The First Way has been difficult for me to grasp but not out of a disagreement of the premises but more so the logic that gets us to the conclusion.
The argument states that there is motion in the world, that change is the actualization of potentiality, and that only whatever is in actuality may actualize what is in potentiality. All of these I perfectly agree with, granting us the first conclusion that whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. But then St.Thomas Aquinas concludes from this that whatever sets something in motion must itself either be moved or immovable, but this seems to neglect the viable alternative of a mover simply remaining unmoved for the duration of its moving something else.
To give an example (which I hope doesn't reflect a deep ignorance as to the subjects referred) when one mows the lawn they move the lawn mower throughout the duration of the mowing process until all the grass has been trimmed. Thus it requires a mover, and the body fulfills this role. But the body too is in motion, therefore it requires a mover as well, and to this I might say that the will fulfills. But the will itself is not in motion, for if it were then it would will differently and thus would not commit to the duration of mowing. But insofar as it does commit to the duration of mowing, it certainly seems to me that in some sense the will is unmoved and thus we have reached a kind of terminus of the movers.
That so, however, it seems to me that the conclusion of St.Thomas Aquinas for a necessary immobile mover no longer follows. Which is obviously problematic because I wouldn't pretend for a second that I'm smarter than the Angelic Doctor, so I clearly either reasoned poorly somewhere or missed his point entirely and I just can't see it. Either way, some feedback would be great.
In your example, didn't the will move/change, from not-willing-to-mow-the-lawn to willing-to-mow-the-lawn?
Quote from: Geremia on June 17, 2022, 09:15:10 AMIn your example, didn't the will move/change, from not-willing-to-mow-the-lawn to willing-to-mow-the-lawn?
It surely must have prior to the mowing of the lawn. But I'm not sure if that is of much relevancy given that during the actual mowing process there is no motion to the will. It remains constant in its object whilst being the concurrent actualizer of the motion of the body and lawn mower. As such, if we were to evaluate the series of movers in the scenario while it took place we would come to a terminus of movers which itself is not immobile. And it seems to me that even if we were to say "the will is constantly actualized toward the willing of cutting the grass because the intellect has judged it bad that the grass be long" then the terminus is either the intellect or the grass. Neither of which is immobile, but instead very much susceptible to change.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 17, 2022, 09:41:12 AMBut I'm not sure if that is of much relevancy given that during the actual mowing process there is no motion to the will
But the point is that something besides the will was required to move/change the will from not-willing-to-mow-the-lawn to willing-to-mow-the-lawn. Whether the will changes or not while moving the lawn isn't relevant to the argument.
St. Thomas isn't Heraclitean; he doesn't believe everything besides God changes (though everything besides Him can change); he knows there are stable/unchanging beings besides God; only the Unmoved Mover cannot change.
Quote from: Geremia on June 17, 2022, 09:57:50 AMBut the point is that something besides the will was required to move/change the will from not-willing-to-mow-the-lawn to willing-to-mow-the-lawn. Whether the will changes or not while moving the lawn isn't relevant to the argument.
What is it that moves the will toward its object in this example? Surely I would think the intellect, and the intellect on the basis of the state of the grass. But even when we get here we conclude in a mover which is unmoved yet is still movable. That is to say, the grass moves the intellect, which moves the will, which moves the body, which moves the mower.
But does this not seem to confirm my point in the OP? That is, that St. Thomas Aquinas (at least in his portrayal of the argument in
Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A3THEP1) co. and
Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 1 cap. 13 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles1.htm#13)) based his argument on premises which don't exactly conclude in an immovable mover which is the terminus of the per se causal series of movers?
For, just because all that is in motion requires a mover to explain its motion, and that a per se causal series of movers must terminate in a first mover which itself is the explanation of the motion of the subsequent movers, doesn't seem to necessitate in a prime mover which is itself immobile. It could be, as I'm attempting to explain, merely unmoved.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 17, 2022, 10:31:41 AMa mover which is unmoved yet is still movable.
St. Thomas's argument doesn't require proving the existence of an unmoving mover, but of an unmovable mover.
Quote from: Geremia on June 17, 2022, 03:46:03 PMSt. Thomas's argument doesn't require proving the existence of an unmoving mover, but of an unmovable mover.
