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In Quest of Kerygma: Catholic Intellectual Life in Nineteenth-Century France

HARRY W. PAUL

Pécuchet s'en retourna mélancolique. Il avait espéré l'accord de la foi et de la raison. Bouvard lui fit lire ce passage de Louis Hervieu: "Pour connaître l'abîme qui les sépare, opposez leurs axiomes: . . . La raison vous dit: Trois c'est trois, et la foi déclare que: Trois c'est un."¹

Catholic intellectual life in nineteenth-century France? Was there anything that is now worth discussing? Most of the current texts depict the mediocrity of French Catholic thought, especially in clerical ranks, throughout the greater part of the century, or at least until 1875-1914, the period of the "intellectual renaissance of Catholicism and the modernist crisis." It would be reasonable to conclude from much of the historical writing about this topic that a suitable paradigm of French Catholic thought was given by Paul Verlaine's poem *Acte de foi* ("Le seul savant c'est encore Moïse!") or by the Abbé Jueffroy's admonition to Bouvard concerning the Trinity ("Adorons sans comprendre"). D. G. Charlton, in his fine study of "secular religions" in France in the nineteenth century, delivered the judgment that Catholic response to the intellectual challenges of the century "was less an attempt at reasoned argument than ecclesiastical repression and bitter abuse at the level of journalists such as Veuillot."² No one has been more critical than the liberal Catholics, chagrined by memories of *Pio Nono* and Louis Veuillot. Adrien Dansette has given a classic caricature: the philosophers did not know Immanuel Kant or his successors; theology was a series of theses supported by unexplained scriptural fragments, linked by tenuous rationalistic arguments; Scripture was little studied except for didactic or polemical tradition-serving purposes; ecclesiastical history was only apology; Christian art, like natural science, was unknown. The Catholic intelligentsia, especially those in the clergy, he argues, did not concern themselves with Positivism or the growth of the "new sciences" such as philology, archaeology, and paleontology, which put much of the Scriptures in doubt. Even the clerical elite did not take full cognizance of the difficulties until after the creation of the Catholic Institutes in the 1870's.³ This

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¹ Gustave Flaubert, *Bouvard et Pécuchet* (Paris, 1959), 336.

² D. G. Charlton, *Secular Religions in France (1815-1870)* (Oxford, Eng., 1963), 23.

³ Adrien Dansette, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine* (2 vols., Paris, 1951), II, 21-24, 439-40.

dismal picture is reproduced in a well-known textbook: "Intellectually speaking, French Catholicism during most of the nineteenth century had been remarkably sterile; there had been some remarkable pioneer ventures into the sphere of social action but little in the realm of thought."⁴ I shall attempt in this article to show the weakness of these opinions, for which recent scholarship gives little support. Writing in 1890, Paul Janet declared, "One of the chief facts of the history of our century has been the reappearance of Christianity or rather Catholicism in the *monde supérieur* of philosophy and of thought."⁵ Concentrating chiefly on the periods of the July Monarchy (1830–1848), the Second Republic, and the Second Empire (1848–1870), although some preliminary consideration of the Restoration is unavoidable, this article will generally sustain the judgment of Janet.

In recent years the historical picture of the Restoration has been retouched to such an extent that it is hardly recognizable as the modern dark age that admirers of the Revolution were prone to depict in historical manuals. The classic rehabilitation of the Restoration is that of Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny: France was never better or more honestly administered; its finances were never better managed; the country received its initiation into parliamentary government; the pre-industrial economy reached its ultimate perfection; and France regained its leadership in science as well as in arts and letters.⁶ Peace, foreign contact, and freedom of expression led to an intellectual blossoming unmatched since the Enlightenment.⁷ It was also the time in secondary education when the university monopoly was broken and when a clerical structure was established. Less pleasant was the purge of anticlericals from the university under Bishop Denys de Frayssinous; Church personnel controlled about a third of the positions in the university by the end of the Restoration.⁸ Thus began the struggle for the control of education that played so large a role in France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The intellectual activity of the Restoration has also been subjected to critical re-evaluation, although it is still difficult for many liberal intellectuals to grant that the thought of those who were ferocious in their opposition to the Revolution has any enduring value. Since Joseph de Maistre, the Vicomte de Bonald, René de Chateaubriand, and Félicité de Lamennais (1782–1854), who is really of a new generation, establish positions that their contemporaries and successors modify or

⁴ Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times* (Chicago, 1960), 375–76. Similarly, Edward R. Tanenbaum concluded "that the nineteenth-century French clergy was almost hopelessly benighted." (Review of René Rémond, *Les deux Congrès ecclésiastiques de Reims et de Bourges, 1896–1900: Un témoignage sur l'Église de France* [Paris, 1964], and Christianne Marcilhacy, *Le diocèse d'Orléans au milieu du XIX^e siècle: Les hommes et leurs mentalités* [Paris, 1964], *American Historical Review*, LXXI [Oct. 1965], 209.) For a slightly more favorable judgment, see Joseph N. Moody, "French Liberal Catholics, 1840–1875," in *French Culture and Society since the Old Regime*, ed. Evelyn Acomb and Marvin Brown (New York, 1964), 163, 171.

⁵ Paul Janet, "La philosophie catholique en France au XIX^e siècle," *Revue des deux mondes*, XCVIII (3^e période, 1890), 391.

⁶ Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *La restauration* (Paris, 1955; new ed., 1963). Of course, France never had to regain leadership in some areas, particularly science.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Chap. v.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

reject, it is difficult to avoid considering the main thrust of their thought before looking at the intellectual activity of the succeeding generation. With the generation of Chateaubriand (1768–1848), about a half generation after Maistre (1753–1821) and Bonald (1754–1840), stands the antitraditionalist philosopher and Restoration politician Maine de Biran (1766–1824). Like the Prince de Talleyrand and Joseph Fouché, Maine de Biran served a variety of regimes: he was administrator of the Dordogne, 1795–1797; a member of the *Conseil des cinq-cents*, 1797–1798; *sous-préfet* of Bergerac, 1806–1812; a deputy and quaestor of the Chamber in the Restoration. A moderate, he voted with the liberals until 1817, but then shifted Right to defend royal power against anarchy and despotism. “Like Joseph de Maistre and . . . Bonald, like Benjamin Constant and Saint-Simon, like Charles Dunoyer and Auguste Comte, Maine de Biran grapples as a philosopher with the political problem of the ‘restoration.’”⁹ It can be plausibly argued that Biran provided a philosophical underpinning for French religious thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although this influence was not evident until later in the nineteenth century.¹⁰

Biran, “the greatest French metaphysician since Descartes and Malebranche,”¹¹ modified his early analytic empiricism to admit that one’s internal experience of voluntary movement of body is an important source of knowledge. Biran’s axiomatic “Je veux, donc je suis,” placing him within Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve’s family of *méditatifs intérieurs*¹² (Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, Blaise Pascal, René Descartes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and others), gave post-Enlightenment French psychology a new antisensationalist orientation and established a new metaphysic of man, which, like Henri Bergson’s, later, followed Augustine’s “Intravi in intima mea. . . .” His *Fragments relatifs aux fondements de la morale et de la religion* (Paris, 1818) justified belief in the soul and in God on the basis of man’s natural propensity for the Absolute. As Emmanuel Mounier saw, Biran was his precursor in developing a mystical personalism hostile to philosophical systems and absolute rationalism.¹³ Although he denounced the rejection of

⁹ Henri Gouhier, “Introduction,” *Œuvres choisies de Maine de Biran* (Paris, 1942), 11.

¹⁰ Roger Daval, *Histoire des idées en France* (Paris, 1965), 75. Biran wrote much and published little. One of his chief editors was Victor Cousin, who brought out some of his work in 1838 and 1841. For details, see Gouhier, “Introduction,” *Œuvres choisies*.

¹¹ Louis Foucher, *La philosophie catholique en France au XIX^e siècle avant la renaissance thomiste et dans son rapport avec elle* (Paris, 1955), attributes a similar statement to Cousin. Henri Gouhier, “Maine de Biran et Bergson,” *Les études bergsoniennes* (Paris, 1948), I, 145, gives Henri Bergson as the source of the remark.

¹² See Philip P. Hallie, “Hume, Biran and the *méditatifs intérieurs*,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XVIII (No. 3, 1957), 295–312. This tradition, emphasizing the claim that an authentic insight into reality derives from internal experience, is found in Félix Ravaisson-Mollien, Jules Lachelier, and Charles Renouvier in the nineteenth century and in Bergson, Gabriel Marcel, and Jean-Paul Sartre in the twentieth century.

¹³ “Ce qui fait la valeur . . . de sa philosophie, c’est qu’elle se confond avec sa vie intérieure. . . . Son plus beau livre . . . c’est sa vie: les autres ne sont que des jalons qui marquent des étapes.” (*Vie Catholique*, Sept. 3, 1927, quoted in Candide Moix, *La pensée d’Emmanuel Mounier* [Paris, 1960], 53.) For Biran, reason did not lead to God: “Dieu est objet d’expérience intérieure . . . ; l’expérience de Dieu est une expérience mystique.” (Geneviève Barbillion, *De l’idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de Maine de Biran* [Grenoble, 1927], Chaps. iv, v.)

philosophy by Bonald ("histrion de la philosophie"), Biran did not think that philosophy gave complete answers to all questions. His *Nouvelles considérations sur les rapports du physique et du morale* (Paris, 1818) showed that "Christianity alone embraces the whole man."

The seminal influence of Biran in French philosophy, especially his establishment of the "most original and profound" elements of nineteenth-century religious philosophy, is widely recognized.¹⁴ But it is debatable whether, as the modern clerical scholar Louis Foucher claims, Biran clearly put to the nineteenth century the orthodox principle of a Catholic philosophy. This claim could be made equally for several varieties of Protestantism; as Lucien Laberthonnière pointed out to Maurice Blondel in 1894, Biran clearly had the idea of a Christian philosophy. But Janet thought that Biran "gave France a philosophy of the mind . . . not a religious philosophy."¹⁵ It is clear that Biran himself finally returned to the Catholic Church in order to experience the presence of Christ. Thus the last thought of Biran, showing the clearly Christian philosopher, is not in his written work but in the last sacrament, taken from Bishop Frayssinous: "L'heure d'écrire est passée."¹⁶

More tangible and immediate was the influence of Chateaubriand, whose real target was, Janet argued, Voltaire, who had made unbelief fashionable. In bringing about the triumph of the idea of the poetry of Christianity, "Chateaubriand conquered Voltaire." Janet thought that the great influence of Chateaubriand and his school could be seen by comparing the attitude of the Marquis de Condorcet with that of Comte on Catholicism, one of the few issues on which they differed. The historically based "apology" of Comte for Catholicism is incomprehensible except in the light of the previous apology of Chateaubriand.¹⁷ A revolution had taken place in the attitude of a part of the intellectual world toward religion. Chateaubriand reinforced the influence of Rousseau, whose *sensibilité chrétienne*, in spite of his hostility toward established religion, had great influence in the early nineteenth century in favor of Catholicism.¹⁸ The pragmatic aspect of Chateaubriand's apology, emphasizing the social value of religion

¹⁴ Philip P. Hallie, *Maine de Biran: Reformer of Empiricism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 196-97. The influence of Biran on Bergson was indirect, through Ravaisson. Bergson went from *bergsonisme* to *biranisme*. Although both based their metaphysics on psychology, they are different types of religious thinkers. (Gouhier, *Études bergsoniennes*, I, 131-73; see also Michelangelo Ghio, *Maine de Biran e la tradizione biraniana in Francia* [2d ed., Turin, 1962].)

¹⁵ Maurice Blondel and Lucien Laberthonnière, *Correspondance philosophique*, ed. Claude Tresmontant (Paris, 1961), 84; Paul Janet, "Le spiritualisme français au dix-neuvième siècle," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXV (2^e période, 1868), 370. Msgr. A. de la Valette Montbrun, *Maine de Biran critique et disciple de Pascal* (Paris, 1914), 287, noted that his "journal intime" hardly ever spoke of Catholic dogma and argued that he could not be regarded as a true Catholic.

¹⁶ See Henri Gouhier, *Les conversions de Maine de Biran* (Paris, 1948), esp. Chap. VII; see also Gerhard Funke, *Maine de Biran: Philosophisches und politisches Denken zwischen Ancien Régime und Bürgerkönigtum in Frankreich* (Bonn, 1947), 257-70.

¹⁷ Janet, "Philosophie catholique en France," 391-423.

¹⁸ Of course, those influenced like Pierre Ballanche and Joubert recognized the "deficiencies" of Rousseau from a Catholic viewpoint. P.-M. Masson, *La religion de J.-J. Rousseau* (3 vols., Paris, 1916), III, 224-25, emphasized these deficiencies. In his criticism of Masson, Albert Schinz, *La pensée religieuse de J.-J. Rousseau et ses récents interprètes* (Paris, 1928), is misleading because he does not emphasize the ambivalent attitude of Catholics toward Rousseau.

("il faut une religion ou la société périt," he concluded in his *Essai historique sur les révolutions anciennes et modernes*), linked him to the traditionalism of Bonald and Maistre. Although disagreeing with Bonald's philosophy, he supported the idea of finding intellectual security in tradition as interpreted by the religious authorities, rather than in Cartesian doubt.

The untenable idea that Bonald, Maistre, and Lamennais were the trinity of an ill-defined traditionalist philosophy is still current.¹⁹ Although Maistre appealed to the general consent as a criterion of truth, he was too much influenced by eighteenth-century rationalism to fail to see that traditionalism could easily lead to skepticism, thus sapping the foundations of faith. Maistre's warning to Lamennais after the appearance of the second volume of the *Essai sur l'indifférence* (Paris, 1820) showed his disagreement with Lamennais's variety of traditionalism. Richard Lebrun's recent work has shown how the liberal clichés about Maistre are either wrong or hopelessly misleading.²⁰ Few writers seem to realize that Maistre was not an orthodox Catholic apologist. In his reaction against the practical atheism of the eighteenth century, Maistre sometimes lapsed into an occasionalism close to that of the seventeenth-century Catholic philosopher Nicolas Malebranche. He knew little about Scholasticism and was deficient in Catholic theology and philosophy. Anti-Lockean, he claimed to hold a modified Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas: God had made certain simple notions innate in man. "In all this, he seems to approach much nearer to the 'ethical theology' of Rousseau and Kant than to orthodox Catholic ideas."²¹ Although "Maistre's ferocious contempt for the Enlightenment hides similarities as much as it reveals differences,"²² his use of Cartesian *innéisme* against the empirical exaggerations of Francis Bacon and John Locke placed him in opposition to the leading philosophes, just as his espousal of Christianity placed him in the forefront of the religious revival of the early nineteenth century.

In a lecture given at Chambéry in 1956, Gilbert Durand drew a philosophic portrait of Maistre, which, in spite of its existentialist outlook, is one of the most penetrating short analyses of Maistre's thought. Durand argues that the hermeneutic Martinist formation of the young Masonic Maistre gave his philosophy the same accents as meditation of Scripture and esoteric traditions gave the great German Romantics. Maistre's analogical thought is the daughter of Martinist symbolism. But Durand voices an existentialist regret that Maistre's thought be-

¹⁹ See, e.g., Charlton, *Secular Religions*, 10–11; and Roland N. Stromberg, *An Intellectual History of Modern Europe* (New York, 1966), 225–29. Although Stromberg recognizes the sociological content of traditionalist theory, he says nothing about traditionalism qua philosophy.

