

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Magda Arnold's Thomistic theory of emotion, the self-ideal, and the moral dimension of appraisal

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Magda Arnold's Thomistic theory of emotion, the self-ideal, and the moral dimension of appraisal

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Magda Arnold is recognised as one of the pioneers of modern cognitive approaches to the study of emotion. Indeed, her definition of appraisal is still employed more or less unchanged by many researchers. Somewhat less well known is Arnold's broader theory of emotion, personality, and human development that formed the context for her ideas about appraisal. In this paper, I examine the influence of the psychology of Thomas Aquinas on Arnold's thinking about appraisal, emotion, the self and self-actualisation. I then critique current conceptions of appraisal in the light of her ideas about emotion and the person. I end with a plea to broaden our conception of what constitutes a moral emotion.

> If . . . emotion is to be instrumental in self-actualization, the objects of emotion must be harmonized with the person's larger goal as a human being. If these objects are seen in their real value, if they are seen in the proper perspective of man's final end, then the judgment that they are suitable will be objective and well ordered.
>
> (Arnold & Gasson, 1954, p. 306)

Magda Arnold has been called, "one of the founding mothers of contemporary emotion theory" (Shields, 1999, p. 3), and the, "founding mother of modern appraisal theory" (Roseman & Smith, 2001, p. 9), and rightly so. While she was not the first to use the term appraisal to refer to evaluative judgments linked to the initiation of emotion, that honour, as Lazarus (2001) argued, goes to Grinker and Spiegel (1945), she was the first

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I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Joan Arnold for her very gracious assistance in supplying me with information about her mother's life and for granting me permission to publish quotations from her mother's autobiographical essay. Although any mistakes and distortions are, of course, mine, this paper would not have been possible without her help. I would also like to thank Stephanie Shields for so kindly putting me in touch with Joan Arnold and for her enormous help and encouragement on this project more generally. Many thanks also to Arvid Kappas and Karen Gasper for their insightful comments and fine suggestions.

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to use the term in the way that we understand it today. Arnold was certainly the first emotion theorist to offer a systematic exploration of the meaning of appraisal, to present an outline of what the appraisal process might be and to examine the relationship of appraisal to emotion and action. Put another way, Arnold's ideas about appraisal are still employed, more or less unchanged, by emotion theorists and researchers more than forty years after the publication of her groundbreaking book, *Emotion and Personality* (Arnold, 1960a, 1960b). Although Arnold's writings on appraisal are among her most frequently cited, her work encompassed much more than her analysis of the appraisal–emotion relationship.

In this paper, I examine Arnold's ideas about appraisal and emotion in the context of her much broader thinking about the organisation of personality and the role that emotions play in personality development and functioning as it was influenced by the psychology of Thomas Aquinas. I pay particular attention to the relationship of the "self-ideal", a central aspect of Arnold's conception of personality, to emotion and motivation. Throughout, I emphasise the role played by Arnold's Roman Catholic beliefs in her thinking about personality and emotion. Finally, I consider the ways in which Arnold's ideas about personality, emotion and religious beliefs and values may help us to more fully appreciate and perhaps develop better models of the constitutive role that moral judgments—judgments about right and wrong—play in the appraisal process for many emotions. As part of this, I present an alternative to current ideas about how to define what is a "moral emotion" and consider how theory and research on emotion might change if we were to pay more attention to the moral dimension of appraisal.

THEORETICAL ROOTS

Arnold's thinking about emotion and personality took place against the backdrop of the waning influence of Freud and orthodox psychoanalysis, the increasing dominance of behaviourism in academic psychology in the 1940s and 1950s, and the reaction against the sterility of behaviourist conceptions of personality, the self, and emotions by the nascent humanistic movement. Arnold met Gordon Allport during the 1947–48 academic year while she was teaching at Wellesley College and considered many of his ideas about the person compatible with her own. In addition to Allport's ideas about the organisation and integrity of the person, Arnold found Goldstein's (1939, 1940) concept of self-actualisation and Maslow's (1954) notion of a hierarchy of needs to her liking and relied heavily on these concepts in developing her extended theory of appraisal, emotion and personality.

Arnold was well prepared to respond positively to these ideas, for, as far back as the early 1940s, she had begun voicing objections to then current

conceptions of emotions as disruptors of ongoing activity that befall the passive person. For Arnold, echoing both Darwin and James, emotions serve important survival-related functions and are one of the means by which we act—automatically but nevertheless intelligently—on the world. (See Reisenzein's discussion of the similarities between Arnold's views and Alexius Meinong's phenomenological analysis of emotion in this issue.) As she says in her unpublished autobiography:

> Emotion is not something that happens to us but something we do: we evaluate something as dangerous, and feel fear; as annoying, and feel anger. Although unintended and often unwanted, emotion is still something we have initiated. Hence we are active in emotion, not passive. We are the actor, the agent . . .
>
> (Arnold, n.d., p. 7)

An epiphany

Defining emotions as actions is a very modern way of thinking about emotion (cf. Averill's, 1980, social constructivist manifesto), but its roots are actually deep in the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Indeed, Aquinas had an enormous influence on Arnold's thinking about emotion and personality. Two events in Arnold's life are important in understanding the role that Aquinas' philosophy played in her thought. The first was a kind of religious epiphany that she experienced in the spring of 1948 and the second was a classroom encounter with the Jesuit psychologist John A. Gasson (1904–1988) during the summer of the same year.

As she recounts in her autobiographical essay, Arnold had been raised a Catholic, "but the religious instruction we had was superficial and led to no strong convictions" (n.d., p. 10). When the Church would not allow her and her fiancé, a Lutheran, to be married unless she signed a document promising to raise her children as Catholics she, "wanted to have no more to do with it" (n.d., p. 10). Religion appears to have then played little role in her life and in her thinking until an experience she had during the 1948 meetings of the Eastern Psychological Association (EPA). Newly arrived in the United States from Canada, Arnold knew no one at the meetings but very quickly became acquainted with some like-minded colleagues. She reports that she had a grand time at the meetings but found it difficult to get to sleep in her hotel room at the end of the day. As she lay there, thinking about the meetings, "too full of all that [she] had seen and heard, enthusiastic about everything psychological" (n.d., p. 10), she describes herself as having a profound realisation about the nature of her beliefs:

> Eventually I did fall asleep, but after some time, I woke again and became aware of a great calm. One by one, all the Catholic doctrines, most of them discarded long ago,

> now appeared in the light of reality: this is the way it is, necessary and undeniable. The Trinity, the virgin birth, Christ's sacrifice on the cross: All that and much more became clear and real beyond all doubt. I stayed awake the rest of the night, thinking. I knew that this experience was bound to change my life. Now I had a firm basis, a firm belief.
>
> (Arnold, n.d., p. 10)

The experience at the EPA meetings initiated what became a lasting affiliation with the Church. The experience also prepared her for the next event that was to change her life.

