THE SCIENCE OF SACRED THEOLOGY FOR TEACHERS

Revelation
By Emmanuel Doronzo

Book Two

Notre Dame Institute Press
Middleburg, Virginia

MT. ANGEL ABBEY LIBRARY
______

ST
/ d7. d
3^7
nvy

NIHIL OBSTAT

Rev. Msgr. Eugene Kevane, Ph. D.
Censor deputatus
IMPRIMATUR

Most Rev. John T. Russell, D.D.
February 7, 1973
Richmond, Virginia

Library of Congress catalog card number: 74-76098
Copyright (C) by Institute for Christian Culture, Inc. Η Ή

Printed in the United States of America

ii

Contents

Bibliography
Introduction
Part I. General notions on revelation
(Theoretical Apologetics)
Chapter One. Nature of Revelation
Chapter Two. Possibility of Revelation
Chapter Three. Fittingness and Necessity of Revelation
Chapter Four. The Nature or Rational Credibility of
Revelation
Chapter Five. Necessity of a Rational Credibility of
Revelation
Chapter Six. The Natural Genesis of the Credibility
of Revelation
22
Chapter Seven. Criteria of the Credibility of
Revelation
Part II. The Fact of Revelation
(Practical Apologetics)
Chapter Eight. Christ’s Testimony About His Mission
as Herald of God’s Revelation
Chapter Nine. Subjective Criteria of the Fact
of Revelation
32
Chapter Ten. Objective Intrinsic Criteria of the Fact
of Revelation
42
Chapter Eleven. Objective Extrinsic Criteria of the Fact
of Revelation. Physical Miracles
Chapter Twelve. Objective Extrinsic Criteria of the
Fact of Revelation. Prophecies
Chapter Thirteen. Conclusion
Glossary
Analytical Index
iii

iv
vi

ix
1
5
11
15

17

24
26

28

63
88
106
108
114

Bibliography

Arcy, M. C. d’, Belief and Reason, London 1944; The Natare
of Belief, London 1945.
Baillie, J., The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. London
1956.

Balthasar, H. U. von, Word and Revelation (trans, from the
German by A. V. Littledale and A. Dru), New York 1965.
Broglie, G. de, Revelation and Reason, London 1965.

Bulst, W., Revelation (tr. B. Vawter), New York 1965.

Daniélou, J., God and the Ways of Knowing (tr. W. Roberts),
New York 1975.

Doronzo, E., Theologia dogmatica I (Washington 1966) 93398.
Gardeil, A., La crédibilité et l’apologétique, Paris 1908; 2nd
ed., 1912.
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., De revelatione per Ecclesiam catholi­
cam proposita, 2 vols., Rome 1917; 5th ed., 1950.
Latourelle, R., “La révélation comme parole, témoignage et
rencontre,” Gregorianum 43 (1962) 39-54; Theology of Rev­
elation (trans, from the French), New York 1966; Christ
and the Church: Signs of Salvation (trans, from the French
by Sr. D. Parker), New York 1972.
iv

Bibliography
Léonard, A., “Vers une théologie de la Parole de Dieu,” La
Parole de Dieu en Jésus-Christ (Tournai 1951) 11-32.

McDonald, H. D., Ideas of Revelation: An Historical Study 2
vols., London 1959-1963.
Mysterium Salutis. Dogmatique de l'histoire du salut (transla­
tion of the German collective work), 1/1 : Histoire du salut
et révélation, Paris 1969.

Niebuhr, H. R., The Meaning of Revelation, New York 1960.
Pauwels, C. F., Apologetik, Ruremonde 1948.
Quinn, E., “Revelation: Propositions or Encounter,” Downside
Review 79 (1960-61) 10-21.
Rabeau, G., Apologétique, Paris 1930.

Ratzinger, J., Rahner, K., Revelation and Tradition (trans,
from the German), Freiburg 1966.
Tresmontant, Cl., Le problème de la révélation, Paris 1969.
Various Authors, “La théologie fondamentale à la recherche
de son identité,” Gregorianum 50 (1969) 757-776.
Vatican II. La révélation divine (collective work), Paris 1968.

Waldenfels, J., Offenbarung, München 1969.
White, V., “St. Thomas’s Conception of Revelation,” Domini­
can Studies 1 ( 1948 ι 3-34.

Wilckens, U., God’s Revelation (trans, from the German),
London 1967.

v

Introduction

The subject matter of this treatise is revelation generically
considered, without particular reference to the individual re­
vealed truths. As shown in the preceding treatise on Introduc­
tion to Theology ( p. 8 f. ) revelation is both the formal reason
of theology as a whole, that is, the light under which God and
the other objects are considered, and its proper principle, in­
asmuch as it is revelation which proposes those truths from
which, as from true principles, theology draws its conclusions.
Under both aspects, revelation is the foundation of theology.
Hence this treatise is rightly called Fundamental Theology.
Revelation, precisely because it is the principle of theology,
cannot be directly proved by this science, for no science proves
its own principles. Each science supposes its principles as cer­
tain and evident from other sources, either through reason or
through faith. Theology holds its principles through faith.
However, theological science, being also wisdom, indeed the
supreme wisdom on earth, can and must direct its attention in
a scientific manner to its own revealed principles. It must not
only explain and present them by way of persuasion, but also
defend them, by proving with certainty their extrinsic credi­
bility, namely that it is fitting to believe them through super­
natural faith, because Christ’s testimony of the fact of revela­
tion is absolutely truthful, being warrented and endorsed by
God himself through his miraculous intervention. Hence this
treatise is also essentially apologetic and can be rightly called
with the combined name of Apologetic Fundamental The­
ology.1
i Apologetics (from the Greek ‘’apologhia,” a speech in defense,
from “apo,” after, and “légo,” I speak) means generically a defense.
The word is often used in Scripture in the sense of self-defense
vi

Introduction
This leads us to its proper definition, expressing its nature
and object: it is the scientific demonstration of the extrinsic
credibility of revelation, through evident criteria, under the
light of natural reason. It is a true scientific demonstration,
not as a science standing by itself, but as a mere integrating
part of the single science of theology, considered as wisdom,
as we just noted. Hence, it does not matter that it proceeds
under the light of natural reason while theology must pro­
ceed under the light of revelation, precisely because it is mere­
ly an extension of theological science, taking over the light of
reason to its own service for the purpose of explaining and
defending its supernatural principles.

Its material object is revelation, theoretically considered in
its general notions; its formal object is the fact of revelation,
shown as credible through evident criteria; its formal reason,
or the light under which it proceeds, is the light of reason,
because its purpose is to prove the credibility or knowability
of revelation in a rational manner, that is, from philosophical
and historical principles. For it is impossible to prove revela­
tion by revelation itself without making a vicious circle; how­
ever, since it is a question of a mere extensive function of the­
ology itself, the light of reason here must proceed under the
direction of the light of revelation.

Hence the whole scientific process of Apologetics consists
in attributing the concept of credibility to revelation (more
precisely to the fact of revelation) by means of evident criter­
ia, so that such criteria are like principles from which the fol­
lowing conclusion is drawn: Revelation (the fact of revela­
tion) is credible. Such a process can be briefly reduced to the
following general syllogism: That which is endorsed by evi­
(Act.22.1; 25.16; 1 Cor.9.3; 2 Cor.7.11; 2 Tim.4.16; 1 Pet.3.15) and
at least once in the sense of defense of a thing, namely of the Gospel
itself (Phil.1,7,16: “In the defense and confirmation of the gospel
... I am appointed for the defense of the gospel.’’ Theologians us­
ually distinguish between apology and apologetics, meaning by the
first the defense of a particular truth (as Trinity, Incarnation, etc.),
and by the second, the defense of revelation as a whole. Hence this
treatise is commonly called Apologetics.

vii

Fundamental Theology

dent extrinsic criteria, is evidently credible. But revelation
(namely that God has really talked to men, according to
Christ’s testimony) is endorsed by evident criteria, that is by
the miraculous intervention of God. Therefore revelation is
credible.2
From the aforesaid object we logically draw the division of
this treatise into two parts. In the first part we shall consider
revelation in its general notions (material object), that is, its
nature and properties, among which is found credibility; and
this amounts to the question of the essence of revelation ( The­
oretical Apologetics). In the second part we shall deal with
the fact of revelation, shown through evident criteria or mo­
tives of credibility (formal object); and this amounts to the
question of the existence of revelation (Practical Apologetics).

2 Do not, however think that in this manner the act of faith it­
self about revelation is resolved into such a syllogism, or that the
evidence of faith itself is resolved into this rational evidence of
credibility, for this is only an extrinsic credibility of the fact of
revelation, which cannot generate faith but only dispose to it. In
fact, in the genesis of the act of supernatural faith we find the fol­
lowing three steps. First, there must be the intrinsic evidence of
the given testimony and of the authority or competence (knowledge
and veracity) of the witness (namely, that Christ, a man of wisdom
and veracity, testified that God has spoken). Second, there follows
the extrinsic evidence of credibility about the fact of revelation.
that is, about the objective truth of Christ’s testimony (namely,
that it is true and credible that God has spoken, as Christ testified,
and that this is shown by evident criteria). Finally, there comes
supernatural faith itself, with its own intrinsic evidence and cer­
titude. founded only on the testimony of God revealing, and elicited
under the movement of grace; however, this faith, which is a purely
infused gift of God, does not follow if the will of man refuses to
comply with the aforesaid extrinsic evidence of credibility and re­
sists the movement of the grace of God, tending to the infusion of
faith (see below, footnote 25 and p. 107).

viii

Part I
General Notions on Revelation
(Theoretical Apologetics)

In the following seven chapters we consider revelation as to
its nature (chap. 1), its possibility (chap. 2), its fittingness
and necessity (chap. 3), and especially its credibility or know­
ability. This latter is more important for our apologetical pur­
pose and hence requires a careful explanation of its nature
(chap. 4), possibility (chap. 5), genesis (chap. 6), and criteria
(chap. 7).

ix

I
Nature of Revelation

The catholic notion of revelation, as proposed by the Mag­
isterium itself with its foundation in Scripture, can be des­
cribed as a direct action of God, which through words and
deeds, manifests to men things and truths known only to him.
In the New Testament this manifestation of God is express­
ed by three words: revelation, manifestation, and speech.

Revelation (in Greek “apokâlupsis,” the English apocalyp­
sis, from “apo,” back, and “kaléo,” I call) indicates a mani­
festation of supernatural truth (Rom. 16.25; Eph. 1.17; Luke
2.32), or an extraordinary manifestation through visions
(Apoc. 1.1; Gal. 1.12; Eph. 3.3; 1 Cor. 14.6,26; 2 Cor. 12.1,7), or
the second advent of Christ (1 Cor. 1.7; 2 Thess. 1.7; 1 Pet.
1.13).
Manifestation ( in Greek “fanérosis,” from “fanerôo,” I
manifest, I make visible; remotely from “faino,” I bring to
light, I make to appear, hence “epifânia,” the English epiph­
any) indicates the first advent of Christ (1 John 1.2; 3.5,8;
Tit. 3.16; Heb. 9.26; 1 Pet. 1.20), as well as his second advent
(Col. 3.4; 1 Pet. 5.4; 1 John 2.28; 3.2).
Speech (in Greek “lâlema,” talk) indicates a speech of God
to man, both by spoken words ( Heb. 1.1 f.3; 2.2) and by writ­
3 Particular value has to be given to Heb. 1.1 f., which refers to
all prophetical revelations of the Ο. T. as to a speech of God: “God,
who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to
the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days has spoken to
us by his Son.” In the Ο. T. itself the various manifestations of God

1

Fundamental Theology

ten words (Heb. 2.5; 6.9; 2 Pet. 3.16); the same meaning is
brought out by the kindred word oracle (in Greek “lôghion,”
from “légo,” I tell, I speak), which is used to indicate the
prophecies of the Old Testament (Acts 7.38; Rom. 3.2).

