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SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

COMMENTARY ON THE LETTER OF SAINT PAUL TO THE ROMANS

Translated by F. R. Larcher, O.P.
Edited by J. Mortensen and E. Alarcón

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Lecture 6

1:16 **Non enim erubesco Evangelium.** Virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti, Judaeo primum, et Graeco. [n. 97]

1:17 **Justitia enim Dei in eo revelatur ex fide in fidem: sicut scriptum est: Justus autem ex fide vivit.** [n. 102]

1:18 **Revelatur enim ira Dei de caelo super omnem impietatem, et injustitiam hominum eorum, qui veritatem Dei in injustitia detinent:** [n. 109]

1:19 **quia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit.** [n. 113]

1:20 **Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas: ita ut sint inexcusabiles.** [n. 117]

1:16 Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἑλληνι:

1:17 δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται, Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

1:18 Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσεβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων,

1:19 διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς: ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφάνέρωσεν.

1:20 τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε αἰδὶς αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους:

1:16 **For I am not ashamed of the Gospel.** For it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone who believes: to the Jew first and to the Greek. [n. 97]

1:17 **For the justice of God is revealed therein, from faith unto faith, as it is written: the just man lives by faith.** [n. 102]

1:18 **For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice:** [n. 109]

1:19 **Because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God has manifested it unto them.** [n. 113]

1:20 **For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.** [n. 117]

97. Postquam Apostolus Romanos fideles, quibus scribebat, sibi benevolos reddidit ostendendo affectum suum ad eos, hic incipit instruere eos de his quae pertinent ad Evangelicam doctrinam in quam se segregatum praedixerat.

Et primo ostendit virtutem evangelicae gratiae, secundo exhortatur ad executionem operum huius gratiae, XII cap., ibi *obsecro itaque*.

Circa primum duo facit:

primo proponit quod intendit,

secundo manifestat propositum, ibi *revelatur enim*.

Circa primum tria facit:

primo proponit virtutem evangelicae gratiae,

secundo exponit ibi *iustitia enim*,

tertio expositionem confirmat ibi *sicut scriptum est*.

98. Dicit ergo primo: ideo *Evangelium non erubesco*, quia, quamvis ut dicitur I Cor. I, 18, *verbum crucis pereuntibus quidem stultitia sit, nobis tamen virtus Dei est. Virtus enim Dei est*.

Quod potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quia virtus Dei in Evangelio manifestatur secundum illud Ps. CX, 6: *virtutem operum suorum adnuntiavit populo suo*; alio modo, quia ipsum Evangelium in se Dei virtutem continet, secundum illud Ps. LXVIII, 34: *dabit voci suae vocem virtutis*.

97. After eliciting the good will of the Roman believers, to whom he was writing, by showing his affection for them, the Apostle now begins to instruct them in matters pertinent to the teachings of the Gospel for which he had been set apart.

First, he shows them the power of the Gospel grace; second, he urges them to perform the works of this grace, at *I beseech you therefore* (Rom 12:1).

In regard to the first he does two things:

first, he sets forth what he intends;

second, he explains it, at *for the wrath of God*.

In regard to the first he does three things:

first, he sets forth the power of the Gospel grace;

second, he explains it, at *for the justice*;

third, he supports his explanation, at *as it is written*.

98. He says, therefore: *I am not ashamed of the Gospel*, because, although *the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, to us who are being saved it is the power of God* (1 Cor 1:18). *For it is the power of God*.

This can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the power of God is manifested in the Gospel: *he has shown the people the power of his works* (Ps 111:6); in another way, that the Gospel itself contains in itself God's power, in the sense of the Psalm: *he will give to his voice a voice of power* (Ps 67:34).

99. Circa quam virtutem tria sunt consideranda.

Primo quidem ad quid se ista virtus extendat, et hoc designatur cum subditur *in salutem*. Iac. I, 21: *in mansuetudine suscipite insitum verbum quod potest salvare animas vestras*. Quod quidem fit tripliciter: uno modo, in quantum per verbum Evangelii remittuntur peccata; Io. XV, 3: *iam mundi estis propter sermonem quem locutus sum vobis*. Secundo, in quantum per Evangelium homo consequitur gratiam sanctificantem; Io. XVII, 17: *sanctifica eos in veritate. Sermo tuus veritas est*. Tertio, in quantum perducit ad vitam aeternam; Io. VI, 69: *verba vitae aeternae habes*.

100. Secundo, per quem modum Evangelium salutem conferat, quia per fidem, quod designatur cum dicitur *omni credenti*. Quod fit tripliciter: primo per praedicationem; Mc. ultim.: *praedicate Evangelium omni creaturae; qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit salvus erit*. Secundo per confessionem; infra X, 10: *oris confessio fit ad salutem*. Tertio per Scripturam, unde etiam verba Evangelii scripta virtutem salutiferam habent, sicut beatus Barnabas infirmos curabat, Evangelium superponendo.

Cavendae sunt tamen superstitiones characterum, quia hoc est superstitiosum. Unde, Ez. IX, 6, illi salvati sunt in quorum frontibus est scriptum thau, quod est signum crucis.

101. Tertio, quibus Evangelium fit in salutem, quia tam Iudaeis quam gentibus. Non enim Iudaeorum tantum Deus est sed et gentium, infra III, 29, et ideo subdit *Iudaeo primum et Graeco*.

Per *Graecum* omnem gentilem intelligens, eo quod a Graecis gentilium sapientia est exorta.

Sed, cum infra X, 10 dicatur *non est distinctio Iudaei et Graeci*, quomodo hic *Iudaeo primum*?

Dicendum est ergo quod quantum ad salutis finem consequendum non est distinctio inter eos, aequalem enim consequuntur mercedem utrique, sicut pro labore etiam in vinea, priores et posteriores, eundem denarium acceperunt, ut dicitur Matth. XX, 1–16. Sed quantum ad ordinem salutis Iudaei sunt primi, quia eis promissiones sunt factae, ut infra III, 2, et in eorum gratiam sunt gentiles assumpti, ac si ramus oleastri inseratur in bonam olivam, ut infra XI, 24. Ex his etiam salvator noster natus est. Io. IV, 22: *salus ex Iudaeis est*.

102. Exponit autem consequenter quomodo Evangelium sit in salutem cum dicit *Iustitia enim Dei revelatur in eo ex fide in fidem*.

Quod quidem dupliciter potest intelligi.

Uno modo de iustitia qua Deus iustus est, secundum illud Ps. X, 8: *iustus Dominus et iustitias dilexit*. Et

99. In regard to this power three things can be considered.

First, to what it extends. This is answered when he says, *unto salvation: receive with meekness the implanted word, which is able to save your soul* (Jas 1:21). This happens in three ways: first, insofar as sins are forgiven by the word of the Gospel: *you are made clean by the word I have spoken to you* (John 15:3). Second, insofar as a man obtains sanctifying grace through the Gospel: *sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth* (John 17:17). Third, insofar as it leads to eternal life: *you have the words of eternal life* (John 6:68).

100. The second consideration is how the Gospel confers salvation, namely, through faith, which is indicated when he says, *to everyone who believes*. This happens in three ways. First, through preaching: *preach the Gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized will be saved* (Mark 16:15). Second, by confessing the faith: *with the mouth confession is made unto salvation* (Rom 10:10). Third, by the Scripture; hence even the written words of the Gospel have a saving power, as Barnabas cured the sick by placing the Gospel upon them.

Nonetheless, one must beware the superstitions of characters, because this is superstitious. Hence in Ezekiel, those were saved who had written on their foreheads a Tau (Ezek 9:6), which is the sign of the cross.

101. The third thing to be considered is the people for whom the Gospel works salvation, namely, both the Jews and the gentiles. For God is God not of the Jews only, but also of the gentiles, as he says below (Rom 3:19); hence he adds *to the Jew first and also to the Greek*.

By *Greek* is meant all the gentiles, because the gentiles' wisdom arose from the Greeks.

But since he says below *there is no distinction between Jew and Greek* (Rom 10:12), why does he say here that *the Jew is first*?

The answer is that there is no distinction as far as the goal of salvation to be obtained is concerned, for both obtain an equal reward, just as in the vineyard the early and the late workers received one coin (Matt 20:10). But in the order of salvation the Jews are first, because the promises were made to them (Rom 3:2), whereas the gentiles were included in their grace like a branch grafted into a cultivated olive tree (Rom 11:24). Also, our savior was born from the Jews: *salvation is from the Jews* (John 4:22).

102. Then he explains how the Gospel works unto salvation when he says, *for the justice of God is revealed therein from faith unto faith*.

This can be understood in two ways.

In one way it can refer to the justice by which God is just: *the Lord is just and has loved justice* (Ps 11:7). Taken

secundum hoc, sensus est quod *iustitia Dei*, qua scilicet iustus est servando promissa, *in eo revelatur*, scilicet in homine credente Evangelio, quia credit Deum implese quod promisit de Christo mittendo; et hoc *ex fide*, scilicet Dei promittentis Ps. CXLIV, 13: *fidelis Dominus in omnibus verbis suis*. *In fidem* scilicet hominis credentis.

Vel, alio modo, ut intelligatur de iustitia Dei, qua Deus homines iustificat. Nam iustitia hominum dicitur qua se homines, propriis viribus, iustificare praesumunt, infra X, 3: *ignorantes Dei iustitiam et suam quaerentes statuere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti*. Quae quidem iustitia revelatur in Evangelio, in quantum per fidem Evangelii homines iustificantur secundum quodcumque tempus, unde subdit *ex fide in fidem*, id est ex fide Veteris Testamenti procedendo in fidem Novi Testamenti, quia ab utroque homines iustificantur et salvantur per fidem Christi, quia eadem fide crediderunt venturum qua nos venisse credimus; et ideo dicitur II Cor. IV, 13: *habentes eandem speciem fidei credimus propter quod loquimur*.

103. Vel potest intelligi *ex fide* praedicatorum in *fidem* auditorum, infra X, 14: *quomodo credent ei quem non audierunt?*

Vel *ex fide* unius articuli, *in fidem* alterius, quia ad iustificationem requiritur omnium articulorum fides. Apoc. I, 3: *beatus qui legit et audit verba prophetiae huius*.

Alio modo potest intelligi *ex fide* praesenti *in fidem* futuram, id est in plenam visionem Dei, quae quidem dicitur fides ratione certae et firmae cognitionis, haec autem ratione Evangelicae cognitionis. I Cor. XIII, 12: *videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem*.

104. Probat autem hanc expositionem cum subdit *sicut scriptum est iustus autem meus ex fide vivit*. Quod quidem accipitur secundum litteram Lxx. Nam in littera nostra, quae est secundum Hebraicam veritatem, dicitur *iustus ex fide sua vivit*.

Dicitur autem *iustus meus*, scilicet a me iustificatus et apud me iustus reputatus, infra IV, 2 s.: *si autem Abraham ex operibus legis iustificatus est, habet gloriam sed non apud Deum. Quid enim Scriptura dicit? Credidit Abraham Deo, et reputatum est ei ad iustitiam*. Unde ex hoc subditur *ex fide vivit*, scilicet vita gratiae. Gal. II, 20: *quod autem nunc vivo in carne, in fide vivo Filii Dei*.

105. Quatuor autem hic considerare oportet circa fidem.

Primum quidem quid sit fides. Importat enim assensum quemdam cum certitudine, ad id quod non videtur, ex voluntate, *quia nullus credit nisi volens*, ut Augustinus dicit. Et secundum hoc differt credens a dubitante, qui in neutram partem assentit; differt etiam ab opinante qui assentit in unam partem, non cum certitudine sed cum formidine alterius; differt etiam a sciente qui per

this way, the sense is that *the justice of God*, by which he is just in keeping his promises, *is revealed in him*, namely, in the man who believes the Gospel, because he believes that God has fulfilled what he promised about sending the Christ. And this is *from faith*, namely, of God who promised: *the Lord is faithful in all his words* (Ps 145:13); *unto faith*, namely of the man who believes.

Or it can refer to the justice of God by which God makes men just. For the justice of men is that by which men presume to make themselves just by their own efforts: *not knowing the justice of God and seeking to establish their own justice, they did not submit to the justice of God* (Rom 10:3). This justice is revealed in the Gospel inasmuch as men are justified by faith in the Gospel in every age. Hence he adds, *from faith unto faith*, i.e., proceeding from faith in the Old Testament to faith in the New, because in both cases men are made just and are saved by faith in Christ, since they believed in his coming with the same faith as we believe that he has come. Therefore, it is stated in 2 Corinthians: *we have the same type of faith as he had who wrote: I believed, and so I spoke* (2 Cor 4:13).

103. Or it can mean *from faith* of the preachers to the faith of the hearers: *how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard?* (Rom 10:14).

Or *from faith* in one article, *unto faith* in another, because justification requires belief in all the articles: *blessed is he who reads and hears the words of this prophecy* (Rev 1:3).

It can be taken as *from* present *faith* and *unto* future *faith*, i.e., into the full vision of God, which is called faith by reason of the certainty and solidity of the knowledge, while this present faith is called faith by reason of the knowledge of the Gospel: *for now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face* (1 Cor 13:12).

104. He supports this explanation when he adds *as it is written: my just man lives by faith*. This follows the Septuagint text, for in our text, which follows the Hebrew truth, it says *the just man lives by his faith*.

It says *my just man*, i.e., justified by me and reputed just before me, as is said below, *but if Abraham was justified by works of the law, he has glory, but not before God. For what do the Scriptures say? Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice* (Rom 4:2). Hence it adds *lives by faith*, i.e., by the life of grace: *the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God* (Gal 2:20).