According to the account she offers in her autobiography, during that eventful spring of 1948, Arnold was invited by Robert White to teach a summer course at Harvard. Hesitant at first, as she had also been asked by Karl Menninger to join the Menninger Clinic, she accepted, and found herself that summer in Cambridge, Massachusetts, presenting her still developing "excitatory" theory of emotion. During one class, in which she was explaining what sounds like a rudimentary version of her theory of the relationship between appraisals and action tendencies, a student in a clerical collar asked, "But where is the emotion?" The question caught her off guard and the persistent follow-up questions that the student posed led her to admit that she had, "left out the experience of emotion itself". Her dogged interlocutor was John Gasson, SJ, who was a professor of psychology at Spring Hill College, a Jesuit college in Mobile, Alabama. Gasson had to cut his stay at Harvard short, but before he left, he and Arnold had a number of conversations about emotion, motivation, and the organisation and structure of personality during which Gasson introduced her to Thomistic psychology.

Arnold says in her autobiography that she was keen to talk with Gasson about, "my notion of the individual as agent; also, the hierarchy of being I had arrived at for myself" (Arnold, n.d., p. 11). These ideas, it turns out, are central to Thomistic psychology and they, along with Aquinas' classification of emotions, shaped Arnold's thinking about emotion and personality in many ways. Understanding the Thomistic roots of Arnold's theory of emotion and personality, I believe, can give us a deeper appreciation of what she understood to be the nature of the appraisal process and the relationship of appraisal to personality.

A peep at Thom[1]

According to Aquinas, drawing on a set of categories developed by Aristotle, the powers of human beings, or, more properly, the powers of the soul, are

[1] I make no apologies for the pun, but must confess that it is not mine. Ralph McInerny uses it as the subtitle of his introduction to Aquinas' thought (McInerny, 1990) and reports that the epithet "Peeping Thomist" was first applied to Mortimer Adler by *Time Magazine*.

organised on three levels, the *vegetative*, *sensitive* and *intellectual*.[2] The three levels of soul or being are organised hierarchically, the lowest level being the vegetative, with the higher levels encompassing the powers of the lower levels. Thus, all living things have a vegetative soul that provides for what might be called purely organismic needs, nutrition, reproduction, and the like. Crucially, at this and the other two levels, the soul has not only a self-organising principle, but a self-actualising principle as well; being at the vegetative level is understood to have an inherent tendency to grow. Animals share vegetative functions with other living things but also have sensitive powers: they move, they feel and they sense the world. Human beings share vegetative powers with other living things and sensitive powers with other animals but they also reason and act voluntarily. Reason and will represent the intellectual powers of the soul and are what distinguish humans from other animals. According to Aquinas, because these powers represent, in a small way, powers possessed by God, humans are naturally drawn toward actualising their powers of reason and will in a spiritual manner.

Aquinas' descriptive psychology divides both the sensitive and intellectual levels of the soul into two parts, the *cognitive* and the *appetitive*. At the sensitive level, the cognitive powers of the soul are what we usually think of as the *five senses* (hearing, touch, smell, taste and vision) along with the "*interior" senses*: the ability to derive meaning out of sensory impressions, the ability to form images in the absence of external stimulation, memory, and an "estimative" sense, which is almost identical to what we now call emotional appraisal. The appetitive powers of the soul at the sensitive level are manifested by the *emotions*, which Aquinas divided into two types, the "concupiscible" and the "irascible", depending on whether, as we would now say, coping with the events that elicit them is easy or difficult, respectively. Arnold was to use a similar scheme in her classification of emotions in *Emotion and Personality* (see her table of "basic emotions", in Volume I, 1960a, p. 196). Crucially, Aquinas thought of emotions in a way quite similar to what Arnold would later call "action tendencies". In Averill's (1976) words, emotions for Aquinas are, "tendencies to respond immediately and intuitively to what is apprehended through the exterior and interior senses" (p. 272). Notice here one important feature of the system, namely, each part functions with the aid of the other parts; the appetitive powers are

[2] In developing my summary of Aquinas' psychology, I have drawn on various parts of the *Summa Theologica* (trans. 1977) especially the First Part, "Treatise on Man", Questions 75 through 84, and the Second Part, Part 1, "Treatise on Human Acts", "Of the Passions Which are Acts Common to Man and other Animals", Questions 22, 23, 30 and 40. I have also made use of summaries and commentaries by Dixon (2003), McInerny (1990), Kenny (1993), Fitzpatrick (1987) and Averill's (1976) brief but extremely lucid introduction to Aquinas on mind.

enabled, in a sense, by the cognitive powers. And, notice the implication here for students of emotion: emotions, like other appetitive functions, require knowledge of their objects. On a more general level, the implication is that, while the soul is organised on a variety of levels, each with its own powers and potentialities, the system functions as a whole. According to Aquinas, the soul is a unity. Thus, for him, there is no mind/body problem.

At the intellectual level, the cognitive powers of the soul are represented by *reason*, which Aquinas divides into passive and active parts, with active reason considered to be the superior part. The appetitive powers of the intellectual level are represented by the *will*. Except as it is naturally drawn toward actualising itself in a spiritual manner, the will is seen by Aquinas as undetermined, as freely acting. We choose a course of action because our cognitive powers apprehend the goodness of it, there being, of course, different degrees of goodness. We might be drawn toward some objects because of the sensual pleasure they may provide (at the sensitive level), but, ultimately, active reason wins out because our intellect apprehends that there is a supreme good (God) and the will leads us to choose actions that bring us into accord with that good. This may seem like quite lofty philosophising, but it is the basis for the *telos* in Arnold's concept of the self-ideal, which I discuss below.