The Magisterium gives us the Catholic notion of revelation
in both Vatican Councils, which deal directly with this sub­
ject. Vatican I, speaking of “the supernatural way [in which
God chose] to reveal himself and the eternal decrees of his
will to mankind,” sees it expressed in the words of St. Paul,
Heb. 1.1 f. about God speaking to men through the prophets
and through Christ4 (sess. 3, chap. 2, Denz. 3044). Here revela­
tion is presented only as speech. Vatican II extends the con­
cept of revelation so as to include both speech and deeds:
“[God’s] plan of revelation is realized by deeds and words,
intrinsically connected, so that the deeds, wrought by God in
the history of salvation, declare and strengthen the doctrine
and the things signified by the words, while the words pro­
claim the deeds and clarify the mystery contained in them”
( Constitution on Divine Revelation, no.2).

In this extension there is no essential addition, but only a
further explanation of the concept of speech, which can be
expressed formally and primarily by words and equivalently
also by deeds, having, however, their value of sign and ex­
pression of the mind by the words themselves. Also a man
can be said to talk, or to manifest his mind, both by words and
by deeds (that is, by signs other than words), provided the
meaning of his deeds has been previously declared by his
words, otherwise the mere deeds would not carry a clear and
certain sense and would not sufficiently manifest the object
and the intention of the mind. As St. Augustine puts it, “Among men words have obtained the leading role in the realm
of signification” (On Christian Doctrine 2.2.3); applying this
principle to the sacraments, particularly to baptism, the holy
Doctor says: “If the word is missing, the water is nothing but
water. If on the contrary the word is joined to the material
to the prophets are called “speech” or “word:” (Ps.84.9; Isa.50.4;
Osee.1.1; Joel 1.1; Jonas 1.1; Mich.1.1; Soph. 1.1; Agg.1.1; Zach.1.1;
Mal.1.1, etc.).
4 See preceding footnote.

2

Nature of Revelation
element, there will be a sacrament, which becomes in itself a
xisible word” (On John, tract .80, no.3). We may say, likewise,
in God’s revelation or manifestation of his mind, if we remove
the words, the deeds are mute deeds; but if we add the words
to the deeds, then we have revelation in the deeds themselves,
which take up the value of living and practical words.5

Hence supernatural revelation consists essentially and for­
mally in a speech of God to man, secondarily also in deeds in­
asmuch as these manifest and confirm in a practical way the
words themselves. Such a concept of speech attributed to God
is not improper or merely metaphorical, but proper, although
analogical.6 For speech consists essentially in manifesting
one’s own thought to another, as from person to person; nor
docs it matter in which way it is done, whether through a
merely sensible sign or through a purely intellectual means,
that is, by the infusion of the intelligible species in the mind
of another. This can be done also by God, and in both ways.
Moreover, in the act of revelation of a supernatural object,
besides the mere presentation of the object (either through
sensible or intellectual means), God must and can infuse some
5 Hence some authors (as Latourelle, Léonard, Quinn, mentioned
above, p. iv, v) exaggerate when they say that the Council, by men­
tioning the deeds as means of revelation, has changed the traditional
concept of revelation, given by the first Vatican Council itself. Some
go so far as to define revelation generically as God’s communication
to man or as God’s manifestation; in the first case the infusion of
sanctifying grace would be a revelation, in the second case any sup­
ernatural instinct, or inspiration (as in the writers of the Holy
Scripture), or assistance of the Holy Spirit (as that given to the
Magisterium), would be revelation. Is not all this an effect and a
cause of theological confusions?
0 Not every analogical concept is metaphorical. It can be purely
metaphorical or improper, as when we say: This food is healthy, or
Peter is a lion (both concepts of good and lion are purely metaphor­
ical). It can be also proper, that is, expressing something which is
formally and properly in the subject; thus, when we say: God is
being, intelligent and volitional, and likewise, man is being, intel­
ligent and volitional, these three perfections (being, intelligence and
will) are predicated properly of both God and man, because they are
found in both formally, although not in the same way, but propor­
tionally, and hence analogically.

3

Fundamental Theology

supernatural light in the intellect itself, to make it able to un­
derstand such an object. Hence God’s revelation is a more
proper and more perfect speech than that of man, since it com­
municates to man the thoughts of God in two ways, that is,
both objectively and subjectively.
These two elements of revelation or speech of God can be
separated, so that God would offer to a man only the presenta­
tion of the object without the supernatural light to understand
it, or vice versa. However, in such cases there would be no
revelation properly so called, that is real speech of God, but
only an inferior kind of manifestation of God; in the first case
there would be only a prophetic instinct (cf. Summa Theol.,
p.2-2, q.173, a.2), like in the vision given to Pharao and inter­
preted later by Joseph (Gen. 41.14-32) or in the words utter­
ed by Caiphas about the death of Christ and interpreted by
St. John (John 11.51). In the second case there would be
either a higher prophetic instinct, as was given to the afore­
mentioned Joseph and John, or an inspiration (that is a super­
natural movement to write what God wants a man to write,
so that the writing is properly attributed to God, as principal
author), as happened to the various writers of Holy Scrip­
ture, or a mere supernatural assistance (by which a writer
or a speaker is merely preserved from error), as happens to
(he Church Magisterium when defining infallibly truths of
faith. This, then, is the difference between the various super­
natural lights or helps, bestowed by God to man, namely rev­
elation, prophetic instinct, inspiration, and assistance of the
Holy Spirit.

4

II
Possibility of Revelation

As shown above, revelation implies two elements, one objec­
tive, the presentation of a supernatural object to human in­
tellect, and the other subjective, the infusion of a supernat­
ural light in the intellect by which it is made proportioned to
the understanding of such an object. Both of these elements
presuppose the existence of a supernatural order in God which
manifests itself in them. Hence the possibility of revelation is
not shown unless we show first the existence of a supernatural
order, and then the possibility of proposing it as an object
understandable by a human intellect, and of infusing in the
same intellect a light above reason, making it able to under­
stand such an object. Since these two things are supernatural,
that is, above all created nature and its powers, we can bring
forth no direct and positive proof, but only indirect or pro­
bable arguments, such as are sufficient to the apologetical pur­
pose of refuting the negation of Rationalists on those two
points.7
7 nationalism, from its general and common principle of the com­
plete autonomy of natural reason, draws the conclusion that there
is no supernatural order, that is, an order of things and truths above reason. This is the teaching of pure Positive Rationalism, either
materialistic (as that of E. Haeckel), or idealistic (as that of Hegel),
both of which deny the very existence of God, identifying him with
the world. A form of apparently mitigated Rationalism teaches that,
even if there were a supernatural order, the human intellect would
not in any way be able to know it, and therefore its revelation would
be impossible. This is the Agnostic Rationalism, which denies di­
rectly not the existence of God, but the possibility of knowing him
and the objective value of the principles of reason leading to know-

I
Fundamental Theology
The existence of a supernatural order or order of mysteries8
(which is de fide from Vatican Council I, scss. 3, can. 1 on
faith and reason) cannot be directly proved, since the object
is essentially supernatural. It can be derived indirectly, how­
ever, from the very existence of God, as a personal being, dis­
tinct from the world. For, what is proper to God ( his nature
and inner attributes) is higher than the proper object of our
intellect and is in no way manifested by this lower object;
hence it cannot be naturally reached by our intellect and con­
stitutes an order above reason, that is a supernatural order.
Indeed, the proper and formal object of our intellect is not God
himself but a created being, that is being as limited and de­
termined by sensible nature. Otherwise our intellect would
ledge of him. The reason for this agnosticism would be either the
pure phenomenal nature of our ideas (Agnostic Empirical Rational­
ism of H. Spencer, A. Comte, and W. James), or their purely sub­
jective value (Agnostic Idealistic Rationalism, founded by E. Kant).
This agnostic rationalism, under both forms, was adopted within the
Church by Modernism. Modernism denies that human reason can
reach beyond phenomena and know with certainty even the exist­
ence of God.
3 Supernatural. in a proper and absolute sense, is that which is above all created nature, as to the essence of the created nature or
at least as to its powers and exigencies. It is divided into essentially
or intrinsically supernatural (or as to its intrinsic causes), which
surpasses both the essence of all created nature and its powers and
exigencies (such are Deity. Trinity, Incarnation, glory, grace); and
modally or extrinsically supernatural (or as to its extrinsic causes)
which surpasses only the powers and exigencies, not the essence,
of created nature, and therefore consists in something which is es­
sentially natural, but cannot be produced by any natural cause
(such are most of those things that are called miracles, as glorifica­
tion of the body, resurrection, the knowledge of the secrets of hearts,
the gift of languages). At present we are dealing only with the es­
sentially or intrinsically supernatural.
Mystery (in Greek “mustérion.” from “muo,” I close) etymologi­
cally means something closed, and. by evolution of speech, some­
thing closed to knowledge, that is secret: the word was used especi­
ally to designate religious truths and rites, as being most secret
and unknown. It is divided into natural mystery, which can be
known without God's revelation, and supernatural mystery, which
cannot be known without supernatural revelation. This is subdivid-

6

Possibility of Revelation
be equal to the intellect of God, as being specified by the same
object, and even would be identified with it which is idealistic
pantheism. Now, in this kind of created being God is indeed
manifested and known in some way, as a cause in its effect,
and therefore according to the attributes that are common to
him and the creatures (as being, one, good, intelligence, will,
power). But God cannot be manifested and known as to what
is proper to him and is not found in the creatures, for no ef­
fect contains adequately the nature and power of its proper
cause. Hence, this intimate reality of God in himself, which
cannot be known by our intellect through its proper and for­
mal object of created being, constitutes an order above reason,
that is a supernatural order.
The possibility of revelation to man of this supernatural or­
der (which is de fide from Vatican I, sess.3, can.2-3 on revela­
tion) cannot be reasonably denied. On the contrary, it can be
sufficiently shown, not indeed through certain and evident
proofs, but at least by the aid of persuasive and probable ar­
guments.

The possibility of proposing a truth of this supernatural
order, as an object understandable by the human intellect,
lies in the objective and ontological value of our analogical
concepts. Indeed, most of the concepts by which we express
higher natural truths themselves and with which we deal in
our natural sciences, including metaphysics and its higher part
theodicy (as the concepts of being, cause, end, relation, sub­
stance, accident, and God himself as the supreme Being—true,
ed into mystery in a broad sense, that which, after its revelation by
God, is perfectly understood both as to its existence and its nature
(such are divine decrees about natural facts, for instance about fu­
ture happenings which we cannot foresee) and mystery in the strict
sense, which, even after revelation (at least the revelation we have
in this life, through the obscure light of faith), is not perfectly
known, for we know by faith only its existence and have only an ob­
scure analogical concept of its essence, so that it still remains a
mystery as to its intimate nature (such are Deity, Trinity, Incarna­
tion, glory, grace). At present we are dealing especially with mys­
teries in the strict sense, which are at the same time essentially sup­
ernatural, so that the supernatural order is perfectly equivalent to
the order of mysteries.
7

Fundamental Theology
good, and omnipotent) are analogical concepts. No one can
deny objective and ontological value to them, without reject­
ing the objective value of our entire knowledge. Therefore
there is no reason why a higher truth of the supernatural or­
der could not likewise be expressed with similar analogical
concepts, having their objective and ontological value, and
hence carrying to the human intellect a proper, although an­
alogical, understanding of a supernatural reality. For exam­
ple, when divine paternity or filiation is revealed, it is not
repugnant that the concept of paternity or filiation, drawn
from creatures, signifies properly, although analogically,
something pertaining to the intimate essence of God.9

The possibility of infusing in the human intellect a light
above the light of reason, to make it able to understand this
supernatural object analogically expressed, cannot be reject­
ed through any a priori reason, as from the impossibility of
conceiving such a light or of putting it in the light of the in­
tellect itself, and hence doubling up the intellectual light or
mingling the two lights in a hybrid and contradictory being,
at once natural and supernatural. For, if a supernatural order
is granted, there is no reason to deny that God can communi­
cate it to a creature in the manner of light or intelligibility,
just as by creation he communicates his natural infinite
science to a finite human intellect. Such supernatural
light (as that of faith or of beatific vision) is not received in
the light of reason as a distinct intellectual power, but as a
sort of habit or disposition which elevates the natural intel­
lectual power so that it can elicit a higher intellectual act.
Hence the two lights do not make up a contradictory being,
because natural and supernatural arc not opposed as being and
non-being, but as imperfect being and perfect being, constitut­
ing two lines specifically distinct. On this account they can be
in the same subject, as one perfecting the other.

