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Peircean Thought As Core Theory For A Phenomenological Ethnomusicology

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Abstract. In this article I situate Peircean semiotics within Peirce's larger phenomenological project. Because Peircean theory is directed at the analysis of specific instances of experience it provides a series of powerful conceptual tools for ethnomusicologists and scholars in other ethnographic disciplines. After revisiting the social potentials of Peirce's primary sign types and their utility for ethnomusicological work, I explore the importance of Peirce's three basic ontological categories—Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness—for understanding and analyzing musical experience. I suggest that these categories are useful for parsing out the whole range of musical states of mind—from trance and "deep listening" to the thoughtful planning of variations and contrasts during performance. Finally, I attempt to show the systematic nature of Peircean theory and why an understanding of different sign functions is necessary for comprehending the states of mind represented by the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. I use my own performance of string band music as a case study.

If ethnomusicology is the study of the dialectical interplay of music making and social life within specific instances toward the goal of understanding the special potentials of musical sound and motion (including dance) as well as understanding the individuals, social groups, situations, movements, and exchanges in which music plays a role, then Peircean theory should be foundational for ethnomusicological training, research, analysis and praxis. My main purpose in this essay is to support this proposition.

Recognition of the value of the semiotic theories of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) has been building among anthropologists, ethnomusicologists and historical musicologists steadily and yet there still seems to be a good deal of

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misunderstanding about the nature of Peircean theory and what it has to offer. As but one recent example, in her 2008 book *Theory for Ethnomusicology*, Ruth Stone discusses semiotics as a linguistic approach to analysis, and offers the critiques that "semiotics has emphasized product to some exclusion of process;" "semiotics has not shown great interest in the context of the performance;" and, "semiotics has often equated language with music" (2008:84–85).

One source of resistance to, and misunderstanding of, Peircean theories may be the *S* word. The term semiotics has been applied to so many distinct approaches, many of them blind alleys, that Peirce is damned by terminological association. Stone's critiques and her equating semiotics with a kind of formalism have validity for certain approaches that have been labeled semiotics.[1] Such critiques could not be further from the mark, however, if we are referring specifically to Peircean semiotics, and since Stone briefly discussed my work immediately before listing the problems, she seems to be lumping Peircean approaches within the target of her critiques.

I now think that a major source of misunderstanding and resistance to Peircean theories lies with those of us who advocated their importance; some of us launched into discussions and uses of technical terminology without emphasizing the broader nature, premises, and purposes of Peircean-guided approaches.[2] As a corrective, in this essay I want to offer my interpretations of some key Peircean ideas as a guide to a particular way of thinking that involves the central consideration of signs, certainly, but within a style of American phenomenology that Peirce originated (see Peirce 1955a; Short 2007).[3] Peircean theory is not just a typology of signs—label the index and the analysis is done. Rather, it is a way of thinking and understanding the world that inflects all aspects of my intellectual work, as well as my personal life, whether signs are explicitly considered or not. Peirce understood his theory of signs as the basis of logical thinking and a phenomenological attitude (see Sokolowski 2000).

Influenced by continental philosophers, Steve Friedson, Jeff Todd Titon, Tim Rice, Harris Berger, and Judith Becker, just to name a prominent few, have been advocating phenomenology as an important orientation for ethnomusicology. I agree. Like continental phenomenology, Peircean phenomenology focuses attention on the becoming of individual selves, which are also social selves, through ongoing experiences in the world. But Peirce adds a whole set of systematically-related tools for understanding the specifics of the processes of being in the world that continental phenomenology (e.g., Heidegger, Hurssel, Dilthey) does not.[4] The main sign types that are of concern to music scholars (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, and dicent—see glossary) each involves different types of linkages within individual selves and the world, and distinct potentials for experience, as do his basic ontological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (see glossary).

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Peirce's theory of signs is the scaffolding for a larger phenomenological project. As an approach, phenomenology has been productive for ethnomusicologists because, by focusing attention on experience, it brings us back to concrete individuals who are the loci of actual musical experiences and social life. Harris Berger (1999:120) makes the distinction between "humanistic phenomenology," with its attention to actual lived experience and the "formal phenomenology" of academic philosophy that "passes over the merely factual in its quest to lay bare the structure of all potential experiences." Based on a theory of signs, and the basic categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Peircean phenomenology offers a general and formal theoretical framework for understanding "the structure of all potential experiences," but it is a framework that only pertains to the analysis of concrete individual experience in actual instances and so bridges humanistic and formal orientations.

It is these aspects of Peircean theory that make it so useful for scholars in ethnomusicology and anthropology who seek to understand musical experience in a nuanced way. In this essay I revisit the potential functions of the sign types that are the source of their analytical value within a broader phenomenological approach. Peircean thinking also suggests intermeshed models of the self, identity, and cultural formations around the concept of habit (Turino 2008a; Perman 2008), as well as of individual feeling, reaction, and thought—all of which, when clarified, are likewise foundational for ethnomusicological work. Finally, Peirce's fundamental categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness provide tools for analyzing musical experience in specific ways that help clarify phenomena such as flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), "trancing" and "deep listening" (Becker 2004), and types of attention during performance (e.g., Friedson 1996; Titon 1997; Berger 1999), the topic taken up in second half of this essay.

Without any possibility of comprehensiveness, this article is intended as a supplement to my 1999 article on Peircean semiotics in *Ethnomusicology*. It is ultimately meant to provide a series of additional hints, suggestions, or sketches of the ways Peircean thinking might help scholars tackle a variety of ethnomusicological questions and issues. I should make it clear from the outset that my goals for working with Peirce's writings over the last thirty years have not been to simply explicate his theories, but rather to build in original ways on his general approach and concepts for ethnomusicological work. Peirce never completed a book or finished his theoretical system; his mode was one of hypothesis and exploration. Writing in 1887–88, Peirce stated his goal somewhat grandly, but I feel justly, as follows:

> To erect a philosophical edifice that shall outlast the vicissitudes of time, my care must be, not so much to set each brick with nicest accuracy, as to lay the foundations deep and massive. . . .The undertaking which this volume[5] inaugurates is to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive

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> that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as filling up of its details (Peirce 1992: 246–247).

Peirce had little to say about music or artistic practice and he did not explore the sign types most involved in this realm of experience in any great depth, although these signs—especially the icon and index—were essential for his major philosophical positions (see Short 2007:46–59).[6] Over the years, my students and I have accepted his invitation to fill in some of the details for the realms of experience most dear to our hearts.

The Definition of Sign as a Way into Peircean Thinking

If ethnomusicology is the study of the dialectical interplay of music making and social life, then Peircean theory is particularly suited for ethnomusicological work.Why? From a Peircean perspective: (1) every musical sound, performance or dance movement, and contextual feature that affects an actual perceiver is a sign, and (2) every perceiver is affected by signs in relation to his or her own personal history of experience, which is at once a partially unique but largely shared social experience (what I call the *internal context* of perceivers, 2008a). So, from these two basic premises we have a way in to understanding the dialectical relations between sound/motion and social life. To analyze any given instance of experience, a Peircean would begin by asking: What and how were the signs operating materially (a sound, a color, etc.) and semiotically? How did actual perceivers in the instance make the connections between the signs and what they stood for? And what were the actual effects of these signs on those perceivers, and why?

These initial premises and questions may be deduced from my extended Peircean definition for *sign*: something that stands for something else (the object of the sign) to a specific perceiver so as to generate an effect (interpretants of particular types) in the perceiver at some point along a continuum of focal awareness.[7] While Saussurean-initiated structuralism is about systems, and much music-theory analysis hypothesizes an ideal listener, Peircean thinking is centered on living, breathing, varied individuals in specific instances of complex experience. A something is not a sign unless it is noticed and affects an actual someone in some way at some level of focal awareness.[8]

An additional Peircean premise housed in this basic definition of sign, one that is often misunderstood, is that the analyst cannot predict what the signs or effects will be, let alone what types of signs they will be operating as, except through the testimony from, or knowledge or observation of the specific perceiv-

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ers being affected. Thus, Peircean thinking requires and inspires ethnographic investigation of the instance and the internal contexts of the people involved. This necessity fits well with the methodologies of ethnomusicology and anthropology and humanistic phenomenological approaches more generally.

Although armed with an abundance of conceptual tools for understanding a given experience, at the core of Peircean thinking is a basic uncertainty and only a series of questions. This aspect may not prove as immediately attractive to scholars of a scientific bent as, say, structuralist thinking with its goal of elaborating predictable systems rather than of dealing with the messiness of human beings and social life (i.e., *langue* versus *parole*). This is a basic choice of orientation that people will have to make for themselves, but my contention is that a structuralist worldview, which still permeates academia, and Peircean approaches differ so radically in their premises and goals that they are not compatible (for a counter argument see Parmentier 1994).

A Peircean definition of the sign requires the analyst/listener to pay close attention to musical sounds in relation to an array of parameters—texture, timbre, tempo, volume, rhythm, mode, the identity of the piece or tune or motive itself—each and any of which may be functioning individually or collectively as signs.[9] So, a Peircean approach requires the analysis of sounds (the materiality of signs) as called for by Gabriel Solis in his recent article (2012). But the analyst must also understand the semiotic potentials of those sounds in relation to the internal contexts of perceivers, which are largely socially derived. Hence, a Peircean approach bridges the gap—if, as Solis contends, there is still a gap—between socially- and sonically-oriented ethnomusicologists.

In regard to sound analysis, I have introduced the concept of semiotic density to refer to the relative number of signs potentially operating together in any given medium. Silently reading the words on a page is semiotically less dense than hearing and watching someone read the text, since the signs of voice tone, rhythm, tempo, and physical gestures, are added simultaneously. Musical sound typically contains a good deal of semiotic density because each and any of the parameters occurring simultaneously may potentially operate as individual signs in consort (i.e., creating parallel effects), or in conflict (unusual or opposing effects). If the "Wedding March" is performed in a minor mode, mode becomes a prominent sign in relation to the tune-as-sign and will probably create a distinct effect as compared to the tune normally rendered. Not limited by the distributional structures of propositional language, musicians have a greater freedom to combine signs, typically icons and indices both simultaneously (e.g., mode + tune) and sequentially. If the signs combined operate in consort they can fortify particular effects, whereas creative or unusual juxtapositions will create more complex, although often more unpredictable effects (e.g., Hendrix's Woodstock version of the "Star Spangled Banner").

