have the *beatific vision*.

1) *By reason of the person.* The soul of Christ was so joined to God that it was *substantially* the soul of *God*. But it would be incongruous for such a soul not to have that full knowledge *of his own person* that the angels and saints in heaven have, who *are joined to God only accidentally*.

292. 2) *By reason of his office.* Christ by his very constitution was the head of the *angels* and was adored by them *from the first moment of his conception*. But it would not be fitting for him to be inferior to the angels precisely in the knowledge of God, which is the last end of creatures.

3) *By reason of the love of God.* God so loved the human nature of Christ that he conferred on him the greatest possible gift, namely, personal union. Therefore it is not apparent how he did not also confer on that nature *a lesser gift*, which is the *beatific vision* which he grants to angels and to justified men.³²

These reasons hold true from the first moment of the hypostatic union. Therefore all theologians rightly hold that Christ had the *beatific vision from the first instant of his conception*.

293. C. *Knowledge per se infused of supernatural and natural things.*

1) *From the perfection of the assumed nature.* Everything in potency is imperfect unless it is reduced to act. Now the human intellect is in potency *to all intelligible things*, in the sense that *according to its nature* it is in potency to know all *natural things*. And it has this potency also in another state of being, that is, of a soul *separated from the body* to know things

30. See Galtier, n. 325; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*, 2.^a part, 2,63-70.129f.

31. See Cajetan, *In 3 q.9 a.1*; Suarez, d.24 s.2 n.6-12; Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.2f.; Galtier, n. 325f.

32. See Galtier, n. 328; Suarez, d.25 s.1 n.4f.; Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.43.

in their proper genus or *according to their proper species*; and *according to the state of divine grace* the intellect is in potency to know all *revealed things*. But the intellect is reduced to act *by the intelligible species*, which are its complete forms. Therefore in the human intellect of Christ there is knowledge per se infused of supernatural and natural things, inasmuch as by the Word, personally united to the soul of Christ, the intelligible species of everything to which the intellect is in potency are imprinted in it, either according to the natural order or to the order of grace.³³

Now the *beatific knowledge*, since it is *above* the natural potency of the human soul, does not actuate or perfect its *natural* potency. Therefore separated souls, in addition to the beatific vision, have infused knowledge, lest their *natural potency* be in vain. Hence it is apparent how infused knowledge is neither excluded nor rendered useless by the beatific knowledge.³⁴

294. 2) *From the dignity of Christ, the head.* It seems to be improper that Christ, from the moment of the hypostatic union as head of the angels, should be inferior to them in the knowledge of things. While the angels see them in God *and at the same time by their own proper species*, Christ *would know those things only in God.*

3) *From the merit of Christ from his first entrance into the world.* We already explained this above in n. 281, where we presented the argument from Holy Scripture concerning Heb. 10:5-9.

295. D. *True knowledge acquired by his own acts.* 1) The fundamental reason is the one given by St. Thomas, that is, *the perfection of the human nature assumed by Christ.* For it is not apparent how the *very perfect* human intellect of Christ could remain *inoperative*, precisely with an operation that is *connatural* to his intellect, which means to abstract species from things and to form an argument.³⁵

2) *From the likeness* that Christ deigned to have with us, we rightly argue that he used his intellectual faculty *just as we do.* For this use is not impossible, even though he already knew things by his beatific and per se infused knowledge, and it is not shown in any way to be contradictory to the purpose of redemption. Indeed, as we have seen in the argument from Holy Scripture above in n. 282-286, it seems to be positively demanded by revealed doctrine that Christ knew things with his own intellect *just as we*

33. See S.Th. III, q. 9, a. 3 c; Cajetan and Suarez, at this place; Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.50.

34. See Galtier, n. 333.

35. See III, q. 9, a. 4 c.

do.

296. Objections. 1. From the vision of God *beatifying joy* necessarily follows, excluding all sorrow and sadness. But Christ was sorrowful and sad on our behalf. Therefore he did not have the vision of God or beatific knowledge.

I distinguish the major: From the vision of God *beatifying joy* necessarily follows excluding all sorrow and sadness in those who are already *simply* comprehensors, *conceded*; in one who was *at the same time* a wayfarer and comprehensor, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

We will propose our explanation of this difficult problem in thesis 15, scholium 4, n. 365-368. There we will treat the defects pertaining to the soul of Christ.

297. 2. It is more perfect to have all acquirable knowledge from the beginning than to acquire it gradually in the course of time. Therefore Christ had acquired knowledge infused per accidens, but not acquired by his own acts.

I distinguish the antecedent: If the reason alone of *the knowledge* is considered, *conceded*; but if the reason for the *manner* of obtaining the knowledge is considered, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

298. Surely it seems to be more perfect to possess all knowledge already from the beginning, if we pay attention to the *knowledge* or *idea* of things only. Thus he is judged to be more perfect who, while still a youth, has such a knowledge of things that others obtain only after much time and effort. But in Christ this reason has no force with reference to knowledge that is per se acquirable, since everything is already known by him perfectly by his beatific knowledge and his per se infused knowledge.

On the other hand, in the case of Christ it is necessary to admit the presence of true knowledge acquired by his own acts, if one pays attention to the *manner* of acquiring that knowledge. For this knowledge can be acquired not only by his own acts, which is not true concerning knowledge per se infused, but also it *demand*s to be acquired by his own intellectual acts, lest this natural faculty of man remain out of use regarding its *connatural* operation, as we pointed out in our argument above in n. 295.

299. 3. Many Fathers openly deny the progress of Christ in gaining knowledge. Therefore Christ did not have true knowledge acquired by his own acts.

I distinguish the antecedent. Many Fathers openly deny the progress of Christ in gaining knowledge, but in such a way that *other Fathers* affirm this progress, *conceded*; in such a way that there is a *consensus* of the Fathers in rejecting this progress, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* This matter will become clearer when we treat the question in the Fathers about the ignorance of Christ below in thesis, 15, scholium 2, n. 357.³⁶

300. Scholium 1. *On the extent of the human knowledge in Christ.* His *beatific*

36. Meanwhile it will suffice to consult Petavius, 1.11 c.2; Stenstrup, th.73,1140-1152. But concerning St. Cyril, see J. Lebreton, S.J., *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité...* (Paris 1927) 1,573-576, where it appears that St. Cyril taught the true progress of Christ's human knowledge. Similarly concerning St. Ambrose, see Drzeczniak, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii de Christo...* 32f.

knowledge was certainly clearer than that of any other creature, as the reasons given for this knowledge manifest. However it could not be *comprehensive*, since the human intellect of Christ is *finite*. Although he does not see all things that are *possible to God*, for such knowledge would be to comprehend the divine power, still he does see everything *that is possible for any creature*. Moreover he sees “all things past, present, and future in the Word, that is, all things that God knows by the knowledge of vision” (D 3646).³⁷ There is a controversy about whether this vision is *actual* or *merely habitual*. St. Thomas rightly holds that it is actual, along with the more common opinion of theologians. But St. Bonaventure, Scotus and others teach that it is habitual.³⁸

301. Knowledge per se infused. a) Regarding *supernatural knowledge*. Christ knew “all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Spirit; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely than others.”³⁹ Concretely, by this knowledge Christ knew *supernatural created things*, like grace, essentially or in their own way of being by their proper species and in their proper genus.⁴⁰ But he did not know *essentially uncreated* being, that is, God, but certainly regarding his *unity* and all of his essential attributes he evidently knew these both as the author of nature and the author of grace. He knew these things from the natural effects of God or from his supernatural effects respectively. Obviously he also knew the *Trinity* itself, at least according to its *existence*, as the theologians more or less generally hold.⁴¹

With by far the more common opinion of theologians it must be said that Christ knew by his per se infused knowledge *the thoughts of hearts and future contingent events*. For this seems to belong to the perfection of this knowledge, since otherwise not all the potentiality of the soul of Christ would be reduced to act.⁴²

302. 2) Regarding simply *natural things*. With almost all the authors who admit knowledge per se infused, it must be said that the soul of Christ knew both whatever can be known by man by the natural power of his intellect, and all natural things that the angels know by their infused species. However by this knowledge Christ seems to have known all these objects not *at the same time actually*, but only *successively and habitually*.⁴³

303. True knowledge acquired by his own acts. It is clear that this knowledge did not increase until the intellect of Christ was able to function naturally and obtained its

37. See S.Th. III, q. 10; Salmanticenses, d.18.

38. St. Bonaventure, *In 3 d.14 a.3* with the scholium of the editors. Scotus, *In 3 d.14 q.2 n.20*. See Salmanticenses, d.18 dub.2 n.32f.; Galtier, n. 330; Mascarucci, *L'onniscienza del Cristo...* Sap 3 (1950) 251-265, 420-440; Adam, *Der Christus des Glaubens* 290f.

39. S.Th. III, q. 11, a. 1 c.

40. See Suarez, d.27 s.3; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.3. Regarding this *essential* knowledge a few theologians disagree. See Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.39-43.

41. See Suarez, d.27 s.5; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.4.

42. See Suarez, d.27 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.2.

43. See S.Th. III, q. 11, a. 1 c.; Suarez, d.27 s.1; Salmanticenses, d.19 dub.1.

perfection successively or in the course of time.⁴⁴ St. Thomas with the predominant opinion of theologians holds that Christ knew with this knowledge “everything that can be known by the action of the active intellect.”⁴⁵

It is true that Christ’s intellect was the most powerful above every human intellect. But since many things cannot be known *by discourse alone*, but multifaceted *experience* must take place, as for example in the physical sciences, it does not seem possible to concede that Christ by his acquired knowledge *de facto* knew *everything* that *can be known by man*. Even in this he wanted to be like us.⁴⁶

304. Scholium 2. *On the use of per se infused knowledge.* Two questions are usually raised by theologians concerning this point. The first is whether in the exercise of his infused knowledge Christ used the normal *conversion to the phantasm*; the second question is whether in the exercise of the same knowledge he used *discourse*.

1) *On conversion to the phantasm.* We understand conversion to the phantasm as the concomitance of the act of the power of *imagination* with the act of the *intellective* power.⁴⁷ The *acquisition* of Christ’s infused knowledge was independent of such a conversion. *In the exercise* of this knowledge Christ *did not need* to rely on conversion to the phantasm, rather, *actually* Christ’s *per se* infused knowledge was *independent* of this conversion at least sometimes, and this is proved by the reasons given for the *existence* of this knowledge. To the question whether Christ *could* convert himself to the phantasm in the use of this knowledge, where the concern is with knowledge of *material* objects, the theologians generally reply in the *affirmative* with St. Thomas.⁴⁸

2) *On discourse.* We understand by “discourse” the operation of the mind by which it proceeds, from one thing known first, to something known later that is dependent on the first.⁴⁹ From the definition it is certain that this infused knowledge of Christ was *acquired without discourse*. Theologians generally hold against Durandus that Christ in the exercise of this knowledge *did not need* discourse. However it is hotly disputed whether Christ in the exercise of his infused knowledge *was able* to make use of discourse.⁵⁰

44. See S.Th. III, q. 12, a. 2; Salmanticenses, d.22 dub.2 n.19ff.

45. *Ibid.*, in the body of the article. See Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.14-18; DTC 14,1658.

46. Thus also Galtier, n. 338; P. Vigué, *Quelques précisions concernant l’objet de la science acquise du Christ*: RechScRel 10 (1920) 1-27. See also L.Cl. Fillion, *Le développement intellectuel et moral de Jésus*: RevClerFr 78 (1914), especially 169-187; A. Durand, S.J., *La science du Christ*: NouvRevTh 71 (1949) 497-503. Some recent authors, who also depart in different ways from the right path in other areas of doctrine, seem to advocate this limitation of his *acquired* knowledge. See J. Riviere, *Le problème de la science humaine du Christ. Positions classiques et nouvelles tendances*: BullLittEccel 7 (1915-1916) 241-261, 289-314, 337-364.

47. See S.Th. I, q. 84, a. 7; Salmanticenses, d.20 dub.1 n.1; Urráburu, *Institutiones philosophicae... Psychologiae pars secunda* (Vallisoleti 1898) 74-76. Even modern experimental psychology fully acknowledges the concomitance of the *image* with *intellection*; see J. Fröbes, S.J., *Tratado de psicología empirica y experimental* (Spanish edition by J. A. Menchaca, S.J., Madrid 1944) 1³, 480f.

48. III, q. 11, a. 2. See Suarez, d. 28 s.1; Salmanticenses, d.20 dub.1.

49. See Salmanticenses, d.20 dub.2 n.15; Urráburu, *Institutiones philosophicae... Logica* (Vallisoleti 1898) 312-317. For more, *ibid.*, 811-852.

50. See Suarez, d.28 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.20 dub.2.

Thesis 14. The humanity of Christ physically cooperates in the accomplishment of Christ's miracles and his other supernatural effects, and it is as a joined instrument of the Word substantially united to that humanity.

S.Th. III, q. 13, a. 2.4; Suarez, d.31; Salmanticenses, d.23; Th. Tschipke, O.P., *Die Menschheit Christi als Heilsorgan der Gottheit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin* (Freiburger Theologische Studien, Allgeier-Krebs, 55 1940).

305. Connection. Having considered the two *perfections* that were co-assumed by the Son of God, namely, grace and knowledge, St. Thomas next treats the last co-assumed perfection—*his power*. This is not because the divine *omnipotence* was communicated to Christ's soul,¹ but because he had a twofold *power*. In one way he had power *as a principal cause*, both for controlling his own body and actions, and to enlighten all rational creatures through his fullness of grace and knowledge. In another way the soul of Christ had power *as an instrumental cause*, not to create or annihilate, but rather to perform all the miraculous and supernatural changes that can be ordained to the purpose of the Incarnation.² In this thesis we will consider this *power* of Christ's soul as an *instrumental cause*.

306. Definition of terms. *The humanity of Christ.* Although St. Thomas in this question speaks directly about the *soul* alone of Christ, this comes from the fact that the two previously co-assumed things, grace and knowledge, properly belong to the soul, and the *power* itself concerns especially the soul and its faculty of will.³ Nevertheless, more generally we say "humanity," as St. Thomas also does elsewhere,⁴ so that we can include both the soul and the body of Christ.

307. Christ's miracles. *All* the miraculous works done by Christ are included.⁵ We prescind *only* from creation and annihilation which are attributed by St. Thomas to God *alone*.⁶ Moreover this question depends on another that is usually considered in the treatise on God the Creator,

1. See III, q. 13, a. 1-3; Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.1; Galtier, n.411.

2. See III, q. 13, a. 2 c; John of St. Thomas, *Isagoge*... at this place.

3. How power mainly but not exclusively looks to the *soul*, see Scheeben, *Handbuch*... 1.5 § 253 n.1115-1117.

4. See, v.gr., III, q. 8, a. 1 ad 1; q.43, a. 2 c; q. 48, a. 6 c. Sometimes St. Thomas says that Christ's "flesh" was the instrument of the divinity: v.gr., III, q. 49, a. 1 c, and ad 1 and ad 2.

5. Certain theologians are not lacking who, admitting the physical instrumentality, make a distinction between the miracles performed by Christ more immediately or by direct *contact* and the miracles he performed *at a distance*. Thus, v.gr., A. Vega, O.F.M., *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio*... 1.7 c.14 at the end; Ceuppens, 126f. See Vázquez, d.57 c.5 n.28-35, where however Cajetan is incorrectly referred to.

6. III, q. 13, a. 2 c.

namely, whether a creature *can* be used by God as an instrument in creation.

And his other supernatural effects. We understand as supernatural effects not the supernatural actions of *Christ himself*, like seeing God, but all the supernatural effects produced by Christ *in others*, especially sanctifying grace.⁷

The supernatural effects produced by Christ during his earthly life are not the *only* ones included here. But *in addition*, we are including all the supernatural effects performed *after* the Ascension of Christ into heaven.⁸

308. Cooperates. There is no controversy about whether or not there is *some* cooperation (*concursum*) of Christ's humanity in the accomplishment of his miracles and other supernatural effects. For it is obviously certain that Christ by his voice, touch, and human power performed miracles, by his human will he forgave sins, and instituted the sacraments. Therefore it is clear that supernatural power to produce these effects was communicated to his humanity.⁹

Therefore Christ *as man* had power much more perfect than the power of others whom we rightly refer to as wonder workers.¹⁰

309. Physically cooperates. The cooperation or concurrence of the humanity of Christ can be of two kinds—moral and physical.¹¹

The humanity of Christ would cooperate *morally*, if by some action of his humanity, for example, by prayer, touch or request God were induced or moved, so that *God alone* would produce a miracle in the physical order. For a morally influencing principle does not touch the effect except *by means of* the influx of the physical cause which it moves.

However it would cooperate *physically*, if it did *something* immediately in the *accomplishment itself* of the miracle, so that the miracle also depends *immediately* on the humanity for its existence in the physical order.¹²

In the hypothesis of *moral* cooperation, the miracle in its physical reality

7. See Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.2 n.9.

8. A few theologians restrict the physical cooperation of the humanity of Christ to the time of the earthly life of the Savior. Thus Vega, *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione...* 1.7 c.14: "it is very probable now that [God] uses his humanity for the justification of those who are justified by the sacrament of the Eucharist, and per se does not regularly immediately justify any others." See E. Hugon, O.P., *La causalité instrumentale dans l'ordre surnaturel* (Paris 1924) 100-117. B. Medina, O.P., erred by excess when he said it is "tolerable" that Christ physically influenced the supernatural effects even in the *Old Testament*: *In* 3 q. 13 a. 2 (Venice 1590) p. 194. See on this matter, Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.4 n.39f.

9. See Suarez, d.31 s.2; Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.2 n.10-14f.; Galtier, n. 412f.; DTC 8,1314f.

10. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica...* 3,121ff.

11. It has rightly been noted that the word "physical" in our question can give rise to a false understanding. See H. Bouessé, O.P., *La causalité efficiente instrumentale de l'humanité du Christ et des sacrements chrétiens*: Revthom 39 (1934) 383. See also Garrigou-Lagange, 288, note 2.

12. See Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.3 n.15.

is immediately *from God alone*. In the hypothesis of *physical* cooperation, the miracle is immediately *both from God and from the humanity of Christ*.

In the thesis we defend this *physical* cooperation or concurrence. We will give more information about the *manner* of this cooperation below in the scholium, n. 325-328.

310. Instrument of the Word. A physical cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The *principal* cause influences the effect by its power, which is proportionate to the effect, like the relation of a painter to his painting. The *instrumental* cause cooperates with its own proper power, but it is not proportioned to the effect and is subordinate to the principal cause, like the painter's brush in relation to the painting.¹³

In the words of St. Thomas: A *principal* cause operates in virtue of its own form, to which the effect is similar, as fire by its heat warms something; but an *instrumental* cause does not act in virtue of its own form, but only by the motion by which it is moved by the principal agent; hence the effect is not similar to the instrument, but to the principal agent; for example, a table is not like the saw, but it resembles the art in the mind of the craftsman.¹⁴ Of course the instrument does something according to what is *proper to it*, but it also acts as it does because *it is moved by the principal agent*.¹⁵

Now we rightly suppose with the common opinion of theologians that the humanity of Christ is not the *principal physical cause* of miracles and of other supernatural effects.¹⁶

311. A joined instrument of the Word substantially united to that humanity. Therefore the humanity of Christ is wont to be called *the joined instrument of the Word*, because it is joined together with the principal agent most intimately, namely, hypostatically. On the other hand, "other saints who are moved by God" are not "united instruments" but separate."¹⁷

13. See Donat, *Ontologia*² n.406; Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* D.17 s.2 n.16.19.

14. III, q. 62, a. 1 c.

15. See I, q. 45, a. 5 c; *De ver.* q.27 a.4 c. For more on this, see J. Stuffer, S.J., *Bemerkungen zur Lehre des hl. Thomas über die virtus instrumentalis*: ZkathTh 42 (1918) 719-762; Id., *Divi Thomae Aquinatis doctrina de Deo operante in omni operatione naturae creatae praesertim liberi arbitrii* (Innsbruck 1923) 122-136 (for the bibliography on Stuffer, see in Lange, *De gratia* n.577); F. Mitzka, S.J., *Das Wirken der Menschheit Christi zu unserem Heil nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin*: ZkathTh 69 (1947) 189-208. Otherwise, Hugon, *La causalité instrumentale...* 8-33; Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 139-143. See also D. van Meegeren, O.E.S.A., *De causalitate instrumentali humanitatis Christi iuxta divi Thomae doctrinam...* (Venlo 1939). For an explanation of the opinions regarding the nature of an instrument, see in Urráburu, *Institutiones...* *Ontologia* 1119-1130. Briefly, Donat, *Ontologia* n. 406.

16. See Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.3. These authors with a quite common opinion of theologians hold that the humanity of Christ was the *principal moral* cause of the miracles and of the supernatural effects.

17. S.Th. III, q. 7, a. 7 ad 1. See also Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* d.17 s.2 n.22; Petavius, 1.7 c.13 n.3f.

312. Adversaries. *Many theologians*, like Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, who expressly consider the production of *grace*, defend instrumental *moral* causality only.¹⁸ Mastrius who alleges that the *Scotists morally agree with this opinion*.¹⁹ Vázquez and Cano who, denying the *physical* causality of the sacraments, seem to deny the same thing about Christ's humanity, as generally do those authors *who deny the physical causality of the sacraments*.²⁰ But among recent authors, Pesch, Billot, Galtier, and others.²¹

313. Theological note. Instrumental physical causality is an opinion, it seems, that is *much more probable*; we hold this opinion with St. Thomas and *all Dominican theologians except Cano*, namely, Vega, Suarez, Valencia, Tanner, Salmanticenses, Scheeben, and others.²²

314. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. From texts where a *command of the human will* of Christ appears. a) Regarding *miracles*. 1) Concerning *persons*. Matt. 8:2f.: *And behold, a leper came to him and knelt before him, saying, "Lord if you will, you can make me clean." And he stretched out his hand and touched him, saying, "I will; be clean." And immediately his leprosy was cleansed.* Luke 7:14: *And he came and touched the bier, and the bearers stood still. And he said, "Young man, I say to you, arise." And the dead man sat up, and began to speak.* John 11:43f.: *When he had said this, he cried out with a loud voice, "Lazarus, come out." The dead man came out.*

18. Alex. of Hales, 3, q. 12 m.2. St. Bonaventure, *In 3 d.13 a.2 q.3*. On the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, see L. Morra, S.D.B., *Cristo, su gracia, su influjo capital* (Santiago 1949) 153-166.

19. *In 3 d.2 q.8*. However among some of the Scotists the state of the question is different, as in Minges, 1, n. 540.

20. Vázquez, *In 3 d.57 c.5f.*; Cano, *Relectio de Sacramentis* p.4,5,6. Concl.

21. Pesch, 4 n.348-352; Billot, th.22, the beginning. Although Billot proposes *intentional* instrumentality, we rightly point out that it is moral causality; see Suarez, d.31 s.5 n.6. Moreover that the "intentional" power proposed by Billot is very different from the power that St. Thomas calls *intentional*, is shown by Hugon, *La causalité instrumentale...* 22-25. Galtier, n.414-426. See DTC 8,1318. However these authors do not seem always to have the same state of the question that we have.

22. S.Th. III, q. 13, a. 2. Many points are adduced in order to show that St. Thomas was an adversary of physical causality. See, v.gr., Galtier, n. 427-454; Mitzka, *Das Wirken...*: ZkathTh 69 (1947) 189-208. But now Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.4 n.21-26 seem to have uncovered the true mind of the holy Doctor. On the evolution of this doctrine in St. Thomas, see Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 118-145. On the whole mind of St. Thomas, see *ibid.*, 146-194. More briefly and exactly for our state of the question, Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 270-287 and in ThRev 40 (1941) 111-113. Vega, *Tridentini decreti...* 1.7 c.10-18, but he favors the position that Christ does not justify by his humanity except those who receive the Eucharist: *loc.cit.*, c.14 at the end and c.18 at the end. Suarez, d.31 s.3. Valencia, d.1 q.13 punct.2. Tanner, d.1 q.5 dub.7 n.180-188. Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.4; many authors are cited in favor of this position *ibid.*, n.20. Scheeben uses another *name*, but in this matter he openly defends physical causality: *Handbuch...* 1.5 § 253.

2) Concerning *inanimate nature*. Mark 4:39: *And he awoke and rebuked the wind, and said to the sea, "Peace! Be still!" And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm.* Matt. 21:19: *And seeing a fig tree by the wayside he went to it, and found nothing on it but leaves only. And he said to it, "May no fruit ever come from you again." And the fig tree withered at once.*

315. b) Concerning *other supernatural effects*. 1) *On the remission of sins*. Luke 5:20, 23-25: *And when he saw their faith he said, "Man, your sins are forgiven you."... "Which is easier, to say, 'Your sins are forgiven you,' or to say, 'Rise and walk'? But that you may know that the Son of man has authority on earth to forgive sins"—he said to the man who was paralyzed—"I say to you, rise, take up your bed and go home." And immediately he rose before them, and took up that on which he lay, and went home, glorifying God.* Luke 7:48: *And he said to her, "Your sins are forgiven."*

2) *On the institution of the sacraments*. Luke 22:19: *And he took bread, and when he had given thanks he broke it and gave it to them, saying, "This is my body which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me."* John 20:23: *"Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained."*

316. All theologians admit that Christ performed all these works also by his *human will*, and it is a necessary consequence from the nature of the hypostatic union, which leaves both natures whole, and from the office of the incarnate Word who was ordaining all these things to the end of the Incarnation. On the institution of the *sacraments*, a special proof will be given in the treatise on the sacraments in general.

These expressions quoted from the gospels are similar to certain formulas in the Old Testament: Gen. 1:3: *And God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light.* 2 Sam. 12:13: *The Lord also has put away your sin.* Now we interpret these statements of the O.T. in such a way that we can say that God by his will *immediately* produced that effect whether natural or supernatural.

Therefore in their obvious meaning these statements of the evangelists proclaim that Christ, by his *human will*, *immediately performed* those miracles or supernatural effects, so that such effects really *depend immediately in their being* on the human will of Christ, just as those effects cited from the O.T. depended on the divine will.

317. B. From texts where the *physical contact* of Christ's humanity appears in the performance of miracles. 1) Some *particular cases*. Matt.

8:14f.: *And when Jesus entered Peter's house, he saw his mother-in-law lying sick with a fever; he touched her hand, and the fever left her, and she rose and served them.* Matt. 9:29f.: *Then he touched their eyes, saying, "According to your faith be it done to you."* Mark 8:23.25: *And he took the blind man by the hand, and led him out of the village; and when he had spit on his eyes and laid his hands upon him, he asked him, "Do you see anything?"... Then again he laid his hands upon his eyes... and he was restored, and saw everything clearly.* John 9:6: *As he said this, he spat on the ground and made clay of the spittle and anointed the man's eyes with the clay.* Mark 7:33-35: *And taking him aside from the multitude privately, he put his fingers into his ears, and he spat and touched his tongue; and looking up to heaven, he sighed, and said to him, "Ephphatha"... and his ears were opened and his tongue was released.*

318. 2) *More general cases.* Mark 3:10: *For he had healed many, so that all who had diseases pressed upon him to touch him.* Luke 6:19: *And all the crowd sought to touch him, for power came forth from him and healed them all.*

Therefore there are many cases in which *the physical contact of Christ* had no notion of a request or a blessing.²³ Therefore it must be said that Christ touched the sick, because this contact *immediately conferred something* to the cure of the sick; otherwise one would have to have recourse to some kind of extraordinary and *preeminent harmony*. This is very clear in the cases in which there is not a simple contact, but *a multiple and very singular* contact takes place, as we recently pointed out in Mark 8:23.25; John 9:6; Mark 7:33-35. These actions could hardly be explained, if they contributed nothing to *the immediate performance* of the miracle itself.

Having admitted also the *physical* cooperation of the humanity of Christ, the words of the evangelists *about power going out from Christ* take on their full meaning: Luke 6:19; 8:46.²⁴

319. Proof from tradition. 1) *The power of miracles* is attributed to *the flesh* of Christ. St. Cyril of Alexandria: "He also places his hand on any sick person, showing that the efficacy of the mighty Word operates through his holy flesh, which he made his own, placing in it a power coming from

23. Therefore we did not want to cite the cases in which reference is made to *the imposition of hands alone*, even though these cases also have their force.

24. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica...* 3,125ff. The distinction used by Ceuppens between the miracles that take place by the *touch* of Christ and those performed *at a distance* does not seem to be valid, as is pointed out above in note 5 and below in objection 2, n. 323. For more on the argument from Holy Scripture, see Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 6-20.

God (θεοπρεπή): in order that we might learn that even though the only-begotten Word of God endures our condition, nevertheless he is still God, doing all things easily by his own flesh: for he really performed miracles by it. And you should not be surprised at this; rather, remember that fire placed in a bronze vase communicates to it the power of its own heat."²⁵

2) *The power of vivifying* is attributed to *the body* of Christ. St. Gregory of Nyssa: "Therefore what is this? Nothing else but that his body was shown to be stronger than death and the beginning of our life... Therefore it is necessary, in the way that nature can, to acquire the vivifying power of the spirit. However since only the body which God assumed received this particular grace..."²⁶ St. Cyril of Alexandria: "But in some way making this matter common by administering it in the flesh because of his unity, even as man he breathed on them in a bodily manner. For he breathed on the Apostles, saying: *Receive the Holy Spirit.*"²⁷

These and other saying of the Holy Fathers seem to lose their real force, if they are interpreted as referring only to the *moral* causality of Christ's humanity.

320. Theological reasoning. 1) *From the cooperation of Christ's humanity in accomplishing the painful redemption.* Having supposed the *immediate and physical cooperation*, which the humanity of Christ exercised in carrying out the *redemption* (we will treat this in the following book on Christ the Redeemer, especially in thesis 29, scholium2, n. 744), which was the source of the greatest suffering for his humanity, it seems altogether suitable that this same humanity also cooperate *immediately and physically* with the divinity *in those glorious signs*, that Christ performed to manifest his glory, and *in the granting of redemption* to each individual person.²⁸

2) *From the analogy with the elevation of man to operating supernaturally.* The intellect and will of man are elevated in order to perform acts that surpass all the power of nature, at one time by an innate habit, and at another time without that habit, as is proved in the treatise on

25. *In Luc. comment.* 4,38: MG 75,550 D. See Weigl, *Die Heilslehre des hl Cyril...* 64f.; Manoir du Juaye, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 180f.; Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 41-53; Grillmeier, *Die theologische... Vorbereitung...* von Chalkedon 1,173f.

26. *Orat. Catech.* 37: MG 45,94 B-C.

27. *De incarn. Unigeniti*: MG 75,1242 A. For more on the *nature* of that physical power that St. Cyril attributed to the humanity of Christ, see Weigl, *die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrill...* 66-73; B. Fraigneau-Julien, P.S.S., *L'efficacité de l'humanité du Christ selon saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie*: RevThom 55 (1955) 615-628. Many texts of the Fathers, especially the Greeks, are gathered together by Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 20-86.

28. For more, see H. Bouessé, O.P., *La causalité efficiente instrumentale et la causalité méritoire de la sainte humanité du Christ*: Revthom 44 (1938) 256-298.

grace.²⁹

Hence first of all it follows that God *de facto* elevates at times created nature to be able to perform works that surpass nature. But especially in our case something else follows. For God *could have* granted to our *naturally* good acts the beatific vision out of pure benevolence *as a gift*. However he willed that the good acts of a just person proceed *immediately from an elevated physical principle* and thus have some *proportion with the reward*. *In a similar way* therefore it seems that it must be said that God determined that the humanity of Christ should cooperate *physically and immediately* with the supernatural effects caused by the Redeemer.

At this point it is also possible to make reference to the *physical* cooperation which the saints seem to have used often in the performance of their miracles.³⁰

321. 3) *From the analogy of the elevation of insensible things to be able to produce superior effects*. The principal analogy is had *from the physical causality of the sacraments*. However the theologians do not agree on this, as will be explained in the treatise on the sacraments in general.

But by far the majority of theologians holds that the *material* fire of hell affects separated *spiritual* substances *physically and immediately* to torment them. Of course God himself could *at the presence of the fire* cause the pain per se immediately. But this quasi pre-established harmony is not the method chosen by God. If therefore in order to punish the damned God elevates a material substance to be able to produce an effect *physically and immediately above itself*, why can we not say with much more reason that God elevated *the humanity of Christ*, so that it might cooperate *physically and immediately* to produce effects so closely connected with the purpose of the Incarnation?

It can be added that those *material creatures* often *cooperated physically* to produce miracles, as serious reasons clearly prove.³¹

322. Objections. 1. The doctrine on the cooperation of Christ's humanity in supernatural effects is understood more easily in the theory of *moral* cooperation only than in the theory of *physical* cooperation. Therefore the theory of *moral* cooperation only is to be preferred.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent and the consequence. For the objector does not dare to state expressly the implied proposition, on which the whole

29. See Suarez, d.31 s.3 n.3f.

30. See Hugon, *La causalité instrumentale...* 173-183.

31. See *ibid.*, 184-190. On the importance of this doctrine in systematic theology, see Tschipke, *Die Menschheit Christi...* 3-5.

consequence depends, namely, that in theology those theories are to be preferred in which the truths of the faith *are more easily understood*. Such a theory would be the ruin of theology, and indeed also of faith. It is not so much the concern of the theologian by which theory the truths of the faith *are more easily understood*, as by which theory *the objective meaning* of the testimonies of Holy Scripture and Tradition *are more faithfully grasped and are more fittingly brought into agreement with other theological truths*. The easiness itself of a *rational* explanation in theology, the science of faith, not rarely is an argument against the theory that proposes this *easy* explanation.

323. 2. The *physical* cooperation of Christ's humanity necessarily requires *immediate contact*. But such immediate contact was present neither in all of Christ's miracles nor is it present now in the production of grace. Therefore the physical cooperation of Christ's humanity is not to be admitted.

I bypass the major and deny the minor. This difficulty supposes a concept of *physical* causality on the part of Christ's humanity that seems to be less correct, since it supposes a causal contact as something in the *quantitative* order.

Not only does the body belong to the humanity, but the *soul* does too, and it does it in a primary fashion. Indeed the soul of Christ can operate by his own *will* as the instrument of the Word, even regarding supernatural effects materially distant from the soul. Our thesis defends primarily that the human *will* of Christ was elevated to produce supernatural effects immediately by the efficacy of his will. The rest of Christ's humanity under the control of his human will takes part in this efficiency of the will.³²

Therefore it does not seem necessary to return to other more difficult solutions of the proposed objection.³³

324. 3. The Council of Trent, in listing the causes of justification (D 1528-1529), does not mention this physical causality of the humanity of Christ. Therefore it seems unwarranted to introduce some *new* cause of justification.

1) *I rebut the argument.* The Council also does not mention the *moral* causality of Christ's humanity; therefore the objector has to solve the same objection. Indeed Trent speaks about the *meritorious* causality of Christ, but this is about the meritorious causality of the *passion* of Christ. The adversaries in no way reduce the influence of the humanity of Christ to *merit* and much less can they restrict such moral influence of the humanity to his *passion*.³⁴

2) *I distinguish the antecedent.* By this enumeration the Council wanted to hand on those things that *all Catholics must hold* as a matter of faith, *conceded*; the Council wanted to exclude further *determinations of theologians, denied. I distinguish the consequence in the same way.*

According to the norm set for itself by the Council, lest it involve itself in the opinions of theologians, it was pointed out specifically that this seventh chapter on justifica-

32. See Bouessé, *La causalité efficiente instrumentale de l'humanité du Christ...*: RevThom 39 (1934), especially 378-393.

33. See Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.4 n.37f.; Gonet, d.19 a.2 n.34-37.

34. See, v.gr., Galtier, n.415.434; Pesch, n.348.

tion did not pre-judge any opinion of scholars.³⁵

4. Many statements of the Fathers are cited that seem to exclude the *physical* influence of the humanity.³⁶ Therefore the argument from tradition is at least greatly weakened.

1) *I distinguish the antecedent.* These statements of the holy Fathers, as appears from the context, against various heretics want to extol the divinity of Christ or the reality of his human nature or the twofold operation in Christ, *conceded*; they want to exclude the physical cooperation of his human nature, in the way explained by us in the definition of terms, in the works that are performed *principally* by the Word by the divine nature, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

2) *I rebut the argument again.* If these statements were taken absolutely, *no place* would be left for the *causality* of the humanity of Christ in the performance of miracles. Therefore both physical and moral causality would have to be rejected.

325. Scholium. *On the concrete way in which the humanity of Christ was elevated to physically produce supernatural effects.* The dispute about this matter is very serious among those theologians holding that the humanity of Christ *physically* cooperates in producing supernatural effects as the *instrument* of the Word.

Of course all of them suppose that no thing can act *without the active power* proportioned to its causality. Therefore if there is an instrumental cause, it must have *active instrumental power*, so that the action, in the way in which it is said to be from the instrument, supposes in the instrument *the power of acting*.³⁷

326. *The previous question*, about which there is some controversy, is whether the humanity of Christ had this instrumental power through something intrinsic to that humanity or perhaps it had it by something that is only extrinsic. A few theologians think that the humanity of Christ was given the power to cooperate instrumentally with the Word *by the conjunction alone* and by actual subordination to the power of God, the principal agent, *without* God producing in the humanity *anything intrinsic*. This opinion rightly is generally rejected, because if the humanity by such subordination receives nothing intrinsic, it is not apparent how it is made proximately able to attain instrumentally effects that surpass the natural powers of that humanity.³⁸

327. *But the fundamental question* is whether the humanity of Christ, in order for it to be made a physically cooperating instrument, needs some power *newly and really added to it* or not. Suarez teaches that no such added power is really required. According to him, the instrumental power in Christ's humanity is *the active obediencial potency* of his humanity. But that active obediencial potency in his humanity is nothing but the entity itself of the humanity by itself. It is called "active obediencial potency" inasmuch

35. See Ch.J. Hefele-H.Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles...* 10. 1.^a part, *Les Décrets du Concile de Trente* by A. Michel (Paris 1938) 94-97. For other objections, see Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.4 n.31-42.

36. See, v.gr., Galtier, n.420-424.

37. See Suarez, d.31 s.6 n.10.

38. See Suarez, *ibid.*, n.19-44; Billuart, diss.1.3 a.2 obj.3; Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.5 n.51-54.

as by it the humanity can perform supernatural works as the instrument of God, who co-operates by his help or concurrence proportioned to the effect and exceeding the concurrence coming from the *natural* power of that humanity. Moreover this active obediencial potency is found *in all things*.³⁹

*However, most theologians generally hold that Christ's humanity was elevated by something really and intrinsically added to it.*⁴⁰

328. There is a *further* debate among the theologians who admit this *intrinsic addition*, namely, *what* is it. *Many* hold that this intrinsic addition is a transient *motion* of God that elevates Christ's humanity to the nature of an instrument for miracles and grace; *it does not just apply* power to the act, but it also confers on the humanity an active *power* ready to act (*in actu primo*). *But most of these theologians* say that this intrinsic addition is a *quality*, not indeed complete and habitual, but *incomplete and having a reality flowing and transient with the effects*.⁴¹

39. See Suarez, d.31 s.5 n.7-9; s.6 n.45-111. Opposed to this opinion, see Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.5 n.45-50, 55-61. Suarez cannot really be said to be the "inventor" of this doctrine; see M. Alonso, S.J., ¿Es original en Suarez la teoría de la potencia obediencial activa? (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana 1940).

40. See Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.5 n.43f. On the doctrine itself, see E. Elorduy, S.J., *La potencia obediencial en Suarez*: LCIenc 9 (1944) 815-833; J. Martín Palma, *La potencia obediencial activa en el plano metafísico según Suarez*: ArchTG 16 (1953) 327-375.

41. See Billuart, d.13 a.2 obj.3; Salmanticenses, d.23 dub.6; DTC 8,1323. Against both explanations, see Suarez, d.31 s.5 n.1-5.

ARTICLE II

ON THINGS THAT PERTAIN TO DEFECTS

Thesis 15. In Christ there was no sin; indeed Christ, considered in himself, formally from the hypostatic union alone is constituted absolutely impeccable.

S.Th. III, q. 15; Suarez, d.33f.; Salmanticenses, d.25; L. Atzberger, *Die Unsündlichkeit Christi* (Munich 1883); Gummersbach, *Unstündlichkeit und Befestigung in der Gnade...* 45-90.

329. Connection. Having explained the assumed perfections in the human nature, namely, grace, knowledge and power, St. Thomas next considers the *defects* or imperfections that the Word Assumed.

But first he treats the defects of *the body* (q. 14), showing that the Word assumed those defects that accompany a passible body. Indeed, on the supposition that he assumed a passible body, he also assumed the *necessity* of undergoing them as a part of nature, but not with a necessity *contracted* from sin; in simple terms, he assumed them voluntarily by assuming such a body.¹

In this thesis we will consider only the defects of his *soul* (q. 15),² and we will treat directly only the question about the *sinlessness and impeccability* of Christ, while relegating other questions to the scholiums.

330. Definition of terms. *In Christ there was no sin.* In this first part of the thesis it is asserted that Christ de facto never sinned; in other words, we attribute to Christ *sinlessness*. We say that there is *no sin* in Christ, that is, neither actual, whether grave or light, nor habitual, whether original or personal. We presuppose these notions from the treatise on sins.

331. Christ considered in himself. In order to determine more accurately in this second part of the thesis the *scholastic* question, we say first of all that we are considering Christ *as he is in himself*, that is, according to those intrinsic elements out of which he is substantially and necessarily constituted, namely, human nature, the person of the Word, and the hypostatic union itself. Therefore in this consideration we leave aside all other gifts of the soul of Christ except the gift of the hypostatic union.³

1. See John of St. Thomas, *Isagoge...* at this place.

2. We denied any defect of *the body* of Christ on the part of any natural *deformity* above in thesis 7, scholium 9, n. 144. On the whole question *about the defects of Christ's body*, see Suarez, d.32; Salmanticenses, d.24; Galtier, n. 436-438; Lercher, th.13.

3. See Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.2 n.7.

332. Impeccable. Impeccability is the *impossibility* of sinning or *indefectibility* in the moral order. We can divide this indefectibility into 1) natural, 2) personal, 3) accidental.

1) *Natural* indefectibility is that which comes *from the nature of the will itself*. This belongs *to God alone*, because every created thing, since it is made out of nothing, is defectible.⁴

333. 2) Personal indefectibility is that which comes from a subject or *from a person* who has such a will. In the thesis we attribute this type of indefectibility to Christ.

Therefore although the human will of Christ does not enjoy *natural* indefectibility, *Christ* rightly is said, speaking properly and essentially, not to have the power of sinning.⁵ For the will belongs to nature not according as the nature is considered absolutely, but according as it is *in this hypostasis*.⁶ Therefore although Christ, by reason of his human will, had the power which *in others* is a power of sinning,⁷ he properly is said not to have had the power of sinning or not to have had a defectible will by reason of his *participated* natural indefectibility: for the will of Christ participated in this from his *hypostatic* union with a person *naturally* indefectible because he is divine.

334. 3) Accidental indefectibility is that which comes from something *added* either to the will or to the person. A gift of this kind would be, for example, confirmation in grace freely given by God to a man or the gift of the beatific vision. In these cases the *will* remains naturally defectible, and actually even *the person*, if it is considered *in itself*. That gift, even though intrinsic to man, is added to the man.

Natural and personal indefectibility in a true sense *exclude the power to sin*, while *accidental* indefectibility in a strict sense excludes only the *defectible actuation* of the power.

335. From the hypostatic union alone. We add these words, with which our thesis in modern times is usually stated,⁸ for a better explanation of the matter which moreover is already sufficiently indicated by the formula: "Christ, considered in himself." The hypostatic union in the *reason why*

4. See S.Th., *De ver.* q.24 a.7 c. For various opinions, see DTC 7,1268-1270. For more, see H. de Lubac, *Surnaturel. Etudes historiques* (Paris 1946) 187-321, where he treats the *impossibility*, according to the tradition, of any spiritual creature being so perfect that it would be impeccable *by its very nature*.

5. See S.Th. 3 d.12 q.2 a.2 c.

6. See S. Th. III, q. 18, a. 1 ad 4.

7. See S.Th., 3 d.12 q.2 a.2 c.

8. For how the old scholastics propose the matter, see Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 57.

Christ is absolutely and totally impeccable.

Formally from the hypostatic union alone. That the hypostatic union is the reason why Christ is absolutely impeccable can be understood formally and materially. *Formally* it signifies that the *concept* of the hypostatic union metaphysically conflicts with the concept of peccability in Christ. But *materially* or *virtually* it would signify that the hypostatic union conflicts with the concept of peccability in Christ not indeed from the concept itself but rather *from some gift derived* from the union itself.

336. *Is constituted.* In the thesis we do not ask about the concrete way in which Christ is rendered impeccable *in the order of execution*. This point pertains rather to the thesis on Christ's freedom even under a precept (below, thesis 18). But we are concerned only with the question whether Christ must be said to be absolutely impeccable *from the concept itself* of the hypostatic union, whatever may be the case *about the means* by which *in the order of praxis* the human will of Christ is made impeccable. Therefore we prefer to say that *he is constituted* impeccable, which refers to the *essence* of the matter, rather than that he *was made* such, which would seem to pertain more *to its realization*.

337. Adversaries. A. *Some older Protestants* seem to have admitted some sin in Christ, inasmuch as they say that he fell into *desperation* on the cross.⁹

B. Günther denies *utterly* our position on the problem of Christ's impeccability. According to this author and his followers, Christ certainly did not sin *de facto*, but *he could sin*. For if he was not able to *abuse* his freedom, then neither could he *use* it, and therefore Christ would not have been able to have any merit.¹⁰ In this view we would be able to say only that Christ was impeccable *consequent* to the mere *prevision* of God about no sin admitted in Christ.¹¹

Contrary to the *manner* proposed by us of conceiving Christ's impeccability, Scotus and generally the *Scotists* teach that Christ from the beginning received *the greatest grace*, by which he was impeccable from the beginning, and he achieved that in virtue of the hypostatic union, *although only virtually, not formally*.¹²

9. See Mahieu, *L'abandon du Christ...*: MéIscRel 2 (1945) 227f. On some traces of the doctrine of the desperation of Christ among the Quietists, Id., *loc. cit.*, 236f. Neither Nestorius nor Theodore of Mopsuestia nor Calvin, contrary to what is often asserted, attributed sin to Christ: see Galtier, n. 361 note 2.

10. *Vorschule...* 2,266 (in Kleutgen, *Die Theologie der Vorzeit* 3, n.253.260 or in Orbán, *Theologia Güntheriana...* 2.68f.

11. See *ibid.*, 2,441ff. (in Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 50); DTC 8,1291.

12. See Minges, 1,297. For more on this, see Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 64-69.

338. Doctrine of the Church. In Christ there was no sin. The *Anathemas* of St. Cyril: “Or if anyone says that he offered the sacrifice for himself and not for us only—for he who knew no sin had not need of sacrifice—let him be anathema” (D 261). *The Council of Florence* in the decree for the Jacobites: “who without sin was conceived, born and died...” (D 1347). See D 44, 301-303, 539. The same thing is certain from the defined constant subjection of the human will to the divine: D 556.

339. Theological note. A. *It is defined divine and Catholic faith that there was no sin in Christ* (D 261, 1347).¹³

B. The *fact* itself of Christ’s impeccability *antecedently* to the foreseen use of his free will is a *doctrine at least theologically certain* from the defined subjection of his human will to the divine will (see D 556); indeed it seems that it must be said to be *a matter of Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium*, already made manifest by the consensus of the Fathers.

The meaning of this impeccability affirmed in the thesis is an opinion that is *morally certain and by far more common* not only with St. Thomas *and his disciples*, but also with St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales and other Franciscans.¹⁴

340. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. In Christ *there was no sin*. 1) *Jesus himself* solemnly testifies to this fact. John 8:46: *Which of you convicts me of sin?* With these words the Lord wishes to declare that he has no relationship with the devil, but that he was sent by God. Therefore he clearly manifests his sinlessness, as he does in another place in John 14:30: *for the ruler of this world is coming. He has not power over me.* The ruler of this world is the devil, who has nothing in Jesus which might pertain to him in any way. Indeed what properly can be said to pertain to the devil is nothing but sin. Therefore in Jesus there is no sin.¹⁵

341. 2) *The Apostles* give testimony to this fact about Jesus. 1 Pet. 2:22: *He committed no sin; no guile was found on his lips.*¹⁶ Heb. 7:26: *For it*

13. On the *value* that the anathemas of St. Cyril have, see above in thesis 13, note 24. On the decree for the Jacobites, see above in thesis 7, note 8. Some scrupulous authors perhaps will be opposed to a strict *definition* of Christ’s impeccability because it is not proposed *explicitly*.

14. See Gummersbach, *Unschuldigkeit...* 61-65. For the older schools of scholastic theology, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...* 2.^a part, 1,320-370. For the Franciscans, see also Scholium of Editors (Quaracchi) in St. Bonaventure, *In 3 d.12 a.2 q.1*. The opinion of Fr. Vázquez and a few others, who derive Christ’s impeccability from the grace of union *formally sanctifying* his humanity (see Gummersbach, *ibid.*, 58f.62) hardly seems to be in conflict with our thesis according to what this opinion *affirms*; however we do not endorse it.

15. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,131ff.

16. See *ibid.*, 133; Holzmeister, *Commentarius in epistulas...* at this place.

was fitting that we should have a high priest, holy, blameless, unstained, separated from sinners. Especially from the general words of this testimony, blameless (ἀκακος), unstained (ἀμίαντος),¹⁷ it is rightly deduced that in Christ there was no moral stain and no original sin.¹⁸ The whole contrast of St. Paul between Christ the just and Adam the sinner clearly proves that Christ had no sin, not even original sin. See Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:21f.

342. B. Scripture points out his impeccability. Heb. 7:26: *For it was fitting (ἔπρεπεν) that we should have a high priest, holy...* The absolute sinlessness of Christ appears as demanded by his office of Redeemer.¹⁹ Therefore not only did Christ not sin, but it was not fitting that he be a sinner.

343. Proof from tradition. A. The holy Fathers say expressly that Christ had no sin. a) Regarding original sin. 1) Explaining Rom. 8:3: *in the likeness of sinful flesh.* Tertullian: “not as if He had taken on Him ‘the likeness of the flesh’...but he means us to understand likeness to the flesh which sinned...in Christ that same flesh is maintained without sin, which in man was not maintained without sin” (R 357). St. Augustine: “...and therefore bringing with Him no original sin...nevertheless, on account of the likeness of sinful flesh in which He came, He was called sin, that He might be sacrificed to wash sin away” (R 1916).²⁰ St. Fulgentius: “But when the likeness of sinful flesh is said to be in the Son of God, it must be believed that the only-begotten God did not take from the mortal flesh of the Virgin the stain of sin, but received the whole truth of human nature” (R 2242).

344. 2) Some Fathers refer this immunity from original sin to the virginal conception from Mary. St. Augustine: “Holy and blessed priests, famous in their treatment of sacred doctrine, Irenaeus... have pronounced against you their opinion about the succession of all men which is bound by original sin, whence no one can rescue them except Him Whom a virgin conceived” (R 1899). St. Leo I the Great: “...he will be present without the stain of the ancient prevarication. For only the one born of the Blessed Virgin is the Son without any sin...” (R 2207). St. Gregory I the Great: “But what man would be without sin, if he descended from one immersed in sin?”

17. See Ceuppens, *ibid.*, 133f.; Bonsirven, *Saint Paul...* at this place; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* at this place.

18. For more on the absence of original sin in Christ from Holy Scripture, see Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 50.

19. See Bonsirven, *Saint Paul...* at this place; Spicq, *op. cit.*, at this place. For more on this connection, see Gummersbach, *ibid.*, 49.

20. See D'Ales, *La Théologie de Tertullien* 182-199. On St. Augustine, see Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie...* 85-93.

Therefore the Son of God comes for our sake in the womb of the Virgin” (R 2311).

345. b) Regarding *actual* sins. 1) They *simply* state the fact. Aphraates: “Of all who have been born and have put on a body, one only is innocent, namely, our Lord Jesus Christ” (R 684). St. Jerome: “but the perpetuity of sinlessness is reserved for God alone and for the Word become flesh who did not endure sin and the faults of the flesh” (R 1406) See 527, 1224, 2247.

2) They say that the Word *assumed* everything belonging to man *except sin*. St. Hippolytus: “becoming thus all that man is with the exception of sin” (R 394). St. Athanasius: “He assumed everything from the Virgin—everything that God from the beginning formed and established for the nature of man, with the exception of sin” (R 799). See R 929, 995, 1006, 1087, 2365, 2367.

346. 3) The *divinity* is mentioned as the reason for this sinlessness. Tertullian: “God alone is without sin, and Christ alone is a man without sin, because Christ is also God” (R 350).

4) The absolute sinlessness of Christ is intimately connected with his office of *Redeemer*. Origen: “as able to absolve and consume and destroy all the sins of the whole world received into himself, because *he did no sin...* nor did he acknowledge any sin” (R 482). St. John Chrysostom: “How did [Christ] die at all for sinners, if He Himself were in sin? For he who dies for sinners ought himself to be without sin” (R 1198). See R 684, 2031, 2213, 2305.

347. B. Christ *was not able to sin*. 1) The Fathers *simply* state the *fact*. St. Augustine: “...mentally looking at the justice of Christ, in whom there could not be any sin, not only in his divinity but also not in his soul or in his flesh” (R 1721).

2) They assign as the *reason* his office of *Redeemer*. St. Leo I the Great: “For we should not now be able to overcome the author of sin and death unless He took our nature on Him and made it his own, whom *neither sin could pollute* nor death retain” (R 2182).

348. 3) Often they single out the *hypostatic union* as the reason for his impeccability. For the most part the Latin and Greek Fathers bear witness to this, when they preach that Christ the man is ἀναμάρτητον (blameless) because he is God.”²¹ Origen: “and so we must believe that there existed

21. Petavius, 1.11 c.10 n.6.

in Christ a human and rational soul, without supposing that it had any feeling or *possibility* of *sin*... That soul which, like an iron in the fire, has been perpetually placed in the Word... and therefore it can be called neither convertible nor mutable, inasmuch as, being incessantly heated, it possessed immutability *from its union with the Word of God*" (R 461).

St. Cyril of Alexandria: "They are utterly stupid who say that Christ himself, for I know not what reason, *was able to sin*... But if for this reason *he carried about a human nature*, that what in Adam was weak, he might declare in himself acceptable and *above sin*, why do they in vain seek anxiously for what they cannot find?" (R 2141). St. John Damascene: "The Lord did not assume this: *For he did not commit any sin*... But because there is one person of Christ, and one Christ, there is one who wills through both natures: as God, testing, and as man, made obedient" (R 2386). See R 798.²²

349. It is clearly deduced from the testimonies of the holy Fathers that Christ, considered in himself, was constituted *formally* and absolutely impeccable from the hypostatic union alone. They argue *from the bare fact* of the hypostatic union to the complete impeccability of Christ and they say that this impeccability is not accidental, but *natural* or essential and *substantial*.²³

350. Theological reasoning. A. St. Thomas gives the reason why there was no sin in Christ, namely, because the whole reason for assuming our defects is lacking, where there is a question of assuming sin; therefore he did not assume it.²⁴

But in particular regarding *original sin*, it must be said that Christ did not contract it, because he did not descend from Adam *by a natural generation*, by which alone original sin is propagated.²⁵

351. B. The arguments that we will now propose do not demonstrate the *bare fact* of Christ's impeccability, but present in addition a convincing *explanation* of this fact that we are defending in this second part of the thesis against the Scotists.

1) *By the communication of idioms*, which we will treat in the following

22. On St. Cyril, see Weigl, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyril*... 86f. On St. Augustine, see Mohan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustini*... 39-42; Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie*... 94f.179. For more testimonies of the Fathers, see Petavius, n.6-15, where various *comparisons* from the Fathers are quoted.

23. See Petavius, I.11 c.12 n.11. Individual texts were cited by Petavius, I.11 c.10 n.6-15. See Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.2 n.12-14.

24. III, q. 15, a. 1 c.; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas*... 244f.; Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.1 n.2.

25. See S.Th. III, q. 15, a. 1 ad 2; Salmanticenses, *loc. cit.*, n.5; Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit*... 50f. There is more on this in the treatise on original sin.

thesis, the *Word* would be said *to sin*, if the *human* will of Christ sinned. Of course, although the Word may be said *to suffer* or *to die*, to say that God sins, “offends the pious ears of all theologians.”²⁶ For what is said about God by the communication of idioms, in a special way is assumed by him and in a sense deified. Hence by sin there would be conferred on Christ a dignity and deification that are repugnant, since sin *as such* is simply evil.²⁷

352. 2) If Christ sinned, then sin would be referred *to the divine will itself of the Word*. For when two natures and wills belong *to the same person*, it pertains to the superior will in functioning to contain and direct the inferior will, if it can. Certainly the divine will can completely direct the human will. Therefore if the human will of Christ sinned, that would come from some defect in the divine will. St. Thomas expresses this in a profound way: “But because he was God, both his soul and his body were *a quasi organ of the Deity*, according to which... the Deity ruled the soul and the soul ruled the body; therefore sin could not touch his soul, *just as God cannot sin*.”²⁸

353. 3) *The humanity of Christ is substantially holy* formally in virtue of the hypostatic union, as we showed above in thesis 12. But *with such holiness* even the smallest moral defect is absolutely repugnant, just as it would be repugnant to the holiness *of God himself*. Therefore Christ, considered in himself, formally from the hypostatic union alone is certainly absolutely impeccable.²⁹

354. Objections. 1. St. Paul in 2 Cor. 5:21 expressly says: *he who did not know sin, was made sin for our sake*. But this means that Christ *assumed sin*. Therefore *de facto* there was sin in Christ.

I distinguish the minor. This means that Christ assumed sin, so that he himself either *personally* sinned or at least had original sin, *denied*; so that Christ is said by St. Paul to have been made “sin” in the same way in which he is said to be made... a curse (Gal. 3:13), that is, because of the *solidarity* of Christ with men, he carried our sins and *because of this solidarity* he was made a sinner and sin, with no opposition coming from the fact of his immaculate *personal* innocence, *conceded*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

26. Suarez, d.33 s.2 n.7.

27. See Suarez, *ibid.*; Galtier, n. 364.

28. 3 d.12 q.2 a.1 sol. See Suarez, *ibid.*, n.7-11. Gummersbach, *Unstündlichkeit...* 60-72; there more profound metaphysical reasons for the diversity of opinion are presented; however what we explained about them above in thesis 4 is what should be accepted.

29. The sense of this argument is very different from the way in which P. Vázquez understands it: see Gummersbach, *op. cit.*, 58-60. It is clear that not only all *actual sin* but also all *habitual sin* is excluded in Christ: see Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.3.

There is not one explanation of Catholics concerning the meaning of this verse. However a *negative* solution, inasmuch as Christ cannot be said to be *personally* a sinner, is held absolutely by all, and St. Paul clearly states it: *he who did not know sin*; but to assert the contrary would be a manifest contradiction with Holy Scripture, as is clear from what we said above in n. 340-342. We propose a *positive* solution that seems to be more in conformity with the text and the context.³⁰

355. 2) If the Word sinned with his *divine* will because of a sin by his *human* will (see above, n. 352), then by his *divine* will he would also *merit*, if his human will performed a good act. But the Word by his divine will *merits nothing*. Therefore this is a sign that the Word by his divine will *would not sin*, if his human will sinned.

I distinguish the major. The Word, if his human will performed a good act, *would act justly* with his divine will, *conceded*; he would actually *merit*, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

This difficulty is derived from the fact that a *just man*, who performs a good act, acquires some merit in the eyes of God. The objection would be valid, if the notion of “merit” and the notion of “acting well” had the same meaning. In God however that is certainly not the case. For God would not now have *to have everything*, so that he could acquire something for himself as a reward.

The question about the merit that the Word acquired by his *human will*, will be explained below in thesis 24.³¹

356. Scholium 1. *On the inclination to sin (fomes peccati) or concupiscence.* The inclination to sin, which we explained in the treatise on God the sanctifier, can be considered either actually (*in actu secundo*) or potentially (*in actu primo*). When it is active it is a certain *movement* of the appetite that *precedes* reason and free will and *inclines* them to sin. *Potentially* or habitually it is the *appetite itself*, or its natural inclination that is disordered in such a way that at times *it can* obstruct the will and incite it to act against reason.³²

That Christ did not have an inclination to sin *actually* is a matter of faith (*de fide*) from the Council of *Constantinople II* against Theodore of Mopsuestia, “who said... that Christ *was disturbed* by the passions of the soul and the desires of the flesh” (D 434). The immunity of Christ from a *potential* or *habitual* inclination to sin is *at least certain*, for reasons analogous to those by which it is proved that Christ was absolutely impeccable.³³

For the same reasons *almost all theologians* hold, and with just reason, that Christ the Lord also could not transgress the *counsels*.³⁴

30. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,134f.; Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 1,315f.; Bover, *Las epistulas...* at this place; Id., *Teologia de San Pablo* 1.5 c.3, 386-419, where also the explanation of the Fathers and theologians are given.

31. For more objections, see Muncunill, n. 551-559; Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.2 n.31-38.

32. See S.Th. I-II, q. 30; B. Beraza, S.J., *Tractatus de Deo elevante...* (Cursus theologicus Oniensis, Bilbao 1924) n. 310-318.

33. See S.Th. III, q. 15, a. 2; Suarez, at this place and d.34 s.2; Galtier, n. 368-370f.; Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.4.

34. See Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.5.

357. Scholium 2. *On ignorance and error.* The question here is about ignorance *in the proper sense* or denoting a *privation*, that is, of those things that according to his status the soul of Christ *needed to know*. For it is clear that the knowledge of Christ suffered some ignorance *in the improper sense, in a negative way*, or better, *simply not knowing*, since, as finite, he did not know everything that is contained in the power of God. Therefore we attribute to the knowledge of Christ the extent we spoke about above in thesis 13, scholium 1, n. 300.

There were not lacking *important Fathers* who attributed some ignorance to Christ *the man*, especially because of Mark 13:32 *But of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. Some of these Fathers* held only the *progress* of the human knowledge of Christ up to his resurrection. *But many of the Fathers*, especially after the Agnoetists, who following the leadership of Themistius attributed ignorance to Christ, strongly affirmed that it is unworthy of Christ to think that he was burdened with any ignorance.³⁵

358. Already at the beginnings of scholastic theology the exclusion of all ignorance in Christ was *almost unanimous*. St. Thomas deduces *from the fullness* of Christ's knowledge that there was no ignorance in him.³⁶

The magisterium itself of the Church, both formerly and recently, has rejected the opinion that places some ignorance in Christ. See D 474-476, 3432-3434, 3645f.³⁷

359. Regarding a *positive* explanation of Mark 13:32: Christ said that he did not know the day and hour, because it was not part of *his mission to reveal this*. This saying of Christ agrees with not a few others in which Christ hides himself, so that the Father may be more apparent.³⁸

Moreover *concerning the knowledge acquired by his own acts* it can truly be said that Christ did not know the day of judgment; as we showed above (n. 282-285) he truly asked questions and experienced true admiration. However since Christ did know the day of judgment by his human knowledge both beatific and infused, it would be false to say that the Lord *simply* did not know it by his human knowledge.

360. From what has been said it is clear how much more Catholic sensitivity shrinks from admitting in Christ any *errors*, when it refused to admit any *ignorance*. The texts that seem to imply error are the so-called "eschatological ones"; these are analyzed extensively in the treatise on the Church.

35. See especially Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité...*⁶ 1, note C, 559-586; Galtier, n. 356-358; DTC 14, 1639-1647. On St. Ephraem who admitted ignorance in the human nature of Christ, see Beck, *Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem...* 78f. For St. Cyril, see also Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 150-162. For St. Ambrose, Drzenick, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii...* 31-33. For St. Hilary, see Giamberardini, *De incarnatione Verbi...* DivThom (Pi) (1947) 199, note 161. On Themistius, see E. Amann, *Themistius*: DTC 15, 219-222.

36. III, q. 15, a. 3 c. See Lebreton, *ibid.*, 586-589.

37. See DTC 14, 1659-1665.

38. See Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme...*⁶ 1, 590; Galtier, n. 360. For another view, Adam, *Der Christus des Glaubens* 292-298; see also Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde*, 2. *Le Mystère...* 400, note 75^{bis}. On St. Thomas, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 260f.

Much more generally theologians affirm also the *absolute impossibility* of error in Christ. It seems that this must be held both because it belongs to the prudent providence of a rational person not to admit falsity and deception in his own nature, when he can easily avoid it, and because in error there cannot be a reason for any true good, and finally because otherwise the authority of the person of the Word speaking through his human nature, if he were capable of error, would be greatly diminished.³⁹

361. Scholium 3. *On the passions.* Two *appetitive powers* or two appetites are distinguished in man. One is the *rational* or *intellective appetite*, the other is the *sensitive*. The rational appetite follows the apprehension of the *intellect* and is called the *will*. The sensitive appetite follows the apprehension of the senses, whether external or internal, and is called simply "*appetite*."⁴⁰

St. Thomas in this place (III, q. 15, a. 2ff.) explains the *sensitive appetite*. But he considers the *will* later on in q. 18. However, since what concerns us is treated there rather briefly,⁴¹ here we will consider at the same time *both* the appetite *and* the will, because in man these are often very dependent on each other.⁴²

362. *The acts of the sensitive appetite* are usually called *passions*. For since by the passions are understood alterations and other resulting changes according to which something is *altered* in the subject, the acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have a bodily change connected with them, are called *passions*.⁴³ But the *act* of the *intellectual* appetite is often called by St. Thomas simply the *will* or *to will*⁴⁴; but lest confusion arise concerning the *power* itself, the act is also called *volition*.⁴⁵ Concerning the *acts of the rational* appetite it is necessary to note that those things are found *in the will* that are also found in the *sensitive appetite*—love, joy, sadness, although they are found there in a higher way, for in the will they are spiritual and not dependent as to their being on the natural passions of the body, and they can be related to the end and to the means.⁴⁶

363. There is no doubt that Christ the Lord had passions. However all the imperfec-

39. See Suarez, d.24 a.3 n.16; Salmanticenses, d.25 dub.6 n.85-92.

40. See S.Th. I, q. 80, a. 2; *De ver.* q.22 a.4; Suarez, *De anima* 1.5 c.1 n.3; Urráburu, *Institutiones philosophicae... Psychologia pars secunda* 6,1-70, 104-151. We follow the way of speaking that is generally used by scholastic theologians; on that and on what modern psychology teaches about the whole matter concerning the appetitive powers, the passions and the affections, see J. Fröbes, S.J., *Psychologia speculativa...* (Freiburg i. Br. 1927) 1, 1.2 c.3 p.209-230; 2, 1.2 c.1 p.126-150; A. Willwoll, S.J., *Seele und Geist* (Freiburg i. Br. 1938) 113-149. For more, especially concerning the teaching of St. Thomas, see H.-D. Noble, O.P., *Les passions dans la vie morale* 2 vol. (Paris 1932). In particular in relation to the Christology of St. Thomas, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 230-246.

41. See John of St. Thomas, at this place; Suarez, d.34 and 38.

42. See Urráburu, *Psychologia* 6,94-104. On the will, there is more below in thesis 17, scholium 1, n. 442f.

43. See S.Th., 1 *De caelo* lect. 1; I, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1. There is more in L. Schütz, *Thomas Lexikon*² (Paderborn 1895); on this matter, see Urráburu, *ibid.*, 77-94.

44. V.gr., *De ver.* q.22 a.15 c; I, q. 83, a. 4 ad 2; III, q. 18, a. 1 ad 3; a. 3 c; however in I, q. 82, a. 5 ad 1 he speaks about "simple affection." See also I-II, q. 22; q. 26, a. 2 c. Urráburu, *ibid.*, 158-178.

45. See, v.gr., Cajetan, *In 1-2* q.8 a.2,

46. See, v.gr., S.Th. I-II, q. 22, a. 3; *De ver.* q.25 a.3; Urráburu, *Psychologia* 6, 156f. St. Thomas treats the passions extensively in I-II, q. 22-48.

tions that accompany them *in us* must be excluded from Christ's passions, so that these passions in Christ are not directed to illicit things nor did they function in a way that is opposed to the judgment of reason nor did they hinder his reason from doing what is right.⁴⁷

The existence of passions *in the sensitive appetite* of Christ is certain from Holy Scripture itself. For Christ is said, v.gr., *anger*: Mark 3:5: *and he looked around at them with anger*; where a *bodily* change in his way of looking around at them is noted; *love*: John 11:3.5.33-36, where the love of Jesus reaches all the way to sensible tears; *sadness*: Matt. 26:37f.: *he began to be sorrowful and troubled*, where the sadness of Christ was so *sensible* that the Apostles noticed it. Moreover among the causes of this sadness many can be mentioned that should produce sensible sadness, such as his imminent *death*. Finally, closely connected with this sensible sadness is the physical "agony" recorded in Luke 22:44.⁴⁸

364. Holy Scripture also teaches the existence of similar affections in his *rational appetite* (see D 2363). *Zeal* for the house of God: John 2:17⁴⁹; *love*: Mark 10:21, where doubtless his love was manifested *in a sensible way*, so that the Apostles saw it, but also and mainly this love was *spiritual*, since it was caused by an *intellectual* motive, namely, by the fidelity of that youth in fulfilling the law of God⁵⁰; *sadness*: Mark 3:5, where the same thing must be said; but especially, Matt. 26:37f, where they are applied incorrectly to a *mere sensible* sadness, since many *intellectual* motives also influenced the mind of Christ.⁵¹

In general the existence of passions and affections in Christ is proved from Holy Scripture, since to Jesus simply are attributed by the evangelists those things that *among other men* are true passions and true affections, such as, in addition to those mentioned above, *joy* (John 11:15), *exultation* (Luke 10:21), *desire* (Luke 22:15), *disturbance* (John 11:33), and so forth.⁵²

365. Scholium 4. *An explanation of Christ's sadness.* There is a big difficulty from

47. See S.Th. III, q. 15, a. 4; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 268-270; Suarez, d.24.38; Salmanticensis, d.25 dub.8 n.99-108, where in n. 105 the *name* itself of the "passions" is reference to Christ is vindicated. On the famous opinion of St. Hilary regarding the passibility of Christ, see Fabre, *La communication des idiomes dans les oeuvres de Saint Hilaire...*: Greg 17 (1936) 485-514; McMahan, *De Christo mediatore...* 44-48; G. Giamberardini, O.F.M., *De dolore, morte et resurrectione Verbi Incarnati secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem*: DivThom (Pi) 51 (1948) 3-18.

48. On these four texts, see Lagrange, *Evangile...*⁴ on these verses. On the *agony* in the garden, see also J. Lebreton, S.J., *La vie et l'enseignement de Jésus Christ Notre Seigneur*³ (Paris 1931) 2,322-344. On the *laughter* of Christ, see F. Jansen, S.J., *Jésus a-t-il ri?*: NouvRevTh 56 (1929) 353-372. On the four sources of *joy* in Christ, see A. Frank-Duquesne, *Joie de Jésus Christ*, in *Ma joie terrestre où donc est-il?*: EtCarm 26 (1947) 21-37. On *other passions* in Christ, see Salmanticensis, d.25 dub.8 n.113-128.

49. See Knabenbauer, Lagrange, *op. cit.*, at this place.

50. See Lagrange, *op. cit.*, at this place.

51. See Lebreton, *La vie et l'enseignement...* 329-344; Suarez, d.38 s.3 n.2f.

52. The Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*" examines in depth the human and divine affections of the Heart of Jesus: AAS 48 (1956) 322-337. For more, see DTC 8,1155-1164. On the profound theological reasons on the passibility of Christ, see S.Th. III, q.14, a. 1; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 241-243. On Christ's affections according to St. Bonaventure, see A. Sépinski, O.f.M., *La psychologie du Christ chez Saint Bonaventure* (Paris 1948).

the beatific vision of the soul of Christ, which we demonstrated above in thesis 13. Since it seems that *joy* necessarily follows from this vision, but it is not apparent how *such joy* can be together with *sadness*, there have not been lacking theologians who, because of Christ's sadness, denied his *blessed joy during the time of the passion*. But if you make an exception for these few authors, the common opinion of theologians refuses to admit such a *limitation* of joy in Christ.⁵³

From the treatise on the last things it is certain that the impassibility of a glorified body is derived from the blessed *soul*, and in such a way that it is something *intrinsic* to the body, as the almost common opinion holds against Scotus and some others.⁵⁴ Likewise, most theologians hold that the impassibility overflows into the body not *physically and effectively* from the beatific vision, but only morally or by a certain *fitting* ordination of God that in its own way is *connatural* to the beatific state.⁵⁵

366. The *sensible* sadness of Christ is explained more easily. For *on the part of the object*, the beatifying joy of the soul and the sensible sadness do not exclude each other, because *they are not related to the same object*; for the object of joy is the possession of the divine goodness, while the object of sadness is some injury, both one's own and that of someone else. And there is no repugnance *on the part of the overflowing*: "That the glory of His soul did not overflow into His body from the first moment of Christ's conception was due to a certain Divine *dispensation*, that He might fulfill the mysteries of our redemption in a passible body."⁵⁶

367. *Spiritual* sadness or sadness in the *will* itself is more difficult to understand, if indeed it is the *will itself* that is affected by beatifying joy. But it is possible to understand it *from the difference of the formal object*. For the same material object, v.gr., the partial frustration of his passion and death with the consequent damnation of many men, which Christ saw in God by his knowledge of *vision*, as permitted by God and therefore *lovable*, by his infused and acquired knowledge he could apprehend the same thing as

53. See Galtier, n.441; Suarez, d.38 s.3 n.6f.; Minges, 1, n.515. Some limitation of the beatific *vision itself* regarding its secondary object is advocated by Manyà, *Theologumena* III, 93-236. See also Moeller, *Le chalcédonisme et le néochalcédonisme en Orient...* (*Das Konzil von Chalkeon*, Grillmeier-Bacht) 1,713 note 67; Adam, *Der Christus des Glaubens* 291. But all interruption of the beatific vision seems to be in conflict with its very nature: see I.F. Sagüés, S.J., *SThS* 4² tr. 6 n.108 ad b).

54. See S.Th. I, q. 97, a. 1 c; Suarez, *De mysteriis...* d.48 s.3; Salmanticenses, tr.9 d.5 dub.2 n.23-48; Minges, 2, n. 733. On Scotus, see *In 4* d.49 q.13. On the other theologians in favor of this opinion, see M. Siuri, *Theologia scholastico-positiva de novissimis...* (Valentiae 1707) tr.40 n.24.

55. See Suarez, *De Deo uno* 1.2 c.30 n.7; Siuri, *loc. cit.*, n.7f.

56. S.Th. III, q.45, a. 2 c. See a somewhat different view in Billot, *De Verbo incarnato* th.24. Manyà, *op. cit.*, 139-148. The assertion made by the mystics that there is no necessary redundancy of spiritual activities in the powers of the soul, that is, that the operations of God in an *imperfect soul* bring ecstasy and other bodily disturbances and that these bodily effects cease in the soul that has already been *purified*: see Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado, O.C.D., *San Juan de la Cruz...* (Madrid-Avila 1929) 1,292-296, 375-387; Id., *Compendio de Ascética y Mística* (Madrid-Avila 1933) 264f; F. Naval, C.M.F., *Curso de teología y mística...*⁶ (Madrid 1942) n.255. On the *redundance* of joy in the body, see St. Teresiam A Jesu, *Libro de la vida* c.17 n.8 (Biblioteca Mística Carmelitana, 1. *Obras de Santa Teresa de Jesús...* by Fr. Silverio de Santa Teresa, C.D. [Burgos 1915] t.1 127); Crisógono, *Compendio...* 233.269f.

something *evil in itself*.⁵⁷

368. The possibility of spiritual sadness is not excluded *on the part of the subject* or *from the opposite way* in which joy and sadness affect the subject, especially when the *greatest* joy affects some subject. Namely, it would seem that there is no place in a soul that is already *totally* beatified for a contrary affection, that is, sadness. A solution may be found in the fact that joy and sadness do not have their own contrariness, unless in a particular case they are concerned *with absolutely the same thing* both materially and formally. However although they do not have a strict contrariety, still there is *great diversity* between them and a *certain repugnance*, so that *without a miracle* they could not coexist in the same subject.⁵⁸ Also, we will propose the ultimate basis for the possibility of the existence of spiritual sadness in Christ below in thesis 18, n. 471f.

Some ideas on the possibility of *the contrariety of wills* will be explained below in thesis 17, scholium 1, n. 442-447.

369. Scholium 5. *On Christ at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor.* From what has been said it is clear how correctly St. Thomas explained as something following from the preceding articles in q. 15 and at the same time as their ultimate nature, namely, how Christ was *at the same time both a wayfarer and a comprehensor*: a *wayfarer* surely, because his soul was still *passible* and his body was *passible and mortal*; but he was also a *comprehensor*, since his soul *saw God and enjoyed God* (q. 15, a. 10).

57. See Suarez, d.38 s.3 n.6-11; Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.45. We say that Christ *could* apprehend by his infused and acquired knowledge something as evil in itself and the object of sadness; however Christ does not seem by this knowledge *necessarily* to apprehend it as evil in itself, and not as permitted by God and therefore lovable. It is possible to confirm this from a Doctor of the Church, St. John of the Cross: see *Cántico espiritual* c.20f. (Biblioteca Mística Carmelitana, 12. *Obras de San Juan de la Cruz...* by Fr. Silverio de Santa Teresa, C.D. [Burgos 1930] t.3 312f.); or Crisógono, *San Juan de la Cruz...*387f.

58. See S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 8; Suarez, d.38 s.3 n.10f. Otherwise Salmanticenses, d.17 dub.4 n.46f. On the solution of St. Thomas and the medieval theologians, see Murphy, *The Dereliction...* 66-116. See Billot, th.24 ad 3rd; Galtier, n. 442-445. Perhaps in this most difficult problem some light can be shed on it by that subtle and frequently used distinction by the mystics between the "soul" and the "spirit": see, v.gr., St. Teresiam A Jesu, *Castillo interior o Las Moradas* 7, c.1f. (Biblioteca Mística Carmelitana, 4. *Obras de Santa Teresa de Jesús...* [Burgos 1917] t.4, 184.186-191). See W. von Ivanka, *Apex mentis. Wanderung und Wandlung eines stoischen Terminus*: ZkathTh 72 (1950) 129-176. On the distinction of the powers from the soul, see Fröbes, *Psychologia...* 2,225-234.

CHAPTER IV

On the things that result from the union

ARTICLE I

WHAT IS FITTING FOR CHRIST IN HIMSELF

Thesis 16. A true communication of idioms must be admitted in Christ. From that we deduce certain rules to be observed regarding the proper predication of the communication of idioms in Christ.

S.Th. III, q. 16; Salmanticenses, d.26; Stentrup, *Christologia* 2, th.37f., p. 627-676; Muncunill, n.560-587.

370. Connection. Having explained the mystery of the incarnation and what pertains to the *union*, and what pertains to the *assumed extremes*, and what pertains to the things *co-assumed*, St. Thomas next considers what follows the union. Therefore the matter covered from q. 2 to q. 15 contains the *principles* from which by a demonstrative process now in a logical way some *conclusions* are deduced that are virtually contained in those principles.¹

In the first place conclusions are deduced regarding those things that are applicable to Christ *in himself* (q. 16 to 19); in the second place, regarding those things that are applicable to him *by comparison with the Father* (q. 20 to 24); in the third place, regarding those things that are applicable to him *by comparison with us* (q. 25f.).

Of the things that are applicable to Christ *in himself*, in this thesis we consider expressly what is applicable to Christ *in his being and becoming* (q. 16). But since *one* follows *being*,² with St. Thomas we must consider what is applicable to Christ regarding his *unity* (q. 17 to 19). Also in the scholium of this thesis, below n. 405, we will treat the unity of Christ regarding his *being* (q. 17), and we will defer other questions concerning the unity of Christ to the two following theses.

371. Definition of terms. *Idiom* (ἰδίωμα) *in virtue of the word* it is a property or the proper nature of any thing.³ *Theologically in this question an*

1. See Gillon, *La notion de consequence...*: Ang 15 (1938) 33f. Also Billot, part one, chapter 3 introduction, adopted the same approach. Otherwise, Salmanticenses, d.26 introduction.

2. See, v.gr., S.Th., 2 CG 58 and 73.

3. See H. Stephanum, *Thesaurus linguae graecae*² (Paris) at this place.

idiom is both the *nature itself* and *whatever belongs to the nature*, whether it belongs to it as a *property in the strict sense*, that is, what *necessarily* follows from the essence of the thing, or it belongs to the nature as a *property in the wide sense*, that is, what belongs to the nature *in any way whatsoever*.

Therefore in Christ an idiom is not only the divine nature itself and the human nature itself, but also both immensity and the power of speaking, which are *properties in the strict sense*, and to be the Creator and to suffer thirst.

372. *Communication* or communion (called ἀντίδοσις by the Greek authors)⁴ of *idioms* is that participation of properties or exchange, by which a person subsisting in one of two natures, has the other nature and what is proper to that other nature in such a way that he can properly be named by these properties.

Concretely: *The Only-begotten Son of God*, a divine person subsisting in the divine nature, has as his own also a human nature and what belongs to that nature in such a way that he can also be named with these latter properties, for example, *man, suffered, crucified*. On the other hand, *Jesus*, a divine person subsisting in a human nature, has also a divine nature and what belongs to that nature in such a way that he can be justly named with these properties, for example, *God, omnipotent, creator*.⁵

373. The communication of idioms is *hardly said so strictly*, when the person subsisting in *both natures*, v.gr., *Christ*, has both natures and those things that are proper to each nature, so that he can be rightly named by these. Nestorius himself readily admitted a communication of idioms in which divine and human attributes were predicated of Christ (see above, thesis 3, n. 30f.35).⁶

374. *The root or principle* of this communication of idioms is both the *union* of the two natures in the same hypostasis, and the union of the same, as they are in themselves, perfect and integral natures, while their *difference* remains in the composition; finally there is also the *circuminsession* that flows from the two natures, that is, the mutual existence of the two natures in each other.⁷

375. *The predication of idioms.* This is a *logical expression* of this

4. See Petavius, 1.4 c.15 n.1-3.

5. Regarding the way of presenting this matter Vázquez disagrees, and we will deal with this in the second part of the thesis, below in note 18. Although the definition of Petavius (*ibid.*, n.1) seems to be different from ours and seems to favor that of Fr. Vázquez, nevertheless it really agrees with ours; see *ibid.*, especially d.16 n.11. This teaching of Petavius is very important, since it faithfully presents the sayings of the Fathers.

6. See S.Th. III, q. 16, a. 4 c.

7. See Petavius, 1.4 c.15 n.3. See above thesis 3, scholium 3, n. 46, and especially Stentrup, 2, th.38 p.666-676.

ontological reality, which we have defined as the *communication* of idioms.

Communication and *predication* are so intimately connected, that it is not surprising if the authors often hardly make a distinction between the two.⁸ We also in order to define communication clearly felt it necessary to mention predication (see above, n. 372f.).

376. *From that we deduce certain rules to be observed.* Since the *predication* of idioms is nothing but the *logical expression of the ontological communication* of idioms, it is clear that the rules to be observed in the correct way of predicating idioms is *derived* from the ontological reality of such communication.

In the second part of the thesis we will consider what these rules are.

377. Adversaries. *By excess,* the *Monophysites* with the *ubiquists*, treated above in thesis 2, n. 18f. All of these, in one way or another, so exaggerate the communication of idioms that they end up by affirming *the unity of nature* in Christ.

By defect, the *Nestorians*, treated above in thesis 3, n. 30-32. They, since they admitted in Christ a *union* of the natures but not a truly hypostatic union, readily conceded that the names, that can pertain *to both natures*, such as *Christ* or *Lord*, can accept the predicates of both natures. However they absolutely refused to say about God what pertains to the *human* nature, and to say about the *man* those things that pertain *to the divine nature*. Hence they conceded that *Christ* was born of the Virgin and was eternal; but they would not say either that *God* was born of the Virgin or that the *Man* was eternal.⁹

378. Doctrine of the Church. 1) *Theoretically.* It condemns the separation or division of idioms in Christ as being between two persons: D 255.

2) *Practically.* Divine idioms are attributed to the man and human idioms to God. Thus already in the *Creeds*, but especially at the *Council of Ephesus*, as we explained above in thesis 3, n. 33f. See also D 900-901.

379. Theological note. A. *The communication of idioms*, in the way it is proposed in the thesis, is *a truth at least theologically certain*, as the necessary conclusion from the revealed dogma about the one person and

8. On this point St. Thomas also shows great similarity with the *Greek* Christology, which was more concerned with the *ontological communication itself*, while the Latin scholastics were concerned more with *logical predication*. See Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* especially 289-293. For more on the history of the communication of idioms among the scholastics, see Borchert, *Der Einfluss des Nominalismus...* 26ff.

9. S.Th. III, q. 16, a. 4 c.

the two natures in Christ. According to the ordinary magisterium of the Church, already clearly manifested by the holy Fathers, it seems that *it must be said to be a matter of faith (de fide)*.

B. *The rules of speaking* in this mystery have a *different value*, depending on the greater or lesser connection with the objective communication of idioms and with the greater or lesser consensus of theologians who approve the individual rules.

380. A. Proof from Holy Scripture. From the argument proposed above in thesis 3, n. 35-37, and in thesis 2, n. 21f., it is immediately deduced that the Only-begotten Son of God participates in or admits in himself human idioms and that the man Jesus admits in himself divine idioms, while at the same time preserving the perfect integrity of both natures. Indeed this is the very communication of idioms that we assert.

381. Proof from tradition. 1) Having supposed the preceding proofs from tradition in thesis 3, n. 38f., and in thesis 2, n. 23f., the argument proceeds in the same way as the argument from Holy Scripture.

2) The holy Fathers propose the *fact* of the communication of idioms *explicitly* or *theoretically*. Origen: "And for this reason, throughout the whole of Scripture, not only is the divine nature spoken of in human words, but the human nature is adorned by appellations of divine dignity" (R 460).¹⁰ St. Gregory of Nyssa: "So that because of the joining together and the natural union both natures become common to each other: the lord assuming in himself the marks of a slave, and the slave glorified with the honor of a lord" (R 1044). St. Ambrose: "...because the same God is the same man, God by his divinity, by assuming flesh the man Jesus Christ, the Lord of majesty is said to be crucified" (R 1267).¹¹

382. St. Augustine: "The blessed Apostle shows this unity of the person of Christ Jesus our Lord thus existing from both natures, namely, the divine and the human, so that each of them also confers a name on the other, both the divine to the human and the human to the divine" (R 1859). St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Therefore what belongs to the humanity becomes the property of the Word, and what belongs to the Word becomes the property of the

10. It seems that Origen was the first one who proposed this doctrine *theoretically*: see G. Bardy, *Origène*: DTC 11, 1542. Among the Latins, Novatian seems to have been the first one (R 606): see Favre, *La communication des idiomes...*: BullLittEcccl 37 (1936) 144.

11. On St. Gregory of Nyssa, see Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius...* 67-75; A. Michel, *Idiomes (Communication des)*: DTC 7, 596. On St. Athanasius, see Weigl, *Untersuchungen zur Christologie des hl. Athanasius* 5f., 61-63, 150f. 171f. On St. Hilary of Poitiers, see Favre, *La communication des idiomes...*: Greg 17 (1936) 481-514; 18 (1937) 318-336.

humanity. For thus the one Christ is understood as both Son and Lord” (R 2130). St. John Damascene clearly explains this whole matter in his *De fide orthodoxa* at the end of the third chapter and through all of the fourth chapter of the third book, which is exactly entitled: περί τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἀντιδόσεως. On the way of mutual communication (see, v.gr., R 2361).¹²

383. Theological reasoning. In Christ there is only one hypostasis of both natures, divine and human, as is clear from the proof of thesis 3 against Nestorius. Therefore whether that hypostasis is considered in the divine nature or in the human nature, that *one* hypostasis possesses both natures with the properties of both.

The matter is clear from the absurd opposite supposition. If that hypostasis existing in the divine nature did not have the human idioms, then these human idioms would belong to *another* hypostasis. Therefore there would be in Christ *two* hypostases—one subsisting in the divine nature, and another whose human idioms would be proper.¹³

384. B. The *rules* of speaking in this mystery. Some ideas from logic should be recalled before the presentation of these rules.

1) *Abstract and concrete terms.* *Abstract terms* are those that signify *simple forms*, or that express a form or a determination of a thing standing by itself and without a subject, v.gr., humanity, whiteness. But *concrete terms* are those that signify subsisting things, or which express a thing together with the form or determination by which it is affected, v.gr., man, a white thing.¹⁴

385. 2) *The signification of something directly (in recto) and indirectly (in obliquo).* Something is said to be signified *directly* when it is in the nominative case; but it is said to be signified *indirectly* when it is in another case that is not the nominative.

386. But what *de facto* is signified directly in individual terms, and what is signified indirectly depends on the nature of the terms.

Abstract terms signify necessarily directly the *form*, since they signify nothing else beside that form: thus “humanity.”

12. On St. Augustine, see Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie...* 57-63. On St. Cyril, see Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius...* 176-185.198; Du Manoir de Juave, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 145-149. For more on the argument from tradition, see DTC 7,596-600.

13. See S.Th. III, q. 16 passim; Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 289-301.

14. See S.Th. I, q. 32, a.2 c; III, q. 16, a. 1 c; a. 5 c; Urráburu, *Institutiones philosophicae...* Logica 134f.; J. Fróbes, S.J., *Tractatus logicae formalis* (Rome 1940) 60.

Concrete adjectival terms, that is, ones that “signify something by way of an accident that inheres in a subject,”¹⁵ signify the subject directly, but the form indirectly: thus “just” is the same thing as “a subject (v.gr., a man) having justice.”

387. *Concrete substantive terms*, that is, ones that “signify something by way of substance,”¹⁶ refer to something directly, but what they mean indirectly is disputed.¹⁷

When one speaks about *the mystery of the Incarnation*, the most common opinion is that it signifies directly the person or suppositum, but indirectly the nature or form; for example, man signifies in Christ not the human nature in the suppositum, but the suppositum having a human nature.¹⁸

This by far more common way of speaking must be retained, because it expresses much more exactly the reality of the hypostatic union and the communication of idioms.

388. 3) *The affirmed identity between the subject and the predicate.* In propositions the identity alone between the *essence* of the subject [*rectum subjecti*] and the *essence* of the predicate [*rectum praedicati*] is affirmed. With the prevalent opinion of theologians it seems that it must be said that identity *in the real sense* between the essence of the subject and the essence of the predicate is sufficient, and that identity also *in the formal sense* is not necessary, as will be made clear below in n. 398. In our case, the proposition “God is a man” affirms the identity between the person or suppositum having the divine nature and the person or suppositum having a human nature.

389. *Rules* to be observed in the predication of idioms. 1) This is fundamental: In Christ already constituted the correct predication of idioms demands: a) that concrete terms are predicated simply about concrete things, b) but not abstract things about other abstract things, c) nor in general abstract things about concrete and vice versa.

15. S.Th. I, q. 39, a. 3 c.

16. *ibid.*

17. Regarding the *philosophers*, see Urráburu, *Institutiones... Logica* 144-146. Regarding *theologians*, where the concern is *the mystery of the Holy Trinity*, see Salmanticenses, tr.6 d.17. For a more general treatment, see Muncunill, n. 572f.

18. Vázquez contests this, d.63 c.4f., where he claims the support of St. Thomas. See also Arriaga, who in his *Cursus theologicus* holds our position and refutes the opinion of Vázquez (*De incarn. d.46 s.2 n.10-13*), while in the *revised* edition of his book (Lyons 1669) he offers various distinctions (*In summulas* d.1 s.10 n.85-90).

390. a) Therefore *human* idioms expressed *concretely* truly and properly are said about *God* and *the Son of God*: God is a man,¹⁹ the Son of God suffered.

However human idioms that are of such a nature that they involve not the nature alone, but also *the human person* as distinguished from the divine person, cannot be attributed to the Son of God. Thus it would be wrong to say: Christ or the Son of God is *other than God* or is a *creature* or *began to exist*. As often as some human idiom does not make it clearly understood, whether beside the nature it *also* includes the *human person*, an explanation must be added: for example, Christ or the Son of God is *less than the Father according to his human nature*.²⁰ Likewise concerning the formula: Christ or the Son of God is subject to the Father or a servant of the Father (see below, n. 507f.).²¹

391. However, human idioms expressed in a concrete way about God are said not absolutely only, but *also denominatively or adjectivally*: God became human (*inhumanatus*). The reason is because in Christ the person is *not simply constituted* by the human nature, but only becomes through that assumed nature something that before he was not; hence the mode of predication, taken from this human nature, can be the same with that which is taken from an adventitious form.²²

392. Similarly *divine idioms expressed in a concrete way* are said truly and properly about *Christ* and about *man*: A man is God, Christ is the Creator.

However, divine idioms about Christ and man are predicated *substantially or absolutely only*, not denominatively or adjectivally. In the strict sense this would not be said correctly: Jesus is a *lordly man*. For “when we say *the man Christ Jesus*, we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the person of the Son of God... Now God and Lord are predicated *essentially* of the Son of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated *denominatively*, since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we *lordly* denominatively from Lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that he is *Lord*.”²³ However it would not be equally bad to say: *a divine man*, since this denomination is *not necessarily* accidental, for we also call the nature or essence *divine*. Nevertheless this expression should be used with great caution.²⁴

19. On further disputes of the scholastics over this formula, see Salmanticenses, d.26 dub.2

20. See S.Th. III, q. 16, a. 8f.; Salmanticenses, d.26 dub.1 n.6; dub.5; Stentrup, 2, th. 37 p.641, note; 647-651; Muncunill, n. 578f.585; A. van Hove, *De quibusdam communicationis idiomatum applicationibus*: DivThom (Pi) 14 (1937) 514f.

21. See S.Th. III, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1 and ad 2; Stentrup, *ibid.*, 651-660.

22. See Stentrup, *op.cit.*, 641.

23. S.Th. III, q. 16, a. 3 c. See Salmanticenses, d.26 dub.3.

24. See S.Th., *ibid.*, ad 3; Stentrup, 2, th.37 p.644; Lercher, p. 110 ad c).

393. *Historically* the expression *lordly man* (*homo dominicus*) recurs in the writings of many of the Fathers and authors, both eastern and western, during the 4th century and at the beginning of the 5th century,²⁵ and it was not condemned for sounding like Apollinarism.²⁶ But when the problem arose about the *unity* of Christ, this formula began to be considered less exact and it was abandoned.²⁷

394. Concrete terms are not predicated *simply*, when they are predicated *in reduplication*. Therefore this proposition: “*Christ as Man is God*” is rather to be denied than to be affirmed, “because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum.”²⁸ But in Christ there are two perfect and integral natures. On the contrary, for the same reason it seems that this proposition is more to be accepted than rejected: “*Christ as man is a creature*.”²⁹ But in individual cases the matter must be carefully examined so that concrete terms pertaining to one nature are not predicated of the other *in a reduplication*.

395. This type of predication concretely must always be used, for it to be correct, *about Christ already existing in two natures*. For, the communication of idioms is based on the joining together of the divine nature and the human nature in the person of the Word. Therefore predications that signify not so much this joining together but the *way* or *order to it*, do not fall under these rules for the predication of idioms.

Viable propositions of this kind are, for example: “God was made man” and “Man was made God.” The first proposition is acknowledged necessarily by Catholics as true, since it occurs in Holy Scripture, v.gr., John 1:14; Rom 1:3.

St. Thomas’s reason is the best: “A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God..., yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of his assuming human nature.”³⁰

396. But the second proposition: “Man was made God” is generally rejected, if it is taken strictly. The reason is because “man” supposed in a determinate way for the person of Christ, which is God himself or the Word himself. But this person is essentially God

25. See J. Lebon, *S. Athanase a-t-il employé l'expression 'Ο κυριακός άνθρωπος?*: RevHistEccl 31 (1935) 309. In this article it is shown that St. Athanasius himself, it seems, used this expression once.

26. See *ibid.*, 308, note 2.

27. See *ibid.*, 322.

28. S.Th. III, q. 16, a. 11 c.

29. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 10 c. Opposed, Van Hove, *De quibusdam communicationis...*: DivThom (Pi) 14 (1937) 515f. On predications *with reduplication* in Christ, see Salmanticenses, d.26 dub.1 n.6; dub.6; Muncunill, n. 585.

30. III, q. 16, a. 6 c. See Salmanticenses, d.26 dub.4 n.37-41.

and has his being as God independently of every temporal determination.³¹ Among the holy Fathers this proposition or its equivalent is found frequently. These authors wished to express that in the mystery of the incarnation it came about that a man was at the same time God; it was not always necessary that strict logic be observed in the Fathers.³² The text of St. Paul in Rom. 1:3, only when badly understood, would give rise to objections.³³

397. b) *Abstract terms are not predicated directly of other abstract terms, as v.gr., divinity is humanity, mortality is immortality.* For since abstract terms signify *the form alone or the nature without the subject*, it would follow from such predication of abstract terms that the *natures themselves* in Christ are *identical* or that there is in him *one nature only*. But if at times similar expressions recur in orthodox writings, they should be explained by a certain kind of literary license, in the sense that abstract terms are used in the place of the concrete ones, as divinity for God.³⁴

398. c) *Generally abstract terms are not predicated of concrete terms and vice versa.* For mutual predicability functions among only those terms that can designate the *one person* of the incarnate Word; of course, abstract terms express the nature or the form *without the subject*. Therefore it would not be proper to say: Humanity is God, the Son of God is mortality.

We said that such predication is not right *generally*. However it can happen that, even if less in a formal sense but surely at least in a real sense, *divine idioms abstractly* signified can be predicated about *concrete* terms of human nature by identity: v.gr., omnipotence is incarnate, man is eternity. For since these abstract divine terms are predicated truly *about the Son of God*, also, it seems, they can be predicated about *the Son of man*, who supposes for the divine person of the Word.³⁵

399. This expression causes more difficulty and has given rise to a major controversy: “Christ is divinity and humanity taken together.” However if Christ is accepted not precisely for the suppositum alone or the person, but *for the composite* made up of two natures united substantially in one person, such an expression seems to make good sense.³⁶

400. Concrete terms that are used *in a reduplication* are equivalent to *abstract* terms. It is not proper to say: Jesus as Man is God, because such

31. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 7 c. See Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.42-46.

32. See S.Th., *ibid.*, ad 2 and ad 3; Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.44. On *the assumed man*, see above, thesis 3, objection 3, n. 42.

33. See S.Th., *ibid.*, ad 1; Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,510-512; Huby, *Epître aux Romains* 43; Bover, *Teología de San Palo* 75f.

34. See S.Th., *ibid.*, a. 5 c; Salmanticenses, d. 26 dub.1 n.7

35. See S.Th. III, q. 17, a. 1 c; Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.8-11; Lercher, n.139.

36. See Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n.11; Muncunill, n. 583.

terms stand *more for the nature than for the suppositum*. See above, n. 394.

401. The concrete terms that designate the *integral parts* of human nature *are also equivalent* to abstract terms. Thus it is not proper to say: the Son of God is the head or the blood. For the integral parts do not stand for the suppositum of the whole but just for themselves, as if they were considered separately or *abstractly*. The same thing would have to be said about *the essential parts*, since these also do not stand for the suppositum of the whole, unless perhaps the soul or the body is taken by synecdoche for the whole man.³⁷

402. 2) *Truly negative concrete terms*, which remove some property of one nature, cannot be predicated absolutely about Christ or about the concrete properties of nature. Therefore these propositions are false: Christ is incorporeal, that is, non-corporeal, or Christ is not equal to the Father. The reason is because a negation *simply* removes from a *subject* that which it denies, and therefore it would *simply* remove from Christ what belongs to him according to one nature, although not according to the other. Nevertheless in Holy Scripture some negative expressions about Christ do appear. They are used in order that the primary place of the Father can be made more clear, or the matter is sufficiently clear from the context: v.gr., Mark 13:32 (see above, thesis 15, scholium 2, n. 359); John 7:16.³⁸

403. 3) Those predications of idioms should be avoided which, although they may have in themselves a correct meaning, have been distorted into a perverse meaning. For, “with us and heretics the very words ought not to be used in common, lest we seem to countenance their error.” That is what St. Thomas says about the sentence: “Christ is a creature.”³⁹

404. 4) Finally, in the predication of idioms we should pay more attention to the accepted mode of signification and the use of the Church and of wise authors, than to put trust in our own cleverness. For error is incurred by the use of different ways of signifying and the use of unusual words.⁴⁰

Objections. They have been covered fairly well above. For more, one can consult

37. See Muncunill, n. 580; Stentrup, 2,646f.

38. See Muncunill, n. 577; Petavius, 4 c.16 n.13; Lercher, n. 140. On John 7:16, see Lagrange, *Evangile...* at this place.

39. III, q. 16, a. 8 c. On the older theologians, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*2.* part, 1, 172-198.

40. See John of St. Thomas, *Ars Logica...* (Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus... by B. Reiser, O.S.B., Turin 1930) 104.

Muncunill, n. 566-575.

405. Scholium. *On the unity of Christ as to his being.* Intimately connected with the questions about the things that belong to Christ *according to his being and becoming*, as we indicated above in n. 370, the question is proposed by St. Thomas about the things that pertain *to the unity* in Christ (q. 17).

However a double unity is distinguished—one *in common*, and the other *in particular*. Unity *in common* is said in order to contrast it *with particular perfections*, v.gr., concerning grace and knowledge; the holy Doctor already treated their unity and plurality in their proper places.

Because in any living thing a distinction must be made between its *being* and its *operation*, therefore St. Thomas treats unity with regard to both. But because being is *prior* to operation, he first deals with unity *according to its being*.⁴¹ We are also treating the same thing in this scholium.

406. Christ is *one and one (unus et unum)* both in the masculine and in the neuter. That Christ is *one in the masculine*, but not two, is a defined doctrine of the faith against the Nestorians (see above, thesis 3, n. 33f.). The reason is because when one (*unus*) designates the person, he must be said to be one (*unus*) in whom there is only *one person (una persona)*. Therefore Christ is not *this one and that one (alius et alius)*.

That Christ is *one in the neuter*, but not two in the neuter is a common opinion among theologians against some older authors who placed in Christ *two suppositums* but only *one person*. The reason is because if “two” in the neuter could be predicated of Christ, that would be *by reason of the natures*. But, since the divine and human natures are not predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only *in the concrete*, that is, *by reason of the one suppositum* that subsists in both, it is necessary that Christ also in the neuter be *one (unum)* and not *two*. Hence, although there are *in Christ* two natures, and therefore this and that (*aliud et aliud*), Christ himself must *not, without some clarification*, be said to be *this and that*.⁴²

407. In Christ there is only *one being* or *act of existence*. From what has gone before it is certain that in Christ there are *two natures* and *one suppositum*. Now therefore the question is whether there are in Christ two acts of existence or only one.

“Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being... Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature.”⁴³ Therefore “*a new personal being*” is not added to the Son of God according to his human nature, but only a new relation of a personal pre-existing being to the human nature.⁴⁴

41. See John of St. Thomas, *In 3 q.17*, introduction.

42. See S.Th. III, q. 17, a. 1; Cajetan, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, at this place.

43. S.Th. III, q. 17, a. 2 c. and ad 1.

44. *Ibid.*, c. For more on this, see Cajetan, at this place; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde*, 2. *Le Mystère...* 504-517. For a contrary opinion, see Suarez, d.36; Minges, 1, n.500-502. We explained much of this above in thesis 4; on the mind of St. Thomas, see *ibid.*, objection 4, n. 64.

Thesis 17. In Christ two natural wills and two natural operations must be acknowledged.

S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 1-3.5f.; q. 19, a. 1f.

408. Connection. Among the things that pertain to Christ *in himself* we considered in the previous thesis both what belongs to Christ according to his being and becoming, and what belongs to the unity of Christ in general as to his being. Now we must deal with those things that pertain *to the unity of Christ* according to his operating. In his operating two things must be distinguished—the *principle of action* or the will (q. 18) and *the operation itself* (q. 19).¹

Although this would be the logical place to consider *Christ's free will*, as St. Thomas rightly does (q. 18, a. 4), but because of its singular importance and because of the noble extent of this matter, we are reserving the next thesis for the development of this point.

In this place St. Thomas also considers *the merit of Christ* (q. 19, a. 3-4). We will treat this matter explicitly below in thesis 24, where with the holy Doctor (q. 48, a. 1) we will consider how the passion of Christ caused our salvation *by way of his merit*.

409. Definition of terms. We understand them in the sense in which this truth has been proposed *by the Church* in the documents that will be cited below against the *monothelists*.

Wills (θελήσεις ἢτοι θελήματα: D 556) designate both the *powers* themselves or the faculties of willing, and especially, as it seems, the *acts* or volitions of these powers.²

Natural wills or wills that express an immediate reference not to the hypostasis but *to the nature*.³ In other words, because in Christ we profess two integral *natures*, we must also profess in him *two natural wills*.

410. Operations (ἐνέργεια) designate, although the matter is not fully

1. See John of St. Thomas, *In 3 q.17*, introduction; q. 18, introduction.

2. See J. Bois, *Constantinople (III^e Concile de)*: DTC 3,1279f. On the other hand, G. Schrenk holds that θελήμα in the controversy with the monothelists *always* signifies the *organ of willing*, in Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 3,62, line 22f. This seems to be too exaggerated, both because of the reasons given by Bois, *loc. cit.*, and because in the N.T. θελήμα designates the object that someone wants (and therefore the *act* of the will), as Schrenk himself admits *loc. cit.*, line 23f. One should recall how up till now St. Thomas under the name of “will” understands both the power and the acts or volitions: see above thesis 13, scholium, n. 362.

3. See DTC 3,1270f.

clear, the *operations themselves* or the acts rather than the active *powers*.⁴

However a *duality of powers* or faculties is evidently had if *there is a duality of acts*. Therefore the words θελήμα and ἐνέργειαι *in agreement with defined doctrine* are translated into Latin by *voluntas* (will) and *energia* (operation) as faculties or *powers*; however those terms seem to have been translated a little less accurately according as they were used *by the Church in that controversy*.⁵

411. Although *historically* the first question was about the Christ's *operation* rather than about his will and although *logically* the term *operation* seems to include *volition*, we hold for the reverse order in the wording of the thesis, because this is the order in which *the documents of the Church* propose this matter. Actually these documents were composed at the time during which the controversy about the will of Christ was being carried on, and the doctrine about the oneness or duality of *wills* is in reality the main point on which everything else depends.

412. **Adversaries.** Those opposed to our thesis are usually called *monotheletists*. Historically however another error of the same tendency appears before the rise of monotheletism in the strict sense.

Political reasons, having to do with unity in the Roman empire, had much to do with the origin of this controversy which disturbed the Church for sixty years (619-679). This explains well why this doctrine was proposed by the heretics in so many different ways, because the whole messy business was more political than doctrinal. This heresy is rightly said to be more variable than any other heresy.⁶

Therefore a formula of union was sought—one that both the monophysites and the Catholics could accept. Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, from the year 619 wanted to retain both wills in Christ, but to speak only about one energy or one operation. From that came the so-called *monenergism*. With this formula Cyrus, the Patriarch of Alexandria, obtained union with the monophysites in 633.

Afterwards, because of the attacks of the Catholics, this doctrine was abandoned; then the heretics began to speak about *one will* in Christ and so established *monotheletism* in the strict sense.⁷

4. See DTC, *ibid.* Tixeront (*Histoire des dogmes...* 3^e, 163, note 2) simply denies that the word "operation" in this controversy signifies the active power; he says that it signifies the act alone or acting itself. But this does not seem to be admitted by all: see F. Bauer in *ThRev* 26 (1927) 273.

5. See DTC, *ibid.*

6. See M. Jugie, *Monothélisme*: DTC 10,2307; Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes...* 160f.

7. See DTC 10,2316-2321; Tixeront, *ibid.*, 161-172.177.188; L. Bréhier, in *Histoire de l'Eglise* by Fliche and Martin, t.5 (Paris 1938) c.4, p.111-123; c.5, p.131-133; c.6, p.160-177.

413. It is difficult to say in what sense they understood this one operation or one will.

There do not seem to have been lacking among the *monenergists* those who denied in the humanity of Christ *all power of acting*. They conceived this humanity as an *inert* substance. The Word would be the *one active principle* and therefore there would be only one operation, namely, the operation of this divine principle. The humanity would be moved by the Word, just as a body receives its life and motion from the soul.⁸

414. However the more common explanation of Sergius and of the *monothelitists* seems to be that it accepts human powers and the will itself in Christ as active but only under the *impulse* or movement of the divine will. So this divine will moves those powers to action, while the human will, being moved by the divine will, simply transmits the divine impulse to the other powers. In the proper sense therefore they deny not the *activity* but the *spontaneous* movement of the human powers and especially of the human will.⁹

415. Doctrine of the Church. St. Leo I stated the fundamental principle: “For each nature does what is proper to each...” (D 294). Later St. Martin I with the *Lateran Council* (649) and St. Agatho with the *Roman Council* (680) proposed the doctrine of two natural wills and operations (D 509-520, 548), and especially *Constantinople Council III* defined the matter: “We proclaim...two natural volitions or wills and two natural actions, without division...” (D 556).¹⁰

It should be noted in Constantinople III that not only the *existence* of two wills and actions is defined, but also the *spontaneity* itself of the human will.

For although the form of the verb is in the passive (κινήθῃαι, D 556),

8. See Tixeront, *ibid.*, 175f. This interpretation of monothelitism is generally held by theologians; see Petavius, 1.8 c.4-6; Stenstrup, 2 th.50 p.812f; Muncunill, n.589. On how knowledge about monothelitism was introduced into the West very late and in an incomplete way, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 155-161.

9. See Tixeront, *ibid.*, 174f.177; Xiberta, 1,194-197. Jugie (DTC 10,2313f.2322) thinks that there was hardly a *real* error among the monothelitists, but rather an *inept way of speaking* resolutely used by them because of the political situation. I. Backes seems to tend in the same direction, *Monotheletismus*: LTK 7,288.

10. On the formula of St. Leo I, see Fr. Diekamp: *TheolRev* 32 (1933) 447f. On St. Martin I, see E. Amann, *Martin I (Saint)*: DTC 10,182-194. On St. Agatho, see T. Evelino, *Il ditelismo nella epistola dogmatica del Papa Agatone. Un contributo alla storia dogmatica del VII secolo* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Bolzano 1940). On Constantinople Council III, see DTC 3,1259-1274. See also DTC 10,2321f. See also above, n. 409f.

the sense of *the middle voice* is both grammatically permitted¹¹ and from its opposition to the following verb ὑποταγῆναι δέ it is required. Therefore the exact version is: for it was necessary that the will of the flesh *move itself*, but also that it be submitted to the divine will....

416. This interpretation is confirmed authentically by the Fathers themselves of this Council. In this same eighteenth action they read and supported a verbal discourse in which the preceding definition is explained in this way: "For if we were to say that the human nature of the Lord is without a will and without activity, how can the perfection of his humanity be saved? For nothing else constitutes the integrity of the human substance, except the essential will, by which the power of free will in us is designated; also the same is to be said of his substantial operation.¹² The human will of Christ is defined by the Fathers to be so *voluntary* that it is also understood as *free*.

Theological note. *Defined divine and catholic faith* (D 556).

417. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) *The existence of two wills or volitions in Christ can be proved with more general sounding texts: My Father, if it be possible, let his cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt.* See Luke 22:42: *nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done.* Since the divine will of Christ is numerically one with the will of the Father, his words in this place refer to his *human* will as distinguished from the divine will. But if there is a direct reference to the *acts* of his will,¹³ from these we deduce necessarily the existence of the power itself. See also John 6:38.¹⁴

b) *The spontaneity of his human will* will become especially apparent from the arguments presented in the following thesis, n. 454-457, in order to prove Christ's *freedom*.

418. c) The existence of human operations in Christ is very clear from

11. See Liddell-Scott-Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford 1951), at this place, p. 952. Citations from the Iliad, 1,47 and 2,144, show the middle voice. See also, E.A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexikon of the Roman and Byzantine periods...* (New York 1900) at this place. Other places using the same sense are cited by L. Rocci, *Vocabolario greco-italiano* (Rome 1939) at this place. That this middle voice is present in the works of St. Athanasius, from whom this sentence was borrowed by the Council, is shown by Galtier, *La conscience humaine du Christ...*: Greg 32 (1951) 554f.

12. Msi 11,663; Hrd 3,1422. See Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles...* 3¹ (Paris 1909) 510f.

13. See Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 3,62, line 23f.

14. See Ceupens, *Theologia biblica* 3,143f. On Christ's *willing and will* in the N.T., see F. Zorell, S.J., *Lexicon Graecum Novi Testamenti*² (Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, Paris 1931) at this place; Kittel, *ibid.*, 3,47f.55f.

the actions by which we proved above (in thesis 7, n. 118-120) that Christ has a fleshly body and a rational soul. For those can be accepted only for his *human nature*.¹⁵

d) *The spontaneity of his human operations* is certain especially from the fact that Christ experienced spiritual sadness *concerning the same material object* about which in his divine nature he experienced the greatest joy. This proves that the passions in Christ do not precede the judgment of his reason, but also that they are not *waiting for a previous movement* from the divine nature, since the *movement of sadness* in Christ's human nature is opposed to the *movement of joy* present in his divine nature concerning the same material object.

