

ward and give praise” to an “object stripped of all concrete relations” and standing “in all the solitude of a metaphysical idea.” As for equality, Burke insisted that it was contrary to nature and therefore impossible to achieve; its advocates, moreover, did “great social harm,” for by pretending that real differences were unreal, they inspired “false hopes and vain expectations in those destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life.” Burke dismissed talk of fraternity as so much “cant and gibberish”; such splendid words were simply the pretexts of the French revolutionists; the causes of the French revolution, however, were “men’s vices—pride, ambition, avarice, lust, sedition.”

Burke’s view of the ancien régime in France was in many ways a romantic one; he was certainly no less a “man of feeling” than was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom he detested. But Burke was essentially a religious man living in a rationalistic age. Although he often spoke the language understood by that age—the language of calculation, expediency, utility, and political rights—he had a mind that his contemporaries, and many others, could not readily comprehend. Burke was conscious, above all things, of the reality and unavoidability of evil, and was thus led to claim that the only hope for humankind was to cling to safeguards that had stood the test of time. His hopes for bliss lay in heaven; on earth, his policy was to defend the tolerable, and sometimes the bad, against the immeasurably worse.

Until recently Burke was considered too unsystematic, too empirical, too “unphilosophical,” and too much of a theorist to deserve serious attention. His conservative views were uncongenial to left-wing historians, such as Harold J. Laski and Richard Wollheim, who found him inconsistent. In 1948, however, the Sheffield Public Library (Yorkshire, England) acquired the Wentworth Woodhouse manuscripts, and the largest known collection of Burke’s private papers became available to scholars for the first time since the writer’s death. The study of these papers did much to enhance Burke’s reputation as a political philosopher of signal importance and originality.

See also Aesthetics, History of; Bolingbroke, Henry St. John; Political Philosophy, History of; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social and Political Philosophy; Traditionalism.

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Maurice Cranston (1967)

Bibliography updated by Philip Reed (2005)

BURLEY, WALTER

(c. 1274–c. 1345)

Walter Burley, renowned logician, natural philosopher and theologian, was born in 1274 or 1275, perhaps at Burley-in-Wharfedale or Burley, near Leeds, in Yorkshire, England. He studied and taught both at Oxford (c. 1294–c.1309) and at the University of Paris (c.1309–1327). Based in England from 1327–1341, he perhaps spent his last years in retirement in southern France and Italy (1341–1344).

OXFORD

Burley was a master of arts by 1301 and is mentioned as a fellow of Merton College in 1305. He appears to have heard John Duns Scotus lecture on the *Sentences*, probably in the academic year 1298–1299, and adopts some Scotistic positions in later works: that being *qua* being is the primary and adequate object of the intellect, and that the intellect understands the singular as singular. If Bur-

ley began to study theology at Oxford, he and William of Ockham, whose studies began c.1307–1308, may have been fellow students. Burley's writings from this period, as Jan Pinborg (1937–1982) has rightly observed, "comprise an almost complete course of logic," including *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* and *Quaestiones super librum Posterior Analytics*, as well as treatments of specific topics, *De suppositionibus* and *De consequentiis*. There are commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy as well, including *Questions on the De anima of Aristotle*, Book 3.

PARIS

Burley's career in Paris, assuming some prior study of theology, could be reconstructed as follows. Between 1309 and 1314 he was an *auditor* of lectures on the scriptures and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, from 1314 to 1317 a *biblicus* (lecturer) on the scriptures, and from 1317 to 1318 a *sententiarius* although his lectures on the *Sentences* are lost. The *Tractatus Primus*, however, recounts a controversy on accidental form with his master, Thomas Wilton, which arose out of his *principium* on Book IV. Its argumentation exhibits a layering of logic and physics in a way that makes Burley a precursor of the Oxford *calculators*, such as Richard Swineshead and John Dumbleton (fourteenth century). In support of his claim that contrary forms, such as hot and cold, belong to the same ultimate species, he argues first *from logic* that things equidistant from an extreme are of the same species. Then, *from Aristotle in natural philosophy*, he argues that if a cooled body is immediately reheated, at some instant, *B*, preceding the first instant the body is cold, *A*, it will have a degree of heat, and at some instant, *C*, succeeding *A*, it will have a degree of cold, both of which degrees will be formally equidistant from maximum heat and thus in the same species. This argument also reflects contemporary debates over first, the *latitude* of forms, the intensive range of possible degrees that an instance of a species of quality may possess; and second, the *first and last instants* of change, the subject also of his *disputatio* at Toulouse, *De primo et ultimo instanti* of the same period.