²⁰ Richard Lebrun, *Throne and Altar: The Political and Religious Thought of Joseph de Maistre* (Ottawa, 1965), 41–44, and the forthcoming "Joseph de Maistre, Cassandra of Science," *French Historical Studies*, VI (No. 2, 1969). Lamennais, "the herald of traditionalism," also differed in many respects from Bonald. (Alex R. Vidler, *Prophecy and Papacy: A Study of Lamennais, the Church and the Revolution* [New York, 1954], 78.)

²¹ Jack Lively, *The Works of Joseph de Maistre* (New York, 1965), 19. For a regurgitation of the "liberal clichés" about Maistre, see Peter Gay's review of *ibid.*, *New York Times*, Mar. 14, 1965.

²² Lively, *Works of Joseph de Maistre*, 45.

came contaminated through "la fabulation historique" in the attempt to base its realism and archetypes on history. As Durand sees, of course, the philosophical thought of Maistre was secondary to his political work, which was concerned with the problems posed by the breakup of European unity and by the task of defining liberty after the revolutionary-Napoleonic holocaust. Maistre's philosophy, his political positivism, and his sociological pluralism influenced the Comte de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Charles Baudelaire, Maurice Barrès, and Charles Maurras. Both Baudelaire ("De Maistre et Edgar Poe m'appriis à raisonner") and Comte ("Condorcet dut être, pour moi, complété par de Maistre, dont je m'appropriai tous les principes essentiels") testified to the strong influence of Maistre on their thought.²³

Like Maistre, Bonald defended revealed religion as the foundation of society and Christianity as the organ of true civilization. Bonald's traditionalist sociology, which had a profound effect on French sociology from Comte to Émile Durkheim, had its foundation in his philosophy of being and of man and especially in his epistemology.²⁴ Bonald attributed language to divine revelation. Since language is necessary for thought, man could not have invented it. "Bonald's system is a synthesis of Malebranche, who teaches him the universality and necessity of ideas, and Condillac, who makes language a necessary condition of the act of intelligence."²⁵ In spite of the retention of a certain *innéisme*, Bonald substituted the evidence of authority, divine in its origin and social in its transmission, for the authority of individual and human evidence.²⁶ But far from providing a philosophical substitute for the Catholic Cartesianism prevalent in clerical circles, Bonald's system became the incubus of orthodoxy because of the confusion it injected into the idea of revelation as a result of his mingling the natural and the

²³ See Gilbert Durand, "Portrait philosophique de Joseph de Maistre," *Cahiers d'histoire*, I (No. 1, 1956), 289-302; see also Mary Alphonsus, *The Influence of Joseph de Maistre on Baudelaire* (Bryn Mawr, Pa., 1943); E. M. Cioran, *Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1957); and Francis Bayle, *Les idées politiques de Joseph de Maistre* (Paris, 1945). Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, tr. Anthony Bower (New York, 1954), 162-64, makes an interesting structural analogy between Maistre's aim of the universal Christian city and the messianic formulas of Hegel and Marx. The latest and probably best study of Maistre is Robert Triomphe, *Joseph de Maistre: Étude sur la vie et sur la doctrine d'un matérialiste mystique* (Geneva, 1967).

²⁴ For a study of the rationalistic structure of Bonald's sociological traditionalism and its influence down to Maurras, see Robert Spaemann, *Der Ursprung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der Restauration: Studien über L.G.A. Bonald* (Munich, 1961). Bonald's contribution to social thought and his connection with social pluralism are shown by Robert A. Nisbet, "De Bonald and the Concept of the Social Group," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, V (No. 3, 1944), 315-31. By contrast, Lamennais was, it can be maintained, more social prophet than pioneer sociologist. (See J.E.S. Hayward, "Lamennais and the Religion of Social Consensus," *Archives de sociologie des religions* [No. 21, 1966], 37-46.) But François Brousse, *Lamennais et le christianisme universel* (Paris, 1963), 108-109, argues that Lamennais was a powerful precursor of Durkheim and sees the "raison universelle" of Lamennais as at least a functional equivalent of Durkheim's "mentalité collective." "Both also regard religious feeling as the essential and primordial feeling of the human race. . . ."

²⁵ Émile Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie* (2 vols., Paris, 1957), II, 589; for the internal contradictions of Bonald's system, see *ibid.*, 589-90.

²⁶ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 25. This work is an essential supplement to Félix Ravaisson's *La philosophie en France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1867), which gave little importance to Catholic philosophy. For a general treatment of relationships between nineteenth-century philosophers and Christianity, see A.-D. Sertillanges, *Le christianisme et les philosophes* (2 vols., Paris, 1941), II.

supernatural. The stages of primitive, Mosaic, and Christian revelation accepted by orthodoxy were effaced, moreover, by the primacy of the original revelation. This danger became plain in Lamennais's *Esquisse* (1840): the truths necessary for salvation exist in ancient traditions.²⁷ It is not surprising that the forces of Roman orthodoxy condemned traditionalism twice in the nineteenth century and rejected the twentieth-century politicized version advocated by *Action Française*.

Victor Hugo apotheosized Lamennais: "Il éclaire comme Pascal, il brûle comme Rousseau, il foudroie comme Bossuet." Hailed as the new Bossuet, Lamennais wanted to emulate Malebranche, an ambition he never achieved.²⁸ But he did attempt in Volumes II, III, and IV of the *Essai* (Paris, 1820–23) and in the *Défense de l'Essai* (Paris, 1821) to develop a new Christian philosophy based on a theory of certitude whose first principle was "what all men believe to be true is true," thus making the authority of general reason, founded on divine authority, the arbiter of truth. Lamennais accepted uncritically much of eighteenth-century sensationalist philosophy and most of Bonald's psychology, especially the traditionalist idea that knowledge of essential truths is innate in society. This anti-Cartesian psychology made revelation a general law of the human mind. It also explicitly denied certain eighteenth-century ideas still powerful in the 1820's. To oppose antiquity to Christianity was no longer possible because the valuable part of ancient thought contained the truths of primitive revelation; reason could not be opposed to Christianity because true reason is general reason, characterized by unity and perpetuity, and by universality, a distinguishing characteristic of Christianity.²⁹

The double danger of these ideas to Catholic orthodoxy was similar to the threat of Bonald's thought. The autonomy of the individual conscience in religious belief was abandoned, although Lamennais's career was to show that this was perhaps more theoretical than practical. Christianity was naturalized by the mingling of supernatural truths with those derived from general reason. There is some ground for arguing that Lamennais's religious evolution put him in a position not entirely different from that of the believer in natural religion. When

²⁷ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 25–26.

²⁸ On Hugo and Lamennais, see Christian Maréchal, *Lamennais et Victor Hugo* (Paris, 1906), and "Victor Hugo mennaisien," *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, XIII (1906), 499–500. Lamennais's philosophy presents the same problem to critics as that of Thomas Aquinas: "La philosophie de Lamennais reste en somme celle d'un théologien, de caractère assez technique et parfois artificiel" was the harsh judgment of Bréhier (*Histoire de la philosophie*, II, 597). But Paul Janet, *La philosophie de Lamennais* (Paris, 1890), 101, praised Lamennais's *Esquisse d'une philosophie* as "la seule synthèse générale tentée au dix-neuvième siècle par un philosophe français," although he admitted it was not a work of first rank.

²⁹ See Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, Chap. II. An exposure of the logical weakness of Lamennais's argument is stated convincingly by Brousse, *Lamennais et le christianisme universel*, 35–36: "S'il établit, comme le fait Lamennais, que la raison individuelle doit se conformer à la raison humaine, il établit cela par la raison individuelle. . . . C'est une contradiction interne très grave, capable de faire écrouler toute l'architecture des raisonnements mennaisiens." See Norbert Hötzel, *Die Uroffenbarung im französischen Traditionalismus* (Munich, 1962), who deals with the roles of Maistre, Bonald, Lamennais, Louis Bautain, Augustin Bonnetty, Henri Maret, and Marie-Ange Chastel in this quarrel and carries the issue to Vatican I.

Gregory XVI's *Singulari nos* (1834) referred to a "fallacious system of philosophy," it meant the Mennaisian philosophy of *sensus communis*.³⁰

The encyclicals of Pope Gregory emasculated the embryonic movement for political liberty making headway among the clergy. But the vague formulas of *Singulari nos* hardly affected the diffusion of Mennaisian philosophy and theology. In 1830–1831 Lamennais gave a course to his epigoni in Paris and to the Order of St. Peter at La Chesnaie, in which he made a more rational effort than he had made before to solve the traditional problems of philosophy. Although he used F. Gottlob Born's dubious late eighteenth-century Latin translation of the critical works of Kant, as did Victor Cousin at the beginning of his teaching, Lamennais made the expected criticism of Kantian psychology, founded on abstract reason, but praised Kant's rejection of the exclusively analytical character of the Abbé de Condillac and David Hume.³¹ A modern student of Lamennais, Christian Maréchal, has viewed these lectures as a stage in Lamennais's evolution marking the transition between the *Essai sur l'indifférence* and the *Esquisse*. But Foucher has replied that the *Esquisse* was not the end of an evolution but a revolution in Lamennais's thought because, among other things, the *Esquisse* recognized that individual reason, having a capacity for truth, provides a basis for philosophy. But this change of opinion seemed to have had little effect on the survival of the authoritarian and somewhat Tertullian conception of Christianity that prevailed among Lamennais's followers. Descartes remained their *bête noire*.

Jean-René Derré has recently given a penetrating analysis of the pervading influence of Lamennais in the intellectual life of France and the intellectual relationship of the Mennaisians to Catholicism outside France.³² In spite of their

³⁰ For an attempt to cast doubt on the contention that Lamennais's philosophy was not condemned by *Singulari nos*, see Louis Le Guillou, *L'évolution de la pensée religieuse de Félicité Lamennais* (Paris, 1966), 196–98, which also has appended some unpublished material, the most important being the "Correspondance inédite Lamennais-Ventura," 440–73. The interpretation of Mennaisianism as traditionalism was challenged by Maréchal in his works on Lamennais, who was, he claimed, a Christian rationalist like Aquinas and Descartes, who derived their philosophy from their faith. For a substantial refutation of this idea, see Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 42–47. Foucher saw continuity between the *Essai* and the *Esquisse*, whereas Maréchal thinks the *Esquisse* was a denial of the *Essai* because of the unrestricted development of Lamennais's rationalism once he left the Church. (See Christian Maréchal, *Lamennais: La dispute de l' 'Essai sur l'indifférence' d'après les documents nouveaux et inédits* [Paris, 1925].)

³¹ These lectures were not formally published until Maréchal's edition as *Lamennais: Essai d'un système de philosophie catholique (1830–1831)* (Paris, 1906). In the opinion of the Catholic scientist and philosopher, A.-M. Ampère, the exposés of Kantian thought in early nineteenth-century France were inferior. He was one of the few who knew Kant's thought well, at least well enough to criticize Maine de Biran's misrepresentation of Kant. On Kant in France, see Louis Foucher, "Sur la première traduction française de la 'Critique de la raison pure,'" *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, CXLI (1951), 85–91; Pierre Deguise, *Benjamin Constant méconnu: Le livre "De la religion"* (Paris, 1966), esp. 82–86; and François Picavet, *La philosophie de Kant en France, de 1773 à 1814, introduction à une nouvelle traduction de la "Critique de la raison pratique"* (Paris, 1888).

³² Jean-René Derré, *Lamennais: Ses amis et le mouvement des idées à l'époque romantique, 1824–1834* (Paris, 1962). For the recent deluge of studies on Lamennais, see the bibliographies of Derré (*ibid.*) and Le Guillou (*Évolution de la pensée religieuse de Félicité Lamennais*). Considerable attention is being given to the impact of Lamennais outside France; see, e.g., Derré, *Lamennais*; Angiolo Gambaro, *Sulle orme del Lamennais in Italia* (Turin, 1958–); Kurt Jürgensen, *Lamennais und die Gestaltung des belgischen Staates; der liberale Katholizismus in der Verfassungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 1963); and W. H. Roc, *Lamennais and England* (Oxford, Eng., 1967).

generally ignoring ethics and scriptural research, the Mennaisians and their associates attempted to create a new humanism based on the explosive combination of dogma and intelligence. A vast quarry of evidence, partially sifted by Derré, exists in the leading Catholic periodicals of the era: *Le Mémorial*, *Le Catholique*, *La Revue européenne*, and especially the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*.

Occupying a rather important niche in early nineteenth-century Catholic erudition was the Danish-born Ferdinand d'Eckstein (1790–1861). An active contributor to papers like the ultraroyalist *Drapeau blanc* and an active minor figure in the power structure of the Restoration, he began as commissioner of police in Marseilles in 1815, became inspector in the ministry in 1818, and then moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1830. The aim of the heavily Germanic periodical *Le Catholique* (1826–29) of “Baron sanscrit” was “to give science an active role in life” through his treatment of “the universality of knowledge in its relationship with the unity of doctrine.” Eckstein was a relentless critic of Benjamin Constant, *bête noire* of the Right, defender of freedom of the press and of liberty, and theoretician of constitutional government in France from the Restoration to 1848, especially in his *De la religion, considérée dans sa source, ses formes et ses développements*, whose appearance in five volumes between 1824 and 1831 made him the great theoretician of religious feeling. Eckstein attacked this little-read work after an analysis of Constant’s sources that showed, the critic unjustly concluded, Constant’s work to be a pastiche of the research of German philologists and students of antiquity, especially Moritz Heyne, Karl Friedrich Hermann, and Johann Heinrich Voss, along with badly assimilated recollections of the author on the great philologist Georg Friedrich Creuzer and journalist, scholar, and mystic Joseph von Görres. This was the French version of the German controversy between Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Catholic faculty at Tübingen. Eckstein attacked the startling explanation in the *Globe* in 1825 of “Comment les dogmes finissent” by Théodore Jouffroy, who taught philosophy at the Collège Bourbon and the Normale between 1817 and 1822, the Normale and the Sorbonne after 1828, and then the Collège de France, and became a deputy in 1831. Eckstein even chided Lamennais for his lack of philological knowledge, vital for progress in history, theology, philosophy, and so forth. Derré has argued that the Baron was the direct precursor of Ernest Renan in philology and equally important for showing the importance of *orientalisme* to Catholic thinkers.³³ Rejecting the Mennaisian attack on reason, Eckstein emphasized, with

³³ See Nicolas Burtin, *Un semeur d'idées au temps de la restauration: Le baron d'Eckstein* (Paris, 1931), especially for an analysis of the ideas of *Le Catholique*. Raymond Schwab, *La renaissance orientale* (Paris, 1950), 277–94, established Eckstein’s role in the revival of Eastern studies. On Constant and religion, see Deguise, *Benjamin Constant méconnu*; and Paul Bastid, *Benjamin Constant et sa doctrine* (2 vols., Paris, 1966), II, 588–699. Bastid is myopic in seeing little in this polemic for the history of ideas and in concluding that Constant’s religious works added nothing to his glory. For a summary of the debate over Constant’s religion and the conclusion that his “christianisme reste sans révélation historique et sans Christ,” see Deguise, *Benjamin Constant méconnu*, 226–31, which, along with Chap. II of Pt. 4, also has a defense of Constant’s “independence with regard to the German historians.”

considerable originality, the importance of evangelizing knowledge in a deeply secular society, an idea that was taken up in *Avenir* and finally triumphed in the Catholic action movement under Pius XI.

