Unknown

2. Proof of the Dogma.—All things are created out of nothing. This truth is clearly contained both in Scripture and Tradition. The Socinian and Arminian claim that it cannot be demonstrated from the Bible, is manifestly false.

a) Let us consider, in the first place, the deeper meaning of certain names applied to God by Sacred Scripture.

α) God’s incommunicable proper name is יַ‌הְוֶה, ὁ ὤν, primus et novissimus. Inasmuch as this name denotes His proper Essence, it applies to God really and truly; in fact, as a proper name, it applies to Him alone,22 or, to put it otherwise, nothing outside of God is or can be called Yahweh. Now, if the things existing outside of God were, like Himself, necessary, increate, and self-existing (even though only after the manner of an eternal self-existing hyle), God could no longer claim as exclusively His own that self-existence which is denoted by the name Yahweh. For the things existing outside Him would then likewise be of the nature of ens a se, and therefore יַ‌הְוֶה. But if God alone is Yahweh, or ens a se, then whatever else exists must be ab alio, that is, created. On this supposition alone is there any sense in calling, as Sacred Scripture does, the things of this world “nothing” in comparison with God. Only an uncreated, self-existent Being can be called Being in the full and perfect sense of the term. Is. 40:17: “Omnes gentes, quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo, et quasi nihilum et inane reputatae sunt ei—All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity.” Wisd. 11:23: “Tamquam momentum staterae, sic est ante te orbis terrarum, et tamquam gutta roris antelucani, quae descendit in terram—For the whole world before thee is as the least grain of the balance, and as a drop of the morning dew, that falleth down upon the earth.” Tertullian develops this idea briefly and beautifully as follows: “Deus unicus est, nec aliter unicus, nisi quia solus; nec aliter solus, nisi quia nihil cum illo. Sic et primus, quia omnia post illum; sic omnia post illum, quia omnia ab illo; sic ab illo, quia ex nihilo—God is unique, and He is unique because He is sole, and He is sole for the reason that nothing co-exists with Him. Thus He is also the first, because all other beings come after Him; and the reason they come after Him is that they are of Him, and they are of Him, because they are created out of nothing.”23

There is another divine name, viz.: הָאֲדוֹן, ὁ κύριος, Dominus coeli et terrae, which describes God as the proprietor and ruler of the universe, precisely because He is its Creator. Cfr. John 1:3: “All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.” Rom. 11:36: “For of him, and by him, and in him are all things.”24 Accordingly, God is the absolute owner and master of “heaven and earth,” that is, of the whole created universe.25 This could not be if He had not created but merely fashioned the world. For an increate, absolutely independent Being necessarily enjoys unlimited autonomy and the right to repel all extraneous interference and to resist attempts made to modify or shape it. As St. Justin Martyr profoundly observes: “He who has not created, has no power over that which is increate and cannot force anything upon it.”26 It follows as a necessary corollary that God could not even assume the rôle of a Demiurge27 if He were not the Creator of the universe. Nor would He be omnipotent, for, as Tertullian rightly says: “I am non omnipotens, si non et hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre—He would not be almighty, had He not the power to create all things out of nothing.”28

According to Holy Scripture, God is the Creator not only of the visible but also of the invisible world, i. e., the Angels. Col. 1:16: “In ipso condita sunt universa in coelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni sive dominationes sive principatus sive potestates—For in him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers.” The Angels were created either from some pre-existent substratum, or out of nothing. They can not have been created from a pre-existent substratum, because they are pure spirits. Consequently the Angels were created out of nothing. And since Scripture tells us that the visible things originated in precisely the same fashion as the Angels, “Heaven and earth,” too, must have been created out of nothing.

β) Our thesis can also be demonstrated directly from Scripture. Thus the formula “exnihilo facere” occurs literally in the exhortation which the mother of the Machabees addressed to her son: “Peto, nate, ut adspicias ad coelum et terram et ad omnia, quae in eis sunt, et intelligas, quia ex nihilo29 fecit illa Deus—I beseech thee, my son, look upon heaven and earth, and all that is in them: and consider that God made them out of nothing.”30 Estimating this passage at its lowest value, it is certainly a convincing testimonial to the belief of the Jews that God created all things out of nothing. But we are justified in attaching to it the authority of an inspired dogmatic text, because the Sacred Writer expressly says that the mother of the Machabees, when uttering the above quoted words, was “filled with wisdom.”31

The Jews no doubt derived their belief in Creation from Gen. 1:1: “In principio creavit Deus coelum et terram—In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Jews and Christians alike regard this text as a direct enunciation of the dogma of Creation. Aside from all other considerations, the circumstance that this account, which is clearly meant to be an ex professo explanation of the origin of the universe, gives no hint of any pre-existing substratum or materia ex qua, permits us to conclude with a very high degree of probability that no such substratum existed, and that, therefore, the universe was literally created out of nothing. We are confirmed in this inference by comparing the sublimely simple Mosaic account with the various cosmogonies of pagan philosophers and poets, such as Plato’s in the Timœus and Ovid’s in the Metamorphoses. A careful analysis of Gen. 1:1 will render our conclusion absolutely certain. בְּרֵאשִׁית is employed without qualification and therefore can have no other meaning than: “In the beginning of all things,” that is, at a time when nothing yet existed, and from whence all things date their existence. By “heaven and earth” we may understand either the complete heaven and the complete earth,32 or the as yet unformed, shapeless, and chaotic raw material from which God in the course of six days successively formed and fashioned the complete beings that constitute the universe. In view of Gen. 1:2: “The earth was void and empty,” the last-mentioned assumption is decidedly the more probable. After the act of Creation proper, therefore, things were still in a chaotic state, waiting to be fashioned. “Informis illa materia,” says St. Augustine, “quam de nihilo Deus fecit, appellata est primo coelum et terra, non quia iam hoc erat, sed quia hoc esse poterat; nam et coelum scribitur postea factum—This unformed matter, which God made out of nothing, was first called heaven and earth; not because it was already heaven and earth, but because it had the capacity of becoming heaven and earth; for we read of heaven that it was made later.”33

It must also be remembered that Holy Scripture often employs the terms “coelum et terra” in a more general sense, as denoting the entire cosmos, or all things which exist outside of God. Had the original terminus of God’s creative act merely been matter in a chaotic, unformed state, it could not possibly have been produced from some other materia informis. For to fashion unformed matter from unformed matter involves a contradiction in terms. Consequently, the original production was strictly a creation out of nothing.

This interpretation is confirmed by the use of the verb creavit, ἐποίησε, בָּרָא. Unlike the verbs עָשָׂה (fecit) and יָצַר (formavit), the Hebrew בָּרָא, in the forms Kal and Niphal (in which it occurs no less than forty-seven times), exclusively signifies a divine and supernatural activity. It is, moreover, never construed with a materia ex qua.34 We cannot, therefore, reasonably doubt that Moses, by employing the term בָּרָא,35 intended to teach the Creation of the universe out of nothing.36

In further proof of this thesis we quote Rom. 4:17: “Vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam ea, quae sunt—God … calleth those things that are not, as those that are.” Or, as the Greek text puts it more pointedly: καλοῦντος (Θεοῦ) τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα.—Τὰ μὴ ὄντα here cannot mean an eternal hyle. It can only mean absolute nothingness, since the divine “call” signifies an omnipotent fiat, in virtue of which Being (ὄντα) emerges from the abyss of non-being. Cfr. Ps. 148:5: “Ipse dixit et facta sunt, ipse mandavit et creata sunt—He spoke, and they were made: he commanded, and they were created.” In the light of this passage St. Paul’s καλεῖν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα is merely a paraphrase of the expression employed by the mother of the Machabees: ποιεῖν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων—creare ex nihilo.

γ) No serious Scriptural difficulties can be urged against this interpretation. The seemingly contradictory text, Wisd. 11:18: “Creavit orbem terrarum ex materia invisa—[Thy almighty hand] … made the world of matter without form,”37 is explained by Estius38 as referring to the creatio secunda, because the Sacred Writer points out that God had the power to send upon the Egyptians “a multitude of bears, or fierce lions,” instead of a swarm of comparatively harmless frogs.

Heb. 11:3, which some writers likewise urge against the construction we have adopted, is susceptible of various interpretations. The passage reads thus: “Aptata esse saecula39 verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent—[By faith we understand that] the world was framed by the word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made.” Did St. Paul by “invisible things” perhaps mean a substratum from which the visible things were made? If he did, we should have to understand the “framing of the world(s)” to refer to the creatio secunda and the “invisible things” to mean the formless raw material from which the universe was moulded, and which according to Gen. 1:1 was called into being by the “creatio prima.”40 Other exegetes take this aptatio to mean creatio prima, and hold that Heb. 11:3 formally enunciates the dogma of Creation. They translate τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γεγονέναι by: “The visible things were made from what was not apparent.” A third, somewhat factitious interpretation of the text is that adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas,41 who holds that by “invisible things” the Apostle meant creative archetypes in the Divine Intellect.

b) The argument from Tradition is based partly on the polemical discussions and partly on the positive teaching of the Fathers.

α) Beginning with the Ionians and Eleatians, up to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa, the pagan philosophers of antiquity, and in their train the heretics of the first centuries of the Christian era—especially the Gnostics—either ignored or declined to accept the Christian concept of Creation. In defending the faith against both these schools, the Fathers found themselves compelled to employ very strong arguments. In an apologetical treatise formerly attributed to St. Justin Martyr, but which is probably spurious, Plato is charged with ignoring the fact that the universe had a ποιητής as well as a δημιουργός. The writer thus explains the vast difference between the two notions: “Without requiring anything else, the Creator creates by his own might and power that which comes into being. The Demiurge, on the other hand, needs some pre-existing raw material from which to fashion his works.”42 Similar arguments are advanced by Theophilus of Antioch43 and Athanasius.44 Irenæus rightly insists against the Gnostics, that a so-called Demiurge would have been unable to do anything with an uncreated, and therefore immutable, hyle.45 Tertullian sharply criticizes Hermogenes in these words: “Totum, quod est Deus, aufert, nolens illum ex nihilo universa fecisse. A Christianis enim conversus ad philosophos, de ecclesia in Academiam et Porticum, inde sumpsit a Stoicis materiam cum Domino ponere, quae ipsa semper fuerit, neque nata, neque facta, nec initium habens omnino nec finem, ex qua Dominus omnia postea fecit—He [Hermogenes] denies that God is God when he denies that He made all things out of nothing. Having left the Church for the sects of the philosophers, he has adopted the Stoic view, that matter co-exists with God, that it is eternal, neither generated nor made, having neither beginning nor end, and that from it God made all things that subsequently came into being.”46

β) In their positive teaching, the Fathers declared the doctrine that the world was created out of nothing to be an article of faith, just as it has since been held by the Christians of all ages, and as it is laid down in the Apostles’ Creed. “Above all things believe,” says the Pastor Hermae,47 “that there is but one God, who created and perfected all things, by drawing them out of non-being into being.”48 Tertullian49 denounces the “materiarii,” who advocated the theory of an uncreated hyle, as heretics and observes: “Regula est autem fidei, qua creditur, unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium praeter mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit—It is a rule of faith, by which we believe that there is but one God, nor any other beside the Creator of the world, who produced all things out of nothing.”50 For the sources of their teaching the Fathers point to Apostolic Tradition and the Mosaic narrative. Thus St. Athanasius teaches: “God created all things, which previously did not exist, through the Logos out of nothing, so that they received being, as He speaks through the mouth of Moses: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”51 The Scriptural text just quoted, according to St. Chrysostom, is a powerful bulwark against all heresies: “This man Moses eradicated all heresies which were later to grow up in the Church, when he laid down the proposition: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. If, therefore, some Manichæan approach thee saying that matter pre-existed, or some other heretic like Marcion or Valentius or any pagan,—reply to him: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”52

Article 2

the heresies of dualism and pantheism and their condemnation

1. The Anti-Creationist Heresies.—The dogma that God created the universe out of nothing has two heretical antitheses, to either one of which all unorthodox systems can be logically reduced: Dualism which holds that the universe (matter in particular) is uncreated and on the same plane with God, and Pantheism, which identifies the universe with God as an emanation from His essence.

Materialism (which in our day prefers to call itself “mechanical Monism” or “Positivism),”1 though it really denies the existence of God, may nevertheless be regarded as a species of Dualism, because it adopts the chief tenet of that heresy, namely, the existence of an eternal uncreated hyle. Similarly the theory of Emanation and Theosophy may be treated as varieties of Pantheism, because both claim that God is identical with the cosmos. Hylozoism, so-called, is a cross between Dualism and Pantheism, though for our present purpose we may regard it merely as an imperfect form of cosmological Pantheism.

We should have to write a complete history of dogmas and heresies, or rather of philosophy, were we to undertake to describe the various Dualistic and Pantheistic systems that have flourished in the course of centuries. Both errors in very deed deserve to be called protean. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to sketch the more important varieties of Dualism and Pantheism, against which the Church has been compelled to proceed in order to keep the dogma of Creation from being beclouded and traduced, and to preserve the Christian (i. e., theistic) concept of God in its pristine purity. For every heresy that impugns the dogma of Creation necessarily entails grave errors against the Church’s teaching on the essence and attributes of God.

a) Many of the ancient pagan philosophers, including Plato, held that God and the world co-existed eternally, though in opposition to each other and incapable of conciliation by mere δημιουργία, which formed a peculiar feature of this system.2

Dualism became more and more variegated, and closely approached Pantheism, in the complex and fantastic systems of the Gnostics, who held matter to be the seat of evil and separated the increate hyle from the centre of divinity by a long series of intermediate beings, which they called aeons. Marcion distinguished between the God of the New Testament and the God of the Jewish Covenant as between two essentially different principles. The God of the Old Testament he held responsible for the existence of the material world, which, however, according to him, was not created out of nothing, but fashioned from eternal and uncreated matter. Marcion was a forerunner of Mâni,3 who carried the system to its ultimate conclusions by distinguishing between the “good God” and His “evil Anti-God.”4 Priscillianism represents a mitigated revival of the Manichæan heresy.5 It had thousands of adherents as early as the fourth century, especially in Spain, and was not entirely extinct at the time of the so-called Protestant Reformation. Since the publication by G. Schepss, in 1889, of Priscillian’s genuine writings, theologians are inclined to judge his teaching less harshly than that of his later followers, though it is impossible to absolve him from the charge of propagating “Gnostic-Dualistic speculations vividly reminiscent of Manichæism, and propped up, apparently, by a system or framework of mythological and astrological ideas.”6

b) Pantheism at bottom is little less than veiled Atheism.7 Its teaching is tersely condensed in the phrase: “God and the universe are one essence.”8 Pantheism is either cosmological or ontological. Cosmological Pantheism puts God first—“God is all,”—while ontological Pantheism assigns first place to the universe—“All things are God.”

α) These two forms of Pantheism are related to each other as the two sides of a medal, or as relative and correlative. Cosmological Pantheism sinks God in the universe; ontological Pantheism merges the universe in God. This logical distinction forms the basis of important real differences. Ontological Pantheism, in developing its axiom πᾱν θεός, finds itself constrained to ascribe to the universe the reality and substantiality proper to God, together with all His quiescent attributes. Cosmological Pantheism, conversely, immerses the Godhead in the restless process of cosmic motion and subjects it to all the various mutations characteristic of created being. It has rightly been observed that, while cosmological Pantheism gravitates toward Pancosmism, ontological Pantheism rather tends towards Acosmism.

β) Ontological Pantheism is characterized by its endeavor to deify the cosmos. It was held by the Eleatic school of Greece,9 and, in more recent times, by Baruch Spinoza,10 a brilliant sophist, who sought by geometrical arguments to establish the proposition that there is but one infinite, indivisible substance, endowed with two attributes, thought and extension, which, as mere modi or “affections” of the one Divine Substance, have no more a distinct reality and substantiality of their own than have the surging waves of the ocean in the great body of water which sustains them.11

Cosmological Pantheism, as we have noted, aims rather at merging God in the universe. It may be divided into three species: Emanatism, Hylozoism, and Evolutionism. The most ancient and the crudest of these systems is Emanatism, which holds that the individual creatures are particles detached from the Divine Substance, though not identical with it. One variety of Emanatism is called realistic, because it holds the world emanating from God to be material. There is another variety which may be described as idealistic, since it dissolves the whole cosmos into a series of intelligible momenta, corresponding to the spirituality of God. Realistic Emanatism is held by the Brahmans, by many Gnostics, and by the Jewish Cabalists. The Emanatism championed by the Neo-Platonists and John Scotus Eriugena is distinctly idealistic.

Hylozoism was taught by the Ionian philosophers of Asia Minor, who believed that God is the world-soul, controlling and vivifying matter as the human soul controls and animates the body, and thus completely identified the life of the world with the Divine Life.

Cosmological Pantheism achieved its highest form in Evolutionism, so-called, which holds that the Absolute was from the beginning immanent, and undergoes a constant process of development, in the universe.13 According to this theory we cannot say God is, because He is constantly in fieri. Goethe refers to the God of the Pantheists as “ein ewig verschlingendes, ewig wiederkäuendes Ungeheuer—an eternally devouring, eternally ruminating monster.” This evolutionary Pantheism was first cast into the shape of a philosophical system by Heraclitus of Ephesus.14 It was developed by Fichte15 and Schelling,16 and perfected by Hegel,17 who, like all other Pantheists before him, declared the visible universe to be a mere manifestation of the Absolute, whence it would follow that the Divine Substance is a purely abstract, vacuous, substance-less mental phenomenon. In Hegel’s hands this idealistic Pantheism became Panlogism, since he asserts the complete identity of our thought with being.18

2. Their Condemnation by the Church.—Against these various forms of Dualistic and Pantheistic error the Church has rigorously upheld the dogma of Creation as essential to the purity and perfection of the Christian concept of God.

a) In the early days she did not deem it necessary to utter a formal dogmatic definition against the Dualistic vagaries of the pagans and the Pantheistic heresies of the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists, but merely enforced the true doctrine through the Creed and in her ordinary catechetical instruction. The Nicene definition of the uncreatedness of the Logos19 may be said to imply the dogma that all other things are created. In the sixth century the Council of Braga condemned Manichæism in the peculiar form in which it had been revamped by the Priscillianists.20

b) In the Middle Ages the Church found it necessary to condemn the resuscitated Manichæism of the Albigenses and the Pantheistic errors of Amalric of Bène and David of Dinant.21 The Fourth Council of the Lateran, A. D. 1215, defined: “Creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium, … sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii dœmones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali; homo vero diaboli suggestione peccavit—The Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, by His omnipotent power, simultaneously with the beginning of time, created a twofold nature, spiritual and corporeal, viz.: the nature of the angels and that of material things, and then human nature, which partakes of both, in that it consists of soul and body. For the Devil and other demons were indeed good in their nature as created by God, but they made themselves bad by their own conduct; man sinned at the suggestion of the Devil.”22 This definition embraces four distinct heads of doctrine: (1) God created all things without exception, spiritual and corporeal, including man, who is a synthesis of both. (2) God created all things out of nothing. (3) As originally created by God, all things were good. (4) Sin, both in angels and men, is not chargeable to God, but to an abuse of creatural liberty.

The same truths were again defined by the Ecumenical Council of Florence,23 which formulated the teaching of the Church against Manichæan errors as follows: “[Ecclesia] firmissime credit, … unum verum Deum, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium et invisibilium creatorem: qui, quando voluit, bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales condidit creaturas: bonas quidem, quia a summo bono factae sunt, sed mutabiles, quia de nihilo factae sunt, nullamque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est.… Praeterea Manichœorum anathematizat insaniam, qui duo prima principia posuerunt, unum visibilium, aliud invisibilium; et alium Novi Testamenti Deum, alium Veteris esse Deum dixerunt—The Church believes most firmly that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things visible and invisible, who, when it pleased Him, out of His goodness created all creatures, spiritual and corporeal. These creatures are indeed good, because made by Him who is the Supreme Good, but they are mutable, because made out of nothing. [The Church further] asserts that nothing is evil by nature, because every nature, as such, is good.… And she anathematizes the folly of the Manichæans who posit two first principles, one the principle of visible, the other of invisible things; and who say that the God of the New Testament is different from the God of the Old Testament.”24 From this time on Manichæism with its offshoots gradually disappears from history, and its place is taken by Materialism and Pantheism.

c) Materialism and Pantheism may be called the prevailing heresies of modern times. Both were clearly and resolutely condemned as atheistic by the Council of the Vatican.25 Caput I of the decrees of this Council, under the heading “De Deo Rerum Omnium Creatore,” treats at some length of God’s relation to His creatures. The Vatican decree is substantially a restatement of the Caput “Firmiter” of the Fourth Lateran Council, from which it differs merely by laying special emphasis on the doctrine that, in creating the universe out of nothing, God acted “with absolute freedom of counsel.”

Because of their great importance, the five canons which accompany Caput I of the Constitutions of the Vatican Council deserve to be reprinted here.

The first is directed against Atheism and reads thus: “Si quis unum verum Deum visibilium et invisibilium Creatorem et Dominum negaverit: anathema sit—If any one shall deny the one true God, Creator and Lord of all things visible and invisible; let him be anathema.”

The second specifically condemns Materialism: “Si quis praeter materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit: anathema sit—If any one shall not be ashamed to affirm that nothing exists except matter; let him be anathema.”

Canon 3 anathematizes the fundamental principle of Pantheism: “Si quis dixerit, unam eandemque esse Dei et rerum omnium substantiam vel essentiam: anathema sit—If any one shall say that the substance or essence of God and of all things is one and the same; let him be anathema.”

Canon 4 is aimed at certain particular forms or varieties of Pantheism: “Si quis dixerit, res finitas tum corporeas tum spirituales aut saltem spirituales e divina substantia emanasse, aut divinam essentiam sui manifestatione vel evolutione fieri omnia, aut denique Deum esse ens universale seu indefinitum, quod sese determinando constituat rerum universitatem in genera, species et individua distinctam: anathema sit—If any one shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence by the manifestation and evolution of itself becomes all things; or, lastly, that God is universal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the universality of things, distinct according to genera, species, and individuals; let him be anathema.”

Canon 5 defines the dogma of Creation in its more important aspects: “Si quis non confiteatur, mundum resque omnes, quae in eo continentur, et spirituales et materiales secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex nihilo esse productas; aut Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum; aut mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit: anathema sit—If any one confess not that the world, and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, have been, in their whole substance, produced by God out of nothing; or shall say that God created, not by His will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself; or shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God; let him be anathema.”26

Section 2

explanation of the dogma

The dogma of Creation presents two different aspects, according as we contemplate either the divine act or its creatural terminus. Viewing it in the first-mentioned or active sense, we shall enquire into (1) God’s conception of the universe as the exemplary cause of all things; (2) the relation of Creation to the Blessed Trinity; and (3) God’s freedom of will in creating the world. These points will be severally treated in the first three Articles of the present section. We shall add a fourth Article on creation as co-existent with time, and a fifth on the question whether or not God can communicate His creative power to creatures.

Article 1

the divine idea of the cosmos as the exemplary cause of creation

1. The Divine Idea of the Cosmos.—Reason tells us that the Creator must have designed the created universe in accordance with some pattern or archetype. As an artist cannot produce a work of art unless he has previously formed some idea of it in his mind, so God must have had a definite conception of the cosmos before He proceeded to mould it.

Metaphysicians are agreed that the idea, or causa exemplaris, is a necessary condition for setting to work all those efficient causes which are endowed with understanding and free will. No intelligent cause proceeds blindly or at random.

God’s idea of the cosmos may be regarded either subjectively or objectively. Subjectively it is God’s creative Wisdom or practical Knowledge, and as such identical with the Divine Essence itself. Objectively, or with regard to content, it is the ideal representation of whatever is to become actual, or, in the words of St. Thomas, the outward imitability of the Divine Essence considered as purely conceptual.1

This definition makes it quite clear that God’s idea of the cosmos is neither a creature, nor a metaphysical entity existing outside of, or side by side with God,2 nor yet the Divine Essence itself. God’s idea of the cosmos must consequently be the possible essence of the created universe, in so far as that essence is rooted in the Divine Substance and conceived by the Divine Intellect from all eternity.3 If we are careful to guard against the Platonic mistake of conceiving the archetypes of things as individual existences extraneous to God, we may safely adopt Clement of Alexandria’s distinction between an ideal world (κόσμος νοητός) and the really existing world (κόσμος αἰσθητός). The former is necessary and eternal, the latter contingent and temporal.

May we speak of divine ideas of created things in the plural number? We may, but only in regard to the multitude of created things. In the Divine Intellect itself there is but one absolutely simple idea,—as simple and indivisible as the Divine Essence with which it coincides. This distinction furnishes the key for the correct interpretation of the plural phrase rationes rerum, or λόγοι οὐσιόποιοι, which occurs in the writings of the Fathers and theologians.

2. The Teaching of Revelation.—While the Church has never formally defined her teaching with regard to the divine idea of the cosmos, Holy Scripture does not permit us to doubt the actual existence of such an idea.

a) Of the various Scriptural texts which may be cited in this connection,5 the most luminous perhaps is Gen. 1:26: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Here God appears in the rôle of a thoughtful artificer, who works out the concept of man in his own mind before he proceeds to create him. He is an intelligent Creator who follows a well-digested plan.

This view is utterly incompatible with the theory of atheistic Darwinism, which attributes the creation of things to “chance.” It is developed in the Sapiential Books of the Old Testament and forms the necessary substratum of St. John’s Logos-doctrine. According to the punctuation of some manuscript codices of the Fourth Gospel, John 1:3 sq. reads as follows: “Et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat,” i. e., that which was created sprang from a vital idea in the Godhead, namely, the Logos. St. Augustine beautifully develops this thought in his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John,6 but the punctuation on which it is based has not stood the test of modern criticism.

b) The Fathers developed the teaching thus adumbrated in Sacred Scripture, some of them explaining it in consonance with, others in opposition to, the Platonic philosophy.7 It remained for the medieval Schoolmen to give it its final polish. The most brilliant exponent of the doctrine of the Divine Idea is St. Augustine.8 From him the Schoolmen received it and unfolded it dialectically.9

Article 2

creation in its relation to the trinity

Though the Blessed Trinity creates per modum naturae, that is to say, qua Godhead, Creation is specially appropriated to the Father as the First of the Three Divine Persons. The fact that the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by philosophical arguments, does not, rightly considered, disprove the teaching of Catholic theologians that all creatures contain some vestige of the Trinity, and that, in addition thereto, the pure spirits, and man who is endowed with reason, “represent the Trinity by way of image.”1

Thesis I: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost created the universe not as separate Persons, but per modum naturae, i. e., in virtue of the essential Knowledge and Volition common to the whole Trinity

Proof. This thesis, which embodies an article of faith, has been repeatedly defined by the Church.2 The “Decretum pro Iacobitis,” adopted by the Council of Florence, in 1439, says: “Firmissime credit, profitetur et praedicat [Ecclesia], unum verum Deum, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium et invisibilium creatorem—The Church most firmly believes, professes, and teaches that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things visible and invisible.”3 And a few lines further up: “Sed Pater et Filius non duo principia Spiritus Sancti, sed unum principium, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium—But the Father and the Son [are] not two principles of the Holy Ghost, but one principle; just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost [constitute] not three principles of the creature, but one principle.”4

We will merely outline the Biblical argument for our thesis. Holy Scripture attributes the Creation of the universe sometimes to the Father,5 sometimes to the Son,6 and sometimes to the Holy Ghost.7 The diacritical particles ex, per, and in (ἐκ, διά, εἰς) in Rom. 11:36: “Ex Patre per Filium in Spiritu Sancto—Of the Father, by the Son, in the Holy Ghost (are all things),” do not signify a difference of power, but simply the Trinitarian relation of origin. The meaning is that the Father has the creative power of Himself, the Son by Generation from the Father, and the Holy Ghost by Spiration from the Father and the Son.8

Certain Patristic writers say that if it were not for the Son, the Father could not create for lack of a creative word. This remark must not be misunderstood. The Fathers who make it merely wish to intimate that, if God were not Tri-une, He would not be God at all, and therefore unable to exercise creative power.9 St. Thomas explains this point as follows: “Processiones personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas—The divine Processions are the cause of the production of creatures, inasmuch as they include the essential attributes of Understanding and Will.”10

Thesis II: Creation is properly appropriated to God the Father

This thesis may be technically qualified as “doctrina catholica.”

Proof. A glance at the so-called Apostles’ Creed11 shows that the Creation of the universe has always been appropriated to the Father. “Credo in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae—I believe in one God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.” The intrinsic reason for this appropriation is the similarity existing between the creative act and the hypostatic character of the First Person of the Trinity. Creation is the beginning of divine operation, and as such related to the Father in His character of principium sine principio (ἀρχὴ ἄναρχος). As a sign of divine power, which culminates in the fiat “Ipse dixit et facta sunt,”12 Creation is related to the notional Understanding by which the begetting Father utters His Word. “Pater dicendo gignit Verbum.” Therefore Creation is rightly appropriated to the Father.13

Thesis III: Though the Divine Trinity is the Creator of the universe only per modum naturae, nevertheless all creatures bear within themselves vestiges of the Trinity; the spiritual creatures, moreover, are real images of the same

This thesis forms part of the theological teaching common to all schools.

Proof. We do not assert that the created universe reflects the Trinity as such. If this were so, the mystery of the Trinity would be demonstrable from the cosmos. As a matter of fact the three Divine Persons do not create qua Triad, but qua Monad, and this is the fundamental reason why the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is incapable of demonstration.14 The meaning of our thesis is that, as productions of the Triune God, creatures reflect the same essential attributes by virtue of which there are two Processions in the Godhead, viz.: understanding and will, knowledge and love. Thus interpreted the thesis offers no difficulties. For it stands to reason, and is further confirmed by the philosophical arguments by which we can prove the existence of God, that the created universe postulates a wise Intellect and a creative Will, and these are precisely the attributes on which the two inner-divine Processions are based. Consequently all creatures contain within themselves certain vestiges15 of the Trinity. These vestiges are, however, blurred and obscure, so that, if it were not for Revelation, the human intellect could not arrive at a knowledge of the mystery. It is only after the mystery was supernaturally revealed that the mind of man was able to discover the relation existing between the Trinity and Creation.16

The second part of our thesis, viz.: that every rational creature bears within itself an image of the Trinity, is to be understood with the same limitations. The created intellect being endowed with understanding and free-will, its “internal word” (verbum mentis) reflects the Logos, while the immanent love which it entertains for itself emblems the Holy Ghost. Cfr. Gen. 1:26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram—Let us make man to our image and likeness.” A still more perfect image of the Trinity is produced in the human soul by sanctifying grace17 and the beatific vision.18

Article 3

creation as a free divine act

It belongs to the treatise on the Essence and Attributes of God to prove that the Divine Will is essentially free.1 Here we have merely to show that, in creating the universe, God acted as a free agent, and, more specifically, that He acted libertate contradictionis sive exercitii and libertate specificationis, not, however, libertate contrarietatis, which latter term means freedom of choice between good and evil.

Thesis I: Creation was a free act, libertate contradictionis, i. e., God was free either to create or not to create, as He pleased

This proposition is de fide.

Proof. The Council of Florence (A. D. 1439) defined: “Deus, quando voluit, bonitate sua universas … condidit creaturas—God in His goodness created all things, when He willed.” The Vatican Council (A. D. 1870), with an eye to the heretical teachings of Hermes and Günther, further developed this definition as follows: “[Deus] liberrimo consilio … utramque de nihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam—God, with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing … both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelical and the mundane.”2 And in Canon 5 the Council adds: “Si quis … Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam necessario amat se ipsum, … anathema sit—If any one … shall say that God created, not by His will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself, … let him be anathema.”3

Holy Scripture teaches this truth in numerous passages, especially in those which accentuate the fact that God “hath done all things whatsoever he would.”4 The dogma is enforced as it were by contrast in 2 Mach. 8:18: “Nos in omnipotente Domino, qui potest … universum mundum uno nutu delere, confidimus—We trust in the Almighty Lord, who at a beck can utterly destroy … the whole world.” God cannot destroy at a beck except what He has freely created. We have a still more definite statement of this truth in Apoc. 4:11: “Tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata sunt—Thou hast created all things; and for thy will they were, and have been created.” St. Paul writes: “Operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae—[He] worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.”5 Where there is “counsel” there must be liberty.

The teaching of the Fathers on this point is in perfect consonance with Holy Scripture. St. Irenæus says: “Ipse omnia libere fecit et quemadmodum voluit—He made all things freely and according to His will,”6 and Hippolytus: “He created even as He would, for He was God.”7 St. Ambrose exclaims: “Quid difficile est ei, cui velle fecisse est?—What is difficult for Him to whom to will means to do?”8 We close the Patristic argument with a brief quotation from the works of St. Augustine: “He made [the universe] with an absolutely free will.”9

Reason argues thus: If God had not been free in creating the universe, He must have acted under compulsion either from without (coactio), or from within (necessitas ab intrinseco). God cannot have acted under external compulsion, because no higher Being existed which could have exercised such compulsion. Nor can He have been actuated by immanent necessity, because in this hypothesis He would not be infinitely perfect, nor self-sufficient, nor absolutely independent (ens a se). Consequently, God was free either to create or not, according to His good pleasure.

Thesis II: The divine act of Creation was free, libertate specificationis; that is, God was free to create either this present universe or any other

This thesis may be technically qualified as doctrina catholica.

Proof. The Provincial Council of Cologne (A. D. 1860)10 defines: “Quemadmodum penes Deum erat, mundum creare aut non creare, ita penes ipsum etiam erat, hunc creare mundum aut alium—As it lay in the power of God to create or not to create a world, so it also lay in His power either to create this particular world, or a different one.”11

a) The Scriptural argument for this thesis is based upon the sovereignty whereby God ordains all things according to His good pleasure. Ps. 134:6: “Omnia, quaecunque voluit, Dominus fecit in coelo, in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis—Whatsoever the Lord pleased he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps.” Theodoret comments upon this text as follows: “The Lord created all things whatsoever He pleased, as Holy Scripture testifies. He did not, however, will all that it lay in His power to do, but only what seemed to Him to be sufficient. For it would have been easy for Him to create ten or twenty thousand worlds.”12

For the rest, it is easy to see, even without the aid of Revelation, that, had God had no other choice than to create or not to create the present cosmos, there would be but one possible world—a view repugnant to the attribute of divine omnipotence, which halts only at contradiction; incompatible also with divine wisdom and perfection, for it is peculiar to wisdom to select and vary creatable forms with the utmost freedom; while God would not be infinitely perfect if His Essence could be the exemplar of but one creatable world.

b) Absolute Optimism is incompatible with Catholic teaching. This philosophical system, excogitated by Leibniz,13 holds that the Divine Intellect, in contemplating an infinite number of possible worlds, was constrained by the divine wisdom and goodness to select, and that the divine power was forced to create, that which was absolutely the best, i. e., the world in which the greatest number of realities harmoniously co-exist.14 The idea of an “absolutely best world” involves an intrinsic contradiction, because in the domain of finite objects there can be no summum bonum or absolute optimum. The Leibnizian conceit is also disproved by experience, which shows that the universe is seriously disfigured by evil. No sane person will deny that a world in which there was no sin, and no misery caused by sin (such as pain and death, sickness and poverty), would be a far “better” world than the one in which we now live. But even if such a thing as an absolutely “best” world were conceivable, the Creator would be under no compulsion to produce it. For no matter whether He makes things great or small, perfect or imperfect, God is sufficient unto Himself, and nowise depends on His creatures. In the words of St. Augustine: “Deus nullâ necessitate, nullâ suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentiâ, sed solâ bonitate fecit, quod factum est—God made the world not because He was compelled to make it, or because He needed it for any advantage of His own, but out of sheer goodness.”15

It is to be remarked, however, that not all forms of Optimism are irrational and repugnant. The relative Optimism advocated by Ruiz and Palmieri, and even by some of the Fathers of the Church,16 is supported by solid arguments and carefully safeguards the liberty of the Creator. The present universe may be regarded as the best in a relative sense, i. e., in so far as it is perfectly consonant to the divine idea, adequately serves the purpose for which it was created, and embraces all possible species of natural17 and supernatural perfection.18

Thesis III: The divine act of Creation was not, however, a free act libertate contrarietatis; that is to say, God was not free to create a bad world; He could create none but a good world

Proof. By a bad world we understand, not one in which there is physical evil (disease, pain, death), but one replete with sin. Evil in its primary and proper sense is sin. But God, who is absolutely holy, cannot be the author of sin. In this sense our thesis is an article of faith, defined as such by the Fourth Lateran Council, and also by the Councils of Florence19 and Trent. The Tridentine canon says: “Si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissive tantum, sed etiam proprie et per se, anathema sit—If any one say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God worketh evil in the same manner that He worketh good, not by permitting it, but properly speaking and per se, let him be anathema.”20

Of the Fathers we will only cite Augustine, who says: “Naturas igitur Deus omnes fecit, non solum in virtute et iustitia mansuras, sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornaturae universum, sive peccare sive non peccare voluissent—God therefore created all beings, not only those which were to persevere in virtue and justice, but those also which were to sin; and He created them not in order that they should sin, but that they should be an ornament to the universe, regardless of whether they would will to sin or not.”21

This dogma is denied by Pessimism, which has justly been called “an error that is contemporaneous with philosophic thought.” Its traces appear in every stage of history.22 Arthur Schopenhauer may be regarded as its chief and most consistent exponent. He holds that the existing universe is the worst imaginable; that it is, in fact, a veritable hell in which “man is the devil of his fellows,” and that its only natural end and object apparently is, to be whelmed in utter destruction.23 Such a theory is plainly repugnant to faith and reason. We will not deny that the problem of evil, which has baffled so many thinkers since the days of the Gnostics and Manichæans, is one of the most difficult in philosophy.24 But the Pessimism of Schopenhauer is opposed to common sense, which tells us that evil does not preponderate in the world; that side by side with physical and moral evil there exists an immense amount of good; that even where it takes the form of sin, evil is oftentimes the source of good which would otherwise remain undone; and, lastly, that a fair equalization and the restoration of the right order, which is partially disturbed here on earth, can only be expected in the world beyond. If we duly consider all these things we shall be persuaded that relative Optimism will ultimately prevail. The most satisfactory solution of “the riddle of the painful earth” is that offered by Christianity; in fact, “the existence of evil is a serious difficulty in the way of accepting any nontheistic interpretation of the universe.”25

According to Catholic teaching man was originally destined for a life of innocence and bliss. He fell from his high estate through his own fault. The Son of God descended from Heaven to redeem the sinful human race, and through His merits this present life of pain and sorrow will be followed by one of unending happiness for those who faithfully obey the divine will. Our Redeemer, who has justly been styled the “Man of Sorrows,” furnishes a splendid pattern for the heroic endurance of this terrestrial exile, which lasts but a short while and affords us an opportunity to accumulate rich merits for the life beyond. In the cross of Christ lies our salvation and reconciliation; its glory dispels the terrors to which evil has given birth.26

Article 4

creation in time

It is an article of faith that the world was created in time, i. e., that “a certain finite number of days has elapsed since the instant when the angels and the material world were brought into being.”1 But theologians differ with regard to the question whether God, had He so willed, could have created an eternal world.

Thesis I: God created the existing universe not from everlasting, but in time

This is de fide.

Proof. In its famous Caput “Firmiter,” the Fourth Lateran Council solemnly defined against the Albigenses, that God “simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit naturam,” and the Council of the Vatican repeated this definition word for word: “God created out of nothing, from the very first beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporeal creature.”2 This dogmatic definition is based on solid Scriptural grounds.

a) The very first verse of Genesis declares that the world began in time: “In principio (בְּרֵאשִׁית) creavit Deus coelum et terram—In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Some theologians doubt whether these words refer to the beginning of time;3 but it is easy to show that they do. רֵאשִׁית, in Biblical usage, signifies either the beginning of time, or a primacy due to dignity, or the cause that produces an effect, or headship in a local sense. In Gen. 1:1 the context clearly excludes the three last mentioned meanings. Consequently, the term must here denote the beginning of time.

Some of the Fathers4 apply “beginning” to the Divine Logos, as principium de principio. But it is highly improbable that Moses had in mind the Logos. Moreover, the Fathers in question did not propound their construction as the primary and only correct one; they merely suggested it as a possible secondary interpretation resulting from a deeper study of the text.5

There are numerous other Scriptural passages which could be adduced in confirmation of our thesis. Cfr., e. g., Ps. 101:26: “Initio tu, Domine, terram fundasti—In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundedst the earth.” Ps. 89:2: “Priusquam montes fierent aut formaretur terra et orbis, a saeculo et usque ad saeculum tu es, Deus—Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed, from eternity and to eternity thou art God.”6

With the possible exception of Origen, the Fathers unanimously teach that the world is not eternal. Tatian, the Apologist, says: “Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, καθάπερ ὁ Θεός—Matter is not beginningless, as God is.”7 St. Basil, the ablest among the Patristic commentators of the Hexaëmeron, declares: “Because many believed that the world was eternal, like God, Moses purposely chose these words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”8 St. Ambrose insists that the world began simultaneously with time. “In principio temporis,” he says, “Deus coelum et terram fecit; tempus enim ab hoc mundo, non ante mundum—In the beginning of time God made heaven and earth; for time began simultaneously with, not prior to, the world.”9 In other words, time began with Creation. Before the Creation of the world there was no real, but only imaginary time.10 Quite appositely, therefore, does St. Augustine observe: “Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed cum tempore—The world was doubtless not made in time, but with time.”11 And he brushes aside the ludicrous question: “What did God do during the time that preceded the Creation?” with the remark: “Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus—There was no then, because there was no time.”12

Thesis II: Creation from all eternity seems to involve a contradiction, and hence was probably impossible

Proof. As against the revealed truth that the world had its beginning in time, it is a purely speculative question of decidedly minor importance, whether or not an eternal world is intrinsically possible. Granted that it is possible, we must carefully distinguish between “beginning in time” and “being a creature.” From the fact that a thing began in time we can rightly conclude to its being a creature, but we could not argue conversely that it must have begun in time because it is a creature; an eternal creature would be as truly a creature as one produced in time.

Still some of the Fathers, believing that an eternal world would involve an intrinsic contradiction, boldly concluded from the dependence of the world to its creation in time. It should however, be noted that not a few of the Patristic texts usually cited in this connection do not really bear on the question at issue. They merely affirm that the dualistic assumption of an uncreated eternal hyle involves a contradiction, whereas the question we are now considering is whether or not creation from eternity would entail a contradiction. But there is another group of Patristic dicta which are germane to our topic. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says: “That which has been brought into being by creation, cannot possibly have existed from all eternity.”13 This view was adopted by a number of eminent Scholastics, e. g., Albertus Magnus and Richard of St. Victor. St. Bonaventure went so far as to declare: “To assume that the world is eternal … and [at the same time] to hold that all things were created out of nothing, is so contrary to right reason that I cannot persuade myself that any philosopher, no matter how small his intellectual capacity, ever took this ground.”14

But St. Bonaventure’s opinion was not shared by all Catholic theologians and philosophers. Those two great antagonists, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, agreed that the proposition that the world necessarily began in time, cannot be cogently established by philosophic arguments. “Mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest,” says St. Thomas; “That the world is not eternal we hold solely as a matter of faith; reason cannot demonstrate it by stringent arguments.”15 The Angelic Doctor carefully reviews the objections raised against this thesis in his work De Aeternitate Mundi.16

Still less is it demonstrable that an eternal creation is necessary.17 Such being the status of the vexed controversy, there is plainly no need for us to embrace either of the contradictory opinions current among Catholic philosophers and theologians. We merely note, in passing, that the authority of the Fathers seems rather to favor the intrinsic impossibility of an eternal creation.18

Article 5

the incommunicability of god’s creative power

Revelation tells us that no creature ever exercised the creative power. Still the purely speculative question may be asked: Could God, if He would, communicate His creative power to a creature, e. g., an angel of the highest rank? Of course no angel could wield the creative power to the full extent of its infinite perfection, or independently of the preservative and concurring influence of the Divine First Cause. The meaning of our question is: Could any creature, as principal, or at least as an instrumental cause, produce anything (e. g., a blade of grass) out of nothing? A categorical denial of this possibility, it is easy to see, will redound to the glory of the Creator.

Thesis I: No mere creature ever created anything out of nothing

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. The Fourth Lateran Council dogmatically declared the Blessed Trinity to be “unum universorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium—The one principle of all things, the Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal.”1 This truth can be proved from Sacred Scripture by a twofold method: (1) by showing that Creation is never attributed to any one but God; and (2) by demonstrating that the Bible positively denies that any creature ever exercised creative power. Heb. 3:4: “Qui autem omnia creavit, Deus est—He that created all things, is God.” Apoc. 4:2: “Tu creasti omnia et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata sunt—Thou hast created all things; and for thy will they were, and have been created.” This truth is enunciated even more solemnly in Is. 44:24: “Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, extendens coelos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus mecum—I am the Lord, that make all things, that alone stretch out the heavens, that establish the earth, and there is none with me.” And in John 1:3: “Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est—All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.” In the light of these and similar texts the Fathers of the Church did not hesitate to brand as heretical the proposition that the world was made by beings of an inferior order. “Those who allege,” says St. John of Damascus, “that the Angels are the creators of any substance whatever, are mouthpieces of the Devil, who is their councillor; for being themselves creatures, the Angels cannot be creators.”2 This view is shared by all theological schools.

Thesis II: God cannot, even by way of grace, communicate His creative power to any creature

This thesis merely represents a theological conclusion.

Proof. The Scholastics generally hold3 that no creature, how high soever its rank, is able, even with divine assistance, to create anything out of nothing.4 Holy Scripture, Tradition, and ecclesiastical teaching alike regard the power to create as the true criterion of omnipotence, and consequently as an exclusive and incommunicable divine attribute, which as essentially differentiates God from His creatures as His eternity or immensity. Theologically, therefore, it is quite consistent to conclude from God’s creative power to His omnipotence and, ultimately, to His self-existence. The notion of a “creating creature,” on the other hand, is as much a contradiction as would be that of a “created God.” Whenever, in fact, Holy Scripture wishes to exalt God’s omnipotence and to impress His creatures with their own impotence, it usually accentuates His creative power.5 Hence we may properly conclude that creative power is a mode of operation peculiar to God, qua God, distinguishing Him from the creature, qua creature. This is most certainly the opinion of the Fathers, who hold that a “creatura creatrix” would involve an intrinsic contradiction. Thus St. Athanasius says: “All things were made through the Word, who would not have wrought all things, were He Himself a creature. Hence even the angels are unable to create, since they are themselves creatures.”6 Similarly St. Augustine: “An angel can no more create a substance than he can create himself.”7

The Scholastics tried to demonstrate the incommunicability of God’s creative power by various philosophical arguments. St. Thomas bases his demonstration on the fact that pure being (ens in quantum est ens), which is the terminus of creation, can be produced solely by the causa universalissima.8 Suarez starts from an analysis of the creative act, which of its very nature, he says, cannot be limited to this or that being (e. g., a grain of sand), but embraces all creatable things. A power that is able to create by a mere act of the will—so runs his argument—can meet with no material obstacle, and must therefore extend to all possibles. Now, such a power cannot be conceived except as actually infinite, and therefore cannot belong to any finite creature. Hence God alone can create.9

Thesis III: The Creator cannot employ a creature as an instrumental cause in creating

This thesis may be qualified as highly probable (probabilissima).

Proof. An instrumental cause is far inferior to a principal cause, because it is moved rather than moving (as, for instance, a saw in the hands of a carpenter). The absolute impossibility of God’s employing creatures as instrumental causes in the act of creation is, therefore, not quite so evident as the truth embodied in the preceding thesis. In fact, not a few Scholastics, following the lead of Peter Lombard,10 opposed the thesis we are here upholding. St. Thomas at first followed the “Master of the Sentences,” but later in life changed his opinion and admitted that it is impossible for any creature to create, even though it were only as an instrument in the hands of God: “Sic igitur impossibile est, quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria neque instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium.”11 A transfer of the creative power to an instrumental cause, akin to the transfer of divine power to man in the working of miracles, the forgiving of sins, and at Consecration during Holy Mass, is inconceivable because of the absence of a materia circa quam; for, in the act of creating something out of nothing there is no subject to which the instrumental cause could be applied and on which it could exercise its causality. This consideration removes a difficulty raised by Oswald, viz.: that “a conversion of one substance into another (transubstantiation) would seem to postulate as great a power as the production of a substance out of sheer nothing.”12 At the Consecration the priest takes bread and wine as a substratum upon which to exercise his ministerial powers; but Creation is the production of something out of nothing without a pre-existing substratum.13

Readings:— *Palmieri, S. J., De Creatione et Praecipuis Creaturis, 2nd ed., Rome 1910.—Mazzella, De Deo Creante, 4th ed., Rome 1908.—Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. IV, §§ 257–263, Mainz 1885.—Oswald, Schöpfungslehre, Paderborn 1893.—Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 62–90, Freiburg 1899.— *G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 417 sqq., Paris 1895.—Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3, Friburgi 1908.—Pesnell, Le Dogme de la Création et la Science Contemporaine, 2nd ed., Arras 1894.—L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore et de Angelis, Friburgi 1905.— *St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 44 sqq.—Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum.—Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vols. I and II, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1892–1895.—Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, Monast. 1869.—Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 134, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 356 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899).— *Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Münster 1867.—Stentrup, Das Dogma von der zeitlichen Weltschöpfung, Innsbruck 1870.—Kleutgen, Vom zeitlichen Anfang der Welt (Beilagen to the Theologie der Vorzeit, Heft 2), Münster 1870.—Th. Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Möglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schöpfung, Münster 1895.—St. Thom., Opusc. De Aeternitate Mundi.—Billuart, De Opere Sex Dierum, diss. I, art. 6.—J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 179 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904.—K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schöpfung, Ratisbon 1910.—W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 205 sqq., London 1897.

Chapter II

the continued existence of the created universe, or divine preservation and concurrence

God, having produced out of nothing the various substances that constitute the created universe, with all their properties and powers, continues to influence them, (1) by preserving them in their being,1 and (2) by concurring in their operations.2 We shall consider the divine Preservation of the universe and God’s Concurrence with His creatures in two separate Sections.

Section 1

divine preservation

1. The Nature of Divine Preservation.—All created beings are contingent and absolutely dependent on the creative First Cause. It follows that, once created, they cannot continue in substantial existence without the co-operation of the Creator. A created being never for a moment ceases to be an ens ab alio,3 and therefore forever depends upon the preservative influence of God. A sudden withdrawal of that influence would result in the inevitable annihilation of the creature. Consequently divine Preservation is as indispensable for the continued existence of the cosmos as Creation was for its beginning.4 In this sense the preservation of the universe is sometimes called “continued creation.”

This does not mean that all created beings sink back into nothingness at every moment of their existence, to be each time promptly recreated by God, as Bayle scoffingly insinuated.5 Divine preservation must not be conceived as intermittent, but as the continued action of God. The power which sustains the universe is an incommunicable attribute of God in the same sense as the creative power which called it into being.

What we have so far said is sufficient to show the falsity of the systems that have been at various times devised in respect of divine Preservation. First and above all we must note that the divine Preservation of the cosmos is not merely negative. “It is not enough for God not to destroy His creatures, He must exercise some positive influence on them.”6 Preservation must be conceived as a positive divine influence directed to the very substance of a creature, and by which the creature is enabled to continue its existence.7

Like Creation, Preservation, entitatively considered, is an eternal and necessary act; terminatively, however, it is temporal and free.

2. The Teaching of Revelation.—Though never formally defined as an article of faith, the doctrine of the divine Preservation of the universe is undoubtedly contained in the sources of Revelation. The Roman Catechism declares that, unless preserved by God’s Providence, the universe would instantly return to its original nothingness.8

a) Holy Scripture clearly enforces the necessity of divine Preservation, as distinct from Creation. Wisd. 11:26: “Quomodo posset aliquid permanere (μένειν), nisi tu voluisses, aut quod a te vocatum non esset, conservaretur?—How could any thing endure, if thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by thee?” If this preservative influence were withdrawn, all living beings would perish. Ps. 103:29: “Auferes spiritum eorum, et deficient et in pulverem suum revertentur—Thou shalt take away their breath, and they shall fail, and shall return to their dust.” Holy Scripture describes divine Preservation either actively as an “upholding” or keeping together, or passively as the indwelling of all things in God. Heb. 1:2 sq.: “Per quem fecit et saecula, … portansque9 omnia verbo virtutis suae—By whom also he made the world … upholding all things by the word of his power.” Col. 1:16 sq.: “Omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt … et omnia in ipso constant10—All things were created by him and in him … and by him all things consist.”11

b) The teaching of the Fathers on the whole conforms to the Scripture texts just quoted. Origen commentates on Acts 17:28 as follows: “In what manner then shall we live and move and be in God, unless with His power He grasps and holds together the universe?”12 St. Chrysostom observes: “To hold the universe together is no smaller matter than to have created it. Nay, if we be allowed to marvel, it is something even greater. For while the act of Creation produced beings, the act of Preservation sustains them, lest they return to nothingness.”13 St. Augustine remarks: “The world would scarcely endure even for one single moment, if God were to withdraw His governance from it.”14

We will close the Patristic argument with a passage from the writings of St. Gregory the Great: “Cuncta ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu teneret—All things were made out of nothing, and their essence would tend to return to nothing, did not the author of all sustain them by his governance.”15

c) It may be set down as a certain theological conclusion that in point of fact God will never actually withdraw His preserving influence either from the universe as a whole, or from any of its constituent parts. He will forever sustain the substance of His Creation. With regard to spiritual substances, their eternal duration (immortality) is an ethical postulate based upon God’s wisdom, sanctity, and fidelity. As to material substances (not, however, their combinations) we have positive assurance that they will also endure forever, Cfr. Wisd. 1:14: “Creavit Deus, ut essent [i. e., permanerent] omnia—He created all things that they might be.”16

Transubstantiation proves nothing against this; for though bread and wine disappear in the conversion, they are not properly annihilated. The same quantity of natural substance is restored when the species become corrupted.17

Readings:— *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 130, 131, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 361 sqq.); Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 272–273, 2nd ed., Mainz 1888; Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. 10–11; St. Thom., Contr. Gent., III, 65 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 236 sqq.); Idem, De Potent., qu. 5; Petav., De Deo, VIII, 2; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 348 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899; L. J. Walker, S. J., art. “Providence,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII.

Section 2

divine co-operation or concurrence

1. Definition of the Term.—The causality of God extends to the operations (operari) of His creatures as well as to their being (esse). He co-operates in their operation by preserving their substance and energy. But His co-operation is more than mediate. We hold with Catholic theologians generally, against Durandus,1 that God lends His immediate physical co-operation or Concursus to each and every creatural act. This particular function of divine Providence is called concursus divinus generalis, in contradistinction to the special assistance granted in the order of supernatural grace.

Two extremes must be avoided in defining the divine Concursus. First, all creatural operations are not attributable solely to God. This is the error of the so-called Occasionalists, who assert that the causae secundae are not true causes.2 Secondly, we must not exclude the divine causality altogether by ascribing all causal influence to the creature. The First Cause actually co-operates with the secondary causes,3 though this co-operation is not a cooperatio in the strict sense of the term; that is, God does not posit one part of the effect, and the creature the other, but the same effect is fully and completely wrought by the First Cause, and just as fully and completely by the second causes. “When one and the same effect is attributed to a natural cause and to the divine power,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, “this does not mean that the effect is produced partly by God and partly by the natural agent. The whole effect is produced by both, though in different ways, just as the same effect is produced wholly by the instrument and wholly also by the principal cause.”4 The right relation between Causa prima and causa secunda demands that the creatural be subordinated to the divine principle in such wise that the effect produced by both derives its physical entity from God more than the creature.5

As regards sin, we must distinguish between its material and its formal cause, that is, between the physical entity of the sinful act (entitas peccati), and its inherent malice (malitia peccati). God lends His co-operation solely to the act as such; the malice inherent in it, or, in other words, the sinning creature’s inclination towards evil, is due entirely to the exercise of its free-will.6

2. The Divine Concursus Demonstrated from Revelation.—The doctrine of the divine Concursus is not strictly a revealed dogma. But it is a certain theological conclusion, as appears from the fact that it is held by all theological schools.7 We quote the Roman Catechism as of special weight in this matter: “Non solum autem Deus universa, quae sunt, providentiâ suâ tuetur atque administrat: verum etiam, quae moventur et agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum atque actionem ita impellit, ut, quamvis secundarum causarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat tamen, quum eius occultissima vis ad singula pertineat, et quemadmodum Sapiens testatur, ‘attingat a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter.’ Quare ab Apostolo dictum est, quum apud Athenienses annuntiaret Deum, quem ignorantes colebant: ‘Non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum; in ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus’—Not only does God by His Providence protect and govern all things that exist, but by His intimate power He also impels to motion and action whatever things move and act, and this in such manner that, although He excludes not, He yet prevents, the agency of secondary causes; for His most secret influence extends to all things, and as the Wise Man testifies, ‘reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly.’ Wherefore the Apostle, when announcing to the Athenians the God, whom not knowing they adored, said: ‘He is not far from every one of us, for in Him we live, and move, and be.’ ”8

a) The Scriptural argument offers some difficulties. In selecting probatory texts we must be careful to choose only such as do not, on the face of them, refer to the supernatural aid of grace or to the purely mediate co-operation of God. For this reason, e. g., 1 Cor. 12:6 is unavailable. This text runs as follows: “Divisiones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus, qui operatur omnia [opera] in omnibus [operantibus]—And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all.” St. Paul here speaks of supernatural co-operation on the part of God.9

Equally unavailing for our present argument is Job 10:8 sqq.: “Manus fecerunt tuae [Domini] me et plasmaverunt me totum in circuitu, … pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me—Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me wholly round about.… Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.” As the plastic power of the womb is undoubtedly due to the creative and preservative causality of God, this text would not lose its force even if it did not refer to His immediate co-operation.