105. Four things must be considered here concerning faith.

First, what faith is. For it involves willed assent, with certitude, to that which is not seen: because, as Augustine says, *no one believes unless he is willing*. According to this definition a believer differs from a doubter, who assents to neither side; he also differs from one holding an opinion, who assents to one side not with certitude but with fear concerning the other side; he differs also from one who

certitudinem assentit ex necessitate rationis. Et secundum hoc fides est media inter scientiam et opinionem.

106. Secundo considerandum est an fides sit virtus.

Et manifestum est quod non est virtus si accipiat pro eo quod creditur secundum illud *fides Catholica haec est ut unum Deum in Trinitate*. Si autem accipiat pro habitu quo credimus, sic quandoque est virtus, quandoque non.

Est enim virtus principium actus perfecti. Actus autem, ex duobus principiis dependens, non potest esse perfectus si alteri principiorum desit sua perfectio: sicut equitatio non potest esse perfecta si vel equus bene non vadat, vel sessor equum ducere nesciat. Actus autem fidei, qui est credere, dependet ex intellectu et voluntate movente intellectum ad assensum; unde actus fidei erit perfectus si voluntas perficiatur per habitum caritatis et intellectus per habitum fidei, non autem si habitus caritatis desit; et ideo fides formata caritate est virtus, non autem fides informis.

107. Tertio considerandum est quod idem numero habitus fidei, qui sine caritate erat informis, adveniente caritate fit virtus; quia, cum caritas sit extra essentiam fidei, per eius adventum et recessum non mutatur substantia eius.

108. Quarto considerandum est quod sicut corpus vivit per animam naturali vita, ita anima vivit per Deum vita gratiae. Primo autem Deus animam inhabitat per fidem, Eph. III, 17: *habitare Christum per fidem in cordibus vestris*. Nec tamen est perfecta habitatio nisi fides per caritatem sit formata, quae per vinculum perfectionis nos unit Deo, ut dicitur Col. III, 14. Et ideo, quod hic dicit *ex fide vivit* intelligendum est de fide formata.

109. Deinde cum dicit *revelatur enim ira Dei*, probat quod dixerat, scilicet virtutem evangelicae gratiae esse omnibus hominibus in salutem.

Et primo ostendit quod est necessaria ad salutem;

secundo quod est efficax sive sufficiens, V cap., ibi *iustificati ergo ex fide*.

Circa primum duo facit.

Primo ostendit virtutem evangelicae gratiae esse necessariam ad salutem gentibus, quia scilicet sapientia, de qua confidebant, salvare eos non potuit;

secundo ostendit quod fuit necessaria Iudaeis, quia scilicet circumcisio et lex et alia in quibus confidebant, eis salutem non attulerunt. II cap. Ibi *propter quod inexcusabilis es*.

Circa primum duo facit.

Primo proponit quod intendit;

secundo manifestat propositum, ibi *quia quod notum est Dei*.

knows scientifically, who through certitude assents by the necessity of reason. Accordingly, faith is midway between scientific knowledge and opinion.

106. The second consideration is whether faith is a virtue.

Clearly it is not, if faith is taken for that which is believed, as in the statement: *this is the Catholic faith, that we venerate one God in Trinity*. But if it is taken for the habit by which we believe, then sometimes it is a virtue and sometimes not.

For a virtue is a principle of a perfect act. But an act depending on two principles cannot be perfect, if either of the principles lacks its perfection, just as riding cannot be perfect, if the horse does not run well or the rider does not know how to guide the horse. Now the act of faith, which is to believe, depends on the intellect and on the will moving the intellect to assent. Hence, the act of faith will be perfect, if the will is perfected by the habit of charity and the intellect by the habit of faith, but not if the habit of charity is lacking. Consequently, faith formed by charity is a virtue; but not unformed faith.

107. The third point to be considered is that the same numerical habit of faith which was not formed by charity becomes a virtue with the advent of charity, because, since charity is outside the essence of faith, the substance of faith is not changed by the coming or going of charity.

108. Fourth, we must consider that just as the body lives its natural life through the soul, so the soul lives the life of grace through God. First of all, God dwells in the soul through faith: *that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith* (Eph 3:17); but this indwelling is not perfect, unless faith is formed by charity, which by the bond of perfection unites us to God (Col 3:14). Consequently, the phrase *lives by faith* must be understood of formed faith.

109. Then when he says *the wrath of God is revealed*, he proves what he had said, namely, that the power of the Gospel's grace exists for all men unto salvation.

First, he shows that it is necessary for salvation;

second, that it is efficacious or sufficient, at *being justified therefore by faith* (Rom 5:1).

In regard to the first he does two things.

First, he shows that the power of the Gospel grace was necessary for the gentiles' salvation, because the wisdom in which they trusted could not save them;

second, he shows that it was necessary for the Jews, because circumcision, the law, and other things in which they trusted, did not bring them salvation, at *wherefore you are inexcusable* (Rom 2:1).

In regard to the first he does two things.

First, he states his intention;

second, he manifests it, at *because that which is known of God*.

110. Proponit autem tria. Primo quidem poenam dicens: recte dico quod in eo iustitia Dei revelatur, **revelatur enim** in eo **ira Dei**, id est vindicta ipsius, quae dicitur ira Dei secundum similitudinem hominum irascentium, qui vindictam quaerunt extra. Tamen Deus vindictam infert ex animi tranquillitate. Sap. XII, 18: *tu autem Dominator noster cum tranquillitate iudicas*.

Et de hac ira Dei dicitur Io. III, 36: *qui incredulus est Filio non videbit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum*.

Hoc autem dicitur quia quidam philosophi dicebant a Deo non esse poenas peccatorum, contra id quod dicitur in Ps. XCIII, 10: *qui corripit gentes non arguet?*

Unde additur **de caelo**, quia credebant circa caelestia eius providentiam occupari, ita quod ad res terrenas non se extenderet. Iob XXII, 14: *circa cardines caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat*. Sed, sicut in Ps. CI, 20 dicitur, *Dominus de caelo in terram prospexit*.

Vel dicitur **de caelo** eorum iniquitatem demonstrare, quia maxime ex magnitudine caeli Creatoris virtutem intelligere debuerunt. Iob XX, 27: *revelabunt caeli iniquitatem eius*.

Vel **de caelo** venturi ad iudicium. Act. I, 11: *quemadmodum vidistis eum ascendentem in caelum, ita veniet*.

111. Secundo ponit culpam pro qua poena infligitur.

Et primo quidem culpam, quae contra Deum committitur cum subdit **super omnem impietatem**. Sicut enim pietas dicitur cultus qui Deo exhibetur, tamquam summo parenti, sic impietas dicitur peccatum quod est contra cultum divinum. Ez. XVIII, 28: *impietas impii super eum erit*.

Secundo, ponit culpam quae committitur in homine cum dicit **et iniustitiam**. Nam iustitia est per quam homines sibi invicem ratione conveniunt et communicant. Iob XXXV, 8: *filius hominis adiuvabit iustitiam tuam*.

112. Tertio ponit cognitionem quam de eo habuerunt, cum subdit **hominum eorum qui veritatem Dei**, id est veram de Deo cognitionem, **detinent in iniustitia**, quasi captivatam. Nam vera Dei cognitio quantum est de se inducit homines ad bonum, sed ligatur, quasi captivitate detenta, per iniustitiae affectum, per quam, ut Ps. XI, 1, *diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum*.

113. Deinde cum dicit **quia quod notum est**, manifestat propositum, ordine tamen retrogrado.

Primo enim consentit quod sapientes gentilium de Deo cognoverunt veritatem;

secundo, ostendit quod in eis impietas et iniustitia fuerit, ibi **ita ut sint inexcusabiles**;

tertio quod iram Dei incurrerunt, ibi **qui cum iustitiam Dei**.

110. And he sets forth three things. First, punishment, when he says: rightly do I say that the justice of God is revealed in it, **for** in it **the wrath of God is revealed**, i.e., God's vengeance, which is called wrath in comparison to angry men who seek vengeance exteriorly; although God takes vengeance with a tranquil spirit: *you, our Lord, judge with tranquility* (Wis 12:18).

Of this anger of God it is said: *he that does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests upon him* (John 3:36).

This is stated, because some philosophers said that punishments for sin are not from God, contrary to what is said in the Psalm: *he that chastises the nations, does he not chastise us?* (Ps 94:19).

That is why he adds **from heaven**, because they believed that God's providence was so occupied with the heavens that it did not extend to earthly affairs: *he walks about the poles of heaven, nor does he consider our things* (Job 22:14). But as it says in the Psalm: *from heaven the Lord looked at the earth* (Ps 102:19).

Or he is said to prove their iniquity **from heaven**, because they should have recognized the power of the Creator above all from the greatness of the heavens: *the heavens will reveal his iniquity* (Job 20:27).

Or **from heaven** he will come to judge: *Jesus will come in the same way as you saw him go into heaven* (Acts 1:11).

111. Second, he mentions the sin for which the punishment is inflicted.

First, the sin against God, when he says: **against all ungodliness**. For just as godliness refers to worship paid to God, as to the highest parent, so ungodliness is a sin against divine worship: *the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself* (Ezek 18:20).

Second, he sets forth the sin committed against man, when he says **and injustice**. For justice is that through which men come together and engage one another reasonably: *your justice will help a son of man* (Job 35:8).

112. Third, he sets out the knowledge they had of him, when he says: **of those men who detain the truth of God**, i.e., true knowledge of God, **in injustice**. For true knowledge of God, by its very nature, leads men to good, but it is bound, as though held captive, by a love of wickedness through which, as the Psalm says, *truths have vanished from among the sons of men* (Ps 11:1).

113. Then when he says **because that which is known of God**, he manifests what he has said, but in reverse order.

For he first admits that wise men among the gentiles knew the truth about God;

second, he shows that there was ungodliness and injustice among them, at **so that they are inexcusable**;

third, that they have incurred God's wrath, at **who, having known the justice of God** (Rom 1:32).

Circa primum tria facit.
 Primo, quid de Deo cognoverunt;
 secundo, ostendit a quo huiusmodi cognitionem acceperunt, ibi *Deus enim illis*;
 tertio, ostendit per quem modum, ibi *invisibilia enim*.

114. Dicit ergo primo: recte dico quod veritatem Dei detinuerunt, fuit enim in eis, quantum ad aliquid, vera Dei cognitio, *quia quod notum est Dei*, id est quod cognoscibile est de Deo ab homine per rationem, *manifestum est in illis*, id est manifestum est eis ex eo quod in illis est, id est ex lumine intrinseco.

Sciendum est ergo quod aliquid circa Deum est omnino ignotum homini in hac vita, scilicet quid est Deus. Unde et Paulus invenit Athenis aram inscriptam: *ignoto Deo*. Et hoc ideo quia cognitio hominis incipit ab his quae sunt ei connaturalia, scilicet sensibilibus creaturis, quae non sunt proportionata ad repraesentandam divinam essentiam.

115. Potest tamen homo, ex huiusmodi creaturis, Deum tripliciter cognoscere, ut Dionysius dicit in libro *de Divinis nominibus*.

Uno quidem modo per causalitatem. Quia enim huiusmodi creaturae sunt defectibiles et mutabiles, necesse est eas reducere ad aliquod principium immobile et perfectum. Et secundum hoc cognoscitur de Deo an est.

Secundo per viam excellentiae. Non enim reducuntur omnia in primum principium, sicut in propriam causam et univocam, prout homo hominem generat, sed sicut in causam communem et excedentem. Et ex hoc cognoscitur quod est super omnia.

Tertio per viam negationis. Quia si est causa excedens, nihil eorum quae sunt in creaturis potest ei competere, sicut etiam neque corpus caeleste proprie dicitur grave vel leve aut calidum aut frigidum. Et secundum hoc dicimus Deum immobilem et infinitum et si quid aliud huiusmodi dicitur.

Huiusmodi autem cognitionem habuerunt per lumen rationis inditum. Ps. IV, 6: *multi dicunt quis ostendit nobis bona? Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*.

116. Deinde cum dicit *Deus illis manifestavit*, ostendit a quo auctore huiusmodi cognitio eis fuerit manifestata, et dicit quod *Deus illis manifestavit*, secundum illud Iob XXXV, 11: *docet nos super iumenta terrae*.

Ubi considerandum est quod unus homo alteri manifestat explicando conceptum suum per aliqua signa exteriora, puta per vocem vel Scripturam, Deus autem dupliciter aliquid homini manifestat. Uno modo, infundendo lumen interius, per quod homo cognoscit, Ps. XLII, 3: *emitte lucem tuam et veritatem tuam*. Alio modo, proponendo suae sapientiae signa exteriora,

In regard to the first he does three things.
 First, he shows what they knew about God;
 second, from whom they obtained this knowledge, at *for God has manifested it unto them*;
 third, how they obtained it, at *for the invisible things*.

114. First, therefore, he says: rightly do I say that they have suppressed the truth about God. For they did possess some true knowledge of God, *because that which is known of God*, i.e., what can be known about God by men through reason, *is manifest in them*, i.e., is manifest to them from something in them, i.e., from an inner light.

Therefore, it should be noted that some things about God are entirely unknown to man in this life, namely, what God is. Hence Paul found in Athens an altar inscribed: *to the unknown God* (Acts 17:23). The reason for this is that man's knowledge begins with things connatural to him, namely, sensible creatures, which are not proportioned to representing the divine essence.