As Derré discovered, *Le Mémorial catholique*, founded in 1824 by Louis-Antoine de Salinis, later bishop of Amiens and archbishop of Auch, and Philippe Gerbet, the best theologian of the group and later bishop of Perpignan, excelled in the clash of ideas characteristic of the epoch in its quest for a modern apologetic and a more human theology, both resulting from involvement in the intellectual currents of the day in religion, philosophy, and literature. "Pour agir sur le siècle, il faut l'avoir compris." Gerbet could find a word of praise for Cousin's opposition to materialism. Jean-Philibert Damiron's simplistic classification of the Mennaisians as the partisans of tradition against the eclectic partisans of observation was demolished in *Le Mémorial*.³⁴ In 1829 a *Revue catholique* was added to the periodical (*Mémorial et revue catholique*) to take up the work done by Eckstein's journal, which had ceased publication. The new review aimed at coverage of discoveries relevant to religion in all areas of human knowledge. Editorial opinion was that since the struggle against Cartesianism and Gallicanism had been won, with Mennaisian philosophical and theological doctrines firmly established, the historically oriented tradition of Eckstein could be profitably pursued.

The same dynamic Catholicism was evident in *Le Correspondant*, founded in 1829, edited by the first group called liberal Catholics (Edmond de Cazalès, Franz de Champagny, J.-B. Claude de Riambourg, Théodore Foisset, Louis de Carné, and, for a while, Montalembert). Attacking Jouffroy's idea that dogma was an exhausted religious form, they insisted on the capability of dogma to inspire new solutions in philosophy and politics, a position to some degree anticipatory of Édouard Le Roy's later pragmatic justification of dogma in the Third Republic.³⁵ The ideas of this group show that it is false to picture all Catholic intellectuals of the period flogging the supposedly dead horses of Voltairism and eighteenth-century materialism,³⁶ dangers the editors believed to be overcome by the new *spiritualisme* of Maine de Biran, by eclecticism, and by Edgar Quinet's popular

³⁴ Jean-Philibert Damiron, *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1828).

³⁵ Édouard Le Roy, *Qu'est-ce un dogme?* (Paris, 1905). A new version of this quarrel can be seen in Gabriel Séailles's "Pourquoi les dogmes ne renaissent pas," in *Les affirmations de la conscience moderne* (Paris, 1903); and the Catholic answer by Gaston Sortais, *Pourquoi les dogmes ne meurent pas* (Paris, 1905).

³⁶ See, e.g., Charlton, *Secular Religions*, 9, who quotes Foucher in support of this claim. In any case, it is easy to show that Voltairism and the old materialism were by no means defunct, as Foucher himself admits (*Philosophie catholique*, 11–15). From 1817 to 1824 it is estimated that 1,598,000 volumes of Voltaire's works and 492,000 of Rousseau's were published. The works of C.-F. Volney, Helvétius, Denis Diderot, Condorcet, Baron d'Holbach, and other intellectual enemies of the clergy went through numerous editions. (Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restauration*, 343–44.) In 1820 Ballanche described the university as Voltairian and saw in Voltaire, the expression of the French *esprit*, the dissolution of religion, family, and morality. (Bibliothèque Nationale, *Nouvelle acquisition française* [hereafter cited as BN, NAF] 14090, fol. 123; see also Émile Saisset, "Renaissance du Voltairianisme à propos d'une brochure de M. Michelet [*du Prêtre, de la femme et de la Famille*]" *Revue des deux mondes*, New Ser., V [Feb. 1, 1845], 377–408.)

translation in 1827–1828 of Johann Gottfried von Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (4 vols., Riga and Leipzig, 1784–91).³⁷

The *Revue européenne* (1831–34), a continuation of *Le Correspondant*, which had been discontinued in February 1831, was, Derré has shown, the organ of Mennaisianism. Many on the *Revue*, like Carné and Cazalès, had worked for *Le Correspondant* before it disappeared. They still acted on the idea that Christendom, including France, was headed for a new destiny. The *Revue* carried Hector Berlioz on Italian music. Foisset kept up the attack on eclecticism. Cousin was “the wandering Jew of philosophy,” then “drifting distraught between Alexandria and Munich.” Frédéric Ozanam, enamored of Clio in her guise of vestal virgin, wrote endlessly on the religious doctrines of India. An article by Cazalès in 1832 comparing the regime of the July Monarchy with that of Caesar earned him six months in prison, a fine of five hundred francs, and seizure of the *Revue*. *Singulari nos* contributed to the end of this promising intellectual venture in 1834.

A powerful traditionalist current ran through much of the nineteenth century in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, begun in 1830 under Augustin Bonnetty (1798–1879), the uncharismatic but indefatigable successor to Lamennais and Eckstein.³⁸ The periodical was frankly apologetic in its announced program of exploring all human sciences, especially history, to gather proof that “Christianity is the universal religion of all time.” In trying to conciliate the “science of God and that of the century,” he attempted to fulfill Maistre’s famous hope, which would be attempted in a different way and with greater sophistication by Louis Bautain and by Alphonse Gratry.

One of the persistent teachings of the *Annales* was that “the study of languages is one of the most fertile means of appreciating sacred scripture and Christianity.” Articles abound on the Hebrew language, new methods of teaching it, with special reference to seminaries, and the historical development of Hebrew studies in France. Étienne Quatremère, Orientalist at the École des langues orientales vivantes and later at the Collège de France, wrote articles in the 1840’s on the world of Biblical times. In 1849 Abbé J.-P. Migne’s *Catholicum lexicon hébraïque et chaldéen* received an extensive, favorable notice, defending Migne against the criticism of Abbé J.-J.-L. Bargès, who taught Hebrew at the Sorbonne as professor of Near Eastern languages in the faculty of theology. Jean François Champollion’s work was praised as an example of the value of Egyptology for Christian-

³⁷ Henri Tronchon, *La fortune intellectuelle de Herder en France* (Paris, 1920), deals with Herder’s impact on French intellectuals between 1768 and Quinet’s translation.

³⁸ Edward Alfred Pulker, “Augustin Bonnetty Considered as a Reconciler of Science and Religion,” master’s thesis, University of Ottawa, 1966; the work deals with Genesis and geology. Excellent brief treatments of Bonnetty are given by both Derré, *Lamennais*, and Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*; see also R. Jacquin, “Un vulgarisateur de cardinal Mai: Bonnetty,” *Revue des sciences religieuses*, XXIX (1955), 137–45. By 1836 the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* had a heavily ecclesiastical annual subscription circulation of 631. Subscribers were most numerous in: Seine, 73; Hérouville, 32; Meurthe, 25; Basses-Alpes, 21; Sarthe, 16; Nord, 15; Var, 15; and Calvados, 13.

ity.³⁹ This approach to Near Eastern studies, somewhat reminiscent of that of W. F. Albright in our day, contrasted sharply with Frayssinous's earlier refusal to admit the disturbing science of Egyptology into the university curriculum.

In his philosophy of history Bonnetty came close to Pierre Ballanche and his faith in palingenesis (gradual change), which had been inspired by Charles Bonnet's *La Palingénésie philosophique* (2 vols., Geneva, 1769–70) and influenced by the "corsi e ricorsi" of Giovanni Battista Vico's *Scienza nuova* (3d ed., Naples, 1744), which Ballanche used to Christianize history. Ballanche's theodicy of history, satisfying the ambivalent attitude of a bourgeois Catholic toward progress, gave a "law of restoration" by which man and society progressed. This gradual change, taking account of the "radical oneness" of life, avoided the horrors of revolutionary change. Although he accepted much of Bonald's theory of the divine origin of language, the basis upon which Bonald argued against man's ability to change the structure of society, Ballanche rejected Bonald's eternal equation of word and idea, thus allowing for the development of thought and "an evolutionary change in social institutions."⁴⁰

A leitmotiv of the *Annales* was the ancient quarrel between the traditionalists and the rationalists. The main issues of this argument had changed little since the days of Bonald's antirationalist polemic. The *Annales* were anti-Aristotelian. Bonnetty dealt with the secular philosophies of Kant and G. W. F. Hegel and the French thinkers he thought tainted by these philosophies—Cousin, Jouffroy, Émile Saisset, Étienne Vacherot, and Henri Maret—only to lament their rationalism and consequent pantheism.⁴¹ The traditionalist predilection for history rather than philosophy was evident not only in articles on the ancient Near East and Asia,⁴² but also in the extensive and often contentious treatment of contemporary historians. As well as being concerned with the sources of Herodotus and with Voltaire's historical works, the *Annales* gave Jules Michelet's history of France a critical examination with regard to its treatment of religion. The lectures of Charles Lenormant at the Sorbonne from 1835 to 1848, when the clerical sympathy of his lectures led to student revolts—it was just after the suspension of Quinet's course—and to his resignation, provided much historical and archaeological material that could be tailored to establish the historical basis of Christian-

³⁹ See, e.g., Jean François Champollion, "Sur le système d'écriture des Égyptiens," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, 3d Ser., I (1840), 294–303.

⁴⁰ Michael Reardon, "Pierre Ballanche as a French Traditionalist," *Catholic Historical Review*, LIII (No. 4, 1968), 573–99.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Hyacinthe de Valroger, "Hegel—Exposition de son système," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, 3d Ser., VII (1843), 358–72, and "M. Cousin," *ibid.*, 85–106.

⁴² Bonnetty advertised himself on the title page of the *Annales* as a member of the *Société asiatique de Paris*. The *Annales* carried many tendentious articles on Asia, especially China; see, e.g., Hyacinthe de Valroger, "Examen des doctrines contenu dans le Bhagavata-Purana et le Vishnu-Purana," *ibid.*, V (1842), 187–211. Bonnetty published an annotated edition of a work by an eighteenth-century Jesuit in China, H.-J. de Prémare, *Vestiges des principaux dogmes chrétiens, tirés des anciens livres chinois, avec reproduction des textes chinois* (Paris, 1878). Earlier the *Annales* had published the *Lettres inédites du P. Prémare sur le monothéisme des Chinois, publiées avec la plupart des textes originaux* (Paris, 1861).

ity. A jaundiced eye was cast on the development of the philosophy of history by Friedrich von Schlegel, Herder, Hegel, and Michelet. Abbé Jean-Claude Gaiet, a regular contributor to the *Annales*, welcomed François Guizot's *L'Église et la société chrétienne*, a work giving cause for all the *gens de bien* to rejoice.⁴³

The natural sciences were also exploited for apologetic ammunition. Being antievolutionist, Bonnetty chose Georges Cuvier rather than Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire or J. B. de Lamarck as his hero. In the first volume of the *Annales* Cuvier was proudly displayed as justifying Biblical chronology through his examination of the historical monuments of all peoples. The sacred geology that Bonnetty based on Cuvier conveniently dated the flood close to the Biblical date. In 1865 five antievolutionist articles by Giovanni Guiseppe Bianconi, advertised as a former professor at Bologna, concluded that man was completely separate from the rest of creation by reason of the intelligence and morality given to him by the author of nature. Abbé Gaiet continued this line in 1869 by arguing for the "unité de l'espèce humaine, réfutation du système de Darwin." Gaiet thought that Charles Darwin had only rehashed Lamarck's system, adding to it a bigger scientific apparatus. But he could refute Darwin only by quoting authorities. Like most people, Gaiet thought that the real question was whether man could descend from the ape. Although the positions of the *Annales* on scientific issues may now seem naïve, it should be remembered that the writers in the periodical buttressed their cosmogony with the theories of contemporary scientists, just as the English antievolutionists did with the erroneous theories of Darwin's "odious spectre," Lord Kelvin, on the age of the earth. The *Annales* conformed to a wider current of negative reaction by the nineteenth-century French intelligentsia to Darwinism.

In 1836 Bonnetty took over the philosophically traditionalist review *L'Université catholique*, founded by Gerbet, Salinis, and Abbé B.-D. de Scorbiac of Juilly with the aim of reforming the education of the clergy and of developing an ecclesiastical science, an aim similar to that of the *Maison des hautes études* Gerbet had founded at Thieux in 1834 to carry on a more orthodox version of Lamennais's efforts at La Chesnaie and Juilly. They hoped to outflank the government's prohibition of a French Catholic university, perhaps patterned after Louvain, by using the press for public courses and lectures. Five faculties were organized: philosophy and religious sciences; arts and letters; physiological sciences; physics and mathematics; and historical sciences. Guizot was sympathetic to the venture. Ignaz von Döllinger sent his congratulations. In 1838 interest in Germany was revived with the group's publication of a *Revue germanique religieuse*, in which those familiar with German intellectual life, like Léon Boré, could attack such dragons as "German pantheism" and denounce Hegel and Friedrich von Schelling. By 1845 *L'Université catholique* had on its staff such luminaries as the Boré

⁴³ J.-C. Gaiet, "Quelques observations sur le dernier ouvrage de M. Guizot; l'Église et la société moderne," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, 5th Ser., IV (1861), 420-28. Gaiet also wrote *Études critiques sur les travaux historiques de M. Guizot* (Paris, 1851).

brothers, Gerbet, the Comte de Montalembert, Ozanam, then professor of foreign literature at the Sorbonne, and the mathematician Melchior Hermite. The periodical survived until 1855, when it was absorbed by the *Annales*.⁴⁴

It is important to keep in mind the political, institutional, and ideological framework within which Catholic intellectual life developed and with which it was frequently in conflict long before the Third Republic. The direction and content of efforts like *L'Université catholique* were obviously conditioned by governmental policies. The July Monarchy has been called, among other things, a monarchy of professors, for, unlike the Restoration governments, it gave cabinet posts to the *universitaires*. As René Rémond has recently pointed out, the trinity of those who had their courses suspended under the Restoration—Guizot, François Villemain, and Cousin, although the last regained his position in 1828 under the ministry of the Vicomte de Martignac—had their revenge in 1830. Professors were made peers. The *Institut* became an Orleanist salon for half a century. Guizot, Adolphe Thiers, and lesser luminaries entered the ranks of the Immortals. Supported by the twin pillars of the press and education, Orleanism was the liberalism of the time. Basing its epistemology upon individual reason, it clashed with the absolutist Catholic theories of the Restoration. There was no Armageddon, however, for Orleanist rationalism was not a materialism but a *rationalisme spiritua-liste*, and within Catholicism this was the period of the blossoming of “a hundred flowers,” a feature of Catholic intellectual life that would be drastically changed by the Thomist renaissance.⁴⁵ But the struggle between the university and Catholics was more serious than it appears in Rémond’s book.

When the great battle over the monopoly of the university began in 1842, that institution soon found itself in a dangerously weak position because of the growing conservatism of the July Monarchy, a hostile public opinion toward alleged abuses resulting from the university’s dictatorship over French youth, and the denunciations of the Saint-Simonians concerning the university’s neglect of the sciences, foreign languages, and technology.⁴⁶ The suppression of the university’s monopoly in 1850, ironically under a republic, was a triumph for Montalembert, his political party, and the bishops.⁴⁷ During its period of captivity, especially in the 1860’s, some *universitaires*, along with many other French intellectuals, became increasingly attracted to the idea of replacing the dogmas of Catholicism, which many saw as the ideological source of their woes, by the principles of modern science. Many came to agree with Émile Littré that only his variety of Positivism

⁴⁴ It was called *L'Université catholique* from 1836 to 1845, then *Recueil religieuse*, 1846–1855. The publication achieved the surprising subscription circulation of sixteen hundred, including many in Germany and fifty in England. (Derré, *Lamennais*, 715–17.) For a general consideration of the treatment of Germany in the periodical literature of the time, see André Monchoux, *L'Allemagne devant les lettres françaises de 1814 à 1835* (2d ed., Paris, 1965), esp. Chaps. XI–XIII.