419. The same spontaneity of the human operations is indicated in Heb. 4:15: *For we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning.* Since temptation, about which he is speaking here, brings with itself a certain motion *against the divine will*, neither a temptation of this kind nor feelings of sadness, fear, etc., stirred up by temptation could be produced in his human nature consequent upon an impulse from the divine nature of the Word, but in the human nature of Christ they were spontaneously produced, just as they are produced in us.¹⁶

Moreover, the way in which Jesus acts in the Gospels is *completely human*, and therefore we would falsely imagine in him that absence of spontaneity that the monothelites talk about.

420. Proof from tradition. A. *Before the appearance of monothelitism.*

a) *The existence of two wills that act spontaneously* is manifested especially on the occasion of the Lord's Prayer in Gethsemane. St. Athanasius: "When [Christ] says: *Father, if it be possible...* he shows there two wills: one human which is of the flesh, and the other divine which is of God. But if his human will because of the infirmity of the flesh prays to overcome the passion, the divine will is ready..." (R 790). St. John Chrysostom: "For these words do not just signify the agony, but also two wills ... opposed to each other" (R 1133). St. Leo I the Great: "He himself [the Lord] says in supplication to the Father: *Father, if it be possible...* The first petition is from infirmity, the second from strength; the former he willed from what is ours, the latter he

15. That Christ has *divine operations* is clearly affirmed by the monothelites. For more on these divine operations, see Ceuppens, *ibid.*, 152f.

16. See Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux* at this place; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* at this place.

chose from what is his own” (R 2203).¹⁷

The Fathers were not able to express the *spontaneity* of the human will more clearly than by referring to some kind of opposed movement of both wills.

421. b) *The existence of two operations that are spontaneous.* 1) The human operation is *distinguished* expressly from the divine. Tertullian: “We see a double status, not confused but joined together in one person... and thus the property of both substances is preserved, so that both the spirit performed its things in him... and the flesh produced its passions—being hungry with the devil, thirsty with the Samaritan woman, weeping for Lazarus, troubled unto death, and finally dead” (R 379).¹⁸ St. Ephraem: “... wherefore those two natures expressed their own affections, that through the affections of two they might discern that there are two operations” (R 705). St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “Believe then that this Only-begotten Son of God came down from heaven upon earth and took upon Him this human nature of like passions with us... and did truly eat as we do, and truly drink as we do... He had the like feeling of the flesh with us; but as God feeding the five thousand from five loaves” (R 817). See R 759, 773, 1080.

422. 2) The human operation is *opposed* to the divine. St. Ambrose: “As being man, therefore, [Christ] doubts; as man He is amazed. Neither His power nor His Godhead is amazed; but His soul is amazed...” (R 1267). St. Cyril of Alexandria: “...so that there was a disturbance of the human nature, but in all things constancy in the divine nature. Surely the constant image of death disturbed Jesus, but the power of the Godhead soothed the aroused passion immediately and changed it into confidence” (R 2103).¹⁹

423. B. *After the beginning of monothelism.* 1) St. Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem (+ 638), defended the Catholic doctrine of *two operations in Christ*, especially in his synodal letter to Sergius (see above, n. 412). In that letter the *unity of the agent* is fully acknowledged, but at the same time the *duality of operations*: “that [the incarnate Word] naturally made evident both operations in an inseparable and unconfused manner according to

17. For Athanasius, see Weigl, *Untersuchungen zur Christologie des hl. Athanasius* 69,155. For St. John Chrysostom, see Weigl, *Christologie vom Tode des Athanasius...* 50. For St. Leo I the Great, see Kuhn, *Die Christologie Leos I*; and see above, note 10. On Augustine, see Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie...* 130-140.

18. See D’Ales, *La Théologie de Tertullien* 198.

19. For St. Ambrose, see Drzenick, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii...* 28-31. For St. Cyril, see Galtier, n. 132-134. J. Maric, *Celebris Cyrilli Alexandrini formula christologica de una activitate Christi...* (Adademia Theologica Croatica, 6, Zagreb 1926) prima pars.

both of his natures” (R 2289).²⁰

424. 2) St. Maximus the Confessor (580-662) in exile went to his death in defense of the Catholic doctrine *about the two wills and operations in Christ*. He explained the orthodox truth in a more philosophical way with great dependence on Leontius of Byzantium (+ ca. 543) who lived before him.²¹

St. Maximus is totally involved in vindicating the correct synthesis of the divine and human natures and the person of Christ. Two operations and two natural wills follow necessarily from the two natures. He distinguishes between *natural* willing (θέλημα φυσικόν) and *gnomic* willing (θέλημα γνωμικόν). The *natural* human will in Christ is demonstrated by Maximus in many different ways. But the other *gnomic* willing, whose principle is not simply nature or an essential property of nature but a habit formed freely from much deliberation and exercise of judgment, belongs to the *human person* and so sin can be found in it. In Christ this *gnomic* willing is not present. The human, *natural* and free willing of Christ is always in conformity with the divine will of the Word.²²

425. 3) St. John Damascene: “He has, corresponding to the two natures, the two sets of natural qualities belonging to the two natures: two natural volitions, one divine and one human, two natural energies, one divine and one human, two natural wills (ἀντεξούσια), one divine and one human” (R 2365). See R 2362, 2366, 2383.²³

426. Theological reasoning. The principal argument that St. Thomas presents in order to prove that there are two wills and two operations in Christ is the one also preferred by the tradition, namely, the *perfection* of both natures in Christ.²⁴

427. Objections. 1. In tradition this formula about the operation of Christ was ac-

20. See Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes...* 3,164-171; G. Bardy, *Sophrone de Jerusalem*: DTC 14,2379-2383.

21. See V. Grumel, *Maxime de Chrysopolos ou Maxime le Confesseur (Saint)*: DTC 10,453f.

22. See R.A. Gauthier, O.P., *Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie de l'acte humain*: RechThAncMéd 21 (1954) 77-82. A little bit different, DTC 10,454-456; Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes...* 3,188-192; H. U. von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie, Maximus der Bekenner: Höhe und Krise des griechischen Weltbilds* (Freiburg i.B. 1941), especially 35-47 and 193-271 (briefly, see Schol 17 [1942] 254). On the relations of St. Maximus with the Lateran Council (649), see J. Pierres, *I. Formula S. Iohannis Damasceni... II. S. Maximus Confessor princeps apologetarum synodi Lateranensis anni 649...* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1940).

23. See Tixeront, *loc.cit.*, 501-504.

24. III, q. 18, a. 1; q. 19, a. 1. See Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 172-175. For more on this whole question in St. Thomas, see *ibid.*, 155-175.

cepted: θεανδρική ἐνέργεια (theandric operation). But by this formula *only one operation* of Christ is signified. Therefore the tradition seems to favor only one operation of Christ.

1) *I distinguish the major*. This formula was introduced by the early tradition and simply admitted by the later Fathers, *denied*; the formula finally at the end of the 5th century was introduced by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (see R 2279) and then in the 7th century was rejected or at least explained in a proper sense, *conceded*. *I bypass the minor and distinguish the consequent*. If the tradition simply admitted this formula, *I bypass the consequent*; if the tradition immediately rejected or explained it in a proper sense, *denied*.²⁵

2) *I bypass the major and distinguish the minor*. It was understood in this way by the author of the formula, *I bypass the minor*; by Catholic tradition, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way*.

An authentic declaration on this was made by the Lateran Council (649). See D 515.

428. *In Catholic theology* the term “theandric” became a technical one to designate *certain* activities of Christ. For a distinction must be made concerning *simply* divine activities that are performed by the Word without any cooperation of the human nature, that is, internal notional activities and external operations common to the Word and to the Father and the Holy Spirit. There are other *human* activities that proceed from the human nature alone as the principle by which they are elicited, such as to eat, to be sad, to pray, to obey. Finally, there are other *mixed* activities that proceed from both natures as the principle by which they are elicited, such as to walk on water, to perform miracles by the physical contact of his hand or by speech.

429. *The simply divine* activities are not theandric. For activity follows the *nature* as the eliciting *formal cause* (*principium quo*) and the person alone as the *efficient cause* (*principium quod*). Surely the simply divine activities proceed from the *divine nature and person*. Therefore in no way can they be properly attributed to a *man*; thus they cannot be said to be *theandric*.

430. *The human* activities can be said to be theandric, but *in a less proper sense*. Since an activity is specified by its own *nature*, a human activity cannot be said in the strict sense to be something *divine*, for the two natures in Christ remain integral and unmixed. However in this sense something divine can be attributed to a human operation, inasmuch as the operation proceeds from a divine person as from the *efficient cause* (*principium quod*). Indeed, *the divine nature itself* to this extent is not totally foreign to human activities, inasmuch as it cooperates with them with divine concurrence and wills them. See below, objection 4, n. 435f.

25. See Galtier, n. 136f. On a new interpretation of this formula of Pseudo-Dionysius that should not be admitted, see Fr. Diekamp in TheolRev 32 (1933) 446f., and E. Amann in RevScRel 13 (1933) 259-263.

431. The *mixed* activities are called in the proper sense “theandric.” In these, *both natures* by way of the eliciting *formal* cause cooperate in the production of the total effect. Thus walking on water, inasmuch as it is *walking*, must be said to be something proper to *human* nature. But inasmuch as it is *on water*, that is, in a miraculous way, it is something that proceeds from the cooperation of the *divine* nature.²⁶

432. 2. The authority of St. Cyril of Alexandria, especially in the question of the unity of Christ, is very great. But St. Cyril expressly says that in Christ there is “one and the same activity.”²⁷ Therefore the argument from tradition for two activities in Christ is greatly weakened.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. So that St. Cyril admits in Christ two activities and two wills, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

433. Although there is a dispute among Catholics on the positive interpretation of this opinion, there is consensus in admitting the complete orthodoxy of St. Cyril.

Compared with others, the explanation seems to be preferred according to which in the phrase the word ἐνέργεια (activity) must be understood *in an objective sense*, and it signifies an *effect*, that is, the resurrection of the young girl that was produced both by the divine omnipotence and by the touch of Jesus’ hand. Therefore a twofold activity of Christ would be designated on the part of the subject, since there are two natural activities in Christ, which we intended to prove in the thesis, but only one activity *on the part of the terminus* or on the part of the effect.²⁸

434. 3. Activities proceed from suppositums. But in Christ there is only one suppositum or person. Therefore also there is one activity.

1) *I by pass the major and minor and deny the consequent and the consequence.* For an argument, according to the rules of a syllogism, must be put in this way: Activities proceed from suppositums. But in Christ there is one suppositum. Therefore in Christ the activities proceed *from one suppositum*. This is now stated correctly.

2) *I distinguish the major.* Activities proceed from suppositums, so that the suppositum is the *efficient* cause, but the activity is *specified by the nature*, which is the formal principal *by which* the suppositum acts, *conceded*; so that the suppositum is both the efficient cause and the formal cause of the activity, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* There would be one operation in Christ, if it proceeded from the suppositum as from an efficient cause and from a specifying formal cause, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.²⁹

26. See S.Th. III, q. 19, a. 1 ad 1; Petavius, 1.8 c.10-12; Pohle-Gierens, 97-100; Galtier, n. 138; Id., *L'unité du Christ...* 270-273.

27. *In Io. Comment.* 1.4 c.2 (in John 6,53 or 54): Edit. Pusey, *Sancti Patris Nostri Cyrilli... in D. Ioannis Evangelium...* (Oxonii 1872) 1,530; MG 73, 577 C-D.

28. See Maric, *Celebris Cyrilli Alexandrini formula...* where the interpretations of many other authors are examined. I.F. de Groot, S.J., agrees in Greg 7 (1926) 595-597.

29. See S.Th. III, q. 19, a. 1 ad 3.

435. 4. By the hypostatic union the Word made a *human nature* his own. But if a human nature was made something belonging to the Word, then the *human activity* also belongs to the Word. Therefore the activity of the *human nature* belongs also to the Word.

I distinguish the major. The Word made the human nature his own *in the order of the person*, so that there is only one person of both natures, the divine and the human, *conceded; in the order of nature*, so that the human nature was absorbed or physically changed by the divine nature of the Word, *denied*.³⁰ *I also distinguish the minor.* The human activity itself will also belong to the Word *in the order of the person, conceded; in the order of nature, denied*.

436. By the hypostatic union the Word does not exercise any *efficient* causality on his human nature, but only a *quasi-formal* causality or rather a *determining* causality, as we explained above in thesis 5, scholium 5, n. 82.

Therefore the divine *action* of the Word has an influence on the human action of Christ *of the same nature* as it has on actions of men in general. The physical concurrence of the Word with the actions of his humanity, whether in the natural order or the supernatural order, is common to the Word along with the Father and the Holy Spirit. The influence that the Word exercises on his human nature by actual graces (see above, thesis 11, scholium 7, n. 226) is explained in the same way that the divine influence affects other just persons: in these it takes place “from the outside,” but in his human nature “from the inside,” as in the nature substantially united with himself.

The completely special title, which in virtue of the hypostatic union the human nature of Christ has to absolute more indefectibility (we treated this above in thesis 15), does not bring it about that the divine motions are exercised *in a different way* on his own nature than they are on some purely created nature.³¹

437. 5. Among the Fathers this is a holy axiom: In Christ the Word is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν,³² that is, the ruling and commanding principle. But, where the Word rules, no *spontaneous* motion is permitted for the flesh. Therefore in Christ activity and the human will cannot truly be said to be spontaneous.

I distinguish the major. In Christ the Word is τὸ ἡγεμονικόν in this sense that the Word as such always has the initial motions, *denied*; in the sense that the activity of the human nature is subject to the divine activity, in the sense that by efficacious graces the human nature of Christ is rendered indefectible, and finally in the sense that the human will spontaneously and indeed freely subjects itself to a choice made by the divine will, *conceded. I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

438. One would falsely imagine in Christ the person of the Word as *being inde-*

30. On some less correct formulas in use among some recent Catholics, see Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 273-280; Id., *Le conscience humaine du Christ...* Greg 32 (1951) 551-565; Lakner in *ZkathTh* 74 (1952) 346.

31. See S.th. III, q. 18, a. 1 ad 1 and ad 2; Galtier, n. 140f.; Id., *L'unité du Christ...* 262-269.282f.

32. See Petavius, 1.8 c.12 n.1-4. On the term itself, see Grillmeier, *Die Theologische...Vorbereitung... von Chalkedon* 1,61f.

pendent of his natures and acting now through his divine and now through his human nature. For “being and acting belong to the person *from the nature*.”³³ Therefore the person of the Word can *do* nothing that is not done through his divine nature, or better, that is not done by his divine *nature*, and that is not common to the whole Trinity.

Certainly the whole activity of the human nature must be referred to the Word as to the suppositum, but not to it as to the *active principle* of the human activity. On the contrary, the human activity of the Word belongs to the word from his human nature.

439. However the unity of Christ must be preserved, not only the *ontological*, inasmuch as in him the one person of the Word is the suppositum of both natures, and also *the moral unity*, consisting in the fact that there is no disagreement in Christ but a wonderful subjection of the human nature to the Word.

We will have more to say about the moral unity of Christ below in the scholium in n. 442f., where we will consider the contrariety of wills, and in the following thesis, where we will consider the freedom of Christ under a precept.

440. In the interim let it suffice to say that, in order to explain the moral unity of Christ and the subjection of his human nature, it is in no way required that the human will should lose its freedom.

This can be illustrated from the doctrine on the inspiration of Holy Scripture. The Holy Spirit assumed men as instruments for writing, he aroused and moved them by supernatural power, and he assisted the authors, “the things which he ordered, and those only, they, first, rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with infallible truth. Otherwise, it could not be said that he was the *Author* of the entire Scripture” (D 3293). Nevertheless the holy authors in a fully human and free way functioned in writing these books.

441. Other objections can be seen in Muncunill, n. 597-599. Moreover, the question of Pope Honorius I (see D 487), who has been said to be a supporter of monothelitism, is usually studied in the treatise on the Church, where the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff is considered.

442. Scholium. *On the contrariety of wills in Christ.* With St. Thomas (q. 18, a. 5 c) theologians distinguish in the human nature of Christ a will of sensuality and a rational will. The will of sensuality “which is called will by participation” (*ibid.*), is the sensitive appetite or the will that follows the apprehension of *sense*, whether external or internal. The *rational* will is the rational appetite or the will that follows the apprehension of the *intellect* (see above, thesis 15, scholium 3, n. 361).

The *rational will* is accepted as a *power* or as the *act* of this power, “which is also called the will.”³⁴ The will as a *power* is the proximate principle of the actual inclination

33. S.Th. III, q. 19, a. 1 ad 4. How easy it is in this matter to speak with less exactness is shown by the recent dispute between well-known authors; for more on this see Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 281-287; Above, n. 435.

34. S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 1 ad 3. See above thesis 15, scholium 3, n. 362.

and it is the *only one* in man. The will as an *act* is the exercise corresponding to that power and the actual inclination, and it is assigned as twofold in man, that is, will *by way of nature* and will *by way of reason*.

443. *Will by way of nature* and *will as nature* or *natural will* is the act by which the volitive power is directed to something that is *in itself desirable*, like health. In other words, it is an act of the will *for an end*: therefore the power is inclined to it simply and absolutely. Hence will as nature is also called the *simple* will.³⁵ However the will as nature is not attracted to its object necessarily, but it can be inclined *freely*.³⁶

The *will by way of reason* or *will as reason* or the *natural will* is the act by which the volitive power is directed to something that is will *only by the order to something*, like taking medicine to achieve health. In other words, it is an act of the will towards that which is for the end, that is, as a *means*: therefore the power is directed to it with a certain comparison, according to which it achieves some goodness from the order to another. Therefore the will as reason is also called a *counseling will*.³⁷

444. A *diversity* of wills was present in Christ inasmuch as the will of sensuality and the natural will in him willed something other than the divine will and his rational will.³⁸

But it has been *defined* that the two natural wills of Christ were not contrary to each other (see D 556).³⁹

445. The *human* will of Christ *as reason*, when it *efficaciously* willed something, was always in conformity with the *divine* will of Christ.⁴⁰ However the conformity “of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree....”⁴¹

There was no contrariety between the human will of Christ as reason and between his *natural will* and his *will of sensuality*. The reason for this is proposed by St. Thomas (III, q. 18, a. 6 c), because the opposition of these wills was not according to the same thing nor was it in the same will.

446. The opposition was not *according to the same thing*, because in Christ neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason given by the will of reason, namely, the will that chose the passion for the salvation of the human race.

Finally, the opposition was not *in the same will*, because the will of reason was

35. See S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 3 c.

36. See Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.2 n.29; Suarez, *Disp. Metaph.* D.19 s.8 n.17f.; E. Hugon, O.P., *Cursus philosophiae thomisticae... 4, Metaphysica Psychologica* (Paris) 167-170.

37. See S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 3 c; I-II, q. 8, a. 2f.; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.1 n.1.

38. See S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 5 c. On the distinction between “diversity” and “contrariety,” see Cajetan, *In 3 q.18 a.6* at the beginning.

39. On the testimonies of the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.9 c.9 n.5.10; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.2 n.28.

40. See Suarez, d.38 s.2 n.2-6; s.4 n.1-3; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.2 n.24-27, 30-33. Many things about the mind of St. Thomas are proposed in these places. Inefficacious motions or “velleities” are admitted by Cajetan *only* in the natural will of Christ and in his will of sensuality: see *in 3 q.18 a.5*.

41. S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 5 ad 2.

not hindered or frustrated by the natural will or the will of sensuality, nor on the other hand was the natural will or the will of sensuality hindered by the will of reason, "For it pleased Christ, in his Divine will, and in his will of reason, that his natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature"⁴² (see R 2064).

447. Therefore there was no opposition between the will of Christ with reference to *the same formal object* nor between the *efficacious acts* of his will. Indeed, the very *inefficacious acts* by which the human will of Christ willed what God absolutely did not want, were in conformity with the divine will as their principle and rule, as what the divine will desired that the human will should do.⁴³

On the concrete way in which the Word ruled the human will, with the intention that the latter should always be obedient to the divine will, we will treat in the following thesis, where the discussion will concern the freedom of Christ under the precept of dying.

42. III, q. 18, a. 5 c. See *ibid.*, ad 1, and Cajetan, at this place; Galtier, *L'unité du Christ...* 268f.

43. See Suarez, d.38 s.4 n.4f.

Thesis 18. The human will of Christ, even in suffering death, was free from necessity; in fact it remained free even under the absolute and rigorous precept of dying.

S.Th. III, q. 18, a. 4; q. 47, a. 2f.; Galtier, thesis 25f.; DTC 8, 1295-130.

448. Connection. For the reasons given above in n. 408, we will dedicate a whole thesis to this question. But in particular we are focused on the freedom of Christ *in dying*, both because of its soteriological importance, since it is the foundation of the satisfaction and merit of Christ, and because of the approach of theologians, who are accustomed to consider the question about the freedom of Christ under a precept, especially when the concern touches *the precept of suffering death*.

Therefore the first part proves the *certain truth* of Christ's freedom, but the second part examines the *disputed questions* about the *precept of dying* and the harmony of the precept with Christ's freedom.

PART ONE

449. Definition of terms. *Freedom* is immunity from a bond or impediment.

Freedom from *coercion* is immunity from *violence*, that is, from force extrinsically applied to a power that is said to be free. This force can be *physical*, as if the movement of an arm is impeded by chains, or *moral*, as if a man is rendered immobile by great fear. Violence connotes some force applied to someone contrary to his own inclination. Hence what takes place free of all coercion is called spontaneous, voluntary, natural. For this reason even brute animals can be said to be free, if they are allowed to act according to their own inclinations.

Freedom from necessity is immunity from any kind of *intrinsic* necessity in a power that is called "free." The appetite of a brute animal inclines it to food that agrees with it. Many movements similarly necessary are also found in the will of man.¹ All of these are certainly spontaneous, but they should not be called *free*. Freedom from necessity is also called freedom of indifference, freedom of choice, free will.²

450. Setting aside all controversy between Catholic schools, free will

1. See Donat, *Psychologia* (Innsbruck 1936) thesis 19, n. 407-410.

2. For more, see Fröbes, *Psychologia speculativa...* 2, 167-172. In a different way, M. de Baets, *De libera Christi obedientia* (Louvain 1905) 19-22. See also A. Durand, S.J., *La liberté du Christ dans son rapport à l'impeccabilité*: *NouvRevTh* 70 (1948) 815-820.

can be defined: “The faculty of choosing things suitable to what is desired, inasmuch as the one who has the faculty of choosing one thing among many is the master of his own deeds.”³ Therefore it can be defined: The faculty of choosing among many things (see D 1525, 1554) or the control over one’s own acts.⁴

We attribute freedom of indifference to Christ, but in this first part we do not determine whether he was also free between *moral good and evil*, about which we will say a few things in scholium 3 of the second part in n. 489f. Therefore it suffices that he was free concerning acts of *equal perfection* and in particular *regarding his suffering and death*.

451. Adversaries. The *monothelites* seem to have denied the human freedom of Christ, which we covered in the previous thesis, n. 414. Perhaps *some recent theologians* denied the freedom *from necessity* in Christ. They attributed to him only freedom from coercion in order to avoid the difficulties involved in preserving Christ’s freedom of indifference.⁵

452. Doctrine of the Church. On the one hand, it has been defined that Christ *merited*, as we will show below in thesis 24, n. 599-601. On the other hand, this proposition of Jansen has been condemned: “In order to merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, it is not necessary for man to have freedom from necessity, but freedom from coercion suffices” (D 2003).⁶ On the meaning of the definition *against the monothelites* at the *Constantinople Council III*, see above, thesis 17, n. 416.

453. Theological note. It seems to be *theologically* certain that Christ’s human will had *freedom from necessity*. For, it is a matter of faith that Christ the man *merited*. Likewise it has been defined that to merit *in the state of fallen nature* freedom from necessity is required. Indeed, if this is true for the state of fallen nature, it is also true for the state of integral

3. Leo XIII, *Encyclical “Libertas”*: ASS 20 (1887) 595.

4. See S.Th. 1, q. 83; 2 CG 47-48; *De ver.* q.22 a.5 ad 7.

5. See Suarez, d.37 s.2 n.1. For more on this matter, see M. de Baets, *De libera Christi...* 23-29; de Baets himself does not attributed simply to Christ freedom from necessity, but only freedom *from the necessity of nature*: in this matter the freedom “of perfection” does not seem to differ essentially, and Durand treats this question in *La liberté du Christ...*: *NouvRevTh* 70 (1948) 820-822. On this notion of freedom among the oriental Fathers, see Moeller, *Le chalcédonisme et le neo-chalcédonisme...* (Grillmeier-Bacht) 1,714. A recent author going down the same road perhaps speaks too easily about the problem of Christ’s freedom under a precept as being “a pseudo-problem”: see *CiencTom* 79 (1952) 335.

6. See J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme*: DTC 8,485-491.

nature in which the will of Christ was established.⁷ For, both the consensus of theologians⁸ and common sense affirm that such indifference pertains to the nature itself of free will and that it is absolutely required so that one can be said to merit reward or punishment. Therefore the theological conclusion is that Christ's human will had freedom from necessity.

That Christ had this freedom in suffering death is established directly in the documents from which we deduced the theological note, for about the *death* of Christ we will show below, in thesis 24, n. 599, that it was *meritorious*.

However, that the freedom of indifference is *not restricted* to his death is *at least certain in theology* from the consensus of theologians. Really there is no reason for admitting the freedom of Christ in suffering and death but not in his other acts. Indeed, regarding his death there is a special difficulty, as will be made clear in the second part of the thesis.

The opinion of those who hold that the freedom of Christ from necessity is *defined* because of the proposition of Jansen that was condemned as heretical, seems to be incorrect. For, even if Innocent X so placed the words "in the state of fallen nature" (D 2003), because Jansen regarding the state of *integral* nature rightly said that freedom from necessity is required for merit, nevertheless it cannot be said that the Roman Pontiff *defined* that freedom from necessity is required for merit in the state of *integral* nature. At most it could be said that this truth is presupposed as evident by both Innocent X and Jansen.

454. Proof from Holy Scripture. Although Holy Scripture does not speak *explicitly* about the freedom of *indifference* of the *human* will of Christ, still it does speak about certain acts of his human will in such a way that the most obvious meaning of these statements is that his will was just as free as our human wills are free.

1) *Choice* is attributed to the human will of Christ. Luke 6:13: *He chose twelve of them, whom he also named apostles.*⁹ (Mark 3:13: *He called to those whom he wanted*). John 7:1: *Jesus went about in Galilee. He did not wish to go about in Judea for the Jews were looking for an opportunity to kill him.* See Matt. 8:3; 27:34.

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7. Although Christ was subject to suffering and death, which are proper to the state of *fallen* nature, nevertheless regarding the decisive point in the mind of Jansen for the question of freedom, Christ was fully in the state of *integral* nature, inasmuch as he was exempt from *original sin* and from *concupiscence*. On the teaching of Jansen, see DTC 8,345f.355f.
8. See Suarez, d.37 s.2 n.5. See also D 1039-1066. But for a different view see de Baets, *De libera Christi...* 18-32.
9. See Lagrange, *Evangile...* at this place. For the correct meaning of the texts cited here, see P. Joûon, *Les Verbes βούλομαι et θέλω dans le Nouveau Testament*: RechScRel 30 (1940) 227-238.

Among the *human* actions of Christ there are: to go into the mountains, to pray to God, to call his disciples, to go down with them (Luke 6:12.13.17), to walk, to speak (Luke 7:16); and another action is stated simply, namely, *to choose, to will*. Therefore the most obvious meaning of the narration requires that this action of willing is also a *human* action, and this is true especially in those places in Holy Scripture where there is an explicit mention of the human will of Christ (see above, thesis 17, n. 417).

We express the freedom of *indifference of our wills* not otherwise than with the words with which the Evangelists speak about the will of Christ: “*he chose,*” “*whom he wanted,*” “*he did not wish.*” Therefore in their obvious meaning the preceding statements must be accepted as being about the true freedom of *indifference* of the human will of Christ.

455. 2) *Merit* or *reward* is attributed to the human will of Christ. Phil 2:8f.: *he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross. THEREFORE God also highly exalted him...* He is speaking about the *human* will of Christ, because the divine will cannot *obey*. The freedom of *indifference* is apparent from the fact that exaltation is proposed by St. Paul in the obvious sense as the *reward* for the humiliation that Christ endured because of his obedience.¹⁰ Moreover, in the common sense of men merit or reward presupposes freedom of *indifference* (see above, n. 453). Indeed the holy Fathers deduce *our* freedom chiefly from the fact that we are capable of obedience and reward.¹¹

456. 3) *In suffering death* Christ’s human will was free from all necessity. John 10:17: *For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life in order to take it up again... I have received this command from my Father.* Although there were many reasons why the Father loved Christ, in a special way mention is made of the tradition that he voluntarily went to his death in obedience to his Father’s command.

It is clear that the issue concerns the *human* will of Christ, because Christ only *as man* was inferior to the Father and was able to obey the Father’s command. His freedom of *indifference* is clear from the fact that the voluntary offering of his soul is mentioned as *the meritorious cause* of the Father’s love: *For this reason the Father loves me, because....*¹²

457. Heb. 12:2: *who [Jesus] for the sake of the joy that was set before*

10. See Prat, *La théologie...* 1,375f.; Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* 282f.290-293.

11. See Suarez, d.37 s.2 n.2.

12. See F. Toletum, S.J., *In... Ioannis Evangelium commentarii* (Rome 1588) at this place; Lagrange, *Evangile...* at this place.

him endured the cross, disregarding its shame. There are two common interpretations of this text: Christ endured the cross patiently, looking forward to the joy that he knew he would merit by this humiliation, or Christ, while he could experience joy on earth, instead chose the cross.

In the first interpretation the text is speaking about *merit*, and therefore about both the *human* will of Christ and his freedom of *indifference*.

The second interpretation is more probable.¹³ According to this interpretation the text speaks about the *human* will of Christ; this seems to be deduced from the fact that the *divine* will desired the cross, and in fact *commanded* the death of the cross, as we saw above. Therefore only with his *human* will could Christ *choose* between joy and the cross. The obvious meaning of this interpretation indicates that Christ *chose* and we usually use this way of speaking when we are talking about a true freedom of *indifference*.

458. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers do not always clearly indicate whether they are speaking about the human will or the divine will of Christ. But since they teach so clearly both wills in Christ, as we saw in the preceding thesis n. 420f., and since at the same time from the context it often readily appears that they are considering Christ *as a man*, a few quotes will suffice in order to bring out the way in which the Fathers make reference to his freedom of *indifference*.

1) *Merit* or *choice* relating to death is attributed to the human will of Christ. St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "I yield it of my own choice to my enemies; for unless I chose, this could not be. He came therefore of his own set purpose to his passion, rejoicing in his noble deed, smiling at the crown, cheered by the salvation of mankind..." (R 830). St. John Chrysostom: "It was permissible [for Christ] to suffer nothing, if he so wished... Therefore, if he willed it, he could not come to the cross" (R 1224). St. Ambrose: "For Christ, had he willed, need not have died, and he did not think that death should be shunned as though there were any cowardice in it..." (R 1275). From that we argue as we did above in n. 454f. when considering the scriptural evidence.

459. 2) The human freedom of Christ *is compared with Adam's freedom*. St. Gregory I the Great: "For unless the first Adam by his voluntary sin had contracted the death of his soul, the second Adam without sin in his flesh

13. See Bover, *Las epistolae...* at this place; I. Rohr, *Der Hebraerbrief* (Bonnerbibel 1916) at this place. For a brief summary of the interpretations of this verse, see Spicq, *L'épître aux hebreux* at this place, where another interpretation is presented according to which our argument would not be valid, since it treats the text as being about Christ's divine will alone.

would not have embraced a voluntary death” (R 2305).

3) The human freedom of Christ is proved from the principle of the Fathers: What is not assumed is not healed (see above, n. 62). St. John Damascene: “Moreover, if he established the freedom of nature, but he himself did not assume it: therefore either he rejected his own creation as not good, or he refused to grant us his cure, and so he deprived us of complete and perfect healing....”¹⁴

4) *Explicitly* freedom from all necessity or *free choice* is attributed to Christ’s human will. St. John Damascene: “Confessing, then, the same Jesus Christ, our Lord, to be perfect God and perfect man, we hold that the same has all the attributes of the Father... and all the attributes of the first Adam, save only his sin, these attributes being... two natural volitions...” (αὐτεξούσια δύο φυσικά) (R 2365).¹⁵ The word “autexousia” [Greek] is used by St. Damascene to signify the complete freedom of indifference that God has.¹⁶ Moreover it is a classical term among the Fathers in order to designate this freedom; it can be traced back to St. Justin.¹⁷

460. Theological reasoning. Beside the reason taken *from the merit* of Christ (see above, n. 452f.) and *from the perfection* of Christ’s human nature (see above, thesis 17, n. 426), following the mind of St. Thomas (III, q. 18, a. 4 c) we can propose this reason. Many things presented themselves to Christ to which his human will was not attracted as to things willed *in themselves*, but they were willed only *according to an order to something else*, for example, to walk about in Galilee and not in Judea was not willed for itself, but for another purpose, namely, to avoid death (see John 7:1). Indeed, it is precisely the choice of things that are not the end itself, but are the means *to the end*, and such choice is the proper act of free will. Therefore Christ’s human will had free choice.

461. Objections. 1. During the time of the scholastics, theologians thought that it is *sufficient* for the nature of *praise* or *merit* that Christ acted *not out of coercion but spontaneously*. But this is a sign that the holy Fathers did not speak clearly about this matter. Therefore we conclude incorrectly from the Fathers that the *meritorious* works of Christ suppose that Christ was free with a *freedom of indifference*.

14. *De fide orthodox.* 1.3 c.14: MG 94,1042f. For more on the same principle of the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.9 c.8 n.4.

15. Through all of chapter 14 in book 3 the free will of Christ is proved. Therefore it is very apparent that the difficulty sometimes raised from the works of St. John Damascene has no value: see Galtier, n. 377, note.

16. See, v. gr., *De fide orthodox.* 1.3 c.14: MG 94,1042.

17. See Petavius, 1.9 c.2 n.4; c.4 n.3.

I distinguish the major. A few theologians, *conceded*; many, *denied*.¹⁸ *I distinguish also the minor.* If many theologians thought that way, *I bypass the minor*; if a few, *denied*.

2. Even by his human knowledge Christ *foreknew infallibly* what he was going to choose. But there cannot be any *free* choice in the presence of this infallible knowledge. Therefore Christ, because of his knowledge, lacked free choice.

I distinguish the major. Christ foreknew infallibly with an infallibility based on something *necessitating* that future choice, *denied*; with an infallibility based on *the future election itself*, *conceded*. *I distinguish also the minor.* Free choice would not be present, if the infallibility were based on something *necessitating* the future choice, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.¹⁹

PART TWO

462. Having proved Christ's freedom of *indifference*, the question is raised by theologians whether he also had this freedom also to choose *between good and evil*. Such freedom for evil is absent in God and it is not certain a priori that it should be attributed to Christ. Indeed, very serious reasons seem to require that Christ the Lord was not free *to sin*. That is so because of the nature of his *perfect impeccability*, especially seeing that this impeccability is the result of his *beatific vision*, with which a freedom to sin can hardly be reconciled.²⁰

Nevertheless, on the other hand, there are reasons that would seem absolutely to demand such freedom in Christ. Thus Holy Scripture speaks about the *precept* or *command* of dying that Christ had. Since the death of the Lord was *meritorious*, it is clear that it was *free*. Therefore Christ could either fulfill the precept or not fulfill it and therefore he was able to sin by not fulfilling the precept.

In this part we are treating the question about Christ's freedom to sin with reference to his death, but the same solution must be applied to the other precepts that Christ perhaps was subject to, such as the precepts of the natural law. We will consider these in detail in scholium 2, n. 489.

463. Definition of terms. *Law* is defined with St. Thomas: "An ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated" (I-II, q. 90, a. 4 c). But a *precept* is a command that is either *particular* which is given to one person or to

18. See Suarez, d.37 s.2 n.1. On the opinion given by St. Thomas in his *Comment. Ad Sent.*, see Galtier, n. 379. See above, note 5.

19. See Suarez, d.37 s.5; Galtier, n. 379.

20. See Galtier, n. 385.

relatively few, or it is *less permanent* which perhaps is given to the whole community during the time of a temporary necessity.

A precept can be *absolute* when it obligates independently of any condition, and it can be *conditioned* when it obligates dependent on some condition, v.gr., unless a dispensation is sought. Such a conditioned precept is also called *dispensable*.

In what concerns our question a precept is divided into a *hard* precept, which brings on an obligation with guilt attached to it, *broad* or *merely penal*, which obliges only *under some penalty*. This merely penal precept can be *strictly such*, if the penalty is some evil or the privation of some good that is due to the person independently of the precept, or *less strictly such*, if the penalty is the loss of some good that would actually be obtained by the observance of the precept.

A precept can also be divided into a *proper one*, which brings on an obligation, and an *improper one* or a counsel or simple good will, which is just an option for the one to whom it is given (see S.Th. I-II, q. 108, a. 4 c).

464. Opinions. We can reduce the opinions of theologians to three categories which have been proposed in order to solve the most serious and difficult questions concerning Christ's freedom.

A. Christ had a *rigorous and absolute* precept of dying. B. Christ had a rigorous but *dispensable* precept of dying. C. Christ did *not* have a *rigorous* precept of dying.

A. They seek conciliation between the rigorous and absolute precept and Christ's impeccability in this sentence: a) some, from a limitation of the precept itself; b) others, the indifference of the principles of acting.

465. a) *From a limitation of the precept itself.* For the precept of the Father considered only the *substance* of death, but not the various *circumstances* of place, time, intensity, motive, and so forth. Therefore with reference to the substance of death, Christ was not free, but he was so regarding the circumstance, that is, he was not free to die or not to die, but only to accept death from this or that motive, from a more or less intensive act, at this time or that time, and so forth. Thus Suarez, Vázquez, Lessius, Valentia, Platel, and others.²¹

466. *From the indifference of the principles of acting.* The human will

21. Suarez, d.37 s.4 n.11. Vázquez, d.74 c.5. Lessius, *De summo bono* 1.2 c.23 n.185-187; otherwise, Id., *In D. Thomam... De incarnatione Verbi... praelectiones theologicae posthumae* q.18 a.4 n.9. Valentia, *De incarnatione*. Q.19, point 2. I. Platel, S.J., *Synopsis universi cursus theologici... De incarnatione Verbi...* (Venis 1737) t.5 q.9 a.3 n.318-325. On the others, see Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.86.

of Christ remained free to fulfill the rigorous precept, for such freedom to sin was not taken away in Christ, neither because of the hypostatic union nor because of the beatific vision, both of which made Christ impeccable.

Because of the hypostatic union (see above, thesis 15). Impeccability is reconciled with the freedom to fulfill a rigorous precept, in the same way, while preserving the difference of *personal* and *accidental* indefectibility, as freedom of this kind is acquired in a creature that is *confirmed in grace*.²² Therefore the explanation will be different according to the various systems by which theologians in the treatise on grace attempt to bring harmony between the efficacy of grace and the freedom of the will.²³

467. *Because of the beatific vision.* Many theories are proposed to reconcile *the love of God*, which in Christ seems to follow necessarily from the beatific vision, with the possibility of *aversion from God* by sin.

The *Scotists* apply to this their doctrine about the beatific vision as *not necessitating* the blessed in heaven to love God²⁴ and their doctrine about the *special* condition of Christ with reference to merit.²⁵

468. The *Dominicans* propose a twofold solution. *The first solution* distinguishes in Christ a *twofold act* of love: both terminate in God's goodness *in itself and by reason of itself*—one is regulated by the beatific knowledge and is *necessary*, the other is regulated by his infused knowledge and is *free*.

The second solution distinguishes in the same act of love a *twofold termination*: one to the divine goodness considered *as in itself*, according as it is the reason for loving God and his necessary perfections, the other to the divine goodness *as it is the reason for loving creatures*; under the first formality or termination the act is *necessary*, and under the second it is *free*.²⁶

22. There are many theologians who absolutely reject this way of speaking: v.gr., Mastrius, d.3 q.9 a.3 n.383f.; Stentrip, th.76 p.1194-1198; Muncunill, n.553-717. Nevertheless, if the distinction of *personal* and *accidental* indefectibility is correctly applied, a great difference among theologians on this point seems hardly possible.

23. See, v.gr., Hugon, q.11 a.3 ad VII; Galtier, n.401f.; Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 78-83, 86-90. Gonet (d.21 a.3 n.85) clearly explains the famous distinction *on the composite sense* (i.e., *taken together*) and the *divided sense* (i.e., *taken separately*) (*de sensu composito ac sensu diviso*) related to the question about the freedom of Christ under a precept. See also Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.6 n.102-105; more extensively, *ibid.*, n.106-115. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De concordia liberae obedientiae Christi cum eius impeccabilitate*: ActPontAcRomSTh 12 (1946) 100-105.

24. See Minges, 2, n.662-667. A different view, Gummersbach, *op. cit.*, 108. See B.M. Xiberta, *Libertat, indefectibilitat i mèrt en Jesucrist*: Criterion 5 (19310 411-416).

25. See Mastrius, d.3 q.9 a.3 n.389-391. Other ways of the Scotists of explaining this are critically examined by Mastrius, *loc. cit.*, n.380-387.

26. See Billuart, diss.18 a.4 § objection 1.

469. *A few Jesuit authors* also try to solve the difficulty coming from the part of the beatific vision by concentrating on the *special* condition of a person in heaven or comprehensor which Christ had. But the reasons given to explain it differ.

Molina *simply states* this amazing fact. God communicated to Christ the vision of his essence, beatific love and joy in such a way that “beyond the nature of these gifts, by limiting the effects that must result from them by the necessity of nature, he left the will of Christ subject to suffering and sadness and therefore free to fulfill or not to fulfill his precepts, which obliged under pain of guilt as if the glory of soul were not in Christ, since that was necessary so that he was able to merit.” The glory of Christ’s soul was so restrained that the will of Christ “therefore would be free to fulfill or not to fulfill the precepts, just as if he did not experience glory but was a pure wayfarer.”²⁷

470. Pesch explains the matter *better*. The *human* will of Christ belonged *at the same time to a comprehensor and wayfarer*. Inasmuch as it was the will of a comprehensor, it tended to God as *seen*; inasmuch as it was the will of a wayfarer, it tended towards God *as known obscurely* by his infused and acquired knowledge. The human will of Christ inasmuch as it tended to God as *seen*, was not free but was necessitated to the love of God and to those things that are necessarily connected with the preservation of this love. The human will of Christ inasmuch as it tended towards God *known obscurely* was certainly free.

The beatific vision is not a form intrinsically constituting or affecting the act of the will of Christ as a *wayfarer*; but rather it influences him extrinsically and by a certain redundancy. Of course this influence of the beatific vision excludes *connaturally* every act opposed to beatitude, for example, any sin; but it can be so *moderated* by God that it does not obtain its complete connatural effect. Hence it comes about that, in spite of its beatitude, the soul of Christ can experience sadness.

Thus therefore one can understand why for the human will of Christ obedience regarding the precept of death could be *free*. Such obedience according to his knowledge as a *wayfarer* did not appear to Christ as a pure good but at the same time as a huge evil. The beatific vision, moderated in the way explained, had for the human will of Christ the nature of an efficacious grace by which it was so assisted that it could infallibly and freely fulfill the precept of dying.²⁸

471. Galtier would seem to take *a further step*. The human will of Christ was *one*, and therefore his efficacious movement towards one material object was also one. Therefore nothing helps that this *one* will, from some other source, for example, from

27. *Concordia...* q.14 a.13 d.53 n.4 n.22 (ed. I. Rabeneck, S.J., Oniae-Matriti 1953). *Commentaria in 1 S.Th.* q.14 a.13 d.18 n.4.

28. See Pesch, n. 333-335. Regarding the elements he uses in support of this opinion, one can consult D. Viva, S.J., *Cursus theologicus... Pars sexta, De Incarn.* d.2 q.4 a.1, although he holds that the precept of dying was not rigorous. Toledo can be cited as favoring the same limitation, *In 3 q.19 a.4 concl.5*; but see *ibid.*, q.18 a.4 concl.4.

his infused and natural knowledge, *is not necessitated* to fulfill the precept of dying, if this *one and the same will* is said from some other source, for example, from his beatific knowledge, to be *necessitated* to obey such a precept.²⁹

Therefore no *necessity* in the human will of Christ regarding the precept of dying is to be admitted, and this is so because the status of Christ under his beatific knowledge was *different* from the status of the blessed in heaven under the same knowledge. *Spiritual sadness* was compatible with Christ's state (on this see above, n. 367-369), which in the case of the blessed is impossible.

The reality of this *spiritual sadness* shows that Christ, even though he had the beatific vision, certainly by derogation of the connatural laws of the beatific state, perceived some aspect of *evil* even in things irrevocably commanded by God. But the will is not moved in a necessarily efficacious way except by an object that is presented to it as *under no aspect* an evil for it.

The precept of dying was made known to Christ both by his beatific knowledge, by his infused knowledge and by his natural knowledge as a supreme good because of its irrevocable connection with the possession of the absolute Good. But the same precept was made known to the same will by his infused and natural knowledge at the same time because of the pains of death as something *truly evil* for him. Therefore the precept of dying, in spite of Christ's state of beatitude, *does not move his will in a necessarily efficacious way*.³⁰

472. Our position. We think that the right solution is to be found in these last opinions which distinguish a twofold act of love in Christ's will—one regulated by his beatific knowledge, which is *necessary*, and the other regulated by his infused knowledge, which is *free*.

The act of love of God from the vision proceeds from the will necessitated by the Good which is in every way good; the freedom to sin cannot coexist with this act. But the act of the love of God from infused knowledge proceeds from the will not necessitated, since under this knowledge God does not appear as good in every way but at the same time as commanding what for the subject is very burdensome or evil. Why the infused knowledge can propose this "evil" aspect in such a way that such an aspect does not seem necessarily to be contemned by someone who by his knowledge of vision sees God as infinitely good, we do not clearly understand. However it is connected with the status of Christ the *wayfarer*, who was to redeem us by his passion. Indeed this fact because of the *spiritual sadness* of Christ is beyond doubt (see above, n. 364-368). No reason can be given for this spiritual sadness unless, as Galtier correctly

29. Pesch proposes this difficulty, but he does not seem to solve it correctly: see Pesch, n334, "The objection is not valid...."

30. See Galtier, n. 404-410. For another explanation to reconcile Christ's beatific vision with his freedom under a rigorous precept, see Platel, *Synopsis... De incarnatione* t.5 c.6 § 1 n.335 or in Pesch, n. 334, "Quare quidem...."

points out, Christ perceived by his infused knowledge some aspect of evil even in things irrevocably decreed by God.

That Christ's human will was *one*, something Galtier insists on, shows very well that this one will does not have an opposed efficacious movement concerning the same material object. But it does not exclude the possibility of an act that proceeds from the will not necessitated to one thing, according as, for example, this will is ruled by the cognition of infused knowledge, which act therefore must be said to be free and consequently meritorious. This possibility is abundantly confirmed by the *diversity* of the acts of the one human will of Christ, which we considered above in n. 444f. Moreover the human will of Christ was not determined because of the beatific vision during a time prior to its being able to place a free act because of its infused knowledge, for both types of knowledge were given *together at the same time*.

We will present more on this below in objection 5, n. 486f.

473. B. Christ had a *rigorous* but *dispensable* precept of dying, because although the precept was already given and in the composite sense of the precept Christ was not able not to suffer, still Christ himself afterwards could remove that composite sense and ask God for a dispensation of the precept and simply prevent the death according to his statement: *Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?* (Matt. 26:53). Thus Lugo and others.³¹

Closely related to this is the opinion of those who think that Christ had a rigorous precept but *dependent*, in one way or another, on *his* acceptance of it. Thus, v.gr., Petavius, Prat, and according to its substance De la Taille.³²

474. C. Christ did *not* have a rigorous precept of dying, but either a *merely penal and less strict* precept (see above, n. 463), as the Wirceburgenses and Muncunill³³ hold, or a *mere good will of the Father*, as is claimed by Petavius, Franzelin, Stentrup, Billot, and others.³⁴

475. Theological note. That Christ had an absolute and rigorous precept of dying is *the more common opinion among theologians and*

31. Lugo, d.26 s.8 n.102-114. On the others, see Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.5 n.94 or Muncunill, n. 714. Recently this opinion was adopted by Pohle-Gierens, p.128f.

32. Petavius, 1.9 c.8 n.13 "Postremo..." Prat, *La Théologie...* 2, 1.4 c.2 p.224. M. De la Taille, S.J., *Mysterium fidei...* (Paris 1921) eluc.8 ad 3.

33. Wirceburgenses, 4, n.412 ad 5. Muncunill, n.727-738.

34. Petavius, 1.9 c.8 n.6-13. Franzelin, th.44, where many theologians in favor of this opinion are mentioned. Stentrup, 2, th.76 p.1201-1212. Billot, q.18 th.30. For the difference in the final explanation between Cardinals Franzelin and Billot, see Billot, *loc. cit.*, after the "Sed contra," note.

more probable. The further explanation based on the indifference of the principles of acting, as we explained it above in n. 472, seems to be *more probable*.

476. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) Christ said that he had received the precept of dying from the Father. John 10:17f.: *For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life in order to take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. I have received this command (ἐντολήν) from my Father.* See John 14:31. While omitting other reasons because of which the Father loves Christ, the giving of his soul or life for the sheep is mentioned by the Lord along with his subsequent resurrection *for our salvation* (see Rom. 4:25), and indeed both of them because of the *command* received from the Father.³⁵

The word “command” (ἐντολήν), although there are some exceptions in which the meaning of a rigorous precept is absent, is a technical term both in the Septuagint version [LXX] and in the New Testament in order to designate God’s commands placed on men (see, v.gr., in N.T.: Matt. 19:17-19, where the *decalogue* is meant; Mark 7:8f., where the *command* of God is contrasted with the *traditions* of men).³⁶

In St. John’s Gospel *in a parallel manner* precepts that *Christ* received from the Father are proposed along with the precepts that Christ gave *to us*. John 15:10: *If you keep my commandments, you will abide in my love, just as I have kept my Father’s commandments and abide in his love.* Finally the *integral command* that Christ applies to himself (John 10:18), is used by St. John for the precept imposed on us, 2 John 4: *just as we have been commanded by the Father.* Indeed, these commands of God and these commands of Christ imposed on us are absolute and rigorous precepts. Therefore, interpreting Holy Scripture in its obvious meaning, the word “command” that the Lord uses in reference to his death should be accepted in the meaning of an absolute and rigorous precept.³⁷

35. See I. Maldonatus, S.J., *Commentarii in quatuor Evangelistas* at this place; Lagrange, *Evangile...* at this place.

36. See Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 2,541-553, where also the extra-biblical use of the word is given. However regarding John 10:18 a rather broad interpretation is given: *ibid.*, 550,1-11. For a comparison with the Hebrew words by which the concept of law or divine precept is designated, see J. van der Ploeg, *Studies in Hebrew Law: CathBiblQuart* (1950) 248-259. For the *religious* aspect of this word, see A. Pelletier, S.J., *Le vocabulaire du commandement dans le Pentateuque des LXX et dans le Nouveau Testament: RechScRel* 41 (1953) 519-524.

37. See Toledo, *In Ioannis Evangelium* in 10:18, especially note 14; Knabenbauer, at this place; Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,148f.

477. 2) Holy Scripture speaks *about the obedience of Christ in such a way* that it supposes an absolute and rigorous precept of the Father. First of all, Christ is said by St. Paul to be ὑπήκοος *obedient*: Phil. 2:8 which word in the N.T. occurs twice up to this point, namely, in Acts 7:39 and 2 Cor. 2:9, and actually in the sense of *obedience to a rigorous precept*.³⁸ Moreover, the obedience of Christ ὑπακοή, which shines forth especially in his death on the cross (see Phil. 2:8), is contrasted by St. Paul with the disobedience παρακοή of Adam. In fact this disobedience of Adam had as its object a *rigorous precept*, therefore it is proper to say that Christ's obedience had a similar precept as its object.

478. *From the holy Fathers* it does not seem possible to find an argument *for the existence* of a rigorous precept of dying, since the texts usually quoted³⁹ do not really touch on the question of the difference between a rigorous precept and a counsel. However it also does not seem possible to make an argument from the holy Fathers *against the existence* of such a precept,⁴⁰ because these testimonies either prove only that Christ died *freely*, or they do not seem to pay attention to the *human* will of Christ. Rather, they pay attention to the *person of the Word* whom, contrary to the Arians who argued from a precept to the inferiority of the Word, they rightly said, as the person of the Word, is incapable of a precept.⁴¹

The authority *of theologians* favors the rigorous precept, not only because of the large number of those who hold it, but because the contrary opinion only recently was introduced into the schools.⁴²

479. Theological reasoning. From the disadvantages of the other opinions.⁴³ *Those who deny the rigorous precept of dying* do so from the impossibility of reconciling such a precept with Christ's impeccability. Logically therefore they assert that Christ was not free in fulfilling any precept regarding that which was strictly commanded. However this seems to be too severe. For in this hypothesis most of Christ's acts would have to be lacking in *merit* since, according to the almost common opinion of

38. On the text of 2 Cor. 2:9, see R. Cornely, S.J. (Cursus sacrae Scripturae, Paris 1909) at this place; J. Sickemberger (Bonnerbibel 1919) at this place.

39. See, v.gr., Toledo, *In Ioannis Evangelium...* c.10 annot.14, beginning; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.70.

40. Petavius cites more texts, 1.9 c.8 n.7-11 or Franzelin, th.44.

41. See Galtier, n. 397.

42. Lugo could write about the opinion denying the precept: "Moreover this solution is singular... and contrary to the common opinion of theologians" (d.26 s.8 n.101); and Franzelin quite clearly confirms this (see th. 44).

43. Many reasons for the suitability of the rigorous precept of dying are given by Toledo, *In Ioannis Evangelium...* in c.10, annot.14.

theologians, Christ was subject to the precepts of the natural law, both negative, as not lying, and positive, as worshipping God, loving one's neighbor (see below, scholium 2, n. 488). But if in so many cases he was not free, therefore also he could not gain any merit by them.

480. *Those who admit a rigorous precept of dying, but a dispensable one*, seem to have the same difficulty as the one above. For *de facto* Christ did not seek a dispensation, and therefore he remained under the obligation of the precept. Indeed, in the composite sense of the precept Christ was not able not to suffer, therefore *de facto* Christ did not die freely and therefore not meritoriously. It could only be said that Christ was free *in a mediated way* in undergoing death, inasmuch as he could have obtained a dispensation; but this mediated freedom does not agree well with the doctrine about the merit of Christ's *blood and death* (see below, thesis 24, n. 599.602).

Those who accept a rigorous precept of dying but in one way or another say it is dependent on his acceptance incur a similar disadvantage. For, on the *supposition* of Christ's acceptance, now Christ was not free to fulfill the precept, and therefore in undergoing his death he was not immediately or *in the proper sense free*.

However both of these ways of speaking turn out to be useless, when the question concerns the precepts of the natural law, and consequently they incur the same difficulty as does the way of speaking of those who *simply deny a rigorous precept*.⁴⁴

481. Those who seek a reconciliation, between the *rigorous and absolute precept* and Christ's impeccability, *from a limitation of the precept itself*, seem to give a defective interpretation of the statements of Holy Scripture, which attribute the merit of redemption *to the death itself*, but not to the various circumstances of time, motive, intensity of the act, and similar points.

Among the opinions that seek this reconciliation from *the indifference of the principles of acting* we prefer the one that distinguishes a *twofold act* of the love of God in the human will of Christ—one necessary and regulated by his beatific knowledge, the other free and regulated by his infused knowledge (see above, n. 472).

482. Objections. 1. Someone who would know for certain from divine revelation that he would die within a year, nevertheless would be called a martyr and would *un-*

44. Against the very *foundation* of these authors, see Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.5 n.93.

dergo death freely, if given the occasion he anticipated his death by enduring it for the sake of the faith. Therefore similarly Christ must be said *to have died freely*, provided that he was free to designate the *time* of his death.

I deny the similarity. A martyr, as in the case mentioned, would be said to undergo death freely, because *in the moment* when he dies or when he chooses death, he is really *free*, both regarding the time of death and regarding death itself, and in order to accept this death he is not bound *by any internal necessity*. On the contrary, according to the advocates of this opinion, Christ *in the moment* when he dies or when he chooses death is surely free *regarding the time*, but not regarding death itself, given the fact that *at no moment* is Christ able not to accept *death itself* or to refuse it, since it is a precept of the Father and therefore must be accepted *necessarily*.

There would be a similarity, according to this opinion, if we imagined a man because of some fixed idea being internally necessitated to cause *his own death*, in such a way that he would lack moral responsibility regarding the killing of himself; however he would still have freedom *to anticipate or to delay* the killing of himself. No one would say that such a man inflicted death on himself *freely*, just because he did it at this time rather than at that time.

483. 2. With a variation in the *motive* or the *intensity* of the act, the act itself changes *substantially*. But the motive or at least the intensity of the act by which Christ accepted death were for him totally free, even though the death itself was for him necessarily accepted since it was commanded. Therefore *from the limitation of the precept of dying* Christ's freedom is sufficiently explained not only regarding the circumstances of his death but also *regarding death itself*.⁴⁵

I distinguish the major: With a variation in the motive or the intensity of the act, the act itself changes substantially, inasmuch as it is *specifically* or at least numerically different, *conceded*; inasmuch as the act *regarding all of its element is free*, *I subdistinguish:* if the will is *necessitated* regarding some element of that act, *denied*; if it is necessitated to no element, *conceded*. *I bypass the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same manner.*

Because the act of accepting death is placed by Christ from a motive of charity or from a motive of obedience, with more or less affective intensity, surely that act will be different at least numerically. In this sense it can be called an *individual act* by which Christ accepted death and was free, inasmuch as Christ was able to place an act that was at least numerically different. But in the opinion of the objector, *death itself is accepted necessarily* as a precept. Therefore both in that individual act and *in any other act* of the acceptance of death there would be some *necessary* element. However this element is precisely to accept death *according to the substance of death*.⁴⁶

484. 3. At the moment in which Christ was apprehended by the Jews he said he could ask his Father and be freed (see Matt. 26:53). But these words indicate that no

45. See, v.gr., Vázquez, d.74 c.5

46. See Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.78.

precept of dying was imposed on Christ except one that was *dispensable*. Therefore a precept of this kind must be accepted.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. These words would have this meaning, if Christ had spoken about the power he had *of changing the decree of the Father, conceded*; if he spoke about the power he had *from the nature of the situation*, as the Son, *of freeing himself from the Jews, denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It is clear from his additional words that Christ did not speak here in light of all the circumstances: *But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?* Certainly Christ could not bring it about that what was predicted in the Scriptures should not be fulfilled. Therefore from the whole context the meaning of these words is clear: that is, Christ refused the armed help of his Father, first of all because *all who take the sword will perish by the sword* (v. 52); and then because *if he so wished* he would not make use of the weak assistance of one sword, but he would have asked his father efficaciously for twelve legions of angels (v. 53). However to the question whether he, having supposed the decree of the Father and having supposed the Scriptures, could *morally* seek such efficacious help from the Father, that was not why the Lord spoke these words, because the prior consideration sufficed to show that he accepted his death *not because of the force of the Jews* but voluntarily.⁴⁷

485. 4. According to St. Thomas: “a man’s obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior’s will” (II-II, q. 104, a. 2 c). But Christ in reference to his death understood his Father’s will. Therefore Christ could be said to be perfectly *obedient* in dying, even though he did not have a rigorous precept of dying.

I bypass the whole argument. For we have not argued *from an abstract definition of obedience*, which had to be fulfilled in Christ’s dying, but *from the real obedience of Christ*, which supposes a rigorous precept (see above, n. 477).⁴⁸

486. 5. According to the opinion that we maintain in the thesis, Christ was free in fulfilling the rigorous precept of his Father, even though he had the beatific vision. But if he was free in this, *he could sin*. Therefore we admit the absurd possibility of the co-existence in Christ at the same time of the status of the blessed and of sin.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Christ could sin *concretely*, that is, if the free act of accepting that precept is considered as proceeding from the will *at the same time necessitated by the vision* to accept the precept, in which will accordingly another *efficacious opposed* movement would be totally repugnant (see above, n. 472), *denied*; Christ could sin *positively*, that is, if that free act is considered only *in itself* as being regulated by the infused knowledge and therefore proceeding freely from the will, *I subdistinguish*: and this positive consideration suffices so that Christ may be said not to have been able to sin, even though he was in the beatific state, *denied*: it suffices that

47. See Maldonatus, *Commentarii...* at this place; Lagrange, *Evangile...* at this place.

48. Also, on the mind of St. Thomas, see Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.75; Galtier, n. 393.395-398; B. Pasciak, O.P., *Obedientia religiosorum perfecta est-ne oboedientia stricte dicta*: Ang 27 (1950) 105-128; especially from p. 122.

the act of the human will of Christ regulated by infused knowledge may be said to be able to be sinful or sin, *I again subdistinguish*: if by the Word, ruling his human will by efficacious graces which leave his freedom intact, this very sin were not excluded with metaphysical necessity, *conceded*; if such a situation were given necessarily and indeed from the very constitution of Christ (see above, thesis 15, n. 331-336. 351f.), *denied*.

If Christ was free in fulfilling a rigorous precept, he fulfilled it in such a way that his will had *dominion* over that act, and therefore he performed it in such a way that he was able not to perform it or to do the opposite (since a mere suspension of the act offers no help in this case, in which the concern is about positively fulfilling the precept); however that would seem to be the same thing as to concede that Christ was able to sin, namely, if he placed an act of refusing to fulfill the precept.

It is not valid then to say that the *blessed* are free, and nevertheless cannot sin: for by a wholly common opinion they are not said to be free to accept an obligating law of God, but on the contrary they are said to be *necessitated* to act well, that is, without sin, although regarding other things not prescribed they remain free. Moreover the distinction between voluntary and free must be maintained because of proposition thirty-nine of de Bay that was condemned (D 1939).

487. If the act of the human will of Christ freely accepting the precept is looked at *regarding its proximate principles*, thus it proceeds from a will naturally defectible (above n. 332f.), so that the contrary could also proceed from it. If however we pay attention to *everything* that is present in Christ, it is certain that, antecedently to all prevision of an absolutely free act, a contrary act would never be placed by the human will of Christ: for the very constitution of Christ the Lord composed of the hypostatic union and the beatific vision excludes such an act. Given the constitution of Christ, it is metaphysically repugnant that the Word does not so control his human will by efficacious graces that this will would never consent to sin. This is explained according to the various systems considered in the treatise on grace, without the human freedom being destroyed by such graces. The question becomes more difficult if the impeccability is considered inasmuch as it is the result of the beatific vision, for the one individual will cannot *efficaciously* both tend from the vision to the acceptance of the precept and at the same time tend from the infused knowledge to the non-acceptance of the precept. But already above in n. 472 we explained how the act regulated by the infused knowledge remains free *in itself*, according as it proceeds from a will which is not necessitated by *such knowledge*.

Christ, therefore, freely accepting the precept could sin, if only the proximate principles of his free act are considered, but without the consideration of everything that pertains to the activity of Christ: in other words, Christ by reason of his human freedom has in some way the physical power of sinning, but nevertheless *simply* speaking he cannot sin and he does not have the power of sinning. The same thing could also be expressed in this way: *in a sense divided* by the constitution of Christ and by the beatific vision there could be sin in the human will of Christ, but not *in a composite sense*; but since in the very name of Christ a definite composite sense is included, Christ is *simply*

impeccable, not however from his natural indefectibility, but from his personal indefectibility (above n. 332f.).

That Christ in fulfilling the precept was free does not signify that a transgression of the precept, even if we look only at the proximate principles of the free act, would be *easy* for Him. If holy men on earth because of their knowledge of God can arrive at such a level of love of God that they sustain *freely* any torment whatsoever rather than commit a small venial sin fully deliberately, how much more must that be said about the love of Christ for God? Nevertheless the impeccability of Christ the wayfarer was not of such a nature that freedom was lacking in him to transgress a precept in the way we have explained it.⁴⁹

488. Scholium 1. *On the nature of this precept.* It can be asked whether the precept of dying was imposed on Christ as a *direct* precept or rather only as an *indirect* precept, inasmuch as in one way or another it is contained *in the whole mission of Christ*. If on the one hand we consider not only *the death itself* but also the *time* of death to be seen as commanded⁵⁰ by the Father and on the other hand we consider the *soteriological* importance that is attributed to the blood and death of Christ (see below, thesis 27, n. 676) and supposing at the same time the divine knowledge of futuribles, it seems that it must be said that a precept of this kind was indeed *direct*.⁵¹

Another question is whether the precept was *natural*, that is, from the natural law of charity both towards God and towards men, or a *merely positive precept*, that is, from a special precept of redeeming men by his death. Both forms of the precept seem to be involved in this matter, for it is not repugnant for them to be together and both recommend the charity of God and of Christ towards men.⁵²

489 Scholium 2. *On other precepts.* A much more common opinion of theologians holds that Christ was *capable* of a rigorous precept and that he was *bound* by such a precept *regarding the natural law*. This opinion should absolutely be held and it is held generally also by those who deny that Christ's impeccability can be reconciled with a rigorous precept. For although, according to these authors, Christ was not *free* regarding what was strictly commanded, nevertheless he could truly be bound by the precept, since he was *subject to God* by reason of his human nature.⁵³

But regarding the old law, it seems that Christ was not subject to it, since he did not descend from Abraham in the ordinary way; just as the transgression of the precept

49. See Suarez, d.37 s.3 n.22ff. For various explanation of theologians about how the beatific vision renders the blessed impeccable, see Gummersbach, *Unsündlichkeit...* 108-117. Moreover how great the *perfection* was of Christ's human freedom modern investigations can confirm, when attention is given to the physical perfection of his body which the Holy Spirit formed from the Virgin Mary; see G. Bourguignon, *Le problème du libre arbitre au regard de la physiologie et de la médecine*: Temoign 12 (1947) 3-16.

50. See Suarez, d. 37 s.3 n.15.

51. Against it, Galtier, n. 399. See J. Solano, S.J., *El sentido de la muerte redentora de Nuestro Señor Jesucristo y algunas corrientes modernas*: EstEcl 20 (1946) 402f., 407-411.

52. See Suarez, d.43 s.3 n.3.

53. See S.Th. III, q. 20, a. 1; Suarez, d.43 s.1; s.2 n.1-3; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.65f.; Muncunill, n. 700-705.

given to Adam did not include Christ, because he was not contained in Adam according to his way of being generated. He could not be subject to *human laws*, because Christ the man was the natural Son of God (see thesis 19, n. 491-510).⁵⁴

Scholium 3. *On the freedom of Christ regarding objectively less perfect acts.* It is certain that Christ did not choose *absolutely perfect acts*, since such an act cannot be given, because however perfect some act might be, another act more perfect *in the physical order* is always possible. *In the moral order*, however, every free act of Christ is absolutely perfect, since it is the act of an infinite person and therefore of infinite worth. The question therefore is whether Christ had the freedom of choosing, between acts for which he here and now had some proportion—a less perfect act in preference to a more perfect one.

There are three opinions on this matter. *Some theologians* denied that Christ could choose a less perfect act in place of a more perfect act. *Other theologians* concede that Christ could choose a less perfect act *with his physical power*. But at the same time they say that He had *strict moral impotence*, that is, of such a nature that it could *never* be reduced to act by reason of the annexed difficulty. A physical power of this kind with moral impotence is said to be sufficient for freedom and therefore also for merit.

However the more common opinion holds that Christ had not only *the physical power* but also the *moral power* of choosing a less perfect act, although it is not thereby denied that He *de facto* always chose the more perfect act.

This third opinion is to be preferred both because the strict *moral impotence* of choosing a less perfect act has not been proved, and because all the acts of Christ were most pleasing to God and of infinite worth *because of the dignity of the acting person*. Consequently the acts of Christ should not be judged like the acts of a *pure man*, whose acts get their worth for the most part *from the object, from the intensity*, and so forth.⁵⁵

54. See Suarez, d.43 s.2 n.4-10; Salmanticenses, d.27 dub.4 n.67f.

55. See Galtier, n. 381-383; Muncunill, n. 692-699.

ARTICLE II

THINGS SUITABLE FOR CHRIST IN COMPARISON
WITH GOD THE FATHER**Thesis 19. Christ the man is the natural Son of God in such a way that by reason of his human nature he cannot be said to be the adopted son of God.**

S.Th. III, q. 23, a. 4; Galtier, th. 17; Lercher, th. 16.

491. Connection. Among those things that result from the hypostatic union, St. Thomas had considered in the preceding questions the things suitable for Christ *by comparison with God the Father* (q. 20-24). Of great importance are the things the Angelic Doctor teaches about Christ *according to his relation to the Father*, that is, about *the subjection of Christ* (q. 20) and about his *prayer* (q. 21). But on these points we are forced to refer you to St. Thomas himself and to his great commentators.¹ We will treat the question about the *priesthood* of Christ (q. 22) below in thesis 27, where we consider the sacrifice of the cross.

Other things are said about Christ *according to the relation of the Father to him*, as if the Father *had adopted* him and that he *predestined* him. In this thesis we will explain the question about the *adoption* of Christ, and we will propose a few things about his *predestination* in scholium 3, n. 515.

492. Definition of terms. *Christ* is the incarnate Word.

Christ as man. The person of the incarnate Word is considered *explicitly* as subsisting in and with a human nature. He could also be said to be: *Christ as this man.*

493. Our thesis is generally stated by the theologians: *Christ as man* is the natural Son of God. *It is reduplicated*, therefore, or the *humanity* is indicated *again*, which, already implicitly designated by the word “Christ,” again, but now explicitly, it is signified by the word “man.” The reduplication “as man” is taken *in a specifying way*. This *specifying* sense has its place, according to the logicians, when the reduplicated term applies or reduplicates for the subject *the formal or specific* concept; for

1. See Cajetan, at this place; Suarez, at this place and d.43-45; Salmanticenses, d.29f.; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde*, 2, *Le Mystère...* 619-647. See the doctrine of Holy Scripture in Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3, 167-176. On the holy Fathers, see Petavius, 1.7 c.7-9. In particular about prayer, see Enrico di S. Teresa, *La preghiera di Gesu nel quadro dei suoi fattori psicologici*: EphCarm 3 (1949) 3-35.

example, a colored object, insofar as it is colored is the object of sight, is grasped in a specifying way, because it reduplicates only the formal idea. Likewise, being as being is the object of metaphysics; it is called a specifying proposition, because in it the reason why being is the object of metaphysics is not signified, but the nature or species is signified with which the predicate adequately agrees.²

The term “as man” is taken in a specifying way because in this proposition: Christ as man is the natural Son of God, the person of Christ, who is the Only-begotten Son of God, *as at the same time he is considered* as subsisting in a human nature, is the formal reason according to which the predicate “natural Son of God” is applied to the subject, Christ. Therefore the term “as man” is taken not merely *materially* and identically for the suppositum otherwise subsisting in the divine nature, but it is taken *formally* for the suppositum subsisting in the human nature or for man in the concrete.³ In other words, “as man” determines the *suppositum* directly as subsisting in a specifying way in the humanity. Therefore by the word “as man” only the *subject* is designated to whom it truly belongs to be the natural Son of God by the grace of union.⁴

494. However, *this way of speaking* has this inconvenience, that *per se* the reduplicated term is understood more properly for the *nature* than for the suppositum (see above, thesis 16, n. 394), and so the proposition is rejected by not a few theologians: Christ as man is the natural Son of God, if *natural sonship* in this proposition is taken in exactly the same sense as the natural sonship of the Word; or if other theologians admit this proposition, in a subtle way they make a distinction lest the words “as man” seem to be reduplicated in an incorrect way.⁵

Therefore in this first part of the thesis in order to avoid some theological controversies we choose to say: “Christ the man,” where it is sufficiently clear that we are speaking directly not about the nature but about the *suppositum*, but considered in his human nature.

2. See John of St. Thomas, *Ars logica...* First part, Summary 1.2 c.24 (Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, ed. Reiser, Turin 1930) p. 57; Complutenses, *Disputationes in Aristotelis dialecticam...* 1.2 last chapter (Lyons 1637) p. 48. It could also be said that the specifying sense does not signify the formal reason, *because of which* the predicate *agrees* with the subject; but that it determines precisely the reason *according to which* the subject *has the capacity* for the predicate to be attributed to it (see Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.2 n.25).

3. See Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.3 n.67. Lercher words the thesis in this way: “Jesus Christ, *also as this man*, is the natural Son of God...”

4. See Salmanticenses, *loc. cit.*, n.69.75.

5. See Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.1 n.34; dub.2 n.40; dub.3. Suarez writes: “...first of all it should be pointed out that sonship can be applied to God in various ways: primarily and most properly it is applied for the natural and personal sonship, by which the second person of the Trinity is constituted; but it is *certain* that Christ *as man* is not referred to God by this sonship” (d.49 s.1 n.2; see *ibid.*, n.10).

N.B. For the sake of clarity we present in advance a summary of the ways in which a term can be *reduplicated*: a) In a *specifying* sense, which we just spoke about, and indeed either *per se* or in a *proper* sense, where the reduplicated term is taken for the *nature*, or *per accidens* in a *less proper* sense, where the reduplicated term is taken for the *suppositum* (and we just gave an example of this above). b) In a *reduplicating* sense, which will be explained below in n. 496, and indeed either *completely*, where the *nature* alone, according as it is distinguished from the person, is the reason why the predicate *simply* agrees with the subject, v.gr., Christ as man can suffer, Christ as man is not the adopted son of God, or *incompletely*, v.gr., Christ as man is mediator or priest (this meaning will be explained below in n. 573).

495. *The natural Son of God.* He proceeds from the Father eternally by a true generation or by the generating communication of the exact same divine nature.

Adopted son of God. He is constituted a son not by generation but by *adoption*. Adoption is usually defined as: the assumption out of goodness of someone as an heir to the estate (see S.Th. III, q. 23, a. 1 c).

496. *By reason of his human nature he cannot be said to be the adopted son of God.* The term “man” in the expression “Christ the man” of the preceding proposition, is reduplicated now *in a reduplicating sense*. This reduplicating sense has its place, according to the logicians, when the reduplicated term applies to the subject the nature of the *cause* because of which the predicate belongs to the subject, v.gr., man as rational is risible, as if one were to say: man *because* he is rational, is risible.

In the thesis therefore the expression “Christ the man” is understood in a twofold way. When we say that Christ the man *is* the *natural* son of God, by the word “man” we understand the *suppositum*, but considered in his human nature, or at most it could be said that the humanity is reduplicated *in the less proper specifying sense* (“as man”); but when we add that Christ the man *is not* the *adopted* son of God, we understand the word “man” as reduplicating the humanity *in the reduplicating sense*. This final point we state expressly in the wording of the thesis: Christ the man *by reason of his human nature* is not the *adopted* son of God.

The question about whether Christ as man, by taking the term “as man” in the *proper* specifying sense, must or can be called the *natural* Son of God, will be considered by us below in scholium 1, n. 511-513.

497. Adversaries. A. The *adoptionists* in the 8th century,⁶ led by Elipandus, the archbishop of Toledo, and Felix, the bishop of Urgel, distinguished in the person of the Word two natures, one divine and one human. By the divine nature he is the Son of God, the Only-begotten, consubstantial with the Father who, being in no way substantially inferior to the Father, accepted in time a visible body from the womb of the Virgin Mary and was born from her. But this one “born of a woman, born under the law” is not the son of God by generation or by nature, but he is so by adoption or by grace, and also he was constituted the first born of all of us who are adopted sons of God.

Although *logically* this opinion leads to the positing of *two persons* in Christ, still the adoptionists themselves *expressly* did not teach this heresy. The source of the error of *adoptionism* was the conviction according to which the concepts of sonship and adoption are predicates of the *nature*, but not of the person. Therefore that “born of a woman” means, in reference to God, *only adoptive sonship*, just as other men are adopted by God as sons. This adoption, by reason of which we are called gods, brings it about that the Son of God according to his humanity is *deified and called God* along with his elect by the grace of adoption.

Historically perhaps *adoptionism* took its origin from an apologetic endeavor. For since Islam says that Jesus is a mere man but also a great prophet, the Mozarabic Christians wished, while retaining this admission of their adversaries, to concede that Christ the man is the son of God only by adoption, so that therefrom they might demonstrate that in Christ there is also a divine nature, according to which he is rightly adored as the natural Son of God.⁷

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6. These adoptionists must be carefully distinguished from the adoptionists of the 3rd century who said that Jesus is a *mere man* whom the Father adopted as a son at his baptism. These heretics are considered in the treatise on the Trinity, where the discussion concerns the true *divinity* of Christ. Nor should they be confounded with the adoptionists with whom the Council of Toledo XI was concerned (D 526); see Madoz, *Le symbole du XI Concile...* 47f.
7. *On the doctrine* of adoptionism and on the arguments with which it is defended, see J.F. Rivera, *La doctrina de la adopción de Cristo-hombre y sus argumentos en los escritos adopcionistas españoles del siglo VIII*: RevEcl 7 (1934) 641-657; 8 (1935) 3-17, 129-139. For the historical question, see E. Amann, *L'adoptionisme espagnol* (Histoire de l'Eglise..., Fliche-Martin, t.6, Paris 1937) c.4 p.129-152; this is repeated almost to the letter in RevScTel 16 (1936) 281-317; R. de Abadal, *La batalla del adoptionismo en la desintegración de la Iglesia visigoda* (Barcelona 1949). On the denial of any historical relation between adoptionism and the Council of Chalcedon, see J. Solano, S.J., *El Concilio Calcedonia y la controversia adopcionista del siglo VIII en España* (*Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, Grillmeier-Bacht) t.2,841-871. On Elipandus of Toledo, see J.F. Rivera, *Elipando de Toledo. Nueva aportación a los estudios mozárabes* (Toledo 1940), where also a bibliography of the whole adoptionist controversy will be found; see also, M. del Alamo, O.S.B., *Los comentarios de Beato al Apocalipsis y Elipando* (Studi e Testi, 122) Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, vol.2 (Città del Vaticano 1946) 16-33.

498. B. *The scholastics in the 12th century* in no way taught real adoptionism, but *supposing* that the person of the incarnate Word explicitly considered and subsisting in and with his human nature is the natural son of God, asked the further question whether *by reason of the human nature* he could be said to be the adopted son of God (adoptionism in the improper sense). Generally they denied this adopted sonship, although their statements in the sense of certain real adoptionism have been so understood by some modern historians. Peter Cantor clearly taught this *improper* adoptionism.⁸

There are not lacking *scholastics in the 14th century* who say, just like Peter Cantor, that Christ is the adopted son of God *by reason of his human nature*. Thus Durandus: “Christ however according as he is a man... has grace from the Holy Spirit according to his human nature, by which there is the adoption of the sons of God; therefore Christ as a man can be said to be a son of the Holy Spirit by adoption. However the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be the father of Christ according to that formula any more than the Father in the deity or the whole Trinity, if the matter is carefully looked at....”⁹

499. Doctrine of the Church. Beside the letters of Hadrian I (D 595, 610f.), there is the *Council of Frankfurt*: “The Son of God was made the Son of man; [that is, he who truly was generated] not adoption, not in appearance, but in both births by being born he has the name of son; and he is true God and true man, the one true son, from both natures, not adopted, because it is impious and wicked towards God the eternal Father that the co-eternal son should be said to be adopted, but he is the true and proper son, as was said above that he must be believed and preached from both natures.”¹⁰ See D 612-615, 619, 681. *The Council of Lyons II*: “We believe in the Son of God... real and perfect in both natures, neither an adoptive son nor an apparent son” (D 852).

500. Theological note. A. It is a *defined divine and catholic truth of faith* against Nestorius that Christ the man is the natural and not the adoptive Son of God (in the sense of adoptionism) (see above, thesis 3, n. 34).

From the documents directed *against the adoptionists themselves*, it

8. See Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*, 2nd part, 2 (1954) 7-43. From the collection of texts quoted by Landgraf it is quite certain that Peter Cantor taught adoptionism only *in the improper sense*.

9. *In 3 Sent.* D.4 q.1. On other scholastics holding the same thing, see Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.1 n.25; DTC 1,418. On the doctrine of Scotus, see *Opera S.Bonaventurae* (Quaracchi), Scholium *In 3 Sent.* d.10 a.1 q.1; differently, Minges, 1, n.504.

10. *Chronicon Moissiacense*, MGH, SS, t.1 p.301. These words seem to reflect the conciliar definition: see Amann, *L'adoptianisme espagnol* 143, note 1; *ibid.*, p.141-145, much information about the documents of Hadrian I and the Council of Frankfurt.

seems that our thesis must be said to be *at least Catholic doctrine*. For the letters of Hadrian I (see D 595, 610f.) condemn this error in severe terms, and although the *Council of Frankfurt* was not ecumenical, its condemnation of adoptionism with serious words was approved by Pope St. Leo III at the *Council of Rome* in 798.¹¹ If the words of the *Council of Lyons II* (D 852) refer to the adoptionism of the 8th century, as it seems, *an equivalent definition* is had.¹²

B. It is *certain in theology* that Christ the man *in no way* is the adoptive son of God (in the sense of the scholastics of the 12th and 14th centuries), so that the contrary opinion is false in theology and temerarious.¹³

501. Proof from Scripture. In addition to the arguments presented above (thesis 3, n. 35-37) against Nestorius to prove that the Only-begotten Son of God is at the same time a true man, other texts can be added according to which *Christ the man* is said to be the *natural* or true *Son of God*.

1) The testimony of the *Father*. Matt. 3:17: *This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased*. These words are said of Jesus, who received baptism as if he were a sinner. Therefore without doubt they are about Christ *the man*. We pointed out above (thesis 6, n. 91) that with these words his *natural* sonship is expressed, because “beloved Son” signifies his only son.

502. 2) The testimony of *Christ himself*. Mark 14:61f.: *Are you the Messiah, the son of the Blessed One? Jesus said, I am; and you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of the power....* About the Son of man, therefore about Christ the man (see above, thesis 7, n. 119 at 3) his *natural* sonship is asserted which in greater detail is proved in the thesis on Christ’s divinity.

3) The testimony of the *Apostles*. Matt. 16:13.16: *Who do people say that the Son of Man is?... Simon Peter answered: You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God*. The argument here proceeds just as it does above at Mark 14:61f. Rom. 8:32: *He who did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up for all of us*. Christ the man was handed over to death: nevertheless St. Paul says of him that he is *God’s own Son*.¹⁴

11. See MGh, LL, s.3 Councils, t.2 p.1 203f. On the various doctrinal qualifications of the theologians derived from the Council of Frankfurt, see B. Dolhagaray, *Frankfort (Concile de)*: DTC 6,718.

12. This profession of faith (D 851f.; TCF 22f.), although not verbally, but certainly virtually and equivalently, was approved by the Council of Lyons: see F. Vernet, *Lyon [II Concile oecumenique de]*: DTC 9,1388.

13. On the diverse opinion of the theologians concerning this theological note, see Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.1 n.35-39.

14. On Mark 14:61f., see v.gr., D’Ales, 56f. For many other testimonies of Holy Scripture, see Petavius 1.7 c.1 n.5-7.

503. Proof from tradition. Beside what we presented above (thesis 3, n. 38f.) from the Fathers about the unity of the person of the incarnate Word, we will add two further testimonies.

1) *One Son of God* in Christ the man is asserted. St. Athanasius: "Therefore the Son of God became the Son of man so that the sons of man, that is of Adam, might be made sons of God. For because the Word was eternally generated above from the Father, *He Himself* (ὁ αὐτός) in time here below was born from the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God... Hence the Son of God tasted death... Therefore according to nature he is the Son of God, but we are sons by grace" (R 788). St. Gregory Nazianzen: "If someone introduces two sons, one from God the Father, the other from a mother, but he is not one and the same, then he is cut off by the adoption of sons, which was rightly promised to believers."¹⁵ St. Cyril of Alexandria: "You see how he does not divide Emmanuel [Heb. 13:8] into two sons, nor of the Word alone separately that he proceeds from the substance of God and of the Father; he claims that he is always the same, but acknowledging the one and only Son according to nature, who clothed himself with humanity, and he names him Christ and Jesus."¹⁶

504. 2) In Christ an *adoptive* son of God is excluded. St. Gregory of Nyssa wrote his *Adversus Apollinarem ad Theophilum* in order to refute this calumny: "For they profess, like certain ones in the Catholic Church worshipping two sons, one according to nature, but another one acquired later *according to adoption* (κατὰ θέσιν)."¹⁷ St. Augustine: "It was fitting, then, that He should baptize who is God's only Son, not His adopted Son. Adopted sons are the ministers of the only Son: the only Son has power; the adopted, the ministry" (R 1811). St. Gregory I the Great: "For it is one thing for born men to accept the grace of adoption, and something else for one singly by the power of the divinity to bring forth God from the concept itself. And there cannot be any comparison between the glory of the Only-begotten, which he has by nature, and some other glory accepted by grace...."¹⁸

15. *Epist.* 101: MG 37,179.

16. *Homil. Pasch.* 8 n.4: MG 77,567. For the bibliography concerning the doctrine of these three Fathers, see above, thesis 3, n.38f., note.

17. MG 45,1271. See Lenz, *Jesuschristus nach der Lehre des hl.G.v.N.* On the word THESEI Gk, see Petavius, 1.7 c.1 n.2s.

18. *Moral.* 1.18 c.52 n.85: ML 76,89. From St. Augustine see also *Contra Secundinum Manichaeum* c.5: ML 42,581. For more, see Mohan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustini...* 31-34; Van Bavel, *Recherches sur la Christologie...* 40f. For other texts of St. Augustine about the one person of Christ who is the Only-begotten of the Father, see Schiltz, *Aux sources de la théologie...*: *NouvRevTh* 63 (1936) 706-708. On other testimonies of the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.7 c.2f.

505. Theological reasoning. A. Christ the man could be said to be the *non-natural* but *adoptive* son of God only inasmuch as the person of the Word by the incarnation *ceased* to be the *natural* Son of God or inasmuch as *at the same time* along with the natural Son of God there would be in God *another son of God*, but one that is not-natural. But the first alternative is repugnant because of the immutability of God, and the other falls into Nestorianism, because, since the word son designates the *person*, if two sons are affirmed, then *two persons* must be placed in Christ. Therefore Christ the man necessarily must be said to be the *natural* Son of God, but he cannot be said to be the *adoptive* son of God.

506. B. Sonship is a *personal* property. But it is not possible for sonship to be said *in a participating way*, if it is applied *essentially*. Therefore Christ, who is the *natural Son of God*, cannot for any reason be said to be the *adoptive* son of God, and therefore he cannot be called such *by reason of his human nature*.

The *major* is certain, because sonship really designates a *person*, according to the common way of speaking of the philosophers, and it is fitting to maintain norm.

Concerning the minor. The principle of this minor should not be so understood as if nothing that is said about Christ *essentially* could simply be said of him *by participation*. For Christ is, v.gr., infinitely omniscient, and still he is said to have limited knowledge (see above, thesis 13, scholium 3, n. 300) according to his human nature. Therefore the principle is particularly valid when a predicate, applied to the subject by participation, includes an imperfection that is intrinsically opposed to that which is essentially such and postulates that imperfection *in the person as such*. Thus Christ cannot be said, by reason of his human nature, to be *a created or finite person*, even though his human nature is finite.

As we said regarding the major of the argument, sonship in the proper sense designates a *person*. Sonship by participation, or in concrete an adopted sonship, includes the notion of an *extraneous* person. Therefore the denomination “adoptive son” would include the imperfection—the extraneousness—that is intrinsically opposed to a *natural son* and would require such imperfection *in the person according to his very nature*.¹⁹

507. Objections. 1. Christ is called the *servant of God*. But it is more dignified to be an *adopted son* than a servant. Therefore in a more proper sense Christ is the adoptive son of God.

19. For more on this, see Suarez, d.49 s.2. On St. Thomas, see Backes, *Die Christologie...* 306f.

I concede the major with by far the more common opinion of theologians. *I distinguish the minor*. It is more dignified to be an adoptive son than a servant, if these notions are considered *in the abstract, conceded*; if they are considered *in the concrete*, that is, in one who is already a natural son, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way*.

508. We said above (thesis 16, n. 387) that concrete substantive nouns signify directly the person and indirectly (in an oblique case) the form, when the discussion concerns the mystery of the incarnation. Therefore it would not seem possible to say that Christ is the servant of the Father, because that would mean that the person of Christ is inferior to the Father, while at the same time he is not inferior, since he is a divine person.

But this kind of predication of “servant” and other terms like it, on the supposition of faith in the hypostatic union, are easily understood to be predicated about the person by reason of the nature, so that the diversity of natures²⁰ suffices for the predication of these statements as being about one and the same person, without requiring different persons. On the other hand, the term “adopted son” has so embedded in it the notion of an extraneous person who is adopted, that the diversity of natures alone does not at all suffice, but two persons in Christ must be affirmed—one a natural son, the other an adopted son.

509. 2. Christ the man is said to be “predestined to be Son of God with power” (Rom. 1:4). But a man who is predestined to be the Son of God is not the natural Son of God but an adopted son. Therefore Christ the man is the adopted son of God.

I distinguish the major. According to the original reading Christ is said to be “predestined,” denied; he is said to be constituted as the powerful Son of God, that is, by his resurrection Christ according to the flesh is constituted by God in the splendors of power; or he is called the Son of God in a broad sense, that is, in a messianic sense, not precisely in the sense of a natural sonship, conceded. I distinguish the minor in the same way.²¹

On this expression itself we will comment below, scholium 3, n. 515.

3. Christ for the same reason cannot be both the natural Son of man and the natural Son of God. But Christ the man is the natural Son of the Virgin Mary. Therefore Christ the man is not the natural Son of God but the adopted son.

I distinguish the major. Christ cannot by reason of the same nature be the natural Son of man and the natural Son of God, conceded; I also distinguish the minor: Christ is the natural Son of the Virgin Mary by reason of the same divine nature by which he is the natural Son of God, denied; by reason of the same divine person, conceded.

20. For more on the controversy over the use of “servant of God,” see Salmanticenses, d.29. St. Augustine explicitly applies this title to Christ; see Mohan, *De nominibus Christi*... 34.

21. See Prat, *La Théologie*... 2,510-513; Lagrange, *Épître aux Romains* (Études bibliques, Paris 1931) at this place; Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 75-77; Ceuppens, *Teología bíblica* 3,199f.; M.E. Boismard, O.P., *Constitué Fils de Dieu (Rom. 1,4)*: *RevBibl* 60 (1953) 5-17. On the various interpretations of theologians, see Suarez, d.50 s.2.

510. 4. Christ the man was adorned with sanctifying grace. But sanctifying grace constitutes man an adopted son of God. Therefore Christ the man is the adopted son of God.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Adopted sonship of God is the primary formal effect of sanctifying grace, denied; the secondary effect, I subdistinguish: which is obtained when a person, who is adorned with sanctifying grace, is extraneous to God, conceded; when this person is already the natural Son of God, denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.

5. There are many texts of the holy Fathers and of the ancient Mozarabic liturgy that speak about Christ the man as the adopted Son of God. Therefore this way of speaking does not seem worthy of condemnation.

I distinguish the antecedent. There are many texts in which the point concerns adoption, but not in the sense of adoptive sonship of God, conceded; otherwise, denied. I also distinguish the consequent.

Abstracting from the texts of the Fathers interpolated by the adoptionists or expunged by them, the patristic and liturgical statements treat adoption in the broad sense for the assumption or even for his election. We have already explained the expression “assumed man” above in thesis 3, n. 42.²²

511. Scholium 1. On Christ the natural Son of God by reason of his human nature. The formula “by reason of his human nature” can be understood so that the human nature is the cause because of which Christ is the natural Son of God, which is obviously an absurd meaning. But it can also be understood in such a way that Christ, subsisting in his humanity, has in the humanity itself a certain condition or relation of a natural son to God. That is the meaning we are concerned about.

From the above explanation (n. 493, 496) it is clear that the words “by reason of the human nature” surely reduplicate the humanity of Christ, not in a reduplicating way, but in a specifying way.²³ However the proper specifying sense we are using in this scholium differs from the less proper specifying sense that was used above in n. 493f., because there the suppositum of humanity was signified directly, but here the human nature of Christ is signified.

Because of the arguments of Holy Scripture and of the holy Fathers, there were some theologians with Suarez and Vázquez²⁴ who thought that Christ inasmuch as he is a man is the natural Son of God; they explained this from the fact that Christ as man is sanctified by God by the grace of union and by that grace he has the right of inheritance or glory. This sonship by the grace of union is not something that comes to Christ already constituted, as is adoption that comes to Christ already constituted.

22. See Rivera, *La doctrina de la adopción...*: RevEcl 7 (1935) 6-17; Id., *La controversia adoptionista del siglo VIII y la ortodoxia de la liturgia mozárabe*: EphLitur 47 (1933) 506-536. In particular on St. Ambrose, see Gapp, *La doctrine de l'union...* 55-60.

23. Platel notes correctly (*Synopsis... De incarnatione* c.6 § 4 b. 396) that some authors call this the specifying sense, while others call it the reduplicating sense. As a result of what we said above in n. 439, 496, here we are calling it the specifying sense.

24. Suarez, d.49 s.1-3. Vázquez, d.89 c.14. Platel, *ibid.*, n.397-399. On the others, see Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.2 n.60.

512. This sonship in Christ really does not differ from the natural sonship by essence that constitutes a person subsisting in the divine nature and is eternally generated by the Father. For the holiness and the right to the divine inheritance, which can be understood in the humanity, come quasi formally from the eternal sonship by way of the union. And all of it is founded on the infinite dignity of that eternal sonship, and the sanctification of the humanity, on the supposition of the union, is absolutely inseparable from it. Therefore there is a unity and identity of the form sanctifying Christ as a man with the same natural sonship and through the essence of Christ as God.

However the predicamental or quasi-predicamental reference is different—one that is usually said to be a reference to another (*esse ad*). One is the reference that Christ as man sanctified by the grace of union and as an heir of eternal life has to God his sanctifier, but the other is a real reference to the Father, which he has inasmuch as he is God by generation.

513. It is not called a natural sonship with complete impropriety, because Christ as man not only had that relation of sonship from the beginning of his conception, but from the beginning he had it in such a way that the grace of union itself was intrinsic to him because by it in a quasi-formal way this man Christ is constituted, so that he is the Christ, and finally in such a way that in virtue of the same union he has the sanctification and the right to the eternal inheritance, by reason of which he is named Son.²⁵

This opinion more commonly and rightly is rejected, both because it does not seem to be founded on the tradition and because with less logical consistency in reference to the arguments from theological reasoning put forward above in n. 506, it introduces into Christ two relations of natural sonship—one of a strict natural sonship and the other of a broad sonship.²⁶

514. Scholium 2. On the adopted human nature of Christ. It is a quite common opinion of theologians that the humanity of Christ could not be said in a proper sense to be adopted, since to be adopted in the usual sense belongs to a person but not to a nature, and also since the nature of Christ in the proper sense could not be adopted to any gift, that is, not to habitual grace to which we human beings are not adopted, seeing that by such grace we are adopted to an eternal inheritance. It could not be adopted to an eternal inheritance, for which it is not adopted by habitual grace, since this grace is later in nature than the grace of union and thus it would be given to a nature not extraneous to, but proper to the Word because of the union; nor could it be adopted by the grace of union, since this is of a higher order and reason than even glory itself, and therefore it cannot be an adoption to glory. Nor would it be adopted to the grace of union, since adoption brings about only an accidental union between the adopter and the adoptee, while the

25. Thus Suarez, d.49 s.2 n.31.34.35.

26. See, v.gr., Franzelin, th.38 at III, 2. On the opinion of Scotus, see Minges, 1,503f. For almost the same reasons theologians generally reject another opinion, which Mastrius (d.2 q.5 n.115ff.) and others quoted by him hold; according to him Christ *as man* is neither the natural Son of God nor the adopted son, but he is the *proper* son. On the recent opinions proposed by Dorsaz and Cuzin, see Galtier, S.J.: *RevAscMyst* 4 (1923) 185-187; 19 (19380 364-368. See also DTC 6,718f.

grace of union brings about a substantial union.²⁷

515. Scholium 3. On the predestination of Christ. A twofold question can be treated here—one terminological and the other real. Regarding the way of speaking, theologians use several types of expression: Christ is predestined, Christ as man is predestined, Christ as man is predestined to be the natural Son of God.

This principle can be established briefly: all the supernatural works that took place in the incarnation were predestined; predestination in no way affects the person of the Word as such; Christ as man can be said to be predestined to all the graces that are a consequence of the hypostatic union.²⁸ In this regard St. Thomas says (III, q. 24, a. 1 ad 1) that predestination is attributed to the person of Christ, not indeed in itself or according as it subsists in the divine nature, but according as it subsists in the human nature.

516. Regarding predestination itself, another twofold question can be asked. One concerns the reason why Christ himself is predestined or the reason why it was predestined by God that the Word should be incarnated; the other has to do with the predestination of Christ as the cause of our predestination.

We answered the first question above in thesis 1, where we proved that Christ was predestined by God in virtue of the present decree which is dependent on the prevision of Adam's sin.

However the predestination of Christ is the cause of our predestination, not if the predestination is considered according to the act of predestination, because by one and the same act God predestined Christ and us; but it is the cause in a positive way if predestination is considered according to the terminus or purpose of predestination. For God so preordained our salvation by predestinating from eternity that it should be accomplished by Jesus Christ.²⁹

These points partly flow immediately from what was said above in thesis 1 and they will also become clearer from what will be said below in thesis 24 about the merit of Christ.

27. See Suarez, d.49 s.4; Salmanticenses, d.33 dub.1 n.19-24.

28. Thus Pesch, n. 180. For more, see S.Th. III, q. 24, a. 1f.; Suarez, d.50; Salmanticenses, d.34.

29. See S.Th. III, q. 24, a. 4 c.

ARTICLE III

THINGS PERTAINING TO CHRIST IN REFERENCE TO US

Thesis 20. The human nature of Christ and each of his parts hypostatically united to the Word must be adored with one and the same absolute worship of *latria* by which the divinity of Christ is adored.

S.Th. III, q. 25, a. 1f.; Suarez, d.53; Salmanticenses, d.35.

517. Connection. After having considered the things that pertain to Christ in himself and in reference to God the Father, St. Thomas next treats the things that pertain to Christ *in reference to us*. First of all he takes up the *adoration* of Christ by which we adore him; then the fact that he is our Mediator with God.

In this thesis we will be dealing with the *adoration* of the humanity of Christ. But regarding the cult of images and of the saints, which St. Thomas treats in this same question (a. 3-6), that will be covered later in another treatise.

518. Definition of terms. *Adoration* is a special type of honor. Honor is defined with St. Thomas: "The recognition of some kind of excellence of another."¹ Honor can be given either among equals or inferiors, and then it is simply called *honor*; or to superiors, and then it is called *adoration* or worship.² Therefore adoration is an act by which someone subjects himself to another as a sign of his excellence and superiority.³ Adoration that is rendered to *God* is the proper act of the virtue of *religion*, which is treated extensively in the treatise on the virtues.

Therefore adoration is certainly an act of the *intellect*, recognizing the excellence of another and the obligation of subjecting oneself to him; it is an act of the *will*, which commands this submission, and finally the *execution* of it, either by a *merely internal* act, which most theologians rightly say is sufficient, or also by an *external* act, which as a secondary element in man

1. II-II, q. 102, a. 2 c.

2. The word *adoration* now is usually reserved for the worship offered to *God alone*. For a certain distinction between worship and honor, see S.Th. II-II, q. 102, a. 2. On adoration considered *historically*, see Beurlier, *Adoration: DTC* 1,437-442. On adoration in Holy Scripture, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,202f.

3. See Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.1 n.2. St. Thomas rightly remarks (II-II, q. 102, a. 2 ad 2) that this honor towards superiors does not necessarily supposed that they have authority over us, but that we owe them respect and honor "even if we are not subject to them."

connaturally accompanies the internal act.⁴

519. The material object and the formal object in adoration should be distinguished. The *material* object is *that which* is adored. It can be the *total material* object, which is the *whole* person, to whom the adoration ultimately directed, and the *partial material* object, which is something pertaining in some way (as a part or something else) to the person to be adored and therefore participating in the venerability of the person. The *total* material object can also be called primary, remote, ultimate; the *partial* material object can be said to be secondary, proximate. Adoration can be directed to the *total* material object in a partial manner only or implicitly and in a less direct manner; adoration is directed to the *partial* material object explicitly and directly.

The *formal* object or the “cause of honor” is the *reason because of which* the adoration is offered. There can be a *primary* formal object, which is the *excellence of the person himself*, and a *secondary* formal object, which is some *special excellence* because of which some *partial* material object is explicitly adored. This distinction has great importance for the following thesis.⁵

520. Adoration or worship is divided by reason of excellence into the adoration of *latria*, which is owed to *divine* excellence, and the adoration of *dulia*, which is owed to *created excellence*. This created excellence is communicated by the excellence of God to some creatures not according to equality, but according to a certain participation. This adoration of *dulia* is owed to the Mother of God in a more eminent way and so it is called *hyperdulia*.⁶

By reason of the connection between the material object that is adored and the formal object because of which that material object is adored, worship is divided into *absolute*, when the material object is adored *for its own sake* or because of the excellence of its *own suppositum*, and into *relative*, when the material object is adored *because of the connection* it has with the excellence of some other thing or of *another suppositum*.⁷

4. See S.Th. II-II, q. 81, a. 7; q. 84, a. 2f.; Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.1 n.5-10. For more, see *ibid.*, n.11-25. Briefly, Muncunill, n.1186. On the *external and internal* element of worship, see Pius XII, *Encycl. “Mediator Dei”*: AAS 39 (1947) 530-532.

5. The question about the distinction between a formal object *which (quod)* and a formal object *by which (quo)*, or the question why adoration pertains to the *moral* virtue of religion and not to the *theological* virtues will be explained in the treatise on the virtues.

6. See S.Th. II-II, q. 84, a. 1 c; III, q. 25, a. 5 c. In what sense *dulia* is offered to God, see II-II, q. 103, a. 3 ad 1; III, q. 25, a. 2 c. See P. Séjourné, *Saints (Culte des)*: DTC 14,961.

7. See S.Th. III, q. 25, a. 3f.6.

521. *The human nature of Christ.* In this thesis *it is supposed* against the Nestorians that *Christ the man* or *Christ as man* in a reduplicating way *in the less proper specifying way* we explained above in thesis 19 (n. 492-494), must be adored with the absolute worship of *latria*. For the person of the Word does not cease to be adorable with this worship of *latria* because he is explicitly considered as subsisting in and with a human nature. There could be a question about *Christ as man*, by reduplicating the humanity *in the proper specifying sense* that the logicians talk about (see above, n. 493), that is, in such a way that the humanity is the *formal reason* according to which the predicate “adoration” pertains to the subject, that is, to the person of Christ.

522. Actually however in this thesis it is not the person that is considered *directly*, but the human nature itself of Christ; but it is not considered as *separated* from the Word (which hypothesis we will consider below in scholium 2, n. 540), but according as it is *really* present in Christ, namely, as hypostatically united with the Word. St. Thomas proposes the question in this way and rightly so.

For if the human *nature* of Christ is adorable with the worship of *latria*, a fortiori that will hold for the *person* of Christ considered according to his humanity, or for *Christ as man* in the proper specifying sense. On the other hand, adoration has this characteristic that it can terminate *directly* not in the integral *person* alone (the *total* material object), but also in *some thing* pertaining in some way to the person (the *partial* material object), as we explained above in n. 509. However that does not hold for the predicates “natural son” or “king,” since they are predicates of the *suppositum*. Therefore in these theses we cannot speak about the humanity of Christ, but about *Christ the man* or about *Christ as man*. On the contrary, in the thesis on the holiness of Christ (above, thesis 12) we were speaking, as we are now, about *the humanity of Christ*.

523. *And each of his parts hypostatically united to the Word.* Although in the thesis we are treating the *absolute* worship of *latria*, we are considering only those parts of the humanity of Christ that are united to the Word not only in the hypostasis but also *according to the hypostasis*; what they are was explained above in thesis 7, scholium 5-8, n. 139-143.

With one and the same absolute worship of latria by which the divinity of Christ is adored. By the words *absolute worship* is indicated the reason *because of which* the humanity of Christ is adored, that is, *excellence of his own suppositum*.

524. We add *with one and the same worship of latria by which the divinity of Christ is adored* in order to signify that the same adoration of *latria*, whose *total* object is the incarnate Word, has for its *partial* terminus or purpose the human nature, inasmuch as this pertains to the Word.

We will consider in scholium 1 (below, n. 538f.) the further twofold question, namely, whether adoration of the *humanity* of Christ, even though it is truly and *univocally* the adoration of *latria*, is *less perfect* than the adoration of *latria* by which the *divinity* of Christ is adored; and whether *beside* this identical adoration of *latria* which we propose in the thesis, the humanity of Christ must be adored *also with another* adoration of *latria*, which must be said to be an *inferior* form of *latria*.

525. Adversaries. *Many early theologians* are directly opposed to the thesis; they say that the adoration of *latria* must be offered to God *alone*, but not to the *humanity* of Christ which is something created.⁸

526. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Constantinople II:* “If anyone... does not adore with one adoration God the incarnate Word with his own flesh, which was handed on from the beginning of the Church of God, let him be anathema” (D 431). Although these words seem to say that the flesh of Christ must be adored by one adoration with the Word, nevertheless *historically* they refer to the error of Monophysitism which said that the divinity makes along with the flesh only *one substance* (μίαν φύσιν ἡγουν οὐσίαν).⁹ Therefore the historical sense seems to be what we do not intend to prove in the thesis but rather just *suppose*, and according to which, above in n. 521, we said that the expression “Christ as man” reduplicates the humanity *in a specifying less proper sense*.

However this doctrine of the Council is very important for our thesis, since the Council for the unity or diversity of adoration is not looking at the natures in Christ but the person. Therefore the principle is proposed by the Council from which we deduce our thesis, namely, the object that is adored is the person.¹⁰

527. The Council of Trent: “There remains, therefore, no room for doubting that all the faithful of Christ... must venerate this most holy sacrament with the worship of *latria* that is due to the true God” (D 1643). The sacrament of the Eucharist, according to Trent, is not simply Christ, because Christ is contained in this sacrament (D 1636, 1651,

8. See Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.2 n.46; Muncunill, n. 1195; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*..., 2nd part, 2,132-169. Very correctly Landgraf says that the worship of *dulia*, which these authors advocate for the humanity of Christ, *in no way* leads to Nestorianism in their way of thinking. For that we consider *the person alone* as the material object of adoration, either of *latria* or of *dulia*, is the fruit of theological progress (*loc.cit.*, 168f.).

9. See Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes*... 3, 148.

10. Because they did not know this principle and the church documents in which the principle is expressed, these early theologians erred and so we have placed them among our adversaries. See Landgraf, *op.cit.*, 168f. On the *Encycl.* “*Haurietis aquas*,” see below, n. 529.

1653) and the real species pertain to this sacrament, as is demonstrated in great detail in the treatise on the Eucharist. Therefore the worship of latria, which is due to God, must be given to the sacrament itself.

It is certainly true that both what immediately follows and the corresponding canon six (D 1656) deal directly with worship of latria that must be given to Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in the discussions of the theologians and Fathers at the Council of Trent adoration almost always is understood to be directly about Christ.¹¹ Nevertheless our argument remains solid, because the Fathers would not have spoken thus in the words given in chapter 5 (D 1643), unless they were persuaded that the adoration of latria due to the person of Christ also included those things that are united with the person of Christ, which in this case is true about the sacrament containing Christ.

However since the sacrament, as containing Christ and being distinct from Christ, must be adored not with absolute worship but only with *relative* worship,¹² for our thesis this argument from Trent has *indirect* value, inasmuch as it contains the principle from which we can argue, namely, to give the worship of *latria* both to the person of Christ *and* to those things that are *joined* together with this person. Therefore a fortiori it must be given to the humanity of Christ, to whom moreover *absolute* worship is due because of the *identity of the suppositum*.

528. Pius VI against the errors of the Synod of Pistoia (D 2661). Hence it is certain that: “the adoration—by which the humanity and the living flesh of Christ is adored... [is] one and the same adoration by which the Word incarnate together with his own flesh is adored.” Therefore not only is our thesis affirmed concerning the *whole* humanity, but also concerning a *part* of it, namely his flesh.

529. Theological note. Our thesis is a *common and certain opinion in theology*. The contrary is called “false” by Pius VI (D 2661). The great variety in the theological note of this thesis among theologians derives from the different status of the question, that is, many under the word “humanity” understand Christ *the man* in the less proper specifying sense that we explained above in n. 521.^{12a}

11. See CTr t.5 869ff; A. Theiner, *Acta genuina SS. Oecumenici Concilii Tridentini...* 1,488-527. Even recent studies do not give a better explanation of the distinction between the worship due to *Christ* and the worship that is due to the *sacrament*: see A. Duval, O.P., *Le Concile de Trent et le culte eucharistique* (Extractum ex libro Memoriali: *Studia Eucharistica DCC anni a condito festo Sanctissimi Corporis Christi 1246-1946*) (Antwerp 1946) 401f.

12. Which is also clear from some of the statements of the Fathers at Trent. See Theiner, *op. cit.*, 1,506 (Castellimaris), 507 (Misiensis), 509 (Salonensis) etc.

12a The *Encyclical Haurietis aquas* says: “This concerns a truth that must be retained by the Catholic faith, since it was already solemnly proclaimed in the ecumenical Councils of Ephesus and Constantinople II”: AAS 48 (1956) 316. It seems that the Encyclical must be understood as being about that *fundamental* aspect against the Nestorians and the monophysites, which is something that *we suppose*.

530. Proof from Holy Scripture. This argument can be made from the fact that many texts that express the adoration of *latria* of *this man Christ* or *Christ the man* (see above, n. 521) clearly indicate that adoration in the order of execution is proximately concerned with the humanity itself, although the divine person primarily and essentially is adored.¹³

531. Proof from tradition. 1) The Fathers affirm the *principle* from which we deduce our thesis (see above, n. 526), against the *Nestorians and other heretics*. St. Athanasius: “And we do not divide the body, being such, from the Word, and worship it by itself, nor when we wish to worship the Word, do we set Him far apart from the Flesh...” (R 795). See R 762. St. Cyril of Alexandria: “The Word of God... was always adored as God, and how he receives adoration as man” (R 2071). Therefore these Father say that the adoration of the Word as such has not been changed by the fact that the Word is adored in the flesh. Thus they advance the principle that the object that is adored is the *person*.

2) The Fathers *expressly* say that the *humanity* of Christ must be adored. St. Ambrose: “By footstool is understood earth, by the earth the flesh of Christ, which we this day also adore in the mysteries, and which the apostles adored in the Lord Jesus” (R 1285). St. Augustine develops the same idea. St. John Damascene: “And not holding that the flesh is not suited for worship: for in fact it is worshipped in the one subsistence of the Word, which indeed became subsistence for it...” (R 2363). In the context it is apparent that these Fathers do not propose a different adoration of the flesh and the Word but *one and the same*.¹⁴

532. Theological reasoning. Honor or worship is shown to a *person* or to a *whole subsisting thing*, for we do not say that the hand of a man is honored but that the *man* is honored. Indeed, in Christ there is only *one person* of a divine and human nature. Therefore both in the divinity and the humanity the same whole person of Christ is adored, and consequently the divinity and humanity of Christ are adored not with different but *with one and the same* adoration. But if many persons were placed in Christ, there would simply be many adorations.

It is certain that this adoration of the humanity is the adoration of *latria*, because the adoration of the humanity is the adoration of *the whole person*

13. On these texts of Holy Scripture, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,203-211.

14. On St. Cyril, see Du Manoir Juaye, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 136. On St. Ambrose, see Drzenick, *Doctrina S. Ambrosii de Christo...* 36f. The text of St. Augustine will be found in *Enarrat. In Psalmos, in Ps 98 v.5: ML 37.1264*. See Mohan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustin...* 34-36. For other texts from the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.15 c.3 n.7-14.

of Christ, from what we have said above. Also, this person of Christ is the incarnate Word of God, to whom the adoration of *latria* is due; therefore also the adoration of Christ's humanity is the *worship of latria*.¹⁵

This worship is *absolute*, because it is offered to the humanity of Christ because of the excellence of *his own* suppositum.

The same reasons hold true not only for the *whole* humanity of Christ but also for *any part* of his humanity.

533. Objections. 1. The *divinity* of Christ must be adored with an adoration *common* to the Father and the Son. But the *humanity* of Christ is not common to him and to the Father. Therefore the humanity of Christ and his divinity must not be adored *with the same adoration*.

1) I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The humanity of Christ is not common to him and to the Father, but he subsists in such a way that the one person of Christ communicates in divinity with the Father, conceded; otherwise, denied. I distinguish the consequent. The humanity of Christ and his divinity must not be adored with the same adoration, if the one person of Christ does not share in the divinity with the Father, conceded; if it shares, denied.