That's certainly the
claim, but I hardly see how that follows given the premises. Could you illuminate where my rationale goes off track? And by that I mean, can you show me how the premises necessitate a per se causal series of movers to terminate in a prime immobile mover?
Quote from: Geremia on June 17, 2022, 03:46:03 PMSt. Thomas's argument doesn't require proving the existence of an unmoving mover, but of an unmovable mover.
An unmovable/unchangeable being is something with 100% actuality and 0% potentiality.
It seems you think the argument doesn't work because there can be unchanging/unmoving changers/movers in the causal chain.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 17, 2022, 10:31:41 AMSt. Thomas Aquinas (at least in his portrayal of the argument in Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A3THEP1) co. and Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 1 cap. 13 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles1.htm#13)) based his argument on premises which don't exactly conclude in an immovable mover which is the terminus of the per se causal series of movers?
For, just because all that is in motion requires a mover to explain its motion, and that a per se causal series of movers must terminate in a first mover which itself is the explanation of the motion of the subsequent movers, doesn't seem to necessitate in a prime mover which is itself immobile. It could be, as I'm attempting to explain, merely unmoved.
After arguing there must be a first mover, St. Thomas says one cannot, without further proof, conclude that the first mover is unmovable:
Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 1 cap. 13 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles1.htm#13):
Quote[20] It remains, therefore, that we must posit some first mover that is not moved by any exterior moving cause.
[21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that there is a first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause—it yet does not follow that this mover is absolutely unmoved. [...]
Quote from: Geremia on June 18, 2022, 07:30:41 AMAn unmovable/unchangeable being is something with 100% actuality and 0% potentiality.
I agree one hundred percent.
Quote from: Geremia on June 18, 2022, 07:30:41 AMIt seems you think the argument doesn't work because there can be unchanging/unmoving changers/movers in the causal chain.
Precisely, because if a mover is not itself in motion then it must therefore be the terminus of a per se causal chain (for it move all in the chain, but is not itself moved, thus there is nothing previous in the chain). That be so, however, it is difficult for one to take this and then jump to the conclusion that it must be immobile, which is necessary so that we may arrive at our Unmoved Mover.
Quote from: Geremia on June 19, 2022, 04:15:29 PMAfter arguing there must be a first mover, St. Thomas says one cannot, without further proof, conclude that the first mover is unmovable:
Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 1 cap. 13:
Exactly, this is correct it seems. Here is my trouble with the Saint's response to this fact, however. He states that there are only two possibilities for this prime mover - that it be immobile, or that it be self moving. But even here the (what seems to me) viable possibility of merely being unmoved is not considered. And as such, although the Saint proves that the second option must be eliminated as the terminus, that does not seem to necessitate that we follow him in saying that the prime mover must be unmovable. Here is the passage I refer to (Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 13, 21):
QuoteThe first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we have the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved.
It seems to me the Saint is operating off the assumption that whatever is not immobile must therefore be in motion, and from this it only makes sense that the prime mover must of necessity be not merely unmoved, but truly immovable. Where he arrives at this conclusion I have yet to discover. Though it could be a fragment of Aristotle's cosmological philosophy, as he believed time was without a beginning or end and thus motion also was without beginning or end, and perhaps therefore that all things which can be in motion are in motion. Alternatively, there could be another explanation somewhere in the physics, though I have yet to explore the whole of that work yet. As a result, I came here to see if it could be explained to me why whatever is not in motion must be immobile.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:10:30 AMif movers are not themselves in motion [at the moment they are moving others] then they must therefore be the terminus of the per se causal chain
Why?
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:21:16 AMIt seems to me the Saint is operating off the assumption that whatever is not immobile must therefore be in motion,
Where's he say that?
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:21:16 AMand from this it only makes sense that the prime mover must of necessity be not merely unmoved, but truly immovable. Where he arrives at this conclusion I have yet to discover.
He doesn't. He has to prove that, as I showed in the SCG quote above.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:21:16 AMall things which can be in motion are in motion
Where's he say that?
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 11:46:34 AMWhy?