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The Categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as the Basis of Peircean Phenomenology and Semiotics

Before proceeding further, it would be useful to introduce Peirce's most fundamental ontological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness that are the basis of his semiotic realism and his entire theory of signs. When referring to states of being, these concepts are exceptionally helpful for thinking about musical experience, as I hope to illustrate later in this essay.

Simply put, Firstness refers to an entity without relation to a Second, that is, an entity in-and-of itself. Secondness is the direct relationship between two entities without the mediation of a Third; it is brute force, or cause and effect, or contiguity. Thirdness involves the mediation of a First and a Second by a Third so as to generate something new, above and beyond the particulars of the First and Second. Although we might consider chemical reactions, or lightening striking a tree to produce fire in this regard, for our purposes Thirdness involves a mind to make something of the sign-object relationship. Semiosis is Thirdness, in that the sign-object relation creates an interpretation and effect (interpretant) in a perceiver. Wind is a First; wind blowing a flag is a Second; when an observer deduces wind direction (object) from observing the flag (sign), it is Thirdness. Habitual, automatic, movements of fingers on a guitar fret board is Secondness; thoughts about where to move ones fingers next or what chord to play is Thirdness. Firstness is only potential until it is brought into relation to a Second. Secondness involves real direct relations between two entities. Thirdness involves generality and/or synthesis and/or creation in relation to a First and a Second.

In some ways, understanding Firstness demands a mental abstraction or a guess about the in-and-of-itself character of something. Firstness is objective reality (that which would be as it is regardless of how one perceives it or what one thinks of it). Firsts are unknowable without a Second (e.g., a perceiver). But logically, Firsts have to exist to come into relation with a Second, and living beings experience Secondness all the time—for example, a tree branch slapping one's face while walking in the woods. The tree branch is a First; the brute force of the slap is initially a Secondness experience; resulting (generalized) thoughts about being more careful in the future, etc., is Thirdness. The reality, or Firstness, of the tree branch is realized through the Secondness of the slap. Wind is a First—only a potential—until noticed when touching a face or seen moving a tree; but Secondness is not possible without the First, hence logically proving its existence.

Peirce emphasized that Secondness was the realm of actuality and real relations, while Firstness was related to quality, feeling and potential. In the introductory section of his phenomenology discussion, edited by Buchler (1955a), Secondness is introduced first, probably because it is easier to grasp than the

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other two categories; it is most real in our experience. And, indeed, a First is only potential until it is brought into relation to a Second in our experience. Nonetheless, the in-and-of-itself character of a First leads me to identify it with "the real" as Peirce has defined this.

What we know about reality—Firsts, as Firsts—comes from the life-long processes of abduction (hypothetical inferences drawn from experience), induction (the testing of hypotheses by experimentation or accumulated experience), and deduction (general understanding of entities or some slice of experience based on the results of induction). Wind direction is "a real." When experienced through a sign such as a weathervane, one might hypothesize wind direction (abduction), but to confirm that the weathervane is actually functioning (i.e., is not rusted in place), one might hold up a ribbon or wetted finger (induction), or one might simply deduce wind direction from past experiences with functioning weathervanes.

Peirce, the evolutionist, argued that the human mind will tend towards the truth about Firsts (Peirce 1955c:18; my phrasing of this). While everyone is aware of the huge errors and even self-destructive tendencies humans are capable of, the reasoning here is that if our abductions were wrong more often that right, we would not survive; for example, acquired knowledge that large, hard, rapidly-moving objects can cause pain or damage, leads to a reluctance to step out in front of a speeding bus. Just as water will find its way downhill, human minds will move towards the truth of the nature of things in the environment, especially those upon which survival and wellbeing depend. I'll bet that even the most staunch idealist philosopher believes in objective reality enough not to step in front of a speeding bus. Animals and humans, at least, generalize Secondness experiences through general icons, indexical-legisigns (rattling my dog's food dish), and symbols, so as to avoid speeding buses and hot stoves in the future.

It is precisely the systemic nature of Peirce's semiotic theories that I find so useful in that each concept and component of the system is logically related to and dependent on all the others through the concepts of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness—hence diminishing the utility of picking-and-choosing this or that concept in isolation.[10] Semiosis, or a semiotic event, is a genuine Third involving sign-object-interpretant. Within this overall Thirdness, each of Peirce's main sign types has relative qualities of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness.

Without belaboring the point, Peirce divided his basic sign concepts into three trichotomies. Trichotomy I is of the sign itself (and hence is a relative First: qualisign, sinsign, legisign [see glossary]). Trichotomy II is of the relationship between sign and object (and hence is a Second: icon, index, symbol). Trichotomy III involves the way the sign-object relationship is interpreted and creates an effect (and hence is a Third: rheme, dicent, argument; see Peirce 1955b, 1931 C.P.

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2.274–2.307; Daniel 1984; Turino 1999; Short 2007 for a fuller explanation of the three trichotomies). The concepts within each trichotomy are likewise ordered as relative Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds. So, a qualisign (the first of Trichotomy I) is a genuine First in that it does not have semiotic capacity until it is realized in an actual instance of a sign (sinsign, the Second of Trichotomy I), and sinsigns are not interpretable without being related to one or more general types for that sign (legisigns, the Third of Trichotomy I). At the opposite end of the spectrum, arguments are genuine Thirds in that they involve symbolic legisigns (the Thirds of Trichotomies I and II) and general premises. Again, Firstness involves potential, Secondness, real relations, and Thirdness, generality. Finally, note that any instance of a sign involves one concept from each trichotomy (e.g., rhematic-iconic-legisign; see Daniel 1984, or Turino 1999).

I turn now to some of the social potentials of Peirce's three most famous concepts—the icon, index, and symbol—which specifically involve the way signs are connected with what they stand for: their objects. The manners in which signs are connected to their objects fundamentally shape their specific potentials in the social world, which logically follows from the fact that Trichotomy II is about real relations between sign and object.

The Second Trichotomy of Signs Revisited

The Social Life of Icons

The icon involves the connection of sign and what it stands for (object of the sign) through some perceived resemblance between the two. Icons are thus relative Firsts because the qualities (qualisigns) that form the basis of resemblance are inherent in the signs and objects themselves. Note, however, that while the bases of resemblance are inherent in the signs and objects, people are socialized to focus on certain characteristics of phenomena and ignore others. Thus, icons, and signs more generally, are partially determined by the objective world (qualities in the signs and objects) and partially the result of learning to attend to the world in certain ways. This situation points to an underlying Peircean premise that has been called semiotic realism; i.e., the objective world influences the capacity of something to operate as a sign, and through the mediation of signs, the external world influences our perceptions of and experiences in the world. Semiotic realism thus provides a very useful middle path between objectivist and subjectivist, as well as realist and idealist, worldviews.

All form recognition depends on iconicity: rhymed lines in poetry indicate form just as the iconicity of motives, sections, timbres, and rhythms among other features allow for form recognition in music. This idea is basic to perception and is developed at some length by Coker (1972: Chapter 5), so needs little elaboration here.

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Icons are the initial bases of all token-type relationships and all category formation. The lumping of phenomena into categories seems to be a process that is hardwired in humans as Susan Gelman (2003) and others have suggested, and it is one of the most basic cultural processes (e.g., see Hall 1977). Peirce suggested that resolving or reducing doubt is also a basic human propensity. The initial phase of interpreting and reducing doubt about a novel experience usually involves making token-type connections, i.e., searching for the identity of that experience in relation to previous similar experience.[11] The initial interpretive move (Feld 1984) most people make when they encounter a new piece of music is to mentally search for a genre or type to which it belongs: "sounds like." Spinning the radio dial one instantly recognizes country music from the sound of a steel guitar or a certain vocal timbre, and so halts, or keeps spinning (the energetic effect of the sign). At a concert of a favorite country star, one might immediately link the opening of the next song performed (sinsign, token) with that song previously enjoyed many times on radio and the recording (legisign, type). The specificity of the type or legisign that informs the interpretation of the sinsign depends on levels of knowledge and context.

Tony Perman (personal communication 12/18/12) suggests that after the initial iconic connection of tokens and types, token-type relations also have an indexical (I would say metonymic) relation in that a token is part of the type as a whole. This is true for token-type relations that are habitual and taken-for-granted, but in cases where there is not a readily available type for a given token, the imagination and creativity of the perceiver are brought into play. Thus, a third function of iconic processes, one that is crucial for explaining why artistic experiences so frequently inspire the imagination, is what I call the inkblot function. The inkblot function is based on the principles that: (1) all signs operate in relation to the personal histories of experience, or the internal contexts, of perceivers, and (2) it is also based on the automatic human propensity to make token-type connections. Inkblot tests work as a psychological tool due to these two human tendencies plus a directive from the psychologist to make such connections. Similarly, music and visual arts are often framed (see glossary) in special ways to invite interpretation.

Because of the basic drive to relate a perceptual instance to a general category, people tend to seek resemblances in novel forms and experiences with things that they already know. In forms where iconicities are not explicit or obvious, perceivers often make imaginative leaps to make such connections. Viewing a series of clouds, or an abstract painting, or listening to music often inspire leaps of imagination to find an iconicity between the perceived sights and sounds and other known things that these icons then call to mind. This drive to make creative iconic connections provides a special space for, and drives, the imagination, explaining a fundamental effect of artistic experiences and other

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semiotic devices such as metaphor (see glossary). The hardwired drive to make token-type connections inspires the imaginative leaps of the inkblot function whether the artist intends to suggest particular iconic connections or not. But verbal, visual, and musical artists, as well as political and social leaders, often purposefully create the products of their imagination in perceivable forms—icons—thus making them imaginable for others.

