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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF
THE CLASSICAL TRUTH-DEFINITION

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1. Introduction

Although truth belongs to the family of crucial philosophical categories, writing its general history still remains a serious challenge for historians of philosophy. Also historical accounts of particular truth-theories are rather fragmentaric. Since the classical (also called "the correspondence") theory of truth has become the most popular and influential among all hitherto proposed answers to the philosophical problem of truth, a lack of its written history is especially strange, more than in the case of its various rivals; this theory maintains, roughly speaking, that truth consists in a relation of correspondence (agreement, adequacy or conformity) which holds between so called bearers of truth (judgements, ideas, thoughts, propositions, statements or sentences) and reality.

This paper presents a sketch of how the gap could be filled with respect to the classical concept of truth (CCT for brevity). It is just a sketch which by no means pretends to any completeness. The history of the classical (as well as every other) theory of truth requires taking into account at least four points, namely

(A) statements which have been explicitly intended as definitions (or other explications) of CCT;

(B) formulations which could be interpreted as definitions (or other explications) of CCT, independently of the intentions of their authors;

(C) the philosophical environment of formulations collected under (A) and (B); it is especially important for cases falling under (B);

(D) criticism of CCT and its defences against raised objections.

I would like to touch each of (A)–(D) but my principal goal is to contribute to (A) and (B).

Although the theory which is the subject of this paper goes back to the ancient Greeks, its presently used labels are rather new. The term 'correspondence' in the context of truth theory was introduced by Russell (see Russell 1910, 1912). However, Russell himself did not use (at least in his earlier works) the term 'the correspondence theory of truth'; in his book from 1984 (written in 1913), he distinguishes (see p. 149): theories which define truth by a correspondence, pragmatism and the coherence-theory. Certainly, the label 'the correspondence theory of truth' was invented under Russell's influence but it is difficult to say who employed it for the first time. The same concerns its German counterpart, namely 'Adäquationtheorie der Wahrheit' which became popular in the 1930s. Also there are difficulties as far as the matter concerns where and when the expression 'the classical theory of truth' has appeared in philosophy. Anyway, this name is very common among Polish philosophers (see (27) below).

2. *Aletheia* in old Greek (see Boeder 1958)

Leaving out the full etymology of *aletheia* (which for instance has led Martin Heidegger to far reaching claims concerning the concept of truth — "truth as openness"), let me note that this word was used in old Greek (especially in early Greek poems) in dialogical situations which involved knowing and asking persons. This use was neither predicative nor attributive; the word occurs together with so called (in Latin terminology) *verba dicendi*. Then, *aletheia* referred neither to abstract statements nor to things in itself but rather to locutions asserting something about concrete cases. To produce an *aletheia* (that is, to say "something true") meant to tell someone "how it is" with reference to a concrete object.

3. *Aletheia* in the Pre-Socratics

There are only very few fragments of the Pre-Socratics in which something is said on truth. Most of them are metaphorical or of a secondary importance. This is probably a reason why historians of philosophy are normally not attracted very much by the theory of truth in the Pre-Socratics; for instance, the index of subjects in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schoefield 1957 does not contain the word 'truth'. Some philosophers try to derive (e.g. Herbertz 1913) certain consequences for the Pre-Socratics' account of truth from their more general epistemolological views, like direct or naive realism. So interpreted the Pre-Socratics, or rather some of them, especially Democritus, are presented as seeing the nature of truth in 'an agreement of thought and being'. A very similar view is also attributed

to Parmenides for his famous statement "[...] for the same thing is for conceiving as is for being" (cf. Coxon 1986, p. 54). Some authors (see for instance Krapiec 1959) regard this statement as the first strict account of the idea of an intentional relation between thought and its object.

