From Duhem's "The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory": Pascal's Pensées Il y a donc deux sortes d’esprits: l’une, de pénétrer vivement et profondément les conséquences des principes, et c’est là l’esprit de justesse; l’autre, de comprendre un grand nombre de principes sans les confondre, et c’est là l’esprit de géométrie. L’un est force et droiture d’esprit, l’autre est amplitude d’esprit. Or, l’un peut être sans l’autre, l’esprit pouvant être fort et étroit, et pouvant être aussi ample et faible. ALBERTUS MAGNUS & METHODOLOGY ------------UNORDERED--------------------- 5. Wallace Fn. 20: Albertus Magnus, Physica, lib. 2, tr. 3, c. 5 "In his exposition of the Physics, moreover, Albert is at pains to point out how mathematical demonstrations differ from those found in the study of nature: the mathematical disciplines are concerned with a necessity that is absolute, whereas the natural philosopher is invariably dealing with a necessity that is only suppositional.(20) The reason for this, in Albert's view, is that the mathematician works with internal causes alone, i.e., with matter and form, which cannot be impeded in their operation, whereas the naturalist analyzes his subject in terms of both internal and external causes, adding the agent and the end to matter and form as his proper principles of explanation. Nature clearly acts for an end — and no medieval had doubts about the truth of that axiom — but since external causes can be impeded it does not always attain the end it intends. Thus Albert is aware that one must reason «on the supposition of the end» being attained when formulating demonstrations in the science of nature (21)." 1. Nogar pdf pg. 22 ff. Fn. 34: Albertus Magnus, Physics, lib. 8, tract 5, c. 2 "It was of prime importance to Albert that his system preserve throughout a denotative reference to sensible reality, and he elaborates at length on the necessity for a strictly physical system to provide strictly physical definitions which are verified ultimately by sense observation." Fn. 35: Physics, lib. 2, tract 1, c. 8 "The difference between a mathematical definition, a metaphysical definition and a purely physical one is carefully outlined, and the last is used to the exclusion of the other two." ---------------- Fn. 36: Physics, lib. 1, tract 1 "In the most formal and strict sense, the physical world is studied by Albert as it is perceived as sensibly changing." Fn. 37: Physics lib. 5, tract 1 "A careful reading of how Albert refines more and more his definitions and methods of applying the definitions shows that although mathematical exactitude is not his aim, he achieves the precision required for strictly scientific procedure." ---------------- pdf pg. 25 Fn. 39: Physics, lib. 1, tract, c. 4 "Finally, he organizes the entire body of biological knowledge, ordering the sciences according to their special problems." Fn. 41: Physics, lib. 8, tract 3, c. 10 "It was an Aristotelian tenet of physical theory that since spatial change was presupposed to all other change, technique proper to a study of spatial change could also be applied to chemical transformation and the organized activity of living things." PDF pg. 26 Fn. 42: Physics, lib. 2, tract 1, c. 8 "Certain artificial techniques could aid in that investigation and verification, and he incorporated those techniques into the unity of physical sciences." Fn. 43: Physics, lib. 8, tract 1, c. 14 "There are some, comments Albert in refuting Aristotle's teaching on the eternity of the world, who think Aristotle is a god and cannot be mistaken, but it is manifest that he can be and is sometimes in error." ------------ORDERED--------------------- 1. Nogar pdf pg. 22 ff. Fn. 36: Physics, lib. 1, tract 1 "In the most formal and strict sense, the physical world is studied by Albert as it is perceived as sensibly changing." Fn. 39: Physics, lib. 1, tract, c. 4 "Finally, he organizes the entire body of biological knowledge, ordering the sciences according to their special problems." Fn. 35: Physics, lib. 2, tract 1, c. 8 "The difference between a mathematical definition, a metaphysical definition and a purely physical one is carefully outlined, and the last is used to the exclusion of the other two." Fn. 42: Physics, lib. 2, tract 1, c. 8 "Certain artificial techniques could aid in that investigation and verification, and he incorporated those techniques into the unity of physical sciences." 5. Wallace Fn. 20: Albertus Magnus, Physica, lib. 2, tr. 3, c. 5 "In his exposition of the Physics, moreover, Albert is at pains to point out how mathematical demonstrations differ from those found in the study of nature: the mathematical disciplines are concerned with a necessity that is absolute, whereas the natural philosopher is invariably dealing with a necessity that is only suppositional.(20) The reason for this, in Albert's view, is that the mathematician works with internal causes alone, i.e., with matter and form, which cannot be impeded in their operation, whereas the naturalist analyzes his subject in terms of both internal and external causes, adding the agent and the end to matter and form as his proper principles of explanation. Nature clearly acts for an end — and no medieval had doubts about the truth of that axiom — but since external causes can be impeded it does not always attain the end it intends. Thus Albert is aware that one must reason «on the supposition of the end» being attained when formulating demonstrations in the science of nature (21)." Fn. 37: Physics lib. 5, tract 1 "A careful reading of how Albert refines more and more his definitions and methods of applying the definitions shows that although mathematical exactitude is not his aim, he achieves the precision required for strictly scientific procedure." Fn. 43: Physics, lib. 8, tract 1, c. 14 "There are some, comments Albert in refuting Aristotle's teaching on the eternity of the world, who think Aristotle is a god and cannot be mistaken, but it is manifest that he can be and is sometimes in error." Fn. 41: Physics, lib. 8, tract 3, c. 10 "It was an Aristotelian tenet of physical theory that since spatial change was presupposed to all other change, technique proper to a study of spatial change could also be applied to chemical transformation and the organized activity of living things." Fn. 34: Albertus Magnus, Physics, lib. 8, tract 5, c. 2 "It was of prime importance to Albert that his system preserve throughout a denotative reference to sensible reality, and he elaborates at length on the necessity for a strictly physical system to provide strictly physical definitions which are verified ultimately by sense observation."