The fourth function of icons that I want to highlight as crucial for thinking about art and music as a social force involves the rendering of imagination in perceivable form. As I have written elsewhere (2008a), drawings and verbal descriptions of robots and spaceships in science fiction that predated the actual building of these machines were icons of possibilities imagined. The drawings of spaceships combined icons of things known: wings, arrow-like vessels, flames, to render an imagined possibility socially perceivable and conceivable. Likewise, as Turnbull described it among Mbuti pygmies, the sound of the *molimo* trumpet was intended to function as an icon for "The Animal of the Forest," which in turn potentially served as a metonym for the forest as a spiritual force. The iconic sound thereby functioned to make an unperceivable phenomenon perceivable and conceivable (1962: Chapter 4). Religious iconography (the word is not ill chosen) frequently serves this social function, although holy relics and fetishes typically function indexically. The early 1960s nationalist rallies in Zimbabwe combined pre-existing music-dance indices of regions and social groups to construct a composite icon of the imagined and, as yet, non-existent nation (see Turino 2000; 2008b for a fuller description). The rendering of imagined entities in a concrete perceptible form is a basic social function of icons in art, ritual, and performance.

General Icons, Iconic Substitution, and Repetitive Listening

How many people have had the experience of daily traveling down the same street or road to home when one day you are surprised by a house or a tree that you had never observed previously and you ask yourself, "How could I have not seen that before?" If this has happened to you, you have probably seen the house or tree but simply not observed it in its individual particularity. This experience is the result of what my former student and friend James Lea has termed iconic substitution (2001: 256–261). The psychological function of making token-type connections—of iconically placing instances within general categories—is to reduce the amount of perceptual phenomena we have to process at any one time. If, when walking through a forest we were to observe every tree in its individual particularity it would take hours to go a short distance. What we do is see trees as a general image or general icon for that type of entity—what Peirce would call iconic-legisign (Turino 1999)—and substitute it for the particulars.

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The idea that general icons (iconic legisigns) and iconic substitution influence the relative foregrounding and backgrounding of specific signs in listening, as well as in all types of experience, provides an important point of departure for thinking about this key phenomenological issue.

After listening to the same recording many times, one day I will notice a percussion part or some other feature that had previously been in the background of my focal awareness, but in that instance is noticed as fundamental to the groove or the texture of the song. How could I have not noticed that before? Since so many potential signs are sounding in music simultaneously, we cannot attend to them all in the foreground of focal awareness. As we listen to a recording repeatedly, the signs that had been in the foreground previously require less attention—we have heard them before. These features become part of the general icon of the piece (the piece as a legisign) and, as such, may move to the background, opening mental space to attend to new signs in the foreground. As this process continues with repeated listening, the general icon becomes fuller. I have the habit of listening to a new favorite song or piece obsessively after first discovering it, but as my general icon for the piece becomes more and more complete I begin to tire of it. What happens is that the general icon of past listening (legisign) is substituted for actually listening to the recording in the present (sinsign); listening is replaced with merely hearing. The recording is then shelved until sufficient time has elapsed so I can begin the process again, if not completely naively at least with the pleasure of being reminded of my previous discoveries. Such processes pertain to real-time performances as well as listening to recordings. For example, these ideas might help us better understand perceptual processes when artists or cover bands perform music live that we originally listened to on recordings that provided the general icons; or listening to repeated performances of highly scripted forms such as orchestral symphonies.

The Social Life of Indices

The concept of index refers to the connecting of a sign and object by a perceiver through co-occurrence; i.e., the perceiver has experienced the sign and object together, often repeatedly, and so their connection is simply true or a fact. Indices are relative Seconds because they involve actual relations between sign and object. As the Second of the Second trichotomy they are the most direct, actual, reality-saturated sign type. When based in repeated individual experiences, which may also be redundant social and even mass experiences, indexical connections become fundamental to the very composition of the self when *self* is defined as "a body, plus the individual's total collection of habits of thought and practice" (Turino 2008a:95). As indexical connections become habitual, they come to be perceived as natural—part of one's common sense conceptions

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of reality. When deeply grounded in habit, the reality of indexical signs often creates particularly direct, that is to say, un-reflected upon, effects at a variety of levels of focal awareness. Because indices are based solely on individual experience, their effects can be highly unpredictable even among different individuals within the same context—they are particularly reliant on the internal contexts of perceivers. In this sense, indices are even more unpredictable than icons for which the basis of resemblance, at least, is inherent in the signs and objects, and certainly more unpredictable than symbols that, by definition, depend on social agreement (see below). The similarity of effects among given perceivers in relation to an index will depend on the degree of shared experiences in relation to that sign.

While it is the reality function of indices that makes them particularly powerful for political, commercial, and personal persuasion, indices have other social and musical functions. After listening to an album repeatedly, the conclusion of a particular track always suggests to my mind the opening of the following track even before it begins; the same thing happens for sections within a piece. Mere contiguity as the basis of indexicality is at work here.

Some indices simply point to their objects, or draw attention to the Now of experience or some particular object or phenomenon. The use of dramatic musical events in presentational performance, for example, are crucial for drawing listeners into the indexical now (see glossary) and for creating the progressive structure of the piece; the introduction of notable events or variations in performance, indexical nows, promise future events and so maintain attention and a future orientation in listening (e.g., Coker 1972: Chapter 8).

Indices also have a metonymic function in which the part stands for the whole. Again, contributing to the reality function of indexical signs, a song, genre, or style that is part of the practices of a particular region or social group can index that region or social group. Likewise, when a song is a prominent part of the shared experience of lovers it can—part standing for the whole—index the lover and the relationship. Simon Frith and many others have noted that the music one listens to in one's formative years remains powerful later in life; the metonymic function—musical experience standing for the whole of youthful experience—may again be operating. As these later examples suggest, indexical signs are paramount in creating emotional effects, but I emphasize that the emotional potency of an index is in direct proportion to the emotional potency of what the sign stand for.

While musical indices often point to, are metonymically part of, or simply co-occur with, our experiences of phenomena existing out in the world, indexical relations also importantly pertain among signs in a given piece (Coker 1972). Leonard Meyer's whole psychological theory of *Emotion and Meaning in Music* is based in the idea that, due to habit, we come to expect chords away from the

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tonic to resolve to the tonic, and that this expectation—based in previously experienced indexical relations—can be played with to create tension. The same principle of playing with expectations due to previously experienced indexical relations (contiguity) works with other musical parameters besides harmony. That is, just as the recognition of musical form is dependent on the iconicity, or lack thereof, among motives, sections, and other sonic features of a piece, it is the indexical relations among particular sounds that comprise the piece as a type or iconic legisign. Here the concept of legisign refers to the existence of some entity—the "Star Spangled Banner"—apart from any actual performance of it; it is a composite idea of the piece, created due to previous experiences of it. As a type (legisign), the "Star Spangled Banner" usually includes the timbres of a marching band, or an orchestra, or voices. These timbres are indexically part of the piece due to multiple instances of hearing it rendered in these media previously for most citizens of the United States. So when Americans hear a recording of Jimi Hendrix's Woodstock version of the piece on electric guitar, these expectations are frustrated and new effects are created.[12] Put another way, as Perman does, "any unorthodox rendition of a piece or unusual juxtaposition prevents our habitual response to the legisign and thus prevents iconic substitution" (personal communication 12/18/12). There is much more to be said about the index as an analytical tool, but we need to move on to the third sign type in Peirce's Trichotomy II: the symbol.

The Social Life of Symbols

Peircean premises require that the symbol be defined in a particular way to distinguish it from icons and indices, i.e., as a third way of connecting sign and object. Although the vast majority of signs operating in music are icons or indices, it is worth elaborating the concept of symbol because it is the main sign type used in scholarly thinking, writing, and teaching, and it is among the Peircean concepts least understood. Peirce's own discussions of the symbol were vague and changing, and there is much disagreement among Peircean scholars regarding this term (see Short 2007:220–222). I came to my, admittedly minority, definition of the concept by beginning with what it is about, and it is worth briefly explaining my position here. As the third term of Trichotomy II, the concept refers to a third way that signs are connected to what they stand for beyond (but including) resemblance and co-occurrence. After thinking about and discussing the problem for twenty-five years, I have come to the conclusion that the only third way of grounding sign and object is through linguistic definition.

Thus, I define Peircean symbols as signs connected to what they stand for by linguistic definition; but equally important, people must agree on that definition of the sign within a given context if it is to function as a symbol. The third aspect of symbols, as Peirce said, is that they are general signs for general

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objects; symbols stand for general classes and conceptions of phenomena, these objects themselves being symbols, rather than specific entities in the world. All three of these features—linguistic definition, agreement about that definition, and generality of sign and object—must be present for a sign to operate symbolically, and together they explain the special capacities of symbolic discourse and thought.[13] Symbols are relative Thirds within Trichotomy II because they are generals and because symbols themselves are used to create new sign-object relations that are not dependent on resemblance (the Firstness of icons) or co-occurrence (the Secondness of indices).

To illustrate points of disagreement, Valentine Daniel (1984) and others (e.g. Martinez 1996) define symbol as a sign based on convention. While social agreement (convention) about a symbol's definition is a necessary component of my definition, convention is not a sufficient criterion because it not a manner of linking sign and object; it is a description that such a linkage is socially shared. Moreover, convention is not unique to symbols; there are conventional indices and icons. A TV-show theme song can index the program among millions of viewers who regularly watch the show, but the sign-object connection is still made through co-occurrence of the song and program in individual experience. That is, the song is a mass index not a symbol. The manner in which sign is connected to objects is the lynchpin of my criteria for distinguishing the terms of Peirce's Trichotomy II (icon-index-symbol). For those who use convention as the sole criterion for defining symbols, mass indices, by definition, become symbols, but this disregards the manner in which perceivers connect sign and object, and the manner of connection is crucial for determining the potential effects of the signs (e.g., the inkblot function and the reality function discussed earlier). Defining any conventional sign as a symbol thus diminishes the theoretical utility of the concept and it does not adequately account for the special nature of symbolic processes.