Besides, such possibility can be shown positively by a three­
fold persuasive and probable reason. The first reason is the
9 As shown in footnote 6 an analogical concept can be also proper
and formal.

8

Possibility of Revelation
existence of the so-called obediential potency1011
in every creat­
ed being in relation to God, that is, of an inner transcendental
reference to God and dependence upon him, as the universal
cause of being as such. On account of this potency, it does not
seem impossible for God to work in any creature whatever is
being, provided it is not in contradiction with the nature of
an individual creature (cf. Summa Theol., p.3, q.ll, a.l).n
Therefore it is not impossible for God to infuse in the human
intellect a supernatural light, since, as has been shown, this
is not in contradition with the natural light of the human in­
tellect. The second reason is the radical capacity of our intel­
lect for knowing any being. For, although the proper and
specific object of the human intellect, formally as human, is
only a determined kind of being, that is being as found in the
sensible nature, nevertheless the extensive object, generically
as intellect, is being as such, in all its breadth. Hence it does
not seem impossible that the human intellect be so changed
and elevated by a supernatural light as to be able to extend
its act to a higher object beyond its specific object ( cf. Summa
Theol., p.l, q.13, a.4, ad 3). The third reason is a kind of nat­
ural desire of knowing God in himself, according to his inner
essence, which spontaneously arises in anyone who through
the light of reason knows the existence of God and his natural
attributes.12 This desire, being natural and spontaneous, al­
though inefficacious and conditional ( “I would wish, if it were
possible, to know the inner essence of God”) and as such ab­
10 About the origin and the nature of the concept of obediential
potency, see L. B. Gillon, in Revue thomiste 47 (1947) 304-310, and
G. Cala Ulloa, in Sapienza 5 (1952) 242-256.
11 Thus by no power whatsoever can it happen that a rock, re­
maining a rock, would have feeling and sensation; or a brute, re­
maining a brute, would reason; or a corporeal eye, remaining such,
would have an intellectual vision or knowledge; or a man, as finite
being, would understand as God understands, in an infinite manner.
12 Cf. Summa Theol. p.l, q.l, a.l; p.1-2, q.3, a.8; Summa Contra
Gentiles 3.50. On this desire much has been written in recent years,
especially on the occasion of the controversy about the absolute
supernaturality of the elevation of man. See P.A. Ciappa, Partecipazione e desiderio naturale di vedere Dio in S. Tommaso d’ Aquino,
Verona 1969; L. B. Gillon, in Angelicum 26 (1949) 3-30, 115-142; L.
9

Fundamental Theology
solutely capable of frustration, cannot be simply vain and
void, that is tending to an impossible object, for nature does
not tend to emptiness and impossibility (cf. Summa Theol.,
p.l,q. 12, a.l).

Malevez in Nouvelle revue théologique 69 (1947) 1-31; 75 (1953)
561-586, 673-689; W. R. O’Connor, The Eternal Quest. The Teach­
ing of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Desire for God, New York
1947; L. Roy, in Sciences ecclesiastiques 1 (1948) 110-142; B.
Stoeckle, in Triercr Theologische Zeitschrift 72 (1963) 1-22.

10

Ill
Fittingness and Necessity of Revelation

The mere possibility of revelation does not necessarily
prove its fittingness and much less its necessity. It even seems
that supernatural revelation is highly unsuitable and harmful
to human reason, depriving it of its autonomy by a submission
to an exterior rule and extrinsic authority. It seems to pro­
pose to it an object different from its proper object, which can­
not be assimilated, like a stone in the stomach. It seems to pro­
vide it with a light not proportioned to its natural powers and
tendencies, just as if the eyes of a night owl or a bat were
placed before the bright sunlight. Moreover, granting the fit­
tingness of revelation, there is no sufficient basis for its nec­
essity, because man with his reason is naturally complete in
his own order and needs no exterior help or complement what­
soever. Such are the objections of Rationalism.

The fittingness of revelation (defined by Vatican Council I,
sess.3, can.2 on revelation ) is shown by the fact that through
it human reason is perfected with an additional light and ob­
ject, and its knowledge carried to a higher level. However, by
this supplement of knowledge and perfection, natural reason
is in no way disturbed or displaced in the normal functions of
its proper inferior sphere; for, as we have shown above (p.
8), no mixture of the two natural and supernatural lights is
made, nor does the supernatural light usurp or hinder the
rights and the activities of natural reason, but it exercises its
proper intellectual activity in a distinct and higher sphere,
seeking nothing else from the human intellect but the neces­
sary support or the natural base for its own operation, and a
11

Fundamental Theology
“reasonable submission” to its higher truths.1314
Besides, not­
withstanding the distinction and mutual respect of the two
lights, their community and partnership in the same intellect
is profitable to both, as it fosters mutual help, so that for the
aforesaid support and submission which the light of revela­
tion receives from the light of reason, it abundantly repays
this same light by freeing and protecting it from error and by
providing it with manifold knowledge, even in its own ration­
al sphere, as we shall see below.

The necessity of revelation for the knowledge of super­
natural truths is self-evident, since such truths are above the
proper object of human reason. Hence, in the hypothesis that
God elevates man to a supernatural end, as de facto happened,
it follows necessarily, by a strict and physical necessity,1'1 that
13 Such is the sense usually given by theologians to Rom.12.1:
“Rationabile obsequium vestrum” (Vulgate version). However, the
immediate exegetical sense is “reasonable worship or service,” con­
sisting in a holy life, befitting rational beings, as is shown by the
Greek original “loghikén latréian;” and such is the sense usually
given in the vernacular translations. In other passages St. Paul
speaks of “obedience to faith” (Rom.1.5; 16.26; cf. 2 Cor. 10.5 f.), to
which can be reduced also the reasonable worship of Rom.12.1.
Vatican Council I (sess.3, chap.3 on faith) uses Rom.12.1 speak­
ing of the “obedience of faith, fitting reason,” but it is not clear
whether the sense is “reasonable obedience to faith” or “reasonable
obedience by faith” (that is, in which faith itself consists); this sec­
ond sense seems more probable, if wo have to explain that expres­
sion by another occurring in the same context (at the beginning of
the same chapter), which reads; “Man is obliged to give to God re­
vealing a full obedience of the intellect and the will by his faith."
However, the reasonable character of the obedience of the act of
faith is explained by the Council through the criteria knowable by
reason and thus we revert to the sense given by the theologians to
the Pauline “rational obedience.” used by the Council.
14 Necessity of finality (arising from a final cause or end, that
is the necessity of means in relation to an end) is called physical or
strict necessity, if without certain means an end can in no way be
reached, and corresponds to physical inability (thus food is strictly
necessary for corporal life). It is called moral necessity, if without
certain means an end cannot be suitably reached, that is, without
great difficulty, and corresponds to moral inability (thus a horse or

12

Fittingness and Necessity of Revelation

lie has to reveal this end to man and all the essential truths
connected with it, so that man may direct to it his intention
and his actions. For nothing is willed unless it is known and
he who proposes an end will also provide the means without
which such end cannot be reached (cf. Summa Theol., p.l, q.l,
a.l).
Furthermore, the fittingness and necessity of revelation
extends beyond its proper object and reaches also natural
truths themselves (as Vatican Council I teaches, sess.3. can.2
and chap.2 on revelation), although in a different manner and
at a lower level, since such truths are the proper object of
natural reason.
Its fittingness for the knowledge of natural truths is shown
by the limited perfection of our intellect, subject to the decep
tion of the senses and to the influence of the will and its pass­
ions, which are often sources of error. This is especially true
in the area of religion and morality. Therefore, to be taught
by God, infallible Truth, concerning the very things which
human reason can know with its own limited and fallible light.
is highly perfective of reason itself, because on the one hand
it receives an infallible confirmation of its own right doctrines
and on the other hand it is preserved from easy deception and
error.15 Moreover, as regards specifically moral and religious
natural truths, the fittingness of revelation is so great that it
grows into a true moral necessity,16 in the sense that without
revelation such truths cannot be suitably known by men, that
is quickly, readily, certainly, and universally, as they should
be known, since on them the end of man’s salvation is totally
dependent.17 This is strikingly confirmed by the history of
a car, and in modern life an automobile or train or plane, is morally
necessary for a journey). Cf. Summa Theol. p.l, q.82. a.l.
15 In the preceding treatise on Introduction to Theology (p. 24)
wo have shown how theological science, which is the daughter of
revelation, elevates and perfects the natural sciences.
1C See footnote 14 about the notion of moral necessity.
17 See the admirable passage of St. Thomas (Summa Theol. p.l.
q.l, a.l; cf. 2-2, q.2, a.4; C. Gent. 1.4; De veritate. q.l 4, a.10), repeal
ed and adapted by both Vatican I (sess.3, chap.2 on revelation) ;m>l
Vatican II (Constil. on Divine Revelation, no. 6).

13

Fundamental Theology

pagan peoples, on whom the light of revelation did not shine
and who professed many grave errors in religious and moral
matters, as is shown in the very best of Greek and Roman
civilization, as well as in the great philosophers, Plato and
Aristotle themselves.18

18 See below, footnote 40.

14

IV
The Nature of Rational

Credibility of Revelation19

So far we have considered revelation in itself. In this and the
following chapters we shall deal with the apologetical prob­
lem of the rational knowability or credibility of revelation.
The problem amounts to this: if actually there is a revelation
from God, can we know with certainty, through our natural
reason and before we give supernatural assent of faith to the
revealed truths, that such revelation has really been made,
and how can we know it? What are the proofs, the means, the
criteria by which we can be certain of that fact?

Such rational knowability of revelation is also called its ex­
trinsic or rational credibility, if we consider it, as we do in
this apologetical treatise, in its connection with the subsequent
supernatural act of faith; for, if revelation is naturally know­
able or able to be ascertained, it is also credible, that is suita­
ble to be believed supernaturally. In this credibility lies the
rational extrinsic foundation of the supernatural faith.20 In the
present chapter we shall consider only the nature of this cred­
ibility, leaving for the following three chapters the explana­
tion of its possibility, genesis, and criteria.
19 Cf. A. Gardeil, “Crédibilité,” Dictionnaire de théologie catho­
lique 3-2 (Paris 1907) 2201-2215; La crédibilité et VApologétique.
Paris 1908; E. Hugueny, in Revue thomiste 17 (1909) 275-298; C. M.
Lagae, ibid. 18 (1910) 478-489, 612-641.
90 See footnote 2 and pp. 19 L, 106 f.

15

Fundamental Theology

The rational credibility of revelation is the aptitude of re­
vealed. truths to be believed with supernatural faith (that is,
on the authority of God revealing), resulting from its extrin­
sic evidence, namely, from the rational evidence of the very
fact of God’s testimony.
The aptness of this definition is shown by the analysis of
the concept of credibility in general, as applicable also to
things which we know from faith on human testimony. For,
there are two ways of certainly and evidently knowing some­
thing, that is, either through the immediate and intrinsic
evidence of the object itself, directly manifesting to the in­
tellect its own intelligibility (called evidence of truth), or
through a mediate and extrinsic evidence, resulting in the ob­
ject from the evidence of an authoritative testimony, that is,
from the evidence of the fact of a given testimony and of the
authority (knowledge and truthfulness) of the witness. This
is called evidence of credibility, by which an object becomes
apt to be believed, that is, held with certitude through an act
of faith. Now this concept of credibility also fits revelation.
For. if we can rationally show through evident signs that God
spoke to man (the fact of testimony or revelation), that same
God whose knowledge and truthfulness need not to be proved,
it fol low's that the truths testified or revealed by God are
rationally credible, that is, extrinsically evident and suitable
for being believed with a supernatural faith, based on the
authority of God revealing.

