Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Our daily love," § "Love is not rude," ¶99As an essential requirement of love, "every human being is bound to live agreeably with those around him".*
*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 114, art. 2, ad 1. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS114.html#SSQ114A2THEP1) ["Whether this kind of friendship (affability) is a part of justice?"]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Our daily love," §§ "Love is generous," ¶102Saint Thomas Aquinas explains that "it is more proper to charity to desire to love than to desire to be loved";* indeed, "mothers, who are those who love the most, seek to love more than to be loved".**
*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 27, art. 1 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS027.html#SSQ27A1THEP1), ad 2. ["Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?"]
**Ibid., q. 27, art. 1.
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Growing in conjugal love," ¶120Our reflection on Saint Paul's hymn to love has prepared us to discuss conjugal love. This is the love between husband and wife,* a love sanctified, enriched and illuminated by the grace of the sacrament of marriage. It is an "affective union",** spiritual and sacrificial, which combines the warmth of friendship and erotic passion, and endures long after emotions and passion subside.
*Thomas Aquinas calls love a vis unitiva (Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, art. 1 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FP/FP020.html#FPQ20A1THEP1), ad 3 ["Whether love exists in God?"]), echoing a phrase of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 12: PG 3, 709). [The previous citation is to a page-length, extended quote of a Martin Luther King Jr. sermon!]
**Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 27 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS027.html#SSQ27A2THEP1), art. 2. ["Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?" Also, Francis's next citation is to Casti Connubii (https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19301231_casti-connubii.html).]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Growing in conjugal love," §§ "Lifelong sharing," ¶123After the love that unites us to God, conjugal love is the "greatest form of friendship".*
*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 123 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#123) ["That matrimony should be indivisible"]; cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/Ethics8.htm) ["Friendship"], 12 (ed. Bywater, Oxford, 1984, 174). [This is quite good and true; cf. this Christendom college prof.'s lecture: "Friendship of Man and Woman According to Aristotle and St. Thomas (http://thomasaquinas.edu/news/lecture-audio-friendship-man-and-woman-according-aristotle-and-st-thomas)."]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Growing in conjugal love," §§ "Joy and beauty," ¶126Saint Thomas Aquinas said that the word "joy" refers to an expansion of the heart.*
*Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 31, art. 3. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS031.html#FSQ31A3THEP1), ad 3. ["Whether delight differs from joy?"]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Growing in conjugal love," §§ "A love that reveals itself and increases," ¶134The very special form of love that is marriage is called to embody what Saint Thomas Aquinas said about charity in general. "Charity", he says, "by its very nature, has no limit to its increase, for it is a participation in that infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit...Nor on the part of the subject can its limit be fixed, because as charity grows, so too does its capacity for an even greater increase".*
*Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 24, art. 7. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS024.html#SSQ24A7THEP1) ["Whether charity increases indefinitely?"]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Passionate love," §§ "The world of emotions," ¶145Experiencing an emotion is not, in itself, morally good or evil.*
*Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 24, art. 1. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS024.html#FSQ24A1THEP1) ["Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?"]
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Passionate love," §§ "God loves the joy of his children," ¶148Excess, lack of control or obsession with a single form of pleasure can end up weakening and tainting that very pleasure* and damaging family life. A person can certainly channel his passions in a beautiful and healthy way, increasingly pointing them towards altruism and an integrated self-fulfillment that can only enrich interpersonal relationships in the heart of the family. This does not mean renouncing moments of intense enjoyment,** but rather integrating them with other moments of generous commitment, patient hope, inevitable weariness and struggle to achieve an ideal.
*Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 32, art.7 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS032.html#FSQ32A7THEP1) ["Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?"].
**Cf. Id., Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 153, art. 2 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS153.html#SSQ153A2THEP1) ["Whether no venereal act can be without sin?"], ad 2: "Abundantia delectationis quae est in actu venereo secundum rationem ordinato, non contrariatur medio virtutis" ["The exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue."].
Quote from: ch. 4 "Love in Marriage," § "Passionate love," §§ "Marriage and virginity," ¶162A wife can care for her sick husband and thus, in drawing near to the Cross, renew her commitment to love unto death. In such love, the dignity of the true lover shines forth, inasmuch as it is more proper to charity to love than to be loved.*
*Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 27, art. 1 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/SS/SS027.html#SSQ27A1THEP1). ["Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?"]
Quote from: ch. 8 "Accompanying, Discerning, and Integrating Weakness," § "Mitigating factors in pastoral discernment," ¶301Hence it is can no longer simply be said that all those in any "irregular" situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. [!!!] More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. ... Saint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well;* in other words, although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: "Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues".** [Being in the state of grace means having the freedom to exercise the virtues? This quote of St. Thomas seems to be a non sequitur; it appears he quotes the greatest theologian of the Church to rationalize living in sin!!]
*Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65, art. 3 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS065.html#FSQ65A3THEP1) ["Whether charity can be without moral virtue?"] ad 2; De Malo, q. 2, art. 2 (http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdm02.html#61260) ["Whether sin consists only in the act of the will?"].
**Ibid., ad 3.
Quote from: ch. 8 "Accompanying, Discerning, and Integrating Weakness," § "Rules and discernment," ¶304It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual's actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. [St. Thomas says that conscience is the act of applying abstract principles (e.g., "Thou shalt not commit adultery") to concrete situations in one's life (cf. Summa Theologica I q. 79 a. 13 (https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/48057/1787) c.). Thus, Francis says conscience "is reductive;" it's something we need to move beyond!] I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: "Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects... In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all... The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail".* It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. [So, God has called us to do the impossible by giving us the "general rules" of the Ten Commandments (natural law)‽ God does not "suffer us to be tempted above that which we are able" (1 Cor. 10 (http://catholicbible.online/side_by_side/NT/1_Cor/ch_10):13), as the Council of Trent reiterated in its Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.i.i.xi.html#v.i.i.xi-p4.79).] At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.**
*Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, art. 4. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS094.html#FSQ94A4THEP1) ["Whether the natural law is the same in all men?"]
**In another text, referring to the general knowledge of the rule and the particular knowledge of practical discernment, Saint Thomas states that "if only one of the two is present, it is preferable that it be the knowledge of the particular reality, which is closer to the act": Sententia libri Ethicorum, VI, 6 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/Ethics6.htm#6) ["Wisdom, the Principle Intellectual Virtue," ¶1194] (ed. Leonina, t. XLVII, 354.)
Location in Amoris Laetitia | Kind of reference | Source text | Theme | |
1 | Chap. 4, para. 99 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (108) | STh II–II, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1 | The virtue of affability |
2 | Chap. 4, para. 102 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (110) | STh II–II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2 | Generosity within charity |
3 | Chap. 4, para. 102 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (111) | STh II–II, q. 27, a. 1 | Generosity within charity |
4 | Chap. 4, para. 120 | Citation in a footnote (115) | STh I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 3 | The unitive nature of love |
5 | Chap. 4, para. 120 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (116) | STh II–II, q. 27, a. 2 | Love as affective union |
6 | Chap. 4, para. 123 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (122) | ScG III, c. 123 | Conjugal love as the highest friendship |
7 | Chap. 4, para. 126 | Paraphrase in the main text with citation in a footnote (127) | STh I–II, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3 | Joy as an expansion of the heart |
8 | Chap. 4, para. 127 | Brief quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (129) | STh I–II, q. 26, a. 3 | The price of the loved person |
9 | Chap. 4, para. 134 | Quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (135) | STh, II–II, q. 24, a. 7 | The infinite increase of charity |
10 | Chap. 4, para. 145 | Citation in a footnote (140) | STh I–II, q. 24, a. 1 | The moral neutrality of the passions |
11 | Chap. 4, para. 148 | Citation in a footnote (144) | STh I–II, q. 32, a. 7 | Pleasure |
12 | Chap. 4, para. 148 | Latin quotation and citation in a footnote (145) | STh II–II, q. 153, a. 2, ad 2 | The worth of conjugal sexual pleasure |
13 | Chap. 4, para. 162 | Citation in a footnote (172) | STh II–II, q. 27, a. 1 | Generosity within charity |
14 | Chap. 8, para. 301 | Paraphrase in the main text with citation in a footnote (341) | STh I–II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 | Difficulty in exercising an infused virtue |
15 | Chap. 8, para. 301 | Citation in a footnote (341) | De Malo, q. 2, a. 2 | Difficulty in exercising an infused virtue (?) |
16 | Chap. 8, para. 301 | Quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (342) | STh I–II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 3 | Difficulty in exercising an infused virtue |
17 | Chap. 8, para. 304 | Quotation in the main text with citation in a footnote (347) | STh I–II, q. 94, a. 4 | Action deals with contingent realities |
18 | Chap. 8, para. 304 | Quotation in a footnote (348) | VI Nic. Ethic. lect. 6 | Norms and practical discernment |
QuoteI think it is important to indicate one aspect: Pope Francis speaks here, with rare clarity, of the role of the passiones, passions, emotion, eros and sexuality in married and family life. It is not by chance that Pope Francis reconnects here with St. Thomas Aquinas, who attributes an important role to the passions, while modern society, often puritanical, has discredited or neglected them.3 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f3)Indeed, in a section entitled "The World of Emotions" (143–46), Amoris Laetitia highlights the decisive role of the passions within human existence and especially within the relationships that constitute marriage and family life.