⁴⁵ René Rémond, *La droite en France de la première restauration à la V^e république* (Paris, 1963), 87–92.

⁴⁶ Paul Gerbod, *La condition universitaire en France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1963), 21.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 141–282, 548, 594–96. The campaign of the bishops is revealed in their letters in the Archives Nationales [hereafter cited as AN], F¹⁹ 3969–70.

could provide "a reconstruction of beliefs and morals."⁴⁸ Science was, it seemed, gaining an easy victory over theology through the work of Darwin, T. H. Huxley, and Karl Vogt and through the efforts of Littré, Hippolyte Taine, and Renan, which were based, according to popular propaganda, on scientific principles. This resurrection of anti-Christian secularism led Félix Dupanloup, bishop of Orléans, who had been favorable to a reconciliation between university and Church in 1850, to sound the alarm in 1863 with his *Avertissement à la jeunesse et aux pères des familles*. But the full political significance of the young republican democrats' hailing of the debacle of the "metaphysical" Second Empire and the advent of the "Positivist" Third Republic would become evident only in the 1880's, when scientific secularism became the prime republican virtue.⁴⁹ A university purged of clerical sympathizers became the ally of the Third Republic. The defeats that went back to the Falloux and Parieu Laws of 1850, the fruit of the alliance between the Church and the Orleanists against radicalism, were at last revenged. The triumph of those ideologically opposed to Catholicism and especially to Catholic influence in education was the most severe setback for all varieties of Catholics since the Revolution.

The great promise of the burgeoning intellectual life of French Catholicism in the second quarter of the nineteenth century is best seen, perhaps, in the "philosopher of Strasbourg," Abbé Louis Bautain, who with Dameron and Jouffroy comprised the famous student trio of Cousin at the Normale.⁵⁰ In 1818, on a trip to Germany with Cousin, he imbibed some of the heady philosophical potions of Hegel, J. G. Fichte, and F. H. Jacobi. Like Jouffroy, he lost his faith while becoming a philosopher. But during an illness a somewhat Pascalian vision combined with a mystical influence like that of Franz von Baader of Mlle. Humann (sister of J.-G. Humann, the Finance Minister in the July Monarchy), he jettisoned rationalism for his own brand of *fidéisme*. Partially following Kant, he declared it impossible to base metaphysics on pure reason. His small work *De l'enseignement de la philosophie en France au XIX^e siècle* (Strasbourg, 1833) attacked eclecticism, the cluster of ideas being propagated by Cousin as a quasi-official philosophy, and the supposedly moribund mélange of Scholasticism and Cartesianism that was part of the intellectual fare of the seminaries. Bautain's own doctrine was, he claimed, only "the Christian religion scientifically explained." To fulfill his aim, he created a school at Strasbourg that was famous for its ecumenicism and its conversions.

⁴⁸ Emile Littré, *Conservation, révolution et positivisme* (Paris, 1852), vii, xxv, cited in Louis Capéran, *Histoire contemporaine de la laïcité française* (2 vols., Paris, 1957), I, xviii.

⁴⁹ See Harry W. Paul, "The Debate over the Bankruptcy of Science in 1895," *French Historical Studies*, V (No. 3, 1968), 299-327.

⁵⁰ Walter Marshall Horton's *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York, 1926) is still a good study of Bautain. Paul Poupard's recent works, using much new unpublished material, give a more complete picture of Bautain; see esp. his *Essai de philosophie chrétienne au XIX^e siècle, l'abbé Louis Bautain* (Paris, 1961), *L'abbé Louis Bautain: Introduction et choix de textes* (Paris, n.d.), and *Le journal romain de l'abbé Bautain* (Rome, 1964).

During the Second Empire Bautain was on the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne, where he continued his attempt to construct a new epistemology. Bautain really modified the Platonic current running through Christian thought by his infusion of safe elements of Kant, German Romanticism, and French traditionalism. Thus he hoped to avoid the pitfall represented by the Kantian demonstration of the failure of reason in metaphysics and also to avoid falling into the heresy of Malebranche's "vision en Dieu," of which he was accused by the followers of Lamennais. In Bautain's epistemology, knowledge is born of belief; essentially, his position seems to be *philosophia ancilla theologiae*. Although his ideas did not have a wide impact immediately, they did influence two new currents in Catholic philosophy: the ontological movement and the movement leading through Gratry into Neo-Thomism. Bautain was also linked to a number of the chief currents of nineteenth-century philosophy. His vitalist explanation of knowledge has some similarity to the new metaphysics of Bergson, to whom he is related also by his anti-intellectualistic, intuitistic, and voluntaristic tendencies. W. M. Horton argued as early as 1926 that Bautain was a forerunner of the Right-wing pragmatism of thinkers like William James as well as of French Catholic Modernism, to which he was linked through his foreshadowing of some of the ideas of the school of the philosophy of action.⁵¹ The role he gives to belief and liberty in epistemology connects him with Jules Lequier and Renouvier. Finally, his views on the origins of ideas, as seen in his *Psychologie expérimentale* (Strasbourg, 1839), are not remote from Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.

Émile Bréhier's classification of Bautain as a "partisan of Bonald" is highly misleading. Their common hatred of rationalism produced a "strategic alliance," but for Bautain tradition "does not override the intelligence of the individual; it helps to develop it."⁵² This was the kind of traditionalism developed at Louvain, which, after its restoration in 1815, shared in the reaction against eighteenth-century rationalism by returning to the classical spirit of the Church fathers, especially Augustine, and of the great Scholastics. This movement was labeled "ontological"⁵³ from Vincenzo Gioberti's *Considérations sur les doctrines religieuses de V. Cousin* (Reims, 1844), although Giacinto Cardinal Gerdil's *La défense du sentiment du père Malebranche sur la nature et l'origine des idées contre l'examen de M. Locke* (Turin, 1748) was an important source of the Christian-Platonic orientation of the conversion of Louvain to ontology about 1840. Gérard Casimir Ubaghs, the leader of the movement, taught the ontological doctrine at

⁵¹ Horton, *Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain*, ix.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 285.

⁵³ Edgar Hocedez, *Histoire de la théologie au XIX^e siècle* (3 vols., Brussels, 1948-52), III, defines ontology as "la doctrine expliquant le caractère spirituel de nos intellections, en donnant pour objet unique à notre raison l'Être divin immédiatement connu par intuition, dans laquelle la réflexion découvre toutes les autres vérités." Gioberti first used the word in this sense to emphasize the difference between his philosophy and René Descartes's "psychologisme." Although Gioberti found his inspiration in Aristotle, the movement was Platonic-Aristotelian. Horton (*Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain*, 287) thinks that the popularity of "ontologisme" in France should not be traced to the influence of Rosmini and Gioberti but to Bautain instead. But see note 61, below.

Louvain from 1845 to 1846,⁵⁴ until Rome intervened to modify his books and his teachings along Thomistic lines, although ontology per se was not condemned.

In an age when popular magazines carry articles on the theological problems raised by space travel, when theologians are calling for the establishment of "theological think-tanks,"⁵⁵ and when the paperback shelves are overloaded with the works of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Adam, Karl Rahner, Romano Guardini, and others, it is not inappropriate to speak of a theological revival. It is amusing to reflect that Susanne K. Langer wrote an epitaph in 1942: "Theology, which could not possibly submit to scientific methods, has simply been crowded out of the intellectual arena and gone into retreat in the cloistered libraries of its seminaries."⁵⁶ *Souvent science varie; bien fol est qui s'y fie!*

"The roots of modern theological development go back to the beginning of the nineteenth century."⁵⁷ In the France of the July Monarchy and of the Second Empire there was a significant philosophical-theological movement that merged into the Thomist renaissance and has been overshadowed by it. Yet many of the concerns and approaches of nineteenth-century movements like the ontological wave are similar to contemporary theological developments. Tillich's "interest in ontology and a view of reality controlled by the concept of the universality of being in God" provides one of a host of possible examples.⁵⁸ The great influence of Schelling on Tillich is also not without its parallel to much of nineteenth-century French thought. Equally striking is the attempt to create a "synthesis between the functions of philosophy and theology."⁵⁹ If the contemporary theological movement is only half as significant as it seems, it is certainly difficult to justify relegating to limbo most of the philosophical-theological thought of figures like Bautain and Gratry. It is more difficult to justify overlooking their role in the dialectic of their times. Their writings were not *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*.

In France the ontological movement counteracted the deplorable traditionalistic equation of Catholicism and authority that made Christianity seem opposed to thought. Abbé Henri Maret (1805-1881), whose *Théodicée chrétienne* (Paris, 1844), the result of his first course in the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne in 1842-1843, took an antirational and protraditionalist approach, was converted to ontology about 1854. Horton has argued that the nineteenth-century scholar-philosopher Marin Ferraz was wrong in saying that Maret executed a *volte-face* in becoming an ontologist. Ferraz thought Maret to be a Bonaldian traditionalist, whereas he was a Bautainian traditionalist who simply shifted his interest between 1844 and 1856, when his *Philosophie et Religion* appeared, from the negative

⁵⁴ Gérard Casimir Ubaghs, *Essai d'idéologie ontologique ou considérations philosophiques sur la nature de nos idées, et sur l'ontologisme en général* (Louvain, 1860).

⁵⁵ *Time*, XCIII (Jan. 24, 1969), 64-65.

⁵⁶ Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York, 1948), 12.

⁵⁷ Charles Henkey, "Foreword," *Theologians of Our Time* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1964), vi.

⁵⁸ Alexander J. McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York, 1964), 33.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* McKelway is chiefly interested in showing that both Tillich and the Thomists oppose the nominalist critique.

critique of reason to the positive emphasis of Bautain on the idea of being, which gives man the faculty of knowing God directly and intuitively. Thus Maret “never moved outside the circle of ideas marked out by Bautain.”⁶⁰ In spite of his exaggerations concerning the intellectual servitude of Maret to Bautain, Horton was justified in rejecting Ferraz’s claim that Maret had become a Christian rationalist.⁶¹ By 1856 it was clear that he had moved fully into the ontological camp, then represented by some of the best minds of the French Catholic world. That conservative accusations against Maret had some influence in Rome is probably indicated by Pius IX’s rejection of his nomination to the bishopric of Vannes in 1860; that he was fairly safe is evident from the consolation prize of being made bishop of Sura *in partibus*.

Abbé Louis Branchereau (1819–1913)—“la plus forte tête du clergé français,” said Cousin—after giving an excellent statement of Kant’s philosophy in his *Praelectiones philosophicae* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1849), resurrected Malebranche’s “vision en Dieu” as the only effective answer to Kant. This philosophical manual rivaled the quasi-official manual of eclecticism by Saisset and Jules Simon and was probably superior to it in metaphysics. But a definitive statement of the ontological position came from Flavien Hugonin, on the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne from 1861 to 1867, when he became bishop of Bayeux. His *Ontologie, ou étude des lois de la pensée* (2 vols., Paris, 1856–57), showed ontology in its full scope as renewing both Christian philosophy and metaphysics. Primarily a theologian himself, Hugonin viewed Aquinas as another theologian, who, having no personal system of philosophy, had been led into the same error as Aristotle regarding the sensational source of knowledge. Asserting the principle of being (“en tant qu’être”) as the first knowledge of the human mind, Hugonin elevated ontology to the rank of the “primary philosophical science,” which could establish the immutable and eternal character of truth. Hugonin opposed the theories of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797–1855), whose leitmotiv of “ideal being,” based partly on Platonic and Augustinian ideas, was probably too much influenced by Kant for Hugonin’s comfort. Rosmini was controversial as late as 1887, when Leo XIII condemned forty Rosminian propositions.⁶² These ideas clashed with the neo-Thomist wave beginning to swell in the mid-nineteenth century. Accusations of pantheism were also hurled at the ontologists. After Rome’s condemnation of

⁶⁰ Horton, *Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain*, 286–87. Horton is not accurate in describing Ferraz’s analysis of Maret. Ferraz called Maret a “traditionaliste mitigé dans son *Essai sur le panthéisme*” (Paris, 1840) and said that even then he seemed inspired by Bautain. (Marin Ferraz, *Histoire de la philosophie en France au XIX^e siècle: Traditionalisme et ultramontanisme* [Paris, 1880], 361–71.)

⁶¹ “. . . il s’y rallie complètement [i.e., to rationalism] dans son livre intitulé *Philosophie et religion*” (Paris, 1856). Ferraz thought that Maret’s intellectual evolution might have been influenced by the attacks of the Jesuit Marie-Angé Chastel on traditionalism and by its condemnation by the Council of Amiens. (See Ferraz, *Histoire de la philosophie*, 370–71.)

⁶² A translation of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati’s *Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee* (4 vols., Rome, 1830) was begun in 1844 with the encouragement of Henri Lacordaire and Montalembert, but did not get beyond the first volume. (See Régis Jolivet, *De Rosmini, De Rosmini, l’idée de la sagesse* [Paris, 1953]; Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 186–89; and A. Robert Caponigri’s article in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [8 vols., New York, 1967], VII, 213–16.)

certain “dangerous” principles prevalent in ontological circles, some philosophical tour de force was necessary to save ontology from damnation. Hugonin’s successor at the Sorbonne, the versatile Jules Fabre d’Envieu, exegete, linguist, philosopher, and theologian, did this by turning Aquinas into an Augustinian. But even Fabre admitted that Aquinas’ Augustinianism was weakened by his empiricist borrowings from the Stagirite.⁶³ Although Aquinas was included in the ontological pantheon, the ontologists did not believe in a Christian philosophy as such. Like some Thomists, they argued that a philosophy already existed that was consonant with Christianity. Thus they differed from the traditionalists and from probably the best mind influenced by Bautain’s ideas, Abbé Alphonse Gratry (1805–1872), who, in Foucher’s opinion, made the most complete attempt in nineteenth-century France to develop a Catholic philosophy.

Horton’s eagerness to establish Bautain as a seminal figure led him to make the dubious charge that Gratry covertly plagiarized Bautain’s ideas. As a Strasbourg disciple of Bautain, Gratry was greatly influenced by him. But clerical suspicions about the orthodoxy of Bautain made it impossible for Gratry to acknowledge his debt directly and possibly forced him to indulge in some logomachizing to ensure that he would not be tainted by the charge of heresy, so freely flung at opponents by ruthless philosophers and theologians and by the eagle-eyed journalistic custodians of orthodoxy like Veillot and Bonnetty. Gratry, a *polytechnicien*, interpreting science in its modern sense, consciously aimed at fulfilling the prophecy of Maistre, in the *Soirées de St. Pétersbourg*, that fame would come to the man who would put an end to the impious eighteenth century by reuniting in himself religion and science on the basis of their natural affinity, a task attempted with a different scientific emphasis by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.⁶⁴ The theme of Gratry’s thought, which presented a paradoxical challenge to nineteenth-century scientism,⁶⁵ was his contention that the Christian idea of an infinite, perfect God is vital to the survival of philosophy and science. Only that idea could keep them from ending in pantheism, skepticism, or Hegelian contradictions.