There is another problem with the word symbol itself. Most English speakers use the term as a synonym for what Peirce called sign because they have learned it through long experience with linguistic clusters such as "national symbol," "religious symbol," "symbol of our love," or "Hey man, that was really symbolic!" Thus, for most people the word symbol is operating as an index and consequently people resist or forget the technical meaning of the term as I am defining it. When based in indexical habit—in this case due to repeated experiences with these clusters—the index trumps the symbol. As a general premise, the index always trumps the symbol because of the reality of these signs that are based in our own experiences. As a reminder, in what follows, I will use a new sign—P-symbol—for the concept as I have defined it.

Words defined with other words are the most abundant type of P-symbols, but there are many forms. If I tell you a certain musical motive means "red," and

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when hearing that motive again you think the general concept "red" (i.e., think the word, "red, "rather having a mental image of the color), then the musical sound functioned as a P-symbol. If you learn in music history class that the fourth movement of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony means "triumph" and you think this general concept when hearing it, the fourth movement is operating as a P-symbol. I would suggest, however, that most people do not connect musical signs with objects in this way, but rather do so through resemblances and co-occurrences.

The most basic P-symbolic process is the ability to create or learn new sign-object relations through the use of language. This serves as the basis for contextual flexibility, as well as semantic specificity, and common understanding and precision of thought. P-symbolic processes also allow for the invention of P-symbols to refer to new ideas and abstractions that cannot be pointed to in the world, but that can help us think about the world in new ways. The central social function of P-symbols is to make general, theoretical, synthetic, low-context (Hall 1977) thought and communication possible. P-symbols allow for greater precision in thought and communication because, by definition, we can designate rather carefully through language what we mean by a sign, and we ask our perceivers to agree to understand the sign in that way, at least for purposes of that specific interaction.

While P-symbolic sign-object relations depend on language, signs in language often do not function predominantly as P-symbols. Let me say this in another way: P-symbols always need words, but words are not always P- symbols. Proper names and demonstrative pronouns function as indices. As children, we learn the meaning of many words in an indexical way; pointing her index finger the child asks, "Mama, what is *that*?" Many words retain this indexical level of meaning, i.e., some existential connection with objects in the world; but what is crucial to remember is that as we move into P-symbolic thinking and communication, the existential connections increasingly shift from phenomena out in the world to other P-symbols in linguistic thought as the objects of the signs.

In normal conversations we are constantly shifting between the iconic ("its like"), indexical ("you mean *that* girl?"), and P-symbolic ("what I meant was . . .") modes. Moreover, in any conversation the same word might function as different sign types depending on the internal contexts of the people involved. If, when talking to a friend, a girl says "my little cat just died last night," the word "cat" is most prominently functioning as an index for the speaker. Although word choice is based on the P-symbolic ground for the word "cat," for this speaker in this context the word is most strongly connected to the actual animal that was her pet. What is important here is that in this case, the word "cat" is an emotionally salient index because of its object. If the person being spoken to does not have pets and does not relate to animals, the same word may function for him largely as a P-symbol,

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a general sign about a general object, and it will not have the same emotional salience except through the indexical connection with his friend's loss. The fact that the same word, cat, can simultaneously function as an index for the speaker and as a P-symbol for the listener with different effects for each within the same speech act, clearly illustrates why Peircean thinking requires the ethnographic analysis of specific instances and inquiry into the internal contexts of the actors. This example also illustrates a hypothesis of mine that the emotional salience of a sign will decline with each degree of shifting from the indexical to the P-symbolic. Indices are potentially the most emotionally salient signs because they connect us with our actual life experiences, just as icons open us to our imaginations, and P-symbols allow us to generalize about these experiences.

While icons and indices are the most prominent sign types operating in music, it is possible for musical sounds to function as P-symbols, but not without the intervention of language. If a foreign visitor is told "that is our national anthem," when hearing the "Star Spangled Banner" for the first time, in this exchange the melody heard is the object of the linguistic sign. If, when hearing the tune again (now acting as the sign), the visitor thinks in words: "that is their national anthem," then the melody functions as a P-symbol in the same way that "=" comes to mean "equals." But this P-symbolic connection will probably not provide the emotional power that the tune has for a patriotic American who learned the sign-object relation through a lifetime of experiences in patriotic events, or the excitement felt by the baseball fan that connects the tune to the opening of the World Series. Academic composers, theorists, and musicologists for various traditions may be more inclined to deal with music P-symbolically, but for people who have not studied music through language, or who don't talk or read about music much, musical P-symbols will be less common.

These examples illustrate several things. First, the nature and function of any sign (the actual material form perceived) can be quite different and can partake of different degrees of iconic, indexical, and P-symbolic qualities depending on the social and semiotic context. Again, the goal here is not taxonomy, but is rather to understand how the different semiotic qualities and combinations function to create specific effects. In reporting the death of her pet, the word "cat" was variably P-symbolic for the friend who didn't relate to pets and indexical for the speaker. Likewise, the melody of the "Star Spangled Banner" might be a P-symbol for the foreign visitor and an index for most citizens of the United States. A photograph is partially iconic in that it works through resemblance and partially indexical in that we assume that the subject is real because it was actually connected to the photo by being in the presence of the photographer and camera.

The key point here is that signs will have very different types of effects depending on the degrees to which they partake of iconic, indexical, and P-symbolic qualities. The iconicity of the photograph renders the object of the sign in a concrete image, while dicent-indexicality (an index that is actually

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affected by its object) guides us to interpret the sign-object as real, true, or authentic—"a photograph is worth a thousand words," although Photo Shop has now opened the door to other interpretations. The word "cat" or the tune of the "Star Spangled Banner" will have different degrees of emotional salience depending on whether the sign-object relations were established indexically or P-symbolically for a given person.

In connection with the idea that each sign type has its own potentials for creating different types of effects, it is important to realize that different artistic media, genres, and types of communication comprise iconic, indexical, and P-symbolic qualities to varying degrees, and in various combinations. Artists and musicians are primarily involved with iconic and indexical signs,[14] for all the reasons explained earlier, whereas everyday speech may involve a good number of P-symbols, depending on the topic, and, hopefully, academic writing operates heavily in the P-symbolic mode. This difference in degree of sign types used helps explain the special effects of art in contrast to these other fields of interaction. Moreover, fields and contexts of practice in which iconic and indexical signs predominate, have greater potential for generating effects of the sense- or emotional-interpretant or energetic-interpretant types, postponing or eschewing P-symbolic thinking altogether. This point is central for the following discussion of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as modes of experience.

As paradoxical as it sounds, one can only explore and explain the expressive and emotional potentials of music—which are reliant on iconic and indexical signs—through the carefully delineated use of P-symbols about those signs. The different sign types are predisposed to serve different human functions and we need them all. Since emotional and energetic semiotic effects are largely grounded in iconic and indexical relations, and are of a different part of ourselves (sense, physical reaction) than the effects generated by P-symbols (typically, word-based thought), it is likely that we will never be able to recreate or translate emotional experiences with P-symbolic language except in a general, and thus emotionally unsatisfying, way. But I do not view the limits of P-symbolic language as a problem. On the contrary, a P-symbolic understanding of the specific functions of the different sign types explains why humans need the arts and other realms of practice, such as ritual, that utilize iconic and indexical signs in a primary way. P-symbolic thinking is necessary to understand the very limits of P-symbolic thinking and thus, the human necessity of art (Turino 1999).

A Peircean-Based Phenomenology of Musical Experience

I would now like to return to my opening suggestion that Peircean thinking is a tradition of phenomenology with the added benefit of a whole series of conceptual tools that help clarify a range of ways-of-being-in-the-world. It

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should be clear by now that pointing or metonymic indices connect us to the world in very different ways from P-symbols or icons. Both P-symbols (which are always legisigns [see Turino 1999]) and iconic legisigns (general icons) produce experiences at the level of phenomena as generals—entities once or twice removed from their existential particularity. P-symbols do this by standing for other general concepts (other P-symbols, hence twice removed), and usually operate high in focal awareness, while general icons function as a composite of past experiences of a type of entity (once removed) and produce low focal awareness of particulars. But icons also function in all the ways enumerated in relation to particulars (e.g., form recognition, token-type relations) and, especially important for thinking about art, provide a special space for the imagination and creative links to and perceptions of the world. Indices bring us into the world and into the moment in the most direct, concrete ways, but the metonymic index can also link us to our past and to other people and places that have been experienced.[15] In musical traditions where sonic- and motion- signs are most frequently icons and indices, musical practice (including dancing and listening) will tend to produce less mediated, as well as imaginative, experiences of and relations with the world.

Central to Steve Friedson's phenomenological approach in his book *Dancing Prophets* is the idea that "Interpretation does not arise from or flow out of experience; lived experience is, at its very inception, an interpretation" (1996:5). From a Peircean perspective it is common sense that lived experience is, at its very inception, an interpretation because all experience is initiated by the perception of signs that have some type of effect on, or as Peirce would say, create some type of interpretant for, the people involved. Peirce's concept of (dynamical) interpretant, which may be translated as any effect created in a perceiver by a particular sign-object relation, can be used as a synonym for "interpretation" if the latter term is understood in its widest possible sense of any effect created by the perception of a sign-object relation. However, the concept of interpretant is larger still in that it encompasses the concepts of interpretation and meaning simultaneously, if "meaning" is likewise understood in its widest possible sense as "any effect created in a perceiver by a particular sign-object relation."[16] While meaning resides in the sign-object relation, it does not come to fruition until sign and object are brought together and interpreted by a perceiver.