115. But man is capable of knowing God from such creatures in three ways, as Denis says in *The Divine Names*.

He knows him, first of all, through causality. For since these creatures are subject to change and decay, it is necessary to trace them back to some unchangeable and unfailing principle. In this way, it can be known that God exists.

Second, he can be known by the way of excellence. For all things are not traced back to the first principle as to a proper and univocal cause, as when man produces man, but to a common and exceeding cause. From this it is known that God is above all things.

Third, he can be known by the way of negation. For if God is a cause exceeding his effects, nothing in creatures can belong to him, just as a heavenly body is not properly called heavy or light or hot or cold. And in this way, we say that God is unchangeable and infinite; and we use other negative expressions to describe him.

Men had such knowledge through the light of reason bestowed on them: *many say: O, that we might see some good! Lift up the light of your countenance upon us, O Lord* (Ps 4:6).

116. Then when he says *God has manifested it unto them*, he shows by what author such knowledge was manifested to them and says that it was God: *he teaches us more than the beasts of the earth* (Job 35:11).

Here it should be noted that one man manifests something to another by unfolding his own thought by means of such external signs as vocal sounds or writing. But God manifests something to man in two ways: first, by endowing him with an inner light through which he knows: *send out your light and your truth* (Ps 43:3); second, by proposing

scilicet sensibiles creaturas. Eccli. I, 10: *effudit illam*, scilicet sapientiam, *super omnia opera sua*.

Sic ergo Deus illis manifestavit vel interius infundendo lumen, vel exterius proponendo visibiles creaturas, in quibus, sicut in quodam libro, Dei cognitio legeretur.

117. Deinde cum dicit *invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi*, etc., ostendit per quem modum huiusmodi cognitionem acceperunt.

Ubi, primo considerandum est quae sunt ista, quae de Deo cognoverunt. Et ponit tria.

Primo quidem *invisibilia ipsius*, per quae intelligitur Dei essentia, quae, sicut dictum est a nobis videri non potest. Io. I, 18: *Deum nemo vidit unquam*, scilicet per essentiam, vita mortali vivens. I Tim. I, 17: *regi saeculorum immortalis, invisibili*.

Dicit autem pluraliter *invisibilia* quia Dei essentia non est nobis cognita secundum illud quod est, scilicet prout in se est una. Sic erit nobis in patria cognita, et tunc erit *Dominus unus et nomen eius unum*, ut dicitur Zac. ult. Est autem manifesta nobis per quasdam similitudines in creaturis repertas, quae id quod in Deo unum est, multipliciter participant, et secundum hoc intellectus noster considerat unitatem divinae essentiae sub ratione bonitatis, sapientiae, virtutis et huiusmodi, quae in Deo unum sunt.

Haec ergo *invisibilia Dei* dixit, quia illud unum quod his nominibus, seu rationibus, in Deo respondet, non videtur a nobis. Hebr. XI, 3: *ut ex invisibilibus invisibilia fierent*.

Aliud autem quod de Deo cognoscitur est *virtus* ipsius, secundum quam res ab eo procedunt, sicut a principio; Ps. CXLVI, 5: *magnus Dominus et magna virtus eius*. Hanc autem virtutem philosophi perpetuam esse cognoverunt, unde dicitur *sempiterna quoque virtus eius*.

Tertium cognitum est quod dicit *et divinitas*, ad quod pertinet quod cognoverunt Deum sicut ultimum finem, in quem omnia tendunt.

Divinum enim bonum dicitur bonum commune quod ab omnibus participatur; propter hoc potius dixit *divinitatem*, quae participationem significat, quam *deitatem*, quae significat essentiam Dei. Col. II, 9: *et in ipso habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis*.

Haec autem tria referuntur ad tres modos cognoscendi supradictos. Nam invisibilia Dei cognoscuntur per viam negationis; sempiterna virtus, per viam causalitatis; divinitas, per viam excellentiae.

118. Secundo, considerandum est per quod medium illa cognoverunt, quod designatur cum dicit *per ea quae facta sunt*.

Sicut enim ars manifestatur per artificis opera, ita et Dei sapientia manifestatur per creaturas.

external signs of his wisdom, namely, sensible creatures: *he poured her out*, namely, wisdom, *over all his works* (Sir 1:9).

Thus God manifested it to them either from within by endowing them with a light or from without by presenting visible creatures, in which, as in a book, the knowledge of God may be read.

117. Then when he says *for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world*, he shows the manner in which they received such knowledge.

Here the first points to be considered are the things they have known about God. He mentions three.

First, *the invisible things of him*, through which one understands God's essence, which, as was said, cannot be seen by us: *no one has ever seen God* (John 1:18), i.e., in his essence, no one living in this mortal life: *to the king of ages, immortal, invisible* (1 Tim 1:17).

He says *invisible things*, using the plural, because God's essence is not known to us in regard to what it is, i.e., as it is in itself one. That is the way it will be known in heaven: *on that day the Lord will be one and his name one* (Zech 14:9). But it is now manifested to us through certain likenesses found in creatures, which participate in manifold ways in that which is one in God. Accordingly, our intellect considers the unity of the divine essence under the aspects of goodness, wisdom, power, and so on, all of which are one in God.

Therefore he calls these *the invisible things of God*, because the one reality in God which corresponds to these names or notions is not seen by us: *so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear* (Heb 11:3).

Another thing known about God is his *power*, in virtue of which all things proceed from him as from a principle: *great is the Lord and abundant in power* (Ps 147:5). This power the philosophers knew to be eternal; hence it is called *his eternal power*.

The third thing known is what he calls *divinity*, namely, they knew God as the ultimate end unto which all things tend.

For the divine good is called the common good in which all things participate; on this account he says *divinity* which signifies participation, rather than *deity*, which signifies God's essence: *for in him the whole fullness of divinity dwells bodily* (Col 2:9).

These three things are referred to the above-mentioned three ways of knowing. For the invisible things of God are known by the method of negation; the eternal power by the method of causality; the divinity by way of excellence.

118. Second, one must consider the medium through which they knew those things. This is designated when he says *by the things that are made*.

For just as an art is shown by an artist's works, so God's wisdom is shown by his creatures: *from the greatness and*

Sap. XIII, 5: *a magnitudine enim speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit creator horum videri.*

119. Tertio, ostendit quomodo per ista cognoscatur Deus, cum dicit *intellecta conspiciuntur.*

Intellectu enim cognosci potest Deus, non sensu vel imaginatione, quae corporalia non transcendunt; *Deus autem spiritus est*, ut Io. IV, 24 dicitur; Is. LII, 13: *ecce intelliget servus meus.*

120. Quarto, potest designari a qua, per hunc modum, Deus cognoscatur, cum dicitur *a creatura mundi*. Per quod, uno modo, potest intelligi homo, Mc. ult.: *praedicate Evangelium omni creaturae*, vel propter excellentiam hominis, qui ordine naturae minor est angelis sed excellit inter inferiores creaturas, secundum illud Ps. VIII, 6: *minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis, omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius, oves et boves*, etc., vel quia communicat cum omni creatura: habet enim esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum animalibus, intelligere cum angelis, ut Gregorius dicit.

Alio modo potest intelligi de universali creatura. Nulla enim creatura, ex propriis naturalibus, potest Dei essentiam in seipsa videre. Unde et de Seraphim dicitur Is. VI, 2 quod *duabus alis velabant caput*. Sed, sicut homo intelligit Deum per creaturas visibiles, ita angelus per hoc quod intelligit propriam essentiam.

121. Potest autem aliter intelligi per *creaturam mundi*, non ipsa res creata sed rerum creatio, ac si diceretur: *a creatione mundi*. Et tunc potest dupliciter ordinari. Uno modo quod intelligatur quod invisibilia Dei intelliguntur per ea quae facta sunt a creatione mundi, non solum per ea quae facta sunt tempore gratiae. Alio modo quod intelligatur quod a creatione mundi homines incoeperunt Deum cognoscere per ea quae facta sunt. Iob XXXVI, 25: *omnes homines vident eum.*

122. Glossa autem dicit quod per *invisibilia* Dei intelligitur persona Patris. I Tim. ult.: *quem nullus hominum vidit*, etc. Per *sempiternam virtutem*, persona Filii secundum illud I Cor. I, 24: *Christum Dei virtutem*. Per *divinitatem*, persona Spiritus Sancti cui appropriatur bonitas. Non quod philosophi, ductu rationis, potuerint pervenire, per ea quae facta sunt, in cognitionem personarum quantum ad propria, quae non significant habitudinem causae ad creaturas, sed secundum appropriata. Dicuntur tamen defecisse in tertio signo, id est in Spiritu Sancto quia non posuerunt aliquid respondere Spiritui Sancto, sicut posuerunt aliquid respondere Patri, scilicet ipsum primum principium, et aliquid respondere Filio, scilicet primam mentem creatam, quam vocabant aeternum intellectum ut Macrobius dicit in libro *Super somnium Scipionis*.

beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their creator (Wis 13:5).

119. Third, he shows how God is known through them when he says *clearly seen, being understood*.

For it is by the intellect that God is known, not by the senses or imagination, which do not extend beyond bodily things: *but God is spirit* (John 4:24); *behold my servant shall understand* (Isa 52:13).

120. Fourth, he designates the things from which God is known by this medium when he says *from the creation of the world*. In one way, this can be understood as referring to man: *preach the Gospel to every creature* (Mark 16:15), either on account of the excellence of man, who in the order of nature is less than the angels but greater than lower creatures: *yet you have made him less than the angels; you have put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen* (Ps 8:5), or because he has something in common with every creature. For he has existence in common with stones, life in common with trees, sense in common with animals, and intelligence in common with angels, as Gregory says.

In another way it can be understood of all creation. For no creature by its own natural power can see God's essence in itself. Hence it is said even of the Seraphim, *with two wings they covered their head* (Isa 6:2). But just as man understands God through visible creatures, so an angel understands God by understanding its own essence.

121. Or, *creation of the world* can be taken to mean not created things but the creation of things, as though it were said: *from the creation of the world*. In this case, one interpretation would be that the invisible things of God are understood by means of things made since the creation of the world and not only since the time of grace. Another interpretation would be that from the creation of the world men began to know God through the things that were made: *all men have looked on it* (Job 36:25).

122. But a Gloss says that by the *invisible things* of God is meant the person of the Father: *whom no man has ever seen or can see* (1 Tim 6:16); by the *eternal power* the person of the Son: *Christ the power of God* (1 Cor 1:24); by *divinity* the person of the Holy Spirit, to whom goodness is appropriated. Not that philosophers under the lead of reason could arrive by means of created things to a knowledge of the persons, so as to know what are proper to each, which do not signify any causal connection with creatures; but by way of appropriation. Yet they are said to have failed in the third sign, i.e., in the Holy Spirit, because they did not mention anything corresponding to the Holy Spirit, as they did for the Father, namely the very first principle, and for the Son, namely the first mind created, which they called the Father's understanding, as Macrobius says in his book *On the Dream of Scipio*.

Lecture 7

1:20 *Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas: ita ut sint inexcusabiles.* [n. 117]

1:21 *Quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt, aut gratias egerunt: sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum:* [n. 126]

1:22 *dicentes enim se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt.* [n. 131]

1:23 *Et mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et serpentium.* [n. 132]

1:24 *Propter quod tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis eorum, in im-munditiam, ut contumeliis afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis:* [n. 137]

1:25 *qui commutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium: et coluerunt, et servierunt creaturae potius quam Creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen.* [n. 141]

1:20 τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσε-
ως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα
καθορᾶται, ἥ τε αἰδὶος αὐτοῦ δύνα-
μις καὶ θεϊότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦς
ἀναπολογήτους:

1:21 διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς
θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ἡγαρίστησαν, ἀλλ'
ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς
αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος
αὐτῶν καρδιά.

1:22 φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράν-
θησαν,

1:23 καὶ ἥλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ
ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκό-
νος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν
καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἐρπετῶν.

1:24 Διὸ παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς ἐν
ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν αὐτῶν
εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ
σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς,

1:25 οἵτινες μετέλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθει-
αν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, καὶ ἐσε-
βάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει
παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογη-
τὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας: ἀμήν.

1:20 For the invisible things of him
from the creation of the world are
clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made. His eternal
power also and divinity: so that they
are inexcusable. [n. 117]

1:21 Because that, when they knew
God, they had not glorified him as
God or given thanks, but became
vain in their thoughts. And their
foolish heart was darkened. [n. 126]

1:22 For, professing themselves to be
wise, they became fools. [n. 131]

1:23 And they changed the glory of
the incorruptible God into the like-
ness of the image of a corruptible
man and of birds, and of fourfoot-
ed beasts and of creeping things.
[n. 132]

1:24 Wherefore, God gave them up to
the desires of their heart, unto un-
cleanness: to dishonour their own
bodies among themselves, [n. 137]

1:25 Who changed the truth of God
into a lie and worshipped and served
the creature rather than the Cre-
ator, who is blessed for ever. Amen.
[n. 141]

123. Postquam Apostolus ostendit veritatem Dei fuisse a gentibus cognitam, hic ostendit eos obnoxios culpae impietatis et iniustitiae.

Et primo ostendit hoc quantum ad culpam impietatis,

secundo quantum ad culpam iniustitiae, ibi *et sicut non probaverunt*, etc.

Posset autem aliquis credere eos a culpa impietatis excusari propter ignorantiam, sicut Apostolus de se dicit infra I Tim. I, 13: *misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci*,

primo ergo ostendit gentiles non esse excusabiles,

secundo ponit eorum culpam, ibi *et mutaverunt gloriam*.