In 1321, now a priest, he received his last leave of absence for two years of study and had completed his studies by the end of 1323 at the latest. He is referred to as *doctor of sacred theology* in 1324. His teaching career was short since he had left Paris by the beginning of 1327.

BURLEY AND OCKHAM

Perhaps in the same year (1317–1318) that Burley was lecturing on the *Sentences* at Paris, William Ockham was

doing likewise at Oxford. It is clear that from his first exposure to Ockham's *Sentences* commentary, Burley found it necessary to oppose him on a number of important issues in logic and natural philosophy. It was not a one-sided engagement. Ockham borrows from Burley's *Tractatus primus* (before 1324) in his *Quaestiones* on the *Physics*, which Burley in turn uses and criticizes in his own final commentary on the *Physics*, the first six books of which were written after 1324–7. In the *Summa logicae* Ockham both uses and attacks Burley's *De suppositionibus*. Burley counterattacks in his second version (after 1323) of *De puritate artis logicae*. While Ockham's *Logic* is organized in the traditional way around terms, propositions, and arguments, Burley's is organized around the general rules of consequences, thus giving priority to propositional logic.

Burley's explanation of the supposition of terms differs from Ockham's, who holds that first, universals do not exist in re, and second, that they are not constitutive parts of the essence of individuals. On the contrary, Burley holds that universals do exist in re although not apart from singulars. Therefore, according to Burley, when the term *human* in a sentence has *simple supposition* or stands for what is common or universal, it stands for what it primarily signifies: the humanness in Socrates or Plato. For Ockham, however, when *human* has simple supposition, it stands for a common concept, humanness in the mind. The only thing a term can signify or refer to is the individual, for instance when *human* supposits *personally* for Socrates, Plato, and so on. Burley eventually ceded ground to Ockham on the issue of universals as constitutive parts, holding that the universal form merely discloses the individual's essence (for instance, human). Ockham's position that universals are only general concepts implies that science, which is of the universal, must be about spoken, written, and mental propositions while for Burley, science is founded on *real propositions*, that is, propositions whose subjects and predicates are real entities, either singular or universal, but whose copulas are purely mental.

As well as resisting Ockham's reduction of res to singular things, Burley objects to Ockham's reduction of Aristotle's categories to substance and quality. In his *De formis*, (c. 1324–1326), he holds that quantity is a form separate from the quantified body, and he also argues that motion is a form over and above the body in motion, increased and decreased by a succession of specifically distinct forms (*De intensione et remissione formarum*, written after 1323). This explanation, which can be called a *succession* theory, extends to all changes in the degree of a qual-

ity a thing may possess: how the just person comes to have more justice, or that something cold becomes somewhat hot. Every increase in justice or heat, every acceleration of motion, results from the acquisition of a new, more perfect form and the loss of the old, less perfect form.

ENGLAND

Burley's departure from Paris was coincident with the coronation of Edward III (1312–1377), who sent him with a deputation in February 1327 to the papal court in Avignon and again in 1330, now as one of the king's *beloved clerks*, men in the royal service, usually of humble beginnings, who were often the king's agents on diplomatic missions. Again, from September 1338 until Easter 1339, Burley went "beyond the seas on the king's service" (*Calendar of Patent Rolls*, 1338–1340, p. 123).

Burley's academic career ended when he left Paris, and it seems that he had no significant scholarly projects in hand during the next seven years. However, some time after Richard Bury was enthroned as bishop at Durham in 1334, Burley became a member of his household. Bury's patronage and the intellectual energy of the circle he gathered around him would fuel Burley's renewed career as a scholar.