Because if a being is undergoing change it follows by necessity that it is due to its being actualized. And as we both seem to agree, whatever is moved must be moved by another; whatever is actualized may only be actualized by that which is already in actuality. Therefore, if some B is changing some A, yet B itself is changing, it follows that there must be some C which is the source of such change. Conversely however, if said B were changing A while itself undergoing no change it follows that there is no member of the series prior to B, for if there were it would imply that B is changing. This is why I stated that if there was a member of a per se causal series which itself is unchanging it follows that it must therefore by the prime mover - or terminus - of such a series.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 11:50:38 AMWhere's he say that?
As far as I'm aware he makes no explicit judgment. Despite this, I find it difficult not to conclude that this was what he believed given how he argues The First Way (i.e. he constantly neglects the possibility that a per se causal series may terminate in a prime mover which itself is capable of change yet is merely unchanging). Now I'm more than aware of the fact that St.Thomas Aquinas was a genius who took very good care to not fall into conclusions without considering seemingly viable alternative explanations, which is why I am at the conclusion that the only way he could have left out the possibility I present (that prime movers need not be immobile) is if he believed it to be inviable. But this being so, given that the possibility I present rests on the assumption that some things may be unchanging yet still changeable, it follows that St.Thomas Aquinas believed that no things can be unchanging unless they are unchangeable.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 11:50:38 AMHe doesn't. He has to prove that, as I showed in the SCG quote above.
If I am not mistaken, this response I gave earlier supports my assertion that he believed it evident that the prime mover must either be immobile or self moving, neither of which encompasses the possibility of being merely unmoved yet movable.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:10:30 AM(Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 13, 21):
QuoteThe first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we have the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 11:50:38 AMWhere's he say that?
If he does say that, I would like to know. If he doesn't, then for the reasons I've stated above I must confess that the Saint was not careful in his assessment of The First Way and that he blundered quite poorly. Being a Thomistic Aristotelian myself, however, and personally fond of the Good Doctor and his work, I find the second possibility very repulsive.
For the sake of not losing focus, I would like to reiterate my central criticism against The First Way and why I believe it fails by first illustrating the argument.
1. We live in a world of change
2. Change is the actualization of potentiality
3. Whatever is being actualized must be actualized by that which is already actual
4. Thus, whatever is undergoing change must be changed by the power of another
5. A per se causal series cannot recede into infinity, but instead must have a first member
6. If this first member is undergoing change, then it can only be because of another and is therefore not first.
7. Therefore, the first member must not be undergoing change.
All of this I agree with whole heartedly. But I simply do not see how the premises reach the conclusion:
8. Therefore, there must be a prime, immobile mover who we call God.
For there simply is no premise which demands we consider that which is not undergoing change as immobile.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 12:55:16 PMQuote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 11:50:38 AMQuote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:21:16 AMall things which can be in motion are in motion
Where's he say that?
If he does say that, I would like to know.
If St. Thomas thought all changeable things are in motion, he'd be a Heraclitean; but St. Thomas admits stable, unchanging beings.
Do you mean to say: "all things which can be in motion
will be or have been in motion" at some point?
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 02:30:49 PMIf St. Thomas thought all changeable things are in motion, he'd be a Heraclitean; but St. Thomas admits stable, unchanging beings.
That is odd, isn't it? A source of confusion this has been for me. I suppose one could say that whatever is not naturally in actuality (that's to say, that their existence is not explicable by their essence) must be actualized here and now by another in a per se causal series. And this of course would reduce to God, for only God is in actuality naturally (due to His essence and existence being one and the same). In this sense, everything other than God really
is undergoing change (because it's potentiality for existence is constantly being actualized by God), but - although that's a great argument in its own right - I have a hard time believing that was what Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas were arguing in The First Way. Mostly because that would mean the Unmoved Mover is the efficient cause of all being, but (from my understanding) Aristotle didn't believe that to be the case (instead seeing Him as the final cause of all being), and also because at this point the argument really becomes a rehash of the argument from the divide between essence and existence.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 02:30:49 PMDo you mean to say: "all things which can be in motion will be or have been in motion" at some point?