124. Circa primum considerandum est quod tunc ignorantia culpam excusat quando sic procedit et causat culpam, quod non causatur a culpa. Sicut cum aliquis, adhibita diligentia debita, dum credit percutere hostem, percutit patrem. Si vero ignorantia causetur ex culpa, non potest subsequentem culpam ignorantia excusare. Unde si quis per ebrietatem homicidium committit, non

123. After showing that truth about God was known by the gentiles, he now states that they were guilty of the sins of ungodliness and injustice.

First, he shows this with regard to the sin of impiety;

second, in regard to injustice, at *and as they liked not to have* (Rom 1:28).

But someone might believe that they would be excused from the sin of ungodliness on account of ignorance, as the Apostle says of himself in 1 Timothy: *I received mercy, because I had acted ignorantly in unbelief* (1 Tim 1:13).

First, therefore, he shows that they are without excuse;

second, he states their sin, at *and they changed the glo-*
ry.

124. In regard to the first it should be noted that ignorance excuses from guilt, when it precedes and causes guilt in such a way that the ignorance itself is not the result of guilt; for example, when a person, after exercising due caution, thinks he is striking a foe, when he is really striking his father. But if the ignorance is caused by guilt, it cannot excuse one from a fault that follows. Thus, if a person

excusatur a culpa, quia peccavit se inebriando, unde secundum Philosophum meretur duplices mulctationes.

125. Primo igitur proponit quod intendit, dicens *ita*, quod est Dei, notum est eis, *ut sint inexcusabiles*, id est ut per ignorantiam excusari non possint Iac. IV, 17: *scienti bonum et non operanti peccatum est illi*. Infra II, 1: *propter quod inexcusabilis est*.

126. Secundo ibi *quia cum cognovissent*, etc., probat quod dixerat.

Et primo, ostendit quod prima eorum culpa ex ignorantia non processit,

secundo quod ex hac culpa est ignorantia subsecuta, ibi *sed evanuerunt*.

127. Quod autem prima eorum culpa non fuerit ex ignorantia, ostenditur per hoc quod Dei cognitionem habentes ea non sunt usi ad bonum. Dupliciter autem Deum cognoverunt. Uno modo sicut omnibus super eminentem, et sic ei debebant gloriam et honorem quae superexcellentibus debetur. Isti ideo dicuntur inexcusabiles *quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt*, vel quia ei debitum cultum non impenderunt, vel quia virtuti eius et scientiae terminum imposuerunt, aliqua eius potentiae et scientiae subtrahentes, contra id quod dicitur Eccli. XLIII, 37: *glorificantes Dominum quantumcumque potueritis*.

Secundo, cognoverunt eum sicut omnium bonorum causam. Unde ei in omnibus gratiarum actio debebatur, quam tamen ipsi non impendebant, sed potius suo ingenio et virtuti suae bona sua adscribebant; unde subdit *gratias non egerunt*, scilicet Domino, I Thess. ult.: *in omnibus gratias agite*.

128. Deinde cum dicit *sed evanuerunt*, ostendit quod in eis ex culpa est ignorantia subsecuta.

Et primo ponit intentum,

secundo manifestat propositum, ibi *dicentes*.

129. Primo ergo proponit culpam quae est ignorantiae causa cum dicit *evanuerunt*.

Vanum enim dicitur quod non habet stabilitatem seu firmitatem. Solus autem Deus de se est immutabilis. Mal. III, 6: *ego Deus et non mutor*. Et ideo tunc solum mens humana est a vanitate libera quando Deo innititur. Cum autem, praetermisso Deo, innititur cuicumque creaturae, incurrit vanitatem. Sap. XIII, 1: *vani sunt omnes homines in quibus non subest scientia Dei*, etc.; Ps. XCIII, 11: *Dominus scit cogitationes hominum quoniam vanae sunt*. In *cogitationibus suis evanuerunt*, in quantum in seipsis, et non in Deo, fiduciam habebant, sibi et non Deo bona sua adscribentes, secundum illud Ps. XI, 5: *labia nostra*, etc.

commits murder, because he is drunk, he is not excused from the guilt, because he sinned by intoxicating himself; indeed, according to the Philosopher, he deserves a double penalty.

125. First, therefore, he states his intention, saying *so*, i.e., things about God are so well known to them, *that they may be without excuse*, i.e., they cannot be excused on the plea of ignorance: *whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin* (Jas 4:17); *wherefore, you are inexcusable* (Rom 2:1).

126. Second, he proves his statement at *because that, when they knew*.

First, he shows that their first guilt did not proceed from ignorance;

second, that their ignorance proceeded from this guilt, at *but became vain*.

127. That their basic guilt was not due to ignorance is shown by the fact that, although they possessed knowledge of God, they failed to use it unto good. For they knew God in two ways: first, as the supereminent being, to whom glory and honor were due. They are said to be without excuse, therefore, *because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God*, either because they failed to pay him due worship or because they put a limit to his power and knowledge by denying certain aspects of his power and knowledge, contrary to Ecclesiastes: *when you exalt him, put forth all your strength* (Eccl 43:30).

Second, they knew him as the cause of all good things. Hence, in all things he was deserving of thanks, which they did not render; rather, they attributed their blessings to their own talent and power. Hence, he adds *or given thanks*, namely, to the Lord: *give thanks to him in all circumstances* (1 Thess 5:18).

128. Then when he says *but became vain* he shows that in their case, ignorance was the result of their guilt.

First, he states his charge;

second, he explains it, at *for, professing themselves*.

129. First, then, he mentions the guilt which caused their ignorance, when he says, *became vain*.

For something is futile when it lacks stability or firmness. But God alone is changeless: *I, the Lord, do not change* (Mal 3:6). Consequently, the human mind is free of futility only when it leans on God. But when God is rejected and the mind rests in creatures, it incurs futility: *for all men who were ignorant of God were foolish and could not know God from the good things which are seen* (Wis 13:1); *the Lord knows the thoughts of man, that they are vain* (Ps 94:11). In *their thoughts they became vain*, because they put their trust in themselves and not in God, ascribing their blessings not to God but to themselves, as the Psalmist says: *our lips are with us; who is our master?* (Ps 11:4).

130. Secundo ponit ignorantiam subsecutam dicens *et obscuratum est*; id est, per hoc quod obscuratum est, factum est *cor eorum insipiens*, id est lumine sapientiae privatum, per quam homo vere Deum cognoscit. Sicut enim qui oculos corporales a sole materiali avertit, obscuritatem corporalem incurrit, ita ille qui a Deo avertitur, de seipso praesumens et non de Deo, spiritualiter obscuratur. Prov. XI, 2: *ubi humilitas*, per quam scilicet homo se Deo subiicit, *ibi sapientia*; *ubi superbia*, *ibi contumelia*. Matth. XI, 25: *abscondisti haec a sapientibus*, secundum quod scilicet eis videbatur, *et revelasti ea parvulis*, id est humilibus. Et de his habetur Eph. IV, 17 s.: *gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum*.

131. Deinde cum dicit *dicentes* exponit quod dixerat.

Et, primo, qualiter in cogitationibus suis evanuerunt, cum dicit *dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt*. *Dicentes*, id est sapientiam sibi a seipsis adscribentes. Is. V, 21: *vae qui sapientes estis in oculis vestris*. Is. XIX, 11: *quomodo dicetis Pharaoni: filius sapientium ego, filius regum antiquorum?* Etc.

Secundo, exponit quod dixerat *et obscuratum est insipiens cor*, cum dicit *stulti facti sunt*, quasi contra divinam sapientiam agentes. Ier. X, 14: *stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua*, de qua scilicet praesumebat.

132. Deinde cum dicit *et mutaverunt gloriam*, ponit peccatum impietatis gentilium.

Et primo quanto ad hoc quod peccaverunt contra Dei gloriam,

secundo quomodo contra veritatem naturae ipsius, ibi *qui commutaverunt veritatem*.

Circa primum duo facit:

primo ponit impietatis culpam,

secundo poenam, ibi *propter quod tradidit*.

133. Culpa quidem eorum fuit quod, quantum in ipsis erat, honorem divinum in alium transtulerunt, secundum illud Ier. II, 11: *populus meus mutavit gloriam suam in idolum*.

Primo ergo ponit id quod mutaverunt,

secundo id in quod mutaverunt, ibi *in similitudinem*.

134. Circa primum, tria sunt attendenda ex parte Dei.

Primo, quidem ipsius gloriam, quam tangit dicens *et mutaverunt gloriam*, quod potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo de gloria qua homo Deum glorificat, ei cultum latrae exhibendo. I Tim. I, 17: *solī Deo honor*. Hanc igitur mutaverunt, cum cultum Deo debitum

130. Second, he mentions the ignorance which followed, when he says *was darkened*, i.e., by the fact that *their foolish heart* was darkened, i.e., deprived of the light of wisdom, through which man truly knows God. For just as a person who turns his bodily eyes from the sun is put in darkness, so one who turns from God, presuming on himself and not on God, is put in spiritual darkness: *where there is humility*, which subjects a man to God, *there is wisdom*; *where there is pride*, *there is a disgrace* (Prov 11:2); *you have hidden these things from the wise*, as they seemed to themselves, *and revealed them to babes*, i.e., to the humble (Matt 11:25); *the gentiles live in the futility of their mind*; *they are darkened in their understanding* (Eph 4:17).

131. Then when he says *professing themselves* he explains his statement.

And first, how they became futile in their thinking, when he says *professing themselves to be wise, they became fools*. *Professing themselves*, i.e., ascribing wisdom to themselves as of themselves: *woe to those who are wise in their own eyes* (Isa 5:21); *how can you say to Pharaoh: I am the son of the wise, a son of ancient kings? Where now are your wise men?* (Job 19:11).

Second, he explains his statement that their *foolish heart was darkened* when he says *they became fools* to the point of acting contrary to divine wisdom: *every man is stupid and without knowledge of his own on which he presumed* (Jer 10:14).

132. Then when he says *and they changed the glory*, he mentions the punishment for the gentiles' sin of ungodliness.

First, in regard to sinning against God's glory;

second, how they sinned against the truth of nature itself, at *who changed the truth*.

In regard to the first he does two things:

first, he sets forth the sin of ungodliness;

second, the punishment, at *wherefore, God gave them up*.

133. Their sin, indeed, was that, so far as in them lay, they transferred divine honor to something else: *my people have changed their glory for that which does not profit* (Jer 2:11).

First, therefore, he mentions what they changed;

second, that into which they changed it, at *into the likeness*.

134. In regard to the first, three things should be noted on the part of God.

First, his glory, which he mentions when he says *and they changed the glory*. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, as referring to the glory with which man gives glory to God by rendering him the worship of latrae: *to the only God be honor and glory* (1 Tim 1:17). They exchanged this, when

exhibuerunt aliis. Alio modo potest intelligi de gloria qua Deus in se gloriosus est, quae est incomprehensibilis et infinita. Prov. XXV, 27: *perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria*. Quae quidem gloria, nihil est aliud quam ipsa claritas divinae naturae; *lucem enim inhabitat inaccessibleem*, I Tim. Ult.

Hanc autem mutaverunt, dum eam aliis attribuerunt. *Incommunicabile enim nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt*, ut dicitur Sap. XIV, 21.

Secundo, notatur incorruptibilitas, cum dicit *incorruptibilis*. Ipse enim solus perfecte incorruptibilis est, qui est omnino immutabilis; omnis enim mutatio quaedam corruptio est. Unde dicitur I Tim. ult.: *solus habet immortalitatem*.

Tertio, notatur naturae sublimitas, cum dicitur *Dei*, ut enim in Ps. XLVII, 2 dicitur: *Deus magnus Dominus*.

135. Ex parte vero eius in quod mutaverunt, tria correspondentia ponuntur. Nam, contra gloriam dicit *in similitudinem imaginis*, id est in similitudinem alicuius rei per modum imaginis ab aliquo expressae. Manifestum enim est quod similitudo imaginis est posterior illa re cuius est imago. Gloria autem, sive claritas Dei, est principium omnis speciei et formae; et sic dum Dei gloriam in similitudinem imaginis mutaverunt, converterunt primum in ultimum. Sap. XIV, 15: *acerbo luctu dolens pater, cito sibi rapti filii fecit imaginem*.

Contra id quod dixerat *incorruptibilis*, dicit *corruptibilis*. Ps. XXIX, 10: *quae utilitas in sanguine meo dum descendo in corruptionem?* Scilicet quod est amplius iam corruptum sive mortuum? Sap. XV, 17: *cum sit mortalis, mortuum fingit, manibus iniquis*.

Contra id quod dixit *Dei*, ponit *hominis*. Iob XXXII, 21: *non accipiam personam viri et Deum homini non aequabo*.

Et, quod est abominabilius, homo gloriam Dei transulit non solum in hominem, qui est ad imaginem Dei sed etiam ad ea quae sunt infra hominem, unde subdit *et volucrem* quantum ad volatilia, *et quadrupedem* quantum ad gressibilia, *et serpentium* quantum ad reptilia. Praeternit autem pisces tamquam magis ab humana conversatione seiunctos. Haec autem omnia sunt a Deo homini supposita. Ps. VIII, 8: *omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius*. Ez. VIII, 9: *ingredere et vide abominationes pessimas quas isti faciunt hic. Et ingressus vidi; et ecce omnis similitudo reptilium et animalium et cetera*.