The influence of Aquinas on Arnold

It is clear that Arnold found Gasson's tutorials in Thomistic psychology compelling; for one thing, they resonated with her dissatisfaction with the determinism of both Freudian theory and behaviourism. For another, they were in accord with ideas she already had regarding the self as an active agent with the capacity for free choice and her belief that emotions are actions. Arnold had also already concluded by the time she met Gasson that there was an essential unity between mind and body. She had even worked out on her own something like the Thomistic scale of being. Critically, the ideas of Aquinas allowed her to address a question that had apparently troubled her greatly, namely, the ultimate source of human action. As she recounts in her autobiography:

> My scale [of being] obviously implied an acting, not merely reacting, individual. I had never had much use for stimulus–response theories and their machine-models of the human being. It had also become clear to me that all vital activities must have a source within the individual. That source might be life. But life could only be a source of organic activities; and where is the source of behavior and conduct? I came back again and again to the soul as the source of activity but did not know how to go on from there.
>
> (Arnold, n.d., p. 12)

Since the top of the system for Aquinas is will informed by active reason, Arnold now had a way to think about human psychology that emphasised rationality and goal setting. Each level of the system could be seen as having goals that might come into conflict with other levels of the system. "A diabetic may have to diet but he gets hungry and eats more than his allowance" (Arnold, n.d., p. 12). Ultimately, however, given the proper circumstances, a person should be motivated by the very top of the system, which, we have seen, is a kind of irresistible pull toward perfection.

In the fall of 1948, Arnold presented a paper on emotion (Arnold, 1950) at the Mooseheart Symposium (see Reymert, 1950) and continued her discussions of Aquinas with Gasson there. By that time she says, "I realised that the Thomistic synthesis offered a firm foundation for the psychological views I had slowly formed over the past years" (Arnold, n.d., p. 13).[3] In the summer of 1949, she taught a second course at Harvard. Gasson was also at Harvard that summer, this time as *her* teacher, giving her, "an abbreviated but intensive course in Thomistic philosophy" (Arnold, n.d., p. 13). Gasson also put her on track at this time to be received back into the Church through the help of a friend of his who was a priest in Philadelphia. By summer's end, Arnold reports that she had read Aquinas' *De Anima* and parts of *Summa Theologica* (presumably, the "Treatise on Human Acts", and at least some of the "Treatise on Man"). "To this day", she says of *De Anima*, "I have not found anything to surpass it. It fits modern research findings and makes them intelligible in a way I have found nowhere else" (Arnold, n.d., p. 13). Meeting Gasson, according to her autobiography, "was the greatest stroke of luck ... He introduced me to the Thomistic synthesis; without it, I would never have achieved the integration of psychological functions I did" (Arnold, n.d., pp. 28–29).

Arnold paid heavily for the identification of her as a Catholic psychologist, but that is another story (see Shields, this issue).

PERSONALITY, EMOTION AND THE SELF-IDEAL

Arnold and Gasson collaborated on a number of projects as their careers became intertwined over the years. Most importantly, in 1950, during her first year at Barat College of the Sacred Heart in Lake Forest, Illinois, Arnold and Gasson organised a conference on personality aimed at developing, "an integrated theory of personality based on a Christian conception of human nature" (Arnold & Gasson, 1954, p. iii). The conference, in Arnold's eyes, was a great success and resulted in *The Human*

[3] Aquinas' work is referred to as the "Thomistic synthesis" because he synthesised Aristotelian thought with the Christian doctrine of the Church Fathers.

Person: An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality (Arnold & Gasson, 1954), a textbook for personality psychology courses at Catholic colleges. In addition to editing the book, Arnold wrote four of its chapters: an examination of "basic assumptions" in psychology from a Thomistic perspective that is notable for its defence of holism and teleological explanation; an overview of human and animal learning; an examination of free association and its relationship to imaginative processes; and an outline of a theory of psychotherapy from a Catholic point of view.

Gasson contributed a chapter examining the concept of theory in science from a Catholic perspective, two chapters on personality theory, the first a critique of then current conceptions of personality—which included a consideration of everything from cybernetics to self-consistency models—and the second a witty and oftentimes quite trenchant brief for a kind of Thomistic personology, and a chapter on religion and personality integration that explores the use of the meditations of St Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises (see Mottola, 1989) as a model for the full and proper development of the self-ideal (see the section on the self-ideal below). Arnold and Gasson also wrote two chapters together, one, a critique and detailed exposition of the existential psychotherapy of Victor Frankl, and the other an outline of what would later become the theory of emotion Arnold presented in *Emotion and Personality*.

Many of the issues examined in both volumes of *Emotion and Personality* are discussed in Arnold and Gasson's chapter, significantly, the relationship of feelings to emotion, the role that judgments play in the initiation of emotion, the place of emotions in motivation, how emotions are to be classified, how bodily changes are related to emotional experience and expression, the relationship of emotions to personality growth and integration, and so on. The context of Arnold and Gasson's exposition of Arnold's theory, namely, their outline of a specifically Catholic psychology of personality, however, allows them to bring to the fore certain aspects of the theory that are decidedly Thomistic in character.

Because of our debt to Arnold for her explication of the process of appraisal, we have, I think, tended to focus too closely on her analysis of the specifics of that process. Take, as an example of this, my own use of the particulars of Arnold's (1960a) definition of appraisal to defend cognitive approaches to emotion against Zajonc's critique of them (see Cornelius, 1996, pp. 128–131). In order to really understand Arnold's concept of appraisal, however, I believe we have to look through the other end of the microscope. For Arnold, because personality is an integrated system that is ultimately governed by rationally made decisions, we have to appreciate the ways in which those decisions are related to the appraisal process. Critical to understanding this is the concept of the self-ideal and what it does. Before

discussing the self-ideal, however, we must examine the role that reflective judgment plays in emotion.

Appraisal, reason, and personality integration

By now, most students of emotion are familiar with Arnold's definition of emotion as:

> *the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as bad (harmful). This attraction or aversion is accompanied by a pattern of physiological changes organized toward approach or withdrawal. The patterns differ for different emotions.*
>
> (Arnold, 1960a, p. 182, emphasis in original)

Arnold offered a similar definition in the chapter she wrote with Gasson. Emotions, according to this earlier definition are, "*the felt tendency toward an object judged suitable, or away from an object judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type of emotion*" (Arnold & Gasson, p. 294, emphasis in original). The major difference between the two definitions, of course, is that, by 1960, Arnold was using the term appraisal to refer to the kinds of judgments involved in the activation of emotion. Between the two statements of her definition of emotion, one can also see, however, a difference in what she intends such judgments to include.