Gratry was antitraditionalist, but he did not accept Cartesianism. Like Aquinas, he held to a religious empiricism. Like Bordas-Demoulin and Renouvier, he was much influenced by his exposure to infinitesimal calculus at the Polytechnique.

⁶³ Jules Fabre d’Envieu, *Défense de l’ontologisme contre les attaques récentes de quelques écrivains qui se disent disciples de saint Thomas* (Paris, 1862). Fabre’s work of 159 pages was prompted by the interpretation of the Jesuit Henry Ramière that the seven propositions condemned by the Holy Office in 1861 meant the condemnation of ontologism, although it was not mentioned specifically.

⁶⁴ Alphonse Gratry’s philosophy is found in his three major works: *De la Connaissance de Dieu* (Paris, 1853), *Logique* (Paris, 1855), *De la Connaissance de l’âme* (Paris, 1858). But he believed that only a religious group could succeed in this immense task. (BN, NAF 27414, fols. 224–25; see L. L. Braun, *Gratry’s Theorie der religiösen Erkenntnis* [Strasbourg, 1914].)

⁶⁵ It would be wrong to consider, from a philosophical viewpoint, the École polytechnique solely as “the source of the scientific hubris,” which one might well do after reading F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), 105–16. Such Catholic teachers and students as Antoine Lavoisier, André-Marie Ampère, Augustin Cauchy, Bordas-Demoulin, Gratry, and Lequier illustrate the antiscientific and sometimes mystical outlook of some *polytechniciens*.

In the opinion of the seventeenth-century Christian mathematician Jacques Ozanam, "Il appartient aux docteurs de Sorbonne de disputer, au pape de prononcer, et aux mathématiciens d'aller au paradis par la perpendiculaire." Gratry replaced the perpendicular by the infinite. According to Foucher, Gratry thought that the chief proof of God's existence is the nonintuitive immediate certainty deriving from a general dialectical process applied to the principle of being. This is another aspect of the principle of transcendence, which is a fundamental law of reason in so far as it is a heuristic tool used to establish first truths in science, ethics, and philosophy.⁶⁶ His acceptance of the existence of the infinite put him on the side of Antoine-Augustin Cournot and Félix Ravaisson against J.-L. Lagrange, Comte, and Renouvier in the great debate over the existence of the infinite and its philosophical significance. Gratry continued the argument with Saisset of the Normale, thus defending his concept of the infinite while carrying on the Catholic jihad against eclecticism.⁶⁷ In upholding the position that the infinite is not an idea but an instinct that is the essence of our reason, Gratry, following Bautain, replaced eclectic rationalism and its impersonal reason by his own anti-intellectualist variety of rationalism. Gratry rejected the key epistemological doctrine of traditionalism, which consecrated general reason as the criterion of certainty. In rejecting the Platonism of the ontological movement, he came close to the Aristotelianism of Thomism. Foucher appropriately categorized his philosophy as a mystical phenomenology in which one does not think by representations, but feels things directly. Gratry's philosophy was far from Thomism, but it was anti-traditionalistic, and, since it had certain elements in common with the philosophy of Aquinas, whom Gratry considered a philosopher of the first rank, Gratry was a John the Baptist preparing for the later triumph of Thomism.

It seemed to the eclectics, as Saisset argued, that Gratry's aim was to place the mind under the yoke of theology rather than to accelerate the return of nineteenth-century philosophy to religion. This was repugnant to eclectics like Saisset who had made a patron saint of Descartes ("à la fois libre penseur et homme religieux").⁶⁸ Although the Mennaisians ferociously opposed, both politically and intellectually, the eclecticism of the university, nearly all Catholics expressed some opposition to Cousin after his famous course of 1828.⁶⁹ Here Cousin seemed pantheistic, and Bautain attacked the danger of pantheism by his *Philosophie du*

⁶⁶ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 206. As Eugène Poitou, *Les Philosophes contemporains et leurs systèmes religieux* (Paris, 1864), 293, points out, Gratry equated, that is, confused, the infinite of the geometers with that of reason, two different entities.

⁶⁷ See Émile Saisset, "Une logique nouvelle à l'oratoire," *Revue des deux mondes*, 2d Ser., XI (1855), 913-42, where he argues that the new logic is a confused "mélange," supported by fantastic analogies, because it tries to reduce to a single method the irreducible inductive process and the dialectical method ("Comment assimiler la méthode dont s'est servi Ampère pour trouver la loi des courants électriques avec celle qui conduisit Platon au premier principe de la vérité et de l'être?") Gratry's reply (*Le Correspondant*, New Ser., I [Oct. 25, 1855], 30-61) did not really answer Saisset's arguments. See E. J. Scheller, *Grundlagen der Erkenntnislehre bei Gratry* (Halle, 1929); and B. Pointud-Guillemot, *Essai sur la philosophie de Gratry* (Paris, 1917).

⁶⁸ Saisset, "Logique nouvelle à l'oratoire," 942.

⁶⁹ Victor Cousin, *Cours de philosophie* (2 vols., Paris, 1828-29).

christianisme (Paris, 1835). Maret continued the attack, especially with an *Essai sur le panthéisme dans les sociétés modernes* (Paris, 1839).⁷⁰ Maret's *Théodicée chrétienne* criticized the natural theodicy of eclecticism. Cousin's *Des Pensées de Pascal, rapport à l'Académie française sur la nécessité d'une nouvelle édition de cet ouvrage* (Paris, 1843) assailed traditionalists as Pyrrhonists who, preferring Pascalian theological skepticism to the certainties of Bishop Bossuet, failed to join in a common effort with the new rationalism of eclecticism, which was in harmony with seventeenth-century Christian philosophy, to combat the eighteenth century and undo the social ruins of the Revolution.⁷¹ Cousin's protégé, Saisset, ingeniously detected a traditionalism in Henri Lacordaire, Maret, and Archbishop D.-A. Affre of Paris that denied the Catholic tradition of Augustine and Descartes.⁷² Saisset argued that eclecticism, unlike Hegelianism, had kept the theistic concept of the divine personality, thus avoiding pantheism. This was close to the truth, for Cousin had now moved away from the German metaphysical influence into a theism and had elaborated the siren doctrine of Neo-Cartesianism to provide for Catholics a viable alternative to traditionalism. This move had great impact on Catholic thought in accelerating the growth of Christian rationalism, as Maret's later ontological turn showed.

The opposition to Cousin sprang in considerable part from his attempt to institutionalize his philosophy within the university. Viewing the university in terms of integration along national and social lines, Cousin believed that his system, based on the principles necessary for a stable society, was the one that would divide France least. But the opening of the university to systematic treatment of, if not direct pleading for, a philosophic potion that contained elements of Cartesianism and Lockean empiricism aroused the horror of Catholics, who fought a bitter battle against a university monopoly resulting in the indoctrination of youth with "anti-Catholic" doctrines. Just as repulsive to the Catholic opposition was Cousin's attempt to establish the secular autonomy of philosophy, free from the shackles of theology.⁷³

Out of this eclectic-Catholic quarrel came one of the most celebrated intellectual skirmishes of the century, beginning with Gratry's criticism of the third volume of Étienne Vacherot's *Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1850), which Gratry thought misinterpreted the Church fathers. Gratry, then chaplain at the Normale, denounced "contemporary sophism in its . . . most dangerous and least known form," as found in this work of Cousin's disciple, also at the Normale. Gratry was alarmed that "the first serious declaration of Hegelian atheism pro-

⁷⁰ A second edition appeared in 1841, at the height of the Catholic-eclectic battle. A conciliatory move by Cousin permitted Maret to obtain an appointment to the faculty of theology in 1842.

⁷¹ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 157.

⁷² Émile Saisset, "De la philosophie du clergé," *Revue des deux mondes*, New Ser., VI (1844), 440-80, and "Le christianisme et la philosophie," *ibid.*, IX (1845), 1021-48.

⁷³ Doris S. Goldstein, "Official Philosophies in Modern France: The Example of Victor Cousin," *Journal of Social History*, I (Spring 1968), 259-79.

duced among us” was crowned by the Institute and hailed as a great work in university circles. It was also not difficult to find “the doctrine of the unity of all substance which aroused Christian disapproval.” Probably because of clerical influence at the Ministry of Education, Vacherot was suspended from his post of *sous-directeur des études littéraires*. His protest against the *coup* of Louis Napoleon further aggravated Vacherot’s position. Although his work *La démocratie* (Paris, 1860) earned him a prison term in 1859, he became a deputy in the National Assembly and then a senator for life in the Third Republic. Gratry soon resigned to pursue his work in the new Oratory until 1857.⁷⁴ Gratry became professor of ethics in the faculty of theology of the Sorbonne in 1863 and was elected to the French Academy in 1867, replacing the Baron Brugières de Barante in the chair formerly occupied by Voltaire. Like most Catholic intellectuals, he had some difficulty accepting papal infallibility. A work of his attacking infallibility led the martinet of orthodoxy P.-L. Pététot to force him completely out of the Oratory in 1870, but Gratry made a typical retraction and remained within the fold of orthodoxy.

Hegelianism was Gratry’s *bête noire*. His battle against Renan and Vacherot is, in part, an attack on thinkers “corrupted” by Hegel. Gratry saw Hegel’s philosophy as a new sophistry; his opposition to Hegel must be understood in the light of Gratry’s attempt to establish the initial truths of religious philosophy by a new analysis of the syllogistic and dialectical operations of reason, both of which assumed the principles of identity and induction. Gratry thought that Hegel had tried to destroy both and was therefore the source of all types of atheism and pantheism. He often criticized doctrines not found in Hegel, who did not simply and purely oppose Aristotle nor entirely deny the principle of contradiction. It is clear that there was no true Hegelian philosophy in France, although components of Hegelianism appeared in the philosophic thought of thinkers as diverse as Taine, Renan, Vacherot, Barrès, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Stéphane Mallarmé, and Charles Péguy. The influence of Hegel on Cousin was obvious in 1828, when Cousin was trying to create a new philosophy of liberty that would agree with the spirit of the Revolution, so incompatible with the sensationalism of Condillac. German philosophy appeared a natural ally for Cousin’s *via moderna*. But when eighteenth-century French philosophy was vanquished, Cousin turned to an attempt to found metaphysics on psychology and necessarily against the Germans. Thus it is not illogical to see Hegelianism, in so far as it influenced Taine, Renan, and Vacherot, in opposition to eclecticism. In the Second Empire a conflict arose between Hegelianism and eclecticism on the one hand and between Hegelianism and religiously inspired philosophy on the other.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Charlton, *Secular Religions*, 115. *La grande encyclopédie* (31 vols., Paris [1886–1902]), XXXI, 647, cites from Vacherot’s “Papiers inédits” his opinion that “La théologie n’est qu’une psychologie supérieure.” (See Alphonse Gratry, *Une étude sur la sophistique contemporaine avec la réponse de M. Vacherot et la réplique de l’abbé Gratry* [Paris, 1851].)

⁷⁵ The third part of Alphonse Gratry’s *Les sophistes et la critique* (Paris, 1864) is a frontal attack

It was not only among a small number of the clergy that the development of nontraditionalist Christian philosophy took place in nineteenth-century France; several lay figures stand above all the rest in their intellectual orientation toward Catholicism, or at least Christianity: Bordas-Demoulin, Frédéric Morin, and Lequier, all of whom developed their philosophies parallel with but in opposition to the traditionalist and authoritarian intellectual current so strong in nineteenth-century French Catholicism.

The Catholic Bordas-Demoulin (1798–1859), like the theoretical Catholic Philippe Buchez, saw the French Revolution as Christian in its principles. (Buchez [1796–1865] is well known to historians for his collaboration with P.-C. Roux-Lavergne on the *Histoire parlementaire de la révolution française* [40 vols., Paris, 1834–38].) Bordas' argument, in the *Essais sur la réforme catholique*, that the Church, in its internal evolution, must follow civil society from autocracy to democracy was the reverse of the dominant trend in ecclesiastical politics in the nineteenth century. He is a suitable patron saint for clerical radicals in the post-Vatican II era. For Bordas the Revolution had as its aims the liberation of the individual and the attainment of the brotherhood of man. Christians ought to finish the Revolution on a political level by working for such things as universal suffrage and democracy and on a social level by opposing capitalist exploitation. Bordas defined progress as the social application of the Gospels. Equally refreshing was his praise for the eighteenth century: although anti-Christian in outlook, it involuntarily showed how Christianity offered the solution to modern social and political problems.⁷⁶

As a *polytechnicien*, Bordas had a great interest in science and mathematics, especially in the polemic over the rational legitimacy of infinitesimal calculus. He lined up in defense of this mathematical panacea with Hoëné Wronski against the strictures of Lagrange and the eighteenth century. Rejecting the empiricist philosophy of Condillac and Pierre Laromiguière along with traditionalism, eclecticism, and the theory of necessary progress involving pantheism, Bordas developed a modernized Platonic-Cartesian philosophy. This philosophy influenced both Renouvier and Gratry, especially the latter in his philosophical use of infinitesimal calculus in "proving" the existence of God.⁷⁷ Bordas attempted to build his metaphysics on the foundation of scientific progress. Free from the rancor that

on Hegelianism. Carl Schmitt, *Politische Romantik* (Munich, 1925), 95, n. 1, has argued that a French version of the Hegel-Schelling quarrel occurred when Ravaisson, influenced by Schelling, attacked what Schmitt exaggerates as the *Scientismus* of Taine, Claude Bernard, Marcelin Berthelot, and Renan. (See A. Forest, "L'hégélianisme en France," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, special suppl., XXIII [Dec. 1931], *Hegel nel centenario della sua morte*.)

⁷⁶ Jean-Baptiste Bordas-Demoulin's *Mélanges philosophiques et religieux* (Paris, 1846), *Les pouvoirs constitutifs de l'église* (Paris, 1853), and *Essais sur la réforme catholique* (Paris, 1856), although anathema to the Catholic establishment, gave the most intelligent counterarguments to the type of attack most cogently stated in P.-J. Proudhon's *De justice dans la Révolution et dans l'église* (3 vols., Paris, 1857). On Buchez, see François-André Isambert, *De la charbonnerie au saint-simonisme: Étude sur la jeunesse de Buchez* (Paris, 1966), and *Politique, religion et science de l'homme chez Philippe Buchez, 1796–1865* (Paris, 1967).