Within this framework, the tapping of one's foot to a particular rhythmic part—an act that, let's say hypothetically, is occurring very low in focal awareness—is the energetic interpretant created by that rhythm-sign. The effect of tapping is at once the interpretation and at least one of the meanings of that sounded rhythm. Although loathed as jargon, I believe that it was Peirce's intention to invent new P-symbols to span conceptualizations made difficult by Standard English.[17] In this case, interpretant does away with the dichotomy

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of interpretation and meaning, and fuses the act of interpretation (verb) and the result (noun).[18] The effecting and effects of signs span the possibilities of: a vague sensation or definite feeling (emotional interpretants); a physical response (energetic interpretants); and sonic, visual, olfactory, and tactile images, and word-based thinking—all of which are both active and resultant. The conception of this range of interpretants (interpretation + meaning) that interact along continua of perception militates against the mind-body, subject-object, act-content, emotional-intellectual dichotomies that phenomenologists dismiss as hindrances to understanding being-in-the-world. Peircean thinking does this by fusing act and result, by offering a continuum of effectings and effects, and by suggesting the idea of semiotic chaining: the ongoing processes of selves-in-the-world mediated by signs (Turino 2008a:11–12).

What does this rhythm, this sign that caused the tapping foot, stand for? It would be counter to Peircean thinking to state an object of the sign categorically because for each perceiver it might be different, but there are some hypothetical places to start. Friedson again: structured experiences are never isolated affairs but are interconnected to previous experiences of the same nature" (1996:6). The linking of an experience to previous similar experiences most certainly involves the iconic token-type relations discussed earlier, but there may be more to it than this. It is also likely that the snowballing effect of indices is involved, whereby the indexical sign carries layers of (immediate) objects and effects from previous similar co-occurrences that one has experienced; i.e., that both the token-type relations at the initial stage of the rhythmic experience and repeated experience of similar indexical signs are the basis of habit that determines the possible (dynamical and immediate) objects and effects of a given sign, in this hypothetical case: tapping. Peircean premises preclude stating categorically what the object(s) of the rhythmic sign are for a particular perceiver. The rhythmic instance affecting a tapping foot raises questions that must be answered through ethnographic research, such as further questions about the sign, instance, and the perceiver. It is also the value of Peirce's work, however, that we have a series of conceptual tools—places to start—to investigate the questions raised.

In his description of musical experience, Friedson quotes Dilthey as saying that the "relational quality of lived experience does not involve reflection and representation, a conscious synthesis of past experiences, but is "a reality that manifests itself immediately, that we are reflectively aware of in its entirety" (Dilthey 1985:17 in Friedson 1996:6). Friedson continues:

> Repeated encounters with the music and dance of Tumbuka healing similarly coalesce into a rich lived experience, one that is manifested in its entirety immediately. Awareness of this immediacy *in its entirety* is precisely what forms the musical tradition of trance dancing in northern Malawi. This is not a matter of subject (trancer) encountering an object (music) [. . .]. Music is not given here as an object

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> of reflection, something that points beyond itself. It is there in immediacy, before the distinctions, between act and content, subject and object, "that characterize representation consciousness" (Makkreel and Rodi 1989:26). Musical experience is reflexive, not reflective: "There is no duality of lived experience and music, no double world, no carry-over from one into the other [. . .]" (Dilthey 1985:17) (Friedson 1996:6).

In his discussion of the value of phenomenological approaches for ethnomusicologists, Jeff Todd Titon describes playing in an old-time string band as a peak personal experience and as his "paradigm case of musical "being-in-the-world." I quote at length:

> Here is how I would describe this experience phenomenologically [. . .]. Playing the fiddle, banjo, or guitar with others, I hear music; I feel its presence; I am moved, internally; I move externally. Music overcomes me with longing. I feel its affective power within me. Now I have moved from what phenomenologists call the "natural attitude," the normal everyday way of being in the world, not to an analytical way but to a self-aware way. I feel the music enter me and move me. And now the music grows louder, larger until everything else is impossible, shut out. My self disappears. No analysis; no longer any self-awareness. The shutting out is a phenomenological reduction, what Husserl called *epoché*. It is a radical form of suspension. I no longer feel myself as a separate self; rather, I feel myself to be "music-in-the-world." That is, the be-ing of desiring brings me to myself, re-presents myself to consciousness. The "I" returns; I am self-aware, I see that I and others are making the music that I hear (Titon 1997:93–94).

These descriptions resonate with my own, and I am sure with many musicians' peak experiences. In past work I have taken pains to try to explain the immediacy of some musical-dance experiences whereby participants are fully in the moment and integrally unified with each-other-and-sound-and-motion. I have used Edward Hall's ideas about social synchrony (1977), Csikszentmihalyi's ideas about flow (e.g., 1990), as well as Peirce's concepts of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness to do so (e.g., Turino 2009). Friedson's and Titon's writing also resonates with my own, and I am sure many musicologists' difficulties putting such experiences effectively into general terms—P-symbols. The unreflected-upon quality of certain performance experiences—here being reflected upon—points directly to the operation of iconic and indexical signs without the mediation of P-symbolic thought during those moments of performance. This less mediated quality of experience cannot be reproduced in the P-symbolic mode, but only referred to and explained in general terms.

In his book, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: a Phenomenology of Music*, Bruce Benson (2003:118) follows Hegel and Gadamer to take a different tack in regard to musical experience. He argues that "an essential ingredient in having a genuine Experience (*Erfahrung)* is the element of surprise: it is precisely when we do not expect something that it affects us the most." Writing from a

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Peircean perspective, Baest and Driel (1995) take this even further to suggest that surprise or novelty is necessary for semiosis, a position that I find severely limiting. Surprise is included in what I referred to earlier as the effect of indexical nows provided by notable musical events within a performance. The resulting experience, however, is likely to be quite distinct from the musical merging emphasized by Friedson and Titon. It is also likely to be distinct from listening to a symphonic movement in a "drop-the-needle [laser?]" music history exam where P-symbolic reflection may be required when searching for the correct types (composer, genre, period, form) for that particular token.

From a Peircean perspective, it is unnecessary to reduce musical experiences to any one type or cause, or to proclaim one type of experience more genuine than others. More to the point, for a Peircean phenomenology of musical-dance experience, within any given performance it is likely that a person's attention and state of mind will shift among a variety of modes of experience, as hinted at in Titon's description (see also Berger 1999). Again, Peirce offers concepts—his basic categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness—to help us think about this.

The Categories, Experience, and Musical Experience

The best ontological example of Firstness I can conceptualize involves a state of mind, or as Buddhists would put it, "no-mind." It is that state when all thought and perception have ceased and thus the self—that is, consciousness—is, for those moments, separate from the world and is in-and-of-itself (e.g., when Titon says "My self disappears"). Firstness can only be perceived as an experience after the fact—recognition of the state ends it by bringing the experience into a mental relation with something else. As a state of mind, Firstness is nonsemiotic; as soon as the experience is recognized, signs—reflection—enter in, and Firstness is ended.

As a mental state, or type of experience, Thirdness involves the signs of relative Thirdness—legisigns, P-symbols, and arguments to reflect about what is taking place; it is a kind of mental metacommentary. This is the state of mind that is most fully semiotic, in that it involves all the sign types. As a mental state, Thirdness involves reflection or generalizing, or synthesizing thoughts about what is going on. It is the state of mind people generally refer to as "thinking."

As an experience, Secondness is what people generally refer to as "reacting," whether to an external stimulus or an internal habit. The mental state of Secondness typically involves the signs of Firstness and Secondness, especially the icon and the index, the rheme and the dicent without the mediation of P-symbols to reflect on what is taking place. Thus, a chain of movements on a guitar fret board is linked as physical icons to the same movements executed in the past (objects)—i.e., are habitual—and one movement gives rise automatically to the next through indexical association; all this can, and often does, take place

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without mediating P-symbolic thought about the movements one is executing, that is, without entering into the mental state of Thirdness. When a drill sergeant yells, "Attention!" and his well-trained soldiers snap to automatically, this is Secondness, an energetic interpretant to an indexical-linguistic sign, the object being the snapping to attention in the past—the habit or the general icon for snapping to. What is confusing is that in the mental state of Secondness, signs, objects, and interpretants are involved; thus a kind of Thirdness is operating, but a limited kind. The key issue is that the interpretants produced do not involve P-symbolic thought about what is taking place. Secondness is cause and effect, and habitual behavior when reflection is not brought to bear on that behavior.

As categories of experience: Firstness is being nothing or everything because distinctions are not made, it is non-semiotic; Secondness is the most direct way of being-in-the-world and is semiotic to a limited degree; Thirdness is reflecting about the world and is fully semiotic.

The types of experiences Friedson and Titon seem to be describing, when no subject-object distinctions are made, may fall within Peirce's category of Firstness. As a state of mind, Firstness is not experienced until after the fact and felt later as an absence—not being there—or as a oneness, being everywhere/everything; and yet, it involves a certain consciousness (fainting, for example, is not Firstness). Particular Buddhist meditation practices are specifically designed to bring practitioners to a state of Firstness. Persons who are spirit mediums are in a state of Firstness during possession because they typically indicate that they were not present while the spirit inhabited them—later asking what had been said and done during the ceremony. Moments of Firstness may occur during certain types of musical performances, and in fact may be a goal; long, heightened repetition and going on automatic pilot may allow for the temporary disappearance of the self. But, the orchestra or session musician who disappears into Firstness for a long time will most likely not be hired back; mbira musicians, for example, are discouraged from entering into trance.

A more common and sustainable mode of musical experience in performance is Secondness during which heightened concentration enhances the melding of the self with a Second (one's instrument, or the sound, or one's partners) such that all other thoughts, distractions and entities in the world disappear. One means of achieving Secondness is what Csikszentmihalyi has studied and theorized in detail as flow (see bibliography in Csikszentmihalyi 1990). Flow is a state of heightened concentration enhanced by the right balance of challenge and skill level in relation to an activity, the boundedness (time and place) of the activity, and immediate feedback. Heightened concentration is only one means to Secondness experience, however; being slapped in the face before contemplation of the source or cause is another type among many. Thus, flow is not coterminous with Secondness but is a particular sub-type. But

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Csikszentmihalyi's discussion of the conditions for and experience of flow does seem particularly pertinent to many musicians' experiences of a common, and for me desired, type of Secondness.