There is another series of Scriptural texts so worded as to be equally applicable to the Preservation of the universe and to the divine Concursus with which we are here concerned. For instance, John 5:17: “Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor—My Father worketh until now, and I work.”

Still more to the point is Is. 26:12: “Domine, dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra operatus es nobis—Lord, thou wilt give us peace, for thou hast wrought all our works for us.” Here “our works” are attributed to God. Cfr. also Acts 17:25: “Quum ipse det omnibus vitam10 et inspirationem11 et omnia12—Seeing it is he who giveth to all life, and breath, and all things.” Probably the most conclusive text is Acts 17:28, cited by the Tridentine Catechism: “In ipso enim vivimus, movemur et sumus—For in him we live, and move, and are.” The Apostle here emphasizes the fact that we are dependent upon the divine co-operation for our existence as well as our life and operation.

b) The Fathers of the Church regarded this as a truth both natural and revealed. Their teaching clearly appears from their polemical writings against the Pelagians. St. Augustine censures those “qui arbitrentur, tantummodo mundum ipsum factum a Deo, cetera iam fieri ab ipso mundo, Deum autem nihil operari. Contra quos profertur illa sententia Domini: Pater meus usquemodo operatur.”13 The doctrinal position of the Pelagians is aptly hit off in St. Jerome’s dialogue between Critobulus and Atticus.14 Critobulus, who speaks for the Pelagian heretics, objects that, “If we need God’s aid in everything we do, we cannot put a pen to paper, or keep silence, or speak, or sit, or stand, or walk about, or run, or eat, or fast, or weep, or laugh, etc., unless God lends us His assistance.” Atticus, who defends the Catholic view, replies that it is quite evident that we can do none of these things except by the aid of God.15 Gregory the Great clearly teaches both the Preservation and the divine Concursus: “Omnia, quae creata sunt, per se nec subsistere valent nec moveri, sed intantum subsistunt, inquantum ut esse debeant acceperunt, intantum moventur, inquantum occulto instinctu disponuntur—Created things, of themselves, can neither continue to exist nor move; they subsist only in so far as they have received the power of subsistence, and they move only in so far as they are disposed thereunto by a hidden instinct.”16

3. The Controversy Between Molinism and Thomism.—The famous controversy between the Molinists and Thomists, which we have already sketched in our volume on God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes,17 sharply reasserts itself in discussing the relation of the concurring First Cause to the operation of the secondary causes, especially in regard to the free acts of rational creatures. While both schools agree in upholding the necessity of the divine Concurrence in all human acts, including those which are free, and even those which are sinful, they differ widely in regard to its measure and mode.

a) The Molinistic theory may be outlined thus. The divine Concurrence postulates two efficient causes (namely, the First Cause and a secondary cause), which by their harmonious co-operation produce the whole effect. The question arises: How is the free act of the will produced by this double cause? Liberty of choice is essentially conditioned by an absolutely free self-determination on the part of the will, and hence it is evident that God, while remaining the First Cause, must so shape His concurrence that the liberty of the creature remains intact. “Albeit the First Cause exerts the strongest influence upon the effect,” says St. Thomas, “that influence is nevertheless determined and specified by the proximate cause.”18 Hence the divine Concursus must comprise a twofold act: an offer of co-operation, and actual co-operation. The former is called concursus oblatus, the latter, concursus collatus.

The concursus oblatus does not as yet produce a determined act of the free will, but is of its nature indifferent, equivocal, and hypothetical, though at the same time necessary, because free volition cannot operate of itself and independently of the First Cause. By seizing, as it were, and leaning on the proffered arm of God, the human will is enabled to get its bearing according to the full extent of the active indifference which constitutes its freedom, and to act according to its good pleasure. Did God proffer only a particular concursus along certain definite lines, the choice of the will would by that very fact be determined and its freedom destroyed.

By Concursus collatus or exhibitus we understand the actual bestowal of divine help for the performance of a specific act which the will freely posits, and which God by virtue of the scientia media foresees with absolute certainty from everlasting. This particular concursus is by its very nature precisely as definite, univocal, and absolute as the free determination of the will. It consists in God’s physically positing the selfsame act to which the free will has determined itself. The will’s self-determination precedes the divine causality as a condition precedes that which it conditions, not, however, as a cause precedes its effect. It follows that the concursus collatus, taken in the sense explained, is and must be strictly simultaneous.19

b) Thomism20 postulates what is technically known as the concursus praevius, that is, a co-operation on the part of God which not only co-produces the free act of the creature, but as a praemotio physica causally predetermines it, and formally applies the will, which is of itself indifferent, to the free act. According to this much-debated theory the free-will of the creature is predetermined by God physically and ad unum before it determines itself. Concursus praevius and praemotio physica, therefore, are merely different names for one and the same thing.

Gonet defines physical premotion as follows: “Actio Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa praemotione coniungere.”21 Let us analyze this definition. Physical premotion is a determination, not merely an indifferent, manifold, and hypothetical offer of co-operation like the concursus oblatus of the Molinists. It immediately and irresistibly (insuperabili virtute) determines the free will ad unum, after the fashion of some transient quality, designed, in the words of Alvarez, to communicate to the will and to all secondary causes the ultimate complement of the actus primus.22 Physical premotion is, more specifically, a predetermination, for the reason that both with regard to causality and nature it precedes the exercise of free will on the part of the creature. It is called physical, in order to distinguish it from every species of moral determination (such as, e. g., a counsel, command, petition), and also to emphasize the absolute effectiveness and irresistibility of the divine impulse. For, as it is metaphysically impossible for the human will to act at all without being predetermined, so, too, it is metaphysically impossible for the will not to act when it is predetermined, or to perform an act other than that to which it is predetermined. This predetermination does not, however, destroy freedom of choice, because God predetermines the will not only with regard to the substance of the act to be performed, but also in respect of its mode, that is, He predetermines the will to act freely. Needless to say, none but an omnipotent First Cause can so predetermine free-will as to cause it to co-predetermine itself, and, consequently, to act with full liberty. Therefore, say the Thomists, physical premotion does not destroy free-will, but postulates and confirms it.23

c) This is not the place to enter into a minute criticism of the two systems. To conform fully to the demands of right reason, Molinism must meet the objection that “free-will, by predetermining itself, forces the divine First Cause into inadmissible co-ordination.” It is more important to guard the majesty and primacy of the divine First Cause, than to preserve the freedom of the human will. Molinism overcomes this objection by explaining that God depends on free-will merely as on a condition, and that the divine causality is far and away superior to that of the creature.24 That the First Cause should accommodate and conditionally subordinate itself to the nature and properties of the individual free creature, is not derogatory to the infinite dignity and sovereignty of God, any more than that God should make the execution of His holy Will dependent on a condition which the creature is free either to posit or not. Having bound Himself by a solemn promise to reward His creatures for the good they do, God cannot violate their free-will, but owes it to His own wisdom, sanctity, and justice to preserve it, to foster it, and to give it full sway. This is not derogatory to His dignity, nor does it imply self-abasement; it is simply a mystery of the divine omnipotence.25

The Molinistic charge that Thomism destroys free-will and makes God the author of sin, will be duly considered in the treatise on Grace. Another objection against Thomism is that the concursus praevius, being neither immediatus nor simultaneus, cannot properly be called a concursus ad actum. Nature and Revelation agree that a free act of the creatural will requires an immediate and simultaneous concurrence on the part of God. The Thomistic concursus to all appearances possesses neither the one nor the other of these qualifications. It is not per se simultaneus, because it is praevius, and it is not immediatus, because it is primarily directed to the efficient cause, i. e., the actus primus, and not to the effect as such, i. e., the actus secundus. Cardinal Zigliara tries to evade this difficulty by pointing out that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of the influxus praevius.26 It is indeed quite true that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of the influxus praevius,—but does not the theory of which the learned Cardinal is an advocate, demand that it must always be so? Duly considered, the concursus praevius, as such, is not really a concursus at all, it is merely a praecursus. As Liberatore convincingly argues: “Si divinus concursus in re aliqua consisteret actioni creaturarum praevia, huius vi Deus in actionem non immediate influeret, sed mediate, nimirum mediâ re illâ praeviâ, ad quam eius operatio proxime terminatur. Ut igitur salvetur Dei concursus immediatus, necesse est ut in ipsa actione creaturarum concipiatur.”27

Readings:— *Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu; *Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, cap. 10, Oeniponte 1878; Idem, (more briefly), Synopsis De Deo Uno, pp. 286 sqq., Oeniponte 1895; Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas de Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae, Paris 1886; J. Pecci, Lehre des hl. Thomas über den Einfluss Gottes auf die Handlungen der vernünftigen Geschöpfe und über die Scientia Media, Paderborn 1888; F. G. Feldner, O. P., Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Willensfreiheit der vernünftigen Wesen, Graz 1890; Frins, S. J., De Cooperatione Dei cum Omni Natura Creata, prœsertim Libera, Paris 1892; *L. de San, S. J., De Deo Uno, t. I: De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes Physicas, Louvain 1894; I. Jeiler, O. F. M., S. Bonaventurae Principia de Concursu Dei Generali ad Actiones Causarum Secundarum Collecta et S. Thomae Doctrinâ Confirmata, Quaracchi 1897.

Chapter III

the final cause or end of creation, and divine providence

Having treated of the efficient and the exemplary cause of the created universe, we now proceed to inquire into its final cause or end.

What is the final cause or ultimate object of Creation? And by what means is that object attained?

Section 1

the final cause or object of creation

1. Preliminary Remarks.—An end, object, or purpose (finis, τέλος) is that for the sake of which the effect or result of an action is produced.1 Aristotle calls it simply τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. Since infinite progression is impossible, there must somewhere exist a “last cause” (finis ultimus), in respect of which all other causes are but means (fines intermedii). Thus man has a last end, an ultimate goal, beyond which there can be no other, and to the attainment of which he must subordinate all other ends for which he may be striving. The created universe, too, must have such a final cause, or last end, and this we now proceed to examine.

It is important for the purpose of our present inquiry to draw a clean-cut distinction between finis operis and finis operantis. A finis operis is an end immanent in the act or work itself, such as the alleviation of poverty in giving alms, or the indication of time on the part of a clock. A finis operantis, on the other hand, is that particular end or purpose which guides or impels an agent in acting and which constitutes the motive or cause of his action. The finis operantis may or may not coincide with, though it can never frustrate, the finis operis. Thus some men give alms out of vanity, or to be reputed charitable, while clock-makers in constructing horologes are usually impelled by motives of gain or love of art. Similarly, in inquiring into the ultimate end of the created universe, we must carefully distinguish between these two questions: (1) What induced God (finis operantis) to create the universe? (2) What is the ultimate end or object (finis operis) for which the universe was created? Divine Revelation returns a clear and distinct answer to both these questions.

2. The Teaching of Revelation.—The teaching of Revelation on this head can be stated in two propositions: (1) God in creating the universe was impelled by His benevolence; (2) The final object of Creation is, primarily, the glorification of the Creator, and secondarily, the beatitude of His rational creatures.

Thesis I: God’s sole motive in creating the universe (finis operantis) was His benevolence

This is de fide.

Proof. God is the Sovereign Lord and infinitely perfect, and therefore the motive of His external operations must be within Himself. For, being eternally self-sufficient and enjoying absolute beatitude in and for Himself,2 He requires for His being or happiness nothing that exists outside Himself. Furthermore, being substantial goodness or love,3 He must have been impelled by His own goodness or love in creating the universe, and, since creation is free, by a free act of His Love. This is in fact the express teaching of Holy Church. “Deus bonitate sua … non ad augendam suam beatitudinem nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur, liberrimo consilio … utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam—God, of His own goodness, … not for the increase or acquirement of His own happiness, but to manifest His perfections by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, and with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing … both [the spiritual and the corporeal] creature.…”4 According to Holy Scripture, God is Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end,5 i. e., the final and the first Cause, who derives the motives of His operation solely from Himself. Isaias 48:2: “Propter me, propter me faciam, ut non blasphemer, et gloriam meam alteri non dabo—For my own sake, for my own sake will I do it, that I may not be blasphemed: and I will not give my glory to another.” Origen couches this fundamental theological verity in the words: “When in the beginning He created the things He willed to create, He had no other motive for His action than His own self, that is, His goodness.”6 St. Augustine says: “It is sufficient for a Christian to assume that the goodness of the Creator was the sole cause of creation.”7

Thesis II: The ultimate purpose of Creation (finis operis) is, primarily, the glorification of God, secondarily, the beatification of His rational creatures

Proof of the First Part of the Thesis (which is de fide). The proposition that the glory of God is the ultimate end of Creation, was denied by Descartes, who insisted that we cannot conceive God as influenced by egoism and vainglory.8 Against this error the Vatican Council defines: “Si quis … mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit; anathema sit—If any one … shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God, let him be anathema.”9

a) The same truth is implicitly taught in all those Scriptural texts which describe God as the absolutely final as well as the highest end and object of all created things. The universe serves its ultimate end by revealing and proclaiming the divine perfections, and thereby glorifying God as the last end of all things. It is in this sense that Sacred Scripture again and again says that God created the universe for Himself. Prov. 16:4: “Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus—The Lord hath made all things for himself.” That propter Deum here means ad gloriam Dei is patent from Rom. 11:36: “Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso10 sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula—For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things: to him be glory for ever.” In his letter to the Hebrews (2:10) St. Paul, by an inimitable play upon words, identifies the causa finalis of the world with its causa efficiens: “Propter quem omnia et per quem omnia—διʼ ὃν τὰ πάντα καὶ διʼ οὗ τὰ πάντα.” For this reason Yahweh Himself says: “Omnem, qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavi eum, formavi eum et feci eum—And every one that calleth upon my name, I have created him for my glory, I have formed him and made him.”11 The material universe glorifies God by objectively reflecting His majesty. Ps. 18:2: “Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei et opera manuum eius annuntiat firmamentum—The heavens shew forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands.” Rational creatures have the additional and higher mission of converting the objective glory of the Creator (gloria obiectiva) into a subjective glorification (gloria formalis) by means of knowledge, love, and praise.12 This obligation is solemnly enjoined upon them by divine command. Deut. 10:20 sq.: “Dominum Deum tuum timebis et ei soli servies; ipsi adhaerebis iurabisque in nomine illius. Ipse est laus tua, et Deus tuus—Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him only: to him thou shalt adhere, and shalt swear by his name. He is thy praise and thy God.” Hence the Christmas hymn of the angelic hosts, “Gloria in excelsis Deo;” hence also the incessant exhortation of the Psalmist, “Laudate Dominum,” and of Daniel, “All ye works of the Lord, bless the Lord.”13

b) The teaching of the Fathers on this point agrees so perfectly with that of Sacred Scripture that we need not rehearse it at length. “What we adore,” says St. Clement of Rome, “is the one God, who has made this whole mass out of nothing and fashioned it as an ornament to His majesty.”14 Tertullian copies this passage word for word in the seventeenth chapter of his Apologeticum.15

c) The Schoolmen draw an important distinction, which is based on the teaching of Scripture, between gloria obiectiva and gloria formalis.16 By gloria obiectiva they understand the objective grandeur of the created universe as a mute manifestation of divine wisdom, benevolence, beauty, etc. Gloria formalis is the subjective glorification of the Creator by His rational creatures, in so far as they are moved by the beauty and grandeur of the physical universe to know, love, and praise Him.17 It is in this manner, and in this manner only, that the ultimate object of Creation (which consists in the glorification rather than in the simple glory of God) can be truly, completely, and perfectly attained. We conclude that, in creating the universe, God aimed principally at being glorified by those of His creatures whom He has endowed with reason. Had He omitted to kindle the light of reason, at least in some of His creatures, the universe would be “a book without a reader, a voice with no one to listen, an altar without a priest, a dwelling without inmates.”18 In view of these considerations it has justly been argued that a purely material world without rational denizens would be repugnant.19

Proof of the Second Part of the Thesis. That the happiness of rational creatures is one of the ultimate objects of Creation, is denied by two classes of opponents. Descartes, King, Stattler, and Kant regard the happiness of the rational creature as the sole object of Creation, irrespective of the glory of God. Others, like Hermes and Günther, hold that the chief end of Creation is the beatification of rational creatures, and that the glory of the Creator must be subordinated to this end. The opinion of the former has already been refuted. It remains to show that the happiness of rational creatures, though one of the chief purposes of Creation, is not its highest end, but essentially subordinate to the glorification of God. In other words, beatitude is merely the secondary object of Creation.20

a) Holy Scripture teaches, (1) that the material universe is subject to man and exists for his benefit and use; (2) that man’s well-being is not an end in itself, but a means to the glorification of God. The former purpose being subordinate to the latter, it follows that the happiness of man (and of the Angels) is the secondary, not the primary end of Creation. Many Scriptural texts could be quoted to show that all irrational creatures are subject to, and destined to serve man,21 and that his eternal happiness is one of the ends of Creation. It is on this truth that theologians base what is known as the voluntas Dei salvifica, that is, the earnest and sincere will of God to free all men from sin and lead them to supernatural happiness. But as He is the Sovereign Good, the Creator must ultimately refer the eternal happiness of His rational creatures to Himself, i. e., He must seek in it His own glorification. Eph. 1:5 sq.: “Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum … in laudem gloriae gratiae suae … ut simus in laudem gloriae eius—Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself … unto the praise and glory of his grace … that we may be unto the praise of his glory.” Only in this way can those who despise the divine glory be confounded. 1 Kings 2:30: “Quicunque glorificaverit me, glorificabo eum; qui autem contemnunt me, erunt ignobiles—Whosoever shall glorify me, him will I glorify: but they that despise me, shall be despised.” There is no exception to this fundamental rule. Even Christ, the Godman, glorified His Heavenly Father in all things. John 17:4: “Ego te clarificavi super terram, opus consummavi—I have glorified thee on the earth, I have finished the work.” Hence the life of the Elect in Heaven is nothing but an unceasing hymn of praise in honor of the Creator. Apoc. 4:11: “Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, accipere gloriam et honorem et virtutem, quia tu creasti omnia—Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive glory, and honor, and power: because thou hast created all things.” Cfr. 1 Cor. 3:22: “Omnia vestra sunt, … vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei—For all things are yours, … and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s.”

b) There is no need of elaborating the argument from Tradition. The Fathers all teach in perfect conformity with Sacred Scripture that the material universe was made for man. “Non quasi indigens Deus hominis plasmavit Adam,” says St. Irenæus,22 “sed ut haberet, in quem collocaret sua beneficia—God formed Adam, not as if He had need of him, but as a subject upon which to confer His benefits.” On the other hand, however, the Fathers insist that man should be constantly mindful of the honor and glory he owes to God, according to the exhortation of St. Paul: “Sive ergo manducatis sive bibitis sive aliud quid facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite—Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God.”23 In his commentary on the Psalms24 St. Augustine says: “Quo fine facias, vide. Si eo id facis, ut tu glorificeris, hoc prohibuit Deus; si autem ideo, ut Deus glorificetur, hoc iussit—Look to the end thou hast in view. If thou dost it in order to glorify thyself, thou dost something which God has forbidden; but if thou dost it in order that God be glorified, thou compliest with His command.”

c) The glory of God and the happiness of His creatures are two ends which can never clash, because the one is subordinate to the other, and the two are so intimately bound up that the attainment of either promotes that of the other. In the last analysis, therefore, Creation has but one adequate end, viz., the glory of God, and this is accomplished by the beatification of His rational creatures, which consists in knowing, loving, and praising the Creator. In fact, the higher purpose is attained in direct proportion to the attainment of the lower—the greater the happiness of the creature, the more ardent will be its love, the more intense its glorification of God. And conversely, the more intense the love and praise which the creature renders to God, the greater will be its own beatitude.

It has been objected that, as some of God’s rational creatures are eternally damned, Creation does not attain its last end and purpose. God inevitably obtains that measure of external glory which He wills; and Hell itself is ultimately a revelation and glorification of the divine justice, though, of course, God does not, voluntate antecedente, seek His glory in the tortures of the reprobate sinners, but in the jubilant hymns of the Elect.25

Readings:—Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Sec. 5, Münster 1867.—Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis Creaturis, thes. 10–11, Romae 1910.—Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 132–133, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 369 sqq.).—Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 68–73, Oeniponte 1878.—Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, 2nd ed., Vol. V, §§ 265–276, Mainz 1888.—Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 453 sqq., Paris 1895.

Section 2

divine providence

1. Definition of the Term.—St. Thomas defines Divine Providence as the all-regulating and stable plan by which God, as the Supreme Ruler of the universe, ordains all things.1

This definition postulates the existence of two divine operations, one of which is proper to the divine Intellect, viz.: foreknowledge of all, especially the conditioned events of the future,2 whereas the second, viz.: a preordainment of whatever is to happen or not to happen, with due regard to the free will of rational creatures, belongs to the divine Will. In a wider sense Providence is called the divine government of the world (gubernatio mundi), in as far as it is the successive execution of the divine plan in time.

Providence, therefore, is related to the divine government of the world as a design is related to its execution. Providence is eternal, while the divine government of the world is exercised in time.

Nor are “Providence” and “divine disposition” synonymous terms. What is usually called a divine disposition (dispositio) has reference to the ordering of things to one another, while Providence ordains things to their final end. Because of their intrinsic relation to the final object of the universe, the various divine dispositions must be conceived as necessary functions of Providence. The same is true of the divine Preservation of the universe and also of divine Concurrence, with both of which we have dealt in a preceding chapter.

2. The Dogma.—The existence of an all-governing Providence was formally defined as an article of faith by the Council of the Vatican: “Universa vero, quae condidit Deus, providentiâ suâ tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter; omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius, ea etiam, quae liberâ creaturarum actione futura sunt—God protects and governs by His Providence all things which He hath made, ‘reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly.’ For ‘all things are bare and open to His eyes,’ even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.”3 This definition excludes the pagan notion of “fate” (εἱμαρμένη), which had already been rejected by the Council of Braga (A. D. 561), and also modern Deism, which either denies Providence point-blank, or represents God as an idle, uninterested spectator of mundane affairs.

For the Scriptural argument we must refer the reader to our work entitled God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 260 sqq.

Among Patristic texts we would call special attention to Theodoret’s ten beautiful discourses on God’s Providence in the government of the world,4 and to the last of St. Chrysostom’s three books to Stagirius, a treatise of consolation written for the benefit of a sorely tried and nearly despairing friend.5

3. Deism.—By Deism we understand a conception of the universe which acknowledges the existence of a personal Creator, distinct from the world, but holds that He does not care for the universe which He has created, simply letting it shift for itself. Deism differs not only from Christian Theism, but likewise from Pantheism and Materialism, and consequently also from Atheism. It may be fitly described as an incomplete, defective, and halting Theism.6

Deism originated in the seventeenth century, in England, by way of reaction against the Episcopal Church. Under the leadership of Toland (1696), Collins (+ 1724), Tindal (1730), who is called “the great apostle of Deism,” Thomas Morgan (1737), and other notorious Freethinkers, it began by attacking the supernatural truths of Christianity and, under Dodwell (1742) and David Hume (+ 1776), sank deep into the quagmire of religious scepticism. German Rationalism (die Aufklärung)—whose leading champions were G. E. Lessing and Im. Kant—like the Freethought of the French Encyclopedists, was merely an offshoot of English Deism. In Germany Deism ultimately developed into Pantheism. In France it engendered Atheism, which celebrated its terrible triumphs in the Revolution. At present Deism is leading a shadowy existence in certain Freemasonic lodges which have not yet adopted rank Pantheism. It is a comfortable creed, for, while freely acknowledging the existence of a “Grand Architect of the Universe,” it cares not how He is worshipped or whether He be worshipped at all. The God of the Deists allows the mighty engine of the universe to run at rovers and permits the droll little creatures called men to disport themselves as they please. Of course, if the universe is ruled by immutable laws and left to itself by its Creator, there can be no room for miracles; supernatural Revelation is impossible and the Christian world-view must be set down as a chimera. In its last analysis, therefore, Deism is pure Naturalism, or Rationalism, and utterly incompatible with revealed religion. It cannot even keep up the appearance of a “religion of pure reason” upon which it loves to plume itself. Having cut loose from God it has lost all semblance of religion and must lead to rank Atheism. Thus the most effective refutation of Deism is its own history.7

Readings:—St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., III, 64–97 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 235 sqq.).—Ruiz, De Providentia Dei, disp. 1–4.—Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. XI.—Idem, De Providentia Numinis, etc.—Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. II, 3rd ed., pp. 173 sqq., Friburgi 1906.—Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 372 sqq., London 1899.—B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 381 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899.—A. Lehmkuhl, Die göttliche Vorsehung, 5th ed., Köln 1906.—K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schöpfung, pp. 106 sqq., Ratisbon 1910.—F. Aveling, art. “Deism” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV.

Part II

Creation Passively Considered, or the Created Universe

By Creation in the passive sense (creari s. creatum esse) we understand the created universe or world (mundus). This, as its Greek name (κόσμος) indicates, is not a chaos, but a well-ordered, graduated, and articulated whole, consisting of three kingdoms, which rise one above the other: (1) The material universe, which embraces animals and plants, (2) the human race, and (3) the Angels.1

Accordingly we shall treat of Creation passively considered, i. e., the created universe, in three Chapters, entitled respectively: (1) Cosmology, (2) Anthropology, and (3) Angelology.

Chapter I

dogmatic cosmology

Section 1

first and second creation

1. Definition of Terms.—In respect of matter, both inorganic and organic, God’s creative operation is divided into two logically and really distinct functions, viz.: (1) The creation of primordial matter out of nothing, and (2) the formation of chaotic matter, i. e., the fashioning of earth and heaven, oceans and continents, plants and animals out of the primitive world-stuff.

The former of these two functions is called first creation (creatio prima). It is creation in the proper sense of the term. The second (creatio secunda) can be called creation only in a figurative or metaphorical sense. Creatio secunda may be said to partake of the nature of creation proper, inasmuch as no one but God in His omnipotence was able to fashion and form the cosmos. Active formation2 has for its term or object passive formation, i. e., the things formed or fashioned. In this passive formation St. Thomas discriminates between distinctio and ornatus. The work of distinction or differentiation which God performed on the first three days of the Hexaëmeron consisted in the separation of light from darkness, of the firmament from the waters below, and of the solid land from the sea. The work of ornamentation, which took place on the last three days, consisted in the allocation of the various celestial and terrestrial bodies, supplying the water with fishes, the air with birds, and the continents with plants and animals.

2. The Teaching of Divine Revelation.—Revelation furnishes a sufficient basis for the distinction between first and second creation.

a) The book of Genesis begins by describing how God created all things out of nothing. Before He undertook the work of formation, which took six “days,” the earth was “void and empty,” and the light as yet undivided from the darkness; in other words, the universe was still in a chaotic state. To this twofold condition there corresponded a twofold operation on the part of the Almighty, viz.: creare and formare, which we call first and second creation. It is characteristic of the conception existing in the mind of the Sacred Writer that He does not describe the act of mere formation or ordering by the verb בָּרַא, which he employed in the first verse, but by such verbs as עָשָׂה and יָעַר, which are capable of being construed with a materia ex qua.3 The only exceptions to this rule are Gen. 1:21: “Creavit (וַיִּכִרָא) Deus cete grandia—God created the great whales;” and Gen. 1:27: “Et creavit Deus hominem … masculum et feminam creavit (כָרָא) eos—And God created man, … male and female he created them.” With regard to these two passages it should be noted that in the one there is question of a true creation, viz.: the creation of the human soul; while the other is specially designed to show forth God’s omnipotence, which manifests itself with special grandeur in the creation of the huge ocean monsters. The playful ease with which the Creator produced these gigantic beings, proves that He is absolutely independent of matter and, therefore, at least indirectly demonstrates His creative power.

For a further confirmation of the distinction between first and second creation we may quote from Wisd. 11:18 the phrase “ex materia invisa (scil. informi, ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης).”4 It is no argument against our thesis that a distinction is made in Gen. 1:1 between “heaven” and “earth,” for heaven and earth were present at the Creation of the universe only with regard to their substance; they were not as yet divided off and moulded into shape,—this took place later (Gen. 1:7–8).

b) The distinction between first and second creation is quite common in the writings of the Fathers. Thus Severian of Gabala (+ after 408) says: “On the first day God created out of nothing (ἐκ μὴ ὄντων) whatever He has made; but on the following days He did not create out of nothing (οὐκ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων), but according to His good pleasure fashioned (μετέβαλεν) that which He had made on the first day.”5 The three Cappadocians expressed themselves in a similar manner.6 St. Augustine very distinctly insists on the concept of creatio secunda.7

In determining the nature of the materia informis out of which God gradually fashioned the cosmos in the course of six days, the Fathers were entirely dependent on the scientific theories prevalent in their day. In expounding these theories, needless to say, they do not represent Tradition, but merely the inadequate notions of an unscientific age, and we are not bound by their speculations. St. Chrysostom’s8 or St. Ephrem’s9 explanations of the process of Creation in the light of the peripatetic theory of the four elements (earth, water, air, and fire), have no more authority than the Patristic or Scholastic defense of the geocentric system of the universe, and we Catholics of the twentieth century are free to substitute for the crude hypotheses of the Patristic period the more solidly established conclusions of modern science, e. g., to regard the molecules as the proper object of the creatio prima and the various chemical compositions as the objects of the creatio secunda.

While, as we have shown, Revelation offers a solid basis for a real distinction between first and second creation and their products, it remains an open question whether or not the two processes were separated by a temporal interval. The great majority of the Fathers not only admit but positively assert an intermission between creatio prima and creatio secunda. It was only the great authority of St. Augustine that preserved later theologians from unduly limiting freedom of interpretation in regard to a question which, because of its relations to natural science, must be handled with the greatest reserve. St. Augustine’s own interpretation10 has, it is true, been generally rejected as forced and artificial; but St. Thomas,11 though himself a defender of the theory of temporal succession, invariably speaks of the Augustinian theory with great respect, and many later theologians, especially those who in some form or other prefer the so-called ideal interpretation, base their right to espouse a less slavishly literal view upon the example of the learned and pious Bishop of Hippo.12

Readings:—Palmieri, De Creatione et Praecipuis Creaturis, thes. 14–15, Romae 1910.—Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 78–79, Oeniponte 1875.—Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 144, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 383 sqq.).—Oswald, Schöpfungslehre, pp. 42 sqq., Paderborn 1885.—G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 1895.—Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Friburgi 1908.—Among the commentaries on Genesis we recommend especially those by Lamy, Hummelauer, and Hoberg.

Section 2

the hexaëmeron in its relation to science and exegesis

Article 1

the mosaic account of the creation and physical science

This subject properly belongs to higher apologetics or fundamental theology.1 In the present (purely dogmatic) treatise it will suffice to lay down certain leading principles which theologians and scientists must constantly keep before them in order to safeguard the sacred rights of revealed religion without trenching on the just claims of science.

Thesis I: Nature and the Bible both tell the history of Creation, and consequently the assured results of scientific investigation can never contradict Holy Writ

Explanation. The Word of God, rightly interpreted, cannot clash with the firmly established conclusions of science, because both Sacred Scripture and science have God for their author. Any apparent contradiction between the two must be traceable either to some false and unproved claim on the part of science, or to an incorrect interpretation of Holy Writ. A thorough investigation of all the data involved usually lays bare the source of error. The Galilei controversy is a case in point.2 There can be no doubt that the various natural sciences—astronomy, geology, palæontology, etc.—furnish, or at least are able to furnish, valuable aids to the exegete who undertakes to interpret the Mosaic cosmogony. The prudent theologian will not spurn these aids. On the contrary, the respect he owes to the Almighty Creator, whose vestiges these sciences seek to trace, will prompt him to welcome their co-operation and to pay due regard to whatever evidence they may have to offer. God has, as it were, set down an objective commentary on the Bible in the “Book of Nature,” to which the theologian can and should devote most careful attention. All true scientists are after a fashion exegetes,3 and therefore friends, not enemies, of the theologians. Those among them who antagonize revealed religion,4 have deserted the solid ground of science for moors and fens in which they gleefully chase deceptive will-o’-the-wisps. Of course, Science has a perfect right to follow her own methods, and the fact that her representatives conduct their researches without constantly trying to square themselves with the Bible does not argue that they mistrust religion or despise Christianity. The history of the inductive sciences shows that in many cases an undue regard for certain favorite interpretations of Scripture has misled science and bred false theories which it took ages to get rid of. We may instance the Copernican system,5 the debate between Neptunists and Plutonists,6 the problem of the geological deluge,7 etc. Unfortunately, too, there have always been over-zealous though perfectly well-intentioned theologians who were ready to add to the confusion by supplying “theological arguments” for unproved and unprovable hypotheses. This explains the existence and animus of such works as J. W. Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science.8

Thesis II: The proper purpose of the Mosaic narrative is not scientific, but strictly religious; hence we must not seek astronomy, physics, geology, etc., in the Hexaëmeron, but chiefly religious instruction

Explanation. The grounds for this proposition are quite evident. The Bible is not a text-book of science. Had it been written to teach a supernaturally revealed system of physics, chemistry, astronomy, or geology, it would be a sealed and unintelligible book, nay, it would have proved positively dangerous to the faith of the masses, because scientific views and terms are subject to constant change. Consequently, in order to accomplish its purpose, it was necessary that the Bible in matters of natural science should adopt the language of the common people, who derive their views of nature from external appearances. This popular idiom is ever true, because it employs relative standards in the contemplation of nature, and remains forever intelligible to the masses, because it makes no claim to describe absolute facts. Even at the present day, despite the universal adoption of the Copernican system, certain popular modes of expression, based upon ocular observation of the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies, retain the geocentric color which they had in the days of Ptolemy. Even learned astronomers still speak of the summer and winter solstices, still refer to the sun as rising and setting, and so forth. “We must remember,” says St. Thomas, “that Moses addressed himself to an uncultivated people, and, condescending to their ignorance, proposed to them only what was obvious to the senses.”9 Moses’ chief purpose was to impress the Jews and the nations that were to come after them, with four fundamental truths, viz.: (1) The existence of one true God, Lord of heaven and earth; (2) the creation of all things out of nothing, which implied the falsity of the Egyptian animal and star worship no less than of Dualism and Pantheism; (3) the duty of keeping holy the Sabbath day, after the example of the divine Artificer, who created the universe in six days, and rested on the seventh;10 (4) that all the things which God made were originally good.11 We do not mean to say, of course, that the purely scientific portions of the Bible have no claim to divine authority, or to deny that they are absolutely infallible. As part of the Inspired Word they embody divine revelation. However, since the Hexaëmeron is susceptible of many different explanations, and the infallible Church has never given an authentic interpretation of it, but, on the contrary, has granted full liberty to exegetes, Science is nowise hampered in her peculiar field of enquiry. St. Augustine went so far as to contend that the creation of the universe was simultaneous with its formation and that what Sacred Scripture calls six days was in reality but a single moment of time.12

Thesis III: The relationship between the Mosaic narrative and natural science may, in principle, be defined thus: The Hexaëmeron constitutes a negative, but not a positive guiding principle for scientists

Explanation. By a positive guiding principle (norma positiva) we mean a rule, the conscientious observance of which guarantees the immediate possession of truth, while its non-observance entails error. Thus the multiplication table is a positive guiding principle in all mathematical calculations and in the affairs of everyday life. A negative guiding principle merely requires that, while enjoying the greatest possible latitude in a certain sphere, we avoid forming any conclusion which directly contradicts said principle. Thus the axiom of parallel lines is a negative guiding principle in geometry, because any proposition that runs counter to it must inevitably prove false. That the Mosaic Hexaëmeron does not prescribe what route science must travel is plain from the fact that the true sense of Genesis 1:1 has never been defined either by the infallible teaching office of the Church or by scientific exegesis. Hence the Mosaic narrative is not a positive norm for the guidance of the naturalist. The very multiplicity of attempted interpretations which the Church has countenanced at various times, confirms this proposition. All that can justly be demanded, therefore, is that the scientist refrain from positively contradicting the Word of God, e. g., by defending such propositions as: “Matter is eternal;” “Matter and energy are the sole principles of the universe;” “The world originated by mere chance,” and so forth. In all other matters, such as the nebular hypothesis,13 the evolution of species, etc., he may hold any conclusions that seem warranted.

The exegete, on his part, is free to interpret the sacred text in accordance with the rules of hermeneutics and in harmony with each particular author’s peculiar style and with the context. Grammar, syntax, and the dictionary are quite as valuable scientific aids as the telescope, the microscope, and the testing tube. It will not do to impose the conclusions of physical science as a positive norm upon exegesis and to demand that the Hexaëmeron be interpreted in accordance with constantly changing hypotheses. Modern exegetes, especially of the last half-century, have been justly charged with paying too much attention to science and too little to the Mosaic text. Though the scientists have an undeniable right to be heard,14 they have no authority to dictate how the Hexaëmeron must be interpreted. All they can reasonably demand is that exegetes accept the established conclusions of science as a negative guiding principle and refrain from advocating as certain, or even probable, any theory that contradicts clearly ascertained facts.15

Thesis IV: Those theologians and scientists who deny that the so-called fossils or petrifactions are real remains of plants and animals, representing them as mere freaks of nature (lusus naturae), needlessly expose the Word of God to ridicule

Explanation. There have been and still are theologians who, in order to save the literal interpretation of the Mosaic narrative, regard the palæontological finds in the lower strata of the earth as specially created products of divine omnipotence, rather than as real remains of primordial organisms. Nothing is so apt to excite ridicule on the part of infidels and indignation in the camp of educated Catholic laymen, as recourse to such pitiable hypotheses, which are altogether unworthy of a true theologian. To assume that the Creator leads truth-seeking man into invincible error, is to stamp Him a cruel deceiver, who makes it His business to lay annual rings around carbonized trees found standing erect in coal-mines, and to fashion in perfect detail large and small trilobites in siluric deposits—some of them even contain well-developed embryos—all mere lusus naturae! St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas vigorously protested against this curious way of “reconciling” faith and science.

Noteworthy for all time is the principle which St. Augustine lays down in his famous treatise De Genesi ad Literam: “In rebus obscuris atque a nostris oculis remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam divina legerimus, quae possint salvâ fide, qua imbuimur, alias atque alias parere sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti affirmatione ita proiiciamus, ut, si forte diligentius discussa veritas eam recte labefactaverit, corruamus; non pro sententia divinarum Scripturarum, sed pro nostra ita dimicantes, ut eam velimus Scripturarum esse, quae nostra est, cum potius eam, quae Scripturarum est, nostram esse velle debeamus.”16 With equal earnestness the Saint censures the stupidity of those who, in the mistaken interest of faith, provoke the sarcastic ridicule of learned infidels: “Turpe est autem nimis et perniciosum ac maxime cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus quasi secundum christianas litteras loquentem ita delirare quilibet infidelis audiat, ut … risum tenere vix possit. Et non tam molestum est, quod errans homo deridetur, sed quod auctores nostri ab iis, qui foris sunt, talia sensisse creduntur et cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum salute satagimus, tamquam indocti reprehenduntur atque respuuntur.”17 These sentiments of the greatest among the Fathers were shared and re-echoed by the most eminent of the Church’s theologians. “Dicendum est,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, “quod sicut Augustinus docet, in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda: primo quidem, ut veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur; secundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter exponi possit, quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat, ut, si certâ ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, id nihilominus asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infidelibus derideatur et ne eis via credendi praecludatur.”18 St. Thomas rightly distinguishes between such Scriptural truths as appertain to the substance of faith, and such as are altogether secondary. “Si ergo circa mundi principium aliquid est, quod ad substantiam fidei pertinet, scil. mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes Sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, inquantum in Scriptura traditur, cuius veritatem diversâ expositione Sancti salvantes diversa tradiderunt.”19 The Creator, when He established nature, also laid down the laws by which it is governed, hence we must not have recourse to miracles except where no natural explanation suffices: “Scriptura in principio Genesis commemorat institutionem naturae, quae postmodum perseverat. Unde non debet dici, quod aliquid tunc factum fuerit, quod postmodum desierit.”20 And again: “In prima institutione naturae non quaeritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit.”21

Thesis V: Since the true interpretation of the Hexaëmeron with regard to the origin of the universe is uncertain, theologians and scientists are free to adopt whatever theory they prefer, provided only it be reasonable and moderate, and not evidently opposed to Scripture

Explanation. This is merely a corollary from the preceding theses. It is scarcely necessary to point out that scientists have vied with theologians in making liberal use of the privilege named. During the last half of the nineteenth century innumerable theories designed to harmonize science and the Bible have sprung up, and the end is not yet in sight. Most of these theories are tissues of more or less airy conjectures, and not a few evince a woeful lack of consistency. The Hexaëmeron has become a playground where imagination runs amuck. The Church evidently apprehends no real contradiction between the Mosaic narrative and the established conclusions of science. Among the forty or fifty theories which have been thus far contrived, it is reasonable to assume that one or two can be used for exegetical purposes without straining the sacred text.

The number and variety of these theories is so great that they cannot easily be grouped in logical categories. For the following rough classification we are indebted to Msgr. Gutberlet.22

1. The Verbal theory interprets “day” literally as a period of twenty-four hours. “This,” says Suarez, “is the more common opinion of the Fathers; … it is also favored by the Scholastics, though, on account of the authority of St. Augustine, they treat his divergent interpretation very modestly and with great reserve.”23 To-day this theory is generally called the Deluge theory, for the reason that most of its modern defenders ascribe the origin of the geological strata and their organic deposits to a catastrophe caused by the Deluge.24 In this hypothesis the Hexaëmeron would antedate the so-called geological epochs. It is now quite generally held that the creation and formation of the cosmos must have required millions of years, and the Verbal theory no longer has any eminent defenders.

2. The Restitution theory (held by Buckland, Wiseman, A. Wagner, Hengstenberg, Vosen, and others), assumes that the ante-diluvian flora and fauna antedates the chaos described in Genesis (tohu-vabohu) and was destroyed by a great catastrophe, following which God recreated the world, forming the present cosmos in the course of six natural days. According to this theory the Hexaëmeron postdates the geological epochs. A. Westermayer25 represents the chaos as the work of the fallen angels. Restitutionism was revamped by A. Stenzel, but it has now been quite generally abandoned in view of the fact that the undisturbed position of the fossils found in the lower strata of the earth makes it improbable that all living organisms were buried by a sudden catastrophe. To attribute such a catastrophe to the fallen angels almost verges on superstition. Stenzel, moreover, confused the tohu-vabohu with the Deluge.

3. The numerous Concordance theories seek to synchronize the successive geological periods with the “days” of the Hexaëmeron. They place the Hexaëmeron either between the different geological periods, or within them. Hence the names of “Interperiodism” and “Periodism.”26 “Interperiodism,” which is a rather obscure system, divides the Hexaëmeron into six ordinary days of twenty-four hours each, separated by long intervening periods, which contain the millions of years demanded by geology. According to “Periodism” the six days of Genesis coincide with the geological periods, and the word “day” means an epoch or period of time. There is an older and a more recent Periodism. The former27 construes a strict parallelism between the six days of Creation on the one hand and six “geological epochs” on the other. Modern Periodism, seeing the impossibility of such a close parallelism, has adopted a more or less idealistic Concordism.28 Among recent champions of Periodism the following deserve to be mentioned: J. Brucker,29 F. Vigouroux,30 M. Seisenberger,31 and Bourdais.32 From this idealistic Concordism to pure Idealism is but one step.33

4. The Idealist theories disregard the chronological sequence of the different stages of Creation and interpret the first chapter of Genesis in a purely religious sense. This puts the Bible and science on different planes; there are no points of contact between them, and a conflict is therefore impossible. The Hexaëmeron transcends the geological periods and has absolutely nothing to do with them. Let the exegete and the scientist each pursue his own way in peace! “Idealism,” says Hummelauer,34 “does not interpret the six days as necessarily meaning six consecutive periods of time, but as six logically distinct, outstanding momenta of God’s creative activity, or as six divine ideas realized in Creation. Cannot the historian truly assert that the Romans subjugated Europe, Asia, and Africa? Or that Goethe wrote prose and poetry? Similarly the inspired writer describes for us how God created light and the firmament, land and sea, plants, stars, and animals.”

The simplest and most acceptable form of Idealism regards the Hexaëmeron as a treatise arranged according to purely logical points of view, with its main emphasis upon the “week,” and the seventh day as the Sabbath. Cfr. Exod. 23:12: “Sex diebus operaberis, septimo die cessabis—Six days thou shalt work: the seventh day thou shalt cease.” The divine week of creation is the model upon which man should pattern his week of labor, the divine Sabbath is the exemplar of his day of rest, which he is to consecrate to God. The introduction of the figure six is not arbitrary; nor is it due to chronological considerations; it is based upon the pragmatism of God’s creative activity, in which the number three of the work of distinction corresponds to a like number in the ornamentation of the universe. This hypothesis has the twofold advantage of safeguarding the historic character of the Hexaëmeron and of avoiding a slavish Concordism. Science can find nothing objectionable in an account of the Creation which is arranged pragmatically rather than chronologically.35

Allegorism, Poetism, and Liturgism virtually destroy the historic character of the Hexaëmeron, and it is not surprising, therefore, that they have met with small favor.36

5. The most widely discussed among the so-called Idealistic theories just now is the Vision theory advocated by Kurtz, Hummelauer, Hoberg, and others. It regards the six days of Creation as so many visions of Adam. In six living pictures or tableaux, symbolizing six natural days, there passed before the mental vision of our ecstatic progenitor the history of creation, which could be known to no one but God. The facts thus revealed to Adam were handed down by Primitive Tradition to Moses, who faithfully recorded them in the Book of Genesis. “It can truly be said,” remarks Hummelauer, “that the universe was created in six days, that is in a vision, like as the heroes of a drama engage in combat on the stage.”37 This theory claims to eliminate even the possibility of a clash between Revelation and science. “The Vision theory,” to quote Hummelauer again, “meets all objections by pointing to the difference which must naturally exist between a vision of the creative act and that act itself. Science and the Bible do not deal with precisely the same object; a difference between them, therefore, does not necessarily argue contradiction.”38

But what becomes of the historic character of the Mosaic narrative? “What is there to correspond to the six days of Adam’s vision? Six ordinary days? or six periods of time? or six logical momenta?—or nothing?”39 Here is the weak spot of the Vision theory. Hummelauer frankly advocates “a theory of Vision sans phrase,” and refuses to accept Periodism in any shape or form.40 But if there is no reality corresponding to the consecutive days of Adam’s vision, the division of time into six days of labor and one day of rest is based on a mere dream, and the Sabbath has no foundation in fact, despite the solemn declaration in Exodus 20:11: “Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus coelum et terram et mare et omnia, quae in iis sunt, et requievit in die septimo; idcirco benedixit Dominus diei Sabbati et sanctificavit eum—For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them, and rested on the seventh day: therefore the Lord blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it.” We must not forget that this revealed truth has been formally proclaimed a rule of human conduct: “Sex diebus operaberis, septimo die cessabis—Six days thou shalt work, the seventh day thou shalt cease” (Exod. 23:12). Obviously the Creator instituted this particular order not because Adam had six visions, but because the universe was actually created in the course of six days. To deny the objective truth of this fact is to do violence to the sacred text. One might as consistently adopt the extreme Idealistic theories. Hence we cannot admit that moderate Concordism and moderate Idealism have lost their raison d’être. The Vision theory, in our humble opinion, can be successfully defended only on the assumption that the six days of Adam’s vision are based on some kind of objective reality.41

Article 2

the hexaëmeron and exegesis

Exegetically those interpretations that deviate from the literal sense of the Mosaic narrative—we have in mind chiefly moderate Concordism and Idealism—can be justified only on the assumption that the Hebrew word יוֹם does not necessarily mean an ordinary day of twenty-four hours, but may signify a longer period of time.

1. Concordism and Idealism can claim the high authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, which every Catholic exegete has a perfect right to follow. We have already adverted to the fact that the eminent Bishop of Hippo regarded the whole week of the Hexaëmeron as one single moment, and that St. Thomas approved of this interpretation. As the Church has never disowned the teaching of St. Augustine, it cannot fairly be claimed that ecclesiastical Tradition compels us to take the Hebrew יוֹם in the sense of an ordinary day of twenty-four hours. Origen and Athanasius anticipated the teaching of Augustine. While the Fathers and Scholastics generally preferred to adhere to the literal sense, they never condemned the Augustinian interpretation. St. Thomas says: “Moyses rudem populum de creatione mundi instruens per partes divisit, quae simul facta sunt. Gregorius vero … et alii Sancti ponunt ordinem temporis in distinctione rerum servatum; et haec quidem positio est communior, et magis consonare videtur litterae quantum ad superficiem; sed prior est rationabilior, et magis ab irrisione infidelium sacram Scripturam defendens, quod valde observandum docet Augustinus,1 ut sic Scripturae exponantur, quod ab infidelibus non irrideantur; et haec opinio plus mihi placet.”2 Under these circumstances the all but universal consensus of the Fathers and Scholastics in favor of the literal interpretation of the Mosaic narrative has no binding force.

2. There are also intrinsic reasons for rejecting the literal interpretation of the word “day.” In the first place geology, palæontology, and astronomy all maintain that the formation of the universe, including our own planet, cannot have taken place within the limits of one natural week. Palæozoic coal, for example, mesozoic chalk, and the so-called tertiary formations postulate immense periods of time. It is to be noted, also, that the first three “days” of the Hexaëmeron cannot have been solar days in the strict sense of the term, because the sun was not created until the fourth day. St. Augustine observes that it is practically impossible to define the exact nature of these ante-solar days.3 In another portion of his writings he says that it is highly improbable, not to say incredible, that the earth should have brought forth full-grown trees in fruitage within the short space of twenty-four hours.

A decisive argument for our contention is found in the fact that the word יוֹם is frequently employed by Sacred Scripture in a wider sense, to denote an indefinite period of time.4 In Gen. 2:4 the entire period of six days is referred to as “one day.” “Istae sunt generationes coeli et terrae, quando creata sunt in die (כְּיוֹם) quo fecit Dominus Deus coelum et terram—These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth.” Ezech. 7:7 we read: “Venit tempus, prope est dies occisionis—The time is come, the day of slaughter is near.” Here “time” and “day” are evidently synonymous. Amos 8:13 has this passage: “In die illa deficient virgines—In that day [i. e., at that time] the fair virgins … shall faint.”

“Day” as a synonym for “time” is also frequent in such Scriptural phrases as dies vanitatis (day of vanity),5 dies tribulationis (day of tribulation),6 dies peccatoris (the sinner’s day),7 dies frigoris (day of frost),8 etc.

If יוֹם does not mean an ordinary “day,” “evening” (vespera, עֶרֶב) and “morning,” (mane, בּקֶר) must likewise be capable of a figurative interpretation. Ereb etymologically means “mixture, confusion.” It is analogously applied to matter in a chaotic state, i. e., awaiting formation. Boker, on the other hand, which originally means “opening” or “revelation,” may be interpreted as signifying the work of seven days reduced to perfect order. This distinction is at least as old as St. Augustine, who says: “Cum dixit: ‘Facta est vespera,’ materiam informem commemorat; cum autem dicit: ‘Factum est mane,’ speciem, quae ipsa operatione impressa est materiae.”9

But why did Moses choose the term “day” to describe the periods of Creation? Why did he not employ some such word as יָמים or עוֹלָם, to indicate that he meant indefinite periods of time? The week of the Creation with its six periods crowned by the Creator’s day of repose—which was surely not an ordinary day, since it still continues—was intended to typify man’s week of labor which terminates with the Sabbath. Between a type and that which it figures there generally obtains a relation of real similarity, which by virtue of the laws of analogy justifies the use of the same concept and the same term.10

3. Nor does the assumption of the moderate Idealists, that the Hexaëmeron must be regarded as history written from the pragmatic rather than the chronological point of view, necessarily run counter to the principles of sound Biblical hermeneutics. Secular historians often refer to something done on a certain day briefly as “day” (e. g., the day of Waterloo, or dies Alliensis for pugna Alliensis). In like manner Holy Scripture sometimes employs the word “day” to describe some particular event (as, for instance, dies Madian,11 dies occisionis,12 dies Domini,13 dies magnus irae),14 irrespective of duration. Similarly, in the Book of Genesis “day” may mean act, work, operation, or performance, regardless of duration. The analogous terms “evening” and “morning” probably signify the completion of one and the beginning of another action, just as we sometimes speak of the evening of life or the dawn of a better future.15

Readings:—Kurtz, Bibel und Astronomie, Berlin 1847.—J. B. Pianciani, Erläuterungen zur mosaischen Schöpfungsgeschichte, Ratisbon 1853.—A Bosizio, Das Hexaëmeron und die Geologie, Mainz 1865.— *F. H. Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., Bonn 1876.— *Hummelauer, Der biblische Schöpfungsbericht, Freiburg 1877.— *C. Güttler, Naturforschung und Bibel, Freiburg 1877.— *F. E. Gigot, Special Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament, I, pp. 142 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1903.— *F. Pfaff, Schöpfungsgeschichte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des biblischen Schöpfungsberichtes, 2nd ed., Frankfurt 1877.—B. Schäfer, Bibel und Wissenschaft, Münster 1881.—J. W. Dawson, The Origin of the World according to Revelation and Science, New York 1880.—F. N. Moigno, Les Splendeurs de la Foi, 3rd ed., 5 vols., Paris 1883.—A. Stoppani, Sulla Cosmogonia Mosaica, Milano 1887.—De Gryse, De Hexaëmero secundum Caput Primum Geneseos ad Literam, Bruges 1889.—J. McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evolution, New York 1890.—Mir y Noguera, La Creacion, Madrid 1890.—C. Güttler, Wissen und Glauben, 2nd ed., München 1904.—A. Trissl, Das biblische Sechstagewerk, 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1894.—W. D. Strappini, S. J., “What Were the Days of Genesis?” in the Month, Jan. 1881.—A. Stenzel, Weltschöpfung, Sintflut und Gott, Braunschweig 1894.—C. Braun, S. J., Kosmogonie vom Standpunkte christlicher Wissenschaft, 3rd ed., Münster 1905.— *A. Schöpfer, Geschichte des Alten Testaments mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Verhältnis von Bibel und Wissenschaft, 5th ed., Brixen 1913.—Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible, s. v. “Cosmogonie Mosaïque,” Paris 1898.— *F. v. Hummelauer, Noch einmal der biblische Schöpfungsbericht, Freiburg 1898.—Zapletal, Der Schöpfungsbericht der Genesis, Freiburg 1902.—P. Schanz, Apology, Vol. I, 4th ed., New York, s.a.—M. Seisenberger, Practical Handbook for the Study of the Bible (Engl. tr. by Buchanan), pp. 260 sqq., New York, 1911.

The older theologians, like Suarez, Billuart, Tournely, etc., treat the Hexaëmeron, and Dogmatic Cosmology generally, under the title “De Opere Sex Dierum,” in connection with the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1a, qu. 65–74.

Chapter II

dogmatic anthropology

Anthropology, as a branch of dogmatic theology, partly coincides with the philosophical discipline of the same name, and partly with psychology. Its object is to determine the natural basis for the supernatural endowment of mankind in Adam, which was forfeited by original sin. Hence in this Chapter of our treatise we shall consider: (1) The nature of man, (2) The Supernatural in man, and (3) Man’s defection from the Supernatural (Original Sin).