QuoteDesires, feelings, emotions, what the ancients called "the passions," all have an important place in married life. . . . It is characteristic of all living beings to reach out to other things, and this tendency always has basic affective signs: pleasure or pain, joy or sadness, tenderness or fear. They ground the most elementary psychological activity. Human beings live on this earth, and all that they do and seek is fraught with passion.Paragraph 144 underlines the extent to which the Lord Jesus himself, within the truth of his humanity, assumed this "passionate" dimension of the human condition. Saint Thomas is then explicitly referenced in paragraph 145 for his Aristotelian thesis concerning the moral neutrality of the passions, opposed to the Stoic thesis that holds that every passion is in itself morally disordered.5 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f5)
(143)4 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f4)
QuoteExperiencing an emotion is not, in itself, morally good or evil [footnote 140 here refers to STh I–II, q. 24, a. 1]. The stirring of desire or repugnance is neither sinful nor blameworthy. What is morally good or evil is what we do on the basis of, or under the influence of, a given passion.Along the line of this integration of the passions within an anthropology and an ethic that are fully human, Amoris Laetitia highlights "the erotic dimension of love" (150–52), since conjugal love has the vocation of uniting synthetically, while also arranging in a hierarchy, the different aspects of the affective life of the spouses: sensuality, feeling, and will. Within this context, it is understandable why, in paragraph 148, Amoris Laetitia makes reference to question 153 of the Secunda secundae (STh II–II, q. 153, a. 2, ad 2), where St. Thomas—in a statement that was not routine in the general context of medieval theology—teaches that the sexual act between spouses may be without sin (and even meritorious) since sexual pleasure experienced within the fully human relational context of marriage does not in any way contradict virtue: "the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue."6 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f6) Nonetheless, in the same paragraph 148, another reference to St. Thomas draws attention to how an excess harms pleasure itself. In question 32 of the Prima secundae (STh I–II, q. 32, a. 7), a question consecrated to the causes of pleasure, St. Thomas explains that likeness—even though in itself it is a cause of pleasure—can accidentally corrupt the proper good of the subject. For example, even though food may be a source of pleasure for a person due to the fact that it is consistent with the demands of that person's bodily life, an excess of food can corrupt the body's good and consequently destroy the pleasure of eating.
(145) [End Page 504]
QuoteSaint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well; in other words, [End Page 511] although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: "Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues."Amoris Laetitia, as did previously Evangelii Gaudium, explicitly refers to question 65 of the Prima secundae (STh I–II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2), in the Summa's treatise on the virtues, and more curiously, to question 2, article 2 of the disputed questions De malo ("Whether sin consists only in an act of the will"), where, salvo meliori iudicio, I have found nothing that directly concerns the problem at hand. Question 65 of the Prima secundae is consecrated to the connection between the virtues. In article 3, St. Thomas defends the thesis according to which, because all the virtues are connected in charity, "which binds everything together in perfect harmony" (Col 3:14 in the RSV), the person in the state of grace, who therefore possesses charity, cannot but possess all of the moral virtues, if not in second act then at least in first act (i.e., in the state of habitus: in habitu). Nonetheless, there is a crucial difference between the acquired moral virtues and the infused moral virtues. The acquired virtues are put in place by the progressive elimination within the subject of dispositions contrary to the virtuous act in such a way that these, over time, disappear. By contrast, the infused virtues can coexist with dispositions contrary to the virtuous act, dispositions inherited from the past life of sin. This renders much more difficult the exercise of virtuous acts. The infused moral virtues therefore do not always have the ease of the acquired virtues. Supposing that a Don Juan has been miraculously touched by grace and justified by it, he would immediately possess the infused virtue of chastity, but it is probable that he would face difficulties in exercising it due to the contrary psychological and even corporeal dispositions that remain etched in him. As Evangelii Gaudium 171 well summarizes, "the organic unity of the virtues always and necessarily exists in habitu, even though forms of conditioning can hinder the operations of those virtuous habits." From this we see the necessity of a great patience toward oneself and others in the [End Page 512] course of moral growth in the Christian life. One will immediately note that this thesis of St. Thomas in no way signifies that the state of grace can coexist with an act that is gravely contrary to a virtue (a mortal sin) but only that it can coexist with a difficulty in actively exercising a virtue. The converted alcoholic probably does not experience, at least initially, any pleasure in sipping an orange juice, but through his infused virtue of temperance he does not thereby abstain any less resolutely from getting drunk. Whatever otherwise may be the case concerning the question of a possible coexistence between, on the one hand, the life of grace, and, on the other hand, voluntary acts that objectively are of a gravely sinful nature (such as adulterous sexual relations) but that may not be mortal sins due to subjective conditionings, this is not directly what the thesis of St. Thomas intends to express.