⁷⁷ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 117–24.

political factors engendered in traditionalism, Bordas took a moderately critical position on Cousin, even defending him from the more typical harsh attacks of Catholics. Cousin's inclusion of a treatise by Bordas⁷⁸ for *couronnement* by the *Académie des sciences morales* in 1840 was an adroit move emphasizing a common bond of Cartesianism between Cartesian Catholics and the eclectics. Returning to the Platonic theory of ideas, to Plotinus, and to Augustine, in opposition to the theories of Epicurus, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, Bordas consecrated individual activity without accepting the necessity of skeptical relativism. "Individuality is the foundation of modern society and the source of all true progress because it activates and develops all our powers. To crush it would force us back to pre-Christian society."⁷⁹

The ideas of the unorthodox and prolific Catholic Morin (1823–1874) were related in some respects to the thought of Bordas. After attending the Normale, Morin taught philosophy in several *lycées* before being forced into private education in 1852 as a result of his refusal to take the required oath of loyalty to the Emperor.⁸⁰ Although a disciple of Ozanam, he was in the intellectually republican group (Vacherot, Émile Deschanel, Louis Jourdan, Jean Reynaud, Amédée Guillemin) associated with *La morale indépendante*, founded in 1865 by Marie-Alexandre Massol and Henri Brisson. The aim of establishing a morality not based on religion stimulated the sympathy of Renouvier, who had written a *Manuel républicain de l'homme et du citoyen* (Paris, 1848) and whose *Science de la morale* (2 vols., Paris, 1869) showed his intellectual involvement in the movement. Fighting mainly against Catholic opposition, especially Monsignor Félix Dupanloup and *Le moniteur du clergé*, Morin tried to gain entry into the Church for the idea of an independent morality. But his republican-tainted theory that individual and group progress takes place through revolution, just as the history of mankind is a series of revolutions, had no appeal for the Catholic establishment, ideologically at ease within the Second Empire.⁸¹

The fine line distinguishing orthodoxy from heterodoxy was also hard to detect in the philosophical fragments of the Catholic *polytechnicien* and poetic philosopher Lequier. More Pascalian than Cartesian,⁸² he rejected the reconciliation of science and religion in thinkers like Bautain and Bordas and tried to work out a new apologetic giving a rational legitimacy to his belief.⁸³ In his consideration

⁷⁸ It was included in Victor Cousin, *Cartésianisme ou la véritable rénovation des sciences* (Paris, 1843).

⁷⁹ Jean-Baptiste Bordas-Demoulin, *Œuvres posthumes* (2 vols., Paris, 1861), I, 153, cited in Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie*, II, 838. On Bordas, see François Huet, *Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de Bordas-Demoulin* (2 vols., Paris, 1861).

⁸⁰ He became a general councilor (Rhône) in 1767 and acting prefect of Saône-et-Loire in 1870.

⁸¹ See Clarisse Coignet, *De Kant à Bergson* (Paris, 1911), Chap. 1; and Jules Simon's eulogy of Morin in an introd. to Frédéric Morin, *Politique et philosophie* (Paris, 1876), vii–xlvi.

⁸² Lequier could not, of course, escape being influenced by the Christian rationalism of which Descartes was a patron saint in the 1840's.

⁸³ Louis Foucher, *La jeunesse de Renouvier et sa première philosophie* (Paris, 1927), 92–93; see also Jean Grenier, *La philosophie de Jules Lequier* (Paris, 1936), esp. 51–72, and his introd. to *Jules Lequier, Œuvres complètes* (Neuchâtel, 1952).

of Catholic dogma, Lequier worked out a plan for its reinterpretation and explanation that attempted to emulate the Scholastics, especially Duns Scotus, in their emphasis on liberty. Like theology, morality needed revising through a search for truth concerning man's destiny, in which the all-pervasive idea of free will in man and his institutions played a key role. Influenced by J.-G. Fichte, Lequier saw the task of Catholic philosophers primarily in terms of opposition to the Hegelian ideas of necessity and determinism; he thus avoided pantheism. Lequier followed his hero Aristotle in claiming that man escapes necessity by the act of thinking about it, a truth that had become the heritage of the Church.⁸⁴

Although it is hardly a guarantee of originality to be included among the thinkers classified as precursors of existentialism, Lequier has been identified with Schelling and Søren Kierkegaard as "one of the greatest philosophers of existence."⁸⁵ In spite of an obvious relation, Lequier's thought has no clear line of descent to the Catholic existentialism of Gabriel Marcel or the related personalism of Mounier. It was through the neocriticist Renouvier (1815–1903) that secularized, or at least de-Catholicized, strains of Lequier's thought survived. Foucher showed in his study of the young Renouvier, whose chief inspiration was initially pantheist and Hegelian, the deep influence of Lequier.⁸⁶ Both were concerned with constructing a rational synthesis centered on the problem stemming from the concept of freedom, but Lequier, unlike Renouvier, worked within the parameters of Catholic dogma. Foucher, following Renouvier himself, concluded that Renouvier arrived at his personalist and historical theism through Lequier, thus explaining the world and man through the free wills of God and man.⁸⁷

One of the most remarkable features of nineteenth-century French Catholic intellectual life, revealed partially in the influence of Fichte's *Bestimmung des Menschen* on Lequier, was its close relationship with the currents of the German Catholic intellectual world, which was by the 1830's in a vastly different situation from what Madame de Staël described in *De l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1810).⁸⁸ Apart

⁸⁴ See Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 130–44. On the influence of Fichte, see Xavier Tilliette, *Jules Lequier ou le tourment de la liberté* (Paris, 1964), 107–82; see also *id.*, "Connaissance de Jules Lequier (1814–1862)," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, LXVIII (No. 1, 1963), 70–84.

⁸⁵ Jean-Paul Sartre's "Faire, et en faisant, se faire" is in Lequier's anti-Hegelian "Faire, non pas devenir, mais faire, et, en faisant, se faire," although Lequier's "faire" applies more to knowledge than to existence. (Jean Wahl, *Tableau de la philosophie française* [Paris, 1946], 153, and *Esquisse pour une histoire de l'existentialisme* [Paris, 1949], 62.)

⁸⁶ It is gross simplification to state that "very probably his [Renouvier's] own philosophic career was given its fundamental orientation by Comte [his mathematics teacher at the Polytechnique]." (W. M. Simon, *European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century* [Ithaca, N. Y., 1963], 102; see Grenier, *Philosophie de Jules Lequier*, 230–50.)

⁸⁷ Foucher, *Philosophie catholique*, 142. "En somme, pour Renouvier, Lequier est un neo-kantien." (Grenier, *Jules Lequier, Œuvres complètes*, viii.)

⁸⁸ Madame de Staël saw German Catholics in a defensive attitude, harmful to the progress of ideas, leaving the Protestants a monopoly in literature and philosophy. But even as early as 1813 this was nonsense. German philosophy was becoming accessible in translation in the 1830's: Baron A.-T.-H. Barchou de Penhoën translated Johann Fichte, *Destination de l'homme* (Paris, 1832), and published an *Histoire de la philosophie allemande depuis Leibnitz jusqu'à Hegel* (2 vols., Paris, 1836). See Monchoux, *Allemagne devant les lettres françaises*, esp. Chaps. v, xix. Jean-Marie Carré, *Les écrivains français et le mirage allemand* (Paris, 1947), gives a general critical survey of French intellectuals and Germany.

from the well-known figures like Klemens Brentano, Friedrich von Schlegel, and Sulpice and Melchior Boisserée, associated with romantico-Catholicism, there were three major currents of Catholic thought, centered in certain institutions. The Kantian rationalism of Georg Hermes of the Catholic faculty of theology at Bonn was condemned by Rome in 1835. In Vienna "the Catholic Hegel," Father Anthon Günther, based upon Descartes a dualistic theism that avoided pantheism, but was not radically different from idealism. The school at Münster was unusual for Germany because it was ultramontane and devoutly Scholastic in opposition to most modern philosophy. In Tübingen, where the great figure was Johann-Adam Möhler, more historian and theologian than philosopher, the theologians developed the twin ideas that dogma evolved and that the Church was an evolving organism. But the brightest star in the German Catholic intellectual firmament was Munich; here, Schelling, Franz Xaver von Baader, Joseph von Görres, Brentano, K.-J.-H. Windischmann, and Döllinger made up the intellectual spearhead of European Catholicism. Edmond Vermeil's thesis of 1913 put forward Tübingen as the most significant of all the German schools. Tübingen was not seduced by the Romantic neomysticism in full flower in Bavaria, the decadent rationalism strong in Baden, or the new type of ultramontanism of the Rhineland. Vermeil saw Tübingen as the school of synthesis, whose clear, profound, and fiery ideology was the fountainhead of Modernism, which appeared in Germany, in England with John Cardinal Newman and George Tyrrell, and then in the Latin countries. A chain reaction was strongly implied, although the diffusion of the ideas was not traced in any convincing fashion.⁸⁹

French interest in German intellectual life had existed since the mid-eighteenth century, but until the last decade of that century there was little attempt to see the originality and profundity of German thought. The credit for the new approach to German thought and literature is usually given to Madame de Staël, with little mention made of her predecessor, the Catholic *émigré* from Lorraine, aristocrat and pupil of the Benedictines, Charles de Villers. In the *Spectateur du Nord, journal politique, littéraire et moral*, which was published at Hamburg from 1797 to 1802, Villers tried to achieve his great aim of providing a means of communication between the French and the Germans in all intellectual areas, but especially in philosophy. What Christ was to the Greeks, Kant was to the French, who adopted Abbé E.-J. Sieyès' opinion that Kant was unintelligible to every Frenchman and that his philosophy was "un inutile casse-tête, un nouveau déluge de scholastique." Villers's articles in the *Spectateur* gave the longest and most systematic treatment of Kant, especially the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, available in French until that time. The *Spectateur* concluded correctly in an issue in 1800

⁸⁹ Edmond Vermeil, *Jean-Adam Möhler et l'école catholique de Tubingue (1815-1840): Étude sur la théologie romantique en Wurtemberg et les origines germaniques du modernisme* (Paris, 1913). For general treatment, see Roger Aubert, *Le pontificat de Pie IX (Histoire de l'église)* (26 vols., Paris 1934-), XXI, esp. Chap. VII, Sect. 2; and Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (4 vols., Freiburg, 1936; reprinted 1955), IV.

that "The substance of what M. de Villers wrote in this paper is to be found in everything that Mme. de Staël has said about German literature."⁹⁰

As Derré has shown, some Frenchmen were following German intellectual developments closely before *De l'Allemagne* appeared.⁹¹ Baron von Humboldt lived in Paris after 1805, and while Schlegel was in Paris he gave a course in literature and in the philosophy of art and assembled the material for his *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier, ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Alterthumskunde* (Heidelberg, 1808, published in French in 1837). Especially enticing for French Catholics was the freedom existing in many German universities in contrast to the government controls imposed in the French system. Eckstein followed the courses of the philologist Creuzer and studied Sanskrit at Heidelberg. He had close relations with Görres, his German alter ego. Döllinger, his close friend, wrote a preface for his posthumous work in 1862. Many of his articles were translated, especially in the Munich periodical *Eos*. After Eckstein's *Le Catholique* ceased publication in 1829, *Le Mémorial catholique et la revue catholique* gave considerable space to praising Schlegel and carried a series of articles on Möhler. An attempt, particularly by Döllinger, to establish close publishing relations with the *Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift*⁹² never reached fruition owing to the disappearance of the Mennaisian periodical in 1830. *Le Correspondant* continued the tradition by a long study of G.-E. Lessing when Eugène Rodriguez' translation of Lessing's *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (Berlin, 1780) appeared in 1830.⁹³ *L'Avenir*, especially in 1830 and 1831, also carried articles on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe by Lacordaire, on Novalis by Montalembert, and on the painters J.-F. Overbeck and Peter von Cornelius. Baader's contributions appeared frequently. But *L'Avenir* was more political and social than its predecessors.

The *Revue européenne* (1831-35) gave prominence to German intellectual

⁹⁰ On Villers and the *Spectateur*, see Paul Hazard, "Le *Spectateur du Nord*," *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, XIII (1906), 26-50. Charles de Villers's studies appeared as *Philosophie de Kant ou principes fondamentaux de la philosophie transcendante* (2 vols., Metz, 1801; 2d ed., 1830). His *Essai sur l'esprit et l'influence de la réformation de Luther* (Paris, 1804) was honored by the *Institut de France* in 1805 and translated into several languages. The Baron Nicolas Massias, who fought against *sensualisme*, especially the Comte A. Destutt de Tracy, and tried to reconcile Condillac and Kant, wrote a *Lettre à M. Stapfer sur le système de Kant et sur le problème de l'esprit humain* (Paris, 1827).

⁹¹ Mention might also be made of Saint-Marc-Girardin, journalist, deputy, and substitute for Guizot at the Sorbonne, who published *Notices politiques et littéraires sur l'Allemagne* in 1834 (Paris, dated 1835) and, as a result of his study *De l'instruction intermédiaire et de son état dans le Midi de l'Allemagne* (2 pts., Paris, 1835-39), drew the attention of the French to their deficiencies in technical and vocational education. Alfred Michiels's *Études sur l'Allemagne renfermant une histoire de la peinture allemande* (Paris) appeared in 1840 and in a second edition in 1850; see also his *La théorie de Kant sur le sublime, exposée par un Français en 1780* (Paris, 1852). See Derré, *Lamennais*, esp. Chaps. I-IV, IX, XI for Mennaisian intellectual relations with Germany. On Bautain and Germany, see the works of Paul Poupard, esp. "Lettre de Möhler à Bautain sur les rapports de la raison et de la foi," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, XLII (1958), 455-82, and "Abbé Bautain und die Katholische-Theologische Fakultät Tübingen. Zu zwei unveröffentlichten Briefen von Möhler und Herbst an Bautain," *Theologische Quartalschrift*, CXXXVIII (1958), 460-70.

⁹² Agreement could not be complete, however, for the *Theologische Quartalschrift* rejected Maistre's ultramontanism and the Mennaisian philosophy of common sense.

⁹³ ". . . si l'on néglige leurs prolongements ésotériques, les idées de Lessing sont devenues, dans la France de 1830, le bien commune de la pensée chrétienne." (Derré, *Lamennais*, 39.)

matters: Eloi Jourdain's years in Germany in the early thirties produced three articles on Baader,⁹⁴ and, in his letters on Germany, three articles on the moral and intellectual state of Prussia.⁹⁵ In his *Souvenirs de jeunesse*, 1828–1835,⁹⁶ Jourdain devoted the second part to his German experiences, giving a critical estimate of such Catholic intellectuals as Baader, Görres, and Döllinger. Only for Döllinger did he express unqualified respect. It was in the *Revue* that Léon Boré wrote in 1832 his famous article "D'un moyen de remédier à l'insuffisance de l'enseignement en France." Long before Renan, he called for the creation of specialized chairs in the French university and recommended specialized training in Germany for French Catholic scholars. Boré thought, of course, that the plodding Germans would amass the materials that the sophisticated French could use more profitably. Boré's preface to his translation of Döllinger (*Origines du christianisme* [2 vols., Paris, 1842]) showed his hostility to Hegel's philosophy of religion and his horror at the spread of pantheism by Jean-Louis-Eugène Lerminier's *Au-delà du Rhin* (Paris, 1835) and Quinet's *Génie des religions* (Paris, 1842).⁹⁷ Animated by a desire to outflank the university monopoly through a Catholic institution, those prominent on the *Revue*, like De Carné, Cazalès, and Boré, established an Association of German Studies in 1833, and a group of French students went to Munich. After the encyclical *Singulari nos* (1834), the *Revue* came to an end, and the Munich group under Cazalès disbanded.⁹⁸ Probably as a result of his personal contacts in Munich in 1832, Lamennais shared the opinion of Gerbet that although "Germany is the factory of ideas . . . it is the India of Europe, the country of intuition," and the danger was that the logical spirit would be lost in the proliferation of intellectual constructs, many of which were like the castles in Spain of metaphysics.⁹⁹ After Lamennais's *Paroles d'un croyant* (Paris, 1834), the alarm of German Catholics completed his disillusionment with Germany.