136. Est autem notandum quod, sicut dicit Glossa, ab adventu Aeneae consueverunt in Italia imagines hominum coli, puta Iovis, Herculis et similium. Sed tempore Caesaris Augusti, devicta Aegypto, eorum cultum Romani assumpserunt qui imagines animalium colebant, propter figuras animalium, quae notantur in caelo, quibus Aegypti, tamquam astrologiae dediti, cultum

they paid to others the worship due to God. Second, as referring to the glory with which God is glorious, which is incomprehensible and infinite: *he that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory* (Prov 25:27). This glory, of course, is nothing less than the brilliance of the divine nature; *for he dwells in unapproachable light* (1 Tim 6:16).

This glory they exchanged, when they attributed it to other things, for *men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood* (Wis 14:21).

Second, his immortality is noted when he says *incorruptible*. For he alone is perfectly incorruptible who is entirely unchangeable; for every change is a form of ceasing to be. Hence, it is said: *he alone has immortality* (1 Tim 6:16).

Third, he notes the sublimity of his nature, when he says *God*, for it is said: *great is the Lord* (Ps 48:1)

135. On the part of that into which they exchanged it, three corresponding things are mentioned. For in contrast to glory he says *into the likeness of the image*, i.e., for a likeness of something produced in the form of an image. For it is plain that the likeness in an image is subsequent to the thing whose image it is. But God's glory or brilliance is the principle of every nature and form; consequently, when they exchanged God's glory for images, they put the first being in last place: *for a father consumed with grief made an image of his child, who had been suddenly taken from him* (Wis 14:15).

In contrast to immortal he says *corruptible*: *what profit is there in my blood, if I go down to the pit?* (Ps 30:9), i.e., what good is a dead thing? *He is mortal, and what he makes with lawless hands is dead* (Wis 15:17).

In contrast to *God* he says *man*: *I will not show partiality to any man and I will not equate God with man* (Job 32:21).

But what is more abominable, man exchanged God's glory not only for man, who is made to the image of God, but even for things inferior to man. Hence, he adds *of birds*, things that fly, *and of fourfooted beasts*, things that walk, *and of creeping things*, things that crawl. He omits fish as being less familiar to ordinary human life. Now all these things were put under man by God: *you have put all things under his feet* (Ps 8:8); *go in and see the vile abominations that they are committing here. So I went in and saw; and there, portrayed upon the wall round about were all kinds of creeping things and loathsome beasts* (Ezek 8:9).

136. It might be mentioned, as a Gloss says, that from the time of Aeneas' arrival in Italy, images of men were cultivated, e.g., Jupiter, Hercules, and so on. But after the conquest of Egypt during the reign of Caesar Augustus, the Romans took up the worship of animal images (on account of the figures of animals discovered in the sky), to which the Egyptians, given to astrology, rendered divine worship.

divinitatis impendebant. Unde et Dominus filios Israel in Aegypto nutritos ab huiusmodi cultu removet dicens Deut. IV, 19: *ne forte elevatis oculis ad coelum videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli*, etc.

137. Deinde cum dicit **propter quod tradidit**, ponit poenam huiusmodi culpae respondentem.

Circa quod considerandum est quod homo medium locum obtinet inter Deum et animalia bruta, et cum utroque extremorum communicat: cum Deo quidem, secundum intellectualitatem; cum animalibus vero brutis, secundum sensualitatem. Sicut igitur homo, id quod est Dei, mutavit usque ad bestias, ita Deus, id quod est divinum in homine secundum rationem, subdidit ei quod est brutale in ipso, scilicet desiderio sensualitatis, secundum illud Ps. XLVIII, 21: *homo cum in honore esset non intellexit*, similitudinem scilicet divinae imaginis propter rationem, *comparatus est iumentis insipientibus*. Hoc est ergo quod dicit **propter quod tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis**, ut eorum ratio subderetur desideriis cordis, scilicet sensualis affectus, de quibus dicitur infra XIII, 14: *carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis*. Quod quidem est contra naturalem ordinem hominis, secundum quem ratio appetitui sensibili dominatur. Gen. IV, 7: *sub te erit appetitus eius, et tu dominaberis illius*.

Inducit ergo homines in desideria cordis eorum sicut in manu dominorum crudelium. Is. XIX, 4: *tradam Aegyptum in manu dominorum crudelium*.

138. Praecipue tamen circa appetitum sensitivum bestialis quaedam deordinatio pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Nam delectationes tactus, circa quas sunt gula et luxuria, manifeste sunt communes nobis et brutis. Et ideo sunt magis exprobrabiles quasi magis brutales, ut dicit Philosophus in III *Ethicorum*.

Et hoc designatur cum subdit **in immunditiam** quae ad peccata carnalia pertinet, secundum illud Eph. V, 5: *omnis fornicator aut immundus*, quia scilicet homo, per huiusmodi peccata, maxime convertitur et trahitur ad id quod est infra ipsum. Unumquodque enim dicitur esse impurum sive immundum ex commixtione vilioris, sicut argentum ex commixtione plumbi. Unde exponens subdit **ut contumeliis**, id est turpibus et immundis actibus, **afficiant**, id est inficiant, **corpora sua in semet ipsis**, id est non quasi ab aliis coacti, puta a barbaris, sed a semetipsis hoc agunt, propria sponte. Infra IX, 21: *an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eodem luto facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam?* Scilicet in turpem usum.

139. Sed cum huiusmodi immunditia sit peccatum, videtur quod Deus in eam homines non tradat, quia, ut dicitur Iac. I, 13: *Deus intentator malorum est*.

Dicendum est quod Deus non dicitur tradere homines in immunditiam directe, inclinando affectum

Hence, the Lord himself instructed the children of Israel raised in Egypt against such worship, when he said: *beware lest you lift up your eyes to heaven and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, you be drawn away and worship them* (Deut 4:19).

137. Then when he says **wherefore, God gave them up** he mentions the punishment for such a sin.

Here it should be noted that man holds a place midway between God and the beasts and has something in common with both: with God, intellectuality; with animals, sensibility. Therefore, just as man exchanged that which was of God for what is bestial, so God subjected the divine in man, namely reason, to what is of the beast in him, his sensual desire, as it is stated: *man cannot abide in his pomp* (Ps 49:20), i.e., understand the likeness of the divine image in him through reason, *he is like the beasts that perish*. This, therefore, is why he says **wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart**, so that their reason would be ruled by the desires of the heart, namely, lustful affections, about which he says below: **make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences** (Rom 13:14). But this is contrary to man's natural order, in which reason dominates the sense appetites: *its desire is under you and you must master it* (Gen 4:7).

Consequently, he releases men to the desires of the heart as to cruel masters: *I will give over the Egyptians into the hand of a hard master* (Isa 19:4).

138. It is chiefly with respect to the sense appetite that a certain bestial derangement is present in carnal sins. For the pleasures of touch, which delight gluttony and lust, are common to us and to beasts. Hence, they are more detestable, being more brutish, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* III.

This is designated when he says **unto uncleanness**, which refers to sins of the flesh, as is clear from Ephesians: *every fornicator or impure man* (Eph 5:5); because it is especially through such sins that man turns to and is drawn to what is beneath him. For a thing is said to be impure or tainted from being mixed with something base, as silver mixed with lead. Hence, in explanation he continues: **to dishonor**, by base and unclean acts, **their own bodies among themselves**, i.e., not as though compelled by others, for example, by savages, but they do this among themselves spontaneously. Below: **has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vase for honor and another for dishonor?** (Rom 9:21). Namely, for menial use.

139. But since impurity of this kind is a sin, it seems that God would not give men over to it: *God himself tempts no one to evil* (Jas 1:13).

The answer is that God does not give men over to impurity directly, as though inclining a man's affection toward

hominis ad malum, quia Deus omnia ordinat in seipsum, Prov. XVI, 4: *universa propter se operatus est Dominus*, peccatum autem est aliquid per aversionem ab eo. Sed indirecte tradit homines in peccatum, in quantum iuste subtrahit gratiam per quam homines continebantur ne peccarent; sicut si aliquis alicuius sustentaculum tolleretur, diceretur facere casum eius. Et per hunc modum primum peccatum est causa sequentis peccati, sequens vero est poena prioris.

Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod unum peccatum potest esse causa alterius indirecte et directe. Directe quidem, in quantum ex uno peccato inclinatur ad aliud, quod fit tripliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem causae finalis; sicut cum quis ex avaritia vel invidia incitatur ad homicidium committendum. Secundo, secundum rationem causae materialis; sicut gula inducit ad luxuriam, ministrando materiam. Tertio, secundum rationem causae moventis; sicut cum ex multis actibus alicuius peccati generatur habitus ad simile peccatum inducens.

Indirecte autem, sicut primum peccatum meretur exclusionem gratiae, qua subtracta, homo ruit in aliud peccatum. Et sic primum peccatum est causa secundi indirecte sive per accidens, sicut removens prohibens.

140. Sed notandum est quod peccatum, in quantum huiusmodi, non potest esse poena, quia poenam contra voluntatem patimur, peccatum autem est voluntarium, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed quia peccatum habet quaedam adiuncta, quae sunt contra voluntatem peccantis, ratione eorum peccatum dicitur poena praecedentis peccati. Hoc autem est, uno modo, aliquid praecedens peccatum, sicut subtractio gratiae ex qua sequitur ut homo peccet. Alio modo, est aliquid adiunctum ipsi peccato, vel interior sicut est inordinatio animi, unde Augustinus dicit in I *Confessionum*: *iussisti Domine*, et sic est ut poena sibi sit omnis inordinatus animus; sive quantum ad exteriores actus, quibus difficultates ac labores adiunguntur, secundum illud quod dicunt impii Sap. V, 7: *ambulavimus vias difficiles*, etc. Tertio, quantum ad id quod sequitur peccatum sicut est remorsus conscientiae, infamia et similia.

141. Deinde cum dicit *commutaverunt*, ponit culpam impietatis quam commiserunt contra veritatem divinae naturae.

Et primo ponit culpam,
secundo poenam, ibi *propterea tradidit*.

142. Divina autem natura potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod est ratio cognoscendi, ut veritas prima, et quantum ad hoc dicit *quia commutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium*.

evil, because God ordains all things to himself: *the Lord has made everything for himself* (Prov 16:4), whereas something is sinful through its turning from him. But he gives men over to sin indirectly, inasmuch as he justly withdraws the grace through which men are kept from sinning, just as a person would be said to cause another to fall, if he removed the ladder supporting him. In this way, one's first sin is a cause of the next, which is at the same time a punishment for the first one.

To understand this it should be noted that one sin can be the cause of another directly or indirectly: directly, inasmuch as from one sin he is inclined to another in any of three ways. In one way, when it acts as a final cause; for example, when someone from greed or envy is incited to commit murder. Second, when it acts as a material cause, as gluttony leads to lust by administering the material. Third, when it acts as a moving cause, as when many repetitions of the same sin produce a habit inclining a person to repeat the sin.

Indirectly, when the first sin merits the exclusion of grace, so that once it is removed, a man falls into another sin. In this way the first sin is the cause of the second indirectly or incidentally, inasmuch as it removes the preventative.

140. It should be borne in mind, however, that sin as such cannot be a punishment, because we suffer punishment against our will, whereas sin is voluntary, as Augustine says. But because sin has certain features contrary to the will of the sinner, it is by reason of them that a sin is called a punishment of a previous sin. One of these features is something preceding the sin, as the withdrawal of grace, from which it follows that a man sins. Another is something that accompanies the sin either interiorly, as that the mind is disarranged; hence Augustine says in *Confessions* I: *you have commanded it, O Lord*, and so it comes to pass that every disarranged mind is a punishment to itself; or in regard to its outward acts, which involve difficulties and labors, as sinners aver: *we journeyed through trackless deserts* (Wis 5:7). The third feature is something that follows the sin, such as remorse of conscience, bad reputation, and so on.

141. Then, when he says *who changed the truth*, he mentions the sin of ungodliness committed against the truth of the divine nature.

First, he mentions the sin;

second, the punishment, at *wherefore, God gave them up*.

142. The divine nature can be considered in two ways: in one way, as being the first truth. In this respect he says that they *changed the truth of God into a lie*.

Quod quidem potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo quia veram cognitionem quam a Deo acceperunt, perversa ratione ad falsa dogmata converterunt, sicut cum dixerunt idola esse deos, vel Deum non esse omnipotentem, vel omniscientem. Ier. IX, 5: *docuerunt linguas suas loqui mendacium*. Alio modo veritatem Dei in mendacium mutaverunt quia divinitatis naturam, quae est ipsa veritas, attribuerunt idolo, quod est mendacium inquantum non est Deus, ut dicitur Ier. XVI, 19 s.: *vere mendacium possederunt patres nostri, vanitatem quae eis non profuit. Numquid faciet homo sibi deos, et ipsi non sunt dii?*

Alio modo potest considerari divina natura secundum quod est principium essendi omnibus per creationem: et sic debetur ei ab homine, interius quidem, cultus secundum pium affectum, Io. IX, 31: *si quis cultor Dei est*, etc., exterius vero, debetur ei servitus latriae, secundum illud Deut. VI, 13: *Dominum Deum tuum adorabis, et illi soli servies*.

143. Unde subdit, contra eos scilicet, **coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius**, etc. Colebant enim caelestia corpora et aerem et aquam et alia huiusmodi, secundum illud Sap. XIII, 2: *aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem*, etc.