I think that we are not able to derive any substantial theory of truth from the fragmentaric and cryptic texts of the Pre-Socratics. These reconstructions which appeal to their general standpoints have no confirmation in more concrete statements. In particular, no fragment on truth occuring in preserved texts of pre-Socratic philosophers might be literally translated with the help of such words as 'agreement', 'adequacy' or 'correspondence'.

Fortunately, grammarians (see Boeder 1958) have established several important facts for our problem. Namely, the Pre-Socratics extended the use of *aletheia* in such a way that it was no longer limited only to concrete dialogical situations. *Aletheia* (as referring to statements of a sort) for pre-Socratic philosophers is primarily an amount of a knowledge (conceived much more abstractly than in the Homeric era) consisting in a relation of a knowing person to a related object of knowledge. Thus, the statement 'snow is white' belongs to *aletheias* just because snow is white. A more sophisticated description of this usage of *aletheia* might consist in an appeal to a relation of correspondence between a statement and what is stated in it. However, the point is that no such appeal is involved in pre-Socratic "semiotics" concerning *aletheia*.

The observations made by grammarians show at least two things. Firstly, the Pre-Socratics used *aletheia* in a more depersonalized way than their pre-philosophical precedessors. Secondly, this more abstract treatment of *aletheia* must be considered as an essential step toward its predicative use.

4. Plato

Two principal fragments by Plato on truth are these (cf. Jovett 1953):

(1)   Socrates: Come now, tell me this. Do you call anything "speaking truths" and "speaking falsehoods"?
Hermogenes: I do.
Socrates: So there would be such things as true and false speech?
Hermogenes: Certainly.
Socrates: So that which speaks of things that are, as they are, would be true speech? And that which speaks of them as they are not, would be false speech?
Hermogenes: Yes (*Cratylus 385 b*).

(2)   Stranger: And the true one states about you the things which are

(or the facts) as they are.

Theatheus: Certainly.

Stranger: Whereas the false statement states about you things *different* from the things that are.

Theatheus: Yes.

Stranger: And accordingly states *things that are not* as being.

Theatheus: No doubt.

Stranger: Yes, but things that *exist*, different from things that exist in your case. For we said that in the case of everything there are many things that are and also many that are not.

Theatheus: Quite so (*Sophist 263 b*).

There are many points in both quoted fragments which require comments. Especially, we can ask how Plato sees relations between being and existence. However, without entering into this very difficult problem, we clearly observe that Plato links truth, existence (being) and predication. His account of truth is abstract — personal parameters play only a secondary role in the explanations offered by Socrates and the Stranger.

5. Aristotle

Almost everybody knows that it was Aristotle who proposed the classical (or correspondence) theory of truth for the first time. However, the fact that his writings contain different and often mutually non-equivalent statements on truth is less recognized. This is a sample of Aristotelian explanations concerning the concept of truth (cf. Ross 1924, Acrill 1963):

(3) To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true (*Metaphysics* 1011 b);

(4) The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is; and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is, is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to be the cause of the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or nor being (*Categories* 14 b);

(5) But since that which *is* in the sense of being true or *is not* in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements; for the true judgement affirms where

the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation (*Metaphysics* 1027 b);

(6)   [...] he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error (*Metaphysics* 1051 b);

(7)   It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you *are* pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth (*Metaphysics* 1051 b);

(8)   Propositions correspond with facts (*Hermeneutics* 19 b).

The formulation (3) is usually taken as Aristotle's official definition of truth. Now (4) repeats the content of (3) but adds that being is in a sense more basic for truth than an assertion which is qualified as true. The two statements are not equivalent because neither does (4) follow from (3) nor does the reverse entailment hold. Statements (5) and (6) introduce an explicit ontological parameter, namely combination and separation; these statements seem to be equivalent (or at least "nearly" equivalent). On the other hand, there is no direct entailment from (5) (or (6)) to (3) or (4), and back.