1G

V
Necessity of a Rational

Credibility of Revelation

A question somewhat debated among theologians is whether
credibility of revelation is absolutely necessary to faith; that
is, whether, in order to be able to elicit the act of supernatural
faith l and hence to receive the infused habit of faith by God),
a man must first acquire a rational evidence and a true ob­
jective certitude21 of the fact of revelation, namely that God
21 Certitude is divided into merely subjective (that is, not found­
ed in the evidence of the object, but in purely subjective motives)
and objective or formal (founded in the evidence of the object, im­
mediate or mediate through faith). This is subdivided into absolute
or metaphysical certitude, which is founded in the very nature of
things and hence admits no exception whatsoever, and conditional
certitude, which is founded in physical or moral laws and hence
admits no exception only on the supposition that some conditions
are kept, which could however be lacking and hence allow excep­
tions. If this certitude is founded in physical laws, it is called physi­
cal certitude (thus it is certain that a stone will fall, provided the
law of gravity is not counter-balanced by an extrinsic agent); and
if it is founded in moral laws, it is called moral certitude (thus it is
certain that a mother will not kill her child, unless by an unusual
perversion she withdraws from those laws that rule the moral act­
ions and inclinations of men). Below certitude is found probability.
which can be so great as to amount to a practical certitude (with­
out ever reaching the strength and the nature of a proper certitude)
and in moral matters is called imperfect or practical moral certi­
tude, as being a sufficient rule for moral and prudent actions, since
a strict certitude cannot be obtained in the ordinary circumstances
of life.

17

Fundamental Theology
has really spoken. This necessity has l>een denied or doubted
by some recent theologians, on the ground of an alleged moral
impossibility for some people (as the uneducated and the
children), to acquire, prior to faith itself, such rational evi­
dence and objective certitude of the fact of revelation. Hence
they hold, as sufficient, some kind of imperfect certitude,
which is not a true objective certitude, but only a high pro­
bability, that is, according to different expressions, an im­
perfect moral certitude, a practical certitude (sufficient to act
prudently in the ordinary circumstances of life), a respective
certitude ( that is, relative to some classes of people, as the
uneducated and the children), a subjective certitude.22
By far the more common opinion of theologians, however,
closely following in the steps of the Magisterium itself,23
teaches that true and objective rational certitude of the fact
of revelation is always and in all subjects required for elicit­
ing the act of supernatural faith, although a physical certitude
is not required, but a moral (even vulgar or common) certi­
tude is sufficient. This teaching excludes, however, any in­
ferior degree of persuasion ( as the so-called imperfect, or prac­
tical, or respective certitude), which does not reach the mini­
mum requisite for a true moral certitude.
22 Thus particularly J. H. Newman, A Grammar of Assent (new
edition by Fr. Harrold. London 1947) 312, who speaks of "an ac­
cumulation of various probabilities”; S. Ha rent (in Diet. Théol. cath.
6-1, col. 219-231); Lerchcr-Schlagenhaufen and Nicolau (in their
theological manuals, where they discuss revelation), who speak of
respective certitude; P. Rousselot (followed by several of his dis­
ciples), “Les yeux de la foi.” Recherches de science religieuse 1
(1910) 241-259, 444-475, who even denies that reason prior to faith
and independently from faith can elicit any certain and sufficient
judgment about the fact of revelation, which would be elicited af­
terwards with the help of grace, that is. under the light of faith it­
self ("les yeux de la foi”).
23· Cf. Gregory XVI, condemning the Fideism of Bautin (Denz.
2753-56); Pius IX, Encycl. “Qui pluribus” (Denz. 2778-80), and in
his condemnation of the Fideism of Bonnetty (Denz. 2813); Vatican
Council I (sess.3, cans.3-4 and chap.3 on faith); Pius X (Decree
“Lamentabili,” prop.25, Denz. 3425).

18

Necessity of a Rational Credibility of Revelation
The necessity of a true and objective rational certitude of
the fact of revelation is shown by the general concept of faith,
whether human or divine. Any faith is a state of firm assent,
in which the intellect rests without positive fear of erring;
but such a state of firmness cannot exist without a rational
and objective certitude, founded in the evidence of the object,
obtained mediately and extrinsically through the testimony
of a witness.24 If this objective evidence of the existence of
the authoritative testimony is necessary for the genesis of any
faith, even of the human faith which can be discontinued and
revoked by reason of a subsequently detected incompetence
of the witness, a fortiori it is necessary for the genesis of di­
vine faith, which is absolutely infallible and irrevocable, be­
ing founded on the infallible testimony of God who can
neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence no other kind of in­
tellectual persuasion, below true certitude about the fact of
revelation, is sufficient for the genesis of divine faith, enab­
ling one to elicit the act of divine faith.

By genesis of divine faith we do not mean the direct produc­
tion of this faith in the intellect by the preceding judgment
of evident credibility, as happens de facto in human faith,
otherwise we would resolve supernatural faith into natural
reason, as to its proper and immediate cause. We only mean
that the natural judgment of credibility is the necessary, al­
though extrinsic, prerequisite to the act of divine faith, with­
out which faith cannot be generated in the human mind by
its proper cause wich is essentially above reason, that is, the
supernatural authority of God revealing.25
Hence the act of faith has a twofold resolution. One is in­
trinsic and objective, wholly related to the object, resting on
the sole authority of God revealing, belonging exclusively to
the supernatural sphere, without any foundation or connection
To St. Augustine it Is evident that “no one believes something,
unless he first thinks that he has to believe” (Ou the Prédestinai ion
of Saints 2.5, ML 44.962).
25 We noted above (footnote 2, see also p. 107) that, even after
this necessary foundation is laid, faith is not necessarily born, un­
less the will of man corresponds to the movement of the grace of
God, tending to the infusion of faith.

19

Fundamental Theology

with the judgment of natural reason (hence: “I believe this
particular truth simply because God has revealed it”). The
other resolution is extrinsic and subjective, wholly related to
the subject and resting on the rational judgment of evident
credibility, as a necessary prerequisite to the supernatural act
of faith and to its intrinsic and objective resolution. In this
judgment of credibility, the authority of God revealing, or the
action of revelation, is reached not in its essentially super­
natural essence, but only in its exterior aspect, as something
supernatural in its mode, that is, as a miraculous divine inter­
vention. In this subjective sense we can rightly say that the
act of divine faith is cxtrinsically resolved into an act of ra­
tional evidence, that is, in the evident credibilty of the fact of
revelation, inasmuch as this is only extrinsically and modally
supernatural, that is miraculous.
The sufficiency of moral certitude about the fact of revela­
tion is based on two reasons.

First, this kind of certitude is the only one available to
everyone. The physical certitude was available only to those
first Christians who physically heard the preaching of Christ
and of the apostles and saw their miracles. All other Christ­
ians, to whom the knowledge of their preaching and miracles
came through the testimony of others, have only a moral certi­
tude of the fact of revelation, based on the testimony of others
and on that moral law according to which a worthy witness
does not lie. Only a few can now acquire a physical certitude
from a careful and scientific examination of those miracles of
a higher moral order which permanently remain in the re­
vealed religion and are in some way visible to all, as is the
Church itself by reason of its universality, sanctity, fruitful­
ness, unity and stability. (See below, pp. 50-54).
Secondly, the supernatural act of faith does not demand
from the natural reason more than a rational and prudential
foundation, that is a firm and prudent judgment on the cred­
ibility of the fact of revelation. But, in order to act rationally
and prudently, even in very serious matters, with firm and
prudent trust in someone’s testimony, a moral certitude is suf­
ficient. Thus in civil courts moral certitude, based on the testi­
mony of upright men, is judged sufficient to infer even capital
punishment.
20

Necessity of a Rational Credibility of Revelation
For the same reasons, it is not necessary for everyone to
have a moral scientific certitude of the fact of revelation;
a vulgar or common certitude is sufficient. For, on the one
hand this is the only one available to many people who are
unable to inquire scientifically into the criteria or proofs of
that fact, and on the other hand such certitude, based on com­
mon knowledge and evidence, is amply sufficient for acting
firmly and prudently in natural affairs and decisions, even of
serious character. However, it must be a true and objective
moral certitude and not a mere probability, no matter how
great and how practical (as is the so-called practical, or re­
spective, or subjective certitude, mentioned above, p. 18),
which is not really sufficient even for natural faith nor for
acting firmly and prudently in natural affairs and decisions.
Such common certitude is generally found also in illiterate
people and in children. However, the simple and sufficient
judgment of evident credibility, which these prudently make
on the immediate testimony of learned people or parents, does
not lean exclusively on such testimony, but through that it
joins the true motives of credibility, confusedly grasped, that
is, either the many historical miracles which are told to them
or that great and ever-living miracle of the Church itself, to
which they belong and in which they know so many wonder­
ful things are contained and manifested.

21

VI
The Natural Genesis of the
Credibility of Revelation

Natural reason itself is physically and morally able to elicit
the judgment of evident credibility of the fact of revelation,
without the help of supernatural grace, although such help is
usually granted.26

Indeed, the fact of revelation, although essentially super­
natural in itself, is only modally supernatural in its exterior
signs, such as miracles. Hence under this aspect it is essentially
natural and falls under the proper object of natural reason,
namely, being as found in sensible nature. Thus a miracle is
perfectly knowable by natural reason, both as to its historical
truth, that is. as a fact subject to our senses, and as to its philo­
sophical truth, that is, as a fact truly miraculous or above
natural powers and hence a direct work of God.27 This is the
26 This statement is questioned, without sufficient reason, by a
few theologians. Thus the aforementioned Rousselot (p. 18) denies
the very physical ability of human reason for eliciting such a judg­
ment, even with the aid of grace and after the infusion of faith. F.
Taymans (in Nouvelle revue théologique [1951] 14-16) and J. B.
Alfaro (Adnotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis [Rome
1956] 169-176, 197-202, 234-268) grant, the physical power, but deny
the moral ability for eliciting such a judgment without the aid of
grace.
27 Vatican Council I. speaking of the preparation to faith, dis­
tinguishes between “internal helps of the Holy Spirit” (grace) and
“external arguments of revelation, that is, divine deeds, primarily
miracles and prophecies, which, because they clearly show the

22

The Natural Genesis of the Credibility of Revelation
reason why even devils, obviously without any help of grace
but compelled by the evidence of exterior signs, elicit a judg­
ment of evident credibility, cause of a kind of natural faith.
St. James points this out in his epistle, saying: “You believe
in the one God, that is creditable enough, but the demons have
the same belief, and they tremble with fear” (2.19; on the
manifestation of this kind of faith in the devils, see Matt. 8.24;
Mark 1.2; Acts 16.17; 19.15).
However, since this judgment of credibility is directed to
dispose a man to the genesis of supernatural faith, it is becom­
ing to divine providence to help with supernatural grace to
make such a judgment easier, by inclining the mind and will
of man to the consideration and ready acceptance of the mo­
tives of credibility, and even in some exceptional cases by
directly, and hence miraculously, supplying the motives of
credibility themselves, which perhaps were not sufficiently
proposed to some individuals through the ordinary natural
ways. As regards children and illiterate men, who have al­
ready received the infused habit of faith in their baptism, this
faith is already present in the subject, and connaturally in­
clines them to form the judgment of credibility of the fact of
revelation, the foundation of their faith. For, as St. Thomas
keenly puts it, “the light of faith makes one see the things
that are believed” (Summa Theol., p. 2-2, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3; cf.
a. 5, ad 1 ; q. 2, a. 9, ad 3).
omnipotence and infinite science of God, are evident signs of divine
revelation, suitable to every man's intelligence." (Sess. 3, chap. 3).
Such an opposition between internal helps and exterior evident
signs suitable to the intelligence of everyone, suggests quite clearly
that interior grace (or grace properly so called) is not necessary to
the actual intelligence of the signs of revelation.
The same meaning must be given to the following parallel text
of Vatican Council II: “In order to elicit the act of faith, the grace
of God and the internal helps of the Holy Spirit must precede and
assist, moving and converting the heart to God, opening the eyes
of the mind, and giving to everyone sweetness in assenting to and
believing the truth.” (Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,
no. 5). In this text “the grace of God,” as distinguished from the
internal helps of God, means grace in a broader sense, that is, ex­
terior help, such as miracles and prophecies.