Et in hoc improbat sapientes gentilium qui, quamvis numquam in imaginibus aliquid numinis esse crederent, sicut sectatores Hermetis credebant, neque ea quae a poetis fabulose dicebantur de diis crederent esse vera, creaturis tamen aliquibus cultum divinitatis impendebant ex quibus rationem fabularum assignabant. Sicut Varro posuit totum mundum esse Deum propter animam eius, dicens quod toti mundo, et omnibus partibus eius, divinitatis cultus impendi potest, scilicet aeri quem vocabant Iunonem, et aquae quam vocabant Liaeum, et sic de aliis. Platonici etiam posuerunt quod omnibus substantiis rationalibus, quae sunt supra nos, cultus divinitatis debetur; puta daemonibus, animabus caelestium corporum, intelligentiis, id est substantiis separatis.

Quamvis autem iis, quae supra nos sunt, aliquam reverentiam exhibere debeamus, non tamen cultum latriae, quae potissime in sacrificiis et oblatione consistit, per quam homo proficitur omnium bonorum Deum esse auctorem, sicut in quolibet regno aliquis honor supremo domino exhibetur quem non licet transferre in alium.

144. Et ideo subdit **qui est benedictus**, id est cuius bonitas est manifesta, sicut enim dicimus benedicere Deum in quantum eius bonitatem corde recognoscimus et ore confitemur. Eccli. XLIII, 33: *benedicentes Deum exaltate illum quantum potestis*.

Addit autem **in saecula**, quia eius bonitas est sempiterna ab alio non dependens, sed omnis boni principium. Et ex hoc sibi debetur omnis latriae cultus.

This can be taken in two ways: first, that they changed the true knowledge they received from God into false dogmas with their perverse reasoning; for example when they claimed that certain idols are gods or that God is not all-powerful or all-knowing: *they have taught their tongue to speak lies* (Jer 9:5). In another way, they exchanged the truth about God for a lie, because they attributed the nature of divinity, which is truth itself, to an idol, which is a lie, inasmuch as it is not God: *our fathers have inherited nothing but lies; worthless things in which there is no profit. Can man make for himself gods? Such are no gods!* (Jer 16:19).

The divine nature can be considered in another way as being the source of existence for all things through creation. Consequently, men owed him worship: inwardly, the worship of a pious love: *if anyone is a worshiper of God and does his will, him he hears* (John 9:31); outwardly, the service of latria: *the Lord, your God, shall you adore and him alone shall you serve* (Deut 9:13).

143. Hence, he continues, charging them that **and worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator**. For they worshipped heavenly bodies and air and water and other such things: *they supposed that fire or wind or swift air or the circle of the stars* (Wis 13:2).

With these words he censures the wise men of the gentiles who, although they never believed that anything divine was present in images, as the followers of Hermes believed, or that the fables created by poets concerning the gods were true, nevertheless paid divine worship to certain creatures, thus lending support to the fables. Thus, Varro supposed that the universe was God on account of its soul and taught that divine worship can be paid to the whole universe, namely, to the air, which they called Juno, to the water, which they called Liaeus, and to other things. Even the Platonists taught that divine worship was owed to all the rational substances above us; for example, to demons, to the souls of the heavenly bodies, and to the intelligences, i.e., the separated substances.

Now, although we should show some reverence to those above us, it should never be the worship of latria, which consists chiefly in sacrifices and oblations, through which man professes God to be the author of all good things. Similarly, in any kingdom certain honors are due the supreme ruler and it is not lawful to transfer them to anyone else.

144. And for this reason he adds **who is blessed**, i.e., whose goodness is evident, just as we are said to bless God, when we admit his goodness with our heart and express it orally: *when you bless him, put forth all your strength* (Eccl 43:30).

He adds **forever** because his goodness is everlasting; it depends on no one else, but is the source of all good. For this reason the worship of latria is due him.

Addit autem **amen** ad omnimodam certitudinem asserendam. Is. LXV, 16: *qui benedictus est super terram benedicetur in Deo. Amen*, quod idem est quod verum, vel fiat.

145. Videtur autem Apostolus triplicem theologiam tangere gentilium.

Primo quidem civilem, quae observabatur a pontificibus in adoratione idolorum in templo; et quantum ad hoc dicit: ***et mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei.***

Secundo theologiam fabularem, quam poetae tradebant in theatris; et quantum ad hoc dicit: ***qui commutaverunt veritatem Dei in mendacium.***

Tertio theologiam naturalem, quam observaverunt philosophi in mundo, partes mundi colentes; et quantum ad hoc dicit: ***et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae potius quam creatori.***

He ends with **amen** to indicate absolute certainty: *he who blesses himself in the land shall be blessed by the God of truth* (Isa 65:16). **Amen**, i.e., it is true, or so be it.

145. It seems that the Apostle touches on the three theologies of the gentiles.

First, the civil, which was observed by their priests adoring idols in the temple; in regard to this he says: ***they changed the glory of the incorruptible God.***

Second, the theology of fables, which their poets presented in the theater. In regard to this he says: ***who changed the truth of God into a lie.***

Third, their natural theology, which the philosophers observed in the world, when they worshipped the parts of the world. In regard to this he says: ***and worshipped and served the creature rather than the creator.***

Lecture 8

1:26 *Propterea tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae: nam feminae eorum immutaverunt naturalem usum in eum usum qui est contra naturam.* [n. 146]

1:27 *Similiter autem et masculi, relicto naturali usu feminae, exarserunt in desideriis suis in invicem, masculi in masculos turpitudinem operantes, et mercedem, quam oportuit, erroris sui in semetipsis recipientes.* [n. 150]

1:28 *Et sicut non probaverunt Deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt,* [n. 152]

1:29 *repletos omni iniquitate, malitia, fornicatione, avaritia, nequitia, plenos invidia, homicidio, contentione, dolo, malignitate: susurrone,* [n. 156]

1:30 *detractores, Deo odibiles, contumeliosos, superbos, elatos, inventores malorum, parentibus non obediētes,* [n. 162]

1:31 *insipientes, incompositos, sine affectione, absque foedere, sine misericordia.* [n. 165]

1:32 *Qui cum iustitiam Dei cognovissent, non intellexerunt quoniam qui talia agunt, digni sunt morte: et non solum qui ea faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus.* [n. 166]

1:26 *διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας: αἱ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν μετέλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν,*

1:27 *ὁμοίως τε καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους, ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσιν τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες.*

1:28 *καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα,*

1:29 *πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ, πονηρίᾳ, πλεονεξίᾳ, κακίᾳ, μεστοὺς φθόνου, φόβου, ἐριδος, δόλου, κακοθηρίας, ψιθυριστάς,*

1:30 *καταλάλους, θεοσυγεῖς, ὑβριστάς, ὑπερηφάνους, ἀλαζόνας, ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν, γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς,*

1:31 *ἄσυνέτους, ἄσυνθέτους, ἀστόργους, ἀσπόνδους, ἀνελεήμονας:*

1:32 *οἵτινες τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγόντες, ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσουντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν, οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνευδοκοῦσιν τοῖς πράσσουσιν.*

1:26 *For this cause, God delivered them up to shameful affections. For their women have changed the natural use into that use which is against nature.* [n. 146]

1:27 *And, in like manner, the men also, leaving the natural use of the women, have burned in their lusts, one towards another: men with men, working that which is filthy and receiving in themselves the recompense which was due to their error.* [n. 150]

1:28 *And as they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not fitting.* [n. 152]

1:29 *Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, avarice, wickedness: full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity: whisperers,* [n. 156]

1:30 *Detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents,* [n. 162]

1:31 *Foolish, dissolute: without affection, without fidelity, without mercy.* [n. 165]

1:32 *Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things, are worthy of death: and not only they who do them, but they also who consent to those who do them.* [n. 166]

146. Posita culpa impietatis, secundum quam contra naturam divinam peccaverunt, ponit poenam, qua scilicet ad hoc reducti sunt ut contra suam naturam peccarent.

Et primo ponit poenam, secundo exponit, ibi *nam feminae*, tertio eius convenientiam ostendit, ibi *et mercedem*.

147. Dicit ergo primo *propterea*, scilicet quia Dei veritatem in mendacium mutaverunt, *tradidit illos Deus*, non quidem impellendo in malum sed deserendo, *in passiones ignominiae*, id est peccata contra naturam, quae dicuntur passiones, secundum quod proprie passio dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur extra ordinem

146. Having set forth the sin of ungodliness, according to which they have sinned against the divine nature, he now sets forth the punishment whereby they have been reduced to sinning against their own nature.

First, he mentions the punishment; second, he explains it, at *for their women*; third, its fittingness, at *and receiving in themselves*.

147. Therefore, he says *for this cause*, i.e., because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie, *God delivered them up* not, of course, by impelling them to evil but by abandoning them *to shameful affections*, i.e., sins against nature, which are called passions in the sense that a passion implies that a thing is drawn outside the order of its own

suae naturae, puta cum aqua calefit aut cum homo infirmatur. Unde quia per huiusmodi peccata homo recedit ab ordine naturali, convenienter dicuntur passiones, infra VII, 5: *passiones peccatorum*.

Dicuntur autem *passiones ignominiae* quia non sunt nomine digna, secundum illud Eph. V, 15: *quae aguntur in occulto ab eis turpe est dicere*. Si enim peccata carnis communiter exprobrabilia sunt quia per ea homo deducitur ad id quod est bestiale in homine, multo magis peccatum contra naturam, per quod etiam homo a natura bestiali decedit. Os. IV, 7: *gloriam eorum in ignominiam commutabo*.

148. Deinde cum dicit *nam feminae eorum*, etc., exponit quod dixerat,

et primo quantum ad feminas,

secundo quantum ad masculos, ibi *similiter autem masculi*.

149. Dicit ergo primo: ideo illos dico in passiones ignominiae traditos, *nam feminae eorum mutaverunt naturalem usum in eum usum qui est contra naturam*. I Cor. XI, 14: *nec ipsa natura docet vos*. Is. XXIV, 5: *mutaverunt ius, dissipaverunt foedus sempiternum*, id est ius naturale.

Est autem considerandum quod dupliciter est aliquid contra naturam hominis. Uno modo contra naturam differentiae constitutivae hominis, quae est rationale; et sic omne peccatum dicitur esse contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra rationem rectam. Unde et Damascenus dicit in II Lib. quod angelus peccans versus est ex eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est praeter naturam.

Alio modo dicitur esse aliquid contra naturam hominis ratione generis, quod est animal. Manifestum est autem quod, secundum naturae intentionem, commixtio sexuum in animalibus ordinatur ad actum generationis, unde omnis commixtionis modus, ex quo generatio sequi non potest, est contra naturam hominis inquantum est animal. Et secundum hoc dicitur in Glossa naturalis *usus est ut vir et mulier in uno concubitu coeant, contra naturam vero ut masculus masculum polluat et mulier mulierem*. Et eadem ratio est de omni actu coitus ex quo generatio sequi non potest.

150. Deinde cum dicit *similiter autem*, exponit quantum ad mares, qui, scilicet, *relicto naturali usu feminae exarserunt*, id est, extra terminos naturae arserunt, secundum illud Ps. CXVII, 12: *exarserunt sicut ignis in spinis*; et hoc *in desideriis suis*, scilicet carnalibus, *invicem masculi in masculos turpitudinem operantes*. Ez. XVI, 37: *nudabo ignominiam tuam coram eis*, etc.

151. Deinde cum dicit *et mercedem*, ostendit hanc poenam convenientem esse culpae, dicens *recipientes in semetipsis*, id est in deformatione suae naturae,

nature, as when water becomes hot or when a man becomes sick. Hence, because man departs from the natural order, when he commits such sins, they are fittingly called passions, as in Romans: *the passions of sins* (Rom 7:5).

They are called *shameful affections*, because their acts are not worthy of man: *it is a shame even to speak of the things that they do in secret* (Eph 5:12). For if sins of the flesh are shameful, because through them man is lowered to what is bestial in him, much more so are sins against nature, through which man sinks below the bestial: *I will change his glory into shame* (Hos 4:7).

148. Then when he says *for their women* he explains his statement.

First, in regard to women;

second, in regard to men, at *and, in like manner, the men also*.

149. He says therefore first: the reason why I say that they have been given up to dishonorable passions is that *their women have changed the natural use into that use which is against nature*. does not nature itself teach you? (1 Cor 11:14); *they have transgressed the laws, broken the everlasting covenant*, i.e., the natural law (Isa 24:5).

It should be noted that something is against man's nature in two ways: in one way, against the nature of what constitutes man, i.e., rationality. In this way, every sin is said to be against man's nature, inasmuch as it is against right reason. Hence, Damascene says that an angel in sinning was turned from what is according to nature into what is contrary to nature.

In another way, something is said to be against man's nature by reason of his general class, which is animal. Now it is obvious that according to the intent of nature, sexual union in animals is ordained to the act of generation; hence, every form of union from which generation cannot follow is against the nature of animal as animal. In line with this it is stated in the Gloss that *the natural use is that a man and a woman come together in one copulation, but it is against nature that a man pollute a man and a woman a woman*. The same is true of every act of intercourse from which generation cannot follow.

150. Then when he says *and, in like manner*, he explains in regard to males, who *leaving the natural use of the women, have burned*, i.e., lusted for something beyond the intent of nature: *they blazed like a fire of thorns* (Ps 118:12); and this *in their lusts*, i.e., carnal desires, *men with men, working that which is filthy*: *I will uncover your shame before them and they will see all your baseness* (Ezek 16:37).

151. Then he shows that this *recompense* suited their guilt, when he says, *and receiving in themselves*, i.e., in the deformation of their nature, *the recompense which was due*

mercedem erroris sui, scilicet quo Dei veritatem in mendacium commutaverunt, *mercedem*, id est retributionem, *quam oportuit* scilicet eos recipere, secundum iustitiae ordinem, ex qua debitum erat ut qui in Dei naturam iniuriosi fuerant, id quod est proprium sibi, creaturis attribuendo, in sui natura contumeliosi existerent.