Perhaps one might say that '*a* is *b*' is true if and only if the relation which holds between referents of *a* and *b* is mapped by the relation holding between *a* and *b*, and false if the mapping is not the case. If we decide to label mapping as 'combination' and not-mapping as 'separation', we obtain something very close to (5) and (6). And if we look at combination as correspondence and separation as non-correspondence, (5) and (6) become popular formulations of the classical definitions of truth.

The statement (7) seems to exemplify previous explanations, particularly (3). Finally, (8) explicitly speaks about facts and correspondence but it is only a marginal remark made by Aristotle when he considered the celebrated sea-battle problem. Hence, there are no sufficient reasons to treat (8) as a serious proposal to define the concept of truth.

If we take (3) as Aristotle's official truth-definition (and, *a fortiori*, as the first mature explanation of CCT), then other Aristotelian formulations should be understood rather as more or less auxiliary comments than proper definitions of truth. The point is very important because no idea of correspondence is directly involved in (3). Although, as my previous remarks show, 'combination' can be replaced by 'correspondence' but nothing forces us to dress Aristotle's truth-theory into "correspondence talk". In fact, (3)–(7) may be explained without any reference to such ideas as correspondence, agreement, adequacy or conformity; recall that

(8) is only a marginal remark. I think that the best understanding of what is going on in Aristotle's theory of truth consists in looking at (3) as something which is very closely related to (1) and (2). Then if we think of Plato's philosophy of truth as a further step in the tradition beginning with old Greek poems and continued by the Pre-Socratics, Aristotle should also be considered in the same way. Under this assumption, (3) schematically says how to answer the question: how is it? Although Aristotle supplements (3) with considerable ontological equipment, his main intuition concerning the concept of truth seems very simple.

6. Schoolmen

Various explanations by Peter Abelard of the concept of truth offered in his Logica Ingrediendibus lead to (see De Rijk 1956, p. LIV)

(9) the sentence p is equivalent with 'p is true' if and only if p is the case.

Clearly, (9) anticipates the semantic definition of truth but it was not properly understood in the Middle Ages (nor later).

The most famous medieval explication of the concept of truth comes from Thomas Aquinas. His formulation is this:

(10) Veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est (*De Veritate 1,2*).

The passage which begins with the word *secundum*, is simply a repetition of Aristotle's main formulation (see (3) above). But the first part of (10) — *veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei* — is an obvious addition to Aristotle, actually related to (5) or (6). Usually, (10) is quoted in its simplified version limited to its first part: *veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei*; in fact, this shortened formula is the most popular wording of the classical truth-definition. However, everybody who employs this simplified record of CCT as "Aristotelian", must remember that it is certainly not Aristotelian to the letter. The question whether and to which extent it is Aristotelian in spirit requires special investigations that exceed the scope of this paper. So I restrict myself to some remarks on *adequatio intellectus et rei*.

One can link the meaning of *adequatio* in (10) with the second (Aristotelian) part of this formula. However, Thomas Aquinas also uses such terms as *conformitas, correspondentia* and *convenientia* to explain his understanding of CCT. It suggests his *adequatio* expresses (or at least might express) contents which is not quite reducible to Aristotelian intuitions.

What is going on in the first part of (10)? There are several possible answers. Let me indicate three. Firstly, *veritas est adequatio intellectus*

et rei may be regarded as a counterpart of (5) or (6). Secondly, the fact that the *adequatio*-formula opens Thomas' definition seems to suggest that he changed the centre of gravity in the Aristotelian truth-theory in such a way that *adequatio, correspondentia, conformitas* or *convenientia* became crucial ideas in defining truth. Thirdly, the *adequatio*-formula was invented by the Schoolmen to capture intuitions concerning truth in a simple way; the Schoolmen very much liked brief formulations. It is very difficult to decide today which interpretation (I am very far from claiming that my three cases exhaust all possible interpretations of (10)) is correct with respect to Aquinas' original intentions. However, the next development of Thomism rather followed the second interpretation. For instance, Suarez says that *veritas transcendentialis significat entitatem rei, connotondo cognitionem seu conceptum intellectus, cui talis entitas conformatur vel in quo talis res representatur* (*Disputationes metaphysicae*, 8, 2.9). The content of (3) is completely absent in Suarez. He proposes instead an analysis of truth with the help of the concept of *representatio* and seems to assume that a *conformitas* (*adequatio, correspondentia*) holds between thoughts and their objects. That is what I mean by "changing the centre of gravity". Most post-medieval thinkers adopted this route in their thinking on truth and tried to explain how *adequatio* should be understood.