2) I distinguish the major. The divinity of Christ is to be adored with adoration numerically the same as the adoration of the divinity of the Father, by reason of the cause of the honor, which is the divine nature, conceded; by reason of the adored person, denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent. The humanity of Christ and his divinity are not to be adored with the same adoration, if the numerical identity of the adoration is sought from the part of the cause of adoration, denied; if it is sought from the part of the adored person, conceded.

In the Trinity there are three persons who are adored, but there is one cause of the honor, namely, the divinity. In the incarnation, on the contrary, there is one person who is adored, but there are several causes of adoration, according as the person is adored because of the divinity or because of the humanity perfected by every type of grace (S.Th. III, q. 25, a.1f.). Our thesis considers adoration from the part of the one who is adored. We will say a few things in the scholiums about the different forms of adoration on the part of the cause of the honor.

534. 2. The worship of *latria* is not due to any created thing. But Christ's humanity is a created thing. Therefore the worship of *latria* is not due to Christ's humanity.

I distinguish the major. The worship of *latria* is not due to any created thing by reason of itself alone, conceded; by reason of the divine person for whom that created thing is his own, denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.

535. A sacrifice is an act of the worship of *latria*. But sacrifice cannot be offered to the humanity of Christ. Ergo the humanity of Christ is not adored with one and the same

15. On this theological reason taken from St. Thomas, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...* 314-317.

worship of latria as the divinity of Christ.

1) I concede the major and distinguish the minor. A sacrifice cannot be offered to the humanity of Christ by reason of the imperfect adoration of latria that would be due to it, denied.; by reason of an extrinsic impediment, I bypass the minor. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.

That sacrifice perhaps could not be offered to the humanity of Christ does not come from the fact that this humanity, considered as determined by the person of the Word, is unworthy or incapable of an act of worship of this kind,¹⁶ but it come from the fact that this one sacrifice of the N.T. is de facto the Eucharist, and Christ the man as the principal priest offers this sacrifice. Hence for other theologians the necessary otherness seems to be lacking which must intercede between the one offering the sacrifice and the one who whom it is offered. But other theologians more correctly, in our opinion, believe that also in this case that sufficient otherness is given. For Christ offers sacrifice through his humanity as through the formal principal (principium quo) of the act, but Christ receives the sacrifice in his humanity by redundancy in it of the adoration by which the incarnate Word is worshipped. These points will be made clearer from the next solution to this difficulty.¹⁷

536. 2) I distinguish the major. Sacrifice is an act of the worship of latria different from the other acts of this worship regarding the nature of perfect latria, denied; different regarding the special determination, conceded. I distinguish the minor in the same way. Sacrifice cannot be offered to the humanity of Christ, because the nature of an act of perfect latria is in conflict with the worship due to the humanity, denied; because the special determination of this act of sacrifice excludes this, I bypass the minor.

We do not see a difficulty in the fact that in the presence of Christ's humanity, v.gr., we genuflect, although this is also worship of latria. But to us it seems improper to offer sacrifice to this humanity. The difference seems to reside in the fact that a genuflection is also customarily made before inanimate objects, v.gr., the wood of the holy cross; but a sacrifice is offered directly and explicitly to a divine person alone. In this sense not even the divine nature of Christ can receive a sacrifice, but only his person. Hence it is now clear that the reason why sacrifice is not offered to the humanity of Christ is not some inferiority in it, but the special way in which a sacrifice is directed to the person, but not to the nature.

But if a sacrifice were offered to Christ, there is no repugnance in the fact that an honor of this kind is communicated to his humanity, or redounds in it, because the humanity constitutes one reality with the person of Christ.

537. 4. The divinity of Christ must be loved with the greatest love. But the humanity of Christ must not be loved above all things. Therefore the humanity of Christ must not be adored with the same worship of latria as the divinity of Christ.

16. Vázquez however denies that the humanity of Christ is in any way a partaker of the sacrifice: *In 3 d.96 c.8 n.61f.*

17. See Muncunill, n.1203; Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.2 n.50f.

1) I concede the major and bypass the minor. I deny the consequent and the consequence, until it is proved. Not all theologians admit this consequence between the reason for love and the reason for adoration regarding the humanity of Christ.¹⁸

2) I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The humanity of Christ must not be loved above all things, if by love we understand the affection by which we wish the greatest good to the humanity, and had not only through the substantial union but through its essence, conceded; if by love we understand the affection by which we wish this greatest good for the person of Christ, subdistinguish: it is not the same love that is directed to Christ's divinity and to Christ's humanity, denied; it is not directed in the same way, conceded. I distinguish the consequent. The humanity of Christ must not be adored with the same worship of latria as the divinity of Christ, if the affection of adoration of latria is directed to the divine excellence had not only by the substantial union but by the essence, conceded; if the affection of adoration of latria is directed to the divine excellence of the person, I subdistinguish: it is not the same worship of latria, denied; it is not directed in the same way, conceded.

In both cases the divinity is loved or adored because of itself, but the humanity because of the divinity. In this sense, love and adoration are not directed in the same way to the divinity and to the humanity. However the divinity is not some thing foreign to Christ's humanity, but the humanity truly is a part of the divine suppositum of the Word.

538. Scholium 1. On the less perfect adoration of latria for the humanity of Christ than for his divinity. There were not lacking theologians who distinguished a twofold adoration in the univocal adoration of latria—one superior, based on the divine excellence in itself, which they say must not be attributed to the humanity, the other inferior, based indeed on the divine excellence but as joined to the humanity and sanctifying it, by which this humanity is adored because of the divinity united with it. However since both of these adorations are based on the divine excellence, they must be called univocally the adoration of latria.

This opinion does not seem to be in agreement with the arguments presented in our thesis, inasmuch as it excludes that the same superior adoration of latria overflows into the humanity. For the fundamental principle in this matter is that the person be honored both in his divine and in his human nature (see above, n. 532). Therefore also in the human nature the divine excellence is adored in itself, or in other words, the superior worship of latria, which belongs to the person, overflows into the humanity, which is a part of the whole suppositum of Christ.¹⁹

539. There would be another question if, beside this identical superior adoration of latria, also some other adoration were admitted regarding the humanity, namely, because of the dignity and excellence which Christ's humanity has because of the union. Suarez thinks that the humanity of Christ considered in this way must indeed be adored

18. Thus, v.gr., recently: Galtier, n. 294 (see against this argument, Muncunill, n.1200); for a different reason, Pesch, n. 203f.

19. See Suarez, d.53 s.3 n.3; Salmanticenses, d.35 dub.2 n.29f.

with the adoration of latria, not however with a perfect but with an inferior latria.

This opinion seems to be proposed in a less reasonable manner, because the dignity which the humanity has from the union seems to be nothing else than the dignity of the Word communicated to the humanity, so that the Word is the formal reason and the union is the condition for adoration. Hence this adoration coincides with that superior adoration of latria of the humanity which we established above in n. 538.²⁰

This will be better understood if one recalls that this excellence or dignity coming to the humanity in virtue of the union with the Word, is really the substantial ontological holiness which, above in thesis 2, n. 238, 252-255, we proved to be the same ontological holiness of the Word.

540. Scholium 2. On the adoration of hyperdulia concerning the humanity of Christ. This question makes sense if the humanity of Christ is considered not actually separated from the Word, but as abstracted from the Word. In other words, if the humanity of Christ is considered with an abstracting precision, which does not deny the determination of the humanity by the Word, but rather attends only to the perfection of the humanity both from itself and from the gifts with which it is affected.

In this way the humanity is rightly said by St. Thomas (q. 25, a. 2 ad 1) to be adored with a more excellent dulia, which they call hyperdulia.

Although theologians commonly concede that in this way the humanity of Christ could be adored in an abstract way, and also that adoration of this kind is good and licit, at the same time they point out that the Church does not use it in her public worship. For, as Cajetan says (at this place in the Summa), the Church keeps in mind but not in her use the adoration due to Christ by reason of his human nature. This could have its origin either from concern that the error of Nestorius in this way is better excluded or because of the lack of common consent among theologians concerning the possibility or licitness of this adoration.²¹

Therefore the principle for distinguishing, according to what has been said, when Christ's humanity should be adored with the worship of latria and the highest form, but when it should be adored with hyperdulia alone is the following: if the humanity is adored because of the perfection which the humanity has from the Word formally, such adoration is latria; but if it is adored because of the perfection which it has from the Word in an efficient way or as its cause, such adoration is hyperdulia. In other words, if that perfection of the humanity is uncreated, the adoration will be latria and the highest form of it; but if that perfection is created, the adoration will be hyperdulia.

20. Suarez, *ibid.*, n. 7f. See Salmanticenses, *ibid.*, n. 38-40.

21. Even many recent authors strongly deny the licitness of this worship of *hyperdulia*: see, v.gr., Franzelin, th. 45 corol. 1 and 2; Pesch, n. 199-202; Pohle-Gierens, 160-162.

Thesis 21. Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus must be said to be both an excellent form of worship of the humanity of Christ and a summary of the whole Christian religion.

Lercher¹ th.32 n.245-254; E. Agostini, S.C.J., *Il Cuore di Gesù. Storia-Teologia-Pratiche-Promesse* (Bologna 1950); V. Carbone, *Teologia del S. Cuore di Gesù* (Rome 1953); J. Stierli, *Cor Salvatoris. Wege zur Herz Jesu-Verehrung* (Freiburg i.Br. 1954).

541. Definition of terms. *Devotion in general* is “the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God” (II-II, q. 82, a. 1 c). It can be considered as an *act* and so “it is the principal act of religion” (II-II, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1) or as a *habit* or permanent disposition of soul for prompt service of God. *Devotion in the broad sense* concerns *the whole service of God*, but *devotion in the strict sense* concerns *the worship* that must be shown to God.¹

The complex of acts that is ordained to the service of God so that they *immediately* look at some *special* object of worship is called a *particular* devotion. Thus in the adoration of Christ adoration can tend directly to a *partial* material object, like the humanity of Christ, the wounds of Christ, the heart of Christ (see above, thesis 20, n. 519).

In the thesis we are considering a *particular* devotion, both *in the broad sense* and *in the strict sense*, as we will point out in the proper places.

542. Heart. This word in a more limited way designates the *physical* or *corporeal* heart, that is, the fleshly muscle surrounded and penetrated with many nerves. Within the breast it beats automatically and is the center for the circulation of blood.

However by a *wider* and more proper meaning the word “heart” designates *the whole subject of the interior life* of man with its thoughts and emotions. Therefore it means above all the soul with its twofold appetitive power and with its intellect. This broader meaning is called *proper*, seeing that the *corporeal* heart is also contained in it as the center of the interior life, at least as the men of that time imagined it, or as an organ manifesting

1. There is more on this in I. de Guibert, S.J., *Theologia spiritualis ascetica et mystica*² (Rome 1939) n.272; O. Zimmermann, S.J., *Lehrbuch der Aszetik* (Freiburg i.Br. 1929) 322 ad 1; E. Dublanchy, *Dévotion*: DTC 3,680-685.

the interior life.²

The *metaphorical* meaning designates something completely *other* than the same word in the proper sense; however it is used in this sense because of the *similarity*. This meaning also occurs, for example, in Matt. 12:40.

543. *The Sacred Heart of Jesus.* Since in this thesis we are dealing with devotion to the Heart of Jesus as proposed and recommended by the Church, the authentic documents of the Church must be taken into account.³ The private revelations of St. Margaret Mary Alacoque (1673-1675) “did not add anything new to Catholic doctrine. But their importance lies in the fact that Christ the Lord—by showing his Sacred Heart—in an extraordinary and singular way willed to invite the minds of men to contemplate and worship the mystery of the merciful love of God for the human race.” Rightly therefore St. Margaret Mary is called the indefatigable promoter and herald of this worship.”⁴

Therefore the expression “Heart of Jesus” seems to be accepted by the Church *in this broader* but *proper* meaning, so that among the emotions of the interior life the *love* of Christ has a *special* place—and indeed it is a love that is *despised* by men.

That the *fleshly heart* itself is necessarily included does not require any demonstration. It is clear from the litany of the Sacred Heart that the whole

2. See Donat, *Psychologia*⁸ n.398-405; A. Guillaumont, *Les sens des noms du coeur dans l'antiquité*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 41-81; A. Lefèvre, *Cor. 1. Usage biblique*: DSpir 2,2278-2281; A. Guillaumont, *Cor. 2. Le “coeur” chez les spirituels grecs à l'époque ancienne*: *ibid.*, 2281-2288; J. Chatillon, *Cor. 3. Cordis affectus au moyen âge*: *ibid.*, 2288-2300; L. Cognet, *Cor. 4. Le coeur chez les spirituels du XVII^e siècle*: *ibid.*, 2300-2307. See J. Doresse, *Le coeur et les anciens égyptiens*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 82-87; Adidevananda, *La notion du coeur dans la vie spirituelle de l'Inde*: *ibid.*, 88-95; L. Massignon, *Le “coeur” (al-galb) dans la prière et la méditation musulmanes*: *ibid.*, 96-102; J. Lhermite, *Le coeur dans ses rapports avec les états affectifs*: *ibid.*, 17-33; F. Dolto, *Le coeur, expression symbolique de la vie affective*: *ibid.*, 34-38; W. Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur*⁴ (Berlin 1952) 731-733; A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens* (Strasbourg 1954) 223.
3. What these principal documents are will be found in N. Nilles, S.J., *De rationibus festorum Sacratissimi Cordis Jesus...*⁵ (Innsbruck 1885). Regarding later documents, see H.I. Nix, S.J., *Cultus SS. Cordis Iesu...*³ (Freibourg i.Br. 1905) 34-36. On the litany of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (for whose history and meaning, see A. Vermeersch, S.J., *Pratique et doctrine de la dévotion au Sacré-coeur...*⁷ [Turin 1930] 2, c.2), see in: *Enchiridion indulgentiarum. Preces et pia opera... indulgentiis ditata et opportune recognita* (Typis polyglottis Vaticanis 1950) n.245. On other invocations and hymns, see *ibid.*, n.223-267. Other documents of the Holy See of greater importance are: Pius XI, Encyclical “Miserentissimus”: AAS 20 (1928) 165-179, and the Encyclical “*Caritate Christi*”: AAS 24 (1932) 177-194; Pius XII, Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*”: AAS 48 (1956) 339-353.
4. 9-353. For the *history* of this devotion, see A. Hamon, S.J., *Coeur (Sacré)*: DSpir 2,1026-1042. Very briefly, C. Richstaetter, *Herz Jesu*: LTK 4,1011-1015. More fully, P. Debongnie, C.S.S.R., *Commencement et recommandements de la dévotion au Coeur de Jésus*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 147-192; J. Stierli, *Die Herz-Jesu-Verehrung vom Ausgang der Väterzeit bis zur hl. Margareta M. Alacoque: Cor Salvatoris 73-136*; *Id.*, *Die Entfaltung der kirchlichen Herz-Jesu-Verehrung in der Neuzeit*: *op.cit.*, 137-165; A. Sanz, *El Corazón de Jesús. Estudio de sus primeras representaciones iconográficas*: MiscCom 19 (1953) 131-164 (J. Calveras, S.J., wrote about this matter in his article: *El simbolismo en el Corazón de Jesús como objeto de culto*: Manr 22 (1950) 32-39).

interior life of man especially—but not exclusively—his appetitive life, is designated by the term “Heart of Jesus”: “Heart of Jesus, abode of justice and love,” “Heart of Jesus, abyss of all virtues,” “Heart of Jesus, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” “Heart of Jesus, obedient unto death,”⁵ and in the Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*” it is developed extensively.

544. Nevertheless *love* is emphasized in a *special* way: “O God, who in the Heart of thy Son, wounded by our sins, dost mercifully vouchsafe to bestow upon us the infinite wealth of thy love” (Roman Missal, prayer for the feast of the Sacred Heart). “... the love of God has been proposed to be honored with a special worship... by the form of devotion wherein devotion is given to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus.”⁶ The entire Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*” is dedicated to extolling this aspect of love: “Since this is true, we readily understand that devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is essentially devotion to the love with which God loved us...”^{6a} Moreover it is very clear already from the most ancient authentic documents.

This love is considered as *despised*. It will suffice to quote the recent, solemn words of Pius XI: “But to all these duties... something else must be added... we mean that duty of honorable satisfaction or reparation which must be rendered to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus... And truly the spirit of expiation or reparation has always had the first and foremost place in the worship given to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, and nothing is more in keeping with the origin, the character, the power, and the distinctive practices of this form of devotion, as appears from the record of history and custom, as well as from the sacred liturgy and the acts of the Sovereign Pontiffs.”⁷ And Pius XII, according to whom this devotion contains “outstanding properties of love *and* satisfaction”: he also says that the “primary reasons” of this devotion are “acts of love *and* satisfaction.”^{7a}

Some differences among the authors in determining the immediate object of this devotion will be explained below in scholium 1, n. 565f.

545. *The entire person* of Jesus Christ is certainly touched by the devotion to his Sacred Heart; indeed, this devotion is directed *ultimately* to him as to its *total* or primary material object. But often *explicitly and directly* it is not the entire person that is worshipped but the heart (see above,

5. *Enchiridion indulgentiarum* n.245; AAS 48 (1956) 324,327, 329-331.

6. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus*”: AAS 20 (1928) 166.

6a AAS 48 (1956) 345.

7. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus*”: AAS 20 (1928) 169-172. For other documents, see Lercher, p. 252f. On the “consecration” that stands out, among the other things that pertain to this devotion, see “*Miserentissimus*,” *op. cit.*, 167f.

7a Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*”: AAS 48 (1956) 339-342.

n. 519). However the way of speaking varies, so that also by the name “Heart of Jesus” *the person of Christ* along with his heart is designated *directly*. Therefore it includes everything that the images of the Heart of Jesus usually portray and should proclaim in the *public* devotion.⁸

This way of thinking and speaking has increased more and more in the documents of the Church, although not exclusively. “The Heart of Jesus,” therefore, often has a *directly personal* meaning, but always in such a way that the person of Christ is signified under the aspect of his “Heart,” that is, of his own interior life and especially of his despised love. In a similar way, the “Immaculate Conception” initially designated only an outstanding quality of the Blessed Virgin, but gradually it came about that now it signifies the *person* of Mary adorned with this quality.⁹

546. *An excellent form of the worship of the humanity of Christ.* Regarding this assertion, the word “devotion” is taken *in the more strict sense* (see above, n. 541). It is not a question of the *licitness* of worship of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which is very clear from the preceding thesis and from the recommendations of the Church already cited in this thesis.

The *excellence* of the worship given to some *part* of the humanity of Christ must be judged from the *secondary formal object* of the devotion or *from the special reason* because of which that part is adored directly (see above, thesis 20, n. 519).

A summary of the whole Christian religion. “Devotion” is used here *in the wider sense* according as it concerns the *integral service of God*. We affirm in the thesis that to look upon the Sacred Heart of Jesus as the *immediate* object in reference not only to the worship due to God but to the *integral* service that should be given to God is the summary, that is, the compendium of the whole Christian religion. In what sense that should be taken will become clear immediately from the proofs.

Among the *specific acts* of devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus “a special place must be given to that Consecration, whereby we devote

8. See Nix, *Cultus SS. Cordis...* 136.

9. See J. Solano, S.J., *La expresión “Corazón de Jesús” en los documentos pontificios*: Manr 27 (1955) 291-310; J. Galot, S.J., *Quel est l’objet de la dévotion au Sacré-Coeur?*: NouvRevTh 77 (1955) 924-938. In the Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*,” which insists very much on the physical heart of Jesus and as a sign and symbol of the love of Christ, at the end we read: “...may this year’s celebration increase from day to day the love of the faithful for the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus. And may his Kingdom, a kingdom “of truth and life, a kingdom of holiness and grace, a kingdom of justice, love and peace,” be extended further to all in the whole world...” (AAS 48 [1956] 353). A kingdom belongs only to a *person*; de facto, these words are read in the Preface for the Mass of Christ the King. This meaning is frequent in the writings of St. Margaret Mary; v.gr., *Avis particuliers* 24 (Gauthey, *Vie et oeuvres de la bienheureuse Marguerite-Marie Alacoque* 2 [Paris 1915] 672f.); *Lettres* 136, 7^e du ms. D’Avignon (Gauthey, *op.cit.*, 602). On this aspect in St. Margaret Mary, see the article by J. Décreau written in AmCl 9, June 1949, 353-364.

ourselves and all things that are ours to the Divine Heart of Jesus.”¹⁰ To this must be added the satisfaction or *reparation* that must be offered to the Sacred Heart (see above, n. 544).¹¹

547. Adversaries. A very singular providence is apparent in the special historical manifestation of this devotion, seeing that “when the Jansenist heresy, the most crafty of them all, hostile to love and piety towards God, was creeping in and preaching that God was not to be loved as a father but rather to be feared as an implacable judge; then the most benign Jesus showed his own most Sacred Heart to the nations lifted up as a standard of peace and charity portending no doubtful victory in the combat.”¹²

Beside this *objective* doctrinal opposition it should be noted that the Jansenists often, beginning in 1730, attacked the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus; before that time the Jansenists at Port-Royal did not actually practice this devotion in the proper sense, but in their Christology they not rarely make use of the symbolism of the Sacred Heart.¹³

After Pius XII said that the Church must defend with all her might the devotion to the Sacred Heart “against the attacks of Naturalism and Sentimentalism,” he then added: “it is very much to be regretted that, in the past and in our own time, this noble devotion is not held in the same state of honor and esteem among some Christians, and sometimes even among those who claim that they are dedicated to the study of the Catholic religion and to acquiring holiness.”^{13a}

548. Doctrine of the Church. A. The excellence of this worship of the humanity of Christ. That the worship of the Heart of Jesus is the worship of the humanity of Christ is clearly established in the documents of the Church from the condemnation of error 63 of the Synod of Pistoia (D 2663). But the excellence of this form of worship could hardly be more highly recommended. Let it suffice to recall that this feast was raised to a double of the first class. Moreover, it was declared a primary feast and for it an office and its own Mass have been prescribed.¹⁴

10. Pius XI, Encyclical “*Miserentissimus*”: AAS 20 (1926) 167.

11. On other particular exercises of devotion approved the Holy See, see *Enchiridion indulgentiarum* n. 248-255.

12. Pius XI, Encyclical “*Miserentissimus*”: AAS 20 (1928) 166f.

13. See L. Cognet, *Les Jansénistes et le Sacré-Coeur*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 234-253. This article is completed by J. Nouwens, M.S.C., *Le Sacré-Coeur et le Jansénisme...*: AnalGreg 71 (1954) 59-72. On Jansenism itself, see R. García Villoslada, S.J., in *Historia de la Iglesia católica* t.4 (B.A.C., Madrid 1951) p.1 c.6 p.200-287.

13a Encyclical “*Haaurietis aquas*”: AAS 48 (1956) 311.

14. See AAS 20 (1928) 177; 21 (1929) 44-47. See J. Pauwels, S.J., *L'évêlation du rite de la fête du Sacré-Coeur*: NouvRevTh 56 (1929) 412-419.

B. A *summary* of the whole Christian religion. Pius XI: “And here today another most auspicious and most divine sign is offered to our sight, to wit the most Sacred Heart of Jesus, with a cross set above it shining with most splendid brightness in the midst of flames... For is not the sum of all religion and the form of all religion and therefore the pattern of more life, contained in that most auspicious sign and in the form of piety that follows from it inasmuch as it more readily leads the minds of men to an intimate knowledge of Christ the Lord, and more efficaciously moves their hearts to love him more vehemently and to imitate him more closely?”¹⁵

Pius XII, after he had made these words his own about the “sum of religion” at the beginning of his Encyclical “*Haurietis aquas*,” says this: “...so much is to be attributed to the devotion to the Sacred heart that it should be considered the absolute profession of the Christian faith, if you consider its use and practice.” And near the end, repeating the image used by Leo XIII and Pius XI, he concludes: “It is Our most ardent desire that all who glory in the name of Christian and who zealously strive to establish the Kingdom of Christ on earth, consider devotion to the Heart of Jesus as the standard and the source of unity, salvation and peace.”^{15a}

Theological note. In both parts our thesis is *Catholic doctrine*.

549. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. *Concerning the excellence of the devotion.*

1) Very frequently both in the O.T and in the N.T. there is mention of the “heart” so that the interior part of man may be designated both in the order of nature and in the order of grace. Therefore the heart signifies that which has maximum worth in man.¹⁶ This already fully suffices in order that, applying this to Christ, we may dedicate a *special worship* of his Heart, based on the supposition of the liceity of divine worship being given to the humanity of Christ, as this was explained in the preceding thesis.

550. 2) Moreover Holy Scripture itself speaks *directly about the Heart of Christ*, giving it this more ample and proper signification (see above, n. 542).

Old Testament. The intimate feelings of the Messiah precisely under the aspect of his “Heart” are mentioned by the prophets and it is described

15. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus*”: AAS 20 (1928) 167. See the Encyclical “*Summi pontificatus*”: AAS 31 (1939) 415. See J. Solano, S.J., *La devoción al Sagrado Corazón de Jesús según las Encíclicas Pontificias* (Bilbao 1950).

15a AAS 48 (1956) 313.344.350f.

16. See Guillaumont, *Les sens... du coeur dans l'antiquité*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 42-51, 63-67; H. Rahner, *Gedanken zur biblischen Begründung der Herz-Jesu-Verehrung: Cor Salvatoris* 19-25.

as fully submissive to the Father, offered in sacrifice, bruised, triumphant and distributing gifts of grace.

a) Ps. 40:9: ... *I delight to do thy will, O my God; thy law is within my heart.* In Hebrew the word here is מערה (viscera); the LXX translates it: κοιλίας; but the excellent codex B (i.e., Vatican gr. 1209) has in this place: καρδιάς. But in order to signify the interior part of man the words κοιλία and καρδία in the LXX are often synonyms. *Because of the influence of the Hebrew text* they are used interchangeably; our text here can be a good example of this, since in it this sense without doubt is had which is usually expressed with one word or the other. Rightly therefore the Vulgate uses the word “cor” or heart.¹⁷ The *Messianism* of this text is certain from its use in Heb. 10:5-10.

At the entrance of Christ into the world his whole mission of doing the will of his Father is directly referred by the Psalmist to the *heart* of Christ.

551. b) Jer. 30:21: ... *I will make him draw near, and he shall approach me, for who would dare of himself to approach me? says the Lord.* The *messianic* meaning here is certain both from the unity of this chapter 30 with chapter 31, in which he speaks about the “new covenant” (see 31:31-34), and from the fact that the leader, who is spoken about in our text, is called “David” (30:9; Hos. 3:5; Ezek. 34:23f.; 37:24f.), and because that leader appears at the same time as priest and king. “to draw near,” “to approach” (גיש) (v. 21), has a *liturgical* meaning, so that it means to draw near for priestly ministry. “To apply his heart” seems to mean: to give his heart as a pledge (ערב), that is, to give his life. For both the context demands this meaning and לב (heart) in Jeremiah has the meaning of the vital principle (see 4:18 taken together with 4:10).¹⁸

The reference here is to the Messiah who, as a priest, offers his own life for the liberation of his people, almost in the sense in which Isa. 53:12 says: ... *he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he poured out his soul to death* (see below, n. 638) or also in the sense in which the Lord will say: *For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again* (John 10:17). Expressly, therefore, the priestly sacrifice of Christ (see below, thesis 28) is designated by his *heart*.

552. c) Ps. 22:15: *My heart is like wax, it is melted within my breast.* These two last words translate the Hebrew (מע); this indicates a close relationship between לב and מע; the second word is translated by the LXX with κοιλία, the first לב with καρδία. On the *messianism* of this Psalm,

17. See Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 3,786f. In particular concerning our text, see Guillaumont, *Les sens... du coeur dans l'antiquité*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 61 note 2; Rahner, *op.cit.*, 30-32.

18. See A. Condamin, S.J., *Le Livre de Jérémie* (Etudes bibliques, Paris 1920) 219f.; Rahner, *op.cit.*, 30-32.

quoted by Jesus as he was dying on the cross, see Matt. 27:46; at the death of Jesus v. 7f. is literally fulfilled from what St. Matthew reports in Matt. 27:41ff., about how the chief priests mocked the Lord. St. Justin accepts these words of Ps. 22:15 as a prophecy by which the agony in the Garden of Gethsemane was foretold.¹⁹

If at the same time what follows in this Psalm is considered: *The afflicted shall eat... may their hearts live forever* (v.26), in which the victory obtained by the Messiah is praised, it will be clearly apparent how Holy Scripture expressly mentions the anguish of the heart of Jesus when it speaks about our redemption by Christ and the gaining of life.

553. d) Ps. 69:20: *Insults have broken my heart, so that I am in despair. I looked for pity, but there was none; and for comforters, but I found none.* The Hebrew text without doubt has the word לב (heart), while the LXX reads: ψυχή, although codex S (Sinaiticus) follows the Hebrew: καρδιά. It is not surprising that in this text the LXX avoided the word καρδιά, although they read the Hebrew לב, because at the time this Greek version was written the word καρδιά in daily conversation no longer retained the meaning of “man’s interior life”; rather, that idea was expressed by ψυχή.²⁰ Several verses of this Psalm are applied to the *Messiah* by the N.T.: v.4, see John 15:25; v. 9, see John 2:17; Rom. 15:3; v. 21, which immediately follows our text, was fulfilled literally in the crucified Christ: see Matt. 27:34.

The *heart* of Christ is said expressly to have been broken by reproaches and to have failed, and in these circumstances it is said that the Lord sought in vain for a comforter. But there is not lacking at the end of this Psalms the idea of the triumph obtained by his sufferings: see v. 30-36.

e) Ps. 16:9: *Therefore my heart is glad, and my soul rejoices; my body also dwells secure...* The N.T. testifies to the *messianism* of this text: see Acts 2:25f.; 13:35.

The *Heart* of Christ is filled with joy because of his triumph: death has been conquered by his resurrection. The resurrected Christ *pours out this [Spirit]* (Acts 2:33), or, as St. Paul comments on that text, through Christ *forgiveness of sins is proclaimed to you, and by him every one that believes is freed from everything from which you could be freed by the law of Moses* (Acts 13:38f.).²¹

19. *Dialogus cum Tryphone Iudaeo* 103, 7f.: ed. J. Goodspeed, *Die ältesten Apologeten* (Göttingen 1914) 220.

20. See Guillaumont, *Les sens... du coeur dans l'antiquité*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 61ff.

21. On this whole argument from the O.T., see G. Closon, S.J., *Das Herz des Erlösers in den heiligen Schriften des Alten Testaments*: ZaszMyst 18 (1943) 17-30; Rahner, *Gedanken zur biblischen Begründung...*: Cor Salvatoris 16-37. John 19:37 quotes the prophecy of Zechariah 12:10; on this matter, see J.M. Díez Alegria, S.J., *El Corazón de Jesucristo en la economía del misterio de Dios*: Manr 26 (1954) 253-262.

554. *The New Testament.* The *Heart* of Jesus Christ is presented directly as crowned with virtues that render Jesus the teacher most approachable, as the source of gentle and ardent love, and finally as the fount from which the Holy Spirit is communicated to the faithful.

a) Matt. 11:29:... *and learn from me; for I am gentle and lowly in heart, and you will find rest for your souls.* The meaning here is not that Christ proposes himself as an exemplar regarding gentleness and humility of heart; rather, these words signify: Learn from me, that is, be my disciples, accept my teaching, seeing that I am meek and humble of heart, not hard and proud like the Pharisees. From the virtues of his *Heart* flows that amiability by which Jesus draws men to himself and can promise them true rest.²²

555. b) Phil. 1:8: *For God is my witness, how I yearn for you with all the affection of Christ Jesus.* The Vulgate word here for “affection” is *viscera*. The word *σπλάγχνα* (*viscera*) means the same thing in this place as *καρδία* (heart), which is certain both from the comparison with the preceding v. 7: *because I hold you in my heart*, and from 2 Cor. 6:11f.: ... *our heart is wide. You are not restricted by us, but you are restricted in your own affections.* This equivalence is admitted not only by the best Catholic exegetes, but also by non-Catholic exegetes.

St. Paul seems to be so identified with Christ that he says that he loves the faithful with the heart of the Lord Jesus Christ: *It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me* (Gal. 2:20). The heart clearly not only is proposed in connection with the affection of love, but at the same time it is claimed by St. Paul *how great* the love of the Heart of Jesus is. For since the Apostle wishes to show his own ardent love for the Philippians, he is not content with invoking the heart of a father or the heart of a brother, but he appeals precisely to the Heart of Christ, as the furnace of charity: if he loves them with the Heart of Christ, a greater love for them can be neither given nor expressed.²³

556. c) John 7:37f.: ... *If anyone thirst, let him come to me and let him drink who believes in me. As the scripture says: out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water.* The punctuation we give to these words differs from that of the Vulgate: ... *let him drink. He who believes in me, as....* Our

22. See Bover, *El Corazón de Jesús en el Nuevo Testamento*: RazFe 48 (1917) 147f.; Jotun, *L'Évangile de N.S.J.C.* at this place; Rahner, *op.cit.*, 26.

23. See Bover, *El Corazón de Jesús en el Nuevo Testamento*: RazFe 48 (1917) 148-152; Id., *El Corazón de Jesús en San Pablo* 37-42; Id., *Las epístolas...* (1950) at this place; Rahner, *op.cit.*, 26f. On the importance, meaning, and frequent use of “heart” in the N.T., see Bover, in the two previously cited works, 143-146; 7-17; Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 3,614ff.

punctuation is admitted by some very important exegetes and it seems to be supported by excellent reasons both from the patristic tradition and from the context.²⁴ Therefore the meaning would be that rivers of living water flow not from one believing in Christ, but *from Christ himself*. The word κοιλία (belly) occurs again; but above (n. 550.552) we saw how in the LXX repeatedly this word recurs with the term καρδία in order to signify the interior part of man. However after St. John Chrysostom very often the authors understand this text in the N.T. along the lines of this equivalence.²⁵ *Rivers of living water*, according to the evangelist himself, refer to the Holy Spirit *whom those who believe in him* [Jesus] will receive (John 7:39).

Therefore the faithful receive the messianic gift par excellence, the Holy Spirit, the source of all holiness and the giver of heavenly gifts, *from the heart of Jesus*.

557. B. Concerning the specific acts of this devotion. These acts, namely, consecration out of love and reparation (see above, n. 546) pertain to the most fundamental chapters of the revealed doctrine.

a) *Consecration out of love.* Often Holy Scripture extols the love of God so that the love of God for all created things must be said to be exceedingly great and it is manifested in a special way for men in the work of the incarnation and redemption.²⁶ As a consequence, we are commanded *to love* God and indeed as the most important act of all our duties towards him: Matt. 22:37f.: *You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment.* St. Paul appears in Holy Scripture as the most noble exemplar of this total consecration to Christ out of love: *Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* (Rom. 8:35); *If any one has no love for the Lord, let him be accursed* (1 Cor. 16:22); *For me to live is Christ* (Phil. 1:21).

558. b) Reparation. The work of Christ was *reparation* of the human race to the offended Father (see below, thesis 25-28). On the other hand, we are taught by Holy Scripture both about the fact that God has been offended (see below, thesis 25ff.) and about our justification and adoptive sonship through Christ and also about our union with Christ that is so close that we die with him (v.gr., Rom. 6:8) and rise with him (Eph. 2:6):

24. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica*, 2. *De Sanctissima Trinitate* (1949) 262ff. To the authors cited in this work should be added especially Rahner, *Gedanken zur biblischen Begründung...: Cor Salvatoris* 37-45. The Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*" uses this reading: AAS 48 (1956) 310.

25. See Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 3,788ff. On the whole argument from Holy Scripture, see Rahner, *loc. cit.*

26. See Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica*, 1. *De Deo uno*² (1949) 202-211. This is treated extensively by the Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*": AAS 48 (1956) 315-337.

a foundation, therefore, is proposed so that we believe that we can also truly make *satisfaction* to God, a point that the Council of Trent will teach expressly (D 1689-1691).

The idea of the mystical body of Christ is presented in which such a wonderful binding together of all the faithful in Christ is proposed so that we truly are *members of each other* (Eph. 4:25) who must be *solicitous for each other* (1 Cor. 12:25). Regarding *prayer*, we often see some of the faithful praying for others: v.gr., Rom. 1:9: *For God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his Son, that without ceasing I mention you always in my prayers*; Rom. 15:30: *I appeal to you, brethren... to strive together with me in your prayers to God on my behalf...* Regarding *satisfaction* offered for the sins of others, this is sufficiently recommended because the *intercession* of a just man for the unworthy is shown to have great value in the eyes of God (see below, n. 638). This is easily deduced both from the mission of Christ making satisfaction for sins, and from our possibility of making satisfaction through the merits of Christ, and from the union of all men among themselves. And the aspect of *offering consolation to Christ* also is not absent from Holy Scripture (see above, n. 553).

559. Tradition. A. *Regarding the excellence of this devotion.* The holy Fathers have many statements, especially in connection with John 7:37f. and 19:34, that extol the Heart of Christ as the fountain of life, from which both the faithful receive the grace of the Spirit and the Church herself is born.²⁷

B. *Concerning specific acts of the devotion.* Since the field here is so great, it suffices to have indicated that the holy Fathers develop the ideas of Holy Scripture in different ways.

560. Theological reasoning. A. The *excellence* of this form of devotion to the humanity of Christ. In every rational being the *internal cause* or the *formal principle* surpasses in dignity the external actions or manifestations; from that source everything else flows and receives its value. Therefore the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, which is honored with a special devotion, is the most worthy of all.

B. The *summary* of the whole Christian religion. The Christian religion or “eternal life,” in order to bring it to men Christ entered into this world (John 10:10), is *that they may know thee the only true God, and Jesus*

27. See H. Rahner, *Die Anfänge der Herz-Jesu-Verehrung in der Väterzeit: Cor Salvatoris 46-73*; Carbone, *La teologia...* 27-30.

Christ (John 17:3). On the other hand, Christ is the *way* to the Father—a way that is absolutely necessary and *one*: *no one comes to the Father, but by me* (John 14:6); at the same time he is the *door* that leads certainly to the Father: *If any one enters by me, he will be saved* (John 10:9). Christ therefore is rightly said to be the *compendium* of the Christian religion.

561. The *devotion* to the Sacred Heart of Jesus is at the same time the true summary of what is necessary to know, to love and to imitate Christ.

In order to *know* Christ intimately, this devotion directs the minds of men more easily, because it does not concentrate on the exterior activity of Christ, but it directs one to the *intimate* life of the Lord, to searching out the more hidden *motives* of the total activity of Christ. In a special way this devotion fixes the mind on the *love* of Christ, which must be said to be the ultimate reason and the true definition of Christ just as it is of God (cf. 1. John 4:16).

This devotion moves one efficaciously to love Christ the Lord more and more; for nothing so stirs up love as to know that one is loved. It helps that this love of Christ for us is considered in this devotion precisely as *despised* both by us and by other men. Therefore we are necessarily aroused to compensate for such a defect of our love with the addition of a *more intense* love of him, and we are stirred up with zeal for the salvation of souls.

Finally, this devotion more efficaciously motivates men to *imitate* Christ more closely, because it is necessary that imitation is a result of love. Indeed this devotion leads on its own to the *most perfect* imitation of Christ.

562. *In our times specially*, that this devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus has become the *summary* of the whole Christian religion is clear from the fact that in a marvelous way by this form of piety a sense of solid *trust* in the sincere salvific will of God has been aroused in us, and a sense of voluntary *penance* so that we can associate our small sufferings with the immense torture of Christ the Redeemer, by which he made satisfaction to the divine justice for sinners (see D 1689-1693).

It is clear to all that this sense of trust and voluntary penance is very

much suited to our contemporary needs (see below, n. 692).²⁸

563. Objections. 1. Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus has as its purpose that the Heart of Christ *is consoled* by the offering of our reparation. But Christ now in heaven cannot suffer anything. Thus in this devotion the offering of *reparation* is less rightly included.

I distinguish the major. This devotion has as its purpose that the Heart of Christ is consoled in the sense in which we offer *satisfaction* to Christ for the sins of men, *conceded*; in the sense in which we truly alleviate the sufferings of Christ, *I subdistinguish*: the sufferings that Christ endured *during the time of his earthly life, conceded*; the sufferings that Christ *endures now, I subdistinguish again*: that he now suffers *in himself, denied*; that he suffers *in his mystical body* and which we can alleviate by our satisfactions, *conceded*.²⁹

564. 2. This devotion *presupposes a strong affection of love for Christ*. But if that is the case, it must be said to be the property of holy souls. Therefore less rightly is it proposed indifferently as the summary of the total religion for *all* the Christian faithful.

I distinguish the major. The formulas that the Church uses in her devotion to the Heart of Jesus often suppose such strong affection, *conceded*; *the object itself* of this devotion, that is, the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, is of such a nature that it attracts only holy men to a knowledge and love of it, *I subdistinguish*: the saints understand *more perfectly* the ineffable riches of this Heart and give themselves to it *more fully, conceded*; sinners are not moved *more efficaciously* to the knowledge and love of Christ, *denied*.

The model for the worship that the Church prescribes for the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is completely the intensity of the affection that *objectively* should be present, given the dignity and amiability of his Most Sacred Heart. This should be kept in mind lest we impose indiscriminately these and similar formulas on all men and in all circumstances.

If however it is proposed, *prudently* and preserving the holy *freedom of the spirit*, to great sinners how God became man in order to take away their sins, how this incarnate God suffered so much in order to save men, what kind of a “heart” Christ had that loves and seeks us even though we are sinners--if these and similar points are correctly proposed, experience teaches how suitable the devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is in order to convert sinners to God with their whole heart.

28. For more on this theological reason, see Solano, *La devoción... según las Encíclicas Pontificias* n.38.45-94.104-109; Agostini, *Il Cuore de Gesù...*; Carbone, *Teologia...* 112-123; L. Verheylezoon, S.J., *La dévotion au Sacré-Coeur* (Mulhouse 1954) 72-257; J. Stierli, *Dogmatische und religiöse Werte der Herz-Jesu-Verehrung: Cor Salvatoris* 248 270; J. Calveras, S.J., *Los elementos de la devoción al Corazón de Jesús...* (Barcelona 1953) 107-291. How the center of the Christian life is “to believe in the love” of God, see L. Lochet, *Dieu nos aime: VieSpir* 90 (1954) 46-68.

29. See Carbone, *Teologia...* 117-119; Verhaylezoon, *La dévotion...* 90-107; K. Rahner, *Einige Thesen zur Theologie der Herz-Jesu-Verehrung: Cor Salvatoris* 191-197; Calveras, *Los elementos...* 162-191.

It must not be denied that in the way of proposing this devotion often there is a desire for an explanation that is: a) *more biblical* (see above, n. 549-558); b) *more theological*, which derives the nature of this devotion both from theological sources and explains it more profoundly according to the principles and foundations of theology, and also solves objections; c) *more liturgical*, which manifests the connection of this devotion with the various seasons and feasts of the liturgical year and especially with the holy sacrifice of the Mass.³⁰

565. Scholium 1. *On the different ways in which theologians understand the object of this devotion.* In general a twofold object is now usually distinguished: one is the *material object*, namely the fleshly heart, while the other is the *formal object*, namely love or the whole interior life of Christ. In other words, the same idea is express in this way: the object of the devotion is the fleshly heart of Christ according as it is the symbol of his love, or the love of Christ according as it is symbolized in the fleshly heart.

However there is a difficulty in the fact that this doubleness of elements in the *one* object of the devotion seems to introduce no small disadvantage for the reflex exercise of this devotion. In fact, the *whole complex* from the material and formal objects does not seem to be able to be replaced without a certain hardness for the invocation of “the Heart of Jesus” in all texts: for example, in the litanies: “Heart of Jesus, formed by the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin Mother,” “Heart of Jesus, tabernacle of the Most High,” “Heart of Jesus, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” “Heart of Jesus, pierced with a lance,” etc.

566. *The wider but more proper* meaning that the word “heart” takes passim throughout Holy Scripture (see above, note 2 and n. 549-556) avoids this disadvantage. But the devotion of the Church must be said to retain the meaning that Holy Scripture contains, unless the contrary is proved. This *one* wider meaning can be substituted for all invocations addressed to the “Heart of Jesus”: for the heart of flesh and the affective life and the whole interior life are signified *directly* by this meaning. Finally, the word “heart” has this wider meaning not only among the Greeks and the Latins but also in our own languages.³¹

Therefore the difference in determining the object of the devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus should not be said to be so real, as if some element would be found in one definition of this object that is lacking in another definition, as rather to say that there is a difference *in the way of conceiving* or of proposing the same thing. Moreover not rarely an *overly exclusive* attention is given to the love of Christ and the whole interior life of the Lord is somewhat neglected.

However for the reasons given we are retaining this *wider but more proper* meaning of the word “heart” along with modern theologians like Lercher, Diekamp and H. Rahn-

30. See A. Dérumaux, *Crise ou évolution dans la dévotion des jeunes pour la Sacré-Coeur?*: EtCarm 29 (1950) 318-324; J. Solano, S.J., *La devoción al Sagrado Corazón de Jesús y la Santa Misa* (Bilbao 1951); J.N. Zoré, S.J., *Recentiorum quaestionum de cultu SS. Cordis Jesu conspectus (Utrum crisis an evolutio praevideatur?)*: Greg 37 (1956) 104-120.

31. For the Spanish language many examples can be seen in G. Correas, *Vocabulario de refranes y frases populares...* (Madrid 1924) 128; Fr. Rodríguez Marín, *Más de 21,000 refranes castellanos...* (Madrid 1926) 84f.

er.³² The Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*" retains the terminology of the "symbol," but we do not think that this document of the Magisterium wishes to touch on this *more subtle* question, which considers the manner alone of conceiving this point and is explained in different ways by recent authors.

567. Scholium 2. *On created and uncreated love as the object of this devotion.* It is certain that the *uncreated* love of Christ is attained *in a practical manner*, as also the divine person with whom it is identified.

But the question not a little disputed by theologians is whether this *uncreated* love is attained or considered *also expressly* just like the *created* love of Christ; about this there is no doubt that it can be meant expressly and directly.

Although because of speculative reasons taken from the distinction of natures in Christ it would seem necessary to say that *only the created* or human love of Christ is the direct object of this devotion, nevertheless because of the authentic texts of the Church, but especially because of the explicit teaching of the Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*," the opinion must be held that considers *both loves* of Christ as the proper and direct object of this devotion.³³

568. Scholium 3. *On the worship of the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus.* Because of many documents of the Magisterium³⁴ it is very certain that the devotion to the Eucharistic Sacred Heart of Jesus is only *a special aspect* of the general devotion to the Heart of Jesus: for this worship is directed to the love of the Heart of Jesus instituting the most holy *Eucharist* and remaining in it. This *identity* with the devotion to the Heart of Jesus seems to have been the reason why in the new authentic collection of indulgences the special prayers to the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus were omitted.³⁵

Benedict XV approved the office in the Breviary of the Eucharistic Sacred Heart of Jesus with the corresponding Mass for feria V after the octave of the feast of Corpus Christi.³⁶ The Encyclical "*Haurietis aquas*" explains that the Eucharist is a gift of the Heart of Jesus, and it encourages promotion of devotion to "the Eucharistic Heart of Jesus."³⁷

32. Lercher³, n.247f. Diekamp⁸⁻⁹, 259-261. Rahner, *Einige Thesen...*: *Cor Salvatoris* 166-171. See also Calveras, *Los elementos...* 44-65, 88-98.

33. AAS 48 (1956) 327-337, 343-345. For a negative opinion, see Galtier, n.301. For the affirming opinion, see in addition to Lercher, p.252, A. Vanderberghe, *De cultu SS. Cordis Iesu*: CollatBrug 39 (1939) 12; Philippe de la Trinité, O.C.D., *Du Coeur du Christ a l'esprit d'amour*. Point de vue théologique: EtCarm 29 (1950) 379-389.

34. They are gathered together and commented on in the work of D. Castelain, *De cultu Eucharistici Cordis Iesu* (Paris 1928). See also A. Vanderberghe, *De cultu Eucharistici Cordis Iesu*: CollatBrug 39 (1939) 40-46, where also a bibliography and history of this devotion will be found.

35. See *Preces et pia opera...* (Typis polyglottis Vaticanis 1938) p.159-167; which are absent in the *Enchiridion indulgentiarum* (1950).

36. AAS 13 (1921) 545.

37. AAS 48 (1956) 331f. 351.

Thesis 22. Christ is the mediator between God and men, but he is the mediator as man.

S.Th. III, q. 26; Suarez, at this place; DTC 8,1347.

569. Connection. Among the things that pertain to Christ by comparison with us, St. Thomas considered the adoration of Christ by which we adore him. Now he moves on to consider the fact that Christ is said to be the *mediator* of God and men.

570. A *mediator in the proper sense* is said to be one who intercedes between two persons in order to bring them together by communicating to one that which belongs to another. Therefore mediator is the name of an *office* or duty. A mediator is also called *moral* or he is in the moral order, because his task is to unite *minds*.

In addition to the office, *the nature of the mean or middle* must be distinguished in the mediator, according to which he is distant from both extremes by uniting them.

But sometimes the name of mediator is used to signify a *substantial medium* between two very distant substances. In this *less proper* sense mediator is the name of a *substance* and is called a *natural, entitative, ontological* mediator or one in the ontological order.¹

571. Christ is the mediator. Here it is understood *in the proper sense*. How Christ *exercises* his office of mediator is evident partly from the *prayer* that Christ uttered for us (see above, thesis 19, n. 491), and partly from our *redemption*, which will be treated in the following theses.

We do not intend to prove here that Christ is the so-called *ontological* mediator. Moreover from the reality of the hypostatic union this is absolutely certain. Below in n. 577 we will point out the relation that many Fathers establish in Christ between this nature of a mediator by his *substance* and that by his *office*.

572. As man. The *person* who exercises the office of mediator is the Word, because in Christ there is no other person except the divine. Therefore the Word is the efficient *cause* (*principium quod*), since actions belong to the suppositum. In this sense *by the communication of idioms* it could be said that the Word is the mediator of God and men, just as it is

1. See Franzelin, th.46; Muncunill, n.951-955; Lercher³, n.159. This term is taken in its *proper* sense in the Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*" of Pius XII: AAS 39 (1947) 521.

said that the Word was crucified. But this meaning is not our concern here.

The question is whether the principle of the formal *cause* (*principium quo*), whence Christ is called mediator, is the divine or the human nature. We reply that such a formal cause is not the divine but the human nature. Therefore “man” in this proposition: “Christ as man is the mediator,” is reduplicated *in the reduplicative sense* (see above, thesis 19, n. 496).

573. Nevertheless this reduplicative sense is necessarily said to be *incompletely* reduplicative. For the human nature *alone*, according as it is distinguished from the person of Christ, is not the reason because of which the predicate *simply* belongs to the subject, since Christ is not the mediator *simply* because of his human nature, but because his human nature *is subsisting in the Word*. For this nature has *formally* from the Word that the acts of his human nature are of such worth and dignity that they suffice to offer perfect satisfaction for men; therefore the office of mediator requires a *divine person*.

In a different way the word “man” is reduplicated in the case of the adoptive sonship of Christ *by reason of his human nature* (above, thesis 19, n.496), because the whole reason of this adoptive sonship is had in the human nature *alone*, which, *by the sanctifying grace* inhering in it, renders Christ the adoptive Son of God, just as we are made adoptive children of God by such grace. Therefore *the human nature* of Christ would be *simply* the cause because of which he could be said to be the adoptive Son of God.

The ultimate reason for the difference between the case of the mediator and the case of the adoptive Son of God lies in the fact that mediator is the name of an *office of uniting* (above, n. 570); but “to unite” is an action that as such is not from the nature alone, but *from the suppositum* through the nature. Therefore in the denomination taken from such action *both* the person *and* the nature are included. On the contrary, the relation of adoptive sonship is something that follows not from some action but from the *nature itself* adorned with such a gift of grace. Therefore *the nature alone*, as it is distinguished from the person of Christ, would be the cause why this adoptive sonship could be simply predicated of the subject, namely, Christ.

574. Adversaries. It seems that the *first Protestants* should be mentioned. Some of them attributed the office of mediator to Christ the man in such a way that *the divine suppositum was not required in any way*; but others said that Christ exercised the office of mediator *according to both natures*—divine and human.²

575. Doctrine of the Church. Beside the more ancient documents in

2. See St. Robert Bellarmine, *Disputationum... De Controversiis christianae fidei...* t.1 l.5 c.2f.; Petavius, 1.12 c.3f.; E.J. Scheller, *Das Priestertum Christi in Ausschluss an den hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Paderborn 1934) 295f. At times however the whole question almost seems to be about a less proper way of speaking: see, v.gr., J.T. Müller, *Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*¹⁰ (Gütersloh 1907) 622,56; 684,47-696,95.

which the words of St. Paul (1 Tim. 2:5) are repeated (see D 293, 487, 496, 642), other sources are the *Council of Florence* (D 1347) and the *Council of Trent* (D 1513). They ascribe the liberation of man only to the merits “of the mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ our Lord” (D 1347).

Theological note. A. *It is a truth of divine and Catholic faith at least from the ordinary Magisterium* that Christ is the mediator of God and men; perhaps it could also be said to be *defined* (see D 1347, 1513).³

B. Christ *as man* is the mediator: this is *a theologically certain truth*, as a legitimate theological conclusion.

576. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. Christ is *mediator*. 1 Tim. 2:5: *For there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all.* Heb. 9:15: *Therefore he is the mediator of a new covenant... since a death has occurred which redeems them from the transgressions....* See also Heb. 8:6; 12:24. Christ is called by St. Paul a mediator by reason of the redemption and reconciliation which Christ brought about; there will be more about this below, thesis 25-29, n. 639f.730-735. Therefore in St. Paul mediator is *the name of an office*.⁴

577. Proof from tradition. A. 1) The Fathers speak about the *task* of Christ the mediator in connection with the redemption and liberation of man. St. Gregory Nazianzen: “It is evident that the Father accepted, but not what he asked... and because it was necessary that man be sanctified by the humanity of God; in order that he might free us, having been overcome by the power of the tyrant, and lead us back to himself by his Son the mediator” (R 1016). St. Augustine: “Since men through original sin were subject to his wrath... a mediator was necessary, that is, a reconciler who would placate that wrath with the oblation of his singular sacrifice” (R 1915).

2) The Fathers often speak about the *ontological foundation* of the mediation of Christ which took place *in history*. St. Hilary: “[Christ] Himself has been appointed as the mediator in His own person for the salvation of the Church, and by the mystery itself of the mediator between God and man He alone is both, while He Himself, by reason of the two natures that are united in Him, is the same person in both natures...” (R

3. For D 1347, see above n. 117, note 8.

4. On 1 Tim. 2:5f., see Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,198-203. On Heb. 9:15, see Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux...* at this place; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux at this place*. For more, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,211-219; Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 4,602-629; DBS 5,997-1083.

873). St. Augustine: “[Christ] is the mediator of God and men; because he is God with the Father, because he is a man with men... but between the divinity alone and the humanity alone the mediatrix is the human divinity and the divine humanity of Christ” (R 1500). See R 1462, 1746, 2184, 2188.

578. B. That Christ is mediator *as man* is expressed with such force, v.gr., by St. Augustine that this was blameless as if the office of mediator were attributed to Christ’s *humanity alone* (see however against this accusation the text cited above in R 1500): “For as man he was Mediator; but as the Word he was not between, because equal to God” (R 1595). “By this he is not Mediator, that he is equal to God. For by this he is as distant from us as the Father is. And how will there be some mediation, where the distance is the same? Therefore the Apostle does not say *One Mediator of God and men Christ Jesus*, but *the man Christ Jesus*. By this therefore he is mediator, because he is a man.”⁵

579. Theological reasoning on this question is presented excellently by St. Thomas. A. *Christ the mediator*. It pertains properly to the office of a *mediator to unite* those between whom he is the mediator. But to unite men to God pertains *to Christ*, by whom men are reconciled to God; this point will be made abundantly clear in the following book on the *work* of Christ.

B. He is mediator *as man*. Two things must be considered in a mediator—*the nature of the middle* and *the office of joining together*. But it is the nature of the middle or mean that it is distant from both extremes. But the mediator brings together, because what belongs to one he communicates to the other. But these two aspects do not belong to Christ except for the fact that he is a man.

For Christ *as God* does not differ from the Father and the Holy Spirit in nature or in the power of dominion. For the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have anything that the Son does not have, so that the Son could confer on men something that belongs to the Father and the Holy Spirit, as if it were something belonging *to others*.

But Christ *as man* is distant both from God in nature and from men in his dignity of grace and glory, but he joins men to God, by making known to men the commands and gifts of God, by making satisfaction to God for men and by praying for them.

5. *De gratia Christi et pecc. orig.* 1.2 c.28 n.33: CSEL 42,193; ML 44,402. For more on St. Hilary, see McMahan, *De Christo mediatore...* 33ff. On St. Augustine, see McMahan, *De nominibus Christi doctrinam divi Augustini...* 44-50. For much more from the Fathers, see Petavius, 1.12 c.1 n.5.f.12-17; c.2; c.6-8. On the early theologians, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...*, 2nd part, 2,288-328.

580. Scholium. *Christ is the one perfect mediator.* St. Thomas rightly makes a distinction here (III, q. 26, a.1 c). To unite men to God belongs to Christ *in a perfect way*, for through him men are reconciled to God to such an extent that Christ is the *perfect* mediator of God and men. However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, *in some respect*, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God *dispositively* or *ministerially*.⁶

6. On the mediation of Christ in relation to the mediation *of the angels* according to St. Thomas, see Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas...*313f. On a certain exaggeration, not always avoided even by theologians, by which the mediation of the Christ and the mediation of the saints, and especially that of the Bl. Virgin Mary, are set in opposition to each other, see SalTer 34 (1946) 348-350.426f.

B O O K I I

O N T H E W O R K A N D P A S S I O N O F C H R I S T

J. Rivière, *Rédemption*: DTC 13,1212-2004; Id., *Le dogme de la Rédemption dans la théologie contemporaine* (Albi 1948) (this work however was finished in 1943 by the author and published later without any changes).

C H A P T E R I

O n t h e d e p a r t u r e o f C h r i s t f r o m t h i s w o r l d

A R T I C L E I

O N T H E P A S S I O N I T S E L F

Thesis 23. In the hypothesis of a condign satisfaction to be offered for sin, the incarnation was absolutely necessary.

S.Th. III, q. 1, a. 2; q. 46, a. 1-3; Suarez, d.4 s.2.7-12; Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.1-5; DTC 7,1478-1482.

581. Connection. After what we have already said about the union of God and man and the things that result from that union, our next consideration will be about what the incarnate Son of God *did or suffered* in the human nature he united to himself.

This consideration is proposed by St. Thomas in four parts. Firstly, the holy Doctor considers what pertains to the *entrance* of Christ into the world; secondly, what pertains to his development or the progress of his life in this world; thirdly, his *departure* from this world; fourthly, what pertains to his *exaltation* after this life (see III, q. 27, Intro.).

What St. Thomas considers about Christ's entrance (q. 27-39) and progress (q. 40-45) is usually treated partially in the treatise on the Bl. Virgin Mary and St. Joseph, and partially in the exegesis of the N.T. Therefore our main interest here is to explain Christ's *departure* and his *exaltation*, which are normally covered in books on dogma.

582. Among those things that pertain to *Christ's departure* from the world, in the first place the holy Doctor treats the *passion* of Christ. He does it in three stages, so that first he speaks about the passion itself, then about the efficient cause and finally the fruit of his passion.

Our thesis is concerned with the first point, namely, *the passion*

of *Christ* itself. However of the twelve articles on this question in the *Summa Theologiae* we are treating directly only the first three in which he concentrates on the *necessity* and the fittingness of the passion. But the rest of the nine articles are considered briefly either in the following theses or they have already been treated above (v.gr., article 8 on the passion not hindering his joy, in thesis 15, scholium 4, n. 365-368); some of these points also are customarily considered by the exegetes.

583. Definition of terms. Satisfaction. Since there will be a direct and extensive treatment of this concept below in thesis 25, n. 631f., it will suffice here to give a brief definition of this notion, such as is required for *this thesis*. Therefore satisfaction is the compensation of the divine *honor* injured by sin.

Sin is defined by St. Augustine (R 1605) and St. Thomas (I-II, q. 71, a. 6): any deed or word or desire contrary to the divine law.

In sin there is a *turning away* from the immutable good and the *turning to* a creature.¹ This aversion and conversion is first of all a *personal* injury or offense against God, inasmuch as the one who commits an evil act does not observe the *honor* of God which is due to the last end: or, inasmuch as the sinner, preferring a lesser good to the greater good, causes an *injury* to God, while God himself is despised by him and he does it in reference to his last end.²

584. However this aversion and conversion is at the same time an *inordinate* act, that is, whoever sins, acts against some order. Therefore the result is that he suffers some detriment from that order. In other words, since those things that are subject to divine providence cannot remain inordinate, some punishment will have to be inflicted by which the violated order is restored.³

Therefore by an act of sinning God is affected with a *personal injury*, a certain *stain* or the privation of sanctifying grace (I-II, q. 86) is caused in the soul, a *twofold guilt* is incurred—one of *guilt*, that is, a debt to repair the offense or personal injury directed against God, but the other a debt of *punishment*, that is, the necessity of suffering some punishment.⁴

There is much more about this point in the treatise on sin.

In the thesis we are considering sin inasmuch as it is a *personal offense*

1. S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 4 c; *De verit.* q.28 a.2 c.

2. S.Th. I-II, q. 21, a. 4 c; *De verit. ibid.*

3. S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 1 c; 3 CG 158.

4. On another meaning of the word "guilt," see S.Th. 2 d.42 q.1 a.2 c. For more on the whole notion of sin, see Horvath, *Heiligkeit und Sünde...*

against God and it produces in the soul *the guilty state of sin*; we are not concerned here with either the stain on the soul or the guilty state of punishment; much will be said about these points below in thesis 27 where we treat the *expiating* reparation of Christ.

585. The sin that we are considering *directly* in this thesis, as that *for which* satisfaction must be given, is *original* sin. For the discussion is mainly about this, when one deals with the necessity of the incarnation (see above, thesis 1, n. 15). However the reasons given prove that a pure creature could not offer condign or adequate satisfaction to God *for any grave sin*. We will have something to say about *venial* sin below in the scholium, n.600f.

586. *Condign satisfaction* or perfectly *sufficient*. This is the compensation of the injured divine honor *by a certain adequateness*.

This adequateness of equivalence should be considered under two headings, namely, on the part of that which is had *as the matter*, and it consists *in the thing itself* by which the compensation is actually made, and on the part of that which is had *as the form*, and it consists *in the conditions* that must be observed in order that the compensation be *out of strict justice*.

Concretely, the compensation of the injured divine honor by a corresponding honor of God of such a nature that it is thought to compensate for the preceding offense to his honor. It can be understood that this honor is *of itself* sufficient reparation for the injured honor, inasmuch as God is honored in such a way as to offset the dishonor he had received. Nevertheless, because of the defect of some of the *conditions*, v.gr., that the act of honoring is not *proper* to the person giving the satisfaction in such a way that in no way does it fall under the control of the creditor or of the offended God, it cannot be called a sufficient reparation of the injured honor *out of strict justice*.

In the thesis we say that the incarnation was necessary not precisely for satisfaction out of strict justice, but for the compensation of his honor *in itself* or materially. We will treat below in thesis 26, scholium 3, n. 664f., the conditions necessary for satisfaction according to strict justice.

587. Satisfaction understood in this way can be sufficient *extrinsically*, when of itself it is not sufficient, but is *accepted* by the offended person as if it had full value, or it can be sufficient *intrinsically*, when it has *in itself* a value equal to the debt incurred.

But this equality is accepted in a double way. For the value of the

satisfaction can be equal to the debt *proportionally*, if for example, although it is not truly equal, it has *some* value in itself and no greater satisfaction can be given by the offending person; or the value of the satisfaction can be equal to the debt *quantitatively*, if for example, it is completely equal to the debt.⁵

Sufficient satisfaction intrinsically and *proportionally* can be called *congruous* satisfaction, for it is befitting the creditor that he forgive the debt of someone who offers all the satisfaction he can and it has some proportion to the debt. But sufficient satisfaction intrinsically and *quantitatively* is perfect and *condign*.

588. Incarnation. It can be taken *in a strict sense*, namely, for the assumption of a *human* nature by God, more concretely by the Word of God, or in a *wide sense* for the assumption of an intellectual nature (v.gr., angelic) by God. The reasons presented in the thesis prove the necessity of the incarnation understood *in the wide sense*. However we will retain the name “incarnation,” because this assumption of an intellectual nature was *de facto* the assumption of a *human* nature by the Word.

Elsewhere we considered some questions about its *possibility* in thesis 6, especially in scholium 3f., n. 105f.

589. The incarnation is said to be *necessary*, inasmuch as without it the end cannot be obtained. But the nature of this end is determined by the words: *In the hypothesis of a condign satisfaction*.

We are *presupposing* that the incarnation on the part of God was free, not only on the supposition of the fall of the human race, for fallen men, setting aside the hypothesis of their restoration, would not be denied their *natural* beatitude, but also on the supposition of God’s will to redeem the human race. “Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the passion of Christ” (S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 2 c).⁶ We pointed out the great *fittingness* of the incarnation above in thesis 1, n. 1.

The question in this thesis is whether, in order to offer *condign* satisfaction to God for sin, which *condign* satisfaction God freely decreed must be required from men, the *incarnation* was necessary, or whether the satisfaction *of a pure creature*, adorned with the fullness of grace, would have sufficed.

5. See S.Th., d.15 q.1 a.2 solut. On a certain “imperfect” worthiness, which is not opposed to our thesis, see J. A. de Aldama, S.J., *Cooperación de María a la redención a modo de satisfacción por el pecado*: EstMar 2 (1943) 179-193.

6. See Suarez, d.4 s.1 n.1f.; Galtier, n. 160-168; Lercher, n. 255f.; DTC 13,1976f.

That *de facto* the incarnation of the Word rendered such condign satisfaction to God will be explained below in thesis 25.

Absolutely necessary. In this thesis we do not prove what is obvious and is admitted by all, namely, that *de facto* no man descended from Adam can offer condign satisfaction for grave sin and in this sense the incarnation was necessary. Rather, we are looking at the *absolute* question concerning what is possible, that is, whether God could create such a pure creature and endow him with such gifts of grace that he would be able to offer God condign satisfaction.

590. Adversaries. Scotus and his *followers* concede that a pure creature, one even endowed with grace, could not satisfy condignly for original sin *in the present order of providence*. At the same time however they say that a pure creature endowed with grace could satisfy sufficiently for the sins of the human race *according to the absolute power of God*.

This opinion has its foundation both in the Scotistic doctrine, which in the matter of satisfaction attributes an important part to the divine *acceptance*, as will be made clearer below in thesis 26, n. 650 where we treat the condign satisfaction of Christ, and also in the Scotistic doctrine that considers the nature of a *personal* injury in sin in a way different from almost all other theologians.⁷

Theological note. Our doctrine is *by far more common and it seems to be morally certain*.

591. Theological reasoning.⁸ There are three elements by which the gravity of an injury and the dignity of the satisfaction are measured. But in the two *main* elements there is a huge disproportion between the offense given to God and any created satisfaction. Therefore a pure creature cannot

7. See Frassen, *Scotus Academicus...* 7,84-93; the Editors of the works of St. Bonaventure (Quaracchi), *In 3 Sent.* d.20 q.3 schol.; Minges, 1, n.567-573; DTC 4,1895f.; 13,1950f. Some other authors are cited in favor of this opinion and contrary to us (see Suarez, d.4 s.7 n.2-4; Editors in Quaracchi, *loc.cit.*; Hugon, q.1 a.2 at IV; Muncunill, n.76; Galtier, n.514, 3rd note); but their doctrine is difficult to evaluate because of a less definite state of the question; see, v.gr., Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.5 n.136. On P. Vázquez, see G. Tessarolo, *La nozione de satisfazione e la necessità dell'incarnazione presso Gabriele Vasquez* (Rome 1942); on the opinion of Fr. Molina, see J. Mendeiros, *A necessidade da encarnação e da redenção em Luis de Molina* (Lisbon 1944, Separata da "Lumen"). On the interpretation of the phrase "pure man" in St. Thomas which Cajetan records, see Salmanticenses, *In 3* q.1 a.2 comment. n.6.

8. Often for our opinion the *testimonies of the Fathers* are quoted. Nevertheless it does not seem to be certain that the Fathers spoke also *about the absolute power of God* which is the controversial point with the Scotists; nor did they speak about *condign* satisfaction in the way we have explained it. Actually, since the notion itself of satisfaction that we use in the thesis is the fruit of the further *progress of theologians* (see below, thesis 25, n. 632), there can hardly be recourse to the Fathers. On the state of the question in the holy Fathers, see Petavius, 1.2 c.14.

offer condign satisfaction for sin.

I prove the major. The gravity of an *injury* is measured *primarily by the dignity of the offended person*. It is also measured *by the way* in which the offended person is treated dishonorably; and finally on the part of the dishonorable *action* itself, which can be more or less deliberate and intense.

But the value of the *satisfaction*, compensating for the personal injury, is measured *by the dignity of the person satisfying*. It is also measured *by the way* in which the offended person is honored; and finally on the part of the satisfying *action* itself, which can be more or less deliberate and intense.

592. *The foundation of this measuring* is derived from the notion of the *personal injury* and the satisfaction corresponding to it. For a *material* thing, v.gr., money, if it is taken away, it is sufficient for the creditor if the same *material quantity* is returned, independently of the dignity both of the person from whom the material thing was stolen and of the person who restores that quantity.

On the contrary, the common estimation of men judges differently when someone's *honor* has been offended. For the injury is not thought to be on the same level when it is given to a king or to an equal, even though *in reality* it is the same injury, for example, if the same offensive words were used. However the personal dignity of the offended person is not the *only* reason that gives gravity to the injury. For perhaps the injury given to the king in itself is so slight and the one given to an equal is so grave, that this latter is rightly held to be simply more serious. *Primarily*, however, according to the common estimation, the gravity of an injury is measured *by the dignity of the person offended*.

But the value of the satisfaction for the same reason, that is, the compensation of *honor*, *primarily*, although not exclusively, is measured *by the dignity of the person making the satisfaction*, according to the common estimation of men.

593. *I prove the minor.* A grave sin is the greatest injury to God both from the *absolute*, infinite dignity of God and from the *relative* dignity of God towards the offending man, since he is man's Lord and Father; then also because of the way in which God is dishonored, namely, placed below created things, which the sinner prefers as his own last end. And finally on the part of the dishonoring *action*, which in the case of a grave sin is fully deliberate, although certainly in this matter many levels of deliberation, intensity, etc., must be admitted. But the *satisfaction* of a pure creature,

even one endowed with the greatest sanctifying grace, is infinitely distant from God *on the part of personal dignity*, because even by his adoptive sonship he does not cease to be a creature of *finite* dignity (see below, objection 2, n. 596). Therefore *regarding the element* from which *primarily* the gravity of the offense and the value of the satisfaction are measured, there is an *infinite* distance between the injury and the satisfaction.

594. Moreover condign compensation of the divine honor is not apparent *on the part of the objective action* by which the privileged creature would be able to show honor to God. For regarding this element, the dishonor was objectively *infinite*, because God in reference to the last end was placed below the creature. But all the honor that a creature can show to God is objectively *finite*, because *infinitely* great honor is *not* rendered to God if the creature is subject to him not only in the substantial nature of the last end, but also if he observes *perfectly* the will of God in those things that are not even commanded under pain of venial sin.

Therefore although *on the part of the satisfying action* greater deliberation, intensity, persistence, etc., may be admitted, that excel the gravity of the offending action on this level, it is sufficiently evident that this excellence disappears in the presence of the infinite inferiority on the part of the *main elements*, by which men rightly measure both injury and satisfaction.

In this argumentation we wished deliberately to stay away from the disputed question *about the infinity of sin itself*, namely, whether a grave offense against God must be said to be *simply* infinite, or only *in a certain respect*. This matter is covered in the treatise on sin.

595. Objections. 1. There is a big difference regarding personal dignity between a king and a plebeian man. But the possible satisfaction offered by a plebeian subject to the king he has offended can be thought to be of such a nature that any prudent person would consider it as *condign* satisfaction. Therefore from the part of personal dignity *condign satisfaction* that a *pure creature* would offer to God does not appear to be impossible.

I distinguish the major. There is a big difference but it is *infinitely* less than the difference between the personal dignity of God and a creature, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The condign satisfaction that a pure creature would offer to God does not seem to be impossible, if the difference between God and the creature is infinite, *denied*; if it were finite, *I subdistinguish*: condign satisfaction of this kind does not appear to be impossible on the part of the *personal dignity alone*, *I bypass the consequent*; on the part both of the dignity and of the *dishonoring action*, *denied*.

596. 2. By grace man is constituted an adoptive son of God. But between son and Father there cannot be an infinite difference regarding personal dignity. Therefore on the part of personal dignity it is not apparent how a pure creature, endowed with sanctifying grace, is not able to offer God condign satisfaction.

I distinguish the major. He is constituted an adoptive son of God but of a dignity that is *finite*, as also of finite ontological sanctity (see above, thesis 12, scholium 2, n. 262), *conceded*; of *infinite* dignity, *denied*.⁹ *I bypass the minor* which at most would hold true for *human* persons. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

597. 3. Man adorned with grace *merits in the eyes of God in a condign way*. But merit of this kind seems to suppose in man *infinite* personal dignity. Therefore man adorned with grace seems to have infinite personal dignity.

I distinguish the major. Man adorned with grace merits condignly in the eyes of God, that is, he merits uncreated good, *inasmuch as it is absolutely in itself, denied*; he merits uncreated good, *inasmuch as it is freely communicable to a creature, I subdistinguish*: and this is an *infinite* reward, *denied*; a *finite* reward, *conceded*. *I distinguish also the minor.* To merit condignly in the eyes of God, inasmuch as he is absolutely, would suppose an infinite personal dignity, *I bypass the minor*; to merit condignly before God, inasmuch as it is freely communicable to a creature, *I subdistinguish*: if as such it is a finite good, *denied*; if as such it were an infinite good, *conceded*.

598. It is completely repugnant that God, the uncreated good, *inasmuch as he is absolutely in himself*, should fall under the merit of anyone, because as such he is a *simply necessary being*. For this reason no one can merit that God should be nor that the eternal Father should produce a Son equal to himself and other similar things.

But inasmuch as God is an uncreated good *freely communicable to a creature*, he can come under merit condignly. However then this would not be as such an *infinite good*, because one who merits that God communicate himself to him in the beatific vision, does not thereby merit some good for God himself, nor does he merit that some real and uncreated good exist in the nature of things; but he only merits that God in himself in the object determining human cognition, which is not an infinite good.¹⁰

599. 4. Many theologians, even in the Thomistic school, admit that a pure creature can, with the absolute power of God, *condignly merit* the remission of a *grave sin*.¹¹ But if that is so, the weight of the authority of the theologians in favor of our thesis is sufficiently lessened. Therefore not much can be deduced in favor of our thesis from the authority of theologians.

I distinguish the major. In such a way, however, that these theologians admit this *merit* to such an extent that they think there is a substantial difference between *merit*

9. The danger of attributing divine qualities to men is denounced in the recent Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis Christi*": AAS 35 (1943) 234, and see S. Tromp, S.J., *Textus et Documenta* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, ser. Theol. 26, Rome 1943) p. 118.

10. See Suarez, d.4 s.4 n.52f.

11. See Salmanticenses, tr.16 d.6 dub.2 n.54; or Muncunill, n. 77.

and *satisfaction, conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. I distinguish the minor in the same way.

We wished deliberately in our thesis to avoid this question, namely, whether a pure creature could *merit condignly* the remission of a grave sin for a sinner. For this matter is not fully clear and concerning it there is no great consensus among theologians. Moreover it does not detract from the authority of the theologians in favor of our thesis, as we pointed out in the distinction given to the major premise of the objection.

The main reason for the difference between merit and satisfaction seems to be placed by the authors, who admit the absolute possibility of a *condign merit* on the part of a pure creature concerning the remission of a grave sin, in the fact that merit says directly a relation to a reward that is *good for the creature*, for whom God condones or remits the debt of guilt and eternal punishment. Satisfaction however concerns directly *the good of God*, that is, in order to repair the divine honor or to remove the personal injury done to God.

Therefore a greater proportion is required in order to offer *satisfaction* to God than is required to gain *merit* with God, in order that God himself will remit for the creature the guilty state of sin and of eternal punishment.

For some other objections consult Muncunill, n.83-91; Lercher³, n.258.

600. Scholium. *On the possibility of condignly satisfying for venial sin.* Although this question really belongs in the treatise on penance, it will be treated here briefly because of its connection with our thesis. The question is about satisfaction not by the powers of nature but that offered by one who is endowed with sanctifying grace. We prescind here also from the question about satisfaction *according to justice*.

The almost common opinion of theologians *affirms the fact*, that is, that a mere man can offer condign satisfaction for venial sin.

However the difference is not small when it comes to the *explanation* of this fact, as it is proposed in the treatise on penance. According to our case, it seems necessary to say that venial sin is indeed *against God*, and also that it is a *personal offense*. However by the injury God is offended only slightly and he is not so dishonored that a creature is preferred to God in the fundamental divine excellence, by which God is the *last end* of man.

In addition, in many very light sins there is only a *semi-deliberate* voluntariness on the part of the sinner. But the satisfaction for them can be with acts that are very intense and long-lasting.¹²

601. A fundamental difference between grave and light injuries among men is acknowledged by all, even though *the offended person* is the same.

Therefore as a consequence to the doctrine presented above where, in the theological reasoning, n. 591-594, we admit the case in which although there is an infinite distance as to *the personal dignity* between the offended God and the offending creature, nevertheless the satisfaction of a mere creature would be possible by reason of the special lightness *concerning the real act of disrespect*.

12. For other questions about venial sin, see SThS 2² tr.2 n.867-901.

ARTICLE II

ON THE EFFECT OF THE PASSION

Thesis 24. Christ by his passion merited for men all gifts whether of grace or of glory.

S.Th. III, q. 19, a. 3f.; q. 48, a. 1; Suarez, d.39-42; Salmanticenses, d.28.

602. Connection. After St. Thomas considered the passion of Christ, he then treats the *efficient cause* of the passion (q. 47), where he considers many things; some of those points (a. 2) were handled in part by us above (see thesis 18, n. 476f.), and another part (a. 3) will be treated by us below (see thesis 25, n. 644 at 2; see above, thesis 18, scholium 1, n. 487).

The holy Doctor next considers the *effect* of the passion of Christ. Firstly, on the manner of causing; secondly, on the effect itself. Among the six articles in which the treatment of *the manner of causing* is covered, this question occupies the first place: whether the passion of Christ caused our salvation *by way of merit*.

603. Definition of terms. Merit. Since the notion of merit is discussed extensively in the treatise on grace, here it will suffice to touch on it briefly. Merit according to the common understanding of men is defined as: a good work worthy of a reward. Merit can be condign and congruous (*de condigno et de congruo*). *Condign* merit implies some *equality* with the reward, so that *according to justice* a reward is due to it; hence it also gets its name from *the equal dignity of the merit* in reference to the reward.¹ *Congruous* merit does not imply this equality with a reward, but to it a reward is due *out of a certain decency*.

In the thesis we understand merit in the proper sense or as *condign*.

604. The passion of Christ. Here it is understood as the passion that led to his death. Therefore death is not considered *in fact*, but *in becoming* (see S.Th. III, q. 50, a. 6 c).

Christ by his passion merited. These words are assertive, not exclusive. Below, in scholium 1, n. 619, we will explain *at what time* and *by which acts* of his life Christ merited. In the thesis however we are concerned directly with the passion, both because this was the principal work of our

1. See S.Th. I-II, q. 21, a. 3f.; q. 114, a. 1; Cajetan, at this place, q. 114 a.3. In what sense "justice" refers to God will be explained in thesis 26, scholium 3, n. 664f.

redemption and especially suited to our liberation, and because in it our redemption was consummated. We will have a few things to say about this in scholium 2, n. 620.

For men. We are speaking about men *after* they lost original justice in Adam. Moreover we include *all* men, both those who lived *before* the coming of Christ and those who live in the *present* state of the law of grace. But on the way in which the merits of Christ influenced the early Fathers, we will say something below in scholium 6, n. 624. On what Christ merited either *for himself* or *for the angels*, we will discuss below in scholium 3, n. 621f. Likewise, on the question whether the gifts bestowed on *Adam before his sin* came from the merits of Christ, see below in scholium 5, n. 623.

605. *All gifts of grace.* Therefore all the graces, whether they are sufficient or efficacious, were gained for men by the merits of Christ. This includes those that *precede* justification, *first justification itself* with the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, the *sacraments* with all their effects, the other graces that are given after the first justification, namely, stimulating and assisting helps to act well, merit for the increase of grace and the actual increase of grace, satisfaction for venial sins and for temporal punishment, and finally perseverance in grace until the end of life.

With one sentence we can say: Christ merited all the supernatural gifts that lead to our eternal salvation. In what way he also merited *natural* gifts for us will be explained below in scholium 7, n. 625.

606. We say “gifts of grace” in order that we might indicate clearly in the thesis that we are considering only the *granting* or *donation* of graces, while prescinding from the question whether Christ merited the *predestination of efficacious* graces.

If God, as we say in the thesis, in time *gives* the gifts of grace *because of Christ’s merits*, it is evident that God *from eternity decreed* that he would give these gifts because of the merits of Christ.

But there is a further question, which we are deferring to scholium 9, n. 629, about whether the reason *why God* precisely decreed from eternity to confer such grace *on this man*, which *infallibly* will obtain its effect, was because of the *merits of Christ* or only because of the Father’s good pleasure.

607. We suppose the case *of the first efficacious supernatural grace*. All theologians must admit that this first grace was *not* predestined by God *after* the foreseen merits of the one who receives this grace. In this thesis we prove that this first grace is given by God in time because of the merits of Christ; therefore from eternity God *willed* to give

it in this way, that is, to give it *because of the merits of Christ*. But the question still remains: *The choice precisely of this man* to whom such efficacious grace is given—does this come from the merits of Christ or from the mere good will of the Father?

We can explain this distinction by an example from the Old Testament. That the angel did not strike the first-born in the houses in which the blood of the lamb was smeared on the two doorposts and the lintel was due to the blood of the lamb; but that *precisely in these houses* the blood was so smeared was due to the observance of the sons of Israel (see Exod. 12:7.13).

All gifts of glory, namely, *the glory itself* or eternal supernatural happiness and the *increase* of even essential glory.

We will say below in scholium 8, n. 626f., whether Christ merited for men *predestination to glory*.

608. Adversaries. *Some of the early theologians* denied that Christ merited for men certain supernatural gifts that *precede* justification. For it seemed to these authors that our justification is not really “gratis,” if there are dispositions coming *from the merits* of Christ that precede justification.²

609. Doctrine of the Church. A. *Christ merited by his passion.* *The Council of Trent:* “If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam... can be taken away... by any remedy other than the merits of Jesus Christ, who reconciled us with God by his blood” (D 1513). “The causes of this justification are... the meritorious cause... is Jesus Christ who... merited for us justification by his most holy passion on the wood of the cross” (D 1529). See D 1027, 1347.

B. *Christ merited the graces that precede justification.* *The Council of Trent:* “Declares that in adults the beginning of justification must be attributed to God’s prevenient grace through Jesus Christ” (D 1515). Although the word “merit” is not used, but on the supposition of the express doctrine about the *merit* of Christ in this Council, there can hardly be a doubt that the words “through Jesus Christ” are understood to be about the *merit* of Christ. The deliberations conducted during the Council concerning the dispositions needed for justification bring out this point.³

610. *Christ merited justification itself.* Above n. 609. D 1529; see D 1545-1547, 1560).

Stimulating and assisting helps to act well. These are implicitly

2. See Salmanticenses, d.28 dub.8 n.97-101, where further points are mentioned that were considered by the early theologians.

3. See J. Rivière, *Mérite*: DTC 10,737-739.741.

attributed to the merit of Christ by the same *Council of Trent*, inasmuch as it teaches in general that *good works* are done by a just person “through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ” (D 1582). See D 1545-1547).⁴

The increase of grace. The same Council: “If anyone says... that the justified man himself by the good works he performs... through the merits of Jesus Christ... does not truly merit an increase of grace... let him be anathema” (D 1582). Therefore the increase of grace is attributed *mediately* to the merits of Christ.

Satisfaction for the temporal punishment. Trent: “If anyone says, concerning temporal punishment, that no satisfaction is made to God through the merits of Christ...” (D 1713).

Glory itself and the increase of essential glory. Trent: “If anyone says... that the justified man himself by the good works he performs... through the merits of Jesus Christ... does not truly merit... eternal life, and (provided he dies in the state of grace) the attainment of this eternal life, as well as an increase of glory, let him be anathema” (D 1582).⁵ Again these are attributed *mediately* to the merits of Christ. See D 1576.

611. Theological note. A. Christ by his passion *merited* for men. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1513, 1529).

B. Christ merited the *beginning of justification, justification itself, satisfaction for the temporal punishment. Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1515, 1529 [see above, n. 609] D 1713).⁶

Christ merited *the increase of grace, glory itself and the increase of essential glory*. It is *at least Catholic doctrine* (D 1582; regarding the stimulating and assisting helps, *implicitly*: see above, n. 610); for what pertains to our question does not seem to be taught by the Council directly (*in recto*), and therefore there is no certainty about a definition.

Christ merited *the other gifts of grace* (see above, n. 605). This is *theologically certain*, or perhaps *certain in theology*.

4. In what sense *good works* suppose *stimulating and assisting grace*, see F. Hünemann, *Wesen und Notwendigkeit der aktuellen Gnade nach dem Konzil von Trient* (Forschungen zur Christlichen Literatur und Dogmengeschichte, Ehrhard-Kirsch, 15, 4, Paderborn 1926), especially 77-85.

5. On the distinction between “eternal life” and “the attainment of eternal life,” see Lange, *De gratia* n.704.

6. Therefore those older theologians must not be said to be even *material heretics*, that is, the ones we listed as adversaries (see above, n. 608). For they denied only that Christ merited the *imperfect dispositions* that precede justification. See Salmanticenses, d.28 dub.8 n.97. Also, J. Rivière does not believe that anything was *defined* in chapter 7, session 6 at Trent (D 1529): see DTC 13,1919. We however, following the principle according to which even the *Chapter headings* of the Council of Trent are held to be *definitions*, say that this was *defined*.

612. Proof from Holy Scripture. Talk *about the merit of Christ* is not present *expressly* in Holy Scripture. In various ways however the matter itself is proposed, that is, that Christ by his passion performed a work that was very acceptable to God and in virtue of it God has granted men justification and grace and glory. We will explain the *more intimate nature* of this work of Christ in the following theses about satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption.

1) Jesus Christ, *the new Adam*. Just as by the evil deed of one man, that is, sin, all men have been constituted sinners, so also by Christ's work of "justice," that is, his death *out of obedience to the Father*, all are constituted *just*. Rom. 5:12, 18-21; Phil. 2:8.⁷ The death that Christ suffered *because of the command of the Father* could not not be *pleasing to God*. But if the justification that *God* works in us is attributed *to this work* of Christ, it is clearly stated that this justification was obtained by the *merit* of Christ's death.

2) Our justification is attributed to the *blood* of Christ. Rom. 5:9: *Since, therefore, we are now justified by his blood...* See Heb. 13:12. How this "justification" according to the teaching of Holy Scripture brings with it *the remaining gifts of grace and glory*, is proved in the treatise on grace.

613. Proof from tradition. The term itself of "merit" does not seem to have been used by the Fathers, in order to signify that Christ's work for us is meritorious, unless perhaps we make an exception for St. Jerome: "So that we might know that to men the booty was distributed that Christ the victor *merited*."⁸ But since the doctrine *of our justification through the merits of Christ* is really so manifest in Holy Scripture and since the holy Fathers insist so clearly on the *objective* redemption of Christ (as we will show in the following thesis, n. 641f.), it is proper that the very frequent statements of the Fathers about the supernatural gifts be understood as referring *to the merits of Christ*. We receive these gifts "from the grace of Christ" and "through Christ." It is as if the Fathers were saying that the redemptive work of Christ was pleasing to God and that it obtained for us all these gifts. It would be superfluous here to quote the individual texts. See, v.gr., R, Index Theologicus, n. 424f.

Only those texts should be excluded from this interpretation in which it appears that the holy Fathers have in mind either the *example* given to us by Christ or the *doctrine* preached by him or something of this nature.

7. See Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* 109f., 220-223; Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,209-211.

8. *Comment. in ep. Ad Ephes.* 1.2 c.4 v.8: ML 26,529f. See Rivière, *Le mérite du Christ d'après le magistère de l'Eglise à l'époque patristique*: RevScRel 21 (1947) 53-89; Id., *Le mérite du Christ d'après le magistère ordinaire de l'Eglise*: RevScRel 22 (1948) 213-239.

The *liturgical prayers* that often conclude with “through our Lord Jesus Christ” should also be accepted in this sense. Undoubtedly in this formula the idea of Christ’s mediation is present, inasmuch as precisely because of *his merits* he is worthy to be heard by the Father on our behalf.

614. Theological reasoning. A. *The merit of Christ.* The passion of Christ was in itself a *most excellent work*, since it was accepted by Christ out of obedience and love towards the Father and out of love for men (see John 10:17f.; Phil. 2:8; John 14:31; 1 John 3:16). But the passion both from the will of the Father and the intention of Christ was ordained to obtain for us our supernatural *salvation* (see John 3:16f.; Rom. 8:32; Eph. 5:25). Therefore there was nothing lacking so that Christ by his passion could *merit* for us supernatural life. B. *All the supernatural gifts* that lead to our eternal salvation are the *object* of Christ’s merit. It is not necessary to descend to particulars, but it is sufficient to call to mind the general principle of St. Paul: just as Adam is the cause of our ruin, so also Christ is the cause of our “justice.” Therefore nothing that leads to this supernatural justice escapes the influence of Christ. This point will be made clearer in the treatise on grace.⁹

615. Objections. 1. Merit supposes *personal otherness*, so that there is one *who* merits, and another *for whom* one merits. But in Christ there is not one who merits and another for whom he merits. Therefore Christ could not merit.

I distinguish the major. Merit presupposes personal otherness in created beings in which the individual persons have only the same nature, *I bypass the major*; such otherness is of the essence of every meritorious act, so that not even a person having two perfect natures could by the acts of one nature merit in reference to himself as existing in the other nature, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor.* In Christ there is not one who merits and another for whom he merits, in such a way that Christ is a person of the Only-begotten, subsisting in two perfect natures, divine and human, *conceded*; in such a way that Christ is a divine person subsisting in one nature, *denied*.

616. It is not surprising if some things flow from the *mystery* of the hypostatic union that offend our normal way of thinking. In created beings such personal otherness is indeed generally found; but if we bypass that affirmation in the *major premise*, we have done it lest we get involved in the question whether, for example, a created person who conducts himself as two moral persons could, as he is acting as one moral person, not improperly merit something for himself while conducting himself as the other moral person.

But in the one Christ *two perfect natures*, one divine and one human, “having free wills and the proper dominion of their own acts,”¹⁰ come together *in one person*, so that the Word is at the same time true God and true man. Hence *it does not appear to be impossible* that the Word, by actions whose proximate principle is the *human* nature,

9. See P. Glorieux, *Le mérite du Christ selon S. Thomas*: RevScRel 10 (1930) 622-649; Bouessé, *Le Sauveur du monde*, 2. *Le Mystère...* 567-618.

10. Suarez, d.4 s.5 n.13, where other things are found that can help to explain this matter.

should merit for men with the Word subsisting in the *divine* nature.

617. 2. True merit excludes *gratuity*. But we are justified *gratis* or as a gift (Rom. 3:24). Therefore Christ could not truly merit our justification.

I distinguish the major. True merit excludes gratuity with respect to the one who merits, *conceded*; with respect to those who themselves did not merit, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor.* We are justified *gratis*, inasmuch as *we ourselves* in no way merited this justification, *conceded*; inasmuch as *Christ* did not truly *merit* this justification for us, *I subdistinguish*: and this *true merit* of Christ ultimately depended on the *gratuitous* will of the Father, *freely* determining our Redemption by Christ, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

618. 3. The supernatural works of a just man are *condign* for the increase of grace and glory. But they would not be so condign, if Christ *has already merited* for us this increase of grace and glory. Therefore Christ did not merit an increase of grace and glory for the just man.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. If Christ already merited this increase of grace and glory, the merits of a just man would not be an increase of grace and glory *exclusively* condign, *conceded*; *the merits of a just man* could not be with an increase of this kind *inclusively* condign, that is, so that Christ *also* merited this increase condignly, *I subdistinguish*: if the meritorious causality of Christ were *of the same nature* as ours, *I bypass the minor*; if the causality of Christ pertains *to a universal and principal cause*, but our causality pertains *to a particular and subordinate cause*, *denied*.

Therefore the merit of Christ does not exclude ours, nor does ours obscure the merit of Christ (D 1692). Rather, Christ's merit produces ours, like a cause to its effect (D 1691); and ours manifests and illustrates the glory of Christ's merits. For the perfection of Christ's merit shines forth in the fact that it both has its effect and does not exclude our works, merits and satisfactions, but gives them force and efficacy. Thus they can be said to come together as causes of a different kind, universal and proximate, each perfect in its own order.¹¹

You will find other objections in Muncunill, n.922-929.

619. Scholium 1. *At what time and with what actions Christ merited.* According to the almost common opinion of theologians, Christ from the first moment of his conception to the end of his life merited without intermission, but not at the first instant of the separation of his soul from his body nor after his death.¹²

Therefore what is said about some saints, namely, that they did not interrupt their

11. In what sense the increase of grace and glory is due to the merits of Christ *in its root*, see Suarez, d.41 s.3 n.4-7; for more on the question whether our merits have a *special or greater worth* from the merits of Christ, see B. Beraza, S.J., *De gratia Christi* (Cursus theologicus Oniensis, Bilbao 1916) n.1005f. In our explanation a consideration lies hidden, namely, that the merits of a just man are *gifts* of God. P. de Letter, S.J., has a lot to say about this doctrine in St. Thomas, *De ratione meriti secundum Sanctum Thomam* (Analecta Gregoriana, 19, Rome 1939) *passim*.

12. See Muncunill, n. 895-903. However on the opinion of St. Bonaventure, see Editores Quaracchi, *In 3 d.18 n.1 q.1 schol.*

prayer even while sleeping,¹³ a fortiori holds true for Christ the Lord. For Christ in his *per se infused* knowledge was independent of his senses regarding the exercise of this knowledge (see above, thesis 13, n. 268).

Regarding *acts*. Some theologians teach that Christ merited by all the *free* and entitatively supernatural acts of his human will. But the authors disagree over the question whether Christ could merit by his acts *of the love of God*. There are a few who, with Vázquez (*In 3 d.74 c.3*), deny that Christ merited by an act of the love of God.

However there is a great diversity in explaining the *way* in which Christ could merit from the love of God. But this diversity is easily understood, if one supposes what we said above in thesis 18 about the freedom of Christ under a precept, especially n. 467-472.¹⁴

620. Scholium 2. *The relation between the passion and the remaining meritorious acts of Christ.* Setting aside the question about the *infinite* meritorious worth of Christ's works (which we will treat below, thesis 26, n.660-663), according to Catholic doctrine it is necessary to say that the merit of Christ is attributed *in a special way* to the *passion of Christ*, both because it was the principal work of our salvation and because by divine ordination all the merits of Christ were as it were in a process of becoming until they were consummated by his passion; but many fitting reasons are found why God ordained it in this way. *Christ himself* precisely through his passion was made perfect (see Heb.2:10; 5:9).¹⁵

621. Scholium 3. *What Christ merited for himself.* *The fact itself* of the merit of Christ *for himself* pertains to Catholic truth (see, v.gr., Phil. 2:8-11; see above, thesis 18, n. 455). However two *objects* of this merit must be kept especially in mind: one is sanctifying grace and essential glory, while the other is the glory of his body and the exaltation of his name.

Regarding *habitual grace and essential glory* the much more common opinion with St. Thomas (III, q. 19, a. 3 c) holds that Christ did not merit them *de facto*; for merit is only of that which is not yet had, hence one would have to say that Christ at some time did not have them, which cannot be said. It is disputed whether Christ was able absolutely *to merit habitual grace*, but it is very commonly admitted that *he could* merit formal beatitude and *essential glory*.

Regarding *the glory of his body and the exaltation of his name*, St. Thomas argues brilliantly (*loc.cit.*) about the fittingness of this fact—a point that pertains to Catholic doctrine. It must be attributed to Christ that it is more worthy and possible according to the common providence. But what is had through merit is more noble than what is had

13. St. Teresa of Avila, *Vida* c.29 (Biblioteca Mística Carmelitana, I. Obras de Santa Teresa de Jesus... 1,231). St. Alphonsus Rodriguez, S.J., *Vida* (Memoria escrita en julio de 1608). (Obras espirituales del Beato Alonso Rodriguez, S.J., por el P.J. Nonell, S.J. [Barcelona 1885] 1,123). See *ibid.*, 106. See also on St. Francis Xavier, *Monumenta Xaveriana...* (Matriti 1912) 2,708-950.

14. See Muncunill, n.887-894.

15. See S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 3; q. 48, aa. 1 ad 2; Suarez, d.4 s.4 n.44-46. On Heb. 2:10 and 5:9, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,182; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* 2, 39f.118.

without merit. Therefore since it was possible for Christ to merit it, it is necessary to say that Christ merited this for himself.¹⁶

622. Scholium 4. *Whether Christ merited for the angels.* If a few theologians are excepted, like the Salmanticenses (d.28 dub.10 n.148), who think it more probable that Christ had no immediate influence on the angels by way of a meritorious cause, but only by physically illuminating and by acting in an instrumental way, Christ is commonly admitted to have merited *an accidental reward* for the angels. However there is a special difficulty regarding habitual grace, by which the angels were sanctified, and regarding the essential glory by which they are blessed.

In general¹⁷ this question is solved depending on the opinion one has about the motive of the incarnation (see above, thesis 1). It seems to us necessary to say that Christ *did not merit* habitual grace and essential glory for the angels. For that Christ merited these things for angels is something that is not based on the nature of things, but it depends on the free disposition of God. Indeed, that God so disposed things not only is not made known to us through the teaching of Holy Scripture and the Fathers, but rather the contrary is indicated, since the Word is said to have been incarnated *for us men*; therefore the incarnation is presented as a singular benefit of men.

623. Scholium 5. *Whether Christ merited for Adam before his fall.* Here there is approximately the same diversity of opinions as in the preceding question. Nevertheless, the more common opinion rightly denies that the grace of the first parents before their sin was from the merits of Christ. For the documents of revelation which teach that Christ came *to repair* the sin of Adam, seem to exclude that he came to merit for Adam his first elevation to the state of supernatural grace.¹⁸

624. Scholium. 6. *On the nature of the causality by which the merits of Christ influenced men living before his coming.* On the controversy among theologians about whether the merits of Christ had an influence on the ancient Fathers in the nature of a morally efficient cause or only in the nature of a final cause, it seems that the following point should be made. Although perhaps it is for the most part a dispute over words,¹⁹ we think that the merits of Christ conferred grace on the ancient Fathers *in a morally efficient way*, because those merits preceded *in the foreknowledge of God*, who was to bestow as a reward on those ancient Father the gifts of grace, although *in actuality* the reward preceded the merit.

16. See Muncunill, n.904-916. On the opinion of the early scholastics concerning Christ's merit for himself and for others, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...* 2nd part, 2,170-253.

17. Neumeyer shows that the solution of this question *does not always* depend on the solution to the question about the motive of the incarnation, *De Christo Angelorum Capite...* On the doctrine of St. Thomas, see Benoist D'Arzy, *Le Christ et ses Anges...* BullLittEccl (1943) 101-117.

18. See Salmanticenses, d.16 dub.4; Muncunill, n.936-939; Galtier, n.468.

19. See, v.gr., how the Salmanticenses, who defend the influence of a final cause only, respond to their adversaries, d.7 dub.4 n.133. Suarez, who holds for the influence of a *morally efficient cause*, says: "merit... can in its own way have an influence, before it actually exists, if by knowledge it moves the rewarder, in whom it has a certain similarity with the final cause" (d41 s.1 n.8).

625. Scholium 7. *Whether Christ merited natural gifts for men.* Although generally the authors pay more attention to the *supernatural* gifts, still they often attribute natural gifts to the merits of Christ. The Salmanticenses, v.gr., hold that Christ merited for us *all* the effects of predestination, among which are mentioned: “even the very substance by which we exist, and all the natural things pertaining to this universe.”²⁰

It seems that we must say that *all natural things* that *de facto* contribute to the fact that we can perform supernatural good works, are from the merits of Christ, inasmuch as they are conferred from the special intention and ordination to the supernatural end: “for just as we can merit and ask for these things in Christ and through Christ, so also since without merit or our prayers they are given, they can be given because of the merit of Christ.”²¹ This is also demanded by the connection that exists between these natural gifts and our cooperation with grace.

626. Scholium 8. *Whether predestination to glory is from the merits of Christ.* We are supposing knowledge of the doctrine of predestination from the treatise on the One God.

Those who hold for the predestination to glory *after* the foreseen merits conceive this whole question differently. For since the predestination to glory is not given except *after* the foreseen merits of the just, Christ can and must be said to be the meritorious cause of predestination to glory to the extent that he is the meritorious cause of *our good works* by which we merit glory. Christ therefore *in a remote way* is the meritorious cause of our predestination to glory.

Those who hold for the predestination to glory *before* the foreseen merits, have to solve the question whether, for example, Christ not only merited all the *effects* of predestination, but also moved God (in the way in which in the treatise on the One God it is explained that God is moved by created objects) to the *choice* by which he chooses men for glory. This election, in the opinion of these authors, is the *cause* of all the *gifts* of grace and glory which are conferred by God on the one predestined. Among these authors there are two opinions on this matter.

627. A. More commonly these authors hold that Christ merited *predestination itself* for men, and actually inasmuch as predestination includes both *the efficacious intention* of conferring glory on some men and *the comparative choice* of these men before others.

However a few theologians, among whom is Suarez, make a distinction: that singular love, by which God before the foreseen merits of men chooses the predestined for glory, *as it is a choice of these before others*, is *not* from the merits of Christ but from the freedom of the divine will. But that will, by which God chose the predestined, *as it is an efficacious love of them*, had its foundation and nature in the foreseen merits of Christ. Consequently Christ must be said to be the meritorious cause of our predestination, because the entire predestination of the elect is born of this efficacious love of them.

Actually, however, there does not seem to be a big difference between these au-

20. D.28 dub.8 n.92. Otherwise Molina, *In 1* q.23 a.4 and 5 d.2 first conclusion.

21. Suarez, d.41 s.4 n.31.

thors, because all admit that the *ultimate and original* cause of the election of the predestined is not the merits of Christ, but *the gracious purpose of the Father*. This will of the Father moved and directed Christ, so that he would offer his merits especially for precisely these men.²²

The general reason why Christ is said to have merited our predestination is, because it seems to bring out better the *dignity of Christ* the head and redeemer, and no disadvantage follows on the part of our *gratuitous* election by God, as we pointed out recently. Further, since Christ merited all the *effects* of predestination, it is necessary to say that he merited *predestination itself*.

628. B. However there are theologians, among them is Scotus,²³ who hold that God predestined men to glory in an expression of reason (*in signo rationis*) *antecedent* to the prevision of the fall of Adam as absolutely future, and antecedent to the merits of Christ. Therefore the passion of Christ was not efficaciously meritorious either with regard to *the efficacious choice* on the part of God to grace and glory, or with regard to the *absolute conferring* of grace and glory. However the passion of Christ was efficaciously meritorious with regard to *the conferring of grace after the fall*.²⁴

629. Scholium 9. *Regarding predestination to efficacious grace.* In the opinion of those authors who defend predestination to glory before the foreseen merits, this further question about predestination to efficacious grace hardly makes sense, because predestination to glory necessarily includes in it predestination to efficacious grace.

Nevertheless these theologians also must solve the question related to efficacious graces given by God to those who are not predestined.

However the theologians who hold for predestination to glory after the foreseen merits, must give an adequate answer to the question whether, for example, the *efficacious* love, by which God, v.gr., chooses Peter for the grace of faith but not Caius, comes from the merits of Christ or not.

The response must be that such predestination to the grace of faith is surely from the gratuitous good pleasure of the Father, but at the same time also from the merits of Christ. What we explained recently in n. 627 about the predestination to glory before the foreseen merits must be applied to this question also.

22. Suarez, d.41 s.4; Salmanticenses, d.28 dub.8 n.114-116; Gonet, d.24 a.3 n.62; Billuart, diss.22 a.2. Dices 1.; Muncunill, 931. On Malebranche, who in vain tried to illustrate the mystery of human predestination from the *human will* of Christ alone, see D'Ales, 386.

23. In 3 d.19 q.unica, ad "In ista quaestione."

24. See F. Lychetum, *Commentaria* at this place (Vivès, 14,717).

Thesis 25. Jesus Christ by his holy Passion made satisfaction to the offended Father by giving him everything the atonement for the sin of the whole human race demanded.

S.Th. III, q. 48, a. 2; Galtier, th. 31; Lercher¹, n.168-178.

630. Connection. With St. Thomas we have explained in what sense the passion of Christ caused our salvation by way of merit. Now the holy Doctor goes more intimately into the way in which the passion of Christ effected our salvation. In the ruin of the human race there is above all the injury done to God; the result of this is both the hatred of God for sinners and the captivity of man under sin and punishment. Therefore salvation was effected primarily by making satisfaction for the injury inflicted. Consequently that is done *by placating God*, which is what the passion accomplished by way of *sacrifice*, and *by liberating man*, which the passion does by way of *redemption*.

The present thesis is concerned with the efficacy of the passion by way of *satisfaction*. But what St. Thomas covered in one article, namely, the fact of satisfaction and the superabundance of such satisfaction, we will treat in two theses.

631. Definition of terms. Satisfaction. The non-soteriological use. a) The fulfillment of some desire, expectation, etc., *without any connotation of repaying a debt* either material or moral; v.gr., So Pilate *wishing to satisfy the people* (Mark 15:15); b) *the payment of a material debt*, v.gr., provided that the agreement is reached for a reasonable amount of money¹; c) *in connection with a moral debt* or some guilt: and indeed, if the guilt is *only apparent* or imagined, then satisfaction signifies the defense or proof of one's innocence, v.gr., *I cheerfully make my defense* (Acts 24:10); but if the guilt is *true*, satisfaction signifies compensation or expiation which is offered primarily *by the one who committed the offense*, v.gr., "having omitted the prayers and supplications by which the Lord would be placated by a long and continuous satisfaction"²; but this compensation can be made *also by others*, but this meaning appears very rarely in the first centuries, v.gr., "Take care, lest our evil deeds are greater than the abundant satisfaction of the just for us."³

632. The soteriological use. Satisfaction can be taken in two ways: in a dogmatic sense (more general), and in a theological sense (more limited).

1. Cassiodorus, *Variarum* 12,8,2: MGH Auct Ant. 12,366,20; ML 69,861.
2. St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 43,2: CSEL 3,2,592; ML (ep.40) 4,334. On this meaning, which pertains especially to the treatise on Penance, see SThS, vol. 4² tr.4 n.168-187.
3. *Sacramentarium Leonianum* April. N.35; C.L. Feltoe, *Sacramentarium Leonianum* (Cambridge 1896); ML 55,33. For more on this, see A. Deneffe, S.J., *Das Wort satisfactio*: ZkathTh 43 (1919) 158-175. See P. Galtier, *Satisfaction* (as to penance): DTC 14,1129-1190.

In the *dogmatic* sense it is the work of Christ that is accepted by God in atonement for *sin*. In the *theological* sense it is the work of Christ that is accepted by God especially in atonement for his *injured honor*. Why we have said that the work of Christ has worth *especially* as atonement for the divine honor will become clear from what we present below in thesis 27, particularly in n. 699. The theological meaning of satisfaction is only a way of making explicit the idea of “sin.” For rightly St. Anselm and later theologians consider sin to be precisely a *personal* offense, and they concentrate consequently in sin mainly on the injury to God’s *honor*.⁴

In this thesis we take satisfaction *in the dogmatic sense*; in the following theses 26 and 27 we direct our attention to the theological sense and we will investigate the more intimate nature of the sorrowful satisfaction of Christ, especially in thesis 27. In the dogmatic sense therefore satisfaction is not directed explicitly to the atonement of *honor*. Our thesis states just the general fact, namely, that Christ offered a certain work to the offended Father that atoned for our sins. Below in thesis 29, scholium 1, n. 743, we will explain the relation between the various connected concepts of merit, satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption.

633. *The offended Father.* An offense of this kind on the part of God is not considered precisely *as dishonor*, which pertains to the *theological* sense of the word “satisfaction”; but we are considering the offense of God in a more general way as aversion or indignation existing in God, from whatever cause such aversion might proceed.

The sin of the human race. In this thesis we do not specify the nature of this sin, whether only original or also actual. In thesis 1, n. 15, with St. Thomas we explained that Christ became incarnate to take away both original and actual sin. Sin of this kind of the human race is proposed as the reason for the divine offense.

Everything demanded. We say this in an assertive way, that is, in an inclusive and not an exclusive sense. In the following thesis we will treat the measure of compensation and we will say that it was *greater* than what the sin required.

The atonement. In theses 26 and 27 we will treat the intimate nature of this atonement, that is, the restoration of the injured divine *honor* together with the *penal* expiation.

634. *Adversaries.* Among those who deny the thesis *directly*, Abelard is to be mentioned especially. He mainly, it seems, in a dialectic way, taught

4. See Rivière: DTC 13,1942-1951; D’Ales, 319-326.

that the redemption is the greatest love for us by the passion of Christ, and he recalls how Christ instructed us “both by word and by example.”⁵ Hence it came about that he is considered by many as the first who understood the redemption not as objective but as *merely subjective*.⁶

The *Socinians* deny the satisfaction of Christ expressly, and they reduce his salvific work to the fact that Christ “announced to us the way of eternal salvation, confirmed it and in his own person manifestly showed it both by the example of his life and by rising from the dead.” Recent *liberal Protestantism* has much to say about the salvation of men by Christ, but only inasmuch as the perfect holiness of Christ stirs up in us a consciousness of sin and at the same time destroys in us the domination of sin; the death of Christ was nothing more than the supreme revelation of human iniquity and divine love.⁷

635. *Modernism* says that Jesus did not teach the dogma of an atoning death. Such dogma is a Greek development of the concept according to which the Messiah was the herald and mediator of immortality and the happiness flowing from it. St. Paul and the author of the fourth Gospel perfected this development, which then St. Athanasius and other Doctors of the Church built into a perfect system.

Hermes thought that Jesus suffered so much and died in order that the ineffable love of God and at the same time the gravity of sin might be demonstrated as it were before the eyes of men. Since there was no offense against God, his justice did not demand any satisfaction. Günther speaks rather obscurely.⁸

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5. *Comment. in epist. ad Rom.* 1.2: ML 178,836. See J.G. Sikes, *Peter Abailard* (Cambridge 1932); C. Ottaviano, *Pietro Abelardo. La vita, le opere, il pensiero* (Rome 1931). On the fundamental theological position of Abelard, see J. Cottiaux, *La conception de la théologie chez Abelard*: *RevHistEcll* 28 (1932)247-295, 533-551, 788-828. More severely than these authors Rivière judges the doctrine of the redemption in Abelard: *DTC* 13,1944ff.; the same author explains this more extensively in his work, *Le dogme de la Rédemption au début du moyen âge* (Paris 1934) 103-129 (under the same title this material appeared in the form of an article in *RevScRel* 12 [1932] 362-388).
 6. See Rivière: *DTC* 13,1944f. On those who are opposed to the thesis indirectly, see Rivière: *DTC* 13,1915-1917. On the Pelagians not to be numbered among adversaries, see J. Rivière, *Hétérodoxie des Pélagiens en fait de rédemption?*: *RevHistEcll* 41 (1946) 5-43 (Id., *Le dogme... théologie contemporaine* 97-132).
 7. F. Socinus, *De Iesu Christo Salvatore* c.1 (A. Wissowatius, Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Amsterdam 1936, 1). See Rivière: *DTC* 13,1953f. For more on Socinianism, see L. Cristiani, *Socinianisme*: *DTC* 14,2326-2334. On liberal Protestantism, see Rivière: *DTC* 13,1955-1957. On F. Schleiermacher, who had the greatest influence and proposed the redemption as the essence of Christianity, see L. Cristiani, *Schleiermacher*: *DTC* 14,1501-1508.
 8. See J. Bessmer, S.J., *Philosophie und Theologie des Modernismus* (Freiburg i.Br. 1912) 33; further, 357-365. G. Hermes, *Christkatholische Dogmatik* (edit. Achterfeldt-Braun, 1836) 2,348ff. See A. Thouvenin, *Hermes*: *DTC* 6,2299. For more, Kleutgen, *Die Theologie des Vorzeit* 3, n.390-396. On Günther, see Kleutgen, *op.cit.*, 3, n.400. More, *ibid.*, n.397-401. More in general, see A. Eröss, *Die Lehre von der Erlösung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1937).