General Readings:—St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 75 sqq., and in connection therewith the treatises De Anima by Toletus, Suarez, and Ruvius; also Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 453 sqq., Münster 1878.—Card. Gotti, De Deo Creatore, tract. 10.—Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis Creaturis, thes. 25–29, Romae 1910.— *Card. Mazzella, De Deo Creante, ed. 2a, disp. 3 sqq., Romae 1880.—T. Pesch, Instit. Psychologicœ secundum Principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3 vols., Friburgi 1897–8.—J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 1892.—W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 272 sqq., London 1897.—H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism and Evolution, St. Louis 1906; Fr. Aveling, art. “Man” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX; E. Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1910.

On the history of the various dogmas involved, cfr. A. Stöckl, Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, 2 vols., Würzburg 1858–9.— *Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vols. I and II, Freiburg 1892–5.—E. Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hl. Irenäus, Münster 1895.— *G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, Paderborn 1893.—F. Hilt, Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom Menschen, systematisch dargestellt, Köln 1890.

Section 1

the nature of man

The subject-matter of this Section may be treated under four subdivisions, viz.: (1) The origin of man and the unity of the human race; (2) The essential constitution of human nature and the relation of soul to body; (3) The immortality of the human soul; and (4) The origin of individual souls. The first two of the subsequent Articles regard man as a whole, that is to say, as composed of soul and body; the last two deal with the soul alone (Dogmatic Psychology). Such incidental questions as the probable age of the human race belong to fundamental theology or apologetics.

Article 1

the origin of man and the unity of the human race

God directly created Adam and Eve, from whom all other human beings are descended by way of propagation. Holy Scripture lays particular stress on the truth that the entire human race is descended from a single pair of progenitors, and thus forms but one family.

Thesis I: The body of the first man as well as his soul were created immediately by God

This thesis may be technically qualified as “sententia satis certa.”

Proof. There is no need of entering upon a refutation of the obsolete heretical contention of the Gnostics and the Manichæans, that Adam was created by a subordinate Demiurge, or by the author of evil. The modern antithesis of Christian Anthropology is atheistic Darwinism, which teaches that in soul and body alike man is descended from the brute, the human soul being merely a more highly developed form of the brute soul.1 This teaching is as heretical as it is absurd. The modified Darwinism defended by St. George Mivart, who holds that the body of Adam developed from the animal kingdom, whereas his spiritual soul was infused immediately by the Creator must likewise be rejected; for while not directly heretical, it is repugnant to the letter of Sacred Scripture and to Christian sentiment.2

a) The creation of man occurred towards the end of the Hexaëmeron, immediately prior to the Creator’s day of rest. The Bible contains two separate accounts of it (Gen. 1:26 sqq., and Gen. 2:7), both of which represent Almighty God as personally creating man.

α) The Creator proceeds with great solemnity in this act. Gen. 1:26 sq.: “And he said: let us make man to our image and likeness … and God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.” This text, be it remarked in passing, excludes the Platonic error, which was espoused by certain ancient rabbis, that Adam was a hermaphrodite. The distinction of sexes is immediately from God. As God took a direct hand in the creation of material and irrational beings, there can be no doubt that He personally created Adam, “the crown of creation,” whose material body from the moment of its origin was to be animated by a soul endowed with sanctifying grace. From the irrational brute to man was indeed a farther cry than from inanimate matter to plant, or from plant to brute, and hence if the immediate operation of the Creator was required for the latter, it was even more urgently demanded for the former. That God created the soul of Adam out of nothing and personally fashioned his body, becomes still clearer from Gen. 2:7: “And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” These words, taken in their natural and obvious sense, represent the creative act of God as one, though divided into two momenta, viz.: formation and breathing.

Did the Creator employ the services of the Angels in preparing the “slime of the earth”? The assumption cannot be positively disproved. But even if He did employ the Angels as His agents, God Himself was the sole causa principalis in the formation of the human body.3

β) The creation of Eve furnishes a decisive argument against the evolutionist hypothesis.

It is quite inconceivable, and at the same time repugnant to the spirit of divine Revelation, that woman should have had a sublimer origin than man. Eve was fashioned immediately by God from a rib which He had taken from Adam.4 Cardinal Cajetan’s allegorical interpretation of this text has been unanimously rejected by theologians as fanciful and unwarranted. St. Paul says: “Non enim vir ex muliere est, sed mulier ex viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum—For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man.”5 If Eve had not sprung bodily from Adam, he could not have exclaimed: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman (virago), because she was taken out of man (quoniam de viro sumpta est).”6 If the sumptio de viro was an immediate act of God, so, a fortiori, was the formatio de limo terrae; and hence Adam’s body, like his soul, must have come directly from the hands of the Creator.7

b) The Patristic teaching on this subject is quite unanimous. Not a single one of the Fathers can be quoted in favor of Mivart’s hypothesis. We shall confine ourselves to a few specimen quotations.

Gregory of Nyssa writes: “If it were simply written: ‘He created,’ you would be free to think that man was made in the same manner as the brute animals, the monsters, plants and herbs. In order to make you see that you have nothing in common with the beasts of the field, Moses describes God’s artistic procedure in creating man thus: ‘God took dust of the earth.’ Then he relates what God did; then he tells us how God did it. He took dust of the earth and with His own hands formed man.”8 John of Damascus, who exalted man’s dignity to the extent of calling him a “little god” (μικρόθεος), deems it quite natural and proper that the body of the first man should have been immediately created by God. “Thus God created man with His hands: He formed his body out of earth, but gave him the soul by breathing.”9 To show the propriety of such direct intervention on the part of the Almighty, St. John Chrysostom compares man to a king, whom God Himself wished to induct into the created universe as his palace.10 Tertullian hails man as “ingenii divini curam, manuum Dei operam, molitionis suae regem, liberalitatis suae heredem.”11 It is one of this author’s favorite sayings that Adam bore a bodily resemblance to the “second Adam,” i. e., Christ, and that the Creator fashioned the body of the first man after the pattern of Jesus.12 The Fathers and Patristic writers generally love to descant on the great dignity of Eve because she was taken from Adam’s side. Eve, they say, did not spring from the head of Adam, which would have signified that she should rule over him; nor from his feet, that she might be his slave; but from his side, that she might be loved by her husband, thus symbolizing the procession of the Church from the side of Christ.13 Such utterances are as incompatible with the views of Mivart14 as they are with crude Darwinism in its application to man.15

Thesis II: All mankind is decended from one pair of progenitors, Adam and Eve

Proof. The unity of the human race, though not yet formally defined, is a Catholic doctrine.

The dogmatic commission of the Vatican Council drew up the following canon: “Si quis universum genus humanum ab uno protoparente Adam ortum esse negaverit, anathema sit.”16 Heresies opposed to this teaching are Pre-Adamism and Co-Adamism. The Pre-Adamites claim that there were men before Adam; the Co-Adamites, that other human beings co-existed with Adam and Eve. Pre-Adamism was reduced to a theological system by the French Calvinist Isaac Peyrère,17 who later became a Catholic and abjured his error before Pope Alexander VII. It has been revamped in modern times with much scientific acumen by Professor Winchell.18 The defense of Christian monogenism against the objections of infidel scientists is a task which we must leave to apologetics. The dogmatic argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows:

a) The Bible does not permit us to doubt that all men without exception—including such widely divergent races as the negroes of Australasia, the Chinese, and the aborigines of the South Sea Islands—are descended from the same progenitors. This unity of descent sufficiently guarantees the unity of the human race, which would remain a fact even if the so-called Neandertal race constituted a new zoölogical species, as is asserted by such eminent authorities as Schwalbe and Klaatsch.19 Dogmatic theology is not concerned with zoölogical distinctions. The purpose of the Mosaic narrative is simply to describe the origin of the universe, including man. We have in Gen. 1:26 sqq. and 2:4 sqq., as it were, the original charter of the human race. The very fact that God, when He was about to create man, debated with Himself—“Let us make man,”—shows that a new and very important link still remained to be inserted in the chain of created beings. Moreover, Gen. 2:5–7 expressly tells us: “There was not a man to till the earth … and the Lord God formed man,” חָאַדָם i. e., man as a species and as the first individual of that species.

With equal certainty we know from Revelation that Eve was the first woman. Gen. 2:20: “Adae vero non inveniebatur adiutor similis eius—But for Adam there was not found a helper like himself.” Had any other human beings existed at that time (Pre-Adamites or Co-Adamites), Eve would not have been the first woman. Her very name “Eve” is intelligible only on the assumption that she is the proto-mother of mankind: “Vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Eva, eo quod mater esset cunctorum viventium—Adam called the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother of all the living.”20 This is confirmed by various other Scriptural texts. Wisd. 10:1: “[Adamus] primus formatus est a Deo pater orbis terrarum, cum solus esset creatus—Adam was first formed by God the father of the world, when he was created alone.” Christ Himself says, Matth. 19:4: “Qui fecit hominem ab initio, masculum et foeminam fecit eos—He who made man from the beginning, made them male and female.” St. Paul repeats the same truth, Acts 17:26: “Fecitque [Deus] ex uno omne genus hominum21 inhabitare super universam faciem terrae—He hath made of one all mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth.”22

b) Peyrère himself admitted that his theory was opposed to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers and to the many conciliar definitions which assert the universality of original sin and of the Redemption.

“I confess,” he says in a letter to Philotimus, “that I was not unaware of the fact that my hypothesis [asserting the existence of Pre-Adamites] was entirely foreign to the opinion of the holy Fathers and to the teaching of orthodox councils; and that the whole fabric of doctrine concerning the fall and redemption of man was based by the Fathers and councils on the hypothesis [sic!] that Adam was the first man.”23

The Fathers often make the common descent of all men from one pair of progenitors the text of inspiring reflections. Lactantius, e. g., dwells on the utter wickedness of hatred, which, he says, is repugnant to the blood relationship that binds all human beings together as members of one family.24 St. Ambrose and others demonstrate the unity of humankind from the manner in which our first parents were created.25 Lastly, the dogma of the universality of original sin, and the consequent duty for all men of whatever race to receive Baptism, as well as the dogma of the Redemption of all through Jesus Christ, presuppose common descent from Adam.

c) Pre-Adamism is heretical only when it culminates in Co-Adamism, because the assertion that certain post-Adamic races had a pre-Adamic origin involves a direct denial of the universality of original sin and of the Redemption.

Fabre d’Envieu26 held that human beings existed upon this earth long before the Biblical Adam, but that they were totally extinct when God created our first parents. While this airy hypothesis is not directly repugnant to the dogma of the universality of original sin and the Redemption of all men through Jesus Christ, it is difficult to reconcile with the Mosaic narrative. Nor is there need of any such gratuitous assumption, so long as science has not discovered the “tertiary man”—the “missing link” which alone could give us the certainty that hundreds of thousands of years ago there lived upon this earth human beings whose traces became entirely obliterated in the later geological strata, only to re-appear in the glacial epoch. Modern man is no doubt genetically related to the diluvial man of the so-called interglacial period. His descent from Adam is Catholic teaching, and it naturally implies that all the different races of men, including the North American Indians and the Esquimos, are members of the Adamitic family.27 The early Christians regarded the assumption of antipodes, i. e., men who live diametrically opposite each other, as repugnant to revealed religion. This hypothesis was in consequence proscribed until it became scientifically established. We know now that the unity of the human race is sufficiently safeguarded by the assumption that the remotest corners of the earth were peopled from one common centre of migration. St. Augustine found this problem a very thorny one. Lactantius brushed it aside with misdirected sarcasm.28

Readings:—H. Lüken, Die Stiftungsurkunde des Menschengeschlechtes oder die mosaische Schöpfungsgeschichte, Freiburg 1876.—St. George Mivart, On the Genesis of Species, London 1871.—Rauch, Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes, Augsburg 1873.—J. Ranke, Der Mensch, 2 vols., 3d ed., Leipzig 1911.— *C. Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung u. seine Entwicklung, 3d ed., Paderborn 1910.—Lépicier, De Prima Hominis Formatione, Romae 1910.—Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, 9th ed., II, 1, 5ter Vortrag, Freiburg 1906.—Fr. Kaulen, Die Sprachverwirrung zu Babel, Mainz 1861.— *A. Giesswein, Die Hauptprobleme der Sprachwissenschaft, Freiburg 1892.—J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 1892.—E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, London 1909.—W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., London 1899.

Article 2

the essential constituents of man and their mutual relationship

In proceeding to consider the composite nature of man, we shall have to answer two separate and distinct questions, viz.: (1) Of how many essential elements does human nature consist? and (2) How are these elements mutually related?

To these questions the Church replies: (1) Man is composed of two essential constituents, body and soul. This teaching is called Dichotomy, or Dualism. (2) The rational soul constitutes the essential form of the body, and the two are substantially united in one nature.

That these philosophical questions have an important dogmatic bearing is evident from the fact that Jesus Christ was true man as well as very God. By finding a correct solution for them we shall obtain accurate theological notions on the substantiality, individuality, and spirituality of the human soul. This will obviate the necessity of entering into a separate discussion of these points. As regards free-will, which is unquestionably a natural endowment of the soul, its existence flows as a corollary from the dogmatic teaching of the Church (to be expounded presently) that original sin did not destroy man’s natural freedom of choice.

Thesis I: Man consists of but two essential constituents, viz.: a body and a spiritual soul

This proposition is strictly de fide.

Proof. All philosophical and theological systems that assume more than two constituents have been condemned as heretical.

Aside from the Platonic theory that there are two or even three souls in the human body,1 the error under consideration was in ancient times held chiefly by the Gnostics and the Manichæans, and later by Apollinaris. The Gnostics believed that man has a threefold soul: πνεῦμα, ψυχή, ὕλη, while the Manichæans thought that the two eternal principles of good and evil, which are essentially opposed to each other, met in Adam, when his soul, which was an emanation from the good principle, was imprisoned in the body by the evil one.2 Apollinaris, on his part, made the trichotomy of νοῦς, ψυχή, σάρξ the basis of his Christological heresy that the Logos supplied reason, which was lacking in the purely sensitive soul of Christ. Passing over the trichotomic errors of the Arabian philosopher Averroës, and of Ockam in the Middle Ages, we will mention only the modern heresy of Anton Günther. Though formally adhering to the Dualist system (according to which man is a synthesis of spirit and nature), Günther practically taught Trichotomy by endowing matter, qua matter, with a nature-psyche of its own and refusing to regard the spirit as the sole vital principle, from which the human body derives its “nature life.”3

At the Eighth General Council held in Constantinople, A. D. 869, the Church raised Dichotomy to the rank of a dogma and condemned Trichotomy as heretical: “Veteri et Novo Testamento unam animam rationalem et intellectualem4 habere hominem docente … in tantum impietatis quidam … devenerunt, ut duas eum habere animas impudenter dogmatizare … pertentent. Itaque sancta haec et universalis synodus … talis impietatis inventores … magna voce anathematizat.… Si autem quis contraria gerere praesumpserit, … anathema sit—Both the Old and the New Testament teach that man has one rational and intellectual soul … [nevertheless] some have been impious enough to assert, quite impudently, that man has two souls. This sacred and ecumenical Council … vehemently anathematizes the inventors of such impiety.… If any one shall presume to act contrary to this definition, let him be anathema.”5

a) Sacred Scripture is quite positive in its teaching that man is composed of but two elements, a material body and a spiritual soul. Gen. 2:7: “Formavit Dominus Deus hominem de limo terrae [corpus] et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae [animam], et factus est homo [synthesis] in animam viventem—And the Lord God formed man [i. e., his body] from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life [i. e., the soul], and man [i. e., the synthesis of body and soul] became a living soul.” “Breath of life” (spiraculum vitae) in this context does not mean an independent animal or plant soul, but the spiritual soul. This is obvious from the fact that the sacred writer sets out with the express purpose of describing the origin of the first man (animal rationale). The man thus dichotomically constituted is identical with the one described in Gen. 1:27 sqq., who, created to God’s own image, is commanded to “rule over all living creatures,” which can only mean that he is to hold sway as an intelligent and free being. Hence spiraculum vitae is synonymous with anima rationalis. In Eccles. 12:7 man is resolved into his constituent elements, and again there are but two: “Et revertatur pulvis [corpus] in terram suam, unde erat, et spiritus [anima spiritualis] redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum—And let the dust [the body] return to its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit [the spiritual soul] return to God, who gave it.” None but an immortal soul—immortal because spiritual—can “return to God.”6

While Sacred Scripture occasionally draws a distinction between “soul” (anima, ψυχή, נֶפֶשׁ) and “spirit” (spiritus, πνεῦμα, רוּהַ), it nowhere countenances the theory that man has two souls. Seemingly discordant passages must be explained either by a poetic parallelism, as in the Psalms, or as a juxtaposition of the higher and lower soul-life, or, lastly, by a desire to differentiate between the pneumatic supernatural life and the merely natural life in man. Under one or other of these aspects it is easy to interpret such texts as Luke 1:46 sq.: “Magnificat anima mea Dominum, et exultavit spiritus meus in Deo, salutari meo—My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour;” Heb. 4:12: “Usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus7—Unto the division of the soul and the spirit;” 1 Cor. 2:14 sq.: “Animalis homo8 non percipit ea, quae sunt Spiritus Dei … spiritualis autem iudicat omnia—But the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God; … but the spiritual man judgeth all things.” The attempt to bolster Günther’s psychology by Scriptural texts has proved utterly futile.

b) The Fathers are all strict dichotomists because they consistently refer to the “soul” as the principle of thought.

It must be observed that the word “soul” (anima, ψυχή) is a relative, whereas “spirit” is an absolute term. To identify “spirit” and “soul,” therefore, is tantamount to asserting the existence of but one life-principle in human nature, viz.: the spiritual soul. Thus St. Athanasius says: “The body of man is called body and not soul, and the soul of man is called soul and not body. The one is a correlative of the other, i. e., the spirit of the body.”10 Even before St. Athanasius, St. Justin Martyr, who had been unjustly charged with Trichotomy, taught quite positively: Τί γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλʼ ἢ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστὸς ζῶον λογικόν;—What is man but a rational living being composed of soul and body?”11

Thesis II: The spiritual soul is the immediate substantial form of the body

This is also de fide.

Proof. Body and soul do not co-exist side by side in a loose mechanical or dynamic connexion, as e. g. a demon might exist in an energumen, but are combined in a substantial unity of nature. Consequently, the spiritual soul, as such, is the immediate substantial form (forma substantialis) of the body, and man’s sensitive and vegetative processes proceed from it as their principle. All philosophical systems that deny this substantial union of nature12 directly contravene the teaching of the Church, which the Council of Vienne (A. D. 1311) formulated against Petrus Ioannis Olivi as follows: “Quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit censendus—Whosoever shall pertinaciously presume to assert, defend or teach, that the rational or intellectual soul is not per se and essentially the form of the human body, shall be considered a heretic.”13

This important dogmatic definition, couched in strictly Scholastic terminology, contains the following heads of doctrine:

(1) Human nature has but two essential constituents, namely, the anima rationalis and the corpus humanum.14

(2) The rational soul “informs,” i. e., animates and quickens the human body as its true and real forma; and that (a) per se, not through the instrumentality of a second (sensitive or vegetative) soul, and (b) essentially (per essentiam suam), not through some accidental influence (as, for instance, by a mere dynamic commingling of spiritual energy with the faculties of the body).

(3) The spiritual soul is consequently the true form of the body—forma corporis, forma substantialis corporis, not a mere forma accidentalis seu assistens.

(4) It follows as an obvious corollary that man’s vegetative and sensitive life is derived from his spiritual soul, which is virtually vegetative and sensitive.

Pope Leo X solemnly approved the Viennese definition at the Fifth Lateran Council, A. D. 1512.15

The misrepresentations of Günther and his school were repeatedly condemned by Pius IX, who, on the one hand, insisted: “Noscimus, iisdem libris laedi catholicam sententiam ac doctrinam de homine, qui corpore et anima ita absolvatur, ut anima eaque rationalis sit vera per se atque immediata corporis forma,” and on the other hand declared: “Sententiam quae unum in homine ponit vitae principium: animam scilicet rationalem, a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sensum accipiat, … cum Ecclesiae dogmate ita videri coniunctam, ut huius sit legitima solaque vera interpretatio nec proinde sine errore in fide possit negari.”16

a) According to Holy Scripture, man is constituted a “living being” (anima vivens, נֶפֶשׁ הָיַח ═ ens vivum) by the union of the limus terrae (i. e., body) with the spiraculum vitae (i. e., spiritual soul). Consequently, his whole life (vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), must flow from the spiritual soul, which vivifies the body by a process of “information” in the true and proper sense of the word. Ezechiel’s vision of the resurrection of dry bones (Ezech. 37:4 sqq.) illustrates this truth. “Ossa arida, audite verbum Domini.… Dabo super vos nervos et succrescere faciam super vos carnes, et … dabo vobis spiritum et vivetis et scietis, quia ego sum Dominus—Ye dry bones, hear the word of the Lord … I will lay sinews upon you, and will cause flesh to grow over you, and … I will give you spirit, and you shall live, and you shall know that I am the Lord.” To understand this sublime prosopopeia we must observe that the Sacred Writer enumerates only two essential constituents of man, viz.: the body (sinews, bones, flesh) and the spirit (spiritus). The spirit revivifies the body by entering into the bones, consequently all life comes from the spiritual soul. This would be impossible if both factors did not coalesce into an unum per se by a substantial synthesis of nature.

b) The teaching of the Fathers was brought out most clearly in connection with the Christological heresy of Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea.17

It is worth while to recall Augustine’s drastic dictum against the Apollinarists: “Animam irrationalem eum [scil. Christum] habere voluerunt, rationalem negaverunt; dederunt ei animam pecoris, subtraxerunt hominis—They attribute to Him [Christ] an irrational, but they deny Him a rational soul; they grant Him the soul of a brute, but they deny Him the soul of a man.”18 Augustine himself held that the human body derives its life from the soul: “Ab anima [scil. rationali] corpori sensus et vita.”19 How the Fathers conceived the mutual relationship of these two constituent elements appears from their favorite comparison of the union of soul and body in man to the Hypostatic Union of the divine with the human nature in Christ. This simile has found its way into the Athanasian Creed: “Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus—For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.”

There is an important Christological axiom: “Verbum assumpsit carnem mediante animâ” (the Word assumed flesh by means of the soul), of which the Fathers made frequent use against Arianism and Apollinarianism. Only by assuming a rational soul, they argued, was the Divine Logos able to take bodily flesh into the Hypostatic Union; for soulless flesh, or flesh animated merely by a brute soul (ψυχὴ ζωτικὴ ἄλογος), would not have been becoming to the Godhead, nor would it have met the requirements of the Redemption. Only flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essential form constitutes man; similarly the human nature of Christ is constituted only by human flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essential form.20 After the outbreak of the Arian and Apollinarian controversy the Fathers never wearied of insisting on the “rationality of the flesh,”21 not, of course, in the sense of a hylozoistic Panpsychism, as advocated many centuries later by Spinoza, but in consonance with the dogmatic definition of Vienne, which, despite its Scholastic phraseology, may be said to flow from Divine Revelation rather than from philosophy.

c) Later theologians have warmly discussed the incidental question, whether the definition of the Council of Vienne can be used as an argument in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine of Hylomorphism as developed by the Scholastics. This philosophic theory holds that all bodies are composed of a substantial form and primordial matter (forma substantialis et materia prima). Is the Vienne definition to be taken as a dogmatic indication that the spiritual soul is immediately united with primordial matter (materia prima, ὕλη πρώτη) rather than with an organized body?

α) St. Thomas distinctly teaches that the spiritual soul is not only the forma corporis, but the unica forma corporis—the sole form of the body.22 He conceives the compositum humanum as consisting not of body and soul, but of primordial matter and soul, because it is the spiritual soul which renders the body materia secunda, i. e., constitutes it a body, and thereby gives it its esse corporis.

The Scotists, on the other hand, hold that the body is first constituted by a separate forma corporeitatis, and subsequently receives the intellectual soul as its essential form. In order to obtain an unum per se as the result of this synthesis, the Scotists conceive the forma corporeitatis to be an imperfect, subordinate form, which offers no obstacle to the substantial completion of the whole by the spiritual soul. It is in this sense that Scotus teaches: “Anima est principium formale, quo vivum est vivum.… Est anima immediatum principium formale essendi et immediatum principium operandi,”23 so that “una forma rationalis dat esse triplex, scil. vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum.”24 But the esse corporis is not immediately communicated by the soul; it is derived from the forma corporeitatis, which is distinct from the soul. This explains the Scotist conclusion that the body retains its forma corporeitatis after death, whereas the Thomists are compelled to invent a new form for the dead body, which they call forma cadaverica. Neither of the two systems is free from logical difficulties. The whole question properly belongs to the sphere of philosophy.

β) It would be absurd to say that the Church has raised Hylomorphism to the rank of a dogma and condemned in advance the fundamental principles of modern physics and chemistry as heretical. The Council of Vienne did not mean to affirm the existence of primordial matter. Nor did it intend to deny the existence of a forma corporeitatis in man. We know that the Thomistic doctrine was anything but popular among the theologians of that age. Moreover, the Viennese definition was drawn up by Scotist theologians, who cannot have intended to persuade the Council to condemn a pet theory of their own school and order. “That the Council did not harbor any such purpose,” says Schell, “is proved by the unquestioned orthodoxy of the Scotist and allied schools.”25 The Jesuit Schiffini, who defends the Thomistic doctrine with great zeal and acumen, finds himself constrained to counsel moderation in this controversy and to warn theologians against drawing hasty conclusions.26 So long, therefore, as the Church permits modern scientific Atomism and the Scotistic system to be taught without let or hindrance, so long will the definition of Vienne be sufficiently safeguarded by saying that the spiritual soul animates the human body (not: primordial matter) as its immediate essential form.27 We are confirmed in this view by the sharp disapproval expressed by Pope Pius IX (June 5, 1876) of any and every extreme interpretation of the papal and conciliar definitions against the opponents of the Thomistic system.28 The most that can be said in favor of the latter is that “by laying a sharper emphasis upon the union of body and soul in one essence, it embodies a deeper and more consistent conception of the Church’s teaching, and thereby more emphatically accentuates the direct fusion of the soul with the innermost essence of the body, the utter dependency of the body upon the soul, and the intrinsic perfectioning and unification of the body, as such, by the soul. However, this teaching is hard to understand because of its profundity, and difficult to handle because of its delicacy. Hence it must not be insisted upon too strongly, lest the dogma itself be involved in difficulties insoluble to any but the most subtle minds specially trained for this purpose.”29

Readings:—Thumann, Bestandteile des Menschen und ihr Verhältnis zueinander, Bamberg 1846.—Liberatore, Del Composto Umano, 2 vols., Roma 1858.—Morgott, Geist und Natur im Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas, Eichstätt 1860.—Soffner, Dogmat. Begründung der kirchlichen Lehre von den Bestandteilen des Menschen, Ratisbon 1861.—Vraetz, Spekulative Begründung der Lehre der kath. Kirche über das Wesen der menschlichen Seele, Köln 1865.— *Katschthaler, Zwei Thesen für das allgemeine Konzil, 2. Abteil., Ratisbon 1870.—v. Hertling, Materie und Form und Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Bonn 1871.— *Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis in Definiendo Dogmate Unionis Animae Humanae cum Corpore, Romae 1878.— *Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 295–296, Mainz 1887.—E. Rolfes, Die substantiale Form und der Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1896.—T. Pesch, S. J., Seele und Leib als zwei Bestandteile der einen Menschensubstanz gemäss der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Fulda 1893.—W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, London 1899.—M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, pp. 545 sqq., 6th ed., London 1906.—J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: A Treatise on the Human Soul, New York 1898.

Article 3

the immortality of the human soul

1. The Teaching of the Church and Various Heresies.—There is a threefold immortality: the essential immortality of God, the natural immortality of the soul, and the supernatural immortality of the body. It is an article of faith that the human soul is immortal. That this immortality is natural, i. e., founded on an exigency of human nature, may be said to be Catholic teaching.

There are three revealed truths which the Church declares to be demonstrable by philosophical arguments. They are: (1) The existence of God, (2) the spirituality of the soul, and (3) free-will.1 The dogma of the soul’s immortality is based on its simplicity and spirituality. Whether this truth is philosophically demonstrable or not is a question that the Church has left open out of consideration for the Scotists.

In every age there have been men who denied the immortality of the soul; these the Church has always treated as heretics.

a) We have it on the authority of Eusebius2 and St. Augustine3 that, as early as the third century, there existed in Arabia a sect called Hypnopsychites,4 who held that the soul slept, i. e. temporarily ceased to exist after death, until the resurrection of the flesh. Nicephorus Callistus5 relates how at an Arabian Council held in 247, Origen combated this heresy with such convincing eloquence that all who had espoused it returned to the pale of the Church.

The theory of a “soul-sleep” does not directly contravene the dogma of immortality, especially if it confines itself to the assertion that the soul survives after a fashion in a dreamy, semi-conscious state. This attenuated Hypnopsychism was combated by Tertullian in his treatise De Anima. He raises the question: “What will happen during the time that we are in the nether world? Shall we sleep?” and answers it as follows: “The soul never sleeps, not even in this life.”6

Another, still more radical sect is mentioned by St. John Damascene. Its adherents were called Θνητοψυχῖται, because they believed that the souls of men, like those of brutes, cease to exist at death.

b) The question of the immortality of the human soul entered upon a new phase when, towards the close of the fifteenth century, paganizing humanists of the stamp of Pietro Pomponazzi alleged that the soul is by nature necessarily mortal. Abul Ibn Roschd, commonly called Averroës, denied that there are individual rational souls. There is, he said, one universal impersonal and objective over-soul (intellectus universalis), which, by illuminating the inferior souls of individuals, enables mankind to participate perennially in the great eternal truths. “This doctrine involves the extinction of the individual consciousness and the impersonality of life after death: human individuals die, but humanity is immortal in the eternity of the objective, universal intelligence.”7 Against this heresy the Fifth Council of the Lateran, under Pope Leo X (A. D. 1512), defined: “Cum … diebus nostris … (nonnulli ausi sint dicere) de natura … animae rationalis, quod mortalis sit aut unica in cunctis hominibus, … sacro approbante Concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes, animam intellectivam mortalem esse aut unicam in cunctis hominibus—As … in our days (some have dared to assert) concerning the nature of the rational soul, that it is mortal, or that there is but one soul in all men, … with the approval of the sacred Council we condemn and reprobate all who assert that the intellectual soul is mortal or is but one in all men.”8

The decree proceeds as follows: “Cum illa [scil. anima intellectiva] non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corporis forma existat, sicut in generali.… Viennensi Concilio … continetur;9 verum et immortalis, et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine singulariter [i. e., individualiter] multiplicabilis et multiplicata et multiplicanda sit.”

An analysis of this dogmatic definition, and of the reasoning by which it is supported, gives us the following points of view:

(1) This definition condemns two distinct heresies: (a) That the spiritual soul is mortal, and (b) that there exists but one universal soul in all men. Consequently, the contradictory proposition, that the spiritual soul is immortal and individual, is an article of faith.

(2) The individuality of the soul is a necessary postulate of personal immortality, and is therefore specially emphasized, first by reference to the dogmatic definition of Vienne concerning the forma corporis, and again by reference to the individual origin of each human soul in the process of generation.

(3) By the immortality of the soul Leo X and the Fifth Council of the Lateran understand that physical indestructibility (incorruptibilitas) which flows as a logical corollary from its nature as a spiritual substance. For this reason the dogmatic definition quoted above begins with the statement that the condemned errors concern the “nature of the rational soul” (natura animae rationalis). Unlike the bodily immortality of our first parents in Paradise, the immortality of the soul therefore is not a pure grace.

The above-quoted definition is the most important and the clearest pronouncement ever made by the Church on the subject of the natural immortality of the soul.

c) In modern times Materialism and emanatistic Pantheism deny the natural immortality of the soul as well as its spirituality and individuality. Materialism asserts that nothing is immortal except force and matter,10 while Pantheism ascribes immortality solely to the impersonal Absolute, of which it holds each individual man to be merely a part. The Vatican Council contented itself with condemning Materialism and Pantheism in globo and re-affirming the spirituality of the soul, which forms the philosophical basis of its natural immortality.11

2. Proof of the Dogma from Revelation.—The demonstration of the immortality of the soul properly belongs to Eschatology. However, as this doctrine forms so important and fundamental a part of our faith, we cannot pass it over in the present treatise.

a) Most non-Catholics hold that the Old Testament Jews did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and that this doctrine is the result of a slow and laborious evolution. We admit that the idea of temporal reward and punishment in the present life had a far stronger attraction for the Jews than retribution in the life beyond. Yet it is entirely wrong to say, as so many Rationalist critics do, that the Old Testament contains no trace of belief in the immortality of the soul. To begin with the Protoevangelium or prophecy of Paradise,—its promise of redemption through the seed of the Woman who was to crush the head of the ancient Serpent, would be utterly meaningless if the souls of men ceased to exist after death. The Patriarchs looked upon this present life as a pilgrimage12 and spoke of death as “going to the fathers.”13 By clearly distinguishing between “going to the fathers,” or “being gathered to their people,” and burial in a common sepulchre,14 Moses indirectly asserted the survival of the soul in the world beyond. Such phrases as: “I will go down to sheol”15 and “You will bring down my gray hairs with sorrow unto sheol,”16 do not refer to the grave, but to the “nether world” (ᾅδης) considered as the abode of departed souls. In confirmation of His teaching on the resurrection of the flesh, Jesus, arguing with the Sadducees, quotes Exod. 3:6: “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob,” and adds by way of explanation: “He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”17 Personal immortality could not be more plainly taught than in this exclamation of the pious Job:18 “I shall see my God, whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another.”

The so-called Sapiential Books of the Old Testament are especially rich in proofs for the immortality of the soul. Cfr. Wisd. 3:2 sqq.: “Visi sunt [iusti] oculis insipientium mori, … illi autem sunt in pace, … spes illorum immortalitate plena est—In the sight of the unwise they [the souls of the just] seemed to die, … but they are in peace.… Their hope is full of immortality.” Wisd. 4:7: “Iustus si morte praeoccupatus fuerit, in refrigerio erit—The just man, if he be prevented with death, shall be in rest.”

The ghost of Samuel said to Saul: “Why hast thou disturbed my rest, that I should be brought up?”19

These and similar texts represent immortality as a natural endowment of the soul and not as a gratuitous gift of grace. This follows from the fact, recorded in Gen. 1:26, that the spiritual soul of man was created to the likeness of God. The soul is an image God, not because it is the principle of vegetative and sensitive life (which is perishable), but because, being an imperishable, indestructible spirit, it resembles the infinite and immortal spirit of Yahweh.

It has been asserted that Ecclesiastes 3:19 is incompatible with the doctrine of immortality, because it puts the death of man on the same plane with the extinction of the brute beast: “Unus interitus est hominis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio—The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal.” But the context clearly shows that the Sacred Writer does not mean by this comparison to deny the immortality of the human soul. His purpose is to emphasize the mortality of the body, and to remind man that he who once aspired to equality with God was in punishment for his presumption reduced to the level of perishable beasts.20 Nor is this train of thought disturbed by the sceptical question: “Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum, et si spiritus iumentorum descendat deorsum?—Who knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend downward?”21 For a little later Ecclesiastes himself insists on the immortality of the soul: “Revertatur pulvis in terram suam, unde erat; et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum—The dust return into its earth, from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, who gave it.”22 Assuredly it will not do to interpret Eccles. 3:21 as implying denial or doubt of a truth so clearly taught in Eccles. 12:7. How, then, are we to understand this difficult text? Exegetes have suggested different interpretations. Some think that the Sacred Writer wished to adapt himself to the mind of the average person, who can perceive no essential difference between the symptoms of agony in man and beast. Gietmann23 holds that the hagiographer simply desired to intimate the uncertainty of man’s fate in the world beyond, because three verses farther up he speaks of the judgment of God, and no man knows, before that judgment has been pronounced, whether he will enjoy everlasting bliss or be condemned to suffer eternal punishment in hell. Thus interpreted the text furnishes a new proof for the doctrine of immortality. Other exegetes, among them Cornely,24 think Eccles. 3:21 is meant to censure the carelessness of men in regard to their future destiny. In this hypothesis the question would mean: “Who payeth the slightest attention to whether the spirit of man tends upward and the spirit of the beast downward?” It is quite obvious that the Jews before Christ could not have had such well-defined ideas about the other world as we Christians have, who know that we are destined to enjoy the beatific vision in Heaven. This fact sufficiently accounts for their gloomy conception of sheol or the nether world.

The New Testament teaching on immortality is so explicit that not even the Rationalists venture to dispute it. Hence it will be sufficient for our purpose to cite the Saviour’s famous dictum: “Nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere, sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam—Fear ye not them that kill the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell.”25

b) Since the immortality of the soul is the very foundation stone of ethics and of the entire supernatural order of salvation, it goes without saying that this truth was unanimously taught, philosophically investigated, and scientifically developed by the Fathers.

The unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus professes: “Immortalis anima habitat in corpore mortali—The immortal soul dwells in a mortal body.”26 St. Irenæus gives this philosophical reason for the immortality of the soul: “Incompositus est enim et simplex spiritus, qui resolvi non potest—For the spirit [soul] is incomposite and simple, and [therefore] cannot be resolved.”27 Tertullian,28 Gregory of Nyssa,29 and Ambrose30 express themselves in similar language. St. Augustine, as is well known, wrote a special treatise “On the Immortality of the Soul.”

Some ancient writers (e. g., the author of the third pseudo-Clementine homily),31 are suspected of having held that God annihilates the souls of the wicked. Their utterances must be read with caution. Some of them are undoubtedly susceptible of an orthodox interpretation. St. Justin Martyr, for instance, in writing: “Neque immortalis anima dicenda est; nam si immortalis, etiam profecto ingenita [increata] est,”32 plainly did not mean to deny that the soul is endowed with natural immortality,33 but had in mind that essential immortality which belongs to God alone. Of course the creature is immortal in quite a different sense than the Creator.34

Readings:—B. Schäfer, Neue Untersuchungen über das Buch Kohelet, Freiburg 1870.—L. Schütz, Vernunftbeweis für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Paderborn 1874.—J. Knabenbauer, Das Zeugnis des Menschengeschlechtes für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Freiburg 1878.—E. Melzer, Die Unsterblichkeit auf Grund der Schöpfungslehre, Neisse 1896.—Fell-Villing, The Immortality of the Human Soul Philosophically Explained, London 1906.— *W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 10th ed., Paderborn 1909.—Ph. Kneib, Die Beweise für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus allgemeinen psychologischen Tatsachen, Freiburg 1903.—F. C. Kempson, The Future Life and Modern Difficulties, London 1907.—Piat, Destinée de l’Homme, Paris 1898.—Elbé, Future Life in the Light of Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science, London 1907.—M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 525 sqq., London and New York 1906.—Idem, art. “Immortality” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII.—For a comparatively complete bibliography of the subject cfr. Alger, The Destiny of the Soul. A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, 14th ed., New York 1889.

Article 4

origin of the soul

Unlike their progenitor, the children of Adam do not owe their existence to a creative act of God in the strict sense of the term. The race propagates itself by sexual generation in accordance with the divine command “Increase and multiply.” The question arises—How does the individual human soul come into being? This problem is of interest alike to the philosopher and the theologian. Three different attempts have been made to solve it. The theory of Pre-existence holds that all souls exist prior to the creation of their respective bodies, in which they are enclosed as in a prison. Generationism (which in its crude form is called Traducianism) asserts that the souls of children, like their bodies, are produced by the parents. Creationism teaches that each human soul is created by God and immediately united with the material product of parental generation.

Thesis I: The theory of Pre-existence, which asserts that the individual soul exists prior to its union with the body, is heretical

This proposition obviously embodies an article of faith.

Proof. The soul may be conceived as pre-existing either in a state of sin, for the atonement of which it is incarcerated in the body;1 or as merely slumbering in a state of innocence or indifference.2 Both assumptions, more especially the first, are opposed to the express teaching of Revelation.

a) A spirit incarcerated in a material body would be in a state of violent and unnatural compulsion. Hence the first of the aforesaid theories implicitly denies the substantial unity of human nature,3 in fact it degrades it by representing the union of body and soul as accidental, after the manner of demoniacal possession. Holy Scripture expressly teaches that man as he proceeded from the hand of God, like all other products of the creative act, was “good,” and that he became bad through sin.4 Hence it must be received as a revealed truth that the soul of Adam at the moment when his body was formed, was perfectly pure and sinless, and that it was breathed into the material body simultaneously with its creation. Consequently the soul cannot have been affected by some previous catastrophe.

The same is true of Adam’s progeny. St. Paul, in speaking of Esau and Jacob, says: “Cum nondum nati fuissent aut aliquid boni egissent aut mali, … non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est ei: quia maior serviet minori—When the children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, … not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said to her [Rebecca]: The elder shall serve the younger.”5 The Origenistic doctrine of Pre-existence was condemned by the Church at a very early date as incompatible with Revelation. A Council held in Constantinople, A. D. 543,6 pronounced anathema against those who “assert the fabulous pre-existence of souls, and the doctrine of the Apocatastasis, which logically flows therefrom.” Against the Priscillianists, who shared the error of Origen, the Council of Braga, A. D. 561, defined: “Si quis animas humanas dicit prius in coelesti habitatione peccasse et pro hoc in corpora humana in terram deiectas, sicut Priscillianus dicit, anathema sit—If any one shall say, as doth Priscillian, that the souls of men sinned in their celestial habitations, and in punishment therefor were cast into human bodies on earth, let him be anathema.”7

b) The milder form of this heresy, which asserts that the souls of men pre-existed in a state of moral innocence, is likewise repugnant to Catholic dogma. Nemesius8 supported it by the threadbare argument that God rested after the sixth day, and now no longer creates souls out of nothing. But, as St. Augustine pointed out, “these opinions, which attribute to the human soul a meritorious life and condition previous to its union with the flesh, have already been condemned by the Catholic Church, not only in the case of some ancient heretics, … but also more recently in the instance of the Priscillianists.”9 Pope Leo the Great, in his dogmatic Epistle to Turribius, Bishop of Astorga, branded the pre-existence theory in all its forms as heretical. “Decimo autem capitulo referuntur [Priscillianistae] asserere, animas quae humanis corporibus inseruntur, fuisse sine corpore et in coelesti habitatione peccasse.… Quam impietatis fabulam ex multorum sibi erroribus contexuerunt; sed omnes eos catholica fides a corpore suae unitatis abscidit, constanter praedicans atque veraciter, quod animae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur corporibus, non fuere—In the tenth chapter the Priscillianists are reported as asserting, that the souls which are planted in human bodies were without a body and sinned in their celestial habitation.… This impious fable they have made up from the errors of many; but all of these the Catholic faith has cut off from the body of its unity, constantly and truthfully proclaiming that the human souls had no existence prior to the time when they were breathed into their respective bodies.”

This condemnation manifestly includes the modern form of Pre-existentism taught by Kant and Schelling. It is scarcely necessary to add that Metempsychosis, so-called, or the theory of the transmigration of souls, which may be classified as an offshoot of the theory of Pre-existence,10 is equally repugnant to right reason and Revelation. The same may be said of the so-called Involution theory, according to which the souls of all men were implicitly contained in the soul of Adam, which is successively split up, as it were, and divided among his descendants.11

Thesis II: Generationism, both in its crude and in its refined form, must be unconditionally rejected

This proposition is theologically certain.

Proof. a) Generationism in its crude form is called Traducianism (from tradux, cutting, slip). Traducianism holds that the soul is produced immediately from the male sperm (semen corporale), and that children are as it were “cuttings” or “slips” detached from the souls of their parents. This opinion was defended in the East by Apollinaris, and in the West, apparently, by Tertullian.12

Tertullian appears to teach that the germ of a new soul disengages itself from the souls of the begetting parents, as a “slip from the stem of Adam.”13 But as an incorporeal soul cannot possibly proceed from a corporeal principle, this theory degrades man to the level of the beast. The brute soul, being entirely merged in matter, can be produced by generation out of the potency of matter; but the soul of man, which is a simple spiritual substance, does not produce material germs from which a new spiritual soul could sprout. Tertullian tries to improve his case by distinguishing between humor and calor seminis, deriving the soul from the former and the body from the latter. But the very suggestion that flesh might possibly beget spirit is essentially materialistic. No wonder Tertullian has been frequently reckoned among the Materialists.14 Lactantius’s refutation of Traducianism still retains its full force: “Illud quoque venire in quaestionem potest, utrumne anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Sed ego in eo iure ab ancipiti vindico: … corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis animus non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili [i. e. spirituali] nihil potest descendere. Atque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subiacet, … ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo Patre—The question may also arise, Is the soul engendered by the father, or by the mother, or by both? I think that it is engendered by neither.… A body may be produced from a body, since something is contributed from both; but a soul cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can depart from a thin and intangible [i. e., spiritual] substance. Therefore the manner of the production of souls belongs to God alone.… From this it is evident that souls are not given by parents, but by one and the same God, the Father of all.”15

The attitude of the Church is sufficiently indicated by a decision of Pope Benedict XII in the matter of reunion (A. D. 1342). When the Armenians were asked to condemn the proposition that “the human soul is propagated from father to son, as body is propagated by body, or one angel by another,”16 their bishops assured the Pope that “this error, that the soul of man is propagated from the soul of the father, as body is propagated from body, … was always proscribed in the Armenian Church, and shall be accursed.”17

b) Generationism in its refined form is far less repugnant to Catholic teaching than the crude Traducianism of which we have been speaking, though the two systems do not seem to differ much in principle. The chief distinction is that refined Generationism recognizes the spirituality of the soul by postulating a kind of spiritual semen (semen spirituale), which, however, from the purely philosophical point of view, is an impossible chimera. The unequivocal bias of some Patristic writers18 in favor of Generationism has done much to weaken the ecclesiastical tradition and to retard the complete triumph of Creationism, which is after all the only tenable system.

For eight full centuries (from the time of St. Augustine to Peter Lombard) the question of the origin of the human soul was treated with much hesitation and uncertainty. It remained for St. Thomas Aquinas to pave the way for a general adoption of Creationism. Generationism had obtained currency by the high authority of St. Augustine, whose sole reason for hesitating to place himself squarely on Creationist ground was that this system had been ostentatiously espoused by the Pelagians in attacking the doctrine of original sin. The Pelagians argued as follows: Nothing unclean can come from the hand of God; therefore the souls of children, created by Him directly out of nothing, cannot be tainted with original sin. Unable to solve this subtle objection, Augustine inclined to the theory that the souls of children are not immediately created by God, but engendered by their parents. He believed in the possibility of a semen incorporeum, from which, he says, the soul in a manner incomprehensible to us, originates in the act of parental generation,—which accounts for the transmission of original sin.19 But Augustine was no decided adherent of the Generationist theory. Indeed he never quite overcame his doubts as to its correctness. On more than one occasion he humbly confessed his ignorance of the true solution of the problem.20 In his epistolary correspondence with St. Jerome, who was a determined Creationist, he frankly declares that he would like to espouse Creationism, if he could only make sure that it was compatible with the dogma of original sin.21

It follows that St. Augustine cannot be quoted as a traditional witness either for or against Creationism.

c) The authority of this great Doctor was sufficient to keep his doubts and misgivings alive for many centuries.22 The Venerable Moneta23 and St. Thomas Aquinas finally broke the spell. St. Thomas did not hesitate to condemn Generationism as “heretical.”24 His immediate predecessors (e. g., Peter Lombard25 and Albert the Great26), though decided champions of Creationism, had not dared to express themselves quite so vigorously. It was no doubt premature on the part of St. Thomas to brand Generationism as a heresy; yet no one can fail to perceive that even in its mildest form this theory is incompatible with the dogma of the simplicity and spirituality of the soul.27

d) Creationism held full sway in the theological schools of the Middle Ages, but in modern times timorous attempts have been made to revive the apparently defunct system of Generationism. Hermes, Klee, and Oischinger endeavored to restore it at least to the rank of a probable opinion. But can a proposition that involves a contradiction in terms be defended as probable? Frohschammer, who remodeled the ancient theory by raising the act of parental generation to the dignity of a secondary creation, barely managed to escape one contradiction only to fall into another, namely, that God’s creative power is communicable to creatures.28 Rosmini29 held that the Creator transforms the sensitive soul, which the child receives by generation from his parents, into an intellective soul by permitting it to catch a glimpse of the “idea of being.” This is an utterly fantastic theory. If it were true, all brute souls could by means of this simple expedient be transformed into human souls. Generationism can no longer be upheld; its fate is sealed for good.

Thesis III: The origin of the human soul can be explained only by an immediate act of creation

This proposition is “theologically certain.”

Proof. a) It is difficult to draw a cogent proof for Creationism from Sacred Scripture, because Sacred Scripture does not tell us whether the creation of the soul is an immediate (creatio ex nihilo) or only a mediate act (concursus) of God. There are, however, certain Biblical texts which seem to favor the Creationist view. Thus St. Jerome comments on Eccles. 12:7 as follows: “Ex quo satis ridendi sunt, qui putant, animas cum corporibus seri et non a Deo, sed a corporum parentibus generari. Cum enim caro revertatur in terram et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum, manifestum est, Deum patrem esse animarum, non homines—Hence those are surely to be laughed at who believe that the souls of men are begotten with their bodies, and are generated not by God but by the parents of their bodies. For since the flesh reverts to dust and the spirit returns to God, who has given it, manifestly the Father of souls is God, not men.” According to 2 Mach. 7:22 sq. the mother of the seven brethren said to them: “Neque enim ego spiritum et animam donavi vobis, et vitam et singulorum membra non ego ipsa compegi, sed enim mundi Creator—I neither gave you breath, nor soul, nor life, neither did I frame the limbs of every one of you, but the Creator of the world.” St. Paul calls attention to the sharp antithesis between the “Father of spirits” and “the fathers of the flesh.” “Patres quidem carnis nostrae,” he says (Heb. 12:9), “eruditiores habuimus et reverebamur eos; non multo magis obtemperabimus Patri spirituum et vivemus?—We have had fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced them: shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, and live?” To judge from this text, the Apostle favored the opinion that the souls of men are created immediately by God.30

b) After what has been said above the reader will not be astonished to learn that the argument from Tradition is fraught with peculiar difficulties. Not as if Creationism had at any time in the Church’s history lacked numerous and determined defenders. St. Jerome’s statement: “The majority of western Christians hold that soul is born from soul in the same manner as body is born from body,”31 is no doubt exaggerated, for we know that Generationism in its pronounced from really had but one, or at most two champions in the West, viz.: Tertullian, and later, perhaps, Rufinus. Nor were conditions much different in the East.32 But the fact that this important and all but self-evident truth was for eight centuries obscured by doubt and contradiction, is sufficient to show that Creationism cannot be regarded as a dogma in the strict sense of the word.

c) In view of these facts Cardinal Norisius insisted against Bellarmine,33 that the lack of a true ecclesiastical Tradition in support of the Creationist system leaves modern theologians free to adopt the doubting attitude of St. Augustine. “Evanescit,” he says, “ecclesiastica traditio, ex qua creatio animarum deducitur.”34 What are we to think of this assertion?

A careful study of the facts shows that Creationism was always implicitly contained in the Church’s belief, and immediately upon its revival assumed all the characteristics of a real and true Tradition, which it had in fact already possessed before the time of St. Augustine. From A. D. 400 to A. D. 1200 Creationism had as many determined champions throughout the world as Generationism had staunch opponents. These critical centuries were not a period of positive, much less of dogmatic affirmation, but of hesitancy and problematic assumption. If we enquire into the deeper causes of the prevailing doubts, we find that they were based not upon the lack of an Apostolic Tradition, but on the apparent impossibility of reconciling the transmission of original sin with the absolute purity of the divine act of Creation. As soon as this difficulty had been cleared away by the Schoolmen, and theologians began to realize the far-reaching implications of the dogma of the spirituality of the soul, the traditional consensus revived with all the marks of a true ecclesiastical Tradition.

d) We may point to certain ecclesiastical decisions as so many landmarks in the history of Creationism.

In his dogmatic Epistle Pope Leo the Great (+ 461) speaks of the breathing of souls into their bodies: “Animae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur corporibus, non fuerunt.”35 Considering that the Mosaic narrative likewise describes the infusion of Adam’s soul into his body as “inspirare spiraculum vitae,”36 we cannot escape the conclusion that Leo the Great employed spirare not as synonymous with generare, but in the sense of a creatio ex nihilo. Strangely enough, the famous dogmatic Epistle of Pope Anastasius II to the Bishops of Gaul, discovered about forty years ago by Fr. Maassen in a seventh-century codex, now preserved at Darmstadt, has hitherto almost entirely escaped the notice of Catholic theologians. Anastasius (496–498) upholds Creationism and condemns Generationism (in its crude form) as a “nova haeresis.”37 Basing his judgment on reports received from the Bishop of Arles regarding the propaganda carried on by certain champions of Generationism, who seem to have shared Tertullian’s views on the origin of the human soul, the Pope sharply inveighs “contra haeresim, … quod humano generi parentes, ut ex materiali faece tradunt corpora, ita etiam vitalis animae spiritum tribuant.” He exhorts the mistaken champions of this theory to accept the “sound doctrine” of Creationism: “Sanae igitur doctrinae acquiescant, quod ille indat animas, qui vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam sint.” In the course of his instruction Anastasius solemnly declares: “Ego absens corpore, spiritu vero praesens, vobiscum ita redargui volo, qui in novam haeresim prorupisse dicuntur, ut a parentibus animas tradi generi humano adserant, quemadmodum ex faece materiali corpus infunditur.” The only thing the parents transmit, besides the body, is original sin: “Quod ab illis [scil. parentibus] nihil aliud potest tradi quam … culpa poenaque peccati, quam per traducem secuta progenies evidenter ostendit, ut pravi homines distortique nascantur.” Recalling Is. 57:16: “Nonne omnem flatum ego feci?” the Pope asks with a show of astonishment: “Quomodo isti novi haeretici a parentibus dicunt factum et non a Deo, sicut ipse testatur? Aut sibi volunt potius credi quam Deo omnipotenti?” He proceeds to point out other Scriptural texts,38 which the Bishops would find effective against the new heresy, and closes his letter with an ardent appeal for the purity of Catholic doctrine: “Nos vero inter multas diversasque occupationes haec interim per indicem titulum significasse sufficiat, ut vos velut conministri mei vocem sequentes meam in hoc pugnare debeatis, ne quid catholicae ecclesiae … foeditas ulla nascatur.”

The solemn tenor of this epistle might lead one to regard it as an infallible ex cathedra pronouncement. But the concluding phrase plainly idicates that the Pontiff merely wished to give instruction, not to decide the controversy. The fact that the letter soon fell into desuetude is sufficient evidence that Creationism was not generally received as an article of faith at the close of the fifth century. It was not even so regarded in the fourteenth century, when Pope Benedict XII (A.D. 1342) required the Armenians to abjure Generationism.39

Creationism is also taught, at least by implication, in Leo X’s dogmatic Bull “Apostolici regiminis,” issued on the occasion of the Fifth Lateran Council, A.D. 1512. This Pope says among other things: “Anima intellectiva … immortalis et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata et multiplicanda.” This can only mean that each rational soul is “infused” into, i. e. created in, its own body. For the soul is either “infused” by God or by the parents:—if by God, “infusion” is equivalent to creation; if by the parents, “infusion” either means creation out of nothing, or generation. It cannot mean creation out of nothing, because God alone has power to create. Nor can it mean generation, because the Pope does not say: anima infunditur filiis, but: infunditur corporibus, a phrase which indicates that the act of infusion is not performed by the parents, and therefore differs from the act of sexual generation. It should be noted that in the Bull under consideration Leo X employs the theological terminology of his time. It was quite usual at that period to say: Animae hominum infundendo creantur et creando infunduntur.40

Lastly, the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary rests squarely upon Creationism. Both the Apostolic Constitution of Alexander VII known as “Sollicitudo” and Pius IX’s dogmatic Bull “Ineffabilem” expressly declare that “The soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary was from the first moment of its creation and infusion into the body … free from all taint of original sin.”

Creationism, therefore, is not merely the doctrine of some particular school, but a theologically certain truth, which no Catholic can deny without temerity.41

There remains the subordinate question: When is the soul created or infused into the body? The medieval theologians generally followed the physiological teaching of Aristotle, who held that the human embryo during the early history of its existence passes through a series of transitional stages in which it is successively informed by the vegetative, the sentient, and, finally, by the rational soul.42 To-day the opinion prevails that the rational soul is created and infused at the moment of conception.43

Readings:—Oswald, Schöpfungslehre, 2nd ed., §§ 12–13, Paderborn 1893.—O. Zehetbauer, Animae Humanae Infundendo Creantur et Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii 1893.—Galassi, Sull’ Origine dell’ Anima Umana, Bologna 1888.— *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 151, Freiburg 1878.—C. Gutberlet, Der Kampf um die Seele, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Mainz 1903.—M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 572 sqq., London and New York 1905.—J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy, The Soul, New York 1898.—St. George Mivart, Origin of Human Reason, London 1889.—D. Mercier, La Psychologie, Vol. II, Ch. 2, Louvain 1905.