When I write academic papers, I often achieve a flow state of Secondness (the rest of the world, time, etc. disappears). For a long time this confused me because the signs I am working with when writing are relative Thirds (legisigns, P-symbols, arguments), and typically Secondness experiences are enhanced by a preponderance of signs of Firstness and Secondness. I think what happens when I am writing in flow is that the mental abstractions/words on the screen that I am working with become the Second, the focus of my intense concentration, just as musical sounds can be the Second when I am playing. What is absent when I am writing in flow is a P-symbolic metacommentary about what I am doing or thinking; I'm just doing it, much like playing banjo on automatic pilot. When writing, if I stop to think about what my readers or my editor might think, then I am out of flow and in a mental state of Thirdness.[19]

I, and many musicians I have spoken with, have had the experience of "being in the pocket," "being in the groove," being in acute Secondness, when, all of a sudden, someone or something—some surprise—interrupts their concentration on the Second, often leading to a stumble or mistake or awkwardness. For example, when a musician whom I highly respect enters the club while I am playing, I might be drawn to a different type of consciousness about what I am doing, or to thoughts about how he will react. I am out of Secondness and now, temporarily, in a state of Thirdness: thinking with P-symbols about the person or about what I am doing rather than simply doing it. Conversely, in Titon's account when he says, "I feel the music enter me and move me. And now the music grows louder, larger until everything else is impossible, shut out. My self disappears," he seems to be describing a movement from Secondness when both he and the music are present, to Firstness when his self disappears. During any musical performance, shifts between the three states of experience are common.

When playing the short AABB old-time tunes in our string band, Euphor, for contra dances, I frequently get into a flow-Secondness state by playing formulaic variations on a tune that are automatic, or by reacting in habitual ways to the habitual moves of my partners. Secondness is my preferred state when playing music. It is what draws me back to playing certain instruments, styles, with certain people, and in certain contexts again and again. The desire for this experience feels like an addiction; like missing my morning coffee, I get grouchy when I go too long without having flow experience. Csikszentmihalyi describes this addictive quality for flow activities more generally. In theoretical terms what happens when we are playing a contra dance? Can Peircean concepts help us understand in more detail what is going on during experiences such as those described by Friedson and Titon?

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At a contra dance, the periods in between playing are somewhat long; the dance caller takes time to teach each dance. My son Matt, who is our leader, fiddler, and an avid dancer, studies the caller's dance card to learn the order of the moves so that he can select one or two melodies that will fit well with the character and dramatic movements of the dance (e.g., where the "balances" fall). After he names the tune(s) I usually have to hustle to change tunings on my banjo to be in the right key; it's noisy and there is a certain tension to get properly tuned before the caller finishes teaching the dance, a period of time I can't predict. The caller signals that we should begin, sometimes indicating the tempo. The band members focus, tap the tempo together for a moment, Matt plays "four potatoes" (a four-beat shuffle formula setting the tempo audibly for the dancers), and we hit together and with the dancers on the next One. This initial focus on the tempo, felt bodily, and on the starting One puts us in heightened concentration and the specific time-frame of the piece. Normal clock time is now irrelevant both in terms of the measurement of time passing (our beats, not the second hand) and in terms of the duration we will play. Since the caller cues the beginning and ending of the dance and can let it go on as long as she wishes, we don't know in advance how long we will play. We know it will be for a good while, but we are freed from having to think about ending it ourselves, so we can just play.

For the most part my attention is on my finger movements on the banjo fret board, physical habits that are icons resembling the same movements I have made in the past (the objects) that indexically generate a physical interpretant: the next moves. At the same time these movement-signs are indices co-occurring with sounds produced; when things are going well, movement and sound correlate exactly providing the immediate feedback that Csikszentmihalyi suggests is a condition facilitating flow. All of this helps me focus my concentration on my hands and the sounds produced as a unity (the First) in relation to the overall sounds of the band (the Second), again facilitating flow or Secondness. Optimally, we are in our own musical time and our own sonic space. Everything else disappears, leading to a feeling of transcending the everyday during and briefly after playing. The emotion of this experience is happiness or joy. Conversely, mistakes—lack of the expected indexicality between movement/sound and those surrounding it—briefly knock me out of flow. Likewise, being out of tune or being out of time with other band mates is painful because the consistent lack of the desired indexical correlations ruins the possibility of flow. Given my addiction to Secondness, this creates frustration.

The AABB tunes are short (each section eight bars in 4/4) and form a repetitive cycle. Both my son and I use old-time or our own tunes as models (mental icons) for formulaic variations (icons), as well as improvisation (typically extensions iconically related to the model and existing formulas). That is, after

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playing the tune more or less "straight" for one or two cycles we begin to vary it. For me, formulaic variations are also largely habitual. Tunes we play are variably segmented, or chunked within sections and a given variation (iconic physical movement + sound) in "slot A" of the tune indexically suggests a physical move (icon) in "slot B" requiring no P-symbolic thought or decision making. When either Matt or I play formulaic variations, the other can respond in a variety of ways: matching it, returning to the basic tune to hold it down, or playing in counterpoint, but Matt and I have been playing together his whole life, and our responses to each other are also deeply habitual, often requiring no P-symbolic thought or decision making. The best moments are those when Matt makes a move that causes a direct (unthinking) sonically complementary effect in my playing. The resulting sound is a sign that creates a feeling of oneness with my partner (interpretant) all in a state of Secondness only to be reflected on later. When after a dance, I ask Matt how he liked it and he responds, "There were definite high points," it is these moments that he is remembering.[20] As an experience shared by many musicians, I believe that these high points are not simply about the sound produced but rather, more importantly, involve the feeling of merging with (Firstness) or deeply connecting with (Secondness) other human beings directly through sound and motion.

For me, during individual dances, the mental state of Secondness might last uninterrupted for five minutes, or sometimes, it lasts for much of a dance, especially when we play standard old-time tunes that we have been doing for fifteen years. Sometimes, however, I might get bored with what I am playing. This knocks me out of Secondness/flow and I momentarily preplan a new direction for my playing, for example, a new register for a variation or a particular pitch as a goal for an improvisation. My attention also might briefly shift to the dancers, placing my playing and the sound in what Harris Berger calls "the defining background" (1999:124). So, within any ten-minute dance, different things move into the foreground and background of my attention shifting my state of experience.

As bandleader, Matt pays more attention to the dancers and to conscious decision making. He might verbalize a change in the middle of a tune, either naming another tune to be played in medley; or perhaps he tells the bass and guitar to drop out to change the texture. He feels that such shifts energize the dancers when the bass and guitar re-enter. While this is a valid concern, for the band leader, for me, words and P- symbolically conceptualized contrasts get in the way of my preferred flow state; when we do this a lot during performances, I chide Matt that we are "getting too artsy." Two points here:. first, because Matt is more concerned with the flow experiences of the dancers and I with my own musical experience, we favor different types of signs that support our different goals; second, for my purposes, activities that 1) involve a preponderance of icons

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and indices, (2) require direct and sustained concentration on those signs, and (3) avoid P-symbolic language and thought about what I am doing, will be the activities that best facilitate the flow-Secondness state that I desire. Put another way, full focus on iconic and indexical signs silences the inner language (or inner chatter) that is going on in our heads most of the time. Inner language is usually P-symbolic, word-based thought.

Judith Becker writes: "The inner language is often evaluating past behavior, planning future behavior, and sometimes distressingly caught in a recursive loop that repeats over and over a scenario in which we were deeply hurt or shamed. Some theorists believe inner languaging to be the primary function of language, as an organizer of experience and thus a producer of meaning. No one knows for sure why we all talk almost constantly, silently to ourselves" (2004:28). Becker states that in trance and deep listening to music, inner language stops. I would add that all activities where full attention is focused on iconic and indexical signs, such activities will function to silence inner language and thus give us a much needed break from that P-symbolic part of ourselves. But even here there are many possibilities depending on the person and context. For instance, in my earlier discussion of academic writing in flow, inner language (P-symbols and arguments) forms the Second, the focal point of my concentration; in this case what is silenced is inner language about the inner language that I am concentrating on, as well as inner language about anything else, hence making a Secondness-flow experience possible.

When playing banjo, if I stay in a flow state long enough during a dance or jam, I might have a moment of Firstness—recognized after I come back. This is not a goal for me, however, and awakening from Firstness during a contra dance is disruptive, often resulting in P-symbol-based thoughts, like "what was that?" or "where was I?"—like waking discombobulated from an absent dream—and I often stumble as a result. Conversely, I remember one Firstness experience while playing in this incredibly long jam on a beautiful day in a Bloomington, Indiana park—after awaking it felt like pure joy. Sometimes when playing alone in my house I have been brought back from Firstness by auditory hallucinations—voices or noises—experiences that were disturbing and frightening. So, not only can we not reduce musical experience to one type, we cannot even generalize the results of a state of Firstness as one type of experience. This is to be expected. Peircean premises and tools require that we approach an understanding of experience in relation to specific instances and actors, and his ideas lead us to expect a variety of possibilities.

It stands to reason that if Firstness states are empty—nothing or everything because no distinctions are made—then their aftereffects are likely to be strongly influenced by external context; for example, the difference between playing alone in an empty house, playing in a friendly group in a sunny park,

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and zoning out during a dance where I had a job to do. Likewise, because of their content-less-ness, Firstness experiences are more open to social framing before or after the experience, as for instance a Zimbabwean medium being possessed by his ancestor, as opposed to a person being filled with the Holy Spirit in a church, as opposed to being filled with patriotic fervor after disappearing during repetitive chanting with thousands at a Nazi rally. In each case, the experience of Firstness would be the same, but how it is interpreted and the effect it will have after one comes back will be distinct depending on internal and external contexts and social conditioning, sometimes through the use of P-symbols to explain or interpret what just happened (e.g., as among Shona spirit mediums in Zimbabwe). By contrast, in Secondness we know full well what the activity is and is about, and we are thus less open to social and contextual manipulation.