As I have emphasised before (see Cornelius, 1996, pp. 117–118), in *Emotion and Personality*, Arnold considered appraisals to be, "direct, immediate, nonreflective, nonintellectual, automatic, 'instinctive', [and] 'intuitive' " (Arnold, 1960a, p. 175), and refers to them as "sense judgments". Throughout the book, she took pains to distinguish between what she calls "intuitive" and "reflective" appraisals, the latter being more deliberate and more rational. When reflective judgments *are* involved in the emotion process, she says, they *follow* appraisal (see 1960a, pp. 175–6). It is clear that Arnold considers such reflective judgments as nonetheless having the power to influence emotion, as when reflection "corrects" an earlier appraisal, but, because of their intuitive and immediate character, so-called intuitive appraisals always precede reflective judgments.

In her earlier statement of her theory, it is significant, I think, that, while she describes emotion judgments as "immediate", she highlights the difference between humans and other animals, as any good Thomist would, and foregrounds the role of reason in the appraisal process. Thus, in describing the operation of what she would later call appraisal, she says, "In the animal, such judgment will be an estimate based upon sense knowledge and sense memory; in the human being, the ... estimate always includes rational elements which have entered into the situation in the past and are

recalled in the present" (Arnold & Gasson, 1954, p. 295). Why does Arnold here emphasise the "rational elements" in the appraisal process and how can appraisal be both intuitive *and* reflective?

Recall that for Aquinas, the powers of human beings are organised hierarchically on three levels, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual. Appraisal, the "estimative sense" for Aquinas, is a function of the cognitive aspect of the sensitive level. Here, objects in the world are judged according to whether they are good or bad for us. But the suitability or unsuitability of objects at this level refers to whether they are good or bad for us in only a limited way, for the sensitive level of the soul cannot know what is ultimately good for us because it does not possess reason. Reason is a function of the intellectual level and only reason can truly know the Good. Letting ourselves be led around by our appraisals at the sensitive level will likely get us into trouble.

As an example of this, Arnold and Gasson discuss the ways in which we may feel ambivalent about a person or thing. Like Aquinas, they argue that there are "polarities" of emotion, by which they mean that different emotions may point us in different directions: "What is good for us we love, what is bad for us we avoid" (p. 299). This implies that we cannot at one and the same time both love and hate the same object. They recognise, however, that people are not that simple. It *is* indeed possible to feel very different emotions about the same person. This is because, they say, we may love and hate different *aspects* of the person, so that, for example, we are attracted by a person's good looks but repelled by his lack of civility toward others. Both of these aspects of the person, however, appeal to judgments made on the same limited "sensory" basis. Something else is needed to save us from the potentially endless number of ambivalent emotional reactions we might have toward any one person or thing. That something else is not to be found at the sensory level. For that, we must look higher:

> In general, the more a human relationship is based on sensory appeal or appeal to isolated tendencies, the more ambivalent will it be. Only when it is based upon a common striving toward a common goal which is in harmony with man's final end, to which all other aspects of that relationship are subordinated, will there be love properly so called ... Only on that level will it be love of a person rather than love of his physical or intellectual attractions. On that level, love becomes a sharing of the Good ...
>
> (Arnold & Gasson, 1954, p. 300)

Emotions, then, may move us hither and thither or they may impel us toward what is ultimately good. What makes emotions do one or the other depends on the extent to which our emotions are controlled by reason. It is only when this happens, Arnold and Gasson argue, that emotions can serve as a means of self-actualisation and personality integration. But how

precisely does this happen? Arnold and Gasson offer two very different answers, one emotional, one not. I describe the non-emotional process first.

In keeping with the Thomistic insistence that active reason and the will are at the top of the system, Arnold and Gasson argue that emotion may be used as a means of self-actualisation and personality integration, "provided that the person actively directs it toward rational ends" (p. 305). This is, unfortunately, not an entirely satisfactory answer because, as Arnold points out elsewhere, reason, in the form of reflection, mostly comes *after* our initial emotion judgments. Yes, we can set our sights on the Good all we want, but we are still likely to feel the immediate push and pull of panic and pleasure. As Arnold was to say later, although, "the appraisal leading to a strong desire is not necessarily final" (Arnold, 1970, p. 177), the result of a conflict between our intuitive appraisals and our deliberative judgment may nevertheless be a compromise, or worse:

> The diabetic may crave sweets yet refrain from giving in to his desire because he knows what the consequences of an indulgence will be. The smoker knows the dangers of smoking but hopes that he will be lucky—and goes on smoking. In both cases, there is reflection, a weighing of alternatives, in which the intuitive appraisal leading to desire is either counterbalanced or reinforced by deliberate judgment. The final decision may not be the most attractive alternative nor is it always the most prudent choice.
>
> (Arnold, 1970, p. 177)

Thus, something else is needed to help us condition ourselves so that our immediate and intuitive judgments are in tune with our higher goals. This something else is to be found in the participation of the intellect and, hence, reason, in the appraisal process itself.

Although Arnold and Gasson are not entirely clear about how this happens, they suggest that, because evaluative judgments for humans are always judgments about the meaning of objects in the world, they must necessarily involve the intellect. According to Arnold and Gasson, what we might call the total meaning of a situation is built up gradually from a person's experiences with it and similar situations in the past. Part of this meaning necessarily involves a person's reflecting on past experiences with the situation and their relationship to his or her higher-order goals and desires. Thus, these become integrated into the person's immediate judgment of the value of the situation and in this way, reflective appraisals are rendered intuitive.

For Arnold and Gasson, personality integration is the process by which a person's emotional responses to the world are guided by his or her higher ideals so that there is a kind of harmony achieved between the ways he or she reacts emotionally and the ways he or she apprehends the world intellectually. The lynchpin of this process is the *self-ideal*, for it is the self-ideal that provides the evaluative process with a model for how objects in the world are

to be appraised according to how they compare with or have implications for what a person ultimately values.

The self-ideal

Developing quite naturally out of her understanding of Aquinas and augmented by ideas she borrowed from Maslow's (1954) theory of motivation—she transforms his hierarchy of needs into a hierarchy of values—as well as Goldstein's (1939, 1940) and Allport's (1937) writings about self-actualisation and personality growth, Arnold's concept of the self-ideal was seen by her as a kind of central organising principle of personality as well as an important, perhaps *the* most important, source of motivation for the person.