Section 2

the supernatural in man

Man’s whole natural endowment was intended merely as the basis and groundwork of a higher and specifically different one, viz.: that of supernatural grace, which renders him capable of participating in prerogatives truly divine.1 In order rightly to understand this sublime destination, we need a working theory of the Supernatural. To acquire a correct idea of the Supernatural, and properly to evaluate the prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise, a critical consideration of such heretical antitheses as Pelagianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism will prove extremely helpful. Since, however, man’s high estate in Paradise was due solely to Grace, and not to any claim or exigency of pure nature, it follows that per se man could have existed in any other state, and in part did so exist.

We shall, therefore, divide this present Section into four Articles: (1) Of nature and the Supernatural in general; (2) Of man’s supernatural endowment in Paradise; (3) Of various heresies concerning the Paradisaical state of man and the dogmatic teaching of the Church in regard thereto; and (4) Of the different states of man, particularly the pure state of nature.

General Readings:—Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 277–280; Vol VI, §§ 300–311, Mainz 1884–87.—Palmieri, De Ordine Supernaturali et de Lapsu Angelorum, Romae 1910.—Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 4 sqq., Romae 1880.—Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 158–184 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 428 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899).— *Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 3rd ed., §§ 83 sqq., Freiburg 1899.—Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.—Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1905.—P. J. Toner, “The Supernatural,” in the Irish Theol. Quarterly, 1912, Nos. 27 and 28.

Article 1

nature and the supernatural

Neither Revelation nor the dogmatic teaching of the Church supplies us with a ready-made theory of the Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the Supernatural Order both in humankind and in the angels, is so definitely marked, and the pronouncements of the ecclesiastical teaching office furnish so many positive indications, that a theological theory can be easily construed. Let us, in logical order, consider the concept of the Supernatural (a) in its comprehension, and (b) in its extension.

A. Definition of the Supernatural

1. Preliminary Remarks.—To obtain a correct notion of the Supernatural, we must begin by analyzing the concept of Nature, because Nature precedes and supposes the Supernatural.

The term Nature, because of its many meanings, may truly be called protean. To escape misunderstanding, which in these matters easily entails heresy, we must study all these various meanings and carefully determine in what sense precisely Nature (φύσις) is the antithesis of the Supernatural.

a) As a technical term in logic, “Nature” denotes the essence of a thing (quidditas, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), as expressed in its definition. It is in this sense that we speak of the nature of God, or the nature of the universe, nay, even of the nature of the Supernatural. Also sin (which is a privation), and the non-ens (which is a negation), possess each a nature or essence by which they are what they are. This definition of Nature takes in the entire domain of actual and logical beings, of being and not-being, of the real and the imaginary, in a word, whatever can be expressed by a definition. In this logical sense Nature is manifestly not opposed to the Supernatural, since the Supernatural, too, has its own peculiar nature, that is, its quiddity or formal essence by which it is what it is.

b) In the ontological sphere, which embraces all actually existing things, there are beings that have no nature, though, logically considered, they have an essence of their own. Such are, e. g., evil, blindness, etc. Ontologically considered, “Nature” is synonymous with substance (substantia prima, οὐσία πρώτη). In this sense God is the “Highest Nature,” i. e., the supernatural substance (substantia superessentialis, ὑπερούσιος). In this sense, too, an angel is called a “spiritual nature,” while man’s nature is said to be partly spiritual, partly corporeal. According to the particular antithesis in which we choose to place it, the term Nature, in ontology, may have a variety of meanings, each of which requires to be carefully defined. Thus, despite the objective identity of the two terms, “Nature” differs from “Essence” in that the latter term denotes simple being, while the former describes that being as a principle of action. “Nature” must be defined differently according as it is opposed to hypostasis (or person) in the Blessed Trinity,2 or to spirit. Other meanings of the term are indicated by such juxtapositions as Nature and Liberty, Nature and Art, Nature and Morality, God and Nature (i. e., the created universe), Nature and Miracle, etc. With the possible exception of “Nature and Miracle”3 none of these antitheses gives us the exact meaning of the term “Nature” when used in contradistinction to “Supernatural.”

In identifying Supernatural with spiritual, unbelieving modern scientists contradict right reason, which justly regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate. Knoodt erred when he declared the antithesis “creatural—super-creatural” to be equivalent to “natural—supernatural.” The divine Preservation of the universe, God’s Concurrence with His creatures, and His benign Providence, though supercreatural, emphatically form a part of Nature, because without these operations on the part of God Nature as such could neither exist nor energize. For the same reason we must reject the teaching of Vock,4 who defines the Supernatural as that which can be wrought by God alone.

c) That which is essentially Supernatural is yet, in theology, sometimes called Natural, though only in a figurative sense. In this connection we must note two meanings of the word “Nature” which occur in the writings of the Fathers, and which Baius and Jansenius have abused in their heretical attempts to counterfeit the true ecclesiastical concept of the Supernatural. Some of the Fathers, notably St. Augustine, refer to the incontestably supernatural state of our first parents in Paradise as “the nature of Adam.” Baius and Jansenius interpret this expression as meaning that the original justice of the first man, with all its preternatural endowments, such as corporeal immortality and freedom from concupiscence, was something essentially natural, that is, demanded by human nature. But Augustine uses the word natura in its purely etymological sense, to designate that which Adam had from the very beginning received from God as a supernatural complement of his nature.5 “Natural,” therefore, in the usage of the great Bishop of Hippo, means “original.” Cfr. Ephes. 2:3: “Eramus naturâ [i. e., a nativitate] filii irae—We were by nature [i. e., originally, from our birth] children of wrath.” The supernatural state of grace which Adam enjoyed in Paradise is also called by St. Augustine6 and St. Leo the Great,7 naturalis generis conditio, that is to say, “a state in accordance with nature” (conveniens, consentaneum); for the supernatural ennoblement and perfectioning of human nature is neither “unnatural” nor “contrary to nature,” but entirely “natural,” i. e., in accordance with nature, befitting nature.8 In all these meanings, the terms Nature and Supernatural involve no opposition. By elimination, therefore, we arrive at the following conclusions:

d) “Nature” designates that which (1) intrinsically constitutes the being of a created substance, either as an essential or as an integral note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its essence (e. g., faculties, talents, powers), or at least can flow therefrom through the exertion of one’s own or some one else’s power (technical skill, training); or (3) whatever, though external to a thing, is necessary or suitable for its existence (e. g., food, air), for its development (e. g., instruction, civil society) or for the attainment of its end (e. g., the knowability of God, beatitude). All these factors (i. e., the constitutive elements of a thing’s being, the faculties, powers, and accomplishments flowing from its essence, and lastly such external agencies as are necessary or suitable for its subsistence, development, or the attainment of its final end), in their totality and severally respond to a proximate or remote claim of the thing under consideration. Its essence demands them. The Scholastics embrace these momenta under the term “debitum naturae” and define “Nature” or “Natural” as that which is due to a thing. (“Natura sive naturale est omne id, quod alicui rei debetur.”)

Every creature has its own specific claims, corresponding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and final end. Hence, in determining the full extent of Nature, we must go beyond the individual creature and the various species of being (matter, man, angel), and consider the totality of all beings with all their just claims or natural demands. “Nature” must consequently be defined as the aggregate of all those perfections to which created beings have a claim, each according to its specific essence, and which, therefore, the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total of these perfections is commonly called the Natural Order (ordo naturalis). Of course, any superfluity of natural goods which the Creator gives to a creature over and above its strict necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the natural order. If the soil produces more food than the human race is able to consume, if the atmosphere contains more oxygen than we require to breathe, these gifts are not “graces” in the strict sense of the term.9

2. Definition of the Supernatural.—The Supernatural, on the other hand, lies beyond or transcends the order of Nature. It is the contrary of naturae debitum. It is naturae indebitum, in a positive as well as in a negative sense. It may be defined as a gratuitous gift of God superadded to the nature of a rational being; or, in the terms of the formal definition abstracted from the condemned propositions of Baius and Quesnel, “Donum Dei naturae indebitum et superadditum.”

a) In this definition donum Dei, being common to both Nature and the Supernatural, is the proximate genus, while naturae indebitum et superadditum expresses the specific difference. The term superadditum indicates that the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, Nature, that it inheres therein as something super-added, and elevates it to a specifically higher order. To emphasize the last-mentioned element as the most important in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection is further described as naturae indebitum, i. e., grace.10

b) Now, a gift of God may be an indebitum, i. e., a supernatural grace, either with regard to the manner of its production (supernaturale quoad modum, as, for instance, a miraculous cure), or with respect of its very substance (supernaturale quoad substantiam). There is an essential distinction between these two categories of the Supernatural. The supernaturale quoad modum has its seat not in nature, i. e., in the creature itself, but outside of it, viz.: in the divine causality. It is Supernatural only with regard to the manner in which it is communicated to the creature, as when a man is raised from the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, life), is something intrinsically and essentially natural. This species of the Supernatural appertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dogmatic Theology proper is concerned mainly with the supernaturale quoad substantiam, i. e., that which essentially and intrinsically transcends the bounds of Nature.

c) The supernaturale quoad substantiam may be subdivided into two well-defined species, according as the supernatural gift which God communicates to the creature transcends the sphere and power of Nature absolutely (simpliciter) or in a relative sense only (secundum quid). The supernaturale simpliciter is the Supernatural in the strict and proper sense of the term (supernaturale stricte dictum). The supernaturale secundum quid is also called Preternatural. There is an essential difference between the Preternatural and the Supernatural. The Supernatural involves divine perfections, i. e., such as by nature belong solely to God. The Preternatural communicates only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom from concupiscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, i. e., something which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently Supernatural. However, since such a Supernatural perfectioning of man does not in principle transcend the creatural order, a grace of the kind just mentioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite otherwise with the supernaturale stricte dictum. The strictly Supernatural absolutely transcends the sphere and power of all real and possible creatures. The possession of such strictly divine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctifying grace, therefore, always entails a sort of deification (deificatio, θείωσις) of the rational creature. For the creature to claim such prerogatives as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount to a demand to be made like unto God.

3. Definition and Importance of the Potentia Obedientialis.—The best means of distinguishing properly between Nature and the Supernatural is furnished by the Scholastic concept of the “potentia obedientialis.” No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural can be constructed without a proper appreciation of this term.

As we have already pointed out, the Supernatural, though it transcends Nature, is designed for and becomes effective only in Nature. By the inherence of the Supernatural in Nature, Nature is raised to a higher sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural limitations and possibilities. Such an elevation of a creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the realization of the Supernatural postulates on the part of God a special physical impulse distinct from His preservation of the universe and His general concurrence. Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or passive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would not really transcend the natural order. On the other hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed with some specific passive potency which, while unresponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the potentia obedientialis. The Scholastics define it as a passive potency by which a creature is enabled to receive into itself a supernatural impulse from God.11 This potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it must contain some faculty which receives the divine impulse and by means of which this impulse effects the supernatural elevation of the recipient.12

B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Supernatural Order

We now proceed to consider the substantially Supernatural (supernaturale quoad substantiam) in its twofold form, viz.: (1) as the Supernatural in the strict sense of the term, and (2) as the Preternatural.13

From the sphere thus marked off must be excluded such supernatural perfections as the Hypostatic Union, the Blessed Eucharist, and the Sacraments, because these exist outside of human nature. They form the subject-matter of separate dogmatic treatises. We are here concerned with those graces only which effect a specifically higher sphere of being and operation in rational creatures, and which can therefore be objectively realized only in Angels and men. Of the subjoined two theses the first concerns Angels and men alike, while the second has reference to men alone.

Thesis I: There are two gifts of God which are Supernatural in the strict sense, and therefore belong to the divine order, namely, beatific vision and the state of grace

Proof. Beatific vision is the highest gift which God bestows on a rational creature in the status termini. It is therefore justly regarded as the standard for gauging all other graces enjoyed by Angels and men. By the state of grace here on earth (in statu viae) we understand the aggregate of those divine gifts which aid man in immediately preparing for, and attaining to, his supernatural end, i. e., the beatific vision. Besides sanctifying grace with all its prerogatives, the state of grace, therefore, also includes actual grace. The supernatural character of the beatific vision as vouchsafed to existing rational creatures in Heaven is a dogma; with regard to purely possible and creatable beings it may be set down as a theological conclusion.14

a) From this teaching the supernatural character of the state of grace in statu viae is a necessary inference. The state of grace on earth is related to the beatific vision in Heaven as a means to an end. Since a means must always be duly proportioned to its end, a supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural, or even preternatural, means.

It is not quite correct, theologically, to distinguish between beatific vision in Heaven and the state of grace on earth as though they were separated by an abyss, and to contemplate them merely in their relation of end and means. Glory and grace are far more intimately related. The character of divine Sonship conferred by both constitutes a common note which puts them on the same essential level and separates the state of grace on earth from the beatific vision in Heaven merely after the manner of what is imperfect from what is perfect.15 St. Paul describes the endowment of grace which God grants to man on earth as an heirship of adopted children, while the state of grace which He bestows on man in Heaven resembles an heir’s taking possession of his inheritance.16 Elsewhere17 the same Apostle refers to the state of grace on earth as “the pledge of our inheritance, unto the redemption of acquisition, unto the praise of his glory.”18 But if the divine Sonship which we are vouchsafed here below is of the same specific nature as that which God grants to the Elect in Heaven, both states must be as strictly supernatural in their essence as the visio beatifica itself. And what is true of divine Sonship, must be equally true of sanctifying grace and of the theological virtue of charity, which, like divine Sonship, endures unchanged in Heaven, whereas hope becomes possession and faith gives way to intuition through the lumen gloriae.19 The necessity of the lumen gloriae as a means of attaining to the beatific vision of God furnishes another proof for the strictly supernatural character of that vision.

b) We do not know with the certainty of faith that there could not exist a spiritual being (such as a seraph or cherub) to whom the beatific vision, and consequently also the supernatural preparation for it (divine Sonship, charity, sanctifying grace), would be due as a postulate of its nature. Ripalda holds that such a being is possible, and that, if it existed, it would be a substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.20 But this theory implies a contradiction in terms.21 No creature, no matter how exalted, can claim what by its very nature belongs solely to God.22 Christ alone, the only-begotten Son of God, has a strict claim to Divine Sonship and Consubstantiality with the Father because of His eternal generation from the Father. He alone can claim the intuitive vision of God and Trinitarian In-existence23 as a right,—which, of course, mutatis mutandis, also belongs to the other two Persons of the Divine Trinity. No mere creature, actual or possible, can rightfully claim prerogatives of a strictly divine order.24 To hold with Ripalda that it is possible to conceive at least one creature with a natural claim to the above-mentioned prerogatives of grace, would be to deny the divine character of the eternal γέννησις of the Logos from the Father, to put natural sonship on a par with adoptive sonship, and to confound the Consubstantiality and In-existence of the Three Divine Persons with the analogical accidents of deification and spiritual indwelling. It would, in a word, be equivalent to reducing the Supernatural to the level of the purely natural.25

Thesis II: Exemption from concupiscence, bodily immortality, habitual infused science, and impassibility are prerogatives which are not natural to man; they are preternatural gifts of divine grace

Proof. The censures which the Church has pronounced against the teachings of Baius compel us to hold as fidei proximum, that the first two of the four prerogatives mentioned, namely, exemption from concupiscence and bodily immortality, are indebita, i. e., pure graces. The other two, viz.: infused science and impassibility, are likewise held by all theological schools to be free and unmerited gifts of God.

These prerogatives are called preternatural rather than supernatural, first, because the Angels have a just claim to them in virtue of their angelic nature; and secondly, because by the possession of them human nature, though it does not receive any strictly divine prerogative, is perfected far beyond anything it can rightfully demand. These characteristics exactly verify the concept of “Preternatural” which we gave above. As a matter of fact concupiscence is per se only a natural and spontaneous effect of man’s composite nature, and the Creator, as such, is not bound to exercise any special intervention to suppress the strife which results from that nature, especially since concupiscence is not in itself a sin nor yet inevitably leads to sin. In the words of St. Thomas: “Poterat Deus a principio, quando hominem condidit, etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quem in conditione naturae suae relinqueret, ut scil. mortalis et passibilis esset et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens; in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste defectus in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus esset.”26

Death being a necessary resultant of the synthesis of body and soul, corporeal immortality, too, must be a preternatural gift of grace.

The same is true in an even higher measure of impassibility, because incapacity for physical27 and psychical suffering28 is a lesser evil than death.29

As regards knowledge, God was not obliged to give man more than the faculty of reasoning, which enables him to attain to a true natural knowledge of his Creator and to acquaint himself with the essential precepts of the moral law. Infused science (scientia infusa, in contradistinction to scientia acquisita), is a free gift of grace.30

Readings:—The opus classicum on the subject is *Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, 4 vols.— *Schrader, S. J., De Triplici Ordine Naturali, Supernaturali et Praeternaturali, Vindob. 1864.—Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia.—Tournely, De Gratia, qu. 3.—Du Plessis d’Argentré, De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum.—Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.— *v. Schäzler, Natur und Übernatur, Mainz 1865.—Idem, Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867.—Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Münster 1872.—Kirschkamp, Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange, Würzburg 1878.—A. Kranich, Über die Empfänglichkeit der menschlichen Natur für die Güter der übernatürlichen Ordnung nach der Lehre des hl. Augustin und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1892.—A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1907.— *J. B. Terrien, La Grâce et la Gloire ou la Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu, etc., Paris 1897.—A. Rademacher, Die übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie, Freiburg 1903.—W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 283 sqq., London 1897.—Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1903.—De Smedt, Notre Vie Surnaturelle, Paris 1910.—Ligeard, La Théologie Scolastique et la Transcendance du Surnaturel, Paris 1908.

Article 2

man’s supernatural endowment in paradise

Having theoretically defined the extent and character of the supernatural and preternatural prerogatives of grace, we now proceed to demonstrate that our first parents actually enjoyed these prerogatives in Paradise. Without this fundamental truth it is impossible to understand the dogma of original sin. We shall deal with the subject in six connected theses.

Thesis I: Adam, the progenitor of the human race, was endowed with sanctifying grace before the Fall

This proposition embodies a formally defined dogma of the Catholic faith.1

Proof. The Biblical argument can best be stated in the form of a syllogism, the major and minor premises of which rest on numerous Scriptural texts:—Adam originally possessed that which was restored by Christ; now Christ restored the lost state of justice, i. e., sanctifying grace;2 consequently Adam originally possessed sanctifying grace.

a) Some theologians have tried to prove this thesis directly from Sacred Scripture; but their demonstrations do not produce anything more than probability. The text upon which they chiefly rely is Eph. 4:24: “Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis—Put ye on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth.” But it is by no means certain that St. Paul speaks of Adam in this passage. In fact it is far more likely that he did not mean to advert to Adam at all. In the first place, it is entirely foreign to the Apostle’s manner of thinking to set up Adam as an ideal of holiness,3 and, secondly, the phrase novus homo applies far more fittingly to the “second Adam,” (i. e. Christ), though this interpretation, too, is not strictly demanded by the context. Probably St. Paul simply wished to say: “Be converted, become new creatures through sanctifying grace.”

Still less convincing is the argument based on Gen. 1:26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram—Let us make man to our image and likeness.” For though the example of several of the Fathers would justify us in referring this passage to Adam’s supernatural endowment, the literal sense is sufficiently safeguarded if we take it to mean merely that Adam bore the natural likeness of His Creator.4

b) The Fathers conceive the possession of sanctifying grace with its attendant prerogatives as a “deification” of the soul, and consequently count it among the strictly supernatural gifts of grace. “Deus hominem creavit accessu ad Deum deificandum,” says, e. g., St. John Damascene, “deificatum (θεούμενον) vero participatione divinae illuminationis, non vero in essentiam divinam mutatum.”5

The belief of the Fathers may be gathered partly from their formal doctrinal teaching, partly from the way in which they interpreted Holy Scripture. Certain of the Greek Fathers (e. g., SS. Basil and Cyril of Alexandria), think the supernatural sanctification of Adam is intimated in Gen. 2:7. They take spiraculum vitae to mean the grace of the Holy Ghost as a supernatural vital principle. Others (SS. Irenæus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) hold that imago Dei (Gen. 1:26) has reference to Adam’s nature, while similitudo Dei describes him as being in the state of sanctifying grace. This is a rather arbitrary interpretation and open to objections from the purely scientific point of view; but the fact that it was adopted by these Fathers sufficiently proves that, as witnesses to Tradition, they firmly believed in the original sanctity of our first parents.6

c) The question as to the precise instant when Adam was raised to the state of supernatural grace, has long been in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists. The Thomists hold that the elevation of man was contemporaneous with his creation, while the Scotists assert that Adam was created in puris naturalibus, and that an interval of time must consequently have elapsed between his creation and his elevation to the state of grace. They contend that his elevation took place at the moment when he was “put into the paradise of pleasure, to dress it and to keep it.”7 The Scotist view, which was shared by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and St. Bonaventure, is founded chiefly on the supposed necessity, on the part of Adam, of preparing himself for justification, since he was not a child but a full-grown man. In the early period of Scholastic theology the Franciscan view was the prevailing one.8 St. Thomas demolished its main argument by showing that Adam’s personal preparation for the grace of justification must have been synchronous with the divine act of Creation. “Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus,” he says, “nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.”9 Although the Tridentine Council purposely evaded this controversy by substituting the phrase in iustitia constitutus for in iustitia creatus in the original draft of its canon on justification,10 the Thomistic view has obtained all but universal currency since the fifteenth century.11

Thesis II: Our first parents in Paradise were by a special grace exempt from concupiscence

This thesis may be qualified technically as “doctrina catholica.”

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches that St. Paul calls concupiscence “sin,” “because it originates in and inclines to sin.” From this dogmatic definition it follows that man was free from concupiscence until after the Fall. This special prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is called the gift of integrity (donum integritatis), because it effected a harmonious relation between flesh and spirit by completely subordinating man’s animal passions to his reason.

a) That this harmony was a prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is sufficiently indicated by Holy Scripture. Gen. 2:25: “Erat autem uterque nudus, Adam scil. et uxor eius, et non erubescebant—And they were both naked: to wit, Adam and his wife: and they were not ashamed.” Shame among savages spells want of pride or decency; in children it flows from innocence. Adam and Eve were certainly not shameless, because the Bible tells us that after the Fall a feeling of disgrace suddenly overwhelmed them. Nor were they wild, uncivilized savages. The Sacred Writer represents them as perfect and highy developed human beings. Hence the fact of their not being ashamed must have been due to a state of childlike innocence, in which the evil impulses of sensuality were kept under perfect control. There is no other satisfactory explanation. It has been suggested that our first parents were blind and could not see each other. But the phrase upon which this interpretation is based, viz.: “And the eyes of them both were opened,”12 plainly refers to their spiritual vision. St. Irenæus’s theory that Adam and Eve were infants,13 is refuted by the fact that God commanded them to “increase and multiply.”14

That our first parents enjoyed complete immunity from concupiscence follows with still greater cogency from St. Paul’s referring to the carnal law which works in our members as “sin.”15 This carnal law, or concupiscence, is not a sin in itself, but, in the Tridentine phrase, “originates in and inclines [man] to sin.”16 Concupiscence cannot have existed prior to the sin of Adam, because an effect cannot precede its cause, and consequently our first parents in Paradise were exempt from concupiscence.

b) The Fathers were so firmly persuaded of the natural integrity of our first parents in Paradise that some of them (e. g., Athanasius,17 Gregory of Nyssa,18 and John Damascene)19 derived marriage from original sin. This was, of course, an unjustifiable exaggeration. Sexual propagation does not exclude natural integrity, and there can scarcely be a doubt that marriage would have been instituted even if man had remained in the state of innocence.20 It was such considerations as these, no doubt, that prompted St. Augustine to retract21 his earlier dictum that, had the human race preserved its primitive innocence and grace, propagation would have been asexual. The primitive Tradition was most clearly brought out in the controversy with the Pelagians, who maintained that concupiscence was a vigor rather than a defectus naturae. This view was energetically combated by St. Augustine in his work De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia.22 In Contra Iulianum, by the same author, freedom from concupiscence is explained to be a gift of grace. The supernatural character of the prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise is emphasized also by some of the other Fathers.23

c) From the purely theological point of view it will be well to explain that man has a twofold appetite, viz., the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the will (appetitus rationalis). Each of these faculties has its own circle of good by which it is attracted, and its own sphere of evil by which it is repelled. The sensitive appetite can seek only sensitive things, whereas the will is able to strive after intellectual goods as well (e. g., virtue, honor). The sensitive appetite is inordinate when it rebels against reason, and in every such case the will can attain the higher spiritual good only by dint of vigorous resistance. Unfortunately the appetitus rationalis (or will) is also affected by an immanent tendency to reject that which is truly good in favor of what is good only in appearance (sin). Rom. 7:17 sqq.: “Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum [i. e., concupiscentia].… Si autem quod nolo, illud facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum.… Video autem aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis—Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.… I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.”

This inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil, which is called concupiscence, exerts itself most violently in the pars concupiscibilis of the lower soul life (libido, gula). But in a wider sense the inordinate affections of the pars irascibilis (as anger, jealousy, pugnacity) likewise pertain to concupiscence. In our first parents all these passions were kept in due subjection by virtue of the donum integritatis.24

Theologians differ as to how man in Paradise was enabled to keep his passions under the absolute control of reason. Durandus held that God infused a preternatural habitus into the sensitive element of human nature; Scotus, that such an habitus was infused into the will; Cajetan, that God established the proper equilibrium between man’s higher and lower nature simply by strengthening his intellect. The problem is not as simple as it appears. The variety of the psychological factors involved, and the wide scope which must be assigned to the will, seem to postulate a rather complicated endowment which enriched the various higher and lower faculties of the soul with habits and enabled these habits to co-operate harmoniously.25 The problem may be simplified by assuming that divine Providence exercised a special external governance by carefully removing all occasions apt to provoke an outbreak of man’s animal passions, and in case of actual danger simply withholding the necessary concursus. On the other hand we must be careful not to exaggerate the donum integritatis, else the Fall of our first parents would appear inexplicable, nay impossible. The question whether by virtue of the gift of natural integrity Adam and Eve were able to commit venial sin, has been answered affirmatively by Scotus and Gabriel Biel, against Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and we are inclined to adopt the Scotist view. For, as Schell correctly remarks: “Adam, as he was actually constituted, must have been liable to err in non-essentials, seeing that he was able to go astray in matters of decisive moment.”26

Thesis III: Our first parents before the Fall were endowed with bodily immortality

This proposition is strictly of faith.27

Proof. By immortality we here understand neither the natural immortality of the soul,28 nor the glorious immortality to be enjoyed by the Elect after the resurrection of the flesh, but an intermediate prerogative peculiar to man’s original state of justice in Paradise.29 In that state, according to St. Augustine,30 man was immortal, not because he could not die (non posse mori), but simply because it was not necessary that he should die (posse non mori). This Paradisaical immortality must have been a preternatural grace, because it constituted no strict postulate of human nature.31

The Scriptural argument for our thesis rests on the story of the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Under penalty of death God had forbidden our first parents to eat of the tree of knowledge. “For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.”32 After the Fall He pronounced sentence as follows: “Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.”33 From all of which it is quite evident that, had Adam never sinned, he would not have been under the necessity of dying. Cfr. Wisd. 2:23 sq.: “Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem34 et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum. Invidiâ autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum—God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world.” St. Paul represents the death of Adam and all his descendants as a divinely inflicted punishment for sin. Rom. 5:12: “Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit—As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men.”

The Fathers unanimously echo the teaching of Scripture on this point.

What part the “tree of knowledge” (עֵץ־חַוִים) played in the preservation of life is not apparent. From the words of Jehovah quoted in Gen. 3:22 sq., we know that to eat of its fruit was a necessary condition of immortality: “Now, therefore, lest perhaps he [Adam] put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever, … the Lord sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.” This passage has led some of the Fathers to regard the tree of life as φάρμακον τῆς ἀθανασίας. Others explain it allegorically.35

Thesis IV: Our first parents were also endowed with an infused knowledge of natural and supernatural truth

Proof. Sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, and immortality of the body were a heritage of Paradise, and as such destined to descend to all of Adam’s children. Besides these our first parents possessed as a fourth strictly personal prerogative, an unusual measure of natural and supernatural knowledge.

a) While the Bible nowhere explicitly refers to Adam’s natural knowledge as infused (scientia infusa), we have sufficient Scriptural warrant for holding that it could not have been acquired by ordinary human means. It must have been infused knowledge which enabled Adam immediately after his creation to call all the beasts of the earth and the fowls of the air by their proper names36 and intuitively to understand the nature and mission of Eve.37 St. Augustine observes that Adam “universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit, quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae in saecularibus etiam libris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras … dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primis indidit rebus”.38

A further confirmation of our thesis may be found in Ecclus. 17:5 sq.: “Disciplina intellectus replevit illos, creavit [i.e. infudit] illis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum, et mala et bona ostendit illis—He filled them with the knowledge of understanding, he created in [i. e., infused into] them the science of the spirit, he filled their heart with wisdom, and shewed them both good and evil.” What we can learn only by dint of painstaking application, Adam and Eve knew by virtue of infused knowledge; which is not, of course, equivalent to saying that their knowledge was substantially different from ours.39

That the progenitors of the human race should be endowed with infused knowledge was meet and congruous for three reasons, to wit: (1) The Creator could not in justice abandon grown-up men to complete ignorance in matters of religion and morality; (2) Adam and Eve had no parents or teachers to give them the necessary instruction; and (3) As the head of the human race, Adam was destined to be its natural guide and teacher.40

b) The knowledge of our first parents must have extended to the domain of the Supernatural. Above all they must have been cognizant of their final destiny. This follows from the fact of their elevation to the state of grace,41 which can be preserved only by means of external revelation and internal acts of faith, hope, and charity. Our first parents, be it remembered, were adults, not children.

As regards the precise character of their supernatural knowledge, they must have had supernatural faith, because without faith “it is impossible to please God.”42 St. Bonaventure was hardly justified in denying43 that Adam and Eve in Paradise had faith, on the ground that “faith cometh by hearing.”44 Until he attains to the beatific vision of God, man must necessarily walk in the twilight of faith, which, in the words of the Apostle,45 “is the substance of things to be hoped for.”

The extent of Adam’s supernatural knowledge is a problem open to debate. This much, however, is certain: He must have known, as he was bound to believe in, the existence of God and eternal retribution in the life beyond, because Sacred Scripture teaches that an explicit knowledge of these two truths is necessary for salvation (necessitate medii).46 In addition to this knowledge Adam probably had a belief in the Blessed Trinity and the future Incarnation of the Logos.47

c) Any attempt to ascertain the extent of Adam’s natural knowledge would lead us from solid ground into the domain of more or less hazardous speculation. The Schoolmen, as a rule, were inclined to exaggerate the intellectual powers of our progenitor. To reduce speculation to reasonable bounds, St. Thomas Aquinas laid down two hard and fast rules. The first is: Adam depended on phantasms for his intellectual concepts; whence it follows: (α) That, unlike the human soul of Christ, he was not endowed with beatific vision here on earth,48 (β) that he could have no intuitive but only an abstractive knowledge of the nature of the Angels,49 and (γ) that he had no intuitive knowledge of his own soul. The second rule laid down by St. Thomas is: In the domain of nature Adam had a perfect infused knowledge only with regard to such things as were indispensable to enable himself and his descendants to live in conformity with the laws of reason. This does not mean that he was not compelled to learn and to inquire, or that he was unable to progress in matters of science and culture. There is no reason whatever for assuming that Adam was acquainted with the Copernican world-view, the stellar parallaxes, spectrum analysis, electricity, X-rays, or the infinitesimal calculus. The progenitor of the human race was well able to dispense with a knowledge of such abstruse scientific matters as these. Besides, had he possessed such knowledge, tradition would surely have preserved fragments of it. The typical exemplar of Adam’s natural attainments, therefore, is not the human knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, whom Holy Scripture calls “the second Adam,” but the wisdom of Solomon. It is worthy of note, in this connexion, that the Scholastics were not all persuaded that Adam was wiser than Solomon.50

Another question has been raised, viz.: Was Adam gifted with infallibility in his capacity as teacher and guide of the human race? On this point, too, it is impossible to form a certain conclusion. St. Thomas sets up some strong arguments to show that Adam was infallible: “Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius.… Unde non poterat esse, quod innocentia manente intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat, ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi”.51 Considering that when ordinary mortals go astray, it is usually due to the fact that the will is too weak to resist and control passion and prejudice, it is highly probable, to say the least, that our first parents in Paradise, keen-witted, unprejudiced, and dispassionate as they were, gave their assent only to what was evidently true, and cautiously felt their way whenever the evidence was insufficient or unconvincing.

d) We now come to another difficult problem, to wit: How did speech originate? The Bible says: “Omne enim, quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen eius—For whatsoever Adam called any living creature, the same is its name.”52 This text would seem to indicate the existence of a primitive language. The naming of the different creatures may be explained either naturally or preternaturally. In the last-mentioned hypothesis Adam must have received language ready made by a miraculous infusion from God. Those who prefer the natural explanation hold that the first human idiom was evolved by virtue of a native impulse. Both explanations have found ardent defenders among theologians, philosophers, and exegetes. Until quite recently it was pretty generally held that Adam received the Hebrew language directly from God as a ready-made and perfect medium of speech.53 This belief was shared by a nineteenth-century exegete of the unquestioned ability of Fr. Kaulen, who was impressed in favor of Hebrew by the following facts: (1) In no other language is there such an intimate relation between nouns and their objects; (2) the peculiar Hebrew use of three consonants is based upon a variation of the third letter and closely resembles logical definition by proximate genus and specific difference. These important phenomena are especially interesting from the viewpoint of the philosophy of language. Yet the theory can hardly be upheld. Comparative Philology shows that ancient Hebrew is the product of a well-defined process of evolution, and therefore cannot be the original language of the human race. Onomatopoeia is common to all civilized languages.54 The discovery that the inflected languages (Semitic and Aryan) are derived from the agglutinative (Turanian group), and these in turn from the isolating tongues,55 has led philologians to surmise that the primitive idiom of the human race consisted exclusively of simple, uninflected root-words. On philological grounds, not to speak of others, it seems reasonable to assume that the first man possessed a highly developed intellect and created his own language by forming monosyllabic root-words. This theory gains additional probability from the fact that the original Semitic root-formations closely correspond to the process of intellectual conception and bear all the earmarks of human invention. The names which Adam gave to various creatures, and which can still be ascertained from a study of ancient Semitic roots, are in each case based on some characteristic note representing a universal concept abstracted from a phantasm. Thus the word “moon,” mensis, Greek μήν, Gothic mêna, Sanskrit mâs and mâsa, is derived from MA, i. e., “to measure,” from which root was formed MAN, i. e., “to think,” which in its turn furnished the etymon of such words as mens, man, Sanskrit mâna.56

Strangely enough, in rejecting the antiquated notions of the Hebraists, modern Comparative Philology has unconsciously reverted to the scientific view-point of the Fathers, who regarded primitive speech as a purely human invention. St. Augustine, for example, extols the transcendent genius of Adam as revealed in naming the different creatures passing before his eyes, and lays down the general proposition: “Illud quod est in nobis rationale, … vidit esse imponenda rebus vocabula, i. e. significantes quosdam sonos.… Sed audiri verba absentium non poterant: ergo illa ratio peperit litteras, notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis atque discretis”.57 St. Gregory of Nyssa, who discusses the probable origin of language at some length,58 vigorously defends the opinion of his teacher, St. Basil, that language is a human invention. Against the objections of Eunomius he lays down the thesis that, endowed as they were by nature with both reflexion and the power of making signs, men could not but learn to communicate their ideas to one another.59 This opinion, which is the most ancient, is probably also the correct one, because it conforms to the sane and sound principle that secondary causes must be credited with all the power they are able to exert.60

Thesis V: Bound up with the prerogatives already mentioned was the impassibility of our first parents in Paradise

This proposition embodies a common teaching of Catholic theologians.

Proof. The impassibility with which man will be endowed after the resurrection of the flesh must be conceived as non posse pati, i. e., as incapability of suffering. The impassibility of our first parents in Paradise, on the other hand, consisted in posse non pati, i. e., in the non-necessity of suffering. They irretrievably forfeited this prerogative for themselves and their descendants by sin. The Biblical argument for our thesis is based upon the fact that Paradise was a “garden of pleasure.”61 Whether we interpret this term literally, as most exegetes do, or metaphorically after the example of Philo, Origen, and others, it is certain that our first parents in the Garden were free from pain and suffering. They led a life of unalloyed pleasure and pure delight. The pains of parturition and hard labor are punishments inflicted for sin.62 The immortality of the body with which the Creator had endowed Adam and Eve, necessarily excluded all those sufferings and infirmities which are the harbingers of death, while the gift of integrity (donum integritatis) effectively stopped the principal source of mental sorrow and temptation, which is concupiscence. St. Augustine gives an alluring description of the life of our first parents in his great work De Civitate Dei: “Vivebat homo in paradiso, sicut volebat, quamdiu volebat, quod Deus iusserat. Vivebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper vivere habens in potestate.… Nihil corruptionis in corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas.… Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum.… Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum.”63

The “golden age” so enthusiastically celebrated in the folklore of many nations represents but a faint recollection of the state of our first parents in the Garden of Pleasure.64

Thesis VI: The five prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise were organically interrelated so that the preternatural graces served as a complement to the supernatural state of grace, and the preservation of the former was causally dependent on the retention of the latter. Theologians therefore justly characterize this primitive state as “the state of original justice and sanctity.”

This thesis embodies a doctrine common to all theological schools.

Proof. Sanctifying grace and its preternatural concomitants were not necessarily interdependent, else they could not exist separately in the present state of repaired nature. Their harmonious combination in Paradise was a free institution of the Creator. Sacred Scripture tells us that the loss of sanctifying grace entailed the forfeit of the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in the Garden. After the Fall, concupiscence, until then properly subdued, suddenly became rebellious,65 death assumed sway over the human race,66 and all manner of suffering followed.67 By the Redemption the race recovered its lost supernatural destiny; but the bond that originally connected sanctifying grace with the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise was never restored.

Catholic theologians are not, however, agreed as to the precise meaning of the term original justice (iustitia originalis).68 The majority take it to signify not the state of integral nature, as such, nor yet mere sanctifying grace, but the aggregate of all those organically correlated prerogatives which constituted the state of our first parents in Paradise. With the exception of infused science, this state of original justice was not a purely personal privilege, but a natural endowment which Adam was to transmit to all his descendants. This distinction explains why the sin of our first parents is transmitted to all men by propagation.

Readings:—St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94–102, and the commentators.—Bellarmine, De Gratia Primi Hominis.—Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, 1. III, c. 1 sqq.— *Casini, Quid est Homo? ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862.—Lohan, Das Paradies nach der Lehre der katholischen Kirche, Mainz 1874.—Fr. Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies? Leipzig 1881.—Oswald, Religiöse Urgeschichte der Menschheit, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.—A. Urbas, Die Geologie und das Paradies, Laibach 1889.—W. Engelkemper, Die Paradiesesflüsse, Münster 1901.—S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, p. 373 sqq., London 1895.—W. Humphrey, S. J., “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 338 sqq., London 1897.—F. Vigouroux, art. “Paradis Terrestre” in the Dictionnaire de la Bible, Vol. IV.

Article 3

various heresies vs. the dogmatic teaching of the church in regard to the state of original justice

The doctrine set forth in the preceding Article has in process of time been impugned by three great heresies; by Pelagianism in the early days of Christianity, by Protestantism at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and in modern times by Jansenism.

1. Pelagianism.—Pelagianism, which flourished in the fifth century, held that the state of our first parents in Paradise was not one of supernatural grace, but essentially and purely a natural state.

a) In consequence of this fundamental fallacy the Pelagians denied the necessity and gratuity of actual grace, nay the very existence of original sin. They admitted that Adam possessed sanctifying grace, with its claim to the beatific vision of God, and that he enjoyed freedom from concupiscence, but insisted that man can merit Heaven and attain to absolute sinlessness by his own free volition, unaided and without transcending his natural faculties. Concupiscence, according to the Pelagians, is not a punishment for sin, nor yet, properly speaking, an inherent defect of human nature, it is simply a vigor naturae, the ordinate or inordinate use of which depends entirely on man’s free will. To bolster the fiction that our first parents in Paradise were in no essential respect superior to their descendants, the Pelagians disparaged Adam’s bodily immortality and impassibility, holding that the only deterioration which mankind suffered in consequence of sin consists in this that Adam’s descendants have his evil example and other incitements to do wrong. Hence the Pelagian maxim: “Peccatum imitatione, non propagatione,” that is, original sin is not really a sin of nature, but merely a sin of imitation. Aside from it, the condition of Adam’s descendants is identical with that of their progenitor in Paradise.

b) Against this arbitrary confusion of nature with the Supernatural the Church has again and again insisted that the sin of Adam resulted in a real deterioration of human nature by robbing it of sanctifying grace with its accompanying prerogatives. That these prerogatives were supernatural was not at first expressly emphasized, but taught rather by implication.

The second council of Mileve, which was confirmed by a plenary council held at Carthage, A. D. 418, and by Pope Zosimus in his Tractoria, defined: “Quicumque dixerit, Adam primum hominem mortalem factum, ita ut, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est, de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, sed necessitate naturae, anathema sit.”1 This definition embraces the following truths: (1) Adam enjoyed immortality of the body; (2) he lost this immortality through sin; (3) this loss was a punishment of sin.

In 431, Pope Celestine I wrote to the Bishops of Gaul against the Semi-Pelagians: “In praevaricatione Adae omnes homines naturalem2 possibilitatem et innocentiam perdidisse, et neminem de profundo illius ruinae per liberum arbitrium posse consurgere, nisi eum gratia Dei miserantis erexerit—By the fall of Adam all men lost their natural power and innocence, and no one can rise from the depth of that ruination by [his own] free-will, except the grace of a merciful God raise him up.”3

Another important dogmatic pronouncement is contained in the fifteenth and nineteenth canons of the Second Council of Orange, A. D. 529. Canon 15 says: “Ab eo, quod formavit Deus, mutatus est Adam, sed in peius per iniquitatem suam. Ab eo, quod operata est iniquitas, mutatur fidelis, sed in melius per gratiam Christi—Adam was changed from that state in which God created him, but he was changed for the worse by his own iniquity. The faithful Christian is changed from the state brought about by sin, but he is changed for the better through the grace of Christ.” Canon 19: “Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate [i. e. sanctitate], in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, servaret. Unde cum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire, quam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare, quod perdidit?—Human nature, even if it had remained in the state of integrity [i. e. holiness] in which it was created by God, could in no wise have preserved [this prerogative] without the divine assistance. Hence, if it was unable without the grace of God to keep the salvation which it had received, how should it have been able without the assistance of that grace to regain that which it had lost?”4

That the lost prerogatives were supernatural can be inferred from these definitions by the following process of reasoning: What is due to human nature on account of its creation, its conservation, and the divine concursus, ex vi notionis can never be lost. Now the Church teaches that by original sin Adam and his progeny lost sanctifying grace, together with its concomitant prerogatives. Therefore the lost endowment was not due to human nature, but a gratuitous favor, in other words, it was a pure grace. Sanctifying grace, in particular, was essentially identical with that prerogative which mankind regained through the Redemption. But this latter favor is restored only per gratiam Christi, to employ the Council’s own words, and therefore must be supernatural in character.

2. Protestantism.—In the sixteenth century erroneous notions on the subject of the original state of the human race were propagated by the so-called Protestant reformers, who, failing to draw the proper distinction between nature and the Supernatural, heretically affirmed that, besides his preternatural prerogatives man by sin also lost certain essential properties of human nature itself, such as the moral freedom of the will.

a) Practically this basic error culminated in the doctrine of man’s justification by faith alone (sola fide), without co-operation on his part. Though Pelagianism and Protestantism agree in acknowledging that man enjoyed an ideal state in Paradise, they are yet diametrically opposed to each other. For while Pelagianism conceives original justice as a purely natural state, “orthodox” Protestantism admits that it contained a divine element, but falsely asserts that this element formed part and parcel of the very nature of man. This identification of the divine with the human, of nature with the Supernatural is decidedly Pantheistic, and we need not wonder, therefore, that many later Protestant theologians (e. g., Schleiermacher) became true-blue Pantheists.5

b) Though the chief purpose of the Council of Trent was to guard the dogmas of original sin and justification, that holy ecumenical synod left no doubt as to what is the orthodox teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the primitive state of man.

The Tridentine Fathers implicitly condemned Pelagianism when they defined that Adam was created “in holiness and justice,” but “immediately lost” this state of grace, and thereby “suffered deterioration both in body and soul.” “Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam, quum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus6 fuerat, amisisse … totumque Adam per illam praevaricationis offensam secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse, anathema sit.”7 This deterioration of body and soul involved the loss of holiness and justice, and also of the gift of integrity8 and the immortality of the body.9 The two last-mentioned prerogatives were supplanted by “death and bodily punishments.”10 Since no one can “lose” what he does not possess, our first parents in Paradise must have actually enjoyed sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, immortality of the body, and impassibility. That these prerogatives were supernatural is not expressly defined by the Tridentine Council.

3. Jansenism.—The Jansenists applied Protestant principles to the domain of grace, which was their chief field of operation, and tried by various subterfuges to evade the dogmatic decrees of Trent.

a) Perhaps no other heresy has so deeply wounded the Church as Jansenism, despite its oft-repeated pretence of loyalty. The chief protagonists of this sect were Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel. One of their palmary teachings was that the state of primitive justice was strictly due to man, something “connatural to him,” a debitum naturae which the Creator owed in justice to mankind. This assertion clearly involves a denial of the supernatural character of grace, though Baius tried to veil this inevitable conclusion by contending that to grant grace and glory to a sinner might be called gratia secundum quid. Other Jansenists asserted that sanctifying grace was due to human nature as such, not to its “works.” But it is quite obvious that what is debitum naturae cannot at the same time be indebitum naturae, i. e., a grace.

b) The Holy See upheld the true faith against Jansenism in a long series of struggles, which culminated in the explicit condemnation of this dangerous heresy.

The most important ecclesiastical pronouncements against Jansenism are: (a) The condemnation, by Pius V (A. D. 1567), of seventy-nine propositions extracted from the writings of Baius; (b) the rejection by Innocent X (A. D. 1653) of five theses formulated by Jansenius himself; (c) the censures uttered by Clement XI in the Bull “Unigenitus” (A. D. 1713), against one hundred and one propositions advocated by Quesnel; and (d) the reprobation of the Jansenistic decrees of the pseudo-synod of Pistoia by Pius VI in his Bull “Auctorem fidei” (A. D. 1794). In studying the question of man’s original state of justice the errors of Baius and Quesnel prove indirectly helpful, inasmuch as their contradictories, though not formally defined articles of faith, clearly embody the teaching of the Church.11

The definition of the Supernatural which we have formulated on a previous page is confirmed by the Church’s official condemnation of the twenty-fourth proposition of Baius, to wit: “A vanis et otiosis hominibus secundum insipientiam philosophorum excogitata est sententia, hominem ab initio sic constitutum, ut per dona naturae superaddita fuerit largitate conditoris sublimatus et in Filium Dei adoptatus.” The supernatural character of sanctifying grace may be inferred from the condemnation of the twenty-first proposition championed by Baius, viz.: “Humane naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium divinae naturae debita fuit integritati primae conditionis, et proinde naturalis dicenda est, et non supernaturalis,” and likewise from the rejection of the thirty-fifth of the propositions extracted from the works of Quesnel, to wit: “Gratia Adami est sequela creationis, et erat debita naturae sanae et integrae.”12

That Adam’s original immunity from concupiscence was a supernatural grace follows also from the condemnation of Baius’s twenty-sixth proposition: “Integritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis eius conditio.”

The Church’s teaching on the subject of the bodily immortality of our first parents may be inferred from the reprobation of proposition number seventy-eight, extracted from the writings of Baius: “Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio.”13

To sum up the argument: It is a Catholic doctrine, directly deducible from revelation (fidei proximum), that sanctifying grace, exemption from concupiscence, and immortality of the body, all of which Adam and Eve enjoyed in Paradise, were supernatural gifts. That the impassibility and infused knowledge enjoyed by our first parents were also supernatural prerogatives is not directly taught by the Church. The supernatural character of the beatific vision, however, so far as it is granted to existing rational creatures, is an express article of faith.14

Readings:—Petavius, De Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Haeresi.—Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali (Append. adv. Baium et Baianos).— *F. Wörter, Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874.—A. Krampf, Der Urzustand des Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa, Würzburg 1889.—A. Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von der Natur und Gnade, Freiburg 1895.—F. Klasen, Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882.—Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., §§ 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.—S. Dechamps, De Haeresi Janseniana ab Apostolica Sede Merito Praescripta, Paris 1654.—A. Paquier, Le Jansénisme, Etude Doctrinale d’après les Sources, Paris 1909.—A. Vandenpeerenboom, Cornelius Jansenius, Septième Évêque d’Y pres, sa Mort, son Testament, ses Épitaphes, Bruges 1882.—B. Jungmann, S. J., Dissertationes Selectae in Hist. Eccles., Vol. VII, Diss. XL, Ratisbon 1887.—Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, Paris 1909.—J. Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “Pelagius and Pelagianism,” Vol. XI.—J. Forget, ibid., art. “Jansenius and Jansenism,” Vol. VIII.

Article 4

the different states of man, and the state of pure nature in particular

1. The Different States of Man.—A sharp distinction must be drawn between historic and purely possible states.

a) A historic state is one in which the human race some time or other actually existed, or now exists. Such states are: (1) the state of original justice in Paradise (status iustitiae originalis), of which we have already treated; (2) the state of fallen nature (status naturae lapsae), into which the human race was precipitated by the sin of Adam. This state consisted in the loss of all supernatural and preternatural prerogatives which our first parents enjoyed in the Garden, and soon gave way to (3) the state of repaired nature (status naturae reparatae), in which God, in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ, restored sanctifying grace, though without the preternatural prerogatives of integrity, impassibility, and bodily immortality which had accompanied it in Paradise. The state of repaired nature is the historic state par excellence, because it has been the condition of mankind since the promise of Redemption.

b) Those states in which man might, but in matter of fact never did exist, are called possible. We may, in the first place, conceive of a state of natural integrity (status naturae integrae) in the narrower sense, i. e., one with a purely natural end,1 yet endowed with such preternatural prerogatives as, e. g., freedom from concupiscence. According as we combine the preternatural prerogatives (freedom from concupiscence, bodily immortality, impassibility, and infused knowledge) into one harmonious whole, or imagine any one of them separately realized to the exclusion of all others, we may subdivide the state of natural integrity into four different states, all of them devoid of strictly supernatural grace. It would serve no useful purpose to enter into a speculative discussion of these states here. Lastly, by eliminating man’s supernatural destiny together with sanctifying grace and all preternatural prerogatives, we arrive at what is termed the state of pure nature (status naturae purae).

2. Possibility of the State of Pure Nature.—The concept of the status naturae purae involves only such notes as belong to the essence of human nature and are due to it by virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, and the general providence of God.2 Among the things that are due to man, as man, (aside from his physical endowment which is included in the definition of animal rationale), is the ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural end and of discovering and observing the moral law of nature. That is, man must be able, by leading a naturally good life, to attain to his natural destiny, which would consist not in the beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of God apt to render the creature naturally happy. To these positive notes must be added a negative one, viz.: the exclusion of all such prerogatives as are either strictly supernatural (e. g., grace, actual and habitual), or at least preternatural.3 A recent writer observes that “this state [of pure nature] is conceived as substantially identical with the state in which man actually exists, minus the character of guilt and punishment which mark the absence of the higher prerogatives, and minus the grace which is operative in all men unto salvation.”4 In this hypothetic state of pure nature, therefore, man would be subject to the same evils from which he suffers at present, viz.: concupiscence, ignorance, and death with its attendant sufferings.

There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state of pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be essentially like the present state of original sin. Original sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs the purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not likely that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bestiality would have wrought such havoc as they actually did and do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we consider that original sin has immensely increased the ravages of these two arch-enemies of humankind. Abstracting from the guilt of sin and the punishment due to it, the state of pure nature may consequently be conceived as somewhat more perfect than the state of original sin. It is permissible, too, with Cardinal Franzelin5 and other eminent theologians, to postulate certain natural aids as substitutes for the missing supernatural assistance in the battle against concupiscence. We may conceive these adiutoria Dei naturalia as due to man in the pure state of nature, but they would not, of course, partake of the essence of strictly supernatural grace.6

Though it would not essentially coincide in every detail with the state of original sin, this hypothetical state of pure nature is per se possible. To say that it is impossible would be tantamount to asserting that God was bound to endow man with supernatural graces and prerogatives. This was precisely the false teaching of Baius.7 “Deus non potuisset,” reads the fifty-fifth of his condemned propositions, “ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.” The Catholic doctrine is that, had He so chosen, God could have created man in the state in which he is now born, minus original sin.

The so-called Augustinians and some Thomists8 thought that the teaching of the Church would be sufficiently safeguarded against the errors of Baius by holding that God could have established the state of pure nature de potentia absoluta, though not de potentia ordinata. But this is not a safe position to take. What God may not do by virtue of His wisdom, sanctity, and benevolence (potentiâ ordinatâ), He cannot do by virtue of His omnipotence (potentiâ absolutâ), which is invariably directed in its operations by the other divine attributes. If God were constrained by some one or other of His attributes9 to endow man with supernatural gifts, these gifts would forthwith cease to be graces, because they would correspond to a legitimate demand of nature. The theologians with whom we are here dealing declare, in opposition to Baius, that these prerogatives are supernatural graces; but in this they are guilty of inconsistency, because they confound nature with the Supernatural, and fail to distinguish between the characteristics of both.10

Readings:—Berti, Augustinianum Systema Vindicat., diss. 2.— *Card. Norisius, Vindic. Augustin., c. 3, Batav. 1673.—Kuhn, Die christliche Lehre von der göttlichen Gnade, § 16, Tübingen 1868.—G. Vandenesch, Doctrina Divi Thomae Aquinatis de Concupiscentia, Bonn. 1870.—Möhler, Symbolism, pp. 23 sqq., Robertson’s translation, 5th ed., London 1906.—Suarez, Proleg. 4 ad Tract. de Gratia.—Goudin, Tract. Theol., t. II, qu. 2, art. 1.— *F. X. Linsenmann, Michael Bajus, Tübingen 1867.—J. F. Sollier, art. “Baius” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II.—Kroll, “The Causes of the Jansenist Heresy” in the Am. Cath. Quarterly Review, 1885, pp. 577 sqq.—W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 338 sqq., London 1897.

Section 3

man’s defection from the supernatural order, or the doctrine of original sin

We shall treat the subject-matter of this Section in five Articles, considering (1) The sin of Adam as the first sin and its effects on our protoparents; (2) The sin of Adam as original sin in the technical sense of the term, i. e., in so far as it affects the whole human race; (3) The nature of original sin; (4) Its mode of propagation; and (5) Its effects in Adam’s descendants.

The doctrine of original sin is a fundamental dogma of Christianity, because on it is based the necessity of the Redemption.

General Readings:— *St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81 sqq.—Billuart, De Peccatis, diss. 6.—Suarez, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 9.

The principal Scholastic treatise on the subject is *De Rubeis, De Peccato Originali, Venetiis 1757, nov. ed. Herbipoli 1857.

Of later authors the student may profitably consult the following: Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 197 sqq., Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. II, pp. 20 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1901).—Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 65–81, Rome 1878.— *Oswald, Religiöse Urgeschichte der Menschheit, Part II, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.—Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 616 sqq., Münster 1872.—Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 5, Rome 1880.—Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VI, Mainz 1887.—Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed., pp. 121 sqq., Freiburg 1908.—G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. II, pp. 551 sqq., Paris 1895.—D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino et de Deo Creatore, pp. 599 sqq., Dublinii 1909.—S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 394 sqq., London 1894.—Le Bachelet, Le Péché Originel, Paris 1900.—P. J. Toner, Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de Lapsu et Peccato Originali, Dublin 1904.—Chanvillard, Le Péché Originel, Paris 1910.