23

VII
Criteria of the Credibility of Revelation

The aforementioned judgment of evident credibility is bas­
ed on objective signs or motives or criteria, through which the
fact of revelation becomes manifest and hence credible or apt
to be believed with a supernatural faith.28 In this criterion
three things are required; first, that it be something histori­
cally certain (its historical truth); second, that it involve a
direct and miraculous intervention of God (its philosophical
truth); third, that it be clearly connected with revelation, that
is, made and directed to the purpose of showing the fact of
revelation, namely that God has spoken (its relative truth).
Since the historical truth and the relative truth can be easily
ascertained, the whole strength and importance of these cri­
teria lie in their philosophical truth, that is, in the fact that
they involve a miraculous effect, which alone is a certain sign
of the intervention of God. In this sense there is only one cri­
terion, miracle itself, which is found in all other criteria, clas­
sified below, inasmuch as they show more or less clearly their
miraculous character. However, since Christian revelation
is a mediate and public revelation, to be transmitted to others,
its criteria must be not only miraculous, but exterior and sen­
sible as well, otherwise its divine origin would not be mani­
fest to others. Hence, the miraculous revelation, given im28 They are called either signs (marks), because they lead to the
knowledge of the fact of revelation; or motives of credibility, be­
cause they move to faith; or, more aptly under our apologetical
viewpoint, criteria of revelation (from the Greek •krinein,” to dis­
cern), because, as distinctive signs, they lead us properly to discern
or distinguish revelation from other facts.

24

Criteria of the Credibility of Revelation
mediately and interiorly to prophets and apostles by God and
certified personally to them through a miraculous and in­
terior sign, does not become a criterion for Christian public
revelation, unless it is also shown through a sensible sign,
that is through a new miraculous intervention of God per­
ceptible by the senses, which would certify for us that such
men are speaking as God’s legates.

These criteria can be divided as follows:
Subjective, which are found within man (such as a satisfy­
ing experience of spiritual peace and joy; the
fulfillment of the higher tendencies and as­
pirations of human nature).
Objective, which are found outside man.
Intrinsic to revealed truth itself (such as sublimity of
doctrine and its wonderful fruits in the life of
Christians).
Extrinsic to revealed truth ( physical miracles and prop­
hecies).

This division follows both a logical order, as is self-evident,
and an order of value and importance, which gradually grows
in descending direction, down to the physical miracles and
prophecies, which are “The Criteria” by antonomasia, as will
be shown below ( pp. 63 ff. ).

25

Part II
The Fact of Revelation
(Practical Apologetics)

In the preceding part, which wc called “Theoretical Apolo­
getics,” we have discussed the general notions of revelation
and credibility, showing that a true and supernatural revela­
tion of God, if any has come to pass, can be known with cer­
tainty and made evidently credible to man. In this second
part, which can be called “Practical Apologetics,” we deal
with the fact of revelation itself, endeavoring to show, with
suitable criteria or proofs, that revelation has in fact been
made, namely, that God really has spoken to mankind.

Since what we claim to be God’s revelation is contained
principally in Christ’s testimony,29 first entrusted to the apost­
les and then faithfully kept and constantly transmitted by
the Church, before expounding the various criteria or the
miraculous interventions of God which prove such testimony
to be true, it is fitting to give, in a first introductory chapter
(chap. 8), a brief and general summary of this revelation,
which in its breadth is sufficiently known from the Bible it­
self and particularly from the Gospel.
29 From time to time, even the question of the historical Jesus is
brought up. Cf. F. M. Braun, Où en est le problème de Jésus. Brux­
elles 1932; J. G. H. Hoffmann, Les vies de Jésus et le Jésus de
l’histoire, Paris 1947; M. Goguel, Jésus (2nd ed., Paris 1950) 39-80,
132-140; I. De la Potterie, “Corne impostare oggi il problema del
Gesù storico?”, Civiltà cattolica 120 (1969) 2, pp. 447-463; Ch. C.
Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesxis, Grand Rapids 1969; Ch. Ander­
son, The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, Grand Rapids 1972.

26

The Fact of Revelation
The subsequent four chapters will show the character and
value of the various criteria, following the division just given
above, that is, of the subjective criteria (chap.9), of the objec­
tive intrinsic criteria (chap. 10), and of the objective extrin­
sic criteria, divided into physical miracles ( chap. 11 ) and prop­
hecies (chap. 12). We will end our apologetical treatise with
a Conclusion about the obligation of believing the revelation
made by God and the genesis of the supernatural act of faith
(chap. 13).

27

VIII
Christ’s Testimony About His Mission

As Herald of God’s Revelation30

This mission is implicit in the very dignity of Messiah,31
which Christ claims for himself. Christ calls himself and is
called by others Messiah, the Messiah whom the prophets had
announced and the Jews were expecting. To John the Baptist’s
disciples inquiring of him: “Are you he who is to come, or
shall we look for another,” he answers in the affirmative to
the first part of the inquiry, referring them to the miracles
he is working. He implicitly approves Andrew’s statement
30 Christ’s testimony about his Divinity is not directly considered
here, as being rather one of the objects of the revelation of God.
For our apologetical purpose it is sufficient to show that Christ
testified to the fact of revelation, saying that God has spoken to
man, and that he himself is the speaker for God, the herald of God’s
revelation. Once granted the Divinity of Christ, which is dogmatic­
ally more important, it follows that Christ is not only the speaker
for God and the herald of revelation, but is God himself speaking
and revealing.
31 The title Messiah (from the Aramaic “Mesiah” and the Hebrew
“Mâsiah,” anointed, translated into Greek as "Kristos,” anointed) in
the Greek version of the Old Testament, is rendered constantly by
the name “Kristos” (Christ); in the New Testament it occurs only
twice, with the Greek word “Kristos” as an explanation: John 1.41:
“We have found the Messiah (which interpreted is Christ)”; 4.25:
“I know that Messiah is coming (who is called Christ).” The cor­
responding title “Kristôs,” as a proper name, occurs very frequently,
often coupled with the name Jesus, “Jesus Christ” (Matt. 1.1; John
17.3; Acts 5.42; 9.34; Rom.1.1, 4,6,8).

28

Christ's Testimony
to Peter his brother: “We have found the Messiah” (John 1.
41). To the Samaritan woman who was talking of the expect­
ed Messiah, Christ says directly: “I who speak with you am
he” (John 4.26) ; he emphatically approves Peter’s confession:
“You are the Christ [that is, the Messiah]” (Matt. 16.15-17);
to the Jews murmuring against him, he says: "If you believed
Moses you would believe me also, for he wrote of me [Deut.
18.15,18]” (John 5.46). To Caiphas asking him with the
solemnity of a religious judge: “I adjure you by the living God
that you tell us whether you are the Christ, the son of God,”
Jesus simply answered: “You have said it” ( Matt. 26.63ff.) ; he
allows others (as Peter and Caiphas, above) to call him Christ,
which is the same as Messiah; he calls himself Christ (Matt.
23.10: "One only is your master, the Christ”; John 17.3: “That
they may know you, the only true God, and him whom you
have sent, Jesus Christ”; cf. Matt. 22.42). The very title
"Christ,” simply the translation of the title “Messiah,” oc­
curring very often in Scripture as the proper name of Jesus,32
testifies to his messianic mission.

The biblical concept of Messiah, as was expressed by the
prophets themselves and kept in the Jewish tradition, implied
the threefold function of king, priest, and prophet or teacher
from God, herald of God's revelation. Moses prophesied: “A
prophet like me will the Lord, your God, raise up for you
from among your own kinsmen; to him you shall listen . . .
And the Lord said to me: ... I will raise up for them a prophet
like you from among their kinsmen, and will put my words
into his mouth; he shall tell them all that I command him”
(Deut. 18.15,18; cf. John 5.46; Acts 3.22). Isaias described
this magisterial function of the future Messiah in the follow­
ing prophecy: “The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the
Lord has anointed me. He has sent me to preach to the meek,
to heal the contrite of heart, and to preach a release to the
captives and deliverance to them that are shut up, to proclaim
the acceptable year of the Lord and the day of vengeance of
our God” (Is.61.1 f.). Christ applied this prophecy to himself,
saying to the Jews in the synagogue at Nazareth : “Today this
Scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing” (Luke 4.18-21).
32 See preceding footnote.

29

Fundamental Theology

The persuasion of the common people is simply expressed in
the words of the Samaritan woman to Christ: “I know that
Messiah is coming (who is called Christ), and when he comes
he will tell us all things,” Christ applied the full meaning of
this to himself, saying: “I who speak with you am he” (John
4.25 ff.).
Christ exercised de facto the proper magisterial function of
Messiah by communicating to men, as legate of God, divine
revelation about truths to be believed and precepts to be ob­
served. St. John in the prologue of his gospel calls Christ ‘‘the
true light that enlightens every man who comes into the
world” (1.9). At the age of twelve, as a future teacher, he is
“in the temple, sitting in the midst of teachers, listening to
them and asking them questions; and all who were listening
to him were amazed at his understanding and his answers”
(Luke 2.46 f.). At the start of his public life he applied to him­
self the prophecy of Isaias, quoted above, and “from that time
. . . [he] began to preach, and to say: ‘Repent, for the king­
dom of heaven is at hand’” (Matt. 4.17), and “they were as­
tonished at his teaching, for his word was with authority”
(Luke 4.32; cf. Matt. 7.29).

Christ declared that he was preaching not on his own ini­
tiative, but as sent by God to spread the “gospel,” to inaugu­
rate “the kingdom of God.” For example: Luke 4.43: “I must
proclaim the kingdom of God, for this is why I have been
sent”; John 18.37 : “This is why I was born and why I have
come into the world. to bear witness to the truth”; Luke 4.1821 : “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me ... to bring good news
to the poor he has sent me..., to proclaim the acceptable year
of the Lord and the day of recompense . . . Today this Scrip­
ture has been fulfilled in your hearing”; John 12.49 ff.: “I
have not spoken in my own authority, but he who sent me. the
Father, has commanded me what I should say, and what I
should declare. And I know that his commandment is ever­
lasting life. The things, therefore, that I speak, I speak as
the Father has bidden me.”
The object of Christ’s testimony, which we call God’s rev­
elation, is described as the “gospel” (in Greek “euanghélion,”
“good news,” from “éu”, well, and “anghelia,” news); and the
30

Christ’s Testimony

•‘kingdom of God.” It consists generically in the “knowledge
of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 13.11), of
those things that are known only by the Father and the Son
and arc revealed by them to whom they choose (Matt. 11.2527), things pertaining to “everlasting life” (John 12.50). It
consists particularly in a well-defined and specific body of
supernatural truths and precepts, which are individually in­
dicated and explained in the Gospel through the mouth of
Christ himself, expounded in the epistles of the apostles, and
divulged through the ages by the Church founded by Christ
for this purpose. To this Church Christ gave the command to
perpetuate his preaching and hand over his testimony of God’s
revelation through the ages; Matt. 24.14: “And this gospel of
the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a wit­
ness to all nations: and then will come the end”; 28.18: “Go,
therefore, and make disciples of all nations . . . , teaching
them to observe all that I have commanded you; and behold
I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the
world.”