More recently I. de Montcheuil explained the nature of sin in such a way that he said *it is not a real offense against God*, since God is too exalted to be able to be dishonored by the filth of sin. Satisfaction, therefore, which the Church teaches us was offered by Christ to the Father, consists in this that the Savior, as the first fruit of the human race, wished to suffer and die on the cross in order to introduce us to the way of purification, through which each one of us must travel, if he hopes to be united with the most pure God.⁹

Positive Christianity attacks the satisfaction of the passion of Christ in a more radical way. It extols the “life” of the Savior only and does not wish to know anything about the passion of Christ, since suffering and death are something peculiar to “negative” Christianity. Moreover the concept itself of satisfaction can have no meaning for those who, rejecting the physical integrity of their own nature, ridicule the notion of original sin and all sin.¹⁰

636. Doctrine of the Church.¹¹ *The Council of Trent* designates our Lord Jesus Christ as the meritorious cause, who “merited for us justification by his most holy passion on the wood of the cross” (D 1529). In the context the discussion is precisely about the remission of sins; hence this satisfaction is proposed as atonement for the sins of men.

The same Council, while treating the necessity and effects of sacramental satisfaction, says that penitential works have value in the eyes of the offended God for the remission of sin. On this occasion it compares our satisfactions with the satisfaction of Christ, “who made satisfaction for our sins” (D 1690). Our satisfactions get their efficacy from the satisfaction of Christ and “by him they are offered to the Father, and through him they are accepted by the Father” (D 1691; see 1713f.). Hence it is that from our satisfactions of this kind the value “of the merit and satisfaction of our Lord Jesus Christ” is in no way obscured or diminished (D 1692).

Against the Socinians, see Paul IV (D 1880). Against the modernists,

9. See I. de Montcheuil, *Leçons sur le Christ* (Paris 1949) c.9f. On the teaching of this work and on the “preceding” ideologues and at the same time on its refutation, see J. Solano, S.J., *Actualidades cristológico-soteriológicas*: EstEcl 24 (1950) 43-69. On Montcheuil and the other authors who during the past 25 years taught something similar, see Basilio de San Pablo, C.P., *Irenismo en Soteriologia...* in *XI Semana Española de Teología* (Madrid 1952) 455-503. On this fundamental principle, namely, that sin is not a real offense against God, see SThS 2² tr.2 n.851. F. Bourassa hardly pays attention to the element of true and proper satisfaction offered by Christ for sin, *Verum sacrificium*: ScEcl 3 (1950) 146-182; 4 (1951) 91-139. For the whole question concerning sin, see H. Rondet, S.J., *Bemerkungen zu einer Theologie der Sünde*: GLeb 28 (1955) 28-44, 106-116, 194-208.
10. A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythos der 20 Jahrhunderts*³⁹⁻⁴⁰ (Munich 1934) 78.71. See the refutation regarding our question in *Studien zum Mythos des XX Jahrhunderts Kirchlicher Anzeiger für die Erzdiözese Köln*, November 1934. Amtliche Beilage, 92-94. On modern objections to redemption, see J.P. Wroe, *The Atonement and the Modern Mind* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1939).
11. On the doctrine more implicit of the symbols of faith, see Rivière: DTC 13,1916.

St. Pius X in the decree "*Lamentabili*" (D 3438).

637. Leo XIII in his *Encyclical on Jesus Christ the Redeemer*: "the only-begotten Son of God became man, and in behalf of mankind made most abundant satisfaction in his Blood to the outraged majesty of his Father and by the infinite price he redeemed man for his own... When Jesus Christ had blotted out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, fastening it to the cross, at once God's wrath was appeased... God's favor was won back" (see D 1514f.).¹² Pius XI in his *Encyclical "Misericordissimus Redemptor"* has much to say on this, v.gr.: "We must need make satisfaction to God the just avenger, 'for our numberless sins and offenses and negligences'... But no created power was sufficient to expiate the sins of men, if the Son of God had not assumed man's nature... Yet, though the copious redemption of Christ has abundantly forgiven us all offenses...to the praises and satisfactions, 'which Christ in the name of sinners rendered unto God' we can also add our praises and satisfactions, and indeed it behooves us so to do."¹³

Pius XII in his *Encyclical "Humani generis"* among the "novelties," which have already produced "poisonous fruits," says: "... the notion of original sin... is perverted, along with the idea of sin in general, as an offense against God, and likewise the idea of the satisfaction offered by Christ for us."¹⁴ And the same Pontiff writes in his *Encyclical "Sempiternus Rex"*: "Truly the Word suffered in his flesh and shed his blood on the cross and paid for us sinners to the Eternal Father the superabounding price of our satisfaction. Hence it is that the certain hope of salvation sheds its light...."¹⁵

The ordinary magisterium proposes clearly this truth as what must be believed as divinely revealed. *Vatican Council I* intended to define it solemnly: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God himself, by suffering and dying in his assumed flesh, could make satisfaction to God for our sins or truly and really did make such satisfaction, and merited for us grace and glory, let him be anathema." "Likewise we condemn as heretical doctrine, if anyone says that the Word of God himself through his assumed human nature did not truly make satisfaction for us to the offended God...."¹⁶

12. ASS 33 (1900-1) 275.

13. AAS 20 (1928) 169f. See *ibid.*, 171.

14. AAS 42 (1950) 570.

15. AAS 43 (1951) 640.

16. CL 7,566 c; 515 c. For more, *ibid.*, 543a-544b; 562a b d. For the Catholic doctrine in the *Roman Catechism*, see 1,5,11f.15.

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith.*¹⁷

638. Proof from Holy Scripture. *O.T.* Isa. 52:13—53:12.¹⁸ Before the prophecy of Isaiah not only was the idea of the *solidarity* of the chosen people familiar to the Israelites, but they also knew that *the intercession of the just man for the unworthy* had great value in the eyes of God.¹⁹

That the servant of the Lord in Isaiah is Jesus Christ is certain both from the teaching of the N.T, from the context, and from the interpretation of the holy Fathers who apply this prophecy in the literal sense to Jesus.²⁰

In this prophecy the greatest moral and physical suffering is expressed and also the death itself of the Messiah (52:14; 53:2-13) as a passion not for his own sins, since he is innocent (53:9), but for the sins of others (53:4-6.8.12). God himself is said to be the author of this passion (53:4.6 and perhaps 10), but the fruit of it is the salvation of men (53:5.11).²¹

Therefore Isaiah explains that the Messiah, by his passion and death, offered in behalf of sinners something to the offended God that was able to atone for the sins of men. But this is the dogmatic concept of satisfaction. Therefore Christ by his most holy passion made satisfaction to God.

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17. On the different qualifications of this thesis among recent authors, see J. Rivière, *Sur la "satisfaction" du Christ*: BullLittEccl 35 (1934) 173f.
18. On the songs about the servant of the Lord in Isaiah, see J. Knabenbauer, S.J.,-F. Zorell, S.J., *Commentarius in Isaiam Prophetam* (Cursus Scripturae Sacrae) 2² (Paris 1923) 361-363 and in the commentary on these pericopes; J.S. van der Ploeg, O.P., *Les chants du serviteur de Jahvé* (Paris 1936); J. Fischer, *Das Buch Isaias* (Bonnerbibel) 2nd part (1939) at this place, where an almost complete bibliography is found; H. Cazelles, *Les Poèmes du Serviteur. Leur place, leur structure, leur théologie*: RechScRel 43 (1955) 5055, where there is a further bibliography. In general, on the "servant of Yahweh," see G. Kittel-G. Friedrich, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum N.T.* 5 (1954) 653-713. H. Kruse, S.J., skillfully makes use of the preceding works and variant readings that were in the manuscript recently found at the Dead Sea, in order to construct a very exact Latin version of these songs, *Carmina Servi Jahve*: VerDom 29 (1951) 193-205, 286-295, 334-340. For Isa.53:9, see J.M. González Ruiz, *Una profecía de Isaias sobre la souffrant dans la littérature rabbinique* (Paris 1940). A. Feullet, P.S.S., *Richesses du Christ "Serviteur de l'Eternel"*: RechScRel 35 (1948) 412-441. V. De Leeuw, *De koninklijke verklaring van de Ebed-Jahweh-Zangen*: EphThLov 28 (1952) 449-471. On the *literally* messianic character, Id., *Le Messianisme du Livre d'Isaïa. Ses Rapports avec l'Histoire et les Traditions d'Israel*: RechScRel 32 (1939) 203-228.
19. See A. Médebielle, *Expiation*: DBS 3,112. See especially *ibid.*, 81-90. Heinisch, *Theologie...* 316. On *substitution*, see S.H. Hooeke, *The Theory and Practice of Substitution*: VetTest 2 (1952) (on this article, see VerDom 32 [1954] 167).
20. In the N.T., v.gr., Mark 15:28; Luke 22:37; Acts 8:30-35; 1 Pet. 2:22.24. On the holy Fathers, see A. Condamin, S.J., *Le livre d'Isaïe* (Paris 1905) 326-330. For more testimonies of the holy Fathers, see H. Kilbert, *Analysis biblica*² (Paris 1856) 1,383-385. On the *context itself*, see Ceuppens, *De prophetiis messianicis...* 318-339. Médebielle: DBS 3,92-97. More briefly, Heinisch, *op.cit.*, 317-319; Galtier, n.455. How the Jewish authors interpreted this text about the Messiah, who would suffer and die in order to expiate the sins of Israel and so enter into his glory, is carefully explained by H. Hegermann, *Jesaja 53 in Hexapla, Targum und Peschitta* (Güttersloh 1954).
21. For more on the expiatory satisfaction of the Messiah in the O.T., see Médebielle: DBS 3,100-112; J. Rivière, *Expiation et Rédemption dans l'ancien Testament*: BullLittEccl 47 (1946) 3-22 (in addition to the brief introduction in *Le dogme... théologie contemporaine* 315-332).

639. *N.T.* Prescinding from the ideas of redemption and sacrifice, which abundantly prove our *present* thesis, but which we will treat in their own theses, the following texts from St. Paul are the most important: 1) Rom. 5:10f. 2) Rom. 3:21-26.²²

1) Rom. 5:10f.: *For if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, now that we are reconciled, shall we be saved by his life. Not only so, but we also rejoice in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received our reconciliation.*²³ Through the death of Christ an essential change has been introduced concerning relations between God and men: they were “enemies,” that is, an object of aversion on the part of God, and therefore they were lying under the “wrath” of God (see Eph. 2:3; 5:6; Col. 3:6); the blood of Christ brought peace, and men were saved from the wrath by Christ (see Rom. 5:9). Lying under this conception as a fundamental idea is that sin is what justly made God turned away from man and placed him under the wrath of God: however the death of Christ was the work that brought about reconciliation by destroying the cause of the hostility, namely, sin. Thus the death of Christ is that which has value with the offended God for the atonement of sin, or in other words, it is satisfaction in the dogmatic sense. See also 2 Cor. 5:18-21.

640. 2) Rom. 3:21-26: *But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law... since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God's righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins; it was to prove at the present time that he himself is righteous and that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus.*²⁴ After St. Paul had shown in the two previous chapters that both Jews and pagans lie under the dominion of sin, incapable of obtaining salvation, he proposes the central thesis of his soteriology: the wonderful transformation of the sinner through the gratuitous gift of

22. Although *ἁσθήριον* in St. Paul also means a *sacrifice*, here we are using this text both because the word itself does not necessarily carry with it the idea of sacrifice and also because the expiatory aspect greatly concerns us in this thesis.

23. See Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,259-266; Lagrange, *Épître aux Romains* 104; Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 345-351; J. Dupont, O.S.B., *La réconciliation dans la théologie de Saint Paul* (Bruges-Paris 1953); M. Meinertz, *Theologie des neuen Testaments* [Bonnerbibel] (Bonn 1950) 2,102-104.

24. See Prat, *op.cit.*, 1,242-247, 504-507; 2,219f.; Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 72-78; Médebielle: DBS 3,162-174; Bover, *Las epistolas de San Pablo* at this place; Id., *Teología de San Pablo* 124-151, 374-377. Otherwise than the preceding, S. Lyonnet, S.J., *De Iustitia Dei in Epistola ad Romanos* 3,25-26: *VerDom* 25 (1947) 129-144, 193-203, 257-263, where also a history of the exegesis on “the justice of God” in this text is proposed.

justification is the fruit of the expiation (ἱλαστήριον, that is, the memorial or the instrument of expiation) which Jesus obtained from God. That God is conceived by St. Paul as *offended* from the fact that this expiation of Christ *tends towards the reconciliation* of God with men.²⁵

1 John 2:2: *and he is the expiation (ἱλασμός) for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world.* 1 John 4:10: *and sent his Son to be the expiation for our sins.*²⁶

641. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers. St. Ambrose has both the subject of the thesis and the word “satisfaction.”²⁷ But many give expression to the matter in different ways. For they say: 1) By the death of the second Adam we have been reconciled with the offended God. St. Irenaeus: “[God] we had indeed offended in the first Adam... In the second Adam, however, we are reconciled, being made obedient even unto death. For we were debtors to none other than to Him whose commandment we had transgressed at the beginning” (R 255).

2) The Father put our sins in Christ in order that we might be healed by his death. St. Justin: “For the whole human race will be found to be under a curse... If, then, the Father of all wished His Christ for the whole human family to take upon him the curse of all... If His Father wished Him to suffer this, in order that by His stripes the human race might be healed...” (R 140). St. Cyprian: “He alone can grant pardon for sins which were committed against Him, who bore our sins, who grieved for us, whom God delivered up for our sins” (R 552).

642. 3) The innocent Christ took our sins and destroyed them by his passion. Origen: “But this man comes for the people more pure than all living things. He assumed our sins and infirmities, as one who was able to solve and consume and destroy all the sins of the whole world taken unto himself, since he did no sin, nor was any deceit found on his lips, nor did he commit any sin” (R 482). Aphraates: “Our Savior, the great King, restored the rebellious world to grace with his Father; and since we were sinners, he bore the sins of all of us” (R 691). St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “Christ took our

25. This remains true in the two more common explanations of Catholics of the term δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. See Médebielle: DBS 3,173f. Also, in the explanation proposed by Lyonnet who interprets ἱλαστήριον as “a propitiation” of the Old Covenant “in which the *sacrifice of expiation*, the most solemn of all sacrifices, attains its efficacy” (*op.cit.*, 143 note). For more about ἱλαστήριον, see J. Moraldi, *Sensus vocis ἱλαστήριον in Rom. 3,25*: VerDom 26 (1948) 257-276; L. Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans la théologie de saint Paul* (Lectio divina, 6, Paris 1951) 114f.

26. See A. Rivera, C.M.F., *Cristologia Yoanea extraevangélica. La redención en las epistolas y en el Apocalipsis de S.Juan* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1939) 22-24; Meinertz, *Théologie...* 2,287-290.

27. *In ps. 37*, 53: ML 14,1036. There is more in Galtier, n. 480.

sins in His body on the tree, that we by His death might die to sin, and live unto righteousness” (R 831).

4) He became a curse in order to free us from a curse. St. Jerome: “he became weak or was made infirm because of ours sins, and he was made a curse for us in order to free us from a curse” (R 1401).²⁸

In the liturgies. After St. Ambrose the word “satisfaction” for the work of Christ occurs for the first time in the *mozarabic liturgy*.²⁹ But the *idea* is very frequent in the *liturgies*, which repeat and develop the ideas of Holy Scripture.

The teaching of the *theologians* will become very clear from what is said in the next thesis, where it will be shown *regarding the fact* of satisfaction that all theologians are agreed, although they do disagree concerning the *extent* of this satisfaction.

643. Theological reasoning. The dogma on original sin has already shown that the *Father* was justly offended by men. On the other hand, *Christ by his passion has truly made satisfaction to the Father*. For “he properly atones for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense.”³⁰ But why precisely the *passion* of Christ had this satisfactory value was suggested above in thesis 24, n. 604. Moreover, the passion of Christ not only freed us *objectively* but it is also an aid in many ways to our *subjective* redemption. See S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 3 c.

644. Objections. 1. Between one who satisfies and the one to whom satisfaction is made there must be a difference. But Christ satisfying and God to whom satisfaction is made is one and the same. Therefore Christ could not make satisfaction to God.

I distinguish the major. Such difference that supposes two persons where, as always happens outside of this case, one person subsists in one nature, *I bypass the major*; where one person subsists in two natures, *denied*. See above, thesis 24, objection 1, n. 615f.

2. It is unjust to impose punishment on an innocent person. But the innocent Christ suffered such punishment. Therefore injustice seems to be approved in Catholic doctrine.

I distinguish the major. It is unjust to impose on an innocent person punishment in the strict sense, *conceded* (see S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 7 c; a. 8 c); punishment in the

28. On penal expiation in the Fathers, see Rivière: DTC 13,1941, where this idea is said to be “as it were a common notion in all Christian antiquity.” For more on this, see below in thesis 27.

29. J. Rivière, *Sur les premières applications du terme “satisfactio” a l’oeuvre du Christ*: BullLittEccl (1924) 361-365. We refer to this liturgy with the common name of “mozarabic”; see however L. Brou, O.S.B., *Liturgie “Mozarabe” ou liturgie “Hispanique”?*: EphLitur 63 (1949) 66-70.

30. S.Th. III, q. 48, a. 2 c.

improper sense, that is, sorrowful satisfaction, *I subdistinguish*: if the innocent person does not offer himself voluntarily as a substitute for the guilty, *conceded*; if he offers himself voluntarily, *I subdistinguish again*: this would be illicit for a judge who does not have direct control over the life of the innocent, which is the case with a human judge, *conceded*; for a judge who has such control, that is, for God, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor*. Christ was really punished, *denied*; he made painful satisfaction, *I subdistinguish*: after he freely and licitly offered himself as a substitute for the guilty to God who has direct control over human life, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

645. 3. St. Augustine writes: “but why he [Christ] wished to suffer all those things in the flesh taken from the womb of a woman is something hidden in his own wisdom.”³¹ But this indicates that at the time of St. Augustine it was still not known that the passion of Christ was one of *satisfaction*. Therefore the idea of the *satisfaction* of Christ by his passion was introduced late into the Church.

I accept the text and I explain. St. Augustine in this chapter is dealing with the speculative question why Christ willed to suffer *in flesh assumed from a woman*, and not in flesh formed from the earth, as the flesh of Adam was, or in flesh created out of nothing or in flesh formed in some other way. This being the case, *I distinguish the major*. St. Augustine says that he does not know the cause why Christ suffered, *denied*; the cause why he suffered precisely in flesh assumed *from a woman*, *conceded*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way*.³²

646. Scholium 1. Vicarious satisfaction. The term “vicarious” does not seem to have been associated with the word “satisfaction” until the beginning of the 19th century,³³ although already in the *mozarabic liturgy* it was applied to the satisfactory work of Christ.³⁴ The term “vicarious satisfaction” occurs often in the *acts of Vatican Council I*.³⁵ But the matter itself is as old in the tradition of the Church as the satisfaction itself of Christ. For the work of Christ who is totally innocent is proposed as atonement for the sin of the *human race*, just as we proved in the thesis and will become more apparent in the following theses. Let it suffice here to say that the notion of substitution, indeed of solidarity and a certain identity between Christ and men is a central point in the teaching of St. Paul, who also says that Christ the Lord was made *sin* for us (2 Cor. 5:21; see above, thesis 15, objection 1, n. 354) and a *curse* (Gal. 3:13).³⁶

647. Scholium 2. The love of the offended Father in Christ's satisfaction. Two

31. *Contra Faust.* 26,7: CSEL, 25,1,736; ML 42,483.

32. See DTC 13,1935. In the same place in column 1934 some other difficulties from the holy Fathers are cited.

33. See Deneffe, *Das Wort satisfactio*: ZkathTh 43 (1919) 174.

34. See Rivière, *Sur les premières applications...*: BullLittEccl (1924) 364f.

35. See Deneffe, *loc.cit.*

36. See Prat, *LaThéologie...* 2,233-236 (where the dangers of exaggeration in the theory of substitution are indicated) 240-250; Bover, *Teologia...* 353-377; Médebielle: DBS 3,175-185 (he conceives the matter somewhat differently than the preceding authors). More theologically, E. Hocedez, S.J., *Notre solidarité en J.C. et en Adam*: Greg 13 (1932) 373-403. D'Ales gathers more information under the express concept of *vicarious satisfaction*, thesis 21,303-341.

truths flow immediately from this thesis: namely, that the Father, who was offended and turned away from the human race, is the same Father who sent his own Son in order to avert his indignation. This explains the infinite love of the Father for men, which caused the amazement of the beloved Disciple. *For God so love the world that he gave his only Son... For God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him* (John 3:16f.). Rightly St. Thomas writes: "And this [i.e., God giving his Son in satisfaction] came of more copious mercy than if he had forgiven sins without satisfaction" (III, q. 46, a. 1 ad 3).³⁷

37. On God the Father sending his Son, according to the teaching of St. John, see B. Bardessono, S.M., *L'antitesi di "peccato" e di "redenzione" e la sintesi della "salvezza" in San Giovanni*: DivThom (Pi) 15 (1938) 3-5; according to the teaching of St. Paul, see Prat, *op.cit.*, 2,91-97, 191-198.

Thesis 26. The satisfaction, which Christ by his passion offered to the offended Father for the sins of the human race, was not only intrinsically condign but also superabundant.

S.Th. III, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2; Suarez, d.4 s.3.

648. Definition of terms. *Satisfaction.* Having already supposed the dogmatic sense, in this thesis we will concentrate on the *theological* sense of this term (see thesis 25, n. 632). Therefore satisfaction is the work of Christ that has the greatest value in the eyes of God (see above, n. 622) *for the atonement of injured honor.*

De facto this work of Christ was especially (see above, thesis 24) his sorrowful passion.

In the following thesis we will explain the more intimate nature of the sorrowful passion of Christ, that is, *whence* the power came to this sorrowful passion in order to make atonement for the injured honor of God.

649. *Condign satisfaction* is that by which the offended person is thought to accept morally as much honor as he lost by the offense.

In this thesis we understand condign satisfaction as being sufficient *intrinsically in a quantitative way*, as we explained above in thesis 23, n. 586f.

However we do not say that Christ's satisfaction was *efficacious* independently of its acceptance by God. For it was a *vicarious* satisfaction, which however is not valid unless the offended person admits that he is satisfied by a substitution of this kind.

The satisfaction that exceeds the offense is said to be *superabundant*, or is thought to be a *greater* honoring of God than the dishonor of God caused by sin. Therefore it exceeds the compensation due for all and even the most serious sins.

650. Adversaries. *The Nominalists* and *many Scotists* taught that the *value or worth* of satisfactory works depends *only* on their acceptance by God.

In particular concerning the satisfaction of Christ, some theologians, like Gabriel Biel and Durandus, said that it was not *essentially condign* but

only because of its acceptance by God.¹

These authors insist on the fact that the satisfactory acts of Christ were acts of Christ *as a man* or acts performed *by reason of his human nature*.

651. Theological note. *It is a morally certain doctrine and very common among theologians that the satisfaction of Christ is intrinsically condign and superabundant.*²

652. Proof from Holy Scripture. Since the texts that prove especially the *high value* of satisfaction (i.e., 1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23), will be explained below in thesis 29, n. 733, it will be sufficient now to explain the *superabundance* of Christ's satisfaction.

Rom. 5:15-21: *But the free gift is not like the trespass. For if many died through one man's trespass, much more have the grace of God and the free gift in the grace of that one man Jesus Christ abounded for many... For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous....*

The Apostle had explained already in chapter 5:1-11 that Christ had reconciled us with God by his death (see above, thesis 25, n. 639). But in searching for the cause why this reconciliation was accomplished by the mediation of one man, he mentions the historical fact that *also one man* was the cause of the enmity between God and men.

On this occasion, St. Paul made a comparison between the fount from which evils flowed (το παράπτωμα) with the fount of good things (το χάρισμα) *in themselves*, that is, according to their own nature and efficacy (v. 15), in order that from thence he might show that from a more powerful cause also come more powerful *effects*.

Therefore, according to the Apostle, the work of justice (v. 18) and obedience of Christ (v.19) have *much more* power to save than the sin of Adam has to condemn.³

653. That the concern in this text is about the *satisfaction* of Christ is

1. On the Nominalists and Scotists. See the Editors of the works of St. Bonaventure (Quaracchi, *In 3 d.20 q.5 schol.* In the same place it is pointed out how Scotus himself did not hold this opinion: this is proved extensively by Minges, 2, n.588-594; see also Dettloff, W., O.F.M., *Die Lehre von der acceptatio divina bei Johannes Duns Scotus...* (Werl-Westf. 1954). Biel, *In 3 d.19 q.1.* Durandus, *In 3 d.20 q.2.* Moreover, it is easily made clear that this idea about dignity coming *from an extrinsic source* is intimately connected with the Scotistic doctrine about *supposition* from an analysis of the principle: "actions pertain to suppositums": see Van de Woestyne, *Cursus philosophicus...* 2², *Ontologia* 250.
2. Suarez, (d.4 s.3 n.11) wrote: "I think it is so certain [our opinion] that the contrary seems to be neither probable nor pious nor sufficiently in conformity with faith."
3. See Cornely, at this place (*Cursus Sacrae Scripturae*); Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,259-263; Bover, *Teologia...* 757.766-777.

easily deduced from what we presented in thesis 25, n. 639f.

That this satisfaction is *superabundant* not only with regard to *original* sin but also to all *actual* sins is stated by St. Paul in v. 16: *And the free gift is not like the effect of that one man's sin. For the judgment following one trespass brought condemnation, but the free gift following many trespasses brings justification.*

St. Paul of course does not say that the work of Christ is to be understood as *satisfactory in the theological sense* (more strictly) (see above, n. 648), but it is the legitimate fruit of later theological reflection.

It is sufficiently indicated that the superabundance of this satisfaction is *something intrinsic to it*, because the compensation for the offense is attributed to the *work* of Christ, that is, to his obedience, *just as* our ruin and the offense against God is attributed to the disobedience of Adam (v. 19). Also, St. Paul does not utter a word about the superabundance of satisfaction coming *from the acceptance of God*. Therefore it is necessary to say that the work of Christ *in itself* is effective in the eyes of St. Paul as a superabundant compensation for sin.

654. The superabundance of Christ's satisfaction is also proved by the trust with which in Holy Scripture the remission of all sins is attributed to the blood of Christ (see, v.gr., Tit.2:14; 1 John 1:7; 2:1f.), with no trace of fear that there could be so many and such great sins that they would *exhaust* the satisfactory power of the work of Christ. Therefore Christ's satisfaction is not only sufficient for all sins, but it is also superabundant.

655. Proof from tradition. Since the *great dignity* and *superabundance* of Christ's satisfaction is proved by many texts of the holy Fathers, in which they extol either the satisfaction itself (see above, thesis 25, n. 641f.) or the sacrifice and redemption of Christ (see below, thesis 28, n. 712f.; thesis 29, n. 736-741), and this is not denied by the adversaries, it will suffice to mention the reason why these texts about dignity and superabundance must be understood *in an intrinsic way*.

In these texts the holy Fathers attribute the reconciliation of men with God *to Christ himself*; in fact they also say that the work of Christ is the *price* (below, thesis 29, n. 737f.), which is understood essentially as having an equal value *in itself* with the matter to be emended; or they emphasize the necessity of Christ's sacrifice because of the *insufficiency* of the sacrifices of the O.T. Therefore the Fathers seem to focus on the *intrinsic* value of the work of Christ, not on some extrinsic value coming from God's acceptance.

656. Theological reasoning. As a result of what we said above in thesis 23, n. 591-594, it is necessary to say that Christ's satisfaction is intrinsically and in its greatness not only of immense worth but also superabundant.

For *personal dignity* is the element from which the value of the satisfaction is measured to be of *such excellence*, that if the person has infinite dignity, *the satisfaction itself* must necessarily be said to *exceed incomparably* every offense against God committed by a creature.

We learn this from the common moral sense of mankind. A king, unjustly dishonored by his subjects, is thought to receive superabundant satisfaction, if in order to make compensation for the injury, another king equal in power to him should offer himself to him as a subject.

It was a stunning invention of God that, in compensation for sin, *God himself* should become a *subject* (see above, thesis 16, n. 390) in order to give honor to God. God really becomes subject to God with that sufficient otherness that we explained above in thesis 25, objection 1, n. 644.

657. Hence it is clear that *any* act of Christ was more than sufficient in order to repair the divine *honor*, as Catholic theologians hold.⁴

Nevertheless the value of Christ's satisfaction increases *on the part of the purpose for which* he honored God, by obeying and loving God *perfectly*, and at the same time *on the part of the action itself* of the one satisfying. This proceeded from the purest love, lasted during his whole life, and drove Christ all the way to undergoing death itself (see S.Th. III, q. 48, a. 2 c).

658. Objections. 1. By the satisfaction of Christ we are not freed *from all the punishments for sin*, as, for example, from death. But if the satisfaction of Christ was condign and superabundant, we should be freed from these punishments. Therefore the satisfaction of Christ is not condign and superabundant.

I distinguish the major. By the satisfaction of Christ we are not freed from all the punishments for sin, if we refuse to *apply* Christ's satisfaction to ourselves, *conceded*; if we do apply it to ourselves, *I subdistinguish*: we are not freed from these miseries according as they are *penalties, conceded*; according as they are *punishments, I subdistinguish again*: that are punishments of *original sin, denied*; that are punishments for *personal sins, I subdistinguish again*: according as they are *eternal punishments, denied*; according as they are *temporal punishments* and indeed only *in a partial way, conceded*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

Although the further explanation of these points belongs in other treatises, a brief summary of the matter is called for here.

The fundamental principle is that Christ's satisfaction was *vicarious*. Therefore the

4. See DTC 13,1980.

Father could accept it not according to its total intrinsic efficacy. But if the Father was thinking along those lines, then Christ did not offer his passion in order that it might be accepted beyond that measure.

Actually it is certain that the passion of Christ is the quasi *universal cause* of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was the quasi universal cause of damnation. The effect of the sin of the first parent came to each one through the flesh; but the effect of the death of Christ comes to each one through spiritual regeneration by which man is incorporated into Christ.

However the all-wise God willed that rational creatures freely apply that universal cause of salvation to themselves. Therefore it is necessary that each one seek to be regenerated by Christ and receive other gifts in which the power of the death of Christ is operative. For those who are reborn in Christ by Baptism, there remains no guilty state of sin and no guilty state of punishment coming from original sin. Hence in them only concupiscence and the other consequences of original sin are left (see D 1515) and they are usually called *penalties*, but not punishments.

Certain penalties also remain in the baptized and they are mentioned by St. Thomas: firstly, that there be conformity of the faithful to Christ, like members to the head; secondly, lest men approach Christ more because of corporal benefits than because of spiritual gifts; thirdly, lest the merit of faith be diminished, because if those believing in Christ were immediately made impassible and immortal, in a certain sense this would compel men to accept faith in Christ; finally, because of spiritual exercises, so that by fighting against his weaknesses man may win the crown of glory.⁵

It is necessary to add that the satisfaction of Christ brings it about that baptism has the *power* to take away the penalties of this present life; and by its power they will be taken away from the just in the resurrection (see III, q. 69, a. 3 c).

Also the *temporal punishment itself* because of personal sins is much lighter now than what would be proportionate to the sin “because of the cooperation of Christ’s satisfaction” (III, q. 69, a. 3 ad 2).

Moreover the Council of Trent (D 1689-1691) spells out the reasons why *the total temporal punishment* due to personal sins is *not* condoned.

659. Scholium 1. *On the universality of Christ’s satisfaction.* Although from the text of St. Paul cited above (see n. 653) it is certain that the satisfaction of Christ is of itself compensatory for *all* sins, it may help to mention some texts of the Church’s magisterium that say that Christ died *for all men*.

The Council of Trent: “But even though “Christ died for all,” still not all receive the benefit of his death, but only those to whom the merit of his Passion is imparted” (D 1523). See D 330-339, 340-342, 624, 900-901, 1522. The Church has condemned limitations of this universality whether proposed by Jansen (D 2005) or by the Jansenists (D 2304) or by Quesnel (D 2432f.).

5. See 4 CG 55, ad 25f.; III, q. 69, a. 3 c. Other reasons are added by Suarez, *De sacramentis*, in 3 q.69 a.3; see *De Incarnatione* d.4 s.3 n.10. On how the distinction among the scholastics began to be proposed between the *sufficiency* and the *application* of the redemption, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte...* 2nd part, 2,329-358.

St. Thomas presents some beautiful images of this universality from the cross and the crucifixion of Christ with thieves: III, q. 46, a. 4, 11. See also q. 47, a. 4.

660. Scholium 2. *On the infinite worth of Christ's satisfaction.* This question obviously concerns the satisfactory works of Christ considered not under their physical aspect, since as such they pertain to a finite entity, as proceeding from a human nature as from a proximate principle, but considered under the *moral* aspect or in the moral order or in moral estimation.

Among the *Nominalists* and *Scotists*, even among those who admitted the intrinsically condign and superabundant satisfaction, the *denial* of the infinite worth of Christ's satisfaction is very common, if satisfaction is understood not only as *extensively* infinite, that is, inasmuch as it can be applied to an infinite number of men, but also *formally* and strictly infinite, and indeed *intrinsically*, not from the acceptance of God.⁶

*However other theologians very commonly*⁷ teach that Christ's satisfaction had infinite worth simply *because of the dignity of the divine person* giving infinite dignity to such satisfaction. This reason certainly seems to prove the matter, although it must be conceded that the question is intimately connected with other metaphysical and moral doctrines, as we suggested above in n. 650 and Frassen clearly explains (*loc.cit.*, in note 6 above).

On the Bull of Clement VI (see D 1027): It is not certain that it is a definition, nor is it clearly apparent whether he wishes to signify a *strict* infinity or only an *extensive* one.⁸

661. However not a few difficulties result from this doctrine about the *infinite* satisfaction of Christ.

a) If the satisfactory works of Christ were to have *infinite* worth, then all the works of Christ would be equal or of the same worth, and there would not be more value in all the works of Christ than in one of them.

A response to this can be made with some theologians by conceding that all the satisfactory works of Christ have simply infinite worth *by reason of the person*. But this infinite worth does not take away the worth of the same act *on the part of the object and the circumstances*, which can be more or less. However this more or less worth is already *equivalently* contained in the worth which the act has by reason of the infinite person, and therefore together with this it does not constitute something more *intensively* but only *extensively*, inasmuch as another worth is present that is *formally* not contained in it and which proceeds from the worth of the person.⁹

6. See Mastrius, *In 3 d.3 q.8 n.275*; Frassen, *De incarn.* t.7 disp.3 a.2 s.2 q.ult (edition at Rome 1901) p. 652; in the following pages Frassen clearly presents the arguments of the Scotists and attempts to solve the objections of the adversaries. On the opinion of Scotus, see also Minges, 1, n.588f. On the opinion of St. Bonaventure in agreement with the teaching of St. Thomas, see *In 3 d.20 q.5* (Quaracchi) Schol., p. 430.

7. See in Muncunill, n.829. More extensively in Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.6 n.165, where you will find much information on that by which the satisfaction of Christ is formally constituted infinite (n. 180-190).

8. See DTC 13,1989.

9. Thus Muncunill, n.837.841f. Similarly, Pesch, n. 436. The Salmanticenses (d.28 dub.1 n.14) and Gonet (d.4 a.3 § 3 n.76) seem to follow both this opinion and the opinion of Fr. Suarez taken as a single unit.

662. However it can be expressed in a different way with Suarez: The *goodness* of Christ's acts is *finite* and therefore Christ's acts were unequal in their own intrinsic and essential goodness, that is, the goodness really inhering in the act itself. But any act of Christ was *infinite* on the part of the person acting concerning the *worth* of that act. Consequently, all Christ's acts had infinite and therefore *equal* worth.¹⁰

More simply nevertheless, setting aside these distinctions, it seems necessary to concede that all the satisfactory works of Christ, as infinite, *have the same worth* in offering satisfaction. But that the passion of Christ had a certain effect, which the preceding satisfactory works of Christ did not have, was *because of the nature of the work*, which was fitting for such an effect, as we indicated with St. Thomas above in thesis 24, n. 620.¹¹

663. b) There would seem to be *many infinites*, if all Christ's acts are said to be simply infinite in reference to satisfaction.

The solution of this problem exists in the fact that it is repugnant to have many infinite things *in being* or in the ontological order. But in the *moral* order the situation is different, since many limited beings seem able to be *infinitely dignified* by a divine person.

But it is necessary to note that all these infinite things of the moral order are not at all such *beside* God or *independently* of God. But precisely *from* that *one* infinite divine being they are made infinite in the moral order.

The ultimate reason for this possibility must be sought from the fact that in order to participate in the infinite dignity of God *union* suffices, which is not the case with regard to the divine attributes (see above, thesis 12, objection 1, n. 252f.).

664. Scholium 3. *On the justice operating in the satisfaction of Christ.* Two principal questions must be distinguished: a) Whether Christ so gave satisfaction to God the Father that there is present in God a true obligation of *justice* to forgive sins; b) whether in this case the satisfaction of Christ can be said to be *out of strict justice*.

a) It is necessary for all to hold that in God there is *some true justice*, as Holy Scripture testifies: v.gr., 2 Tim. 4:8. However there is a sharp dispute whether a *creature* can have title to a true *right* with reference to God or not.

All of course concede that this *right* in a creature is not present except on the pre-supposition of a divine covenant or promise.

More commonly theologians rightly concede that there is such a right in a creature, and this does not seem to imply an imperfection in God.

665. b) More commonly also theologians affirm, while many others deny it, that the satisfaction of Christ fulfilled all the conditions that are required in order to preserve *strict justice*. These conditions are usually listed: so that *otherness* is given between the one who satisfies and the one to whom the satisfaction is given; that it be *from the personal goods* of the satisfier; that it be *from goods not owed for any other reason*; that

10. D.4 s.4 n.40f.

11. See Franzelin, s.4, Prenotes to VI; Galtier, n.512.

it is *not* be based on the grace or on the liberality of the creditor.

However, for the most part, the solution depends *on the very notion of justice*, and it does not seem possible for it to be divided.¹²

12. See Suarez, d.4 s.5f.; E. Elorduy, S.J., *Teoría de Suarez sobre la justicia de Dios* (Granada 1942); Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.7-10; Muncunill, n.845-868; DTC 13,1989f.

Thesis 27. The satisfaction, which Christ by his passion offered to his offended Father for the sins of the human race, was not only reparation of the divine honor but also essentially, although by no means primarily, expiation before the vindictive justice of God; it was, therefore, satisfaction by way of expiatory reparation.

Galtier, th.32 n.484-507; J. Solano, *El sentido de la muerte redentore de Nuestro Señor Jesucristo y algunas corrientes modernas*: EstEcl 20 (1946) 399-414.

666. Connection. Since the reparation of injured honor, which we treated in the preceding thesis, can be offered by internal acts and without suffering, the question presents itself about why Christ's satisfaction was so full of suffering. Undoubtedly that must be attributed ultimately to the free decree of the divine Will, since the incarnation itself is necessary only hypothetically (see above, thesis 23). However now we ask whether some *proximate* reason can be assigned, and we say that it is the vindictive justice of God. At the same time we are treating the *relation* between the various elements that constitute the satisfactory work of Christ.

667. Definition of terms. *Satisfaction* is taken here in the *theological* sense, that is, the work of Christ that before God has the *greatest* value to compensate for his *injured honor*. Since in the preceding thesis we concentrated on the nature of compensation of injured *honor*, now we turn ourselves to a *further* understanding of the satisfaction of Christ; we will consider what lies hidden under the word "*greatest*," so that we can grasp the *whole* theological meaning of Christ's satisfaction. Therefore we are dealing with satisfaction in its theological sense, and indeed not only regarding its principal element but regarding the *total* theological concept of the satisfaction of Christ.

Reparation of the divine honor. As the fruit of the theological work carried out since the time of St. Anselm (see above, n. 632) we *suppose* that sin is a *personal* offense against God, that is, injurious to the divine honor. For this reason Christ's satisfaction was superabundant atonement of the injured *honor* of God, as we explained in the preceding thesis.

668. The justice of God. Regarding our present concern, justice is "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right."¹ Prescinding

1. S.Th. II-II, q. 58, a. 1 ad 1. This definition is already found in Ulpian and it has always been considered to be good: see D.M. Pruemmer, O.P., *Manuale Theologiae Moralis...*¹⁰ (revised ed. by E.M. Muench, O.P.) 2, n.70. Ulpian has it in *Dig.* 1.1 t.I lege 10.

from the question whether *strict* justice can be predicated of God,² we assert with the Council of Trent that there is *justice* in God. The Council attributes a different reason “to divine justice” for why sinners are received by God in one way before baptism and another way after baptism (D 1690).

Vindictive justice has as its object vengeance or the punishment of those who have sinned (II-II, q. 108). “Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault” (I-II, q. 46, a. 6 ad 2). There is a dispute whether vindictive justice is in God as a distinct attribute, which is to be denied. But much more serious is the dispute about which of the various kinds of justice is present in God, that is, whether it is legal justice, either governing or providential, or distributive justice or commutative justice.³ In vengeance the intention of the avenger is not directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, but chiefly it is directed to some good to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who sinned that justice may be upheld (see S.Th. II-II, q. 108, a. 1 c).

Expiation is *penal* compensation offered to the vindictive justice of God. Expiation of this kind is not understood as a mere toleration of punishment, as if some material suffering would suffice, but the Catholic notion of expiation insists on the *moral* quality of the expiatory act, as will be made clear below (n. 671) in our explanation of the various opinions on this.

669. *Essentially.* In the satisfactory work of Christ the *essence* is constituted by those elements without which, in the hypothesis of condign satisfaction (see above, thesis 23, n. 589), this satisfaction of Christ would not be condign or perfectly sufficient intrinsically in a quantitative way, in the sense similar to what was explained above in n. 586f. But what in Christ’s satisfactory work is found to be *more seemly* only or *more fitting* is called *accidental*, that is, that Christ takes his origin not only from the seed of Adam (see above, n. 133f), but precisely from the seed of David. Thus it happened more fittingly, since the people of Israel were chosen by God in a very special way, but this happened in a way that was accidental with regard to the worth of the satisfactory work for the sin of the human race.

However we do not wish to say that the *whole* historical passion of Christ was necessary for such high dignity in the *abstract* hypothesis

2. See Suarez, *Opus sextum, Disputatio de iustitia...* s.1 n.1-25; s.6; Urráburu, *Institutiones... Theodicaea Vallisoleti* 1900) 2,603ff.; I. Hellín, S.J., *Theologia naturalis (Cursus philosophicus S.I., 5, B.A.C., Madrid 1950)* n. 898.

3. See Suarez, *ibid.*, s.5 n.3-20; Urráburu, *ibid.*, 612-616.

of condign satisfaction. For essentially his least act of suffering would have been superabundant. Therefore it is necessary to say that *the penal element* for any abstract hypothesis of condign satisfaction was necessary in Christ's work. Of course God in his own great wisdom decreed that this penal element was to be *concretely* the passion and death of Christ. Therefore these elements cannot be said to be accidental, but they must be held to be *essential* in the *historical* satisfactory work of Christ, just as they are held to be essential in order to repair the *honor of God*, notwithstanding the fact that even the least act of reparation on the part of Christ would be superabundant reparation of the honor of God. This will be treated more extensively below in objection 4f., n. 687f.

By no means primarily. Rightly the theologians consider the most essential element in sin to be the *personal* offense of God (see above, n. 583f., 632). Consequently the *most* essential satisfaction consists in *reparation of the divine honor* injured by sin. Therefore we say that the *expiation* offered to God's vindictive justice is the element that *in a less primary way* constitutes the essence of satisfaction.

Expiatory reparation. These words briefly summarize our explanation, as will become clear later (n. 673f) in our presentation of the various opinions on this.

670. Opinions. Three theories are wont to be proposed to explain the more intimate nature of the satisfaction that Christ by his sorrowful passion offered to the Father for sin.

a) *The theory of punishment.* *Punishment* is understood as not just some evil or some mere affliction, but an evil or affliction imposed precisely for the purpose that the violated order and the voluntary transgression might be repaired. No attention is paid to the moral qualities of the act with which that affliction is sustained, but more to the material *quantity* of the punishment to be sustained.

According to this theory of punishment, God demands a sanction which restores the violated order for sin which is a certain *disorder*. Christ, because he assumes the person of sinful men, experiences the complete effects of the divine wrath. He, the innocent one, takes to himself the full weight of punishment that was due to us sinners. In this way he assuaged the vindictive justice of God *and made satisfaction for sin*.

This doctrine, extended by the early Protestants even to extreme consequences,⁴ is not admitted by Catholics.

4. See Solano, *El sentido de la muerte redentora*. EstEcl 20 (1946) 399.

671. b) *The theory of penal expiation.* The notion of *expiation* implies some evil or affliction, like punishment; but it differs from the latter because the endurance *as such* of the evil or affliction is not said to repair the violated order, except inasmuch as the endurance of the evil *proceeds from a free will*.

According to this theory of penal expiation, Jesus Christ did indeed satisfy divine justice by the suffering of his passion, but these were pleasing to God because they proceeded from the free love of Christ. In no way is it necessary that the sufferings of Christ should be of the same nature and of the same intensity as those which we merited. For the *moral dignity* of these sufferings makes them more acceptable, in the eyes of God, than any other *punishment* could do which the divine justice could require.

Therefore the suffering occupies the first place, but *it is dignified by the acts of the will*.⁵

672. c) *The theory of moral reparation.* The notion of *moral reparation* implies an *act of honor* that aims at compensation for injured honor. An act of this kind can be an act of suffering, but the *essence* of moral reparation is nothing but the reparation of honor either by suffering *or in some other way*.

According to the theory of moral reparation, in order to understand the satisfactory work of Christ the key is not to be sought in suffering but *in the personal dignity* of the one who suffers. The suffering is only the element that is *de facto* present, but secondarily and accidentally. Hence the passion of Christ gets its worth from the fact that suffering of this kind is an excellent act of *submission* to God in atonement for our sins. So Christ does not really satisfy by suffering, but he satisfies by being *patient*. Thus recently I. Rivière.⁶

673. We explain Christ's satisfaction by way of *expiatory reparation*, in order to join together in one phrase what was found to be well said in the two preceding theories.

From the theory of penal expiation the element of the *vindictive justice* of God must by all means be retained.

From the theory of moral reparation: the element of compensation for the injured divine honor precisely through *free acts that show honor to*

5. See Galtier, n. 491-500, where it is profoundly explained how the Catholic notion of expiation is located "outside the controversies of the schools" and extols the *moral* element.

6. See Solano, *El sentido de la muerte redentora...*: EstEcl 20 (1946) 400-403, 406-409. On the works about redemption written by Rivière, on his merits and defects, see Basilio de San Pablo, C.P., *El Doctor Juan Rivière, Teólogo de la Redención*: RevEspT 14 (1954) 79-103. On the opinion that L. Richard defends about not admitting the vindictive justice of God except towards those who are "fixed in sin," see our article *Actu-idades cristológico-soteriológicas*: EstEcl 24 (1950) 54.

God, pertains to the fundamental notion of satisfaction, which is proposed by theologians.

Therefore it is necessary to say that Christ *de facto* made satisfaction for us *both* by the internal acts of his submission honoring the Father *and* by the sufferings that the vindictive justice of God demanded. But since the compensation of honor has its essential elements in satisfaction, therefore we express “reparation” by the use of a *substantive*; however the suffering, which pertains is a less primary way to the *essence* of Christ’s satisfaction, we express by the use of an *adjective*, namely, “expiatory.”

674. Theological note. That expiation is of *the very essence* of the satisfactory work of Christ, contrary to what the theory of moral reparation affirms, seems to us to be *morally certain*. That the reparation of the divine honor is the most important element is an opinion that is *common and certain in theology*.

675. Theological reasoning. In the hypothesis of condign satisfaction, freely chosen by God, expiation is of the *essence* of Christ’s satisfactory work, 1) if by expiation satisfaction is made *essentially* to the vindictive justice of God, 2) if the Father not only permitted but also *positively willed* the passion and death of Christ. But both points are valid. Therefore expiation is of the essence of the satisfactory work of Christ.

The major as to 1). For if it is of *the essence* of full satisfaction for sin that expiation is sufficient for the vindictive justice of God, then this *essential* aspect cannot be denied concerning Christ’s expiation; also, this expiation is admitted expressly and undoubtedly by the adversaries.⁷

The major as to 2). If the preceding point is admitted, then one objection made by the adversaries is this: God did not positively intend or will the passion and death of Christ, but he only *permitted* it. For, the immediate cause of the passion was the great sin of the Jews—a sin which God could only permit but in no way directly intend.⁸ However, concerning the way in which this positive will of God is to be understood, we will make the important distinction below in n. 681 between *to will something essentially* and *to will something accidentally*.

676. The minor as to 1). There is an essential requirement that vindictive justice be satisfied. a) *The special reason for this attribute.* The vindictive justice of God is one of the divine perfections which the sinner makes light

7. Rivière: DTC 13,1967f.1974; Id., *Le dogme... théologie contemporaine* 148-159.

8. Rivière: DTC 13,1968f.1973; Id., *Le dogme... théologie contemporaine* 374f.

of (see below, scholium 1, n. 691) and therefore in condign satisfaction it must be sufficiently restored. But if in the other divine perfections, v.gr., holiness, love, given the necessary moral conditions, satisfaction is given by one and the same act of reparation of the divine honor, that does not hold true with regard to the vindictive justice of God. For satisfaction can be made without suffering or punishment to the other divine attributes by purely internal acts of submission, love and so forth. But the nature of vindictive justice is that it demands some *punishment*.

677. b) *The essential importance of this attribute.* But the place that both reason and especially revealed doctrine assign to the vindictive justice of God regarding committed sins is *absolutely fundamental*. For, we do not understand how the supreme Legislator can establish serious laws without some sanction. Holy Scripture states clearly and distinctly the fact of divine punishment, beginning with the punishment of original sin to the punishment of the flood and the other punishments, described almost without interruption, which God demanded from the chosen people, and, not to mention other points, all the way to the revealed dogmas about purgatory and the eternity of hell. Also Holy Scripture does not hesitate, even in the New Testament, to speak explicitly and often about the “vengeance” of God (see Luke 18:7.; 2 Thess. 1:8) and the his “wrath” (see John 3:36; Rom. 2:5; Eph. 5:6).⁹

678. c) *The Catholic doctrine on the fundamental necessity of expiation connected with the remission of sin.* This principle is expressed by Moses, namely, that God forgives sin but he in no way leaves it unpunished: *The Lord is slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love, forgiving iniquity and transgression, but he will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of fathers upon children...* (Num. 14:18; the same is in Exod. 34:7). And the Lord de facto responds to Moses: *I have pardoned, according to your word... None of the men who... have put me to the proof these ten times and have not hearkened to my voice, shall see the land which I swore to give to their fathers* (Num. 14:20.22f.). This way of proceeding of God is confirmed by many other examples, among which it should be noted that not even Moses is freed from punishment for his prevarication: see Num. 20:12; Deut. 3:23-28; 32:48-52. Something similar happened to David: see 2 Sam. 12:13f.¹⁰ Regarding the economy of the New Testament the solemn

9. See many texts gathered together in a. Michel, *Vengeance*: DTC 15,2613f. On this matter in the O.T., see Heinisch, *Theologie...* 227ff.251f., 263-273. In the N.T. concerning the wrath of God Prat says well (*La Théologie...* 2,258): “God’s way of acting concerning sinners remains the same” as in the O.T.

10. See Heinisch, *Theologie...* 232f.

definition of the Council of Trent will suffice: “If anyone says... that it is a fiction that, after the eternal punishment has been removed by the virtue of the keys, there often *remains a temporal punishment to be expiated*, let him be anathema” (D 1715). See 1689f., where it is developed more at length, and at the same time it is stated that the sacramental satisfaction imposed by the priest must be “also for the retribution and chastisement of former sins.” See also D 1712).

Indeed, it is defined expressly in Trent that *satisfaction* is made to God concerning the temporal punishment “by means of the punishments inflicted by him and patiently borne...” and “of those voluntarily undertaken, as fasts...” (D 1713).

679. d) The doctrine *about the great value of expiation in order to avert the more serious punishments of God*. The youngest of the seven brothers killed by Antiochus spoke in this way to the king: “...and through me and my brothers to bring to an end the wrath of the Almighty which has justly fallen on our whole nation (2 Macc. 7:38). But the Council of Trent says this: “And no way of averting the punishments that threaten us from the Lord was ever held in the Church of God *more secure* than the practice of the works of penance done with a sorrowful heart” (D 1690). From the proximate and remote context it is clear that the Council is speaking about *penal* works.

680. e) *In the satisfactory work itself of Christ* it is clear *how much importance* is attributed to expiation by the holy Fathers in reference to the redemption: “In order to explain the redemptive efficacy of Christ’s death, it was necessary to show that his death, by way of substitution, absolved the punishment due to our sins. Thus de facto an explanation of this kind was commonly known throughout ancient Christianity. Hardly one will be found among the holy Fathers who did not express this idea with more or less amplitude, whether he did it on his own initiative or on the occasion of commenting on Isaiah 53 and the various places in the New Testament which suggest this idea...”¹¹

From all of this we deduce: it is necessary to think that to offer satisfaction *to the vindictive justice of God*, namely, by expiation, is not something accessory or accidental, but something *essential*, when it is a matter of offering some work that is suitable to make satisfaction for sin.

681. The minor as to 2). The Father not only permitted but also *willed* this concrete expiation of Christ through his passion and death. a) *Negatively*.

11. Rivière: DTC 13,1941.

The passion and death of Christ had the very grave sin of the Jews as its proximate cause. But God only permitted *this sin*. However the *passion* itself was good, “and this was by an absolute preordained will, just as it was also willed by Christ himself with an absolute will.”¹² However, lest an absolute volition of this kind of Christ’s passion on the part of God be badly understood, it must be noted that God cannot will per se physical evils and evils of punishment, that is, by willing them as they are in themselves, but *only per accidens*, that is, by ordaining them to a good that has a greater value than the good prevented by those evils. However, he does *will* them, and does not just permit them, while he only *permits* moral evils.¹³

How these two points cohere, that is, the mere *permission* of the sin of the Jews and the absolute *willing* of Christ’s passion, is explained according to the various systems usually proposed in the treatise on the One God, where the knowledge and will of God are treated. We in coherence with the teaching of “middle knowledge” hold the following: God in his wisdom, in a way beyond our way of thinking, preordained the passion and he foresees by his middle knowledge what the Jews would do in different circumstances, if he allowed them to use their own judgment. Having supposed this foreknowledge, God ordained that Christ should be born at such a time and place, preach and perform other good works, and at the same time he wills to permit the Jews to do what he foresaw they would do, if they were allowed; and then he also *willed* that Christ should suffer what he actually did suffer.¹⁴

682. b) Positively. If the Father only permitted the passion of Christ, it is necessary to say that he did not will it but only permitted that to which precisely our *redemption* is attributed, that is, the passion (see thesis 24ff., 28f.). Logically therefore the *historical redemption of Christ* would have been only *permitted* by God. But this, to prescind from some other points, not even the adversaries admit.

We can add to this that the precept of dying more probably for Christ was a *direct* precept (see above, n. 488).

683. Objections. 1. Even in the hypothesis of condign satisfaction, *one act of love and reparation* on the part of Christ was fully sufficient for the redemption of the hu-

12. Suarez, *De mysteriis vitae Christi*. Comment. in S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 10 (ed. Vivès, 19,572).

13. See Hellín, *Theologia naturalis (Cursus philosophicus...)*, 5. Madrid 1950) n. 911f.

14. See Suarez, *De mysteriis vitae Christi*. Comment. in S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 10 (ed. Vivès, 19,572.). Rivière quotes these same words from Suarez less accurately, in order to prove that the best theologians do not wish to refer Christ’s passion to anything *except* the permissive will of God: J. Rivière, *Le dogme de la Rédemption: Etude théologique*² (Paris 1914) 256f.; Id., DTC 13,1973; Id., *Le dogme... théologique contemporaine* 375 note 51.

man race. Therefore the *penal* element cannot be said to be essential to the satisfactory work of Christ.¹⁵

I distinguish the antecedent. One act of love on the part of Christ was fully sufficient for the redemption of the human race to repair the *honor* of God, *conceded*; both for the reparation of his honor and for *the expiation of his vindictive justice*, which from what we have proved in the thesis is *essential, denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* The penal element cannot be said to be essential to the satisfactory work of Christ, if by an act of love and reparation alone satisfaction is given both to the divine honor and to the divine vindictive justice, *conceded*; if satisfaction is given to the divine honor alone, *denied*.

God certainly could have redeemed us even if Christ offered *no* satisfaction (see thesis 23, n. 589). But in the thesis we are considering the case in which God wills that *condign* satisfaction be given to him. But up to this point, this *condignness* could be *partial*, that is, related to the reparation of the divine *honor* only, which indeed is the main and greatest essential element (see above, n. 669), and *total* condignness, that is, what is said to be *truly and simply* condignness, related namely to *all* the essential elements that must per se be present in real satisfaction. Among these, therefore, not only the honor of God but *also the vindictive justice of God* must be taken into consideration essentially.

684. 2. There are many statements of the Fathers and theologians that propose the passion and death of Christ as something that God only *permitted*.¹⁶ But it seems to be too hard to declare our thesis as *certain* contrary to so many authorities. Therefore at most our thesis should be said to be *more probable*.

I distinguish the major. And these statements generally say that God *simply* permitted the death of Christ, *denied*; they say that God permitted the death of Christ, while indicating it *as a sin of the Jews, conceded*. *I also distinguish the minor.* It would seem to be too hard to declare our thesis as certain contrary to so many authorities, if they attributed the death of Christ *simply* to the permission of God, *I bypass the minor*; if these authorities attribute the death of Christ to the permission of God only, *while indicating it as a sin of the Jews, denied*.

We explained this distinction and its foundation above in n. 681.

Regarding those quoted texts, in order to consider only three of them, it should be noted that *the text of St. Augustine*¹⁷ says expressly: “the blood of the just man was *necessary* in order to destroy the autograph of sinners,” and that the sentence is ordered to making a distinction between the evil will of Judas and the Jews on the one hand and the just permission of the Father on the other hand. *The text of St. Bonaventure* is given by Rivière¹⁸: “He did not hand him over [the Father the Son] by inflicting death or commanding it, but my permitting it”; however the whole text points to the distinction proposed by us: “God did not hand him over by inflicting death, or by commanding others

15. See Rivière: DTC 13,1969-1980.

16. See above, n. 675 note 8.

17. *Ennarat. In Ps. 61* n.22: ML 36,745f.

18. DTC 13,1973.

that they should hand him over, but by permitting it.”¹⁹ Moreover in this same place St. Bonaventure says: “satisfaction must be penal, and the greatest satisfaction supremely penal.”²⁰ We considered *the text from Suarez* above in n. 481, note 14.

685. 3. According to St. Thomas: “*The very least one of Christ’s sufferings* was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins” (III, q. 46, a. 5 ad 3). But justice has to do with *equality* in reparation of injury. Therefore at least *the whole* passion of Christ cannot on the part of Christ proceed *from the virtue of justice itself*.

1) *I concede the major and distinguish the minor.* Justice is so ordered to equality that *inequality through defect* is against the nature of justice, *conceded*; *inequality through excess, denied.* I also *distinguish the consequent.* The whole passion of Christ cannot proceed from the virtue of justice itself, if *inequality through excess* is opposed to the nature of justice, *I bypass the consequent*; if *inequality* is opposed only through defect, *denied.*

2) *I concede the major and distinguish the minor in another way.* Justice is so ordered to equality that a satisfactory act could not be understood to have the goodness of justice and be a proper act of the virtue of justice, *if it is performed in order to constitute some equality, even though it is exceeding, by making recompense for the injury done and it takes place because of the real goodness of this object, denied*; otherwise, *I bypass the minor. I also distinguish the consequent.*

3) *I bypass the whole objection.* Our thesis does not mention *the virtue of Christ* from which there proceeds in Him the satisfactory work for the redemption of the human race: although this virtue would be, for example, religion, our thesis would still stand. For we are investigating whether that satisfactory work of Christ is *objectively* reparation, not only of the divine honor but also, and indeed essentially, expiation before the vindictive justice of God. However since the condign satisfaction of Christ is only *hypothetically* necessary, it is also necessary that *God willed* that satisfaction be made to his vindictive justice through Christ’s passion. But the question *about the virtue of Christ* through which this expiatory satisfaction came about is secondary.

686. *I explain.* What is proper to the virtue of justice is that it is not situated between two vices, like other moral virtues. Hence there is no opposition to justice by excess, but by defect, that is, by not rendering to another what is due to him, or rendering to him less than is due. Therefore from the fact that Christ made satisfaction by acts of *superior worth*, there is no reason why, from this point of view, the said satisfaction should be excluded from the nature of justice.²¹

This explanation rather indicates how there is *no inconvenience* from the *superabundance* of satisfaction. However *a more positive* reason why this superabundant satisfaction must be applied to justice is apparent from the second distinction of the minor that we just made above and that we will now briefly comment on.

19. *In 3 Sent.* d.20, one article, q. 5 response to 1: Ed. Quaracchi, t.3 p.428.

20. *Ibid.*, response to 4.

21. See Salmanticenses, tr.12 a.1 n.7-10; *Arbor praedic. virtutum* n.55; tr.21 d.1 dub.9 n.254-267f.

2) In every virtue, in order for someone to acquire the goodness of that virtue it suffices that he acts *from the motive of that virtue*.²² The question, raised by the objection, concerns not only expiation or *penal* satisfaction but also the *satisfaction of honor*: for both forms of satisfaction equally pertain to justice, since both intend to *compensate* something. Now surely, if among men someone performs an act by which he honors an offended person in order to compensate for the dishonor he had done to him, and this act greatly exceeds the dishonor he had done, everyone will say that he has performed an act precisely as *compensation* for the injury, and therefore an act of justice, although certainly an act of *superabundant* compensation. Therefore the same principle applies to the superabundant *penal* satisfaction of Christ. More commonly theologians refer the whole satisfaction of Christ to true and proper justice on the part of Christ,²³ although in defining the lowest species of this justice they disagree considerably.²⁴

687. 4. It is unworthy to think that divine justice willed to have *much more suffering* from Christ than what was necessary for satisfaction. But from what has been conceded in the previous objection, *any least suffering* of Christ would be sufficient for satisfaction. Therefore at least the *total* passion of Christ *cannot be referred to the vindictive justice of God*.

I distinguish the major. It would be unworthy to think this about divine justice, if such superabundant satisfaction had to be offered *by an outside person who is forced*, and at the same time *if good reasons are not given*, which would make this superabundant expiation *more fitting, conceded*; if this superabundant expiation is prescribed *not for an outsider, but to one who is willing and for the sake of excellent reasons, denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The total passion of Christ cannot be referred to the vindictive justice of God, if this superabundant satisfaction is demanded from an outsider who is forced and without sufficient motives, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

The amazing love of God shines forth brilliantly in the fact that *God himself*, who had been offended by men, willed to make satisfaction for men, so that St. Thomas wrote profoundly: “And this [that is, God gave his Son as satisfaction for men] came of *more copious mercy* than if he had forgiven sins without satisfaction” (III, q. 46, a. 1 ad 3) (see above, n. 647). Moreover, how *sufficient otherness* is had between the one who satisfies and the one to whom satisfaction is made, we explained above in n. 644.

However the incarnate Word, with great love towards God and towards men, offered an act of superabundant expiation to the justice of God, and actually it was expiation of infinite worth, as we saw in the preceding thesis.

688. The reasons why God willed that Christ suffer so much and why Christ himself by his human will freely accepted such suffering can, along with St. Thomas, be summarized in a few points. First of all, the holy Doctor in response to the question why,

22. See F.F. Regatillo, S.J.-M. Zalba, S.J., *Theologiae Moralis Summa* (B.A.C. Madrid 1952) 1, n. 717.

23. See Suarez, d.4 s.5 n.5.18; Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.9 n.253-259.

24. See Salmanticenses, d.1 dub.9 n.259-264, 267-274.

although the least suffering of Christ would suffice for the salvation of the human race, the Lord still willed to assume the *greatest* suffering, he answers with these words: "Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by his power, but also according to justice. And therefore he did not simply weigh what great virtue his suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to his human nature, his pain would avail for so great a satisfaction" (III, q. 46, a. 6 ad 6). This must be understood to be about *proportion* and not about *equality* (see below in the explanation of the following objection in n. 690).

St. Thomas lists other reasons which also in the words of Holy Scripture prove precisely why man was liberated by *the passion of Christ*: 1) man knows thereby how much God loves him and so is stirred to love him in return; 2) by his passion Christ gave us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice and other virtues displayed in the passion; 3) Christ by his passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace and glory for him; 4) by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin; 5) it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so a man by dying should vanquish death (III, q. 46, a. 3 c).

689. 5. In order that the *passion* may be said to be *essential* in Christ's satisfactory work, not only the *penal element* but also the *whole passion* must pertain to the essence of this work. But *the least suffering suffices* for superabundant expiation. Therefore the passion cannot be said to be *essential* to the satisfactory work of Christ.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The least suffering suffices for superabundant satisfaction, if the satisfactory work of Christ is considered *concretely*, that is, as God in history willed that the satisfaction take place, *denied*; if the satisfactory work of Christ is considered *abstractly*, *I subdistinguish*: and under this consideration, the passion of Christ as it is *moral reparation of the divine honor* must be said to be essential to the satisfactory work of Christ, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The passion of Christ cannot be said to be essential to the satisfactory work of Christ, if the satisfactory work of Christ is considered *concretely*, *denied*; if this work is considered abstractly, *I subdistinguish*: and then the same would be valid for the moral reparation of the divine honor, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

The adversaries admit that the whole *essence* of the passion of Christ regarding satisfaction is the *moral reparation of the divine honor*. But if the difficulty were valid, this also would have to be denied, since *the least internal act of reparation*, performed by the incarnate Word, would have superabundant worth to repair the divine honor because of the dignity of the Only-begotten person. The objection, therefore, makes an illicit transition from what would be valid *per se* for condign satisfaction to what *de facto* is valid in the historical satisfaction of Christ. This historical satisfaction, for the reasons just given in the preceding objection, includes the passion for the reparation of honor just as *essentially* (although less primarily) as it includes it for expiation before the vindictive justice of God. However in the thesis we are not treating some *possible* satisfactory work of Christ, but we are concerned with the *interpretation* of the *historical* elements that are found in the concrete satisfactory work performed by Christ.

690. 6. If Christ made satisfaction for the sins of the human race to the vindictive justice of God, he would have had to endure eternal punishment and all the sufferings that men are subject to because of their sins. But Christ did not endure all these punishments. Therefore he did not make satisfaction to the vindictive justice of God.

I distinguish the major. If in the expiation itself one looks mainly *at the dignity* of the one enduring the punishment (see 4 CG 55 ad 23; above n. 671, 673), *denied*; if attention is paid *to the material element alone*, *I subdistinguish*: if the satisfaction of Christ must or could have *equality* with all those punishments for which he was making expiation, *conceded*; if it must or could have only some *proportion* with those punishments, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.* Christ did not make satisfaction to the vindictive justice of God, if attention was paid mainly to his dignity, *denied*; if the concern was for the material element alone of the punishment, *I subdistinguish*: he did not make satisfaction *equally*, *conceded*; he did not make satisfaction *proportionally*, *denied*.

The Lord could not experience such great magnitude of suffering as is found in the magnitude of suffering *in eternal punishment*, nor is it credible that the suffering of Christ, *considered in itself*, attained *equality* with all the temporal punishments with which the sins of men are punished either in this life or in purgatory, or with which all could be punished, if all were remitted with regard to their guilt. *Proportion*, however, can consist in this, that, just as he made satisfaction for the crimes and punishments, so also he would make satisfaction by the greatest sufferings and punishments of this life; the proportion also consists in the fact that he vanquished our *death* by his *death*.²⁵ Moreover the principal solution consists in the fact that Catholic doctrine looks primarily *at the dignity* of Christ in his work of satisfaction, as we suggested in the course of the response.

691. Scholium 1. *On the other divine attributes against which the sinner offends.* From the treatise on sin it is certain that sin offends God in many ways regarding the various divine attributes.²⁶ This consideration is very important both for understanding the gravity of sin and for grasping the various aspects of the satisfaction offered by Christ. However this does not require further treatment here, if we suppose what was already said in n. 676.

692. Scholium 2. *On the practicality of this doctrine concerning the expiation of Christ.* On this aspect of doctrine it is necessary today to insist very strongly, because many do not want to hear even the word “expiation” or anything about penance, according to these serious words of Pius XI: “Certainly We know, and with you, Venerable Brethren, We deplore the fact that in our day the idea and the name of expiation and penance have with many lost in great part the power of arousing enthusiasm of heart and heroism of sacrifice. In other times they were able to inspire such feelings, for they appeared in the eyes of men of faith as sealed with a divine mark in likeness of Christ and

25. See Suarez, d.4 s.4 n.45f.

26. See SThS 2², tr.2 n.850 at 2.

his saints: but nowadays there are some who would put aside external mortifications as things of the past; without mentioning the modern exponent of liberty, the “autonomous man” as he is called, who despises penance as bearing the mark of servitude. As a fact the notion of the need of penance and expiation is lost in proportion as belief in God is weakened, and the idea of an original sin and of a first rebellion of man against God becomes confused and disappears.”²⁷

We think that the proper understanding of Christian expiation cannot be found, if in the satisfactory work of Christ only an *accidental* role is assigned to his expiation.

693. Moreover that these tendencies, which wish to ignore expiatory penance, are not a necessary fruit of modern philosophy, has been shown sufficiently in our day by, for example, M. Blondel, who as a philosopher has written so profoundly about redemption as penal expiation offered to the divine justice.²⁸

Although the entire Christian life, especially after the amazing spread devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, should assume a sense of filial love and of unlimited trust in him,²⁹ still a sense of fear of God, the just judge, is recommended by the Lord himself: *But I will warn you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has power to cast into hell; yes, I tell you, fear him!* (Luke 12:5).

27. Encyclical “*Caritate Christi compulsi*”: AAS 24 (1932) 188f.

28. See M. Blondel, *La philosophie et l'esprit chrétien* (Paris 1944) 1,159-186, 319-323. One can also consult: G. Truc, *Incarnation et Rédemption. Essai de psychologie et de philosophie religieuses* (Paris 1945) 20.50-56, 89-108. Very profound and suited to the modern mentality, see Adam, *Der Christus des Glaubens* 354-361.

29. See Solano, *La devoción al Sagrado Corazón según las Encíclicas Pontificias*, n.59f., 69-85, 89-94.

Thesis 28. Christ as man is a priest who offered himself on the altar of the cross in a real sacrifice.

S.Th. III, q. 22; q. 48, a. 3; q. 49, a. 4; Scheller, *Das Priestertum Christi...*; Lercher³, th.25f.

694. Connection. Since according to the order of St. Thomas we must now treat the effect of the passion of Christ *by way of a sacrifice*, at the same time we will deal with the question of Christ's priesthood. We postponed this question from thesis 19, n. 491, to this place because priesthood is intimately connected with sacrifice, as will be clear immediately.

695. Definition of terms. *Christ as man.* This is taken in the same sense as above in thesis 22, n. 572, where the concern was with Christ the *mediator*. Since to prove that *Christ as man* is a priest both the same reasons and ones similar in this thesis would be advanced like those that were presented in the thesis about Christ the mediator, we decided that it is better to abstain from any further proof of this aspect in this thesis.

696. Priest (ἱερεὺς). *Etymologically* seems to take its origin from the word "holy" or "sacer."¹ *Really* in a certain *broad* sense it is understood as a man deputed in a special way for divine worship.

It is difficult to define in a *strict* sense, since there is controversy whether priesthood should be defined formally by reference to *mediation* or by reference to *sacrifice*.² Whatever must be held generally in a formal way concerning priesthood, we think that the priesthood of the Old and New Testament must be defined with reference to *a mediation* that includes *sacrificial* power (see S.Th. III, q. 22, a. 1 c).

697. A priest can be defined with St. Paul: He who is taken from among men and is called by God, is ordained for men in those things that pertain to God; he can suffer together with men and he offers gifts and sacrifices for sins (see Heb. 5:1-4)³; or with the Supreme Pontiff, Pius XI: a man who, by the office lawfully entrusted to him, is a mediator between God and men, whose entire duty in life embraces those activities which pertain to the eternal Godhead, and who offers prayers, remedies and sacrifices in the name of society (see D 2274).⁴

1. See Ae. Forcellini-V.de Vit, *Totius latinitatis lexicon* (Prati 1871) 5,287.

2. See R. Rábanos, C.M., *El Sacerdocio de Cristo según San Pablo* (Madrid 1942) 45-54.

3. With these words St. Paul has before his eyes the *Levitical* priesthood. See Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,445f.; Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux* 261; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* at this place. Other authors believe that here Paul is giving a definition *in general* of the priesthood: see Rábanos, *El Sacerdocio...* 36-39.

4. See Encyclical "*Ad catholici sacerdotii*": AAS 28 (1936) 8.

The same idea can be stated briefly: A priest is a man who, by the office divinely given to him, is a mediator between God and men, representing society in the public worship of God, especially with sacrifices.⁵

698. Sacrifice. Since many things concerning sacrifice as an excellent act of the virtue of religion are considered in the treatise on the virtues, and since likewise many things about the notion of sacrifice are explained in the treatise on the Eucharist, we will spell out only those aspects that pertain to this *dogmatic* thesis. The sacrifice that Christ offered is understood to be just as much a true and proper sacrifice as the liturgical sacrifices of the Old Testament. For in this sense both St. Paul (Heb. 7:27; 9:6ff.) and the Council of Trent (see D 1739f.) speak about the sacrifice of Christ.

Of these sacrifices, which are mentioned by the same Trent in the place just cited, some were offered during the time of nature (see Gen. 4:4; 8:20f.; 22:1-13; 31:54), while others were offered during the time of the *Law of Moses*.

The legal sacrifices of the O.T. can be distinguished: considering what is offered and the reason for the offering, into bloody and unbloody. *Bloody* sacrifices were sacrifices of animals that were offered *by the pouring out of blood*. But the *unbloody* sacrifices did not involve animals, but *certain things*—either solid, like grain or bread, of liquid, like wine. Those things were either consumed by fire or separated from all profane use or poured out on the ground.

Considering the end or purpose, the principal legal sacrifices were: holocaust (see Lev. 1), an expiatory sacrifice (see Lev. 24:7), a peace offering (see Lev. 3).⁶

699. He offered. As a *priest*, Christ offered this sacrifice to the Father. *He offered himself*. Christ himself was the victim in this sacrifice.

On the altar of the cross. The cross, on which Christ perfected the effusion of his own blood, is considered as an altar where this sacrifice was offered to God.

700. Adversaries. A. Concerning the *priesthood* of Christ: “recent rationalists, in order more effectively to reject the sacrament of orders,

5. *De universalitate sacerdotii*, about which Pius XI wrote in his Encyclical; more on this can be found in V. Cathrein, S.J., *Die Einheit des sittlichen Bewusstseins der Menschheit*, 3 vols., (Freiburg i.Br. 1914). See also J. Hastings (a non-Catholic), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh 1918) 10,278-336. On the priesthood of the *Old Testament*, see DB 5,640-660.

6. See DB 5,1311-1333; Heinisch, *Theologie...* 189-199.

deny that Christ either was or willed to be a priest.”⁷ The *Socinians* admit only a *heavenly* priesthood of Christ, as we will explain immediately.

B. Concerning the *sacrifice* of Christ. *Rationalists and modernists* deny *absolutely* the sacrificial character of Christ’s death (see D 3438).

The *Socinians* (see above, thesis 25, n. 634) also deny that *the death of Christ on the cross* was a sacrifice, but they imagine some kind of heavenly oblation of Christ, by which he presented and offered himself in heaven to the Father. The death on the cross was the necessary means for this oblation or for this *priestly beginning* and to that extent it can be called the beginning of his offering. Moreover Christ’s death caused our salvation *by giving us an example*, inasmuch as it was an outstanding example of virtue; it also caused our salvation *in an explanatory way*, because Christ’s death and glorification is an argument that God wishes to forgive the sins of us sinners and to confer on us the reward of eternal life.

Christ did not receive his *priesthood* before he entered into heaven, but only *after his death*, so that he might appear before God on our behalf.⁸

701. Doctrine of the Church. A. Christ is a *priest*. *The Council of Ephesus*: “If anyone, therefore says, that it is not the Word of God himself who, when he became flesh and man like us, became High Priest..., let him be anathema” (D 261).⁹ *The Council of Trent*: “ ... it was, therefore, necessary... that another priest arise according to the order of Melchizedek, our Lord Jesus Christ... because his priesthood was not to end with his death...” (D 1739-1740). See D 641-642, 802, 1743.

Pius XI prepared a votive Mass of Jesus Christ, the supreme and eternal Priest and together with it published his Encyclical letter “*Ad catholici sacerdotii*.”¹⁰

B. *The sacrifice of the cross*. In the same contexts in the Councils of *Ephesus* and *Trent* just quoted, the Fathers also speak about the oblation and sacrifice of himself that Christ offered on the cross to God the Father. See also D 1753f.

702. Theological note. Regarding the two truths about the priesthood of Christ and Christ’s sacrifice of himself on the cross, the thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 261 [see above, thesis 3, note 24]; D 1739-

7. Pesch, n. 530. On the *indirect and only mediate* errors concerning Christ’s priesthood, see Scheller, *Das Priestertum...* 107-119.

8. See Franzelin, th.51 ad 1; Scheller, *Das Priestertum...*296-298. For more arguments directly against the Socinians, see Galtier, n.527-529.

9. See Du Manoir de Juaye, *Dogme et spiritualité...* 502.

10. See AAS 28 (1936) 53-56.

1741, 1743).¹¹

703. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. Christ is a *priest*. O.T. Ps. 110:4: *The Lord has sworn and will not change his mind: you are a priest (כהן) for ever after the order of Melchizedek.*

The *messianic* meaning of this Psalm is clear from the New Testament in which no other text of the Old Testament is quoted more often. See, for example, Matt. 22:43f.; Acts 2:34-36. Verse 4 is referred to as *messianic*. See Heb. 5:6; 7:21. The expression *according to the order of Melchizedek* signifies: *in the way of Melchizedek*. See Gen. 14:18-20.¹² Also usually quoted are Jer. 30:21; Zech. 6:11-13.¹³

704. N.T. Heb. 4:14—5:10; 6:20—10:18. The *truth* of the priesthood of Christ: Heb. 3:1; 4:14; 5:10; 6:20, etc. The *excellence* of this priesthood over the Levitical priesthood is apparent from the personal dignity of Melchizedek, king and priest (7:1-3). Moreover Melchizedek is more excellent than Levi, because he received tithes from Levi through Abraham and then he blessed Abraham (7:4-10). The creation of the new priesthood of Christ brings with it the abrogation of the Aaronic priesthood (7:11-14). Christ, contrary to the Levitical priests, established by an oath and for ever, is an immaculate priest (7:15-28).¹⁴

705. Christ's *sacrifice of the cross*. O.T. Isa. 53:10: *when he makes himself an offering (אשא) for sin*. The word (אשא) is a very common term to designate a sacrifice or offering for a crime (see, v.gr., Lev. 5:6.15.18f.; 7:1; 14:12; 19:21; Num 6:12).¹⁵

The sacrifices of the O.T. represented the perfect sacrifice of the cross, according to the teaching of St. Paul: Heb. 10:1f.¹⁶

706. N.T. I. *An introductory consideration.* The death, blood and cross of Christ are often connected with man's redemption. a) *Death*. Rom. 5:6:

11. A certain hesitation possibly may remain concerning a strict *definition*. But if we pay attention not only to the grammar but also to the meaning, there cannot be any doubt about a strict definition.

12. See Ceuppens, *De prophetiis messianicis...* 148-164; E. Nacar, *Rey y sacerdote. Salmo 110*: EstBibl 5 (1946) 281-302; Esteve, *De caelesti mediatione sacerdotali...* 229-231; R. Galdos, S.J., *Jesucristo, Sacerdote Eterno según el orden de Melquisedec*: MiscCom 2 (1944) 35-53; Id., *Melquisedec en la Patristica*: EstEcl 19 (1945) 221-246; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* 2,203-214.

13. See Heinisch, *Theologie...* 315.

14. See Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,445-452; Rábanos, *El sacerdocio...* 113-216; Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux* 17-75; Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,176-196; L. Soubigou, *Le chapitre VII de l'épître aux Hébreux ou le sacerdoce selon l'ordre de Melchizédech*: AnTh (1946) 69-82; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* 2,119-139.

15. See above, thesis 25, note 16.

16. See Heinisch, *Theologie...* 198f.

While we were yet helpless... Christ died for the ungodly. 1 Cor. 15:3: *For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the Scriptures.* See, v.gr., Rom. 5:8.10; 6:3.5.8.10; 1 Cor. 8:11; 2 Cor. 5:15; Gal. 2:21; Col. 1:22. Similarly “to hand over” or “to give his life”: Matt. 20:28; John 10:15.17; Rom. 4:25; 8:32; Gal. 2:20; 1 John 3:16.

Blood. Rom. 5:9: *...justified by his blood.* Heb. 13:12: *So Jesus also suffered outside the gate in order to sanctify the people through his own blood.* See Rom. 3:25; Eph. 2:13; Heb. 12:24; 1 John 1:7; 1 Pet. 1:2.19; Rev. 1:5.

The cross. Eph. 2:16: *... and might reconcile us... to God through the cross, thereby bringing the hostility to an end.* Col. 1:20: *making peace by the blood of his cross.* See Rom. 6:6; 1 Cor. 1:17f.; Gal. 2:19f.; 5:11.

707. II. The death of Christ, a true *sacrifice*. 1) A general designation. Eph. 5:2: *Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God.* By the word “offering” (προσφοράν) *the free and loving “handing over”* of himself for the honor of the Father that Christ does “for us” seems to be signified. The word “sacrifice” (θυσία) refers to the sacrificial “victim.” Therefore in this text there is both the material element, “the victim,” and the formal or internal element, “the offering.” See Heb. 8:3.

708. 2) *Apaschal sacrifice.* 1 Cor. 5:7: *Christ our paschal lamb has been sacrificed (ἐτύθη).* Both the sacrificial meaning of the word “sacrificed” and the comparison with the paschal sacrifice signifies the truly sacrificial character of Christ’s death. Moreover St. John pointed out the symbolism of the paschal lamb in relation to the death of Christ: see John 19:36. Elsewhere also in Holy Scripture the comparison is made between Christ and the paschal lamb; see, v.gr., 1 Pet. 1:19.

Although the word “lamb,” which Holy Scripture often applies to Christ, alludes directly not to the paschal lamb but to the lamb Isaiah speaks about in 53:7, still the sacrificial meaning would be included, since in the relevant passage from Isaiah it is certain that the Messiah through his death offered a *sacrifice* to God (see above, n. 705).

709. 3) A *sacrifice of the covenant.* Heb. 9:15-20: *Therefore he is the mediator of a new covenant... since a death has occurred which redeems them from the transgressions under the first covenant... Hence even the first covenant was not ratified without blood....* First, the Old Testament was

ratified by a sacrifice. Also the New and eternal Testament was ratified by a sacrifice, and this was by the death of Christ. See Matt. 26:28; Mark 14:24; Luke 22:20; 1 Cor. 11:25; 1 Pet. 1:2.

4) An *expiatory* sacrifice. Heb. 7:26f.: *For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest..., who has no need, like those high priests, to offer sacrifices daily, first for his own sins and then for those of the people; he did this once for all when he offered up himself.* See Heb. 2:17f.; 9:11-14.26.28; 10:4-14; 13:11f. Many kinds of sacrifice are considered: gifts, offerings, immolations, holocausts, which are offered to God in expiation for *sin*. The one sacrifice of the cross as expiation before God for all the sins of mankind was a perfect substitute.¹⁷

710. Proof from tradition. A. Christ is a *priest*. 1) The Fathers *relying on the words of Holy Scripture propose the priesthood of Christ.*

2) They simply call Jesus Christ a *high priest* or just a *priest*. It will suffice to quote just the earliest Fathers. St. Clement of Rome: "This is the way, beloved, by which we found our Savior, Jesus Christ, the high priest of our offerings, the protector and helper of our weakness" (R 18). St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Indeed the priests are good, but the supreme high priest is more excellent, to whom the holy of holies is committed..." (R 61). St. Polycarp: "But God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is himself the eternal high priest, Jesus Christ the Son of God, fortifies us..." (R 76).

711. 3) They set forth Christ as a priest *and at the same time as a victim*. St. Gregory Nazianzen: "... he offers himself up for us as a sacrifice, and immolates himself as a victim. He is at the same time both priest and lamb of God—he who takes away the sin of the world" (R 1063). St. John Chrysostom: "Thus Christ was offered up once. Offered up by whom? By himself. This not only says that he is a priest, but also an offering and a sacrifice..." (R 1221). See R. 1268. There is more in Rouët de Journal in the theological index, n. 418.

4) St. Augustine strongly embraces the doctrine of our whole thesis. He connects the idea of Christ the *priest* with the ideas of *mediator* and *sacrifice*. Christ is called a priest *inasmuch as he is a man*. He is *priest and victim*. Christ's holiness is intimately associated with his priesthood. St.

17. See Bover, *Teología...* 331-337; Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,452-456; 2,214-224; Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans... saint Paul* 115f.; Meinertz, *Theologie...* 2,91-96. Especially for the word „covenant“ (διαθήκη), see Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux*, at 9:15; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* 2,285-299. On "the lamb of God" in John 1:29.36, see Eric E. May, O.F.M.Cap., *Ecce Agnus Dei! A Philosophical and Exegetical Approach to John 1,29.36* (The Cath. Un. of America. Studies in Theology, Second Series 5, Washington, D.C. 1947); J. Leal, S.J., *El sentido soteriológico del cordero de Dios en la exégesis católica Io 1,29.36*: *EstEcl* 24 (1950) 147-192.

Augustine explains and confirms with arguments the close association of priesthood and *royal dignity* in the one person of Christ.¹⁸

712. B. Christ's *sacrifice of the cross*. 1) *In connection with the words of Holy Scripture* this sacrifice is presented by the Fathers. Origen: "Since he [Paul] had said above, that he handed himself over as redemption for the whole human race... now he adds... *God offered him as a propitiation...*, namely, by the offering of his own body he made appeasement to God for men..." (R 498).¹⁹ St. Augustine: "... *and so we were by nature children of wrath...* [Eph. 2:3]. Since men were caught in this wrath by original sin, so grave and pernicious to which they added more and greater sins, a mediator was necessary, that is, a reconciler who could placate this wrath by the offering of a single sacrifice, which was foreshadowed by all the sacrifices of the law and the prophets" (R 1915). See R. 2188, 2270.

2) The *excellence* of Christ's sacrifice is affirmed *above all the ancient sacrifices*. Origen: "... and therefore the other sacrifices ceased, because this sacrifice was of such a nature that just one sufficed for the salvation of the whole world" (R 492). Eusebius Caesar: "But when that which is perfect arrived..., the former stopped and were replaced with a more excellent and true sacrifice" (R 664). St. Leo I the Great: "Or what sacrifice was ever more hallowed than that which the true High Priest placed on the altar of the cross by the immolation of his own flesh?" (R 2188). See R 33, 2208, 2270, 2311.

713. 3) A certain *necessity* of this sacrifice of Christ for taking away our sins is extolled. St. Athanasius: "For since the Word understood that the corruption of men could not be removed in any other way unless they completely died... Hence he offered up to death the body that he received as a sacrifice and victim free of all stain, and by his oblation for others he warded off death from all those like him" (R 715). St. Gregory I the Great: "Therefore such guilt had to be destroyed, but it could not be destroyed except by a sacrifice. A sacrifice had to be found, but what kind of sacrifice could be found to absolve men?... [The Son of God] offered the sacrifice for us; he offered his body for sinners as a victim without sin, which could both die for humanity and cleanse it with righteousness" (R 2311). See R 2188.

18. For more from the Fathers, see Scheller, *Das Priestertum...* 119-151. In particular on St. Augustine, see also Mohan, *De nominibus Christi...* 60-62; A.F. Krueger, *Synthesis of Sacrifice according to Saint Augustine* (Fac. Theol. S. Mariae ad Lacum, Mundelein, Ill. 1950) 76-78. On St. Cyril, see G. Sabatino, *La Dottrina del Sacerdozio de Cristo in S. Cirillo Alessandrino* (Pontificia Facoltà Teologica S. Luigi, Posillipo-Napoli) (Avellino 1949).

19. On this text (R 498), see J. Solano, S.J., *Un texto de Origenes en Rouët de Journal* (EP 498 núm. 498): EstEcl 19 (1945) 517f.

4) Christ on the cross offered himself to the Father as a new Adam, bearing the human race in a certain way in himself. St. Irenaeus: "... in the second Adam, however, we are reconciled, being made obedient even unto death" (R. 255). St. Athanasius: "He sends his own Son... that henceforth, as if all had died through Him, the word of that sentence might be accomplished (for all died in Christ)..." (R 767). St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Therefore we were crucified with him, when his flesh was crucified, which in some way contained all of nature in itself; as also in Adam..." (R 2123).²⁰

714. Theological reasoning. A. Christ *the priest*. In a proper sense the office of a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people, especially inasmuch as he makes satisfaction to God in some way for the sins of men. But this is especially the case with Christ, as we explained in the thesis (see S.Th. III, q. 22, a. 1 c).

B. Christ's *sacrifice* on the cross. A sacrifice for sin is something done for the honor really due to God in order to placate him. But Christ offered himself in his passion for us. The fact that he voluntarily embraced his passion was very pleasing to God, since it was done with the greatest charity (see III, q. 48, a. 3 c).²¹

715. Objections. 1. The function of a priest is *to kill* a victim in sacrifice. But Christ did not kill himself. Therefore he was not at the same time both priest and victim.

I deny the major. Since many aspects of this question are explained in the treatise on the Eucharistic sacrifice, it is sufficient to point out here that Holy Scripture does not say that Christ killed himself, but it certainly says that Christ *offered* himself to the Father.²²

716. 2. Every sacrifice from the fact that it is offered to God is *sanctified* by God. But Christ's humanity *from the beginning* was sanctified and joined to God. Therefore Christ *as man* could not be the offering or victim of this sacrifice.

20. For the testimony of Origen (R 492), see j. Rivière, *Théologie du sacrifice rédempteur. Un témoignage d'Origène*: BullLittEccI 45 (1944) 3-12. For St. Athanasius, see J.B. Berchem, A.a., *Le Christ Sanctificateur d'après Saint Athanase*: Ang 15 (1938) 549f. For other patristic texts concerning Christ's sacrifice of the cross, see DTC 13,1936f.1941f. On St. Leo, see Mozeris, *Doctrina Sancti Leonis...* 24-27.

21. See L. Hardy, *La doctrine de la rédemption chez saint Thomas* (Paris 1936) (this work has been evaluated very differently: see v.gr. RevThom 43 [1937] 127-129 and BullThom 5 [1937] 85-91), where the first place in the doctrine of St. Thomas is given to sacrifice. On the *religious* value of Christ's sacrifice and of the sacrifices of the rest of humanity, see A. Gaudel, *Sacrifice*: DTC 14,687-690. On Christ's *priesthood* among theologians, see Scheller, *Das Priestertum...* 151-294, 298-392.

22. In what sense Christ was the indirect *cause* of his own death (see S.Th. III, q. 47, a.1-3) and why the death of *martyrs* is not a sacrifice, see Suarez, d.46 s.1 n.2f.; Salmanticenses, d.31 dub.1 n.6-8.

I distinguish the major: Every sacrifice from the fact that it is offered to God is sanctified with a *substantial* ontological holiness, *denied*; with an *accidental* ontological holiness, *I subdistinguish:* coming from an internal and physical habit of sanctifying grace, *denied*; otherwise, *conceded*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

That Christ's humanity is sanctified from the beginning does not prevent it from being sanctified *in some other way* through some sacrificial oblation (see S.Th. III, q. 22, a. 2 ad 3). In its own way, what we said above in thesis 12, objection 3, n. 256, should be used in solving this difficulty.

717. Scholium 1. *On the form by which Christ is constituted a priest.* The question here is about the title or the quasi-form in virtue of which Christ is constituted a priest. Although in this matter there are many opinions among theologians, they agree in the fact that the *hypostatic union* is the *foundation* or root of Christ's priesthood. The theologians also agree that Christ is not constituted a priest through any *character*, as are the priests of the New Testament (see S.Th. III, q. 63, a. 5 c).

Regarding other determinations it seems necessary to say that the hypostatic union is the quasi-form by which Christ has *sacerdotal power*. But in order to exercise this power what is necessary for him is his *capital* habitual grace, which is a consequence of the hypostatic union. His "vocation" from God (see Heb. 5:4-6) is really included in the hypostatic union.²³

718. Scholium 2. *On the moment when Christ's priesthood began.* From what was said in the preceding scholium, it seems clear that we cannot talk about a true priesthood of Christ *before* the incarnation. But there can be a debate about the moment after the incarnation when Christ began to exercise his priestly functions.

It seems to us more in conformity with the doctrine of Holy Scripture to say that Christ exercised his priesthood *at the very moment of his incarnation* (see Heb. 10:5-10). In this way also the greatest union is had between all the acts of the life of Christ.²⁴

In what sense this oblation of Christ was a *sacrifice* will be explained below in scholium 5, n. 722.

23. See Salmanticenses, d.31 dub.1 n.16f.; Rábanos, *El Sacerdocio...* 83-91. Whether from Heb. 5:5 it can be proved expressly that divine sonship is included in Christ's priesthood, see Ceuppens, *Theologia biblica* 3,179F.; Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* at this place. Bourassa writes profoundly about the harmony between Christ's sacrifice, priesthood and holiness, *Verum sacrificium*: ScEcc1 3 (1950) 146-182; 4 (1951) 91-139. However it should be noted that we mentioned these articles above in n. 635, note 9.

24. See the various opinions of the authors in Rábanos, *El Sacerdocio...* 163-168.

719. Scholium 3. *On the eternally lasting priesthood of Christ.* The fact is certain. Heb. 6:20: *Jesus... a high priest for ever.* Heb. 7:24: *He holds his priesthood permanently, because he continues for ever.*

However two questions remain: a) whether Christ is an eternal priest in some broad sense, that is, *until the end of the world*; b) if Christ's priesthood does not end with the existence of the world, *in what sense* can Christ be said to be a priest for ever?

a) There are some theologians who understand "eternity," as mentioned in Hebrews 6 and 7, to be about the duration *until the end of the world*. However much more commonly *it is taken as eternity in the proper sense*. But it should be noted that the difference is mainly a matter of words.²⁵

The priesthood of Christ until the end of the world is connected especially with the celebration of the *Eucharistic sacrifice*, of which Christ is the principal offerer, in the sense explained in the treatise on the Eucharist (see D 1743).

720. b) Christ can be said to be *a priest for ever*, because his priestly *dignity* is eternal or the quasi-form because of which Christ has priestly power (see above, n. 717). See Heb. 7:16.

A certain priestly *activity* of Christ is also eternal, at least in this sense that Christ continually approves the immolation made once in a bloody way on the cross, and so he offers to God without ceasing *adoration and thanksgiving*.

The sacrifice immolated once on the cross is also eternal, that is, the humanity of Christ marked with his wounds. Rev. 5:6: *I saw... a Lamb standing, as though it had been slain.*

Finally, the *power* of that sacrifice offered once or the *consummation* of the sacrifice will be eternal (see S. Th. III, q. 22, a. 5).²⁶

721. Scholium 4. *On the kind of priesthood to which Christ's priesthood pertains.* The priesthood of Christ is of a certain more eminent and higher order than the priesthood of the law of nature, of the old law, of the law of grace, because it has in its nature an infinite dignity by reason of the person.

All those other sacrifices are referred to Christ in some way and have some similitude with the sacrifice of Christ.

Christ is said to be a priest according to the order of Melchizedek not as though the latter were a more excellent priest "but because he foreshadowed

25. Thus expressly Arriaga, who denies eternity in the proper sense: *De incarn.* d.47 s.3 n.14. Lugo also denies such eternity: *De incarn.* d.29 s.3 n.33-35, although he does concede "it can be said that de facto Christ's priesthood will remain for ever, even after the day of judgment" (*ibid.*, n.36).

26. For more, see Rábanos, *El sacerdocio...* 170-192.

the excellence of Christ's priesthood over the Levitical priesthood" (S.Th. III, q. 22, a. 6 ad 1).²⁷

722. Scholium 5. *On the sacrifice of Christ from the first moment of his earthly life and during his whole life.* The terms in Heb. 10:5-10 are sacrificial. Therefore it is necessary to say that Christ from the beginning of his life offered himself as a sacrifice.

The explanation of this fact comes in two forms. Those who hold the distinction of a *ritual* sacrifice and of a *personal* sacrifice, think that this oblation (Heb. 10:5-10) and the rest of Christ's earthly life was *a true sacrifice in the strict sense*.

Others however consider this oblation of Christ and his whole earthly life *as a preparation* for a sacrifice in the proper sense, which would be the sacrifice of the cross. So Christ throughout his whole life had those internal attitudes of obedience and charity, which conferred worth to the sacrifice of the cross.

It should be noted that St. Thomas does not restrict the *sacrifice* of Christ to just his death, but he extends it to the whole passion (III, q. 48, a. 3; see III, q. 47, a. 2 c: "the sacrifice of Christ's passion and death").²⁸

The explanation of this matter depends on the question about the essence of a sacrifice, which will be presented in the treatise on the Eucharist.

723. Scholium 6. *On the heavenly sacrifice of Christ.* All Catholics hold that the death of Christ was a true sacrifice, by which the sins of men were abolished by the expiation of Christ the priest and men were reconciled with God.

But a twofold further question is proposed. a) Is the sacrifice of the cross *complete* in itself? b) Can one speak about a certain *true heavenly sacrifice* of Christ?

a) There are those who think that an oblation of Christ *after the Ascension* is required, that the sacrifice of the cross may be completed and finished. This is understood in different ways.

It seems necessary to say that this teaching does not have a sufficient foundation in the theological sources. The statements of tradition are given in the full sense, without taking anything away from the integrity of the sacrifice of the cross.

b) Also the question about the *heavenly* sacrifice of Christ depends on

27. See Suarez, d.46 s.3 n.7; Salmanticenses, d.31 dub.2. On the comparison between Christ and Melchizedek by reason of one sacrifice, see Rábanos, *op. cit.*, 193-212. See also *ibid.*, 213-216.

28. See M. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe...* (Paris 1926) 741-745. Differently, Esteve, *De caelesti mediatione sacerdotali...* 77f.104.

the more general doctrine about the nature of a sacrifice.

The best exegetes say that this theory can in no way be based on the teaching of the letter to the Hebrews.²⁹

724. Scholium 7. *On the efficacy of the sacrifices of the Old Testament.* With a quasi-sacramental efficacy those sacrifices could confer from the work produced (*ex opere operato*) legal fitness for divine worship. See Heb. 9:9f., 13.

With a figurative signification all those sacrifices foreshadowed the sacrifice of Christ. See Heb. 7:19; 10:1.

With symbolic power the sacrifices of the Old Testament suitably expressed the necessary attitudes of mind towards God, namely, humility, adoration, penance, and especially faith, by which a man was disposed from the work of the performer (*ex opere operantis*) to recover the grace of justification. See S.Th. I-II, q. 102, a. 3; q. 103, a. 2.³⁰

29. See Galtier, n. 532f.; Prat, *Théologie...* 1,456; Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux* 65f.; Rabanos, *El sacerdocio...* 175-179; Esteve, *op. cit.*, 17-23, 101-108; Spicq, who has much about Christ the heavenly priest, mentions the one earthly sacrifice of the cross: *L'épître aux Hébreux*, v.gr., 1 (1952) 297-300 and 2,268-285.

30. See Lercher, n. 203; DTC 14,689.

Thesis 29. By his holy passion Jesus Christ brought about our redemption.

S.Th. III, q. 48, a. 4f.

725. Definition of terms. *Redemption.* Etymologically it is an act of redeeming. But *to redeem* is *to buy again* or simply *to buy*. Therefore the idea of *paying a price*, if you look at this word only in an etymological way, is undoubtedly expressed.¹

It *really* signifies liberation from some evil either by paying a price or *without a price*. For in Holy Scripture the word *redeem* renders not only the Greek root ἀγοραζω but also λύω (λύτρον, λύτρωσις...). But in fact λυτροῦσθαι renders, beside other words, the Hebrew root קָנָה with which the idea of paying a price is not necessarily connected, but actually at times expressly excludes it, as in Isa. 52:3.²

726. Concretely and exactly³ in our thesis, redemption signifies liberation mainly from sin and from the effects of sin through the passion of Christ.

In what sense this should be understood is sufficiently clear from the preceding theses on merit, satisfaction and sacrifice. We will have something to say about the relation among these concepts below in scholium 1, n. 743.

This liberation can be understood adequately and inadequately. *Adequately* it includes *the whole work* of Christ on our behalf.⁴ *Inadequately* it looks at *a particular aspect* of Christ's work, namely, the aspect of *freeing* us from some evil. In the thesis we are concerned with this *particular* aspect.

727. Doctrine of the Church. 1) The salvific work of Christ is proposed expressly as *redemption*. a) Paul IV: "...or that our same Lord and God, Jesus Christ, did not submit to the most bitter death of the Cross in order to redeem us from sins and from eternal death..." (D 880). See D 1025, 1364. Pius XI in 1933 proclaimed an extraordinary Holy Year for a general jubilee "at the conclusion of nineteen centuries since the accomplishment of the redemption of the human race."⁵

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1. See Forcellini-De Vit, *Lexicon...* at this word. The word "redemption" carries with it the idea of a "price" even more strongly in middle and late Latin usage; see Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis* (Paris 1938) at this word.
 2. See A. Vitti, S.J., *Theologia biblica novi Testamenti. Soteriologia* (Ad usum privatum auditorum Pontifici Institutii Biblici, Rome 1932) 32f.34-46; Kittel, *Theologisches...* 4,331 ad b.333.335. See also for λύτρωσις (v.gr., Luke 1:68; 2:38; 24:21) Kittel, *loc.cit.*, 353f.; Prat, *Théologie...* 2,227-231.
 3. On other meanings, see DTC 13,1912-1915.
 4. Today redemption is taken most often in this *adequate* sense, v.gr., both in DTC and in DB. The same can be said about "Erlösung" in LTK.
 5. AAS 25 (1933) 5.

b) Christ himself is often called the *redeemer*. *The Council of Trent*: “If anyone says that Jesus Christ was given by God to men as a redeemer in whom they are to trust but not also as a lawgiver...” (D 1571). See D 636, 930, 1636, 1642, 1694, 2015, 3677.

728. 2) The work of Christ is proposed as *liberation*. It will suffice to cite the Encyclical “*Tametsi futura*” of Leo XIII, where this idea is expressed: “nor was there any other cure by human efforts, at the time when Christ the Lord, having descended from heaven as liberator, appeared...” (Cav 791f.).

3) The work of Christ is described as *salvation*. a) The passages should be recalled in which Christ is said to have come “for our salvation.” *The Council of Nicaea*: “We believe... in our one Lord, Jesus Christ... who for our salvation... suffered...” (D 125). See above, thesis 1, n. 7.

b) Christ is called *Savior*. *Constantinople IV*: “We decree that the sacred image of our Lord Jesus Christ, Liberator and Savior of all people, must be venerated with equal honor...” (D 653). See D 1, 498, 516, 518, 653, 1524, 1545, 1703.

729. Theological note. The thesis is *of divine and Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium*. It must also be said to be *defined by the solemn magisterium* (D 125, 1571).

730. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. A metaphor from the root λύω (loosen). 1) λύτρον (redemption). Matt. 20:28: ... *the Son of man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom (λύτρον) for many*. See Mark 10:45; 1 Tim. 2:6 (ἀντίλυτρον).

In the Old Testament λύτρον (generally in the plural) corresponding to various Hebrew roots, is mainly the *price* of liberation, v.gr., for one’s own life (Exod. 21:30; Num. 35:31), for a slave (Lev. 25:51f.), for a handmaid (Lev. 19:20), for the sale of a field (Lev. 25:26), for the first-born males who are offered to the Lord (Num. 18:15).

In profane use the word λύτρον recurs also as the *price* of liberation for men captured in war, for slaves, etc.

Christ therefore says that he will give his life as *the price of liberation* in place of the many (or all) or for the good of many.

That from which we are liberated, from the whole teaching of Christ, cannot be anything other than sin, since sin is the one true evil for man. To whom Christ pays this price is implicitly indicated when Christ is said to die *by command of the Father*. The *Father*, therefore, is the one to whom the price of our liberation from sin has been offered and paid by Christ.

731. 2) λυτροῦσθαι (*middle voice* of the verb). Tit. 2:14: *who gave himself for us to redeem (λυτρώσεται) us from all iniquity.* 1 Pet. 1:18f.: *You know that you were ransomed (ἐλυτρώθητε: passive voice) from the futile ways inherited from your fathers, not with perishable things such as silver and gold... but with the precious blood of Christ, like that of a lamb without blemish or spot.* The idea of liberation from iniquity is proposed; and also at the same time it is indicated by the idea of a price, which is said to be Christ or the blood of the lamb.

Moreover λυτροῦσθαι does not always carry with it the notion of a price to be paid, including its use *in the New Testament.* Luke 24:21. See above, n. 725.

732. 3) ἀπολύτρωσις (*redemption*). Rom. 3:24: *justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption (ἀπολύτρωσεως) which is in Christ Jesus.* See 1 Cor. 1:30; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14; Heb. 9:15. It is not clearly apparent whether in these texts the idea of a *price* to be paid is *also* contained, or whether only the idea of *liberation* is expressed. See also Luke 1:68; 2:38 (λύτρωσις).

In the fuller sense ἀπολύτρωσις also recurs, signifying *perfect* liberation in heaven. Eph. 4:30: *And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, in whom you were sealed for the day of redemption.* See Rom. 8:23; Heb. 9:12.⁶

733. B. A metaphor from the root ἀγοράζω (*buy*). 1 Cor. 6:20: *you were bought with a price (ἡγοράσθητε... τιμῆς).* See 7:23; 2 Pet. 2:1; Rev. 5:9; 14:3f. In Gal. 3:13 and 4:5 the derivative ἐξαγοράζω recurs.

The origin of this metaphor, especially in St. Paul and very much in use at that time among the Greeks, seems to be sought in the purchase of slaves in order to free them. For the gods were thought to pay the price, which in reality the slave himself had previously brought to the temple, in order that the slave in question might be liberated from the servitude by which he was bound. But St. Paul insists on the fact that Christ *really* paid the price for the faithful (Gal. 3:13), which was nothing else but Christ himself.

However it should be noted that the idea of the *sale* of the people of Israel by God is already affirmed by the O.T. See Isa. 50:1.

The faithful bought with a price by Christ are called *slaves of Christ or of God*, because they were bought by Christ (1 Cor. 7:22f.; see 6:19f.). But they are also considered as *free children*, in opposition to the slavery of the law from which they have been liberated (Gal. 4:1-7).

However this *buying* of Christ is not from the slavery alone of the law, but in gen-

6. See Kittel, *Theologisches...* 4,341-359; Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,507f.; 2,227-231; Vitti, *Soteriologia*, 34-40; DBS 3,112-114, 123-133, 157-162.184f. On the expectation of redemption (in the broad sense) in the O.T. and among the ancient peoples of the Orient, see Heinisch, *Theologie...* 323-331; DTC 13,1921-1927.

eral from slavery to *sin*, as the contrast in 1 Cor. 6:15-20 supposes. See also Rom. 7:14.⁷

734. C. A metaphor from the root σώζω (save). 1) The word σώζω describes the mission or work of Christ. Matt. 1:21: *you shall call his name Jesus, for he will save (σώσει) his people from their sins.* John 3:17: *For God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved (σωθή) through him.* See also Luke 19:10; 1 Cor. 1:18.21; 1 Tim. 1:15.

2) The noun σωτηρία (or the adjective σωτήριον) designates the work of Christ. Acts 4:12: *And there is salvation (σωτήρια) in no one else.* Heb. 5:9: *he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey him.* See Luke 1:69.71; Tit. 2:11.

3) The name Σωτήρ is given to Christ. Luke 2:11: *for to you is born this day in the city of David a Savior (Σωτήρ), who is Christ the Lord.* Acts 5:31: *God exalted him at his right hand as Leader and Savior.* Tit. 2:13: *awaiting...the appearing of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ.* See also Acts 13:23; 2 Tim. 1:10; 2 Pet. 1:1.11; 1 John 4:14.

735. This root σώζω is often used in the N.T. concerning liberation from evils of the body or return to the pristine state of health (see, v.gr., Matt. 9:21f.; Mark 5:23; John 11:12; Acts 4:9), or liberation from the adverse forces of nature (v.gr., Matt. 8:25; 14:30; Acts 27:20.31.34.44; 1 Pet. 3:20), or liberation from hostile men (v.gr., Matt. 27:40.42.49; John 12:27; Acts 27:43), etc.

However the evil from which Jesus especially saves men is *sin*. Matt. 1:21: *he will save his people from their sins.* Luke 19:10: *For the Son of man came to seek and to save the lost (concerning Zacchaeus the sinner).* 1 Tim. 1:15: *Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.*

Therefore the work of Christ is proposed as the liberation of men from sin and restoration to the state of spiritual health or salvation. That this *salvation* was brought about especially *by the passion and death of Christ* must be deduced first of all from the first two metaphors just explained (n. 730-733) and from what was said above about sacrifice (thesis 28, n. 703-709).⁸

736. Proof from tradition. 1) That the Fathers rightly propose the passion and death of Christ as work by which man is reconciled to God and freed from sin is sufficiently clear from what was said especially in the preceding theses on satisfaction (thesis 25, n. 641f.) and about the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ (thesis 28, n. 711-713). Now a few points will be added that emphasize more directly the aspect of *liberation*.

2) *Physical-mystical redemption.* Many Fathers, especially among the Greeks, insist on the fact that human nature was already restored *by the hypostatic union itself*

7. See DBS 3,159-161; Kittel, *Theologisches...* 1,125-128; Vitti, *Soteriologia* 28-34; Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,229f.; Meinertz, *Theologiae...* 2,101f.

8. See Vitti, *Soteriologia* 20-28, where he treats this root word σώζω as it is used in the Greek O.T. and in Hellenism; Bardessano, *L'antitesi di "peccato"...*: DivThom (Pi) 15 (1938) 9-23. On liberation from the multiple slaveries to which man was subjected, see Lercher³, n.218. See E.B. Allo, O.P., *Les deux sauveurs du paganisme gréco-romain*: RevScPhTh 15 (1926) 5-34.

or reintegrated into its pristine state. For the primeval happiness of man consisted in his participation in the divine immortality; salvation therefore had to be looked at as *liberation from death*. Certainly the Word by the hypostatic union made our nature a participator in his divinity and destroyed our death, when he made us companions of his own resurrection.

The Fathers in no way attributed this liberation to the incarnation *alone*, but without doubt at the same time they proposed the *death* of Christ as satisfaction and a sacrifice.⁹

737. 3) Liberation from the power of the devil. Since in Holy Scripture liberation from sin is proposed as a snatching away from the power of the devil (see Acts 26:18), and the devil is portrayed either as being in opposition to Christ (see John 12:31; 14:30; 1 John 3:9) or as being in relation with the sinner (1 John 3:8), the Fathers develop these ideas further and highlight them with new images.

a) *The idea of redemption or liberation from the power of the devil* occurs often. But that the blood of Christ *was paid to the devil* as the price of this redemption is *expressly* excluded by many Fathers. But in the case of those Fathers who do say this, it is clear from the context that they are only speaking *metaphorically*, in order to bring out the painful conditions by which Christ saved us. St. Ambrose speaks in a more difficult way. We will now present some samples of their various testimonies.

738. Origen: "But to whom did he give his soul as the price of redemption for the many? Not to God. Therefore to the evil one? For he ruled over us, until the soul of Jesus was given as the price of our redemption to the deceiver" (R 508). St. Ambrose: "But the price of our liberation was the blood of the Lord Jesus, which necessarily had to be paid to the one to whom we had been sold because of our sins" (R 1257).

Adamantius: "...the devil holds on to the blood of Christ and his soul as a price for the human race. Great is that blasphemy and profound the stupidity."¹⁰ St. Gregory Nazianzen: "But if the price of redemption is not paid to anyone else but to the one who holds the captives, I ask: to whom is the price paid and for what reason? If to the evil one... what an outrage!... But it is clear that the Father accepted it, not however because he sought it or needed it, but because of the plan of redemption..." (R 1016). St. John Damascene: "Therefore he dies... offering himself to the Father as a sacrifice for us. For we were in debt to him and therefore the price of our redemption had to be paid to him, so that in this way we could be freed from condemnation. For it is not possible that the

9. See DTC 13,1938f.; I. Loncke, *De indole ac valore theoriae physico-mysticae redemptionis*: CollatBrug 46 (1950) 123-129. On the evolution of the mind of St. Augustine, who very well completes the theory of the Greek Fathers, see E. Braem, O.E.S.A., *Het christologisch Aspect van Augustinus' Leer over de heiligmakende Gnade*: SyllExcerptDiss 22 (1951) [1]-[38]. On St. Cyril, who proposes a synthesis of both theories, see Fraigneau-Julien, *L'efficacité de l'humanité du Christ selon saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie*: RevThom 55 (1955) 615-628.