Article 1

the sin of adam considered as the first sin, and its effects on our proto-parents

All men are born in the state of original sin. This state necessarily supposes as its cause a sinful act of the free will; for the assumption that original sin is not incurred through actual guilt would logically lead to the Manichæan heresy of the existence of an essentially evil principle.

The sin of Adam is original sin in a twofold sense: (1) As a sinful personal act (peccatum originale originans), and (2) as a sinful state (peccatum originale originatum). It is the state not the act that is transmitted to Adam’s descendants.

In the present Article we shall consider the sin of Adam as a personal act, (1) in its historic aspects and (2) in the immediate consequences which it entailed upon our first parents.

Thesis I: Our first parents, seduced by Satan, committed a grave (mortal) sin by transgressing the precept of probation

This thesis embodies an article of faith.1

Proof. The Fall of our first parents, as every Catholic knows from his catechism, is an important historical fact, not a mere myth, as alleged by the Rationalists.

a) The Bible relates that God gave Adam and Eve a probationary precept by forbidding them to eat of the fruit of a certain tree in the Garden, called “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” This command bound them under pain of mortal sin—not because of its intrinsic importance, but on account of the attendant circumstances. We all know how Satan approached Eve in the form of a serpent and persuaded her to transgress the divine command,—how “She took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband, who did eat.”2 This simple account is plainly meant to be historical and is treated as such throughout the Bible. Cfr. Ecclus. 25:33: “A muliere initium factum est peccati, et per illam omnes morimur—From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die.” 1 Tim. 2:14: “Adam non est seductus [a serpente], mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit—Adam was not seduced [by the serpent]; but the woman being seduced, was in the transgression.” Ecclesiastical Tradition, too, has always maintained the historic character of the Fall. St. Augustine3 thus explains the gravity of the first sin: “There is in it pride, because man chose to be under his own dominion rather than under the dominion of God; and sacrilege, because he did not believe God; and murder, for he brought death upon himself; and spiritual fornication, because the purity of the human mind was corrupted by the seducing blandishments of the serpent; and theft, for man turned to his own use the food he had been forbidden to touch; and avarice, for he had a craving for more than should have been sufficient for him; and whatever other sin can be discovered on careful reflection to be involved in this one admitted sin.”4

b) Differences of opinion are permissible with regard to certain questions of detail, provided only that original sin be acknowledged as a historical fact. The “tree of knowledge” is as mysterious as the “tree of life.” Cajetan held that the story of the serpent merely symbolizes inward temptation. But this audacious hypothesis never found much support among Catholic theologians. The divine curse5 is intelligible only on the assumption that the serpent was a real animal, employed by Satan for the purpose of seduction. Cfr. Apocalypse 12:9: “Et proiectus est draco ille magnus, serpens antiquus,6 qui vocatur diabolus et satanas—And that great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil and Satan.” 2 Cor. 11:3: “Timeo ne sicut serpens Hevam seduxit astutiâ suâ, ita corrumpantur sensus vestri—I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his subtility, so your minds should be corrupted.”

The holy Fathers and theologians generally hold that intellectual pride was the motive of the Fall. Cfr. Ecclus. 10:15: “Initium omnis peccati superbia—Pride is the beginning of all sin.” Considered in itself, the sin of our first parents, according to St. Paul’s teaching, was an act of grave disobedience,—which disposes of the strange hypothesis that the Fall was due to the natural use of marriage.7

It is not so easy to decide whether the transgression of the law of probation constituted the first mortal sin committed by Adam and Eve, or whether they had previously been guilty of other grievous offenses. Alexander of Hales held that previous mortal sins on the part of our first parents had smoothed the way for their transgression of the decisive precept of probation, which involved the fate of Adam and all his progeny. Among modern theologians this view has been adopted by Schell.8 Though not exactly untenable, it lacks probability. The majority of Catholic divines hold that original sin was the first mortal sin committed by our first parents, because every mortal sin entails the loss of sanctifying grace.

Thesis II: By transgressing the law of probation Adam forfeited sanctifying grace and merited eternal damnation; he became subject to bodily death and the dominion of Satan, and suffered a deterioration in body and soul

This is de fide.9

Proof. Every grievous sin entails the loss of sanctifying grace and provokes the anger of God. The very grievous nature of the sin committed by our first parents may be inferred from the punishment with which God had threatened them. After the Fall He appears to Adam as the angry judge. The relation of sonship was turned into enmity, which spelled eternal damnation. Death, which had been the sanction of the law of probation,10 was actually inflicted on our first parents as a punishment.11 “Invidiâ diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum—By the envy of the devil, death came into the world.”12 Incidental to it was the dominion of Satan, which is intimated in the so-called Protevangelium (Gen. 3:15), and explicitly taught in the New Testament.13 The deterioration which human nature suffered through the Fall, manifested itself in the sudden awakening of concupiscence, which had till then been duly subject; the flesh rebelled against the spirit, the intellect was darkened and the will enfeebled.14

The corruption of nature caused by original sin must have been far greater in Adam than it is in his descendants, and for two reasons:—first, because of the singularly privileged status of our progenitor, and secondly, because the first or original sin, which St. Augustine calls “peccatum ineffabiliter grande,” was a voluntary personal transgression, deserving of far severer punishment than a merely inherited state. In Adam’s descendants original sin exists merely as habitual sin, in which the personal will of the individual has no share.

As for Adam and Eve, the Church piously believes that they repented and were ultimately saved.15 St. Irenæus16 defends this belief against Tatian. Rupert of Deutz’s assertion that our first parents were damned cannot be made to square with the fact that their names figure in the calendar of Saints (December 24th). Besides, the promulgation of the Protoevangelium in Paradise would seem to indicate that they were saved.

Readings:—Reinke, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Alten Testaments, Vol. II, pp. 210 sqq., Münster 1855.— *P. Scholz, Theologie des Alten Bundes, Vol. II, pp. 90 sqq.—Patrizi, De Interpret. Scriptur., 1. II, qu. 3, Rome 1876.—Schöpfer, Geschichte des Alten Testamentes, 3rd ed., pp. 40 sqq., Brixen 1907.—J. F. Driscoll, art. “Adam” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I.

Article 2

the sin of adam considered as original sin in the technical sense of the term

1. Heretical Theories and their Condemnation by the Church.—Theologically as well as historically the different heresies that have arisen in regard to original sin may be reduced to three main heads. (1) Manichæism, Priscillianism, and Pre-existentism hold that there is a sin of nature (peccatum naturale),1 but no original sin in the technical sense of the word. (2) Pelagianism teaches that there is a primeval sin, but no sin of nature and no original sin. (3) Protestantism and Jansenism contend that there is a sin of nature which is at the same time original sin, but that original sin is identical with concupiscence and destroys free-will, thereby seriously impairing human nature.

a) The earlier heresies concerning original sin all revolve around the problem of evil. The Manichæans and Priscillianists admitted the existence of a sin of nature, but attributed it to an absolutely evil principle, which they called hyle (flesh), and which, they declared, necessarily contaminates the spirit on coming in contact with it. The Pre-existentists, or Origenists, conceived natural sin as the result of a moral catastrophe in the realm of pure spirits, antedating the existence of matter. All of these writers to a greater or less extent deny the doctrine of original sin.2

b) A far more radical heresy was that of the Pelagians. They admitted that Adam sinned, but denied that his sin is transmitted to his descendants. Pelagius himself and Cœlestius3 maintained the following errors: (1) Man, as now constituted, does not differ essentially in endowment from Adam before the Fall. The only difference (an accidental one) is that personal sins are committed in the present order.4 (2) New-born infants do not bring original sin with them into the world; they are baptized not “for the forgiveness of sins,” but merely that they may be enabled to attain to the regnum coelorum, which, in the mind of these heretics, is something quite different from eternal life. (3) The sin which Adam committed in Paradise injured him, but not his descendants, except in so far as their willpower is weakened by his bad example. (4) Since Adam’s sin is not transmitted to his descendants, they cannot be punished for it. Death is not a punishment for sin, but a necessity of nature (necessitas naturae), and concupiscence is merely nature’s way of asserting itself (vigor naturae).

Few heresies were so vigorously combated from their very birth, and condemned by so many councils, as Pelagianism. During the short period from A. D. 412 (or 411) to 431 no less than twenty-four councils, in the East and in the West, denounced the new sect. Prominent among them is the Second Council of Mileve (416); its canons were taken over by a plenary council held at Carthage in 418, and approved and promulgated by Pope Zosimus in his Epistola Tractoria. Pelagianism was cut to the quick by the second canon of this council, which reads as follows: “Quicumque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde sit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis ‘in remissionem peccatorum’ non vere sed false intelligatur, anathema sit—Whoever denies that new-born infants should be baptized immediately after birth, or asserts that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins, but do not contract from Adam original sin, which must be expiated in the waters of regeneration, and that consequently the baptismal form ‘for the remission of sins’ applies to them not truly, but falsely; let him be anathema.” The Council bases this definition on Rom. 5:12 sqq., and on ecclesiastical Tradition, and concludes: “Propter hanc enim regulam fidei etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum in semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis regeneratione mundetur, quod generatione traxerunt—According to this rule of faith little children, who are as yet unable to commit actual sin, are therefore truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that by regeneration they may be cleansed of that which they have contracted by generation.”5

The Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431) imposed this teaching on all clerics under pain of deposition, and the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529) dealt Pelagianism a further blow by defining: “Si quis soli Adae praevaricationem suam, non et eius propagini asserit nocuisse, aut certe mortem tantum corporis, quae poena peccati est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae, per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transiisse testatur, iniustitiam Deo dabit contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem, etc.—If any one asserts that the prevarication of Adam injured himself only and not his progeny, or alleges that bodily death, which is the penalty of sin, but not sin, which is the death of the soul, was brought by one man upon the entire human race, he attributes an injustice to God and contradicts the Apostle, who says: ‘By one man, etc.’ ”

c) In more modern times we meet with two great heresies which misrepresented the nature of original sin by describing it as an intrinsic and radical corruption of nature. The two heresies in question are Protestantism and Jansenism. They denied free-will6 and asserted that concupiscence is the formal element of original sin.

Zwingli flatly denied that original sin involves real guilt, and thus reverted to the teaching of Pelagius, from whom, however, he differed by entirely rejecting the doctrine of free-will. Jansenism (Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel) held that original sin formally consists in concupiscence, and that every act performed without grace is sinful.7

The Protestant conception of original sin was solemnly condemned by the Tridentine Council in its supremely important Decretum de Peccato Originali.8 The first of the five canons of this decree describes the sin of Adam and the consequences which it entailed upon himself.9 Canon II defines how “sin, which is the death of the soul,”10 is transmitted from Adam to his descendants.11 Canon III defines original sin as “one in its origin, and being transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own.” Canon IV substantially repeats the second canon of the Council of Mileve,12 on the effect of infant baptism as the ordinary means of purging the soul from guilt. Canon V defines the effect of Baptism to be an actual remission of sin, and reduces the influence of concupiscence to its true bounds. We reproduce this canon in full because of its dogmatic importance: “Si quis per Iesu Christi gratiam, quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat; aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non imputari, anathema sit—If any one denies that, by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred by baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only erased or not imputed, let him be anathema.”

Consequently it is an article of faith that original sin is real sin, and that its entire guilt is blotted out by Baptism. “In renatis enim nihil odit Deus,” the Tridentine Fathers add, “quia nihil est damnationis iis, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per baptisma in mortem—In those who are born again, there is nothing that God hates, because there is no condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ by Baptism into death.”

As for the innate predisposition to sin, the fomes peccati or concupiscence which remains in man after Baptism, the Council solemnly declares: “Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit—This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood it to be called sin, as being truly and properly sin in those born again, but because it is of sin and inclines to sin. And if any one is of a contrary sentiment, let him be anathema.”

Hence it is also an article of faith that concupiscence as such is not really sin, but is merely so called by metonymy, because “it is of sin and inclines to sin.”

The Jansenist teaching on original sin was condemned as heretical by Popes Pius V, Innocent X, Clement XI, and Pius VI.

2. Scriptural Proof for the Existence of Original Sin.—The dogma of original sin implies, first, the existence of habitual sin in man from birth, and, secondly, its connexion with the sin of Adam. Adam’s sin, in as far as it was personal, could not fall on his descendants. Like his death, it was by its very nature incommunicable. Original sin is consequently not a personal sin but a sin of nature, which inheres in all human individuals as guilt, and is a true sin only in its logical connexion with Adam’s voluntary transgression of the divine command in Paradise.

a) The nature of original sin is far less sharply defined in the Old than in the New Testament. The oftquoted text Ps. 50:7: “Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis concepit me mater mea—Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me,” seems from the context to refer rather to concupiscence, i. e., the inclination which draws all men to evil, and which the Psalmist mentions in extenuation of his own unrighteousness. Some of the Fathers of the Church, it is true, quote this passage against the Pelagians,13 but in doing so their main object is to demonstrate that Adam’s sin injuriously affected his descendants. That the injury which it inflicted is identical with original sin can hardly be proved from this text, unless it be interpreted in the light of the New Testament.

A somewhat more conclusive text is Job 14:1 sqq., which was cited already by the Fathers as an argument for the existence of original sin. The passage runs as follows: “Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.… Who can make him clean that is unclean? Not one.” This is a literal translation of the Hebrew text. The Vulgate brings out the sense of the passage more clearly thus: “Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? Nonne tu qui solus es?—Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art?” The meaning plainly is: No one but God can sanctify a man conceived in ethical uncleanness, i. e., in sin. There is no question here of Levitical uncleanness. The Sacred Writer plainly means that every man is conceived in original sin, though he does not explicitly mention the relation of man’s guilt to the sin of Adam,—a relation which not even St. Paul himself emphasized on all occasions. Cfr. Eph. 2:3: “Nos … eramus natura (φύσει) filii irae, sicut et ceteri—We … were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.”

b) The locus classicus for our dogma is Rom. 5:12–21. St. Paul in this passage draws a sublime parallel between “all” (πάντες, also πολλοί) and the “one” (εἷς) who, under one aspect, is the first Adam as the author of sin and death, and under another, the second Adam (i. e., Christ) as the Father of grace and salvation. The passage may be divided into three sections, all of which clearly bring out the doctrine of original sin.

α) Consider in the first place Rom. 5:12: “Sicut per unum hominem peccatum (ἡ ἁμαρτία) in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo (εφʼ ᾧ) omnes peccaverunt—As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.”

According to the context εἷς ἄνθρωπος here can only mean Adam, who is the author of sin and death. By peccatum (ἡ ἁμαρτία) St. Paul evidently means a real sin, in the strict sense of the term, not mere concupiscence, or death as the penalty of sin. If peccatum spelled death, the text would contain a tautology: “By one man death entered into this world, and by death, death.” If it meant concupiscence (which, it is true, St. Paul in Rom. 7:17, also calls peccatum, but only by metonymy), the sense would be: “By one man concupiscence entered into this world, and by concupiscence, death.” But concupiscence is not per se sinful, much less a sin by which “all men sinned.” We must also take into consideration that Adam was not punished with death on account of his concupiscence, but for his disobedience, which was a grievous sin. The Apostle expressly says: “Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi—By the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.”14 It is quite obvious that the “sin” which, together with death, was by “one man” transmitted to all others, cannot be identical with the personal transgression of Adam. Like the death of Adam, this sin was not communicable to others, and moreover the Apostle never calls it ἁμαρτία, but sometimes παράβασις (praevaricatio), occasionally παράπτωμα (delictum), or παρακοή (inobedientia). Consequently it can only be the habitual sin of Adam (habitus peccati) which “entered into this world” through him, i. e., was by him transmitted to all his progeny.—The anacoluthic clause, εφʼ ᾧ πάντες ἧμαρτον—in whom all have sinned—is taken by the older Latin Fathers and by a number of councils as a relative sentence, and interpreted thus: “In quo [scil. uno homine, i. e., Adam] omnes peccaverunt—And in him [i. e., in this one man, Adam], all have sinned.” This may be said to embody the traditional view, since it has been the constant belief of Christians that all men sinned in Adam. Nor is there anything in the Greek text of Rom. 5:12 to disprove this construction. In New Testament Greek ἐπί is sometimes used interchangeably with ἐν, e. g., ἐπʼ ὀνόματι for ἐν ὀνόματι. Since Erasmus, however, many Catholic exegetes prefer to take ἐφʼ ὧ causally for ὅτι (ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅτι, eo quod, quia, which may be a Hebraism from כַּאֲשֶׁד). It must be admitted that this interpretation is more in conformity with the Greek idiom than the phrase ἁμαρτάνειν ἐπί (for ἐν) τινι. Nor does it in any way impair the dogmatic bearing of the text. If ἐφʼ ὧ be construed relatively, the sense of the passage is: “All men have sinned in Adam;” if causally, it means: “All men (and consequently children too) must die, because all have sinned.”

The trend of the Pauline argument therefore is: The sin of this one man Adam is exactly co-extensive with the death of the body, which entered this world in consequence of it. Now, infants too must die. This can assuredly not be a punishment for personal sins, as they are incapable of sinning. Hence they suffer the penalty of death because the habitual sin of Adam has been transmitted to them. It is this habitual sin we call original sin. Consequently all men are born in the state of original sin.

β) Proceeding with his demonstration the Apostle continues:15 “Usque ad legem enim peccatum erat in mundo; peccatum autem non imputabatur, quum lex non esset. Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri—For until the law sin was in the world; but sin was not imputed, when the law was not. But death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them also who have not sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of him who was to come.”

Though St. Paul in this passage refers to the personal transgressions of men “from Adam unto Moses” rather than to the habitual sin of our progenitor, the context shows that peccatum here again is used in the sense of moral transgression. The Apostle notes that “until the law,” that is, up to the time when the Mosaic code took effect, personal crimes were “not imputed,” i. e., not punished by death, and that nevertheless death reigned “even over them who have not (μή) sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam,” i. e., in the manner in which Adam sinned. The negative particle μή (not) is absent from some codices and Patristic citations of the passage; but modern textual criticism has fully established its authenticity. It occurs in the majority of extant MSS. as well as in the Itala, the Vulgate, and the Peshitta, and the rhetorical figure which the Apostle employs in this passage (auxesis) clearly demands it.

St. Paul evidently wishes to meet an objection which might arise from his expression “πάντες ἧμαρτον—all have sinned.” “All men have sinned personally,” it might be argued, “and therefore all men must die.” True, replies the Apostle, the men who lived “from Adam unto Moses” did commit many personal sins. But it was not on this account they had to die. For there was not then any positive law which punished personal sins by death, as was the case later under the Mosaic code. Yet “death reigned from Adam unto Moses,” even over those who (such as infants) were not guilty of personal sin. Consequently, death was not a punishment for personal sin, but for that particular ἁμαρτία which “entered into this world” through the fault of Adam, i. e., original sin.

γ) An additional argument for the existence of original sin is contained in Rom. 5:18 sq.: “Igitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius [scil. Christi] iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae. Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius hominis [scil. Adae] peccatores constituti sunt multi (ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί), ita et per unius obeditionem iusti constituentur multi (δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί)—Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just.” The Apostle’s reasoning is quite transparent. He develops the parallel between Adam and Christ, which he had begun in verse 12. The reader will note the sharp antithesis between constituti peccatores by the disobedience of Adam, and constituti iustos by the obedience of Christ. The human race (πάντες ἄνθρωποι, οἱ πολλοί) has by the sin of Adam become a race of sinners, precisely as, by the “justification of life” through Christ, it has recovered justice. Now, justification is effected by the grace of being “born again of water and the Holy Ghost;”16 consequently, the sin of Adam inheres in man from birth,—it is really and truly inherited.

It may be objected that, since “many” but not all were justified by and in Christ, so a pari “many,” but not all men were tainted by the sin of Adam, namely those who imitated Adam’s sinful conduct. But St. Paul expressly rejects this construction. Moreover, there is a perfect parity between “being born” and “being born again;” for as no man contracts original sin except by descent from Adam, so no man is justified except he be born again of the Holy Ghost. That the number of individuals in the two contrasted groups is unequal, is due to the fact that descent from Adam is inevitable, while spiritual regeneration depends upon a voluntary act, i. e., the reception of the Sacrament of Baptism.17

3. The Argument from Tradition.—Belief in the existence of original sin dates back to Apostolic times. This can be shown: (a) from the constant practice of infant Baptism, and (b) from the verbal teaching of the Fathers.

a) The necessity of infant Baptism (paedobaptismus) has always been regarded as a conclusive argument for the existence of original sin. Baptism of its very nature is a sacrament instituted “for the forgiveness of sins.”18 If, therefore, new-born infants must be baptized “for the forgiveness of sins,” and their sin, unlike that of adults, cannot be personal sin, then it must be original sin. This argument, which St. Augustine effectively employed against Bishop Julian of Eclanum,19 was extremely repugnant to the Pelagians.20

Origen testifies to the early practice of baptizing infants in order that they might obtain forgiveness of their sins.21 St. Cyprian says: “Si a baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur, quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans, qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contraxit—Since nobody is denied baptism and grace, how much more ought an infant not to be denied [these benefits], who being but just born has done no sin, except that, by being descended from Adam in the flesh, he has contracted by birth the contagion of the ancient death.”22

b) In examining the positive teaching of the Fathers, it will be well to consider (α) the Western Fathers apart from (β) the Eastern. Pelagianism was an occidental growth and was almost entirely extirpated by the Latins, notably St. Augustine. The Eastern Fathers, in view of the errors of the Gnostics and Origenists, which flourished mainly in the Orient, and for fear of encouraging such false beliefs as that in the existence of an absolutely evil principle, were accustomed to speak of original sin with caution and reserve.

α) As for the pre-Augustinian period, St. Augustine23 himself calls upon antiquity as bearing witness against the Pelagians. “Non ego finxi originale peccatum, quod catholica fides credit antiquitus; sed tu [Iuliane], qui negas, sine dubio es novus haereticus—It was not I who devised the original sin, which the Catholic faith holds from ancient times; but you [he is addressing Julian], who deny it, are undoubtedly an innovating heretic.”24

Vincent of Lerins wonderingly enquires who before the time of Cœlestius ever dreamt of denying the doctrine of original sin.25 Among the most ancient testimonies is that of Tertullian, who in his favorite legal phraseology writes: “Omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donec in Christo recenseatur; peccatrix autem immunda recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate.”26

β) The belief of the Oriental Christians could not be substantially different from that of their western brethren, because the churches of the East and West at that time conjointly constituted the one true Church of Christ. In matter of fact, Irenaeus, who belonged to the East both with regard to birth and training, gives expression to the primitive faith when he writes: “Deum in primo quidem Adam offendimus (προσεκόψαμεν), non facientes eius praeceptum; in secundo autem Adam reconciliati sumus.… Neque enim alteri cuidam eramus debitores, cuius praeceptum transgressi fueramus ab initio (ὑπερέβημεν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς)—In the first Adam we offended God by disobeying His command; but in the second Adam we were reconciled.… For to no one else were we indebted for having transgressed His precept in the beginning.”27 St. Athanasius tersely declares: “In that Adam sinned, death entered the world.”28 And St. Basil29: “Because we did not abstain, we were expelled from Paradise.”30

The Pelagians made desperate efforts to claim at least one of the Greek Fathers in favor of their view. Bishop Julian of Eclanum repeatedly appeals to the authority of the “great John of Constantinople.”31 Did St. Chrysostom ignore, nay even oppose, the doctrine of original sin?32 St. Augustine triumphantly defended him against this charge. In descanting on the effects of Baptism St. Chrysostom says: “In the laver of regeneration grace touches the soul and eradicates the sin which has taken root in it.”33 But what does he mean when he writes in another of his works: “Ideo etiam infantes (τὰ παιδία) baptizamus, licet peccata34 non habeant (καίτοι ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα)”—Therefore do we also baptize little children, although they have no sins.” Augustine rightly explains that Chrysostom meant actual sins: “Intellige propria [scil. peccata] et nulla contentio est. At inquies: Cur non ipse addidit propria? Cur, putamus, nisi quia disputans in catholica ecclesia non se aliter intelligi arbitrabatur? Tali quaestione nullius pulsabatur, vobis nondum litigantibus securius loquebatur.”35 Elsewhere Chrysostom positively asserts the existence of original sin. Thus he says in his homilies on the Book of Genesis: “Christ appeared only once; he found our paternal note of indebtedness, which Adam had written (εὗρεν ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον πατρῷον, ὅτι ἔγραψεν ὁ Ἀδάμ); for it was he [Adam] who laid the foundation of the debt (τοῦ χρείους) which we have increased by subsequent [i. e., personal] sins.”36 Julian further insisted that, according to St. Chrysostom, St. Paul in employing the word “sin” merely meant the penalty of bodily death. In his commentary on Rom. 5:19 the Saint says: “What does the term ‘sinner’ mean here? It seems to me that it means one who has incurred a penalty and is condemned to death.”37 But the context shows that Chrysostom merely wishes to deny that all men became personal sinners through the sin of Adam. For in the same homily from which we have quoted he clearly admits the existence of habitual sin: “We have received out of that grace not only so much as was needed to take away the sin, but much more. For we were freed from the penalty, cast off all injustice, and re-arose as men newly-born, after the old man had been buried.… All this Paul terms a superabundance of grace, intimating that we have not only received a medicine adapted to the hurt, but health and beauty.… For Christ hath paid so much more than we owed.… Therefore, O man, doubt not if thou seest the richness of so many graces, and ask not in what manner that spark of death and sin was quenched, since a whole ocean of graces was poured out upon it.”38 St. Augustine was therefore perfectly justified in addressing Julian in such harsh words as these: “Itane ista verba S. Ioannis Episcopi audes tamquam e contrario tot taliumque sententiis collegarum eius opponere, eumque ab illorum concordissima societate seiungere et eis adversarium constituere? Absit, absit hoc malum de tanto viro credere aut dicere. Absit, inquam, ut Constantinopolitanus Ioannes de baptismate parvulorum eorumque a paterno chirographo liberatione per Christum tot ac tantis coepiscopis suis, maximeque Romano Innocentio, Carthaginiensi Cypriano, Cappadoci Basilio, Nazianzeno Gregorio, Gallo Hilario, Mediolanensi resistat Ambrosio.… Hoc [dogma] sensit, hoc credidit, hoc docuit et Ioannes.”39

It must be admitted, however, that St. Chrysostom’s interpretation “does not coincide exactly with the ideas of Augustine on the nature of original sin. He frequently repeats that the consequences or penalties of the first sin affected not only our first parents, but also their descendants, but he does not say that the sin itself was inherited by their posterity and is inherent in their nature. In general, to appreciate the homiletic teaching of Chrysostom apropos of sin it is well to remember that he had in mind Manichæan adversaries with their denial of free-will and their doctrine of physically irresistible concupiscence, an error that cut away the foundations of all morality, and one which he opposed with all his might.”40

Readings:—Greg. de Valentia, Controv. de Peccato Originali.— *Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, 1. 3 sqq.—Mariano a Novana, O. Cap., De Originaria Lapsi Hominis Conditione, Parisi 1882.—Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 30 sqq., Freiburg 1883.—A. Scher, De Universali Propagatione Originalis Culpae, Romae 1895.—Bossuet, Défense de la Tradition et des Saints Pères, VIII, 2 sqq.—Baur, Das manichäische Religionssystem, Tübingen 1831.—Mandernach, Geschichte des Priscillianismus, Trier 1851.—Klasen, Innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882.—The Anti-Pelagian Works of Saint Augustine, Translated by Peter Holmes et al., Vol. I, Preface, Edinburgh 1872. (The documents which relate to the Pelagian controversy will be found in an appendix to St. Augustine’s works edited by the congregation of St. Maur. For a full bibliography of Pelagianism consult Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 504 sq., Freiburg and St. Louis 1908.)— *Möhler, Symbolism, ch. 2 sqq., 5th English ed., London 1906.—Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, Freiburg 1875.—Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.—F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, Cambridge 1903.—S. Harent, art. “Original Sin,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI.—MacEvilly, An Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. I, 4th ed., New York 1891.—P. M. Northcote, The Curse of Adam, London 1915.

Article 3

the nature of original sin

We might fitly preface this Article with the well-known dictum of St. Augustine: “Antiquo peccato nihil est ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius.”1

That the sin of Adam indwells as a real and true guilt (reatus culpae) in all his descendants, is most assuredly an impenetrable mystery. While the Church has never dogmatically defined the nature of original sin, she teaches: (1) that it exists as a real and proper sin in every human being in consequence of his descent from Adam;2 (2) that Baptism removes whatever is of the nature of sin;3 and (3) that the concupiscence which remains after Baptism does not partake of the nature of guilt.4

It is within these clearly defined limits, therefore, that we must seek for the constitutive elements of original sin. The Church tells us in what the essence of original sin does not consist; it remains for scientific theology to ascertain its true nature. In the following series of systematic theses we shall endeavor as far as possible to go to the root of the problem.

Thesis I: Original sin does not descend as a substantial form from Adam to his progeny, constituting man an incarnate image of the Devil

This is de fide.

Proof. The heretical view opposed to this thesis was held by the Lutheran theologian Mathias Flacius Illyricus (+ 1575), head of the so-called “Substantiarians,” who contended that the sin of Adam intrinsically transformed the soul into a sinful substance and an image of Satan, comparing it to “wine which turns into vinegar.” Illyricus was opposed in his own camp by a school called “Accidentarians.” Being little more than a revamped Manichæism, his theory stands and falls with the ancient heresy asserting the absolute nature of evil. “Malum illud,” says St. Augustine, “quod quaerebam, unde esset, non est substantia; quia si substantia esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorruptibilis substantia, magnum utique bonum; aut substantia corruptibilis, quae nisi bona esset, corrumpi non posset—That evil, the origin of which I have been so long seeking for, is no substance; for if it were a substance, it would be good. For it would either be an incorruptible substance; a great good indeed; or it would be a corruptible substance, which if it were not good could not be corrupted.”5 The theory of the Substantiarians has not even the recommendation of novelty, for it substantially agrees with the teaching of the Euchites or Messalians, which was condemned by the Third General Council of Ephesus, A. D. 431.6 It is unnecessary to point out the absurd consequences to which this error leads, not only with regard to the doctrine of the Creation, but likewise in Anthropology and Christology.7

Thesis II: Concupiscence as such does not constitute the essence of original sin

Proof. This thesis is also de fide.8 It is aimed at the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth century (Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon), and against the Jansenists (particularly Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel), who depicted concupiscence in lurid colors and asserted that it is a formal sin and original sin.9 This theory was condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent.10

The orthodox doctrine on the subject of concupiscence is based upon the Epistles of St. Paul and the teaching of the Fathers, notably St. Augustine.

a) St. Paul expressly declares that Baptism obliterates whatever is sinful and deserving of reprobation in man. Rom. 6:4: “Consepulti sumus cum illo [scil. Christo] per baptismum in mortem—We are buried together with him [i. e., Christ] by baptism into death.” Rom. 8:1: “Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est11 iis, qui sunt in Christo Iesu—There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.” We know from experience that concupiscence remains in man even after baptism; hence concupiscence cannot be a sin, and least of all original sin.

Jansenism can be triumphantly refuted from the writings of St. Augustine, whom it professes to follow. It is quite true St. Augustine, like St. Paul,12 calls concupiscence sin; but he manifestly does not mean that it is a sin in the strict sense of the term, except by the free consent of the will. “Peccati nomen accepit concupiscentia,” he says quite unmistakably, “quod ei consentire peccatum est—Concupiscence has received the name of sin, because it is a sin to consent to it.”13 In fact, St. Augustine anticipated the authentic declaration given by the Tridentine Council, that the reason why St. Paul calls concupiscence sin is because it “is of sin and inclines to sin.”14 “Sic autem,” he writes, “vocatur peccatum, quia peccato facta est, quum iam in regeneratis non sit ipsa peccatum; sic vocatur lingua locutio, quam facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam facit manus—As arising from sin, it is called sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually sin; and it has this designation applied to it, just as speech which the tongue produces is itself called tongue, and just as the word hand is used in the sense of writing, which the hand produces.”15 And again: “Restat ergo [in baptizatis] cum carne conflictus, quia deleta est iniquitas, sed manet infirmitas—There remains, therefore, a conflict with the flesh [in those who are baptized], because, while unrighteousness is wiped out, infirmity remains.”16

We may add the following theological argument. It is possible to conceive a state of pure nature in which concupiscence would be neither a sin nor original sin; consequently, original sin is not identical with concupiscence.17

b) If original sin is not concupiscence, neither is it identical with the hereditary evils brought upon the human race by the misconduct of Adam.18 There can be no original sin without moral guilt. Mere penalties are not sins, they presuppose sin.

Some of the earlier Schoolmen19 believed that original sin is a positive quality (morbida qualitas) which is transmitted from the infected body to the soul and asserts itself in the form of concupiscence. A few Scholastic theologians derived this contagious disease from the poisonous juices of the forbidden apple which Adam ate in Paradise, or from the pestilential breath of the serpent which seduced Eve. This untenable theory bears a striking resemblance to that of the Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century. There is, however, an essential difference between the two. Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini, and the other representatives of this school expressly teach that concupiscence (which they identify with original sin) loses its sinful character in those who are regenerated by Baptism. But this very consideration should have convinced them that concupiscence cannot be identical with original sin even before justification, because the morbida qualitas remains after Baptism without losing its intrinsic nature.20

Hermes21 gathered up as into a sheaf the various heresies of Luther, Zwingli, and Baius. He held that “original sin is a disposition common to all natural descendants of Adam and Eve in consequence of their descent from these sinful progenitors, and which, in course of time, produces an inevitable dissonance between reason and the senses.”22

Thesis III: It is highly improbable that, as certain eminent theologians hold, original sin consists exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the actual sin of Adam conceived as morally enduring

Proof. The theory23 rejected in this thesis is based upon a peculiar conception of habitual sin.

a) Theologians and moral philosophers rightly distinguish between actual sin (peccatum actuale) and habitual sin (peccatum habituale). Actual sin (sin as an act) is the cause of habitual sin (sin as a state), because a sinful action produces a state of enmity with God. Now, while the majority of Catholic divines define habitual sin as a privation of sanctifying grace,24 the writers whose particular theory we are here considering regard the loss of sanctifying grace merely as a punishment for sin, not as a sinful state.25 In this hypothesis the nature of habitual sin cannot consist in the loss of grace. In what, then, does it consist? De Lugo answers: “Peccatum habituale est ipsum peccatum actuale moraliter perseverans, physice autem praeteritum, in ordine ad reddendum hominem rationabiliter exosum Deo.”26 Since original sin is plainly not an actual sin committed by him in whom it indwells, but merely a sinful state traceable to Adam, the same theologian consistently defines it as “ipsum peccatum actuale Adae moraliter perseverans, quamdiu parvulis non condonatur, in ordine ad reddendos eos rationabiliter exosos Deo.”27 This morally enduring fault and its imputability is the reason why God withholds the jewel of sanctifying grace from every child at the moment of its conception. In other words, privation of grace is not the constitutive element of habitual sin, but merely a penalty due to it. This theory has been defended by a number of subtle arguments, which may be summed up as follows: (1) In the state of pure nature there would be habitual sins which would not entail the loss of sanctifying grace; consequently the privatio gratiae cannot constitute the essence of sin. (2) Habitual sins may be venial sins, and in that case they do not entail the loss of supernatural grace; consequently, and a pari, habitual mortal sin (and therefore also original sin) does not essentially consist in the loss of supernatural grace. (3) It is far more consistent and more satisfactory to consider the loss of grace as a cessation of divine friendship, and therefore as a punishment for sin, rather than as a sin in itself. (4) If the privation of grace constituted the essence of habitual sin, repeated mortal sins would produce but one habitual sin, because sanctifying grace can be lost only once. In other words, all habitual mortal sins would be specifically equal to, or would constitute, but one sin,—which is absurd. For the solution of these subtle difficulties we refer the student to Palmieri.28

b) The theory which we have just expounded, especially the exaggerated form in which it was championed by Ambrosius Catharinus and Albertus Pighius, is inadmissible: (1) On account of the dogmatic consequences which it involves, and (2) because it does not fully square with the Tridentine teaching.

In its more moderate form, as propounded by Salmeron, Toletus, and especially De Lugo,29 this theory is less objectionable, because these writers make two admissions which insure the orthodoxy of their system even if the Church should one day define it as an article of faith that the privation of grace enters into the formal essence of original sin.30 These admissions are: (1) That the sin of Adam is morally at least a real sin also in his descendants, and (2) that original sin cannot be conceived without a privatio gratiae. Ambrosius Catharinus maintains that original sin consists exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the sin of Adam, and that his descendants, therefore, are not really sinners (ab intrinseco) but are merely so called by a sort of divine imputation, somewhat after the manner in which, in the Lutheran view of justification, man does not become internally justified by Baptism, but merely seizes the extrinsic justice of Christ and with it, as with a cloak of grace, covers the sinful nakedness of his soul. It is true that Catharinus refers to the privation of grace as a penalty of original sin; but he fails to establish any organic and necessary connexion between the two. Unlike De Lugo, he omits to accentuate the fact that the loss of sanctifying grace is ex vi notionis an essential consequence of original sin.

However, De Lugo’s theory, too, is open to objection. It fails to account for the individual guilt of original sin as an intrinsic (privative) quality, and does not get beyond the extrinsic imputation of the sin of Adam. If original sin in its formal essence were but the actual sin of Adam in so far as it morally continues in his descendants until forgiven by Baptism, it could not strike root in the souls of infants and exist in them as individual, physically inhering sin. The only quality of original sin that inheres in the individual, according to this theory, is the privation of grace, and this De Lugo and his school do not conceive as the substance, but merely as a penalty of original sin. This view can hardly be harmonized with the fundamental conception underlying the Tridentine definition, to wit, that original sin is “transfusum omnibus et inest unicuique proprium,”31 and that those affected with it “propriam iniustitiam contrahunt.”32 The Council goes even further than that; it adds that unrighteousness follows natural birth in precisely the same manner in which righteousness follows regeneration. This gives rise to the antithesis between nasci and contrahere propriam iniustitiam on the one hand, and renasci and iustum fieri gratiâ Christi on the other. Now the essence of justification consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace; and if this be true, then original sin (like habitual sin in general) essentially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. Thus the theory of De Lugo, and a fortiori that of Catharinus, falls to pieces.

Thesis IV: Original sin essentially consists in privation of grace, so far as this is voluntary in all men through the will of their progenitor

This proposition embodies a common teaching of Catholic theologians.

Proof. We have to show: (1) that privation of grace (privatio gratiae) constitutes the essence of original sin, and (2) that, through its causal relation to the sin of Adam, it involves guilt on the part of all who are affected by it. These two elements, viz., privation of grace and the origin of this privation in voluntary guilt, together constitute original sin.

1. As regards the first of these elements, it follows from the preceding thesis that the privatio gratiae is not merely a punishment, but original sin itself. Because of the importance of this proposition we shall restate the argument in a somewhat different form.

a) It is an article of faith that infant Baptism so completely obliterates original sin, qua guilt, that nothing odious or damnable remains in the regenerate infant.33 This effect is produced solely by sanctifying grace, which Baptism infuses into the soul of the child. “Nam sicut revera homines, nisi ex semine Adae propagati nascerentur, non nascerentur iniusti, quum eâ propagatione … propriam iniustitiam contrahunt: ita nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam iustificarentur, quum eâ renascentiâ per meritum passionis eius gratia, qua iusti fiunt, illis tribuatur.34 Consequently original sin, considered as habitual sin, consists essentially in privation of grace, whereby the child becomes an enemy of God, just as he is constituted a friend of God by the sanctifying grace conferred in Baptism.

b) Following in the footsteps of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 528) the Tridentine Fathers teach35 that original sin is “the death of the soul” (mors animae). Now, in the present economy of grace, the only way in which the soul can die is by being deprived of its supernatural life-principle, which is sanctifying grace. Let us put the argument into the form of an equation: privatio gratiae ═ mors animae ═ peccatum originale; consequently, peccatum originale est privatio gratiae.

c) According to the teaching of St. Paul36 original sin and justification are opposed to each other as contraries; to deny the one is to affirm the other, and vice versa. Now, if sanctifying grace constitutes divine sonship or justice, then the absence of this grace (due to the guilt of Adam) must constitute the state of enmity with God, usually called original sin.

d) We arrive at the same result by the method of elimination. The state of original justice in Paradise comprised the following factors: (1) Sanctifying grace as the primary element of original justice, (2) integrity of nature (immunitas a concupiscentia) as its secondary element, and (3) bodily immortality and impassibility as its tertiary element.37 By original sin Adam forfeited all these prerogatives for himself and the whole human race, and they were superseded by their contraries, viz.: privation of grace, concupiscence, mortality, and possibility. Among these evils death and suffering are assuredly not sins, but merely inherited evils, or, to speak more accurately, penalties of sin. Concupiscence cannot constitute the substance of original sin, because the Church teaches that it remains in the soul after Baptism.38 Consequently privation of grace must be the formal essence of original sin.

These convincing arguments have led the majority of theologians to adopt the view formulated in our thesis.39

2. To render privation of grace a sin, another factor must co-operate, namely the ratio voluntarii, i. e., freely incurred guilt. Although sanctifying grace, even in baptized infants, is doubtless more than a mere physical ornament of the soul (viz.: moral righteousness and sanctity, gratia sanctificans, iustificans), its loss involves real guilt only when it is due to a sinful act of voluntary renunciation. For every habitual sin postulates an actual sin, every guilt a moral crime, the death of the soul a sinful act of murder. To deny this fundamental principle of moral philosophy would be equivalent to Manichæism.40 Consequently, original sin, too, being real guilt, must have for its efficient cause a sinful act. Where are we to look for this sinful act? In the case of infants it surely cannot be a personal sin, since an infant is guilty of original sin before he is able to commit a sinful personal act. The sin which causes privation of grace in an infant, therefore, can be none other than the sin of Adam in Paradise, constituting in some way or other a real guilt in the infant as well. This is precisely the teaching of St. Paul. Rom. 5:12: “Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit—By one man sin entered into this world.” Rom. 5:19: “Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi—By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.” This is also the unanimous and firm belief of the Fathers of the Church. In the words of St. Augustine: “Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum—For we were all in that one man, when we were all [identical with] that one man who through a woman fell into sin.”41

3. To the question, why the sin of Adam inheres as a true sin, i. e. as real guilt (reatus culpae) in all his decendants, we can only reply that this is a mystery which theological speculation is unable to explain. The following considerations are commonly adduced to refute certain philosophical objections.

It was the will of God that Adam should be physically and juridically the head of the human race, and, as such, should act as its representative. God had given him original justice and its concomitant preternatural prerogatives not only as a personal privilege, but as a heritage which he was to transmit to all his descendants. In other words, original justice was essentially hereditary justice, original sanctity was essentially hereditary grace, and a privilege given to human nature as such.42 Consequently, hereditary grace and human nature were from the first causally related. The nexus existing between them was based neither on metaphysical necessity nor on any legal claim, but was instituted by the free will of God. When Adam voluntarily renounced original justice, he acted not for himself alone, but as the representative of his race, as the moral and juridical head of the whole human family. Thus the loss of original justice was essentially a privation of hereditary justice, and as such tantamount to a voluntary renunciation on the part of human nature of its supernatural heritage. This voluntary renunciation involves an hereditary guilt, which is voluntary on the part of each and every individual human being, because Adam, acting as head and progenitor of the race, rejected sanctifying grace in the name of his entire progeny. Consequently original sin is not a personal sin, but a sin of nature, conditioned upon our generic relation to Adam, who, contrary to the will of God, despoiled human nature of grace and thereby rendered it hostile to its Creator.

It will be worth while to support this explanation by theological authorities. St. Anselm of Canterbury, who is called the Father of Scholasticism, writes luminously as follows: “In Adamo omnes peccavimus, quando ille peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est necessitas, ut cum essemus peccaremus: quoniam per unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi.”43 St. Thomas Aquinas says with his usual clearness: “Sicut autem est quoddam bonum, quod respicit naturam, et quoddam quod respicit personam, ita etiam est quaedam culpa naturae et quaedam personae. Unde ad culpam personae requiritur voluntas personae, sicut patet in culpa actuali, quae per actum personae committitur. Ad culpam vero naturae non requiritur nisi voluntas in natura illa. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod defectus illius originalis iustitiae, quae homini in sua creatione collata est, ex voluntate hominis accidit. Et sicut illud naturae donum fuit et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum homine in iustitia permanente, ita etiam privatio illius boni in totam naturam perducitur quasi privatio et vitium naturae; ad idem genus privatio et habitus referuntur. Et in quolibet homine rationem culpae habet ex hoc, quod per voluntatem principii naturae, i. e. primi hominis, inductus est talis defectus.”44 Blessed Odo of Cambrai (+ 1113) graphically describes the difference between personal sin and sin of nature as follows: “Peccatum, quo peccavimus in Adam, mihi quidem naturale est, in Adam vero personale. In Adam gravius, levius in me; nam peccavi in eo non qui sum, sed quod sum. Peccavi in eo non ego, sed hoc quod sum ego; peccavi homo, non Odo; peccavi substantia, non persona. Et quia substantia non est nisi in persona, peccatum substantiae est etiam personae, sed non personale. Peccatum vero personale est, quod facio ego, qui sum, non hoc quod sum; quo pecco Odo, non homo; quo pecco persona, non natura. Sed quia persona non est sine natura, peccatum personae est etiam naturae, sed non naturale.”45

The logical and theological possibility of original sin therefore depends upon three separate and distinct conditions: (1) The existence of a supernatural grace which was not due to human nature, and the absence of which entails enmity with God, i. e., a state of sin; (2) The existence of an ontological nexus by which Adam and his descendants constitute a moral unity or monad; (3) The existence of a positive divine law conditioning the preservation or loss of hereditary grace upon the personal free-will of our progenitor as the head and representative of the whole human family.

God cannot be charged with cruelty or injustice on account of original sin, for He denies fallen man nothing to which his nature has a just claim. Adam’s headship was divinely intended for the purpose of transmitting original justice (not original sin) to all his descendants. God did not cause but merely permitted the Fall of man, perhaps with a view of making it the source of still greater blessings, such as the Incarnation, Redemption, grace, etc. O felix culpa, o certe necessarium Adae peccatum!

4. The Contractual and the Alligation Theories.—To facilitate a deeper understanding of the community of nature and will that unites Adam with the members of his family, there have been excogitated two separate and distinct theories, one of which is called the theory of Contract, the other, the theory of Alligation. The contractual theory (sometimes also called “Federalism”), holds that God made a formal contract with Adam to this effect: If you preserve hereditary justice, it will be transmitted to all your descendants; but if you forfeit it, you will involve yourself and your posterity in misery and sin.46 According to the other theory, God by a decretum alligativum so bound up the will of all of Adam’s descendants with that of their progenitor that the will of Adam became the will of his family, just as under the civil law a free-will act of a guardian is considered equivalent to that of his ward.

It seems to us, however, that neither of these theories contributes anything to a profounder appreciation of the nature of original sin. If the causal nexus existing between Adam and his descendants was a positive ordinance of God, there was no need of a contract or decretum alligativum. If, on the other hand, we deny the existence of such a causal nexus, the transmission of Adam’s sin by inheritance becomes absolutely unintelligible. A breach of contract might result in an evil of nature, but it could never produce a sin of nature, while the inclusion of the will of Adam’s descendants in that of their progenitor per se can constitute only a nexus conditionis, but never a nexus unitatis. Revelation furnishes no basis whatever for such hypotheses, and Dominicus Soto is right in treating them as “fictions.”47

One more important observation and we shall close. We have explained that original sin formally consists in privation of grace and that concupiscence is merely a resulting penalty. St. Thomas and several other eminent theologians regard concupiscence as an integral though secondary constituent of original sin, in fact as its materia (its forma being absence of grace).48 The Angelic Doctor explains this as follows: Every habitual sin embraces two essential elements: (1) A turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and (2) a turning to the creature (conversio ad creaturam). The first is the formal, the second the material element. In the case of original sin, this turning to the creature manifests itself most drastically in concupiscence, and therefore concupiscence enters as an integral constituent into the essence of original sin and is thereby sharply differentiated from other evils such as mortality, suffering, diabolical or external temptation, etc. In matter of fact concupiscence, though not in itself sinful, lies very near the line that divides the physical from the moral order; so much so that even its unconscious movements (motus primoprimi) are, materialiter, opposed to the moral law, and escape being sins only by the circumstance that the will withholds its formal consent. It is in this sense we must understand St. Augustine, when he speaks of a reatus concupiscentiae, as for instance in the following passage: “Cuius concupiscentiae reatus in baptismate solvitur, sed infirmitas manet, cui donec sanetur, omnis fidelis, qui bene proficit, studiosissime reluctatur”.49 This view, which was adopted by some of the Schoolmen, must not be confounded with the heretical teaching of the Protestant Reformers, or with that of the Jansenists.50 The Tridentine Council originally intended to defend this Scholastic view against its opponents by adding to its first draft of the Decretum de Peccato Originali the words: “Non improbare Synodum eorum theologorum assertionem, qui aiunt, manere post baptismum partem materialem peccati originalis [scil. concupiscentiam], non formalem.” This clause was, however, omitted from the final draft of the decree.51

Readings:— *Schlünkes, Wesen der Erbsünde, Ratisbon 1863.—Hurter, Compend. Theol. Dogmat., t. II, n. 407 sqq., Oeniponte 1896. (S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 398 sqq.).—G. Pell, Das Dogma von der Sünde und Erlösung im Lichte der Vernunft, Ratisbon 1886.— *Scheeben, Mysterien des Christentums, §§ 40 sqq., 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912.—J. H. Busch, Das Wesen der Erbsünde nach Bellarmin und Suarez, Paderborn 1909.—S. Harent, art. “Original Sin” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI.—C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schöpfung, pp. 360 sqq., Ratisbon 1910.—P. J. Toner, “Matter and Form of Original Sin,” in the Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1911), pp. 186–195.

Article 4

how original sin is transmitted

1. The Specific Unity of Original Sin.—Our guiding principle in this Article must be that original sin is specifically one in all men, and that it comes down to us from the first sin of our proto-parents in Paradise. By its peculiar mode of transmission original sin is numerically multiplied as many times as there are children of Adam born into the world. Yet in each and every one of these there inheres one and the same specific sin, i. e., the sin of Adam, with no difference either of essence or degree so far as gravity is concerned. Such is the express teaching of the Church. “Hoc Adae peccatum,” says the Tridentine Council, “quod origine unum est, propagatione transfusum, omnibus inest unicuique proprium—This sin of Adam, one in its origin, being transfused into all by propagation, is in each one as his own.”1

It is a controverted question among theologians whether original sin derives solely from Adam or from both Adam and Eve as its efficient cause; or, rather, whether there would be an original sin if Eve alone had fallen. Holy Scripture seems to answer this question in the negative; for whenever it refers to original sin, it speaks of it as the “sin of Adam” (peccatum Adami) or the “sin of one man” (peccatum unius hominis).2 In point of fact Adam alone was qualified to act as the head and representative of the human race. The apparently dissentient text Ecclus. 25:33: “A muliere initium factum est peccati et per illam omnes morimur—From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die,” is merely a statement of the historic fact that Eve seduced her husband. Hence, in the words of St. Thomas, “Original sin is not contracted from the mother, but from the father. Accordingly, if Adam had not sinned, even though Eve had, their children would not have contracted original sin; the case would be different if Adam had sinned and Eve had not.”3 It remains to be explained how original sin is transmitted from Adam to his descendants.

2. The Transmission of Original Sin by Natural Generation.—To solve this problem we must first examine in what way the nature of Adam is transmitted to his descendants. The answer obviously is—by sexual generation. By this same act the child also contracts natural or original sin. The Catholic formula for this truth reads: “Generatione contrahitur peccatum,”4 or: “Adae peccatum propagatione transfusum,”5 which is diametrically opposed to the Pelagian heresy that “sin is transmitted by imitation, not by propagation.”6

Original sin can be transmitted only by the natural mode of sexual generation, i. e., the commingling of male with female, because this is the way in which all children of Adam come into being. Hence the frequent occurrence of the phrase “ex semine Adae” in the various definitions of our dogma.7 If any man, therefore, though a descendant of Adam, were not born ex semine Adae, he would not be subject to original sin. This is the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was “conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary.”8 Not so His mother, who was miraculously conceived without original sin in view of the merits of her Divine Son.9 When, as in the case of St. John the Baptist, the lack of generative power (regardless of whether it is due to female sterility or male impotency) is miraculously supplied by God, there is sexual generation, and consequently also original sin.

3. Original Sin and Creationism.—The Catholic teaching that original sin is transmitted by sexual generation contains the solution of a great difficulty, which caused St. Augustine to waver between Creationism and Generationism.10 The Pelagian argument was substantially this: A spiritual soul cannot originate otherwise than by a creative act of God. But since nothing impure can come from the hands of God, it is absurd to say that the human soul is contaminated by original sin. The solution of the difficulty is as follows: The parents engender the whole child, not merely its body. This is not, of course, to be understood in the sense that they create the spiritual soul. What they do is to produce a material substratum which is determined and disposed by the laws of nature to receive a spiritual soul. This soul, forming a constitutive element of that human nature for which the parents lay the foundation, incurs original sin, not on account of its creation by God, but in consequence of the genesial connexion of the human nature, of which it forms a part, with Adam. “Sic ergo originale peccatum est in anima,” says St. Thomas, “in quantum pertinet ad humanam naturam. Humana autem natura traducitur a parente in filium per traductionem carnis, cui postmodum anima infunditur, et ex hoc infectionem incurrit.”11 Bellarmine gives an equally clear explanation in his treatise De Amissione Gratiae: “Siquidem anima ut prius intelligitur creari a Deo, nihil habet cum Adamo ac per hoc non communicat eius peccato, sed quum in corpore generato ex Adamo incipit habitare et cum ipso corpore unum suppositum facere, tunc peccatum originis trahit.”12

It follows that original sin in the soul of a new-born babe is produced neither by Almighty God nor by the child’s parents. It is not produced by God, for He merely creates the soul, just as He would do were man in a state of pure nature, and refrains from endowing it with sanctifying grace for the sole reason that it is destined to be the substantial form of a body which is derived by generation from Adam. Nor is original sin produced by the child’s parents, because the parents merely beget a human nature, regardless of whether it is to be constituted in righteousness or sin. The efficient cause of original sin is purely and solely Adam. “Infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem,” says Aquinas.13 This is the reason why even pious and saintly parents beget their children in the state of original sin. For, as St. Augustine observes, “parents, though themselves regenerated, beget not children inasmuch as they are born of God, but inasmuch as they are still children of the world.”14

4. The Part Played by Concupiscence in the Transmission of Original Sin.—To prevent misunderstanding and to acquire a clearer notion of original sin and the manner of its propagation, we must carefully distinguish (1) between actual and habitual concupiscence, (2) between concupiscence in the begetting parents and in the begotten child, and (3) between material and formal concupiscence.

a) Whether concupiscence be conceived actually as an evil commotion, or habitually as an evil disposition, the fact that it exists both in the begetting parents and the begotten child furnishes an inductive proof of the actual transmission of original sin by sexual generation. It is an article of faith that the loss of integrity is a penalty of original sin. Had not human nature, through Adam, voluntarily renounced sanctifying grace, and with it all the preternatural prerogatives with which it was originally endowed (including the perfect dominion of reason over the lower passions), neither parents nor children would now be subject to concupiscence. The existence of concupiscence, which is the result of sin, may, therefore, from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, be taken as a certain proof for the existence of original sin, which is its underlying cause. We say, from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, for human reason would be unable to draw this conclusion without the aid of Revelation, because in the state of pure nature, which we know to be possible, concupiscence might exist without being caused by sin.

b) Taken in the more limited sense of formal concupiscence of the flesh as manifested in the act of sexual generation, concupiscence is not the proper cause of the transmission of original sin, nay it is not even a necessary condition of such transmission. We know from Divine Revelation that the principal cause of original sin is the transgression of Adam. Sexual generation, whether accompanied by concupiscence or not, is merely instrumental.