What I'm saying is more radical. That in order to accept the First Way argument one has to postulate that all that is capable of motion/change
is in motion/change in some way, shape, or form.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 03:49:32 PMin order to accept the First Way argument one has to postulate that all that is capable of motion/change is in motion/change in some way
Why? So St. Thomas should'nt've written (
Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A3THEP1) co.): "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world
some [not all] things are in motion." ("
Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo.")?
Also, St. Thomas does say (
Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP002.html#FPQ2A3THEP1) co.): "a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act." ("
movet...aliquid secundum quod est actu."), but I don't think he means that everything that has actuality moves.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 08:53:09 PMWhy?
My answer lies in this previous response:
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 01:09:49 PM1. We live in a world of change
2. Change is the actualization of potentiality
3. Whatever is being actualized must be actualized by that which is already actual
4. Thus, whatever is undergoing change must be changed by the power of another
5. A per se causal series cannot recede into infinity, but instead must have a first member
6. If this first member is undergoing change, then it can only be because of another and is therefore not first.
7. Therefore, the first member must not be undergoing change.
The first member of a per se causal series is unchanging, as we see, but we may ask the question as to whether it is unchanging
yet changeable or unchanging
and unchangeable. Notice how the premises do not give us any reason to favor one of these possibilities over the other. Nothing explicitly demands that a prime mover must be immobile (an attribute which is necessary for one to be actus purus), only that the prime mover be unchanging.
But St. Thomas Aquinas very confidently exclaims that the First Way demonstrates the necessity of prime movers being immobile rather than merely unmoved. This must mean that he rejects the possibility that something can be both unchanging
yet changeable, because if he did believe this to be possible then it would follow that we have not deduced the necessary existence of our Immobile Mover. One could rightfully quip "surely, as long as it is possible that prime movers are merely unchanging
yet changeable rather than being both unchanging
and unchangeable, it could very much be the case that all prime movers are of the former type and not of the latter type, therefore suggesting that an Immobile Mover is not necessary".
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 08:53:09 PMSo St. Thomas should'nt've written (Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 co.): "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some [not all] things are in motion." ("Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo.")?
Perhaps that is the case. I'm only a student, however, and can't speak for what the teacher should or shouldn't have said because that would imply I understand his intentions, but that I do not understand them is precisely why I'm troubled. Though, from my estimate, and from what I have argued, it certainly
seems as though it may have been better to say that all in the world is in motion, at every moment, without rest.
Quote from: Geremia on June 20, 2022, 08:53:09 PMAlso, St. Thomas does say (Summa Theologica I q. 2 a. 3 co.): "a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act." ("movet...aliquid secundum quod est actu."), but I don't think he means that everything that has actuality moves.
I don't think so either, I concur, otherwise Our Lord would be in motion too which is patently impossible. Though, perhaps what the Saint alludes to is the fact that in all which merely
participates in actuality there is motion - precisely insofar as motion is the actualization of potentiality - because their actualities are granted to them moment per moment by God. I think Edward Feser spells it out well enough in his Aristotelian argument for God. Though my problem with this is mentioned in an earlier post:
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 03:49:32 PMthat would mean the Unmoved Mover is the efficient cause of all being, but (from my understanding) Aristotle didn't believe that to be the case (instead seeing Him as the final cause of all being), and also because at this point the argument really becomes a rehash of the argument from the divide between essence and existence.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 21, 2022, 05:45:22 AMbut we may ask the question as to whether it is unchanging yet changeable or unchanging and unchangeable.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 20, 2022, 08:10:30 AMHe states [in Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 1 cap. 13 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles1.htm#13) n. 21] that there are only two possibilities for this prime mover - that it be immobile, or that it be self moving. But even here the (what seems to me) viable possibility of [the first mover] merely being unmoved [while moving others] is not considered.
Unchanging changeable being ≠ self-moved being?
Quote from: Geremia on June 21, 2022, 06:52:34 PMUnchanging changeable being ≠ self-moved being?
Correct (so it seems), as St. Thomas Aquinas (after demonstrating that self moved movers are reduced to an unmoved mover and a moved) concludes that we arrive at an absolutely unmoved mover, again without considering the case of an unmoved mover which is merely unmoved rather than immovable. Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 13, n.22:
QuoteConsequently, one part of the self-moved mover is solely moving, and the other part solely moved. We thus reach the same conclusion as before: there exists an unmoved mover.