10. *De recta in Deum fide* 1. C.27: GChS 55; MG 11,1758.

blood of the Lord could be offered to the tyrant.”¹¹

739. b) *The idea of the abuse of the dominion* that the devil exercises over sinners. Especially among the Latin Fathers the way in which the devil has a certain *right* over *sinners* is extolled. But this “right” is nothing other than the power of punishing them, which he has from God. But because the devil killed Christ the *innocent one*, he is found guilty of the crime and so he is *justly punished* by the loss of his captives.

St. Hilary: “...the prince of the world coming and finding nothing but the punishment of sin, that is the law of death, he took it, by which he is judged to be the author of human death, because he directed the unknown death of sin against the author of life.”¹² St. Augustine: “Therefore what is the justice by which the devil is conquered? What, except the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because, since he found in him nothing worthy of death, he killed him nevertheless. And of course it is just that the debtors whom he held should be set free, because they believe in him, whom he killed without any debt” (R 1675).

740. c) Many *images* are used by the Fathers. Among others, the image of a “fight” or battle between Christ and the devil is used, and various metaphors by which it is indicated that the devil was *deceived*, because, his human nature hiding the divinity of the Word, he dared to fight with Christ and so he was captured.

St. Ambrose: “Therefore in a spiritual wrestling the Lord Jesus, taking our burdens, subjected himself to the experience of his passion. And in the form of weakness, in order that the adversary would judge him to be like other men, whom he could easily overcome, he abandoned the arms of his divinity, and he took up the shield of humanity. Certain of victory, the tempter approached him: he wanted to wound his side with the spear of a soldier, thinking also that this man like Adam could be overthrown through a wound in his side. But the Lord Jesus, wounded in his side, produced life out of that side... and when, in that death, in that burial of his body he was thought to be defeated, even though pierced he raised himself by his own power: the adversary fell, the Lord rose from the dead.” St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “It was necessary that the Lord suffer for us: but the devil would not have dared to approach him, if he knew who he was... His body therefore was food after his death, in order that, since the dragon hoped that he would be able to devour it, he would also vomit out those whom he had

11. *De fide orthod.* 3,27: MG 94,1095.

12. *Tract in ps.* 68, 8: CSEL, 22,319f.; ML 9,475.

already devoured.”¹³

741. St. Augustine: “Therefore why did you unwisely exult, my conqueror, because by Liberator had mortal flesh?...He was your mouse-trap: where you rejoiced, that is where you were captured.” “The devil rejoiced when Christ died, and the devil was overcome by that very death of Christ: he took the food as in a mouse-trap... The cross of the Lord was the devil’s mouse-trap: the food by which he was captured was the death of the Lord.” St. Gregory I the Great: “Who does not know that food is placed on a hook to hide the sharp point? For the food attracts but the hook catches. Therefore our Lord, coming for the redemption of the human race, made himself like a hook to kill the devil. For he assumed a body, so that in it the Behemoth might desire the death of his flesh as a source of his own food. Since he unjustly desired that death, he lost us whom he was holding as it were justly.”¹⁴

All these testimonies very well confirm how important in the minds of the Fathers was the idea of our *liberation or redemption* because of the death of Christ.

742. Theological reasoning. A threefold bondage is mentioned by St. Thomas from which we have been liberated by the passion of Christ. a) We have been *liberated from sin*, because by his passion Christ abundantly compensated for the *personal injury* that we inflicted on God by sinning and so by the application of the merits of Christ the *stain of guilt* in us is destroyed and *the guilty state of sin* ceases (see above, thesis 23, n. 583f.).

b) By the passion of Christ we have been *liberated from the punishment of sin* both *directly*, inasmuch as the punishment is removed because of the sufficient satisfaction offered by Christ (see above, thesis 26, objection 2), and *indirectly*, inasmuch as the passion of Christ is the cause of the remission of sin, on which is based the guilty state of punishment.

c) By his death Christ snatched us *from the power of the devil*. Principally Christ liberated us *from eternal punishment*, whose administrator the devil

13. St. Ambrose, *Enarrat. In Ps. 40* v.4 n.13: ML 14,1073; St. Cyril, *Catech.*, 12,15: MG 33,742.

14. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 134 c.5 n.6; 263,1: ML 38,745.1210. St. Gregory, *Moral.* 1.33 c.7: ML 76,680. On this whole argument of the Fathers, see DTC 13,1939.1941; J. Rivière, *La doctrine de la Rédemption chez saint Césaire d'Arles*: BullLittEcccl 44 (1943) 3-20; Id., *Contribution au dossier des "Cur Deus homo" populaires...*: BullLittEcccl 46 (1945) 129-138. On this same matter in the scholastics, see DTC19,1942-1950; J. Rivière, *Le dogme de la rédemption au XII^e siècle d'après les dernières publications*: RevMoiAgeLat 2 (1946) 101-112, 219-230; D.E. de Clerck, *Questions de soteriologie médiévale*:: RechThAncMed 13 (1946) 150-184; Id., *Droits du démon et nécessité de la rédemption*: RechThAncMéd 14 (1947) 32-64; Id., *Nouveau témoin du "conflit des filles de Dieu"*: RevBén 58 (1948) 110-124; Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte*...2nd part, 2,254-287.

is said to be (see above b); but Christ has also liberated us *from temptations of the soul and vexations of the body* on the part of the devil, because by his passion he proved a remedy for men by which they can protect themselves against the attacks of the enemy (see III, q. 48, a. 4; q. 49, a. 1-3).

743. Scholium 1. *A comparison between the different aspects under which the work of Christ has been described.* The word *redemption*, if it is taken in the adequate sense (see above, n. 726), designates the *whole* work of Christ. *Merit* denotes the work of Christ inasmuch as it was a *good* work, *pleasing to God*, which *obtained gifts for men*. *Satisfaction*, which is a *species* of merit, touches further the root cause why God considers this work of Christ pleasing *precisely* in order to grant gifts to sinners, that is, compensation or *reparation of the injured divine honor*. Thus God, who was truly offended by men, has been placated on their behalf. *Sacrifice* then determines even more the concrete manner of Christ's satisfaction, namely, by the exercise of the most perfect act of the virtue of religion. However *redemption* in its inadequate sense connotes *its effect on men* who, as captives under the power of sin, *are liberated*.¹⁵

744. Scholium 2. *The passion of Christ by way of efficiency.* The *principal* agent of man's salvation is God. But because the humanity of Christ is the *instrument* of the divinity (see above, thesis 14), therefore all Christ's actions and passions operate *instrumentally* in virtue of the divinity for human salvation. Therefore the passion of Christ in an *efficient* way causes man's salvation (S.Th. III, q. 46, a. 6 c).

Indeed it was a *divine person* who offered the sacrifice of the cross and that is the source of its infinite value (see above, thesis 26, scholium 2). But *the human nature of Christ* was the *formal cause* by which that sacrifice was offered. For Christ *as man* is a priest (see above, thesis 28, n. 695). Therefore the humanity of Christ by his passion *physically* concurred in order to produce our salvation. So the passion of Christ truly accomplished our salvation.

We defend above (thesis 14) as by far the more probable opinion that the humanity of Christ also physically concurs *in the actual conferring of grace*. But that must not be understood in such a way as if the *passion* of Christ, like something that happened in the past *and is already gone*, is the instrument physically producing a supernatural effect that *is taking place now*. For to operate in a physical manner it is necessary that what acts is physically and actually existing right now.¹⁶

745. Scholium 3. *On the descent of Christ into the underworld.* A. Fact. Surely Holy Scripture teaches, especially in 1 Pet. 3:19, that the soul of Christ descended into the underworld during the three days of his death. This truth is taught both by the holy

15. On the relation between Christ's satisfaction and sacrifice, see E. Hocedez, *A propos d'un livre sur l'Incarnation*: Greg 12 (1931) 144-146.

16. See Cajetan, *In 3 q.56 a.1 ad 3*; Suarez, d.31 s.8 n.6-10. On the more general teaching of St. Thomas, see J. Lécuyer, C.S.Sp., *La causalité efficiente des mystères du Christ selon saint Thomas*: DocCom 6 (1953) 91-120.

Fathers and it is proposed by the creeds and other documents of the magisterium, so that it is necessary to say that it is a defined doctrine of divine and Catholic faith (D 801).¹⁷

Regarding the *place* itself into which Christ descended. The word *hell* signifies the hidden place in which souls are detained who have not obtained the heavenly beatitude.¹⁸

It is indeed certain in theology that Christ descended into the underworld in which the just were detained. It is more probable that he did not descend into *purgatory* and it is almost certain that he did not descend into *the hell of the damned*.¹⁹

746. B. Soteriological importance. a) The descent is for Christ himself *the beginning of his glorification* which he merited by his passion, so that even then the words of St. Paul were fulfilled: *every knee should bow... and under the earth* (Phil. 2:10).

b) For the souls of the just detained in the limbo of the Fathers the descent of Christ was *the application of the fruit of the redemption*; this took place in a concrete way because those souls began to see God.²⁰

It is a matter of controversy whether Christ freed some souls detained in purgatory who otherwise would have to remain there. Generally theologians deny that Christ set free all the souls detained in purgatory.²¹

747. Scholium 4. On the resurrection of Christ. Although the resurrection and ascension of Christ logically pertain to the second chapter of this book (see thesis 30, n. 753), for practical reasons we will treat these truths now by way of a scholium. Moreover, since this dogma of our faith concerning Christ's resurrection is treated extensively in fundamental theology, it will suffice here to point out its soteriological importance.

In addition to the special reasons because of which it was necessary that Christ should rise from the dead (see S.Th. III, q. 53, a. 1 c), Christ's resurrection with reference to us is the cause of the resurrection of bodies and souls.

Regarding the resurrection of *bodies*, Christ's resurrection is both the efficient cause and the exemplary cause. It is the *efficient cause* inasmuch as the humanity of Christ according to its resurrection is the instrument joined together with his divinity (see above, thesis 14). But it will be the *exemplary cause* especially regarding the resurrection of the *just*, who have been conformed to the image of the Son of God (see Rom. 8:29). See Phil. 3:21.²²

17. See Holzmeister, *Commentarius in epistolas SS. Petri et Iudae apostolorum* 295-354. On other texts of Holy Scripture, see *ibid.*, 318; Lercher, n.222; H. Quillet, *Descente de Jésus aux enfers*: DTC 4,565-583, where he deals also with the objections of the adversaries; Grillmeier, *Der Gottessohn im Totenreich*: ZkathTh 71 (1949) 1-53, 184-203. On a non-Catholic work, in which many things worthy of consideration are contained, W. Bieder, *Die Vorstellung von der Höllenfahrt Jesu Christi*, see J. Danielou: RechScRel 37 (1950) 594-600.

18. *Catech. Rom.* p.1 c.6 n.2.

19. See Suarez, *De mysteriis...* d.43 s.4 n.3; DTC 4,583-590.

20. See S.Th. III, q. 52, a. 1, 4f.; *Catech. Rom.* p.1 c.6 n.6: DTC 4,618f. See G. Philips, *La grâce des justes de l'ancien Testament*: EphThLov 24 (1948) 33-37. On the relation between the descent of Christ and our baptism, see O. Rousseau, O.S.B., *La descente aux enfers. Fondement sotériologique du baptême chrétien*: RechScRel 40 (1951-1952) (Mélanges J. Lebreton, 2) 273-297.

21. See S.Th. III, q. 52, a. 8; DTC 4,616f.

22. See S.Th. III, q. 56, a. 1; *Catech. Rom.* p.1 c.6 n.13.

Moreover Christ's resurrection is the *pledge* of our own bodily resurrection. 1 Cor. 15:20.23: *But in fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep... But each in his own order: Christ the first fruits.*²³

748. Regarding the resurrection of *souls* or regarding justification. The dependence of our justification on the resurrection of Christ is clearly stated by St. Paul. Rom. 4:25: *he was put to death for our trespasses and raised for our justification.* Of course it is necessary to think about the causal influence of Christ's resurrection on our justification by means of faith; the object of this faith is God *who raised from the dead Jesus our Lord* (Rom. 4:24).

However the causality of Christ's resurrection is also *exemplary*: see Rom. 6:4f.11. Moreover this causality is also *moral*, inasmuch as by way of *sacrifice* the resurrection of Christ influences our redemption, seeing that it constitutes one thing with the death of Christ: for on the part of God it is the public recognition and acceptance of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. But it is also *efficient* causality instrumentally, because we do not participate in Christ's life (justification) except as members of the body of Christ whose Head is the *glorious* Christ. Moreover this life of Christ is given to us at the same time by the Holy Spirit and especially in the Eucharist. But Christ does not join his vital influence with the influence of the Holy Spirit except as the glorified One. This connection between the resurrection of Christ and our justification is shown also by St. Paul with the symbolism of baptism (Rom. 6:3-11) and by comparison with the new Adam (1 Cor. 15:16-22; 45-49).²⁴

749. Scholium 5. *On the Ascension of Christ.* This fact, which now is usually considered extensively in the school of exegesis of the N.T.,²⁵ is numbered among the dogmas of our faith, as is abundantly clear in the creeds themselves. See D 11, 44, 72, 189-190, 76, 125-126, 150. Christ's ascension is intimately connected with his resurrection (we just spoke about that above), and at the same time with the sitting of Christ at the right hand of the Father, which we will treat in the following thesis.

Beside the reasons because of which it was fitting that Christ should ascend into heaven (see S.Th. III, q. 57, a. 1), the soteriological importance of the ascension must also be considered in virtue of which Christ's ascension rightly should be said to be *the cause of our salvation*, both on our part and on the part of Christ himself.

On our part, because through Christ's ascension our mind is moved towards him, while place is given to faith, hope, charity and reverence. *On the part of Christ himself*,

23. See Prat, *La Théologie...* 1,160f.; 2,439-441.

24. See S.Th. III, q. 56, a. 2; F. Holtz, S.C.I., *La valeur sotériologique de la résurrection du Christ selon saint Thomas*: EphThLov 29 (1953) 609-645; Prat, *La Théologie...* 2,250-254; Bover, *Teologia...* 1.5 c.4 p.419-431; Al. Janssens, C.I.C.M., *De valore sotériologico resurrectionis Christi*: EphThLov 9 (1932) 225-233; E. Sauras, O.P., *La Asunción de la Santísima Virgen* (Valencia 1950) 382-412; D.M. Stanley, S.J., *Ad historiam Exegeseos Rom 4,25*: VerDom 29 (1951) 257-274; Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans... saint Paul* 65-71; especially T. Zapelena, S.J., *De Ecclesia Christi* 2nd part (Rome 1954) 398-423; F.X. Durrwell, *La Résurrection de Jésus Mystère de salut* (Le Puy-Paris 1954).

25. See V. Larrañaga, S.J., *La Ascensión del Señor en el Nuevo Testamento* (Madrid 1943) 2 vols.; P. Benoist, O.P., *L'ascension*: RevBibl 56 (1949) 161-203.

because Christ by ascending into heaven both prepared the life for us of ascending into heaven, and at the same time as Lord he entered into heaven in order to intercede for us that he might send divine gifts from there to men (see S.Th. III, q. 57, a. 6).²⁶

750. Scholium 6. *Christ a prophet.* On the charismatic grace of prophecy in Christ we gave some hints above (thesis 11, scholium 6, note 42), where a prophet was defined with St. Thomas (III, q. 7, a. 8 c) as one who “knows and announces things what things are far from men’s senses,” or one who “enlightened by a special divine assistance, especially announces future contingent things known only to God.”²⁷ But in connection with the *work* of Christ it must now be added that Christ is a prophet *in a certain broader sense*.

In the O.T. the word προφήτης (Latin: propheta) is the Greek translation of the LXX for three Hebrew nouns: especially נביא but also sometimes הַנָּבִיא and הוֹתֵן. Etymologically προφήτης seems to signify a man who speaks for another or in the place of another. *Actually* in the O.T. it designates a man who speaks in the name of God and manifests the divine will to men. A prophet is chosen by God who tells him what to say and what to do.

751. The prophets of the Israelite people were historically the supreme and authentic teachers instructed by God, that they might preserve the covenant given through Moses, increase it with new revelations, and prepare for a new covenant. A religious and at the same time a political office was given to the prophets by God for that theocratic people.²⁸

The Messiah as a prophet was foretold beginning with the book of Deuteronomy (18:15-19; see also Acts 3:22f.) and later in Isaiah (42:1-7; 61:1-3).²⁹ In the N.T this title is applied to Christ by others. See Matt. 21:11; Luke 7:16; 24:19; John 4:19; 9:17). The *Roman Catechism* calls Christ the greatest prophet (p.1 c.3 n.7).³⁰

752. Scholium 7. Christ appear expressly in the N.T as a *teacher* (διδάσκαλος, καθηγητής), and in fact he refers to himself *explicitly* in this way. See John 13:13f.; Matt. 23:8.10. But *regarding the reality* of being a teacher, it is mentioned often, for example, where Christ is described as *teaching* or where he says that he has manifested the name of God to men (John 17:6.8.26) or that he is the light of the world. The mag-

26. See *Catech. Rom.* p.1 c.7 n.4-9. For more on these last three scholiums, see Lercher, n.222-229. On the connection between the death of Christ and glory, see Esteve, *De caelesti mediatione sacerdotali...* passim, and especially 206-227.

27. H. Lamiroy, *De munere Christi prophético*: CollatBrug 27 (1927) 359.

28. See A. Pohl, S.J., *Historia populi Israel inde a divisione regni usque ad exilium...* (for private use at the Pont. Institutii Biblici) (Rome 1933) 22-30; E. Mangenot, *Prophète*: DB 5,705-720; Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon...* 1540.

29. See Ceuppens, *De prophetis messianicis...* 101-114; Koch, *Der Gottesgeist und der Messias*: Bibl 27 (1946) 376-403; Heinisch, *Theologie...* 311-314.

30. For more, see J. Loncke, *De indole muneris prophetici Christi Redemptoris*: CollatBrug 46 (1950) 182-186: there the concern is with Christ the prophet-teacher.

isterium of the Church extols this quality of Christ.³¹

Although Christ is often said to be both “prophet” and “teacher,” it seems that there is a difference between them. For a prophet in the O.T exercised an office of a supreme ruler over kings and priests which a simple “teacher” cannot do. Moreover “prophet” sounds like something more proper to the O.T. Therefore Christ is called more often a “teacher” rather than a “prophet.”³²

31. For more on this, see Lercher, n. 235-237.

32. The distinction between “προφήτας” and “διδασκάλους” is different, if one is referring to *charismatic gifts* in the letters of St. Paul in the early Church; see briefly, Prat, *La Théologie...* 1, note D, 498-500.

CHAPTER I I

On the exaltation of Christ after this life

Thesis 30. Christ the man is king of all men and peoples; and he is king also as man. His kingdom is spiritual: yet direct power belongs to him in the first reality (in actu primo) also over temporal kingdoms.

S.Th. III, q. 58f.; D'Ales, 402-414; Lercher³, n.238-244; A. Vanderberghe, *De potestate Christi regia*: Col-latBrug 39 (1939) 209-216, 278-285.

753. Connection. In the first chapter of this book with St. Thomas we treated Christ's exit from this world. Now the last step to take with the same holy Doctor is the consideration of Christ's *exaltation*. Since for practical reasons we passed over some things concerning Christ's resurrection (III, q. 53-56) and ascension (q. 57) above in thesis 29, scholium 4f., n. 747-749, now we have to consider the question of Christ's sitting at the right hand of the Father (q. 58) and also his judiciary power (q. 59). We treat both of these under the notion of Christ's *royalty*. For St. Thomas expressly considers Christ's royal dignity in these two questions (see q. 58, a. 1 d; a. 2 c. a. 3 c; q. 59, a. 4 ad 1).¹

754. Definition of terms. *Christ the man* or *Christ as this man*. Here it is taken in the sense given above in thesis 19, n. 492. If someone wishes to express the same thing with that formula: *Christ as man*, the word "man" is reduplicated *in the less proper specifying sense* (see. Thesis, 19, n. 493f.).

In order for this proposition: "Christ the man, or this man Christ" to be true, the communication of idioms suffices (see above, thesis 16, n. 372).

755. King. We are taking the notion of "king" from the Encyclical "*Quas primas*"; we will quote from it soon in n. 763. In a *metaphorical* sense someone is said to be a king who attains great excellence in some particular order: for example, king of poets, king of painters, that is, the greatest poet, the greatest painter. But someone is said to be a king in the *proper* sense who has the office of ruling men joined together in society and

1. Elsewhere in the *Summa* St. Thomas had touched on the kingship of Christ: v.gr., III, q. 31, a. 2 c; q. 36, a. 2 ad 3; a. 7 ad. 3. On the teaching of St. Thomas concerning Christ's royal power, see J. Leclercq, O.S.B., *La realeza de Jesucristo en las obras de Santo Tomás*: CiencTom 59 (1940) 144-156. The prayer given by St. Thomas on the first Sunday of Advent on Christ's royalty can be added: see RevThom (1946) 158ff. or VieSpir 78 (1947) 400-415.

leading them to the common end: he performs this office by the exercise of a triple power, namely, legislative, judiciary and executive.

That Christ is a king in the *metaphorical* sense because of the high level of his excellence by which he stands out among all created things is perfectly clear, and we are not talking about this kind of kingship in the thesis.

Therefore we are asserting that Christ is a king in the *proper* sense.

756. *Of all men.* In what sense Christ must be said to be king of angels and of all created things will be explained below in scholium 3, n. 786f.

And peoples. We understand “people” as men forming a *perfect civil society*. It is certain a fortiori that Christ is the king of every *domestic* society.

757. *Christ as man.* We take a further step in this second part of the thesis. The word “man” is reduplicated *in the proper specifying sense*, as explained above in thesis 20, n. 521. We are saying therefore that the Word rules creatures *with his human will*.

It might seem that the word “man” is reduplicated in the *reduplicating* sense (see above, thesis 19, n. 496). However that would be said less correctly, because royal power does not belong to Christ the man *from the principles of his human nature*, but it was given to him because of the union with a divine person (see below, especially scholium 1, n. 784).

758. *Kingdom* (βασιλεία). This word is understood in two different ways. For sometimes it signifies *the royal dignity and power* with which the supreme ruler of the community is endowed; but sometimes it designates *the whole community* or society over which that royal power is exercised.²

A spiritual kingdom. Power or authority is defined in reference to a *society*; but a society is specified by its proximate end. Therefore a spiritual kingdom will be had where the proximate end of a perfect society is the sanctification of souls.

A temporal kingdom is had where the proximate end of a perfect society is the public temporal prosperity.³

In this thesis the word “kingdom,” where the matter in question is

2. For the N.T., see Zorell, *Lexicon graecum...* at this word. For the more general use of this word, see Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 1,579f. For the Latin language, see Forcellini-De Vit, *Totius latinitatis lexicon* at this word.

3. See V. Cathrein, S.J., *Philosophia Moralis...*¹⁴ (Freiburg i.Br. 1927) n.505f.600; I González, S.J., *Philosophia Moralis (Philosophiae Scholasticae Summa...*B.A.C. [Matriti 1952] t.3) 1006-1022; L.R. Sotillo, S.J., *Compendium Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici* (Santander 1947) n.14-24.102; A. Vermeersch, S.J.-J. Creusen, S.J., *Epitome iuris canonici cum commentariis...*⁶ (Mechlin-Rome 1937) t.1 n.2f.

the spiritual kingdom of Christ, designates his royal *power*; but where “temporal kingdoms” are mentioned, the perfect *civil society* is indicated.

759. *Direct power* is that which concerns some thing *because of itself*. But *indirect power* is that which concerns some thing *because of the connection* it has with something else over which it has direct power.

Direct power in the first reality (in actu primo). Power, whether it is direct or indirect, can be considered as it is in itself or in its exercise. Power *in itself* is called power *in the first reality (in actu primo)*; but the exercise of power is said to be power *in the second reality (in actu secundo)*.

760. Christ *as man* has, according to this thesis, direct *spiritual power in the second reality*, that is, he *exercises* his royal power over those who are proximately ordered to the sanctification of souls.

Regarding *temporal things* or things that by their *nature* are concerned with man’s earthly life, and also regarding *civil societies*, by reason of his *spiritual power* Christ has *indirect temporal power*, according as and inasmuch as those temporal things are connected with spiritual things.⁴

Besides, we attribute direct temporal power to Christ *in the first reality*. Hence kings in civil society are not really vicars or agents of Christ, but *they would be*, if Christ *exercised* the royal power, which he has in the first reality.

761. Adversaries. A. *Secularism*, “the disease of our time,” denies that Christ the man is the king of all men and peoples. But in a special way *secularism* attacks the idea that *civil societies* ought to acknowledge Christ the King.

Secularism denies this *about God himself*; but it is especially opposed to Christ the man, the founder of the visible Church (D 3679).⁵

B. *Many early theologians* are often cited who denied that Christ as

4. This description of the *indirect* power of Christ seems to be more in conformity with the way of speaking about indirect power that is found among theologians and canonists. See St. Bellarmine, *Tract. de potestate Summi Pontificis... adversum Gulielmum Barclajum* c.5 (edit. Naples 1588, t.2 p.2 page 278); F.M.Capello, S.J., *Summa iuris publici ecclesiastici...*⁵ (Rome 1943) n.199.219-246; A. Ottaviani, *Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici* (Vatican City 1935) t.1 n.24; Sotillo, *Compendium iuris publici...* n.218. However M. J. Nicolas, O.P., attacks this description and prefers to call Christ’s royal power in temporal affairs *direct and mediated* (Id., *Le Christ Roi des nations*: RevThom 44 [1938] 476). Also Vermeersch-Creusen (*Epitome...* n.15) in the place of *indirect* power speaks sometimes about a *direct* power touching temporal affairs, which is spiritual *per accidens*. For a refutation of this so-called *direct power*, see Vermeersch-Creusen, *op. cit.*, n.16f.

5. See the Encyclical “*Quas primas*”: AAS 17 (1925) 604f.; B. Emonet, *Laïcisme*: DAFC 2,1767-1810; J. Koch, *Laicismus*: LTK 6,343.

man had direct temporal power in the first reality.⁶

762. The doctrine of the Church. A. Christ the man is the king of all men and peoples. *The Creed of Epiphanius*: "... one Lord Jesus Christ... the same King" (D 44). *The Nicene-Constantinople Creed*: "and his kingdom will have no end" (D 150; see above, thesis 9, n. 162).⁷

Leo XIII: "...he [Jesus Christ] is the supreme leader and Lord. His empire includes not only Catholic nations, not only baptized persons who, though belonging to the Church by right, have been led astray by error or have been cut off from her by schism, but also all those who are outside the Christian faith; so that truly the whole of mankind is subject to the power of Jesus Christ" (Cav. 794). "The creator and also the redeemer of human nature, the Son of God, is the King and Lord of the world, and he has supreme power over men... Therefore the law of Christ should prevail in human intercourse and society, so that he is the leader and master not just of private life but also of public life" (Cav 795).

763. Pius XI: "... the power of King belongs to Christ as man in the strict and proper sense. For it is only as man that he may be said to have received from the Father "power and glory and a kingdom" (see Dan. 7:13f.), since the Word of God, as consubstantial with the Father, has all things in common with him...."⁸ See D 3675f. "Nor is there any difference in this matter between the individual and the family or the State; for all men, whether collectively or individually, are under the dominion of Christ" (D 3679).

The same Roman Pontiff in 1925 instituted the feast of the Kingship of our Lord Jesus Christ, double of the first class, to be observed yearly throughout the whole world on the last Sunday of the month of October, "that the mysteries of the life of Jesus Christ, commemorated previously through the year, might be completed and perfectly fulfilled by the sacred solemnities of Christ the King."⁹

764. B. Christ is King also *as man*. Pius XI in the often quoted Encyclical "*Quas primas*" has many things to say that seem to confirm this. Thus, for example, "... the title and the power of King belongs to Christ as man...

6. See Salmanticenses, d.32 dub.2 n.9-11. A. Luis, C.S.S.R., *La realeza de Maria* (Madrid 1942) 117-120. To a great extent this matter is a battle over words: see Pesch, n. 568; Galtier, n.566.

7. On documents older than the Nicene Creed, see Maly, *De verbis Symboli*...4-11. On other documents of the Roman Pontiffs, see J. Leclercq, O.S.B., *La royauté du Christ dans les lettres des papes du XIII^e siècle*: *RevHistDrFranç* 21 (1942) 112-120.

8. AAS 17 (1925) 596.

9. *Ibid.* 608. See *ibid.*, 607.655-668.

For it is only as man that he may be said to have received from the Father “power and glory and a kingdom” (see Dan. 7:13f.) (see above, n. 763). “From this it follows not only that Christ is to be adored by angels and men, but that to him as man angels and men are subject...” (D 3676).

However we do not deny that elsewhere in this Encyclical statements must be understood to be about Christ *the man* (see above, n. 754): hence it can be said that perhaps Pius XI did not have in mind this further determination of ours.

765. C. Christ the man has a *spiritual* kingdom. Pius XI: “The kingdom is spiritual and is concerned above all with spiritual things...” (D 3678). “All creation thereby has been made subject to his dominion that he might present to your infinite majesty a universal and everlasting kingdom—a kingdom of truth and life, of holiness and grace, a kingdom of justice, of love and of peace.”¹⁰

D. Christ as man has direct power in the first reality *also over temporal kingdoms*. Pius XI: “It would be a grave error, on the other hand, to say that Christ has no authority whatever in civil affairs, since, by virtue of the absolute legal right over all creatures committed to him by the Father, all things are in his power. Nevertheless, during his life on earth he refrained from the exercise of such authority...” (D 3679).

Although with these words of Pius XI the old controversy of theologians (see above, n. 761) is thought generally to be answered with an authoritative decision,¹¹ the matter is not fully clear both because of the general reason given above in n. 764, and because it cannot easily be admitted that the Roman Pontiff wished to respond to the opinion of so many theologians with these rather hard words.

766. Theological note. A. Christ the man is a King: *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 150; see above, thesis 9, note 8). Christ the man is the King of all men and of all peoples: *Catholic doctrine* (D 3679).

B. And he is also a King as man: *It would seem to be Catholic doctrine* (D 3676; above, n. 763; see however above, n. 764).

C. Christ the man has a spiritual kingdom: *at least Catholic doctrine* (D 3678). But it must also be said to be: *divine and Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium*.

D. Christ as man also has direct power in the first reality over temporal

10. Preface for the Mass of Christ the King: AAS 17 (1925) 668.

11. See however Lavaud, O.P., *La royauté temporelle de Jésus-Christ sur l'univers. Une controverse théologique: VieSpir* 18 (1926) 139.

kingdoms: *a doctrine much more common among theologians and it seems to be certain*. Perhaps it could also be called: *Catholic doctrine* (D 3679; see however above, n. 765).

767. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. Christ the man is the King of all men and peoples. *O.T.* 1) Ps. 2:6.8: *I have set my king¹² on Zion, my holy hill... Ask of me, and I will make the nations your heritage, and the ends of the earth your possession.*

The messianism of this Psalm is certain both from the testimonies of the N.T. (Acts 4:25; 13:33; Heb. 1:5), from the Jewish and Christian tradition and from internal arguments.

In this Psalm it is taught that the Messiah, that is, Christ the man, is a king, whose dominion extends over the whole earth, so that he is the king of kings and of all nations. See also Ps. 110.¹³

768. 2) Isa. 9:6f. (in Heb. 5f): *and the government will be upon his shoulder, and his name will be called... Everlasting Father* (eternal father, or who forever shows himself as a benign father to his subjects), *Prince of Peace* (a peaceful prince). *Of the increase of his government... upon the throne of David and over his kingdom he will sit...*

The messianism of this text is proved both from the testimony of St. Matthew (4:13-16), from the Christian tradition (almost all the Jews living after Christ deny the messianic character of this passage), and from the fact that the various qualities of this "child," which appear in this context, are fulfilled in the Messiah and in the Messiah alone.

It is taught in this passage that the Messiah is a true man, a "child," a "son," and a future king who will sit on the throne of David; he will nourish enduring love for his subjects in great peace; he will extend his kingdom more and more and he will render his enemies impotent. See also Isa. 11:1-16.¹⁴

12. Ceuppens (*De prophetiis messianicis...* 133f.) says that the Greek version of the LXX omits the word "king." However that is true in the sense that in the Vatican codex (gr. 1209) and at most in one miniscule codex "βασιλευς" is omitted. But this word was admitted in the critical edition which was made of the LXX edition by A. Rahlfs (Stuttgart 1935, vol.2 p.2). Moreover the *kingly* meaning of this passage remains intact even without this word.

13. See Ceuppens, *De prophetiis messianicis...* 129-164; T. de Orbiso, O.f.M.Cap., *El "Reino de dios" en los Salmos*: EstFranc 49 (1948) 13-35, 199-209; A. Robert, P.S.S., *Considérations sur le messianisme du Ps. II*: RechScRel 39 (1951-1952) (Mélanges Jules Lebreton, 1) 88-98. For more on the Psalms, see F. Segula, *Messias Rex in Psalmis*: VerDom 32 (1954) 21-33, 77-83, 142-154.

14. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 226-246. On Isa. 11:1-16, see *ibid.*, 246-274; Koch, *Der Gottesgeist und der Messias*: Bibl 27 (1946) 241-268; Id., *Geist und Messias* (Vienna 1950). Perhaps also the title „ebed-Jahweh“ in Isa. (see above, n. 638) is a *royal* title: De Leeuw, *De koninklijke verklaring...*: EphThLov 28 (1952) 449-471; Id., in *L'attente du Mesie* (Bruges 1954).

769. 3) Dan. 7:13f.:...*and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a son of man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before him. And to him was given dominion... that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him...*

The messianism of this text is clear from the qualities of the described kingdom, namely, that it will be universal and everlasting (7:18.27).

A difficulty for the *personal* messianism of this prophecy, which can come from the fact that where this vision *is explained*, the concern is not with the person of the king but with the *kingdom* (vv. 18.22.27): *to the people of the saints of the Most High*), is easily solved if we pay attention to the argument of tradition (v.gr., Matt. 26:64) and also consider that the identification between the king and the kingdom was very common both in antiquity and in Daniel.

Therefore the king of saints is designated together with his people and with his kingdom, so that Daniel thought more about the person of the king than he did about the people of the saints, when he described the fact of the conferring of royal power. For the king himself, and not the kingdom, is crowned solemnly and he accepts the keys of the kingdom.

The Messiah therefore is proposed by Daniel precisely, being like a *son of man*, as a king whose kingdom is universal and everlasting.¹⁵

770. N.T. 1) *The Gospels*. Luke 1:32f.: ... *and the Lord God will give to him the throne of his father David, and he will reign over the house of Jacob for ever*. John 18:37: *You say that I am a king*.

Matt. 28:18-20: *All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples of all nations...* This text has great probative force, if it is considered as a compendium of Christ's deeds and words. For Christ is presented in the N.T. as endowed with legislative (v.gr., Matt. 5:22.28.32.34...; John 14:15), judicial (v.gr., John 5:22.27; Acts 10:42) and executive authority (Matt. 25:34.41). But now *in virtue* of his fullness of power (*therefore*) he sends out his apostles as founders of the *perfect* society of the Church, which is truly the *kingdom* of God and of Christ, as is shown at great length in the treatise on the Church.

771. 2) *St. Paul*. 1 Cor. 15:24f.: *Then comes the end, when he delivers the kingdom to God the Father... For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet*.

15. See Ceuppens, *op.cit.*, 481-490; Linder, *Commentarius in librum Daniel* at this place. For other related texts from the O.T., see the Encyclical "*Quas primas*": AAS 17 (1925) 596f.; Heinisch, *Theologie...* 309-311. In general, on the religious aspect of royalty among the Israelites, see J. de Fraine, S.J., *L'aspect religieux de la royauté israelite...* (Rome 1954).

Christ is the king of the militant Church, over which he exercises his royal authority, until he overcomes all his enemies. Then finally he will render back to the Father this royal authority given to him by the Father.¹⁶

3) Rev. 1:5: ... *and from Jesus Christ who is... the ruler of kings on earth.* 17:14: *and the Lamb will conquer them, for he is Lord of lords and King of kings.* 19:12.16: *His eyes are like a flame of fire, and on his head are many diadems... On his robe and on his thigh he has a name inscribed, King of kings and Lord of Lords.*¹⁷

772. B. Christ is King also as man. In Holy Scripture a king is announced having a *human origin* (son of David), who is proposed explicitly as a *man*. Therefore if there is no reason why royal dignity should be removed from him *as a man*, it is necessary to say that he is a king also *as a man*.

But there is no apparent reason why Christ *by his own human will* is not able to exercise his royal authority. On the contrary, because of internal reasons the *divinity* is excluded from Christ *as a man*, although in the same place (Isa. 9:6; see above, n. 768) that *child* is called *Mighty God*.

773. C. Christ the man has a spiritual kingdom. The fundamental argument of this assertion is the integral concept of Holy Scripture, which understands the kingdom of God and Christ above all in reference to the sanctification of souls, the end of which sanctification is eternal supernatural salvation.

That is also clear in the O.T., even if often sensible images are used to express it. But it is stated even clearer in the N.T., so that Christ himself at the end of his earthly life could say: *My kingship is not of this world* (John 18:36).

De facto the *preparation* for entrance into the kingdom of God and Christ is penance (Matt. 3:2; 4:17); one *enters* into it by faith and baptism (John 3:3; Mark 16:16); the *proper* qualities of this kingdom are humility, poverty, self-denial, chastity, meekness (see v.gr. Matt. 5:1-12); the *greatest commandment* of this kingdom is love of God and, for the sake of God, other men, even one's enemies (see v.gr. Matt. 22:37-40; 5:43-48); this kingdom is not *opposed* to the kingdoms of this world but to the powers of darkness (Col. 1:13). All of these texts show that the kingdom of Christ is directed proximately to the sanctification of souls.¹⁸

16. See v.gr. Huby, *Saint Paul...* at this place.

17. See A. Meyenberg, *Jesus der König in der hl. Schrift* (Lucerne 1926). On how the idea of the „kingdom“ of God and of Christ pervades Holy Scripture, see A. Oñate, *El “Reino de Dios” en la Sagrada Escritura:* EstBibl 3 (1944) 343-382.

18. For many other quotes, see Oñate, *El “Reino de dios”...* : EstBibl 3 (1941) 347ff.

774. D. Christ as man has direct power in the first reality also over temporal kingdoms. From Holy Scripture it seems that hardly anything in favor of this assertion can be deduced, since the witnesses of Holy Scripture *really* deal with Christ's spiritual kingdom, although the images often used refer to temporal things. This is certain from the preceding number 773.

775. **Proof from tradition.** 1) The Father emphasize the *fact* of Christ's kingdom. Thus St. Ambrose: "We are the kingdom of Christ before, afterwards that of the Father..." (R 1274). St. Cyril of Alexandria: "For Christ ruled and commanded the whole world. And he manifests that to us when he says: *All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me.* For even if as God he had authority over all things, because of the ministry of the flesh he says that everything was given to him that he had as God. Since therefore he gained a kingdom, he placed the holy Apostles over it as leaders for us..."¹⁹

2) They pay special attention to his *judicial and executive* authority. St. Justin: "For with what reason should we believe of a crucified man... and Himself will pass judgment on the whole human race, unless..." (R 125). St. Irenaeus: "... that to Jesus Christ, our Lord... every knee should bow... that He should execute just judgment towards all" (R 191). Tertullian: "... Jesus Christ... He shall come with glory... and to condemn the ungodly to everlasting fire" (R 290). See R 31, 33, 101, 552, 647, 1014, 2262.

3) They hand on a *further determination* of this royal authority of Christ. We will select a few things from St. Augustine: "However because Christ himself is from the seed of David according to the flesh, but God blessed above all forever, he is our King and our God: he is our King since he was born of the tribe of Judah according to the flesh, Christ the Lord and Savior; but he is our God, because he is before Judah...."²⁰ "For Christ is not the king of Israel in order to demand tribute or to equip an army with swords and visibly fight against enemies. But he is the king of Israel because he rules minds, because he is concerned about eternity, and because he leads to the kingdom of heaven those who believe, hope and love."²¹

19. *Comment. in Is* 1.3 c.41 n.17f.: MG 70,843.

20. *Enarrat. in Ps* 75 n.1: ML 36,958.

21. *Tract. in Io* tr51 n.4: ML 35,1765. For much more on St. Augustine, see Mohan, *De nominibus Christi...* 61-67; E. Negrete, *La realeza de Cristo según San Agustín*: *RelCult* 14 (1931) 161-178, 331-350. On St. Justin, see J. Leclercq, *L'idée de la royauté du Christ dans l'oeuvre de Saint Justin*: *AnTh* 7 (1946) 83-95. For other testimonies of the Fathers, see D'Ales, 404.408f.412f. See also J. Kollwitz, *Das Bild von Christus dem König in Kunst und Liturgie der christlichen Frühzeit*: *ThGl* (1947-1948) 95-117. For more on the middle ages, see J. Leclercq, O.S.B., *Le sermon sur la royauté du Christ au Moyen-âge*: *ArchHistDoctrLittMA* 18 (1943) 143-180; Id., *L'idée de la royauté du Christ au XIII^e siècle*: *AnTh* 5 (1944) 218-242; Id., *L'idée de la royauté du Christ au XIV^e siècle*: *RevEspT* 10 (1950) 205-226.

776. Theological reasoning. A. Christ the man is the King of all men and peoples. a) By reason of the *hypostatic union*. In virtue of this union the man Jesus is the King of all, because he is the true God. b) By reason of the *redemption* because he liberated us from sin, from the punishment of sin, from the power of the devil and he made us his own (see above, thesis 29, especially n. 742).²²

777. B. He is King also as man. a) Christ is a *priest* precisely *as man*, and the same thing can be proved about Christ the Redeemer; indeed the reign of Christ is an office and participates in the nature of both offices, that is, of Priest and of Redeemer.²³ Therefore Christ is King as man.

778. b) The human nature of Christ participates in all the authority of excellence, as much as this is possible and in accordance with the purpose of the incarnation.²⁴ Indeed, it was possible and consonant with the purpose of the incarnation that the human will of Christ should rule over the whole human race. Therefore Christ as man is a King.

The *possibility* of this is proved not only negatively, because no impossibility is apparent, but also *positively*. For to rule over others, especially if it is a question of the whole human race, the greatest knowledge, rectitude and authority are required. But it is certain that Christ in his human intellect had the greatest *knowledge* (see above, thesis 13), in his human will he had the greatest *grace and impeccability* (see above, thesis 11 & 15), in his soul the greatest *participation in divine omnipotence*, so that this would concur to produce those supernatural effects (see above, thesis 14).

The end of the incarnation was the redemption of men by the humility, obedience, passion and death of Christ. But at the same time Christ came as the *King* of all men, as we have proved in this thesis. But it is in accordance with this office of the incarnate Word that his *human will*, which is *adored* by angels and men *with one and the same worship of latria* as the divinity of Christ (see above, thesis 20), should assume and participate in the royal authority of Christ the man.

779. c) Lower things are ruled in a certain order by God through higher things, but not by higher things under certain conditions, but by the higher things simply and absolutely. Hence it is necessary to say that all things are ruled by the soul of Christ, which is and exists simply and absolutely above every creature.²⁵

22. See the Encyclical "*Quas primas*": AAS 17 (1925) 587f.

23. See *ibid.*, 600.

24. Suarez proposes this principle even more strongly, *De Mysteriis...* d.52 s.1 n.11.

25. See S.Th. III, q. 59, a. 6 ad 3; Cajetan, at this place.

780. C. Christ's kingdom is spiritual. This does not need any further proof, since the whole work of the incarnate Word is ordered particularly to *the supernatural salvation of men*.

D. He also has direct authority in the first reality over temporal kingdoms. We proved above in n. 777-779 that Christ's human will participates in the kingly authority of Christ the man. But Christ the man has direct authority in the first reality over temporal kingdoms by reason of his divinity. On the other hand, no cogent reason has been given why participation in the royal divine authority in the human will of Christ *should be limited to spiritual things alone*.

Two reasons are usually advanced against this participation in the kingly authority over temporal things. The first is derived from the fact that for the spiritual mission of Christ and for his giving to men an example of humility and poverty it seems to be unfitting for him to have such authority over temporal things. The answer to this is that it is valid *regarding the use of such power*, but not *regarding its actual possession in the first reality*. Humility and poverty are even more commended thereby. That Christ possessed *such power* which he never used is not opposed to his spiritual mission.

The second reason comes from the fact that mere authority, which is not actually used, is *useless*. But this is not true where the authority alone independently of its exercise bestows *perfection* and contributes to the greater dignity of the subject, as happens in our case. The human nature of Christ had many other powers that were never actually used, such as the gift of languages and a perfect knowledge of natural things.²⁶

781. Objections. 1. The Roman Pontiff is the Vicar of Christ on earth. But a vicar participates in the authority of the one whose place he takes. Therefore the Roman Pontiff has direct authority in the first reality over temporal kingdoms.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. A vicar participates in the authority of the one whose place he takes *according to the measure* in which he receives that authority, *conceded*; unlimited, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* The Roman Pontiff would have this direct authority, if he participated in Christ's authority in an unlimited way, *conceded*; if according to some measure, *I subdistinguish*: if Christ gave him this participated authority, *conceded*; if de facto he did not give it, *denied*.

The authority of the Roman Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ is participated in *according to the purpose* of the Church: but this purpose is not directly temporal, as is explained abundantly in the treatise on the Church and in Canon Law.

Moreover, even if he did participate in this authority, in no way could the Roman Pontiff *exercise* an authority which *the Lord himself* did not exercise

26. See Salmanticenses, d.32 dub.2 n.7.

782. 2. In the Encyclical "*Quas primas*" the pope says: "If princes and magistrates... are filled with the persuasion that they rule, not by their own right, but by the mandate and in the place of the Divine King...."²⁷ But these words indicate that temporal rulers are *vicars* of Christ the King. Therefore Christ not only has direct authority in the first reality over temporal kingdoms, but that he *exercises* it in the second reality.

I accept the text and I explain. The quoted text means that secular rulers are vicars of Christ in the full sense, *denied*; it means that they have authority from Christ, in a sense similar to that by which a *husband* represents Christ for his wife, *conceded*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

The Supreme Pontiff a little before in the same Encyclical explicitly *denied* that Christ *exercised* authority over civil or earthly affairs or that he *exercises* such authority now (see D 3679). Therefore the quoted words cannot have the meaning that the objector gives to them

783. What the real meaning of these words is can be deduced positively from the fact that the quoted text comes immediately after these words: "It is for this reason that St. Paul, while bidding wives revere Christ in their husbands, and slaves respect Christ in their masters, warns them to give obedience to them not as men, but as the vicegerents of Christ...."²⁸

Now a man can be said to be a vicegerent of Christ in the exercise of his authority concerning his wife, only inasmuch as the subjection should be given *because of Christ, who commands such order and subjection*. Therefore a wife in such subjection truly submits herself rather to *Christ*.

Moreover, there is nothing unfitting in the fact that a prince should rule by the mandate and in the place of Christ, inasmuch as Christ is *God*. For St. Paul, when speaking about secular rulers, said: *there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God* (Rom. 13:1). This solution is suggested by the phrase "mandate of the *divine King*" which the Encyclical uses here.

784. Scholium 1. *Christ as man had true kingly authority, but it was not primary or supreme.* Primary kingly authority seems to include these two things: independence from every higher authority and that this supreme authority is had from intrinsic and essential principles of nature. These two qualities so belong to God inasmuch as he is God that they cannot be communicated to humanity. It is clear with regard to absolute independence; but that the second does not belong to Christ's humanity is certain, because the royal authority does not belong to Christ the man *by reason of his humanity* or from its own principles; but it was given to him *because of the union with a divine person*.

Nevertheless Christ's authority is *truly*, properly and simply kingly. In fact the authority of Christ is more truly kingly than that of any merely human king. For both Christ as man and any legitimate king participate in the divine authority of ruling, but

27. AAS 17 (1925) 602.

28. *Ibid.*

Christ does so much more perfectly and eminently.²⁹

785. Scholium 2. *Christ is King of those who lived before his arrival.* The solution can be given to this question which St. Thomas presents concerning the *judiciary* power of Christ, that is, before the incarnation judgments of this kind were exercised “by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Word of God; and the soul united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the Incarnation” (III, q. 59, a. 4 ad 3).

Nevertheless *all* men will be judged by Christ as man at the last judgment, and so all fall under the kingly authority of Christ even as a man.³⁰

786. Scholium 3. *Christ as man is King of the angels.* Pius XI explicitly states the traditional doctrine and its foundation: “From this it follows not only that Christ is to be adored by angels and men, but that to him as man angels and men are subject and must recognize his empire; by reason of the hypostatic union Christ has power over all creatures” (D 3676).

This kingly power belongs to Christ *as man*, as the reasons presented above in n. 778f. clearly show.

In what sense Christ as man *will judge* the angels is a disputed question; the point is whether in the last judgment the good angels will be judged by Christ regarding their essential reward, but the bad angels regarding their essential punishment.

St. Thomas regarding this point on the judgment of the angels says that “this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as he is the Word of God” (III, q. 59, a. 6 c).

However Suarez thinks it more probable that also all the angels will be judged by Christ, inasmuch as he is a man, at the last judgment concerning their essential reward or punishment, at least by a judgment of approval or condemnation.³¹

787. Scholium 4. *Christ as man is King of lower creatures.* In the strict sense in which we take the word “king” in this thesis (see above, n. 755), real subjects of Christ can only be *rational* creatures. However, in agreement with the way of speaking of Holy Scripture, in which God is said to be *the king of all the earth* (Ps. 478), Christ can also be called the king of insensible things.

Here also the principle of St. Thomas holds true: “to whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed” (III, q. 59, a. 4 c). However all lower things are ordered *to man* and consequently to the end of beatitude which is eternal salvation.

788. Scholium 5. *Christ as man is the Lord of all temporal things in the world.* In what has gone before the power of ruling and governing subjects whether in the spiri-

29. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis...* d.52 s.1 n.4-10, where he speaks directly about the judicial authority of Christ.

30. There is more about this in the treatise on the last things, or in Suarez, *De Mysteriis...* d.53 s.1f.; d.57 s.7.

31. Suarez, *De Mysteriis...* d.57 s.8. On the whole teaching of St. Thomas about Christ the King of angels, see Benoist D’Azy, *Le Christ et ses Anges...*: BullLittEccl (1943) 121-136; the angels are described by St. Thomas mainly as “ministers” of Christ.

tual order or the temporal order was given the most attention. However regarding the *dominion of property* of temporal things which Christ as man obtained, more or less the same things should be said as we explained concerning his authority over temporal kingdoms.³²

789. Scholium 6. *On the related notions of head, lord, leader, ruler, king.* Although these notions taken together fully apply to Christ, still an important difference between them should be made.

Head says a vital influence and a certain excellence of order and perfection and at the same time external government (see above, thesis 11, n. 227f.). Hence it is a *broader* notion than king, and therefore it is not directed so explicitly to the power of commanding or *ruling*, and this also holds for a *perfect* society.

Lord can be something in the merely *private* order. Therefore it does not fully coincide with the notion of king, although also the terms “Lord” and “King” are intimately connected.

Leader, ruler are not terms often used by Holy Scripture and in the course of the centuries among many peoples, so that the man in a perfect society enjoying supreme power would be so designated.³³

King in the sense of the Encyclical “*Quas primas*” (see above, n. 755) connotes the supreme authority of jurisdiction in a perfect society. The term “Christ the King” has something special about it, which *secularists* use with such hatred, and at the same time so many faithful Christians and martyrs of our time use with great love.

790. Scholium 7. *And he sits at the right hand of God.* This formula, which is so closely connected with the kingly power of Christ, will have to be explained briefly.

This metaphor was used already in the O.T. about the Messiah: Ps. 110:1: *Sit at my right hand, till...* (see above, n. 767). But it recurs often in the N.T.: Mark 16:19: *So then the Lord Jesus, after he had spoken to them, was taken up into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God.* See v.gr. Luke 22:69; Acts 7:56; Rom. 8:34; Eph. 1:20; Col. 3:1; 1 Pet. 3:22; Heb. 1:3. It can be said for certain that his idea pervades the whole New Testament.

By this expression is signified that Christ has a singular part in the glory and power of God the Father. Indeed the New Testament asserts this about Christ *after his Ascension*. For by this reality Christ entered into heaven as to his own place destined for him by God as the connatural dwelling place of the glorified humanity of Christ and for the exercise of his kingly power.³⁴

32. See Salmanticenses, d.32 dub.3. More briefly, Muncunill, n.1020-1024.

33. On the notion of “king” in *Holy Scripture*, see DB 5,1114-1128. Regarding the Hellenistic world, see Pauly-G. Wssowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart 1899) 3,55-82; Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch...* 1,562f. Regarding all the main peoples known to us, see Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* 7,708-732.

34. See Lercher, n. 230. For the formula “sitting at the right hand,” see in addition to what we said above about Ps. 110:1 in note 12, Kittel, *Theologisches...* 2,37-39; H.L. Strack-P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar... aus Talmud...* 1,835f. (on Matt. 20:21).

791. It really belongs only to Christ to sit at the right hand of God. Heb. 1:13: *But to what angel has he ever said: sit at my right hand...?* However, “since Christ is our Head, then what was bestowed on Christ is bestowed on us through him” (S.Th. III, q. 58, a. 4 ad 1).

It is proper now to summarize briefly the whole plan of our salvation through our intimate *solidarity* with Christ in the words of St. Paul, by which our treatise on the incarnate Word will find its conclusion. Eph. 2:4-6: *But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ (by grace you have been saved), and raised us up with him, and made us sit with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.*

TREATISE 2

MARIOLOGY

OR

ON THE BLESSED

VIRGIN MARY

by
Fr. Joseph A. de Aldama, A.J.

Translated from Latin by
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I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. *Scientific Mariology.* Mariology, as a science, was created recently. What had been handed down from revelation and explained by the Fathers was later developed into a theological treatise by the work of medieval Doctors, especially St. Bernard, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas and Scotus. The original nucleus of a special theological treatise "On the Blessed Virgin" is contained in the *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 27 and following. But the development of these questions was made especially by Fr. Francis Suarez in his work, *De Mysteriis Vitae Christi* d.1-23, in which, in addition to a more diligent treatment of the matter and a more thorough investigation of tradition, a new methodology also appears which contributed greatly to the formation of Mariology. These seeds of the new science of Mariology (to which were to be added the strictly mariological works first of St. Peter Canisius, and then of Sylvester Saavedra, Novatian, De Rhodes, Vega, and others), were scarcely preserved, and still less evolved, in the first theological manuals in which the treatise on the Virgin Mary was reduced to two or three theses in the treatise on the incarnate Word or the treatise on original sin. But the times after the definition of the Immaculate Conception gave a new and strong impulse to Marian studies. Hence gradually it came about that those theses developed into a true and separate treatise, and so into a new science of Mariology (of course as a part of theology). Such works now exist, especially those by Alastruey, Merkelbach, Garrigou-Lagrange, Roschini, Dillenschneider, etc.¹

2. *On mariological principles.* This attempt at creating a new science introduced the question about the principles of Mariology, from which scientific conclusions could be deduced, and by which these conclusions could be joined together and coordinated into an apt system. These principles are not new; in fact, they are found in the writings of the Fathers, in the whole tradition of theology and in the magisterium of the Church. These main principles of Mariology, besides the fact of the maternity of God and Redeemer, which will be considered below, are the following²:

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1. On the history of Mariology, see G.M. Roschini, O.S.M., *Mariologia* 1,383-399; C. Dillenschneider, C.S.S.R., *La Mariologie de S. Alphonse de Liguori* vol.1 (Fribourg 1931); J.A. de Aldama, *Piété et système dans la Mariologie du "Docteur Eximius"*: Maria (De Manoir) 2,975-990. See also I. Diamond, S.J., *De connexion inter Mariologiam et ceteras Theologiae partes*: Alma Socii Christi 11,14-21; A. Winkhofer, *Die genuine Entwicklung der marianischen Dogmen*: ib. 5,1,1-24.
 2. On the principles of Mariology in general, see G.M. Roschini, *De principiis fundamentalibus Mariologiae*: Marian 2 (1940) 232-250, and later in *Mariologia* 1,338-379; J.M. Bover, S.J., *Los principios mariológicos*: EstMar 3 (1944) 11-33, and later in *Soteriologia Mariana* (Madrid 1946) 29-100.

3. a) *The principle of singularity or transcendence.* It can be formulated thus: Since Mary is absolutely singular, transcending all other created beings, she has gifts and privileges that other persons do not have. Pseudo-Albert the Great said it very well: “Mary cannot be numbered among others, because she is not one among all, but one above all others.”³ St. Bonaventure: “Since therefore she is above all orders, per se she constitutes her own order.”⁴ Suarez: “The mysteries of grace, which God worked in the Virgin, must not be measured by ordinary laws.”⁵ This principle is used often by the Supreme Pontiffs. Thus Pius XI: “From the dogma of the divine maternity, as from a fount of hidden bubbling water, flows the singular grace of Mary and her dignity, which is the highest after God.”⁶ In these words there is also a suggestion of the root from which this principle arises, namely, the divine maternity.

4. b) *The principle of fittingness.* It is formulated: God conferred on Mary all the gifts concerning whose real fittingness a solid proof can be brought forward. St. Thomas: “In the Blessed Virgin there had to be present everything that is more perfect.”⁷ Scotus: “If it is not opposed to the authority of the Church or the authority of Scripture, it seems more probable that what is more excellent is to be attributed to Mary.”⁸ It is obvious that this principle must be used cautiously and prudently, as Gerson and Petavius noted long ago. But it is used by the holy Pontiffs, like Pius IX: “It was absolutely fitting that such a venerable Mother... should be distinguished as the one always endowed with the splendor of perfect holiness.”⁹

5. c) *The principle of eminence.* It is formulated: Every privilege that God conferred on any saint he also gave to his Mother—either formally or eminently or equivalently. St. Bernard: “Therefore it is established that what was given to just a few mortals, certainly was not denied to so great a Virgin.” St. Bonaventure: “Whatever measure of dignity and glory was given to them in a partial way, was given to the holy Virgin completely.” St. Albert the Great: “Whatever a pure creature, capable of knowing God, can perceive, that in its totality was given to the Mother of the Lord.”¹⁰

3. *Mariale* resp. to q. 70.

4. 2 d.9 q.7 (Ed. Quaracchi 2,253).

5. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.3 s.5 n.31.

6. Encyclical “*Lux veritatis*”: AAS 23 (1931) 513.

7. 3 d.3 q.2 a.1 sol.1.

8. 3 d.3 q.1 n.10.

9. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,836.

10. St. Bernard, *Epist. 174 ad canonicos Lugdunenses*: ML 182,334; St. Bonaventure, *Serm. 2 de Assumptione*, 2; St. Albert the Great, 1*Sent.* dist.44 a.5 ad q. 3.

Similarly Pius XI: “She is the Mother of God; therefore whatever privilege (in the order of sanctifying grace) has been granted to any of the saints, she obtains it more than all.”¹¹

6. d) *The principle of analogy.*¹² It is formulated: Between the privileges of the humanity of Christ and the privileges of Mary there is a true analogy. Suarez: “It was fitting that the Virgin be very much like Christ and joined together with him.”¹³

7. e) *The principle of association.*¹⁴ It is formulated: Mary is associated with her Son the Redeemer in the work of redemption. Nicholas Claravallensis: “Immediately the name of Mary is taken from the treasure of the divinity..., it was decided that with Her all of this was to be done; so that just as without Him nothing was made, so also without Her nothing was re-made.”¹⁵ St. Albert the Great: “The Lord be with you. The preposition “with” signifies association: if the Lord is with her, She also is with the Lord.”¹⁶ Similarly Pius IX: “The most holy Virgin, joined with Him by a tight bond, together with Him and through Him exercising eternal hostility against the poisonous serpent and triumphing over him completely, trampled his head with her immaculate foot.”¹⁷ Leo XIII: “And truly the Immaculate Virgin, chosen to be the Mother of God and thereby associated with him in the work of man’s salvation...”¹⁸ Pius XI: “The august Virgin... therefore the Mother of Christ was chosen so that she might be an associate in the redemption of the human race.”¹⁹

8. f) *The principle of recirculation.* It is formulated: To the action of the woman (Eve) for our ruin is opposed the action of the woman (Mary) for our restoration. St. Irenaeus: “That recirculation which is from Mary to Eve...”²⁰ St. Augustine: “Thus a great mystery takes place: that since death was imposed on us through a woman, life would come to us through

11. Encyclical “*Lux veritatis*”: AAS 23 (1931) 513. These words are taken from Cornelius a Lapide.

12. See Laurent, *Le rôle de l’analogie en Théologie Mariale*: EtMar 4 (1938) 103-144; E.M. Esteve, O.C., *Del principio de analogia y proporción*: EstMar 4 (1944) 55-65; M. Cuervo, *La cooperación de Maria en el misterio de nuestra salud debe ser concedida analógicamente a la acción de Jesucristo*: EstMar 2 (1943) 110-151; J. Bover, *El principio mariológico de analogia*: Alma Socia Christi 11,1-13.

13. De Mysteriis vitae Christi d.18 s.4 n.11.

14. See U. Urrutia, S.J., *De nomine Sponsae in unione hypostatica*: Alma Socia Christi 11,146-152.

15. *Serm. 11 de Annunciatione* among the sermons of St. Peter Damian: ML 14,558.

16. In Lc 1,28.

17. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,839.

18. Encyclical “*Supremi Apostolatus*”: Acta Leonis XIII, 2,35.

19. Letter “*Auspiciatus profecto*”: AAS 25 (1933) 80.

20. *Adversus haereses* 1.3 c.22 n.4: MG 7,959.

a woman.”²¹ St. Bonaventure: “A suitable method is that medicine works against the illness, restoration to what has fallen, and a remedy for an injury...; so that contraries are cured by their contraries.”²²

9. The primary principle of Mariology. Recently the question has been raised about the supreme and primary principle of all Mariology. The concern is whether all these principles are so connected with each other that they actually proceed and arise from just one more universal and more fundamental principle. And if that is the case, then which one should be so designated?²³

In this matter there are many opinions of theologians and also many ways of speaking about it. For in addition to those few who have doubted the existence of one principle (Zimara), or have denied it (Bonnefoy), here is a summary of the theologians’ opinions or way of speaking:

One simple principle, which is:

Mary the Mother of God: Pohle-Gierens, Fernández, Llamara, Gagnebert...

Mary the New Eve: Deneffe, Zimara, Alameda.

Mary the universal Mother: Roschini now.

One composite principle, which is:

Mary Mother and Spouse: Scheeben, Druwé.

Mary Mother and Corredemptrix: Merkelbach, Benz.

Mary Mother of God concretely and historically: Bover, Bernard.

Mary Mother of the whole Christ: García Garcés.

Two supreme principles, which are:

Mary Mother of God and spiritual Mother: Cuervo.

Mary Mother of God and Companion of the Mediator: Bittremieux, Dillenschneider, Ceuppens, Alastruey, Roschini earlier...

10. To someone considering these opinions it is very apparent that

21. *De agone christiano* c.2 n.24: ML 40,303.

22. *Breviloquium* p.4 c.3 (Ed. Quaracchi 5,243); see J. Carol, O.F.M., *De Corredemptione B.V. Mariae* (Vatican City 1950) 62ff. More on this theme has been assembled by the French mariologists in *EtMar* 12 (1954), under the title *La Nouvelle Eve*.

23. On this question, see G.M. Roschini, *De principiis fundamentalibus Mariologiae*: *Marian* 2 (1940) 217-232, and later in *Mariologia* 1,324-337, where there is a large bibliography; A. Luis, C.S.S.R., *Principio fundamental o primario. ¿Como enunciarlo, si se da ese único principio?*: *EstMar* 3 (1944) 186-217; Elías de la Dolorosa, C.P., *La maternidad divina, principio supremo de la Mariologia*: *EstMar* 3 (1944) 35-53; S. Alameda, O.S.B., *El primer principio mariológico, según los Padres*: *EstMar* 3 (1944) 163-186.

theologians who formerly thought about the divine maternity only as the supreme principle of Mariology, because of the developed treatment of Marian Soteriology, arrived at the affirmation of a twofold supreme principle—sometimes acknowledging a twofold principle verbally, at other times actually proposing it but denying it verbally. However this question is not simply a matter of words.

That both functions of Mary (maternity of God and maternity of men) must be retained is sufficiently and per se apparent. So much so that if these two are either independent of each other or simply coordinated, then a twofold supreme principle of Mariology must be constituted. But we think that the matter is completely different.²⁴ Namely, divine maternity essentially implies in this order spiritual maternity. Mariologists daily seem to be more inclined to defend this logical deduction. Hence logically it is necessary to say that the one supreme principle of Mariology is the divine maternity. Or if someone prefers another formula—the maternity of the Redeemer. For since the Redeemer must necessarily be God and there is no redemption except by incorporation of men into Him, which incorporation is had essentially by means of the divine maternity, the *maternity of the Redeemer* aptly conjoins the maternal aspect with the soteriological aspect.

11. *The division of our treatise.* From what has been said the division of our treatise can be gathered, even though others may present it differently.²⁵

- Chapter I. On the predestination of Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer.
- Chapter II. On the preparation of Mary for her maternity.
- Chapter III. On divine maternity.
- Chapter IV. On spiritual maternity.
- Chapter V. On the glorification of the Mother of the Redeemer.

24. M. Llamera, O.P., *La maternidad espiritual de María*: EstMar 3 (1944) 67-161.

25. On the various divisions of Mariology, see F.M. Roschini, *Mariologia* 16-23; M.J. Nicolás, O.P. *Essai de synthèse mariale*: Maria 1,707-741.

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CHAPTER I

On the predestination of Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer

12. Pius IX in the Bull “*Ineffabilis*” speaks thus: “The ineffable God..., since from all eternity he foresaw the lamentable ruin of the whole human race coming from Adam’s transgression and in the mystery hidden for ages he decided to complete the first work of his goodness through the Incarnation of the Word with a more hidden mystery, that in opposition to his merciful plan man, led into sin by the cunning of diabolical iniquity, might not perish, and, what was lost in the first Adam might be happily restored in the second Adam: from the beginning and before the ages chose and ordained a mother for his only begotten Son, from whom he would become incarnate and be born in the blessed fullness of time. And God honored her above all other creatures with such love that in her alone he was pleased with a most singular benevolence.”¹

Therefore the election and predestination of Mary is joined with the decree of Redemption to be accomplished by the incarnate Word. In fact she is so joined together with him that the same Pontiff wrote a little further on: “The origin of the Virgin... was decided by one and the same decree along with the incarnation of divine Wisdom.”²

13. Many things about that decree that are disputed by theologians will not be disputed by us, although a different way of thinking about this matter has different consequences in Mariology.³ This will be sufficient for us now: God, when decreeing the Redemption, at the same time decreed a worthy Mother of the Redeemer.

Thesis 1. The choice of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer is gratuitous.

Suarez, *De Mysterioris vitae Christi* d.1 s.3; Merkelbach, *Mariologia* 93-104; Alstruey, 51-66; Roschini, 2,1,9-66.

1. CL 6,836.

2. CL 6,836. See Pius XII, *Const. Apost. “Munificentissimus Deus”*: AAS 32 (1950) 768.

3. See Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,19-43, where there is also a bibliography on this question. On his singular opinion, see *ibid.*, or also I. Rocca, O.S.M., and G. Roschini, O.S.M., *De ratione primariae existentiae Christi et Deiparae*: Marian 3 (1941) 1-31; C.M. Berti, O.S.M., *Animadversiones in articulum “De ratione primariae existentiae Christi et Deiparae” Patrum Mag. Rocca et Roschini*: *Ibid.*, 124-150; I Rocca et G. Roschini, *Sul così detto motivo dell’Incarnazione. Consensi e dissensi*: *ibid.*, 151-168; *Intorno alla ragione primaria dell’esistenza di Cristo e della Madonna*: *ibid.*, 301-371.

14. Definition of terms. *Choice* is a divine act whereby God absolutely and efficaciously decreed that this particular woman, Mary, would be the Mother of the Redeemer. This can be conceived in two ways. *First*, so that among the women who were foreseen to exist in the future, Mary was chosen for this office. *Second*, so that Mary, not yet future but merely possible, was chosen. In this second case the reason for the existence of Mary is had from that decree. For, she would not exist unless she had been chosen as the Mother. In the first case Mary's existence is independent of the decree of her choice as the Mother. Therefore she would exist even if she were not the Mother of the Redeemer. In the thesis we prescind from this question, but we will say something about it later.

15. Mother of the Redeemer. The terminus of the choice, as it refers to the Blessed Virgin, is directly and immediately the maternity of the Redeemer. But, as is clear, this maternity, as it is contained in the decree, is conceived concretely and historically, that is, what is demanded by this Redeemer, whether in his person or in his redemptive mission. Hence the choice to be the Mother of the Redeemer includes:

a) Choice to be *the Mother of God*. For the Redeemer, according to the divine plan, is God.

b) Choice for *maternal union with the Redeemer* as such. This union cannot be purely physical or physiological, but it is necessarily also psychological and moral. Hence the Mother of God will be maternally the Companion of the Redeemer in the work itself of redemption.

c) Choice to be *the spiritual mother of men*. For the redemption, given the necessary solidarity in Christ between God and men, will be only a new communication of the divine life, inasmuch as men, incorporated into Christ, accept, from the Head Himself as His true members, the adoptive sonship of God which flows from His natural sonship. However the maternal function of Mary, whereby God takes on human flesh, is our true incorporation into Christ. Hence Mary, who becomes the Mother of God so that the redemption might be possible, is by that very fact the Mother of the whole Christ, whether of the Head or of his members.

Therefore we are treating the choice of Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer according as it includes all of this. In the thesis we are not considering the choice of Mary for grace and glory; this will be touched on later.

16. Gratuitous, or not from the foreseen merits of Mary herself. That is, Mary did not in any way merit that she should be chosen to be the

Mother of the Redeemer. Rather, her choice, in its totality, comes from the divine predilection. As should be clear, we are considering only the order of intention, not the order of execution.

17. Adversaries. Vázquez held that the Blessed Virgin Mary was chosen for the divine maternity because of her foreseen merits. But since the first grace is said to have been given to the Virgin *in order that* she be the Mother of God, by the phrase “in order that” it is stated that the final cause was designated before her merits, not indeed by an efficacious choice, but by a simple will. Platel and Theophilus Raynaldus held a similar choice after her foreseen merits.⁴

18. Theological note. The thesis must now be said to be *certain in theology*.

19. Proof. Exemption from original sin was granted to Mary because of her divine maternity. Therefore the choice of her for this maternity is first in intention. Therefore it is gratuitous. *The ultimate consequence* is clear, because before the foreseen conception, which is untouched by original sin, there are no merits of Mary that are absolutely future. The *antecedent* is proved: The holy Pontiffs speak in this way, for example, Pius IX: “God from the beginning and before the ages chose... a mother... Therefore he wonderfully filled her with an abundance of all the heavenly gifts...that she, being always and absolutely free from every stain of sin... And indeed it was altogether fitting that she... ever adorned with the splendors of a most perfect holiness and entirely immune from the stain of original sin, should have the most complete triumph over the ancient serpent. It was she to whom the Father willed to give his only Son... (And he wished to) give him in such a way that he would be, by nature, one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Virgin.”⁵ Likewise St. Pius X: “The Virgin was kept the more free from all stain of original sin because she was to be the Mother of Christ; and she was the Mother of Christ that the hope of everlasting happiness might be born again in our souls.”⁶ The liturgy of the Church also makes use of this meaning: “O God, who by the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, prepared a worthy dwelling place for your Son....”

4. G. Vázquez, *In 3 q.23 c.4*; Platel, *Synopsis universi cursus theologici* t.5 c.2 par.3 n.145f.; Th. Raynaldus, *Cypticha Mariana* part.4 n.10f.

5. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,836.

6. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36,458.

20. Scholium. 1. The choice of Mary to be the Mother of the Redeemer seems to be so gratuitous that God simply selected her among possible creatures. Hence the whole reason for the existence of Mary is her choice as Mother. Therefore she is essentially Mother.

2. From the divine predestination of Mary it follows that she pertains to the soteriological order and to the hypostatic order. It is in this sense that the words of Pius IX must be understood: "The origin of the Virgin... was decided by one and the same decree along with the incarnation of divine Wisdom."⁷ Or also, if we wish to speak about pure creatures, it can be said that Mary constitutes her own and special order, as St. Bonaventure says.⁸

3. On the predestination of Mary *to grace and glory*, it seems necessary to say with Suarez: "It is said that the Blessed Virgin Mary, to our way of thinking, was predestined and chosen intentionally to be the Mother of God before she was chosen for such great grace and glory... For the Bl. Virgin was predestined to such great grace and glory because she was chosen to be the Mother of God..., so that she would be disposed in such a way that was fitting for the Mother of God."⁹

4. All of this has been said about the order of intention. *In the order of execution* Mary merited the divine maternity. That is, "by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God."¹⁰ This is the common opinion of theologians, which is based on the statements of the holy Fathers and of the liturgy. But that merit, according to the more common opinion of theologians, was not condign (Biel), or approaching condign (Janssens), or worthy (St. Bonaventure), but congruous not only in the broad sense (Sylvius, Billuart, Wirceburgenses, Garrigou-Lagrange), but also in the strict sense (Hugon, Bittremieux, Friethoff, Alestruey, Merkelbach, Lercher², Roschini). They understand congruous merit in the broad sense as the merit of impetration.¹¹

7. Bull "*Ineffabilis*": CL 6,836.

8. 2 d.9 q.7 (Ed. Quaracchi 2,253).

9. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.1 s.3 n.3.

10. S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 11 ad 3.

11. On this question see Roschini, *Mariologia* 43-48, where the different authors are cited.

CHAPTER II

On the preparation of Mary for her maternity

21. The maternity of the Redeemer, for which Mary was chosen by God, since it includes especially the maternity of God, is such an excellent gift that it certainly requires other supernatural gifts in the Mother. It was fitting that God should have a worthy Mother. But she would not be a worthy Mother of God, who is Himself supreme holiness, unless she was absolutely immune from all sin and fully endowed with gifts of grace. Therefore in this way God prepared her so that she might become the worthy Mother of the Redeemer.

But also, because this miraculous maternity according to the divine plan had to remain for a time hidden from men, it was necessary that the Son of the Virgin Mother be born within the confines of a legitimate marriage. Hence a spouse had to be given to her, with whom she was joined in holy matrimony.

Therefore while considering the divine preparation of the Mother, we will investigate the following:

- Art. 1. Her immunity from original sin.
- Art. 2. Her immunity from the “fomes” of sin.
- Art. 3. Her immunity from personal sin.
- Art. 4. Her positive holiness and fullness of grace.
- Art. 5. Her virginal marriage.

ARTICLE I

ON THE IMMUNITY OF MARY FROM ORIGINAL SIN

Thesis 2. The Blessed Virgin Mary at the first instant of her conception was, by the singular privilege of God, in view of the merits of Christ, preserved immune from all stain of original sin.

Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.3; X. le Bachelet, *Immaculée Conception*: DTC 6,845-1218; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,211-287, where there is an ample bibliography; Alestruey, 141-231; Merkelbach, 106-142.

22. Connection. Having considered the choice that was made by God eternally that Mary should become the Mother of the Redeemer, we will not treat the carrying out of this choice. Therefore in the fullness of time,

God endows the conception of Mary with the gifts of his grace.

23. Definition of terms. The words of the thesis are taken from the dogmatic definition (D 2803), since they very well determine the meaning of this dogma:

Immune from all stain of original sin, that is, she did not contract original sin; she did not have the actual infection of this sin, its stain, its guilty state of sin and punishment. But because in this order of providence the lack of original sin supposes sanctification by grace, therefore we speak in an indistinct manner about immunity from original sin and about the immaculate or most pure conception.

24. At the first instant of her conception. The question here is about the passive conception of Mary whereby she was conceived by her mother. We say that Mary was not sanctified in the womb before her birth, but at the very moment of her conception, and in fact at the first moment of the union of her soul with her body. Therefore at the very same time the Virgin's soul was created, united with her body and sanctified.

By the singular privilege of God. It is called a *privilege*, because it is a true exception from the general law under which human beings, propagated by natural generation, are conceived in original sin. However we are not saying anything about how this exception took place. It is said to be *singular*, because it was granted to Her alone, or at least there is certainty about Her alone.

25. In view of the merits of Christ. This privilege in Mary is had because of the foreseen merits of Christ the Redeemer. Therefore Mary comes under the redemption of Christ, although in a more sublime manner.

Preserved. The grace of God so protected her from original sin that she never contracted it, which she certainly would have contracted, without such preservation.

26. Adversaries. a) The thesis formerly was denied by many great Doctors and theologians because of the difficulty of reconciling with it the dogma of the universal redemption of Christ.

b) After the definition, *Jansenists and Old Catholics, Protestants and recent Orthodox theologians.*¹

1. On the Orthodox, see M. Gordillo, *Compendium theologiae orientalis*² 134-152, with a bibliography. On the opposition from Muratori, see G.M. Roschini, *Ludovico A. Muratori e l'Immacolata: Marian 1* (1939) 103-107.

c) Rosmini (D 3234) proposed a false explanation of the dogma.

27. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *The historical preparation of the dogma:* a) Sixtus IV in the years 1476 and 1483 (D 1400, 1425-1426) approves the feast, whose object he explains, while forbidding the giving of the note of heresy to the pious opinion.²

b) Innocent VIII in the year 1489 approves the invocation of the Virgin under the title of Immaculate in her conception.³

c) *The Council of Trent* s.5 cn.5 (D 1516) in the year 1546, does not wish to include Mary in the decree on original sin. Pius IX says the following about these words: "With this declaration the Tridentine Fathers sufficiently indicate that the most Blessed Virgin was free from original sin, given the circumstances of place and time. Therefore they say clearly that nothing can be really adduced from the divine writings, nothing from the tradition and authority of the Fathers that would in any way be opposed to this great prerogative of the Virgin."⁴

d) St. Pius V in the year 1567 (D 1973) condemns a proposition of de Bay. He also puts an office of the Immaculate Conception in the Roman Breviary.

e) Paul V in the year 1567 forbids teaching in public the contrary opinion.⁵

f) Gregory XV in the year 1622 orders the use of the word "Conception" for "sanctification."⁶

g) Alexander VII in the year 1661 (D 2015) declares that the object of this devotion is the conception itself of the Virgin. In this Bull almost all the words of the future definition are contained.

h) Clement XI in the year 1708 extends the feast as prescribed for the universal Church.

Note. In 1439 at the *Council of Basel* in session 36 defined the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. In the mind of the Fathers that decree was a true definition, but because that council was not Catholic, but truly

2. See C. Sericoli, O.F.M., *Immaculata B.M. Virginis Conceptio, iuxta Xysti IV constitutiones* (Siena 1945); *De praecipuis Sedis Apostolicae documentis de B.M.V. Immaculata Conceptione*: Ant 29 (1954) 373-408.

3. See DTC 7,1164.

4. Bull "*Ineffabilis*": CL 6,839. On the Council of Trent, see J. Olazarán, *El dogma de la Inmaculada Concepción en el Concilio Trento*: EstEcl 20 (1946) 105-154; L. Kruse, *Die Conceptio Immaculata auf dem Konzil von Trient*: ThGl 44 (1954) 161-185; J. Sagüés, *Trento y la Inmaculada*: EstEcl 28 (1954) 323-367.

5. Letter "*Regis Pacifici*": Bullarium Romanum 12,356ff. On the historical origin of this document, see J. Delgado Varela, *La Mariología en los autores españoles de 1600 a 1650*: Est 7 (1951) 251-259.

6. Bullarium Romanum 12,658-690. On the historical origin of this document, see Delgado Varela, *loc.cit.*, 260f.

schismatic, it had no dogmatic value.⁷

2. *The solemn dogmatic definition by Pius IX in the year 1854 (D 2803).*⁸

3. The centenary celebration of the dogmatic definition by Pius XII in his encyclical, "*Fulgens Corona*."⁹

Theological note. *Solemnly defined divine and Catholic faith.*

28. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. Gen. 3:15.

N.B. *On the Proto-gospel.*¹⁰ The traditional opinion of Catholics, which, intended and expressed by the Holy Spirit as the true and genuine meaning of that text, is taught by the Supreme Pontiffs Pius IX and Pius XII¹¹ and maintains the mariological meaning of the Proto-Gospel, although not just in one way. For some find Mary in that text only in an eminent sense, some in a typical sense, some in a fuller sense, and others in a literal sense.¹² To make a theological argument these views are accidental; for the meanings either typical or literal or fuller are truly biblical meanings. It is more probable that the typical meaning is excluded, and it concerns the meaning which the Holy Spirit wished to express with those words of the hagiographer and so expressed, whether it is found from the words alone, or from the work of tradition, of the Magisterium, of the analogy of faith. But it is possible to dispute whether this meaning

7. Msi 29, 183. On this decree and its historical and ideological preparation, see H. Ameri, O.F.M., *Doctrina theologorum de Immaculata B.V. Mariae conceptione tempore Concilii Basileensis* (Rome 1954); K. Binder, *Kardinal Juan de Torquemada und die feierliche Verkündigung der Lehre von der unbeflechten Empfängnis auf dem Konzil von Basel: Virgo Immaculata* 6, 146-163.

8. See M. Gordillo, *La definición dogmática de la Inmaculada en la historia de la Bula "Ineffabilis Deus"*: EstMar 15 (1955) 327-337. On the nature of this definition, see H. Lennerz, *Duae quaestiones de Bulla "Ineffabilis Deus"*; *secunda quaestio: num definitio Immaculatae Conceptionis sit definitio alicuius conclusionis theologicae*: Greg 24 (1943) 356-366. With a contrary opinion before Marin-Sola, *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico*³ (B.A.C., 1952) n.209 p.37-378.

9. AAS 45 (1953) 577-592. See Salm 1 (1954) 726-731; J. Filograssi, *Il dogma dell'Immacolata nell'enciclica "Fulgens Corona"*: Greg 36 (1955) 67-96.

10. See V.G. Bertelli, *L'interpretazione mariologica del Protoevangelo (Gen 3,15) negli esegeti e teologi dopo la Bolla "Ineffabilis Deus" de Pio IX (1854-1948)*: Marian 13 (1951) 257-291; *Il senso mariologico pieno e il senso letterale nel Protoevangelo (Gen 3,15) dalla "Ineffabilis Deus" al 1948*: *ibid.*, 369-395; T. Gallus, *Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii (Gen 3,15) tempore post-apostolico usque ad Concilium Tridentinum* (Rome 1949); *Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii posttridentina usque ad definitionem dogmaticum Immaculatae Conceptionis* (Rome 1953-1954); B. Mariani, O.F.M., *L'Immacolata nel Protovangelo: Virgo Immaculata* 3,28-99, where you have an ample bibliography; M. Painador, *Estudio comparativo de las pruebas de Escritura en favor de la Inmaculada Concepción de María*: EstMar 15 (1955) 53-77. In denial of the Mariological sense of the Proto-Gospel are J. Chaine, R. de Vaux, Clamer, Heinisch; see Bertelli, *loc. cit.*, 258-269. Goosens, *De cooperatione immediato matris Redemptoris ad redemptionem obiectivam* 86-101, defends a merely accommodated sense. Ceuppens also wrote: "We think that there is no convincing argument proving that the prophecy in Gen. 3:15 refers to the Bl. Mary, either in the literal sense or in the typical sense" (*De Mariologia biblica* 60).

11. See A. Bea, *Bulla "Ineffabilis Deus" et hermeneutica biblica*: Virgo Immaculata, 3,1-17.

12. See Bertelli, *loc. cit.*, 269-291, 369-394.

should be called simply literal or a fuller sense.¹³

It is also accidental to the argument whether Mary is included in “woman” or in “seed,” although the prior hypothesis seems to be more probable.

29. Hence I argue¹⁴: God foretells that he will put enmity between Mary and the devil. But this enmity implies Mary’s immunity from original sin. Therefore Mary was immune from original sin.

The major. As we have said, this is the traditional opinion of Catholics. And also, according to some recent studies,¹⁵ although the major part of the holy Fathers and early authors seem to have interpreted the Proto-Gospel in a collective or moral sense, nevertheless they do not think that this interpretation is in conflict with its Christological meaning, which many clearly follow in addition to the moral sense. But the Mariological meaning among some, even more ancient authors, acknowledges the Bl. Virgin in the “woman,” while seeing Christ in the “seed of the woman” (St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, Serapion Thmuisitanus, St. Ephrem, Pseudo-Ephrem, Letter to a Sick Friend, St. Epiphanius, Prudentius, St. Leo the Great, Isidorus Pelusiota, St. Isidore of Spain, St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, Pseudo-Bede, Etherius and Beatus, Claudius of Turin, Agobardus, Breviarium Gothicum, Notkerus, Rupertus Tuitiensis, etc.). Among other more recent authors, since the victory against the devil pertains to the entire posterity of Eve, the following attribute it in a special way to the Bl. Virgin (St. Fulbertus, Pseudo-Paul the Deacon, St. Bernard, Peter the Venerable, Amedaeus of Lausanne, Osbertus de Clara, Petrus Blessensis). Finally, among others the victory is joined together in both ways (Godofridus Vendomensis, Hermanus Turnocensis, Petrus Cellensis, Gilbertus Foiotensis, etc.

Add to this list many old authors, who profess the Christological meaning (St. Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, Alexander Alexandrinus, St. Methodius, Novatian, St. Ambrose), in which Mary seems to be found virtually. And also all those who urge the

13. See Bea, *loc.cit.*, 9-16.

14. See Mariani, *loc.cit.*, 76-99; J. Brinktrine, *Das Protoevangelium und die unbefleckte Empfängnis: Virgo Immaculata* 3,18-28; A.-M. Malo, O.F.M., *L'economie divine dans la Révelation biblique de l'Immaculée Conception: L'Immaculée Conception* (Ottawa 1955) 13-15.

15. See T. Gallus, *loc.cit.*; S. Stys, *Fundamentum exegeticum interpretationis mariologicae Gen 3,15* (Dublin 1949), in Polish, but it has a Latin summary, p. 107-109); *De antithesi Eva Maria eiusque relatione ad Protoevangelium apud Patres*: CollTh 23 (1952) 318-365; D.J. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., *The First Gospel, Genesis 3,15* (New York 1954); R. Laurentin, *L'interpretation de Genèse 3,15 dans la tradition jusq'au début du XIII^e siècle*: EtMar 12 (1954) 79-186; J. Madoz, *Hacia los origenes de la interpretación mariologica del Protoevangelio*: EstEcl 23 (1949) 291-306. According to these studies the following should be corrected: L. Drewniak, *Die mariologische Deutung von Gen 3,15 in der Väterzeit* (Breslau 1934).

antithesis between Eve and Mary. Even though this is done in a literary way independently of the Proto-Gospel, still it really touches on the mariological meaning.

Therefore this interpretation, although not certainly first of all, nevertheless is truly traditional; in the 13th and 14th centuries it was used by almost all; in the 15th century it is held as the common explanation of the Doctors, and in the 16th century it begins to be attacked by the Protestants. This mariological interpretation did not have its origin in a false reading of “she” for “he” (since it first appears among the Greeks), nor at a later time is it used by only those who retain that false reading.

The *major* is proved also from the text itself: for the woman cannot be Eve alone (who certainly fell into sin), or woman in general (because as a woman she does not vanquish the devil).

The minor: The enmity must be understood as victory over sin (or as immunity from sin). But such enmity is established so that the victory must be absolute, or over all sin. Therefore it extends also to immunity from original sin.

This major: In the text the enmity is a punishment opposed to the friendship made between Eve and the devil. But such friendship did not exist except by consent to sin. Therefore. Moreover in no other way can a man be an enemy of the devil except by his victory over sin.

This minor: The enmity is complete and without exception. Therefore it must exclude all sin, including original sin; otherwise Mary would have been a friend of the devil at least in that case. Moreover, the same enmity is placed between Mary and the devil as between Christ and the devil (in Mary of course because of her relation and union with Christ). But this latter is absolute. Therefore.

30. Note. Pius IX has the following to say about this argument: “The Fathers and writers of the Church..., recalling the words with which God, by foretelling the prepared remedy of his mercy for wounded mortals concerning the origins of the world, both thwarted the audacity of the deceiving serpent, and in a wonderful way gave hope to our race, said: ‘I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed’; he taught by this divine oracle clearly and openly that the merciful Redeemer of the human race was prophesied, namely, the Only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, and his chosen Blessed Mother, the Virgin Mary, and at the same time the enmity of both of them extraordinarily expressed against the devil. Therefore, just as Christ, the Mediator of God and men, having assumed human nature, destroyed the

written decree against us by nailing it to the cross, so the holy Virgin, joined together with Him by a close and indissoluble bond, together with Him and through Him showing everlasting enmity for the poisonous serpent, and triumphing over him completely, trampled on his head with her immaculate foot.” Concerning these words it should be noted that the Bull teaches not only the mind of the Fathers and the Church authors about the mariological interpretation of the Proto-Gospel (although it does not affirm their consensus in this matter), but also that this is its meaning; and the meaning is not just accommodated, but truly intended and expressed by the Holy Spirit. And so it says that the Proto-gospel is correctly used to prove the Immaculate Conception, since it is based on the interpretation of the Fathers and the Church authors. However, this sense is not foreign to the true biblical meaning of the text.¹⁶

2. Allusions to the Proto-gospel, which support and confirm its traditional mariological meaning, are contained in the following quotes from the holy Pontiffs. Thus Leo XIII writes: “And when, in the first stages, the parents of mankind fell into sin, involving their posterity in the same ruin, she [Mary] was set up as a pledge of the restoration of peace and salvation.” St. Pius X: “Hence whenever the Scriptures speak prophetically of the grace which was to appear among us, the Redeemer of mankind is almost invariably presented to us as united with His mother. The Lamb that is to rule the world will be sent—but he will be sent from the rock of the desert; the flower will blossom, but it will blossom from the root of Jesse. Adam, the father of mankind, looked to Mary crushing the serpent’s head, and he dried the tears that the malediction had brought into his eyes.” Pius XI: “We invoke the immaculate Mother of God as our intercessor before God who, just as she formerly crushed the head of the old serpent, so also always remains the safe protection and the invincible Help of Christians.”¹⁷

3. Pius XII teaches concerning the same text: “We must remember especially that, since the second century, the Virgin Mary has been designated by the holy Fathers as the new Eve, who, although subject to the new Adam, is most intimately associated with him in that struggle against the infernal foe which, as foretold in the *protoevangelium* [Gen. 3:15], would finally result in that most complete victory over the sin and death

16. See Bea, *loc. cit.*, 5-9. On the dispute about the consensus of the Fathers, see H. Lennerz, *Duae quaestiones de Bulla “Ineffabilis Deus”*: Greg 24 (1943) 346-366; G.M. Roschini, *Sull’interpretazione patristica del Protoevangelo*: Marian 7 (1944) 76-96; H. Lennerz, *Consensus Patrum in interpretatione mariologica Gen 3,15f.*: Greg 27 (1946) 300-318; G.M. Roschini, *Ancora sull’interpretazione patristica del Protevangelo*: Marian 8 (1946) 293-299; T. Gallus, “*Patres Ecclesiaeque scriptores*” in *Bulla Pii IX “Ineffabilis Deus”*: DivThom (pi) 52 (1949) 76-82; Carol, *De Corredemptione* 110.

17. Leo XIII, Encyclical “*Augustissimae Virginis*”: ASS 30 (1898) 129; St. Pius X, Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36 (1904) 462; Pius XI, Encyclical “*Divini Redemptoris*”: AAS 29 (1937) 96.

that are always mentioned together in the writings of the apostle of the Gentiles.” And again, with the express intention of proving the Immaculate Conception: “In the first place, the foundation of this doctrine is to be found in Sacred Scripture, where we are taught that God, Creator of all things, after the sad fall of Adam addressed the serpent, the tempter and corrupter, in these words, which not a few Fathers, Doctors of the Church and many approved interpreters applied to the Virgin Mother of God: ‘I will put enmities between thee and the woman....’ Now, if at any time the Blessed Mary were destitute of divine grace even for the briefest moment, because of contamination in her conception by the hereditary stain of sin, there would not have come between her and the serpent that perpetual enmity spoken of from the earliest tradition down to the time of the solemn definition of the Immaculate Conception, but rather a certain subjection.”¹⁸

31. 2. Luke 1:28.¹⁹ Mary is said to be full of grace, not just in any way, but as befits the Mother of the Redeemer and of God. But such plenitude of grace includes immunity from original sin. Therefore Mary is immune from original sin.

The major. The word *κεχαριτωμένη* in the fullest sense designates her who is endowed with the most abundant grace. Evidently it does not mean the absolute fullness of grace, such as Christ had, but a relative fullness. Indeed in the context there cannot be any other purpose of this relation except the object of the angelic annunciation, which follows immediately, namely, the maternity of God the Redeemer.

The minor. It is befitting the dignity of the Mother of the Redeemer that she never had any participation with the enemies of the Redeemer himself; but it is befitting the dignity of God that she was never turned away from God. But both facts would not be obtained unless it is by immunity from original sin. Therefore the fullness of grace involves immunity from original sin.

32. Note. Pius IX has this to say about this argument: “But since the Fathers with their minds and hearts thought that the Blessed Virgin when

18. Bull “*Munificentissimus Deus*”: AAS 32 (1950) 768; Encyclical “*Fulgens Corona*” AAS 45 (1953) 379. See S. Bartina, S.J., *Los argumentos de Escritura en la bula “Fulgens Corona”*: EstEcl 28 (1954) 373-386; Felipe de Fuenterrabía, O.F.M., *El Protoevangelio (Gen 3,15) a la luz de la bula “Ineffabilis” y de la “Munificentissimus”*: EstFranc 55 (1954) 15-52; S.M. Gozzo, O.F.M., *De valore Sacrae Scripturae in quibusdam documentis ecclesiasticis circa Immaculatam Conceptionem B. Mariae Virginis*: Ant 29 (1954) 357-372.

19. See P. Bonnetain, *Immaculée Conception*: DBS 4,254-263; J. Leal, *La salutación del ángel en el estudio de la Inmaculada desde su definición (1854-1954)*: EstEcl 28 (1954) 391-415. On the philological interpretation of this text, see J. Fantini, *Κεχαριτωμένη* (Luke 1:28): Salm 1 (1954) 760-763.

the angel Gabriel announced to her the sublime dignity of Mother of God by the name and command of God that she was full of grace, taught that by this singular and solemn salutation, otherwise never heard of, it is shown that the Mother of God was the abode of all Divine graces, adorned with all the charisms of the Holy Spirit, yea, the treasury well nigh infinite and abyss inexhaustible of these charisms, so that she was never subjected to the one accursed. Together with her Son she participated in a perpetual blessing she merited to hear from Elizabeth who was inspired by the divine Spirit: Blessed are you among women and blessed is the fruit of your womb." Also Pius XII said: "Moreover, since the same holy Virgin is saluted "full of grace" and "blessed among women," by these words, as Catholic tradition has always interpreted, it is plainly indicated by this singular and solemn salutation...[the quoted words of Pius IX follow]."²⁰ What Pius IX said was taught by the holy Fathers, these same things are taught by Pius XII, affirming moreover that this is the meaning of the words, just as Catholic tradition always understood them. Without doubt that is the literal meaning.

33. Proof from tradition.²¹ The dogma of the Immaculate Conception did not always shine in the Church with the same clarity. We will now present the different stages of this historical evolution.

First period. The stage of implicit faith, up to the Council of Ephesus. The truth of the Immaculate Conception is found implicitly:

a) In the doctrine of the Fathers about the parallel between Eve and Mary, where Mary is shown as the associate with the Redeemer in destroying the work of the devil. This is the case with the Ante-Nicene Fathers.²²

b) In the words "holy," "innocent," "most pure," "chaste," "undefiled," "immaculate" and others like them. This applies especially to the Post-Nicene Fathers, among whom the follow stand out: St. Ephraem (R 719),

20. Pius IX, Bull "*Ineffabilis Deus*": CL 6,840; Pius XII, "*Fulgens Corona*": AAS 45 (1953) 579. See Bartina, *loc.cit.*, 386-390; Carlos de Villapadiera, O.F.M.Cap., *El saludo del ángel y de Isabel (Lc 1,28-42) a la luz de la "Ineffabilis" y de la "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EstFranc 55 (1954) 53-72. On other texts of Scripture that are sometimes quoted to prove the Immaculate Conception, see P. Bonnetain, *loc.cit.*, 263-281; Le Bachelet, *Immaculée Conception*: DTC 7,861-863; M. Jugie, *L'Immaculée Conception dans l'Écriture Sainte et dans la Tradition orientale* (Rome 1952) 46-54.

21. See Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.*, 872-893, 979-1189; Jugie, *loc.cit.*, 56-57; A Rivera, C.M.F., *Inmaculada Concepción: la tradición en los Padres griegos*: EstMar 15 (1955) 79-109; F.P. Solá, *La doctrina de la Inmaculada Concepción en los Padres occidentales no españoles*: *ibid.*, 111-127; J. Solano, *La Inmaculada en los Padres españoles*: *ibid.*, 129-151.

22. See M.A. Nauwelaerts, *De Maria Nova Heva doctrina Patrum Anticaenorum*: DivThom (Pi) 34 (1931) 480-491; G. Jouassard, *La Nouvelle Eve chez les Pères Anténicéens*: EtMar 12 (1954)35-54; B. Capelle, *Le thème de la Nouvelle Eve chez les anciens docteurs latins*: *ibid.*, 55-76; G. Söhl, *Elementa evolutionis in historia dogmatis Immaculatae Conceptionis B.M. Virginis ante Concilium Ephesinum*: Virgo Immaculata 4,1-9.

St. Ambrose (R 1314), St. Augustine (R 1794), and others.²³

34. Second period. The stage of the beginning of explicit faith, up to the 11th century.

a) The Fathers and Church authors extol the original purity of the Mother of God with the highest praises. Thus in the 5th century, Pseudo-Maximus Taurinensis: "Mary is simply a suitable dwelling for Christ, not because of her body but because of her original righteousness." St. Proclus (R 2141f.); Theodotus Ancyranus, and more probably Iacobus Sarugensis, Chrysippus and Hesychius of Jerusalem. In the 6th century, Pseudo-Fulgentius: "When he said 'full of grace,' he shows that the wrath of the first sentence has been completely excluded and that the full blessing of grace has been restored." Romanus Melodus, Anastasius of Antioch. In the 7th century, St. Ildephonsus, St. Sophronius: "No one is adorned with holiness as you are, no one has been filled with purifying grace like you." St. Germanus of Constantinople. In the 8th century, St. Andrew of Crete (R 2336ab). St. John Damascene. In the 9th century, Paschasius Radbertus: "The honor of outstanding piety is yours, and it is your glory to preach the pure chastity of the most Blessed Virgin and to confess that she is untouched by any stain from our first parents." At this time the Eastern authors generally held the privilege of the Immaculate Conception.²⁴

b) The feast of the Conception of the B.V. Mary was celebrated in the East already in the 8th century, and from the 9th century in England; from there it spread to Spain, France, Germany. But the object of the feast at the

23. See Jugie, *L'Immaculée Conception* 67-76. On St. Ephraem it is denied by L. Hammesberger (*Die Mariologie der ephremischen Schriften* [Innsbruck 1938] 57ff); P. Krüger (*Die Immaculata-Frage bei den syrischen Kirchenvätern: Virgo Immaculata* 4,13-16; see I. Ortiz de Urbina, ¿Vale el testimonio de San Efrén en favor de la Inmaculada?: *EstEcl* 28 (1954) 417-422; M. Gordillo, *Mariologia Orientalis* 94. On St. Ambrose, see however J. Huhn, *Das Geheimnis der Jungfrau-Mutter Maria nach dem Kirchenvater Ambrosius* (Würzburg 1954) 238-253. On the mind of St. Augustine, which has been disputed very much, see C. Boyer, *La controverse sur l'opinion de saint Augustin touchant la conception de la Vierge: Virgo Immaculata* 4,48-60; I.M. Dietz, O.F.S.A., *Ist die Jungfrau nach Augustinus "Immaculata ab initio"?*: *ibid.*, 61-112; here an anterior bibliography is presented.

24. Ps. Maximus Taurinensis, *Hom.5 in Natale Domini*: ML 57,235; Theodotus Ancyranus, *In S. Deiparam et Simeonem*: MG 77,1396; Chrysippus, *In S. Mariam Deiparam*: PO 9,339f.; Hesychius, *In S. Deiparam*: MG 93,1464f.; Ps. Fulgentius, *Sermo de laudibus Mariae*: ML 65,899; Romanus Melodus, *Canticum in Nativitatem Mariae* 13: Pitra, *Analecta Sacra* 1,199; Anastasius of Antioch, *Oratio 3 de Incarnatione*: MG 89,1377; St. Sophronius, *Sermo in Annuntiatione Virginis*: MG 87,3248; St. Germanus, *Hom.2 in Praesentatione Virginis*: MG 98,313; St. John Damascene, *Hom. in Nativitatem B. Mariae V.*: MG 96,664; Paschasius Radbertus, *De partu Virginis* 1: ML 120,1375. See Jugie, 77-135, 164-200; Gordillo, *Mariologia Orientalis* 113-121. An affirmative opinion about Jacob Sarugensem is held by Gordillo, *loc.cit.*, 101 and C. Vona, *Un argomento filologico a favore dell'Immaculata Concezione in S. Giacomo de Sarug: Virgo Immaculata* 4,133-144. The negative opinion is defended by Jugie 153f. and P. Krüger, *loc.cit.*: *Virgo Immaculata* 4,23f. See also A. Van Roey, *La sainteté de Marie d'après Jacques de Saroug*: *ibid.*, 113-132.

beginning is not yet clearly defined.²⁵

35. Third period. The stage of a great controversy in the Western Church (there is no controversy in the Eastern Church). It continues up to the Council of Basel (1439).²⁶

a) The 12th century. *A great controversy begins* by opposition that is raised against the feast, first in England and then especially in France by St. Bernard. The thinking of St. Anselm on this question was quite ambiguous.²⁷ The real difficulty was that the problem was not yet clearly defined because of certain theological ideas about original sin and concupiscence, and because of physiological ideas about conception and animation. However some true progress in doctrine takes place among the first scholastics, although some speak rather about sanctification of Mary in the womb, at least assertively, and sometimes also exclusively. At this time theologians generally attributed the greatest purity to the Bl. Virgin Mary. However when they speak about a certain “purification” by the Holy Spirit in the Annunciation, this purification seems rather to be understood as not from some kind of sin, but from the effects of original sin, especially from concupiscence. The Immaculate Conception is defended explicitly by Eadmerus, Osbertus de Clara, Magister Nicolaus, Pseudo-Cantor, Pseudo-Abelard, Pseudo-Comestor, Pseudo-Anselm, Hervaeus de Bourg-Dieu,²⁸

25. For the West, see A.M. Cechin, O.S.M., *La Concezione della Vergine nella liturgia della chiese occidentale anteriore al secolo XIV*: Marian 5 (1943) 50-117; Grosjean, *La prétendue fête de la Conception de la sainte Vierge dans les Eglises celtique*: AnaBoll 61 (1943) 91-95; S. Van Dijk, *The Origin of the Latin Feast of the Conception of the Bl. Virgin Mary*: The Dublin Review 118 (1954) 251-267. For the East, see Jugie, 135,141. Gordillo, *Mariologia* 117-119; A. Koren, *La devozione mariana et in specie la fede nell'Immacolata Concezione nei testi liturgici bisantinoslavi*: Virgo Immaculata 4,145-157; M. Jugie, *La fête byzantine de la Conception de sainte Anne*: Alma Socia Christi 5,2,29-35.

26. For the tradition of the Eastern Church, see Jugie, 200-307; Gordillo, *Mariologia* 120-129.

27. See Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,48-52; 1,222f.

28. Eadmerus, *Tractatus de conceptione sanctae Mariae* (ed. H. Thurston and T. Slater, Friburg 1904), in which we read: “Clearly *he could*; therefore if he *willed it, he did it*” (n.10); Obertus de Clara, *Epist. ad Warinam decanam Vigornensem; epist. ad Anselmum abbatem S. Edmundi; sermo de conceptione sanctae Mariae* (in the cited edition of Eadmerus); Mag. Nicolaus, *Liber de celebranda conceptione contra Bernardum* (ed. C.a. Talbot: RevBem 64 [1954] 92-117); Ps. Cantor, *Sermo de conceptione Beatissimae V. Mariae* (ed. Alva v. Astorga, *Monumenta antiqua* 1,107-117); Ps. Abelard, *Tractatus de conceptione B.V. Mariae* (ed. Alva v. Astorga, *Radii solis* 614-621); Ps. Anselm, *Epist. ad coepiscopos Angliae* (ed. Emmen: Virgo Immaculata 5,149f.); Hervaeus, *Comment. epistolae ad Romanos* 8: ML 181,698; *Comment. In 2 epist ad Corinthios* 5: ML 181,1048.

the anonymous works of the Holy Cross and Paris.²⁹ St. Bernard and his disciples defend the contrary opinion.³⁰

36. The 13th century. Opposition of the great scholastics. All admit her sanctification in the womb, exclusively; but also in such a way that the tendency became always stronger to admit her sanctification immediately after her conception. The main difficulty came from the universality of redemption by Christ. All those authors had such conviction about the purity and holiness of the Virgin that they would have willingly admitted the Immaculate Conception, if they had seen a way of reconciling it with the universality of redemption. At the time therefore in opposition to the pious teaching are Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure,³¹ John de la

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29. On all these authors, see L. Modric, O.F.M., *Doctrina de Conceptione B.V. Mariae in controversia saec. XII: Virgo Immaculata* 5,13-73; G. Gagov, O.F.M.Conc., *L'ambiente liturgico e culturale inglese a favore dell'Immacolata e Giovanni Scoto O. Min.*: *ibid.*, 74-89; H.F. Davis, *Theologia Immaculatae Conceptionis apud primos defensores, scil. In Anglia saec. XII*: *ibid.*, 1-12; F.M. Mildner, O.S.M., *The Immaculate Conception in England up to the Time of John Duns Scotus*: *Marian* 1 (1939) 200-221; *The Immaculate Conception in the writings of Nicolas of St. Albans*: *Marian* 2 (1940) 173-193; A. Emmen, O.F.M., *Epistola pseudo-anselmiana "conceptio veneranda" eiusque auctoritas in litteratura medievali de Immaculata Conceptione: Virgo Immaculata* 5,137-150; I. Riudor, *La Concepción Inmaculada de María en la primera mitad del siglo XII*: *EstEcl* 28 (1954) 445-472. On the way in which Eadmerus understood the Immaculate Conception, see the recent disputation by A.M. Cechin, *"Ineffabilis Deus" et Eadmerus*: *Marian* 6 (1944) 87-107; G. Geenen, *Eadmer, le premier théologien de l'Immaculée Conception: Virgo Immaculata* 5,90-136; B. del Mámol, *Maris Corredemptrice. Eadmer enseigne-t-il que Marie racheante fut rachetée?*: *ibid.*, 194-201. Peter Campostellanus is to be assigned to a later date; see L. Modric, *Le Petro Campostellano, qui primus assertor Immaculatae Conceptionis dicitur*: *Ant* 29 (1954) 563-572.
30. *Epist. 172 ad canonicos Lugdunenses*: *ML* 182,332-336. On the debate about the mind of St. Bernard, see Roschini, *Mariologia* 1,232.
31. See J. Bittremieux, *Le sentiment de St. Bonaventura sur l'Immaculée Conception de la sainte Vierge*: *Et-Franc* 40 (1928) 367-394; Joseph A. Leonisa, O.F.M.Cap., *Dogma Immaculatae Conceptionis et Doctorum Angelici et Seraphici doctrina*: *DivThom (Pi)* 5 (1904) 632-640; *St. Bonaventura zur unbeflecten Empfängnis Mariä*: *FranzStud* 20 (1933) 304-308.

Rochelle, Gulielmus de Melitona, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas,³² Peter of Tarantasia, Henricus Gandavensis, Aegidius Romanus. Towards the end of this century a contrary reaction begins: St. Peter Paschasius,³³ Gulielmus de Ware (Guarra), Raimundus Lullius.³⁴

In spite of these objections, the feast is celebrated more and more; some interpret its object to be the sanctification of Mary, others her conception.

37. c) The 14th century. *A big Scotistic reaction.* It becomes clear especially by Scotus, after Gulielmus of Ware, how the privilege of the immaculate conception can be reconciled with redemption by Christ, by making a distinction between liberating and preservative redemption. From this came a huge step towards the acceptance of the pious opinion. Therefore at the time those in favor of it are, *from the Order of Friars Minor,*

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32. There is much debate about the true doctrine of St. Thomas. See Alastruey, 1,232-240; N. del Prado, *Santo Tomás y la Inmaculada Concepción* (Barcelona 1909); Id., *Divus Thomas et Bulla dogmatica "Ineffabilis Deus"* (Friurg 1919); P. Lumbreras, *Saint Thomas and the Immaculate Conception* (Indiana 1924); P. Renaudin, *La pensée de saint Thomas sur l'Immaculée Conception* (Avignon 1926); Michel Ange, O.F.M.Cap., *Saint Thomas et l'Immaculée Conception* Or 11 (1927) 300-307; S. Schmutz, *War der hl. Thomas Gegner der unbeflecten Empfängnis*: BenedMschr 2 (1929) 523-527. More recently, Friethoff, *Quomodo caro B.M. Virginis in originali concepta fuerit*: Ang 10 (1933) 321-324. A historical solution according to which St. Thomas at the beginning and at the end admitted the Immaculate conception, by P. Mandonnet (BullThom 1933, 164-167) proposed and later opposed by P. Vosté (*De mysteriis vitae Christi*² 13-20), and now defended by P. Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Madre del Salvador* 53-58, having supposed the critical edition of the minor work made by J.F.Rossi, *S. Thomae Aquinatis expositio salutationis angelicae* Div Thom (Pi) 34 (1931) 445-479; however on this see J. de Blic, *Saint Thomas et l'Immaculée Conception*: RevApol 56 (1933) 25-36. On this solution see Roschini in Marian 3 (1941) 81-83, and G. de Rosa, *Importante problema di esegesi tomistica nella soluzione di due studiosi contemporanei*: Marian 10 (1948) 133-159. See moreover S. Euzipi, *Il pensiero di Tommaso de'Aquino riguardo al dogma della Immacolata Concezione* (Rome 1941), who holds that St. Thomas de facto taught nothing either for the Marian privilege or against it. On this book, see Roschini in Marian 3 (1941) 294-297, and the response of the author in Marian 4 (1942) 62-70. For this whole controversy see also C. Gutiérrez Velasco, O.P., *Immaculata Conceptio et Angelicus Doctor*: DivThom (Pi) 57 (1954) 181-219; G.Fr. Rossi, *A proposito de testi di San Tommaso relativi alla dottrina "De B.M. Virginis Conceptione"*: ibid., 280-285; *Quid senserit Angelicus Doctor S. Thomas de Immaculata Virginis conceptione*: ibid. 333-392; *L'autenticità dei testi di San Tommaso d'Aquino*: "B. Virgo a peccato originali et actuali immunis fuit," "B. Virgo nex originale... peccatum incurrit," *respectivamente degli anni 1254 e 1273*; ibid., 442-466; M. Cuervo, *Por qué Santo Tomás no afirmó la Inmaculada*: Virgo Immaculata 6,11-68, or Salm 1 (1954) 622-674; R. Verardo, *De concupiscentia in transmissione peccati originalis iuxta S.Thomam, ac de eius doctrinae momento relate ad progressum dogmatis Immaculatae Conceptionis B. Mariae V.:* Virgo Immaculata 6, 69-107.
33. See V. Mancini, *Il primo difensore dell'Immaculata Concezione de Maria e stato un mercedario*: S. Pietro Pascasio (Naples 1939); A. Sancho Blanco, O. de M., *Sanctus Petrus Paschasius, episcopus et martyr Immaculatae Conceptionis defensor*: Virgo Immaculata 8,1,1-35.
34. See Andrés de Palma de Mallorca, O.F.M.Cap., *La Inmaculada en l'escola Lulista*: EstFranc 55 (1954)171-194. For this and the following time, see F. Guimaraens, *La doctrine des théologiens sur l'Immaculée Conception de 1250 à 1350*: EtFranc 4 (1953) 23-51, 167-187.