St. Augustine, instead of regarding concupiscence as a mere mode, or an inevitable concomitant, of sexual generation (in the state of fallen nature), held it to be the instrumental cause of original sin. Such at least seems to be the tenor of a number of passages in his writings; e. g.: “The very embrace which is honorable and permitted, cannot be effected without the ardor of concupiscence.… Now from this concupiscence whatever comes into being by natural birth is tied and bound by original sin.”15 It was due to the influence of this great Doctor (who, as we have pointed out before, found himself unable to form a definite opinion with regard to the comparative merits of Generationism and Creationism),16 that Peter Lombard and others of the Schoolmen unduly exaggerated the part played by concupiscence in the transmission of original sin.17 Even if a child were miraculously begotten without concupiscence on the part of its parents, it would yet be tainted by original sin, because born of the seed of Adam. Such a child would come into the world precisely like other children,—not in a state of pure nature, nor yet in the state of sanctifying grace, but defiled by original sin; and it would consequently need Baptism just as much as any other child. Consequently the “ardor of concupiscence” is not a necessary condition, much less the instrumental cause, of original sin.

c) In its material sense, however, i. e., as sexual commerce, or the conjugal embrace, concupiscence is the instrumental cause of original sin, because original sin is transmitted by sexual generation. It is in this sense that the Fathers of the Church, and especially St. Augustine, say that where there is no concupiscence of the flesh, there is no original sin. They take absentia concupiscentiae as meaning sine opere viri, or sine amplexu maritali.18 Jesus Christ is the only man who was thus conceived.19

Readings:— *Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg.), De Peccato Originali, cap. 3.—Katschthaler, Theol. Dogmat. Specialis, Vol. II, Ratisbon 1878.—Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1901.

Article 5

the penalties of original sin

Although the penalties of original sin are practically the same for Adam’s descendants as they were for Adam himself, there is a difference in degree. Our first parents deserved a severer punishment for their actual transgression than their unfortunate descendants, who have committed no personal fault but are merely tainted by inherited guilt. The sin of our first parents was a mortal sin, while that with which their descendants are born is merely a sin of nature, and consequently, in point of co-operation, there is less guilt in original sin than even in the smallest venial sin. This is the express teaching of St. Thomas.1

But why does God, who punishes venial sin only with purgatory, visit original sin with eternal damnation? For the reason that, in the words of Francis Sylvius, original sin by its very nature imports privation of justice, and he who is infected with it lacks that grace by which alone the punishment can be lifted.2

1. The Penalties of Original Sin in the Wayfaring State.—In order to gain a clear notion of the effects of original sin, let us consider an unbaptized infant. He is free from personal guilt, mortal or venial, and tainted solely by the stain of original sin. A consideration of his condition here below and his fate in the next world, should he die before receiving Baptism, will give us a good idea of the nature of original sin and the penalties which it entails.

Divine Revelation enables us to reduce the effects of original sin in the status viae to four distinct groups, all of which are penalties until Baptism removes their guilt and together with it their characteristic as a punishment; some of them, however, continue as mere consequences of original sin even after Baptism.

a) By far the worst effect of original sin in the theological order is the privation of sanctifying grace,3 which involves the loss of all its supernatural concomitants, such as adoptive sonship, the theological virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, etc.4 The privation of these strictly supernatural gifts, entailing as it does the loss of all claim to Heaven and of the right to actual graces (these can, however, be regained by Baptism), plainly bears the stamp of a just punishment. But even in the privatio gratiae there is besides the element of guilt also an element of punishment.

Privation of grace implies (1) the turning away of man from God (aversio hominis a Deo), which constitutes the nature of original sin as such; (2) a turning away of God from man (aversio Dei ab homine), i. e., the anger and indignation of God against the sinner, which constitutes the punishment for sin,—a punishment that manifests itself in the privation of sanctifying grace. It is in this latter sense that St. Thomas teaches: “Conveniens poena peccati originalis est subtractio gratiae et per consequens visionis divinae.”5 And again: “Subtractio originalis iustitiae habet rationem poenae.”6

b) The most disastrous effect of original sin in the moral order is concupiscence, so touchingly described by St. Paul7 as “the law of sin that is in my members.”8 Second among the evil effects of original sin, because most intimately related to concupiscence, is the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Not only does man’s tendency to evil furnish evident proof of the existence of original sin,9 but concupiscence even in its unpremeditated stirrings—including the irascible passions—not only furnishes the occasion for a large number of actual sins, but leads directly to material sins.10 It is for this reason that St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans calls concupiscence sin, and St. Thomas Aquinas treats it as an integral constituent—more specifically as the material component—of original sin.

c) In the physical order, death, passibility, the suffering caused by disease, unhappiness, etc., are not mere consequences but also penalties of original sin; and this is as true of every man born in the state of original sin as it was of Adam himself. Chief among these evils is the death of the body, which in most of the Scriptural texts dealing with the subject is emphasized as the typical penalty of sin in the physical order.11 The Council of Trent describes this whole category of evils by the phrase, “mors et poenae corporis.”12

Special mention must be made of the disturbed relation of fallen man to nature, especially to the animal kingdom. In enumerating the prerogatives enjoyed by Adam in Paradise, the Roman Catechism expressly says that he ruled over the brute creation. This teaching is well supported by Gen. 1:26 sqq. Adam forfeited this prerogative both for himself and his descendants, but through the merits of Jesus Christ it was restored in a limited degree and by way of exception to certain of the Saints (St. Francis of Assisi, among others).

d) Another, extrinsic, penalty of original sin is the dominion of Satan, under which humanity has groaned ever since the Fall. In casting off the divine law man voluntarily shouldered the galling yoke of the Devil and became his slave. 2 Pet. 2:19: “A quo enim quis superatus est, huius et servus est—For by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave.” The Fall of our first parents inaugurated the diabolical regimen which caused Christ to describe Satan as “the prince of this world,”13 while St. Paul went so far as to refer to him as “the god of this world.”14 With the Fall also began the temptation of man by the Devil, the worship of demons, idolatry, the deception practiced by pagan oracles, diabolical possession, etc.15

It is interesting to note that the Tridentine Council refers to the captivitas diaboli as the cause of death, and speaks of the Devil as exercising a “reign of death.”16 What are we to understand by this “reign of death”? Surely something more than bodily decay. It means the power of evil, which is quite as truly a reign of death as the dominion of Jesus Christ is a power unto life. “The opposition of life and death,” remarks Glossner, “is personified in Christ on the one hand, and in the Devil on the other. Christ is the author and ruler of life, because He is life itself. The Devil is irretrievably doomed to eternal death by his personal conduct, and is consequently ‘the prince of death,’ the ruler of the ‘empire of death.’ ”17

2. The Dogma of Free-Will.—It is an article of faith that even in the state of original sin man retains full liberty of choice between good and evil.

Liberty in general is immunity either (1) from external compulsion (libertas a coactione), or (2) from inward necessitation (libertas a necessitate). Free-will embraces both and may therefore be explained as active indifference of doing or not doing a thing (libertas contradictionis sive exercitii), of doing it thus or otherwise (libertas specificationis), of doing what is good or what is evil (libertas contrarietatis). The last-mentioned kind of liberty is not a prerogative, but a defect of free-will. The libertas contradictionis constitutes the complete essence of free-will; for he who is able freely to will or not to will, is eo ipso also able to will this particular thing or that. Hence the term free-will (liberum arbitrium, libertas indifferentiae). The necessity consequent upon a free act does not destroy, but rather includes free-will, and is therefore called necessitas consequences s. consequentiae, in contradistinction to necessitas antecedens s. consequentis, which determines the will.18 As soon as the will, by determining itself, has performed a free act, this act becomes a historical fact and cannot be undone. This is what is called historical necessity. There is another kind of necessity, termed hypothetical, which does not destroy the liberty of the will; for to will an end one must needs will those means without which the end cannot be attained. A traveller who insists on visiting a city which can be reached in no other way than by water, must necessarily choose the water route, though he may enjoy untrammeled liberty of choice with regard to his starting point and different lines of steamers. The distinction between physical and ethical freedom of choice does not affect substance but merely extension. Physical liberty extends to morally indifferent actions, such as walking, reading, writing, and so forth, whereas ethical liberty refers solely to such actions as are morally good or bad. The theologian is concerned with ethical liberty only, and our thesis is that man enjoys freedom of choice between good and bad even in the state of original sin.

a) Luther asserted that ethical liberty was so completely destroyed by original sin that fallen man is compelled to do good or evil according as “God or the Devil rides him.” This teaching has been expressly condemned as heretical. “Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium post Adae peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, … anathema sit—If any one assert that the free will of man was lost and became extinct after the sin of Adam, let him be anathema.”19 It was on the denial of free-will that Calvin based his terrible doctrine of Predestination.

α) The dogmatic teaching of the Church is supported by all those numerous texts of Scripture which describe the human will, even in the condition in which it finds itself after the Fall, as exercising a free choice between good and evil, life and death, the worship of the true God and idolatry, and which expressly ascribe to man the power of governing his passions. To quote only a few passages: Deut. 30:19: “Testes invoco hodie coelum et terram, quod proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem, benedictionem et maledictionem; elige ergo vitam—I call heaven and earth to witness this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose therefore life.” Josue 24:15: “Optio vobis datur; eligite hodie, quod placet, cui servire potissimum debeatis, utrum diis, quibus servierunt patres vestri in Mesopotamia, an diis Amorrhaeorum, in quorum terra habitatis: ego autem et domus mea serviemus Domino—You have your choice: choose this day that which pleaseth you, whom you would rather serve, whether the gods which your fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of the Amorrhites, in whose land you dwell: but as for me and my house we will serve the Lord.” Gen. 4:7: “Sub te erit appetitus eius, et tu dominaberis illius—The lust thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” There are many other passages in which Holy Scripture postulates liberty of choice by commanding or suggesting something conditioned upon man’s free will. Cfr., e. g., Matth. 19:17: “Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata—If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” St. Paul freely admits the existence of a moral and religious aptitude even in pagan nations, thereby indirectly teaching the doctrine of free-will.20

β) As regards the Fathers, Calvin himself admits that they unanimously defend free-will. The Greek Fathers21 speak of the αὐτεξούσιον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως quite as often as their Latin colleagues of the liberum arbitrium.22 St. Augustine, on whom the Jansenists pretend to base their heterodox teaching, occasionally alludes to “a decline of free-will in consequence of original sin”;23 but the liberty he has in view is not the natural ethical liberty of the will; it is the freedom from concupiscence which our first parents enjoyed in Paradise and which they forfeited by original sin. Thus he says in his treatise Against Two Letters of the Pelagians: “For which of us can say that by the sin of the first man free-will perished from the human race? Through sin liberty indeed perished, but it was that liberty which was in Paradise.… For free-will is so far from having perished in the sinner, that by it all sin.”24

b) In addition to its denial of free-will, Jansenism upheld another grievous heresy, viz.: that in the state of fallen nature mere freedom from external compulsion (libertas a coactione) is sufficient to produce merit or demerit. The third of the series of condemned propositions extracted from the writings of Jansenius reads: “Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione.”25 This proposition was condemned as heretical; hence it is an article of faith that the will, to be entirely free in its actions, must not only be exempt from external compulsion, but must intrinsically determine itself; in other words, it must be absolutely free also from intrinsic necessity.26

α) Sacred Scripture accentuates the sovereignty of the will over its interior actions quite as strongly as the essential dependence of the ethical merit or demerit of our free-will actions on the absence of all manner of intrinsic necessitation. St. Paul says of him who has the choice between the married state and virginity: “Having no necessity, but having power of his own will (μὴ ἔχων ἀνάγκην, ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει περὶ τοῦ ἰδίου θελήματος).”27 And in Ecclus. 31:8 sqq., the moral value of human actions is described as necessarily conditioned by free determination: “Beatus dives, qui inventus est sine macula, et qui post aurum non abiit nec speravit in pecunia et thesauris. Quis est hic? et laudabimus eum; fecit enim mirabilia in vita sua. Qui probatus est in illo et perfectus est, erit illi gloria aeterna; qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, facere mala et non fecit—Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish: and that hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures. Who is he, and we will praise him, for he hath done wonderful things in his life. Who hath been tried thereby, and made perfect, he shall have glory everlasting. He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, and could do evil things, and hath not done them.”

β) This conception, which is based upon the most elementary moral sentiment, dominates the writings of the Fathers to such an extent that it was only by the most violent sophistry that Jansenius was able to base his heretical teaching on the utterly misunderstood dictum of St. Augustine: “Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est—We must of necessity act according to that which pleases us most.”28 By delectatio St. Augustine does not mean the unfree impulse which in the impulses called motus primo-primi overpowers the will; but that deliberate delectation which motivates the determination of the will. That a man may repel the attraction of grace as freely as he may resist the incitements of the senses, Augustine knew from his own experience, for he says in his Confessions: “Non faciebam, quod et incomparabili affectu amplius mihi place-bat—I did not do that which pleased me incomparably more.”29 At no time in his life did this great and holy Doctor ever deny free-will or teach that freedom from external compulsion is sufficient to render a moral action meritorious. “God gave free-will to the rational soul which is in man,” he says in his treatise against Fortunatus. “Thus man was enabled to have merits: if we are good by our own will, not of necessity. Since, therefore, it behooved man to be good not of necessity, but by his own will, God had to give to the soul free-will.”30

3. How Nature is “Wounded” by Original Sin. The Scholastic theory of the vulneratio naturae is based on the ancient teaching of the Church that original sin entailed a serious de terioration of both body and soul,31 and on the doctrine of various councils that it weakened and warped free-will.32

a) In attempting to estimate the extent of the injury which human nature suffered through original sin, and to determine the measure of its influence upon the attenuatio et inclinatio liberi arbitrii, St. Thomas Aquinas proceeds from the principle that fallen man—aside from original sin proper, as guilt—could experience a deterioration of his nature only with regard to those psychic faculties which are apt to be the seat of virtues, to wit: reason, will, pars irascibilis, and pars concupiscibilis. By opposing to the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance) the four contrary vices of ignorance, malice, weakness, and cupidity, the Scholastics arrived at what they called the four “wounds of nature” inflicted by original sin. It is quite obvious that free-will, too, was affected by these four vices, especially by evil concupiscence.33 Man suffers grievously from these wounds34 even after justification.

b) Theologians are not agreed as to whether these “wounds of nature” consist in an actual deterioration of the natural faculties of the soul, or merely in the privation of supernatural justice. Of course, neither of the two contending schools dreams of asserting that original sin formally annihilated any natural faculty of the soul. The more moderate school contents itself with saying that fallen nature is merely the state of pure nature into which man was thrown back, while the extreme school insists that original sin seriously impaired the natural faculties of the soul. This difference of opinion accounts for the various interpretations put upon the well-known axiom: “Natura est spoliata gratuitis et vulnerata in naturalibus.”35 The rigorists describe the relation of fallen man to man in a state of pure nature as that of a patient to one in the enjoyment of good health (aegroti ad sanum), while their opponents compare it to the relation of a man who has been stripped of his garments to one who has never had any (nudati ad nudum). A reconciliation of the two opinions is impossible except on the basis of a previous understanding with regard to the true conception of the so-called state of pure nature.36

4. The Effects of Original Sin in the Status Termini, or the Lot of Unbaptized Children.—Since original sin is not actual sin, but merely a sin of nature, the punishment inflicted on those who die while involved in it cannot consist in physical suffering (poena sensus), but simply and solely in their exclusion from the beatific vision of God (poena damni). The hypothesis that they will be punished by fire (poena ignis) must be rejected as cruel and untenable.

a) The rigoristic view alluded to in the last sentence had its defenders among the Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers. We mention only Fulgentius,37 Avitus of Vienne,38 and Pope Gregory the Great.39 It was advocated also by a few of the Schoolmen, e. g., St. Anselm,40 Gregory of Rimini41 (who was called by the opprobrious name of “torturer of little children),”42 and by Driedo,43 Petavius,44 Fr. Sylvius, and the so-called Augustinians, to whom may be added Bossuet and Natalis Alexander. St. Augustine,45 while admitting that the punishment of unbaptized children is “the mildest punishment of all,”46 yet speaks of it as ignis aeternus, so that Faure47 and others have charged him with advocating the more rigorous view.48 In matter of fact his attitude was one of uncertain hesitation. Towards the end of his life he seems to have held that the penalty pronounced in Math. 25:41: “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,” would not fall upon unbaptized children, but that, “as between reward and punishment there may be a neutral sentence of the judge.”49

b) The teaching of the Church is more clearly apparent from her dogmatic definitions than from either Scripture or Tradition. It is an article of faith that children who die unbaptized must suffer the poena damni, i. e., are deprived of the beatific vision of God. “Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”50 The arbitrary assumption, said to have been made by the Pelagians, that unbaptized infants, though deprived of the kingdom of heaven (i. e., communion with Jesus Christ and the Saints), nevertheless enjoy “eternal life” (i. e., the visio beatifica), was never admitted by the Fathers nor by the magisterium of the Church.51 “Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat,” says the Tridentine Council, “… aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam aeternam consequendam, anathema sit.”52

But do unbaptized infants also suffer the poena sensus? More specifically, are they condemned to the punishment of fire? The milder and more probable opinion is that they are not. This milder teaching is traceable to the writings of some of the earlier Fathers;53 but the Church did not emphasize it until a much later period. An important, though not ex-cathedra, decision is the dictum of Innocent III, embodied in the Corpus Iuris Canonici, that “Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus.”54 The opposition in this passage between original and actual sin on the one hand, and carentia visionis and cruciatus (i. e., poena ignis) on the other, justifies the conclusion that privation of the beatific vision (= poena damni) is the only punishment inflicted on him who has no other guilt than that involved in original sin, while he who is guilty of actual sin has to suffer the eternal torments of hell (= poena sensus). When the Jansenist pseudo-council of Pistoia ventured to ridicule the so-called limbus puerorum as a “Pelagian fiction,” Pope Pius VI solemnly declared in his dogmatic Bull “Auctorem fidei” (A. D. 1794): “Perinde ac si hoc ipso, quod qui poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum illum et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter regnum Dei et damnationem aeternam, qualem fabulabantur Pelagiani: falsa, temeraria, in scholas catholicas iniuriosa.”

But how is this teaching to be reconciled with the definition of the Council of Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or merely in original sin, at once go down to hell, to be punished unequally?”55 What is the meaning of the phrase in infernum? Does it imply that the unbaptized children are condemned to the tortures of hellfire? Impossible. To understand the definition aright we must attend to the expressly defined disparity of punishment quite as carefully as to the descensus in infernum. As there is an essential difference between original and actual sin, the disparitas poenarum held by the Church must be more than a mere difference of degree; it must be specific, which can only mean that unbaptized infants suffer the poena damni, but not the poena sensus.

As a matter of fact the pain of hellfire can be inflicted only in punishment of personal sin, because it directly affects human nature in its innate faculties and powers, and subjects not merely the supernatural and preternatural gifts a man may have, but his very nature to the punitive justice of God. “Peccato originali non debetur poena sensus,” says St. Thomas, “sed solum poena damni, scil. carentia visionis divinae. Et hoc videtur rationabile propter tria. Primo quidem quia … peccatum originale est vitium naturae, peccatum autem actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem et visio divina sunt supra naturam humanam, et ideo privatio gratiae et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam propter originale. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae et bonae eius habitudini, et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui nisi propter peccatum actuale.”56

c) In connection with the subject just discussed theologians are wont to treat the question (of considerable importance in pastoral theology) whether, in view of the dogma that unbaptized children suffer the poena damni, it is possible to entertain the hypothesis that these infants may enjoy a species of natural beatitude in the world beyond. Cardinal Bellarmine somewhat harshly calls the affirmative view heretical and lays it down as an article of faith that those children who die without the grace of Baptism are absolutely damned and will be forever deprived of supernatural as well as natural beatitude.57 The eminent Cardinal’s thesis is true in so far as man in the present economy cannot miss his supernatural without at the same time missing his natural destiny. Now, according to the dogmatic teaching of the Church he who dies in the state of original sin cannot attain to the beatific vision of God, which is his supernatural end, and consequently incurs eternal damnation (poena damni); hence it would be heretical to assume that he could escape damnation and attain to his natural end in the form of a purely natural beatitude corresponding to the status naturae purae. But Cardinal Bellarmine overlooked the fact that between these two extremes (damnation in the strict sense and natural beatitude) there is conceivable a third state, viz.: a condition of relative beatitude materially though not formally identical with natural beatitude properly so called. He who dies in the state of original sin can never formally attain to natural beatitude, because original sin remains in him and will perpetually exclude him from the kingdom of heaven; in other words, as there is no status purae naturae, so there can be for him no beatitudo purae naturae. But materially he may enjoy all those prerogatives which in some other economy would have constituted man’s natural end and happiness, viz.: a clear abstractive knowledge of God combined with a natural love of Him above all things,—such a love is in itself a source of natural beatitude. It may almost be laid down as a theological axiom that original sin, as such, cannot deprive man of those natural prerogatives which in the state of pure nature would constitute his natural end and object; but that it affects only supernatural prerogatives. For this reason St. Thomas does not hesitate to assert that the consciousness of being eternally deprived of the beatific vision of God is not even a source of tormenting pain or exceptional sadness to unbaptized children. “Omnis homo usum liberi arbitrii habens proportionatus est ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quia potest se ad gratiam praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur; et ideo si ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt illud, quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus proprios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum consequerentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae, imo magis gaudebunt de hoc, quod participabunt multum de divina bonitate in perfectionibus naturalibus.”58 This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is now shared by so many eminent theologians that it may justly be called sententia communior,59 and so far from being un-Catholic or heretical, may be entertained as highly probable.60

Readings:—St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5.— *Fr. Schmid, Quaestiones Selectae ex Theologia Dogmatica, pp. 289 sqq., Paderborn 1891.—J. R. Espenberger, Die Elemente der Erbsünde nach Augustin und der Frühscholastik, Mainz 1905.—Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill), London 1906.

Chapter III

christian angelology

Human reason may conjecture the existence of pure spirits but is unable to demonstrate it by cogent arguments.1 What knowledge we possess of the Angels is based entirely on Divine Revelation,2 and for this reason we will treat of them under the title of Christian Angelology, in contradistinction to the pagan fictions of genii and demigods.

As the history of the Angels runs parallel to, and displays many analogies with, that of the human race, we are justified in dealing with it after much the same method. Hence we shall divide this Chapter into three Sections. In the first we shall treat of the nature of the Angels; in the second, of the supernatural aspects of the angelic creation; and in the third, of the apostasy of the Angels from the supernatural order. Leaving to Scholastic speculation the deeper problems involved in the existence and activity of pure spirits, we shall confine ourselves to a reasoned exposition of the positive dogmatic teaching of the Church.

General Readings:— *St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 50 sqq., 106 sqq.—Idem, Contr. Gent., II, 46 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 108 sqq.).—Idem, Opusc. 15, De Substantiis Separatis.—Cfr. also St. Thomas’ commentators, notably Ferrariensis and the treatises De Angelis composed by Billuart, Philippus a SS. Trinitate, Gonet, Gotti, and the Salmanticenses.

*Suarez, De Angelis, is the opus classicum on the subject.

The doctrine of the Fathers is admirably summarized by Petavius, De Angelis (Dogm. Theol., t. III).

A complete and thorough monograph is Tourneley, De Angelis.

Among modern theologians the student will find it profitable to consult Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 135 sqq. and §§ 181 sqq., Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 376 sqq., London 1899); Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 17 sqq., 58 sqq., Romae 1878; Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 281–290, Mainz 1884; Oswald, Angelologie, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1889; Simar, Dogmatik, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 313 sqq., Freiburg 1899; L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore et de Angelis, Friburgi 1905; D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino et De Deo Creatore, pp. 493–511, Dublinii 1909; S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 265–311. See also R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, London 1887, and Hugh Pope, art. “Angelus” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I.

On the cultus of the Angels, see Bareille, “Le Culte des Anges à l’Époque des Pères de l’Eglise” in the Revue Thomiste, March 1900; J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 12th impression, pp. 411 sqq., London 1903; Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, pp. 133 sqq., 219, 274 sqq., 372 sqq.—F. Andres, Die Engellehre der griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts und ihr Verhältnis zur griechisch-römischen Dämonologie, Paderborn 1914.

Section 1

existence, nature, number, and hierarchy of the angels

Article 1

existence and nature of the angels

1. The Dogma.—The existence of Angels is a truth so obviously founded in Scripture, Tradition, and the teaching of the Church that it seems superfluous to undertake a formal demonstration of it. We therefore merely indicate some of the many Scriptural texts in which it is expressly taught: Ps. 90:11; 102:20; 148:2; Matth. 4:11; 18:10; 22:30; 25:31; John 1:51; Heb. 1:4.

St. Augustine voices the belief of the Fathers when he says: “Quamvis non videamus apparitionem angelorum, tamen esse angelos novimus ex fide … Spiritus autem angeli sunt; et cum spiritus sunt, non sunt angeli; cum mittuntur, fiunt angeli. Angelus enim officii nomen est, non naturae. Quaeris nomen huius naturae, spiritus est; quaeris officium, angelus est: ex eo quod est, spiritus est; ex eo quod agit, angelus est—Although we may not see them, we know by faith that Angels exist.… The Angels are spirits, but it is not as such that they are Angels; they become Angels by being sent. For Angel denotes an office, not a nature. You ask the name of this nature. It is ‘spirit.’ You ask its office. It is that of an angel [i. e. messenger]. In as far as he exists, an Angel is a spirit; in as far as he acts, he is an Angel.”3

We know three Archangels by name, viz.: Michael, Raphael, and Gabriel.

Though it is uncertain whether the Mosaic account of the Creation,4 in employing the term coelum, means to include the Angels,5 the creation of the Angels out of nothing is undoubtedly an article of faith. St. Paul expressly teaches: “In ipso [scil. Christo] condita sunt6 universa in coelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia,7 sive throni sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates—In him [i. e., Christ] were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers.”8 The Church through her infallible teaching office has raised this truth to the rank of a formally defined dogma at the Fourth Council of the Lateran: “Creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium, qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam.”9 This definition was substantially reaffirmed by the Vatican Council: “God … created out of nothing, from the very first beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelical and the mundane, and afterwards the human creature.…”10

When the Angels were created is not so clearly defined. The phrase “Simul ab initio temporis,” strictly interpreted, says no more than that they were created in and with time. Whether the creation of the Angels was simultaneous with that of the material universe is uncertain. Simul may be interpreted in the sense of aequaliter (κοινῇ), and in the phrase “ac deinde humanam,” deinde is not necessarily temporal, but may be illative in meaning. As St. Thomas has pointed out,11 the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council was aimed at a Manichæan heresy which did not bear directly on the time of the creation of the Angels. Nevertheless many theologians regard the interpretation just suggested as artificial and hold the simultaneous creation of the Angels and the material universe to be a theologically certain doctrine, which may not be rejected without temerity. We prefer not to read into the Lateran definition something which its authors evidently did not intend to put there, and adopt the affirmative view merely for the reason that it is the common teaching of theologians.12 It would at any rate be unreasonable to assume an immoderately long interval of time to have elapsed between the creation of the angels and that of the physical universe. The only thing we know positively is that the Angels existed at the time of Adam,13 whence it follows that they were created no later than the sixth “day.”

2. The Nature of the Angels.—It is Catholic doctrine, though not yet an article of faith, that the Angels are incorporeal substances, i. e., pure spirits.

a) This doctrine can be more effectively demonstrated from Holy Scripture than from ancient ecclesiastical Tradition, the latter being far less clear and definite. The Bible constantly refers to the Angels as spirits (spiritus, πνεύματα), in express contradistinction to souls.14 St. Paul, moreover, draws a direct contrast between a pure spirit15 and man, who is a compound of spirit and body. Eph. 6:12: “Non est nobis colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum—Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.”

That the Angels have often visibly appeared to men is no argument against their incorporeity. When they assume a body, that body is merely an outer garment, put on for a transitory purpose, not something which the bearer informs after the manner of a substantial form.16 Therefore Raphael said to Tobias: “Videbar quidem vobiscum manducare et bibere, sed ego cibo invisibili et potu, qui ab hominibus videri non potest, utor—I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you: but I use an invisible meat and drink, which cannot be seen by men.”17 The much-discussed text, Gen. 6:2: “The sons of God seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, took to themselves wives,”18—which misled even some of the Fathers,19—does not refer to the Angels at all, but to the pious Sethites, who married the evil daughters of Cain.20

b) As we have already noted, the Fathers do not teach this doctrine as clearly as the Bible. Several of their number ascribe to the Angels a body of ether or fire. This they were led to do by a literal interpretation of Ps. 103:4: “Qui facis angelos tuos spiritus et ministros tuos ignem urentem—Who makest thy angels spirits, and thy ministers a burning fire.”21 Some conceived Satan as clothed in an aërial body.22 It is evident from all this that belief in the incorporeity of the Angels was the result of a gradual development. To-day it is held as theologically certain.23

c) Are the Angels composed of matter and form? This is quite a different question from the one discussed above. Granted that the Angels are pure spirits, it may be asked whether their purely spiritual nature admits of a composition of matter (determinabile) requiring for its actuation a form (determinans), or whether, like the Divine Essence, they are metaphysically simple.24

Being purely spiritual substances, the Angels are physically simple, and therefore essentially immortal. “Not, indeed, that their destruction is in itself an impossibility, but because their substance and nature are such that, when once created, perpetual conservation is to them natural.”25 They are indestructible also for this reason that the Creator is bound by His own wisdom, goodness, sanctity, and justice to conserve these pure spirits, in whom He has implanted an immanent craving for beatitude.26

3. Intellect, Will, and Power of the Angels.—Being pure spirits, the Angels must possess intellect and free-will; for no spirit is conceivable without these attributes. Hence they are called simply νόες or νοῦς by the Fathers, and intelligentiae by the Scholastics.

a) The comprehension of the angelic intellect and its mode of operation is a subject of speculation, concerning which our limited mind is at a decided disadvantage. The Schoolmen have practically exhausted the capacity of the human intellect along these lines. As of faith we need only hold that the Angels are not endowed with cardiognosis nor with a certain knowledge of the free-will acts of the future; these being exclusively divine prerogatives.27 It follows that their knowledge of the thoughts and future free actions of men is purely conjectural and can at most engender moral certitude.

Can the Angels communicate their thoughts to one another? It would be unreasonable to assume that such a vast number of pure spirits, endowed with intellect and free-will, should lack the means of intercommunication. Besides, we know on the authority of Holy Scripture that the Angels do converse with one another.28 But Revelation tells us nothing about the nature of their intercourse. The only thing we know for certain is that they do not converse by word of mouth. Among the six theories that have been excogitated on the subject the most plausible is that of St. Thomas. He holds that the Angels converse by a mere act of the will, which manifests the thought of the speaker to him whom he wishes to address.29

b) That the Angels are endowed with free-will follows from the fact, (which is demonstrable on purely philosophic grounds), that free-will belongs to every spiritual nature as such. Indeed, if God operates freely ad extra because He is the supreme and infinite Spirit,30 and if man, who occupies the lowest rank in the scale of intellectual beings, enjoys freedom of choice because the light of reason burns within him,31 surely the Angels, who form the connecting link between God and man, and most certainly far outrank the latter, must also be endowed with free-will. The logical force of this argument is irresistible. Free-will is either included or it is not included in the concept of spirit. If it were not included therein, then God Himself would not be free; if it is, then the Angels, too, are free, freer in fact than man, who is hampered by his senses. Sacred Scripture, moreover, tells us that the Angels rejoice,32 that they have desires,33 that some of them sinned and were transformed into demons. The story of the Fall is the most convincing proof that the Angels enjoy freedom of choice. Cfr. 2 Pet. 2:4: “Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit—God spared not the Angels that sinned.”

In the light of these and similar texts St. John Damascene defines an Angel as “a rational, intelligent, free nature, with a mutable will,” and he adds: “Every being that is endowed with reason, is likewise equipped with free-will. Consequently an Angel, being a nature endowed with reason and intelligence, is also equipped with freedom of choice. Being a creature, he is mutable, because free either to persevere and progress in what is good, or to turn to the bad.”34

c) The Angels are by nature superior to, and more excellent than man. Cfr. 2 Pet. 2:2: “Angels … are greater in strength and power.” Gal. 4:14: “You … received me as an angel of God, as Jesus Christ.”35 The names by which the Angels are called in the Bible (Dominations, Virtues, Powers) also indicate that they enjoy superior prerogatives, though, of course, being themselves mere creatures, they can neither create nor perform miracles.36

It is to be remarked, however, that Angels (and demons) by virtue of their natural faculties are able to perform actions which impress man as exceeding the powers of nature (miracula quoad nos). But such actions are not miracles in the strict and proper sense of the term unless the nature of the case or its attending circumstances make it plainly evident that the effect is one which could not be produced by any agency short of the divine omnipotence. We need not add that, with regard to the extent of their power, good and evil spirits alike depend at all times on the Divine Will, without whose command or permission they cannot interfere with the laws of nature.

Article 2

number and hierarchy of the angels

1. Number of the Angels.—Sacred Scripture and Tradition furnish us no clue by which we could determine the number of the Angels. It is certain that they are very numerous. Cfr. Dan. 7:10: “Millia millium ministrabant ei et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei—Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him.” Apoc. 5:11: “I heard the voice of many angels … and the number of them was thousands of thousands.” Basing their calculations on the parable of the Good Shepherd, some of the Fathers have estimated the numerical proportion of Angels to men as 19:1. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: “Consider all the human beings that have lived from Adam to the present day; their number is very large, and yet it is small, for of Angels there are still more. They are the ninety-nine sheep, we are the one hundredth, since there is but one human race.”37

Theologians differ as to whether or not the Angels are all of one species. St. Thomas holds that each constitutes a distinct species.38 Suarez teaches that the members of each choir bear a specific relation to all the other members of the same choir.39 Cardinal Toletus assumes that, like men, all the Angels belong to one and the same species.40 The problem really defies the limited powers of human reason. Cardinal Toletus and those who hold with him must not, however, be understood as asserting that the specific unity of the Angels results from procreation, because the Church has formally condemned the proposition that “the human soul is propagated from parent to child just as body from body or one Angel from another.”41

2. The Nine Choirs and the Three Hierarchies of the Angels.—The Angels are distributed into various Orders, some superior, others inferior. This is not an article of faith, but it may be set down as a certain truth. Sacred Scripture enumerates nine such Orders. Isaias saw the Seraphim,42 Moses mentions the Cherubim as guardians of Paradise,43 and St. Paul,44 enumerates the Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers, to which, in another place,45 he adds the Virtues. Besides these the Bible frequently mentions Angels and Archangels. The fact that Holy Scripture carefully discriminates between these different Orders is sufficient warrant that the names employed by the Bible are not merely synonymous terms.46 The precise number of the angelic choirs is not known to us. In how far they differ, and what are their mutual relations, is a matter of speculation rather than of faith.47

Since the time of the Pseudo-Dionysius48 it has been customary in the Schools to group the nine angelic choirs into three divisions, in imitation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, each division comprising three choirs (ordines, τάξεις), as follows: (1) The supreme hierarchy, comprising the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; (2) The intermediate hierarchy, comprising the Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; (3) The lowest hierarchy, comprising the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels.

This difference in rank is believed to be due to the fact that the members of the supreme hierarchy, who are, so to speak, assistants at the divine throne, receive their orders directly from God Himself, while those of the intermediate hierarchy hand the divine commands down to the lower Angels, who in turn communicate them to men. Revelation is silent on this point. According to Pseudo-Dionysius,49 whom the Scholastics, thinking him a pupil of the Apostles, blindly followed,50 the division of the Angels into hierarchies has still another signification. The higher Angels, he says, are charged with the mission of “illuminating” and “purifying” those of the lower Orders. By illumination (illuminatio) the Schoolmen mean the communication of knowledge by an Angel of a higher to an Angel of a lower Order. In so far as the inferior Angel is thereby cleansed of defects incident to his imperfect mode of cognition, the process is also called “purgation” (purgatio). We need scarcely remind our readers that this teaching does not exceed the value of a more or less well-founded opinion.51

Section 2

the angels and the supernatural order

Article 1

the supernatural endowment of the angels

1. Their Elevation to the State of Grace.—After having created the Angels, God did not leave them in puris naturalibus, but endowed them with sanctifying grace. Thus they became His adopted children and received a claim to the beatific vision. This is the unanimous teaching of Catholic theologians, and it is based upon Divine Revelation. Being “saints,”1 “angels of light,”2 “elect angels,”3 “sons of God,”4 and so forth, the Angels must necessarily be conceived as endowed with sanctifying grace. There is no ground for the assumption5 that the demons never enjoyed such a supernatural endowment. On the contrary, it is quite certain that all the Angels without exception were elevated to the supernatural order.6 We read in the Epistle of St. Jude: “Non servaverunt suum principatum,7 sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium—And the angels … kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation;” i. e., they did not preserve their supernatural prerogatives, but relinquished their place of honor. Consequently the demons too, before the Fall, were endowed with grace.8

According to the more common opinion of Catholic divines, the Angels are endowed with grace each according to the measure of his natural perfection, i. e., the natural prerogatives with which he was created. This doctrine has nothing in common with Pelagianism; for it is not merit (meritum naturae), but the disposition of each Angel’s nature which guides God in distributing His graces. In the words of St. Basil, “The Powers of Heaven are not holy by nature, but they possess the measure of their sanctification from the Holy Ghost, according to the rank by which one excels the other.”9 Or, as St. John Damascene puts it, “They partake of light and grace, each according to his dignity and order.”10 According to this theory the Seraphim11 rank first in the order of grace. because their nature is the most perfect; while the “Angels,” simply so called, occupy the lowest rung of the ladder. But since this teaching cannot be demonstrated from Revelation, its value does not exceed that of a probable opinion.12

2. When Were the Angels Sanctified?—A number of medieval theologians13 held that all the Angels remained for some time after their creation in the pure state of nature and were elevated to the state of supernatural grace at a later date. St. Thomas demonstrated by weighty arguments that the sanctification of the Angels must have been contemporaneous with their creation.14 Among the Fathers this view had been championed by St. Augustine: “Deus angelos cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam—God created the Angels with a chaste love, by which they adhered to Him, endowing them with grace at the same time that He created their nature.”15 Though not an article of faith, this opinion has become the prevailing one in consequence chiefly of its having been adopted into the Roman Catechism. St. Thomas himself had previously championed the contrary view as the more common and probable one.16

3. The Probation of the Angels.—It is the teaching of the Fathers, unanimously defended by Catholic theologians, that, like men, the Angels had to undergo a probation, during which they found themselves in the status viae and had to merit the beatific vision of the Blessed Trinity. The fact that they were able to merit the beatific vision presupposes that while in the wayfaring state they received an external revelation of the truths necessary for salvation, and, like man, were bound to prepare themselves by a free act of internal faith for the attainment of eternal happiness.17 Gennadius18 taught that the Angels were simultaneously raised to the state of grace and glory in the instant of their creation. But this opinion is incompatible with the revealed truth that some of them apostatized. If the fallen Angels had been constituted in the state of glory, it would have been impossible for them to sin, because the beatific vision of God completely abrogates the creature’s freedom of chosing evil.19

How long the period of probation lasted, whether but a single instant, or two morulae, or three,20 is a matter of pure conjecture. The only thing that we must hold as an article of faith is that a portion of the Angels came forth unsullied, while the remainder fell and were cast into hell. The good Angels “stand before the Lord,”21 “before his throne,”22 they dwell in “the heavenly Jerusalem,”23 i. e., “in heaven.”24 Christ expressly teaches: “Their [little children’s] angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.”25

That the grace and glory enjoyed by the Angels is a supernatural state follows from what we have said in a previous Chapter of this volume on the essence of the Supernatural,26 and also from the rejection by the Church of Baius’s propositions: “Nec angeli nec primi hominis adhuc integri merita recte vocantur gratia;” “Et bonis angelis et primo homini, si in statu illo perseverasset usque ad ultimum vitae, felicitas esset merces, et non gratia;” “Vita aeterna homini integro et angelo promissa fuit intuitu bonorum operum, et bona opera ex lege naturae ad illam consequendam per se sufficiunt.”27 The condemnation of these propositions proves that the special endowment of the Angels, like that of man, was essentially supernatural.

Article 2

the angels in their relation to men, or the guardian angels

The Catholic Church teaches that every man has a Guardian Angel, whom he should venerate and invoke. This teaching is founded on Sacred Scripture.1

The mission of the Guardian Angels may be briefly described as follows: They ward off dangers from body and soul, they inspire good and salutary thoughts, they convey our prayers to the throne of grace, they assist us in the hour of death and bear the souls of the elect to Heaven.2 The Catholic teaching on the subject may be formulated in four theses.

Thesis I: The Angels exercise a kind of general guardianship over the human race

Proof. Though we can adduce no express dogmatic definition in support of this thesis, it must be accepted as an article of faith, because it is taught by the magisterium ordinarium of the Church, which, in its turn, voices the manifest teaching of Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul lays it down as an indisputable axiom that the Angels minister to those who “shall receive the inheritance of salvation.” Heb. 1:14: “Nonne omnes sunt administratorii spiritus3 in ministerium missi propter eos, qui haereditatem capient salutis?—Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” The Psalmist touchingly describes the tender care which the Angels bestow upon man. Ps. 90:11 sq.: “Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis; in manibus portabunt te, ne forte offendas ad lapidem pedem tuum—He hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways; in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone.” The lives of Tobias and of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself prove how faithfully the Guardian Angels perform their duty.

This doctrine was part of the Apostolic Tradition, as is clearly evidenced by the following passage from Origen: “This too is contained in the ecclesiastical teaching, that there are Angels of God and good powers who serve Him for the purpose of consummating the salvation of men.”4

Since this angelic guardianship is based upon a divine mission,5 the question has been broached whether such missions are limited to the lower choirs, or whether members of the higher choirs too are sometimes sent down from Heaven. There are two theological opinions on this subject. One, based on the writings of the Pseudo-Areopagite, and espoused by SS. Gregory the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, holds that only the lowest three, or at the most five of the lower choirs discharge the office of messengers, while the Seraphim, the Cherubim, the Thrones, and the Dominations are constantly assembled around the throne of the Most High. Since, however, theologians have begun to emancipate themselves from the authority, once all too highly regarded, of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the opinion of Scotus and his school has become the more common one, to wit, that all Angels without exception are employed as divine messengers. There are two very good reasons for adopting this view. The first is the authority of St. Paul, who emphatically teaches that all spirits are “sent.”6 The second is the fact that Angels of the highest rank have been commissioned to execute divine commands, as, e. g., the Seraph in Isaias 6:6 sqq., and the two Cherubim “placed before the paradise of pleasure,” Gen. 3:24.7

Thesis II: Every Christian from the moment of Baptism has his particular Guardian Angel

Proof. Suarez says of this thesis: “Though not expressly contained in Holy Writ, nor yet formally defined, it is received by universal consent in the Church and has such a solid foundation in Scripture, as interpreted by the Fathers, that it cannot be denied without very great temerity and even error.”8 The Biblical basis of this doctrine is our Saviour’s own declaration: “Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex his pusillis; dico enim vobis, quia angeli eorum9 in coelis semper vident faciem Patris mei—See that you despise not one of these little ones: for I say to you, that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.”10 The expression “their angels” (i. e., the angels of these little children), plainly points to the existence of Guardian Angels (angeli custodes seu tutelares, ἄγγελοι φύλακες). That each man has a Guardian Angel is also proved by a passage in the Acts of the Apostles. The friends of St. Peter, when he knocks at the door after his deliverance from prison, joyfully exclaim: “It is his angel.”11 The objection that the Saviour’s words apply exclusively to the children of the Jews, is invalid. For, in the first place, all the supernatural prerogatives of the Synagogue descended in an enhanced degree upon the Christian Church; and, secondly, the Fathers in their interpretation of this and similar passages nowhere make a distinction between Jews and Christians, or between the Old and the New Testament. St. Basil declares: “That each one among the faithful12 has an angel, who directs his life as a guide13 and shepherd,14 nobody can deny who remembers the words of our Lord: “See that you despise not one of these little ones.”15 Commenting on this same dictum of our Divine Saviour, St. Chrysostom writes: “Each faithful Christian has an Angel; for every righteous man had an Angel from the very beginning, as Jacob says:16 The Angel that nourisheth and delivereth me from youth.”17 Origen undoubtedly voices the belief of the Primitive Church when he says: “Each of us, even the lowliest, has an Angel by his side.”18

The faith of the early Christians manifested itself unmistakably in the devotion they paid to the Guardian Angels. As early as the fourth century it was customary to erect altars and sanctuaries in their honor. The Feast of the Guardian Angels originated in the eleventh century. “Though of comparatively recent introduction, [it] gives the sanction of the Church’s authority to an ancient and cherished belief.”19

Some of the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers held that besides his Guardian Angel every Christian has also a demon to tempt him.20 Bellarmine rightly reckoned this belief, which has absolutely no Scriptural foundation whatever, among the errors of Hermas. That every man should be afflicted with an imp to plague him, is a notion which can hardly be reconciled with belief in a benevolent Providence. Perhaps Hermas was led to adopt it in a well-meant endeavor to Christianize the pagan idea of a genius niger as a counterpart to the genius albus.

Some modern writers on the philosophy of religion maintain that Jewish and Christian angelology was borrowed from the pagan religions of the East, and that in the last analysis the Angels are merely personifications of Divine Providence. Not to speak of the extreme antiquity of the Jewish belief in Angels,21 this theory is disproved by the teaching and conduct of Christ Himself, and also by the sharp contrast existing between the Angels of the Bible and the figments of pagan mythology.

Thesis III: Not only Christians and those justified, but heathens and sinners also have each a Guardian Angel

Proof. Suarez refers to this proposition as embodying “the common teaching of theologians and Fathers.”22 Its meaning is that every man has a Guardian Angel in as far as he is a man, not in consequence of Baptism or justification. This angelic guardianship begins at birth. “Magna dignitas animarum,” says St. Jerome, “ut unaquaeque habeat ab ortu nativitatis in custodiam sui angelum delegatum.”23 Theodoret and Isidore of Sevilla base this belief on Christ’s dictum concerning little children, which we have quoted above.24 Quite a number of the Fathers, it is true, speak of Guardian Angels only in connection with pious Christians; but their utterances must not be interpreted in an exclusive sense; these Fathers merely wish to emphasize that every good Christian enjoys the special protection of a Guardian Angel, which does not exclude that God bestows the same paternal providence also upon the heathen and the sinner.

The attitude of the Schoolmen on this question was governed by the declaration of St. Anselm, that “every soul is committed to an Angel at the moment when it is united with the body.”25 St. Thomas, proceeding from the principle that “the guardianship of the Angels over men is as it were the carrying into effect of divine Providence,”26 argues as follows: “Beneficia, quae dantur divinitus, ex eo quod est Christianus, incipiunt a tempore baptismi, sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, in quantum habet naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale beneficium est custodia angelorum.… Unde statim a nativitate habet homo angelum ad sui custodiam deputatum.”27 Socrates’s assertion that he enjoyed the guidance of a tutelary spirit (δαιμόνιον) expresses a profound truth.28

Thesis IV: Every State and every ecclesiastical province has its own divinely appointed tutelary spirit

Proof. This thesis, which embodies merely a probable opinion, finds some slight support in the famous vision of Daniel,29 where the Archangel Michael battles side by side with Raphael as princeps Iudaeorum, for the Israelites against two other Angels, who are called princes (שָׂרִים) of the Persians and the Greeks. Of the four Angels engaged in this conflict three are expressly designated as “princes” of certain nations or States. We must refer the reader to St. Thomas for an explanation as to how Angels can battle with one another on behalf of their clients.30 St. Basil commenting on the vision of Daniel says: “That there are certain Angels who are placed at the head of entire nations, … is a fact which the wise Daniel heard from the Angel [Raphael], who spoke to him thus: The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me, and behold Michael came to help me.”31 Some of the Fathers think that the “man of Macedonia” who appeared to St. Paul in a vision and besought him to “pass over into Macedonia, and help us,”32 was the tutelary Angel of the Macedonians.33 St. Michael, who is called “the Prince of Guardian Angels,” was regarded as the tutelary spirit of the Jewish Synagogue; in the New Testament he is venerated as the special protector of the Catholic Church.34

Certain Scriptural expressions35 permit us to infer that churches, cities, and ecclesiastical provinces likewise have special tutelary spirits.36

That we owe a duty of reverence to our Guardian Angel is taught by St. Bernard in these words: “In quovis diversorio, in quovis angulo, angelo tuo reverentiam habe.”37

Readings:—Trombelli, Trattato degli Angeli Custodi, Bologna 1747.—Berlage, Dogmatik, Vol. IV, §§ 26 sqq.—De la Gerda, De Angelo Custode.—Albert. a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., t. I, pp. 321 sqq., Oeniponte 1893.—Chardon, L’Ange et le Prêtre, Paris 1899.—S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 298 sqq.—R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, pp. 99–119, London 1887.—C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schöpfung, pp. 441 sqq., Ratisbon 1910.—H. Pope, art. “Guardian Angels” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII.—K. Pelz, Die Engellehre des hl. Augustinus, Münster 1913.

Section 3

the apostasy of a number of the angels

Article 1

the fallen angels or demons

1. The Existence of Evil Spirits.—The Fall of the Angels was unlike that of man. The human race apostatized as a whole, because all men were virtually contained in Adam and consequently all contracted original sin through him. The fallen Angels sinned as individuals, each of his own accord, and thereby rendered themselves guilty of actual sin.

The existence of evil spirits is an obvious inference from the revealed truth that a portion of the angelic host, who were all originally created in the state of sanctifying grace, rebelled against God and were cast into hell. “Diabolus et alii daemones a Deo quidem naturâ creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali,” says the Fourth Council of the Lateran.1 Our Lord Himself says: “I saw Satan like lightning falling from heaven.”2 St. John in the Apocalypse gives a graphic description of his fall: “Cauda eius [scil. draconis] trahebat tertiam partem stellarum coeli et misit eas in terram.… Draco … proiectus est in terram et angeli eius cum illo missi sunt—And his tail drew the third part of the stars of heaven, and cast them to the earth.… And the dragon … was cast unto the earth, and his angels were thrown down with him.”3 On the strength of this text certain mystically inclined theologians estimated the proportion of the fallen angels to those that remained faithful as 1:3. Whether this estimate be correct or no, we may safely assume that the number of the faithful Angels exceeded those who fell away.

The Bible consistently distinguishes between the “Devil,” or “Satan,” in the singular, and “demons,” in the plural number. Satan is described as the seducer, the demons as his victims. While the latter are designated by the indefinite terms “demons” (daemones, δαίμονες, δαιμόνια), or “unclean spirits” (spiritus impuri s. nequam, πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα ἢ πονηρίας), their leader, “the prince of demons,”4 is called by the proper name of “Satan” (σατάν or σατανᾱς, שָּׂטָן, i. e., an adversary) or “Devil” (diabolus, διάβολος, i. e., slanderer or accuser, from διαβάλλειν, to traduce), and by such quasi-proper names as Asmodeus,5 Azazel,6 Beelzebub7 and Belial.8 The name Lucifer does not occur in the Bible.9 Nor is there any Scriptural warrant for speaking of “devils” in the plural number. There is but one Devil, though there are many demons or evil spirits. It is the teaching of Holy Scripture that the kingdom of Christ is opposed by a kingdom of evil ruled by the prince of this world, who is the father of lies, Leviathan or the “great dragon … that old serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world.”10

From the psychological point of view it is a reasonable assumption that the apostasy of the Angels was instigated by one of their own number, most likely by the one who ranked highest both in natural and supernatural endowment,11 and that consequently the kingdom of evil originated at the very summit of creation and thence spread over heaven and earth.

What was the nature of the sin committed by the fallen angels? Fathers and theologians quite generally hold that it was pride; but they are not agreed as to its underlying motive. Some think the pride of the fallen angels was inspired by envy because of the great things which God had in store for the human race (elevation to the state of grace, the Hypostatic Union, Mary the Queen of Angels, and so forth). Others believe the inordinate desire of these angels to be like God prompted them to rise in mutiny against their Sovereign.12

2. The Punishment of the Fallen Angels.—It is an article of faith that the fallen angels in punishment for their crime were forthwith shorn of grace and cast into hell, where they have no hope of redemption. Sacred Scripture teaches this expressly. Cfr. 2 Pet. 2:4: “Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit cruciandos—God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by infernal ropes, to the lower hell, unto torments.” Epistle of St. Jude 6: “Angelos vero, qui non servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium, in iudicium magni diei vinculis aeternis sub caligine reservavit—And the angels who kept not their principality, but forsook their own habitation, he hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of the great day.” The phrase “reserved unto the judgment of the great day” does not mean that the evil spirits have any chance of redemption, but merely indicates that their punishment will not be complete till after the Last Judgment, when they shall cease to harass men.

The much-discussed theory that a time will come when all free creatures, demons and lost souls included, shall share in the grace of salvation (ἀποκατάστασις πάντων),13 was rejected as heretical in the first of the famous anathemas pronounced at the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 543. Christ Himself implicitly condemned it when He spoke of the final judgment: “Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius—Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels.”14 It is the almost unanimous opinion of theologians15 that, unlike man, the fallen angels were granted no time for repentance.

Article 2

the demons in their relation to the human race

While the good Angels are placed as guardians over men in order to help them to attain their temporal and eternal salvation, the Devil, who “was a murderer from the beginning,”1 by way of punishment for original sin, exercises a “reign of death” (imperium mortis) over the human race. This “reign of death” manifests itself in three ways.

1. Temptation to Sin.—There are two species of temptation, known by the Scholastic names of tentatio probationis and tentatio seductionis. The tentatio probationis aims at proving the will, while the tentatio seductionis has for its ultimate object the ruin of the soul. It is quite plain that God cannot seduce men.2 When He “tempts” a man, He simply “tries his faith,” as in the case of Adam and Abraham; which is quite compatible with His infinite holiness. Satan and his demons, on the contrary, continually strive by lies and false pretences to seduce men to commit sin and thereby to incur eternal damnation. John 8:44: “Ille homicida erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, quia non est veritas in eo; quum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur, quia mendax est et pater eius—He was a murderer from the beginning, and he stood not in the truth; because truth is not in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.” “As a roaring lion,” says St. Peter, “[the Devil] goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.”3

Whether the demons have a hand in all the temptations to which men are subject, is a problem regarding which the Fathers and theologians do not agree. What renders its solution difficult is the circumstance that, as Suarez has rightly pointed out, the underlying question is not one of power, but of fact. St. Thomas takes middle ground. He attributes all temptations to the indirect influence of the Devil. “Diabolus,” he says, “est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia instigavit primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato consecuta est in toto genere humano quaedam pronitas ad omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt verba Damasceni et Dionysii. Directe autem dicitur esse aliquid causa alicuius, quod operatur directe ad illud; et hoc modo diabolus non est causa omnis peccati. Non enim omnia peccata committuntur diabolo instigante; sed quaedam ex libertate arbitrii et carnis corruptione.”4

2. Demoniacal Possession.—God in His infinite wisdom occasionally permits demons to take possession of the human body. Ascetic theology distinguishes three species of demoniacal possession: (1) Circumsession, (2) obsession, and (3) possession in the strict sense of the term. Demoniacal possession, even in its highest stage, must not be conceived as analogous to the Hypostatic Union, or the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just. It is no more than the relation of one who moves to him who is moved. We know that demoniacal possession is possible from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. Both in the Gospels and the Acts Christ and His Apostles are frequently described as expelling evil spirits from persons possessed by them (daemoniaci, ἐνεργούμενοι). It is a blasphemous reflection upon the truthfulness and sanctity of the Godman to assume, as some modern Rationalists do,5 that Christ simply played the rôle of a physician or magnetic healer to accommodate Himself to the superstitions of the Jews. The Church placed herself squarely upon the ground taken by her Founder when she adopted various exorcisms into her liturgy and even established a special ordo of exorcists.6 Cases of diabolical possession were frequent in the Apostolic age and for a long time thereafter.7 The Church still recognizes the possibility of demoniacal possession in her Pontifical. The indications of demoniacal possession are: “Ignota lingua loqui pluribus verbis vel loquentem intelligere; distantia et occulta patefacere; vires supra aetatis seu conditionis naturam ostendere, et id genus alia.” Under the present discipline no exorcism may be performed without the express mandate of the Bishop. This rule is intended to prevent mistakes and abuses, such as have occurred in the past and are likely to occur again. We know that in the Middle Ages epilepsy, impotence, and other diseases were frequently ascribed to demoniacal influence, and no attention was paid to the fact that people who believe they are possessed by an evil spirit are often merely insane.8

3. Black Magic.—By black magic9 theologians understand the power of producing superhuman effects without the coöperation of God or the blessed Angels. If any such power really exists, it must certainly be attributed to the influence of evil spirits.10 The possibility of human intercourse with Satan cannot be denied in view of the many instances recorded, or assumed as true, in the New Testament. The medieval witch-baiters sinned grievously by exaggerating the power of the Devil, by neglecting the most elementary principles of sound psychology, and by proceeding with unpardonable carelessness and inhuman cruelty in the trial of persons accused of witchcraft. No period of the world’s history is characterized by so many insane superstitions and such a radical want of common sense as the terrible time during which thousands of supposed witches were tried, tortured, and executed for practicing sorcery.11 Of course, the theological principle that there are demons and that they have power to injure man in body and soul, is no more disproved by these medieval excesses than by the all too ready credence which in our own time thousands of well-meaning Catholics gave to the bogus revelations of Leo Taxil and his fictitious Diana Vaughan.12

Readings:—St. Anselm, De Casu Diaboli.— *St. Thomas, Quaest. Disp., De Daemonibus.—M. Psellus, De Daemonum Operatione (reprinted in Migne, P. G., CXXII, 819 sqq.).—J. M. Platina, De Angelis et Daemonibus, Bononiae 1740.—M. Gerbert, Daemonurgia Theologice Expensa, Friburgi 1776.—W. Schneider, Der neuere Geisterglaube, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Leistle, Die Besessenheit mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Lehre der Väter, Dillingen 1887.— *M. Hagen, Der Teufel im Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—Duhm, Die bösen Geister im Alten Testament, 1904.—S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 302 sqq.—R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, pp. 39 sqq., 120 sqq., London 1887.—Spirago-Clarke, The Catechism Explained, 8th ed., pp. 147 sqq.—Delaporte-Sadlier, The Devil: Does He Exist? And What Does He Do? New York 1904.—N. Paulus, Hexenwahn und Hexenprozess, vornehmlich im 16. Jahrhundert, Freiburg 1910.—W. H. Kent, articles “Devil” and “Demon” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV.—M. J. O’Donnell, art. “Possession,” ibid., Vol. XII.—J. P. Arendzen, art. “Occult Arts,” ibid., Vol. XI.—Habert, La Magie, Paris 1908.—R. Polz, Das Verhältnis Christi zu den Dämonen, Innsbruck 1907.—J. G. Raupert, Modern Spiritism, London 1904.—Idem, The Supreme Problem, London 1911.—A. V. Miller, The Dangers of Modern Spiritualism, London 1908.

