

texts, and what may be called investigation, which is concerned not with texts, but with the “things themselves” in the signification whereby anything is a “thing.” Like Husserl, Cairns regularly offered methodological reflections: he not only described the things reflectively observed, but also described how he had been able to analyze them, emphasizing reflection, analysis, “seeing,” and description.

Furthermore, Cairns often began by describing the *psychological* phenomenological epochē and reduction—a methodological step whereby consciousness remains intramundane but is abstracted from other mundane things—before contrasting it with the specifically *transcendental philosophical* epochē and reduction that refrains from accepting the intramundaneity of consciousness and makes the grounding of the world and all sciences of it possible. Although investigation, methodology included, predominates overwhelmingly in the writings of Husserl, it may be hoped that the posthumous publications of his arguably closest critical continuer will also help phenomenologists remember what phenomenology is.

See also Consciousness; Consciousness in Phenomenology; Husserl, Edmund; Phenomenology.

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CAJETAN, CARDINAL

(1469–1534)

Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), the most influential Renaissance Thomist, studied and taught in Italy, early distinguishing himself in teaching, commentaries, and debates as a philosopher and theologian. Rising to the leadership of the Dominican Order and becoming prominent in ecclesiastical politics, he was made cardinal in 1517. In 1518–1519 he disputed with Martin Luther.

Cajetan’s works number more than a hundred titles. His later writing was primarily devoted to biblical exegesis; his primary contributions to Thomistic philosophy and theology are due to his earlier commentaries and treatises, most notably his commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas’s *De Ente et Essentia* (On being and essence, 1495), his treatise *De Nominum Analogia* (On the analogy of names, 1498), and his formidable commentary on Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae* (1507–1522), which is printed with the pontifical (Leonine) edition of Aquinas’s work. Other significant philosophical works include commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* and on Aristotle’s *Categories*, *Posterior Analytics*, *De Anima*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics* (these last two have never been published), and a treatise on economics.

The *De Ente et Essentia* commentary is a sophisticated defense of Aquinas’s metaphysics, loosely organized in question format, clarifying (inter alia) the Thomistic

theses that being is the first object of cognition, that matter is the principle of individuation, and that essence and existence are really distinct in creatures. Sensitively attending to language, the work, with the *Categories* commentary, is also an important source for Cajetan's realist semantics.

De Nominum Analogia teaches a threefold classification and hierarchy of analogical signification. *Analogy of inequality* only counts as analogy from the metaphysician's perspective; logically, it is a form of univocation (as *body* is predicated equally of, though realized differently in, plant and stone). *Analogy of attribution* is Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation; a term naming primarily one thing is extended to others by virtue of their relation to the first, as *healthy* denominates animal (intrinsically, as *subject* of health) and medicine (extrinsically, as *cause* of the animal's health). *Analogy of proportionality* is based not on a relation, but on a similarity of relations (as the body's ocular vision is proportional to the soul's intellectual vision). When proper and not merely metaphorical, denomination here is always intrinsic. Cajetan regards this as the most genuine form, a true mean between univocation and equivocation, and the majority of his treatise explores the implications (for abstraction, judgment, and reasoning) of proportionally similar concepts.

Cajetan's writings are shaped by the polemical context of Renaissance Thomism. Concerned to address the objections of humanists (such as Count Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, whom he debated in 1495), Italian Averroists, and especially Scotists (foremost Anthony Trombetta, his contemporary at Padua and primary dialectical target of the *De Ente* commentary), Cajetan does not simply repeat formulas from Aquinas, he rearticulates Thomistic ideas in sometimes novel terminology. Despite this, and notwithstanding apparent departures from Aquinas on particular points (e.g., whether the soul's immortality is demonstrable), Cajetan was long regarded as a definitively authoritative expositor of Aquinas. When the twentieth-century Thomistic revival, distinguishing the historical Aquinas from longstanding scholastic traditions, emphasized differences between Cajetan and Aquinas, Étienne Gilson and others criticized Cajetan, especially on the topics of abstraction and existence. On analogy some scholars challenged whether the elements of Cajetan's comprehensive, systematic theory—especially the discussion of extrinsic versus intrinsic denomination, the preference for proportionality, and the threefold classification itself—are warranted from Aquinas's rather more dispersed and occasional reflections on the subject. Whether Cajetan's distinct philo-

sophical vocabulary is a departure from the mind of his master, or a legitimate development of authentic Thomism in light of the innovations of the intervening centuries, remains a question, but the forcefulness of his mind has never been doubted.

See also Aristotle; Humanism; Thomas Aquinas, St.; Thomism.

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CALDERONI, MARIO

(1879–1914)

Mario Calderoni ranks next to his teacher Giovanni Vailati as an Italian "Peircean pragmatist." He was graduated in law from the University of Pisa in 1901, and later lectured on the theory of values at the universities of Bologna and Florence.

Calderoni engaged in analyses of human behavior. These began with the interpretation of voluntary acts, which he regarded as the only nonmetaphysical problem of free will. In everyday life we all possess as good a criterion as is necessary to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary acts. To find out whether an act is to be called voluntary or not, we must modify the circumstances in which it usually occurs. If it still occurs in any case, we call it "involuntary"; if not, we call it "voluntary." The difference rests on the "plasticity" of voluntary acts, on their liability to modification by certain influences. A voluntary act "is liable not to be performed if the actor ... is given some new information on its consequences." What determines his acting is some expectation, which we can modify "either by changing one of the actor's beliefs by means of persuasion or reasoning, or, so to say artificially, by adding to the consequences the act would bring about if it were performed" (*Scritti*, vol. 2, pp. 25–26.). This criterion would hold good even if it were proved that all our