31

IX
Subjective Criteria of the
Fact of Revelation

By subjective criteria we mean the proofs that arc derived
directly from the subject, namely, found within man himself.
These criteria can be expressed and determined in several
ways and considered under different aspects, but they all amount generically to a fulfillment of the various human as­
pirations, both intellectual and moral, which arise in the in­
dividual man and in the collectivity, such as individual long­
ing for interior peace and joy, universal aspiration for truth,
religion, morality, virtue, justice, stability of family and
society. We shall consider first the existence of such a fulfill­
ment of human aspirations through revelation or Christian re­
ligion, and then its apologetical value, that is, whether it is
an evident sign or criterion of the fact of revelation, the sup­
ernatural origin of this religion.
1. Christian revelation greatly satisfies and fulfills all hu­
man aspirations, in both the intellectual and the moral order.33
33 This fact is denied by Rationalism, which rejects the fittingness
(even the possibility itself) of revelation, as being harmful to hu­
man reason (see above, pp. 5, 11). Against it Pitts IX declares that
“faith is the teacher of life, the guide of salvation, the expellor of
all vices, the fecund parent and nurse of virtues . . ., the one who
’preached peace, announced good things’ (Isa. 52.7) to all.” (Encycl.
“Qui pluribus,” 1846, Denz. 2779). Vatican Council I attributes to
the Church "inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good things” (sess. 3,
chap. 3, on faith), adding that the Church "far from opposing the
culture of human arts and sciences, aids and promotes it in many

32

Subjective Criteria of the Fact of Revelation
The individual aspirations or deepest longings of every man
for peace and joy of mind, for human dignity, for personal
liberty, for freedom oj conscience or religious freedom,
are safeguarded and fulfilled by Christian doctrine. Vatican
Council II declares: “The Church truly knows that only God
. . . meets the deepest desires of the human heart, which is
never fully satiated by earthly nourishment” (Pastoral Con­
stitution on the Church in the Modern World, no.41). “The
Church is able to shelter the dignity of human nature against
all wavering opinions, for example, those which either under­
value or excessively glorify the human body. By no human
law can human personal dignity and liberty be so safely guard­
ed, as by Christ’s gospel, entrusted to the Church” (ibid.).
“Only in freedom can man direct himself to righteousness, that
same freedom which is so highly priced and eagerly sought
by our contemporaries . . . Man’s dignity itself requires that
he act according to conscious and free choice . . . But man ob­
tains such dignity when, freeing himself from all slavery to
passion, he seeks his goal in the free choice of righteousness
and searches, with effective and sagacious diligence, for the
suitable means to that end. Since man’s freedom has been
wounded by sin, he is unable to achieve effectively and fully
such relationship with God without the help of his grace”
(ibid., no.17). “The human person has a right to religious
freedom. Such freedom consists in this, that all men must be
ways.” (Chap. 4, Denz. 3013. 3019).
More recent documents of the Magisterium, particularly those of
social character, show how aptly the Christian revelation meets the
weighty problems of the present age, both individual and social.
Thus Leo XIII. Encycl. “Immortale Doi,” 1885, and “Libertas,” 1888;
Phis XI, Encycl. “Divini illius Magistri," 1929, “Casti connubii,”
1930, and “Quadragesimo anno,” 1931; Pius XII, Encycl. “Summi
pontificatus.” 1939; John XXIII, Encycl. “Mater et Magistra," 1961,
and “Pacem in terris," 1963; particularly Vatican Council II. Past­
oral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World “Gaudium et
spes," Dec. 7, 1965, which extensively shows the fittingness of the
Christian doctrine in the present conditions of the world, regarding
the individual (no. 41), society generically (no. 42), marriage and
family (nos. 47-52), culture (nos. 52-62), socio-economic life (nos.
63-72), political life (nos. 73-76), and international relations (nos.
77-90).

33
MT. ANGEL A88EY LIBRARY
ST. BENEDICT. OREGON 97373

Fundamental Theology

immune from coercion on the part of individuals, of social
groups, and of any human power . . . The right to religious
freedom is rooted in the very dignity of the human person, as
is made manifest by the revealed word of God and by reason
itself” (Declaration on Religious Freedom, no.2).
The universal aspirations in the intellectual and speculative
order, that is, the quest for truth, which is innate to man (for,
as St. Augustine puts it, there is nothing that man desires
more than knowing the truth), are fulfilled by Christian
revelation. Indeed, this religion offers to man definite and se­
cure doctrines about God, the unknown Supreme Being, who
is necessarily found at the end of every man’s search for truth,
even at the very bottom of Atheism itself, for man is naturally
religious and his “soul is naturally Christian” (Tertullian,
Against Mardon 1.10). It gives to man a suitable explanation
of the origin, the course and finality of the world, by appeal­
ing to the concept of creation and to the truth of divine pro­
vidence and government. It gives a suitable solution to the
problem of man’s own origin and destiny, which touches and
troubles him intimately, particularly in some major events of
life, as in suffering and failures, in catastrophe and death;
such human riddle cannot be solved but through the same doc­
trines about God’s creation and providence, and through be­
lief in eternal life and in an ultimate settlement of things.34
As to the universal aspirations in the intellectual practical
order, that is, in the order of human practical culture and civ­
ilization, which are keenly felt and promoted in the modern
34 Vatican Council II: “Man’s dignity has its foundations and its
full achievement in God himself . . . Hence, when a divine founda­
tion and the hope of an eternal life are lacking, man’s dignity is
most grievously injured, as is often shown by current events, and
the riddles of life and death, of guilt and sorrow, remain unsolved,
so that men are easily driven to dispair. Meanwhile every man be­
comes an unsolved puzzle to himself, however obscurely he may be
aware of it. For, on certain occurrences, particularly when major
events of life take place, no one can simply avoid considering such
a puzzle; to which God alone can supply a full and satisfactory solu­
tion, by inviting man to the knowledge of higher things and to
humble search for truth.” (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in
the Modern World, no. 21).

34

Subjective Criteria of the Fact of Revelation
age, the Church has always fostered and satisfied them within
the limits and exigencies of its spiritual and primary mission.3536
In the first centuries the Church adopted the best of Graeco­
Roman civilization, saved it from the general collapse of the
Roman Empire, extended it to barbarian peoples together with
Christian revelation, prevented it from fading away in the
succeeding dark ages, and helped it to mingle with and to im­
pregnate the rising new civilization of the Middle Ages. In the
following centuries up to the present time, never did the
Church cease keeping pace with the progress of culture and
civilization, inasmuch as it was fitting to its primary mission
which is to evangelize, not to civilize, the world. Recently Vat­
ican Council II has directed its attention in a particular way
to the values of temporal things and the ways of fostering the
modern culture, also in its practical and corporal aspect.3®
35 Note the following words of Pius XI to M. D. Roland-Gosselin:
“It is necessary never to lose sight of the fact that the objective of
the Church is to evangelize, not to civilize. If it civilizes, it is for the
sake of evangelization.” (Semaines sociales de France, Versailles
1936. pp. 461-462).
36 The Council leaches that the human body has its own proper
value and hence no one is allowed to despise his bodily life (Past­
oral Constitution on the Church, nos. 14, 41). Temporal things in
general have their value, not only extrinsically, because they help
man in the attainment of his ultimate goal, but also intrinsically, be­
cause they were made by God, who, after creating the material
world “saw ... it was very good” (Gen. 1.31), and because of their
relationship both to the human person, for which they were made,
and to Christ, to whom God ordained all things, even material (Col.
1.18) (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity, no. 7).
Hence there should be a general concern in the Church as a whole
for cultivating and promoting the construction and development of
the temporal order in the right way, and directing it to God through
Christ (Ibid., and Pastoral Constitution on the Church, no. 39). In
particular, this concern regards both the bishops, who should know
that earthly things and temporal institutions are related to man’s
salvation and contribute to the welfare of the Church (Decree on
the Bishops’ pastoral office, no. 12), and to the laity, who, as in their
own proper field, should cooperate in the development of human
labor, technical skill, and civic culture, considering the renewal of
the temporal order as their special obligation (Dogmatic Constitu­

35

Fundamental Theology

However, since material culture is only indirectly linked
with the primary mission of the Church and with supernatural
revelation itself, no one can reasonably expect to find neces­
sarily in the Catholic nations a higher standard of civiliza­
tion than in pagan or non-Catholic countries. On this subject
of human culture or civilization, there is a general misunder­
standing, due to the ambiguity of the two words themselves.
Man is composed of body, intellectual faculties and moral
faculties. The human culture or advancement and the human
civil behavior is likewise threefold, that is, in ascending grad­
ation of perfection, corporal, intellectual and moral. The moral
culture and that part of the intellectual culture which is con­
cerned with religious truth (Ethics and Theodicy) are expect­
ed to be, and are in fact, much higher in Christian nations,
while the other part of intellectual culture and the physical or
corporal culture can be lower or higher or equal according to
contingent causes and circumstances. It can even happen that
some of the principles of revealed ethics, as the importance of
caring more about the salvation of the soul and about eternity,
than about the body and temporal things, or the necessity of
suffering and expiation, may lead some persons or peoples,
either by false interpretation or by undue exaggeration or by
the very desire for Christian perfection, to draw back or pro­
ceed at a much lower step on the path of culture and civiliza­
tion. On the contrary, for opposit reasons of pagan or mater­
ialistic or atheistic trend, it may happen that other peoples or
classes of people, discarding every idea of spiritual values and
every hope of future life, trusting simply in their own moral
liberty and devoting themselves entirely to the acquisition and
development of bodily and material things, progress at a much
speedier pace on the way of material progress and culture,
while they draw back from moral culture.37 Thus the Graeco­
tion on the Church, no. 36; Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity,
no. 7).
37 Vatican Council II: “The modern world shows itself at once
strong and weak, capable of the best and of the worst deeds, while
it finds wide open before itself the road to liberty or slavery, to
progress or regress, to brotherhood or hatred. Moreover, man be­
comes aware that it is up to him to lead in the right direction the
forces which he has untied and which may oppress him or obey

36

Subjective Criteria of the Fact of Revelation

Roman culture was physically and intellectually higher than
the Hebrew, but morally much lower; several of the modern
Communistic nations, as the Soviet, seem to proceed faster in
the physical and scientific culture than some of the Christian
nations, but they descend lower and lower in the realm of
moral and religious culture.
The universal aspirations of men in the moral order, regard­
ing both the end of man (his final and total happiness) and
the means to that end < which are the various virtues, whose
seeds were planted by the Creator in the human conscience),
are particularly fulfilled by Christian doctrine and practice.
Revelation recalls and confirms the natural truth that man’s
true and final happiness is found only in the knowledge and
love of God, who is man’s beginning and end, according to St.
Augustine’s maxim: “You have made us for yourself, O Lord,
and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (Confessions
1.1). Moreover, it supernaturally manifests to man the possi­
bility and the existence of an immediate union with God
through the beatific vision, which surpasses the power and the
efficacious desire of human nature. Revelation fulfills the as­
pirations of man to virtue, strengthening the natural motives
of the different virtues and completing them by the addition
of supernatural motives. Thus the highest virtue of religion,
whose seeds are naturally planted in every human conscience
(for man is naturally religious and in this sense his “soul is
naturally Christian,” as emphatically stated by Tertullian,
Against Marcion 1.10), is perfected through revelation by
the removal of all kinds of false mysticism and superstition,
into which those same people often incline who deny a person­
al God and check in their conscience the true natural religious
instinct. Besides, revelation adds to natural religion a pure
interior worship of the Divinity, joined to a definitely deter­
mined and suitable exterior worship, consisting mainly in
Christ’s eucharistie sacrifice and the reception of the sanctify­
him.” (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
no. 9). “In the present time, not a few people, excessively trusting
in the progress of the natural sciences and technical arts, have fallen
into an idolatry of temporal things, thus becoming their slaves
rather than their masters.” (Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity,
no. 7).

37

Fundamental Theology
ing sacraments. The virtue of prudence is freed from the ad­
mixture or adulteration of a sort of utilitarianism. The virtue
of fortitude rises even to the palm of martyrdom. The virtue of
temperance (which fosters the institution of temperance so­
cieties, particularly against alcoholism) is enriched and elevat­
ed by the motives of mortification and expiation. The virtue of
justice is tempered by supernatural mercy and love, which
alone are able to remove disagreement and strife in families
and society, and to diffuse among men a true peace that no
natural motives can promise.
The entire proof of our statement is confirmed by three
signs. First, by the generally outstanding character of the
life of Christian individuals, families and societies. Second, by
the spontaneous testimony of individuals, converted to our
faith, who acknowledged that they found in it all the benefits
they had sought in vain elsewhere. Third, by the adaptability
of revealed religion to all men and nations of whatever char­
acter or culture, a thing which has not happened in the case of
other religions. Paganism, Buddhism, Islamism and late Jud­
aism, continuously flourished only within the narrow limits of
a single people or place.