Et quamvis *merces* proprie videatur in bonum sonare, tamen hic sumitur pro quacumque retributione, etiam in malis, secundum modum quo dicitur infra VI, 23: *stipendia peccati mors*. Mich. I, 7: *mercedes eorum igni comburentur*.

Est autem notandum quod satis rationabiliter Apostolus vitia contra naturam, quae sunt gravissima inter peccata carnalia, ponit idololatriae poenam, quia simul cum idololatria incepisse videntur, scilicet tempore Abrahae, quando creditur idololatria incoepisse. Unde et tunc primo leguntur in Sodomitibus punita fuisse, ut Gen. XIX. Simul etiam idololatria crescente, huiusmodi vitia creverunt. Unde dicitur II Mach. IV, 12 s., quod Iason *ausus est sub ipsa arce optimos quosque epheborum in lupanaribus ponere*. Erat autem hoc non initium sed incrementum quoddam et profectus gentilis et alienigenae conversationis.

152. Deinde cum dicit *et sicut non probaverunt*, ostendit eos iustitiae fuisse subiectos.

Et primo ostendit ex qua priori culpa in haec peccata devenerunt,

secundo enumerat horum peccatorum differentias, ibi *repletos omni iniquitate*.

153. Culpam autem praecedentem ponit, cum dicit *et sicut non probaverunt Deum habere in notitia*. Quod potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, quia quamvis lumine rationis per creaturas visibiles veram Dei cognitionem habere potuerunt, tamen ut liberius possent peccare, *non probaverunt*, id est non approbaverunt, ut ipsi haberent Deum in sui notitia. Iob XXI, 14: *recede a nobis: scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus*.

Alio modo, potest intelligi quod ipsi non probaverunt quod Deus in sui notitia haberet facta humana, secundum illud Ps. XCIII, 7: *dixerunt: non videbit Dominus, nec intelliget Deus*. Et secundum hunc sensum convenienter huic culpae respondet poena cum subditur *tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum*.

154. Dicitur autem hic sensus hominis non exterior, quo sensibilia cognoscuntur, sed interior, secundum quem iudicat de agendis, secundum illud Sap. VI, 16: *co-gitare de illa sensus est consummatus*.

Dicitur autem sensus reprobis quo aliquis reprobandum iudicium habet de agendis, secundum illud

to their error, i.e., the error of exchanging the truth of God for a lie; *the recompense which was due*, i.e., the retribution they deserved to receive according to the order of justice, which required that those who insulted God's nature by attributing to creatures what is his alone, should be affronts to their own nature.

Although *recompense* seems to imply something good, it is taken here for any retribution, even evil: *the wages of sin is death* (Rom 6:23); *all their wages shall be burned with fire* (Mic 1:7).

It should be noted that the Apostle very reasonably considers vices against nature, which are the worst carnal sins, as punishments for idolatry, because they seem to have begun as idolatry, namely, at the time of Abraham, when idolatry is believed to have begun. That seems to be the reason why they are first recorded to have been punished among the people of Sodom (Gen 19). Furthermore, as idolatry became more widespread, these vices grew. Hence it is written that Jason *founded a gymnasium right under the citadel, and he induced the noblest of the young men to wear the Greek hat* (2 Macc 4:12), i.e., put them in brothel houses. Now this was not the beginning, but an increase and progression of the heathenish and foreign manners.

152. Then when he says *and as they liked not*, he shows that they fell under a penalty of justice.

First, he shows that previous sin brought them to these sins;

second, he enumerates the differences among these sins, at *being filled with all iniquity*.

153. He mentions the preceding sin when he says *and as they liked not to have God in their knowledge*. This can be interpreted in two ways: in one way, that although they could have had true knowledge about God by the light of reason considering visible things, nevertheless, to sin more freely, *they did not like to have God in their knowledge*, i.e., they did not approve having God in their knowledge: *they said to God: depart from us. We do not desire knowledge of your ways* (Job 21:14).

In another way it can mean that they did not acknowledge that God knows about human behavior: *the Lord does not see: the God of Jacob does not perceive* (Ps 94:7). According to this interpretation the punishment is shown to fit this sin, when he says *God delivered them up to a reprobate sense*.

154. *Sense* here does not mean man's external sense, by which sense-perceptible things are known, but the interior sense, according to which he judges his behavior: *to fix one's thoughts on her*, i.e., wisdom, *is to have perfect sense* (Wis 6:15).

It is called a base sense, because it reached discommendable judgments about behavior: *men of corrupt mind*

II Tim. III, 8: *homines mente corrupti, reprobī circa fidem*. Ier. VI, 30: *argentum reprobū vocate eos*.

155. Et ideo subdit *ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt*, id est ea quae a recta ratione discordant. Sap. III, 11: *inutilia opera eorum sunt*.

Est autem conveniens ut qui contra Dei notitiam peccaverunt, vel eum cognoscere nolentes, vel eum cognoscere non arbitantes, in perversitatem sensus traderentur. Unde et Sap. XIV, 31 dicitur: *peccantium poena perambulat semper in iustorum praevaricationem*.

156. Deinde cum dicit *repletos*, etc., enumerat huiusmodi inconvenientia opera. Et primo, ponit id quod est generale, dicens *repletos omni iniquitate*, quia ut dicitur I Io. III, 4: *omne peccatum est iniquitas*.

Sicut enim omnis virtus, in quantum exequitur praeceptum legis, habet rationem iustitiae, ita etiam omne peccatum, in quantum a regula legis divinae discordat, habet rationem iniquitatis. Et sic in Sacra Scriptura praecipue peccata arguuntur.

Dupliciter autem eorum culpam exaggerat. Primo quidem intensive per hoc quod dicit *repletos*. Ille enim videtur repleti iniquitate cuius affectus est totaliter ad peccandum dispositus, secundum illud Ps. XIII, 3: *quorum os maledictione et amaritudine plenum est*. Secundo extensive quia scilicet non tantum in uno peccaverunt sed in omnibus. Sap. XIV, 27: *infandorum idolorum cultura omnis mali causa est*.

157. Consequenter cum dicit *malitia*, enumerat peccata in speciali.

Et primo quantum ad transgressionem, quae opponitur praeceptis negativis,

secundo quantum ad omissionem, quae opponitur praeceptis affirmativis, ibi *superbos*.

Circa primum duo facit:

primo ponit peccata quibus aliquis deterioratur in seipso,

secundo peccata quibus aliquis fit nocivus proximo, ibi *nequitia*.

158. Circa primum, ponit quidem id primo quod est generale cum dicit *malitia*, quae est habitus vitiosus, virtuti oppositus. Unde ex malitia peccare dicuntur qui ex habitu peccant. Ps. LI, 3: *quid gloriaris in malitia?*

In speciali ponit peccatum quo quis deordinatur circa appetitum corporalium delectationum, cum dicit *fornicatione*. Quamvis enim fornicatio proprie sit cum meretricibus, quae iuxta fornices, id est arcus triumphales, se publice prostituebant, tamen hic sumitur pro omni illicito concubitu. Tob. IV, 13: *attende tibi fili mi ab omni fornicatione*.

Secundo, ponit vitium per quod quis deordinatur circa appetitum rerum exteriorum cum dicit *avaritia*,

and counterfeit faith (2 Tim 3:8); refuse silver they are called (Jer 6:30).

155. Therefore, he continues: *to do those things which are not fitting*, i.e., behavior not in accord with right reason: *their works are useless* (Wis 3:11).

Yet it is fitting that those who sinned against knowing God either by refusing to acknowledge him or by thinking that they do not know him, should be given up to a perverse sense. That is why it is written: *a just penalty always pursues the transgression of the unrighteous* (Wis 14:31).

156. Then when he says *being filled*, he enumerates these unbecoming actions. First, he describes their general state, saying *being filled with all iniquity*, because, as it is said: *all sin is wickedness* (1 John 3:4).

For just as every virtue, inasmuch as it carries out a precept of the law, qualifies as justice, so every sin, inasmuch as it is at variance with the rule of the divine law, qualifies as wickedness. And so sins are particularly reprehended in the Sacred Scripture.

He stresses their guilt in two ways: first, in its enormity, when he says *filled*. For that person seems to be filled with wickedness whose affections are totally dedicated to sinning: *their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness* (Ps 13:3). Second, in its extent, because they sin not in one matter only but in all: *the worship of idols is the beginning and cause and end of every evil* (Wis 14:27).

157. Then when he says *malice*, he enumerates their sins in detail.

First, their transgressions which disobey negative precepts;

second, their omission, which disregard affirmative precepts, at *proud*.

Regarding the first he does two things:

first, he mentions the sins by which a person deteriorates within himself;

second, those by which he becomes harmful to his neighbor, at *wickedness*.

158. In regard to the first he describes the source of deterioration in general terms, when he says *malice*, which is a habit of vice opposed to virtue. Hence it is that a person who sins from habit is said to sin from malice: *why do you boast of malice?* (Ps 51:1).

In regard to particulars, he mentions first the sin by which a person is disarranged in regard to the desire for bodily pleasures, when he says *fornication*. For although fornication, strictly speaking, is with prostitutes who offered themselves publicly near the fornices, i.e., the triumphal arches, yet here it is taken for any unlawful concubinage: *beware, my son, of all fornication* (Tob 4:12).

Second, the vice through which a person is misaligned in his desire for external things, when he says, *avarice*, which is the untamed desire for possessing: *keep your life*

quae est immoderatus appetitus habendi. Hebr. ult.: *sint mores sine avaritia, contenti praesentibus*.

159. Deinde ponuntur peccata quae tendunt ad nocumentum proximi. Et primo ponit id quod est generale cum dicit **nequitia**, dum scilicet attentat aliquis quod nequit implere; quod maxime contingit circa nocumenta proximorum, quibus non potest aliquis aliquando pro voto nocere. Ps. VII, 10: *consumetur nequitia peccatorum*.

Consequenter ponit radicem horum peccatorum dicens **plenos invidia**, quae est dolor de alieno bono, ex quo aliquis incitatur ad nocendum alteri. Sap. II, 24: *invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum*.

160. Postea ponuntur nocumenta et primo manifesta, et quantum ad facta, cum dicit **homicidiis**, quae sunt praecipua nocumenta. Os. IV, 2: *maledictum, mendacium et homicidium, furtum et adulterium inundaverunt*. Dicit autem pluraliter **homicidiis**, quia homicidium non solum consistit in opere sed etiam in voluntate. I Io. III, 5: *qui odit fratrem suum homicida est*, qui scilicet odit ad occidendum.

Et quantum ad verba, cum dicit **contentione**. Est autem contentio impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris. Prov. XX, 3: *honor est homini qui se separat a contentione*.

161. Deinde ponit nocumenta occulta et, primo, illud quod est generale, cum dicit **dolo**, quando scilicet aliud simulatur et aliud agitur. Ier. IX, 8: *sagitta vulnens lingua eorum, dolum locuta est; in ore suo pacem cum amico suo loquitur et occulte ei ponit insidias*.

Post haec ponit radicem interiorem horum nocumentorum, cum dicit **malignitate**, quae importat malum ignem, id est malum affectum in corde secundum illud Ps. XXVII, 3: *loquuntur pacem cum proximo suo mala autem in cordibus*. Ps. V, 6: *non habitabit iuxta te malignus*.

162. Consequenter ponit nocumenta occulta, quae praecipue fiunt verbis, cum dicit **susurrone**, qui scilicet occulte susurrant in auribus hominum ad seminandas inter eos discordias. Eccli. XVIII, 15: *susurro et bilinguus maledictus in populo; multos enim turbavit pacem habentes*. **Detractores**, qui scilicet detrahunt famae alicuius occulte, id est eo ignorante mala dicentes de eo. Eccl. X, 11: *si mordeat serpens in silentio nihil eo minus habet qui occulte detrahit*.

Et ne putentur ista peccata esse levia, quia solo ore committuntur, subdit **Deo odibiles**. Impugnant enim id maxime quod Deus in hominibus amat, scilicet mutuum amorem. Io. XV, 12: *hoc est praeceptum meum ut diligatis invicem*. Unde dicitur Prov. VI, 16: *sex sunt quae*

free from love of money, and be content with what you have (Heb 13:5).

159. Then the sins which tend to harm one's neighbor are mentioned: first, **wickedness**, i.e., villainy, which inclines a person to attempt what he cannot accomplish. This happens especially in regard to harming one's neighbor, whom one does not always succeed in harming as planned: *let the evils of the wicked come to an end* (Ps 7:9).

Second, he mentions the root of these sins, when he says **full of envy**, which consists in being grieved at another's good; as a result one is incited to harm the other: *through the devil's envy death entered the world* (Wis 2:24).

160. Then are mentioned the wrongs: first, the obvious ones that are deeds, when he says **murders**, which are the chief wrongs: *there is swearing, lying, killing, stealing, and committing of adultery* (Hos 4:2). He says **murders** in the plural because murder is present not only in the action but also in the will: *anyone who hates his brother is a murderer* (1 John 3:15), i.e., who hates him to kill him.

Second, the obvious ones that are words, when he says **contention**, which is an attack on the truth launched with the self-assurance of shouting: *it is an honor for a man to keep aloof from strife* (Prov 20:3).