Arnold and Gasson, together and in their separate writings, define the self-ideal in a number of ways. Gasson (1954) described the self-ideal somewhat abstractly as, "the rational purpose implicit in the active integration and organization of personality" (p. 196) and as, "not an idealised version of one's self, but ... the ideal of the perfect person as the individual conceives of him" (p. 193). Arnold (1959) defined the self-ideal as a person's "recognition of what is good" (p. 33) and as, "our life goal, what we in our heart of hearts are striving for and what, in striving, we finally achieve" (p. 34). Developmentally, the self-ideal grows out of the maturing child's recognition of those aspects of his or her parents' characters that he or she judges as good and that he or she lacks. Thus, the self-ideal "implies a comparison between the child as he is now and as he wants to be" (Arnold, 1960b, p. 281). Note, that the self-ideal is both a model toward which a person actively strives and a source of the person's motivation for such striving.

It is important to note that Arnold and Gasson see the self-ideal as something that is "chosen" by the person, "partly unwittingly, partly after reflection" (Arnold, 1959, p. 34), but chosen nonetheless.[4] There is an important moral implication here, as we are held fully accountable for our actions only insofar as we freely choose them. This applies to both morally proscribed and morally prescribed actions. If I am coerced into doing what is good, then I am not really good myself in any meaningful way; I am only doing what is good because I have to. Because a person's self-ideal reveals not only what he or she values but that he or she has reached a stage of

[4] Notice how this differs from the determinism of Freud's concept of identification (see Freud, 1922/1959, Chapter VII). Although the "unwittingly" qualification leaves room for unconscious influence, it is clear that, for Arnold, a person's choices in life are made much more consciously than Freud would ever allow.

self-development in which he or she recognises the necessity of aspiring toward some life goal, the self-ideal may be seen as an "index" of a person's maturity (Arnold, 1960b, p. 282). For Arnold and for Gasson, a person's maturity is indexed first by whether or not he or she has chosen a self-ideal, and has then ordered his or her values according to that self-ideal—notice the influence of Maslow's hierarchy of needs here. Second, it is indexed by the content of the person's self-ideal.

As might be expected, given the roots of the idea in the philosophy of Aquinas, not to mention the roots of Aquinas' thought in Aristotle, both Gasson and Arnold assume that the choice of a self-ideal consists of a kind of naturally occurring propensity of the person to recognise what is good and to try to act in such a way as to bring his or her life into accord with it. Arnold refers to this as a "natural tendency toward perfection" (1959, p. 33). As implied by the epigraph at the beginning of this paper, Arnold and Gasson assume that there is a good, an "objectively valid" good, that is above all others, that is, a Good. For Gasson (1954), the Good, "is human nature at its best incarnated in a concrete person" (p. 193). According to him, self-actualisation guided by such an ideal involves striving,

> not toward something but toward someone whose perfection we gradually make our own. In all human history there is only one man so perfect that even his enemies have to acknowledge him as such: Jesus Christ. Even in non-Christian cultures, the ideal human person is one who is and acts Christlike. For people who have no knowledge of such a historical person, the same qualities nevertheless appeal as ideal. (Gasson, 1954, pp. 193–194)

Echoing Gasson, Arnold argues that:

> the "world and the flesh" have an attraction that is difficult to resist, yet is out of proportion to their genuine value for the human being ... It is here that religion correct[s] our values and draws our attention to an ideal that far surpasses what man can set up for himself. Revelation asserts that man has a destiny which goes beyond any of the goals he can reach in this world; that man's desire for perfect knowledge, for unfailing love and understanding, for enduring happiness, can and will find its fulfilment in God who is all in all. This sets the goal of human life as union with God. Such an ideal will organize man's actions and bring them into harmony.
>
> (Arnold, 1959, p. 35)

I have quoted both Arnold and Gasson at length on their conception of what the ultimate self-ideal must consist because I think it is important to have an appreciation of the way in which they saw the self-ideal in religious (i.e., Thomistic) terms. This is what distinguishes their ideas about self-actualisation from those of Goldstein, Maslow and the other humanists. Although Arnold and Gasson drew on the ideas of Maslow and Goldstein in developing their concept of self-actualisation, they faulted both for not

considering religious aspirations as important components of the process. Arnold recognised the truth in the humanists' assertion that the major impediments to self-actualisation are the constraints imposed on one's growth by unmet needs and the actions of other people (see Arnold, 1960b, pp. 285–286). For Arnold, however, the problem with self-actualisation as conceived of by Goldstein and Maslow was that it had no direction, no rational end-point, and, hence, no *telos*: "The implication seems to be that human nature has potentialities for freedom and self-determination but that it depends entirely on favorable environmental circumstances whether these will ever come to fruition" (Arnold, 1959, p. 32).

Even though Arnold's concept of the self-ideal is unmistakably religious in *content*, the notion of an ideal or life goal that serves to bring order to a person's motivations and emotions need not be seen only in religious or spiritual terms. One may certainly strive toward an ideal the content of which is entirely secular, and both Arnold and Gasson admit as much in the way they occasionally qualify their religious beliefs in discussing the self-ideal (see Arnold, 1960, p. 330; and Gasson, 1954, pp. 193–194).[5] Arnold considered herself, after all, very much a scientist and was committed to developing a theory of emotion and personality that would apply to everyone, not just those who are religious. What is important about the self-ideal, whatever the origins of its content, is that acting in accordance with it brings harmony and integration to one's personality and serves to optimise in a sense one's emotional responses to the world.

From self-ideal to appraisal

The self-ideal influences all of a person's actions, including the emotion appraisals he or she makes. According to Arnold, because the appraisal of any object or event in the world involves a value judgment and because a person's hierarchy of values is determined by his or her self-ideal, the self-ideal is intimately involved with appraisal and the generation of emotion. Moreover, because the self-ideal is the ultimate source of a person's motivation, Arnold recognises that emotion and motivation are closely interrelated. As she says, "a man's motivational system is established and organized around his self-ideal. As his ideal becomes integrated and articulated in his everyday activity, it determines his further actions. Whenever anything seems attractive or pleasant, it is also appraised as it contributes or detracts from the ideal toward which he aims" (Arnold, 1960b, p. 286).