(AL 301)
QuoteI earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: "Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. . . . In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all . . . The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail (Et hoc tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia descenditur)."Amoris Laetitia refers here to the very important question 94 of the Prima secundae, consecrated to the natural law, and more precisely to article 4, which discusses the unity and universality of the natural law. In this article, St. Thomas begins by elaborating a difference between the object of speculative reason and the object of practical reason. Speculative reason bears upon a necessary object: the (common) principles are necessary, as are the (proper) conclusions. In contrast, practical [End Page 513] reason bears on an object (human action) that must fit within a reality marked by contingency. The principles, then, possess a certain necessity, but the more one gets down to the conclusions (i.e., the more one approaches the concrete action, which alone is real), the more "play" and contingency there are.
(AL 304)
QuoteWhile the negative precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are connected with an evil end . . . wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times [semper et ad semper]. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due [End Page 516] circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done.19 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f19) [End Page 517]The last reference to St. Thomas in Amoris Laetitia is found in footnote 348 at the end of this same paragraph 304. In the heart of paragraph 304, after having quoted question 94, article 4 of the Prima secundae, we see two points meant to balance each other out: (1) "general rules . . . cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations," and (2) "what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule." We turn, then, to footnote 348:
QuoteIn another text, referring to the general knowledge of the rule and the particular knowledge of practical discernment, Saint Thomas states that "if only one of the two is present, it is preferable that it be the knowledge of the particular reality, which is closer to the act": Sententia libri Ethicorum, VI, 6It is important to interpret correctly this remark of St. Thomas. In no way is it a question of giving preference to the exception to the norm, as opposed to the norm itself. In reality, St. Thomas does not compare here two norms but two types of knowledge of a norm: (1) general, "abstract" knowledge of the one, universal norm and (2) the proper knowledge of a particular application of this norm in the concrete. This particular knowledge implicitly contains the general norm, in such a way that he who possesses it can get by without explicit knowledge of the general norm. The example given by St. Thomas, which comes directly from Aristotle,20 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f20) allows us to understand this better:
(ed. Leonina, t. XLVII, 354).
QuoteAction has to do with singulars. Hence it is that certain people not possessing the knowledge of universals are more effective about some particulars [i.e., better qualified for action] than those who have universal knowledge, from the fact that they are expert in other particulars. Thus if a doctor knows that [End Page 518] light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know which meats are light, he cannot help people to get well. But the man who knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful is better able to effect a cure. Since then prudence is reason concerning an action, the prudent person must have a knowledge of both kinds, viz., universals and particulars. But if it is possible for him to have only one kind, he ought rather to have the latter, i.e., the knowledge of particulars that are closer to operation.21 (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/658714#f21)The person who only possesses particular knowledge does not in any way contradict the general principle that light meats are easy to digest and thus procure health. But he knows by experience that the flesh of fowls procures health without necessarily knowing that this property results from the fact that fowl is a meat easy to digest.
Quote from: Geremia on April 07, 2018, 08:26:49 PMFor an excellent refutation of Amoris Lætitia's specious argument here—that the speculative intellect must agree with the practical intellect (prudence) for there to be moral certitude (or, conversely, that their disagreement implies God's laws have exceptions)—see: Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The Order of Things: The Realism of the Principle of Finality (https://isidore.co/calibre/#panel=book_details&book_id=9803) ch. 6 "Moral Realism: Finality and the Formation Of Conscience".
Quote from: ch. 8It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual's actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. [St. Thomas says that conscience is the act of applying abstract principles (e.g., "Thou shalt not commit adultery") to concrete situations in one's life (cf. Summa Theologica I q. 79 a. 13 (https://christianity.stackexchange.com/a/48057/1787) c.). Thus, Francis says conscience "is reductive;" it's something we need to move beyond!] I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: "Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects... In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all... The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail".* It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. [So, God has called us to do the impossible by giving us the "general rules" of the Ten Commandments (natural law)‽ God does not "suffer us to be tempted above that which we are able" (1 Cor. 10 (http://catholicbible.online/side_by_side/NT/1_Cor/ch_10):13), as the Council of Trent reiterated in its Doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.i.i.xi.html#v.i.i.xi-p4.79).] At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.**
*Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, art. 4. (https://isidore.co/aquinas/summa/FS/FS094.html#FSQ94A4THEP1) ["Whether the natural law is the same in all men?"]
**In another text, referring to the general knowledge of the rule and the particular knowledge of practical discernment, Saint Thomas states that "if only one of the two is present, it is preferable that it be the knowledge of the particular reality, which is closer to the act": Sententia libri Ethicorum, VI, 6 (https://isidore.co/aquinas/Ethics6.htm#6) ["Wisdom, the Principle Intellectual Virtue," ¶1194] (ed. Leonina, t. XLVII, 354.)