Firstness experience is a human universal that is interpreted and valued differently according to learning and context. This idea supports Judith Becker's productive goal of bridging universalist and cultural-particularist interpretations of trancing and extraordinary musical experiences (2004). In her analysis of trancing, Becker "insist(s) that cultural expectations always play a part in trance behavior, that the trance experience is never unmediated and is intimately tied to its own ontogeny" (2004:41), and that "It has been demonstrated that one learns not only how to imagine trance and how to behave in trance but also how to go into trance" (*ibid*.:42). Firstness experiences of a mundane type, such as briefly but fully spacing out—are quite common, but most people in the United States are not taught how to do this; typically as school children we are scolded when we do. Not being part of religious traditions like those of the Shona or Pentecostals, I have not been trained to use or frame Firstness experience; this results in the unpredictable aftereffects I have experienced and my preference for Secondness as a more predictable means of shutting down the inner chatter. Yet, this same absent state of mind that school children are scolded for in the United States. is socially sanctioned, encouraged, and directed in a variety of religious traditions around the world involving prolonged trance or meditation experiences when the self of the practitioner is entirely absent.

Given Becker's broad conceptions of trancing and deep listening, however, I do not want to make Firstness a synonym for these phenomena; rather I want to use Peirce's categories to understand such phenomena in more specific terms. Becker asks: "Can trance events be of different kinds and degrees such as the mild trance of the performer who feels herself to be one with the music she plays, or the trance of the listener whose whole attention becomes focused on the music, or deep possession trance in which one's own self appears to be displaced and one's body is taken over by a deity or a spirit . . ." (2004:43). From a Peircean perspective, I would guess that the performer "who feels herself," or the listener

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whose "whole attention becomes focused" are in a state of Secondness, whereas the medium she describes is probably in Firstness.

Firstness and Secondness experiences are related in that they both provide a sense of the transcendence of the everyday, and they do not involve P-symbolic thought about what is taking place or about other things. Moreover, activities that foster Secondness are often a means to achieving Firstness when this is a goal (see Becker's descriptions of trancing stimuli and techniques), and, as in my case, even when Firstness is not a goal. But Firstness and Secondness differ fundamentally in the kind of state of mind involved; Secondness is semiotic, Firstness is non-semiotic, and the social potentials of these two states are quite different, as I have tried to indicate above. So, in response to Becker's question about different kinds and degrees of what she and others consider trance, the answer would be *yes!* they can be quite different.

Peirce's fundamental categories, aided by the sign types of the second trichotomy, allow us to analyze continuities and compare all types of experiences from mundane spacing out to spirit possession; from being in the pocket to deep listening; and from dancing on automatic pilot to generating P-symbolic propositions about that activity. His framework also allows us to trace the movement between different states of mind and experience within particular instances in a more specific way than a term like trance understood broadly could ever do (e.g., see Becker 2004:43).

Due to the length of individual contra dances (circa ten to fifteen minutes), when playing with our string band I sometimes get bored with the tune we are playing and purposely move out of Secondness to Thirdness to actually think with P-symbols about doing something different or calling a different tune in medley. Likewise sometimes a new move by a partner surprises me and knocks me out of Secondness which also feels like an awakening or disruption, but less intense than coming back from Firstness. After a few repetitions, we may get back in the pocket, and so it goes. The obvious point is that musical experience is not one thing but rather involves multiple shifting states of experience in relation to the habits and goals of individuals, and in relation to the sonic and social context of performance. The other point is that while the instances I have mentioned in passing may seem common and commonsensical, as they should be, Peircean theory provides an array of conceptual tools to point to, specify, generalize, and explain what is happening, moment to moment, during performance.

As Charles Seeger sometimes lamented, musicology is a practice that largely involves what I am calling P-symbols about musical practices that largely involve icons, indices, rhemes, and dicents, i.e., signs of Firstness and Secondness. While he saw this as a "linguocentric dilemma," I see it simply as a useful fact based on my understanding of the specific potentials of the different sign-types. Many people, ethnomusicologists included, probably do not want to parse out and

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analyze their musical experiences on a moment to moment basis. Fair enough. But, such analysis could be a primary goal for musicologists with a phenomenological orientation, and my argument here has been that Peircean theory provides the best tools for the job.

Over the years, a number of colleagues and students have remarked that they are not interested in signs. For me this is akin to those who report to me that they are not interested in theory. I am unable to really understand such statements. Everyone is experiencing the world every waking minute of every day through signs, and signs are the stock-and-trade of academics, just as everyone acts in the world according to his or her theories about it, when "theory" is understood as "the general understanding of something;" academics generalize continuously. So, from my perspective, it makes sense to be clear and explicit about our theoretical positions, about the signs we use, as well as about the ways signs work, and again I suggest that a Peircean approach provides the best tools for the job.

If we wish to experience Firstness—being, or Secondness: the most direct way of being-in-the-world, rather than theorize about ourselves-in-the world in Thirdness, we should simply participate in certain types of music and dance in certain ways. I have always thought, however, that a happy life results from a balanced self that results from balancing these different types of activity, parts of the self, and modes of being. Inner language is often quite useful for figuring things out, but we also need a break from this part of ourselves. I am attracted to the types of participatory music that I play because they facilitate Secondness experience, but I am also an intellectual who enjoys figuring out how things work, and for this I need P-symbols, arguments, and full-blown Thirdness. Understanding the functions of the different sign types and the nature of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness experience helps me approach a balance in my own life. Peircean theory continues to provide ideas to guide me and my students, both academically and personally. This is why Peircean thinking has been central to my ethnomusicological as well as my musical and personal praxis.

Glossary of Terms

Argument: The Third concept in Peirce's Trichotomy III (involving how signs are to be interpreted); this sign type fits with the standard sense of the term: the systematic ordering of propositions, based on premises, to make a point.

Dicent sign: The second concept from Peirce's Trichotomy III, involving how signs are interpreted. A dicent is a sign that is interpreted as actually being affected by its object. The weathervane and wind direction is the classic example of a dicent-index. Body language as signs of inner moods, where bodily gestures are interpreted as being directly influenced by those inner moods, is another typical example (Peirce, as interpreted by Turino).

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Firstness: An entity without relation to a Second, that is, an entity in-and-of itself (Peirce). Firstness is that which would be as it is regardless of how it is perceived when brought into relation to a Second (in this case, a perceiver), and hence pertains to Peirce's conception of "the real" and objective reality (my interpretation of Peirce).

Flow: A state of heightened concentration enhanced by the right balance of challenge and skill level in relation to an activity, the boundedness (time and place) of the activity, and immediate feedback (M. Csikszentmihalyi). Heightened concentration is only one means to Secondness experience; being slapped in the face before contemplation of the source or cause is another type among many. Thus, flow is not coterminous with Secondness.

Frame: The mental framework that influences how interactions and experiences are interpreted (Bateson, Goffman). These mental frameworks are typically cued indexically (e.g., a stage for the "theatrical frame," a wink for a "joking frame"). The entirety of "frame theory" can be subsumed and generalized by the concepts in Peirce's Third Trichotomy.

Icon: Connection of sign and object through resemblance (Peirce). There are three types: image, diagram, metaphor (see below).

Index: connection of sign and object through co-occurrence (Peirce). Indices may (1) simply function through experienced contiguity; (2) they may point at/to their objects; (3) part standing for whole, they may be metonyms; 4) they may be metonymic sinsigns that indexically identify their legisign (Turino, Perman).

Indexical cluster: Cases when the strongest indexical associations of a sign are with other signs so that they may become habitually connected through repetition of the cluster. Nationalist and academic canons of music and dance are a good example of indexical clusters (Turino).

Indexical nows: Significantly dramatic pointing indices that draw the perceiver into a heightened experience of the moment and produce heightened attention to the object. Surprise functions in this way (Turino).

Inkblot function: The propensity to make iconic connections between instances (tokens) of novel experience with general categories of phenomena (types) already known based on the perceiver's personal history, or internal context (Turino).

Internal context: The personal/social history of experience of a perceiver that influences all interpretation of signs and the effects they will have (Turino).

Interpretant: (dynamical): The effect in a perceiver created by the sign-object relationship. There are three basic types: (1) a sense or feeling, "emotional interpretant;" (2) a physical reaction or "energetic interpretant;" and (3) a sonic, tactile, visual, olfactory image or word-based thought in the mind (Peirce). In my interpretation, the interpretant comprises both the act of interpreting and

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the result or effect of the sign, which I gloss broadly as "meaning" regardless of whether the interpretant is a feeling, a physical response, or a sign in the mind.

Legisign: The third sign in Peirce's Trichotomy I (of the sign itself). A legisign is a sign as a general type. All the instances (sinsigns) of the word "cat" on a printed page, for example, are informed by the word "cat" as a general sign (a symbolic legisign). The Star Spangled Banner, as a piece apart from any instance of performance or pzarticular score or recording, is a legisign. Legisigns (the general categories for the sign) inform the meaning of instances of the sign. Legisigns are nested in relation to levels of specificity: The "Star Spangled Banner" as a piece apart from any particular performance," "national anthems," "patriotic music," "Euro-American music," "music," etc. are all possible legisigns for any specific performance of "The Star Spangled Banner."

Metaphor: The third type of icon where juxtaposed signs (often words indexically related) assert or suggest an iconicity among the objects of those signs. For example, the statement, "John is a mountain of a man" suggests, variably, that the objects (the person who is John, and a large geological formation of rock) are similar in some way, that is, John is large, hard, tough, etc. Metaphors often function to create imaginative connections among the objects of the juxtaposed signs, and so fit within this broader function of iconicity (Peirce, as expanded by Turino).

Metonym: A type of indexical relation where the part is associated with and thus stands for the whole (general), like synecdoche, where the part can stand for the whole, or the whole for the part (*Webster's Unabridged*, 1983). Usually understood as rhetorical devices, these terms are extended here to also refer to non-linguistic signs.