I don't understand how [what you're calling] an unchanging changeable being is not a self-moved being.
Quote from: Geremia on June 22, 2022, 08:52:15 PMI don't understand how an unchanging changeable being is not a self-moved being
It's not a self moved being because both (a) it's not being moved and (b) it can be moved by externalities.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 23, 2022, 07:04:26 AM(a) it's not being moved
A self-moved being can be stationary at a certain moment in time, too, though.
Wait, does "unchanging changeable being" even make sense? Isn't that a self-contradiction?
Quote from: Geremia on June 23, 2022, 03:34:01 PMA self-moved being can be stationary at a certain moment in time, too, though.
True, but I suppose what I mean to say is that unchanging changeable being is a broader category than self moving being, because unchanging changeable things can encompass both self moving things and non-self moving things. It just requires that the the being in present (a) isn't going through motion and that (b) despite this it nonetheless could go through motion at some future period (whether by its own power or an eternal agent).
Quote from: Geremia on June 23, 2022, 03:34:01 PMWait, does "unchanging changeable being" even make sense? Isn't that a self-contradiction?
I think it could be if by change we mean that a things potentiality for existence is being actualized, because in that case everything
is changing other than God, and God - on top of being unchanging - is also
unchangeable. Outside of that, I'm not sure how it could be a contradiction.
Side note: I'm currently in the process of reading Joseph Kenny's "Philosophy of Nature (https://isidore.co/aquinas/defaultNat.htm)", which is giving a very useful overview of St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Physics. I haven't gotten to the unmoved mover part yet, but when I do I'll be sure to illustrate where I go wrong in my thought process.
Well, I read through Joseph Kenny's "Philosophy of Nature (https://isidore.co/aquinas/defaultNat.htm)" and it looks like him and I have come to the same conclusion: Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas's argument fails. Quotes from Joseph Kenny:
QuoteAristotle's argument from motion failed to establish the existence of an immaterial first mover
QuoteAristotle had no idea of impetus (or inertia), whereby an agent can communicate to a projectile a transient accidental form {resembling the permanent form of gravity} that keeps it in motion until this form is corrupted by resistance. Aristotle realized that no power could keep fuelling the sun, moon and the planets on their daily course around the earth for eternity unless it had infinite energy. Infinite energy cannot be contained in any body. Therefore the movers of these heavenly bodies must be spirits. These spirits carry out this task in service of the earth below out of love of the supreme principle of the universe, God himself.
QuoteBut once we introduce the notion of impetus {to say that the heavenly bodies are no different from man-launched satellites kept in motion by the two vectors of gravity and an impetus perpendicular to gravity, which need no refuelling but require only their initial propulsion} then there is no need to postulate spiritual forces to push the moon and other heavenly bodies. Once they were initially set in motion, they go on by themselves, just like natural motion, which Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas said requires no efficient cause here and now.
The big problem I gather from Kenny's account as well as my own independent reading of the
Physics is that the fundamental flaw of the First Way is that it presupposes that all motion on earth is in some way essentially dependent on the motion of the heavens (like the Sun and the stars and whatnot), and these heavenly bodies are of course in motion themselves. Thus, the only way they could be moving is if something is moving them, and particularly, something which is spiritual - and thus without potency - here and now. This is why St. Thomas didn't postulate the alternative "a mover which itself is unmoved but movable" because the heavens (although they might come to rest) are eternally (after the fact of creation) in motion and thus the question of it being at rest while moving is never something that pops up because... well the heavens are always in motion. This is the origin of the problem I initially came here to have solved. But in any case, the argument still doesn't work under these considerations because it fails to account for the fact that (1) motion on earth is not essentially dependent upon the heavens and (2) that inertia (or the reception of an impetus, as Kenny describes) could account for heavenly motion without the need of postulating a further mover (especially when we consider that the impetus could be natural - which both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas consider earlier in the work but fail to account for in the development of the First Way).