Scotus, Aureolus,³⁵ John de Bassolis, Peter Thomas, A. Andreas, G. Rubió, L. Vitalis,³⁶ Francis de Mayronis, Peter de Aquila, Francis de Marchia and at the end of the century all of them; *from the Order of Preachers*, John Tauler, John Bromiard; *from the Order of Carmelites*, John Bacon³⁷ and after him all; *from the Order of St. Augustine*, Thomas Argentoratensis and all after him; also the authors *from the Orders of the Premonstratentians, Holy Trinity, Servites*; many *from the Benedictines, Cistercians, Carthusians*. Against the privilege of the Virgin are most of the *Dominicans, Gregorius Ariminensis, Alvarus Pelagius, Ioannes de Polliaco, Ioannes de Neapoli*,³⁸ and those doctors who afterwards became Benedict XII and Clement VI.³⁹

38. The fourth period. The stage of triumph. Up to the dogmatic definition. Daily the number of those defending the pious opinion increases. The Magisterium of the Church determines the feast in an official way, its object in the sense of the conception, and defends the advocates of this privilege. Theologians study carefully the pious doctrine (the question is asked about the proximate debt, as we shall see) and they defend it against difficulties. The Christian people show reverence to the Immaculate Virgin in all the ways in which the devotion of the people can be shown. We already said something above about the Supreme Pontiffs during this time. Concerning others in particular the following should be mentioned:

39. a) The universities not only defend the privilege of the Conception, but also demand an oath defending it before the conferring of academic degrees. Thus Paris (1497), Cologne (1499), Moguntina (1500), Vienna (1501), Valentina (1530), Barcelona, Granada, Complutensis, Baezae, Osunae, Compostella, Toledo and Caesaraugustana (1617), Salamanca⁴⁰ and Panormitana (1618), Oscensis (1619), Ingolstadt (1653), Duacena,

35. G. Guarrae, I. Duns Scotus, P. Aureli, O.F.M., *Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione B.M. Virginis* (ed. C. Balic, Ad Claras Aquas 1904); C. Balic, *Ioannes Duns Scotus, Doctor Immaculatae Conceptionis* (Rome 1954). See F. Cavallera, *Gulielmus Ware et l'Immaculée Conception*: RevD Scot (1911) 133-136; J. Kaup, *Duns Scotus als Vollender der Lehre von den Unbeflecten Empfängnis*: BeitrGPHMA, Suppl 3,2,991-1008; C. Balic, *Ioannes Duns Scotus et historia Immaculatae Conceptionis* (Rome 1955); Alejandro de Villamonte, O.F.M.Cap., *Contribución de la teología franciscana al desarrollo del dogma de la Inmaculada, siglos XIII y XIV*: Salm 1 (1954) 693-712.

36. On these authors, see A. Braña Arrese, O.F.M., *De Immaculata Conceptione B.V. Mariae secundum theologos hispanos saec. XIV* (Rome 1950); L.M. Farsé, O.F.M., *La concepció immaculada de la Verge segons Fr. Guillem Rubió, O.F.M.*: AnalSacraTarrac 7 (1931) 95-121.

37. See B.M. Xiberta, *Ioan. Bachonhorp y el dogma de la Inmaculada Concepción*: EstFranc 40 (1928) 99-111.

38. Ioannis de Polliaco et Ioannis de Neapoli, *Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione B.M.V.*: (ed. C. Balic, Sibenici 1931).

39. On the Byzantine writers of this time, see G. Elderov, O.F.M.Conv., *La dottrina dell'Immacolata nei maestri francescani e nei palamiti dei secoli XIV-XV*: Virgo Immaculata 4,185-196.

40. See F. Marcos, *La Universidad de Salamanca y la Inmaculada*: Salm 1 (1954) 539-605.

Coimbra and Evora (1662), Salzburg and Krakow (1697). At the end of the 17th century 150 universities were defending the Marian privilege and 50 of them required an oath.

b) *Religious orders*. In addition to those cited in the previous period, all the new orders established during this time. Thus, the *Theatines*, *Barnabites*, *Somaschites*, *Jesuits*, *Pious Schools*, *Capuchins*, and also the *new religious Congregations*. From the *Order of Preachers* at this time one must cite as being for the privilege *Catarinus*, *Campanella*, *Gulielmus Pepin*, *St. Louis Bertrán Vincent I. Antist* and *eight Spanish Dominicans* who, in the year 1618, petitioned the Holy Father to command the Fathers of their Order to preach publicly in favor of the Immaculate Conception and to recite her office of the day.

c) *The principal catechisms*, like that of Canisius, Bellarmine, Bossuet, and others.

The conclusion of this period: from the middle of the 17th century the doctrine about the Immaculate Conception becomes common in the whole Church; this fact cannot be challenged even by the attacks of the *Jansenists*.

40. Out of all of this an argument can be made from tradition: A doctrine, which in the Church during many centuries continually so increased in the belief of the faithful, since it was a doctrine that apparently had some great difficulties because of other dogmas and other Catholic doctrines; against which so many great theologians argued; with which a feast and devotion were connected, that was attacked by many but nevertheless grew daily; this whole situation was not only tolerated by the Supreme Pontiffs but daily favored it more and more; a doctrine, I say, adorned with these historical circumstances, cannot not be revealed by God. But such is the case with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Therefore it is revealed. *The minor* is clear from what has been said. *The Major*: because such a amazing fact, if it is considered in its totality, no other sufficient explanation can be given.

41. Theological reasoning. It is fitting that the Bl. Virgin Mary should have as much immunity from sin as she is able to have. But she was able to have immunity from sin. Therefore she had it.⁴¹

The Major: a) This principle is admitted by theologians, even by those who denied the privilege of the Virgin. Thus St. Anselm, St. Bernard, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure make use of this principle. St. Anselm may be

41. It seems this argument was first proposed by F. Gulielmo de Ware, the teacher of Scotus. See G. Guarre, I. Duns Scoti et Aureoli *Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione B.M. Virginis* p.XIIf. See however what we said above in note 28 about Eadmerus, and M. Bélanger, *Immaculée Conception et Maternité divine: L'Immaculée Conception* (Ottawa) 127-150.

heard to speak for all of them: "It was fitting that the Virgin should shine with a purity than which under God a greater cannot be conceived."⁴² b) It is fitting that the Mother of God be most holy. See S.Th. III, q. 27, a. 4.

The minor: God could create Mary's soul in the state of grace. And the following points are not opposed to this:

a) the dogma *about the universality of original sin:* for from this it follows that Mary ought to have contracted original sin, if she were left to herself; but it does not follow that God could not exempt her de facto from contracting that sin;

b) the dogma *about the universality of redemption:* for she could be redeemed by a preservative redemption;

c) the dogma of *redemption through Christ:* for she could be redeemed by the merits of Christ, absolutely foreseen by God.

42. Note. Concerning this argument Pius IX writes: "And, indeed, it was altogether fitting that so venerable a mother, aglow with radiance, ever adorned with the splendors of a most perfect holiness and entirely immune from the stain of original sin, should have the most complete triumph over the ancient serpent. It was she to whom the Father willed to give his only Son, generated from his heart and equal to himself and whom he loves as himself. (And he wished to) give him in such a way that he would be, by nature, one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Virgin. And as the Son himself actually chose her to be his mother, just so the Holy Spirit willed and ordained that she should conceive and give birth to the one from whom he himself proceeds."⁴³ Pius XII wrote recently: "Almighty God could certainly, by virtue of the merits of the Redeemer, bestow on her this singular privilege; that therefore he did not do so, we cannot even suppose. It was fitting that Jesus Christ should have such a mother as would be worthy of him as far as possible; and she would not have been worthy if, contaminated by the hereditary stain even for the first moment only of her conception, she had been subject to the abominable power of Satan."⁴⁴

43. Scholium. *On the redemption of the Blessed Virgin Mary.* a) *The fact.* It is expressly taught by the Magisterium of the Church that the Blessed Virgin Mary was truly redeemed by Christ the Lord. Thus Pius XII: "We easily perceive that Christ the Lord in a certain most perfect

42. *De conceptu virginali* 18: ML 158,451.

43. Bull "*Ineffabilis*": CL 6,536.

44. Encyclical "*Fulgens Corona*": AAS 45 (1953) 581.

manner really redeemed his Mother, since it was by virtue of his merits that she was preserved by God immune from all stain of original sin.”⁴⁵ Pius IX also wrote that “the most holy Virgin Mary, Mother of God, because of the foreseen merits of Christ the Lord and Redeemer, was never subject to original sin, but was totally preserved from the stain or original sin, and therefore was *redeemed* in a more sublime manner.”⁴⁶ Therefore the formula of the dogmatic definition cannot be understood in any other way: “in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Savior of the human race,” which correspond to the formula of the Bull “*Sollicitudo*”: “in view of the merits of her Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the human race” (D 2015).⁴⁷ And in no way is it necessary to make a point about the change of the word “Savior” for “Redeemer,” both because of the words of the Bull just quoted, and because of the equivalence of the formulas made by Pius himself on the day after the dogmatic definition.

On the basis of all this it is necessary to say that the doctrine, which holds that the Blessed Virgin is included within the bounds of redemption as a passive subject of it (not only active), must absolutely be held as implicitly contained in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Hence here is what Pius XII wrote: “Nor can it be asserted that the redemption by Christ was on this account lessened, as if it did not extend to the whole race of Adam.”⁴⁸ With these words it is taught expressly that the privilege of the Immaculate Conception in no way detracts from the universality of passive redemption.

44. *Its nature.* Therefore Mary is both preserved from sin and redeemed. Indeed, *for that reason redeemed because preserved*, as it is expressed in the quoted texts: “preserved... and therefore redeemed in a more sublime manner”; “really redeemed, since... she was preserved.” Therefore with full justice Mary is said to be redeemed by a *preservative* redemption. Certainly her redemption is “true,” and a “perfect” and “more sublime” redemption.⁴⁹ This redemption however supposes preservation, not from just any sin, but from original sin. The texts of Pius IX and Pius XII cited above say this expressly. Therefore the redemption of the Blessed Virgin

45. Encyclical “*Fulgens Corona*”: AAS 45 (1953) 581.

46. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,839.

47. This formula also corresponds historically to the formula of the Council of Basel: “through whom liberating and preserving that blessed person from the original stain, he redeemed her with a more sublime kind of sanctification” (Msi 29,183).

48. Encyclical “*Fulgens Corona*”: AAS 45 (1953) 581.

49. Therefore in no way can preservative redemption and redemption that is perfect and sublime be placed in opposition to each other, as if there were two different forms of redemption. The historical texts and the words of the Magisterium understand both formulas to be about one and the same redemption.

is not sufficiently explained by her preservation from personal sin, but it must certainly be held that her redemption implies a true preservation from original sin.

Hence it follows that the Blessed Virgin is said for this reason to be redeemed by Christ, because in view of His merits she was preserved from original sin. Therefore in an equivalent way it is necessary to say: she would have contracted original sin, unless she was preserved from it by the merits of Christ. It seems to be absolutely certain that this is the meaning of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, whether from its whole history or from the mind of the Church and the thinking of the Christian people.

45. c) *The consequences.* From the above it can now be deduced what is required for a true preservative redemption. Indeed there are some authors who hold that the preservative redemption is well maintained if *a mere possibility* of contracting original sin is granted to be present in her before Her preservation. Therefore her redemption will be preservation from such a possibility of sinning. But this does not suffice in order to save the truth of redemption. For a mere possibility is equal for both sides of a contradiction. Therefore it will be equally true to say: Mary, if she is not preserved, can contract original sin; and to say: Mary, if she is not preserved, cannot contract original sin. Therefore in no way is what we just said maintained, namely, that her preservation was of such a nature that, unless she were preserved, she would certainly have contracted original sin.

Therefore a *certain previous necessity*, objective and hypothetical, of contracting original sin must be admitted. Indeed this necessity is nothing other than a certain result of causes because of which a true original sin would certainly be present in Mary, if the divine preservation had not intervened. This objective and hypothetical necessity, which is nothing really in the person of the Virgin and therefore does not suppose any stain or lack of purity in Her, must be asserted a posteriori from the truth of Her redemption, which otherwise does not seem able to be saved.

46. d) *The question of debt.* From what we have said the controversial question is solved about the debt of original sin in the Blessed Virgin. For a debt is nothing but a certain necessity, more or less proximate, of contracting original sin. Therefore, prescinding from words, we think that some debt of original sin must be asserted in order to defend the redemption of the Blessed Virgin.

This necessity can be conceived in many ways, as in the whole sequence of causes in different ways the expression is conceived in which

the preservation intervenes. In this sense we can speak about a proximate or a remote debt. For it can be defended that Mary, included in Adam, was preserved from original sin only by that expression in which Her person was constituted; then there is a proximate debt. But it can also be defended that Mary was preserved from that inclusion in Adam; then there is a remote debt. In the first case there is truly present a necessity of contracting the sin; in the second case, a true necessity of inclusion. The first way of conceiving this seems to be much more fitting.

47. Now there are some authors who try to suppress every debt in Mary, because they deny that She pertained “to the order of Adam,” because of her predestination in Christ and with Christ antecedently to Adam. But in this opinion it is not apparent how her preservative redemption from original sin can be saved. For in this hypothesis, not only can no necessity in Mary for this sin be thought, but not even the possibility, that is, if every connection with Adam is taken away, which is not a pure and physical origin of nature. But given this physical connection alone, there can be no thought of original sin.⁵⁰

50. The question about the debt of original sin in the Bl. Virgin arose historically in the Middle Ages between the defenders of the Immaculate Conception, at first only implicitly, and then also explicitly. Catarinus, denying that Mary sinned in Adam, but supposing a hypothetical necessity of her inclusion in him, gradually changed the idea of the debt, while more or less asserting what was later called a remote debt. This doctrine of Catarinus, from the years 1615 and 1616, in which it was defended by Toletus, Complutus and Hispalus, cleared of any censure by a decree of the Spanish Inquisition, was often advocated by theologians in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was also opposed by many, while some began to deny that there was any debt at all. In our own times the question has been raised again, so that many theologians deny any debt of sin in the Bl. Virgin. Some of these, while retaining preservative redemption, try to explain that she was preserved from the possibility alone of sin; others wish to remove even the preservative redemption itself. On this whole question, see J.A. Aldama, *En torno a la redención preservativa*: Salm 1 (1954) 164-177, where there is a bibliography on the recent dispute. To this should be added: J.M. Alonso, *Num B. Virgo peccati debiti fuerit obnoxia*: EphMar 5 (1955) 33-46; *El débito del pecado original en la Virgen: Reflexiones críticas: IRevEspT* 15 (1955) 67-96; Basilio de San Pablo, *Impresiones de un independiente sobre la cuestión del “débito”*: EphMar 5 (1955) 9,32; Cristótopmo de Pamplona, *La redención preservativa de María y el requisito esencial de la preservación*: EstMar 15 (1955) 153-167; J.M. Delgado Varela, *Una célebre discusión acerca del débito del pecado original en la Virgen Santísima*: EphMar 5 (1955) 191-209; Enrique del Sagrado Corazón, *La Inmaculada en la tradición teológica española: la sentencia sobre el “debitum peccati: 1595-1600*: CiencTom 95 (1954) 513-564; *Los Salmanticenses y la Inmaculada: su tesis sobre la redención y el débito de pecado*: EstMar 16 (1955) 101-133; N. García Garcés, *¿Debió tener la Santísima Virgen el pecado original?*: EphMar 5 (1955) 95-110; M.Llamera, *El problema del débito y la redención preservativa de María*: CiencTom 81 (1954) 441-512, or EstMar 15 (1955) 169-223; Pedro Alcántara, *Las primeras elaboraciones de los conceptos de redención preservativa y débito de pecado*: EstMar 16 (1955) 101-133; E. Sauras, *Contenido doctrinal del misterio de la Inmaculada*: CiencTom 81 (1954) 363-420 (especially 383-392), or EstMar 15 (1955) 9-52.

ARTICLE II

ON MARY'S IMMUNITY FROM THE INCLINATION (*FOMES*) TO SIN

48. Immunity from the inclination to sin (*fomes peccati*) is closely connected with immunity from original sin, or immunity from concupiscence which, as Trent says (D 1516), is from sin and leads to sin. The question now is whether the Virgin Mary was immune from the inclination to sin, and how.

49. The *fomes peccati* is said to be an inclination to sin, coming from the sensitive appetite. Therefore it is concupiscence inasmuch as it inclines to sin, either because it precedes the deliberation of reason and the will, or because it acts against right reason.

It is considered in two ways: a) *in the first reality (in actu primo)*, that is, the sensitive appetite itself, according as it is ready and proximately disposed to elicit acts opposed to right reason; b) *in the second reality (in actu secundo)*, that is, motions of the sensitive appetite contrary to right reason.

But this inclination in the first reality is called: a) *unbound*, if it is proximately ready for its acts; b) *bound*, if it is not able to produce acts contrary to reason because of the *extrinsic* removal of occasions or the denial of divine cooperation; c) *extinct*, if the sensitive appetite because of its *intrinsic* perfection is completely subject to right reason, and therefore cannot produce contrary acts. Therefore, strictly speaking, if the inclination is extinct, it is really absent; but if it is bound, regarding the matter at hand it is *de facto* not present, although it is possible to dispute about the concept; and if it never was there, then it cannot be said to be extinct, but simply nothing.

50. *All theologians agree* that this inclination to sin did not exist in the Virgin Mary in the second reality (*in actu secundo*). They also agree, at least since the 12th century, that the inclination in her was extinct from the moment of the Incarnation; that seems to be sufficiently in accordance with the statements by which the Fathers explain the special purity which the Virgin had from that time.

However the theologians dispute whether or not that extinction of the inclination took place only at the moment of the Incarnation, or was present already before that time. The dispute is put in these terms: whether from the first instant of her conception up to the conception of Christ the inclination to sin in Her was only bound, or totally extinct. Actually this question historically is closely connected with the question of her Immaculate Conception. For,

those who denied the Immaculate Conception more easily admitted that the inclination was bound at the beginning and then extinct after the Incarnation.

Therefore they admit: a) that the inclination was only *bound*, St. Bede, Paschasius Radbertus, Peter Lombard, Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great, Peter of Taranta, St. Bonaventure, Aegidius Romanus, Durandus, and others; b) that the inclination was *extinct*, Scotus, Gabriel Biel, Thomas Argentina, Marsilius, Maior, Suarez, Vázquez, Valentia. Now almost all theologians follow this opinion.

There were theologians (Vega, Sedlmayer), and there are still some even now (Hugon, Chollet, Jannota), who say that the inclination in the Virgin, properly speaking, was not bound or extinct, but it was simply *excluded*. Of course this can be just a manner of speaking, provided that one retains on the one hand that the inclination in the first reality never existed in the Virgin, but on the other hand that this was obtained by her as a true privilege.¹

51. To be sure, after the definition of the Immaculate Conception no reason is apparent why she did not have from the very beginning what she had after the conception of Christ. But there are positive reasons for the existence of that gift in the Virgin *already from the beginning*.

a) The honor of Christ required that the flesh of the Virgin, from which his own flesh was to be formed, should be totally pure, and therefore immune from any inclination to sin. But the same reason proves that her purity should never have been stained. Therefore from the beginning she had to be immune from such inclination.

b) The inclination of sin is a consequence of original sin. Therefore since she never had original sin, she ought not ever to have had an inclination of sin.

c) This immunity was granted to the first parents at the beginning. Therefore it must not be denied to the Blessed Virgin.

52. *It is not valid to object:* there are other consequences of original sin, which the first parents did not have before their sin, but which were in the Virgin, for example, passibility; therefore the same holds for the inclination. For other penalties of life are not moral imperfections and therefore they could have been in the Bl. Virgin and in Christ the Lord; but the inclination to sin is a moral imperfection, inasmuch as it inclines one to sin.²

1. On the medieval authors, see B. Korosak, O.F.M., *Mariologia S. Albert M. eiusque coaequalium* (Rome 1954) 384-394.

2. On this question about the inclination of sin, see Alastruey, 235-242; Merkelbach, 149-157; Roschini, 2,2,96-105; J. de Castro Engler, C.M.F., *Explicação teológica de dom da imunidade da concupiscência na Imaculada*: EphMar 4 (1954) 333-356.

53. Therefore the *passions* in the Bl. Virgin were not as they are in us, but rather as they were in Christ; St. Thomas explains this in III, q. 15, a. 4.

54. At this point the question can be raised *about the state of nature* in which the Bl. Virgin was conceived, that is, whether or not the state of original justice was granted to Her. Actually, given her immunity from original sin and from any inclination of sin, this whole question is about the gifts of impassibility and immortality.

The first opinion of theologians is of those who assert that the Bl. Virgin had those gifts either from the first instant, or at least from the time of the conception of Christ. Thus Vega, Baeza, Sedlmayr, Janssens, Lepicier, Alastuey, Roschini apparently, Bover. Famous Byzantine theologians like Gregory Palamas, Isidore Glabas and Nicholas Cabasilas had already in the 14th century conceded the fullness of the state of original justice to the Bl. Virgin, but Scholarios rejected it.³

The second opinion holds that the Bl. Virgin lacked those gifts, not indeed because of sin (which she never committed), but because it pleased God in his wisdom that She suffer in these things the necessities of nature. Thus Suarez, Terrien, Hugon, Campana, Merkelbach, Garrigou-Lagrange.

55. *This second opinion* seems to us to be more true. For the state given to the Bl. Virgin is not had in virtue of primeval elevation (for she carried the debt of sin), but in virtue of a new and special elevation (for she was redeemed by Christ). But what this special elevation was will have to be investigated in another context. Now it is certain that it implies the greatest amount of sanctifying grace initially and also immunity from concupiscence. But on the other hand it is also certain de facto that the Bl. Virgin was passible and mortal; since this is found in the very condition of nature, one should not think that she is excused from it, unless it is certainly proved. Therefore it is better to conclude that this natural necessity remained in the Bl. Virgin. Another excellent reason for this appears in her office of Corredemptrix. Hence what is natural in us and also a punishment for sin is natural in the Bl. Virgin but a work of the divine plan to bring about our redemption. Hence the Bl. Virgin was not in the state of original justice, nor in the state of fallen and restored nature, but in a state wholly singular and proper to Her.⁴

3. See M. Gordillo, *L'Immacolata Concezione e lo stato di giustizia originale nella Mariologia dei Palamiti: Virgo Immaculata* 4,170-184.

4. On this question, see Roschini, 2,2,214-224; B. Prada, C.M.F., ¿La inmunidad de la concupiscencia en la Virgen es una consecuencia del dogma de la Inmaculada?: *IlustrCler* 47 (1954) 488-498; Bernardo de la Inmaculada, C.P., *La primera gracia de María y la justicia original. Su inserción en el misterio de Cristo: EstMar* 15 (1955) 225-254.

ARTICLE III

ON MARY'S IMMUNITY FROM PERSONAL SIN

56. Immunity from sin, which maternity of the Redeemer brings with it, is not limited to original sin, but extends also to any personal sin. However, since it is quite clear there was no mortal sin in Mary, it is necessary to treat her immunity from venial sin, which is a special privilege of the Bl. Virgin.

Thesis 3. The Blessed Virgin Mary in her whole life by a special privilege of God was immune from any venial sin.

Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,105-120; Merkelbach, 142-149; Alastruey, 242-251; Dublanchy: DTC 9,2413-2421.

57. Connection. The perfect preparation of the Mother of the Redeemer implies absolute purity. Thus therefore, after we have seen Her immunity from original sin, with which is connected immunity from the inclination to sin, now her immunity from every personal sin must be proved. However since it is sufficiently clear that the Bl. Virgin avoided all mortal sin, we ask the question in particular about Her immunity from all sin whatsoever, including venial sin; if the Bl. Virgin possesses this immunity, it constitutes a special privilege in Her.

58. Definition of terms. *Venial sin* is a human act, morally evil, by which the habitual conversion of the mind to God through charity is not removed, but it is not referable to God.

Any venial sin, that is, either deliberate or surreptitious. In the thesis we are prescinding from positive imperfections which are not venial sins. We will treat this matter later.

In her whole life, that is, not just for a long time.

By a special privilege of God: for it is a matter of faith (D 1573) that the just man cannot avoid all venial sins during his whole life. Therefore if Mary avoided venial sins during her whole life, there must be some exception for Her from such a law. This comes to a *privilege*. But it is called a *special privilege*, because it is granted very rarely; in fact it is not certain that it was ever granted to another person, at least in such abundance.

59. Adversaries. *Old and more recent Protestants* who accuse Mary of many things. Turmel held that traditional doctrine up until the 13th century

admitted sins in the Bl. Virgin.¹

60. Doctrine of the Church. a) *The Council of Trent* s.6 cn.23 (D 1573), where the faith of the Church concerning this privilege is defined.²

b) St. Pius V against de Bay, proposition 73 (D 1973).

c) Pius IX: "Therefore, he wonderfully filled her, far more than all the angels and saints, with an abundance of all the heavenly gifts taken from the treasury of his divinity. In this way, she, being always and absolutely free from every stain of sin, completely beautiful and perfect, would possess such a plenitude of innocence and sanctity that, under God, none greater could be known and, apart from God, no mind could ever succeed in comprehending."³

d) Pius XII: "She who was without sin, either her own or inherited, was always intimately connected with her Son...."⁴

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* at the Council of Trent.

61. Proof from Holy Scripture. Mary is said to have perpetual enmity with the devil (Gen. 3:15) and to be full of grace (Luke 1:28). But neither could be said truthfully if she had any sin, even the smallest. Therefore she had no sin, not even the smallest.

62. Proof from tradition.⁵ a) At the beginning this truth is contained *implicitly* in the statements of the Fathers, in which Mary is said to be most pure and innocent; she is compared with the Church and both are said to be without a wrinkle, without a stain, etc. And it becomes *more explicit* from the 4th century: St. Ephraem (R 719), St. Ambrose (R 1314), St. Augustine (R 1794), St. Athanasius.⁶

b) However there are *certain vacillations* of the Fathers during the 3rd and 4th centuries. The main one comes from a false interpretation of the prophecy of Simeon, as if the foretold sword signified doubts and

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1. In his book, *La sainte Vierge dans l'histoire* (Paris 1908) p. 52, published under the pseudonym of G. Herzog. On this book, see AAS 1 (1910) 554 and 22 (1930) 517-520.
 2. See J.A. de Aldama, *El valor dogmático de la doctrina sobre la inmunidad de pecado venial en Nuestra Señora*: ArchTG (1946) 53-67.
 3. Bull "*Ineffabilis*": CL 6,836.
 4. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 247.
 5. On this argument, see Le Bachelet, *Immaculée Conception*: DTC 7,873-882; Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2414-2419; G. Jousard, *Le problème de la sainteté de Marie chez les Pères depuis les origines de la patristique jusqu'au concile d'Ephèse*: EtMar 5 (1948) 11-31; M. Gordillo, *Mariologia orientalis* 8.
 6. *Fragm. Comment. in Lc*: MG 27,1845.

scandal of Mary during Christ's passion. This interpretation, whose author was Origen,⁷ for some time continued in the writings of some authors.⁸ However, in their statements, although quite hard, their mind regarding sin in Mary is not always clear. There are texts of some of the Fathers about a certain untimely haste or vanity of Mary in John 2:3f. and Matt. 12:46-48, as we find in St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, St. John Chrysostom, Severianus de Gabala.⁹ Also in these statements it is not always clear that the Fathers have found sin in Mary.

c) Later there is *no controversy or doubt* among the Doctors, all of whom hold that "Her soul was completely protected from all stain of sin"¹⁰; that Her "life was protected immune from all sin"¹¹; that "no sin had a place in Her,"¹² etc. The purification of Mary at the moment of the Incarnation, about which St. Leo the Great, St. John Damascene¹³ and others speak, seemingly must be understood to be about the complete removal of the inclination of sin, just as the later authors say.

63. Theological reasoning. a) The greatest purity is fitting for the Mother of God. Therefore immunity from every sin, even the slightest. If these truths are valid for original sin, a fortiori are they valid for personal sin.

b) The main source of venial sins is the inclination of sin (*fomes peccati*). But this inclination, even in the first reality, was extinct in Mary (or at least bound). Therefore Mary did not have venial sin.

64. Objections. 1. In Luke 1:34 Mary appears to be incredulous in asking the angel *how can this be?* Thus the old Protestants and recently Harnack.¹⁴

Response. Certainly there is no incredulity, since Her faith is praised by Elisabeth who is full of the Holy Spirit (Luke 1:45). But, as St. Augustine says, "what was future,

7. *In Lc* hom. 17: MG 13,1845.

8. See the texts of these authors in G. Gallus, *De sensu verborum Lc 2,35 eorumque momento mariologico*: Bibl 29 (1948) 226-228. See also G. Jouassard, *L'interprétation par saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie de la scène de Marie au pied de la Croix*: *Virgo Immaculata* 4,28-47.

9. St. Irenaeus, *Advers. Haereses* 3,16,7: MG 7,926; Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 7: ML 2,812; Oehler, 2,440; St. John Chrysostom, *In Io* hom.21,2: MG 59,130f.; *In Mt* hom.27,3; 44,1: MG57,347.464f.; Severianus de Gabala, hom.8

10. Eadmerus, *De excellentia B.M.V.* 3: ML 159,560.

11. St. Bernard, *Epist.* 174,5: ML 182,334.

12. Richard of St. Victor, *Explicatio in Cantica* 26: ML 196,482.

13. St. Leo the Great, *Serm.* 22,3: ML 54,196; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 3,2: MG94,986; *In dormitione B. Mariae* V 1,3: MG 96,7-4. On these texts, see DTC 9,2414f.

14. See Canisius, *De Maria Virgine incomparabili* 4,1; Harnack, *Zu Lc 1,34-35*: ZNTWiss 2 (1901) 55f. Harnack (who wishes to conclude from this that these verses are not authentic) clearly puts Luke 1,34 and Luke 1,18 together. But there is a big difference. Zechariah, not yet believing, asks for a sign so that he can believe; hence the angel stresses his own authority in speaking and condemns him. Mary, believing the fact announced to her, asks only for the manner so that, having vowed her virginity to God, she might obey God in all things. Hence she is told the manner by the angel and in no way is she condemned.

was certain; she asked about the way it would happen.”¹⁵

2. In Luke 2:43-50 Mary seems to be negligent in losing Jesus, too anxious and impatient in looking for him; hence she is also reprehended by Jesus. Thus the old Protestants.¹⁶

Response. There is no negligence, since she correctly thought that He was “in the company”; likewise there is no impatience or too much anxiety, since the words of Mary are not of reprehension or of correction, “but have a certain admiration from her maternal and tender affection for her Son and confidence in his conduct.”¹⁷ Finally, the words of Christ “are not words of reprehension, but of instruction and consolation and of a certain defense.”¹⁸

65. 3. In John 2:3f. indications of importunity, vanity and ostentation seem to be present; therefore she is rebuked by Jesus. Thus again the old Protestants.¹⁹

Response. In those words of Mary surely nothing is apparent that is not full of charity for the spouses, modesty and trust in her Son. But the words of Christ can in no way be understood as reprehensive, since he immediately performs a miracle. Moreover how they should be understood positively is explained in different ways.²⁰

4. In Matt. 12:46f. again there are indications of ambition and importunity. Thus the old Protestants.²¹

Response. Such indications are to be absolutely denied; they have been totally fabricated by heretics. The different ways in which His Mother and His relatives thought about Jesus is obvious in Mark 3:21, where there is nothing about Mary.

66. 5. Above texts of the holy Fathers are cited that can be used as an objection. But concerning these texts one should note that in many of them a benign interpretation can be made, since it is not sufficiently apparent that the Fathers understood the importunity or even the doubt as deliberate and voluntary. In other texts, although such an interpretation is difficult to maintain, there is no coherence between these statements and others in which they extol the remarkable purity of Mary. Finally, some other texts simply cannot be saved.²²

67. **Scholium 1.** What has been said about immunity from venial sin applies equally to immunity from positive imperfections, in the more probable opinion of those who hold

15. *De civitate Dei* 16,24,2; ML 41,501; CSEL 49,167.

16. See Canisius, *loc. cit.*, 4,14-19.

17. Toledo, *In Lc* 2,48.

18. Toledo, *In Lc* 2,49.

19. See Canisius, *loc. cit.*, 4,20.

20. See E. Power, *Quid mihi et tibi, mulier?*: VerDom 2 (1922) 129-135; P. Gaechter, *Maria in Kana*: ZkathTh 55 (1931) 351-402; E. Zolli, *Quid mihi et tibi, mulier?*: Marian 8 (1946) 3,15; Eufrazio di Cristo Re, *Che significa “quid mihi et tibi”?*: ScuoCatt 75 (1947) 137-142; P. Vannutelli, *Alle nozze di Cana*: Marian 10 (1948) 72f.

21. See Canisius, *loc. cit.*, 4,21.

22. See Le Bachelet, *Immaculée Conception*: DTC 7,886-889. On all of these difficulties, see Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.4 s.3f.

the distinction between a positive imperfection and a venial sin. For without doubt there is more purity in the lack of these imperfections, which spiritual persons desire and attend to. Likewise, these imperfections for the most part come from the inclination of sin.²³

68. Scholium 2. *On impeccability.* So far we have spoken about sinlessness. For we have seen that the Bl. Virgin never sinned de facto, not even venially. But there is a further question about whether or not she was at least able to sin. This is the problem of impeccability, which is closely connected with what was said before.

Impeccability is defined as the impossibility of sinning, or indefectibility in the moral order. In this case it is clear that we are not dealing with natural impeccability, which belongs to God alone. But we are also not dealing with merely accidental impeccability, which is extrinsic to the will and to the person. Therefore we are dealing with a certain *personal* impeccability, similar to the impeccability of Christ. For in Christ impeccability derives from the hypostatic union itself; but in Mary it comes from her divine maternity. Therefore just as Christ is constituted truly impeccable from the hypostatic union, so Mary is constituted truly impeccable because she was chosen to be the Mother of the Redeemer. It is clear that there is a great difference in the opposition that exists between the hypostatic union and sin on the one hand, and between the maternity of the Redeemer and sin on the other. However, having made this distinction, Mary's impeccability can be said to be *intrinsic*. For sin is truly repugnant to Her because she is the Mother of the Redeemer.

Hence it is also clear that this impeccability is had in the Virgin not only from the time of the Incarnation, but *from her conception*. Surely this point, although it has been denied by some of the great Doctors (in accordance with their opinion about her sanctification in the womb and the binding of the inclination of sin), now it seems cannot be denied after the defined dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Therefore now all admit the fact of Mary's impeccability from the beginning.

Hence it is necessary to say that Mary's impeccability is *antecedent*, not just consequent. That is, Mary is not thus impeccable because God foresaw that she de facto would never sin, but she was such before the divine foreseeing, because of her dignity as the Mother of the Redeemer. But this must be held in such a way that her freedom is protected, which some of the ancient authors did not sufficiently save, especially the Nominalists.

Therefore the *way* in which Mary's impeccability was put into act is not the beatific vision (which the Virgin did not have habitually),²⁴ but it came on the one hand from the extinction of the inclination of sin, and on the other hand from the special providence of God—both *external* by removing the occasions of sin, and *internal* by strengthening and confirming Her in good through her fullness of grace.²⁵

23. See Garigou-Lagrange, *La Madre del Salvador* 60; Alastruey, 250f.

24. On this problem, see J.A. de Aldama, *¿Gozó de la visión beatífica la Santísima Virgen alguna vez en su vida mortal?:* ArchTG 6 (1943) 121-140; A. Martinelli, *De primo instanti conceptionis B. Mariae V.* (Rome 1950) 65-75. G. Scalia, *La visione beatifica della Madonna* (Catania 1954) recently attributed the permanent beatific vision to the Bl. Virgin during Her mortal life, not with positive arguments, but from theological reasoning.

25. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.4 s.4; Alastruey, 251-259.

ARTICLE IV

ON MARY'S POSITIVE HOLINESS AND FULLNESS OF GRACE

69. We have seen the more negative element in the great purity of the Bl. Virgin Mary. But a more positive element was joined together with this element (and it could not be otherwise in this order): namely, the Bl. Virgin was not only immune from every stain of sin and positive imperfection, but she was also wholly beautiful and perfect, wonderfully endowed with an abundance of all heavenly gifts, innocence and complete holiness, as Pius X said (above, n.60). For, all of these gifts were fitting for the Mother of the Redeemer, and with them she was prepared by God for her ministry. We will not consider her holiness.

Indeed we said above that the Bl. Virgin, because she was conceived immune from original sin, was adorned with sanctifying grace from the first moment of her conception; because she never sinned, and was really impeccable, she never lost that grace. But when we speak about grace, with this name we designate the whole supernatural organism required to lead a divine life. This organism, as Leo XIII teaches,¹ consists of sanctifying grace as a new nature, the infused virtues as new faculties of life, the gifts of the Holy Spirit as habits by which the soul, docile to the movements of the Holy Spirit, follows them more easily and more readily.

Therefore all of these gifts in a certain perfect way were present in the Bl. Virgin, as was fitting for the worthy Mother of the Redeemer. Now it is not necessary to treat each one, but only those in which something is found that needs special intention.²

70. In the Bl. Virgin Mary there is first of all the *fullness of grace*. In general this pertains to faith, since She was saluted expressly by the angel with this title (Luke 1:28). This is surely true immediately at the moment in which she became the Mother of God, the Redeemer. In fact the same thing must be said from the very beginning of her conception, since the cause of Her holiness is not the divine maternity as the sanctifying physical form, but as a certain moral dignity requiring holiness in Her who is already destined to be the Mother of God.

Surely this fullness of grace must be understood not as absolute, but as *relative*. For it is not a question about the fullness of grace demanded by

1. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29,652-654.

2. On the virtues, gifts, sanctifying grace, see Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,148-149; Alastruey, 287-350; Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Madre del Salvador* 118-131.

the hypostatic union. Moreover such fullness of grace in Mary cannot be understood as if, because of its perfection and quantity, it could not increase in any way. Therefore by this relative fullness a certain abundance of grace is designated, and indeed it is as great as is required to worthily assume the sublime office of maternity of the Redeemer. However since this office is higher than all others, except for the office of Christ and comes as close as possible to the office of Christ, Mary receives the fullness of grace beyond others except for Christ, and even approaching that of Christ Himself, as much as this is possible for a pure creature.³

71. But many theologians contributed to the *explanation* of this accumulation of many graces during the 16th and 17th centuries. Their doctrine obtained more or less this development:

a) The beginning is taken from the words of St. Thomas, in which the words of the holy Fathers are collected: "But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His humanity: because He received His human nature from her. Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater fullness of grace than others" S.Th. III, q. 27, a. 5). In these words a comparison is contained between the initial grace of Mary and the grace of others. Cajetan understood them to be only men, not angels.⁴ But Medina⁵ extends the comparison also to the angels, and after him Suarez, explaining it in a scholarly fashion, and asserting that this can be believed piously and with probability.⁶ In this stage of evolution the *initial* grace of Mary is said to be greater than the *final grace of any* angel or human person. Afterwards this thesis was pleasing to all, and today it is a common and certain opinion of theologians.

b) At the same time however Suarez⁷ added that the *final* grace of the Virgin is probably greater than the final grace of all angels and men taken collectively.⁸ At the beginning this seemingly did not please all, but the

3. But an absolute fullness of grace, which therefore could not increase, was attributed to the Bl. Virgin by C. de Moral. See I. de Guerra, O.F.M., *La gracia inicial de la Inmaculada en la Mariología de Carlos del Moral*: VerVid 12 (1954) 203-229. Toledo, *In Lc* anot.67, explains beautifully the relative fullness of grace in Mary.

4. *In 3 q.27 a.5.*

5. *In 3 q.27 a.5.*

6. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.4 s.1 n.4.

7. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.18 s.4 n.8.

8. From what is said by Suarez (*ibid.*, n.14) and Henríquez (*Summa Theologiae Moralis* 2,56), this doctrine, publicly preached by B. John of Avila, was first advocated in the schools at Salamanca in the year 1571, with the approval of many Doctors of that university, among whom were Luisius Legionensis and Martínez Cantalapiedra. See R. de Scorraile, *François Suarez* 1,77. A brief response of L. Legionensis was published in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España* 10,467f.

seeds of future evolution were contained in it.⁹

c) In the meantime, theologians progressed further, asserting that the grace of the Virgin, *at the time of the conception of Christ*, was greater than the *final* grace collectively of all angels and men. Thus Valentia and Novatus.¹⁰

d) Indeed that the *initial* grace of the Virgin is greater than the *final* grace of angels and men collectively, some Franciscans asserted in a public disputation at Valladolid in the year 1649.¹¹ B. de los Ríos had already defended that thesis in the year 1641.¹² Indeed, as Alva de Astorga¹³ recounts, around the year 1616 the Franciscans at Alcala defended “in the instant of her Conception she had more grace than all the blessed, even collectively.” But afterwards also Vega, De Rhodes, Contenson, C. del Moral, St. Alphonus de Liguori,¹⁴ and later many others, like Sedlmayr, Baudrand, etc. Now this opinion has become more common among theologians; thus Lahitton, Garrigou-Lagrange, Janssens, Hugon, Campana, Neubert, Tanquerey, Muncunill, Alastruey, Ravagnan, Roschini; denying it are Terrien, Lepicier, and recently Baudiment,¹⁵ who were preceded by Theophylus Raynaldus.¹⁶ This opinion is pious and can be held firmly, both from the extrinsic authority of the theologians who defend it, and from the supereminent dignity of the divine maternity with which it certainly seems to agree.¹⁷

72. And surely the following words of the holy Pontiffs seem to support this opinion:

Pius IX: “God ineffable... from the beginning and before the ages chose and ordained a mother for his only begotten Son, from whom he would become incarnate and be born in the blessed fullness of time. And God honored her above all other creatures with such love that in her alone he

9. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.18 s.4 n.9. How much this was contained in the solid piety of that time is proved not only by the quoted sermon of Bl. John of Avila, but also by the various sermons of St. Lawrence of Brundisi. See his *Mariale* (Opera omnia, Padua, vol.1, 1928) 230.341.425.451.462.482.499f. On Suarez, see J.A. de Aldama, *El sentido moderno de la Mariología de Suarez*: ActCentNac-Suar 11948) 2,65-68.

10. Valentia, *In 3 d.2 q.1 p.5*; Novatus, *De eminentia Deiparae* t.2 c.6 q.22 and 24; Salazar, *In Proverbia Salomonis* 31,29 n.179, he also seems to say the same thing.

11. See Velázquez, *Maria Immaculata concepta* 1.3 diss.3 adn.3 n.7.

12. *Hierarchia Mariana* p.547.

13. *Militia Immaculatae Conceptionis* 696.

14. See Vega, *Teologia Mariana* pal.16 cert3; Rhodes, *Disputationes theologicae scholasticae* t.2 q.4 s.3 part 1; Contenson, *Theologia mentis et cordis* 1.10 d.6 c.1 spec.2; C. del Moral, *Fons illimis* 2,15ff.; St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, *Le glorie di Maria* disc. della nascita p.1.

15. *De quelques outrances de la théologie mariale contemporaine*: AnTh 6 (1943) 105-115. On this see P.E. Vadeboncoeur, *Quelle est cette outrance?*: RevUnivOtt 16 (1946) 209-226 in the special section.

16. *Dypticha Mariana* p.2 punct.7.

17. See A. Martinelli, *De primo instanti conceptionis B.V. Mariae* 3 note 8.

was pleased with a most singular benevolence. Therefore, he wonderfully filled her, far more than all the angels and saints, with an abundance of all the heavenly gifts taken from the treasury of his divinity. In this way, she... would possess such a plenitude of innocence and sanctity that, under God, none greater could be known and, apart from God, no mind could ever succeed in comprehending.”¹⁸

Leo XIII: “She dispenses grace with a generous hand from that treasure with which from the beginning she was divinely endowed in fullest abundance that she might be worthy to be the Mother of God. By the fullness of grace which confers on her the most illustrious of her many titles, the Blessed Virgin is infinitely superior to all the hierarchies of men and angels, the one creature who is closest of all to Christ.”¹⁹

Pius XII: “May the Virgin Mother of God... obtain for all a true love of the Church—she whose sinless soul was filled with the divine Spirit of Jesus Christ above all other created souls.”²⁰

Hence it is also clear that the *theological reasoning* for this doctrine can be found in Mary’s maternity, both inasmuch as she is the Mother of God, and inasmuch as she is the Mother of the Redeemer associated with him in the work of redemption.²¹

73. However this plenitude of grace, which we have seen was so excellent right from the beginning, in no way excludes an *increase* of the same grace in the Bl. Virgin. For, she was a wayfarer, and only a wayfarer, in her mortal life. Therefore, just as her works were most perfect, so she continually had an increase of grace in her soul, since in this matter she was not in a worse condition than that of other just persons. In fact, for many reasons, her situation was better.

But an increase of grace took place in the Virgin both *from the work done (ex opere operato)* (especially through the sacrament of the Eucharist after the passion and death of Christ), and *from the work of the performer (ex opere operantis)*. And it really took place to a degree that we can scarcely imagine. For since the merit of our works increases with

18. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,536.

19. Encyclical “*Magnae Dei Matris*”: ASS 25,141.

20. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 347.

21. On this whole question, see Merkelbach, 157-213; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,122-133; Alastruey, 260-267; Godts, *La sainteté initiale de l’Immaculée* (Brussels 1904); Dillenschneider, *La mariologie de S. Alphonsus de Liguori* 2 c.16; B. Ravagnan, *De Mariae plenitudine gratiae*: Marian 3 (1941) 102-123, 269-285; 3 (1942) 42-56; S. Gutiérrez, *La plenitud de la gracia de la Santísima Virgen*: EstMar 5 (1946) 188-196; A. Pérez Goyena, *Historia de una célebre opinión teológico-mariana*: RazFe 39 (1914) 30-44; J.M. Bover, *Santidad inicial de María*: EstEc; 28 (1954) 563-571; R. Morency, S.J., *La libre coopération de Marie à sa grâce initiale*: L’Immaculée (Ottawa) 105-126.

the influence of charity, an altogether greater merit must be placed in the works of Virgin, whose charity was so perfect. Add to this that she never put any obstacle to this continual increase of grace, since she was free of all sins and imperfections, including the spark of concupiscence. Also it seems that one must hold that grace increased in the Virgin after the Incarnation *from her physical and intimate contact with Christ*, especially since she conceived Him, carried Him in her virginal womb, gave birth to Him and nursed Him. For Christ the Lord is the fount of all grace. Hence such familiar and intimate association with Christ can hardly be conceived without an increase of holiness and grace.²² In this continual increase of grace it is clear that the Bl. Virgin attained the summit of the mystical life.²³

74. The increase of grace from meritorious works is connected with the question: *when did she merit*, or, by what acts did the Bl. Virgin merit? Also, on the supposition that she really merited during the whole time of her life (although at one time there were some theologians who undeservedly denied to Her the possibility of meriting after the conception of Christ), two questions present themselves:

a) Whether she merited *from the first moment of her conception*. It is certain that she did not merit from the first moment of her conception, if God did not give her from the beginning the use of reason and free will. Therefore this is the real question that must be asked. Actually the opinion affirming the Bl. Virgin's *use of reason* at the first instant of her conception, which was hinted at by some authors in the 14th century and was actually taught in the 15th century by St. Bernardine of Siena,²⁴ became truly common in the 16th century and remained so to our times. Still there are some theologians who, admitting her use of reason at the first instant of her conception, understand it in an exclusive way (that is, they think that privilege did not continue in the Bl. Virgin). That privilege of the Virgin was denied by Gerson, Muratori, Pohle-Gierens and P. Synave,²⁵ but their negation has not been able to weaken the influence of the more common opinion. Therefore the affirmative opinion is pious and probable, not only

22. On the manner of the increase and progress of grace in Mary, see Suarez, *De Mysteriorum vitae Christi* d.18 s.4; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,139f.

23. See Gabriele di Santa M. Maddalena, O.C.D., *Aspetti e sviluppi della grazia in Maria Santissima secondo la dottrina de S. Giovanni della Croce*: Alma Socia Christi 11,43-57.

24. *De excellentia B.V. Mariae in gloria* serm. 13 a.2 c.3; *De conceptione B.M.V.* serm. 4 a.1 c.3.

25. Gerson, *De susceptione humanitatis Christi* ver.20; Muratori, *De superstitione vitanda* c.23; Pohle-Gierens, *Dogmatik* 2 (Paderborn 1932) 263; P. Synave, *Somme théologique. Vie de Jésus* 1 (Paris 1927) 251. On the opinion of St. Thomas, who in III, q. 27 a.3 seems to deny it, there has been much debate. Many say that the holy Doctor denied only the permanent use of reason, but not a transient use at the first instant of her conception in an exclusive sense.

from the authority of theologians, but also from its internal fittingness, especially if the accelerated use of reason in the sanctification of St. John the Baptist is admitted; however, this point is disputed.²⁶ Having admitted her use of reason at the first moment of her conception, theologians commonly hold, while Soto and Belluto disagree, that She disposed herself by her own supernatural acts for her initial sanctification.²⁷

b) Whether *she merited continually by all the acts* of her life. This question has two aspects to it according as it concerns only her time of being *awake*, or also her time of *sleeping*. Regarding the first question, the affirmative opinion is quite common among theologians, and Suarez says that it is certain.²⁸ But concerning the second question, there were not lacking theologians who affirmed it, like St. Bernardine, Dionysius the Carthusian, St. Peter Canisius, Suarez, Rhodes, Contenson, St. Francis de Sales, Vega, St. Alphonsus de Liguori, Terrien, Hugon, Alastruey, Roschini, and others. In this regard Suarez says that this opinion is probable. However it must be noted that the merit of the Virgin during the time of sleeping can be affirmed in this way, because it is supposed that there was in her permanent infused knowledge. All theologians who say that she had the use of reason from her conception attribute to the Virgin this habitually infused knowledge. But opposed to that currently are Lepecier, Van Noort, Campana, Merkelbach, and others.²⁹

26. See Martinelli, whose work cited above in note 17 is nothing but a disquisition on the use of reason of the Bl. Virgin at the moment of her conception.

27. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 1.5; B. Belluto, *Disputationes de Incarnatione dominica* disp.16 q.1 a.3 n.53f. See Martinelli, *loc.cit.*, 111-116; Morency, *loc.cit.*, in note 21.

28. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.18 s.2 n.7.

29. On the increase of grace in the Virgin and on related questions, see Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.18; d.4 s.7; d.19 s.3; Alastruey, 267-340; Merkelbach, 206-298, 199-208; Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Madre del Salvador* 71-98; Dillenschneider, *La Mariologie de saint Alphonse de Liguori* 2,243-264.

ARTICLE V

ON MARY'S VIRGINAL MARRIAGE

75. After we have treated the preparation of Mary's soul for her role as Mother of the Redeemer (and on this occasion we also considered the plenitude of grace in Mary during the whole time of her life), it is now time to say something about her quasi social preparation whereby God prepared Her for maternity. For in the divine plan the maternity of God ought to be a virginal maternity, since it is more fitting for God. In what sense this takes place will be investigated later. But for other reasons this miracle of her virginity must remain for a time hidden. On the one hand Mary was divinely inspired to embrace virginity, no matter what Jewish women thought contrary to that; but on the other hand there had to be a true marriage whose natural fruit Christ would be thought to be, although in reality he would be a supernatural and virginal fruit. That efficacious inclination in Mary's soul led her to the desire and then to the vow of virginity. But her matrimony is a true marriage existing between Mary and Joseph. At length both her virginity and marriage had to be brought together in a fitting way.

76. *On the vow of virginity.*¹ a) That the Bl. Virgin Mary consecrated her virginity to God perpetually, and therefore took a vow of virginity, is certain in theology from the consensus of theologians beginning in the 12th century, while today some oppose it.²

This doctrine was first taught expressly by St. Augustine,³ under whose direction and the later unanimity of the Doctors, the ancient texts must be understood of St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Athanasius and others, as proposing the Bl. Virgin as a model for virgins and asserting the firm virginal intention of Mary.⁴ In fact the feast of the Presentation of

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1. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.6; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,269-278; Alastruey, 474-486; Martinielli, *loc.cit.*, 97-103; B. Korosak, *Mariologia S. Alberti* 326-338; B. Leurent, *La consécration de Marie à Dieu*: RevAscMyst 31 (1955) 225-248; A.M. Maestu Ojanguren, O.F.M., *De voto virginitatis B.V. Mariae: Alma Socia Christi* 1,115-145.
 2. See D. Haugg, *Das erste biblische Marienwort* (Stuttgart 1938); Gaechter, *The Chronology from Mary's Betrothal to the Birth of Christ*: ThSt 2 (1941) 145-170, 347-368; *Maria im Erdenleben* (Innsbruck 1953); Feret, *Messianisme de l'Annonciation: Prêtre et Apôtre* (1947) 37ff.; J. Auer, *Maria und das Jungräulichkeitsideal*: GuL (1950) 411ff.; K. Rahner, *Le principe fondamental de la théologie mariale*: RechScRel (1954) 517.
 3. *De sancta virginitate* 4,4; *Serm.* 225,2; *Serm.* 291,5; ML 40,398, 38,1097. 1318.
 4. St. Jerome, *Ep.* 22.18.38.41: ML 22,405.422.424; St. Ambrose, *De institutione virginis* 5,35; 6,44; 7,15: ML 16,328.331.333; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *In diem natalem Christi*: MG 46,1130f.; St. Athanasius, *De virginitate*: Muséon 42 (1929) 247. (See M. Aubineau, *Les écrits de saint Athanase sur la virginité*: RevAscMyst 42 [1955] 247). In the same sense, see Pius XII, Encyclical "Sacra Virginitas": AAS 46 (1954) 187-189. On the texts of the holy Fathers, see Petavius, *De Incarnatione* 14,4.

the Bl. Virgin Mary, celebrated in Jerusalem since the 6th century, must be interpreted under the same light. In the Middle Ages this doctrine was taught by St. Bede, Radulphus Ardens, St. Anselm, Eadmerus, Rupertus Tuitiensis, Hugo of St. Victor, St. Bernard, Ernaldus Bonaevallensis, Arnulphus Lexoviensis, Peter Lombard, and after that by all the Doctors.⁵ From that time down to ours this opinion has been very common among almost all theologians.

The foundation of this doctrine is to be found in the common explanation of Mary's response: *How can this be since I do not know man?* (Luke 1:34).⁶ "She truly would not have said this, unless she had previously vowed her virginity to God," as St. Augustine says. For it is clear from the whole context that these words must be understood about the future, not about the present. For as St. Augustine says: "If she were disposed to know a man, she would not have wondered."⁷ The response of the Virgin cannot be explained by the fact that, since she was only engaged and not yet joined together in marriage, she could not consummate the marriage according to Jewish custom. As if she had said: How can that take place *now*, as you command, since I do not know man nor can I right now? Such an explanation, although it may be possible, still is not necessary, nor is it traditional. In fact it supposes that the Bl. Virgin at the moment of the Annunciation was not yet the real wife of Joseph, which is less probable, as we shall see immediately. Moreover such a response of the Virgin to the angel announcing the will of God and so going against merely human traditions would have been very inept.

The objections made against it are not important. For even though the perpetual consecration of virginity was not known at that time (which now of course must be affirmed cautiously), nevertheless the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, because of whose familiar movements Mary vowed her virginity (S.Th. III, q. 29, a. 1 ad 1), could not be suppressed by these human customs. But when it is objected that desire for virginity only had its origin because of Christ, one forgets that Mary's vow had its origin in the foreseen merits of Christ himself and in divine inspiration.

But if one adds that the Bl. Virgin led an ordinary life that was in every way common, not an extraordinary life such as would be the life of a

5. St. Bede, *In Lucae evangelium* 1: ML 92,318; Radulphus Ardens, *Hom.* 16: ML 155,1362; St. Anselm, *Hom.* 9: ML 158,645f.; Eadmerus, *De excellentia B. Mariae* 4: ML 159,563; Rupertus Tuitiensis, *De laesione virginitatis* 6: ML 170,551; Hugo Victorinus, *De B. Mariae virginitate* 1: ML 176,865f.; St. Bernard, *Super Missus est hom.* 3,7: ML 183,74f.; Ernaldus Bonaevallensis, *De laudibus B. Mariae virginis*: ML 189,1727; Arnulphus Lexioviensis, *Serm.* 4: ML 201,172; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4,30.

6. On the authenticity of Luke 1:34 see B. Brinkmann, *Jungfrauengeburt und das Lukasevangelium*: Bibl 34 (1953) 327-332; he responds to the recent objections raised by H. Vogels.

7. *Serm.* 225,2: ML 38,1097.

consecrated virgin, it is necessary to remember that her interior perfection was not of the ordinary kind but most exalted.

b) Among theologians, especially because of the influence of the medieval canon lawyers, there was a lengthy dispute concerning the nature of the vow of virginity taken by Mary. For many theologians, along with St. Thomas (4 d.30 q.2 a.1), held that her vow was conditional. Others however, with St. Bonaventure, defended an absolute vow. This last opinion today has become more common and more probable.

c) There is also a dispute about the time when the vow of virginity was actually taken by the Bl. Virgin Mary. It must be admitted, from what we have said, that it was certainly taken before the Annunciation, since otherwise Mary's response to the angel would not make sense. But a further determination of the time can hardly be made, even though there are many theologians who put the taking of the vow in the very moment of her conception, if one supposes that the use of reason was given to Mary at the moment of her conception; this indeed is affirmed piously and rationally.

77. On the marriage of Mary and Joseph. a) That a *true marriage* existed between Mary and Joseph was denied by Julian of Eclanus.⁸ Also many medieval canonists spoke about this inaccurately, because the doctrine about the essence of marriage was not always well known. Indeed in recent times Freisen⁹ denied it, and then later retracted his opinion. However it is a doctrine that is *certain in theology*,¹⁰ from the consensus of theologians. It is also taught by Leo XIII: "Thus in giving Joseph to the Blessed Virgin as spouse, God appointed him to be not only her life's companion, the witness of her maidenhood, the protector of her honor, but also, in virtue of the conjugal tie, a participator in her sublime dignity."¹¹ The foundation for this is taken from Matt. 1:16-20, where Mary is called the wife and Joseph her husband. This whole pericope cannot have any other meaning. The holy Fathers also hold the same thing, if we prescind from some vacillations in terminology; they insist very much on the wisdom of the divine plan, seeing to it that Christ is born of Mary as a married woman. St. Thomas

8. *Contra Iulianum* 5,12,46: ML 42,810.

9. CIC c.44f. C.27 q.2 (Friedberg, 1,1075f.). Freisen, *Geschichte des canonischen Eherechts* 85,152.

10. Suarez (*De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.7 a.1 n.2) says that it is a matter of faith (*de fide*), and so taught by all theologians. But that this goes too far is shown by Vázquez (*In* 3 d.125 c.3). Benedict IX says that it is certain, *De Synodis* 13,32,13.

11. Encyclical "*Quamquam pluries*": ASS 22,66.

beautifully summarizes the ideas of the Fathers in III, q. 29, a. 1.¹²

b) The question *about the time* when this marriage began is very complex because of the different ways of speaking about it. Some hold that the Jewish matrimony consists of two stages: the first was the beginning of matrimony in such a way that it was more like our formal matrimony than our period of engagement, because many of the effects of a true marriage flowed from it; the other was the bringing of the bride to the home of the groom and so the marriage was completed. In this opinion the two aspects are designated in the Gospel: the first, “since she was betrothed” (μνηστευθείσης); the second, “before they came together” (συνελθεῖν). Therefore in this opinion at the Annunciation Mary was already the real wife of Joseph, although she had not yet entered into the house of her husband. Thus Holzmeister, Perrella, and others.

Others hold, supposing those two aspects of Jewish matrimony, that a real marriage was not had until after the bringing of the bride to the home of the groom. Hence in this opinion at the Annunciation Mary was a spouse, but not yet the wife of Joseph. She became his wife after the command of the angel (Matt. 1:24). Thus Vosté.

Still other hold that Mary really and truly had celebrated her nuptials with St. Joseph, and had begun to live with him before the Annunciation, but obviously in a virginal manner. The command of the angel only causes her to retain or again assume her previous commitment to virginity. Thus Henze, Frangipane.

The first opinion seems to be *more probable*.¹³

78. Virginal marriage. From what we have said so far there is a difficulty in combining a true marriage with a preceding vow of virginity, in fact an absolute vow. The difficulty can be posed in this way: What was the immediate object of this matrimonial consent? For if it is a question of a true marriage, then the object of the consent seems to be the right to the body of the spouse. But if this is admitted, it is not apparent how the vow of virginity can be maintained without being violated.

12. On this whole question, see Holzmeister, *De Sancto Joseph quaestiones biblicae* (Rome 1945) 31-33, where there is also a significant bibliography. On the terminology of the holy Fathers, see R. Bidagor, *Sobre la naturaleza del matrimonio en San Isidoro de Sevilla*: *Miscellanea Isidoriana* (1936) 263-285; J. Huhn, *Das Geheimnis der Jungfrau-Mutter Maria nach dem Kirchenvater Ambrosius* (Würzburg 1954) 221-238.

13. U. Holzmeister, *De Sancto Ioseph quaestiones biblicae* 68-79; J.M. Vosté, *De conceptione virginali Christi* 19; C. Perrella, *Beatissima Virgo cum caelestem excepit nuntium*, *S. Ioseph sponsalibus solis, non vero nuptiis iuncta erat*: *DivThom* (Pi) 35 (1932) 378-398, 519-531; Cl. M. Henze, *Beatissima Virgo, cum caelestem excepit nuntium*, *S. Ioseph non solis sponsalibus, sed nuptiis iuncta erat et cum eo cohabitabat*: *DivThom* (Pi) 51 (1948) 46-58; D. Frangipane, *Utrum B.V. Maria ab angelo salutata iam in domo Ioseph ut coniux fuerit*: *VerDom* 25 (1947) 99-111; J.M. Bover, *Las bodas de María con José, anteriores a la Anunciación*: *EstJos* 5 (1951) 8-18.

Therefore it is necessary to say that the object of this consent really was a right to the body, so that it was a true marriage. However it is given in such a way that at the same time there is a condition of not using that right. But the condition in this case seems to have been transformed into a true obligation, contracted together with the acquired right to the body. This obligation did not come from the virtue of justice (for thus there would be a true contradiction in this consent and contract), but it comes from the virtue of religion and fidelity. In this way it seems possible to explain a virginal marriage.

Billot describes this very well: "This singular marriage stands out as preeminent over all others. For matrimony, when it was first instituted, in a certain way was a foretelling of the future mystery of the incarnate Word; the marriages of the New Testament imitate it, like a birth its exemplar. But the marriage of Christ's parents received the incarnate Word himself coming down from heaven, faithfully cared for him and in a decent way introduced him to the world."¹⁴

14. *De Sacramentis* th.36. On the whole question, see Merkelbach, 260-263; Alastruey, 33-47; H. Rett, *Die Joseph-Ehe in ihrem Original und ihrer Nachahmung*: *ZkathTh* 32 (1908) 590-596; Korošak, *Mariologia S. Alberti* 183-193, 198-209.

CHAPTER III

On divine maternity

79. The office for which the Bl. Virgin Mary was prepared by God with so much grace was the maternity of the Redeemer. But since the Redeemer in this order necessarily is God himself, that maternity is *the maternity of God*. Therefore we will now treat this matter.

First of all this question must be investigated *in itself*, that is, in what sense, with what truth, with what right is Mary to be called the Mother of God. Also this maternity has been revealed to us de facto as *virginal*, whatever might be the necessity of this property in the divine maternity. Therefore after we have investigated these points as the true foundation of the whole question, we will have to investigate the *excellence* of this virginal divine maternity, whether considered in itself, or in relation to the other gifts of grace. Therefore we will consider the following;

Art. 1. On divine maternity.

Art. 2. On virginal maternity.

Art. 3. On the excellence of divine maternity.

Art. 4. On the transcendence of divine maternity.

Art. 5. On divine maternity as formally sanctifying.

ARTICLE I

ON DIVINE MATERNITY

Thesis 4. The Bl. Virgin Mary is properly and truly the Mother of God.

S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 4; Suarez, *De Mysteriori vitae Christi* d.1 s.1; Alastruey, 75-89; Merkelbach, 19-65; Roschini, *mariologia* 2,1,141-170; Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2340s.2349-2369.

80. Connection. We have said that the Bl. Virgin Mary was predestined from eternity for the maternity of the Redeemer, and we also saw that God prepared her for it in an extraordinary manner. Now we seek to understand that maternity. But because on the one hand we know that the Redeemer was Jesus, God and man, and on the other hand we have proved in Christology that this Redeemer truly took his body from Mary, our question now is whether Mary, who truly is the Mother of Jesus, can also truly be said to be

the Mother of God.

81. Definition of terms. *Mother of God*, or she that gives birth to God θεοτόκος.

Truly and properly, or not only in some broad and improper sense, as a woman is said to be the mother of an architect or painter, but because she truly gave birth to God, a divine person, so that in the very moment of her active delivery the child she gives birth to is simply God.

82. Adversaries. Beside those who deny either the divinity of Christ or his true humanity or origin from Mary, the direct adversaries are Nestorius and the *Nestorians*. Nestorius, according to his teaching about the hypostatic union, denied that Mary in the proper sense is θεοτόκος; and he said that this term cannot be admitted, except in an improper sense and in conjunction with the term ἀνθρωποτόκος. But he is truly and properly said to be χριστοτόκος or also θεοδόχος (God-bearer).¹ Later *Nestorians*, not only with words, but also in reality hold the same error, for they defend strongly that the maternity of Mary produced what they call the human hypostasis of Christ.² All of these were preceded by Paul of Samosata who said that Mary gave birth only to a man, that she did not give birth to the Word, since Mary did not exist before the ages³; Diodorus of Tarsus who forbade that the son of Mary be considered the Word⁴; Theodore of Mopsuestia who both rejected the word θεοτόκος and thought that it was insane to say that God was born of the Virgin.⁵

83. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Ephesus*: a) condemned Nestorius as a heretic⁶; b) expressly held the truth of the divine maternity in the letter of St. Cyril to Nestorius, which was approved by the Council (D 250-251); c) likewise in the anathemas of St. Cyril (D 252), read at the

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1. This is the true teaching of Nestorius in sermons and letters of the years 428-430 (see *Epist. ad Caelestinum*: ACO I,2,13: ML 50,439-441), which he did not change, but he changed on the language in the Book of Heraclidus. See Gordillo, *Mariologia* 33; Nilus A.S. Brocardo, O.C.D., *De Maternitate divina B.M. semper Virginis Nestorii Constantinopolitani et Cyrilli Alexandrini sententia* (Rome 1944) 4-11.
 2. See Gordillo, *loc. cit.*, 34-39.
 3. See G. Bardy, *Paul de Samosate* (Louvain 1923) 309.
 4. *Contra Synusiastas* 1: MG 33,1560f.
 5. See Leontius Byzantinus, *Contra Nestorium* 3,10: MG 86,1363; Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Contra Apollinarium*: MG 66,993.
 6. ACO I,1,2,35f. He was already called this by Benedict XIV (D 2528) and recently by Pius XI in the Encyclical "*Lux veritatis*": AAS 23 (1931) 511f. See A. D'Ales, *Le dogme d'Ephèse* 145; J. Lebon, *Autour de la définition de la foi au Concile d'Ephèse*: EphThLov 8 (1931) 393-413; I. Ortiz de Urbina, *Le sviluppo della Mariologia nella Patrologia Orientale*: OrChP 6 (1940) 66.

same time, although they were not expressly approved by the Council.⁷

The Council of Chalcedon (D 301).

The Council of Constantinople II, cn. 2 and 6 (D 422-423, 427).

The Lateran Council, cn.3 (D 503).

The Council of Constantinople III (D 554-555).

Paul IV against the Socinians (D 1880).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

84. Proof from holy Scripture. Luke 1:35. That which is born from Mary is the Son of God in the proper sense, and therefore God. But that which is born from Mary is the son of Mary. Therefore the son of Mary is God, or Mary is the Mother of God.⁸

Gal. 4:4. The Son of God is said to be made (that is, born) of the woman (that is, Mary). Therefore similarly.

Luke 1:43. Mary is the Mother of the Lord (so she is called by Elizabeth who is filled with the Holy Spirit). The Lord (κύριος) is the divine name, also in the same context. Therefore Mary is the Mother of God.⁹

85. Proof from tradition.¹⁰ The use of the word θεοτόκος is frequent in the 3rd and 4th centuries: St. Hippolytus,¹¹ Origen,¹² Pierius,¹³ St. Peter of Alexandria,¹⁴ St. Alexander of Alexandria,¹⁵ St. Athanasius often (R 788),

7. On the worth of these anathemas, see J. Puig de la Bellacasa, *Los doce anatemas de San Cirilo, ¿fueron aprobados por el Concilio de Efeso?*: EstEcl 11 (1932) 5-25; P. Galtier, *Les anathématismes de saint Cyrille et le Concile de Chalcédoine*: RechScRel 23 (1933) 45-57; A. Deneffé, *Der dogmatische Wert der Anathematismen Cyrillis*: Schol 8 (1933) 64-88, 203-216. On the anathemas themselves and their composition, see J. Mahé, *Les anathématismes de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie et les évêques orientaux de patriarchat d'Antioche*: RevHistEcl 7 (1906) 505-540; J. Lebon, *loc.cit.*, 402-412.

8. On the punctuation and the meaning of the text, see J. Bover: Bibl 1 (1920)92-94; EstEcl 8 (1929) 381-392; G. Carli, "...Ideoque et quod nascetur sanctus vocabitur Filius Dei": PalCl 30 (1951) 714-722.

9. See Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité* 1,354-373.

10. See A. d'Ales, *De verbo Incarnato* (Paris 1930) 132-135; I. Ortiz de Urbina, *Lo sviluppo della Mariologia nella patrologia Orientale*: OrChP 6 (1940) 5053, 62-76; P. Clement, *Le sens chrétien et la maternité de Marie avant le conflict nestorien*: EphThLov 5 (1928) 599-613.

11. The authenticity of this text (*De benedictionibus Iacob*: TU 38,13), which seemed doubtful to Bardenhewer (*Geschichte* 2,608 note 1), has been defended by H. Rahner, *Hippolit von Rom als Zeuge für den Ausdruck θεοτόκος*: ZkathTh 59 (1935) 73-81. However it remains doubtful for Lebreton (RechScRel 36 (1936) 204 note 25) and for Ortiz de Urbina (OrChP 6 [1940] 50 note 1). See also F.J. Doelger, *Zum Theotokos-Namen*: AntChr 1 (1929) 118-123, and for the use of the word θεοτόκος before, V. Schweitzer, *Alter des Titels θεοτόκος*: Der Katholik 83 (1903) 97-113.

12. *In Lc 6*: GchS 9,44 (ed. Rauer).

13. TU 5,2,171.

14. *Fragm.7*: MG 18,517.

15. MG 18,568: *Athanasius Werke* (ed. Opitz) 3,1,28.

Didymus of Alexandria,¹⁶ St. Basil,¹⁷ St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1014), St. Gregory of Nyssa,¹⁸ St. Cyril of Jerusalem,¹⁹ St. Epiphanius (R 1086), St. Ephraem (R 745), Severianus of Gabala,²⁰ Eusebius,²¹ Atticus,²² St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2058, 2060, 2125), and others. Also at this time Julian the Apostate.²³ In the 4th century there is the very ancient antiphon “Sub tuum praesidium,” where the word θεοτόκος appears.²⁴

b) Likewise among the Latins: She is called the Mother of God by St. Ambrose,²⁵ By Cassian (R 2054); and She that generates (*Generatrix*) God by St. Ambrose.²⁶

c) The doctrine itself, without being named, was traditional before the Council of Ephesus: This in the 2nd century St. Ignatius (R 42), St. Justinus (R 127), St. Irenaeus (R 223). In the 3rd century Tertullian,²⁷ St. Hippolytus (R 393). In the 4th century Lactantius (R 634), St. Hilary,²⁸ St. Chrysostom (R1172), St. Damasus.²⁹ In the 5th century St. Jerome (R 1400), St. Augustine (R 1518), Sedulius writing “Salve, sancta parens...” Therefore the people were upset when they heard Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia denying the truth of the divine maternity.³⁰

86. Theological reasoning. S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 4: A woman is truly and properly said to be the mother of someone whom she conceived and gave birth to. But the Bl. Virgin Mary conceived and gave birth to God.

16. *De Trinitate* 1,31; 2,4; 3,41: MG 39,421.481.988.

17. *Hom in sanctam Christi generationem* 5: MG 31,1468.

18. *Epist.* 3: MG 46,1024. But the homily *In diem natalem Christi*, in which the word θεοτόκος appears, does not seem to be authentic. See Ortiz de Urbina, *loc.cit.*, 51 note 6. On the use of the word by the Cappadocians, see G. Söll, *Die Mariologie der Kappadozier im Lichte der Dogmengeschichte: Alma Socia Christi* 5,1,142f.

19. *Catecheses* 10,19: MG 33,685.

20. *Hom. de legislatore* 7: MG 56,410. On the author of this homily, see Zellinger, *Studien zu Severian von Gabala* (Münster 1926) 60f.; M. Marx, *Severiana unter den Spuria Chrysostomi*: OrChP 5 (1939) 310.

21. *Vita Constantini* 3,43: MG 20,1104; GChS 1,95 (ed. Heikel); *Contra Marcellum* 2,1: MG 24,777; GChS 4,32 (ed. Klostermann).

22. See J. Lebon, *Discours d'Atticus de Constantinople sur la sainte Mère de Dieu*: Le Muséon 46 (1933) 188. However the attribution is not completely certain; see Ortiz de Urbina, *loc.cit.*, 64.

23. Cited by St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Iulianum* 8: MG 76,901.

24. See P. Mercennier, *L'antienne mariale grecque la plus ancienne*: Le Muséon 52 (1939) 229-233; G. Vannucci, O.S.M., *La più antica preghiera alla Madre de Dio*: Marian 3 (1941) 97-101. That this antiphon is not prior to the 4th century is proved by O. Stegmüller, *Sub tuum praesidium. Bemerkungen zur ältesten Überlieferung*: ZkathTh 74 (1952) 76-82.

25. *De virginibus* 2,2,7: ML 16,209; *Hexaemeron* 5,20,65: ML 14,148. See J. Huhn, *Das Geheimnis der Jungfrau-Mutter* 32-37.

26. *In Lc* 10,130: ML 15,1930; CSEL 32,504.

27. *De carne Christi*, 18: ML 2,828f.; Oehler, 2,455.

28. *Tractatus super Psalmos* 131,8: ML 9,733; CSEL 22,668.

29. *Carmen* 2: ML 13,376.

30. See John of Antioch, *Epist. ad Nestorium*: MG 77,451f.; Leontius Byzantinus, *Contra Nestorium* 3,10: MG 83,1363.

Therefore she is the Mother of God.

Mother here is understood formally. The *minor* is clear because the subject of conception and birth was not a human person, who never existed in Christ, but a divine person.³¹

87. Objections. 1. The terminus of generation is a nature. But Mary did not generate the divine nature. Therefore she is not the Mother of God.

I distinguish the major. The total terminus, *denied*; the formal terminus, *I subdistinguish*: the nature as it is in a subject, *conceded*; nature alone, *denied*.

The total terminus is that which is generated, or the subject of generation, or a person. The formal terminus is that by which the subject is generated. But the subject alone cannot be generated, because it cannot subsist by itself alone, unless it is in a person. Also just as a person cannot be generated unless it is in some nature, because it subsists in a nature. It is wont to be said that the terminus of generation is a person. However St. Thomas says better that the *terminus* of generation is a nature, because this is signified by way of the form, to which the intention of nature is directed, but that the *subject* of generation is a person, which is signified by way of subsistence. See S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 1.

88. 2. The Son of Mary began to exist by his generation from her. But God does not begin to exist. Therefore the Son of Mary is not God, or she is not the Mother of God.

I distinguish the major. He began to exist in his human nature, *conceded*; he began to exist simply, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.* God did not begin to exist simply, *conceded*; he did not begin to exist in a particular way, that is, in his human nature, *denied*.

89. 3. The generative action of Mary terminates in the humanity before this nature is united with the Word. But in this way Mary can in no way be said to be the Mother of the Word. Therefore Mary is not the Mother of God.

I distinguish the major. Before in nature and at the same time, *conceded*; before in nature and in time, *denied*.

The maternal influence of Mary terminates in the body, requiring the infusion of the soul, so that at the same moment the soul, body and humanity are united with the Word. In the same way the Jews are said to have killed God, because by their action the union of the soul with the body was dissolved, and consequently the humanity as such was separated from the Word. These aspects are better understood in the opinion which places the soul and body of Christ by nature to be united to the Word before they are united with each other.³²

90. 4. If human parents did not dispose the matter for union with the soul so that in some way they cause this union, they could not truly be said to be parents. Therefore in a like manner, if Mary by her influx in no way caused the union with the person of the

31. See J. Bittremieux, *De notione divinae maternitatis B.M. Virginis*: EphThLov 1 (1924) 71-81.

32. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.1 s.1 n.14-16.

Word, she cannot truly be said to be the mother of the Word. Therefore she is not the mother of the Word.

There are some authors who simply deny the minor of this difficulty. For they admit that the Bl. Virgin by her true and physical influx brought about the hypostatic union. This however, although it is said by some authors to be probable, simply does not solve the problem. For, this influx would be instrumental influx, but merely instrumental influx is not generative influx and hence it would not explain the truth of generation, which we are attempting to explain.³³ Therefore, *by conceding the minor*, it is necessary to respond in a different way.

Therefore *I deny the parity of the major*. Human fathers communicate humanity to their child, which is not just the body but also the soul. Therefore, even though they cannot immediately cause the soul, still they have to dispose the matter of the body in such a way that it really demands the infusion of the soul. Hence in some sense they do cause this infusion. However all of this was done by Mary regarding Christ and therefore she truly communicated humanity to Him. But she is not said to be the Mother of God because she communicated divinity to Him in the same way, but because that humanity never existed as subsisting in itself, but as always subsisting in the Word.

However, *we can also add to this* that Mary was also in a certain true sense the cause of the union of the humanity with the Word, inasmuch as it was not done without the consent of Mary, and therefore without her true influx, which however seems to have been only moral.

Moreover it can perhaps also be said that the maternal influx of Mary, not alone, but at the same time with the fecundating influx of the Holy Spirit, truly terminated in some exigency of the soul being united with the divine hypostasis. For thus the words of the holy Fathers would be well understood, for they so join together the virginal generation with the divine generation that they simply say that God could not be generated except virginally, and that the fruit of a virginal conception could not be anything but divine.³⁴

91. 5. If Mary were truly the Mother of God, there would be a relation of sonship of God to Mary. But there cannot be such a relation. Therefore she is not the Mother of God.

The *solution* of this difficulty depends on the question of a real relation and a logical relation, which exists in Christ with reference to Mary. In this matter there is a difference of opinion.

Those who hold that in Christ there is a real relation (created) of sonship to His Mother (Suarez), *concede the major and deny the minor*.

But if it is urged: a relation of sonship affects the person, and therefore in this case

33. See Suarez, *De Mysteriorum vitae Christi* d.1 s.1 n.15; *In 3 d.10 s.1 n.9*; Salmanticenses, *De Incarnatione* disp.5 dub.3 n.41f.; J. Bittremieux, *Utrum B. Virgo dici possit causa efficiens unionis hypostaticae*: EphThLov 21 (1944-1945) 167-180; J. Brinktrine, *Estne B.M. Virgo causa efficiens instrumentalitatis Incarnationis Verbi?*: DivThom (Pi) 51 (1948) 319-324; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,195f.

34. See J.A. de Aldama, *El tema de la divina maternidad de María en la investigación de los últimos decenios*: EstMar 11 (1951) 63-70.

a divine person; but in a divine person there cannot be a real relation *ad extra*; they respond by making this distinction: it affects the person as a subject being named, *conceded*; as a subject of inhesion, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way*. This opinion seems to be more true.

But those who hold that in Christ there is logical relation of sonship to His Mother (St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and many others), *distinguish the major*: there is a relation that is either real or logical, *conceded*; a real relation only, *denied* and *I distinguish the minor*: there cannot be a real relation, *conceded*; a logical relation, *denied*. But if it is urged: by a logical relation no one becomes really a son; therefore God would not be really the Son of Mary; they respond *by distinguishing the antecedent*: by a relation that is a logical relation at both ends, *conceded*; which is logical in the Son and real in the Mother, *denied*. This is what takes place in the relation of creature and Creator.³⁵

92. Scholium. *On the supernaturalness of the divine maternity taken actively.* 1. Mary gave the Word in his humanity everything that other mothers give to their children. That is, from the substance of her own flesh by a vital process she physically formed the ovum which, by a determination accepted from outside of her (in the case of Mary from the Holy Spirit, because of her virginal conception), was fertilized and produced an embryo requiring the information of a soul. Then it developed, was nourished in her womb and was born.

The infusion of the soul and the union with the divine person had to take place at one and the same time. This is contained implicitly in the dogma of the divine maternity.³⁶ When that moment happened is not explained in the same way by all.

According to recent authors, the infusion of the soul takes place at the moment when the ovum is fertilized by the extrinsic principle. Therefore it would be necessary to say that the Word was united with the humanity existing in the embryonic and developing state. However this theory is not certain.

According to the early authors, the first development of the embryo is before the animation, which does not take place until towards the end of the third month. Hence in the case of Christ they posit a new miracle, by which the Holy Spirit affected the development of the embryo in one moment in such a way that from the very beginning it could be animated and united with the Word.³⁷

93. 2. In this generative process according to the doctrine of the faith a *supernatural influx* to fertilize the ovum must be affirmed, since this generation was virginal. The question is also raised whether *some other supernatural influx* must be admitted prior to the fecundation itself by which the generative power of the Virgin was elevated for the production of the embryo.

35. See S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 5; Suarez, *De Mysteriorum vitae Christi* d.12 s.2; Alastruey, 1,123-126; Merkelbach, 50-52; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,167-170.

36. S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 4; Suarez, *De Mysteriorum vitae Christi* d.1 s.2 n.12f.

37. See Merkelbach, 26038; A. Breitung, *De conceptione Christi Domini inquisitio physiologico-theologica*: Greg 5 (1924) 391-423, 531-568; A. Chollet, *Animation*: DTC 1,1305-1320.

Some recent authors (after Saavedra³⁸) affirm it, by placing some intrinsic elevation in the power. This elevation is an active quality, spiritual and supernatural, received not in the organic power (as Saavedra said), but in the soul of the Virgin, by which Mary is formally constituted the Mother of God in the first reality (*in actu primo*).

The foundation of this opinion is the *intrinsic* teleological ordination or exigency which they think is absolutely required in the ovum (and consequently in the generative power) with respect to the total end of the generation, which is the person of the Word.³⁹

However it seems that this opinion must not be admitted. In the maternal ovum, taken precisely as such, there is no other intrinsic teleology but that by fertilization it develops into a human nature. But ordination to the end that the nature so developed would terminate personally in the Word, alone seems to be what is had from the obediential potency in a creature, which comes to it *from outside* by the decree of God and from the consent of Mary.

And therefore the generative action of the Mother would terminate in the person of the Word not accidentally, but essentially, given that prior decree and consent.

However it can be added, if the ovum is considered not precisely as it is produced by the generative power of the Mother, but in a reduplicating way as fertilized by the Holy Spirit, there is really an *intrinsic* teleology with respect to the divine person, as was said in n. 90. But, as is clear, this teleology does not proceed from the generative power of the Mother (therefore in it elevation is not required), but from the supernatural fecundation of the Holy Spirit.⁴⁰

Therefore: The divine maternity taken actively must be said to be supernatural from its fecundation. But considered in itself it must be said to be natural, if it is looked at in a purely physiological way. But it is supernatural if it is looked at completely, as it is a generative action from the free and supernatural consent of the Virgin ordained extrinsically, and from the fecundation of the Holy Spirit intrinsically ordered to the generation of God.

38. *De sacra Deipara* vest.1 d.4 s.1. See also J. De la Zerda, O.S.B., *Maria effigies revelatioque Trinitatis et attributorum Dei* acad.6 s.2 n.12ff.; Chr. Vega, *Theologia Mariana* pal.24 cert.9 n.1569ss.

39. J.M. Bover, *La gracia de la divina maternidad*: EstMar 5 (1946) 147-164; see R. de Yurre, *ibid.* 135; J.M. Delgado, *Fr. Silvestre de Saavedra y su concepto de maternidad divina*: EstMar 4 (1945) 152-158; G. Rozo, C.M.F., *Sancta Mater Dei* 24-39.

40. See J.A. de Aldama, *El Tema de la divina maternidad*: EstMar 11 (1951) 68-72.

Thesis 5. The free consent of Mary pertains to the full concept of the divine Maternity,

S.Th. III, q. 30, a. 1; M.J. Nicolás, *Le concept intégral de Maternité divine*: RevThom 62 (1937) 58-93, 230-272; J.M. Bover, *Deiparae Virginis consensus* (Matriti 1942); S.M. Ragazzini, O.F.M.Conv., *La divina Maternità de Maria nel suo concetto teologico integrale* (Rome 1948) 125-143.

94. Definition of terms. *The full concept of divine Maternity*, that is, divine Maternity as foreseen and intended by God and therefore as it actually was in history. Therefore the free consent of Mary is not something accidental to the Maternity of God, but something essentially included in it.

Divine Maternity can be taken actively and passively. *Actively* it is the generative action that terminates in the Word existing in a human nature. *Passively* it is a relation resulting in Mary from that generative action. Taken actively it can still be considered: a) *merely physiologically*: that generative action of God that would take place in the same way if it happened in Mary without her knowledge and consent; b) *morally*: that generative action of God as it takes place with the knowledge and consent of Mary. We say that the divine maternity must be understood not merely physiologically, but also morally, so that we can have the concept of it that was determined by God.

95. Mary's consent can be considered in two ways from the part of its terminus: a) as it concerns the generation of Jesus, who is God, but *prescinding from the maternity of the Redeemer*, as such; b) as it concerns the generation of Jesus, who is God and *formally Redeemer*. The first aspect is in the consent of Mary, inasmuch as she is a particular person; the second, inasmuch as she represents the human race. For now we will consider Mary's consent only *in the first sense*, prescinding from the second.

Moreover this consent of Mary should be understood *in the supernatural order*. Therefore it implies that Mary's act is very meritorious, both on the part of her intellect (faith), and on the part of her will (formally consent together with love for God).

96. Doctrine of the Church. St. Leo the Great: "A royal virgin is chosen from the family of David, who, pregnant with a holy fetus, conceived this divine and human child first in her mind and then in her body."¹

St. Gelasius I: "Knowing that he is coeternal with his Father according to his divinity, according to which he is the maker of all things; and he deigned [to become man] by the consent of the most holy Virgin, when she

1. *Sermo* 21,1: ML 54,191.

said to the angel: Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord....”²

Innocent III: “Thus after that, the Holy Spirit came immediately and prepared a triple way before the face of the Lord. The first was the virginal consent... For when the angel had explained to the wondering Virgin the manner and procedure of the conception, immediately burning with intense love She consented and, moved by the Holy Spirit, responded: Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord... Blessed was she who believed, since it has been fulfilled in her. For the author of faith could not be conceived by one without faith; and therefore it was necessary that the first way, namely the assent of the Virgin be prepared.”³

Leo XIII: “The eternal Son of God being made man came among men, but Mary consented to this and conceived of the Holy Spirit.”⁴

Theological note. From what has been said, the thesis is *Catholic doctrine*. It is also *a matter of divine faith*, as we shall see.

97. Proof from Holy Scripture. Luke 1:28-38. Divine Maternity is proposed to Mary (v. 30-33); She expresses difficulties which the angel resolves (v.34-37); then finally Mary consents (v. 38).

Therefore we argue thus: Divine Maternity is proposed which Mary understands and freely assents to. But in this way the free consent of Mary is included in the concept of divine Maternity. Therefore.

The major. The divine Maternity is revealed to Mary as future; therefore it will happen with her knowledge, that is, with her believing. Also the divine Maternity is still future while Mary raises difficulties and then hears their solution from the angel. Therefore her freedom is apparent. Finally, as soon as Mary’s consent is given, the angel departed from her. Therefore her consent was intended in the whole conversation with the angel.

The minor. The full concept of the divine Maternity includes everything that God de facto foresaw and willed should take place in time related to the human generation of Christ from Mary. But God foresaw and willed the previous free consent of Mary. Therefore the free consent of Mary is included in the Maternity.

98. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers.* 1. *They opposed the obeying consent of Mary to the disobedience of Eve.* Thus, for example, St. Justin (R 141). St. Irenaeus: “And if she [Eve] disobeyed God, but this one

2. *Epist.* 2: ML 59,20.

3. *Sermo* 12: ML 127,506.

4. Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27,178.

[Mary] was persuaded to obey God: it was so that the Virgin Mary might become the advocate for the virgin Eve; and just as the human race was afflicted with death through a virgin, it is released through a Virgin; being disposed in like manner: virginal disobedience made right by Virginal obedience.”⁵ Tertullian: “By a jealous operation God recovered his image and likeness, which had been captured by the devil: Eve believed the serpent: Mary believed Gabriel.”⁶

2. *The consent of the Virgin is awaited.* Thus, for example, St. Ephraem: “Most blessed of women... Your way of acting will be amazing, if by your response you reject the news I bring you about the conception of the Most High... Receive my words with thanksgiving... Therefore, O angel, I offer no resistance. If the Holy Spirit wishes to come to me, let Him come; I am his handmaid.”⁷ St. Proclus: “Do you refuse to take part in His birth, He who is immortal, so that the rule of death may be destroyed? Do you refuse to receive Him into your womb who takes away the sin of the world?... Come now, shake off the dust of carnal thought, so you can put on the garment of mystical thought.”⁸

3. *Mary’s consent is praised.* Thus, for example, St. Ambrose: “[Mary] did not reject faith, she did not refuse her mission: she adjusted her affection, she pledged her obedience... Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord... You have obedience, you see your wish. Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord, all is ready for the office; let it be done to me according to your word.”⁹ St. John Damascene: “She therefore [Mary], hearing that name [of God] which she always adored with her whole desire and honor, uttered her word of obedience with fear and joy: Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord.”¹⁰

4. *Her faith is praised.* Thus, for example, St. Augustine: “Mary... in faith conceived the flesh of Christ.”¹¹ St. Peter Chrysologus: “She believes the word and worthily conceives the Word...; and she arrives at the whole reality, who by hearing consents to this mystery of faith.”¹²

99. b) *The later Doctors and theologians.* St. Bernard: “Behold, the price of our salvation is offered to you: we will be freed immediately, if you consent... The whole world, hastening to your people, is waiting for this. And not undeservedly, when the salvation of everyone depends on what comes

5. *Advers. Haereses* 5,19,1: MG 7,1175.

6. *De carne Christi* 17: ML 2,827f.; Oehler, 2,454.

7. Th. J. Lamy, *S. Ephraem Syri hymni et sermones* 2,600.

8. *Orat. de Laudibus S. Mariae* 14: MG 65,747.

9. *In Lc* 2,14-16: 15,1639; CSEL 32,4,49-51.

10. *Hom. 1 in Dormitionem B.V. Mariae* 1: MG 96,710.

11. *Contra Faustum* 29,4: ML 42,490; CSEL 25,747.

12. *Sermo* 142: ML 52,582.

from your lips.”¹³ St. Albert the Great: “We desire to know what belonged to her in this relationship with the Lord. And we say that there were two things: namely, her consent of humble charity and her undoubting faith in the promised truth.”¹⁴ St. Thomas: “For the angel had a threefold purpose in regard to the Virgin... to lead her mind to consent.” St. Bonaventure: “The fecundation of the Virgin took place, with God doing it and the Virgin consenting, so that the reparation would respond to the fall.”¹⁵ Toledo: “For God did not wish to become man for us in any other way than by the Bl. Virgin freely consenting to it.”¹⁶ St. Peter Canisius: “Divine wisdom willed to speak to her so that the mystery of our redemption might begin only with her willing consent, that is, that she should become the Mother of Emmanuel knowingly and willingly.”¹⁷

100. Theological reasoning. Undoubtedly God could have done it differently, but he wanted to have Mary’s consent; this we know from revelation. But the *great fittingness* of this divine will is: *First*, for this is very necessary in any human maternity, because from it flow important rights and duties concerning the child. *Second*, because this is even much more true about the divine maternity in which the Virgin comes associated with God as much as possible within the hypostatic union. But it is necessary that this take place through acts that are very meritorious. For it is clear that the acts of the Virgin giving her consent had the greatest merit, both on the part of her faith, and on the part of her obedience, and on the part of her submission to God, and on the part of her love.

101. Scholium. *On the divine Maternity taken passively.* Divine Maternity taken passively is a real relation in Mary. Its terminus is the Word subsisting in humanity, but its foundation is the change produced in Mary by the divine Maternity taken actively, that is, a physiological, psychological and supernatural change. The question has been asked whether, in addition to this relation, another new entity has been added whereby Mary is formally constituted in the state of being the Mother of God.

In fact this is affirmed by some. For some postulate a certain physical reality, which they call the grace of divine maternity. When this was received in the soul of the Virgin, it constituted her as the Mother of God in the first reality. We said in the scholium of the previous thesis that we do not agree with this opinion.

Others propose “a material being” (*esse materiale*), which they say is a special relation of the presence of the Triune God, as such, in the soul of the Virgin. In this way the

13. *Homil. Super “Missus est”* 4,8: ML 183,83.

14. *In Lc* 1,28.

15. S.Th. III, q. 30, a. 4; St. Bonaventure, *In Lc* 1,25 n.40.

16. *In Lc* 1, annot. 112.

17. *De Maria Virgine incomparabili* 3,1.

person of Mary is completely elevated supernaturally. However this special presence is founded on formal participation, not appropriated, in the fecundation of the Father; according to this view, Mary has the same Son and is a co-parent with the Father. But this theory, because, beside other difficulties, supposes as its foundation actions *ad extra* of the divine persons, which are not merely appropriated but truly different in the individual Persons, must be rejected.

The conclusion is, therefore, that the divine maternity taken passively is nothing other than that real relation existing in Mary.¹⁸

18. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.12 s.3; J.M Bover, *La gracia de la divina maternidad*: EstMar 5 (1946) 147-164; J. Alonso, C.M.F., *Nauraleza y fundamentos de la gracia de la Virgen*: Est Mar 5 (1946) 11-110; J.A. de Aldama: EstMar 11 (1951) 71f. On the medieval Doctors, see C. Koser, O.F.M., *De constitutivo formali maternitatis divinae B.M. Virginis*: Alma Socia Christi 11,79-114.

ARTICLE II

ON VIRGINAL MATERNITY

102. The virginity of Mary has been revealed to us by God in connection with the dogma of the divine Maternity. In the full sense this involves the integrity of the mind and the integrity of the body. However the dogma on virginity seems to signify rather virginity of the body. Therefore we will now treat this matter, since we have already treated her virginity of mind.

Thesis 6. The divine Maternity of Bl. Mary is a completely virginal maternity.

S.Th. III, q. 28; Suarez, *De Mysteriorum vitae Christi* d.5; Alastruey, 443-473; Merkelbach, 216-263; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,239-268, where you will find a good bibliography; Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2369-2385.2341.2346.

103. Connection. The divine Maternity is a very special maternity not only from the fact that it has as its terminus a divine person, but also from the miraculous and singular way in which it was accomplished, namely virginally. Therefore after we have established the fact of the divine Maternity, now we have to consider the way in which this maternity appeared in the world from the historical point of view, according to what we know from revelation.

104. Definition of terms. *Completely virginal*, that is, Mary was the Mother of God in such a way that she always preserved her complete virginity.

Virginity is the bodily integrity of a woman. Normally this is injured by perfect carnal copulation. That Mary's Maternity was completely virginal, or preserved her full virginity (or, which is the same thing, the dogma of Mary's perpetual virginity) has three elements:

a) *The virginal conception of Christ*, that is, without the cooperation of a man. The seed of life, which naturally is delivered by the man, had to be supplied miraculously by God. However this miraculous action is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation. Hence this first element of the dogma can be expressed negatively (conception without the cooperation of a man, without the seed of a man), and positively (conception by the Holy Spirit). This is virginity *before the birth*.

b) *The virginal birth of Christ*, that is, without detriment to bodily integrity. The conservation of this bodily integrity and the absence of pain

in giving birth are so connected in the perpetual belief of the Church and in patristic tradition with the virginal birth that they must be retained as necessary elements of the dogma of the virginal birth.¹ However we assert only the fact of this element, prescinding from any further explanation. This is virginity *in giving birth*.

c) *The denial of any other conception or birth*. That is, the Bl. Virgin did not have any other child, nor did she experience any matrimonial injury to her bodily integrity. This is virginity *after the birth*.

We say that Mary had this threefold virginity and therefore we call her “always a Virgin.” However the words of the thesis can be understood in a twofold way. In the first way, inasmuch as they say something to us by transmitted revelation, namely, that *de facto* the divine Maternity was virginal in the threefold sense. In the second way, inasmuch as those words express an intrinsic connection between divine Maternity and that threefold virginity, that is, that the divine Maternity *could not be anything* but virginal. The wording of the thesis is true in both senses, but at this time we will treat only the first sense.

105. Adversaries. a) *They denied all virginity*. Celsus, according to whom Jesus was born of Mary by adultery; Cerinthus and Carpocrates, according to whom Jesus is the son of Mary and Joseph according to the natural laws of conception and birth.² In the 16th century the *Anabaptists* who said the same thing and that there were other children from the same marriage. Likewise the *Unitarians*.³ Finally, *Rationalists* and *Modernists* who, having an abhorrence for anything supernatural, say that the Catholic doctrine about the virginal maternity was introduced in the 2nd century because of the influence of the teachings of the docetists (thus, v.gr., Turmel), or is some kind of myth or legend to which H. Koch assigned various stages.⁴

1. Hence in no way can consent be given to the recent interpretation of virginity, which wants to prescind from this bodily integrity and absence of pain in giving birth. See A. Mitterer, *Dogma und Biologie der heiligen Familie* (Vienna 1952) 110f.
2. See Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1,32: MG 11,721; St. Irenaeus, *Advers. Haereses* 1,25.26: MG 7,680-686; St. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 30,14: MG 41,429; St. Philastrius, *Liber de haeresibus* 35: ML 12,1151.
3. See Canisius, *De Maria Virgine incomparabili* 2,8; Paul V, *Const. "Cum quorundam"*: Bullarium Romanum 6,500.
4. Herzog (Turmel), *La Sainte Vierge dans l'histoire* (see above n. 59 note 4); H. Koch, *Virgo Eva-Virgo Maria* (Berlin 1937), who, after denying the truth of Mary's virginity, invented these stages in the historical evolution of the legend: 1) Jesus is the natural first-born among many sons of Mary and Joseph. 2) The idea of a virginal conception is introduced; other children are said to be the fruit of the later marriage of Mary and Joseph. 3) The idea of perpetual virginity is admitted; other children are the fruit of a previous marriage of Joseph. 4) In the West later even Joseph is said to be a virgin; the brothers of the Lord are called His cousins. On this book, see Lebon in *RevHistEddI* 34 (1938) 336-345. See also J.M. Vosté, *De conceptione virginali Christi* (Rome 1933); or also *Ang* 10 (1933) 195-241, 335-358.

b) *They denied the virgin birth.* Tertullian who admits virginity in the conception but holds for a natural birth (R 359). Jovinian (4th century) according to whom Mary “as a virgin conceived, but did not give birth as a virgin,” because he said that “she was corrupted in giving birth.”⁵

c) *They denied the perpetual divinity after the birth.* Tertullian (R 380). *Antidicomarianites* in the East, Helvidius in Rome and Bonosus, a bishop in Sardica.⁶ All of these held that Mary had many children after Jesus and they try to prove this especially from Holy Scripture.

106. Doctrine of the Church.

- a) *Virginal conception.* Without a man: Creed of Toledo I (D 189-1900). By the Holy Spirit: Apostles’ Creed (D 11, 20) and other Creeds (D 44, 72, 150)), St. Gregory the Great (D 479), Lateran Council IV (801).
- b) *Virginal birth:* Jesus is said to be born of the Virgin: Apostles’ Creed (D 30), Innocent III (D 791), Sixtus IV (D 1400).
- c) *Virginal conception and virginal birth together:* St. Leo the Great (D 294; R 2182), Honorius I (D 487), the Lateran Council under Martin I (D 503), the Creed of Toledo XI (D 533).
- d) *Perpetual virginity:* St. Leo III (D 619), Paul IV (D 1880).
- e) *Mary is called ἀειπαρθένος*, “always a virgin”: the Creed of Epiphanius (D 44), John II (D 401). Council of Constantinople II (D 422, 427, 437), Lateran Council (D 502d.), Leo IX (D 681), Lateran Council IV (D 801), etc.

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith.*

107. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *Virginal maternity is promised:* Isa. 7:14.⁷ According to the Hebrew text: *Behold* (in the demonstrative sense), *a virgin* (a definite virgin, from the article) *is with child and will bear a son and shall call his name Emmanuel.* From this text I argue thus: Emmanuel is Christ. But the mother of Emmanuel is foretold as a virginal mother. Therefore the mother of Christ is foretold as a virginal mother.

The major: a) From Pius VI, who condemned the opinion saying that

5. See St. Jerome, *Epist. 42 ad Siricum* 4: ML 16,1125; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 82: ML 42,35. On Jovinian see W. Haller, *Jovinianus. Die Fragmente seiner Schriften, die Quellen zu seiner Geschichte, sein Leben und seine Lehre* (Leipzig 1897) in TU 17,2,151-159.

6. On the Antidicomarianites, see St. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 78,1: MG 42,700; on Helvidius, see St. Jerome, *De perpetua virginitate B. Mariae adversus Helvidium* 3.5.7.9.11: ML 23,195.198.201.204; on Bonosus, see St. Siricius, *Epist.* 9,3: ML 13,1176.

7. On this argument see the ample biography in Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,98. Add J. Ceuppens, *La prophétie de la 'almah*: EphThLov 28 (1952) 648-678; S.J. Bonano, C.M.F., *Isaias 7,14. Text and Context*: EphMar 4 (1954) 99-115; M. Peinador, C.M. F., *La profecía isaiana de la 'almah (Is. 7,14-17)*: *ibid.*, 117-123.

this prophecy does not pertain to Christ in any literal or typical sense.⁸ b) *From the New Testament*: Matt. 1:22f. c) *From the unanimous Catholic tradition*: there are only a few authors who do not admit that Christ is Emmanuel in the literal sense, but do admit it in the typical sense; although this is not correct, still it suffices for our argument. d) *From the context*: Emmanuel is the lord of the land of Juda (8:8), which is constantly called the land of Yahweh; because of him enemies are overcome (8:9f.); he has messianic names (9:6f.); he has a messianic kingdom (11f.).

The minor: *From the New Testament*: Matt. 1:22f. (see Luke 1:27-31). b) *From unanimous Catholic tradition*. c) *From the text itself*: 'almah signifies a marriageable young girl. But she as such is said to conceive and give birth. Therefore.

This major: although it is not possible to argue from the etymology alone, nor for certain from biblical usage,⁹ nevertheless it is proved from the fact that the prophet speaks about a certain miraculous sign. But that would not be the case, if he were talking about a young girl conceiving naturally. Therefore he is speaking about a marriageable young girl.

This minor: The prophet sees a virgin pregnant and giving birth, who, even though going through pregnancy and birth, is still properly called a virgin; therefore he expresses it as something truly miraculous. And this is confirmed by the absence of a father and from the giving of the name by the mother, contrary to Jewish customs (see Isa. 8:1-4).¹⁰

108. N.B. *On this prophecy*. 1. This argument, by which the virginal conception and virginal birth are clearly proved, is a classical and traditional argument among the holy Fathers. Thus St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Origen, St. Basil, Lactantius, Tertullian, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, etc.¹¹

2. It cannot be denied theologically, as we have seen, that *Mary* is the Mother of Emmanuel. In fact, *Mary* is the Mother of Emmanuel not in a typical sense, but in the literal sense, in spite of what has been affirmed at times and less coherently by some Catholic authors. For that in which precisely St. Matthew and the entire Christian tradition see the fulfillment of this prophecy is lacking in the case of any other woman beside *Mary*, namely, virginal conception and birth. Therefore no other woman could be the

8. The Letter "*Divina*," in which he condemned the book of Io. L. Isembiehl, on the prophecy of Emmanuel: Bullarii Romani continuatio 6,145f.

9. See on this matter, Lattey: *BiblCathQuart* 9 (1947) 89-95.

10. See J. Cales, *Le Sens de 'almah en hébreu d'après les données sémitiques et bibliques*: *RechScRel* 1 (1910) 161-168.

11. St. Justin, *Apologia* 1,33: MG 6,380; St. Irenaeus, *Advers. Haereses* 3,19: MG 7,941f.; Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1,34: MG 11,725; St. Basil, *Homil. in sanctam Christi generationem*: MG 31,1468; Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 412: ML 6,749; Tertullian, *Advers. Iudaeos* 9: ML 2,617f.; St. Augustine (see F. Cavallera, *Saint Augustin et la prophétie de la Vierge Mère*: *RechScRel* 1 [1910] 380-384); St. Jerome, *Advers. Iovinianum* 1,32: ML 23,266.

type or model in this matter. Therefore the text must be understood literally to be about Mary. Hence any other interpretations whatsoever must be rejected, that is, that it is about the wife of Ahaz who is the mother of Hezechiah, or about Isaiah's wife who is the mother of the son mentioned in Isa. 8:1-4, or about some indefinite woman who is the mother of some son.

3. There is a question about how the conception of Emmanuel, which will take place after so much time, could be the *sign* of the proximate liberation of Judea. In this matter it seems that the following should be said. Two objects show themselves to Isaiah offering this sign and foretelling it: the securing of the Davidic dynasty and the liberation of Judea from her enemies. The first was intended absolutely, the second only conditionally according to the promises of God (2 Sam. 7:12-16). A causal connection is certainly given between the two (because that liberation is given finally in view of the future Messiah), but not a temporal connection (as is clear especially from what follows in 8:1-4; 9:1-7). Therefore the conception of Emmanuel is a sign of the divine benevolence (and not a sign of threat) and consequently of liberation from enemies, inasmuch as these enemies intended to destroy the continuance of the Davidic dynasty. It is as if the prophet said: It is so certain that your present enemies will not destroy the Davidic dynasty, because God now proposes to you Emmanuel, virginally conceived and born. An Emmanuel, I say, who will be from that dynasty and because of whose arrival the house of David will continue to exist. Therefore you ought to have great trust in the Lord. However this sign cannot be understood, unless one supposes that it is received through faith, and of course this way of acting and speaking is used more than once by God (see Exod. 3:12, and elsewhere). Finally, this sign appears immediately connected with the proximate liberation of Judea (v. 16) because of prophetic anticipation.¹²

109. 2) *The virginal maternity is announced*: Luke 1:26-38.¹³ From Mary's words it is apparent that she was at the time a virgin and had the intention of remaining in her virginity, which was the only impediment proposed by her (v. 34). From the angel's words it is apparent, in spite of that impediment, that the whole affair would be carried out supernaturally by the Holy Spirit (v. 35). Therefore Mary will become a mother in a miraculous way so that she does not have to renounce her virginity.

Virginal conception is contained immediately in this text; but also the virginal birth is contained mediately. In fact even her perpetual virginity seems to be contained in it: for a virgin, who has a difficulty in accepting the dignity of the divine maternity because of her resolve to remain a virgin,

12. See A. Vaccari, s.J., *De signo Emmanuelis Is 7*: VerDom 17 (1937) 45-49, 75-81. Otherwise L. Dennefeld, *Le "signe" dans la prophétie d'Emmanuel*: RechScRel 7 (1917) 69-86; J. Cales, *Les trois discours prophétiques sur l'Emmanuel*: RechScRel 12 (1922) 169-177; C. Ceuppens, *De signo Emmanuelis*: Ang 23 (1946) 53-59; *De mariologia biblica* 24-44. But not all in the same way.

13. On the authenticity and historicity of the text, see Fonck, *Moderne Gegner Mariae*: ZkathTh 25 (1901) 650-662; Bardenhewer, *Mariae Verkündigung* 4-26; A. Medebielle, *Annonciation*: DBS 1,271-273; Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2341-2345; Prümmer, *Die Empfängnis vom Heiligen Geist*: Stimm 114 (1928) 413-424; Ceuppens, *De mariologia biblica* 81-95.

cannot be thought to then lose her virginity afterwards, especially since she preserved it in the conception and birth.

110. 3) *The virginal maternity is verified:* Matt. 1:20f. Mary did not conceive from Joseph (v. 18f.), but positively from the Holy Spirit (v. 20f.).¹⁴

The virginal conception is had immediately in the text; but note that the Evangelist says that in this way the prophecy of Isaiah, in which the virgin birth is also contained, has been fulfilled.

111. Proof from tradition. 1) Mary is called a *virgin* (παρθένος) already by St. Ignatius (R 62), St. Justin (R 136), Tertullian (R 330), St. Hippolytus (R 394).

2) She is called “always a virgin” (ἀεὶπαρθένος) by Didymus of Alexandria¹⁵ and by St. Athanasius¹⁶; by St. Epiphanius¹⁷ and by Cyril of Alexandria¹⁸ in the East. But in the West this title is found in Leporius,¹⁹ Julian Eclanensis²⁰ and Pelagius.²¹

3) *In the East* is affirmed: a) virginity before birth and in the birth clearly by Aristides (R 112), St. Justin,²² St. Irenaeus,²³ Clement of Alexandria,²⁴ St. Ephraem (R 711, 745), St. Gregory of Nyssa,²⁵ Amphylochus Iconiensis,²⁶ St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2133), etc.

b) Virginity after the birth is expressly affirmed by Origen,²⁷ Didymus of Alexandria (R 1073), St. Basil,²⁸ St. Ephraem,²⁹ St. Epiphanius,³⁰ St.

14. On Matt. 1:16 and the Syro-sinaitic version, see J. Schaumberger, Über die Echtheit der Lesung des Sinai-Syrers (Mt 1,16): ThPraktQschr 78 (1925) 302-314.

15. *De Trinitate* 1,27; 3,4: MG 39,404.832.

16. *Fragmenta in Lc*: 27,1393.

17. *Ancoratus* 120: MG 43,233; GChS 25,148; *Haereses* 78,10: MG 42,716.

18. *Homiliae diversae* 4: MG 77,992.996. The texts of St. Peter of Alexandria and Hippolytus, which are usually cited, do not seem to be authentic. See J.A. de Aldama, S.J.: EstEcl 21 (1947) 487-489.

19. *Libellus emendationis* 3,5: ML 31,1224f.; Hahn, 299f.

20. Hahn, 289.

21. Hahn, 290. The text of Cassian is not authentic.

22. *Dial. cum Thryphone* 84: MG 6,673f.

23. *Advers. Haereses* 3,19f.: MG 7,941f. The expression “still a virgin” in Irenaeus (R 223) in no way signifies that Mary lost her virginity later, as H. Koch said, *Adhuc virgo* (Tübingen 1929). On this question, see B. Capelle, *Adhuc virgo chez saint Irénée*: RechThAncMéd 2 (1930) 388-395.

24. *Sromata* 13: MG 9,529f.

25. *In Cantica* 13: MG 44,1053.

26. *Homil. in occursum Domini* 3: MG 39,49.

27. *In Io* 1,6: MG 14,32; *In Lc* 7: MG 13,1818. Origen understood virginity in birth in an imperfect manner, from a false understanding of Luke 2:23 (R 476), as it seems; and he did not think this was contrary to the complete virginity of Mary. Perhaps some of the other Fathers had the same idea.

28. *Homil. in sanctam Christi generationem*: MG 31,1468.

29. *Comm. In Diatessaron Tatiani*. See P. Krueger, *Die somatische Virginität der Gottesmutter in Schriftume Ephraens des Syrsers*: Alma Socia Christi 5,1,46-82.

30. *Haereses* 78,8f.: MG 42,709f.

John Chrysostom,³¹ etc.

4) *In the West* Mary's perfect virginity is preached by St. Hilary,³² St. Zeno of Verona,³³ St. Jerome (R 1361), who wrote against Helvidius and Jovinian; St. Ambrose,³⁴ who wrote against Jovinian; St. Leo the Great (R 2194), St. Maximus of Turin (R 2217), St. Augustine (R 1518), St. Peter Chrysologus (R 2177), Gennadius (R 2228), St. Fulgentius (R 2242), St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, who wrote a tract called "on the perpetual virginity of Bl. Mary against three infidels."³⁵ The Fathers bear witness to the virginity, also in the birth, as a great miracle that demands our faith in something that is difficult and almost incredible.³⁶

112. Theological reasoning. The arguments which pertain to a more profound knowledge of this mystery and which are used passim by the holy Fathers are collected together by St. Thomas in III, q. 28, a. 1-3.

113. Scholium 1. *On the brothers of the Lord.* They are mentioned in the Gospels: Matt. 13:55 (Mark 6:3); 12:46 (Mark 3:31; Luke 8:19); John 2:12; 7:3-5. Similarly in other texts of the N.T.: Acts 1:14; 1 Cor. 9:5; Gal. 1:19. They were certainly not sons of Mary, as we saw in the thesis. But if they are called "brothers," this comes from the way of speaking of Scripture, according to which by the name of "brother" and "sister" all relatives are designated, especially those in the second degree (like cousins). See Gen. 13:8; 14:14.18; 24:60; 29:15; 1 Chron. 15:5-9, etc.

The question has been raised about whether there were children of Joseph from a previous marriage. Some apochryphal books in ancient Christianity do affirm this. This opinion seems to have been common in the Greek Church (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Hippolytus, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoretus of Ancyra; Severus of Antioch, John of Thessalonica, Anastasius of Sinai, and others; but especially in the Eastern liturgical books) and in the Syrian Church. In the Latin Church, however, very few speak in this way (St. Hilary, Ambrosiaster, Gregory of Turin; St. Ambrose and St. Augustine suggest it as a possible solution). In the 19th century it is defended especially by Lightfoot. But really this opinion cannot be admitted, both because otherwise the word of the dying Christ can hardly be understood (John 19:26f.), and because in the Gospel the Holy Family is constantly composed of only three persons, and because the mother of James and Joseph is the Mary who was living at the time of Christ's death (Matt. 27:56). Moreover among contemporary theologians the opinion is

31. *In Mt* homil.5: MG 57,58.