It is now proper to introduce an important distinction (see Woleński and Simons 1989), namely that of weak and strong concept of correspondence. If the concept of correspondence is goverened by (3) (or similar statements), we are dealing with correspondence in the weak sense. On the other hand, Suarez's approach employs correspondence in the strong sense. I am inclined to regard the distinction of the two concepts of correspondence as fairly crucial for the history of CCT. Thus, we must always ask which concept of correspondence is used in particular truth-theories because many difficulties with interpreting philosophers' view on truth are rooted in their view of the distinction in question. As far as the matter concerns the concept of correspondence, it has been explained by notions like sameness, similarity, model, picture, co-ordination, isomorphism or homomorphism (see some definitions listed in section 9 below).

Let me finish this section with some historical remarks (see Gilson 1955). Thomas Aquinas notes that his definition of truth is derived from *Liber de definitionibus* by Isaac Israeli; Aquinas also refers to Avicenna in this context. However, *adequatio* does not occur in Israeli's truth-definition which (in Latin version) is this: *Et sermo quidem dicentis: veritas est quod est, enuntiativus est natura veritatis et essentiae ejus, quonian illud sciendum quod est res, vera est; est veritas nonnisi quod est*; this formula is

fairly Aristotelian. Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* says (in Latin translation) that *veritas [...] intelligitur dispositio in re exteriore cum est ei aequalitas;* the last word suggests the strong sense of 'correspondence'. It was William of Auvergne who introduced the term *adequatio* in philosophy for the first time. He refers (in *De universo*) to Avicenna in the following way: *[...] et hoc [intentio veritas] ait Avicenna, est adequatio orationis et rerum.* Then William adds that the truth is *adequatio intellectus ad rem.* In Albertus Magnus' treatise *De bono* we find that truth is *adequatio rei cum intellectu.* Then comes (10).

7. Modern philosophy from the Renaissance to Kant

(11)   Veritas auterm enunciationis seu iudicii nihil aliud est quam conformitas ore factae aut iudicii mente peracto cum ipsa enuntiata seu iudicata (Gassendi, *Syntagma philosophiae Epicuri* I, 1);

(12)   [...] mot verité, en sa propre signification, denote la conformité de la pensée avec l'objet (Descartes, A letter to Mersenne, 1639).

(13)   Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is [...] [Signs] [...] contain *real truth* when [...] are joined, as our ideas agree, and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature but by knowing that such (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, V, § 9).

(14)   Those propositions are true which express things as they are; or truth is conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things themselves (Wollaston, *The Religion of Nature Delineated*, I).

(15)   Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (Spinoza, *Ethica*, axiom VI);

(16)   Contentons nous de chercher la verité dans le correspondence des propositions qui sont dans l'esprit, avec les choses dont il s'agit (Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essays*, IV.5, § 11).

(17)   Veritas est consensus iudicii nostri cum objecto seu re representata (Wolff, *Philosophiae rationalis sive logica*, § 505);

(18)   Die Namenklärung der Wahrheit, dass sie nämlich die Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit ihren Gegenstande sei, wird hier geschenkt und vorausgesetzt (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernuft*, A 58).