Index

Abélard, 264.

Abraham, 345.

Accident, 7.

Accidentarians, The Lutheran, 260.

Acosmism, 23.

Adam, Visions of, 115 sq.; Supernatural endowment of, 124; The body of, not developed from the animal kingdom, 127; Was not a hermaphrodite, 128; Was personally created by God, 128; The first man, 134; Manichaean error concerning, 138; His supernatural state in Paradise, 183; Was endowed with sanctifying grace before the Fall, 196 sqq.; When was he raised to the state of supernatural grace? 199 sq.; Exempt by a special grace from concupiscence, 200 sqq.; Was he gifted with infallibility? 210 sq.; Was created in holiness, 222 sq.; Original sin contracted from Adam, not Eve, 279 sq.

Adductio ex non esse ad esse, 6.

Adiutoria Dei naturalia, 230.

Albertus Magnus, 53, 170, 205.

Albertus Pighius, 265, 267.

Albigenses, 26, 50.

Alexander of Hales, 236, 316.

Alexander VII, Pope, 132, 177.

Allegorism, 115.

Alligation, The theory of, 276 sqq.

Amalric of Bène, 27.

Ἁμαρτία, 247 sq.

Ambrosius Catharinus, 265, 267, 269, 276.

Ambrose, St., 42, 52, 134, 160, 255, 258.

Anastasius II, Pope, 175 sqq.

Angelology, Christian, 308 sqq.; Not borrowed from paganism, 335.

Angels, The, Created out of nothing, 12; God’s creative power not communicable to, 54 sqq.; Were they instrumental in the creation of man? 129; Rôle of in Scholastic philosophy, 308; History of the, 309; Nature of the, 311 sqq.; Three Archangels known by name, 312; Created out of nothing, 312 sq.; When created, 313 sq.; They are pure spirits, 314 sq.; Have often visibly appeared to men, 315; The “sons of God” and the “daughters of men,” 315; Teaching of the Fathers on, 315 sq.; They are physically simple, essentially immortal and indestructible, 316; They possess intellect, 317 sq.; Are not endowed with cardiognosis, 317; They can communicate their thoughts to one another, 317 sq.; Possess freewill, 318 sq.; Damascene’s definition of, 319; The Angels by nature superior to man, 320 sq.; Are able to perform miracula quoad nos, 320; Number of, 321 sq.; Are they all of one species? 321 sq.; Nine choirs of, 322 sqq.; Difference in rank, 323 sq.; The supernatural endowment of, 325 sqq.; Their santification contemporaneous with their creation, 327; Their probation, 328 sq.; The Guardian Angels, 330 sqq.; Apostasy of a number of the Angels, 340 sqq.

Animals, Man’s disturbed relation towards, in consequence of original sin, 290.

Animal worship, 106.

Anselm of Canterbury, St., 274, 286, 301, 336.

Anteperiodism, 113.

Ante-solar days, 119.

Anthropology, Dogmatic, 124 sqq.

Anticreationist heresies, 20.

Anti-God, Theory of an evil, 22.

Antipodes, 136.

Apocatastasis, 164, 343.

Apollinaris, 138, 145, 166.

Apostles’ Creed, The, 18, 38.

Appetite, Twofold in man, 203.

Archangels, 312, 322, 323.

Arguments for the existence of God also show that He is the absolute creator of the universe, 8.

Arianism, 146.

Aristotle, 8, 17, 80, 177.

Armenians, 168, 176.

Arriaga, 267.

Asmodeus, 342.

Astronomy, 104, 105.

Athanasian Creed, 146.

Athanasius, St., 18, 19, 57, 141, 202, 256.

Atheism, 23, 29, 93.

Atomism, 149.

“Auctorem fidei,” Bull, 224, 304.

Aufklärung, 94.

Augustine, St.—On Gen. 1:1, 14; For some time under the sway of dualistic error, 22; On John 1:3, 35; On the freedom of God’s creative will, 43, 46; On the creation of sinful creatures, 47; On the creation of the world not in time but with time, 52; Denies that an angel can create, 57; On divine Preservation, 65; On the divine Concursus, 71; On the finis operantis of creation, 83, 88; On creatio secunda, 101, 102; Teaches that the six days of creation were but a single moment, 107; Protests against a foolish way of reconciling faith and science, 109; As an advocate of Concordism and Idealism, 118; On the ante-solar days, 119; On the Hexaëmeron, 122; On the unity of the human race, 136; His dichotomic standpoint, 142; Drastic dictum against the Apollinarists, 145; On the Hypnopsychites, 151; On the immortality of the soul, 160; Against the errors of the Priscillianists, 164; Inclines to Generationism, 169 sq.; Admits there is no eccles. tradition in favor of Generationism, 173 sq.; On the supernatural state of our first parents, 183; On the spiraculum vitae, 198; On the propagation of the human race, 202; On freedom from concupiscence, 202; On the bodily immortality of our first parents, 205; On the infused knowledge of Adam, 207 sq.; On the origin of speech, 213; On the life of our first parents in Paradise, 215 sq.; On the gravity of the first sin, 234 sq., 237; On infant baptism, 253; Against Pelagianism, 254; Defends St. Chrysostom, 256; Against Julian of Eclanum, 257 sq.; His teaching on original sin does not coincide exactly with that of St. Chrysostom, 258; On original sin, 259; Teaches that it is not a substance, 260 sq.; Jansenism can be refuted from his writings, 262 sqq.; All men sinned in one man, 273; On concupiscence as a secondary element of original sin, 278; On concupiscence as the instrumental cause of original sin, 285 sq.; On “free-will” after the Fall, 295; His teaching misinterpreted by Jansenius, 297 sq.; On the lot of unbaptized children, 301; On the Angels, 311 sq.; On the sanctification of the Angels, 327.

Augustinians, The so-called, 230, 301.

Aureolus, 62.

Averroës, 138, 152.

Avitus of Vienne, 301.

Azazel, 342.

Baius, 183, 223, 224, 225, 230, 231, 243, 262, 265, 272, 329.

Baptism, 135, 243, 244, 245, 252, 253, 260, 264, 270, 335.

Basil, St., 51, 198, 213, 255, 256, 258, 326, 333, 337.

Bayle, 63.

Beatitude merely a secondary end of Creation, 86.

Beatific Vision, The, a supernatural prerogative, 190 sq.

Beelzebub, 342.

Being, Creation the production of being as being, 7.

Belial, 342.

Bellarmine, Cardinal, 173, 265, 282 sq., 305, 306, 307, 334.

Benedict XII, Pope, 168, 176.

Bereschith, 14.

Berlage, 63.

Bernard, St., 316, 338.

Bible, Nature and the, both tell the history of Creation, 103 sqq.; Not a text-book of science, 105; Speaks the language of the common people, 105.

Biel, Gabriel, 56, 205.

Body, The human, An essential constituent of man, 137 sqq.

Boker, 120 sq.

Bonaventure, St., 53, 199, 205, 209, 316, 331.

“Book of Nature,” The, 104.

Bossuet, 301.

Bourdais, 114.

Braga, Council of, 26, 92, 164.

Brahmans, 24.

Brucker, J., 114.

Buckland, 112.

Cabalists, 24.

Cajetan, Cardinal, 129, 204, 235.

Calvin, 262, 295.

Caput “Firmiter,” 27, 29, 50.

Carthage, Plenary Council of (A. D. 418), 219, 240.

Catechism, Roman, 64, 69, 71, 327.

Causae secundae, 67.

Causality, God’s absolute, 3.

Causa prima, 68.

Causa universalissima, 58.

Celestine I, Pope, 220.

Chartres, School of, 27.

Chemistry, 148.

Cherubim, 322, 323, 332.

Children, The lot of unbaptized, 300 sqq.

Choirs of the Angels, 322 sqq.

Christ, The “Second Adam,” 130, 210, 247, 252; The Apollinarists deny Him a rational soul, 145; Alone has a claim to Divine Sonship, 193; Restored the lost state of justice, 196 sq.; Not tainted by original sin, 281; The only man conceived sine opere viri, 286; Drove out demons, 347.

Chrysostom, St. John, 19, 65, 93, 101, 130, 255, 256, 257, 258, 334.

Circumsession, Diabolical, 346.

Clement of Alexandria, 33 sq.

Clement of Rome, St., 85.

Clement XI, Pope, 224, 245.

Co-Adamites, 131 sq.

Coelestius, 239 sq., 255.

Coelum et terra, 14, 15.

Cohortatio ad Gentes, 18.

Collins, 93.

Cologne, Provincial Council of, 43.

Comparative Philology and the origin of speech, 212 sq.

Concordance theories, 113.

Concordism, 114 sq., 117, 118.

Concupiscence, Freedom from, a grace, 188, 194 sq.; Our first parents originally exempt from, 200 sqq.; Not a vigor naturae, 202; An inordinate inclination towards evil, 203; Became rebellious after the Fall, 217; Is not sin but of sin and inclines to sin, 245; Not the essence of original sin, 261 sqq.; The part it plays in the transmission of original sin, 283 sqq.; Formal concupiscence of the flesh not the proper cause of the transmission of original sin, 84 sq.

Concurrence, Divine, 67 sqq.; Definition of, 67; Demonstrated from Revelation, 69; The controversy between Molinism and Thomism, 72.

Concursus collatus, 74.

Concursus divinus generalis, 67.

Concursus oblatus, 73.

Concursus praevius, 74, 77.

Constantinople, Council of, 138, 163 sq., 344, 543.

“Continued creation,” 62.

Contract, The theory of, 276 sq.

Conversion of nothing into something, 6.

Copernican world-view, The, 105, 106, 210.

Cornely, 159.

Cosmogonies, The Mosaic and pagan, 13; The Mosaic and science, 104.

Cosmology, Dogmatic, 98 sqq.

Cosmos, Pantheism deifies the, 23; The divine idea of the, 32 sqq.

Creare, Meaning of the term in Gen. 1:1: 15, 99.

Creation, The, God’s first work, 1; A true conception of, indispensable, 1; Subjective and objective, 2; Considered as a divine act, 3 sqq.; The concept of explained, 4; Definition of, 4 sq.; Not a conversion, 6; Periphrastic definition of by St. Thomas, 7; Invariably results in substance, 7; Reason could have arrived at the concept of Creation without supernatural aid, 8; But de facto is indebted for it to Revelation, 8; Futile objections raised against the dogma by infidel philosophers, 8; Creation a necessary conception, 9; Proof of the dogma, 9 sqq.; From Scripture, 10; The dogma enunciated in certain divine names, 10; In Gen. 1:1, 13; Proved from Tradition, 17; Anti-creationist heresies, 20; Dualism, 21; Pantheism, 23; The dogma defined by the Vatican Council, 30; Explanation of the dogma, 32; The divine idea of, 32; In relation to the Trinity, 35 sqq.; Creation properly appropriated to the Father, 38; Creation as a free divine act, 40 sqq.; libertate contradictionis, 41 sqq.; libertate specificationis, 43 sqq.; But not libertate contrarietatis, 46 sqq.; Creation in time, 49 sqq.; Creation from all eternity, 52 sqq.; Can creatures create? 54 sqq.; Final cause or end of, 79 sqq.; Finis operantis, 81 sq.; Finis operis, 83 sqq.; Creation passively considered, 97 sqq.

Creationism, 169 sqq.; Not a dogma in the strict sense, 173 sqq.; But a theologically certain truth, 177; And original sin, 281 sq.

Creatio prima, 16, 98, 100 sq.

Creatio secunda, 6, 16, 98, 100 sq.

Creative power, The, incommunicable, 54.

Creator, The, 8.

Creatura creatrix, 57.

Creatures, All bear vestiges of the Trinity, 39; Spiritual creatures are real images of the Trinity, 40; Can they create? 55; Can be employed as instrumental causes in creating, 58; The happiness of, merely a secondary end of Creation, 86.

Cross of Christ, The, 49.

Curse, The divine, 235.

Cyprian, St., 253 sq., 255, 258.

Cyril of Alexandria, St., 53, 198.

Cyril of Jerusalem, St., 321.

Δαιμόνιον, The, of Socrates, 337.

Damascene, St. John, 56, 130, 152, 198, 202, 319, 326.

Daniel, 337.

Darwin, 214.

Darwinism, 34, 127.

David of Dinant, 27.

“Days” of the Hexaëmeron, 113 sqq., 117 sqq.

Death, 195, 237, 240, 245, 247, 289.

Debitum naturae, 185.

Decretum pro Iacobitis, 36.

Deification, entailed by the possession of supernatural prerogatives, 188, 198.

Deism, 92, 93.

Deluge, The, 105, 113.

Deluge theory, The, 112, 113.

De Lugo, 266, 267, 268, 269.

Demiurge, 11, 17, 18, 127.

Δημιουργία, 21.

Demons, 340 sqq.; In their relation to men, 344 sqq.

D’Envieu, Fabre, 135.

Descartes, 83, 86, 142.

Devil, The, Good by nature, 27; Envy of, the cause of death, 206; Seduced our first parents, 233 sqq.; Original sin does not constitute man an incarnate image of the, 260 sqq.; Humanity under the dominion of the, 290 sq.; There is but one, 341 sq.; Human intercourse with the, 348.

Diabolical possession, 346 sqq.

Dichotomy, 137, 138 sq.

Diognetus, Epistle to, 160.

Disposition, Divine, 91.

Dodwell, 94.

Dominations, 320, 322, 323, 332.

Dominicus Soto, 277.

Dominus coeli et terrae, 11.

Donum integritatis, 200, 204, 215.

Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, 105.

Driedo, 301.

Dualism, 20 sqq., 26, 106.

Duns Scotus, 54, 204, 205.

Durandus, 56, 67, 69, 204.

Eccles. 3:19, Not incompatible with the doctrine of immortality, 158 sq.

Egyptians, 16.

Εἱμαρμένη, 92.

Eleatians, The, 17, 23.

Elements, Essential, of human nature, 137 sqq.

Emanation, Theory of, 20, 24.

Embryo, The human, 177 sq.

Encyclopedists, French, 94.

End, Definition of, 80; Final, of creation, 80 sqq.

Endowment, Man’s supernatural in Paradise, 196 sqq.

Energumenes, 346 sq.

Ἕν καὶ πᾶν, 23.

Ens ab alio, 3, 10, 62.

Ens a se, 3, 10.

Ephesus, Council of, 242, 261.

Ephrem, St., 101.

Ἐπιθυμία, 138.

Erasmus, 249.

Esquimos, 135.

Estius, 16, 172.

Eternity, Was the world created from? 52 sqq.

Eucharist, The Blessed, 190.

Euchites, 261.

Eunomius, 213.

Eusebius, 151.

Eve, Creation of, 129; Dignity of, 131; The first woman, 133; Original sin not contracted from, 279 sq.

Evil, 47, 181.

Evil Spirits, Existence of, 340 sqq.; Nature of their sin, 342; Their punishment, 343; In their relation to the human race, 344 sqq.

Evolutionism, 24, 25.

Exegesis and the Hexaëmeron, 117 sqq.

Ex nihilo, True sense of the phrase, 6.

Ex nihilo nihil fit, 8.

Ex nihilo sui et subiecti, 5.

Ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, 6.

Ezechiel’s vision, 144 sq.

Fall, The, Of our first parents, 233 sqq.; Of the Angels, 340 sqq.

Fate, 92.

Faure, 301.

Federalism, 276 sqq.

Fichte, 25.

Finis, 80.

Finis operantis of Creation, 81 sqq.

Finis operis of Creation, 83 sqq.

First and Second Creation, 100 sq.

Flesh, “Rationality” of, 146.

Florence, Council of, 28, 36, 41, 47, 304.

Fomes peccati, 244 sq.

Forma cadaverica, 148.

Forma corporeitatis, 147 sq.

Formation of the universe, 6, 98, 99.

Fossils, 109.

Francis of Assisi, St., 290.

Franzelin, Cardinal, 229.

Frassen, 267.

Fredegis of Tours, 6.

Freemasonry, Deism in, 94.

Freethinkers, 93.

Freewill, 137, 222, 242; The dogma of, 291 sqq.

Frohschammer, 171.

Fulgentius, 301.

Galilei controversy, The, 104.

Gen. 1:1, analysis of, 14 sq., 17, 50; Sense of, never defined by the Church, 107.

Generation, Defined, 5; Sexual, 161 sqq.; Asexual, 202; Original sin transmitted by natural, 280 sq.; Sexual, not the proper cause of the transmission of original sin, 284 sq.

Generationism, 166 sqq., 173 sqq.

Genius albus, 335.

Genius niger, 335.

Gennadius, 328.

Geocentric world-view, 101.

Geology, 104, 105.

Geometry, 107.

Gerson, 332.

Gietmann, 158.

Gloria obiectiva and formalis, 85.

Glorification of God, the ultimate object of Creation, 85.

Glory, 192.

Glossner, 291.

Gnostics, The, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 48, 127, 138.

Gnosticus intuitus, 24.

God, Self-existing, 3; The cause of the universe, 8; As Yahweh, 10; As Dominus coeli et terrae, 11; As Demiurge, 11; The Creator of the invisible world, 12; The God of the Old Testament vs. the God of the New, 21, 29; His creative wisdom, 33; Creation properly appropriated to the Father, 38; His freedom in creating the world, 45; Incommunicability of His creative power, 54; Creation never attributed to any one but God, 55; He will never withdraw His preserving influence from the universe, 66; Alpha and Omega, 82; His object in creating the universe, 81; His Providence, 91; He is the “highest nature,” 181.

Goethe, 25.

Golden Age, The, 216.

Gonet, 75.

Grace, The state of, as distinguished from beatific vision, 191 sq.; Its concomitants in Paradise, 216 sq.; Voluntary privation of, the essence of original sin, 269 sqq.

Grammar as a scientific aid in exegesis, 108.

“Grand Architect of the Universe,” 94.

Gregory Nazianzen, 35, 255, 258.

Gregory of Nyssa, 130, 160, 198, 202, 213.

Gregory of Rimini, 264, 301.

Gregory the Great, 65, 72, 301, 331.

Guardian Angels, 330 sqq.

Gubernatio mundi, 91.

Günther, 86, 138, 144.

Gutberlet, 112.

Hatred, 134.

Hebrew language, The, Did Adam receive it directly from God? 212.

Hegel, 25, 214.

Hell, 89, 304 sq., 343.

Hengstenberg, 112.

Henno, 267.

Henry of Ghent, 62, 264.

Heraclitus of Ephesus, 25.

Heresies, Anticreationist, 20.

Hermas, Pastor of, 18, 335.

Hermes, 86, 171, 265.

Hermogenes, 18.

Hexaëmeron, Distinctio and ornatus, 99; In its relation to science, 103 sqq.; Its purpose strictly religious, not scientific, 105 sqq.; Susceptible of many different interpretations, 106; None adopted by the Church, 106; The Hexaëmeron is a negative guiding principle for scientists, 107; Scientists free to interpret it in any reasonable and moderate way, 111 sqq.; Different theories of, 112 sqq.; And exegesis, 117 sqq.; Creation of man towards the end of the, 128.

Heyse, 214.

Hilary, St., 258.

Hippolytus, St., 42.

Hoberg, 115.

Holy Ghost, 346.

Hugh of St. Victor, 199.

Hume, David, 94.

Hummelauer, J. (S. J.), 114, 115, 116.

Hyle, An eternal, uncreated, 6, 10, 18, 20, 21, 53; An absolutely evil principle, 239.

Hylomorphism, 147, 148.

Hylozoism, 20, 24, 25.

Hypnopsychites, 151 sq.

Hypostatic Union, The, 146, 190, 342, 346.

Idea of the Cosmos, The divine, 32 sqq.

Idealism, 114 sq., 118.

Idealist theories, 114 sq.

Illyricus, M. Flacius, 260.

Immaculate Conception, 177.

Immortality, Of spiritual substances, 66; Of the human soul, 151 sqq.; Proved from Revelation, 155 sqq.; From Tradition, 160 sqq.; Bodily, a supernatural prerogative, 194 sq.; Our first parents before the Fall were endowed with bodily, 205 sqq.; The Church’s teaching on the bodily immortality of our first parents, 225; Of the Angels, 316.

Impassibility, a supernatural prerogative, 194 sq.; Enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise, 214 sqq.

Incarnation, Probable belief of our first parents in the, 209.

Incommunicability of the creative power, 54.

Indebitum naturae, 186, 194.

Indestructibility of the human soul, 154; Of the Angels, 316 sq.

Indians, North American, 135.

Infallibility, Was Adam gifted with? 210 sq.

Infant Baptism, 243 sq., 253, 270.

Infusion of the soul into the body, 176 sq.

Innocent III, Pope, 303.

Innocent X, Pope, 224.

Integrity, The gift of, 200; Possessed by our first parents, 202, 215; The loss of, a penalty of original sin, 284.

Intelligentiae, 317.

Ionian philosophers, 25.

Interperiodism, 113.

Irenæus, St., 18, 42, 88, 160, 198, 201, 255.

Isaias, 322.

Isidore of Sevilla, 336.

Jansenism, 223 sq., 242 sqq., 262, 278, 295.

Jansenius, 183, 223, 224, 243, 262, 296, 297.

Jerome, St., 71, 93, 170, 173, 336.

Jews, The, Their belief in Creation, 13; In immortality, 155 sqq.

Job, His belief in personal immortality, 156 sq.

John 1:3, 35.

John, St., Logos-doctrine of, 34.

John, St., of Damascus. (See Damascene.)

John the Baptist, St., 281.

John Scotus Eriugena, 24.

Julian of Eclanum, 253, 256, 257, 258.

Justification, 252, 268, 271, 335.

Justin Martyr, St., 11, 17, 35, 142, 160.

Kant, 86, 94, 165.

Kaulen, Fr., 212.

Kilber, 267.

King, 86.

Klaatsch, 132.

Klee, 63, 171.

Kleutgen, Jos. (S.J.), 173, 176.

Knowledge, Infused, of our first parents, 207 sqq.

Knoodt, 182.

Κόσμος, 97.

Κόσμος νοητός—κόσμος αισθητός, 34.

Künstle, K., 26.

Κύριος, ὁ, 11.

Kurtz, 115.

Lactantius, 134, 136, 167.

Languages, 212.

Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 27, 47, 50, 55, 312, 313, 340; Fifth Council of the, 143, 153, 176.

Leibniz, 45, 142.

Leo the Great, 26, 165, 174, 184.

Leo X, Pope, 143, 153, 176 sq.

Lessing, 94.

Lessius, 89.

Liberatore, 77.

Liberty, 291. (See also Freewill.)

Liturgism, 115.

Λόγοι οὐσιόποιοι, 34.

Logos, The Divine, 5, 26, 35, 37, 40, 51, 138, 193, 209.

Lucifer, 342.

Lumen gloriae, 192.

Lusus naturae, 109.

Luther, 262, 265, 293.

Maassen, Fr., 175.

Macedonia, 338.

Machabees, The Mother of the, 12 sq.

Magic, 348 sq.

Maher, M. (S.J.), 214.

Man, The nature of, 126 sqq.; The origin of, 126 sqq.; The first man immediately created by God, 127 sqq.; The Creation of, 127 sqq.; Called μικρόθεος, 130; All men descended from Adam and Eve, 131 sqq.; Essential constituents of, 136 sqq.; Dichotomy proved from Scripture, 139 sqq.; Has an immortal soul, 151 sqq.; Things due to him as man, 228 sq.; His defection from the supernatural order, 232 sqq.

Mâni, 21.

Manichaeism, 19, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 48, 127, 138, 238 sq., 260, 313.

Mankind, Descended from Adam and Eve, 131.

“Man of Sorrows,” The, 49.

Marcion, 19, 21.

Marriage not derived from original sin, 202.

Mary, Blessed Virgin, 281, 342.

Mass, The, 59.

Materia informis, 101.

Materialism, 20, 29, 93, 154.

Materia praeiacens, 5, 6.

Materiarii, The, 19.

Melanchthon, 262.

Μὴ ὄν, 6.

Messalians, 261.

Metamorphoses, Ovid’s, 13.

Metempsychosis, 165 sq.

Michael, Archangel, 337, 338, 342.

Mileve, Council of, 219, 240, 243.

Mill, John Stuart, 22.

Miracles, 59, 111, 182, 190, 320.

Mivart, St. G., 127, 130, 131.

Molecules, 101.

Molinism, On the divine Concursus, 72 sqq.

Moneta, Ven., 170.

Monism, 20, 22.

Monogenism, Christian, 132.

Morgan, Thomas, 93.

Mosaic account of the Creation, The, 13; Historic character of, 116 sq. (See also Hexaëmeron.)

Moses, 19, 52, 116, 130, 250, 251, 322.

Müller, Max, 214.

Names, Deeper meanings of God’s, 10 sqq.

Naturalism, 94.

Nature, and the Supernatural, 180 sqq.; Explanation of the term “Nature,” 181 sqq.; Definition of, 185; The state of pure, 228 sqq.; The state of fallen, 227; The state of repaired, 227; How “wounded” by original sin, 298 sqq.

Neanderthal race, 132.

Necessity, Historical, 292.

Negroes, 132.

Nemesius, 164.

Neo-Platonists, 24, 26.

Neptunists, 105.

Nicephorus Callistus, 152.

Norisius, Cardinal, 173.

Νόες, 317.

Νοῦς, 138, 317.

Obsession, 346.

Occasionalism, 67.

Ockam, 138.

Odo of Cambrai, 275.

Oischinger, 171.

Olivi, Petrus Ioannis, 142.

Olympius, 255.

Omnipotence, God’s, 57.

Onomatopoeia, 212.

Optimism, Absolute, 45; Relative, 46.

Orange, Second Council of, 220, 242.

Ordines angelorum, 323.

Ordo naturalis, 185.

Original justice, State of, 216 sqq., 227.

Origen, 51, 65, 82, 152, 164, 215, 239, 253, 331, 334.

Original Sin, Marriage not a result of, 202; Heresy of the Pelagians concerning, 218 sqq.; State of, not identical with the state of pure nature, 229 sq.; The doctrine of, expounded, 232 sqq.; The sin of Adam as the first sin, 233 sqq.; Heretical Theories concerning, 238 sqq.; Tridentine decree on, 243 sqq.; Scriptural proof for, 245 sqq.; Traditional proof for, 253 sqq.; The nature of, 259 sqq.; Does not descend as a substantial form from Adam to his progeny, 260 sqq.; Is not a substance, 260 sq.; Concupiscence not the essence of, 261 sqq.; Not identical with concupiscence, 264 sq.; No morbida qualitas, 264; Does not consist exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the actual sin of Adam, 265 sqq.; Consists essentially in privation of grace, 269 sqq.; Why does the sin of Adam inhere as a true sin in all his descendants? 273 sqq.; The contractual and alligation theories, 276 sqq.; How it is transmitted, 279 sqq.; Its specific unity, 279; Derives from Adam, 279 sq.; Transmitted by natural generation, 280 sq.; And Creationism, 281 sq.; The part played by concupiscence in the transmission of, 283 sqq.; The penalties of, 286 sqq.; Effects of, in the status termini, 300 sqq.

Oswald, 59.

Οὐσία πρώτη, 181.

Over-soul, The universal, 152.

Ovid, 13.

Paedo-baptismus. (See Infant Baptism.)

Palæontology, 104.

Palmieri, 46, 267.

Pancosmism, 23.

Panlogism, 26.

Panpsychism, 146.

Pantheism, Its teaching, 8, 20, 23; Cosmological and ontological, 23 sqq.; Its influence on modern thought, 25; Supplants Manichaeism, 29; Condemned by the Vatican Council, 30; Differs from Deism, 93, 94; Incompatible with the dogma of Creation, 106; Denies the immortality of the soul, 154 sq.; The, of later Protestant divines, 222.

Πᾶν θεός, 23.

Paradise a garden of pleasure, 215.

Parents, Our first, Exempt by a special grace from concupiscence, 200 sqq.; Were they blind? 201; Were they infants? 201; Their natural integrity, 202; Were they able (in Paradise) to commit venial sin? 204; Fall of, 233 sqq.; Were they ultimately saved? 238. (See also Adam and Eve.)

Passibility, A penalty of original sin, 289.

Pastor of Hermas, The, 18.

Pattern, 33.

Paul, St., 16, 42, 70, 88, 163, 172, 192, 197, 201, 206, 209, 247, 249, 252, 257, 262, 263, 271, 289, 290, 294, 296, 312, 314, 322, 330, 332, 338.

Pelagianism, 218 sqq., 239 sqq.; 254, 281, 326.

Pelagians, 71, 169, 202, 218 sqq., 239, 246, 253, 256, 302.

Periodism, 113 sq.

Peripatetic theory of the elements, 101.

Pessimism, 48.

Petavius, 301.

Peter Lombard, 58, 170, 199, 285.

Peter, St., 333, 345.

Petrifactions, 109.

Peyrère, Isaac, 132, 134.

Φάρμακον τῆς ἀθανασίας, 207.

Philo, 6, 215.

Physical premotion. (See praemotio physica.)

Physics, 105, 148.

Pistoia, Pseudo-council of, 224, 303.

Pius V, Pope, 224, 245.

Pius VI, Pope, 245, 303.

Pius IX, Pope, 149, 177.

Platel, 267.

Plato, 6, 8, 13, 17, 21, 33, 35, 137, 142.

Plutonists, 105.

Poetism, 115.

Pomponazzi, 152.

Positivism, 20.

Possession, Demoniacal, 346 sqq.

Postperiodism, 113.

Potentia obedientialis, 188 sqq.

Powers, 320, 322, 323.

Praemotio physica, 75.

Pre-Adamites, 131 sq., 134, 135 sq.

Pre-existence, Theory of, 162 sqq., 238.

Preservation, Divine, 61 sqq.; The nature of, 62; Not merely negative, 63; Proved from Scripture, 64; Active and passive, 64.

Preternatural, The, 187 sq.; Prerogatives, 194.

Principalities, 322, 323.

Principium sine principio, 38, 51.

Priscillian and Priscillianism, 22, 26, 164, 238.

Privatio gratiae, 269 sqq., 288.

Probation, Precept of, 233 sqq.

Processes, Formative, 5, 7.

Production, Modes of, 5.

Prophecies, 190.

Protestantism, Heretical teaching of, on original sin, 221 sqq., 242 sqq.

Protoevangelium, The, 155.

Protyle, 6.

Providence, Divine, 91 sqq.; Definition of, 91; How related to the divine government of the world, 91; The dogma, 92.

“Providentissimus Deus,” Encyclical, III.

Pseudo-Clement, 160.

Pseudo-Dionysius, 323, 324, 331, 332.

Ptolemy, 106.

Pure Nature, The state of. (See Nature.)

Quesnel, 223, 224, 225, 243, 262.

Raphael, Archangel, 337, 338.

Rationalism, 94.

Rationes rerum, 34.

Reason might have arrived at the concept of Creation, but in matter of fact did not, 8.

Redeemer, The, 49.

Redemption, The, 135, 217, 227.

Reign of death, The, 291, 344.

Restitution theory, 112.

Reticius, 255.

Revelation, Reason indebted to, for the true concept of Creation, 8.

Richard of St. Victor, 53.

Rickaby, Jos. (S.J.), 308.

“Riddle of the painful earth,” The, 48.

Ripalda, 193.

Rosmini, 171.

Rufinus, 173.

Ruiz, 46, 93.

Rupert of Deutz, 316.

Sabbath, The, 106, 116, 121.

Sacraments, The, 190.

Salmeron, 267, 344.

Samuel, 157.

Satan, 340 sq. (See also Devil.)

Saul, 157.

Sayce, 214.

Schell, 148, 205.

Schelling, 25, 165.

Schepss, G., 22.

Schiffini, 148.

Schleicher, 214.

Schleiermacher, 222.

Schmid, Fr., 307.

Schopenhauer, 48.

Schwalbe, 132.

Science, Habitual infused, A supernatural prerogative, 194 sq.; Possessed by our first parents, 207 sqq.

Scientia media, 74.

Scientists as exegetes, 104.

Scotists, The, Their doctrine of the forma corporeitatis, 147 sq.; On the immortality of the soul, 151; On the elevation of Adam to the state of grace, 199 sq.

Scotus, Duns. (See Duns Scotus.)

Scotus Eriugena. (See John Scotus Eriugena.)

Seisenberger, M., 114.

Self-existence, God’s, 10, 57.

Semen spirituale, 168.

Semi-Pelagians, 220.

Seraphim, 322, 323, 326, 332.

Serpent, The, in Paradise, 235.

Severian of Gabala, 100.

Shame, 200.

Sheol, 156.

Sin, 28, 45, 47, 68, 181, 200, 236, 245, 344. (See also Original Sin.)

Socrates, 337.

Sola fide, Protestant theory of justification, 222.

Solomon, 210.

Sonship, Divine, 192, 193.

Sorcery, 348.

Soul, The human, Is not merely a more highly developed form of the brute soul, 127; The spiritual soul an essential constituent of man, 137 sqq.; Man has but one, 140 sq.; The principle of thought, 141 sq.; The spiritual soul the immediate substantial form of the body, 142 sqq.; Immortality of the, 151 sqq.; Does it sleep after death till the Resurrection? 151 sq.; The soul an image of God, 157; Origin of the, 161 sqq.; Generationism unacceptable, 166 sqq.; Creationism the only true theory, 169 sqq.; Infused into the body, 176 sq.; When infused, 177 sq.

Soul-sleep, Theory of, 152.

South Sea Islands, Aborigines of, 132.

Space in its relation to Creation, 9.

Speech, Origin of, 211 sqq.

Spencer, Herbert, 9, 25.

Spinoza, Baruch, 24, 146.

Spiraculum vitae, 140, 198.

Spiration, 5.

Stagirius, 93.

Star worship, 106.

States of man, The different, 226 sqq.; Historic, 226 sq.; Possible, 227 sq.

Stattler, 86.

Status termini, 191.

Status viae, 191.

Steinthal, 214.

Stenzel, A., 112.

Stoa, The, 17.

Suarez, 58, 76, 112, 307, 332, 335, 345.

Substance, Creation results in 7; Creatures are not emanations of the divine, 24; When synonymous with Nature, 181.

Substantia intrinsece supernaturalis, Possibility of a, 193.

Substantiarians, The Lutheran, 260, 261.

Succession, 6 sq.

Suffering, A penalty of original sin, 289.

Supernatural Order, Prerogatives of the, 190 sqq.

Supernatural, The, in man, 179 sqq.; Definition of, 180 sqq.; Not synonymous with spiritual, 182; Definition of the term, 186 sqq.; Two species of, 187 sq.; The Preternatural, 187; The strictly supernatural, 188; Prerogatives, 190 sqq.

Sylvius, Francis, 287, 301.

Tatian, 51.

Taxil, Leo, 349.

Temptation to sin, 344 sqq.

Tertullian, 10 sq., 12, 18, 19, 35, 85, 130, 152, 160, 166 sq., 173, 175, 255.

Θείωσις, 188, 198.

Theodore Abucara, 168.

Theodoret, 93, 336.

Theophilus of Antioch, 18.

Theosophy, 20.

Thomas, St., Definition of Creation, 7; On Heb. 11:3, 17; On the divine idea of the cosmos, 33; On the divine Processions, 37; On the eternity of the world, 54; Teaches that pure being can be created only by the causa universalissima, 58; And that a creature cannot even be an instrumental cause in creating, 59; And that being is the essence of God alone, 65; On co-operation between God and the creature, 68, 73; St. Thomas and Thomism, 74; On the formation of the universe, 99; On St. Augustine’s interpretation of the Hexaëmeron, 102; Explains why the Bible is written in unscientific language, 106; Protests against a foolish way of reconciling faith and science, 110 sq.; On the Hexaëmeron, 118 sq.; On the creation of man, 129; On the forma corporis, 147; Paves the way for Creationism, 169 sq.; On the potentia obedientialis, 189; On concupiscence, 194 sq.; On impassibility, 195; On Adam’s elevation to the state of grace, 199; Holds that our first parents (in Paradise) could not commit venial sin, 205; On the knowledge of our first parents before the Fall, 209 sq.; On the infallibility of Adam, 211; On the mystery of original sin, 274 sq.; On concupiscence as a secondary constituent of original sin, 277; On the transmission of original sin, 280, 282; On Christ’s immunity from original sin, 281; On the penalties of original sin, 286; On concupiscence as the material component of original sin, 289; On the influence of original sin on human nature, 299; On the punishment due to original sin, 305; On the lot of unbaptized children, 306 sq.; On the Angels, 308; Holds that they converse by a mere act of the will, 318; Holds that each Angel constitutes a distinct species, 321 sq.; On the sanctification of the Angels, 327; On the orders of the Angels, 331 sq.; On the Guardian Angels, 336 sq.; On temptation, 345 sq.

Thomism, On the divine Concursus, 74 sqq.; On the question: When was Adam raised to the state of supernatural grace? 199 sq.; On the state of pure nature, 230 sq.

Θυμός, 138.

Thrones, 322, 323, 332.

Timæus, Plato’s, 13.

Time in its relation to Creation, 49 sqq.

Tindal, 93.

Tobias, 331.

Tohu-vabohu, 113.

Toland, 93.

Toletus, Cardinal, 267, 322.

Traducianism, 166 sqq.

Toner, P. J., 301, 302.

Transmigration of souls, 165 sq.

Transmission of original sin, Mode of, 279 sqq.

Transubstantiation, 66.

Tree of knowledge, 206 sq., 234, 235.

Tree of life, 235.

Trent, Council of, 47, 199, 222 sq., 243 sqq., 262, 263, 268 sq., 270, 278, 279, 290, 291, 293, 302.

Trichotomy, 138, 139, 142.

Trinity, The dogma of Creation in its relation to the, 35 sqq.; The Trinity as Creator, 38; Vestiges of the, in all creatures, 38 sqq.; Rational creatures bear the image of the, 40; Nature vs. hypostasis in the, 182; Our first parents probably had a belief in the, 209.

Turribius, 165.

“Unigenitus,” Bull, 224.

Unity of the human race, 126 sqq.; Is a Catholic doctrine, 131 sq.; How safeguarded, 136.

Universe, The, Essentially an ens ab alio, 3; Beginning of the, 4; Formation, 6; God the cause of the, 8; The divine idea of the, 32; The best in a relative sense, 46; Was it created from all eternity? 52.

Valentius, 19.

Vatican, Council of the, 29, 50, 82, 83, 92, 131, 155, 313.

Vaughan, Diana, 349.

Verbal theory, 112.

Vestiges of the Trinity in all creatures, 38.

Vienne, Council of (A. D. 1311), 142, 146 sqq.

Vigilius of Salzburg, 136.

Vigouroux, F., 114.

Vincent of Lerins, 255.

Virtues, 320, 322, 323.

Vision theory, 115 sqq.

Vock, 183.

Vosen, 112.

Vulneratio naturae, 298 sqq.

Wagner, A., 112.

Westermayer, A., 113.

Whitney, Prof., 214.

Will, The human, 203, 204.

Winchell, 132.

Wiseman, Cardinal, 112.

Witchcraft, 348.

Woman, Creation of, 129; Promise of redemption through the seed of the, 156.

World, The beginning of the, 4; Not “metamorphosed nothingness,” 9; God the Creator of the visible as well as the invisible, 12; The theory of an absolutely perfect, 45; Was it created from all eternity? 52.

Yahweh, 10.

Zacharias, Pope, 136.

Zigliara, Card., 77.

Zosimus, Pope, 219, 241.

Zwingli, 243, 264, 265.

1. God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes. A Dogmatic Treatise. Prefaced by a Brief General Introduction to the Study of Dogmatic Theology. By the Rev. Jos. Pohle, Ph.D., D.D. Authorized English Version, with Some Abridgement and Added References, by Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder 1911.—The Divine Trinity. A Dogmatic Treatise. By the Rev. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., D.D.… Authorized English Version, with Some Abridgement and Numerous Additional References, by Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder 1911.

2. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 133 sqq.

3. “Creatio simpliciter est productio rei ex nihilo.” Cfr. J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 202 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904.

4. Ex nihilo, in the sense of ex nihilo sui et subjecti. “Since that which already is, is not being made, but that is being made which was not; so the nothingness, or the not being, of the thing which is being made, is presupposed to the effecting of it. This is what is called the nothingness of itself, as distinguished from the nothingness of its subject.” (W. Humphrey, S. J., “His Divine Majesty,” or The Living God, p. 206, London 1897.)

6. ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός. (Nicene Creed). Cfr. Pohle-Preuss. The Divine Trinity, pp. 162 sqq.

9. Hence the current distinction between creatio prima (ex nihilo) and creatio secunda (ex materia praeiacente).

10. De Nihilo et Tenebris. Fredegis flourished about the beginning of the ninth century. Cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. I, col. 714 n., 3rd ed., Oeniponte 1903.

12. Cfr. St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 45, art. 1, ad 3: “Haec praepositio ‘ex’ non designat causam materialem, sed ordinem tantum, sicut cum dicitur: Ex mane fit meridies, i. e., post mane fit meridies.”

13. We shall treat of this subject more in detail in a later volume, on the Blessed Eucharist.

14. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 65, art. 3.—“The last three words [of this definition] are merely declarative. The sense of them is contained in the words which precede them.… The formal object of creation is being.… Creation makes that to be, which was not. Hence, another definition—Creation is the production of being, as being.”—(Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 207.)

16. “Creatio est productio entis in quantum est ens.” S. Theol., 1a, qu. 44, art. 2.

17. Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., General Metaphysics, p. 253 (Stony-hurst Series).

18. “To be created is proper to substance. This is so, both because, if substance is to be made, it can be made only by creation; and because other things, even if they are made at the same time, and along with substance, are nevertheless made of that substance, because it is through the reality of the substance that they consist.”—Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 207 sq.

19. Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 839, 2nd ed. Innsbruck 1878; Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20, sect. 1, n. 24; K. Elser, Die Lehre des Aristoteles über das Wirken Gottes, Münster 1890.

22. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 163 sqq.

25. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 286 sqq.

26. Cohort. ad Gentiles. The authenticity of this work is, however, doubtful. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, p. 54, Freiburg and St. Louis 1908.

36. Cfr. Lamy, Comment. in Libr. Genes., Malines 1883; V. Zapletal, O.P., Der Schöpfungsbericht der Genesis, Freiburg 1902.

37. The English rendering of this passage is more accurate than that of the Latin Vulgate—ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης means ex materia informi. Cfr. on this text C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schöpfung, p. 63, Ratisbon 1910.

42. Cohort ad Gent., 22. “Very probably it [the Cohortatio ad Gentes] was composed at the end of the second or the beginning of the third century, though at present opinions differ very widely as to its origin.” (Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, p. 53.)

45. “Si immutabilis est materia [increata], mundus ex eo non conditur, siquidem materia omnem mutationem respuit, eo quod est ingenita.” (Migne, P.G., VII, 1248.)

46. Tertull., Contra Hermog., c. 1. How the Arians confounded the concept of Creation with that of Generation in regard to the Logos, is explained in Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 123, sqq.

48. ποιήσας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἷναι τὰ πάντα.

52. Hom. in Genes., 2, 3. For the solution of certain Patristic difficulties into which we cannot enter here, the student is referred to Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 53 sqq., Rome 1878.

1. On the various Monistic systems cfr. the recent admirable work of Fr. Klimke, S. J., Der Monismus und seine philosophischen Grundlagen, Freiburg 1911.

3. On Mâni (the Greek form is Μάνης) and Manichæism, consult Arendzen’s article “Manichaeism” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX, pp. 591 sqq.

4. “The preponderance of good or evil is explained by the temporary advantage gained by the one over the other. This teaching profoundly influenced early Christianity. St. Augustine fell under its sway for some years (Confess.). We find it coming out afresh in the doctrines of the Albigensians of the XII century. In our day it has been advanced by John Stuart Mill (Essay on Rel. and Nature, p. 41).”—Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, p. 201.

5. On the theological side of Dualism cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 213, 221 sqq. For a brief general account see Michael Maher, S. J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 169. To avoid misunderstandings the student should note that in modern philosophy the term Dualism is employed in a different sense, signifying, in opposition to Monism, the ordinary common-sense view that the existing universe contains two radically distinct kinds of being or substance—matter and spirit, body and mind.

6. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 427 sqq.—Bardenhewer points out that while Priscillian’s writings, as edited by Schepss, “contradict in various ways the received accounts of the heresy, particularly those of Sulpicius Severus (Chron. 2:46–51; Dial., ii [iii], 11 sq.), at the same time, by reason of their imperfect manuscript tradition and the obscurity of their diction, these newly found writings contain what are at present insurmountable difficulties.” Cfr. Schepss, Priscillian, ein neuaufgefundener lateinischer Schriftsteller des 4ten Jahrhunderts, Würzburg 1886; also E. Michael, S. J., in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1892, pp. 692 sqq., and P. J. Healy in the Catholic Encyclopedia, article “Priscillianism,” Vol. XII, pp. 429 sq., with bibliography.

7. On Atheism see Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 49 sqq.

8. ἕν καὶ πᾶν. That existing things are to be explained by an emanation out of the original one divine substance, is a doctrine found in all ancient mythologies. For a succinct historical sketch of the various systems see J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 180 sqq., New York 1904; W. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 17 sqq., 168 sqq., 306 sqq., 470 sq., Boston 1903.

10. Born at Amsterdam, of Jewish parents, in 1632. Cfr. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 466 sqq.

11. Cfr. B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 200 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899.

13. The influence of Pantheism on modern thought has been, and continues to be, very great. The English Agnostic school teaches that God is unknowable and as such does not come within the purview of human thought and action; nevertheless, in all other points it is fashioned in the mould of Spinoza. “Hence comes the charge—so strange at first sight—that Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In the criticism of his system we meet with the same difficulties that we find in Spinoza, i. e., the nature of mind and of matter, the character of their interaction, and the doctrine of determinism. Both Spinoza and Spencer teach a pure Naturalism, with this difference only that the God of the former becomes to the latter the Unknown and Unknowable behind the phenomena.”—Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 189 sq.

14. His was the famous dictum: Πάντα ρεῖ, “All things are flowing.” Cfr. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 53 sqq.

18. For a general refutation of Pantheism see B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 112 sqq., 200 sqq., and Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 204 sqq. Cfr. also P. Hake, Handbuch der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft, Vol. I, pp. 71 sqq., Freiburg 1875, and Jos. Hontheim, S. J., Institutiones Theodicaeae, pp. 465 sqq., Friburgi 1893.

20. Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 231 sqq. In former editions of the Enchiridion, this condemnation was attributed to St. Leo the Great. Karl Künstle has shown (Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905, pp. 117 sqq.) that it is a Spanish fabrication, made after the year 563.

21. On the teaching of the school of Chartres, of which Amalric (or Amaur) and David were the leading exponents, cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 220 sqq. See also Funk-Cappadelta, A Manual of Church History, Vol. I, pp. 355 sq., London 1910.

24. Decret. pro Iacobitis, cited in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, nn. 706 sq.

26. These canons can be found in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, nn. 1801 sqq. Also, with an English translation, in the Appendix to Cardinal Manning’s work, The Vatican Council, 4th ed., New York reprint, 1902, pp. 192 sqq. For a detailed analysis of them see Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, pp. 496 sqq. Cfr. also Granderath-Kirch, Geschichte des vatikanischen Konzils, 3 vols., Freiburg 1903–06.

5. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 225 sqq.

7. Among those who opposed the Platonic view were Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Gregory of Nazianzus.

8. He writes: “Quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quodsi recte dici et credi non potest, restat, ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente Creatoris? Non enim quidquam extra se positum intuetur, ut secundum id constitueret, quod constituebat; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quodsi hae rerum creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse …, non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt et eiusmodi atque incommutabiles manent, quarum participatione fit, ut sit, quidquid est, quoquo modo est.” In Libr. 83 Quaest., qu. 46, 2.

1. Bonjoannes, Compendium of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas.… Translated into English. Revised by Fr. Wilfrid Lescher, O. P., p. 116, London 1906.

4. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 704. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 231 sq.

8. Cfr. St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 5; Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 224 sq.

9. “The three Divine Persons are, all of them, required in order to the causality of creation; inasmuch as that God is required, to whom a trinity of persons is essential, so that without this trinity He would not be God.”—(Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 226.)

10. S. th., 1a, qu. 45, art. 6. On some very subtle problems involved in this theory see Ruiz, De Trinit., disp. 3, sect. 1. On the whole subject cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 275 sqq.

11. Though “we cannot safely affirm the Apostolic composition of [this] Creed, there is no doubt that in substance it goes back to Apostolic times. As a result of [its] intimate association with the liturgy and teaching of the Church, the Apostles’ Creed has always been held to have the authority of an ex cathedra utterance.”—Cfr. H. Thurston’s admirable article “Apostles’ Creed,” with bibliography, in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I.

13. On the divine Appropriations in general see Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 244 sqq.

15. “In every effect there is something corresponding to the cause; something which may be said to represent that cause. This representation may be such that the existence of the effect merely indicates the existence of the cause, and such an effect is said to show a vestige of the cause; the proper meaning of the word ‘vestige’ is ‘footprint’; and a footprint which shows that a man has passed, but does not tell what manner of man he is, affords an instance of a vestige. When the representation affords some distinct knowledge of the nature of the cause, even if this knowledge be imperfect, the representation is called an image, such is the work of a sculptor or painter.”—Sylvester Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 233 sq., London 1895. Cfr. also Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 227 sqq.

18. Cfr. Hurter, Compend., Vol. II, thes. 127; S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 232 sqq., London 1895. We shall recur to certain aspects of this subject in our treatise on Grace.

1. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 430 sqq.

4. E. g., Ps. 113:3: “Deus autem noster in coelo; omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit.”

12. De Curand. Graecor. Affect., 4. On Theodoret of Cyrus cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. I, coll. 360 sqq., Oeniponte 1903. Cfr. also Fortescue, The Orthodox Eastern Church, pp. 56, 58, 70, London 1907; Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 370 sqq.

14. Cfr. Tennemann’s Manual of the History of Philosophy, ed. Johnson-Morell (Bohn’s Philological Library), pp. 340 sqq., London 1878. “Leibniz’s … Théodicée was composed for the purpose of refuting Bayle, who had tried to show that reason and faith are incompatible. The work is devoted, in a large measure, to the discussion of the problem of evil and to the defence of optimism.”—Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 511.

15. De Civit. Dei, XI, 24. Among those who have effectively refuted absolute Optimism we may mention: Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodic., pp. 622 sqq.; Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., I, qu. 2, cap. 22, cited by Kilgenstein, Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor, pp. 212 sqq., Würzburg 1897.

16. Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbit., III, 5; St. Chrysost., Hom. in 1 Cor., 12; St. John Damasc., De Fide Orth., II, 29.

18. Grace, glory, hypostatic union. For further information on the whole subject the student is referred to Palmieri, De Deo Creante, thes. 12, Romae 1878; Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 650 sqq., Oeniponte 1878; Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 247 sqq., London 1897. Prominent among the more recent defenders of absolute Optimism is G. W. Allen, The Mission of Evil. Being a Suggestion towards a Philosophy of Absolute Optimism, London 1900.

20. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 6. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 253 sqq. and 449 sqq.

23. Cfr. Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 589 sq. For a good critical exposition of Schopenhauer’s system see Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 283 sqq.

24. “What place the principle of evil occupies in the constitution of things: how it came to exist: and how it may best be treated and its consequences avoided in practice—such questions as these really lie at the root of all philosophizing, whether speculative or didactic, ancient or modern; and it is mostly as a practical way of possible escape from some of the most painful and distressing of actual or possible experiences that religion in general has commended itself to the mind of man.”—A. B. Sharpe, Evil: Its Nature and Cause, p. 7, London 1907.

26. Cfr. J. Dippel, Der neuere Pessimismus, Würzburg 1884; E. L. Fischer, Das Problem des Übels und die Theodicee, Mainz 1883; v. Keppler, Das Problem des Leidens in der Moral, new ed., Freiburg 1911; A. B. Sharpe, Evil: Its Nature and Its Cause, London 1907; Idem, in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, article “Evil”; Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, Chapter 15, pp. 297 sqq.; Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 393 sqq.

4. Cfr. Theophil., Ad Autol., II, 10; Clem. Alex., Strom., VI, 7; Basil., Hom. in Hexaëm., 1.

10. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 306 sqq.—“The now of time is the boundary line between the past and the future. As soon, therefore, as the world was created, there existed a boundary line between an imaginary or possible past, and a real future. This was the beginning of real time.”—Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 257.

11. De Civ. Dei, V, 6.—Creation is said to have taken place in time, in the sense that real time began with creation. Before real time, there was only possible time. This was indefinite, in the possibility of it. Hence we may, with St. Augustine, say that the world was made with time, rather than made in time. Cfr. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 257.

16. Cfr. the learned monograph of Dr. P. Thomas Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquino über die Möglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schöpfung, Münster 1895.

18. Cfr. Hontheim, Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 710 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 249 sqq.; Stentrup, Das Dogma von der zeitlichen Weltschöpfung, Innsbruck 1870.

3. Against Durandus and Gabriel Biel. Cfr. the latter’s Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist., I, qu. 4.

4. Durandus was ill-advised when he wrote: “Quamvis nulli creaturae sit communicatum, quod creet, tamen non apparet aliqua ratio convincens necessario, quod Deus non posset facere aliquam creaturam, quae possit aliquid producere nullo supposito in quo agat—Though it has not been given to any creature to create, yet there appears to be no stringent and necessary reason why God should not be able to make some creature which would possess the power to produce something out of nothing.” L. c., n. 23.

6. Serm. contr. Arian., ii, n. 21. Newman’s translation; cfr. Select Treatises of St. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians, Vol. I, p. 277, 9th impression, London 1903.

7. De Gen. ad Lit., IX, 15, 28. For other Patristic texts bearing on this topic cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 436 sqq., Paris 1895, and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed., pp. 12 sqq., Friburgi 1908.

9. Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 11. Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante, thes. 6.

13. Cfr. St. Thom., Contr. Gent., II, 21 (Rickaby, God and His Creatures, pp. 88 sq., London 1905); Idem, De Pot., qu. 3, art. 4; also Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 451 sq.

3. “The fact that a creature actually exists, does not exist necessarily, but depends on an external cause as much for its continuous as for its initial existence.” (Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, p. 364.)

4. The peculiar theory advanced by Henry of Ghent and Aureolus, that there is a specific difference between the creative and the preservative action of God, has been justly rejected by all theological schools. Cfr. St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a. qu. 104, art. 2, ad 4.—On Henry of Ghent (Doctor Solemnis) see Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 384 sqq.; on Peter d’Auriol (Aureolus), ibid., pp. 403 sq.

5. If Bayle’s opinion were true, justly observes B. Boedder, S. J. (Natural Theology, p. 354, 2nd ed., London 1899), “there would be properly no preservation at all, but only renewal by divine creation of interrupted existences.”

7. This last-mentioned point must be strongly emphasized against certain modern theologians (e. g., Berlage and Klee), who postulate the Divine Preservation only for dissoluble compound substances (organisms), but hold that the so-called incorruptible and simple substances (the elements, pure spirits) preserve themselves.

8. Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. ii, qu. 19. “Nisi conditis rebus perpetua eius [Dei] providentia adesset, atque eadem vi, qua ab initio constitutae sunt, illas conservaret, statim ad nihilum reciderent.”

14. In Gen. ad Lit., IV. 14. “Being is not the nature or essence of anything created, but of God alone,” says St. Thomas Aquinas. “Nothing then can remain in being when the divine activity ceases.” (Contr. Gent., III, 65.) “This is a truly magnificent argument,” comments Fr. Rickaby. “In these idealist days, there is no difficulty in bringing any theist to avow that things could not be at all, if they dropped out of the thought of the Supreme Mind. But God’s mere thinking of them is not enough to raise them out of the order of pure possibilities, and transfer them into the region of actual being. To give them actuality, God must will them; and to keep them in existence He must will them continually.” (Of God and His Creatures, p. 236, note.)

15. Moral., XVI, 37, 45. Other Patristic texts will be found in Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 658 sqq., Oenip. 1878.

17. For a detailed treatment of this point we must refer the student to the treatise on the Blessed Eucharist.

2. For a brief summary of the considerations usually urged against Occasionalism, see J. L. Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy, pp. 70 sq., New York 1909.

3. “To signify that all capabilities of creatures for action must be reduced to divine creation and preservation, and that the exercise of these capabilities can never take place but with dependence upon divine volition, Scholastics say that God concurs with His creatures in action as the first cause, whilst the creatures are second causes.” (Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 395 sq.)

4. Contr. Gent., 3:70: “Patet quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti attribuitur, quasi partim a Deo et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum, sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento et principali agenti etiam totus.” (Cfr. Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 242, London 1905.)

6. God’s predetermination, in the words of Fr. Boedder, “causes the free choice which is sinful, but He does not cause it as sinful.” (Natural Theology, p. 372.) Cfr. St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 3, art. 2.

9. It should be noted, however, that the phrase ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι, because of the general terms in which it is couched, is most probably meant to include man’s natural acts.

15. “Iuxta meum sensum non posse perspicuum est.” Cfr. St. Jerome’s Ep. ad Ctesiph.

16. Regarding the consensus of the Schoolmen on this point see Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 82.

17. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 383 sqq., St. Louis 1911.

19. For further information on this question see Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu, I, 14 sqq.; Hontheim, Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 770 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Schiffini, Disput. Metaph. Specialis, Vol. II, pp. 331 sqq., August. Taurinor. 1888; B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 355 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899.

20. So called on the plea that it is the doctrine of St. Thomas; the Molinists claim that the Saint is not rightly interpreted by those who impute to him this teaching. Cfr. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 371 sqq., 439 sqq.

22. Alvarez, De Aux., III, disp. 18, n. 18, ad 1: “… ut conferat voluntati et omnibus causis secundis ultimum complementum actûs primi.”

24. “Primo,” says Suarez, ‘causa prima altior est et nobilior magisque independenti modo influit in effectum. Secundo causa prima respicit per se primo actionem illam sub quadam universaliori ratione; nam causa prima influit in quemlibet effectum vel actionem ex eo praecise, quod aliquid entitatis participat, causa autem secunda semper influit sub aliqua posteriori magisque determinata ratione entis. Unde fit tertio, ut influxus causae primae ex se et ex suo genere dicatur etiam prior subsistendi consequentia; nam influxus causae primae absolute non pendet a causa secunda, sed quantum est ex suo genere, potest esse sine illa, non vero e converso.” Metaphys., disp. 22, sect. 3, n. 10.

25. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 440, 455 sqq.

27. Instit. Philos., Vol. II, n. 66, Naples 1881. For a more complete treatment of these subtleties see Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, pp. 676 sqq., Oeniponte 1878. The student is also referred to the works cited under “Readings” and to the treatise on Grace, which is to appear later as a separate volume of this series.

3. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 423 sqq.

5. “I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, saith the Lord God.” (Apoc. 1:8.)

7. Enchirid., c. 9. Cfr. also St. John Damascene, De Fide Orth., II, 2. The philosophical argument is developed somewhat at length by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 19, art. 2–3.

13. Dan. 3:57.—Why God’s zeal for His own glory does not imply egoism and vainglory, we have explained in God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 432 sqq.

15. For the teaching of St. Augustine, see that holy Doctor’s work, Doctrina Christiana, I, 32. The philosophical argument is forcibly stated by St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., III, 16 sq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 196 sqq.). Cfr. also Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., l. XIV.

19. Cfr. Pohle, Die Sternenwelten und ihre Bewohner, 6th ed., pp. 467 sqq., 495 sqq., Cologne 1910.

21. E. g., Gen. 1:28: “And God blessed them [our first parents], saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth.”

23. 1 Cor. 10:31. On this text consult St. Augustine’s treatise De Doctrina Christiana, ch. 22.

25. Lessius explains the intrinsic relation existing between the glory of God and the beatitude of His creatures as follows: “Itaque in summa Dei gloria extrinseca formaliter et intrinsece includitur summum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine illo concipi nequeat; et hoc ipso quod Deus illam gloriam intendit et quaerit, intendit et quaerit summum bonum et commodum nostrum. Unde non minus Deo gratias agere debemus, quod quaerit gloriam suam, quam quod quaerat salutem nostram, quia gloria eius est salus nostra.” De Perfect. Moribusque Divin., XIV, 3, n. 36. For a refutation of the false theories of Hermes and Günther consult Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, Sect. 5.

2. See Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 361 sqq.

3. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. 1. (Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 1784.)

5. Πρὸς Σταγείριον ἀσκητὴν δαιμονῶντα. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, p. 334. There is a difficult passage in the writings of St. Jerome, which the reader will find quoted, with a brief explanation, in Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 358 sq. Ruiz has brought together quite a number of Patristic texts in his work De Providentia, disp. 3, sect. 3. The philosophical argument is well developed by J. Hontheim, S. J., in his Institutiones Theodicaeae, pp. 805 sqq., Friburgi 1893. Cfr. also Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 445 sqq.

6. For a good account of Deism see Fr. Aveling in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, s. v.

7. On God’s relation to evil, especially moral evil or sin,—a relation which Deism blandly ignores,—cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 442 sqq. See also our remarks on Pessimism, supra, pp. 48 sq. St. Thomas deals with this aspect of the subject in his Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 49. On the Optimism of St. Thomas, cfr. Boedder, Natural Theology, Appendix VI, pp. 467 sqq.

2. “Formation is an operation which, from already created matter, moulds different natures, fittingly compounds them, collects them into one synthesis, furnishes them with their own proper forces, and ordains them towards an end.” (Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 262.)

4. Our English version correctly renders this passage thus: “Thy almighty hand, which made the world of matter without form.” (Cfr. supra, p. 15).

6. Basil., Hom. in Hexaëm., 2; Greg. Naz., Orat., 44, n. 4; Greg. Nyss., Hom. in Hexaëm., 2.

10. Basing on Ecclus. 18:1: “Creavit omnia simul (κοινῇ)—He created all things together,” Augustine contracts the six days of Creation into one day, nay, into one single moment of time, and interprets “evening” as referring to the cognitio vespertina of the Angels.

12. Cfr. Petavius, De Opere Sex Dierum, I, 5; Grassmann, Die Schöpfungslehre des hl. Augustinus und Darwins, Ratisbon 1889.

2. The most recent and the best account of the Galilei case is that by Adolf Müller, S. J., in his two excellent volumes: Galileo Galilei and Der Galileiprozess (Freiburg 1909), which deserve to be translated into English. Cfr. also G. V. Leahy, Astronomical Essays, pp. 181 sqq., Boston 1910; J. Gerard, S. J., The Church vs. Science, pp. 22 sqq., London 1907.

3. Some of them, like Cuvier, Linné, Newton, Secchi, consciously; others, like Lyell, Kölliker, Virchow, unconsciously.

7. Prestwich, On Certain Phenomena Belonging to the Close of the Last Geological Period, New York 1895.

8. New York 1889. A splendid antidote to this venomous book is Fr. Lorinser’s Das Buch der Natur, 7 vols., Ratisbon 1876–80.

12. De Gen. ad Lit., IV, 22; De Civ. Dei, XI, 9. Supra, pp. 101 sq. Cfr. Fr. Schmid, De Inspirationis Bibliorum Vi et Ratione, Brix. 1895; P. Dausch, Die Schriftinspiration, Freiburg 1891; K. Holzhey, Die Inspiration der hl. Schrift in der Anschauung des Mittelalters von Karl dem Grossen bis zum Konzil von Trient, München 1895; Chr. Pesch, De Inspiratione S. Scripturae, Friburgi 1906.

13. Cfr. Leahy, Astronomical Essays, pp. 231 sqq.; Clerke, Modern Cosmogonies, pp. 21 sqq.

15. Such are, for instance, the Restitution and the Deluge theories (v. infra, p. 112). On this question of principle cfr. Kaulen, “Grundsätzliches zur kath. Schriftauslegung” in the Lit. Handweiser, 1895, Nos. 4 and 5; and A. Schöpfer, Bibel und Wissenschaft, Brixen 1896.

21. Ibid. ad 3. Cfr. Aug., De Gen. ad Lit., II, 1. On the whole subject see Leo XIII’s admirable Encyclical “Providentissimus Deus,” of Nov. 18, 1893, of which an English translation can be found in Seisenberger’s Practical Handbook for the Study of the Bible, pp. 159 sqq., New York 1911, and also in Archbishop Messmer’s translation of Brühl’s Bibelkunde (Outlines of Bible Knowledge, pp. 257 sqq., Freiburg and St. Louis 1910). Cfr. also Zanecchia, Divina Inspiratio SS. Scripturarum ad Mentem Divi Thomae, Rome 1898; C. Chauvain, L’Inspiration des Divines Ecritures, Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, De Inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae, Friburgi 1906.

25. Erschaffung der Welt und der Menschen und deren Geschichte bis nach der Sündflut, Schaffhausen 1861.

26. The Deluge theory might analogously be called “Anteperiodism,” and the Restitution theory “Postperiodism.” Cfr. v. Hummelauer, Nochmals der biblische Schöpfungsbericht, p. 54, Freiburg 1898.

27. It was held by Cuvier, Fraas, Pfaff, Hugh Miller, Guyot, Dana, Pianciani, Dawson, etc.

28. C. Güttler; cfr., however, this writer’s article “Hexaëmeron” in Herder’s Kirchenlexikon, Vol. V, col. 1980 sqq., Freiburg 1888.

32. “Le Jour Génésiaque,” in La Science Catholique, 1889, pp. 550 sqq.

33. Compare, e. g., the first with the fourth edition of Reusch’s work Bibel und Natur (4th ed., Bonn 1876).

36. Among the advocates of these theories may be mentioned: Stoppani, Hauser, Clifford, and De Gryse.

39. J. Kern, S. J., in the Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck 1895, p. 730.

41. On this controversy the student may profitably consult K. Holzhey, Schöpfung, Bibel und Inspiration, Stuttgart 1902; N. Peters, Glauben und Wissen im ersten biblischen Schöpfungsbericht, Paderborn 1907; F. E. Gigot, Special Introduction to the Study of the Old Testament, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 142 sqq., New York 1903.

3. De Civit. Dei, XI, 6: “Qui dies cuiusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis aut impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere.”

4. St. Hilary already took notice of this. “Diem frequenter significari pro aetate cognovimus,” he says, “ut ubi dies tota est, illic omne vitae tempus ostensum sit.” (In Ps. 55, n. 2.)

10. Cfr. Corluy, Spicil. Dogmatico-Bibl., t. I, pp. 163 sqq., Gand. 1884; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 39 sqq., Friburgi 1908; Duilhé-Braig, Apologie des Christentums, pp. 178 sqq., Freiburg 1889.

15. “Restat ergo,” says St. Augustine (De Gen. contr. Manich., I, 14, 20), “ut intelligamus, in ipsa quidem mora temporis ipsas distinctiones operum sic [scil. dies] appellatas, vesperam propter transactionem consummati operis, et mane propter inchoationem futuri operis: de similitudine scil. humanorum operum, quia plerumque a mane incipiunt et ad vesperam desinunt. Habent enim consuetudinem divinae Scripturae, de rebus humanis ad divinas res verba transferre.” Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 1895; Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., pp. 250 sqq., Bonn 1876; F. Kaulen, Der biblische Schöpfungsbericht (Gen. I, 1–2, 3) erklärt, Freiburg 1902.

1. Cfr. H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism, pp. 39 sqq., St. Louis 1906; E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, pp. 49 sqq., London 1909.

2. Cfr. W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., pp. 15 sqq., London 1899.

3. “It was necessary,” says St. Thomas, “that the first human body should be fashioned immediately by God … though possibly the Angels rendered some assistance, as they will also do at the resurrection by gathering up the dust.” (S. Theol., 1a, qu. 91, art. 2.)

12. Op. cit., c. 6: “Quodcunque enim limus exprimebatur, Christus cogitabatur homo futurus.”

13. “Dormit Adam, ut fiat Eva; moritur Christus, ut fiat ecclesia. Dormienti Adae fit Eva de latere; mortuo Christo lancea percutitur latus, ut profluant sacramenta, quibus formatur ecclesia.” (Aug., Tract. in Ioa., 9, n. 10.) Cfr. Conc. Viennense, apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 480.

14. On the Genesis of Species, pp. 277 sqq., London 1871; Lessons from Nature, pp. 177 sqq., London 1876.

15. Cfr. A. Jakob, Der Mensch, die Krone der Schöpfung, Freiburg 1900; O. Mohnike, Affe und Urmensch, Münster 1888; J. Diebolder, Darwins Grundprinzip der Abstammungslehre kritisch beleuchtet, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1891; E. Dennert, At the Deathbed of Darwinism, Burlington, Ia., 1904; W. Lescher, O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., London 1899; E. Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1910.

18. Preadamites, or A Demonstration of the Existence of Men Before Adam, Chicago 1890. On the main theses of this work, which is “almost as replete with facts and science as with suppositions and erroneous guesswork,” cfr. P. De Roo, History of America Before Columbus, Vol. I, pp. 14 sqq., Philadelphia 1900.

19. Cfr. E. Wasmann, The Berlin Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, pp. 71 sqq.

22. For a refutation of certain specious objections drawn from Sacred Scripture consult Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 251 sq.

24. “Si ab uno homine, quem Deus finxit, omnes orimur, ergo consanguinei sumus, et ideo maximum scelus putandum est, odisse hominem vel nocentem.” (Instit., l. 6.)

25. “Non de eadem terra, de qua plasmatus est Adam, sed de ipsius costa facta est mulier, ut sciremus, unam in viro et muliere esse naturam, unum fontem generis humani.” (De Paradiso, c. 10, n. 48.)

27. On the “tertiary man,” cfr. J. Ranke, Der Mensch, Vol. II, pp. 456 sqq., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900. On the North American Indians, see De Roo, History of America Before Columbus, Philadelphia 1900.

28. On the moot decision of Pope Zacharias against Bishop Vigilius of Salzburg, who was a contemporary of St. Boniface (cfr. Baronius, Annales, ad annum 748), see Pohle, Die Sternenwelten und ihre Bewohner, 6th ed., pp. 523 sqq., Köln 1910.

1. Father Rickaby, by the way, thinks that the traditional idea of Plato’s teaching on this head does him an injustice. “The passage, Timaeus, 69c–70a, describing how ‘the mortal kind of soul,’ with its two divisions, was allocated in the body by inferior deities, after the Supreme Deity had produced the intellect, misled early commentators, and after them St. Thomas, into the belief that Plato supposed three distinct souls in one human body. Plato never speaks of ‘souls’ except in reference to distinct bodies. He speaks of ‘the soul’ of man as familiarly as we do. The νοῦς in the head, the θυμός (St. Thomas’s pars irascibilis) in the chest, and the ἐπιθυμία (pars concupiscibilis) in the belly, are not three souls, but three varieties of one soul.… In the ultimate analysis of Plato’s meaning nothing more will appear, I believe, than the triple division, accepted by Aristotle and St. Thomas, of νοῦς, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, three phases of one soul, the first inorganic and spiritual, the two latter organic and involving connextion with the body.” (Of God and His Creatures, p. 120, n.)

3. Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, 2nd ed., Vol. II, n. 791 sqq., Innsbruck 1878.

5. Quoted in Denzinger’s Enchiridion, 10th ed. edited by Cl. Bannwart, n. 338.

6. Compare Luke 23:46: “Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit” with John 12:27: “Now is my soul troubled.”

11. De Resurrect., fragm. 10. On the orthodoxy of St. Irenæus cfr. Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hl. Irenäus, pp. 162 sqq., Münster 1894. St. Augustine’s dichotomic standpoint clearly appears in his De Anima. For the philosophical arguments see St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 76, art. 3, and Contr. Gent., II, 58 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 120 sq.).

13. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 481. On this dogmatic definition cfr. W. Lescher, The Evolution of the Body, 2nd ed., pp. 8 sq., London 1899.

16. Breve “Eximiam tuam” ad Card. de Geissel, Archiep. Colon., 15 Junii 1857; Epist. “Dolore haud mediocri” ad Episc. Vratisl. (Breslau) d. 30 Apr. 1860. For a trenchant refutation of Günther’s erroneous teaching see Oswald, Schöpfungslehre, pp. 176 sqq., Paderborn 1885.

17. Died A. D. 390. Cfr. J. F. Sollier’s article on “Appollinarianism” in Vol. I of the Catholic Encyclopedia.

21. σῶμα ψυχωθὲν νοερῶς (Cyril of Alexandria), σὰρξ ἔμψυχος λογική (Sophronius).

22. “Dicendum est, quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine nisi sola anima intellectiva, et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola, quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt.” S. Theol., 1a, qu. 76, art. 4.

26. “An vero,” he writes, “legitimâ consecutione inde colligatur vel existentia primae materiae, prout haec intelligitur in doctrina scholastica, praesertim D. Thomae, vel sententia eiusdem Aquinatis de unitate formae substantialis in eodem corpore, complures quidem rationali discursu id deducunt, sed minime did potest quasi ab Ecclesia definitum, nec oppositum censuram aliquam theologicam meretur, quamdiu Ecclesiae iudicio res ulterius determinata non fuerit. Quare prudentiae limites excederet ac temeritatis merito argueretur is, qui in rebus eiusmodi propriam sententiam sic propugnaret, ut ceteros contra sentientes quasi violatae religionis vel sublestae fidei viros traduceret.” Disp. Metaphys. Spec., Vol. I, ed. 2a, p. 395, Aug. Taurin. 1893.

29. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 153, Freiburg 1878. On the whole question cfr. Botalla, La Lettre de M. Czacki et le Thomisme, Paris 1878; Palmieri, De Deo Creante, pp. 769 sqq., Romae 1878; Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis, Romae 1878. On the life and writings of Olivi the student may profitably consult the Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, II, 377 sqq., III, 409 sqq., Freiburg 1886–87, and L. Oliger’s article, “Olivi, Pierre Jean,” in Vol. XI of the Catholic Encyclopedia.

1. Decr. Congr. S. Indicis 1855: “Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animae spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 30 sqq.

6. De Anima, c. 58. Among the Syrians the theory of the soul-sleep was advocated by Aphraates, A. D. 336.

8. Constit. “Apost. regim.,” quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 738.

11. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. I: “Ac deinde [condidit Deus] humanam [creaturam] quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam—And afterwards [God created] the human [creature], as partaking, in a sense, of both, consisting of spirit and body.” Cfr. Conc. IV. Lateran. 1215, quoted supra, p. 27.

24. Introd. in Utriusque Test. Libr. Sacros, Vol. II, pp. 179 sqq., Paris 1887.

25. Matth. 10:28. For the teaching of St. Paul see 1 Cor. 15:1 sqq.; Heb. 11:13 sqq. A more detailed treatment of the subject in F. Schmid, Der Unsterblichkeitsund Auferstehungsglaube in der Bibel, Brixen 1902.

33. Natural immortality implies that the nature of a being is such as to have no inherent tendency to death, so that it will not die or cease to exist, unless God withdraws His conservation. Cfr. S. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, p. 334.

34. Cfr. 1 Tim. 6:16: “Qui solus habet immortalitatem—Who only hath immortality.” For the philosophical arguments see St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., II, 79 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 152 sqq.). Cfr. Ph. Kneib, Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bewiesen ans dem höheren Erkennen und Wollen, Wien 1900.

6. This Council must not be confounded with the Fifth General Council of Constantinople, A. D. 553; cfr. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, Vol. II, pp. 790 sqq., Freiburg 1875.

7. See Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 236. On the doctrine of the ἀποκατάστασις, cfr. P. Batiffol in the Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v.; On Origen’s teaching on this point, see J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, Engl. tr., Vol. I, pp. 280 sq., St. Louis 1910.

8. De Nat. Hom., c. 2. This popular work of Nemesius, who was Bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, about the end of the fourth century, may be considered as the first complete and systematic treatise on anthropology. It was translated into English (The Nature of Man) by George Wither, London 1636. Cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 98; Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 223.

9. De Anima et eius Origine, I, 7: “Haec dogmata, quibus putatur anima ante carnem habuisse aliquem statum bonum et meritum bonum, si forte nescis, in antiquis haereticis et recentius in Priscillianistis iam catholica damnavit Ecclesia.”

10. The Transmigration theory seems to be almost co-eval with history. There are traces of it among the early Egyptians, and it was and is almost universal among the Hindus. To a large extent it swayed the philosophies of Greece in the days of Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus. Cfr. J. Gibbons, Theories of the Transmigration of Souls, London 1907; J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 2nd ed., pp. 276 sqq., New York 1904; Dowd, The Soul, its Powers, Migrations, and Transmigrations, San Francisco 1888.

12. We say apparently, because the peculiar sense in which Tertullian uses the word “body” makes it difficult to arrive at a just evaluation of his teaching.

13. Cfr. De Anima, c. 19: “Anima velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta et genitalibus foeminae foveis cum omni sua paratura pullulabit tam intellectu quam sensu.”

16. “Quod anima humana filii propagatur ab anima patris sui, sicut corpus a corpore et angelus etiam unus ab alio.” Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 533; cfr. Raynald., Annal. Eccles. ad a. 1341, n. 50.

17. “Hic error, quod anima hominis propagetur ab anima patris sui, sicut corpus a corpore … semper fuit excommunicatus in ecclesia Armeniorum, et maledictus sit.” (Martène, Vet. Monum., t. VII, p. 319.)

18. Especially Theodore Abucara (Opusc. 35), Macarius (Hom. 30, n. 1), and Gregory Nyssen (De Opif. Hom., c. 29).

19. Ep. ad Optat., 190: “Incorporeum semen animae sua quadam occulta et invisibili via seorsum a patre currens in matrem.”

20. “Libentius disco quam dico, ne audeam docere, quod nescio,” he says in his work Contr. Iulian., V, 4.

21. “Unde illa de novarum animarum creatione sententia, si hanc fidem fundatissimam [peccati originalis] non oppugnat, sit et mea; si oppugnat, non sit tua.… Ecce volo, ut illa sententia etiam mea sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.” Ep. 166, 25, ad S. Hieron.

22. Cfr. the writings of his pupil Fulgentius (De Verit. Praedest. et Grat., III, 18) and those of St. Gregory the Great (Ep. 53 ad Secundin.).

23. In his Summa contra Catharos et Waldenses, II, 4. On Moneta Cremonensis, a Dominican writer of the thirteenth century (+ 1235), cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, t. II, 2nd. ed., col. 267 sq., Oeniponte 1906.

24. Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 118, art. 2: “Haereticum est dicere, quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.”

27. Cfr. S. Thom., Contr. Gent., II, 86: “Ridiculum est dicere aliquam intellectualem substantiam vel per divisionem corporis dividi vel etiam ab aliqua virtute corporis produci. Sed anima humana est quaedam intellectualis substantia.… Non igitur potest dici, quod dividatur per divisionem seminis neque quod producatur in esse a virtute activa, quae est in semine; et sic nullo modo per seminis traductionem anima humana incipit esse—It is ridiculous to say that any subsistent intelligence is either divided by division of the body or produced by any corporeal power. But the soul is a subsistent intelligence. Therefore it can neither be divided by the separation of the semen from the body, nor produced by any active power in the same. And thus the division of the semen can in no wise be the cause of the soul commencing to be.” (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 164.)

31. Ep., 126: “Maximam partem Occidentalium autumare, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima.”

32. Kleutgen has collected numerous Patristic texts from writers of both the East and the West, and published them in the Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck 1883, pp. 196 sqq.

37. The text of his letter will be found in A. Thiel, Epist. Romanor. Pontif. Genuinae, t. I, pp. 634 sqq., Brunsbergae 1868.

39. Fr. Kleutgen, S. J., was the first in 1883 to point out the scope and importance of Pope Benedict’s demand. (Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1883).

40. Cfr. Albert. Magnus, Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 17; O. Zehetbauer, Animae Humanae Infundendo Creantur et Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii 1893.

41. For the philosophical arguments for this thesis, and the solution of various objections raised against it, we may refer the student to Oswald, Schöpfungslehre, pp. 221 sqq., Paderborn 1885; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 486 sqq., Paris 1895.

42. Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 118, art. 2, ad 2, and in elucidation thereof Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 657; Maher, Psychology, pp. 575 sq.; Harper, Metaphysics of the Schools, Vol. II, pp. 553 sqq.

43. Cfr. Jos. Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 1906. On the doctrine of Lotze and Ladd cfr. Maher, Psychology, pp. 576 sqq.

1. 2 Pet. 1:4: “θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως—partakers of the divine nature.”

3. A miracle is always something supernatural, though it cannot be said, conversely, that the supernatural is always miraculous.

5. Natura ═ nascitura, nativitas ═ una cum origine; naturale ═ originale.

8. Cfr. Coelestini I Epist. 21, ad Episc. Gall., a. 431: “In praevaricatione Adae omnes homines naturalem possibilitatem et innocentiam perdidisse.”

9. Cfr. T. Pesch, S. J., Institutiones Philos. Naturalis, pp. 345 sqq., Friburgi 1880; J. Pohle, “Natur und Übernatur,” in Esser-Mausbach, Religion, Christentum, Kirche, Kempten 1911, pp. 315–469.

11. “In anima humana,” explains St. Thomas, “sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva: una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, quod potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem actu, in quem reducitur per agens naturale. Et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creaturis.”S. Theol., 3a, qu. 11, art. 1.

12. For further information on this point cfr. Glossner, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik nach den Grundsätzen des hl. Thomas, Vol. II, pp. 197 sqq.; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. II, pp. 512 sqq., Paris 1895. On the whole subject the student may profitably consult v. Tessen-Wesierski, Dei Grundlagen des Wunderbegriffes nach Thomas von Aquin, pp. 48 sqq., Paderborn 1899.

13. Miracles and prophecies belong to the supernaturale quoad modum, and hence do not concern us here.

14. We have demonstrated this in a previous volume. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 86 sqq.

18. ἀῤῥαβὼν τῆς κληρονομίας. “Pignus enim ponitur,” says St. Augustine, “quando cum fuerit res ipsa reddita, pignus aufertur; arrha autem de ipsa re datur, quae danda promittitur, ut res quando redditur, impleatur quod datum est nec mutatur.” (Serm., 156, 15.)

19. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 101 sqq.

21. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 86 sqq.

25. For a more exhaustive treatment see Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 37, 39; Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. III, pp. 193 sqq., Paris 1896.

29. Cfr. St. Thom., Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 19, qu. 1, art. 4: “Immortalitas illa et impassibilitas, quam homo habuit in primo statu, non inerat sibi ex suis principiis naturae, … sed ex beneficio Conditoris; unde naturalis proprie dici non potest, nisi forte naturale dicatur omne illud, quod natura incipiens accepit.”

30. Cfr. on the whole subject of this thesis A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed.: “Natur und Übernatur,” Freiburg 1907.

4. Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 410 sqq. Concerning certain other, equally weak arguments adduced from Sacred Scripture, see Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 88 sq., Friburgi 1908.

6. The teaching of the Schoolmen can be seen from St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 95, art. 1; St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, part. V, cap. 1; Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, III, 17. On the curious attitude of Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus; cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 361 sqq.) and Eusebius Amort, see Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp. 194 sq., Freiburg 1878.

8. St. Thomas himself refers to it as “communior.” (Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 4, art. 3.)

11. For the teaching of the Fathers on this disputed point consult Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 94 sqq.

13. Adv. Haer., III, 22, 4: “Non intellectum habebant filiorum generandorum, oportebat enim illos primo adolescere, dein sic multiplicari.”

14. Gen. 1:28. Cfr. also Gen. 2:23 sq.: “And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.”

20. For a detailed discussion of this point consult St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 95, 98 sq.

22. Cfr. also his Contr. Iulian., IV, 16, 82: “Quid est gustato cibo prohibito nuditas indicata nisi peccato nudatum, quod gratia contegebat? Gratia quippe Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale corpus bestialem libidinem non habebat. Qui ergo vestitus gratiâ non habebat in nudo corpore, quod puderet, spoliatus gratiâ sensit, quod operire deberet.”

25. Cfr. Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, III, 12; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XX, 20; XIV, 26; St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 97, art. 4; Mangenot, art. “Arbres de la Vie, etc.” in Vigouroux’s Dictionnaire de la Bible, Vol. I, cols. 895 sqq., Paris 1895.

31. Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 97, art. 2: “Vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae.”

32. The Hebrew text has: חָּמוּת מוֹת, literally: “Thou wilt have to die.” (Gen. 2:17.)

39. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94, art. 3, ad 1: “Primus homo habuit scientiam omnium rerum per species a Deo infusas, nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra, sicut nec oculi, quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis, quos natura produxit.”

46. Heb. 11:6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.”

50. Cfr. Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, III, 9, 29. On the human knowledge of Christ, we must refer the student to the dogmatic treatise on the Incarnation.

53. Cfr. Ben. Pererius, S. J., Comment. in Gen., II, 20 (Romae 1591): “Lingua vero, quam a primo habuit Adam [a Deo] et secundum quam imposuit animalibus nomina, concessu omnium hebraea fuit.”

54. This feature has, however, been greatly exaggerated. Max Müller holds that the efficiency of the onomatopoeic (and the interjectional) principles is extremely limited, many apparent instances of onomatopoeia not being really so. Cfr. M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 4th ed., p. 456, London 1900.

55. An isolating language is one of simple, uninflected root-words. Chinese has never developed beyond this stage.

60. Cfr. Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, 2 vols., London 1880. “Apart from the question of the original fund of root-sounds,” says Fr. Maher, l. c., p. 457, n., “which is equally a difficulty to all purely rational theories—Müller’s general doctrine seems plausible. The fierce conflict, however, which still prevails on most fundamental questions of the science of Comparative Philology, makes one feel that beyond the limited region of common agreement even the most attractive hypotheses are extremely hazardous.… Opposed equally to Max Müller and Schleicher is the chief American philologist, Professor Whitney. With him language, which separates man from the brute, is essentially a voluntary invention, an ‘institution’ like government, and ‘is in all its parts arbitrary and conventional.’ (Life and Growth of Language, p. 282.) Steinthal’s teaching increases the novelty; and Heyse, who stands to Hegel as Schleicher to Darwin, evolved a mystical creed on the subject, in unison with the spirit of his master’s philosophy.” An account of the various theories is given in Sayce’s Introduction to the Science of Languages, Vol. I, c. 1, London 1875. On the dogmatic aspect of the question the reader may profitably consult Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 112 sqq.

61. גַּן כִּעֵרֵן, which the Septuagint renders by παράδεισος, the Vulgate by paradisus voluptatis; in later portions of the Old Testament, e. g., in the Canticle of Canticles 4:13, it is called פַּרדַּם.

4. Syn. Arausic. II, can. 15 et 19. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 188, 192.

8. Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. V, canon 5: “Concupiscentia … ex peccato est.”

9. L. c., can. 1: “Adam … incurrisse mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus.”

12. Cfr. also proposition XVI of the Synod of Pistoia, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 1516.

13. Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1026 and 1078. Cfr. also proposition XVII of the Pistoian Synod, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1517.

6. This theory is defended against Becanus (Summa Theol. Scholast., p. II, tr. 4) by Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 71 sqq., 85 sqq., Friburgi 1901.

8. Augustinians—Berti, Norisius, Bellelli; Thomists—Contenson, Serry, De Lemos.

9. Ex decentia Creatoris et lege iustissimae providentiae, as the Augustinians put it.

3. “Nam superbia est illic, quia homo in sua potius esse quam in Dei potestate dilexit; et sacrilegium, quia Deo non credidit; et homicidium, quia se praecipitavit in mortem; et fornicatio spiritalis, quia integritas mentis humanae serpentina suasione corrupta est; et furtum, quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus est; et avaritia, quia plus quam illi sufficere debuit, appetivit, et si quid aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti consideratione inveniri potest.” (Enchiridion, c. 45.)

4. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 2a, 2ae, qu. 163, and H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Totsünde, Untersuchung der Frage nach dem Wesexsunterschiede zwischen dem peccatum mortale und veniale. Breslau 1903.

7. Cfr. St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 5:19: “Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi—By the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.”

1. “The sin of the first man, from whom, according to the doctrine of faith, all other men are descended, was at once a personal sin, inasmuch as it deprived that first man of his own private good, and also a sin of nature (peccatum naturale), inasmuch as it took away from that man, and consequently from his posterity, a benefit conferred upon the whole of human nature.” (St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52; Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 381.)

2. On the Church’s condemnation of these errors cfr. supra, pp. 20 sqq.; pp. 161 sqq.; also K. Künstle, Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905.

6. Luther, De Servo Arbitrio; Calvin, Instit., IV, 18; Zwingli. De Providentia, c. 6.

7. Cfr. Baius’ condemned proposition: “Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.” For further information on this subject we must refer the reader to our treatise on Grace.

11. This canon employs almost the exact phraseology of the Second Council of Orange, cited above, p. 242.

17. On the whole subject cfr. Al. Schäfer, Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, Münster 1891.

19. “Non est,” he says on one occasion, “cur provoces ad Orientis antistites.… Nam peccatum originale, quacumque aetate sis baptizatus, aut ipsum [solum] tibi remissum aut et ipsum [i. e., simul cum actualibus]. Sed si verum est, quod audivimus, te infantulum baptizatum, etiam tu, quamvis a tuis propriis peccatis innocens, tamen quia ex Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate traxisti, et in iniquitate conceptus es, profecto exorcizatus et exsufflatus es, ut a potestate erutus tenebrarum transferreris in regnum Christi.” (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., I, 4.)

22. Epist. ad Fidum, 64, n. 5. For a more detailed treatment we must refer the student to the dogmatic treatise on the Sacrament of Baptism.

23. De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 25.—In his work Contra Iulianum Pelagianum he marshals a veritable phalanx of Patristic texts and concludes as follows: “Non est hoc malum nuptiarum, sed primorum hominum peccatum, in posteros propagatione traiectum. Etenim huius mali reatus baptismatis sanctificatione remittitur.… Propter quam catholicam veritatem sancti ac beati et in divinorum eloquiorum pertractatione clarissimi sacerdotes Irenæus, Cyprianus, Reticius, Olympius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius [Naz.], Innocentius, Ioannes [Chrysost.], Basilius, quibus adde presbyterum, nolis velis, Hieronymum, ut omittam eos, qui nondum dormierunt, adversus vos proferunt de omnium hominum peccato originali obnoxia successione sententiam.” (Contra Iulianum Pelag., 2:10. 33).

25. Commonit., 35: “Quis ante Coelestium reatu praevaricationis Adae omne genus humanum denegavit adstrictum?”

30. A large number of other equally pertinent Patristic texts is cited by Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VI, pp. 736 sqq., Maniz 1887. For the development of the dogma up to the time of St. Augustine, cfr. F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, pp. 273 sqq., Cambridge 1903.

32. This thesis is defended by two Protestant writers on the history of dogmas, Wigger and Münscher.

40. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, p. 340, Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. On the philosophical aspects of the dogma of original sin cfr. St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 380 sqq.).

6. The Messalians, or Euchites (i. e., Praying folk), believed that evil was a physical substance and that the Devil indwelled personally (ἐνυποστάτως) in every man. (Funk, Manual of Church History, Eng. trans. by L. Cappadelta, Vol. I, p. 147, London 1910; J. P. Arendzen, art. “Messalians” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X.) Cfr. St. John Damascene, De Haer., n. 80.

7. The student will find this matter exhaustively treated by Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat., V, 1–3; Suarez, De Peccato Orig., disp. 9, sect. 2; and De Rubeis, De Pecc. Orig., c. 54.

19. Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini, Driedo, and others. Cfr. Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., 1a 2ae, disp. 132, c. 4.

22. Refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, pp. 616 sqq., Münster 1872.

23. Among its adherents may be mentioned: Ambrosius Catharinus (Opusc. de Lapsu Hom.), Albertus Pighius (Contr. I de Pecc. Orig.), Alphonsus Salmeron (In Ep. ad Rom., disp. 46), Toletus (In Ep. ad Rom., cap. 5), and De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2 and 7).

29. In this form the theory was also espoused by a number of minor writers, e. g., Arriaga, Platel, Kilber, Frassen, and Henno.

30. “Ad rationem peccati originalis pertinere privationem gratiae sanctificantis.” Cfr. Schema Propos. Conc. Vatican. in the Collectio Lacensis, t. VII, pp. 517, 549.

39. Cfr. St. Anselm, De Concept. Virg., c. 26; St. Thomas Aquinas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82; De Malo, qu. 4, art. 1; Compend. Theol., c. 145; Duns Scotus, Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 29, qu. 2; Dominicus Soto, De Nat. et Grat., 1, 9; Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat., V, 9; Suarez, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 9, sect. 2; and most other theologians.

40. The Church has condemned the proposition (No. 46) of Baius: “Ad rationem et definitionem peccati non pertinet voluntarium, nec definitionis quaestio est, sed causae et originis, utrum omne peccatum debeat esse voluntarium.” Likewise Prop. 47: “Unde peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla ratione ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habuit.”

44. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 30, qu. 1, art. 2.—Cfr. also S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 1; De Malo, qu. 4, art. 1.

46. Thus Ambrosius Catharinus and others; cfr. De Rubeis, De Pecc. Orig., c. 61.

47. For a more detailed treatment of these theories cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 584 sqq.

48. “Peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus gratiae originalis.” S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 83, art. 5.

49. Retract., I, 15, 2.—Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82, art. 3.

8. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, qu. 15, art. 1, ad 2: “Unde Christus non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed solum secundum corpulentam substantiam. Et ideo Christus non accepit active ab Adam humanam naturam, sed solum materialiter, active vero a Spiritu Sancto.… Et propter hoc Christus non peccavit in Adam, in quo fuit solum secundum materiam.” For a more detailed treatment of this subject we must refer the reader to the dogmatic treatise on the Incarnation.

9. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception belongs to Mariology, to which we shall devote volume VI of this series of dogmatic text-books.

14. De Nupt. et Concup., I, 18, 20: “Ii qui generant, si iam regenerati sunt, non ex hoc generant, quod filii Dei sunt, sed ex hoc, quod adhuc filii saeculi.”

15. De Nupt. et Concup., I, 24, 27: “Ipse ille licitus honestusque concubitus non potest esse sine ardore libidinis.… Ex hac carnis concupiscentia quaecumque nascitur proles, originali est obligata peccato.”

18. Cfr. St. Augustine, De Gen. ad Lit., X, 20; Leo the Great, Serm. de Nativitate Domini, 2.

19. St. Anselm has left us a special treatise on this subject under the title of De Conceptu Virginali et Peccato Originali.

1. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, ad 2: “Inter omnia peccata minimum est originale, eo quod minimum habet de voluntario. Non enim est voluntarium voluntate istius personae, sed voluntate principii naturae tantum [scil. Adae]. Peccatum enim actuale, etiam veniale, est voluntarium voluntate eius in quo est, et ideo minor poena debetur originali quam veniali.”

2. Fr. Sylvius, Comment. in S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 87, art. 5. “Quod originali peccato debeatur poena aeterna, non est simpliciter ratione suae gravitatis, sed est ex conditione peccati et subjecti, quia peccatum illud importat [naturâ suâ] privationem iustitiae et gratiae, et subiectum eius, nimirum homo, invenitur sine gratia, per quam solum remissio poenae fieri potest.” (Sylvius was an eminent Scholastic theologian of the seventeenth century, whose commentary on the Summa of St. Thomas is distinguished by great clarity and completeness. See P. von Loe in the Kirchenlexikon, Vol. XI, 2nd ed., col. 1042 sq.) Cfr. also St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5, art. 1, ad 9; S. Theol., 3a, qu. 1, art. 4.

4. For a detailed treatment of these prerogatives consult the dogmatic treatise on Grace, to be published as Volume VII of this series.

15. On the Devil’s dominion over the human race as manifested in our own day, cfr. J. Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme Problem, Buffalo 1910, pp. 80 sqq.; on diabolical possession, infra, pp. 346 sqq.

16. Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 1: “… et cum morte [incurrit Adam] captivitatem sub eius potestate, qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, i. e. diaboli.” Cfr. Heb. 2:14. See also Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1.

17. Dogmatik, p. 348 sq. For a further treatment of this point see Theoph. Raynaud, De Attribut. Christi, sect. 5, c. 15, Lugduni 1665.

18. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 365 sqq.

19. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 5 (in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 815).

20. The references to prove this proposition will be found in Simar, Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 37 sqq., 81 sqq., Freiburg 1883.

21. E. g., Basil (In Is., I, 19) and John of Damascus (De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12).

22. A large number of Patristic texts bearing on this doctrine has been collected by Bellarmine, De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., V, 25 sqq.

23. Thus, e. g., in the oft-quoted passage: “Libero arbitrio male utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum.” (Enchir. 30; Migne, P. L., XL, 246.)

24. Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., I, 2, 5: “Quis nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa, quae in Paradiso fuit.… Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per illud peccent.”

28. In Galat., 49. (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 2141). For a more detailed discussion of this and kindred topics the student is advised to consult the dogmatic treatise on Grace.

29. Confess., VIII, 8, 20. (Jansenius taught that we necessarily follow the greater indeliberate attraction, whether good or bad.)

30. Contr. Fortunat., disp. 1, 15 (Migne, P. L., XLII, 118): “Animae rationali, quae est in homine, dedit Deus liberum arbitrium. Sic enim posset habere meritum, si voluntate, non necessitate boni essemus. Cum ergo oporteat non necessitate, sed voluntate bonum esse, oportebat ut Deus animae daret liberum arbitrium.” For a detailed refutation of the heretical teaching of Jansenius see Palmieri De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 615 sqq., Romae 1878; cfr. also Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical letter “Libertas” of June 20, 1888.

32. Cfr. Arausic. II, can. 25. “Liberum arbitrium attenuatum et inclinatum;” Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1: “Tametsi in eis [scil. hominibus lapsis] liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esset, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum.”

33. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 85, art. 3: “Per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae, quae possunt esse subiecta virtutum, scil. ratio, in qua est prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscibilis destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae.”

34. On the philosophical aspect of the Fall and the wounds inflicted thereby on both the intellectual and the moral nature of man, see J. Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme Problem, 2nd ed., London and New York 1911.

36. Cfr. supra, pp. 228 sqq. The arguments for the rigorist view can be found in Alb. a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., ed. Gottefrid. a Graun, t. I, pp. 468 sqq., Oeniponte 1893, and Franc. Schmid, Quaest. Select. ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 297 sqq., Paderbornae 1891. The case for the milder view, which seems to us to be the more probable one, is well stated by Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, th. 78 and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed., pp. 152 sqq., Friburgi 1908.

48. P. J. Toner goes so far as to say that “St. Augustine was an innovator, and … sacrificed tradition to the logic of an indefensible private system.” (Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 15).

49. De Lib. Arbit., III, 23. For a succinct account of the controversy cfr. P. J. Toner, l. c.

51. Dr. Toner holds (l. c., p. 316) that “the teaching attributed to the Pelagians—viz., that they admitted unbaptized infants to the beatific vision and only excluded them from a certain accidental degree of glory (companionship with Christ and the Saints)—is an historical fiction.… Nearly all the great theologians who have made a serious study of the history of the question admit that it was only natural happiness for unbaptized children that the Pelagians meant to defend.”

55. This definition reads as follows: “Definimus, illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato moriuntur vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas.” (Decret. Unionis Conc. Flor., quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.)

56. De Malo, qu. 5, art. 2. Cfr. Bolgeni’s monograph, Stato dei Bambini Morti senza Battesimo, Rome 1787; J. Didiot, Ungetauft verstorbene Kinder. Dogmatische Trostbriefe, Kempen 1898; P. J. Toner, “Lot of Those Dying in Original Sin,” in the Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 15.

57. De Amiss. Grat., VI, 2: “Fide catholica tenendum est, parvulos sine baptismo decedentes absolute esse damnatos et non solum coelesti, sed etiam naturali beatitudine perpetuo carituros.”

59. Among those who share it we may mention: Suarez (De Pecc. et Vitiis, disp. 9, sect. 6), and Lessius (De Perfect. Div., XII, 22). Prominent among the comparatively few who oppose it is Cardinal Bellarmine (De Amiss. Grat., VI, 6), and latterly Franz Schmid, Quaest. Selectae ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 278 sqq.

60. Cfr. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche nach der altchristlichen Literatur bis zur Zeit des hl. Augustinus, pp. 301 sqq., Freiburg 1903.

2. This fact did not prevent Scholastic philosophy from assigning to the Angels an important rôle in its speculations. “Modern thought,” says Fr. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., in an exquisite passage of his classic essay on Scholasticism (New York 1908, pp. 70 sq.), “attends curiously to the brute creation, and to the physiology of the human body; it believes in experimental psychology; it never attempts to contemplate intellect apart from brain and nerves. On grounds of pure reason, it asks, what have we that can be called knowledge even of the very existence of angels? The angels have taken flight from Catholic schools of philosophy; the rustle of their wings is caught by the theologian’s ear alone. Whether philosophy has lost by their departure, it is not for these pages to say. St. Thomas would have counted it a loss. The angels entered essentially into his scheme of the cosmos, and were indispensable transmitters of thought to human kind. ‘Our intellectual knowledge,’ he says, ‘must be regulated by the knowledge of the angels.’ (Contra Gentiles, III, 9). Modern psychology is serenely oblivious of the fact. Catholics, no doubt, still believe in angels, dread the evil ones (devils), and pray to the good ones who now see the face of God. Catholics also believe that good angels are often the vehicles through which ‘actual grace,’ that is, warnings and impulses in order to salvation, descends from God to men. But that man owes his ordinary knowledge of mathematics, chemistry, sanitation, railway management, to any action whatever of angelic intelligence upon his mind—is there any man living who thinks so? If all that St. Thomas meant was that we should try to penetrate beyond the surface evidence of the senses, that is what every scientific man endeavors to do in his view of nature—to see e. g. in a bar of iron what a pure intelligence would see there, that is the effort of science. But St. Thomas meant more that (cf. Of God and His Creatures, p. 252), and some are beginning to suspect that he is right.”

5. Theologians have been split into two opposing factions on this question ever since the Patristic era.

9. Cap. “Firmiter,” quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428.

10. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1 (apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1783), Manning’s translation (The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 4th American ed., p. 209, New York 1902).

18. “Videntes filii Dei (the Septuagint has οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ Θεοῦ) filias hominum, quod essent pulchrae, acceperunt sibi uxores.”

20. Cfr. P. Scholz, Die Ehen der Söhne Gottes mit den Töchtern der Menschen, Ratisbon 1865; Robert, Les Fils de Dieu et les Filles de l’Homme in La Revue Biblique, 1895, pp. 340–373 and 525–552.

21. On the Angelology of the Jews cfr. Hackspill, “L’Angelologie Juive à l’Époque Néotestamentaire” in La Revue Biblique, 1902, pp. 527–550.

22. Cfr. St. Fulgentius, De Trinit., c. 9. Even St. Bernard (cfr. his De Considerat., V, 4) entertained rather hazy notions on this point, as also Abbot Rupert of Deutz (De Trinit., I, 11), Cardinal Cajetan, and Bañez.

24. Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure held that the nature of Angels admits of potentiality and actuality. Cfr. on this controversy St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 50, art. 2.

26. Cfr. Matth. 18:10; 25:41; Luke 20:36. As regards the relation of the Angels to space, that is a philosophical rather than a theological problem, on which the student may, if he wishes, have recourse to Suarez, De Angelis, l. IV, and F. Schmid, Quaest. Select. ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 28 sqq., Paderborn 1891.

27. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 359 sqq., 361 sqq.

29. Cfr. Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 107, art. 1: “Ex hoc quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri per voluntatem ipsius angeli, conceptus mentis unius angeli innotescit alteri; et sic loquitur unus angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.”—On the different theories in question cfr. Becanus, De Angelis, c. 1, qu. 14; Gregory of Valentia, De Deo Creatore, disp. 8, qu. 4, p. 2. On the mode of operation peculiar to the angelic intellect, and on its medium, see St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 54 sqq., and Suarez, De Angelis, l. II.

34. De Fide Orth., II, 3. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 59, art. 1, and Suarez, De Angelis, I. III.

36. That the power of creating something out of nothing belongs to God alone, and is incommunicable, we have demonstrated supra, pp. 55 sqq.; that every supernatural effect (and a miracle in the strict sense is a supernatural effect) postulates an infinite causality, i. e., omnipotence, was shown supra, pp. 187 sqq.

37. Catech., 15. For a more complete treatment of this topic see Petavius, De Angelis, I, 14, and Suarez, De Angelis, I, 11. Cfr. also O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, pp. 7 sq.

41. “Anima humana filii propagatur ab anima patris sui sicut corpus a corpore et angelus etiam unus ab alio.” Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 533. For a fuller discussion of this subject cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 204 sqq.

47. “Dicant qui possunt,” says St. Augustine (Enchir., c. 58), “ego me ista ignorare confiteor.” Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed., pp. 214 sq., Friburgi 1908.

48. De Coelesti Hierarchia, c. 3. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, p. 270.

51. On the interesting problems involved in these speculations the student may profitably consult St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 106, 108; Stiglmayr, S. J., “Die Engellehre des sogen. Dionysius Areopagita” in the Comte Rendu du Congrès Intern. à Fribourg, Vol. I, pp. 403 sqq., 1897; Hugo Koch, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen, Mainz 1900.

5. Made by Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure.

6. “Neque tamen haec assertio ex fide certa est. Nam Magister Sententiarum in 2 dist. 5 absque nota erroris existimavit, daemones nunquam habuisse gratiam. Ceterum est ita certa nostra assertio, ut iam eam negare censeatur esse plane temerarium.” (Gregory of Valencia, disp. 4, qu. 13, p. 1.)

8. Cfr. St. Ambrose, Serm. in Ps., 118, 7, n. 8: “Ipse diabolus per superbiam naturae suae amisit gratiam.” Other Patristic texts in Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. II, pp. 628 sqq., Paris 1895.

10. De Fide Orth., II, 3: “Pro sua quisque dignitate et ordine splendoris gratiaeque participes.”

12. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 62, art. 6: “Rationabile est, quod secundum gradum naturalium angelis data sint dona gratiarum, et perfectio beatitudinis.”

13. Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and others.

14. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 62, art. 3: “… quamvis super hoc sint diversae opiniones, hoc tamen [scil. quod angeli in gratia creati fuerint] probabilius videtur et magis dictis Sanctorum consonum est.”

15. De Civ. Dei, XII, 9. For some other Patristic texts of similar tenor see Suarez, De Angelis, V, 4.

16. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sentent., II, dist. 4, qu. 4, art. 2. Cfr. Catech. Rom., P. 1, c. 2, qu. 17: “Cum illud sit in divinis litteris, diabolum ‘in veritate non stetisse,’ perspicuum est, eum reliquosque desertores angelos ab ortus sui initio gratia praeditos fuisse—Since Holy Scripture says that the Devil ‘stood not in the truth,’ (John 8:44), it is clear that he and the rest of the rebel angels were gifted with grace from the very moment of their creation.” This sentence does not, of course, decide the question at issue.

19. For a more elaborate treatment of this point we must refer the student to Eschatology.

20. This is the opinion of Suarez and Scheeben. Suarez writes (De Angelis, VI, 3, 5): “Prima [morula] fuit creationis et sanctificationis cum dispositione ad illam et consequenter cum merito de condigno gloriae; secunda fuit perseverantiae in gratia cum merito de condigno gratiae et gloriae; tertia receptionis gloriae.” Scheeben deals with this problem in his Dogmatik, Vol. II, n. 1139.

27. Propos. 1, 3, 4 Baii Damn., in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, nn. 1001, 1003, 1004.

5. The term “Angel” is derived from ἄγγελος; ἀγγέλλειν, to send.

7. Gerson declared the Thomistic view to be heretical; but this is manifestly unjust, because the Thomists willingly concede that the higher (or so-called assisting) choirs may act at least mediately as divine messengers, i. e., by transmitting God’s commands to the lower Angels. How violently the simplest Scriptural passages were sometimes strained in order to square them with the teaching of Pseudo-Dionysius, can be seen in Suarez, De Angelis, VI, 10.

19. On the history of this feast cfr. the article “Guardian Angels, Feast of,” by T. P. Gilmartin, in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. On the festivals of the Angels in general see K. A. H. Kellner, Heortology, pp. 328 sqq., London 1908.

20. Thus Origen (Hom. 12 in Luc.), Gregory of Nyssa (De Vita Moysis), Tertullian (De Anim., c. 30), and Cassian (Collat., VIII, 17). They seem to have followed the Shepherd of Hermas (l. II, mand. 6): Δύο εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι, εἷς τῆς δικαιοσύνης, εἷς τῆς πονηρίας.

21. See Gen. 3:24; 16:7 sqq. Cfr. Hackspill, “L’Angelologie Juive” in La Revue Biblique, 1902, pp. 527 sqq.

22. “Non solum iustos, sed etiam peccatores, neque solos fideles, sed etiam infideles, neque solos baptizatos, sed etiam inbaptizatos habere angelos custodes, est communis sententia theologorum et patrum, quos in priore assertione principali allegavimus.” (De Angelis, VI, 17.)

25. Elucid., II, 31: “Unaquaeque anima, dum in corpus mittitur, angelo committitur.”

26. “Angelorum custodia est quaedam executio divinae providentiae circa homines.” (S. Theol., 1a, qu. 113, art. 2.)

28. Cfr. Manning, The Daemon of Socrates, London 1872. For a lengthy and attractive discussion of the “Daimonion of Socrates” (for which he admits his inability to find a proper translation) cfr. M. Louis, Doctrines Religieux des Philosophes Grecs, Paris 1910.

34. Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., IV, dist. 43, art. 3, qu. 3: “Ministerium illud erit principaliter unius archangeli, scil. Michaelis, qui est princeps Ecclesiae, sicut fuit Synagogae.” On St. Michael, his personality and his cult see F. G. Holweck in the Pastoral-Blatt, St. Louis, Mo., 1910, No. 7, pp. 97 sqq.

1. Caput “Firmiter,” quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428.

12. Hence the name of Michael (מִיכָאֵל Quis est ut Deus?) On the cult and feast of St. Michael, cfr. F. G. Holweck in the Pastoralblatt, St. Louis, July 1910. For a more detailed account of the doctrine of the Fall of the Angels the student is referred to Suarez, De Angelis, VII, 10 sqq.

13. Latin, restitutio in integrum. This doctrine originated with Origen and was taught among others by St. Gregory of Nyssa. See the article “Apocatastasis” by P. Batiffol in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I.

3. 1 Pet. 5:8: “Adversarius vester diabolus tamquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret.”

4. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 114, art. 3. Cfr. Fr. Hense, Die Versuchungen und ihre Gegenmittel, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1902.

5. Cfr. Barker Stevens, The Theology of the New Testament, pp. 76 sqq., Edinburgh 1901.

6. Ordination to the office of exorcist is the second of the four minor orders of the Western Church. Cfr. our dogmatic treatise on the Sacrament of Holy Orders and the article “Exorcist” by P. J. Toner in Vol. V of the Catholic Encyclopedia.

7. Irenæus, Adv. Haer., II, 32, 4; Tertullian, Apol. c. 23. Cfr. Alexander, Demonic Possession in the New Testament, London 1902.

8. Cfr. Heyne, Über Besessenheitswahn bei geistigen Erkrankungszuständen, Paderborn 1904; W. H. Kent, art. “Demoniacs” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV.

9. “White magic” is a natural art, based on an extraordinary facility of doing things.

10. On the pagan oracles and the false prophets of whom the Fathers so frequently speak, cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante, pp. 483 sqq.

11. Cfr. J. Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, Vol. VIII, Freiburg 1895 (English ed. by A. M. Christie, Vol. XVI.)

12. Cfr. H. Gruber, S. J., Leo Taxil’s Palladismus-Roman, 3 vols., Berlin 1897–8.

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