And, further than this, as Joseph Kenny goes on to explain, even operating under the assumptions of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, it still requires
even further argumentation than is provided in the First Way for us to arrive at God, because it is just as possible that the mover of the heavens is merely an angel rather than God Himself - given that angels are both immobile and capable of moving others. Thus, all things considered, the First Way fails.
Now... at last, I can rest lol. I've been non-stop pouring over the Physics, Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Theologica, and Joseph Kenny's writing for like a week or three straight.
That
Quote from: Aristotle on June 24, 2022, 09:33:14 AMthe heavens are always in motion
follows from what you said:
Quote from: Aristotle on June 23, 2022, 03:53:00 PMeverything is changing other than God
But does St. Thomas believe the latter?
Quote from: Aristotle on June 24, 2022, 09:33:14 AMthe First Way [...] presupposes that all motion on earth is in some way essentially dependent on the motion of the heavens
St. Thomas and Aristotle seem to side with Mach (https://hsm.stackexchange.com/q/11481/232), not Newton, regarding what would happen if the heavens ceased moving.
Litt, O.C.S.O.,
Les corps célestes dans l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=7688):
- PDF p. 141:
"9. De pot., 5, 8 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdePotentia5.htm#5:8), c. Utrum cessante motu cæli, remaneat actio et passio in elementis."
"Whether, the motion of the heavens ceasing, action and passion remains in the elements?" - PDF p. 144:
"9. De caelo, II, l. 4 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/DeCoelo.htm#2-4), n. 342. ...cessante motu caeli, omnis motus inferiorum corporum cessaret [...], quia virtutes inferiorum corporum sunt sicut materiales et instrumentales respectu cælestium virtutum, ita quod non movent nisi motæ."
"if the motion of the heavens were to cease, so too would the motion of all lower bodies, [...]. For the powers of the lower bodies are as matter and instruments in relation to the heavenly powers, and hence do not move unless moved."
cf. Assis (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_list&search=authors:%22%3DAssis%2C%20Andr%C3%A9%20K.%20T.%22)'s
Relational Mechanics EU2019 Dynamic Earth lecture (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjrTSP4UGFo), esp. 14:25 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjrTSP4UGFo#t=14m25s)ff., where he cites Mach's
Science of Mechanics (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=3436) (slides (https://www.ifi.unicamp.br/~assis/Relational-Mechanics-07-07-2019.pdf) 10ff.):
- "The principles of mechanics can be so conceived, that even for relative rotations centrifugal forces arise."
- "Try to fix Newton's bucket and rotate the heaven of fixed stars, and then prove the absence of centrifugal forces."
Quote from: Geremia on June 24, 2022, 09:00:41 PMBut does St. Thomas believe the latter?
From my readings, no. St. Thomas Aquinas does not believe that everything other than God is changing (at least in the sense discussed in the Physics). There is a genuine belief that somethings can simply be at rest.
However, when there
is motion, that motion is going to be essentially dependent on the heavens and therefore - since according the Ptolemaic system of cosmology everything is in motion around the earth - the terminus of movers is going to have to be something immaterial.
Quote from: Geremia on June 24, 2022, 09:34:46 PMSt. Thomas and Aristotle seem to side with Mach, not Newton, regarding what would happen if the heavens ceased moving.
Litt, O.C.S.O., Les corps célestes dans l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin:
I'll admit my ignorance, I don't know who the Mach fellow is, except the little I found on Wikipedia, so I'll refrain from comment on that. However, from the quotes you provided and translated below, it seems to confirm Kenny's conclusion above - as well as my own.
Quote from: Geremia on June 24, 2022, 09:34:46 PM"if the motion of the heavens were to cease, so too would the motion of all lower bodies, [...]. For the powers of the lower bodies are as matter and instruments in relation to the heavenly powers, and hence do not move unless moved."
I can't speak to whether Kenny's interpretation of impetus is correct. I have a hard time understanding how motion can be a transient form communicated to another when I thought whatever is moved is moved by another. But, even setting that aside and assuming a mover is requires at every instant throughout the duration of a motion (which I am most certainly not against), it seems
this idea is the most key to the arguments error. After all, we know it's not true because we now know what exactly the powers of the sun pertain to, and that if the sun and even every extraterrestrial thing were to cease being, all of earth would continue to be for quite a bit of time.