These samples show that philosophers who represented radically different epistemological views used the formula "truth consists in confor-

mity (agreement) of thought with its object" to express their own truth-theories. This is a surprise because we know that they did not share the same views on truth. The Cartesian account of truth is much better captured by his statement that *verum est quod clarae ac distinctae percipio* which expresses the main tenet of the evidence theory. Spinoza and Leibniz belong to the family of coherentists; Wolff is a fairly Leibnizian philosopher who defends his master against various objections. Kant is famous for his strong attack on CCT. Only Gassendi, Locke and Wollaston are genuine correspondists in this company. Thus, the correspondence formula was used in the 16th and 17th centuries as a convenient scheme for recording very different, often mutually conflicting, intuitions on truth. However, independently of differences in particular cases, the concept of correspondence has a constant element in all formulas (11)–(18), namely it occurs in its strong meaning. So the distance between (11)–(18) and (3) is rather far.

8. The Nineteenth century

Bernard Bolzano's semantic approach to the concept of truth is perhaps from the contemporary point of view the most interesting contribution to CCT in the 19th century. Although interesting, it was not influential because Bolzano's work was not appreciated in a proper way at that time; to some extent, Bolzano's fate resembles that of Petrus Abelard.

Several important criticisms of the classical theory of truth appeared in the 19th century. Jacob Friedrich Fries advanced Kantian objections in this way: "We cannot, as is usually done, speak of truth as opposed to error by saying that truth is the correspondence of a representation with its object. We can only say that the truth of a judgement is its correspondence with the immediate cognition of reason in which it is grounded. [...] The general meaning of truth is only the internal agreement of mediate cognition with the immediate. This immediate recognition possesses its truth from its sheer presence of reason" (Fries, 1989, p. 31; the German original was published in 1805). This passage contributes to how Kant understood correspondence and, moreover refreshes some traditional objections against CCT (stated as far back as by ancient sceptics) by pointing out that there is no truth-criterion if truth is conceived as conformity of our knowledge with transcendental reality.

Franz Brentano (who himself defended a kind of evidence theory of truth) raised other objections against the classical theory of truth (see Brentano 1930). For him, the *adequatio*-formula leads to a fundamental misinterpretation of Aristotle's conception of truth. Moreover, Brentano

argued that this formula raises serious difficulties of its own, independently of its historical relation to Aristotle or any other author. The difficulties are these:

(a) Let A be a sentence and F^A a fact corresponding to A. To assert that A corresponds to F^A one must use a sentence B which says that A corresponds to F^A. However, it raises the question of correspondence of B to F^B and so *ad infinitum*. For Brentano, the outlined argument shows that the correspondence theory of truth is inevitably burdened by *regressus ad infinitum*.

(b) If truth consists in correspondence with existing reality, we must ask what negative existentials, for instance, the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' correspond to.

(c) For Brentano, every logical tautology may be translated into a negative existential statement. So we encounter the problem of truth for tautologies.

Independently of Brentano, also Gottlob Frege (see Frege 1892, 1918) and Francis Bradley (see Bradley 1914) raised the *regressum* objection. Moreover, for both Frege (truth is not definable for him) and Bradley (he defended a coherence-theory), each theory of truth based on the concept of correspondence must admit what has been called a Great Fact to which all true propositions correspond. However, Frege and Bradley maintained that this is an obvious absurdity because the correspondence theory requires that if a proposition is true, it corresponds not to the whole reality but to a particular fact.

Nevertheless, the correspondence theory of truth was fairly popular among philosophers in the 19th century. Let me mention three German definitions (though the respective books were published after 1900, they expressed thoughts "belonging" to the 19th century):

(19)   Die Wahrheit unserer Erkenntnis ist die, Übereinstimmung unserer Urteile mit der Wirklichkeitswelt; da unsere Urteile rückschreitend bis auf Sinneseindrücke zurückführen so ist die Wahrheit unserer Erkenntnis schliesslich auch die übereinstimmung unserer Vorstellungen und Sinneseindrücke mit der "Wirklichkeit" (Mauthner 1902, p. 360).