2. Apologetical value of the subjective criteria.
Notwithstanding its marvelous character and its subjective
force of attraction, such a fulfillment of human aspirations by
revealed religion is not objectively a sufficient criterion of the
fact of revelation, that is, one which would be the basis for an
evident and certain judgment that our religion has a reveal­
ed and supernatural origin, and hence is suitable for being
believed and indeed one which must be believed with super­
natural faith.38 The reason is, because such a marvelous ful­
38 A rather recent opinion among Catholic writers holds, on the
contrary, that these subjective criteria are fully sufficient, and even
equal in strength to the objective criteria, or stronger than these,
or simply the only sufficient criteria. Hence it advocates a radical
change in Catholic Apologetics, to be built only, or primarily, or at
least equally, on subjective criteria.
The reason for removing the traditional Apologetics (based on
objective criteria, principally miracles and prophecies) and intro­
ducing a new Apologetics or a “method of immanence” (called

38

Subjective Criteria of the Fact of Revelation
fillment, even taken in its entirety, does not clearly and ex­
teriorly bear the character of a true miracle, that is, of a direct
and extraordinary intervention of God, marking it with the
seal of his testimony. Hence, absolutely speaking, it could be
attributed to a natural cause or to the confluence of several
natural causes, which would prove only the outstanding char­
acter of our religion, as the best among natural religions, or
even as the only true natural religion; but not, however, prove
it to be a supernatural religion.
“Apologetics of Immanence,” or “Apologetics of Adaptation,” or
“Apologetics of Integration”) is the merely intellectual character
of the old Apologetics, which is either insufficient in itself or at
least inadequate to the mind of modern man.
According to Maurice Blondel (+1949), the founder of this new
Apologetics, and his principal disciple L. Laberthonnière (+1932),
objective criteria, particularly physical miracles, are altogether in­
sufficient because the philosophical nature of a miracle, as a deroga­
tion of natural laws by God, cannot be known with certainty, as
there are no fixed laws in nature, and therefore no ontological
changes or exceptions of laws, but only apparent changes. Hence the
only possible Apologetics is that of immanence.
According to others, the objective method, although valuable in
itself, is practically insufficient for modern man, imbued as he is
with rationalistic principles. Hence it must be either simply replaced
by the subjective method (thus L. Ollé-Laprune, Blondel’s teacher,
and G. Fonsegrive, advocating simply an Apologetics of adaptation),
or joined and strengthened with the subjective method, without
which it would be insufficient (thus, among others, A. Liégé, J.
Levie, A. de Bovis, N. Dunas, pleading for an Apologetics of inte­
gration ).
Cf. Blondel, L’action. Paris 1893; second edition in 2 volumes,
Paris 1936-37; La philosophie et l’esprit chrétien. 2 vols., Paris 194446; Laberthonnière, Essais de philosophie religieuse, Paris 1903;
Réalisme chrétien et idéalisme grec, Paris 1904 (both volumes plac­
ed on the Index); Dunas, “Les problèmes et le statut de l’apologéti­
que,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 43 (1959)
643-680.
For ampler knowledge of Blondel’s theory and its development,
see R. Aubert, Le problème de l’acte de la foi (éd. 2, Louvain 1950)
277-337. For a right appraisal and refutation of this doctrine, see
C. Boyer, in Gregorianum (1935) 485-503.

39

Fundamental Theology

Of course, some of the elements shown above, as the beatific
vision of God, the eucharistie sacrifice and the sacraments, the
higher motives of Christian virtues, are in themselves intrin­
sically supernatural, and several of the other things included
in the marvelous fulfillment of human aspirations may be
modally supernatural, that is produced miraculously, but the
supernatural or miraculous character of both is not visible
and cannot be proved with certainty, since they have only a
subjective value, that is, the fulfillment of subjective aspira­
tions. For, this subjective value of doctrines and practices is
of itself indefinite and variable, according to the different
psychology and customs of peoples, so that a thing which com­
pletely satisfies one, may satisfy another less or not at all.
Hence we see men easily satisfied in their own religion, as
a Jew, trusting only in Mosaic law and the old revelation, a
Mohammedan, trusting only the Koran, a Buddhist, resting
peacefully in Brahmanic contemplation and expectation. We
even see people easily shifting from one religion to another
in order to find a satisfaction of some individual aspirations
not found in their former religion.
Although objectively insufficient, such a criterion has never­
theless the force of a solid probability of the divine miracu­
lous intervention to fulfill in the described manner all the hu­
man aspirations. By reason of its probability and especially
of the force of attraction which it exercises on many people,
particularly in modern times, this criterion is in practice very
useful, at least for a start on the road to faith and as a step­
ping stone for the search and consideration of the objective
and certain criteria, which alone are sufficient and required
to elicit the judgment of evident credibility, the necessary
prerequisite for the act of supernatural faith. Just as in other
matters probability often leads to certitude, so such a probable
criterion, with the aid of subjective inclinations and of the
apologetical art of the preacher, who would fittingly and op­
portunely present it to the various categories of men, may
lead to the willing and right consideration of the objective
criteria, and through these to the certain judgment of credi­
bility.
Moreover, it is probable that the various subjective criteria,
taken all together, could be made sufficient through their

40

Subjective Criteria of the Fact of Revelation
change into an objective criterion, that is by considering them
as a true miracle of the moral order, inasmuch as, in view of
the natural weakness of the will and the moral inability of
the intellect for a suitable acquisition of the natural truths of
religion (see above, p. 13 f.) it would seem impossible that
the Christian religion could fully satisfy all the moral and
intellectual aspirations of man without being a miraculous ef­
fect of God. But in this way we have no longer a subjective,
but an objective internal criterion, to be reduced to the cri­
terion of the sublimity and fruits of Christian doctrine. More­
over its sufficiency is not certain, as will be shown below ( pp.
54-57).

41

X
Objective Intrinsic Criteria of the

Fact of Revelation

According to the sketch given above (p. 25), these criteria
are found in and derived from the revealed truth itself, as its
properties. They can be reduced to three: 1) the sublimity of
the revealed doctrine and its marvelous fruits, shown both in
2) the sanctity of its believers, and in 3) the marvelous propa­
gation, Catholic unity, and unaltered stability of the Church.

Like in the preceding question, we shall consider first the
existence of these three properties and then their apologetical
value, that is whether they are evident criteria or signs of the
fact of divine revelation.

1. The Christian doctrine is truly sublime in its articles,
and marvelous in its fruits, that is in the sanctity of its be­
lievers and in the propagation, unity and stability of the
Church.

A. Sublimity of the revealed doctrine.
The very historical origin of Christian doctrine bears the
signs of a wondrous happening. In fact Christ did not learn it
from rabbinic schools, which he did not attend, nor directly
from the books of the Old Testament, for on the one hand he
did not have the means and social conditions for a particular
study of Scripture, as is evident from the Gospel itself, and
on the other hand in his own teaching he surpassed by far the
doctrines and the laws of the books of the Old Testament.
Hence the wonder, that the twelve year old boy already arous­
ed in the doctors of the temple “amazed at his understanding
42

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

and his answers (Luke 2.47). And later on there was the
continued admiration of the people from the beginning of his
public ministry: “And all bore him witness, and marvelled at
the words of grace that came from his mouth. And they said:
Is not this Joseph’s son?” (Luke 4.22); “And when he had
come to his own country, he began to teach them in their
synagogues, so that they were astonished, and said: ‘How
did this man come by this wisdom and these miracles? Is not
this the carpenter’s son? Is not his mother called Mary?’”
(Matt. 13.54 f.). Again: “Jesus went into the temple and be­
gan to teach. And the Jews marvelled, saying: ‘How does this
man come by learning, since he has not studied?’” (John
7.15); “The attendants answered: ‘Never has man spoken as
this man” (John 7.47). Christ himself gave an answer to all
such wondering, saying to the same Jews in the temple: “My
teaching is not my own, but his who sent me” (John 7.16).
Likewise, the manner of his teaching bears an extraordi­
nary character, as appears from the simplicity and beauty of
its form (especially in the parables), from the clarity of pro­
nouncements (cf. Matt. 5 to 7, the Sermon on the Mount),
from its controversial effectiveness (Matt. 12.33 ff.; Luke
11.14 ff.), from the gravity and clarity of the accusations against the doctors of the law (Matt. 23.1 ff.), and mainly from
the teaching authority shown to the people: “The crowds
were astonished at his teaching; for he was teaching them as
one having authority, and not as their Scribes and Pharisees”
(Matt. 7.28 f.).39

The doctrine in itself shows perfection and harmony, the
two constituent parts of the concept of sublimity. This is
evident as regards the natural truths, taught by Christ, which
agree with and afford the necessary complement to whatever
natural reason can find about the essence and attributes of
God, and about the nature and the properties of man (spirit­
uality and immortality of the soul), as well as man’s moral
conditions (purpose of life, moral law, reward, destiny, brief­
ly: human ethics). This perfection of doctrine is the cause of
the admirable fulfillment of the intellectual and moral aspira­
39 Cf. P. Quinsat, “La manière dont Jésus parlait,” Maison Dieu
(1954) 59-82.

43

Fundamental Theology

tions, of which we have spoken above ( pp. 32 ff.).
The same perfection and harmony appears also in the super­
natural truths revealed by Christ. For, notwithstanding their
lofty and mysterious nature, no opposition can be found either
between themselves or with natural reason, but to a careful
analysis they rather manifest a general fittingness and har­
mony.

Thus the mystery of the Trinity of persons in God is not
opposed to the natural truth of the oneness of God, but com­
pletes it by the distinction of nature and person, and the two­
fold trinitarian processions of the Son from the Father and of
the Holy Spirit from both finds an imperfect but significant
illustration in the natural acts of the human intellect and will
(the interior word proceeding from the intellect, and love
proceeding from both). The mystery of the Incarnation is not
opposed to divine perfection, which remains unchanged and
untouched by it, and completes the notion of divine provi­
dence, particularly through the twin mystery of redemption,
which brings this providence to its apex. The mystery of
grace, or man’s elevation to the supernatural order, completes
the rational perfection of human nature. The mystery of
original sin agrees with the inner weakness of human nature
and gives a suitable explanation of its evil inclinations and of
the general evil and misery in the world. The mystery of
eternal life and beatific vision matches with the natural truth
of the immortality of the soul and with a certain natural de­
sire of seeing God in himself (cf. above, p. 9 f.), and at the
same time completes the mystery of grace, which is the seed
of eternal life and the root of the beatific vision. The mystery
of hell is fitting to the truths of law, justice and divine provi­
dence. Supernatural law and ethics are in perfect agreement
with and complete the natural law and ethics (see what has
been said above, on p. 37 f., about the completion of natural
virtues by the supernatural).
There are of course several difficult and opposed concepts,
inherent to the supernatural nature of these mysteries; but.
far from proving in them a real contradiction or unfittingness,
they show rather their great perfection or sublimity, which
consists precisely in unifying into a higher synthesis things

44

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

that are opposed in a lower sphere. Thus in the mystery of
Trinity, unity and plurality are joined in the same simple Be­
ing; in the Incarnation, infinite divine nature and finite hu­
man nature; in redemption, justice and mercy; in the eleva­
tion of man, nature and supernature; in the mystery of hell,
and of Christ, at once redeemer and judge, the greatest mercy
and the strictest justice; in Christian ethics, life with death,
perfection with renunciation, contemplation with action, sim­
plicity with prudence.
The proper perfection and originality of Christian doctrine
is further shown through its comparison with the doctrines of
other religions. For in no other religion or philosophy can we
find such perfect fittingness with and completion of the truths
of natural religion and ethics. In no one, a fortiori, are found
the supernatural mysteries mentioned above nor the higher
ethics based on supernatural motives. The few similarities
that are found between the Christian religion and the others
are only apparent or superficial, since they mingle with great­
er and fundamental differences regarding the proper and
formal object of the various truths. Moreover they are due
to some fundamental human ideas and exigencies, to which
Christ himself necessarily had to adapt his religion, although
it is essentially different from the others. Such are the mes­
sianic mission (as in Christ and Mohammed), the doctrinal
authority (as in Christ and other religious leaders), the var­
ious cultual practices, inspired by natural religion, as pray­
er, sacrifice, communication with the Divinity, the rite of
ablution or purification, and the sacrificial meal. Every one
of these truths or practices is specifically different in the
Christian religion, as is evident, for instance, in Christ, the
Messiah, who is at once man and God, as well as the revealer
of supernatural truths; in the Church, at once perfect visible
society and Mystical Body; in Baptism, cause of interior re­
generation; in the Eucharist, sacrifice of the body of Christ,
really present, and immediate participation of it.
In view of such fundamental and essential differences it is
also evident that the truths of Christian religion were not de­
rived or borrowed from any of the pagan religions or philo­
sophies, infected with doctrinal polytheism and fatalism, am­
biguous and often shameful rites, ethical utilitarianism and

45

Fundamental Theology
personalism. All of this St. Paul includes in the following re­
probation: “Do not bear the yoke with unbelievers. For what
has justice in common with iniquity? Or what fellowship has
light with darkness? What harmony is there between Christ
and Belial?” <2 Cor. 6.14 f.). Nor is Christian religion prop­
erly derived from Judaism itself, but it has only preserved,
fulfilled and surpassed that indeed true and supernatural re­
ligion, thus showing its own perfection and originality.