32. *In Mt* 1,3f.: ML 9,921f.

33. *Tractatus* 2,8,2: ML 11,414.

34. *De institutione virginis* 13: ML 16,325. See J. Huhn, *Das Marienheimmis beim Kirkenvater Ambrosius: Alma Socia Christi* 5,1,105-114; *Das Geheimnis der Jungfrau-Mutter* 37-94, 110-126, 192-221.

35. ML 95,51-110.

36. See I. Ortiz de Urbina, *Lo sviluppo della Mariologia nella Patrologia Orientale: OrChP* 6 (1940) 40-82; Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2369-2382.

prevalent about the virginity of Joseph, which was already had in St. Jerome (R 1361), Pseudo-Augustine, Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas,³⁷ St. Bernardine of Siena, Gerson, Soto, Dionysius the Carthusian, Salmeron, Todledo, Suarez,³⁸ A Lapide, Benedict XIV and others. And it is taught by Leo XIII: “and virgins have the same exemplar [St. Joseph] of virginal integrity.”³⁹ However what the exact relationship is between Jesus and these relatives is difficult to determine.⁴⁰

114. Scholium 2. On the paternity of St Joseph. Regardless of the dogma of his virginity, St. Joseph is called the father of Jesus: Luke 2:33.41.43.48. In what sense? Or what real foundation does this name have?

“A real and proper paternity” has been proposed.⁴¹ This opinion has been condemned by the Holy Office.⁴²

Next a certain kind of “incomplete natural paternity” was proposed; according to this opinion St. Joseph was not efficiently absent in the conception of Christ; so he had some influence on it as a cooperator of the Holy Spirit and as an instrument under the divine action. This opinion was also condemned.⁴³

Finally, a certain “virginal paternity” has been proposed. This is explained in such a way that it is on the one hand a formal and true, although analogical, participation in the paternity that is in the first person of the Trinity, in virtue of which he alone has the title “father of the Word” in common with the first person of the Trinity; but on the other hand, after having removed any positive cooperation in the conception of Christ, it is a real paternity in the full sense, even though not in the proper sense, by which St. Joseph is the virginal father, in mind only and not in the body; hence this paternity is not physical, but mysterious. But such formal and analogical paternity must not be admitted in any way, since it is not necessary and it is asserted gratuitously. However a father *in the full sense* seems to say more than father *in the proper sense*, namely, that he communicated his nature to the son by generation. Therefore it can hardly be understood that he is a father in the full sense, and that only in mind and not also in body. It has been disputed among recent authors whether St. Joseph is father in the proper sense or not. Indeed, if “proper” is taken as opposed to metaphorical, it seems that he must be said to be the father in the proper sense. For there is in him a certain true relation of paternity towards Jesus. The foundation of this is not physical but juridical. That is, the matrimonial contract of Joseph with Mary together with the birth of Jesus in that marriage (although not from the marriage), and that not accidentally but according as that marriage was decreed

37. S.Th. III, q. 28, a. 3 ad 5; a. 4 c and ad 3.

38. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.5 s.4 n.9.

39. Encyclical “*Quam pluries*”: ASS 22,68.

40. F. Prat, *Jésus Christ* 1,533-545; Ceuppens, *De Mariologia biblica* 192-201; U. Holzmeister, *Quaestiones biblicae de S. Joseph* (Rome 1945) 42-45; A. Durand, *Frères du Seigneur*: DAFC 2,131-148.

41. Thus José D.M. Corbató, *El immaculado S. José* (Valencia 1907).

42. ASS 41 (1908) 43.

43. Thus R. Petrone, C.M., *La paternità divina di S. Giuseppe*: DivThom (Pi) 31 (1928) 29-49; see the retraction, *Ibid.*, 361. *Intorno alla paternità di San Giuseppe*: CivCatt 79 (1928,3) 481-496; M. Cordovani, *La paternità di San Giuseppe e la concezione di Gesù*: ScuoCatt 12 (1928) 3-8.203f.; A. Deneffe in Schol 4 (1929) 299; A. Janssens in EphThLov 16 (1929) 155.

by God precisely in order to obtain the birth of Jesus in a fitting way. Therefore in this sense Joseph can surely be said to be "the virginal father of Jesus."⁴⁴

115. Scholium 3. *On the origin of the dogma concerning perpetual virginity.* From what we have seen so far, it is sufficiently clear that the origin of this dogma cannot be anything else but a revelation from God. We have presented more than enough arguments in favor of this revelation. But the different stages of its evolution, as presented by the rationalists, are completely groundless.

That the doctrine about the virginity of Mary did not come from the influence of docetism, or from it alone, is proved from the fact that St. Ignatius and St. Irenaeus, fierce opponents of docetism, are also witnesses for the virginal maternity.

Its origin from Judaism, as if the Jewish-Christians invented a legend in order to extol the holiness of Christ (thus Harnack, Reville), is excluded by the fact that they insisted rather on the Davidic origin of the Messiah (against which at first sight a virginal conception could be understood). Also among them the estimation of virginity was not of such a nature that it would bestow great glory on Christ.

An origin from Greek myths, as if Jesus, preached as the Son of God, was thought to have his origin according to the mythological ideas about the origin of the gods (Loisy, Clemen), we can refute because no influence of an ethnic-Hellenic nature is present in the gospel accounts; because a real virginal conception is not had in Greek mythology; because even sufficient time was lacking for the creation of a legend before St. Luke composed his Gospel.

Finally, the stages of evolution devised by Koch contradict completely the documents of Christian antiquity; nor can they be affirmed, unless one accepts many interpretations of texts that are a priori and the products of prejudice.⁴⁵

116. Scholium 4. *On the connection between divine maternity and virginal maternity.* In the thesis we have seen that there is a certain connection between divine and virginal maternity; at least that connection is present which de facto in history joined together both realities. But there is a question about whether there is a true and intrinsic connection flowing from the very nature of divine maternity and virginal maternity. And it does seem that this must be affirmed strongly. For the holy Fathers often teach that the Son of God could be born only from a virgin; and contrariwise, that a virgin could not have a son, unless he is God. However these words seem not to be understood sufficiently about a merely historical connection, since they point to a real necessity. Therefore it is necessary to say rather that the Fathers there affirm an intrinsic connection between these two realities. Thus in their teaching they have given us a more intimate understanding of this dogma. However the influx of the Holy Spirit in the fecundation of the maternal ovum seems to us to be sufficient to explain that intrinsic connection. For thereby a true and proper virginal conception is had, and, and as we said above, an

44. Thus G. Breynat, *Saint Joseph, père vierge de Jésus* (Montreal 1944);

45. See Merkelbach, 227-235; Ceuppens, *De Mariologia biblica* 91-95, and the other authors cited above in n. 109.

intrinsic ordination of the fertilized ovum to a divine person.⁴⁶

117. Objections. Many have already been anticipated in the preceding scholiums. Now we will offer a few more.

1. In Luke 2:7 and in Matt. 1:25 Jesus is called the first-born son of Mary. Therefore she had other sons later.

I answer that in biblical usage the “first-born” signifies the first son, that is, one not preceded by any other, and therefore he is said to “*open the womb*” (Exod. 13:2; Num. 18:5ff.). This last expression is nothing other than a realistic way of saying “the first-born.” Hence it could be said about the Virgin Mary (Luke 2:23). Thus there is an inscription on a Jewish tomb about a mother who died after she gave birth to her first-born.⁴⁷

118. 2. In Matt. 1:18 Mary is found to be pregnant *before they came together*. Therefore they came together afterwards, that is, they consummated the marriage.

According to the opinion of authors about the time of the marriage contracted between Joseph and Mary, it is possible to give a sufficient *response* to this difficulty in two ways (see above, n. 77). Those who hold that Mary had not yet moved in with Joseph before the Annunciation consequently hold that the words *before they came together* must be understood to be about cohabitation in the same house; hence they simply deny the suppositum. But those who hold that Mary already cohabited with Joseph before the Annunciation, concede indeed that the words *before they came together* must be understood about the consummation of the marriage, and they respond with St. Jerome: “It does not follow that they came together afterwards, but Scripture shows that it did not happen.”⁴⁸

119. 3. In Matt. 1:25 Mary did not know Joseph *until she had born a son*. Therefore she knew him afterwards.

What we just heard from St. Jerome applies in the same way to the use of the conjunction *until* (Latin *donec*; Greek *έως*). For this word in the mind of the evangelist signifies what did not happen before, but not what happened afterwards. This use of the conjunction is frequent in Scripture: 2 Sam. 6:23; Matt. 5:18; 13:33; 22:24 (with parallels); Luke 22:16.18.

46. See the texts assembled by J.M. Bover, *Cómo conciben los SS. Padres el misterio de la divina maternidad. La virginidad, clave de la maternidad divina*: EstMar 8 (1949) 185-236.

47. See I.B. Frey, *La significacion du terme πρωτότοκος d'après une scription juive*: Bibl 11 (1930) 369-372. On the meaning of the phrase “the first-born son of Mary” in the Holy Fathers, see G. Jouassard, *Le premier-né de la Vierge chez saint Irénée et Hippolyte*: RechScRel 12 (1932) 509-533; 13 (1913) 25-27.

48. *Comm. in Mt 1*: ML 26,25.

ARTICLE III

ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE DIVINE MATERNITY

120. After we have considered the fact of the divine maternity, which is a virginal maternity, we must investigate its excellence. For, as we said above, in its moral dignity it is the cause or reason because of which Mary was endowed by God with so many privileges and graces, so that she might be a worthy mother of God. Now we have to evaluate morally this lofty dignity.

121. a) *The excellence that was bestowed on the Virgin Mary because of her divine maternity is really very great.* The Roman Pontiffs have spoken about this. Pius IX: “She [Mary] is superior to all, God alone excepted, by nature more beautiful, more comely and more holy than the Cherubim and Seraphim and all the hosts of angels; heavenly and earthly tongues are not sufficient to sing her praises.”¹ Leo XIII: “Certainly the dignity of the Mother of God is so exalted that nothing can be greater... [In her outstanding dignity] the Mother of God exceeds by far all other created natures.”²

Similarly the holy Fathers. St. Ambrose: “What is more noble than the Mother of God? What is more splendid than her whom splendor chose?”³ St. Peter Chrysologus: “She was truly blessed, who was greater than heaven, stronger than the earth, larger than the world; for she alone contained God whom the world cannot contain.”⁴ Nicholas Claravallensis: “What is more grand than the Virgin Mary, who carried the hidden magnitude of the supreme divinity within her own womb? Pay attention, Seraphim, observe the dignity of her superior nature and you will see: whatever is greater, is less than the Virgin; only the Artisan surpasses that work.”⁵ St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Is any man able to celebrate adequately the dignity of the most praiseworthy Mary?”⁶ St. John Damascene: “Truly you excel all created things in dignity, because from you alone the great Artisan was born.”⁷

Thus also theologians. St. Thomas: “The Mother of God was above the

1. Bull “*Ineffabilis*”: CL 6,841.

2. Encyclical “*Quantum pluries*”: ASS 22,66.

3. *De virginibus* 2,2,7: ML 16,209.

4. *Sermo* 143: ML 52,584.

5. *Sermo in Nativitatem B.V. Mariae*: ML 144,738.

6. *Homiliae diversae* 4: MG 77,991.

7. *Homil. 1 de nativitate M.V.* 7: MG 96,672.

angels as regards the dignity to which she was chosen.”⁸

However theological reasoning can argue like this: the dignity of a created person is to that extent greater when he or she is more closely joined to God. But Mary, because she is the Mother of God, is a created person who is very closely united with God. Therefore.⁹ Or thus from St. Thomas himself: “Something is more noble depending on how closely it is associated with God. And so the human nature of Christ is most noble, because of its union with God. And after him is the Bl. Virgin from whose womb his flesh united with the divinity was taken.”¹⁰

122. b) *The excellence of Mary because of the divine maternity is in a certain way infinite.* Thus commonly theologians: St. Thomas: “The Bl. Virgin, because she is the Mother of God, has a certain infinite dignity, coming from the infinite good which is God.”¹¹ Pseudo-Albert the Great: “She is exalted because she not only gave birth to a coequal Son, but infinitely more. Because also in this case in a certain way he makes the goodness of his Mother infinite. For every tree is known from its fruit; hence if the goodness of the fruit makes the tree good, infinite goodness in the fruit reveals infinite goodness in the tree.”¹² Dennis the Carthusian: “Not unreasonably the great theologians say that, by reason of this maternal fecundity and maternity of God, the Blessed Virgin has a dignity that is in a certain way infinite.”¹³

Here is the reason: The value of a relation is taken from its terminus (S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2). But maternity is a divine relation whose terminus is infinite. Therefore it also must be said to be infinite in a certain measure. Therefore it is clear that the divine maternity is not infinite simply, but only in a certain measure, that is, by reason of the terminus.

123. c) *Because of the divine maternity Mary pertains to the hypostatic order.* Thus expressly Suarez,¹⁴ and with him generally other theologians.

A multitude of elements are called the orders of things, which are united by reason of one principle—univocally or analogically, statically or dynamically. For example, we speak of the natural order, the supernatural order, the hypostatic order. These of course differ among themselves depending on a different communication from God, that is, in essence,

8. S.Th. III, q. 30, a. 2 ad 1.

9. For this argument, see S.Th. III, q. 55, a. 3; q. 27, a. 5.

10. *In I d.44 q.1 a.3.*

11. S.Th. I, q. 25, a. 6 ad 4.

12. *Mariale* q. 197.

13. *Sermo 1 de Conceptione B.M. Virginis.*

14. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.1 s.2.

nature, divine person. The hypostatic order primarily and essentially is constituted in Christ, by the ineffable communication of the person of the Word who assumed a human nature. But everything that has a necessary connection with this hypostatic union, and which is intrinsically related to it, pertains to that order. This holds especially for the divine maternity which, as such, is ordered totally to that union, and which terminates in that union itself. Of course it is not the case that the Mother of God produced that union or that she has a strict exigency for it (preserving the exigency of this ovum of the mother as fertilized in a miraculous way by the Holy Spirit); but inasmuch as Mary gave her consent not to any kind of maternity, but to the divine maternity; and inasmuch as that maternal ovum (even prescinding from the action of the Holy Spirit, as such) truly required the infusion of this soul, which de facto in the priority of nature had been united with the Word. Therefore it is better to say that Mary pertains intrinsically to the hypostatic order.¹⁵

124. d) *Because of the divine maternity Mary is connected in a special way with the divine persons.* Pius IX teaches: "It was she [Mary] to whom the Father willed to give his only Son, generated from his heart and equal to himself and whom he loves as himself. (And he wished to) give him in such a way that he would be, by nature, one and the same common Son of God the Father and of the Virgin. And as the Son himself actually chose her to be his mother, just so the Holy Spirit willed and ordained that she should conceive and give birth to the one from whom he proceeds."¹⁶ St. Thomas calls these special relations to the Trinity "affinity to the Trinity."¹⁷

Regarding the Father, Mary is associated with him first of all in the generation of the same Son: "She alone with God the Father can say to the Son of God: You are my Son."¹⁸ For one and the same Person is the subject of both generations in his different natures. For at the moment of his generation from the Virgin at the same time both generations were had, since the divine generation has neither a beginning nor an end. However Mary should not be called (in the strict sense) the Spouse of the Father, which she has occasionally been called, but only rarely. Then for a special reason Mary should be called the Daughter of the Father; for this title is frequent in the holy Fathers (unique daughter, first-born daughter). The reason is that Mary in her maternity manifests a perfect similarity with God

15. See J.A. de Aldama, *El tema de la divina maternidad*: EstMar 11 (1951) 73, where a recent bibliography is given.

16. Bull "*Ineffabilis*": CL 6,836.

17. S.Th. II-II, q. 103, a. 4 ad 2.

18. S.Th. III, q. 30, a. 1.

the Father: The Father generates in one nature only, so does She; the Father alone generates without a mother, She does it alone without a father; the Father generates without any change, She without injuring her virginity. Indeed it pertains to a son to proceed from his father as a personal image and likeness of him. Hence Mary, in whom there is not only this likeness, but to whom also is given the power to express this likeness, in a very special way is the Daughter of the Father.

Regarding the Son, Mary is his Mother in a preeminent way. She is also His spouse. This title is wholly traditional both in the Father and in the liturgy.¹⁹ The reason for this can be the great likeness and analogy that exists between the union of the Mother of God with God and the hypostatic union. But this is wont to be called by the Fathers a “marriage.” Hence even St. Thomas says that Mary, in the name of all human nature, gave her consent to this wedlock, which is proper to a spouse.²⁰

Regarding the Holy Spirit, Mary is the Mother of the Spirator, since she is the true Mother of the Son who is the Spirator. Already in Christian antiquity she is very often said to be the temple of the Holy Spirit. Indeed she obtains this title not only because of her sanctifying grace, but also by a very special title, inasmuch as, having been overshadowed by the Holy Spirit, under his activity she became the Mother of the Word. Recently she is also often called the Spouse of the Holy Spirit, which happened only rarely in antiquity. It is clear that the reason for this title is the Incarnation. Here however one must be very careful lest it is falsely understood.²¹

Theologians dispute whether Mary can be said to be a *complement of the Trinity*, as if Mary, by her maternity, contributed something to the Holy Trinity. Indeed, given the imperfection of the term, which can be understood badly, it is still true that Mary was the reason why new relations *ad extra* were added to the Divine Persons, and in this sense she contributed something to the Trinity. Therefore she can be said to be a complement of the Trinity, that is, inasmuch as she approaches the Trinity in a singular way, is close to it, and is united with it in a very special way.²²

19. See A. Piolanti, “*Sicut sponsa ornata monilibus suis.*” *Maria come “sponsa Christi” in alcuni teologi del secl. XII: Virgo Immaculata* 5,181-193.

20. S.Th. III, q. 30, a. 1.

21. See J. Müller, *Mariologia* q.1 a.2-4; S. Alameda, *La excelencia de la divina maternidad en los Padres: RevEspT* 3 (1943) 493-558; J. Bittremieux, *Relationes B.M. Virginis ad personas SS. Trinitatis: DivThom (Pi)* 37 (1934) 549-568; 38 (1935) 6-41; G.R. de Yurre, *Suarez y la trascendencia de la maternidad divina: RevEspT* 1 (1940) 874-917; J.M. Bover, *La gracia de la Madre de Dios: RevEspT* 5 (1945) 65-86; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,171-188; I.M. Alonso, *Relationes Immaculatae Cordis B.M. Virginis ad personas Sanctissimae Trinitatis: Alma Socia Christi* 6,2,54-81.

22. See P. Godts, *Marie complément de la T.S. Trinité* (Esschen 1926). So also Hesychius of Jerusalem, *Serm. 5 de Deipara: MG* 93,1461.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE DIVINE MATERNITY

125. We will now compare the divine maternity with the other supernatural gifts, and especially with sanctifying grace. And *we ask* which of these dignities is prevalent. But this question would seem to be sufficiently answered from what has preceded. For if the divine maternity is the greatest dignity and in a certain sense infinite, it necessarily exceeds all gifts of grace. However this question, disputed among theologians, is not answered by all in the same way. Many theologians hold, both the older and more recent ones, that the divine maternity is more excellent than sanctifying grace. The Nominalists held the contrary, or at least logically should have held it. Suarez, and after him many others, distinguishing between divine maternity taken by itself and divine maternity with its order to the gifts of grace that are due to it, say that the former is less than sanctifying grace, but that the latter is greater.¹

126. *Therefore it is necessary to say* that the divine maternity is a dignity that greatly surpasses sanctifying grace. This assertion is completely traditional and is briefly proved in this way:

1) Divine maternity is a certain supreme dignity and infinite. Therefore it surpasses grace.

2) Divine maternity pertains to the hypostatic order. Therefore it surpasses grace which pertains only to the supernatural order.

3) The formal effect of divine maternity is to make Mary the natural Mother of God; the formal effect of grace is to make man an adopted son of God. But it is a greater dignity to be a natural mother, than to be an adopted child. This *minor* is proved, because in the former case a substantial union with God is present; in the latter only an accidental union.

4) Divine maternity radically and virtually contains grace. Therefore it surpasses it.

5) Because of the divine maternity a special devotion of hyperdulia, above that due to all the saints, is due to Mary. But devotion to the saints is due because of their gifts of grace. Therefore the divine maternity surpasses grace.

1. See S.Th. 1 d.44 q.1 a.3 c; Pseudo-Albert the Great, *Mariale* q.140f.; St. Bonaventure, 1 d.44 dub.4; G. Biel, 3 d.4 a.3 dub.3; Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.1 s.2; Novatus, *De eminentia Deiparae* vol.1 c.8 q.9; Vega, *Theologia Mariana* vol.2, palaestr.25 cert2; Contenson, *Mariologia* 10, diss.6 c.2 spec.2; Salmanticenses, *De Incarnatione* dsip.36 dub.3 parr.2 n.30; Seldmayr, *Scholastica mariana* p.2 q.9 a.6.

127. However if a comparison is made between divine maternity and grace not under the idea of dignity, but under the idea of a gift elevating our natural actions and putting them into conformity with the last supernatural end, then sanctifying grace must be said to surpass divine maternity. For the latter only radically and virtually contains that supernatural elevation of moral acts, while on the other hand grace brings that about formally. It is in this sense that Luke 11:27f. should be understood.²

2. Alastruey, 122-126; Merkelbach, 64-71 and *L'éminent dignité de la Mère de Dieu* (Brussels 1921); G.R. de Yurre, *Suarez y la trascendencia divina y la gracia santificante*: RevMar 5 (1946) 111-146; J. Alonso, *Naturaleza y fundamentos de la gracia de la Virgen*: Est Mar 5 (1946) 11-110; J.a. de Aldama, *El tema de la divina maternidad* 76f.; F. Lopera, *De divina maternitate in ordine unionis hypostaticae ad mentem Doctoris Eximii*: EphMar 4 (1954) 67-88.

ARTICLE V

ON THE DIVINE MATERNITY AS FORMALLY SANCTIFYING

128. Having established the excellent dignity of the divine maternity, next theologians *ask* whether from that alone she can be said to be formally holy, even prescinding from sanctifying grace. And in fact among the older theologians that position was held by Ripalda, Saavedra, Vega, Sedlmayr; among moderns, Scheeben; and in our times Müller, Lercher, R. de Yurre, Bover, Rozo, Nicolás, Bernard, Ceuppens, Delgado.

This question is disputed, clearly, by analogy with a similar question proposed about the holiness of the humanity of Christ. Actually not all of the quoted authors understand that formal holiness in the same way. They speak about a different concept of holiness, and some of them are also based on the concept of divine maternity which includes a certain elevation of the power itself of the Virgin. As we said above, we do not approve of this concept.

129. Having left to one side these views, it seems necessary to say with regard to this question:

1) Because of the divine maternity Mary is holy with a certain *ontological holiness*. For the divine maternity is a quasi form by which Mary is rendered united to God, inasmuch as she is both physically united with the incarnate Word, and by means of the conception of Christ she attains the end of the Divinity—and all of this takes place in the hypostatic order. But this is formally to have ontological holiness from the divine maternity. This is the meaning given to it by Scheeben, Müller, Lercher, and perhaps some others; and it seems that this can hardly be denied.

130. 2) Because of the divine maternity Mary more probably is also formally holy with a certain *gratifying holiness*. We are speaking about the divine maternity, prescinding of course from sanctifying grace, but including all her relations to God. Thus therefore considered adequately, it produces in Mary effects similar to the effects of sanctifying grace. This will become clearer by considering each of these effects.

a) In virtue of the divine maternity alone Mary is a *partaker of the divine nature*. Sanctifying grace therefore is said to confer a share in the divine nature, because it is the foundation and root of supernatural acts. Moreover, divine maternity is a certain formal likeness, although analogical, to the paternity of the Father (that is, the temporal generation of the Son

of God from Mary is like the generation of the same Son from the Father). Therefore it is a certain special participation in the divine nature.

b) In virtue of the divine maternity Mary is the *Daughter* of the Father in a very special way. For it pertains to children to have a nature similar to the father and communicated to them by that father. But from the Father she advanced to the point (not of course by generation) that she would be the Mother of God, that is, that she would have such a similarity to the Father in herself. Therefore in an exceptional way she must be said to be the Daughter of the Father—the first-born and unique Daughter of the Father, as she is often called by the Fathers of the Church.

c) In virtue of the divine maternity alone Mary has a *right to an eternal inheritance*. For if she is a Daughter, she has the right of children. Moreover the right of inheritance cannot be denied to Mary, who is joined to the divine family as Mother and Spouse.

d) In virtue of the divine maternity alone Mary is *most pleasing to God*. For through it she is very closely united with the divinity and inserted into the divine family, that is, by a union intermediate between the union of an adopted son with his Father through grace, and the union of a natural Son with the Word through the hypostatic union.

For these reasons, therefore, that opinion may probably be defended, even if all the foundations are not defended that are proposed by the cited authors, which seem to us to be very weak and improbable.¹

1. G.R. de Yurre, *La teoría d la maternidad divina formalmente santificante*, en Ripalda y Scheeben: EstMar 3 (1944) 255-286; J.M. Bover, *La gracia de la Madre de Dios*: RevEspT 5 (1945) 65-86; *Santidad inicialde María*: EstEcl 28 (1954) 571-574; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,189-194; G. Rozo, *Santa Maria, Mater Dei* (Milan 1943); J. Delgado, O.deM., *Maternidad formalmente santificante (origen y desenvolvimiento de la controversia)*: EstMar 8 (1949) 133-184; J. A. de Aldama, *El tema de la divina maternidad* 77-80.

CHAPTER IV

On spiritual maternity

131. After we have treated the divine maternity, which is the first and fundamental aspect of the maternity of the Redeemer, the next step is to consider Mary's spiritual maternity, in which is found a second aspect of that maternity.

Intimately connected with this spiritual maternity of Mary, in one way or another, are corredemption, the dispensation of graces and universal mediation. But there is a dispute among theologians about the order in which these offices are logically connected with each other.¹

Indeed there are those who hold for the priority of corredemption over the spiritual maternity, so that Mary therefore is the spiritual mother of men because she is the corredemptrix.² On the other hand, there are those who hold for a priority of spiritual maternity; hence Mary is the corredemptrix because she is the spiritual mother of men.³ Finally, there are those who defend a mutual and varying interdependence between all these offices.⁴

To a great extent this question depends on a definite concept for each one of these offices, since all of them can be conceived in a more or less comprehensive way.

We consider her spiritual maternity as the foundation. The immediate quasi formal effect of this is her universal mediation; this therefore is her "maternal mediation." However we recognize corredemption and the dispensation of graces as the quasi different acts of both. The first pertains to the stage of bringing about redemption, while the second pertains to the stage of applying and communicating redemption.

Hence we will proceed in the following way:

Art. 1. On spiritual maternity in general.

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1. On the connection between divine maternity and spiritual maternity and also corredemption, see E. Gagnon, P.S.S., *Maternité divine et corredemption*: Alma Socia Christi 2,49-60; Chrysostomus de Pamplona, O.F.M.Cap., *De divina maternitate ad corredemptionem et maternitatem spiritualem relata*: *ibid.*, 118-132.
 2. Friethoff, *De alma Socia Christ Mediatoris* 112f.; Dillenschneider, *La Mariologie de Saint Alphonse de Liguori* 2,155f.; Alastruey, 739; Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, O.C.D., *Naturaleza de la maternidad espiritual de María*: *EstMar* 7 (1948) 142.
 3. M. Llambra, O.P., *La maternidad espiritual de María*: *EstMar* 4 (1944) 67-162; *María, Madre corredentora, o la maternidad divino-espiritual de María y la Corredemptrix* (Rome 1940); *Della maternità spirituale alla corredenzione*: *Marian* 3 (1941) 372-397; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,200, in the 2nd edition, because previously he held the opposite opinion.
 4. J.M. Bover, *Orden en que han de concebirse maternidad, corredención y oficio de dispensar las gracias*: *EstMar* 1 (1942) 101-165; *María Mediadora universal* (Madrid 1946) 399-408.
- 4a See Bover, *María Mediadora universal* 469-478.

- Art. 2. On universal mediation in general.
 Art. 3. On corredemption
 Art. 4. On the dispensation of graces.

A R T I C L E I

ON SPIRITUAL MATERNITY IN GENERAL

132. There is nothing older in Catholic doctrine than to call the Bl. Virgin Mary the mother of men. This title refers to the great prerogative of the Virgin in the supernatural order according to which the spiritual life of sanctifying grace is communicated to all men by a certain action, which is aptly called maternal. But it is very important to pay attention to the twofold stage in which this spiritual maternity is exercised. For first of all the Virgin is the mother of all men in a quasi global fashion, that is, of all those who are members of Christ's Mystical Body, to the same degree as they are members of Christ. Then she is the mother of each one *de facto*, from the moment in which he is inserted into the Mystical Body of Christ by Baptism. The first stage pertains to achieving redemption and therefore it is aptly connected with her office of Corredemptrix. The second stage pertains to the application of the fruits of redemption and so coincides with the distribution of graces by Mary. Therefore these points will be treated later individually. Now we will consider her spiritual maternity in general.

Thesis 7. The Bl. Virgin Mary was constituted proximately and formally the spiritual mother of all men both by her consent to the Incarnation and by her compassion under the cross.

Alastruey, 741-758; Merkelbach, 296-306; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,199.227; J.M. Bover, *Maria Mediatora universalis* 386-408; Th. Koehler, *Maternité spirituelle de Marie: Maria (Du Manoir)* 1,573-600.

133. Definition of terms. *Mother:* we understand this now only as a title; without doubt a certain reality aptly applies to it, but here we are saying nothing about the nature of this maternity.

Spiritual, that is, in the order of sanctifying grace which is the life of the soul.

Closely and formally, that is, we men are the terminus of that maternity. She is called our mother not only because she is the Mother of Christ, who gave the life of grace to us. This would not suffice for the proper naming

of a spiritual mother.

By her consent, inasmuch as Her consent by the will of God was directed not just to the temporal maternity of Christ, but also to our spiritual maternity. For it is at the same time the title of this maternity and the first moment in which it is constituted, as it were by generation or conception.

By her compassion, inasmuch as her compassion was not maternal only with regard to Christ, but also with regard to us. It is a new title of spiritual maternity and the second moment in which it is constituted, as it were by giving birth.

134. Doctrine of the Church. It is very abundant, especially in the statements of the more recent Pontiffs.^{4a}

1) *Spiritual maternity in the Incarnation*: St. Leo the Great: “Today’s feast of the birth of Jesus from the Virgin Mary renews for us... the sacred beginnings; and while we adore the origin of our Savior, we are found to be celebrating our own beginning. For, the generation of Christ is the origin of the Christian people, and the birth of the Head is the birth of the body... All of the faithful, brought forth at the baptismal fount, just as they were crucified in the passion with Christ, resuscitated in the resurrection, placed in the Ascension at the right hand of the Father, so they are born together with Him in this nativity. For any man... who is regenerated in Christ... is already contained in the seed of the Savior.”⁵

St. Pius X: “For is not Mary the Mother of Christ? Then she is our Mother also. And we must in truth hold that Christ, the Word made Flesh, is also the Savior of mankind. He had a physical body like that of any other man: and again as Savior of the human family, he had a spiritual and mystical body, the society, namely, of those who believe in Christ... Now the Blessed Virgin did not conceive the Eternal Son of God merely in order that He might be made man taking his human nature from her, but also in order that by means of the nature assumed from her he might be the Redeemer of men... Wherefore in the same holy bosom of his most chaste Mother Christ took to Himself flesh, and united to Himself the spiritual body formed by those who believe in Him. Hence Mary, carrying the Savior within her, may be said to have also carried all those whose life was contained in the life of the Savior. Therefore all we who are united to Christ, and as the Apostle says are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones (Eph. 5:30), have issued from the womb of Mary like a body united to its head. Hence, though in a spiritual and mystical fashion, we are all children of Mary, and she is the Mother of us all. Mother, spiritually

5. *Serm. 6 in Nativitate Domini*: ML 54,213.

indeed, but truly Mother of the members of Christ, who are we.”⁶

Pius XI: “But there is another matter, Venerable Brethren, which We think We should recall in regard to Mary’s office of Maternity, something which is sweeter and more pleasing; namely that she, because she brought forth the Redeemer of mankind, is also in a manner the most tender mother of us all, whom Christ our Lord deigned to have as His brothers.”⁷

Pius XII: “Within her virginal womb Christ our Lord already bore the exalted title of Head of the Church... she brought him forth... Therefore she was the most holy mother of all the members of Christ.”⁸

135. 2) *Spiritual maternity under the cross.* Benedict XIV: “The Catholic Church, instructed by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, with the affection of filial piety has always striven to honor most zealously the same one [Mary]... as a most loving mother who remained alone at the last word of her dying Spouse.”⁹

Pius VIII: “For she is our mother, a mother of piety and grace, a mother of mercy, to whom Christ entrusted us as he was about to die on the Cross.”¹⁰

Leo XIII: “The most holy Virgin, as the Mother of Jesus Christ, is thus the mother of all Christians; for she generated them on Mount Calvary amidst the intense sufferings of the Redeemer.”¹¹ “As such God gave her to us. Having chosen her for the Mother of His only begotten Son, he taught her all a mother’s feeling that breathes nothing but pardon and love... Such, finally, she proves herself by her courage in gathering in the heritage of the enormous labors of her Son, and in accepting the charge of her maternal duties towards us all. The design of this most dear mercy, realized by God in Mary and confirmed by the testament of Christ, was comprehended at the beginning, and accepted with the utmost joy by the Holy Apostles.”¹² “Moreover, it was before the eyes of Mary that was to be finished the Divine Sacrifice for which she had borne and brought up the Victim... there stood by the cross of Jesus His Mother, who, in a miracle of charity, so that she might receive us as her sons, offered generously to Divine Justice her own son, and died in her heart with Him, stabbed with the sword of sorrow.”¹³ “Now in John, as the Church has constantly taught, Christ designated the

6. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36,452f.

7. Encyclical “*Lux veritatis*”: AAS 23,514.

8. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 247f.

9. Bull “*Gloriosae Dominae*”: Bullarium 2,428.

10. Bull “*Praestantissimus*”: Bullarium Romanum 9,106.

11. Encyclical “*Quamquam pluries*”: ASS 22,67.

12. Encyclical “*Octobri mense*”: ASS 24,196.

13. Encyclical “*Iucunda Semper*”: AAS 27,178.

whole human race.”¹⁴ “And, at the supreme moment of His public life, when sealing the New Testament in His precious Blood, He committed her to His beloved Apostle in those sweet words, ‘Behold, thy Mother!’”¹⁵

Pius XI: “The sorrowful Virgin participated in the work of redemption with Jesus Christ; having been constituted the mother of men, and taking them to herself as a witness of divine charity, she embraced them as sons and lovingly protects them.”¹⁶ “The Christian people grew not only in their devotion to the Mother of God as an ever-present advocate, but also in their love for her as a mother bequeathed to them by their Redeemer.”¹⁷ “...Mary who, since she keeps within her motherly heart all men committed to her protection on Calvary, cherishes and loves not only those whose fortune it is to enjoy the fruits of the Redemption, but all those others likewise who do not yet know that they have been redeemed by Jesus Christ.”¹⁸ “For since all men are children, on the word of the dying Jesus, of the Virgin Mother of God, it is also appropriate for all of them to rejoice over her praises.”¹⁹ “The Virgin Mary, constituted the Mother of all men under the cross of her Son, is honored solemnly and piously.”²⁰

Pius XII: “Thus she who, according to the flesh, was the mother of our Head, through the added title of pain and glory became, according to the Spirit, the mother of all His members.”²¹ Similar documents of his were published often during the Marian Year.²²

136. Theological note. That Mary in some true sense is the spiritual mother of men is a matter of *divine and Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium* and universal belief of the Church. That her spiritual maternity is connected with her consent to the Incarnation and with her compassion under the cross is *at least Catholic doctrine*.

137. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. John 19:25-27. The entire strength of this argument depends on the question whether in the text John acts only as his own private person, or he represents in person the whole human race, and this not in some accommodated sense, but in a true sense. Of course

14. Encyclical “*Adiutricem populi*”: ASS 28,130

15. Encyclical “*Augustissimae Virginis*”: ASS 30,129.

16. Apostolic Letter “*Explorata res est*”: AAS 15 (1923) 104f.

17. Encyclical “*Quas primas*”: AAS 17 (1925) 694.

18. Encyclical “*Rerum Ecclesiae*”: AAS 18 (1926) 83.

19. Letter “*Saeculum mox quintum*”: AAS 23 (1931) 10.

20. Letter “*Septimo abeunte saeculo*”: AAS 25 (1933) 435. See also the letter proclaiming the Holy Year as a Jubilee of the Redemption: AAS 5 (1933) 6.

21. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 247.

22. See AAS 46 (1954) 484.494.655.660-664.

there are many exegetes who hold for the accommodated sense only. However this often repeated teaching of the Holy Pontiffs seems to demand something more than a mere sense of accommodation. Moreover, because from Benedict XIV the Church accepts it as “instructed by the teaching of the Holy Spirit,” and from Leo XIII that “the Church has constantly taught” that John was designated the person of the human race (see n. 135), it is necessary to investigate how actually such a meaning is found in the text.

Surely after Rupert Tuitiensis (before Gregory of Nicomedia and perhaps also Origen), this interpretation was quite common. This interpretation, from an analysis of the context, whether the immediate context (because everything that immediately precedes or follows has a more universal meaning), or the mediate context (because the whole Gospel of John abounds in narrations, which, beside the historical sense, also have another symbolic meaning), seems to be much more probable.

However these words of Christ do not formally constitute the spiritual maternity itself, but declare it as already fully constituted.²³

138. 2. Rev. 12:15. The woman designates Mary, the Mother of Christ. But not only according as she is the Mother of the physical Christ. Therefore according as she is the Mother of the mystical Christ.

The *minor* is clear, since the pains of giving birth, mentioned in v. 2, were completely absent in the birth of Jesus.

Therefore the whole force of the argument depends on the *major*, that is, whether the Woman is Mary in an accommodated sense only, or in some sense intended by the Holy Spirit. These words of St. Pius X seem to say that the sense is not just an accommodated one:

St. Pius X: “*A great sign appeared in heaven, a woman clothed with the sun, and with the moon under her feet and crown of twelve stars upon her head. Everyone knows that this woman signified the Virgin Mary, the stainless one who brought forth our Head. And being with Child, she cried travailing in birth, and was in pain to be delivered.* John therefore saw the

23. On this argument, see M. Legnani, *De theologica certitudine maternitatis B. Virginis quoad fideles, iuxta Christi verba “Mulier ecce filius tuus”* (Venice 1899); C. A. Kneller, *Io 19,26-27 bei den Kirchenväter: ZkathTh 40* (1916) 457-612; J. Ernst-C.A. Kneller, *Origenes und die geistige Mutterschaft Marias (Ioh 19:26ff): ibid., 47* (1923) 617-632; P. Gaechter, *Die geistige Mutterschaft Marias. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung von Io 19:26: ibid., 391-429*; J. M. Bover, „*Mujer, he ahí a tu hijo*“: *Maternidad de María para con todos los hombres, según San Juan 19,6-27: EstEcl 1* (1922) 5-18; Id., “*Mulier, ecce filius tuus*”. *Spiritualis et universalis B. Virginis maternitas ex verbis Christi morientis demonstrata: VerDom 4* (1924) 225-231; Id., *La maternidad de María, expresada por el Redentor en la Cruz: EstBibl2* (1942) 627-646; T. Gallus, *Mulier, ecce filius tuus: VerDom 21* (1941) 289-297; R. Rabanos, *La maternidad espiritual de María en el Protoevangelio y en San Juan: EstMar 7* (1948) 35-50; I. Leal, *Beata Virgo omnium spiritualis Mater ex Io 19,26-27: VerDom 27* (1949) 65-73; M. Peinador, *La Sagrada Escritura en Mariología: EstMar 11* (1951) 48-53.

most holy Mother of God already in eternal happiness, yet travailing in a mysterious childbirth. What birth was it? Surely it was the birth of us who, still in exile, are yet to be generated to the perfect charity of God, and to eternal happiness. And the birth pangs show the love and desire with which the Virgin from heaven above watches over us, and strives with unwearied prayer to bring about the fulfillment of the number of the elect."²⁴

The greater part of interpreters thinks that in the Woman the Church is meant. However the explanation that connects the Woman with Mary is present already in antiquity in Andrea of Caerea, Aretha or Caesarea, Oecumenius among the Greeks, and among the Latins there are Pseudo Augustine, Cassiodorus, Ambrose Aupertus, Haymone of Halberstad; and this opinion even now is defended by many. This seems to enjoy true probability, provided that the Church is not excluded from the meaning of the text. For certain elements (v. 5) are understood not only in the obvious sense about the Mother of the Messiah, but it does not seem possible to understand them in any other way, especially if John's way of speaking is compared with the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament.²⁵

Moreover in these words her spiritual maternity of men (v. 17) is described formally under the aspect of compassion (v. 2). However note the different way of speaking of St. Pius X.

139. Proof from tradition. 1) Spiritual maternity is contained implicitly in the parallelism of Eve-Mary: one the cause of death, the other the cause of life. Hence Mary is said explicitly to be "the mother of the living," v.gr., by St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Epiphanius, and others.²⁶

2) From the doctrine of the Mystical Body Mary is said to be "the mother of the members," v.gr., by St. Augustine (R 1644).

3) The Fathers press the relation between the Incarnation and the

24. Encyclical "Ad diem illum": ASS 36,458. The allusion there seems to be to Calvary.

25. On this argument, see R.M. de la Broise, *Mulier amicta sole. Essai exégétique*: Et 71 (1897) 289-307; E.B. Allo, *Le douzième chapitre de l'Apocalypse*: RevBibl 18 (1909) 529-554; L. Fonck, *Signum magnum apparuit in caelo*: VerDom 2 (1922) 353-357; J.M. Bover, *El capitulo 12 del Apocalypsis y el capitulo 3 del Génesis*: EstEcl 1 (1922) 319-336; Id., *La "mujer" del Apocalypsis, madre dolorosa del Redentor crucificado*: *Maria Mediadora universal* 358-370; G.M. Perrella, *Senso mariologico dell'Apocalipse 12*: DivThom (Pi) 43 (1940) 215-222; L. di Fonzo, *Intorno al senso mariologico dell'Apocalipse 12*: Marian 3 (1941) 248-268; A. Rivera, *Inimicitias ponam...* (Gen3,5). *Signum magnum apparuit...* (Apoc. 12,1): VerDom 21 (1941) 113-122, 183-189; G.M. Roschini, *La donna dell'Apocalipse 12*: Marian 4 (1942) 124-128; A. Rivera, *La maternidad espiritual de María en San Lucas 1,26-38 y en al Apocalypsis 12*: EstMar 7 (1948) 84-90. On the other arguments, see J.M. Bover, *Spiritualis B. Mariae Virginis maternitas in Christo Iesu, B. Pauli documentis comprobata*: VerDom 3 (1923) 307-310; J.f. Bonnefoy, *Le Mystère de Marie selon le Protoévangile et l'Apocalypse* (Paris 1949); M. Peinador, *La sagrada Escritura en Mariologia*: EstMar 11 (1951) 38-41; A. Colunga, *La mujer del Apocalypsis*: Salm 1 (1954) 675-687.

26. St. Peter Chrysologus, *Serm. 140 De Annuntiatione*: ML 52,576; St. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 79,18: MG 42,728.

spiritual maternity. Thus, St. Cyril of Alexandria: "Thus [Christ] with us and like us underwent generation..., in order that being born from a woman according to the flesh..., he might recapitulate the human race..., and through the flesh united to Himself he might contain all in Himself."²⁷ St. Augustine: "Therefore how do you not pertain to birth from the Virgin, when you are members of Christ?"²⁸ St. Leo the Great: "The generation of Christ is the origin of the Christian people, and the birth of the Head is the birth of the body... They were born together with Him in his nativity."²⁹

4) On the relation between compassion and maternity, see the texts cited above in n. 137.

5) St. Irenaeus says it beautifully: "A pure Son opening a pure womb in a pure way—a womb which regenerates men into God and which He made pure."³⁰

6) These ideas recur also in the liturgy.³¹

140. Theological reasoning. a) Mary is the mother not only of the physical Christ, but also of the Mystical Christ. Therefore she is our mother.

Antecedent: Mary's maternity terminates formally in the Redeemer (that is, not in Jesus, who later became the Redeemer, but in Him who at the very first moment already is the Redeemer, and in order that he might be the Redeemer). But redemption happens by insertion into Christ of those who have a fundamental solidarity with Him in the same human nature. Therefore.

b) Spiritual maternity is had from the generation of the Mystical Body. But this generation has two principal stages, namely, in the Incarnation and under the cross. Therefore in these two moments especially her spiritual maternity is constituted.

The *minor* is proved, because our solidarity with Christ begins with the Incarnation, so that He, a true man, can make satisfaction for men. In the cross our union with Christ is attained in a higher way from the power of Christ's blood, by which we were purchased by Him and in Him.

141. Scholium 1. *On the extension of this spiritual maternity, as intimately con-*

27. *Advers. Nestorium* 1,1: MG 76,17.

28. *Serm.* 192,2: ML 38,1012.

29. *Serm.* 21,2: ML 54,213.

30. *Advers. Haereses* 4,33,11: MG 7,1080. Note however that this text is not understood in the same way by all. See Galtier, *La Vierge qui nos régénère*: *RechScRel* 5 (1914) 136-145; M.A. Genevois, O.P., *La maternité de saint Irénée*: *RevThom* 41 (1936) 26-51; H. Rahner: *ZkathTh* 57 (1933) 393. But the context in which Isa. 7:14 is cited indicates rather a mariological interpretation, not an ecclesiological one.

31. See J.M Parent, O.P., *La maternité spirituelle de Marie dans la liturgie romaine*: *Alma Socia Christi* 2,234-248.

nected with the truth of Christ's Mystical Body, in a proportionate way the same things must be said that St. Thomas says in III, q. 8, a. 3 about Christ the Head.

142. Scholium 2. *On the nature of spiritual maternity.* The title because of which Mary is said to be the spiritual mother of men is not a mere adopted title or one given to her, but it signifies a certain true, though analogical, generation in the moral order. For, the physical generation of Christ tends towards the formation of the mystical Christ, that is, toward the incorporation of men in Christ. This is so not only because redemption would have been impossible unless Christ were a man and he is a man because of that generation, but because redemption is had "in Christ" from the will of God; this supposes a previous solidarity with Him. Therefore that incorporation of men into Christ was ordained to participation in His spiritual life. Therefore in all of this there is a certain quasi spiritual or moral generation. In the first stage, therefore, the consent of the Virgin to the Incarnation is a true spiritual conception, inasmuch as it is a formally maternal act, beginning the generation of the mystical Christ. But in the second state, the compassion of the Virgin on Calvary is a true spiritual birth, inasmuch as it is a formally maternal act, by which the human race is reborn in Christ through complete incorporation into Him.³²

32. See J.M. Bover, *María Mediadora universal* 393-405; Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *Nauraleza de la maternidad espiritual*: EstMar 7 (1948) 121-144; *La acción de María en las almas y la Mariología moderna*: EstMar 11 (1951) 255-278; G. Freuand, O.S.B., *Maternité divine et maternité de grâce*: RevThom (1939) 675.

ARTICLE II

ON UNIVERSAL MEDIATION IN GENERAL

143. Because the Bl. Virgin is the spiritual mother of men, and to the extent to which she is such a mother, she ought to be called the Mediatrix between God and men, since she brings to men the things that pertain to God and she brings the things that pertain to men to God. She does the former inasmuch as she regenerates men to the divine life; but she does the latter inasmuch as she offers her maternal consent in the name of and as a representative of the human race. Therefore we will now consider the existence and truth of this Marian mediation.

Thesis 8. The Bl. Virgin Mary is said to be and in the proper sense is Mediatrix.

Alastruey, 713-725; Merkelbach, 306-323; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,231-230, where there is an ample bibliography; Bittremieux, *De mediatione universali B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* (Bruges 1926); Bover, *Maria Mediadora universal* 427-442.

144. Definition of terms. A woman is said to be a *mediatrix* in the proper sense who intercedes between two persons, in order to bring them together by bringing what belongs to one over to the other. A mediatrix *fundamentally and in the first reality (in actu primo)* who has the dignity and excellence in such a way that she is constituted as a medium between both extremes, therefore distinct from both and in some way participating in both (ontological mediation). A mediatrix *formally and in the second reality (in actu secundo)* who performs an act of bringing together the extremes—by bringing the good of one to the other (moral mediation).

Mediation can be *principal and participated*: the former takes place by the proper power of the mediator; the latter, by the power accepted from the principal mediator.

We say that the Bl. Virgin Mary has the office of mediatrix before God, with a mediation participated and subordinate to the mediation of Christ. But this mediation of the Virgin is not simply necessary in order to reconcile men with God, but only from the will of God who wills to associate Her with the unique principal Mediator, who is necessary and sufficient.

Meanwhile we say nothing about the acts by which Mary has exercised or does exercise that mediation. For this will be treated in the following articles. But it seems that the ontological mediation of the Bl. Virgin must

be placed in both aspects of her maternity, the divine and the spiritual.

145. 1) *Protestants*, who stress the word of St. Paul: *There is one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus* (1 Tim. 2:5).

2) Then this was strongly renewed by the *Jansenists*, especially Adam Windenfeldt, who admits no other mediation of Mary except her prayer for us.¹

3) The title of Mediatrix has been displeasing to some Catholic authors.

146. Doctrine of the Church. Since many documents will be quoted in the following articles, now we will cite only more general comments.

Pius IX: "The Mediatrix and Advocate is the most powerful woman in the world with her Only-begotten Son."²

Leo XIII: "To thee we lift our prayers, for thou art the Mediatrix, powerful and at once pitiful, of our salvation."³ "Our Lady, our Mediatrix, the Reparatrix of the whole world, the Dispenser of all heavenly gifts."⁴ Invoke "the powerful and ever-acceptable intercession of the Blessed Virgin."⁵ "Undoubtedly the name and attributes of the absolute Mediator belong to no other than to Christ, for being one person, and yet both man and God, he restored the human race to the favor of the Heavenly Father... And yet, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, there is no reason why certain others should not be called in a certain way mediators between God and man, that is to say, in so far as they co-operate by predisposing and ministering in the union of man with God. Such are the angels and saints, the prophets and priests of both Testaments; but especially has the Blessed Virgin a claim to the glory of this title. For no single individual can ever be imagined who has ever contributed or ever will contribute so much towards reconciling man with God... She it is from whom is born Jesus; she is therefore truly his Mother, and for this reason a worthy and acceptable Mediatrix to the Mediator."⁶

St. Pius X: "By this companionship in sorrow and suffering already mentioned between the Mother and the Son, it has been allowed to the august Virgin to be the most powerful Mediatrix and Advocate of the whole

1. See P. Hoffer, *La dévotion à Marie au déclin du XVII^e siècle, autour du Jansenisme et des „Avis salutaires de la B.V. Marie à ses dévots indiscrets“* (Paris 1938) 275; C. Dillenschneider, *La Mariologie de saint Alphonse di Liguori* 1,41-54.

2. Bull "*Inefabilis*": CL 6,843.

3. Encyclical "*Iucunda semper*": AAS 27,182.

4. Encyclical "*Adiutricem populi*": ASS 28,130f.

5. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29,658.

6. Encyclical "*Fidentem piunque*": ASS 29,206.

world with her Divine Son.”⁷

Benedict XV instituted of the feast of the Bl. Virgin Mary, Mediatrix of all graces.

Pius XI: “Trusting in her intercession with Christ, who whereas He is the one mediator of God and men, chose to make His Mother the advocate of sinners, and the minister and Mediatrix of grace....”⁸ “Interposing likewise the powerful patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mediatrix of all graces....”⁹

147. In these texts Mary is called:

- a) Mediatrix;
- b) Mediatrix with her Son, the Mediator;
- c) Mediatrix between God and men.

Her mediation is explained as distinct from the common mediation of the Saints, because it is based on Her maternity, on the special work she contributed to the reconciliation of men, on her association with Christ the Mediator which she accepted from Him, in a moral communion of sufferings and sorrows.

Theological note. That the Bl. Virgin Mary is a Mediatrix in some true sense, and that from a title very special before the other saints, is *a matter of faith from the ordinary magisterium*. That the title of Mediatrix is used correctly is *certain from the frequent use of the Roman Pontiffs and the Liturgy*; there can be no doubt about this.

148. Proof from tradition. 1) The holy Fathers, ecclesiastical authors and early theologians use the *title of Mediatrix*. And in fact they call Mary:

a) Mediatrix, our Mediatrix, Mediatrix of men, of the whole world, of the human race, Mediatrix of grace, of salvation. Thus St. Ephraem, St. Epiphanius, Antipater Bostrensis, St. Andrew of Crete, St. Tharadius, Isidor of Thessalonica, St. Anselm, Eadmerus, St. Bernard, Adamus Scotus, William of Paris, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, Gerson, Driedo, Salmerón, Suarez, Contenson, St. Alphonsus de Liguori.

b) Mediatrix between God and men, of God and of men. Thus St. Ephraem, Basil of Seleucia, William of Paris, St. Albert, St. Laurence Justinian.

c) Mediatrix with the Mediator, with the Son, between men and

7. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36,454. See I. Quadrio, S.D.B., *La mediazione sociale di Maria SS. nel magistero di S. Pio X*: AnGreg 68,361-381.

8. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus Redemptor*”: ASS 20 (1928) 192.

9. Encyclical “*Caritate Christi compulsi*”: ASS 24 (1932) 192.

Christ, between the guilty and the judge, between Christ and the Church. Thus St. John Damascene, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, Petrus Blesensis, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert.¹⁰

2) The holy Fathers use *other titles also* that signify the same reality. Thus, v.gr., advocate, nurse of reparation, restorer of lost mercy, restorer of the lost world, repairer, our savior, and so forth.¹¹

3) They express the same doctrine *under the metaphors* of aqueduct, hill, way, stairs, bridge, ship, port.¹²

4) Both the title of Mediatrix and the doctrine appear often in Latin *hymns* of the Middle Ages.¹³

149. Theological reasoning. a) Mary has *ontological mediation*. She is separate from God, because she is only a human person; she is separate from men, because she approaches the limits of divinity by her divine maternity. But on the other hand she participates in God, because from her divine maternity she pertains to the divine family; she participates in men, because from her spiritual maternity she pertains to the new supernatural human family whose head is Christ.

b) Mary exercises *moral mediation*. We will prove this expressly in the following articles. For now it will suffice to say that she brought Christ to men, and that Her intercession, because of her singular dignity and grace, is absolutely special.

150. Objections. 1. According to St. Paul there is *one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus* (1 Tim. 2:5). Therefore Mary's mediation is excluded.

First response. Therefore the mediation of the Saints is excluded (see D 1821).

Second response: I distinguish the antecedent. There is one principal and independent Mediator, *conceded*; secondary and subordinate, *denied*.

2. But the Apostle's text excludes simply any other mediator. For, he says *one Mediator* in the same way as he says *one God*. But in this way another God is simply excluded. Therefore another Mediator is also simply excluded.

I deny the parity. Because "God" is the name of a nature, while "Mediator" is the name of an office. But there is nothing surprising in the fact that the divine nature cannot be shared in such a way that there could be another God, which in this case is impossible; but the office of a Mediator, in a subordinate and secondary way, can be shared with others.

10. See J.M. Bover, *Maria Mediatrix*: EphThLov 6 (1929) 439-462. See also in the 14th century P. Thomas, *De conceptione B.M.V.* 3 c.9; I. Vitalis, *Defensorium B.V.M.* 4 c.4.

11. See Bittremieux, *De Mediatione universalis B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* 128.

12. See J.M. Bover, *De universalis B.M. Virginis mediatione metaphorica testimonia*: Marian 4 (1941) 201-237.

13. See Serapio de Iragui, *La Mediación de la Virgen en la himnografía latina de la Edad Media* (Buenos Aires 1939) 182-251; *La Mediación de la Virgen en la liturgia*: Alma Socia Christi 2, 223-226.

3. The mediation of Mary is either of the same order as the mediation of Christ or it is of the same order as the mediation of the Saints. If the first, then there is not “one Mediator”; if the second, then we are saying nothing special about Mary. Therefore Her special mediation should not be affirmed.

I offer a third form. Mary’s mediation is a special mediation of an intermediate order. For, it is simply of a different order than the mediation of Christ, since it participates in his and is subordinate to it. But it is also simply of a different order than that of the Saints, since it proceeds from a person having the dignity of a higher order, and it is exercised with a completely different causality and amplitude, as we shall see.

151. Scholium 1. *The twofold aspect of Marian mediation.* We saw both in the teaching of the holy Pontiffs and in the documents of tradition that the Bl. Virgin is called in the same way Mediatrix with the Mediator and Mediatrix with God. The reason for this can be that the Bl. Virgin is in the middle both between her Son and men, and between men and God. However these are different aspects of one and the same mediation. The first way of speaking signifies the aspect of Mary’s mediation towards Christ, that is, of a Mother to her Son. The second way of speaking signifies the aspect of Mary’s mediation towards God, that is, of an associate of the Redeemer towards the offended God. The first aspect seems to be exercised more in intercession and the distribution of graces; the second rather in corredemption.¹⁴

152. Scholium 2. *The Bl. Virgin Mary, Mediatrix of angels.* It is clear that this question must be solved in a different way by the theologians, according to their different opinions about the primary end of the Incarnation. But even in the Thomistic opinion it is necessary to say that the Bl. Virgin is the Mediatrix of angels, inasmuch as she obtains something special for them from the Incarnation.¹⁵

14. See Bittremieux, *De Mediatione universali B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* 229f.

15. Bittremieux, *loc.cit.*, 230-234.

ARTICLE III

ON CORREDEMPTION

153. Thus far we have spoken about spiritual maternity and universal mediation in general. Now we intend to treat corredemption and the distribution of graces, which are two particular aspects both of spiritual maternity and of mediation. We treat mediation, for, as St. Thomas wrote about Christ (III, q. 26, a. 2), Christ is very truly said to be a Mediator, because he unites men with God “by offering satisfaction and prayers for men”; therefore, always keeping the right proportion, we will say the same thing about the Bl. Virgin. But we concentrate on her spiritual maternity, because it pertains to Mary to do both tasks “maternally,” namely, by generating men to the divine life, whether in the stage of producing redemption or in the stage of communicating that redemption. Therefore in this article we will treat the first actuation of her mediation and spiritual maternity, which is corredemption.

On this question *there are three problems to consider*. *The first* is, whether de facto the Bl. Virgin is Corredemptrix, and rightly can be so named. *The second* is, where in the life of the Bl. Virgin is found the historical realization of this corredemption, or, by what acts did she exercise this corredemption. *The Third* is, how in the concrete should the corredemption be conceived, or, the manner and causality of Marian corredemption. We will consider this last point in a scholium and the two previous points in the following theses.

154. However it should be *noted* that this question has been hotly disputed in recent theology. For there are some theologians who hold that all cooperation of Mary in redemption is located in her mediate physical (and moral) cooperation, because she is the Mother of the Redeemer, or in her immediate (moral) cooperation in the communication of redemption, which they call *subjective redemption*.¹ But in accomplishing the work itself of redemption (*objective redemption*), they deny that there is any proximate or

I. This terminology (objective and subjective redemption) is very displeasing to certain authors who defend corredemption. However we think that this should not be urged too strongly, since it is easily understood what the opposing authors wish to say with this terminology. The concept of objective redemption is also attacked therefore because the whole effect of redemption is in the redeemed men. Hence a distinction has been proposed: *redemption in the cause and redemption in the effect* (see S.Th. III, q. 49, a. 1 ad 3). Thus G.P. Kreling, O.P., *De objective verlossing*: Theologische Opstellen (Mélanges Van Noort, Utrecht 1944) 118-130. But it is well said by P. Druwé (*La médiation universelle de Marie*: Maria [ed. Du Manoir] 1,520f.), that by the passion and resurrection of Christ humanity has already been redeemed according as it is included in Christ. This indeed was necessary in order that individual members of the faithful by their incorporation into Christ might participate in the redemption.

immediate causality of the Virgin. The main authors who defend this position (omitting those who either touch on it only in passing or have changed their opinion) are these: H. Lennerz, J. Ude, G. Philips, G.D. Smith, J. McCarthy, A. Michel, W. Goosens who merited approval in recent reviews of his work.²

More recently a third way of redemption between objective and merely subjective has been proposed; they call it *receptive redemption* and attribute it to the Bl. Virgin. They propose this inasmuch as the Bl. Virgin, as the most perfect created human person and in the name of all humanity, accepted as applied to herself and to others (subjectively) the redemption (objectively) accomplished by Christ alone. Therefore the holy Virgin is called Corredemptrix, because *in a receptive way* (not just subjectively, and also not objectively) by receiving her redemption she has cooperated in it. This, they say, is proper to a woman, proper to a mother: to be subject to a man, to receive, to depend. But it pertains to a man alone to act and to give. This receptive acceptance and appropriation of objective redemption made by the Bl. Virgin is affirmed by these authors to be necessary for the redemption to be truly human and fruitful. In this sense the cooperation of Mary in the Redemption, which is wholly singular, is said to be necessary. Thus, H.M. Köster, O. Semmelroth, A. Müller.³

We really think that neither of these opinions explains sufficiently what needs to be explained. The positive documents of the magisterium and tradition demand a cooperation in the redemption which is more than merely subjective. Certainly the acceptance of redemption, although made in the name of all humanity,⁴ is wholly insufficient.

Therefore we intend to clarify and support the opinion which holds

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2. H. Lennerz, *Considerationes de doctrina B. Virginis Mediatrix*: Greg 19 (1938) 419-446; Id., *De redemptione et cooperatione in opere redemptionis*: Greg 22 (1941) 301-324; and often elsewhere; J. Ude, *Ist Maria die Mittlerin aller Gnaden? Eine dogmatisch-kritische Untersuchung* (Brixen 1928); G. Philips, *De Maria Mediatrix gratiarum*: RevEccL Liege 30 (1938-39) 179-185, 249-255, 296-312; G.D. Smith, *Mary's Part in our Redemption* (London 1938); J. McCarthy, *The Universal Mediation of the Blessed Virgin*: The Irish EccRev 52 (1938) 131-146, 273-285; A. Michel, *Le rôle de Maria dans la Rédemption*: AmCl 57 (1946) 9-37; W. Goosens, *De cooperatione immediata Matris Redemptoris ad redemptionem obiectivam* (Paris 1939). Concerning the reviews of this work, see RevScRel 19 (1939) 332-341 (J. Riviere), ThRev 39 (1940) 1s (B. Poschmann), RechThAncMéd 12 (1940) 205-207 (B. Capelle), RevHistEccL 35 (1939) 917 (R. Draguet); and even before this on the occasion of other articles, Congar in RevScPhTh 27 (1938) 646-649. On these authors, see J. Carol, *De Corredemptione B.V.M.*, 47f.
 3. H.M. Köster, *Die Magd des Herrn* (Limbourg 1947); *Unus Mediator* (Limbourg 1950); *Die Stellvertretung der Menschheit durch Maria* (Paderborn 1954) 323-359; O. Semmelroth, *Urbild der Kirche* (Würzburg 1950); A. Müller, *Ecclesia-Maria* (Freiburg 1951).
 4. The teaching of tradition is known about the Bl. Virgin giving her consent to the angel in the name of all humanity. On this matter German theologians have collected together many texts in the volume: *Die heilsgeschichtliche Stellvertretung der Menschheit durch Maria* (Paderborn 1954). However it is one thing that this representation of all humanity is given in Mary, and something else, completely different, in this representation alone to find Her whole cooperation in objective redemption. Much less is it the primary principle of all Mariology, as some have suggested.

for Mary's *immediate cooperation in accomplishing objective redemption*. However regarding the other authors mentioned only once, we will keep their arguments in mind in the objections and in our explanations.

Thesis 9. The Bl. Virgin Mary participated with Christ in the work of redemption and therefore she is rightly called the corredeptrix.

Alastruey, 725-735; Merkelbach, 323-344; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,251-351; Bittremieux, *De mediatione universali B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* 7-112; C. Bover, S.J., *Réflexions sur al Corédemption de Marie: Alma Socia Christi* 2,1-12.

155. Definition of terms. *The work of redemption*, that is, the summary of the actions by which the human race was freed from the slavery of the devil.

Participated with Christ: she was associated and united with Christ the Redeemer in order to accomplish that work. But we understand this causality as immediate and moral (therefore distinct from the causality by which she became mother of Christ the Redeemer). However, as is clear, it is secondary (not necessary except on the supposition of the divine will) and subordinate (having its total efficacy from the primary and absolutely necessary causality of Christ the Redeemer).

Is rightly called corredeptrix: that is, because she is truly redemptrix in the defined sense, this title can justly be applied to her.

156. Doctrine of the Church.⁵ 1) Pius IX: "Just as Christ, the Mediator of God and men, having assumed a human nature, destroying the handwritten decree against us, in triumph nailed it to the cross, so also the Holy Virgin, joined to him by a close and unbreakable bond, together with him and through Him exercising eternal enmity against the poisonous serpent, crushed his head with her immaculate foot."⁶

2) Leo XIII: "She took her part in the laborious expiation made by her Son for the sins of the world."⁷ "To thee we lift our prayers, for thou art the Mediatrix, powerful at once and pitiful, of our salvation."⁸ "And truly the Immaculate Virgin, chosen to be the Mother of God and thereby associated

5. Cristóstomo de Pamplona, O.F.M.Cap., *La corredepción mariana en el magisterio de la Iglesia*: EstMar 2 (1943) 89-110; J.M. Bover, *María mediadora universal* 447-468; Bittremieux, *Adnotationes circa doctrinam B.M. Virginis Corredeptricis in documentis RR. Pontificum*: EphThLov 16 (1939) 745-778); H. Seiler, *Corredeptrix. Theologische Studie zur Lehre der letzten Päpste über die Mitterlöserschaft Mariens* (Rome 1939); J.B. Carol, *Romanorum Pontificum doctrina de B.V. Co-redemptrice*: Marian 9 (1947) 3-63; J.M. Díez-Alegria, S.J., *La mediación de María en la entrega del hombre a Dios*: Manr 23 (1951) 281-326.

6. Bull "Ineffabilis": CL 6,839.

7. Encyclical "Iucunda semper": ASS 27,178. See ASS 31,257.

8. Encyclical "Iucunda semper": ASS 27, 178.

with Him in the work of man's salvation, has a favor and power with her Son greater than any human or angelic creature has ever obtained, or ever can gain."⁹

3) St. Pius X: "And from this communion of will and suffering between Christ and Mary, she merited to become most worthily the reparatrix of the lost world, and dispensatrix of all the gifts that our Savior purchased for us by his death and by his blood... Yet, since Mary carries it over all in holiness and union with Christ and has been associated by Christ in the work of redemption, she merits for us *de congruo* (in a congruous manner), in the language of theologians, what Christ merits for us *de condigno* (in a condign manner)" (D 3370).¹⁰ "There are those whom a pious love for the Most Blessed among the virgins so pleases, that they can never mention Jesus, unless it is accompanied with the glorious name of his Mother, our *corredemptrix*, the Blessed Mary. This praiseworthy custom is extended to that invocation, or Christian greeting, concerning which the decree of this Holy Congregation was given on March 27, 1913...."¹¹ The Congregation of the Holy Office assigned indulgences to the prayer which says: "Blessed be your holy name, blessed be your sublime prerogative of being the true Mother of God, always a virgin, conceived without the stain of sin, of being the *corredemptrix* of the human race."¹²

157. 4) Benedict XV: "So did she suffer with her suffering and dying Son, and almost die; so did she abdicate her maternal rights over her Son for the salvation of men, and so placate God's justice, insofar as was fitting for her, so did she sacrifice her Son, that it can properly be said that she with Christ redeemed the human race" (D 3370).

5) Pius XI: "The Virgin participated with Jesus Christ in the very painful act of redemption" (D 3370). The Virgin Mary "by her mystic union with Christ and His very special grace she likewise became and is piously called a reparatress."¹³ "O Mother of piety and mercy, compassionate and *corredemptrix*, you stood by your sweet Son as He was consummating on the wood of the cross the redemption of the human race...."¹⁴ Pius XI in his allocutions often used the title "*Corredemptrix*."

9. Encyclical "*Supremi Apostolatus*": ASS 16,114. Leo XIII, while still a diocesan bishop, used the title of "*Corredemptrix*"; see Carol, *loc.cit.*, 516.

10. How in this text the point is really about the immediate cooperation of Mary in accomplishing our redemption is explained very well by A. Druwé, *La Médiation universelle de Marie* 438-451.

11. Decree of the Holy Office: AAS 5 (1913) 364. See also ASS 41 (1908) 409.

12. Decree of the Holy Office: ASS 6 (1914) 108f. See *Preces et pia opera, indulgentiis ditata* (Rome 1938) n.316. See L. Pillet, S.D.B., *La corredenzione mariana nel magisterio del B. Pio X* (Turin 1951).

13. Encyclical "*Miserentissimus Redemptor*": AAS 20 (1928) 178.

14. Prayer at the end of the Jubilee Year: *L'Osservatore Romano*, 29-30, April 1935.

Pius XII: "It was she... always most intimately united with her Son... offered him on Golgatha to the Eternal Father for all the children of Adam."¹⁵ "We must remember especially that, since the second century, the Virgin Mary has been designated by the holy Fathers as the new Eve, who, although subject to the new Adam, is most intimately associated with him in that struggle against the infernal foe which, as foretold in the Protoevangelium, would finally result in that most complete victory over the sin and death that are always mentioned together in the writings of the apostle of the Gentiles... Hence the revered Mother of God, from all eternity joined in a hidden way with Jesus Christ in one and the same decree of predestination... the noble associate of the Divine Redeemer, who has won a complete triumph over sin and its consequences..."¹⁶ "But the Blessed Virgin Mary should be called Queen, not only because of her Divine Motherhood, but also because God has will her to have an exceptional role in the work of our eternal salvation... Now, in the accomplishing of this work of redemption, the Blessed Virgin Mary was most closely associated with Christ... If Mary, in taking an active part in the work of salvation, was, by God's design, associated with Jesus Christ, the source of salvation itself, in a manner comparable to that in which Eve was associated with Adam, the source of death, so that it may be stated that the work of our salvation was accomplished by a kind of recapitulation, in which a virgin was instrumental in the salvation of the human race, just as a virgin had been associated with its death; if, moreover, it can likewise be stated that this glorious Lady had been chosen Mother of Christ in order that she might become a partner in the redemption of the human race...; then it may be legitimately concluded that as Christ, the new Adam, must be called a king not merely because he is Son of God, but also because he is our Redeemer, so, analogously the Most Blessed Virgin is queen not only because she is Mother of God, but also because, as the new Eve, she was associated with the new Adam."¹⁷

158. *Please note* regarding these texts: a) *The title* "Corredemptrix" is expressly affirmed, in spite of the objections of some theologians.

b) *The cooperation of Mary* in the work of redemption is affirmed constantly. And that is not only in the application of redemption, but also in its accomplishment; for these two sometimes are expressly distinguished

15. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 248. On other texts of Pius XII, see J.B. Carol, *Pio XII e la corredenzione di Maria*: Marian 1 (1939) 361-364.

16. Bull "*Munificentissimus Deus*": AAS 32 (1950) 768. On this text, see Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *La Corredención o asociación de María con Cristo, recalcada en la "Munificentissimus"*: EstMar 12 (1952) 163-167; J.B. Carol, *The Apostolic Constitution "Munificentissimus Deus" and Our Lady's Corredemption*: Marian 13 (1951) 237-256.

17. Encyclical "*Ad coeli Reginam*": AAS 46 (1954) 633-635.

(Leo XIII, St. Pius X). This cooperation is also different from the divine maternity (Pius XII).

c) *The root* of that cooperation is located in the mystical union with Christ. This is not a mere joining together of the Mother with her Son; rather, it is had by a special divine will to admit and associate Her with Christ in the work of redemption. Hence:

Theological note. a) That Mary cooperated in the work of redemption, at least mediately, is *a matter of faith (de fide)*.

b) That she also cooperated immediately is a doctrine *more in conformity with the quoted texts of the Holy Pontiffs*. Indeed these texts, taken together as a whole, signify the constant teaching for a century of the Roman Pontiffs proposed to the whole Church more clearly with the passage of time. For they are not unaware of the disputes of theologians over this matter.

c) That the title of Corredemptrix is used rightly is *certain*; and it is not licit to doubt about its suitability.

159. Proof from Holy Scripture. Gen. 3:15. There the work of redemption to be accomplished by Christ is foretold. But in the same text Mary is associated with Christ in one and the same work. Therefore Mary with Christ brought about the work of redemption.

The major is clear. *The minor* is proved: There is enmity between the serpent and her seed on the one hand, and the serpent and Mary and Christ on the other. But in this was there is association of Mary with Christ in the same battle and in the same triumph. Therefore.¹⁸

160. Proof from tradition.¹⁹ *In the Fathers* already at the beginning the teaching appears about the association of Mary with Christ in his work under the comparison of Eve-Mary. The general formula for this can be: "Death through Eve, life through Mary."²⁰ Thus St. Justin (R 141), St. Irenaeus (R 224), Tertullian (R 358), St. Augustine (R 1578). Similar statements are made by St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Epiphanius, St. Jerome, St. Peter Chrysologus,

18. See J. B. Carol, *loc.cit.*, 91-121; R. Rábano, *La Corredención de María en la Sagrada Escritura*: EstMar 2 (1943) 9-59; W. Goosens, *De cooperatione immediata Matris Redemptoris ad redemptionem obiectivam* 86-103.

19. See J. Lebon, *L'apostolicité de la doctrine de la médiation mariale*: RechThAncMéd 2 (1930) 129-143; J.M. Bover, *La mediación universal de la "Segunda Eva" en la tradición patristica*: EstEcl 2 (1923) 321-350; F.P. Solám, *La corredención de María en la tradición patristica*: EstMar 2 (1943) 61-88; F. Druwé, *La médiation universelle de Maria*: Maria 1,458-517; Carol, *De Corredemptione* 128-150. For the Eastern tradition, see Gordillo, *Misiologia orientalis* 68-150.

20. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 22,105: ML 22,408.

St. John Damascene.²¹

This teaching, which appeared in ancient times in the writings of the Fathers, is necessarily connected with revelation. For, it has its origin in Gen. 3:15 (St. Irenaeus, St. Justin, the Bull “Munificentissimus”), in Rev. 12 (St. Irenaeus), in the teaching of St. Paul about the second Adam (St. Irenaeus).²²

b) *In the Middle Ages* the same parallelism was taught by St. Bernard, Peter Blesensis, St. Bonaventure, and especially by Pseudo-Albert the Great. Here are some of his words on this: “Eve generated all to death, Mary to heaven...; the former is the principle of mortality, the latter the principle of regeneration...; the former was the occasion of loss to her husband, the latter help to her Son for redemption.”²³ The same idea recurs often in Latin hymns.²⁴ Worthy of special mention is “Ave Maris Stella” (8th to 9th century).

c) *The term itself* “Corredemptrix” appears already in the 14th century.²⁵ It appears likewise in the 14th-15th century in a hymn: “So suffering with the Redeemer—arrested as a transgressor—you become “Corredemptrix.”²⁶ It is used afterwards by Alano,²⁷ Salmerón, Bartholomeo de los Rios, Maximilian Reichenberg, Chrystophoro Vega, Balthassare de Riez,

21. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cataches*. 12.15: MG 33,41; St. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 78,18: MG 42,728f.; St. Jerome, *Epist.* 22,105: ML 22,408; *Tract. in Ps.* 96: Anecdota Maredsolana 3,92; St. Peter Chrysologus, *Serm.* 140: ML 52,576; St. John Damascene, *Hom. in Nativitatem B.M.V.* 7: MG 96,672. See J.M. Bover, *La mediación universal de la “Segunda Eva” en la tradición patristica*: EstEcl 2 (19230 321-350; Id., *La mediación universal de María según San Ambrosio*: Greg 5 (1924) 25-45. Many texts were already assembled before by C. Passaglia, *De Immaculato Deiparae semper Virginis conceptu* 2,830-916.

22. See F. Druwé, *loc.cit.*, 460-477.

23. St. Bernard, *Hom. 2 super “Missus est”* 3: ML 183,62f.; Peter Blesensis, *Serm.* 34: ML 107,665; St. Bonaventure, *De donis Spiritus Sancti* coll.6 n.16 (ed Quaracchi 5,486); Ps. Albert the Great, *Mariale* q.29 par.3. See Plessner, O.F.M., *Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura über die Mittlerschaft Mariens*: FranzStud 23 (1936) 353-389; L. Di Fonzo, *Doctrina S. Bonaventurae de universalis Mediatione B. Virginis Mariae* (Rome 1938), and on this book see, G. Roschini, *La dottrina de S. Bonaventura sulla mediazione universale di Maria*: Maria 2 (1940) 59-80; J.M. Bover, *La mediación universal de la Santísima Virgen en las obras del B. Alberto Magno*: Greg 7 (1926) 511-548. M.M. Desmarais, O.P., *Saint Albert Le grand, Docteur de la médiation mariale* (Paris-Ottawa 1935); J. Bergmann, *Die Stellung der seligsten Jungfrau im werke der Erlösung nach dem hl. Kirchenlehrer Albertus Magnus* (Freiburg 1936).

24. See Serapio de Iragui, *La Mediación de la Virgen en la himnografía latina de la Edad Media* 101-130; *La Mediación de la Virgen en la liturgia*: Alma Socia Christi 2,207-216.

25. In an anonymous Spanish treatise written, it seems, before the year 1323; see Carol, *De Corredemptione* 173.

26. *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi* 46,128.

27. See Carol, *loc.cit.*, 174.

Sedlmayr, Van Ketwigh, St. Alphonse Liguori, and others.²⁸ It is defended expressly by Grenier against the Jansenists.²⁹ In an equivalent way Richard of St. Laurence had already called Mary “coadjutrix for the redemption of the world,” and Pseudo-Albert the Great, St. Antoninus and others “the adjutrix of the redemption.” Bernardine de Bustis, Clichtovaeus, Salazar, Rhodes, Ripalda also call her the “redemptrix”³⁰; in fact that happened already in the 11th century.³¹

161. Theological reasoning. Mary appears associated with Christ to constitute with Him one adequate principle to repair supernatural life. But that principle exercised its causality de facto in the redemptive work of Christ. Therefore Mary cooperated in that work.

The major is proved, because Mary is associated with Christ just as Eve was with Adam. But Eve is associated with Adam to establish the principle not only of natural life, but also for the communication and transmission of supernatural life. Therefore.³²

162. Objections.³³ Mary was *redeemed* by Christ. Therefore she cannot be *corredemptrix*. *I prove the consequent*. In order for the fruits of the redemption to be applied to Mary, it is necessary that the redemption was already completed. But if redemption was completed, She could not cooperate in it. Therefore.

Regarding this difficulty there were some theologians who were inclined to deny the

28. Salmerón, *Commentarii in evangelium historiam et in Acta Apostolorum* tr.41 (ed. Matrity 1601 t.10.430); Barth. de los Rios, *Hierarchia Mariana* (Antwerp 1641) p.59; Max. Reichenberg, *Mariani cultus vindiciae*, animad. 24. Chryst. Vega, *Theologia Mariana* pal.29 cert.1 n.1716; Balthas. De Riez, *Les justes louanges de la Très Auguste Mère de Dieu* (Aix 1662) p. 226; Sedlmayr, *Scholastica Mariana* part.2 q.8 a.10 n.1411 (in Bourassé, *Summa Aurea* t.7 col. 1275); Van Ketwigh, *Panoplia Mariana* (Antwerp 1720) p. 101; St. Alphonse de Liguori, *Opera dommatica contra gli eretici*, *Comm. Al Conc. Tridentino ss.25 par I* (Naples 1871) p.181. On the teaching of these authors, see C. Dillenschneider, *Le concours soteriologique de Marie à notre Rédemption chez les théologiens du XVII siècle étrangers à l'école béruillienne*: EphThLov 16 (1939) 779-800; Id., *Le concours soteriologique de la Vierge d'après le mariologie dominicain Van Ketwigh, 1720*: RevThom 44 (1938) 790-797; Id., *La Mariologie de S. Alphonse de Liguori* 2 122-153; T. Gallus, *Maximilianus Reichenberg, S.J. (+ 1673), defensor Corredemptrix*: DivThom (Pi) 54 (1951) 189-196. Other documents are made available by J.B. Carol, *loc. cit.*
29. *Apologie des dévots de la Sainte Vierge* p.161.180-184. It is also defended by St. Alphonse di Liguori in the place cited in the preceding note. See Carol, *loc. cit.*, 302ff.
30. Richard of St. Laurence, *De laudibus B.M. Virginis* 3,12; Ps. Albert the Great, *Mariale* q.25.3; St. Antoninus, *Summa* p.4 tit.15 c.20 par.14 and c.44 par.2; Bernardine of Bustis, *Marialie* (ed. 1513) fol.u.t.; Clichtovaeus, *De dolore B.M.V. in passione Filii sui* (Paris 1517) p.70f.; Salazar, *Pro immaculata Deiparae Virginis conceptione defensio* c.21 n.1-6; Rhodes, *Theologia Scholastica* tr.8 disp.unic. q.1 s.4 par.1; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.79 s.11 n.86. See J.M. Bover, *B.V. Maria hominum Co-redemptrix*: Greg 6 (1925) 537-569; W. Sebastián, O.F.M., *De B. Virgine Maria universali gratiarum mediatrice. Doctrina Franciscanorum ab anno 1600 ad annum 1730* (Rome 1952).
31. See R. Laurentin, *Le Titre de Corédemptrice. Etude historique* (Rome 1951).
32. See M. Cuervo, *La Virgen Santísima Mediadora de gracia y el Rosario*: Alma Socia Christi 2,249-271.
33. See R.M. Gadneret, O.P., *Difficultés sur la Corédemption: principes de solution?*: Alma Socia Christi 2,13-20.

antecedent. But this cannot be sustained, as we said above while treating the Immaculate Conception.

Likewise there were others (Godts, Schüth, Campana) who held the possibility of some kind of influence of Mary in her own redemption. It seems that this can hardly be understood correctly.

Therefore it is necessary to respond: *I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent*. She cannot be the corredemptrix of herself, *conceded*; of others, *denied*. And for the proof *I distinguish the major*: it was completed, that is, everything was done by Christ that was required for Mary's redemption according to the will of God, *conceded*; everything was done by Him that was de facto required for the redemption of others according to the same divine will, *denied*.

Christ's redemption for Mary is not the same as that for others. This difference is not just in a different application (because Mary's redemption is preservative, while the redemption of others is liberating), but also in the very application of redemption (because the redemption of Mary is the redemption of the future Mother of the Redeemer). Therefore several expression of reason can be distinguished. In the first expression Mary is redeemed, because by the prevision of the merits of Christ she is preserved from all sin. In the second expression Mary, who is thus preserved and sanctified, is chosen as the Mother of the Redeemer and as the associate with Him to accomplish the redemption for the rest of mankind.³⁴

163. 2. But then a *twofold redemption* must be admitted. But of this twofold redemption there is not even a trace in the sources.

I distinguish the major. Twofold in its complete historical reality, *denied*; twofold in order and in nature, *conceded*. But that a trace of this twofold redemption is not present in the source, can be *bypassed* (for this also is not simply to be conceded), but the *supposition is denied*. For if this is necessary in order to explain the teaching of the Magisterium and Tradition, then it can surely be supposed by theologians as a theological explanation.

164. 3. Redemption is an *act of public worship*, which can be offered only by a priest. But the Bl. Virgin Mary is not a priest. Therefore she could not perform that act.

1) *The whole argument is bypassed*. For we are not now saying that the Bl. Virgin so concurred in the redemption that she touched on all the formalities of it.

2) *I distinguish the minor*. She is not a priest, that is, she performed no sacerdotal action, *denied*; she is not a priest, that is, she did not possess priestly ministry, *conceded*. But there will be more about this later.

34. See A. Deneffe, *De Mariae in ipso opere redemptionis cooperatione*: Greg 8 (1927) 14-22; J.M. Bover, *Redempta et Corredemptrix*: Marian 2 (1940) 39-58; *Maria Mediadora universal* 370-377; E. Druwé, *loc.cit.*, 536f; J.M. Díez-Alegría, *La mediación de María en la entrega del hombre a Dios*: Manr 23 (1951) 319-322.

Thesis 10. The Bl. Virgin Mary participated in accomplishing the work of redemption principally by her virginal consent and by her maternal compassion.

Alastruey, 538-558; Merkelbach, 325-330; Roschini, 2,1,351-356; Bover, *Deiparae Virginis consensus, corredemptionis ac mediationis fundamentum* (Matriti 1942); *Marta Mediadora universal* (Matriti 1946) 253-285; *Virginis consensus, fuitne vera corredemptio?*: Alma Socia Christi 2,164-172; H. Guindon, S.M.M., *Compassion corredemptrice*: ibid. 49-60.

165. Connection. After we have established that Mary was associated with the Redeemer in the accomplishment of the work of redemption, our next question is in what historical fact of her life Mary's association in the redemptive act took place. And we say that it happened principally in the Incarnation and under the cross.

166. Definition of terms. *Participated*: we are dealing with the same immediate causality, and it is obviously moral, in achieving objectively redemption itself.

Virginal consent, that is, the consent that Mary gave to the angel for the virginal maternity of the Redeemer.

Maternal compassion, that is, participation in the sorrows of Christ, which Mary had especially near the cross of Jesus.

Principally, that is, we affirm these two historical moments of Mary's cooperation in the work of redemption; we are not saying they are the only ones, but the principal ones. However here we are not concentrating on the manner of this cooperation.

Therefore *we affirm* that both the consent of the Virgin and the compassion of the Mother had true, moral and immediate causality in the work of redemption, together with the acts of Christ himself, but subordinate to and dependent on his acts. Therefore the thesis has two parts.

PART 1: ON HER CONSENT

167. Doctrine of the Church. 1) Leo XIII: "The eternal Son of God, about to take upon himself our nature for the saving and ennobling of man and about to consummate thus a mystical union between himself and all mankind, did not accomplish his design without adding there the free consent of the elect Mother, who acted in some way in the role of the human race itself, according to the illustrious and most true opinion of St. Thomas...."¹ "When she professed herself the handmaid of the Lord for

1. Encyclical "*Octobri mense*": ASS 24,195.

the mother's office, and when, at the foot of the altar, she offered up her whole self with her Child Jesus—then and thereafter she took her part in the laborious expiation made by her Son for the sins of the world.”² “She offered to mankind, hastening to eternal ruin, a Savior, at that moment when she received the announcement of the mystery of peace brought to this earth by the Angel, with that admirable act of consent in the name of the whole human race... They also elucidate what we owe to Mary for our reconciliation and salvation.”³

2) Pius XII: “She consented in the place of the whole human nature, so that a certain spiritual marriage might be had between the Son of God and human nature.”⁴

168. *Note concerning these texts.* In them is affirmed: a) the connection between the consent of the Virgin and the Incarnation of the Redeemer; b) the representative character of this consent; c) its soteriological worth.

Theological note. *More probable and more in conformity with the doctrine of the Church.*

169. Proof from Holy Scripture. Luke 1:38. Her consent exercises true and immediate causality in its object. But the object of Mary's consent is the maternity of the Redeemer, as such. Therefore Mary truly and immediately cooperates in the maternity of the Redeemer. But in this way she truly and immediately cooperates in the redemption itself. Therefore.

The major. Whenever consent is seriously sought from another for the performance of some work, the principle of the action is not thought to be proximately and adequately constituted before the consent is obtained. But so the object truly morally and immediately depends also on the one giving consent. Therefore consent exercises true and immediate causality on the object itself.

The minor. a) The object proposed to Mary by the angel is the virginal maternity of the Messiah, who is the Son of God and the King of Israel. This office of Mary, who knows the Scriptures and has the light of the Holy Spirit, can be nothing else but the work of redemption.

b) The object of consent, as manifested here by Mary, is the complete offering of herself for the service of God in order to carry out the divine plan.

c) Therefore Mary gives her consent to maternity of the Redeemer,

2. Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27,178.

3. Encyclical “*Fidentem piumque*”: ASS 29,206f.

4. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 247.

including all the maternal duties that pertain to such a Mother.

This last minor. Such maternity does not signify the bare physical fact of maternity, but also the subsequent duties which follow from communion with the Redeemer.

170. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers attribute to Mary's consent a true *causality* in the order of redemption. St. Ephraem: "The angel came down from heaven and the Virgin spoke with him, and so this was the beginning of reconciliation... Eve signed a bill of credit, and the Virgin paid it... Eve lost it, and Mary restored it."⁵ Nicolaus Claravallensis: "God formed a plan... for the redemption of men... by way of redemption. And immediately from the divine treasury the name of Mary comes up, and all this was decided to take place through Her and in Her and from Her and with Her."⁶

b) They attribute this causality in particular to the *obedience and faith* contained in her consent: St. Irenaeus (R 224), Tertullian (R 358). St. John Damascene: "Mary in obedience to the divine will, Herself deceived the deceiving serpent and returned immortality to the world."⁷

c) These same ideas recur *at a later time*: St. Bernard: "In the eternal Word of God we were all made, and behold, we die. In your brief response we are all remade so that we are recalled to life... The consolation of the miserable depends on your mouth, the redemption of captives...." Richard of St. Laurence: "From the heart of the Bl. Virgin came forth her faith and consent; by these two acts the salvation of the world was begun... Therefore it is apparent to what extent this woman cooperated in the salvation of the world."⁸ Pseudo-Augustine: "O Blessed Mary..., who by your singular assent came to the rescue of the fallen world."⁹

d) From the beginning *theologians* urge the representative character of the Virgin's consent. Thus St. Antoninus, St. Thomas (III, q. 30, a. 1), Suarez, Sedlmayr, Toledo, etc.

e) Various *liturgical texts* can also be added.¹⁰

5. *Hymni et sermones* (ed. Lamy), 5,975-978.

6. *Serm. 2 de Annuntiatione*: ML 144,558.

7. *Hom. 1 in Nativitatem B.V.M.* 7: MG 96,671.

8. St. Bernard, *Hom. 4 super "Missus est"* 8: ML 183,83; Richard of St. Laurence, *De laudibus B.M. Virginis* 2,2.

9. *Serm. 2 de Annuntiatione dominica* 3: ML 39,2106. See J.M. Bover, *Singulari tuo assensu mundo succurristi perditio*: Marian 2 (1940) 329-351 see. Marian 3 [1941] 70-72).

10. See Serapio de Iragui, *La Mediación de la Virgen en la liturgia*: Alma Socia Christi 2,195-207.

171. Theological reasoning. Through the Incarnation redemption was started formally. But by her consent Mary cooperated morally in the Incarnation as such truly and immediately. Therefore truly and immediately by her consent she cooperated in the redemption.

The major. That is, by the Incarnation we not only have him who afterwards will bring about redemption, but we have the Redeemer himself beginning the redemption.

The minor. Consent seriously sought exercises true, moral and immediate causality in what is known and intended by the one consenting. But Mary, from whom consent was seriously sought, knew and willed not only the Incarnation viewed physically, but also formally as the beginning of redemption. Therefore Mary by her consent cooperated morally in the Incarnation as such, truly and immediately.

This last minor. She knew this from her knowledge of the Scriptures and from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as is made apparent in her great “Magnificat.”

172. Scholium. *What is the extent of the causality of consent?* It can be asked whether this moral causality of the virginal consent extends to the whole redemption, or only to its beginning. Surely it extended to the entire redemption, at least implicitly. For Mary offers herself as a handmaid for the divine service to accomplish that marvelous work, without any limitation, according to God’s will; hence freely (out of faith and obedience) she consented to the sorrows that would come her way from her maternal communion with the Redeemer. Moreover the Redeemer, as She undoubtedly knew from her study of Scripture and much more from her internal supernatural illumination, had to suffer much and accomplish the redemption by his death. Hence it is not surprising that She, with the help of divine grace, also accepted by her consent participation in the sufferings and passion of her Son, the Redeemer. Consequently it can be said with great probability that the moral causality of the virginal consent bore immediately on the whole redemption. Finally, such consent given in this way continued morally in the Heart of the Mother, and became daily more explicit, since she pondered in her Heart the deeds and the words of Christ. From this daily renewed consent the communion of affection through Christ’s whole life became closer and more perfect between Mary the Corredemptrix and her Son the Redeemer. Thus Leo XIII could write: “She promptly proclaims and consecrates herself the handmaid of God even while she becomes His Mother. Her sacred promise was as sacredly kept with a joyous heart; henceforth she led a life in perpetual union with her Son Jesus, sharing with Him His joys and sorrows.”¹¹

PART 2: ON HER COMPASSION

11. Encyclical “*Magnae Dei Matris*”: ASS 25,145.

173. Doctrine of the Church. 1) Pius VII: “The Christian faithful really owe reverence to the Bl. Virgin Mary, as the sweet Parent of her Son, so that with careful zeal and benevolence they may cultivate the memory of the sorrows—those intense sufferings that She, while standing near the cross of Jesus, endured with singular and invincible fortitude and constancy and which She offered to the Eternal Father for their salvation.”¹²

2) Leo XIII: “She took her part in the laborious expiation made by her Son for the sins of the world. It is certain, therefore, that she suffered in the very depths of her soul with His most bitter sufferings and His torments. Moreover, it was before the eyes of Mary that was to be finished the Divine Sacrifice for which she had borne and brought up the Victim... There stood by the Cross of Jesus his Mother, who, in a miracle of charity, so that she might receive us as her sons, offered generously to Divine Justice her own Son, and died in her heart with Him, stabbed with the sword of sorrow.”¹³

3) St. Pius X: “When the extreme hour of the Son came, beside the Cross of Jesus there stood Mary His Mother, not merely occupied in contemplating the cruel spectacle, but rejoicing that her only Son was offered for the salvation of mankind, and so entirely participating in His Passion, that if it had been possible she would have gladly borne all the torments that her Son bore. And from this community of will and suffering between Christ and Mary she merited to become most worthily the Reparatrix of the lost world and Dispensatrix of all the gifts that our Savior purchased for us by His Death and by His Blood.”¹⁴

4) Benedict XV: “Thus with her suffering and dying Son she almost died, and she so abandoned her maternal rights to her Son for the salvation of mankind, and immolated her Son to placate the Divine Justice as much as she could, that it can rightly be said that She along with Christ redeemed the human race.”¹⁵

5) Pius XI: :”The sorrowful Virgin participated with Christ in the work of redemption....”¹⁶ “O Mother of piety and mercy, who, as compassionate and corredemptrix stood by your sweet Son as he was accomplishing on the wood of the Cross the redemption of the human race...: preserve in us, we pray, and daily increase the precious fruits of redemption and of your compassion.”¹⁷

6) Pius XII: “It was she..., always most intimately united with her Son,

12. In Bover, *Soteriologia Mariana* 453.

13. Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27,178.

14. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 10 (1918) 182.

15. Apostolic Letter “*Inter Sodalicia*”: ASS 10 (1918) 182.

16. Apostolic Letter “*Explorata res est*”: AAS 15 (1921) 104.

17. Prayer at the end of the Jubilee Year: *L'Osservatore Romano*, 29-30 April 1935.

offered Him on Golgotha to the Eternal Father for all the children of Adam, sin-stained by his unhappy fall, and her mother's rights and mother's love were included in the holocaust...."¹⁸

174. Please note concerning these texts: In them a) The connection between Mary's compassion and the redemption is affirmed; b) This connection is of such a nature that because of it she is rightly called the corredemptrix; c) therefore the fruits of the redemption and of Mary's compassion are recounted in the manner of one and the same thing.

Theological note. *More probable and more in conformity with the texts of the Pontiffs.*

175. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers in the parallelism of Eve-Mary also stress the parallelism of tree-cross. But such parallelism supposes the soteriological action of Mary under the cross of Christ, corresponding to the action of Eve under the tree. But this could not be anything else but compassion. Therefore. Here are some other texts: St. Ambrose: "Adam from the virginal earth, Christ from the Virgin... Foolishness through a woman; wisdom through a woman. Death from the tree; life from the cross."¹⁹ St. John Chrysostom: "Virgin, wood and death were symbols of our defeat... Now see how those same things are the cause of our victory. For Eve, Mary; for the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the tree of the cross; for the death of Adam, the death of the Lord."²⁰ John Euboeensis: "For the tree and the woman were the origin of your exile from Paradise; but now the tree and the woman are your restoration."²¹

b) *In hymns of the Middle Ages* many things are said about the compassion of the Virgin and some of these texts seem to mention expressly the causality of that compassion. Thus: "Praise to the Father, and also to the Son—together with the holy Paraclete—for the sufferings of the Mother and her Son—by which we have been restored."²²

c) *In the 12th century* the same doctrine is taught by Arnoldus

18. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 247. See also other quotes from Pius XII above in n. 157.

19. *Expositio in Lucam* 4,7: ML 1q5,1698; CSEL 32,4,142.

20. *In Sanctum Pascha concio* 2: MG 52,768.

21. *Serm. In Conceptionem S. Deiparae* 21: MG 96,1495.

22. *Analecta Hymnica Medii Aevi* 52,57. Many texts have been collected by Serapio de Iragui, *La Mediación de la Virgen en la himnografía latina de la Edad Media* 150-175; however in his conclusions he seems to weaken too much the worth of these documents. See Carol, *loc.cit.*, 177f.

Carnotensis,²³ Godefridus Admotensis,²⁴ Richard of St. Laurence.²⁵

d) During the time of *the great Scholastics* this causality of compassion is expressed more clearly. Thus, Pseudo-Albert the Great: “The Bl. Virgin is not a vicar but a helper and associate; she was a partaker in the kingdom who was a partaker in the sufferings for the human race, when... She alone remained under the cross and She accepted in her heart the wounds that Christ bore in his body.”²⁶ St. Bonaventure: “In a wonderful way Mary must be praised and loved, because it pleased Her that her Only-begotten was offered for the salvation of the human race. And she also suffered so much that, if it were possible, She would willingly endure all the torments that her Son endured.”²⁷ There is a dispute about the mind of St. Thomas on this matter.²⁸

e) *In the 14th and 15th centuries* a similar doctrine was proposed by the *Speculum humanae salvationis*,²⁹ Alanus,³⁰ Tauler,³¹ St. Antoninus.³²

f) *In the 16th century*, among others those to be mentioned are Salmerón,³³ Catarinus,³⁴ St. Robert Bellarmine.³⁵

g) *In the 17th century* this doctrine was quite commonly accepted, while some opposed it. This is true a fortiori of the following centuries.³⁶

176. Theological reasoning. Mary was associated with Christ immediately in accomplishing the work of redemption. But the work of redemption is obtained especially through the passion and death of Christ. Therefore it is fitting that She participated in the passion and death of Christ. But she participated especially by her maternal compassion. Therefore her maternal compassion immediately influenced the redemption.

177. Note. We have seen the cooperation of Mary in beginning and completing redemption. But redemption permeated the whole life of Christ. The Roman Pontiffs have much to say about Mary’s association with Christ the Redeemer during his whole

23. *De septem verbis Domini in cruce*: ML 189,1694.

24. *Hom. 7 in Assumptionem*: ML 174,985f.

25. *De laudibus B. Mariae Virginis* 1,15. See Carol, 156-162.

26. *Mariale* q.42,5; see Carol, *loc. cit.*, 164ff.

27. *In 1* dist.48 a.2 q.2 dub.4; see Carol, *loc. cit.*, 162ff. But there has been a dispute recently about the genuine interpretation of the mind of St. Bonaventure. See T. Szabó, O.F.M., *Doctrina S. Bonaventurae de mediatione B.V. Mariae quoad omnes gratias*: Alma Socia Christi 2,293-341.

28. See Carol, *loc. cit.*, 168f; A. Ciappi, O.P., *De cooperatione B.V. Mariae in mysteriis humanae salutis, iuxta doctrinam St. Thomae et Commentatorum ex ordine Praedicatorum*: Alma Socia Christi 2,272-292.

29. Vol.2 p.1. See Carol, 173.

30. *Homiliae* (Paris 1514) fol.199.

31. *Sermo de Purificatione B.M.V.*

32. *Summa* p.4 tit.15 c.20 § 14.

33. *Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* tr.41 (Cologne 1604) vol.10 p.339.

34. *De Immaculata Conceptione opusculum* 1.3 persuasion 14.

35. *Sermo de Nativitate B. Virginis*. See Straeter: Greg 25 (1944) 32.

36. See Carol, 321.381.480.

life. That is, the communion of sorrows between Mother and Son which in Mary, as we have seen, was not only maternal but also soteriological, was actuated in the individual mysteries of the redemption; in this way the office of Corredemptrix extends to all those mysteries. Therefore in the thesis we say that this office is located “principally” in her consent and in her compassion.³⁷

178. Objections. A) *Regarding consent.*

1. Mary’s consent is given when redemption does not yet exist. Therefore she cannot influence it.

I distinguish the antecedent. It has not yet begun, *denied*; it is not yet completed, *I subdistinguish*: in the matter itself, *conceded*; in the intention of Mary giving her consent, *denied*.

2. What is not necessary for an effect, cannot be called a cause of the effect. But Mary’s consent is not necessary for redemption. Therefore she does not concur in it.

I bypass the major which is simply not true. *I distinguish the minor.* It is not absolutely necessary, *conceded*; hypothetically, *denied*.

3. But it is also not necessary hypothetically. For if Mary’s consent were necessary hypothetically, without it there would have been no Incarnation or redemption. But there is no reason for this affirmation. Therefore it was not hypothetically necessary.

I concede the major and deny the minor. Surely in our historical order consent was requested of Mary, and the Incarnation did not take place before She gave her consent.

4. But Mary’s consent is not truly and properly requested. For the Fathers praise Mary’s obedience. But this obedience supposes that God ordered Her to become a mother, and not that he waited for her consent. Therefore Her consent is not really requested.

Firstly. *I reverse the argument.* The obedience of Christ in effecting our redemption is praised by St. Paul. Therefore the redemption was imposed on Him, without waiting for His consent. Therefore even if He had not consented, the redemption would have been accomplished. Secondly. *I concede the major and distinguish the minor.* This obedience supposes that God revealed his plan to Mary so that she might freely consent to it, *conceded*; it supposes that God imposed his plan on an unwilling Mary, *denied*.

5. Consent does not have efficacy unless it is directed to what is known and intend-

37. See Leo XIII: [When we pray the Rosary] “we recall the memory of her exalted dignity and of the Redemption of the human race which God began through her. We likewise bring to mind the divine and everlasting bond which links her with the joys and sorrows, the humiliations and triumphs of Christ in directing and helping mankind to eternal life” (Encyclical “*Magnae Dei Matris*”: ASS 25,141); “As the various mysteries present themselves one after the other in the formula of the Rosary for the meditation and contemplation of men’s minds, they also elucidate what we owe to Mary for our reconciliation and salvation” (Encyclical “*Fidentem piumque*”: ASS 29,206f.); “For as often as we salute Mary with the angel’s greeting as Mary full of grace, so often... we remember her other singular merits, by which she was made a partaker with her Son in the redemption of mankind... They are the mysteries of our redemption at which she was not only present, but also took part...” (Apostolic Letter “*Parta humano*”: ASS 34,194f.; see also the Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27, 178). St. Pius offers similar words (Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36,451-453) and also Pius XI: “She brought forth for us Jesus our Redeemer, and nourished Him, and offered Him as a Victim on the Cross, by her mystic union with Christ and His very special grace she likewise became and is piously called a reparatress” (Encyclical “*Miserentissimus Redemptor*”: ASS 20,178).

ed by the one consenting. But Mary did not know anything but the plain Incarnation. Therefore she had influence on it alone, but not on the redemption.

I distinguish the major. What is known and intended only implicitly, *conceded*; only explicitly, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* Explicitly, *I bypass*; at least implicitly, *denied*, as is clear from the “Magnificat.”

179. B) Regarding compassion.

6. Mere compassion does not have moral causality in relation to acting. Therefore Mary did not cooperate in bringing about the redemption.

I deny the supposition. Mary’s compassion is no mere compassion of some mother for a suffering son; but it is the actuation of a particular positive association of this Mother with her Son, who was about to redeem the world by his passion.

180. Scholium. *On the different ways of corredemption.* We have seen that the Bl. Virgin Mary cooperated immediately in the work of accomplishing redemption, and that it was principally located in her virginal consent and maternal compassion. Our next question concerns the way or manner of her cooperation. And because the moral causality, which can be in consent, is sufficiently clear, the whole question now concerns the moral causality of compassion. We will study this by comparison with the causality of Christ’s passion, as it is explained by St. Thomas in III, q. 48.³⁸

181. 1. On corredemption by way of merit. a) *We say* that the compassion of the Virgin had meritorious causality, not only in the individual and personal order of the Virgin herself, but also in the social and objective order of the redemption to be accomplished for all mankind. Just as the passion of Christ merited for us the gifts of grace and glory, and thus accomplished our redemption, so did the compassion of Mary together with the passion of Christ. Today this seems to be the more common opinion among theologians.

b) *It is based* on the pontifical teaching of Leo XIII and St. Pius X. Leo XIII wrote: “For as often as we salute Mary with the angel’s greeting of Mary full of grace, so often... we remember her other singular merits by which she was made a partaker with her Son in the redemption of mankind.”³⁹ St. Pius

38. See M. Cuervo, O.P., *La cooperación de María en el misterio de nuestra salud debe ser concebida analógicamente a la acción de Jesucristo*: EstMar 2 (1943) 111-151. Not all the authors who defend corredemption in the proper sense understand it in the same way. Thus, v.gr., T. Gallus, defending that the Bl. Virgin was the “material principle” of objective redemption: *Ad B.M. Virginis in redemptione cooperationem*: DivThom (Pi) 51 (1948) 113-135; *Mater dolorosa, principium materiale*” *redemptionis obiectivae*: Marian 12 (1950) 227-249; *Doctrina corredemptionis apud Iudocum Clichtoveum*: Marian 14 (1952) 293-304; *Ad “principium materiale” redemptionis obiectivae*: DivThom (Pi) 57 (1954) 230-261. On this theory see Dillenschneider, *Le mystère de la corédemption mariale* 18-25, and Marian 14 (1952) 25.

39. Apostolic Letter “*Parta humano*”: ASS 34,194.

X: "Yet, since Mary carries it over all in holiness and union with Christ and has been associated by Christ in the work of redemption, she merits for us *de congruo* (in a congruous manner), in the language of the theologians, what Christ merits for us *de condigno* (in a condign manner)."⁴⁰ There has been much debate over the meaning of this last text. The adversaries insist on the present tense of the verb "merits" (*promeret*) in opposition to the past tense "merited" (*promeruit*); hence they conclude that the text is dealing with the graces already acquired by the merit of Christ, which the Bl. Virgin now asks for. Thus they hold that the verb "promeret" must be understood in the broad sense for "to beseech" or "to obtain." But it seems that one must proceed in the inverse order: the formula "de congruo promeret" in opposition to the other "de condigno promeruit" undoubtedly must be understood in a technical sense. That is even more the case since the Pontiff refers expressly to theologians (whether the allusion is to the whole phrase, or to the terminology of "de congruo"). But of course now the Bl. Virgin cannot merit in this sense. Therefore the present tense must be understood as being used for the past, or as what is known as the "historical present."⁴¹

182. c) Compassion can be understood as meritorious in two ways. *In the first way*, according as it signifies a certain quasi appropriation of the meritorious passion of Christ, inasmuch as the merits of Christ himself in some true sense can also be attributed to Mary. If the matter is conceived in this way, the works, which had as their reward our gifts of grace and glory, were only the meritorious works of Christ; but not only as they are from Christ, but at the same time also as they are attributed to Mary by her maternal right. However the right of this attribution is had in an appropriation, that is, in a positive act by which Mary efficaciously made the merits of Christ her own. But the efficacy of this act resides not in the mere will of Mary, but in Her maternity, or rather in her maternal rights to the life of her Son. These rights of Mary seem to be taught by Benedict XV: "Thus with her suffering and dying Son she almost died, and she so abandoned her maternal rights to her Son for the salvation of mankind..."⁴² And recently by Pius XII: "On Golgotha she offered Him together with the holocaust of her maternal rights and her maternal love."⁴³ Please note that in this way of understanding the matter that they do not attend to the

40. Encyclical "*Ad diem illum*": ASS 36,454.

41. See Bittremieux, *De congruo promeruit nobis B. Virgo, quae Christus de condigno*: EphThLov 8 (1931) 422-436; J.M. Bover, *Maria Mediadora universal* 456-458; L. di Fonzo, *B. Virgo de congruo, ut aiunt, promeret nobis, quae Christus de condigno promeruit*: Marian 1 (1930) 418-459, where there is a large bibliography on this matter.

42. Apostolic Letter "*Inter Sodalicia*": ASS 10 (1918) 182.

43. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 247.

meritorious worth of the act, by which Mary appropriates to herself the merits of her Son, but only to the truth of the act. That being the case, the merits of Christ juridically are those of Christ and of Mary.

In the second way, compassion is thought to be meritorious according as in itself it is a work worthy of a reward, which is received by God in the objective order of universal salvation, because it is not the work of some private person, but of a person joined together with Christ in the work of accomplishing redemption. In this way of understanding the matter the works, which had as their reward our gifts of grace and glory, were the meritorious works of Christ and Mary, the passion of the Son and the compassion of the Mother. We think that this second way can be safely held.

183. d) *The worth of meritorious compassion* is at least congruous (*de congruo*). The question has been asked whether it is also condign (*de condigno*). Indeed in the first way of conceiving compassion there does not seem to be any difficulty. Even in the second way condignness is affirmed by some regarding the reality, whatever may be the case concerning the way of speaking. Thus A. Fernández, Balic, Cuervo, Bover are opposed. Others have proposed a merit that is *supercongruous* (*de supercongruo*).⁴⁴ It seems that condignness can be defended rightly. For having supposed the association of Mary with Christ in the work of accomplishing redemption, one must admit in the Virgin a certain *divine ordination of grace* for the good of other human beings (in fact this must be admitted in every hypothesis, if there is corredemption by way of merit). To this ordination there is added also a certain *equality*, which is necessary for condignness. For the Bl. Virgin on the one hand has infinite dignity in a certain sense, but on the other hand she has as much grace as is "sufficient for the salvation of all mankind."⁴⁵ Therefore a certain condignness between Mary's merit and the gifts of grace and glory for all mankind seemingly must be asserted as more probable. But it is an *imperfect condignness*, which cannot be said with strict justice, since it supposes the merit of Christ and is simply based on it. Therefore this opinion can be defended to the extent that it admits a certain type of condignness that is inferior to the condignness of the merits of Christ. In this sense it does not seem that the theological expression, quoted above from St. Pius X, can be opposed, whatever may be the case with the terminology.

44. EtMar (1936) 247f. The doctrine of condign Marian merit was defended as the common opinion of Spanish Mariologists at the Roman International Congress in 1950. See EstMar 11 (1951) 12f. In opposition is: M.-J. Nicolas, O.P., *Le mérite de la Vierge*: RevThom 53 (1953) 167-174.

45. St. Thomas, *Expositio solutionis angelicae*.

184. c) Against the whole doctrine of corredemption by way of merit there is the following *objection*:

The principle of merit does not fall under merit. But the object of Christ's merits is the principle of Mary's merits. Therefore the object of Mary's merits cannot be the same as the object of Christ's merits.

Some respond by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: the object of Christ's merits, inasmuch as these are referred to Mary taken personally, is the principle of Mary's merits, *conceded*; the object of Christ's merits, inasmuch as they are referred to other men, is the principle of Mary's merits, *denied*.

Lebon responds: I distinguish the minor. The object of Christ's merits is the principle of the merits that Mary has as a private person, *conceded*; as a public person associated with God for the work of redemption, *denied*. And *I distinguish the consequent in the same way*. The meritorious object of Mary, as she is a private person, cannot be the same as the object of Christ's merits, *conceded*; the object of Mary's merits, as she is a public person associated with God for the work of redemption, *denied*. In this last solution it is supposed that the grace of the Corredemptrix, as such, is not from Christ but from God, although Mary's grace, as a private person, is certainly from Christ who redeems her in a more sublime way. This solution seems to have its own probability.⁴⁶

185. On corredemption by way of satisfaction. a) *We are saying* that the compassion of the Virgin had satisfactory causality in the objective order of accomplishing redemption for other men. For, she could not satisfy for herself, since she had no sin. Just as the passion of Christ sufficed for the sins of the whole world and this produced our redemption, so also did the compassion of Mary together with the passion of Christ. Today more commonly theologians hold this position.

b) The *foundation* of this doctrine is found in those titles from tradition in which Mary is called "our propitiation," "restrainer of the wrath of God" (St. Anselm), "purifier of crimes" (Rupertus), "magnificent price for Eve"

46. See A. Fernández, *De mediatione B. Virginis secundum doctrinam D. Thomae*: CiencTom 38 (1928) 145-170; C. Calic, *Die sekundäre Mittlerschaft der Gottesmutter*: WissWeish 4 (1937) 1-22; M. Cuervo, *La gracia y el merito de María en su cooperación a la obra de nuestra salud*: CiencTom 57 (1938) 87-104, 204-223, 507-543; J.M. Bover, *María Mediadora universal* 299-307; J. Lebon, *Comment je conçois, j'établis et je défend la doctrine de la médiation mariale*: EphThLov 16 (1939) 655-744; G.M. Roschini, *Utrum meritum corredemptivum Deiparae appellari possit meritum "de condigno"*: Marian 3 (1941) 238-247; M. Cuervo, *Sobre el mérito corredemptivo de María*: EstMar 1 (1942) 325-352; M. Llamera, *El mérito natural corredentivo de María*: EstMar 11 (1951) 81-140; J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *Le mérite social de Marie et sa prédestination*: Alma Socia Christi 2,21-48; M. Cuervo, *La Virgen Santísima Mediadora de gracia y el Rosario*: *ibid.*, 256-268.