Bonnetty's periodical *Annales* devoted some space to German thought. Its coverage, although not quite so bad as Derré states,¹⁰⁰ was inferior to that of the Mennaisian periodicals. It carried the translations of Schlegel by Eugène Boré¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ Eloi Jourdain, "Exposition du système philosophique de M. de Baader," *La Revue européenne*, I (1831), 71–85, and "Analyse de la philosophie de Baader," *ibid.*, III (1832), 65–76, 184–201.

⁹⁵ *Id.*, "Lettre sur l'Allemagne," *ibid.*, V (1832), 181–207, and "De l'état moral et intellectuel de la Prusse," *ibid.*, VI (1833), 179–89, 310–25.

⁹⁶ Charles-Sainte Foi (Eloi Jourdain), *Souvenirs de jeunesse*, ed. C. Latreille (Paris, 1911), Pt. 2.

⁹⁷ Lerminier, who had studied law in Germany, was professor of comparative legislation at the Collège de France, 1831–1838 and 1849–1857. He also wrote *Lettres philosophiques adressées à un Berlinois* (Paris, 1832). Other translations by Boré were Joseph von Görres' *Jeanne d'Arc d'après les chroniques contemporaines* (Paris, 1843) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Hermann et Dorothee* (Paris, 1886).

⁹⁸ Derré (*Lamennais*, 528) exaggerates the effect of the end of the *Revue* as "l'abandon des ambitions scientifiques et métaphysiques dans lesquelles la réflexion catholique française avait prise une vie nouvelle."

⁹⁹ Philippe Gerbet, *Conférences de philosophie catholique: Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1832), 130, cited in Derré, *Lamennais*, 298–99.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 496.

¹⁰¹ Eugène Boré was Léon's brother and *professeur suppléant* of Armenian at the Collège de France before becoming superior-general of the Lazarists.

and tendentious comments on theology at Halle and Munich and, generally, on the "anti-Christian" works of German scholars. The *Annales* reprinted some of Quinet's criticism of David Friedrich Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu* (Tübingen, 1836), translated by Émile Littré in 1839–1840, and in 1845–1847 carried a series of articles on Strauss's German adversaries. In 1842 two articles of E. W. Hengstenberg on the weakening of faith in the authenticity of the Pentateuch were translated. Abbé Hyacinthe de Valroger, former director of the *Grand Séminaire* at Bayeux and then a founder of the new Oratory, wrote two articles in 1843 on Hegel.¹⁰² Germany was not ignored, even if nothing startling emerged from the anti-rationalist-Protestant line followed in the *Annales*.

The clerical intelligentsia, aware of the significance of German religious studies, favored sending some students to Germany, the most famous of whom were Maret and G.-R. Meignan, in the 1840's, and H. Vollot in the 1860's. Maret and Meignan spent most of their time in Munich, but Vollot went to Tübingen. A contemporary of Maurice d'Hulst, who chose to study in Rome, Vollot died after a short time on the faculty of theology of the Sorbonne. Maret, who became dean of the faculty, always kept in touch with the German world. The residence of Meignan, Vollot's predecessor at the Sorbonne and then bishop of Châlons, in Munich and Berlin produced more written evidence for the effect of German ecclesiastical science on a young French priest than the stay of any other cleric. His notes on the philosophers were considerable, but those on the disputes produced by German exegesis were voluminous. He preferred J. A. W. Neander to F. C. Baur¹⁰³ and followed the work of scholars like Albrecht Ritschl, J. F. K. Keil, Hengstenberg, and, especially, G. H. A. von Ewald. In Berlin he got little satisfaction from Schelling's lectures, but was consoled by discussing Catholic theology with Neander. This exposure to German criticism had little impact on the outlook of the French clergy, who generally followed the advice of Maret to Meignan: "You will be in the midst of rationalism, child of the Reformation. Follow its tactics closely." The erudition and method of teaching at Halle and Bonn excited Meignan, but he noted sadly that "the Protestant principle distorts science and makes learning fruitless." Only at Louvain was it obvious how useful this erudition and method could be "when a Catholic hand knows how to use them."¹⁰⁴

General Catholic periodicals as well as the specialized periodicals of the clergy brought to the attention of readers many German currents of thought and works.¹⁰⁵ The implications of German scholarship became more public in 1858,

¹⁰² Hyacinthe de Valroger's translation of F. A. G. Tholuck's *Essai sur la crédibilité de l'histoire évangélique en réponse au Dr Strauss* (Paris) appeared in 1847. In his letters to Dupanloup, he regretted how little German exegesis was appreciated in France. (BN, NAF 24712, fols. 356–63, 24713, fols. 170–71, 24714, fols. 230–35.)

¹⁰³ The criticism of Strauss by both had obvious appeal for Meignan.

¹⁰⁴ See Henri Boissonnot, *Le cardinal Meignan* (Paris, 1899), esp. Chaps. VII–IX.

¹⁰⁵ In the first category were such periodicals as *Revue catholique* (1836–61) and *Bibliographie*

when the *Revue germanique* was founded by Charles Dollfus and Auguste Nefftzer with the help of Littré, Alfred Maury, Renan, and Taine.¹⁰⁶ This *Revue* soon gave a *haute vulgarisation* of German higher criticism, especially, it declared, "the liberal rational criticism of Strauss and the radical school of Tübingen, long unknown in France. . . ." This criticism was, of course, known but rejected by many of the French clergy, whereas the new secular review accepted much of it. In the first issues of 1858 Michel Nicolas presented German Biblical criticism and scholarly opinions on the antecedents of Christianity. Abbé Arthur Le Hir of Saint-Sulpice wrote a reply to Nicolas' article.¹⁰⁷ Meignan also counterattacked, rehashing the old teachings of Tübingen and other German schools.¹⁰⁸ That Meignan's series was never finished indicated the general lack of interest among French Catholics in the quarrels. In 1861 the Jesuit *Études* carried articles attacking those of the *Revue germanique*.¹⁰⁹ The furor created by Renan's *La vie de Jésus* in 1863 was the culmination of a quarrel whose origins went back at least to the 1830's and which became especially heated in the 1850's and the 1860's.¹¹⁰ Although the quality of French Catholic scholarship was not so high as it became in the Modernist era of Louis Duchesne and Alfred Loisy, it was by no means helpless before the rationalist critique, as is frequently asserted.

The black picture of Catholic religious scholarship has a venerable history, dating from Lamennais's *Réflexions sur l'état de l'église* (Paris, 1808), which denounced the degradation of learning among the eighteenth-century clergy.¹¹¹ In 1843 an infuriated Michelet along with Quinet made his slashing attack on *Des Jésuites*: "What is done in the seminaries . . . is known by the nullity of its results"; their graduates were as ignorant of science as of the world. Vacherot made a more solid and more reserved criticism in 1868.¹¹² He criticized the clergy for giving literary, oratorical, or metaphysical answers to the questions raised by the scientific criticism of Strauss and Renan. This was essentially the same criti-

catholique (1841-89); in the second were periodicals like *Archives du clergé catholique* (1855) and, especially, *Archives de la théologie catholique* (1861-).

¹⁰⁶ It was later called *Revue germanique, française et étrangère* (1858-69). The general aim of the review was "faire connaître l'Allemagne savante à la France." (Claude Digeon, *La Crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870-1914* [Paris, 1869], 42.) Edmond de Pressensé immediately stated his fear that the *Revue* would propagandize pantheist Germany to the exclusion of Christian Germany. (*Revue chrétienne*, V [1858], *ibid.*)

¹⁰⁷ Abbé Legrand (Arthur Le Hir), "Saint Pierre et saint Paul en face des juifs et des judaïsants: Études sur les temps apostoliques," *Univers*, Mar. 15, 18, 1859.

¹⁰⁸ G.-R. Meignan, "D'un mouvement anti-religieux en France," *Le Correspondant*, New Ser., X, (Feb. 1859), 225-50; (Mar. 1859), 428-55.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., H. Mertian, "Les origines du christianisme d'après la *Revue germanique*," and "Les origines du christianisme d'après l'école de Tubingue," *Études*, III (1861), 60-87, 396-423, 605-35.

¹¹⁰ *Études* trained its heavy artillery on Renan: "M. Renan et l'exégèse antichrétienne," *ibid.*, I (1859), 161-218; "M. Renan," *ibid.*, New Ser., II (1863), 597-633; "Les distractions de M. Renan," *ibid.*, 841-61, in which Alexandre Bourquenoud attacked Renan's competence in Near Eastern studies; and "M. Renan et la grammaire hébraïque," *ibid.*, 1063-76.

¹¹¹ For a partial antidote to Lamennais's attack, see R. R. Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France* (Princeton, N. J., 1939).

¹¹² Étienne Vacherot, "La théologie catholique en France," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXXVI (2^e période, 1868), 294-318. This article brought a reply from Alphonse Gratry, "Lettres sur la religion, réponse à M. Vacherot," *ibid.*, LXXX (2^e période, 1869), 129-48; and a reply from Vacherot, "La méthode théologique," *ibid.*, 149-71.

cism later made by Albert Houtin's attack in *La question biblique chez les catholiques de France au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1902). Thus, as Alec R. Vidler states, neither liberals nor intransigents were ready to face Renan's challenge of criticism or to understand it.¹¹³ Is this true? Had the condemnation of Richard Simon's works in the seventeenth century retarded Biblical criticism in France for over a century?¹¹⁴

There were certainly grave deficiencies in nineteenth-century Catholic scholarship in France. These shortcomings were part of a wider pattern of general backwardness, especially in areas vital for the history of religions, in the French university itself. Unimaginative bureaucratic control combined with conservative clerical influence made the system partially moribund. Although the *Institut d'Égypte* and the *École des langues orientales* had been founded in 1795, Fraysinoux excluded the controversial science of Egyptology from the university in the heyday of Champollion. But by mid-century enlightened Catholic opinion was aware of the need for the new scholarship and was confidently charting the course for the future. Abbé A.-L.-A. Perraud, professor of ecclesiastical history at the Sorbonne, did not share all of the hostile opinions of J.-B. Bossuet on Simon. Enlightened by F. X. Reithmayr of Munich, he recognized a "healthy and fertile part" of Simon's work.¹¹⁵ It is generally argued that seminary training was bad; that few clergy went beyond the seminary to train in the Catholic faculties of theology maintained by the state aggravated this deficiency. The fears of Rome and the hierarchy concerning the control of the state over doctrine and also by the suspicions of Rome concerning the orthodoxy of professors like Maret explain the lack of attendance. The difficulties of Monsignor D.-A. Affre in the 1840's in establishing the *Maison des Carmes* for higher Catholic studies indicate the lack of enthusiasm in Rome and the opposition of the July Monarchy to any private educational facilities. Having no students or teachers, the Toulouse faculty of theology closed in 1830. But Salinis had been professor of dogma at Bordeaux; Cazalès had headed the *Petit Séminaire* at Nîmes and then the *Grand Séminaire* at Montauban; and J.-J.-L. Bargès had taught Arabic at Marseilles. Some of the provincial seminaries harbored good scholars, like Valroger at Bayeux and L.-J. Bondil at Digne, although they frequently found their way to Paris,¹¹⁶ whose

¹¹³ Alec R. Vidler, *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church* (Cambridge, Eng., 1934), 30.

¹¹⁴ This opinion was stated in a "Rapport sur les progrès des études sémitiques in France, 1840-1866," *Recueil de rapports sur les progrès des lettres et des sciences en France* (Paris, 1867).

¹¹⁵ A.-L.-A. Perraud (later cardinal bishop of Autun), *L'oratoire de France au XVII^e et au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1865), 501-503. The numerous letters of Perraud in the Dupanloup Papers reveal his immersion in the scholarship of the day. (BN, NAF 24701, esp. fols. 531-617.) Renan also admired Simon: "La méthode de Simon est la vraie; c'est elle de la raison pénétrante, aidée par un immense savoir. La connaissance profonde des langues orientales. . ." Renan accused Bossuet of having killed Biblical studies in France and of preparing the way for Voltaire. (Ernest Renan, "L'exégèse biblique et l'esprit français," *Revue des deux mondes*, LX [2^e période, 1865], 235-45.)

¹¹⁶ In 1849 Archbishop Marie D.-A. Sibour issued an "Ordonnance relative à un examen annuel pour les jeunes prêtres de Paris," in Scripture, dogma, ethics, canon law, and history during the first five years after ordination. (AN, F¹⁹ 4087; also relevant are *ibid.*, F¹⁹ 3112-13, personnel: Supérieurs des petits séminaires; 3968, Séminaires: enseignement en général; rapports avec l'université,

Circean attraction for all scholars enervated provincial intellectual life. Until 1828, when a bowdlerized version of Abbé Jean-Hermann Janssens' *Hermeneutica sacra* (Louvain, 1818) became available, no manual of Scripture was used. Even at Saint-Sulpice, which was also responsible for a quarter of all French seminaries, Antoine Garnier, who was in charge of Scripture for nearly the first half of the nineteenth century, had little knowledge of German criticism.

Yet one of the most brilliant products of the clerical system, Renan, gave an estimate of his education that is, on the whole, favorable.¹¹⁷ Renan appreciated the solid classical education of Dupanloup (“Virgile lui semblait faire partie de la culture intellectuelle d’un prêtre au moins autant que la bible”) dispensed at Saint-Nicolas du Chardonnet, although the study of the sciences was excluded. For Renan, Saint-Nicolas was “la maison la plus brillante et la plus mondaine.” This education had a weak basis in ideas, and its superficial humanism was incapable of preserving his faith after three years’ exposure to reason and “la recherche critique de la vérité.” He received the scientific and philosophical training that destroyed his faith at Saint-Sulpice, the Gallican-oriented seminary of freedom and virtue, where the rhetoric of Dupanloup, the antirationalism of Lamennais, and the romantic theology of Lacordaire were equally scorned. In the “beau parc mystique d’Issy,” Renan imbibed for two years a Cartesian-Scholastic intellectual concoction, denounced by the Neo-Catholics as rationalist, that gave him an excellent training in logic and his clarity of mind.¹¹⁸ German philosophy was known at Issy. Cousin and Jouffroy, although not in the curriculum, were the subject of lively polemics. When Renan entered Saint-Sulpice for his theology the course in Scripture consisted mostly of an assistant’s reading aloud Garnier’s huge manuscript, which was based on enormous erudition, solid linguistic knowledge, and late eighteenth-century Biblical exegesis.¹¹⁹ Garnier’s pupil and successor, Le Hir, was steeped in German exegesis and theology, especially that of Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm Gesenius and Ewald. Although Hebrew was not compulsory, Renan devoured the Semitic languages taught by Le Hir, a better comparative grammarian, said Renan, than Quatremère of the Collège de France. Renan and

état du personnel enseignant des 87 séminaires diocésains; 4090, Facultés de théologie; 4092-94, Commission et École des hautes études ecclésiastiques [École des Carmes et chapitres Ste. Geneviève . . . 1825-1876].)

¹¹⁷ Ernest Renan, *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (Paris, 1883), a work not much used by the critics of clerical education. Jean Pommier, *La jeunesse cléricale d'Ernest Renan* (Paris, 1933), 59, 449, gives a low estimate of the value of the Sulpician education and sees apologetic essentially unchanged since the eighteenth century. Pommier's work is a massive and indispensable analysis, but he completely underestimates the religious revolution developing in Catholic scholarship.