(20)   Ungesucht bietet sich die alte aristotelische Antwort dar, die bis in die gegenwart herein ihr ansehen behauptet hat: das Urteil misst sich, indem es wahr sein will, an der Wirklichkeit übereinstimmen. Die Unhaltbarkeit dieser Definition fällt indessen in die Augen, sobald man ihr nun ihre genaue Fassung, gibt. Nicht von einer Übereinstimmung des Urteils, sondern nur von einer Übereinstim-

mung des Urteilsgegenstands mit der Wirklichkeit kann die Rede sein. In der Tat ist dies der genuine Sinn der aristotelischen Wahrheitstheorie (Maier 1926, p. 223).

(21)   *Materiale* [Wahrheit] ist, ganz allgemein, "Übereinstimmung" (Konformität) des Denkens mit den Sein. Es gibt aber zwei Arten der Materialen [Wahrheiten]: a) *Empirisch-immanente* [...]. Hier bedeutet die "Übereinstimmung" von Denken und Sein [...] *nicht* die *Abbildung* u. dgl. des Sienden im und durch das Denken, sondern *Übereinstimmung* des Einzelurteils mit der methodisch gesetzen Realität, die in einem System von Wahrnemungs- und Urteilsnotwendigkeiten sich darstellt [...]. b) *Metaphysische* [Wahrheit] ist die Übereinstimmung des Denkens mit der absoluten Wirklichkeit [...]. Auch hier kann von einen "Abbilden" keine Rede sein, sondern die "Übereinstimmung" bedeutet hier ein mehr oder weniger treffendes "Nachkonstruieren" der transzendenten Wirklichkeits-Verhältnisse *in immanenten, begrifflichen Symbolen* (Eisler 1930, pp. 450/451).

In fact, the definitions (19)–(21) are attempts to adjust the correspondence theory (in the strong meaning of correspondence) to Kantian objections; this tendency is especially evident in Maier's case who attributes correspondence in its strong sense to Aristotle. Eisler's views are particularly interesting in this context. His *Dictionary* summarizes German philosophical experience at the end of the 19th century. Reading his explanations, we can clearly see how difficult it was to explain words like 'Konformität' or 'Übereinstimmung'. These key words are put in quotes or surrounded by phrases like 'mehr oder weniger'.

9. The Twentieth century

(22)   Every judgement is a relation of mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgement is true if the relation which is one of the objects relates to the other objects, otherwise it is false (Russell 1910, p. 156).

(23)   The belief is true when the objects are related as the belief asserts that they are. Thus the belief is *true* when there is a certain complex which must be a definable function of the belief, and which we shall call the *corresponding* complex, or the *corresponding fact* (Russell 1984, p. 144).

(24)   A judgement that *uniquely designates* a set of facts is called *true* [...] the concept of truth was almost always defined as an agree-

ment between thought and its object — or, better, between judgement and what is judged [...] here is no doubt that this definition expresses a correct conception. But which conception? [...] the notion of agreement, in so far as it is to mean sameness or similarity, melts away under the rays of analysis, and what is left is unique coordination. It is in the latter that the relationship of true judgements consists, and all those naive theories according to which our judgements and concepts are able in some fashion to "picture" reality are completely demolished. No other sense remains for the word "agreement" than that of unique coordination or correspondence (Schlick 1974, p. 61; the German original was published in 1918).

(25) 4.011 A proposition is a picture of reality [...]. A proposition is a model of reality [...].

4.022 [...] A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true [...].

4.05 Reality is compared with proposition.

4.06 Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of reality (Wittgenstein 1922).

(26) The propositional function p is true is simply the same as p (Ramsey 1978, p. 45; the first edition of Ramsey's papers was published in 1931).

(27) We should like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the *classical Aristotelian conception of truth* (see (3) above — J. W.). If we wish to adapt ourselves to modern philosophical terminology, we could perhaps express this conception by means of the familiar formula:

The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with (or correspondence to) reality.