161. Then he mentions the covert injuries: first, one that is general, when he says **deceit**, i.e., when one thing is pretended and something else is done: *their tongue is a deadly arrow; it speaks deceitfully; with his mouth each speaks peaceably to his neighbor, but in his heart he plans an ambush for him* (Jer 9:8).

After these he mentions the inner root of these harmful deeds, when he says **malignity**, which implies an evil fire, i.e., ill will in the heart: *they speak peace with their neighbors, while mischief is in their hearts* (Ps 28:3); *the Lord abhors deceitful men* (Ps 5:6).

162. Then he mentions the covert wrongs that are perpetrated by words when he says **whisperers**, i.e., those who secretly whisper in men's ears to sow discord among them: *curse the whisperer and deceiver, for he has destroyed many who were at peace* (Eccl 28:15); **detractors**, i.e., persons who detract from another's reputation secretly, i.e., saying evil things about another without his knowing it: *if a serpent bites before it is charmed, there is no advantage in a charmer* (Eccl 10:11).

But lest these sins be regarded as trivial, because they are committed only by words, he adds **hateful to God**; for they mainly attack something that God loves in men, namely, mutual love: *this is my commandment, that you love one another* (John 15:12); hence it is said: *there are six things*

odit Deus et septimum detestatur anima eius, scilicet qui seminat inter fratres discordias.

Addit autem **contumeliosos**, qui scilicet mala in faciem inferunt. I Tim. I, 13: *qui prius fuit blasphemus et persecutor et contumeliosus.*

Sic ergo haec tria vitia in materia conveniunt, quia omnes mala dicunt de proximo.

Differunt autem in fine, nam susurro intendit discordiam, detractor infamiam, contumeliosus iniuriam.

163. Consequenter ponit peccata quae pertinent ad omissionem, et primo ponit radicem horum peccatorum cum dicit **superbos**.

Dicuntur enim superbi quasi super se euntes per inordinatum appetitum excellentiae, volunt enim praeesse, non subesse alienae regulae, et ideo praecepta omittunt. Eccli. X, 15: *initium omnis peccati superbia*, quod verum est quantum ad aversionem a Deo, non quantum ad conversionem ad bonum commutabile. Dicitur enim I Tim. ult. quod *radix omnium malorum est cupiditas*.

164. Secundo ponit processum superbiae, ex quo primo in corde nascitur elatio, ut scilicet homo se super alios efferat. Lc. XVIII, 11: *non sum sicut ceteri hominum*. Unde dicitur contra elatos illud Ps. CXXX, 1: *neque elati sunt oculi mei*.

Secundo ex superbia in opere nascitur novitatum praesumptio, et quantum ad hoc subdit **inventores malorum**; quia enim bona iam a Deo et ab hominibus sunt instituta, consequens est ut ipsi de novo adinveniant mala. Is. III, 8: *adinventiones eorum contra Dominum*.

165. Consequenter ponuntur ipsae omissiones. Et primo respectu superiorum; unde, quantum ad parentes, dicit **parentibus non obedientes**. Contra id quod dicitur Eph. VI, 1: *filii obedite parentibus vestris in domino*. Quantum autem ad Deum dicit **insipientes**, id est contra divinam reverentiam agentes. Iob XXVIII, 28: *ecce timor Domini ipsa est sapientia et recedere a malo intelligentia*.

Secundo, ponit omissionem quantum ad seipsum. Cum dicit **incompositos**, in habitu et in incessu. Eccli. XIX, 27: *amictus corporis et risus dentium et ingressus hominis, enuntiant de illo*. Quidam tamen inculpan- tur Is. III, 16 de hoc quod composito gradu incedebant, quia illa compositio excedebat modum communem hominum, inter quos conversabantur.

Tertio, ponit omissionem quantum ad pares ad quos debemus habere, primo, affectum in corde; contra quod dicit **sine affectione**. Prov. XII, 10: *viscera impiorum crudelia*. II Tim. III, 2: *Erunt homines seipsos amantes*, scilicet et non alios. Secundo, debet homo eis exhibere socialem conversationem; contra quod subdit **absque foedere**, quo scilicet aliis socialiter non convivunt. Iud. XVIII, 27 s. *percusserunt eos in ore gladii eo quod*

which the Lord hates, and a seventh is an abomination to him (Prov 6:16), namely, a person who sows discord among brothers.

He adds **contumelious**, namely, those who insult another to his face: *though I formerly blasphemed and persecuted and insulted him* (1 Tim 1:13).

Thus he mentioned three vices that agree on one point, namely, they say something evil about one's neighbor.

But they differ in their aim, for the whisperer intends discord, the slanderer ill repute, and the insolent injury.

163. Then he mentions the sins that involve omission: first, the root of these sins, when he says **proud**.

They are called haughty, as though moving on a higher plane than they ought. On account of an unregulated desire for excellence, they wish to be first, refuse any rule outside themselves, and, therefore, ignore commands: *the beginning of all sin is pride* (Eccl 10:13), which is true, insofar as sin is a turning from God, but not insofar as sin is a turning to a perishable good. For it is stated: *the love of money is the root of all evils* (1 Tim 6:10).

164. Second, he describes the progress of pride. First, from it is born in the heart a boastful attitude, so that a person esteems himself above others: *I am not like other men* (Luke 18:11). Against those who over-estimate themselves it is said: *my eyes are not raised too high* (Ps 131:1).

Second, from pride arises presumption to be new and different in behavior, to which he alludes, when he says **inventors of evil things**. For since good things have already been established by God and men, the result is that they devise new evils: *their devisings are against the Lord* (Isa 3:8).

165. Then the omissions are mentioned: first, in regard to authority; hence, in regard to parents he says **disobedient to parents**, contrary to what is commanded in Ephesians: *children, obey your parents in the Lord* (Eph 6:1). In regard to God's authority he says, **foolish**, i.e., acting contrary to God's wisdom: *the fear of the Lord is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding* (Job 28:28).

Second, he mentions a sin of omission relating to oneself, when he says **dissolute** in appearance and in gait: *a man's attire and open-mouthed laughter and a man's manner of walking show what he is* (Eccl 19:30). Some fall under this indictment, when their manner conflicts with the common customs of the people among whom they live.

Third, he mentions omission touching one's equals, toward whom we ought to have, first of all, affection in the heart; hence, he says **without affection**: *the heart of the wicked is cruel* (Prov 12:10); *men will be lovers of self* and not of others (2 Tim 3:2). Second, a man should live in social life with his equals, in contrast to which he says **without fidelity**; consequently, they do not live in society with others: *they smote them with the edge of the sword* (Judg 18:27ff.);

cum nullo hominum haberent quicquam societatis et negotii. Eccle. IV, 10: *vae soli quoniam cum ceciderit*, etc.

Quarto, quantum ad inferiores, subdit **sine misericordia**, quam debemus miseris exhibere. Iac. II, 13: *iudicium sine misericordia fiet illi qui non facit misericordiam*, etc.

166. Deinde cum dicit **qui cum iustitiam**, ostendit eos esse obnoxios irae, sive vindictae divinae.

Circa quod tria consideranda sunt.

primo, naturalis eorum affectus quia, cum cognoscerent Deum iustum et omnes alias perfectiones habentem, non crediderunt quod pro peccatis poenam inferret. Soph. I, 12: *dicunt in cordibus suis: non faciet Dominus male*. Et hoc est quod dicit **qui cum iustitiam Dei cognovissent, non intellexerunt**.

167. Secundo poena peccatis eorum debita, cum dicit **digni sunt morte**. Infra VI, 23: *stipendia peccati mors est*.

Dignum est enim quod anima, quae deserit Deum, a corpore suo deseratur per mortem corporalem, et finaliter deseratur a Deo per mortem aeternam, de qua dicitur in Ps. XXXIII, 22: *mors peccatorum pessima*, et, Apoc. XX, 6: *in his mors secunda non habebit potestatem*.

168. Tertio considerandum est quibus talis poena debetur. Et, primo, his **qui talia agunt**, scilicet praedicta peccata, secundum illud Ps. V, 7: *odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem, perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium*.

Et **non solum illis qui faciunt sed etiam his qui consentiunt facientibus**. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo directe, vel laudando peccatum, secundum illud Ps. IX, 24: *laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae*, vel etiam praebendo consilium et favorem, secundum illud II Par. XIX, 2: *impio praebes auxilium*. Alio modo indirecte, quando non reprehendit aut impedit quocumque modo, si potest, et praecipue si ex officio incumbat, sicut peccata filiorum imputantur Heli, sicut patet I Reg. III, 13. Haec autem specialiter Apostolus dicit propter quosdam sapientes gentilium, qui, et si idola non colebant, tamen colentibus non resistebant.

woe to him that is alone when he falls and has no one to lift him up (Eccl 4:10).

Fourth, he mentions an omission affecting one's inferiors, when he says **without mercy**, which we ought to show to the desolate: *judgment is without mercy to one who has shown no mercy* (Jas 2:13).

166. Then when he says **who, having known the justice**, he shows that they are deserving of God's anger or vengeance.

In this regard there are three points to consider.

First, their naturalistic attitude, because although they knew that God is just and possessed of all other perfections, they did not believe that he would punish their sins: *they say in their hearts: the Lord will not do evil* (Zeph 1:12). This is why he says, **who, having known the justice of God, did not understand**.

167. Second, the punishment due to their sins, when he says, **are worthy of death. The wages of sin is death** (Rom 6:23).

For it is fitting that the soul which deserts God should be deserted by its own body through bodily death and in the end be deserted by God through eternal death: *the death of the wicked is very evil* (Ps 34:22); *over such the second death has no power* (Rev 20:6).

168. Third, he considers those who deserve this punishment: first, **they who do such things**, i.e., the above mentioned sins: *you hate all evildoers. You destroy those who speak lies* (Ps 5:5–6).

But **not only they who do them, but they also who consent to those who do them**. And this in two ways: in one way directly, by applauding sin: *the wicked is praised in the desires of his heart* (Ps 10:3), or even by offering advice and help: *should you help the wicked* (2 Chr 19:2). In another way, indirectly, by not objecting or opposing in any way, and especially when one is obliged by his office. Thus, the sins of his sons were imputed to Eli (1 Sam 3:13). In particular, this is directed against those gentile wise men who, even though they did not worship idols, did nothing to oppose those who did.

CHAPTER 2

Lecture 1

2:1 Propter quod inexcusabilis es, o homo omnis qui iudicas. In quo enim iudicas alterum, teipsum condemnas: eadem enim agis quae iudicas. [n. 169]

2:2 Scimus enim quoniam iudicium Dei est secundum veritatem in eos qui talia agunt. [n. 178]

2:3 Existimas autem hoc, o homo, qui iudicas eos qui talia agunt, et facis ea, quia tu effugies iudicium Dei? [n. 180]

2:4 an divitias bonitatis ejus, et patientiae, et longanimitatis contemnis? ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit? [n. 183]

2:5 Secundum autem duritiam tuam, et impenitens cor, thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae, et revelationis iusti iudicii Dei, [n. 186]

2:1 Διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων: ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων.

2:2 οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας.

2:3 λογίζῃ δὲ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ὁ κρίνων τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας καὶ ποιῶν αὐτά, ὅτι σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ;

2:4 ἢ τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνοχῆς καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας καταφρονεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοιαν σε ἄγει;

2:5 κατὰ δὲ τὴν σκληρότητά σου καὶ ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ,

2:1 Wherefore you are inexcusable, O man, whosoever you are who judges. For wherein you judge another, you condemn yourself. For you do the same things which you judge. [n. 169]

2:2 For we know that the judgment of God is, according to truth, against those who do such things. [n. 178]

2:3 But do you think this, O man, who judges those who do such things and does the same, that you shall escape the judgment of God? [n. 180]

2:4 Or do you despise the riches of his goodness and patience and longsuffering? Do you not know that the benignity of God leads you to penance? [n. 183]

2:5 But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you treasure up to yourself wrath, against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God: [n. 186]

169. Postquam Apostolus ostendit quod gentiles iustificati non sunt ex veritatis cognitione quam habuerunt, hic ostendit quod neque etiam Iudaei iustificati sunt ex his in quibus gloriabantur. Et sic utrisque est necessaria ad salutem virtus evangelicae gratiae.

Primo ergo dicit quod Iudaei non sunt iustificati ex lege.

Secundo, quod non sunt iustificati ex genere, de quo gloriabantur, cap. III: *quid ergo est amplius?*

Tertio, quod non sunt iustificati ex circumcisione, cap. IV: *quid ergo dicemus?*

170. Circa primum considerandum est quod Iudaei et gentiles, ad fidem conversi, se invicem iudicabant de priori vita. Iudaei enim gentibus obiiciebant, quod sine Dei lege viventes, idolis immolabant. gentes autem obiiciebant Iudaeis quod, lege Dei accepta, eam non servabant.

Primo ergo utrosque arguit de inordinato iudicio;

169. After showing that the gentiles did not become just from the knowledge of the truth they had, the Apostle now shows that neither were the Jews made just by the things in which they gloried. Consequently, both of them need the power of the Gospel's grace for salvation.

First, therefore, he says that the Jews were not made just by the law;

second, that they were not made just by the race in which they gloried: *what advantage then has the Jew?* (Rom 3:1).

third, that they were not made just by circumcision: *what shall we say then?* (Rom 4:1).

170. In regard to the first point it should be noted that Jews and gentiles converted to the faith judged each other on their previous life. For the Jews objected to the gentiles that when they lived without God's law, they sacrificed to idols. The gentiles on their part objected to the Jews that even though they received God's law, they did not keep it.

First, therefore, he rebukes both sides and their extravagant judgment;