All things considered, I'm curious as to why the First Way hasn't been dropped by Thomists. Garrigou-Lagrange supports it in his "God, His Nature and His Existence" as well as Edward Feser in his book "Aquinas" which is odd because they take the argument for the First Way and strip it of its cosmological presuppositions (not without good reason, I'd suppose) without understanding that the resultant argument makes little sense in proving what they believe it proves. As, I hope, I have demonstrated in the OP. Here's the argument when we do add the cosmological theory into the mix:
1) Motion is real; 2) Motion is the actualization of potentiality; 3) All potentiality needs an actualizer to actualize it; 4) Therefore all motion requires a mover; 5) Something is in motion; 6) Thus, it requires a mover; 7) The movers of all things on earth are the heavens; 8 ) The heavens themselves are in motion; 9) Therefore something must move the heavens; 10) This mover cannot be material, for the heavens and earth exhaust all the material movers (i.e. there is no material mover except insofar as it is on earth or the heavens); 11) Therefore the mover must be immaterial and immobile.
Unfortunately, it only ever gets us to an angelic substance, not necessarily God. Even more reason to reject the First Way, in my opinion.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 25, 2022, 06:08:01 AMI don't know who the Mach fellow is, except the little I found on Wikipedia, so I'll refrain from comment on that.
Watch Assis's lecture; it's only 32 min.:
Interestingly, there are experimental tests of which view, Mach's or Newton's, is correct (slide 25 of his lecture (https://www.ifi.unicamp.br/~assis/Relational-Mechanics-07-07-2019.pdf);
Relational Mechanics and Implementation of Mach's Principle with Weber's Gravitational Force (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=4655), §24.5 Experimental Tests of Relational Mechanics, pp. 460-74). The experiments require measuring lengths down to 1 part in 10
29, which is currently beyond today's technological capacities (cf. Planck length = 1.6×10
-33 m), but will be feasible in the future (https://hsm.stackexchange.com/a/14569/232), with the development of more precise measurement apparatuses.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 25, 2022, 06:08:01 AMI have a hard time understanding how motion can be a transient form communicated to another when I thought whatever is moved is moved by another.
A "transient form communicated to another" is not an instance of "whatever is moved is moved by another"?
Quote from: Aristotle on June 25, 2022, 06:08:01 AMif the sun and even every extraterrestrial thing were to cease being, all of earth would continue to be for quite a bit of time.
How do you know that?
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 01:40:03 PMWatch Assis's lecture; it's only 32 min.:
Very interesting. I will give it a view.
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 01:45:22 PMA "transient form communicated to another" is not an instance of "whatever is moved is moved by another"?
After some consideration, I suppose it would be an instance of "moved by another" given that the form would be the mover and the substance would be moved.
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 01:46:18 PMHow do you know that?
Well the sun does two main things (as well as a few others, but these two are the most important for life on earth): it heats and it brings energy. If the sun disappeared tomorrow, we would cease to have an addition of heat and energy. But we already have a lot of energy on earth, and heat. I'm not saying life would last long, but what I
am saying is that motion in general would continue. But even if that weren't true and the motion of the heavens ceasing would mean an immediate ceasing of all motion on earth, given that impetus can be natural rather than imposed (such as the impetus of objects to fall toward one another), the fact that the heavens are in motion would not necessarily indicate a mover of the heavens.
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 01:40:03 PMInterestingly, there are experimental tests of which view, Mach's or Newton's, is correct (slide 25 of his lecture; Relational Mechanics and Implementation of Mach's Principle with Weber's Gravitational Force, §24.5 Experimental Tests of Relational Mechanics, pp. 460-74).
Really?! Incredible! I got to the end of the video and was getting worried I'd have to die with another mystery lingering in my mind.
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 01:40:03 PMThe experiments require measuring lengths down to 1 part in 1029, which is currently beyond today's technological capacities, but will be feasible in the future, with the development of more precise measurement apparatuses.