(For a theory of truth which is to be based upon the latter formulation the term "correspondence theory" has been suggested.)

[...] we could possibly use for the same purpose the following phrase:

A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs.

However, all these formulations can lead to various misunderstandings, for none of them is sufficiently precise and clear (though this applies much less to the original Aristotelian formulation than to either of the others; at any rate, none of them can be considered a satisfactory definition of truth. It is up to us to look for a more precise expression of our intuitions [...].

Thus, if the definition of truth is to conform to our conceptions, it

must imply the following equivalence:

> *The sentence "snow is white" is true, if and only if snow is white*
> (Tarski 1944, pp. 342/343).

> [...] we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by
> saying a *sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false
> otherwise* (Tarski 1944, p. 353).

(28) Reverting to the analysis of truth, we find that in all sentences of
the form 'p is true', the phrase 'is true' is logically superfluous.
When, for example, one says that the proposition 'Queen Anne
is dead' is true, all that one is saying is that Queen Anne is dead.
Thus, to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, and to say
that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. And this indicates
that the terms 'true' and 'false' connote nothing, but function in
the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial" (Ayer 1946,
pp. 117/118).

(29) An atomic sentence [...] consisting of a predicate followed by an
individual constant is true if and only if the individual to which
the individual constant refers possesses the property to which the
predicate refers (Carnap 1947, p. 5).

(30) I accept the commonsense theory (defended and refined by Alfred
Tarski) that truth is correspondence with facts (or with reality);
or, more precisely, that a theory is true if and only if it corresponds
to the facts (Popper 1972, p. 44).

(31) The combination 'it is a fact that' is vacuous [...] 'It is a fact that
snow is white' reduces to 'Snow is white'. Our account of the truth
of 'Snow is white' in terms of facts has now come down to this:
'Snow is white' if and only if snow is white. [...] Here, as Tarski
has urged, is the significant residue of the correspondence theory of
truth. To attribute truth to the sentence is to attribute whiteness
to the snow. Attribution of truth to 'Snow is white' just cancels the
quotation marks and says that snow is white. Truth is disquotation
(Quine 1987, p. 213).

The formulations (22)–(31) present a considerable variety of definitions
intending to capture the classical intuitions. We can preliminary divide
these proposals into three groups:

(a) strong correspondence definitions (Russell, Wittgenstein, Schlick, per-
haps Popper);

(b) semantic definitions (Tarski, Carnap);

(c) redundancy and disquotational definitions (Ramsey, Ayer, Quine).

It is interesting that in (a) and (c) we find a reference to Tarski — Popper does it in the group (a) and Quine in (c). There is an irony here because Popper and Quine defend with help of Tarski those formulations which he regarded as wrong. For Tarski, (30) is simply obscure but disquotational and redundancy theories have difficulties with a proper analysis of the following statement: logical consequences of true sentences are true.

Both Schlick and Tarski criticize traditional versions of the classical truth-definition but they do it in radically different ways: Schlick tries to strenghten the concept of correspondence, Tarski entirely abandons the concept of strong correspondence in favour of something that perhaps could be called 'semantic correspondence' (satisfaction by all objects).

I think that the concept of semantic correspondence is a very good explicatum for the concept of weak correspondence. Now, if (3) is to be interpreted *via* weak correspondence, the semantic theory of truth has an obvious philosophical import as a modern realization of Aristotelian intuitions. This view is opposite to Max Black's very often quoted statement: "[...] the neutrality of Tarski's definition with respect to the competing philosophical theories of truth is sufficient to demonstrate its lack of *philosophical relevance*" (Black 1948, p. 63). Let me remind you that the formula *veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei* has been employed (see section 7. above) by competing philosophical theories of truth but, as far as I know, nobody has considered it as devoid of "philosophical relevance".

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