[5] I thank Arvid Kappas for pointing this out to me.

Because the appraisals that a person makes are constituted by value judgments that reflect what his or her self-ideal defines as important, a person's emotions will reveal his or her self-ideal. This is very similar to Epstein's (1980) notion that if you want to understand what a person values, examine what makes him or her emotional. It is also very similar to an argument that de Rivera (1989) develops, following Scheler (1973), that "emotion *discloses* value" (p. 14, emphasis in original). According to de Rivera, "emotions do not simply reveal value ... [they] function in different ways to preserve or enhance the values to which a person is committed" (p. 19). Arnold also saw emotions as being more than mere reflections of our values. For her, because emotions impel us toward or away from objects and events in the world, objects and events that we have appraised as being relevant to our self-ideal, they must always be seen as moving us toward our self-ideal. They are, in her words, the "guardians of the self-ideal" (Arnold, 1960b, p. 299).

In what may be the first list of what have come to be called the "moral emotions" (Haidt, 2003), Arnold examines guilt, shame, remorse, repentance, self-blame, boredom, and a kind of existential suffering for the ways in which each of these may help a person realise his or her self-ideal by moving him or her *away* from objects, persons and situations that may stand in the way of his or her self-actualisation. Arnold also examines a number of hedonically positive emotions—the desire to know, a variety of forms of love (which she calls "union with others"), love of beauty, "doing and making", mirth and laughter, happiness, and the religious emotions—for the ways in which they may help move a person *toward* his or her self-ideal.

Foremost among the hedonically negative emotions that are guardians of the self-ideal for Arnold is a kind of proactive experience of shame. Like more modern researchers (see, for example, Tangney & Dearing, 2002), Arnold considers exposure of the self to be the essence of the experience of shame. Not unexpectedly, she links such exposure to the self-ideal and further defines shame as a failure to "measure up to the self-ideal as it ought to be" and as "an appraisal that the person is not acting in accord with human ideals" (Arnold, 1960b, p. 301). Although Tangney (see Tangney & Stuewig, 2004; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996) has shown quite convincingly that shame is almost always maladaptive in terms of motivating moral behaviour, Arnold considers shame to be a potentially powerful motivator of prosocial behaviour because she sees the failure involved in shame on a much broader scale, that is, as about human beings' highest aspirations and not simply about the need to hide a suddenly exposed self. Moreover, Arnold suggests that it is really the *threat* of the experience of shame that motivates behaviour consistent with a person's self-ideal: "Once the self-ideal is formed, once excellence is known and wanted, shame prevents a man from acting contrary to this ideal" (1960b, p. 301).

As might be expected given what we know about the wider context of Arnold's thinking about emotions, she regarded religious emotions to be especially important aspects of human experience. The experience of such emotions is, of course, part of what separates humans from other animals. Given the crucial role that religious values play in the self-ideal as she defines it, there is also a way in which many or even *most* of the emotions a person might experience may be considered religious. But like William James, whose work on religious experience (James, 1902) she mentions in passing when discussing her theory of the brain functions that underlie the experience and expression of emotion (Arnold, 1960b), she was also interested in emotions that are explicitly spiritual or religious in nature. Intriguingly, she finds the emotions most commonly associated with religious experience, that is, the experience of awe, reverence and submission (see 1960b, p. 326), to be the *least* interesting.

Possibly because of her discontent with the way in which Maslow's notion of self-actualisation seemed to rule out the fulfilment of needs at the very top of his pyramid to all but a select few, Arnold was more interested in what might be considered mundane experiences of the divine. For her, the metaphorical experience of God as a "father", "brother", "bridegroom", or "stern judge" is more likely to help a person progress toward his or her self-ideal than mystical experiences of the more numinous or ineffable variety. Although they may be rooted in metaphor, such experiences of God and God's love are "as direct as sense experience" (Arnold, 1960b, p. 327) and can be powerfully transformative, serving as an "urge to action, an action often ranging far and wide, producing prodigious achievements" (p. 327). In the end, according to Arnold, there is no better foundation for one's self-ideal: "As an aid to the establishment of a worth-while self-ideal, and its singleminded pursuit under the most trying circumstances, this love of God has no equal" (p. 327).

THE SELF-IDEAL AND THE MORAL DIMENSION OF APPRAISAL

Our knowledge of emotion has come a long way since Arnold's time, especially in our understanding of how the appraisal process might work, of which appraisals underlie which emotions, and of how appraisals are related to action tendencies and physiological and other bodily responses, among other things. The study of emotion, and psychology more generally, however, has also started to come back around to some of Arnold's concerns, among them, how emotions are related to moral behaviour (see Haidt, 2002, 2003) and the experience of religious emotions (Watts, 1996; Pyysiaeinen, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Arnold's theory of emotion is

interesting in its own right, of course, but because of the way in which it highlights the interrelationships among a person's values, self-ideals, motivations, appraisals, and emotions, it reveals, I believe, two shortcomings of contemporary emotion theory.

First, with a few notable exceptions, I think cognitive emotion theorists have failed to fully appreciate the extent to which emotions and the appraisals on which they depend are inextricably related to a person's value system and self-ideal. Second, related to this and perhaps because of it, I think we have also failed to fully appreciate the ways in which *all* emotions may be said to be "moral" emotions because all appraisals entail value judgments. In other words, emotions serve to maintain a set of standards as to how one should act in the world. These shortcomings have led us, in turn, to a relative neglect of what I would call the moral dimension of appraisal. Because of the relative lack of interest we have shown in values and ideals and the ways in which these may drive the appraisal process, we are in danger, if I may echo the battle cry of the personologists of old, Henry Murray, Gordon Allport and their ilk, of developing a psychology of emotion in which the person has all but disappeared (for a point of reference, see Carlson's, 1971, 1984, critiques of personality and social psychology).

Recognising the importance of the self-ideal

With regard to my first point, to be sure, there are individual researchers and theorists in psychology who consider the ways in which values, moral judgments and self-ideals are involved in the appraisal process, and some of them have used their prominence to ensure that these notions have high visibility in the field. Ellsworth and Scherer (2003), in their summary of appraisal research and theory, for example, emphasise how crucial considerations of identity, values and morals are in understanding appraisal. They note that, "from its origin[,] appraisal theory has recognized the important role of the social context of appraisal, particularly with respect to norms, values, and justice on the one hand and the self and its social identity on the other" (p. 581), and observe that "legitimacy, value relevance . . . [and] compatibility with external standards" have been identified by several theorists as important dimensions of appraisal" (p. 581). They argue further that the self-ideal "is central for the genesis of the so-called self-reflexive emotions" (p. 581).