(Damascene); or they say that “the Virgin paid the price [for Eve]” (St. Ephraem), “the Bl. Virgin made satisfaction for the guilt [of Eve]” (St. Albert the Great), “she made satisfaction to the Father for her mother” (St. Bernard), etc.⁴⁷ This is also the doctrine of the recent holy Pontiffs. Leo XIII: “She took her part in the laborious expiation made by her Son for the sins of the world.”⁴⁸ St. Pius X: “And from this community of will and suffering between Christ and Mary she merited to become most worthily the Reparatrix of the lost world.”⁴⁹ Benedict XV: “Thus with her suffering and dying Son she almost died, and she so abandoned her maternal rights to her Son for the salvation of mankind, and immolated her Son to placate the Divine Justice as much as she could, that it can rightly be said that She along with Christ redeemed the human race.”⁵⁰

c) Satisfactory compassion can also be understood in two ways. *In the first way*, according as it signifies a certain quasi appropriation of the satisfactory passion of Christ, inasmuch as the satisfaction of Christ in some true sense can also be attributed to Mary. If the matter is conceived in this way, the works of satisfaction that pleased God were only the satisfactions of Christ; but not only as they are from Christ, but also as they are rightly attributed to Mary, because of her maternal rights in the life of her Son.

In the second way, satisfactory compassion is conceived as in itself it is a penal work, which is accepted by God in the objective order of universal salvation, because it is not the work of some private person, but of a person joined together with Christ in the work of accomplishing redemption. In this way of conceiving the matter, the satisfactions, which de facto pleased God, were the satisfactions of Christ and Mary--the passion of the Son and the compassion of his Mother. Of course the latter is subordinate to the former and based on its power. We defend this second way.

186. d) *The worth of satisfactory compassion is at least congruous (de congruo).* The question is raised about whether it is condign (*de condigno*), even in the second way of conceiving the matter. But this seems to be a greater difficulty than in the case of merit. For, since sin involves an infinite malice, in order to establish some equality between the offense and the satisfaction (which is absolutely required for condignness) the infinity of the satisfaction must be affirmed. In fact, since the worth of the satisfaction is measured from the person making the satisfaction, an infinite or divine

47. See C. Friethoff, *De alma Socia Christi Mediatoris* 37-45.

48. Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27,178.

49. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36, 453f.

50. Apostolic Letter “*Inter Sodalicia*”: ASS 10 (1918) 82.

person would be required. Nevertheless there are not lacking recent theologians, who, like the older ones, *defend a certain condignness of Mary's satisfaction*. They are more or less the same ones mentioned earlier.

This opinion seems to enjoy solid probability. *In the first place*, because the worth of Mary's satisfaction is not like the worth of the satisfaction of other men. This difference is not only quantitative, but it is also qualitative, for it is the satisfaction of the Mother of God. Indeed, since the dignity of divine maternity is in some respect infinite, we must conclude that the worth of Her satisfaction is also infinite in some respect. But, as the more probable and true opinion of theologians holds, the malice of sin is also not simply infinite, but only in some respect. Therefore we can find a certain adjustment and equality between the malice of the offense and the worth of Mary's satisfaction, since both of them are infinite in some respect.

In the second place, several older theologians, coming from different schools, admitted the possibility of some condign satisfaction on the part of a creature, although of course this condignness could not be perfect nor in strict justice. But having granted this, and heeding the singular association of Mary with Christ in the work of accomplishing redemption, it seems necessary to conclude that this imperfect condignness belonged to Her, and that therefore the compassion of the Virgin has satisfactory worth that is in some way condign. Hence in order for this condignness to be true, it supposes only some equality between the offense and the satisfaction. But not just any condignness seems to suppose equality between the person satisfying and the person offended, but full and perfect condignness, out of strict justice. Without doubt it is from this that the first necessarily borrows its entire worth.⁵¹

187. 3. On corredemption by way of sacrifice. a) This question is more difficult. We take our beginning from the teaching of the Roman Pontiffs. Leo XIII: "It was before the eyes of Mary that was to be finished the Divine Sacrifice for which she had borne and brought up the victim... There stood by the Cross of Jesus his Mother, who, in a miracle of charity, so that she might receive us as her sons, *offered* generously to Divine Justice her own Son, and died in her heart with Him, stabbed with the sword of sorrow."⁵² "Moreover, one must remember that the Blood of Christ shed for our sake

51. See J.A. de Aldama, *Cooperación de María a la redención a modo de satisfacción por el pecado*: EstMar 2 (1943) 179-193; J.M. Bover, *María Mediadora universal* 317-330; Alastruey, 2, 46-67.

52. Encyclical "*Jucunda semper*": ASS 27,178.

and those members in which He offers to the Father the wounds which He received, the price of our liberty, are no other than the flesh and blood of the Virgin.”⁵³ St. Pius X: “Moreover it was not only the prerogative of the Most Holy Mother to have furnished the material of his flesh to the Only Son of God, who was to be born with human members, of which material should be prepared the Victim for the salvation of men; but hers was also the office of tending and nourishing that Victim, and at the appointed time *presenting Him for the sacrifice*... But when the supreme hour of the Son came, beside the Cross of Jesus there stood Mary His Mother, not merely occupied in contemplating the cruel spectacle, but rejoicing that her Only Son was offered for the salvation of mankind, and so entirely participating in His Passion, that if it had been possible she would have gladly borne all the torments that her Son bore.”⁵⁴ Benedict XV: “Thus with her suffering and dying Son she almost died, and she so abandoned her maternal rights to her Son for the salvation of mankind, and *immolated* her Son to placate the Divine Justice as much as she could, that it can rightly be said that She along with Christ redeemed the human race.”⁵⁵ Pius XI: “And now lastly may the most benign Virgin Mother of God smile on this purpose and on these desires of ours; for since she brought forth for us Jesus our Redeemer, and nourished Him, and *offered Him as a Victim* by the Cross, by her mystic union with Christ and His very special grace she likewise became and is piously called a repararess.”⁵⁶ Pius XII:

“She, who was free of her own and inherited sin and was always closely joined together with her Son, on Golgotha offered Him together with the holocaust of her maternal rights and her maternal love.” Pius XII: “It was she, the second Eve, who, free from all sin, original or personal, and always most intimately united with her Son, *offered him* on Golgotha to the Eternal Father for all the children of Adam, sin-stained by his unhappy fall, and her mother’s rights and mother’s love were included in the holocaust.”⁵⁷

b) In these texts without doubt a certain *cooperation of Mary with the redemptive sacrifice of Christ* is being taught. This cooperation consists at least in this: Mary prepared the victim of the sacrifice, by giving birth to Christ and nourishing and protecting him. Therefore she really prepared the victim, since the flesh and blood, which are immolated on the cross, are the flesh and blood of Mary. Then the sacrifice itself took place, while she was present and rejoiced in his sufferings for the salvation of mankind.

53. Encyclical “*Fidentem piunique*”: ASS 29, 207.

54. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 10 (1918) 182.

55. Apostolic Letter “*Inter Sodalicia*”: ASS 10 (1918) 182.

56. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus Redemptor*”: AAS 20 (1928) 178.

57. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 247.

Moreover the Pontiffs speak about the office of placing on the cross the divine victim that was prepared by Mary. These words at times are used for the presentation in the temple, but it seems that is not always the case.

However there is still a question about whether a greater form of cooperation must be admitted, namely, a cooperation that is strictly priestly, so that Mary can be said to have accomplished with Christ the sacrifice itself of the cross. And this *seems to be the case* from some of the statements. For Mary is said to have renounced her rights to the victim for the salvation of mankind. Moreover it is said that she “offered her Son willingly to Divine Justice,” “offered a victim on the cross”; indeed, “*immolated* her Son to placate the Divine Justice as much as she could”; and that she did this not as a private person, but “as the second Eve.” Finally, She offered her sufferings and maternal rights together with her Son in a holocaust.

In order to explain these texts *it has been said* that the term “offered” must be taken only in a broad sense. However, if that term were used once in passing that could readily be admitted. But this term is repeated frequently, in a completely sacrificial context, in relation to the sacrifice of the cross, in reference to its victim, in reference to its redemptive efficacy. It does not seem that all of these points can be explained by a broad use of the term. That is even more the case, because some of the quoted words were written after the well-known disputes of the theologians on this matter, and they are certainly not restrictive words. Therefore it seems necessary to admit a special cooperation of Mary in the sacrifice of the cross, which is her immediate moral cooperation and in a sacrificial way. And this is not surprising, since Mary is not just the Mother of Christ, but she is also associated with Him in the work of accomplishing the redemption; this work was consummated in the sacrifice of the cross.

188. c) Can this cooperation of Mary be said to be *strictly priestly*, so that the sacrifice of the cross was offered at the same time by Christ and by Mary, from which Mary would also have a corresponding priesthood? A threefold priesthood is distinguished in the New Testament: the first is the priesthood of Christ, supreme and eternal; the second is the ministerial priesthood, which is had in the Church through the sacrament of Holy Orders; the third is the general and broad priesthood of all the Christian faithful, which is mentioned by St. Peter (1 Pet. 2:9).

The cooperation of the Virgin in the sacrifice of the cross cannot be reduced to an act of this last type of priesthood. This is so not only because this priesthood refers to the Eucharistic sacrifice, while Mary cooperated in the sacrifice of the cross; but also because Mary in a very special way united

with the Victim, in a singular way was joined together with Christ in the work of accomplishing the redemption. Mary's cooperation in the sacrifice of the cross cannot be reduced to an act of the ministerial priesthood, since without doubt Mary did not possess such priesthood, nor could she have it. Therefore it seems fitting to affirm some participation of the Virgin in the priesthood of Christ, because of which she is said to possess a type of priesthood below that of Christ, but above our ministerial priesthood.

189. d) But it is a completely different question whether the Bl. Virgin *should be called a priest*. For sometimes titles should not be used for reasons that are extrinsic to the reality involved. Of course this title was used by Pius IX,⁵⁸ and St. Pius X attached indulgences to a prayer that contained this title.⁵⁹ But on April 8, 1916, the Holy Office stated its disapproval of images that presented the Bl. Virgin wearing priestly vestments.⁶⁰ Next, a devotion to the Virgin-Priest, occasioned by a certain magazine article, was condemned.⁶¹ It is clear that in both cases the Holy Office wished to avoid confusion with the ministerial priesthood in the minds of the less-instructed faithful.⁶²

58. Letter to O. Van den Berghe, which is found at the beginning of the second edition of the book, *Marie et le Sacerdoce* (1875). There it says: "from the time of her virginal conception of Christ to his cruel death she united herself so closely to the sacrifice of her divine Son that she was called the *Virgin-Priest* by the Fathers of the Church."

59. AAS 40 (1907) 109f. However these indulgences are no longer granted.

60. AAS 8 (1916) 146. This decree, given on January 15, 1913, was not published until April 8, 1916.

61. See *Palestra del Clero* 6 (1927) 611. In that letter Cardinal Merry del Val, in the name of the Holy Office and on the occasion of the article "La vera divozione alla Vergine Sacerdote," published in the same magazine during the same year, said this: "E stato segnalato a questa suprema Congegatione del Sant'Offizio un articolo... Al qual proposito questa medesima Sacra Congregazione ha ordinato che la S.Eccellenza voglia richiamare sopra el menzionato articolo l'attenzione della Direzione di quel periodico, e avvertirla che la divozione de cui ivi si trata in conformità del Decreto del S.Offizio del 8 Aprile 1916 non e approvata e non si può propagare."

62. See N. García Garcés, *Cooperación de María a nuestra redención, a modo de sacrificio*: *EstMar* 2 (1943) 195-247; J.M Bover, *María Mediadora universal* 331-354. 466-468, 501-511; E. Sauras, ¿Fué sacerdotal la gracia de María?: *EstMar* 7 (1948) 387-424; R. Laurentin, *Essai sur un malaise théologique: Marie et le sacerdoce*: *NouvRevTh* 69 (1947) 271-283; *Le problème du sacerdoce marial devant le Magistère*: *Marian* 10 (1948) 160-178. In relation with this doctrine see also R. Laurentin, *Marie et la Messe. Essai sur un problème de spiritualité sacerdotale*: *NouvRevTh* 71 (1949) 39-55; J. Nox, *The Blessed Virgin Mary and the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass*: *Euntes Docete* 1 (1948) 82-103; M.P. Pourrat, *Marie et le Sacerdote*: *Maria* 1,8-824; Basilio de San Pablo, C.P., *Los problemas del Sacerdotio y del sacrificio de María*: *EstMar* 11 (1951) 141-220; J.M. Delgado Varela, O. de M., *Consagración del sacerdote al Corazón de María Santísima*: *Alma Socia Christi* 6,2,96-146.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE DISPENSATION OF GRACES

190. We have seen the mediation of the Virgin Mary and the actuation of her spiritual maternity in the stage of accomplishing redemption. Hence she is truly said to be and really is the *Corredemptrix*. The task still remains to investigate Her mediation and actuation of maternal spirituality in the stage of applying redemption to individual persons. In this sense she is said to be and really is *the Dispensatrix of graces*.

Thesis 11. The Bl. Virgin Mary truly is the Dispensatrix of all graces.

Alastruey, 625-657; Merkelbach, 345-381; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,394-407; Bittremieux, *De mediatione universalis B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* 134-243; Bover, *Maria Mediadora universal* 409-426, 228-235.

191. Definition of terms. A woman is said to be a *dispensatrix of graces* on whom depends in a causal way the fact that in the concrete graces are given to men that are in the treasury of redemption. It is clear that this causality, of whatever nature it might be (for we are prescinding from this point in the thesis), is undoubtedly subordinated, even at this stage, to the causality of Christ. Essentially however and in the abstract the office of dispensing graces can be separated from the office *corredemptrix*, so much so that the former can be real without the latter. However *de facto* it is certain from what we have already proved that the Bl. Virgin is *Corredemptrix*. Therefore from this she has a new title regarding the dispensation of graces.

It is clear that the affirmation of this activity of Mary in the distribution of graces does not signify the intrinsic necessity of the matter, but the divine will decreeing this for the Virgin. However another question can be this: whether the *corredemption* by its nature implies the office of being the *dispensatrix of graces*.

We are saying that Mary *now* has the exercise of that office, that is, after her assumption into heaven, prescinding from the question whether she also had it while living on earth. But we are treating this question in this chapter, and not in the following one, because of its doctrinal connection.

192. All graces. Here we mean universality regarding the graces granted and regarding the persons to whom they are given. However we assert this universality in the thesis only in a general way, prescinding from other questions, which can be raised about some graces in concrete situations.

Truly, that is, not just because Mary gave us Christ; for in this sense it can rightly be said that she is the dispensatrix of graces because she gave the world the author of grace. But such appellation would be very improper. Therefore we affirm the office of dispensing graces taken in a proper and formal sense, according to some kind of immediate causality on the graces themselves, either direct or indirect.

193. Adversaries. *Protestants, Jansenists*, among whom in particular are Adam Windenfeldt,¹ Muratori, under the pseudonym of Lamindus Britanius,² and others. All of these, under the pretext of pious exaggerations, reduce very much the intercession of the Virgin.

194. Doctrine of the Church.³ Leo XIII: We need to obtain the favor of “the great Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, the guardian of our peace and the minister to us of heavenly grace, who is placed on the highest summit of power and glory in heaven, in order that she may bestow the help of her patronage on men who through so many labors and dangers are striving to read that eternal city.”⁴ “God... listens to the prayers of her whom He wished to be the minister of his heavenly graces.”⁵ “With equal truth may it be also affirmed that, by the will of God, Mary is the intermediary through whom is distributed unto us this immense treasure of mercies gathered by God... Thus no man goes to the Father but by the Son, and no man goes to Christ but by His Mother.”⁶ “The recourse we have to Mary in prayer follows upon the office she continually fills by the side of the throne of God as Mediatrix of divine grace; being by worthiness and by merit most acceptable to Him, and, therefore, surpassing in power all the angels and saints in Heaven... And later, without measure and without end will she be able to plead our cause, passing upon a day to life immortal... We turn our prayerful voices to Mary. Thus is confirmed that law of merciful mediation of which We have spoken, and which St. Bernardine of Siena expresses: ‘Every grace granted to man has three degrees in order: for by God it is communicated to Christ, from Christ it passes to the Virgin, and from the Virgin it descends to us.’”⁷ “From her heavenly abode she began, by God’s decree, to watch over the Church, to assist and befriend us as our Mother;

1. In his work *Monita salutaria B. Mariae Virginis ad cultores suos indiscretos*, in 1673. See C. Dillenschneider, *La Mariologie de saint Alphonse de Liguori* 1,41-54.

2. See Dillenschneider, *op.cit.*, 73f.

3. See J.M. Bover, *Maria Mediadora universal* 478-489.

4. Encyclical “*Supremi Apostolatus*”: ASS 16,113.

5. Encyclical “*Superiore anno*”: ASS 17,49.

6. Encyclical “*Octobri mense*”: ASS 24,195f.

7. Encyclical “*Iucunda semper*”: ASS 27, 178f.

so that she who was so intimately associated with the mystery of human salvation is just as closely associated with the distribution of the graces which for all time will flow from the Redemption... She is the Dispenser of all heavenly gifts.”⁸ “From her, as from an abundant stream, are derived the streams of heavenly graces. In her hand are the treasures of the mercies of the Lord; God wished her to be the beginning of all good things.”⁹ “Thus the most powerful Virgin Mother, who formerly cooperated in charity that the faithful might be born in the Church, is also now the mediatrix of our salvation..”¹⁰

2) St. Pius X: “And from this communion of will and suffering between Christ and Mary, she merited to become most worthily the reparatrix of the lost world and Dispensatrix of all the gifts that Our Savior purchased for us by His Death and by his blood.... Jesus sits at the right hand of the majesty on high. Mary sits at the right hand of her Son—a refuge so secure and so a help so trusty against all dangers that we have nothing to fear or to despair of under her guidance, her patronage, her protection.”¹¹ The Virgin is “the Mediatrix of all graces.”¹² “For through her, who is the mirror of justice and seat of wisdom, the Omnipotent willed us to have all things.”¹³ This is the time of the feast and Mass for B.M.V. Mediatrix.

3) Benedict XV: “But if for this reason all of us have received these graces from the treasury of redemption, they are administered as it were by the hands of the Sorrowful Virgin herself.”¹⁴ “Since the most holy Virgin Mary was chosen with so many and such great merits to be the Mother of God and at the same time was divinely constituted the mediatrix of graces for all mankind.”¹⁵ “She is the most blessed Mother of God and has the power of mediatrix of graces with the Lord.”¹⁶ “Whatever graces he [Christ] confers on men, she has their distribution and appointment.”¹⁷

Pius XI: “Christ “since he is the one Mediator of God and men, wished to join his Mother to Himself as the advocate of sinners, the minister and mediatrix of grace.”¹⁸ “We know that everything is given to us by the Excellent and Supreme God through the hands of the Mother of God.”¹⁹

8. Encyclical “*Adiutricem populi*”: ASS 28,130f.

9. Encyclical “*Diuturni temporis*”: ASS 31,146f.

10. Apostolic Letter “*Parta humano*”: ASS 34,195.

11. Encyclical “*Ad diem illum*”: ASS 36,453f.

12. Apostolic Letter “*Manilensium Archiepiscopus*”: AAS 2 (1910) 901.

13. *Sermo ad PP. Franciscas*”: AAS 2 (1910) 909.

14. Apostolic Letter “*Inter Sodalicia*”: AAS 10 (1918) 182.

15. Apostolic Letter “*Cum Sanctissima Virgo Maria*”: AAS 9 (1917) 324.

16. Apostolic Letter “*Locarni, intra fines*”: AAS 11 (1919) 67.

17. Encyclical “*Fausto appetente die*”: AAS 13 (1921) 334.

18. Encyclical “*Miserentissimus Redemptor*”: AAS 20 (1928) 178.

19. Encyclical “*Ingravescentibus malis*”: AAS 29 (1937) 380.

“The Virgin Mother herself, the Mediatrix with God of all graces.”²⁰ “The Virgin Mary..., the Mediatrix with God of all charisms.”²¹ “To the Virgin, the Mediatrix with God of all graces.”²² “For she is the Mother of God, the administrator of heavenly graces...”²³

Pius XII: “For the Bl. Virgin has so much grace with God, she enjoys such power with her Only-begotten Son, that whoever in need of help does not run to her, is attempting to fly without wings, as Dante sings.”²⁴ “May she never cease to beg from him that copious streams of grace may flow from its exalted Head into all the members of the Mystical Body.”²⁵

195. *Please note* concerning these texts: It is said in them: a) that in general we have grace through Mary, that graces come to us from Her, that graces are in Her hands; b) that in particular Mary procures graces for us from God, that she is the Mediatrix of graces; c) that the graces, about which we are concerned, are all graces of redemption, whatever Christ confers on men, or from a negative point of view that Christ grants us nothing except through Mary.²⁶

Theological note. That the mediation of Mary regarding the dispensing of graces is altogether special and by far exceeds the mediation of the saints *seems to be a matter of faith from the ordinary Magisterium of the Church.* That it refers to all graces in a general way is *at least Catholic doctrine.*²⁷

196. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers and Church authors:

a) They say that in the hands of Mary are the treasures and gifts of grace that God grants to man. Thus, v.gr., St. Peter Damian, Pseudo-Ildephonsus Toletanus, Hugo of St. Victor.²⁸

20. Apostolic Letter “*Galliam Ecclesiae filiam*”: AAS 14 (1922) 186.

21. Apostolic Letter “*Extat in civitate*”: AAS 16 (1924) 152.

22. Apostolic Letter “*Cognitum sane*”: ASS 18 (1924) 213.

23. Letter “*Sollemne semper*”: AAS 24 (1932) 376.

24. Letter “*Superiore anno*”: AAS 32 (1940) 145.

25. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 248. See AAS 46 (1954) 851.

26. Although the Roman Pontiffs in these texts speak mainly about the Bl. Virgin as she is now in heaven, still there are some texts in which they speak about the graces granted by Christ through Mary while she was on earth. Thus Leo III: “During His private life on earth He associated her with Himself in each of His first two miracles: the miracle of grace, when, at the salutation of Mary, the infant leaped in the womb of Elizabeth; the miracle of nature, when He turned water into wine at the marriage-feast of Cana. And, at the supreme moment of His public life...” (Encyclical “*Augustissimae Virginis*”: ASS 30,129). Thus Pius XII: “Furthermore, her only Son, condescending to His prayer at Cana of Galilee, performed the miracle by which His disciples believed in Him” (Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35,247).

27. On the definability of this doctrine, see Druwé: *Maria* 1,562f.

28. St. Peter Damian, *Serm. 45 in Nativitate B.M. Virginis*: ML 144,740; Ps. Ildephonsus Toletanus, *De Corona Virginis* 15: ML 96,304; Hugo of St. Victor, *Miscellanea* 5,44: ML 177,772.

b) They call her the treasurer of God's graces, the almsgiver of the Trinity, the dispensatrix of divine graces. Thus for example Richard of St. Laurence, Iacobus a Voragine, Raymundus Iordanus, St. Bernardine.²⁹

c) They call her an aqueduct (St. Bernard, Richard of St. Laurence, St. Albert the Great, Raymundus Iordanus, St. Thomas of Villanova) or the neck (Radulphus Ardens, Hermanus Tornacensis, Amadeus Lausanensis, Philippus de Herveng, Richard of St. Laurence, St. Albert the Great, St. Bernardine); the same doctrine is contained under these and similar metaphors.³⁰

d) Latin hymns of the Middle Ages often call Mary our Advocate with God whose intercession is efficacious.³¹

e) All of these are valid *for all graces* in general, whether with assertive formulas or with exclusive ones. Thus, v.gr., St. Ephraem, Pseudo-Modestus of Jerusalem, St. Germanus, Richard of St. Laurence, St. Bonaventure.³²

f) There are two *classical formulas* of this doctrine. One of St. Bernardine of Siena: "Every grace that is communicated in this world has a threefold process: for in a very orderly way it derives from God to Christ, from Christ to the Virgin, from the Virgin to us."³³ The other is of St Bernard: "So it is His will who wants us to have everything through Mary; she, I say, is His, but she is for us."³⁴

197. Theological reasoning. a) Mary is truly the spiritual mother of each human person. But she would not be that, if the whole economy of grace, according as it is in each one, did not depend on Her immediate action. Therefore She is the Dispensatrix of graces.

The minor: Spiritual maternity is had in the concrete by the infusion, protection and increase of the new supernatural life in each person, and by the actions that are connected with it. Therefore if Mary is the mother, she

29. Richard of St. Laurence, *De laudibus B.M. Virginis* 2,1,24; Iacobus a Voragine, *Serm. 2 de B. Virgine* in Sabb.5 hebdom.40 (*Sermones Quadragesimales*, Venice 1602) p.171; Raymundus Iordanus, *Contemplationes de B. Virgine* p.9 contempl.14; St. Bernardine of Siena, *Serm. 52 de salutatione angelica*.

30. See J.M. Bover, *De universali B.M. Virginis mediatione metaphorica testimonia*: Marian 3 (1941) 201-237.

31. See Serapio de Iragui, *La mediación de la Virgen en la himnografía latina de la Edad Media* 400-432; *La mediación de la Virgen en la liturgia*: Alma Socia Christi 2,226-233.

32. St.Ephraem, *Sermo de SS.Virginis laudibus* (ed. Assemani) 3,532; Ps. Modestus of Jerusalem, *Encomium in dormitionem SS.Dominae nostrae Deiparae semperque Virginis* 10: MG 86,3306; St. Germanus, *In S. Mariae Zonam*: MG 98,379; Richard of St. Laurence, *De laudibus B.M. Virginis* 2,3; St. Bonaventura, *Collationes in Evangelium S.Ioannis* c.14 coll.53 n.4 (ed. Quaracchi 6,603). On a recent dispute concerning the mind of St. Bonaventure regarding universality in the distribution of graces, see T. Szabó, *Doctrina S.Bonaventurae de mediatione B.V.Mariae quoad omnes gratias*: Alma Socia Christi 2,293-341.

33. *Serm. 6 in Annuntiatione B.M. Virginis*.

34. *Serm. In Nativitate B.M. Virginis* 7: ML 183,441. See J. Riudor, S.J., *La mediación de María en la distribución de las gracias, según los escritos eclesiásticos de la primera mitad del siglo XII*: EstMar 12 (1952) 301-318.

must exercise influence on all of these by her own action.

b) Mary is truly the Corredemptrix. Therefore she is the Dispensatrix of graces.

The consequent: The purpose or end of redemption is not fully obtained in the stage alone of accomplishing redemption, unless it is extended also to the stage of applying redemption. But Mary is associated with Christ the Redeemer in the complete purpose of redemption. Therefore if she is the Corredemptrix, then she must also be the Dispensatrix of graces.

198. The principal objections, because they are taken from the universality of graces (either assertively or exclusively), and from the manner of causality, will be answered in the following scholiums.

199. Scholium 1. *On the universality of graces in Mary's dispensation.* In the thesis we said that Mary is the mediatrix of all graces in general. Now this universality of graces is to be considered in particular. Therefore we say first of all *assertively* that all graces and individual graces that are given to men, through some intervention of the Virgin not only are given *de facto*, but also *de iure*, inasmuch as She has this office that was given to her by God. Grace here is understood as any supernatural gift, whether habitual or actual. The words of Leo XIII celebrate this universality (“She who was so intimately associated with the mystery of human salvation is just as closely associated with the distribution of the graces which for all time will flow from the Redemption”), St. Pius X (“The Dispensatrix of all the gifts that Our Savior purchased for us by His Death and by his blood”), Benedict XV (“But if for this reason all of us have received these graces from the treasury of redemption, they are administered as it were by the hands of the Sorrowful Virgin herself”), quoted above.

This same point is expressed by an *exclusive* formula: that no grace is conferred on us by God except through Mary. Some words of Leo XIII quoted above seem to say this (“God... listens to the prayers of her whom He wished to be the minister of his heavenly graces... With equal truth it may also be affirmed that, by the will of God, Mary is the intermediary through whom is distributed unto us this immense treasure of mercies”), Pius XII (“whoever in need of help does not run to her, is attempting to fly without wings”). The necessity of this intercession of Mary is surely absolute, or without exception; but, as is clear, it comes from the positive and free decree of God.

It seems that the direct intervention of the Bl. Virgin in the dispensation of graces *must be distinguished* from Her intervention that is indirect only. Mary dispenses actual graces directly; but only indirectly sanctifying grace and its increase. But this indirect intervention must not be understood only inasmuch as the Bl. Virgin gave us Christ, from whom we receive sanctifying grace, but also inasmuch as directly by her own causality she brings it about that we receive the sacraments, that we have a proper disposition for receiving them, that we obtain supernatural helps in order to merit. All of these are ordained expressly by her maternal will to achieve these ends.

Finally, please note that the Bl. Virgin exercises this office on our behalf, even if

we do not ask for Her intervention explicitly and for each grace. The reason is because She has this office entrusted to her by God according to the objective constitution of the supernatural order, just as God willed it to be.³⁵

200. Scholium 2. *On the causality of the Bl. Virgin in the dispensation of graces.* This causality is at least *moral*, consisting in actual intercession. This must be held as a minimum, and all theologians de facto hold it. However this intercession must be admitted to have two aspects: one express, and the other interpretive. Express intercession, inasmuch as she actually prays to God for us; interpretive intercession, inasmuch as she presents Herself before God both as the Mother of God and as the Corredemptrix.³⁶

Theologians also raise the question whether a certain *physical* causality of the Bl. Virgin in the distribution of graces must be admitted. The meaning of this question cannot be other than this: whether the Bl. Virgin concurs in the production of graces by way of being a physical instrument. Some recent theologians affirm this point, such as Hugon, Lepicier, Fernández, Clemens, Lavaud, Bernard, Plessis, Sauras, Roschini. However many other contemporary theologians do not wish to admit this causality, which in his day Suarez rejected.³⁷ They are: Terrien, Bainvel, Van der Meersch, Bittremieux, De la Taille, Merkelbach, Friethoff, Lennerz, Cuervo, Alastruey, Lercher. This second opinion seems to be more true.

Hence the “intercession” and “distribution” of graces must be understood as formulas for one and the same reality. That is, she dispenses or distributes graces to the extent that she intercedes efficaciously and exercises influence with true moral causality on the existence of graces.³⁸

However the recent words of Pius XII should be noted: “Besides, the Blessed Virgin possessed, after Christ, not only the highest degree of excellence and perfection, but also a share in that influence by which He, her Son and our Redeemer, is rightly said to reign over the minds and wills of men. For through His humanity the divine Word performs miracles and gives graces; if he uses His sacraments and Saints as instruments for the salvation of men, why should He not make use of the role and work of His most holy Mother in imparting to us the fruits of redemption?”³⁹ These words attribute instrumental causality to the Bl. Virgin, as it does to the Humanity of Christ and to the sacraments. But they affirm only the fact of this causality, not the mode of instrumentality.

35. See Alastruey, 652-657.

36. These things are said by analogy to the teaching of St. Thomas about the intercession of Christ (III, q. 54, a. 4 and q. 57, a. 6) and about the intercession of the saints (*Suppl. Q. 77, a. 3*).

37. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.23 s.1 n.2.

38. See Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,408-420; Alastruey, 658-668; Merkelbach, 367-371; Bittremieux, *De mediatione universalis B.M. Virginis quoad gratias* 261-301; E. Sauras, *Causalidad de la cooperación de María en la obra redentora*: *EstMar* 2 (1943) 319-358; Ildefonso de la Immaculada, *Elementos fisico-marianos en la gracia y la mística*: *EstMar* 7 (1948) 197-240.

39. Encyclical “*Ad caeli Reginam*”: AAS 46 (1954) 636.

CHAPTER V

On the glorification of the Mother of the Redeemer

201. The next topic to consider is the heavenly life of Mary and Her glorification. This of course could only be because it corresponds to the dignity of the Mother of the Redeemer. However, since this supreme glorification has the special quality that it is taking place right now not only of her soul, but also of her body, we will begin with this question. For what concerns the glorification of her soul has already been treated sufficiently, because we have seen the immense and almost infinite treasure of grace; to this seed as its fruit her almost infinite heavenly glorification must correspond.¹ But the special offices of Mary merited her a special position in heaven. This is established on the one hand by her singular intercession, but on the other hand by her supreme office of Queen. But because we already treated her intercession and resulting dispensation of graces in the preceding chapter, now we will consider her royalty. Finally, after having studied everything that pertains to the person, dignity and offices of the Bl. Virgin, we will have to examine our relations to Her which are shown by our devotion to her. Therefore we will treat the following points:

Art. 1. On the bodily assumption into heaven of the Mother of the Redeemer.

Art. 2. On the Mother of the Redeemer, Queen of all.

Art. 3. On the veneration to be shown to the Mother of the Redeemer.

ARTICLE I

ON HER BODILY ASSUMPTION INTO HEAVEN

202. The bodily glorification of the Mother of the Redeemer *de facto* and in the concrete includes two elements. The first is Her death; the second is Her later heavenly life in the body once again informed by her soul. This happened in such a way that between the two moments the corruption of the body was completely avoided. That second element has been defined as a dogma of faith. However the first so modifies this second that it effects the glorification of the body by a true resurrection. Therefore we think that both elements pertain to the real and concrete glorification of the Mother of the Redeemer, even though they do not possess the same level of certitude. Therefore it will be necessary to treat both of them separately.

1. See Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *Visione beatifica e Assunzione: Alma Socia Christi* 10, 24-34.

Thesis 12. The Bl. Virgin Mary truly died; however her death is not a merely historical fact, but it is connected in various ways with the doctrine of the faith.

Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,224-236; Alastrucy, 395-412; M. Jugie, *La mort et l'Assumption de la Sainte Vierge* (Vatican City 1944); on this book, see J. A. de Aldama, *La muerte de la Santísima Virgen, según una obra reciente*: *EstEcl* 21 (1947) 291-321; F. de P. Solá, *Acotaciones a un libro*: *EstEcl* 21 (1941) 337-355.

203. Definition of terms. *She died*: she suffered the separation of the body from the soul. We affirm the bare fact of death, prescindendo from the length of time the separation lasted, from the way in which it took place, from the other circumstances.

Not a merely historical fact: it must be judged not only by a historian, but also by a theologian, because it falls under the formal object of theology.

204. Adversaries.² 1. St. Epiphanius seems to have doubted about Mary's death. Timothy of Jerusalem perhaps held her immortality *de facto*, but his way of speaking is not at all clear.³

2. In the 17th century *an unknown Italian theologian*, attacked by Beverini as being under the pseudonym of Athanasius.⁴

3. In the 18th century *an anonymous Spanish Jesuit theologian*, who wrote a tractate on the immortality of Mary, defending his thesis with many arguments.⁵ Perhaps this tractate should be attributed Cardinal Alvaro de Cienfuegos.⁶

4. After the definition of the Immaculate Conception, the death of the Virgin was denied by D. Arnaldi, Ios. Pennachi and Ios. A. Virdia.⁷

5. Recently M. Jugie did not really deny the death of the Virgin, however he did try very much to weaken belief in it. He gathered together everything that can be raised up against it, and at the same time asserted that the matter seems to be merely historical, not theological; he also said that sufficient

2. See C. Balic, *La controversia acerca de la muerte de María Santísima desde la Edad Media hasta nuestros días*: *EstMar*9 (1950) 101-123; F. Maggioni, *La morte de la Madonna in scritti recenti*: *ScuoCatt* 81 (1953) 33-50.

3. St. Epiphanius, *Panarion*, her.78,11: MG 42,716; Timothy of Jerusalem, *Oratio in prophetam Simeonem et in textum Evangelii: "Nunc dimittis servum tuum" e in B. Virginem*: MG 86,246f. See O. Faller, *De priorum saeculorum silentio circa assumptionem B. Mariae Virginis* (Rome 1946) 27-32. But on the date of this Timothy, see B. Capelle, *Les homelies liturgiques du prétendu Timothée de Jérusalem*: *EphLit* 63 (1949) 5-26, and Jugie, *L'Immaculée Conception dans l'Écriture Sainte et dans la tradition orientale* 74, note 3.

4. B. Beverini, O.M.D., *De corporali morte Deiparae* (ed. Balic, Rome 1950).

5. *Tractatus de immortalitate B. Virginis Mariae* (ed. Balic from the only codex 1611). This tractate was composed, as part of a certain *Vitae B. Virginis*, after the year 1707; see *ibid.*, XXXIIF.

6. See *ArchTG* 13 (1950) 326f.; 14 (1951) 285.

7. On these authors and their works, see M. Jugie, *La mort et l'Assumption de la sainte Vierge* 515f; *EstEcl* 21 (1947) 314-317.

reasons are not to incline one's opinion one way or the other.⁸ Some fell under his influence, among whom Roschini and Gallus stand out.⁹

Many theologians should not be called adversaries, who, even though they admit that the Bl. Virgin de facto died, held and do hold that She is immortal by right.

205. Doctrine of the Church. 1. Pius XI: "Praying continuously we should make Mary our daily Mediatrix, our true Advocate, so that we may hope to receive from Her, assumed into the glory of heaven, that at the hour of our death, which is like hers—since she like us finished this life, because in Her there was not the grace of creation but the grace of redemption, which did not confer a true and proper immortality—She might be our Advocate before the divine goodness and mercy."¹⁰

Pius XII in the dogmatic definition of the Assumption strove to avoid completely the question about the death of the Bl. Virgin. Therefore he chose the formula *having completed the course of her earthly life*, which is true in the same way if the end of Her earthly life was by death, or if it was the definitive gift of glorious immortality without death.¹¹ However in the defining Bull the death of the Bl. Virgin is mentioned often. Sometimes this occurs in the mouth of witnesses quoted by the Supreme Pontiff. And of course it should be noted that the same Pontiff, who in the Bull carefully avoided any mention of the apocryphal writings on this, did not attempt to avoid citing the testimonies of those who positively affirm Mary's death. At times word about the death of the Virgin in the Bull comes from the mouth of the Pontiff himself, at least indirectly: "Since the Christian faithful, under the instruction and leadership of their Pastors, have learned from the Sacred Scriptures... In a similar way it was not difficult for them to agree also that the great Mother of God departed from this life just as her Only-begotten Son did."¹² In these words, even if the Roman Pontiff does not reveal directly his own mind, nevertheless he gives authoritative testimony

8. *Loc. cit.*, 503-582.

9. Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,234ff.; *Il problema della morte di Maria dopo la Costituzione Dogmatica "Munificentissimus Deus"*: Marian 13 (1951)148-163; T. Gallus, *La Vergine immortale* (Rome 1949); *La Madonna Assunta* (Rome 1951). On this book, see M. Quera, *Un libro sobre la immortalidad de Maria*: EstEcl 26 (1952) 365-378.

10. *This is an allocution when the decree for the canonization of Blessed Thouret was read*: L'Osservatore Romano, August 16-17, 1933. Here is the original Italian text: "Con l'assiduità della preghiera si deve fare di Maria la quotidiana mediatrice, la nostra vera avvocata, sicche possiamo sperare de Ella, Assunta nell gloria del Cielo, nell'ora del nostro trapasso, che fu pure il suo—poiche Ella pure fece questio passo, essendo in Lei non la grazia di creazione, ma la grazie di redenzione, la quale non conferiva immortalità vera e propria--, porra Ella essere nostra avvocata presso la divina bontà e misericordia."

11. See EstEcl 25 (1951) 377-380.

12. Bull "Munificentissimus Deus": AAS 42 (1950) 759.

about the conviction of the Christian people, under the leadership of their Pastors. In fact, this testimony has such great weight that no one can miss it.¹³

Theological note. That the Bl. Virgin Mary truly died, although it was not defined,¹⁴ is *the common opinion of theologians* for many centuries, and it is an opinion that can be said to be *in conformity with the tradition and ordinary Magisterium of the Church*.¹⁵ But that it is dealing with a fact that is not purely historical, but also theological, is *certain*.¹⁶

206. Proof of the first part.

From tradition.¹⁷ 1. *From testimonies:*

a) *Already in the 3rd century* there are testimonies about the death of the Bl. Virgin, whether in the East (Origen, St. Ephraem, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Severianus Gabalensis), or in the West (St. Augustine explicitly, St. Paulinus of Nola and St. Ambrose implicitly). One is found to have doubted strongly—St. Ephraem; but the text of Timothy is doubtful.

b) All the *apocryphal* books about the death of the Virgin, without exception, agree on this fact, while they disagree in so many other things. But this fact proves the preceding historical tradition. And it cannot be said that her death was for their fancy the more obvious solution, since other more fanciful things could have been invented easily, like Elijah in the fiery chariot and similar things.

c) From the 6th century there are *in the East* explicit homilies on the dormition of the Mother of God. Thus Iacobus Sarugensis (6th century); Pseudo-Modestus of Jerusalem (7th century); St. Germanus, St. Andrew of Crete, St. John Damascene (8th century); Theodorus Studita, Theognostus, Ioseph Hymnographus (9th century); Leo X (10th century; Ioannis Mauripodes) (11th century); Ioannes Phurnensis (12th century); Gregory Palamas, Nicephorus Chumnus, Nicolaus Cabasilas, Isidore of

13. See J. A. de Aldama, *Los primeros comentarios de la Bula "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 377-387; F. de P. Solá, *La muerte de la Santísima Virgen en la Constitución Apostólica "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EstMar 11 (1952) 125-155.

14. See EstEcl 25 (1951) 377-380.

15. See EstMar 12 (1952) 6.

16. See E. Sauras, *El misterio de la Asunción y la fuerza teológica que ha alcanzado*: CiencTom 74 (1948, I) 37-97.

17. The collected testimonies are found in C. Balic, *Testimonia de assumptione B. Virginis Mariae ex omnibus saeculis* (Rome 1948), and by J.M. Bover, *La Asunción de María* (Madrid 1951) 301-423. See also the works already cited by J. Jugie, and O. Faller; G. Gagov, *La tradizione dei primi cinque secoli sulla morte e sulla tomba della B.V. Maria*: MiscFranc 47 (1947) 132-151; A. Rivera, *La muerte de María en la tradición hasta la Edad Media*: EstMar 9 (1950) 71-100; M. Gordillo, *La muerte de María, Madre de Dios, en la tradición de la Iglesia de Jerusalén*: EstMar 9 (1950) 43-62.

Thessalonica (14th century); M. Palaeologus, Gregorius Scholarios (15th century), etc.

d) From the 8th century *in the West* homilies and tractates have been preserved in which the death of Mary is taught. Thus Paul Winfridus, Ambrose Autpertus (Pseudo-Augustine), Pascasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Jerome), and others (8th century); Atto Vercellensis 10th century); St. Peter Damian, St. Fulbertus, Carnotensis (11th century); Guericus Abbas, Ioannes Belettus, Peter Abelard, Richard of St. Victor, Gualterus A St. Victor, Amedaeus Lausanensis (12th century); St. Martinus Legionensis, Sicardus Cremonensis (13th century), etc.

e) From the 13th to the 19th century *all theologians* held the anticipated resurrection of the Virgin, and so they understood her Assumption. The only known adversaries during all this time are the unknown Italian "Athanasius" and one anonymous Jesuit.

f) From the 19th century *very few contrary theologians* have in no way been able to disturb the weight of tradition.

207. 2) From the liturgy. a) The feast, which in the East certainly from the 6th century, and more probably even from the 5th century, was called the feast of "dormition" or "migration," was also so named in Rome at least from the 7th century. There subsequently it was called the feast of the "assumption," always however on the supposition of her death.¹⁸

b) In the Eastern liturgy we read: "Your death, O Immaculate One, became the bridge to an eternal and better life."¹⁹

c) In the Western liturgy two liturgical prayers are found in which the death of the Virgin is clearly stated:

The first is: "The feast of this day, O Lord, is being venerated by us, in which the holy Mother of God underwent temporal death, but she could not be held by the bonds of death...." This prayer ("*Veneranda*"), sometimes slightly changed, is found already in the Gregorian Sacramentary which Hadrian I sent to Charlemagne, and it remained in the Roman liturgy for many centuries. Now it is still found in the rites of Lyons and Milan and in the missal of the Dominicans.

The second is: "May the prayer of the Mother of God, O Lord, come to the aid of your people ("*Subveniat*"); although because of the condition

18. See V. González, *La dormición de María en las antiguas liturgias*: EstMar 9 (1950) 63-90. On the object of this feast the Bull "Munificentissimus Deus" says: "The holy Fathers and great doctors proposed the meaning [of the feast] and the reality with higher reasons, especially by making clear what the liturgical books often touch on precisely and briefly, namely, that with this feast *not only* is there no corruption of her body to be commemorated, but rather the triumph she obtained over death..." (AAS 42 [1950] 760).

19. Matins for August 15, can.1. See A.G. Welykyj, O.S.B.M., *L'Assunzione della B.V. Maria Deipara nell liturgia bizantina*: Alma Socia Christi 5,2,46-48.

of the flesh she has left this earth, we know that in her heavenly glory she is praying to You for us." This prayer, which was still read in the same Sacramentary, remained in the Roman liturgy until the year 1950.²⁰

208. 2. From theological reasoning. 1) Although Mary did not contract original sin, she still had its debt. Therefore the nature which she received was a nature fallen in Adam, except for her privileges which are proved explicitly. But fallen nature in Adam was mortal, and the privilege of immortality for her has not been proved. Therefore Mary died.

2) The grace which Mary had from the beginning was the grace of redemption. But the grace of redemption brings with itself the necessity of dying. Therefore Mary died.²¹

209. Proof of the second part. That which has an immediate and intrinsic connection with some revealed truth *cannot* be said to be a merely historical fact. But such is the death of the Bl. Virgin Mary. Therefore it is not a merely historical fact.

The minor: In the present order death has an immediate and intrinsic connection with original sin. For it is not present in the world except because of that sin. And it is not given for a person in particular except because of a committed sin, or because of its debt, or because of its reparation.²²

210. Objections. 1. The whole doctrine about the death of the Virgin depends historically on *the apocryphal writings*. Therefore it is to be rejected.

1) *I deny the antecedent*, for there are also prior testimonies, wholly independent of the apocrypha. 2) Yes, but on the contrary, the absolute unanimity of the apocrypha does not seem to be able to be explained aptly and historically without a preceding more ancient tradition.

2. In the 5th and 6th centuries there was *a tradition in Jerusalem about the immortality* of the Bl. Virgin; the witnesses of this tradition are Timothy, Hesychius, Chrysippus, Acta Ioannis, Anonymus Placentinus.

I deny that such a tradition existed.

20. The prayer "Veneranda" seems to be attributed to Sergius I (687-701), using Eastern sources. The prayer "Subveniat" is older. See B. Capelle, *L'oraison "Veneranda" à la Messe de L'Assomption...*: EphThLov 26 (1950) 354-364.

21. See Basilio de San Pablo, C.P., *Si la gracia de María excluye o rechaza su muerte*: EstMar 5 (1946) 305-345; *La immaculada y la muerte de María*: EstMar 15 (1955) 303-326; Bernardo de la Immaculada, C.P., *La muerte de María, exigencia de su gracia santificante*: EstMar 9 (1950) 125-173; Ch. Boyer, S.J., *Raison de la mort de la T.S. Vierge*: StudMar 6 (1950) 125-150; M. Cuervo, O. P., *El dogma de la Immaculada y la muerte de María*: EstMar 9 (1950) 213-225; E. Sauras, O.P., *La Asunción de la Santísima Virgen* (Valencia 1950).

22. See B. Aperribay, O.F.M., *La muerte de la Santísima Virgen, ¿problema meramente histórico, o también teológico?*: EstMar 9 (1950) 18-42.

Timothy's text is very obscure and probably truncated. Moreover it seems that it comes from a much later period. Hesychius calls Mary "the garden of incorruption" and "the paradise of immortality," because virginally she gave birth to Him who is the true immortality, as is clear from the context. Chrysippus is quoted in vain in opposition because he calls Mary "the branch of Jesse always blooming." The *Acta Ioannis* in the version of Pseudo-Procorus say that Mary passed over "from life to life"; but they do not deny that this transition took place by death. The same must be said about the Anonymous Placentinus, when he speaks about the house of Mary "from which they say that She was taken up to heaven."

211. 3. In the *Roman Liturgy* there was a certain regression from the 9th century to the 20th century concerning the affirmation of the death of the Bl. Virgin. For the Collect "Veneranda" was suppressed, and hence the formulas that remain "because of the condition of the flesh she has left this earth" and "you have transferred her from this world" can be understood in a different way.

I deny the existence of such regression. The Collect "Veneranda" was not suppressed for some doctrinal reason; hence the quoted formulas retain the same obvious sense that they always had. Moreover the words "because of the condition of the flesh she has left this earth" cannot have any other meaning. For, it is well understood that the Church desires that the Mother of God in heavenly glory pray to God for us, *although*, because of her mortal nature, at one time she was dead. But it does not make sense that the Church desires the same thing, *although* because of the special condition of her body she was transferred to heaven. In this second case, "since" or "because" would be said, but no way "although." But if now the prayer "Subveniat" has been suppressed, this only means that in the dogmatic definition a *precision* has been made concerning her death.

212. 4. The antithesis of Eve-Mary implies that Mary is like the innocent Eve. But the innocent Eve was immortal. Therefore Mary too is immortal.²³

Response 1. From that perhaps it would follow that Mary is immortal by right but not actually.

Response 2. I deny the major. The antithetic parallelism between Eve and Mary is only in the association of Mary with Christ for restoration, like that of Eve with Adam for ruin.

5. But thus the figure (Eve) is more excellent than the figured (Mary). For, the former had immortality, which the latter lacked.

I deny the assertion. In this order the victory over death by death and resurrection (as in Christ) is more excellent than pure immortality. Moreover *I deny the supposition*, namely, that the figure and the figured must agree in every respect.

6. The whole reason for death in this order is original sin. But Mary did not have original sin. Therefore she did not die.

I distinguish the major. The whole reason for death, that is, the whole reason why

23. See Gallus, *La Madonna Assunta* 80-84.

death was introduced into the world is original sin, *conceded*; the whole reason for death, that is, the whole reason why some definite person died is original sin, *I subdistinguish*: original sin either actually, or as a debt, or in reparation, *conceded*; precisely as contracted in reality, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor*: She did not really contract it, *conceded*; she did not contract its debt, and did not cooperate in its reparation, *denied*.²⁴

7. If Mary is the Corredemptrix, Her cooperation with Christ in the objective redemption had its terminus in Christ's death. But Her death was beyond that terminus. Therefore at least from corredemption she should not die.

I distinguish the major. Her cooperation, whether as actually given, or as from a given intention and as foreseen by Christ, had its terminus in Christ's death, *conceded*; only as actually given, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor*. Her death, as really given, was beyond that terminus, *conceded*; as from a given intention and as foreseen by Christ, *denied*.

8. Christ, the new Adam, had a right to immortality which he renounced because of the Father's will. Therefore likewise Mary, the new Eve, had the same right which she did not have to renounce because there was no precept of dying given to her.

I deny the parity. Christ had a right to immortality because His person was divine and His humanity substantially holy. But Mary did not have a similar right, because Her person and nature were from the race of Adam naturally, who lost by sin the gift of immortality for himself and for his posterity.

213. 9. The Bl. Virgin Mary *could not die* because of sickness (because of the perfect fashioning of her body), or because of old age (because it also is a kind of sickness), or because of an excess of love (because such love would have been inordinate), or because of sorrow (because emotions in Her were always subject to reason), or because of the permanent beatific vision (because it is not certain that this necessarily supposes death); on the other hand, she did not suffer martyrdom. Therefore it is plain that she did not die.²⁵

Response 1. Although the way Mary died escapes us, nevertheless its fact must be asserted based on the reasons given in the thesis.

Response 2. Whatever may be the case for the possibility of other explanations, on the supposition of Mary's natural mortality (which we think is altogether more probable), it seems necessary to say with Suarez that She died from the force of her love and ardent desire and very intense contemplation. Such love cannot for any reason be said to be anything but very orderly. This type of death from intense love is taught, among others, by St. Andrew of Crete, St. Germanus, Isidore of Thessalonica, Rupertus, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas of Villanova, Bossuet, St. Francis de Sales, St. Alphonsus Liguori.²⁶

Moreover *two questions* in this matter must be carefully distinguished. *The first*

24. See M. Quera, ¿El privilegio de la Inmaculada Concepción exige su inmortalidad?: EstEcl 28 (1954) 581-602.

25. See Jugie, 570-577; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,235f.

26. Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.21 s.1 n.4; Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *La muerte de amor de María*: EstMar 9 (1950) 239-268; L. Colomer, *La muerte de María a la luz del amor*: EstMar 9 (1950) 269-287.

is, what is the root or the ultimate cause of Mary's death; *the second is*, what was its proximate cause.

Concerning the first question, some authors hold that the Bl. Virgin was immortal from some privilege, but that she submitted to death because of her free choice by which she renounced her privilege of immortality; hence in this case the root of her death must be placed in a free act of Mary's will. Thus Lepicier, Janssens, Alastruey, Bover; Roschini is also favorable to this opinion, and it must also be held by all those who, defending that Mary was in the state of original justice, admit her death. However other theologians hold that Mary was simply mortal, not indeed as a punishment of original sin contracted from Adam (see D 1973), but because the original state of innocence was lost in Adam for the whole nature, and therefore for all of his descendents, and there is no proof that Mary had a special privilege in this; hence the root of death must be placed in the natural mortality of Mary. Thus Suarez, Terrien, Hugon, Gorrino, Bittremieux, Merkelbach, Garrigou-Lagrange, Lercher, Basilius a St. Paul, Sauras, and others. This second opinion seems to be more true.²⁷

Concerning the second question, in ancient Christianity there were a few who held that the Bl. Virgin suffered martyrdom, because of a false understanding of Luke 2:35.²⁸ Theologians generally do not admit in Mary disease, sickness, old age, by analogy with what is said about Christ.²⁹ But St. Peter Damian said that Mary died from the force of sorrow.³⁰ The more common opinion of theologians holds that she died from the intensity of her love and contemplation.³¹

On the time of Mary's death almost nothing certain can be said.³²

27. See Laureano M. de St. Bartolomé, *La immaculado y la causa de la muerte de María*: VerVid 12 (1954) 173-201.

28. See Timothy of Jerusalem, *Orat. in prophetam Simeonem*: MG 86,246f.; St. Epiphanius, *Panarion* haer.78,11 and 23: MG 42,716.736; St. Paulinus of Nola, *Epist. ad S. Augustinum*: ML61,416; St. Augustine, *Epist. ad S. Paulinum*: ML 33,644; St. Ambrose, *Expositio in Lucam 2,61*: ML 15,1656; St. Isidore, *De ortu et obitu Patrum* 67,112: ML 83,148f. (see 83,1285f.); Tusaredus, *Epist. ad Ascaricum* 11: ML 99,1239f.

29. See S.Th. III, q. 14, a. 4.

30. *De celebrandis vigiliis* 1: ML 145,801.

31. See Alastruey, 412-418; Merkelbach, 271; Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Madre del Salvador* 133.

32. See U. Holzmeister, *De anno mortis Deiparae*: Marian 4 (1942) 167-182; B. Ocerín-Jaurégui, *Año de la muerte de María Santísima*: VerVid 6 (1948) 115-141.

Thesis 13. The Bl. Virgin Mary was assumed in body and soul into heavenly glory.

Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,2,279-340 with a bibliography which is also offered by Bover, *La Asunción de María* (Madrid 1951) 425-440; Alastruey, 486-506; Merkelbach, 272-289; L. Krupa, O.F.M., *Theologia assumptionistica et quaestio de morte B.V. Mariae: Alma Socia Christi* 10,35-77; F. S. Müller, *Origo divino-apostolica doctrinae evectionis Beatissimae Virginis ad gloriam caelestem quoad corpus* (Innsbruck 1930).

214. Definition of terms. *Assumed* is taken from *Assumption*.¹

1) *Assumption* signifies: a) *In virtue of the word*, the translation into heaven not by one's own power (like Ascension), but by the power of another. Since it is clear that Mary's soul was in heaven from the moment of her death, the question is raised about the body informed by the soul.

b) *Negatively*, immunity from corruption of the body, or its resolution in decay and ashes.

c) *Positively*, the heavenly glorification of the body, which the Apostle describes: "For this perishable nature must put on the imperishable, and this mortal nature must put on immortality" (1 Cor. 15:53).

2) *Assumption can be considered*: a) *Concretely*: as it took place historically and de facto. Understood in this way it includes death (the terminus from which), heavenly glorification (the terminus to which), and resurrection (the way from one to the other).

b) *Formally*: as it designates the essential element. Understood in this way it says nothing but heavenly glorification of the body, prescind from the other elements, which however it does not deny. Therefore formally and essentially Assumption is had, having affirmed this heavenly glorification, whether incorruption and immortality happened to Mary without her previous death, or it happened after her death by resurrection (see 2 Cor. 5:2f.). This Assumption, taken formally, constitutes the full triumph over death, according to the Apostle: "When the mortal puts on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: 'Death is swallowed up in victory...'" (1 Cor. 15:54f.). Therefore this full victory over death, *by its own very concept*, does not require resurrection, even though *de facto* resurrection is an essential part of this victory in Christ, and it will be also for Christians according to the general law; indeed it is also in the Blessed Virgin, as it seems to us must be held.

3. Bodily assumption is a *privilege*. For it is an exemption from the general law, by which the bodies of men, even of the just, after death corrupt, and resurrect only on the last day. In this sense Assumption is an anticipation of the full victory over death, while denying any corruption of

1. These terms are taken from the Bull "Munificentissimus Deus" passim: AAS 42 (1950) 753-771.

the body.

215. Adversaries. In the Middle Ages many authors held for our ignorance about the bodily Assumption of Bl. Virgin Mary, especially under the influence of the Letter of Paschasius Radbertus to Paul and Eustochius, which was received by all as a work of St. Jerome.

216. Doctrine of the Church. Pius XII: "We pronounce, declare and define it to be a divinely revealed dogma: that the Immaculate Mother of God, the ever Virgin Mary, having completed the course of her earthly life, was assumed body and soul into heavenly glory."² In this text the Assumption of the Bl. Virgin Mary, taken *formally*, is defined directly. It is also defined that this Assumption took place after the end of her earthly life. This formula signifies *negatively*, that her Assumption will not be put off until the end of time, as it will be for us, and that there never was any corruption that touched the body of Mary. But it signifies *positively* that her Assumption took place quickly, although not necessarily immediately. For nothing is said about the time. Moreover the formula is restricted, since it says and supposes nothing about the *way* in which the course of her earthly was completed—whether it was by death, or it was by a divinely added glorification. Finally the formula must be understood in a specifying way, not in a reduplicative way, that is, it says that Mary *who is* Immaculate, the Mother of God and ever Virgin was Assumed; but she was not Assumed *as* Immaculate, the Mother of God and ever Virgin.³

Theological note. *Solemnly defined divine and Catholic faith.*⁴ This surely was a priori surprising, both because that was not an opportune place of deciding the controversy existing among theologians, and because in the commission itself of theologians who wrote the Bull, there were theologians representing both opinions. But even a posteriori the same point can be proved from an analysis of the Bull. Therefore we think even now, consequent to what we defended elsewhere, that the bodily Assumption of the Bl. Virgin Mary is contained in revelation formally, not just virtually. See EstEcl 25 (1951) 398-401.393f.; P. Parente, *La giustificazione teologica della definizione dogmatica dell'Assunzione*: Studia Mariana 8 (1954) 18-21.

2. Bull "*Munificentissimus Deus*": AAS 42 (1950).

3. See J.A. de Aldama, *Los primeros comentarios de la Bula*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 377-380.

4. There were not lacking authors who thought that the Assumption was defined as virtually revealed.

217. Proof from the ordinary magisterium of the Church.⁵ Before the dogmatic definition, there was present in the ordinary magisterium of the Church universal consent concerning the truth and revelation of the Assumption taken formally. But such consent by itself is a certain and firm argument that the Assumption taken formally is a truth pertaining to the deposit of divine revelation. Therefore it has been revealed by God that Mary was assumed into heaven.

The Major: The bishops dispersed throughout the world, with an almost unanimous voice, gave their approval to it to the Roman Pontiff, who asked them officially for their opinion.

The minor is clear: especially since it is treating a truth which could not be known except by revelation, just like the heavenly glorification of Mary's body, or Her Assumption taken formally.

218. Proof from tradition.⁶ 1. *From express testimonies.*

a) *From the 13th century* to our times faith in the bodily Assumption of the Mother of God was certain and undisturbed. Questions were raised only about the reasons necessary to prove it, about the theological note of this truth and about its definability.

b) *In the 10th to the 12th centuries* in the East there was no controversy⁷; but in the West the influence of the pseudo-Jerome letter, although it raised great hesitations because of the authority accorded to St. Jerome, still it was not of such a nature that it suppressed the previous affirmations, but on the contrary these latter prevailed over the doubts.⁸

c) *From the 6th century* there are clear and explicit testimonies about the Assumption, whether in the East (Theoteknos, Theodosius of Alexandria, Pseudo-Modestus of Jerusalem; Pseudo-Athanasius, Hippolytus of Thebes,

5. See the Bull "*Munificentissimus Deus*": AAS 42 (1950) 756f.

6. The texts are assembled by C. Balic, *Testimonia de Assumptione B.V. Mariae ex omnibus saeculis*, and by J.M. Bover, *La Asunción de María* 301-423. See also the works cited by M. Jugie and O. Faller. Also F.de P. Solá, *La Asunción de María en la tradición patristica*: EstMar 6 (1947) 119-135; N. García Garcés, *La Asunción en la himnografía medieval*: EstMar 6 (1947) 403-412; B. Altaner, *Zur Frage der Definibilität der Assumptio B.M.V.*: ThRev 44 (1948) 129-140; J.M Bover, *La Asunción de María* p.1 1.2; C. Piana, *Assumptio B.M. Virginis apud scriptores saec. XIII* (Rome 1942); L.M. Puech, *Assumptionis B.V. Mariae ad mentem Scoti demonstratio*: Ang 23 (1948) 133-137; L. Carli, *La morte e l'Assunzione de Maria SS. nelle Omelie greche dei secoli VII, VIII* (Rome 1941); M. Gordillo, *La Asunción de María en la Iglesia española (siglos VII-XI)* (Madrid 1922). On the Bull of definition, see P. Franquesa, C.M.F, *El argumento de Tradición según la Bula "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EstMar 12 (1952) 67-123.

7. That the theory of a twofold Assumption, which Jugie raised, was not based on the writings of the Byzantine theologians has been admirably demonstrated by M. Gordillo, *L'Assunzione corporale della SS. Virgine Madre di Dio nei teologi bizantini (saec. X-XV)*: Marian 9 (1947) 64-89.

8. See S. Alameda, *La desorientación asuncionista de los siglos VIII-XIII y sus causas*: EstMar 6 (1947) 203-221; A. Landgraf, *Scholastikertexte aus der Frühscholastik zur Himmelfahrt Mariens*: ZkathTh 69 (1947) 345-353; G. Marocco, *Nuovi documenti sull' Assunzione nel Medio Evo Latino*: Marian 12 (1950) 399-459.

St. Andrew of Crete, St. Germanus, St. Damascene, Theodorus Studita, Theophanes Nicaenus, etc.), or in the West (St. Gregory of Turin, Notkerus, Hincmarus, Pseudo-Augustine, etc.).⁹

d) *Traces of a prior tradition* are given both by the apocryphal “Transit of the Bl. Virgin Mary” under an imaginary narration,¹⁰ and by the writings of St. Epiphanius,¹¹ Severianus Gabalensis, St. Ephraem, St. Ambrose, etc.

2. *From the liturgy.* a) *The feast* of the Assumption was celebrated certainly at least from the middle of the 6th century in Alexandria, from the beginning of the 6th century in Jerusalem, from the end of the 7th century in France, from the years 604-687 in Rome, from the 9th century in Spain; more probably also from the close of the 5th century in Jerusalem.¹²

b) *The object of the feast* was not only the denial of any corruption in the dead body of the Bl. Virgin Mary, but also Her transporting triumph over death and Her heavenly glorification.¹³

c) *Some examples*, among others, that can be given are these: “The feast of this day, O Lord, is being venerated by us, in which the holy Mother of God underwent temporal death, but she could not be held by the bonds of death, for she gave birth in the flesh to your Son our Lord.”¹⁴ “God the King of all things gave you what is above nature; for just as he protected your virginity in giving birth, so in the tomb he preserved your body incorrupt and glorified it through a divine transferring.”¹⁵

d) But because “the Liturgy does not generate Catholic faith, but rather follows it, and from it, like fruit from a tree, sacred rites come forth,” it cannot be said that the origin of faith in the Assumption is to be found in the feast, but rather that such faith preceded the feast.¹⁶

9. See A. Wenger, *L'Assomption de la T.S. Vierge dans la tradition byzantine du VI^e au X^e siècle* (Paris 1955); M. Jugie, *Le témoignage de saint Gregoire de Tours sur la doctrine de l'Assomption et sure la fête mariale primitive*: Alma Socia Christi 10,8-14.

10. There has been much controversy about the theological worth of the apocrypha in this matter. Now after the dogmatic definition it can in no way be said that the origin of the feast and belief in the Assumption is to be found in them. Therefore it is fitting rather to refer them to a previous tradition, although one that is corrupted in many ways. On the apocrypha, see J.M. Bover, *Los apócrifos y la tradición asuncionista*: EstMar 6 (1947) 99-118; *La Asunción de María* p.1 1.2 c.4.

11. Bover, *La Asunción de María* 119-125; I. Rodríguez, *La muerte y la Asunción de la Santísima Virgen en San Epifanio*: VerVid 6 (1947) 103-113.

12. See B. Capelle, *La fête de l'Assomption dans l'histoire liturgique*: EphThLov 3 (1926) 33-45; Id., *La fête de la Vierge à Jerusalem au V^e siècle*: Le Muséon 56 (1943) 1-33; A. Raes, *Aux origines de la fête de l'assomption en Orient*: OrChP 12 (1946) 269-274; P. Gassó, G. Bassó, E.M. Llopart, O. Porcel, *La Asunción en la liturgia*: EstMar 6 (1947) 137-202. See also M. Gordillo, *art.cit.*, 65 note. Regarding the universality of the feast, see the diverse articles collected in: Alma Socia Christi 10,78-431.

13. See the Bull “*Munificentissimus Deus*”: AAS 42 (1950) 760; A.G. Welykyj, *L'Assunzione dell B.V. Maria Deipara nella liturgia bizantina*: Alma Socia Christi 5,26-53.

14. Roman Liturgy in the Gregorian Sacramentary.

15. Eastern Liturgy in the *Menacis totius anni*.

16. Bull “*Munificentissimus Deus*”: AAS 42 (1950) 760.

219. Proof from Holy Scripture.¹⁷ Gen. 3:14f. In the Proto-Gospel the complete victory of the Redeemer and His Mother are announced. But this victory was not only over sin, but also over death. Therefore Mary had to conquer death completely. But also this complete victory over death is not had except by incorruption and glorious immortality, which is what is meant by the Assumption taken formally. Therefore Mary was assumed into heaven.

The major: Having supposed the mariological meaning of the Proto-Gospel (see n. 28), the point there is the conflict between Christ and Mary on the one hand, and with the devil on the other. But the complete victory over the devil is affirmed. Therefore the complete of Christ and Mary in the redemption is announced.

The minor: Sin and death are joined together, not only in their origin (Rom. 5:12ff.), but also in the victory by which they are destroyed by the redemption (1 Cor. 15:21-26).

The second minor: This is taught expressly by St. Paul in 1 Cor. 15:54-57.

220. It is confirmed from the same Holy Scripture.¹⁸ a) The Sacred writings "set the loving Mother of God, as it were, before our very eyes as most intimately joined to her divine Son and as always sharing his lot. Consequently, it seems impossible to think of her, the one who conceived Christ, brought him forth, nursed him with her milk, held him in her arms, and clasped him to her breast, as being apart from him in body, even though not in soul, after this earthly life."

b) "Since our Redeemer is the Son of Mary, he could not do otherwise, as the perfect observer of God's law, than to honor, not only his eternal Father, but also his most beloved Mother. And, since it was within his power to grant her this great honor, to preserve her from the corruption of the tomb, we must believe that he really acted in this way."

17. See L.G. da Fonseca, *L'Assunzione de Maria nella Sacra Scrittura*: Bibl 28 (1947) 321-362; M. Peinador, *La Asunción de la Santísima Virgen en la Sagrada Escritura*: EstMar 6 (1947) 51-98; J.M. Bover, *La Asunción de María* 1.1; M. Jugie, *L'Assomption de la Sainte Vierge et l'Écriture Sainte*: AnTh (1942) 1-46 and *la mort et l'Assomption de la sainte Vierge* p.1." cap.1; A. Bea, *La sacra Scrittura "ultimo fondamento" del dogma dell'Assunzione*: CivCatt 101 (1950) 547-561; M. Peinador, *De argumento scripturistico in Bulla dogmatica*: EphMar 1 (1950) 27-44; R. Rábanos, *La argumentación escriturística en la Bula*: EstMar 12 (1952) 43-66; J.a. de Aldama, *Los primeros comentarios de la Bula*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 390-395.

18. Bull "Munificentissimus Deus": AAS 42 (1950). On the force of this argumentation, see EstEcl 25 (1951) 311f.

221. Theological reasoning.¹⁹ 1. *From the Immaculate Conception.*

The Bl. Virgin Mary by her Immaculate Conception obtained a complete victory over sin. But this victory over sin would not have been complete, if it were not also a complete victory over death. Therefore Mary obtained a complete victory over death. But again a complete victory over death supposes the heavenly glorification of the body. Therefore Mary was assumed into heaven with her body.

The minor: If it was a complete victory over sin it has to pertain also to its consequences. But the first consequence of sin is death. Therefore unless there was a complete victory over death, there would not have been a complete victory over sin.

The Bull "*Munificentissimus Deus*" uses this argument: "These two privileges [Immaculate Conception and Assumption] are closely connected with each other. Christ surely overcame sin and death by his own death; and one who is generated in a new way by Baptism, overcomes sin and death through the same Christ. However by a general law God does not confer on the just the complete effect of victory over death until the end of time. Therefore the bodies of the just also corrupt after death, but on the last day they will be rejoined with their glorious soul. Nevertheless God willed that the Bl. Virgin Mary be exempt from that general law. *She surely conquered sin by her singular privilege of the Immaculate Conception, and therefore she was not bound by that law of remaining in the tomb subject to corruption, nor did she have to wait until the end of time for the redemption of her body.*"²⁰

In this argumentation we think that the middle term is not the privilege of the Immaculate Conception, but the complete victory over sin, which we

19. See C. Frithoff, *De doctrina Assumptionis corporalis B.M.V., rationibus theologis illustrata*: Ang 15 (1938) 3-16; J.M. Bover, *La Asunción de María* p.1 1.3; E. Esteve, *La Asunción corporal y los principios de la Mariología*; EstMar 6 (1947) 223-234; Cristóforo de Pamplona, *La Asunción basada en los grandes privilegios marianos*: ibid., 263-279; A. Luis, *Valoración comparativa de los argumentos con que suele probarse la Asunción*: ibid., 281-303; B. Capelle, *Théologie de l'Assomption d'après la bulle "Munificentissimus Deus"*: NouvRevTh 72 (1950) 1009-1027; B. García, *La razón teológica en al Constitución "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EphMar 1 (1951) 45-88; G. Quadrio, *Le ragioni teologiche addotte dalla costituzione "Munificentissimus Deus" alla luce della Tradizione fino al Concilio Vaticano*: ScuoCatt 79 (1951) 1851; B. García, *Teología de la Asunción: La armonía de las prerrogativas marianas como argumento de la Asunción*: EstMar 12 (1952) 319-358.

20. AAS 42 (1950) 754. .

know for certain from the privilege of the Immaculate Conception.²¹

222. 2. From the divine Maternity.²² a) The Bl. Virgin Mary because of her divine Maternity was always closely joined together with Christ in her earthly life. Therefore likewise she must be joined together with him in heavenly life. But this union would not be perfect if it were only concerning the soul. Therefore also concerning the body she must be joined together with Christ in heaven.

b) Christ, as the Son of Mary, had to honor his Mother as much as he could (for he is a most perfect observer of the divine law). But he could honor Her through the heavenly glorification of her body. Therefore he gave Her this glorification.

223. 3. From Corredemption.²³ Mary was completely associated with Christ the Redeemer in accomplishing redemption. But redemption brings with itself complete victory not only over sin, but also over death. Therefore Mary must completely conquer death. But this victory would not have been perfect, if Mary were subject to the corruption of the tomb and had to wait until the end of the world for her bodily glorification. Therefore Mary was assumed with her body into heaven.

The last minor: For such victory over death is common to all the redeemed, but it is not proper to the Corredemptrix, just as also it was not proper to the Redeemer.

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21. See EstEcl 25 (1951) 401-406. In the same sense, E. Cid, *Del dogma de la Inmaculada al de la Asunción*: DivThom(Pi) 57 (1954) 422-441. For a copious bibliography on this question, see O. Casado, C.M.F., *Boletín Asuncionista*: EphMar 1 (1951) 147.163.168f. Add Chrisóstomo de Pamplona, *De la Inmaculada a la Asunción*: EstPr 55 (1954) 99-170; M.A. Rossi, O. De M., *Assumptio B.V. Mariae corpore et anima in caelium, quae implicite continetur in privilegio Immaculatae suae Conceptionis*: Alma Socia Christi 7,291-305. Aeg. Caggiano, O.F.M., *De consonantia dogmatis Immaculatae Conceptionis cum aliis catholicis veritatibus*: Ant 29 (1954) 431-435; H. Barré, *Immaculée Conception et Assomption au XII^e siècle*: Virgo Immaculata 5,151-180.
22. See L. Colomer, *La maternidad divina y la perfecta asociación de María a Jesucristo, fundamentos de la Asunción*: EstMar 6 (1947) 235-261; H. Bouessé, *De la maternité de Marie a sa glorieuse Assomption*: NouvRevTh 70 (1948) 823-834; and the articles by P.B. García cited in note 18.
23. See L. Colomer, *loc.cit.*; Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *La corredención o asociación de María con Cristo, recalçada en la "Munificentissimus Deus"*: EstMar 12 (1952) 158-163.

ARTICLE II

ON THE MOTHER OF THE REDEEMER, QUEEN OF THE WORLD

224. Although Mary is Queen from her essential mission, still it is fitting here to consider her royalty, since she acquired definitively the splendor of a kingdom after her assumption.

Thesis 14. The Blessed Virgin Mary is truly a Queen.

Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,1,221-233; *Royauté de Marie: Maria* (Du Manoir) 1,601-618; Alastruey, 801-821; Merkelbach, 382-391; M.J. Nicolas, *La Vierge Reine: RevThom* 45 (1939) 1,29.207-231; A. Luis, *La realeza de Maria* (Madrid 1942); *La realeza de Maria en los ultimos veinte años: EstMar* 11 (1951) 221-251.

225. Definition of terms. A woman is called *metaphorically* a queen who has a certain preeminence in some order of things. *In the proper sense*, however, a woman is called a queen who either by herself, or by reason of her husband or of her son participates in the supreme dignity and power in a perfect society.

The title “Lady” is related to the title “Queen” and it designates the same reality.

It is clear that in the supernatural order Jesus Christ is the only King of the universe and he is that completely, properly and absolutely. But Mary is called a queen in a limited and analogical way.¹ However while defending this, in the thesis we assert the fact alone, prescinding for the time being from the further question about the nature of this Marian royalty.

226. Doctrine of the Church. Mary in the ancient Councils (v.gr., Constantinople III, Nicea II) and by the holy Pontiffs (Martin I, St. Agatho, Innocent III, Boniface IX, Sixtus IV, etc.) commonly is called first of all Lady, then also Queen, Queen of the heavens (Sixtus IV, Sixtus V, Urban VIII, Clement XIII, Pius IX, Leo XIII), Queen of heaven (Paul V, Innocent XI, Innocent XII, Clement XI, Pius VI, St. Pius X), Queen of heaven and earth (Benedict XIV, St. Pius X), Queen of the world (Leo XII, Pius XII), Queen of angels and saints (Pius XII), and she is given many similar titles.²

Pius XII in 1942 wrote: “As surely all know in what manner Jesus Christ is the King of the universe and the Lord of lords in whose hands

1. See Pius XII, Encyclical “*Ad caeli Reginam*”: AAS 46 (1954) 635.

2. See P. Luis, C.M.F., *La realeza de Maria* en los documentos eclesiásticos: EphMar 5 (1955) 317-334.

have been placed the fate of individual citizens and peoples, so also his dear Mother Mary is honored by all the Christian faithful as Queen of the world, and has obtained great power of intercession with God... Just as all things obey and submit to the eternal will of God, so in a certain way it can be said that the approving kindness of her Only-begotten Son always responds to the prayers of the Virgin Mother of God. That is especially true now, since the same Blessed Virgin enjoys eternal beatitude in heaven, and has been triumphally crowned and hailed as the Queen of angels and men.”³

The same Pius XII in 1946 in a radio broadcast to Portugal proclaimed the truth of Mary’s royalty and her titles.⁴

Finally in the year 1954 he instituted the universal feast of Mary Queen and he explained the fact of Her royalty, her titles and nature.⁵

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith from the ordinary magisterium.*

227. Proof from Holy Scripture.⁶ Luke 1:30-35. Mary appears there as the Mother of the divine King, who indeed is conceived and born truly a King, and does not take over his kingdom later.

228. Proof from tradition.⁷ a) *From the holy Fathers.* The first ecclesiastical writers often call Mary “Mother of the King,” “Mother of the Lord,” alluding to Luke 1:30-35 and 1:43. Thus, among others, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Ephraem, Prudentius, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Sedulius, Basilus Seleuciensis. Thus they readily call her Lady (Pseudo-Origen, St. Jerome, St. Chrysologus, Epiphanius of Constantinople, Pseud-Modestus), Queen (St. Andrew of Crete, St. Germanus, St. Damascene). These titles were used very much from the 6th to the 8th century. Thus St. Ildephonse of Toledo: “O my Lady, my Sovereign, You who rule over me, Mother of

3. Letter “*Dum saeculum*”: AAS 34 (1942) 126.

4. *Nuntius radiophonicus ad Lusitaniam*: AAS 38 (1946) 264-267.

5. Encyclical “*Ad caeli Reginam*”: AAS 46 (1954) 625-640. On this encyclical, see M. Peinador, *Propedéutica a la encíclica “Ad caeli Reginam”*: EphMar 5 (1955) 291-316; J. Galot, S.J., *Reine de l’Univers*: Nouv RevTh 77 (1955) 491-505; J.A. de Aldama, *Enseñanzas mariológicas del año mariano*: Salm 1 (1954) 734-736.

6. See F.C. Fenton, *Our Lady’s Queenship and the New Testament Teaching*: Alma Socia Christi 46 (1954) 625-640.

7. The texts have been assembled by Barré, *La royauté de Marie pendant les neuf premiers siècles*: RechScRel 29 (1939) 129-162, 303-334; A. Luis, *La realeza dd María* 32-77. See also T.B. Falls, *The Queenship of Mary in the Church Fathers*: Alma Socia Christi 3,87-92; A.C. Rush, C.S.S.R., *The Queenship of Mary in Early Assumption Literature*: *ibid.*, 111-121; A. rivera, C.M.F., *La tradición en la enciclical “Ad caeli Reginam”*: EphMar 5 (1955) 335-352.

my Lord..., Lady among handmaids, Queen among sisters.”

b) *In the Middle Ages* this doctrine was very common and often appears. In this matter those who should be mentioned are: Alcuin, Hincmarus, Iosephus Hymnographus, Ioannes Geometra, Ioannes Eucaitensis, St. Peter Damian, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, Gerson.

Many similar titles recur *in the Latin hymns* of this time.⁸

c) *In the modern age* St. Peter Canisius must surely be named, for he answered the objections of the Protestants. Suarez more than once speaks about Mary's royalty, as something totally clear from which he argues to prove other points. Likewise Salazar and many others. This doctrine was studied directly and expressly, after its treatment by Suarez, by Bartholomew de los Rios and Chrystopher Vega. And St. Alphonsus Liguori should be added to this list.⁹

d) *The Liturgy* agrees,¹⁰ both in the East and in the West, as, for example, in antiphons “O Queen of Heaven, Rejoice,” “Hail, Queen of Heavens,” and in the prayer “Hail, Holy Queen.” Now the same faith is found in the new liturgical feast of the Queenship of Mary.

e) To the above can be added *the Litany of the Bl. Virgin Mary* and the fifth glorious mystery of the Rosary, “which can be called the mystical crown of the heavenly Queen.”

f) Finally, a proof of the same faith is the frequent custom of *crowning* statues of the Virgin Mother of God, carried out by the holy Pontiffs either personally or by delegation.¹¹

229. Theological reasoning. a) *From the divine maternity.* Mary truly is the Mother of the Son of God; but the Son of God is a King; therefore Mary is the Mother of a King, or a Queen.

About this argument Pius XII wrote: Because the Son of Mary is said to reign forever and She is called the Mother of the Lord, “from this it is easily concluded that She is a Queen, since she bore a Son who, at the very moment of His conception, because of the hypostatic union of the human nature with the Word, was also as man King and Lord of all things.”¹²

b) *From companionship with Christ the King.* Christ is a King, not

8. See Serapio de Iragui, *La Mediación de la Virgen en la himnografía latina de la Edad Media* 297-399.

9. St. Peter Canisius, *De Maria Virgine incomparabili* 5,13; Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.3 s.5; d.22 s.2 n.4; Salazar, *Expositio in Proverbia Salomonis* 8,15f. A. Munster, *La Souveraineté de la Vierge d'après les écrits mariologiques de Barthèlemey de los Rios, O.E.S.A.* (Gand 1946). On St. Alphonsus, see F.J. Connell, *C.S.S.R., St. Alphonsus and the Queenship of Mary*: Alma Socia Christi 3,122-126.

10. See J.C. Fenton, *loc.cit.*, 69-79.

11. On all of this, see the Encyclical “Ad caeli Reginam”: AAS 46 (1954) 267-633.

12. Encyclical “Ad caeli Reginam”: AAS 46 (1954) 633.

only because he is the Son of God, but also because he is the Redeemer; but Mary is associated with this Redeemer in her office of Corredemptrix; therefore She is also a Queen.

On this argument Pius XII wrote: "If Mary, in taking an active part in the work of salvation, was, by God's design, associated with Jesus Christ, the source of salvation itself, in a manner comparable to that in which Eve was associated with Adam, the source of death, so that it may be stated that the work of our salvation was accomplished by a kind of "recapitulation," in which a Virgin was instrumental in the salvation of the human race, just as a virgin had been closely associated with its death; if, moreover, it can likewise be stated that the glorious Lady had been chosen Mother of Christ in order that she might become a partner in the redemption of the human race...: then it may legitimately be concluded that as Christ, the new Adam, must be called a King not merely because He is Son of God, but also because He is our Redeemer, so, analogously, the Most Blessed Virgin is queen not only because she is Mother of God, but also because, as the new Eve, she was associated with the new Adam."¹³

Also the *true titles* of Mary's royalty are certainly proved by these two arguments, which, speaking more concisely, agree in this point that Mary is called Queen, and is such because of her special association with Christ the King; this association is both maternal and active in the work of redemption.¹⁴

230. A further theological explanation. Having proved the fact of Mary's royalty and recounted its foundation and her titles, a question must be raised about the intimate nature of that same royalty. In this matter there is not one opinion among theologians.

For *some* want to explain the concept of Marian royalty from the concept of a *king*. But since a king is properly so named from the threefold power—legislative, judicial and executive—"by which, if he lacks it, his rule can hardly be understood," they have tried to attribute the same threefold power to the Bl. Virgin. Thus De Gruyter, Mura, Moore and to a certain extent, Garénaux.¹⁵

Others, however, have explained the concept of Marian Royalty from the concept of a *human queen*. A woman is called a queen from her intimate

13. Encyclical "Ad caeli Reginam": AAS 46 (1954) 634f.

14. A natural title of inheritance must be excluded, which has been mentioned by some theologians. See Salman-ticensis, *De Incarnatione* tr.21 p.4 disp.32 dub.1.

15. De Gruyter, *De B. Maria Regina* (Buscoduci 1934) 144ff.; Mura, *Le Corps Mystique du Christ* (Paris 1934) 2,157f.; K.B. Moore, O.C.D., *The Fact and the Nature of the Queenship of Mary*: Alma Social Christi 3,64-67; Garenaux.

connection with a king, from whom she borrows her royal dignity. But her royal influence consists in the fact that, by her requests and the amiableness of her person, she can influence the heart and mind of the king for the benefit of his subjects. These authors appeal especially to the words of P. Suarez: "While explaining or limiting this dominion, Pseudo-Athanasius says that it is according to the feminine sex, as if he would say it is such as is usually the case in a wife or mother because of her connection with the king."¹⁶ Hence Mary is truly called Queen because she is the Mother of the divine King, and intimately associated with him in the work of redemption, she exercises maternal influence with her Son by her prayers for men. Therefore Her royal power is a pleading power of intercession in the distribution of graces. Thus Barré, Dillenschneider, Nicolas, Roschini, Luis, Santonicola, and others.¹⁷

Finally, there are *other theologians*, who, rejecting the analogy from the concept of a king and from the concept of a queen in the same way, take a different path and intend to explain Mary's royalty from the excellence, influence and privileges of a mother in the family. That is, Mary's royal power is wholly maternal, and she exercises it with a maternal right. It is clear that this exercise cannot be limited to mere intercession, but that it extends to a real action in favor of her children, by conferring supernatural perfection on them. Thus García Garcés.¹⁸

231. In order that we may briefly define something in this matter, it seems necessary to say:

1. Mary's royalty is not to be explained from an analogy with the concept of a human king. Among other things, what indicates this is the reason or titles which constitute Mary's royalty. Hence, from this source, there should be no resort to the threefold royal power which pertains to a king.

2. Mary's royalty is not to be explained from the concept of mother. For the formalities of a queen mother are two and diverse; their concepts must be accurately distinguished, even though they are verified in one and the same person, and the kingdom of Christ really coincides with a certain family of God.

3. Mary's royalty is more fittingly explained from a concept of a queen

16. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.22 s.2 n.4.

17. Barré, *Marie, Reine du monde*: EtMar 1937) 21-75; M.J. Nicolas, *La Vierge Reine*: RevThom 45 (1939) 207-231; Roschini, *La royauté de Marie*: Maria (Du Manoir) 1,607-618; A. Luis, *La realeza de Maria en los últimos veinte años*: EstMar 11 (1951) 221-251; A.M. Santonicola, *La regalità di Maria* (Milan 1942): Alma Socia Christi 3,127-156.

18. N. García Garcés, *De regali Corde B.V. Mariae*: EphMar 4 (1955) 169-190.

among men. That is certain from its foundation, which is to be placed in an intimate association with the King. Hence, from this angle, it must be explained from its efficacious intercessory power in favor of men.

4. Mary's royalty exceeds the concept of a human queen, although it does agree with it analogically. It obtains this from the singular manner of its association with the King. And indeed:

a) From the maternal association with Christ the King there results in Her a royal splendor and eminence that surpasses the excellence of all creatures. Therefore she obtains a preeminence over all things after that of her Son. This is true of all creation and therefore she is rightly called Mary Queen of the world.

b) From the same maternal association with Christ the King there results in Her in a special way an excellence above all intellectual creatures in the supernatural order. For since the divine maternity confers on Her a fullness of grace, the highest grade of perfection after Christ, and therefore she acquires a true, though subordinate, preeminence in the kingdom of Christ.

c) From her association with Christ the King in accomplishing the work of redemption there results in Her a royal faculty of dispensing the treasures of the kingdom, which are truly hers, not only because they belong to her Spouse the King, but also because she acquired them, together with him, by her own merits and by her compassion.

d) But from the nature of these gifts, which is intimate and pertaining to minds and wills, Her efficacious influence is exercised on the very souls of her subjects, whether this influence is only moral and in the line of intercession, or also in the line of physical causality, according to the different opinions of theologians.

Therefore Mary is called a Queen by an analogy with queens of this world, but in a more excellent way. For just as Christ and human kings are so called analogically, so that Christ is the principal analogate because he more fully possesses the threefold royal power and he has it from a title that is absolutely more true and more profound, so Mary and human queens are called queens analogically. This is so in such a way that the principal analogate is Mary, since she has a closer association with the King and so both possesses a greater splendor and power and exercises an influence on subjects that is more true and intimate.

ARTICLE III

ON THE VENERATION TO BE SHOWN TO THE MOTHER OF THE REDEEMER

232. Thus far we have studied what God did with Mary, that is, he made her the virginal Mother of the Redeemer, and therefore also our Mother, since she was associated with Him in the work of redemption. Next we have to consider our duties towards Her. Undoubtedly these duties will be duties of filial piety towards our heavenly Mother, of trust and of prayer to the Mother of the Redeemer and our Corredemptrix.¹ But all these things suppose our fundamental relation to Her, namely, the veneration that we must show to Her. Now we will have to treat this matter.

Thesis 15. The absolute cult of hyperdulia is due to the Blessed Virgin Mary.

S.Th. III, q. 35, a. 5; Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.32; Alastruey, 833-846; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,3,13-20; Merkelbach, 392-423; E. Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2439-2453.

233. Definition of terms. *Cult*, or adoration, is an act by which someone submits himself to another as a sign of his excellence and superiority.

Cult is said to be *absolute*, if it is directed to the person himself because of his excellence; it is *relative*, if it is directed to another object because of its connection with the excellence of the person.

Cult by reason of excellence can be: a) *latria*, because of the divine excellence; b) *dulia*, because of created supernatural excellence; c) *hyperdulia*, because of some created excellence, but one that is absolutely singular.

It is obvious that the Bl. Virgin must not be venerated with the absolute cult of latria. Essentially a relative cult of latria could be given to Her, because of Her physical union with God, which surely is greater than what is found in the cross. However this cult in the concrete order, inasmuch as we are prescinding from her personal dignity, could easily give rise to many abuses and therefore is to be rejected.²

The cult of hyperdulia is based on the singular excellence, which the Bl. Virgin Mary has, because she is the Mother of God. This dignity, although created, is in a certain respect infinite, and makes Her pertain to the hypostatic order. Hence it is clear that hyperdulia differs specifically

1. See Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,3,21-41; Alastruey, 871-888.

2. See Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.2 s.2 n.2.

from *dulia*, by which we venerate the Saints. It is another question, whether the cult given to the Bl. Virgin because of her fullness of grace and singular gifts, which certainly can also be called *hyperdulia*, differs specifically from *dulia*; this is better denied.³

234. Adversaries. 1) Some women in the 5th century in Arabia gave the absolute cult of *latria* to the Virgin. Because they offered to the Virgin as to a goddess *collyrides*, or cakes, as a sacrifice, they are called *collyridians*.⁴

2) *Protestants* said that the cult of the Virgin is idolatry.⁵

3) These same objections afterwards were repeated often by the *Jansenists*, especially in the work *Monita salutaria*⁶; also by modern rationalists who say that the cult of Mary arose in the Church from pagan infiltrations in the 4th century because of the huge number of conversions from paganism.⁷

235. Doctrine of the Church. 1) *The Council of Trent* in session 26: decree on the invocation and intercession of the Saints (D 1821; 1823).

2) Alexander VIII condemned the proposition: "Praise that is offered to Mary, as Mary, is vain" (D 2326); this was taken from *Monitis Salutaribus*: "Praise that is offered to me, as to me, is vain; praise that is offered to me as mother and handmaid of the Lord, is holy."⁸

3) Pius VI against the Synod of Pistoia (D 2671).

4) Leo XIII in various ways increased the cult of the Bl. Virgin, especially by his Encyclicals on the Holy Rosary. During his time the Sacred Congregation of Rites wrote: "The Church worships the Queen and Lady of Angels with a higher type of veneration above that of the other Saints; to her, since She is the Mother of God, is due not just any kind of *dulia*, but *hyperdulia*."⁹

5) *The Code of Canon Law* in cn. 1255 prescribes: "to the Blessed Virgin Mary [is due] the cult of *hyperdulia*."

6) Pius XI wrote: "Why, therefore, do the Reformers and not a few non-Catholics bitterly condemn our piety towards the Virgin Mother of God, as though we were withdrawing the worship due to God alone? Do they not know, or do they not attentively consider that nothing can be more pleasing

3. See Merkelbach, n.220.

4. See St. Epiphanius, *Panarion* haer.79,1: MG 42,740f.

5. See Canisius, *De Maria Virgine incomparabili* 5,11-17; C. Crivelli, *Notre Dame et les Protestants: Maria* 1,675-693.

6. See Dillenschneider, *La Mariologie de S. Alphonse de Liguori* 1,41-67.

7. See Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2445, where the principal bibliography is cited.

8. Windenfeld, *Monita salutaria... monito* 6; see Bourassé, *Summa Aurea* 5,156f.

9. See Ass 16,526.

to Jesus Christ, who certainly has an ardent love for his own Mother, than that we should venerate her as she deserves, that we should return her love, and that imitating her most holy example we should seek to gain her powerful patronage?"¹⁰

236. Theological note. a) It is a matter of divine and Catholic faith, from the ordinary magisterium, that the cult of latria must not be given to Mary, if the concern is with absolute cult; but if the concern is with a relative cult, it is a *common and certain opinion*. b) That a cult of hyperdulia in general should be given to Mary is *Catholic doctrine*; it is a *more common and probable opinion* that this cult is specifically different from the common cult of dulia.

237. Proof from tradition.¹¹ From apostolic times to the beginning of the 4th century there are not a few implicit testimonies for the cult of praying to the Bl. Virgin. For, from the end of the 2nd century veneration of the saints has been verified; but since at that time the supernatural privileges of Mary (divine maternity, virginity, mediation) are sufficiently present in the belief of all, it is clear that the Church was no stranger to the veneration of the Virgin. Indeed from the 2nd century there are many images of Mary in the catacombs, as in the cemetery of Priscilla (2nd to 3rd century) and in the cemetery of Saints Peter and Marcellian (3rd to 4th century). Finally, since before the middle of the 4th century the cult of Mary appears generally in the Church, and history cannot assign either a time or a place when it started, it is necessary to conclude that it is very ancient and connected with the beginnings of Christianity.

It should also be noted that at this time (3rd to 4th century) there is an explicit document about this cult, namely, the Marian antiphon "*Sub tuum praesidium.*"

238. b) In the 4th century St. Epiphanius condemns the women who offer to Mary a cult of latria: but he affirms that she must be venerated.¹² St. Ambrose, while proposing Mary as a model for virgins, exhorts them to ask the Bl. Virgin for the necessary graces.¹³ In the Acts of St. Mary of Egypt there is the recourse of this penitent woman to Mary.¹⁴ Already at this time churches are built in honor of the Bl. Virgin Mary. Finally, Marian feasts

10. Encyclical "*Lux veritatis*": AAS 23 (1931) 513.

11. See Dublanchy, *Marie*: DTC 9,2439-2452.

12. *Panarion* haer.79: MG 42,751.753; see also MG 35,1181; 46,909-912.

13. *De institutione virginis* 13,83: ML 16,325.

14. See also MG 87,3,3714.

are celebrated at least from the beginning of the 4th century.

239. c) *From the 5th century* the cult of Mary, whether liturgical or private, is very well known. Fathers and ecclesiastical writers speak about the singular and supereminent cult of the Mother of God. Thus Pseudo-Modestus of Jerusalem, St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, St. John Damascene.¹⁵

d) *In the Middle Ages* the doctrine about hyperdulia appears expressly in St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus and generally in others.

e) *In the Modern Age* St. Peter Canisius brilliantly defends the cult of the Virgin Mary against the attacks of the Protestants. St. Laurence of Brindisi says something similar. Then St. Alphonsus Liguori defends it strongly against the Jansenists.

240. Theological reasoning. An absolute cult is specified by the excellence of the person to whom it is given. But the excellence of the Bl. Virgin is totally singular. Therefore a singular cult is due to her. But again that cult cannot be one of latria. Therefore it is rightly called hyperdulia.

The major: The formal object of a cult is the excellence of the person to whom it is given. Therefore it is specified by this.

The minor: The Bl. Virgin is the Mother of God. But this excellence is totally singular, in a certain respect infinite and pertaining to the hypostatic order.¹⁶

241. Scholium 1. *On the Christian origin of the Marian cult.* Many rationalists hold that the cult of the Bl. Virgin has its origin in the pagan cult of the goddess-mother, like Isis, Artemis or Ishtar. It is clear that this can in no way be admitted theologically based on what has already been proved. Nor can it be maintained historically. For we have seen that the cult of the Virgin is based on the revealed doctrine of Her excellence. Also, she is not venerated as a goddess, but as a creature, although the most noble creature. And where some pagan infiltration does occur, the Church condemns it as heresy.¹⁷

242. Scholium 2. *On the special cult of the Immaculate Heart of Mary.* Veneration to the Immaculate Heart of Mary is now promoted in the Church in various ways. Regarding its legitimacy and meaning a few points require

15. Pseudo-Modestus of Jerusalem, *Encomium in B.V.*: MG 86,303; St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, *De perpetua virginitate S. Mariae*: MG 96,105; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 4,15: MG 94,1168.

16. See P. Straeter, *Sinndeutung der Marienverehrung*: Katholische Marienkunde 3,345-384; M. Gordillo, *Fundamento teologico del culto della Vergine Madre di Dio presso gli Orientali*: Alma Socia Christi 5,2,1-16.

There is more about the Marian cult in the same fascicule and in vol. 9 of the same collection.

17. See Merkelbach, n. 222.

a theological explanation.¹⁸

a) The *Heart* of Mary in this devotion designates the whole subject of the interior life of the Virgin, with the twofold activity of appetite and intellect. Therefore it includes the bodily Heart, having an intimate connection with her psychological life, especially the appetitive, and therefore naturally designating this life, especially its love.¹⁹ Thus in the decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites: "For in this cult the Church gives due honor to the Immaculate Heart of the Bl. Virgin Mary, since under the symbol of this Heart of the Mother of God she devoutly venerates the exceptional and singular holiness of Mary's soul, but especially her ardent love for God and her Son Jesus, and her maternal piety toward men who have been redeemed by the divine blood."²⁰

243. b) The wholly singular excellence of the affective life in Mary the Mother of God and the Corredemptrix of men also deserves a singular cult. This excellence is participated in by Her bodily Heart because of the natural redundance of emotions and because of the excellence of the person of the Virgin. These are indeed the theological *foundations* of this special cult.

244. c) While we omit the *biblical* allusions, in which the first foundation of this devotion is contained,²¹ in the age of the Fathers a few references are made to the Heart of Mary by Origen, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, St. Ephraem, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Prudentius, St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Amphylochius, St. Germanus, St. Ildephonsus. *In the Middle Ages* it is treated by Paul Warnefridus, Pseudo-Anselm Lucensis, Guitbertus Abbas, St. Anselm, Bruno Artensis, Rupertus Tuitensis, Honorius Augustodunensis, Eadmerus, Godefridus, Hugo of St. Victor, St. Bernard, St. Albert, Richard of St. Laurence, St. Bonaventure, Iacobus a Voragine, Gerson, St. Bernardine of Siena,²² St. Antoninus of Florence, and others.

18. See Alastruey, 846-853; Roschini, *Mariologia* 2,3,43-45; J. Arragain, C.I.M., *Introduction à la théologie de Coeur de Marie*: Alma Socia Christi 6,2,1-29.

19. See Gregorio de Jesús Crucificado, *Objeto material y formal del culto al Corazón Immaculado de María*: EstMar 4 (1945) 265-299; M. Llamera, *El corazón físico de la Virgen, ¿es también objeto-sujeto del culto cordimariano?*: EstMar 4 (1945) 407-410; P. Parente, *Oggetto e legittimità del culto del Cuore Immaculata de Maria (Il Cuore Immaculato de Maria)*, Corso de conferenze, Rome 1946) 9-30; J. Calveras, *Objeto del culto al Corazón de María. Reajustando la terminología*: EstMar 7 (1948) 371-386; N. García Garcés, *De Immaculato Corde B.M.V., seu quid veniat nomine "cordis" et quodnam sit obiectum proprium eius salutiferae devotionis*: EphMar 2 (1953) 3-24, or Alma Socia Christi 6,2,30-53.

20. See AAS 37 (1945) 50.

21. See G. Puerto, *Fundamentos dogmaticos de la devoción al Corazón de María*: EstMar 3 (1944) 223-266; M. Peinador, *El Corazón de María en los Evangelios*: EstMar 4 (1945) 11-58.

22. See D. Scaramuzzi, *Il Dottore del Cuore Immaculato de Maria: San Bernardino di Siena (Il Cuore Immaculato di Maria)* 169-175.

Also at this time devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary appears often in hymns.²³ At the beginning of Modern Times the ones to be mentioned are especially St. Thomas Villanova, Blessed John of Avila,²⁴ Salmerón, St. Peter Canisius, St. Francis de Sales.²⁵

But the true public devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary was started by St. John Eudes. By his efforts many bishops in France approved this devotion which since that time has been strongly promoted. After him are named Fr. Pinamonti and Fr. Gallifet, and especially St. Anthony M. Claret.²⁶

The liturgical feast, after various difficulties (1648-1855), when at first it obtained for those seeking it approbation from Pius IX in 1855, later was instituted for the whole Church by Pius XII in 1944.²⁷

245. d) Consecration stands out in the devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. After the ideas of some form of consecration to the Bl. Virgin bore their first fruit already in the 16th century both in Spain (in the works especially of Fr. Bartholomew de los Rios and Fr. John of Los Angeles),²⁸ and in France (in the work of the Berullian school),²⁹ from the beginning of the 20th century a desire for the consecration of the whole world to the Immaculate Heart of Mary was promoted often and constantly. The apparitions of the Bl. Virgin in Fatima contributed greatly to the fostering of this desire. Kindly acceding to these desires, Pius XII consecrated the world to the Immaculate Heart of Mary on October 31, 1942, and again in the Vatican Basilica on December 8, 1944.³⁰

Consecration is an act by which we freely submit to God ourselves and all we have by acknowledging His dominion over us. Therefore consecration to the Bl. Virgin, and to Her Heart, is possible to the extent that she has some dominion over us; but she really does have this, since she

23. See N. García Garcés, *La devoción al Corazón de María en la poesía religiosa de la Edad Media*: EstMar 4 (1945) 173-264.

24. See J. Calveras, *La devoción al Corazón de María en el "Libro de la V. María" del B. Avila*: Manr 17 (1945) 296-346; 18 (1946) 3-29, 221-256; N. García Garcés, *El B. Avila, Apóstel del Corazón de María*: Maestro Avila 1 (1946-47) 13-29, 123-146.

25. See J.M. Bover, *Origen y desenvolvimiento de la devoción al Corazón de María en los Santos Padres y escritores eclesiásticos*: EstMar (1945) 59-172; F. De Solá, *La devoción al Corazón Immaculado de María en España*: EstMar 4 (1945) 411-461.

26. See G. Posterius, *Il culto del Cuore Immacolato di Maria attraverso i secoli (Il Cuore Immacolato di Maria)* 31-54.

27. See E. Pujolerás, *La festa liturgica del Cuore Immacolato di Maria (Il Cuore Immacolato de Maria)* 107-141.

28. See J.B. Gomis, *Esclavitud Mariana, Fr. Juan de los Angeles y su Cofradia de Esclavos y Esclavas*: VerVid 4 (1946) 259-286.

29. See a. Luis, *Precedentes históricos d la consagración al Corazón de María*: EstMar 4 (1945) 463-519.

30. See AAS 34 (1942) 345f.

is the Queen of the whole world. The proper terminus of the consecration is the person of the Virgin. But Her Immaculate Heart is named expressly, because it includes Her love which induces us to return love for love.³¹

e) *Reparation* belongs together with consecration to the Immaculate Heart.³²

246. Scholium 3. *Devotion to the Bl. Virgin, a sign of predestination.* That devotion to the Bl. Virgin is a sign of predestination is a truth that is generally recognized in Christian people and it is also taught by the magisterium of the Church. Thus Benedict XV: "Wherefore the Church herself with many liturgical prayers earnestly beseeches the Bl. Virgin Mary that she mercifully assist men at the moment of death. For there is a constant conviction among the Christian faithful, proved by long experience, that all those who have the same Virgin as their Patron will not perish forever."³³ Pius XII: "Devotion to the Virgin Mother of God, which in the opinion of holy men is a sign of predestination...."³⁴

This doctrine is based on sayings of ancient writers, like St. Germanus and St. Anselm,³⁵ of theologians like Novatian, of Doctors of the Church like St. Robert Bellarmine, St. Alphonsus Liguori, and many others.³⁶

Of course it is not a matter of an infallible sign, which cannot happen except by a divine revelation. But much less is it a question of a sign that is more or less magical, while excluding or neglecting good works and the necessary means of salvation. But, because of the intimate union between Mary and Christ, the Blessed Virgin cannot not efficaciously bring souls to Him. On the other hand, the Mediatrix and Dispensatrix of graces will not deny the great grace of predestination to those devoted to her. The special reason for this is that She has singular rights to the graces which are granted to her children.³⁷

247. Scholium 4. *On the cult of St. Joseph.* We saw above that St. Joseph is the husband of Mary, who remains a virgin (n. 77f.), and also truly the father of Jesus, although the foster-father (n. 114). The question can

31. See J. Bittremieux, *Consecratio mundi Immaculato Cordi B. Mariae Virginis*: EphThLov 20 (1943) 99-103; J. Lebon, *Les fondements dogmatiques de la consécration au Coeur Immaculé de Marie* (Liège 1946); Roschini, *La consacrazione al Cuore Immacolato di Maria (Il Cuore Immacolato di Maria)* 55-78 and in *Mariologia* 2,3,224-228; C. Feckes, *Die Weihe der Kirche und der Welt an Maria*: Katholische Marienkunde (Straeter) 3,323-344; G. Geenen, O.P., *Les antécédentes doctrinaux et historiques de la consécration du monde au coeur immaculé de Marie*: Maria 1,825-873; E. Pujolrás, C.M.F., *Fondamenti dommatici della consecrazione al Cuore Immacolato de Maria*: Alma Socia Christi 6,2,82-95.
32. See A. Rivera, C.M.F., *La reparación en la devoción al Immaculado Corazón de María*: Alma Socia Christi 6,2,157-170; and much more that is assembled in vol.8 Fasc.2 of the collection *Virgo Immaculata*.
33. Apostolic Letter "*Inter sodalicia*": AAS 10 (1918) 182.
34. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 584.
35. MG 98,300.309.320.341.349.356; ML 158,956.
36. Novatian, *De eminentia Deiparae* 2,404; Bellarmine, *Opera oratoria postuma* (ed. Tromp) 6,695; St. Alphonsus, *Le glorie de Marie* c.1.
37. See J. Beumer, *Marienverehrung, Zeichen und Mittel der Auserwählung*: Katholische Marienkunde (Straeter) 3,210-225.

also be raised whether St. Joseph pertains to the hypostatic order. A special connection between him and the realization of the hypostatic union can hardly be denied. Suarez suggested that there are certain ministries, which touch on the hypostatic order, and that St. Joseph is in that order, although on the lowest level.³⁸ Many theologians after Suarez agreed with this. Some of them hold that St. Joseph pertains to that order intrinsically. But it is said better and more generally that he pertains to it only extrinsically, morally and mediately.³⁹

From this of course comes the special dignity of St. Joseph, to which there necessarily also corresponds a special devotion. Such devotion, which some theologians have called a cult of the highest *dulia*, can best be called with recent authors a cult of “*protodulia*.” This is a special and singular devotion, but one still within the limits of *dulia*.

And surely the dignity of St. Joseph is wholly singular, and if it in no way approaches the infinite dignity of the Mother of God, still it comes closer to it than the dignity of all the other Saints, since it is closely connected with the hypostatic order, although in an extrinsic way. Certainly this demands a cult and veneration which surpasses the ordinary veneration of the other Saints.⁴⁰

38. *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* d.8 s.1 n.10.

39. See B. Llamera, *¿Pertenece S. José al orden hipostático?*: *CiencTom* 71 (1946, II) 250-281.

40. See F. Hormaeche, *Derecho de San José a la protodulia*: *EstEcl* 6 (1927) 4-37; Isaie de Castel Sanpietro, *Du droit de saint Joseph au cultre de protodulie*: *EtFranc* 47 (1935) 129-142, 257-270; B. Llamera, *Introducción a la teología de San José*: *CiencTom* 66 (1944) 255-275.

A P P E N D I X

On the cult and veneration of the Saints

Thesis 16. The saints living in heaven are to be venerated with the cult of *dulia*.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 72, a. 2; Pesch, 4,628-647; Muncunill, *De Verbi Divini Incarnatione* 1224-1228, 1236-1247.

248. Definition of terms. The meaning of *cult* and *dulia* was given above (see n. 233).

Saints living in heaven. We venerate them because, although saints living on earth can also be venerated provided there is sufficient evidence about their holiness, but because ordinarily we cannot be certain about their perseverance, they should not be venerated until after their death. Of course we do have full certitude about their holiness once they have been infallibly canonized by the Church.

Adversaries. *Protestants* who calumniate Catholics by saying that Catholics worship the saints as if they were gods.

249. Doctrine of the Church. a) *The Council of Rome in the year 993* (D 675): we honor the servants so that honor may redound to the Lord.

b) *The Council of Trent* sess. 22, ch. 3 (D 1744) and cn. 5 (D 1755): Masses are celebrated in honor of the saints in order to obtain their intercession with God.

c) *The Council of Trent* sess. 25 (D 1821) defines the licitness of the cult of the saints; this teaching later appears in the Tridentine Profession of Faith (D 1867).

d) That this whole matter pertains also to perfect men was taught by Innocent XI against Molinos (D 2235).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

250. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers often speak about veneration of the Saints. Thus, v.gr., they say that we should venerate the Saints because of their holiness (R 81), or because they are friends of God and that they may pray for us (R 2378); they teach that the death of the Saints, especially of the martyrs, should be commemorated by Christians (R 572); but that the cult given to them is completely different from the cult due to Christ (R 1109); and therefore that

altars should not be established for them, because our veneration of them is not of such a nature that we also offer sacrifices to them (R 1603).

b) The cult of the martyrs in the daily praxis of the Church is certain, from the earliest times and also in the catacombs.

c) There are many sermons of the holy Fathers about the Saints preached to the people in the annual celebrations.

d) Finally, the traditional veneration of images and relics of the Saints is certain.

251. Proof from theological reasoning. a) Religious cult, acknowledging his excellence, is due to a person who has supernatural excellence. But the Saints have such excellence. Therefore cult is due to them.

b) This cult is specified by the excellence itself of the Saints to whom it is attributed. But this excellence is not divine or intrinsically connected with the hypostatic order, as it is in the Bl. Virgin. Therefore the cult of the Saints is not the cult of latria or hyperdulia, but simply the cult of dulia.

252. Objection. Some Fathers seem to find fault with the invocation of the Saints. Thus, v.gr., St. Ambrose says: "God does not need a beseecher, but a devout mind."¹

I deny the assertion. About this quote from St. Ambrose it is necessary to say that he is affirming there only that God does not need beseechers in order to know our necessities; but he does not deny that we must direct prayers and intercessions to God.²

253. Scholium. *On the veneration of relics and images.* Relics in the strict sense are what is left over from the bodies of the dead Saints. In the broad sense they are also things that they used during their lifetime and that their bodies, even dead bodies, have touched. The veneration, which is given to relics, is a relative cult, since it is directed to them because of the connection they have with the person of the Saints. The solemn veneration of relics is found in the whole ecclesiastical tradition, as even the Acts of the Martyrs give abundant witness to. The magisterium of the Church has often approved of this. Thus the Council of Nicaea II condemned those who throw away the relics of the martyrs (D 603); the Council of Rome in 993 (D 675) approved the veneration of them; the Council of Constance (D 1269) did the same against the Wycliffites and the Hussites; and especially the Council of Trent in session 25 (D 1821) against the Protestants, and in its Profession of Faith (D 1867).

The cult of images is also relative. The defense of this cult against the iconoclasts was made principally by the Council of Nicaea II (D 600-601, 603). The Council of Constantinople IV (D 653-656) and the Council of Trent in session 25 (D 1823, 1867) proposed the same doctrine.³

1. *Commentarius in epist. ad Romanos* 4,22: ML 17,58.

2. There is much more about the words of the holy Fathers in Bellarmine, *De Ecclesia triumphante* 1.1 c.19.

3. On this question see Pesch, 4,648-671; C. Emmereau, *Iconoclasme*: DTC 7,575-595; V. Grumel, *Images (culte des)*: DTC 7,766-844.

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