Object: What the sign stands for, be it a physical object or an abstract idea (Peirce).

P-symbol: My explication of the Peircean symbol involving: (1) connection of sign and object through linguistic definition in (2) situations where the people interacting agree on that definition, and (3) they are general signs about general objects, i.e., symbols have other symbols (usually word-based concepts) as their objects (point 1, Turino; points 2 and 3, Peirce).

Qualisign: The first sign type in Peirce's Trichotomy I, it is the quality that makes something fit to operate as a sign. Qualisigns are genuine Firsts in that they do not function semiotically until they are realized in a sinsign (see below), the second sign type in Trichotomy I. The general premise is that Firsts are unknowable until embedded in or connected with Seconds.

Reality Function: The unquestioned, personal truth of indexical signs, which are grounded in the perceiver's own, often repeated experience (Turino).

Rhematic/rheme: The first sign of Peirce's Trichotomy III; a sign interpreted as a possibility rather than as a causal actuality (Peirce).

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Secondness: The direct relationship between two entities without the mediation of a Third; Secondness is brute force, cause and effect, unreflected upon habit (Peirce).

Semiotic realism: The idea that the objective world influences the capacity of something to operate as a sign, and that signs influence our perceptions of and experiences in the world. Semiotic realism usefully provides a middle way between objectivist and subjectivist worldviews (Peirce, as interpreted by Turino).

Sign: Something that stands for something else in some way so as to activate an effect in a perceiver at some point along a continuum of focal awareness (Peirce, expanded by Turino).

Sinsign: The second sign from Trichotomy I (the sign itself). It is any specific instance (token) of a sign experienced in actuality. Sinsigns are related to and informed by one or more legisigns (Peirce).

Symbol: See P-symbol.

Thirdness: The relation of a First and a Second by a Third so as to produce something beyond the Secondness relation. Chemical reactions, lightening striking a tree to produce fire are examples. All semiosis is Thirdness in that the sign and object are brought together in a mind to produce an interpretant (the effect of the sign-object relation). Within semiosis, however, the sign categories and trichotomies of sign categories pertain to relative Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. For example, a qualisign (the First of Trichotomy I) partakes most fully of Firstness since it is merely a quality of a sign that does not function semiotically until it is embodied in a sinsign (the Second of Trichotomy I), and the sinsign is rendered significant by its legisign(s) (the Third of Trichotomy I) (Peirce).

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. Musicologists and anthropologists who have been working with Peircean ideas include: Coker 1972; Singer 1978; Daniel 1984; Lidov 1987; Feld 1988; Turino 1989, 1999, 2000, 2008a, 2009;

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Mientjes 1990; Baest and Driel 1995; Martinez 1996, 1997; Lea 2001; Rice 2001; Perman 2008, 2010, 2011; Wallach 2008; Fiol 2009; Wibbelsman 2009).

2. Feld criticized the work of Nattiez as largely taxonomic (e.g., see Feld 1984). Stone's critiques rightly apply to the approaches of scholars such as Tarasti, Cooper, Keiler, Powers, and many others that are considered music semiotics.

3. I would place myself in this category along with Coker, Daniel (1984), and Lidov, among others. Among music scholars, Jose Luiz Martinez stands out as an exception. Early on, he emphasized the necessity of understanding Peirce's semiotics in relation to his broader philosophical ideas (1996:99–101), but see Gordon Thompson's review of Martinez's *Semiosis in Hindustani Music* (1999).

4. T.L Short's book, *Peirce's Theory of Signs*, is the single best synthetic analysis and history of Peirce's thinking and writing that I know.

5. As a response to idealism, phenomenology "signifies the activity of giving an account, giving a *logos*, of various phenomena, of the various ways in which things can appear" (Sokolowski 2000:13). "[Continental] Phenomenology insists that identity and intelligibility are available in things, and that we ourselves are defined as the ones to whom such identities and intelligibilities are given. [. . .] phenomenology is reason's self-discovery in the presence of intelligible objects" (Sokolowski 2000:4). "Phenomenology is the science that studies truth. It stands back from our rational involvement with things and marvels at the fact that there is disclosure, that things do appear, that the world can be understood, and that we in our life of thinking serve as datives for the manifestation of things" (Sokolowski 2000: 185). Writers such as Heidegger and Dilthey, have parallels with Peirce, especially their attention to concrete experience and to signs as mediating human experience in the world and understanding. Yet, these writers do not attempt to delineate specific sign types and the different work that they do, nor do they systematically relate the various concepts that they provide to the extent that Peirce does. In the end, continental phenomenologists give me fewer tools and a less complete theoretical system to conduct my own analyses of experience.

6. This quote comes from the manuscript, "Guess at a Riddle," which was an outline of a book never completed.

7. In response to Tim Rice's discussion of my working with Peirce, Kofi Agawu (2010:328) suggests that people should just read Peirce. This, of course, is good advice, but a number of the uses, interpretations, and concepts that I have developed within a Peircean approach will not be found in Peirce's writing per se (e.g., Turino 2008a, and see the glossary at the end of this article). The ultimate criterion for judgment will be whether my "appropriations" of Peirce are coherent and useful for ethnomusicological work, as well as for thinking about personal and collective experience more generally.

8. Signs and objects can be both external or internal to the perceiver; interpretants are, of course, necessarily in the perceiver. Peirce's choice of the word "object" does not suggest that signs only stand for material entities out in the world. As we shall see, the objects of certain signs are other signs in the mind.

9. Peirce suggested that signs produce three basic types of semiotic effects: (1) a sensation or feeling, what he called the emotional interpretant; (2) a physical reaction, including anything from tears or an adrenaline rush to tapping one's foot, energetic interpretant; and (3) an image- or word-based thought, logical interpretant. Peirce's idea of semiotic chaining (see Turino 2008a:11–12) suggests a sequential mode of analysis in which the effect or interpretant of the initial sign, say an adrenaline rush in reaction to a loud noise, becomes the next sign in the chain, "a sense of danger," creating another effect—jumping back—or the word-based thought, "What the hell was that!?" Tony Perman suggests that this trichotomy of interpretants is problematic in that feelings always have a physiological component which precedes feelings, a good reminder that many Peircean concepts should not be regarded as hermetically sealed (p.c. 12/12)

10. For example, Nattiez attempted to insert the Peircean *interpretant* into what was largely a structuralist framework, without much success in my opinion (1990).

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11. In Peircean theory, token-type connections involve processes outlined in his First trichotomy, the linking of *sinsign* (an instance of a sign) to that sign as a general type (legisign)—e.g., a given performance of the "Star-Spangled Banner" (sinsign) in relation to the general icon of the piece (legisign).

12. The concept of legisign is very useful for social and musical analysis. Note, for instance that legisigns are nested in terms of specificity. The legisign "Star Spangled Banner" is nested within the legisign of "national anthems" which is nested within "patriotic music" and so on. Hendrix's version is nested within "creative versions of the national anthem," "rock," "protest music," "Hendrix performances," among other possibilities. Determining which legisigns are operating for particular perceivers is key to understanding their interpretations and the effects of the signs.

13. As a hint from Peirce that linguistic definition is involved in grounding sign and object he writes "If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow" (Peirce 1931, 2.302). Elsewhere he says: "Language and all abstracted thinking, such as belongs to minds who think in words, is of the symbolic nature." In the same passage he notes that while many words have a symbolic base, they also may function iconically and indexically (1998:307), thus my comment that although all symbols need words, not all words are functioning as symbols. That a symbol is a general sign for a general object: "Not only is it [the symbol] general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a general nature" (ibid.:292). Peirce goes on to say "Symbols are particularly remote from the Truth itself [experience of something?]. They are abstracted. They neither exhibit the very characters signified as icons do, nor assure us of the reality of their objects, as indices do" (ibid.:307). But he also simply defines symbol as "a conventional sign, or one dependent upon habit (acquired or inborn), . . ." (Peirce1992:297), thus supporting the most common definition of the term.

14. Many Peircean scholars equate music strictly with the icon and emotional interpretant (e.g., Short 2007:204–205). This is due, I believe, to a limited view of the roles of music in the social world rather than errors regarding Peirce's semiotics.

15. Metonymic indices can stand for past experiences and other places experienced in memory (i.e., without those existential particulars being present in the instance) through the immediate object. Peirce distinguished between the dynamical object (existential entity outside the sign) and the immediate object (the object as carried within the sign).

16. This understanding of the meaning of a sign fits more broadly within Peirce's philosophy of Pragmatism.

17. As Peirce writes to Lady Welby, "You know that I particularly approve of inventing new words for new ideas" (1958:383).

18. In Peirce's conception the situation is more complicated. He suggested three macro-types of interpretants: (1) "Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its own peculiar Interpretablity before it gets any Interpreter" [i.e., aspects inherent in the sign that guide interpretation]; (2) "Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation" [i.e., the actual effects of signs—emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants]; and (3) "the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretive result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered" [i.e., something approaching the truth about the object] (1958: 414). In a letter to William James, Peirce suggests the active aspect that I am emphasizing: "As to the Interpretant, i.e., the "signification," or "interpretation" rather, of a sign . . ." (E.P.2, 1998: 496). The issue of "meaning" is difficult as well in that in some places Peirce associates it with the object and in others with the interpretant, but since the sign brings forth its object in the perceiver for the interpretant both are involved in the act of interpreting and the effect of the sign, the latter of which I equate with "meaning."

19. I would like to thank Tony Perman for pushing me to solve this particular riddle. I would also like to make the practical suggestion that a common form of writer's block may occur due to trying to write in a state of Thirdness—too much meta-thinking about the writing process rather than just writing.

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20. High Fidelity studio recordings of our music can be found online at CD Baby—"Matt and Tom Turino: Here and Far Away," (2008); our full string band on "Eurphor" (2012); and, on "Tom Turino and Friends: Charlie the Hat" (2013).

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