The late Richard Lazarus (1922–2002), perhaps the most well-known contemporary appraisal theorist, also emphasised the relationship among appraisals, moral values and the self (for a recap of his theory, see Lazarus, 2001). Indeed, because of the important role he assigned self-relevant values and goals in his theory of appraisal, Lazarus may be said to be the true

inheritor of Arnold's project to develop an integrated theory of emotion and personality. The key similarity between Arnold and Lazarus' theories is that both assume that the self is a central organising principle for personality, motivation and emotion. For both Arnold and Lazarus, the emotion/motivation system, from top to bottom, is strongly influenced by a person's self-related values and goals. ("Self-related values and goals" is something of a tautology, as *all* values and goals are self-related, cf. Lazarus, 1991, p. 101, but, because the self-as-organiser is so easily forgotten, the relationship deserves overemphasising.) Lazarus' delineation of several types of ego-involvement and the emotions with which they are associated (see Lazarus, 2001, p. 58), and his notion that such relationships are embodied in what he called "core relational themes" demonstrate the pervasive influence of the self on appraisal and emotion.

Like Arnold, Lazarus was influenced by the work of Victor Frankl (1946/1959) and regarded the person as an agent, "actively searching for meaning ... struggling to create workable and consistent schemata with which to understand who and what one is in the world" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 335). For Lazarus, as for Arnold, this means that individuals strive to create a sense of self that in turn serves to guide their behaviour:

> as individuals struggle to fashion their views of themselves and the world in which they live, they evolve a self-consistent, integrated system of motives, beliefs, and scripts or story lines, which are serviceable in directing their lives and dealing with the conditions of life that are encountered.
>
> (Lazarus, 1991, p. 335)

Lazarus calls this "integrated system" *ego-identity*. Subsumed within one's ego-identity is one's self-ideal.

Echoing Arnold, Lazarus implied that reflective thought is an important determinant of the process by which one comes to use one's emotions to move toward one's goals in life. Lazarus was not as sanguine, however, as Arnold about the dominion of reason over the system and, in fact, recognised a number of ways in which disjunctures among the various goals a person holds may lead to ineffective coping and a kind of emotional disregulation (cf. Lazarus, 1991, p. 337). Like Arnold, he nevertheless held that "harmony" among the components of a person's emotion/motivation system, and hence optimal psychological functioning, may only be brought about by integrating them with one's higher goals in life (see Lazarus, 1991, p. 453).

Not all appraisal theorists see the self-ideal, however defined, as necessary for understanding the appraisal process and few theorists see the self-ideal as having the kind of grand organising role that Arnold and, later, Lazarus postulated for it. Even for Ellsworth and Scherer (2003), the self-ideal is only a part of one of the four appraisal dimensions they propose, and then is only important in some emotions and, apparently, not others. Furthermore,

Ellsworth and Scherer appear to suggest that the self-ideal and the values it embodies are only important insofar as they reflect a person's social context and the ways in which appraisals are always made against the backdrop of norms and values as they are reflected in the behaviour of others. While this is certainly true (cf. Manstead & Fischer, 2001), and refers to processes that Arnold regarded as important sources of emotion (see, for example, her analysis of shame), she might find this view of the self-ideal troublesome in that it does not emphasise enough the active nature of the self-ideal. For her, it is not simply the case that some emotions are occasioned by comparisons between what we have done and what we think we should have done in any one particular situation; rather, *all* of our behaviour is measured by and motivated toward our self-ideal. The self-ideal is prior to social comparison not only temporally but in a teleological sense as well.

Some of the functions associated with what Arnold called the self-ideal are mentioned by various contributors to Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone's (2001) review of appraisal research and theory, but none, apart from Lazarus, define the self-ideal as expansively as she did. Next to Lazarus, the theorist who comes closest to appreciating the role of the self-ideal in appraisal in a manner similar to Arnold is Scherer. The self-ideal, for Scherer (2001), is one component of a series of stimulus evaluation checks by which the person assesses the personal implications of environmental events (see pp. 98–99). Scherer's model nicely captures the multidimensional nature of appraisal and the way in which it may be truly seen as a *process*, but one does not get a sense from the model of how the values that constitute the various stimulus checks within the system might be organised by higher level values and goals, although the potential importance of the self-ideal in this regard is implied in some of the examples he uses to illustrate the relationship between values and appraisals.

Are all emotions moral emotions?

If appraisals—all appraisals—are centrally related, as Arnold would argue, to the values embodied by a person's self-ideal, and hence, reflect what a person believes to be right and wrong, then there is a way in which all emotions are "moral" emotions, in as much as they enact, or simply *are*, a person's moral commitments (cf. Spackman, 2002; Solomon, 1976, makes a similar argument, see especially pp. 195–203.) This is a much broader definition of the so-called moral emotions than that offered by Haidt (2003), who defines the moral emotions in terms of their elicitors and their action tendencies. This broader definition allows us place the locus of moral behaviour and, hence, moral responsibility in the person.

Haidt favours an approach in which emotions are counted as moral to the extent to which they (1) involve what he calls "disinterested elicitors" (Haidt, 2003, p. 853), and (2) are associated with "prosocial action tendencies" (p. 854). The first condition refers to the ways in which, "some emotions are easily triggered by triumphs, tragedies, and transgressions that do not directly touch the self" (p. 853), while the second specifies that the action tendencies associated with moral emotions, "either benefit others or else uphold or benefit the social order" (p. 854). This scheme allows Haidt (2003) to distinguish four families of moral emotions: the *other-condemning emotions* (contempt, anger, disgust), the *self-conscious emotions* (shame, embarrassment, guilt), the *other-suffering emotions* (compassion) and the *other-praising emotions* (gratitude, elevation). Haidt's list has the advantage over the list of moral emotions that Arnold offered (the usual suspects plus remorse, repentance, boredom, suffering, the desire to know, love, doing, mirth, happiness and the experience of the divine), in that he is able to more precisely specify the link between the appraisals and prosocially oriented action tendencies associated with each.