¹¹⁸ J.-A.-A. Manier, one of Renan's teachers, was much influenced by Thomas Reed, the Scottish philosopher. The clerical intelligentsia adroitly used translations of the anti-Enlightenment Scottish philosophers Dugald Stewart and Reed in their fight against the legacy of the eighteenth century in France. (See, e.g., Abbé P.-H. Mabire's edition of the *Philosophie de Thomas Reed* [Paris, 1884].) Renan's hostile attitude toward the eighteenth century was formed at Saint-Sulpice.

¹¹⁹ Garnier was the pupil and collaborator of Abbé Lourdet, the occupant of the chair of Hebrew at the old Collège royale, who did considerable work in Armenian. Quatremère, himself an austere Jansenist-type Catholic, paid homage to him in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, 2d Ser., XIX (1839), 7-25. Garnier was among the Sulpicians sent to Baltimore in 1791 to found a seminary; Chateaubriand was on the same voyage of the *Saint-Pierre*. Garnier returned to France in 1803.

Le Hir necessarily drifted apart and often disagreed over Semitic topics. The master sometimes showed his more famous pupil to be wrong, as in the case of the Phoenician inscriptions Renan discovered in 1862.¹²⁰

Le Hir was not alone in the Catholic world in examining the questions posed by the new Near Eastern studies. Abbé J.-J.-L. Bargès, a specialist in Arabic, Abbé François-Marie Bertrand of Versailles, and Alexandre Bourquenoud were among a growing number of the clergy who, instead of opposing one German authority to another in the fashion of Meignan, were now beginning to examine the evidence themselves. This new mood and approach were clear before the appearance of *La vie de Jésus*. Abbé Henry-Joseph Crelier contested Renan's interpretation of the moral system in Job, and Émile Hautcoeur, showing his mastery of German scholarship, attacked Renan's translation of the Song of Songs.¹²¹ Bonnetty's *Annales* clearly showed the *esprit nouveau* in carrying articles by Félix Nève of Louvain on the renaissance of Syriac studies and Jules Mohr on the progress of studies in Near Eastern languages, history, and religion.¹²² Jules Oppert's translations of the "Inscriptions des Sargonides" added the dimension of Assyrian history.¹²³

This new critical spirit coexisted with the older uncritical type of learning that found its most indefatigable servant in the *auvergnat* entrepreneur Abbé J.-P. Migne, recognized by C.-V. Langlois as one of the most extraordinary polygraphs and compilers in the history of learning. Much of the intellectual part of the vast collective enterprise was done by Dom J.-B. Pitra, a well-known patrologist. On his own press Migne printed his most notable collections: 221 volumes of *Patrologia latina*, 1844-1855, and 166 volumes of *Patrologia graeca*, 1857-1866, putting writers of doctoral dissertations and of official Church documents eternally in his debt. It is significant that Migne's *Catholicum Lexicon hébraïque et chaldéen* was severely criticized by Bargès of the Sorbonne.¹²⁴ The critical spirit, recognizing only scholarly excellence, gave no quarter to the antiquated, tendentious type of scholarship.

The prevalent idea that the Church was dumfounded by *La vie de Jésus* because there was no one among the clergy to meet Renan on his own ground of

¹²⁰ Arthur Le Hir, *Épigraphie phénicienne: Examen des inscriptions d'Oumm-el-Awamid expliquées par M. Renan* (Paris, 1864). Le Hir accused Renan of spreading false translations. In Renan's *Souvenirs* (p. 151) he said of Le Hir: "Il s'occupa des inscriptions phéniciennes et fit une supposition très ingénieuse, qui depuis a été confirmée." Pommier (*Jeunesse cléricale d'Ernest Renan*, 487), in spite of Renan's perceptive remarks to the contrary, concludes that Le Hir was not superior to Garnier.

¹²¹ Abbé H.-J. Crelier, "Examen du système moral attribué au livre de Job par M. E. Renan," *Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques*, I (1860), 305-21; E. Hautcoeur, "*Le cantique de cantiques*: Étude sur la traduction de M. Renan," *ibid.*, II (1860), 121-42.

¹²² Félix Nève, "De la renaissance des études syriaques," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, IX (1854), 7-25, 85-103; X (1854), 421-36; Jules Mohr, "Tableau des progrès faits dans l'étude des langues, de l'histoire et des traditions religieuses des peuples de l'Orient pendant les années 1858 et 1859," *ibid.*, XX (1859), 245-70, 325-52.

¹²³ "Les inscriptions des Sargonides," *ibid.*, VI (1862), 43-75, 183-208.

¹²⁴ Bonnetty attacked Bargès as an audacious novice who knew more Arabic than Hebrew. ("Examen impartial du catholicum lexicon hébraïque et chaldéen publié par M. l'abbé Migne et des critiques dont il a été l'objet," *ibid.*, 3d Ser., XIX [1849], 61-78.)

Biblical exegesis is obviously nonsense.¹²⁵ Renan's exegesis was not the threat; it was his axiomatic rejection of the supernatural and his messianic assumption of the defense of "a religious humanism against the scribes and pharisees of the Catholic Church."¹²⁶ Meignan quickly pointed out that criticism of Renan by the German Protestant scholars of Tübingen and Göttingen was epitomized by the harsh judgment of Karl Theodor Keim: "Renan n'a écrit qu'un roman ayant l'air de toucher de grandes questions, et n'en résolvant aucune."¹²⁷ It is appropriate that the most successful Catholic reply was also a novel, Veuillot's *Vie de Notre Seigneur Jésus Christ. Dieu et homme* (Paris, 1863; 3d ed., 1864; 11th ed., 1889).¹²⁸ The furor over Renan's *La vie de Jésus*, in many ways another family quarrel, had little to do with the serious issues involved in Biblical scholarship. On these issues Catholic scholarship was solid if embryonic. Those who, like Vacherot, denounced the lack of Catholic religious science merely arraigned the descendants of Bossuet (Charles-Émile Freppel, Dupanloup, and Affre) and the philosopher-theologians (Maret and Bautain), who could not be expected to be saturated in Biblical exegesis, and failed to deal with the Catholic scholars, such as Le Hir, Bargès, and Crelier, who, more or less in the tradition of Simon, more than held their own in the new science of religions. This tradition produced Renan and would produce the great flowering of Catholic scholarship of the Modernist epoch of Loisy and Duchesne.¹²⁹

The approach to discovering the roots of the Modernist crisis has all too often been a version of the birth of Pallas Athena, surely one of the very few areas of intellectual history now suffering from the Dark Ages-Renaissance syndrome. John Ratté has recently pointed out that "Modernists and orthodox historians rejected the efforts of Edmond Vermeil to trace Modernist ideas back to the work of John-Adam Möhler and [Johan-Sebastian von] Drey at Tübingen in the 1820's."¹³⁰ Vermeil's analysis did not, of course, attempt "to determine in detail the sources and the origins of French Modernism, or to question its powerful originality." He simply wanted "to reconnect it to a current of thought that already has been within the womb of Catholicism itself for a century. . . ." Vermeil did suggest analogies, some of which may be questioned, among Loisy, Möhler, and Newman, and he did assert that "The Tübingen theologians did not . . . distinguish faith from science," a concept, he noted, developed admirably by the Modernists Le Roy, Blondel, and Laberthonnière. But it is only on the last of

¹²⁵ H. W. Wardman, *Ernest Renan* (London, 1964), 82, recognizes only Le Hir's capability.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹²⁷ Boissonnot, *Meignan*, 192.

¹²⁸ Obviously inferior in all respects save orthodoxy—presumably Dom Guéranger safeguarded that—to the work of Renan, it still sold well. The work of Renan, like the condemned *Génie* of Chateaubriand, inspired many Catholics, including the clergy. For a new, friendly assessment of Renan, "un génie méconnu," see Don Sauveur Paganelli, *Ernest Renan* (Uzès, 1966).

¹²⁹ See the superb study of Émile Poulat, *Histoire, dogme et critique dans la crise moderniste* (Paris, 1962), which does not, however, probe the earlier nineteenth-century roots of Modernism.

¹³⁰ John Ratté, *Three Modernists: Alfred Loisy, George Tyrrell, William L. Sullivan* (New York, 1967), 29, 41, n. 42.

nearly five hundred pages that he said that the intellectual tradition of "la théologie wurtembergoise" was developed in Germany, reached England a little later, and then settled in France after the long work of slow infiltration that gave German Romanticism an important influence on French thought in the nineteenth century. When Rome fights the Modernist movement, he concluded, it is really fighting the German ("germanique") and Northern European conception of Catholicism,¹³¹ a conclusion that curial conservatives might be willing to agree to in these days of Hans Küng, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Karl Rahner, although the contamination of Latin and even American Catholicism indicates that heterodoxy is just as international today as it was in the early twentieth century. It is easy enough to assert that Möhler had no influence on Loisy, Tyrrell, and Friedrich von Hügel. Perhaps the problem has been approached from the wrong end. It may be that the important questions are to what extent French and German thought interacted in the first half of the nineteenth century and to what extent the ideas generated by that contact survived and developed in France. It is hard to believe that the ferment generated by Franco-German religious contacts in the first half of the nineteenth century had no influence on developments in the second half of the century.

One could, of course, adopt the view of Renan that Bossuet killed Biblical studies in France by his attack on Simon.¹³² Those inclined to dismiss this as a fantastic hypothesis should remember that the process has been elevated to the status of "a basic law of intellectual history" by Friedrich Heer:

whenever the thinking of a religious, political or social group is forced into a corner by some specific historical circumstance, usually in a life and death struggle, the shock of this experience creates a psychological block which can prevent further thinking in the given traumatic area for centuries afterward. In other words, whole complexes of ideas and impressions are simply blotted out. This blocking occurs whether it is the inner or the outer existence of the group which is threatened.¹³³

But the task of applying this conceptual model to the history of French Catholic thought from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century does not fall within the scope of this essay.¹³⁴

The purpose of this article has been to plead for an examination of the ostensibly orthodox Catholic thought of nineteenth-century France as a vital link in

¹³¹ Vermeil, *Jean-Adam Möhler*, 445-73, esp. 463, 469, 473. It might be interesting to consider the encounter as a clash of "two ways of thinking": the Modernist "hard-centred approach," with its assumption of the possibility of "explanation," and the "soft-centred approach," which gives a description, calls it "a spiritual reality," and treats the name as an explanation. "Reverence is the soft-centred equivalent of curiosity." (See "On Hard and Soft Centres," in Alex Comfort, *Darwin and the Naked Lady* [New York, 1962], 1-22.)

¹³² See note 115, above. Renan probably exaggerated the French deficiencies, thus, incidentally, enhancing his own importance in "introducing" German criticism into France. C.-F. Dupuis and C.-F. Volney made important contributions before the German "higher critics." (George A. Wells, "Stages of New Testament Criticism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXX [No. 2, 1969], 147-60.)

¹³³ Friedrich Heer, *The Intellectual History of Europe*, tr. Jonathan Steinberg (2 vols., Garden City, N. Y., 1968), I, 3.

¹³⁴ The eighteenth-century variables that will not fit into this model may be found in Palmer, *Catholics and Unbelievers*, esp. Chap. v.

understanding the intellectual whirlwind that struck in the early twentieth century. This paper has also made evident, I hope, that there was an astounding variety of Catholic systems of thought in the nineteenth century, rather than the stagnant pool of orthodoxy in which, some writers assume, the Church was drowning. The adoption of Thomism by the establishment as a quasi-official philosophy probably had as one of its results, although it may fall under the law of unintended consequences, the relegation into the category of risky speculation, if not heterodoxy, of the Catholic philosophical-theological quarrels that gave Rome so much *Angst* throughout the nineteenth century. The growing rigidity of doctrine promoted by Rome, as a means of ending the debates of the nineteenth century, it was hoped, had, with the Modernist crisis, the reverse result: a family quarrel became a crusade in which true believer confronted infidel, with no middle ground between *romanità* and heresy, or at least schism.¹³⁵ Even the assumption of a paradigm of orthodoxy for French Catholic thought in the nineteenth century does not preclude the importance of that thought for understanding the Modernist period. As Alfred North Whitehead pointed out, "Theology itself exhibits exactly the same character of gradual development, arising from an aspect of conflict between its own proper ideas. This fact is a commonplace to theologians, but it is often obscured in the stress of controversy."¹³⁶ This process of the theological dialectic continues, even within what appears to be the most orthodox of periods, as the Le Hir-Renan relationship showed, and one could easily list a host of heretics or schismatics hatched in the incubators of orthodoxy. Whatever the importance of the Oedipal complex in explaining these intellectual mutations, another cerebral factor should be kept in mind:

Christian and anti-Christian systems can always be deduced from every significant theological and philosophical system. Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, and Marx were theistic and atheistic at the same time. The most orthodox thinkers, the church fathers of philosophy and theology, all contain their opposite in themselves. Hence they turn out to be powerful promoters of heresy while they were consciously defending orthodoxy. A good deal of the nonconformist systems of thought and belief prevailing in Europe can be traced back to Paul, Augustine, Scotus, and Eckhart.¹³⁷

If we accept Loisy's argument that the essential aim of Modernism was, while remaining within Catholicism and without damaging the unity of the Church, to break the absolutism of theological belief and especially to remodel the intellectual regime of the Church and its teaching, then there is a remarkable structural similarity between the aims of the Modernists and those of most Catholic intellectuals in the nineteenth century. The *Institut catholique* may have been, as Vidler said, the nursery of Modernism, but the institution was not created *ex*

¹³⁵ See Ratté, *Three Modernists*, 337–52, for comment on this last point.

¹³⁶ Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge, Eng., 1929, originally pub. in 1926), 226.

¹³⁷ Heer, *Intellectual History*, I, xii. Similar is the ingenious attempt to explain the plethora of political interpretations of Rousseau, while still maintaining the unity of his thought. See Peter Gay's introd. to Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Bloomington, Ind., 1963).

*nihil*o. Its intellectual roots go back beyond 1875. Perhaps not a little of the explanation of the thought of the Modernists is to be found in the supposedly sterile concoctions with which the seminarians were force fed. But it can hardly be denied that Rome, horrified by the isotopes of Catholic thought, decided that a clash of doctrines is not an opportunity but a disaster—to invert Whitehead's aphorism—and opted for the theology of "Le paysan de la Garonne."¹³⁸ To what extent Modernist thought is a highly qualified derivative of much of nineteenth-century orthodoxy, in some ways comparable to the relationship, perhaps, between James Joyce's Thomism and the thought of Aquinas,¹³⁹ is a question that may have a surprising answer.

¹³⁸ Jacques Maritain, *Le paysan de la Garonne: Un vieux laïc s'interroge à propos du temps présent* (Paris, 1966). I realize that, distasteful as it may be to the intelligentsia, "one must credit the conservative opponents of too radical an *aggiornamento* with a good deal of sociological instinct." (Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* [Garden City, N. Y., 1967], 170.)

¹³⁹ William T. Noon, *Joyce and Aquinas* (New Haven, Conn., 1957), vii, concludes that the connection "is for the most part a matter of thematic correspondences and general categories or affinities of outlook." It has long been believed by historians of science that "One of the characteristics of orthodoxy seems to be that it stimulates heresy. . . ." (L. Pearce Williams, *The Origins of Field Theory* [New York, 1966], 31.) A book that should be the vade mecum of intellectual historians is Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, 1962).