Very interesting... so if I'm apprehending things correctly, this experiment would allow us to know if space is absolute - as Newton postulated - or relative, or relational, yes? Now that's certainly exciting. I'm currently reading Edward Feser's
Aristotle's Revenge (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=6971) and finished the section on space and time. It seems his opinion is strongly against both Newton's absolute space
and a relational view of space. But he doesn't (in my opinion) develop his own opinion on what the nature of space really is - except that he noted that space
requires relations but is not reducible to it. What is your opinion?
Quote from: Aristotle on June 25, 2022, 05:18:15 PMI'm currently reading Edward Feser's Aristotle's Revenge and finished the section on space and time.
You'd like
Universe without Space and Time: An Essay on Principles for Relational Cosmology Drawn from Catholic Tradition and Empirical Science (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=5028) by Fr. Victor Warkulwiz, M.S.S., Ph.D.; he's a proponent of Assis's relational mechanics.
Quote from: Geremia on June 25, 2022, 09:07:39 PMYou'd like Universe without Space and Time: An Essay on Principles for Relational Cosmology Drawn from Catholic Tradition and Empirical Science by Fr. Victor Warkulwiz, M.S.S., Ph.D.; he's a proponent of Assis's relational mechanics.
I'll certainly give it a read. Only problem is that it seems the book is no longer available.
Quote from: Aristotle on June 26, 2022, 07:48:02 AMOnly problem is that it seems the book is no longer available.
The EPUB of it (https://isidore.co/CalibreLibrary/Warkulwiz,%20Fr.%20Victor,%20M.S.S.,%20Ph.D_/Universe%20without%20Space%20and%20Time_%20An%20Essay%20on%20Principles%20for%20Relational%20Cosmology%20Drawn%20from%20Cat%20(5028)/Universe%20without%20Space%20and%20Time_%20An%20Essay%20-%20Warkulwiz,%20Fr.%20Victor,%20M.S.S.,%20Ph.D_.epub) is.
Quote from: Geremia on June 26, 2022, 01:42:43 PMThe EPUB of it is.
When I click the link it says "No epub format for the book 5028."
Quote from: Aristotle on June 26, 2022, 06:12:49 PMWhen I click the link it says "No epub format for the book 5028."
Try this link (https://isidore.co/CalibreLibrary/Warkulwiz,%20Fr.%20Victor,%20M.S.S.,%20Ph.D_/Universe%20without%20Space%20and%20Time_%20An%20Essay%20on%20Principles%20for%20Relational%20Cosmology%20Drawn%20from%20Cat%20(5028)/Universe%20without%20Space%20and%20Time_%20An%20Essay%20-%20Warkulwiz,%20Fr.%20Victor,%20M.S.S.,%20Ph.D_.epub).
In my Duhem feed (https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Duhem&as_sdt=0&scisbd=1&hl=en), I discovered this recent article (which cites his "Note on the Validity of the Principles of Inertia and Conservation of Energy (https://isidore.co/forum/scholastic.us.to/note.html), reproduced in
God: His Existence and His Nature vol. 2 (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=3122) by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.):
- Gaven Kerr, "A Deeper Look at Aquinas's First Way (https://isidore.co/misc/Physics%20papers%20and%20books/Zotero/storage/JDHRMG3L/Kerr%20-%202022%20-%20A%20Deeper%20Look%20at%20Aquinas's%20First%20Way.pdf)," Nova et Vetera 20, no. 2 (2022): 461–84.
The end of Kerr's article addresses an argument
contra Feser regarding "existential inertia".
Quote from: Geremia on June 29, 2022, 09:26:40 PMGaven Kerr, "A Deeper Look at Aquinas's First Way," Nova et Vetera 20, no. 2 (2022): 461–84.
Hmm... very interesting. I'll have to give it a read. Is it a defense of the first way?
Quote from: Geremia on June 29, 2022, 09:26:40 PMThe end of Kerr's article addresses an argument contra Feser regarding "existential inertia".
I'm afraid any argument for "existential inertia" is bound to fail. I would certainly know given that I've attempted to defend it for a while. In any case, is this article a defense of the first way or is it rather an addressing of Feser's Aristotelian argument? If it's the latter than I highly doubt I'd find any disagreement with it, given that I am very fond of that argument - though it is most certainly not the First Way, I would argue. If it's the former though, would you kindly give a summary of the defense? I'd be eager to see what can be made of the first way.