Haidt is correct to emphasise the ways in which certain emotions are elicited by appraisals that include more than just reference to the ways in which an object or event in the world may affect the self. However, I think it is important to include within the definition of moral emotions some reference to the (value) judgments on which they are based. This serves to link the social with the personal (cf. Manstead & Fischer, 2001), as recent research on appraisals about honour (see Fischer, Manstead, & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999) and injustice (see Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998) and their relationship to shame and pride and anger does, and shows why moral violations are taken so personally. As Arnold recognised, our value systems, embodied in our self-ideals, may represent our religion's, social group's or even humanity's highest aspirations, but they are nevertheless *our* individual aspirations. To insist that moral emotions be associated with "disinterested elicitors" also runs the risk of missing how some emotions may be used to uphold certain moral orders precisely because the appraisals on which they rest are entirely personal.

An example of this is offered by Sabini and Silver (1982), in their analysis of the moral judgments that underlie anger. They describe how Sabini, while a graduate student, bullied a young woman to give up her seat to him on a bus "in the name of science", and how his behaviour served to incite a fifty-something-year-old man to a fit of rage. Sabini had done nothing personal to the man and it was obvious that the man and woman were complete strangers. Nevertheless, Sabini's behaviour toward the young woman had violated the man's sense of how to treat others properly. The incident ended with the man screaming, " 'Some day somebody could kill you for that!'" (p. 163), and jerking Sabini out of the seat he had appropriated from the

young woman. One could certainly say, along with Haidt, that the man's reaction involved a perception of injustice that *could* have been "disinterested", but it was not. The man took what happened to the woman personally and being in high dudgeon revealed his moral evaluation of Sabini's boorishness. We would have to know much more about the man to understand the particulars of his reaction but my point is that he reacted to something that happened to someone else as if it had happened to him (cf. Aristotle's definition of anger in *The Rhetoric*, Book II, Chapter 2). Thus, his moral evaluation of the situation was a *personal* evaluation.

The assertion that all emotions are moral emotions in some sense because the appraisals on which they are based reflect what a person considers to be right or wrong has important implications for how we understand emotions and go about studying them. Two questions in particular present themselves.[6] First, if we were to acknowledge that all emotions have a moral component, how might our understanding of what constitutes a "basic" emotion change? The question of what counts as a basic emotion is a contentious one; how one defines what is "basic" about basic emotions very much depends on what functions one assigns emotions, and different theorists emphasise different functions (Ortony & Turner, 1990; see also Cornelius, 1996). Privileging the moral dimension of appraisal might suggest that we take a much more ideographic approach to the question: A basic emotion for a person is one that arises from his or her most important values as determined, following Arnold, by his or her self-ideal. Hence, different people will have different constellations of basic emotions. By this account, what is considered a basic emotion will also be determined, to some extent, by the social, historical, religious and political contexts of a person's life. Ellison's (1999) analysis of the representation of public expressions of grief and other "tender" emotions by men demonstrates that what are considered to be emotions or sentiments basic to men are subject to historical change. Shields (2002) likewise shows that the basic emotional characteristics associated with femininity and masculinity, what she calls "emotion master stereotypes", are historically contingent, social/political constructions that serve to reproduce and maintain gendered asymmetries in power.

A second question concerns how to study emotions. Specifically, how might research on emotion change if we were to acknowledge that the appraisals associated with all emotions have a moral dimension? For one, taking fear as an example, we might begin asking what larger individual and social functions are served by the emotion and the actions with which it is associated as these are implied by the moral evaluation of the feared object (cf. Armon-Jones, 1986; Cornelius, 1996). Clinicians since Freud routinely

[6] I thank Arvid Kappas for suggesting I consider these questions.

consider the secondary functions of emotions such as fear and the ways in which fear might be related, for example, to a person's moral reputation. Fear may indeed be a signal that one is in a potentially dangerous situation, and may help prepare one to deal with the situation, but it may also serve to steer one clear of morally suspect situations or indicate that one has transgressed an important moral boundary (cf. Haidt and colleagues' analysis of disgust as a response to sociomoral rule violations in Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; see also Douglas, 1966; Miller, 1997). According to Lutz (1983), the fear-like emotion the people of the South Pacific atoll of Ifaluk call *metagu*, which occurs in situations that threaten the core social values—obedience, co-operation, nonaggression—of their society, does just this. Lutz's analysis of *metagu* also makes clear that the emotion is recognised as something that children *should* experience and as something the development of which requires the socialising intervention of adults because it contributes to the smooth functioning and cohesion of the group.

Further, as Lutz's analysis of *metagu* reveals, recognising the moral dimension of appraisal allows us to consider the ways in which the individual experience of particular emotions may contribute to the maintenance of the social/moral order of a society. An extended and complex example of this may be found in Delumeau's (1990) examination of how the clergy in Western Europe used the fear of damnation as a form of social control in the 13th through the 18th centuries.[7] What is interesting about Delumeau's account is that it demonstrates how control of the moral order may be achieved by transforming the appraisals associated with fear into moral judgments. Delumeau shows how this very personal emotion was used to reinforce the power of the clergy over broad aspects of the daily life of an entire society. Although her focus is not explicitly on the moral dimension of emotions, Shields' (2002) analysis of gender and emotion convincingly demonstrates the pivotal role played by emotion in creating and maintaining traditional gender ideologies and what are considered authentic and appropriate emotional displays for women and men. Other examples of the role of emotions in constructing and upholding particular social/moral arraignments may be found in Ellison (1999) and Moldoveanu and Nohria (2002).

MAGDA ARNOLD'S PLACE IN HISTORY

Magda Arnold's place in the history of cognitive approaches to the study of emotion is secure. The field cannot ignore her paradigm-shifting

[7] For an example of this in American history, see Jonathan Edwards' 1741 sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" (Edwards, 1992).

contributions to our understanding of the nature of the appraisal process. I argue here, however, that she should be remembered as more than just the "founding mother of appraisal theory". While contemporary students of emotion might be hesitant to adopt her Thomistic theory of emotion wholesale, I believe that the study of the appraisal–emotion relationship could only be enriched by a consideration of the ways in which the appraisals a person makes are related to the person's hierarchy of values as reflected in the self-ideal. Following Arnold, if we do not know what persons value, we are not likely to understand why they appraise objects and events the way they do and, hence, why they are emotional in any particular situation.

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