Between 1334 and 1337 Burley completed a commentary on Books 1–6 of the *Ethics*, added Books 7 and 8 to his final commentary on the *Physics*, and revised his commentary on the *Ars vetus*. He began to revise the commentary on *Ethics* 1–6 and add a commentary on 7–10 in 1338–1339. In the commentaries on the *Physics* and *Ars vetus* are found Burley's references to the *moderni*, those thinkers encountered first during his Paris years, who threaten the purity of the font of all philosophy: Aristotle. The doctrines that Burley identifies as being those of the *moderni* are not confined to any single philosophical discipline, and appear, by Burley's account, to form a systemic threat to philosophy itself. His commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*, begun in 1338–1339, is, along with his *Ethics* commentary, heavily dependent on Thomas Aquinas's expositions of those works (written between 1269–1272). Nevertheless, they contain doctrines original with Burley, for example, in the *Politics*, that of the "co-rulership" of kings with those who are "their friends and the friends of the government" (fol. 186r) and doctrinal divergences from Aquinas, for example, in the *Ethics*, the role of the speculative intellect in understanding the precepts of natural law (1500, fol. 103r).

Upon completion of the four expositions of Aristotle (c.1340), Burley, who was now in his mid-sixties, appears

to have sought some disengagement from the rigors and antagonisms of scholarly life, which may have led to his journey to Italy, probably in 1341.

SOUTHERN FRANCE AND ITALY

In 1341 Burley engaged in a *disputatio de quolibet* in the arts faculty at Bologna, an event that has been connected with his supposed Averroism. Burley was not an Averroist, however, if this term implies someone who adopts positions contrary to the Christian faith on the authority of Averroes. This is clear from the beginning of his career in his questions on *De anima*, Book 3, where he concludes that "neither is the material intellect one in all, nor also the agent intellect" (3.44). Then in Paris, where his master was the Averroist Wilton, his short work *De potentiis animae* reiterates this position.

The *De vita et moribus philosophorum* was long thought to have been the fruit of Burley's retirement in southern Europe. However, large sections from it are found in a manuscript dated 1326, when Burley was in Paris, which, together with the claim that no attribution of the work to him is earlier than the fifteenth century, has led to a presumption against Burley's authorship of this immensely popular work. Nevertheless, this evidence is not conclusive, and given his habits of appropriating large amounts of text from other authors and frequently reworking his own texts, it is not impossible that the *De vita et moribus philosophorum* passed through Burley's hands at some point in its history.

On 23 November 1343, Burley was in Avignon to present a copy of his commentary on the *Politics* to his old Parisian acquaintance Pierre Roger, now Clement VI (1291–1352). This gift, complete with an elegant letter and a miniature showing the presentation, could have been both in appreciation and expectation of further patronage. Indeed, Burley obtained the rectory at Great Chart, Kent, on 19 June 1344, the last date he is known to have been alive.

Walter Burley exerted considerable influence both on his contemporaries and on philosophical thought into the sixteenth century, to which the number of early printed editions of his commentaries on Aristotle testify. This influence may be attributed, firstly, to the originality and the clarity of the positions he maintained in the controversies of his day, both in logic and natural philosophy. He contributed significantly to the debates concerning supposition theory, consequences, *obligationes*, and *sophismata*. In natural philosophy his theory of the *first and last instants* of change, which distinguishes between *permanent* and *successive* things or states, becomes a stan-

dard view, and the *succession* position, which he defends in his classic work, *On the Intension and Remission of Forms*, is frequently cited, being both opposed and defended, into the sixteenth century.

His skill at the traditional exercise of commentary on Aristotle was also acknowledged. In glossed Latin manuscripts of Aristotle and Averroes, he is one of the commentators most frequently cited, especially in connection with the *Ethics*, *Politics*, *Physics*, and logical works of Aristotle. In addition, manuscripts of Burley's commentaries on these works had a wide circulation. Early printed editions of an important collection of *auctoritates* of Aristotle and other philosophers carry his textual comments, along with those of Averroes, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. A revival of interest in Burley's thought, particularly his logic and natural philosophy, was underway by the 1960s, and earlier assessments of him as an unworthy opponent of Ockham have not survived a closer study of his work, which has revealed its originality and depth.

See also Albert the Great; Aristotle; Averroes; Averroism; Duns Scotus, John; Grosseteste, Robert; Peter Lombard; Swineshead, Richard; Thomas Aquinas, St.; William of Ockham.

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BURTHOGGE, RICHARD

(c. 1638–c. 1698)

Richard Burthogge, the English physician and idealist philosopher, was born in Plymouth. After taking an arts degree at Lincoln College, Oxford, he studied medicine at the University of Leiden and returned to his native country to practice near Totnes in Devonshire. Of pacific and conciliatory disposition, he seems to have wavered in the religious controversy between Catholicism and Puritanism, and in philosophy, between Lockean sensationalism and Cambridge Platonism. He distinguished between