B. The fruits of sanctity, produced by the revealed doctrine.

These fruits are shown both in Christ himself, at once
founder of the new religion and exemplar to his followers, and
in the Church, taken as a whole and considered particularly
in some of its outstanding members, namely the martyrs.
The entire life of Christ, as historically related in the Gos­
pel, is a witness to his holiness and lofty virtues. In vain did
his adversaries, Scribes and Pharisees, seek anything in his
actions that could be an object of calumny or accusation;
hence, without fear of contradiction in the midst of one of the
hottest controversies, he challenged them, saying: “Which of
you can convict me of sin?” (John 8.46). And during the final
showdown in the court of justice before Caiphas “the chief
priests and all the Sanhedrin were seeking false witness against Jesus, that they might put him to death, but they found
none, though many false witnesses came forward” (Matt.
26.59 f.), so that the judge himself had to provoke Christ to
saying that he was the Son of God, to build up against him a
charge of blasphemy and justify the death sentence (Matt.
26.63-66).

Christ shows a high degree of perfection in the field of
every virtue. His religion and charity toward God, his Father,
is summarized in the following declaration: “My food is to do
the will of him who sent me, to accomplish his work” (John
4.34). His charity toward, his neighbor is shown in his entire
salvific mission throughout his public life, in the unceasing
ministry of preaching, in the healing of sick, in the forgiveness
of offenses, which made him address his traitor with the name
of “friend” (Matt. 26.50) and pray for his persecutors on the
cross (Luke 23.34), and finally in dying, as a criminal, in be­
half of all mankind, for “greater love than this no one has,
46

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

that one lay down his life for his friends” (John 15.13).
His prudence is manifested in the way he gradually incul­
cates his messianic and divine dignity, in order to avoid the
false political interpretation of his mission by the common
people and a reaction on the part of the Scribes and Pharisees,
as well as in the indirect and efficacious manner he answers
the insidious questions of the same doctors (as on the con­
demnation of the adulterous woman, John 8.3-9; on the tribute
due to Caesar, Matt. 22.15-22; on his divine Sonship, Matt.
22.46; on his teaching authority, Matt. 21.23-27). His justice
is shown particularly in driving out the sellers and the buy­
ers from the temple < Matt. 21.12 f.) and in publicly exposing
the vices of the Pharisees (Matt. 23.1-36); his temperance, in
the simplicity and poverty of his life, such as to be able to say:
“The Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head” (Matt. 8.20);
his fortitude (combined with patience and perseverance), in
bearing the continued persecution of the doctors of the law,
in standing for truth against all false accusation in their court
of justice. And finally in giving, through a painful and patient
martyrdom, the supreme testimony of his sanctity and his di­
vine mission.

The life of the Church shows likewise an extraordinary
sanctity, and an unfailing moral fruitfulness, both in the
world at large and especially in its own members.
The Church, through its doctrines and laws, has restored
or improved the morals of the world. First in the individuals.
for many crimes and corrupted customs, which were common
and tolerated among pagans ( as pederasty, sodomy, unstable
concubinate, sacred prostitution), gradually fell into disuse in
Christian times or were at least commonly considered as grave
depravities. Secondly, in family life, as is clear from the re­
stored dignity of women, the rights of children protected against the tyranny of fathers, the expulsion of polygamy and
easy divorce, the prohibition of abortion and of the various
practices preventing human fecundation. Finally, in civil
society, as is evident from the abolition of slavery, the care of
the poor, the sick, and the weak, the abolition of political
tyranny, the condemnation of racial discrimination, the pro­
tection of private property, the promotion of peace among
47

Fundamental Theology

peoples and the fostering of the so-called international law.40
The Church fosters and in many of its members obtains the
so-called common sanctity, as is clear from the common ob­
servance of several difficult precepts, particularly about mor­
tification, chastity (both in individual and in family life), sac­
ramental confession, and of the peculiar evangelical counsels
(poverty, chastity, obedience) which have given rise to many
religious communities. It obtains also in several of its mem­
bers a heroic sanctity, as is evident from the lives of Saints
and particularly from the causes of canonization.
Among these, the martyrs*1 deserve a particular mention,
for they represent of themselves a particular and outstanding
witness to the supernatural character of Christian religion, or
a particular criterion of revelation.

As regards the history of martyrs,42 in the first three ccn40 Among the greatest philosophers, Plato pleads for the introduc­
tion of a general form of communism, both social and domestic, by
which everything should be common, including women, and Arist­
otle tries to justify absolute slavery through the principles of natural
law. Both of them defend also suppression of deformed children or
previous abortion (cf. Aristotle, Polit., book 7. no. 1335; however see
the mild interpretation of St. Thomas, ibid.. lesson 12). The primi­
tive Roman law. called “Law of the Ten Tables,” bore such an arti­
cle: “The father shall quickly kill a child conspicuously deformed”
(table 4), and later Seneca, a philosopher and Nero’s tutor, justified
such a law and practice, by saying: “No wrath, but reason, sets apart the useless from the healthy.” (On Wrath 1.15).
41 Martyr (from the Greek “mârtus,” witness) is generically un­
derstood to be one who by dying or suffering a deadly pain for the
faith of Christ (hence death or pain inflicted by an enemy of the
faith, as such) gives witness to Christ. For a more precise concept of
martyrdom, see St. Thomas, Summa Theol. p.2-2, q.124: E. Hocedez,
“Le concept de martyre,” Nouvelle revue théologique 45 (1928)
81-99, 198-208; R. Hedde, “Martyre,” Dictionnaire de théologie cath­
olique 10-1 (Paris 1928) 220-233.
42 Cf. P. Allard. “Martyre.” Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi
catholique (ed. 4, Paris 1926) 331-492; H. Grégoire, Les persécu­
tions dans l’empire romain, Bruxelles 1951; E. De Moreau. La per­
sécution du Christianisme dans l’empire romain. Paris 1951; Nou­
velle revue théologique 73 (1951) 812-832.

48

Objective Intrinsic Criteria
t uries there were no less than twelve successive and general
persecutions by decrees of the Roman emperors ( the first un­
der Nero in 64 and the last under Julian the Apostate in 363;
the most violent and more general persecution was that of
Diocletian from 303 to 311). In the following centuries up to
the present time, persecutions have been only sporadic and
local (as during the French, Russian, Mexican, and Spanish
revolutions, and under the Soviet regime). It cannot be doubt­
ed that the member of martyrs in the Roman persecutions
(which particularly come under our consideration) was very
large, although it cannot be either exactly or approximately
determined; this is testified by some pagan witnesses (Tacitus,
Annal. 15.44; Pliny the Younger, Epist., book 10, no. 96) and
by many Christian sources (St. John, Apoc. 6.9-11; 17.6; Cle­
ment of Rome, Epist. to the Corinthians 6; Irenaeus, Against
Heresies 4.33.9; Lactantius, On the Death of Persecutors 16;
Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History 8.6, etc).43

The condition of martyrs, under a physical, moral, and social
aspect, is manifold. Among them are found very young peo­
ple (Tarcisius, Agnes), old men (Polycarp), women (Agnes,
Perpetua, Cecilia, Agatha), soldiers (Sebastian), plebeians
(Theodotus, Serenus), noblemen (Clemens, Apollonius),
apostles (Peter and Paul), learned men (Justin, Irenaeus,
Cyprian). The aforementioned pagan witness Pliny the
Younger speaks of “many of all ages, of all ranks, of both
sexes.”

The motive for suffering was only one, that is, religious
faith, which was also, directly or indirectly, the motive of per­
secution. For. whatever may have been the immediate aim
of the persecutors, it is certain that the Christian religion
came to be considered as in radical opposition to the minimum
43 The number of martyrs, up to the year 311, once greatly exag­
gerated by some historians (11 million according to Florès, 2 million
according to Gaume), has been exceedingly reduced by some modern
writers (H. Grégoire proposes much less than 10,000 in his work
Les persecutions dans l’empire romain [Bruxelles 1951] 162, while
L. Hertling, in Gregorianum [1944] 103-129, gives about 100,000).
The Roman Martyrology counts 13.825 martyrs, which seems to be
closer to the truth.

49

Fundamental Theology
of religious conformity, requested by the tolerant Roman law,
so that Christians were considered as public enemies, under
their religious standard; hence the public axiom: “Christians
are not allowed.” The pagan writer Suetonius, speaking of
the first persecution by Nero, says that “Christians, a class of
men characterized by a new and malicious superstition, were
sent to torture” (Life of Nero 16.2). Tertullian at the end of
the second century testifies that Christians were considered
as “public enemies of the gods, of the emperors, of laws, of
moral customs, enemies of the whole nature” ( Apol. 4), and
because they did not sacrifice to the emperor they were
“charged with sacrilege and high treason; and this was the
supreme charge, nay the whole charge” (ibid. 10).

The manner of suffering, amid frightful physical and moral
torments (crucifixion, burning, exposures to beasts, mockery,
tears of relatives, exposure of women to houses of prostitu­
tion), shows only virtue and heroism, namely fortitude of soul,
tranquillity of mind, hope in God’s help, meekness, charity
and prayer in behalf of the persecutors themselves.
C. The marvelous propagation, Catholic unity and unaltered
stability of the Church, as a fruit of the Christian doctrine.

The propagation of the Church44 shows all the signs of an
extraordinary event, considering its huge size ( that is, its
local, numerical and social expansion), its great speed, its
scanty means, and the serious obstacles opposed to it.
The size of this propagation, as a local or geographical ex­
pansion, in the apostolic time itself ( hence in the lapse of some
seventy years, from Christ’s death in the year 30 to St. John’s
death about the end of the first century) has no other limits
than those of the Roman and civilized world. This is clear
from the Acts and Epistles of the apostles and the Apocalypse.
St. Paul emphatically testifies that “the gospel truth ... is in
the whole world, . . . has been preached to every creature un­
der heaven” (Col. 1.6,23; cf. Rom. 1.8). In the middle of the
44 Cf. J. Rivière, La propagation du Christianisme dans les trois
premiers siècles, Paris 1907: L. Hertling, “Die Zahl der Christen zu
Beginn des vierten Jahrhundcrts,” Zeitschrift fiir katholische Théo­
logie 58 (1934) 243-253.

50

Objective Intrinsic Criteria
second century Justin, and at the end of the same Irenaeus
and Tertullian, testify that the Christian religion had already
reached beyond the very limits of the Roman Empire.45
The great numerical expansion is easily conjectured from
the geographical expansion itself. The Church started with
12 apostles and 70 disciples of Christ; immediately after the
Ascension 120 disciples are referred to (Acts 1.15); on the day
of the first Pentecost 3000 were baptized; a little later the
number of Christians grew' to 5000 (Acts 4.4) and was fur­
ther increased (Acts 5.14) until mention is made of many
thousands (Acts 21.20). According to Tacitus, in the first per­
secution by Nero in the year 64 a “huge multitude” of Christ­
ians died in Rome (Annal. 15.44); from Pliny’s epistle to Tra­
jan toward the beginning of the second century it appears
that a great part of the population in Bythinia wras Christian
and a century later Tertullian testifies that in Africa “almost
the larger part of every city” was Christian (To Scapula 210).
Around the beginning of the fourth century, when Constan­
tine, the first Christian emperor, took the power, at least a
fifth (some say a fourth, others a half) of the Roman Empire
was Christian.

The social expansion is evident in the apostolic age itself.
Among the apostles, besides the ten fishermen, we find a bus­
inessman (Matthew') and a learned man of the Pharisees’
school (Paul). Among the other followers there is a Pharisee,
doctor of the law (Nicodemus), and a nobleman (Joseph of
Arimathea). Shortly after the Ascension there came to the
new' faith a large group of Jewdsh priests (Acts 6.7); Cor­
nelius, a centurion (Acts 10.1 ff. ) ; proconsul Sergius Paulus
(Acts 13.12); Dionysius the Areopagite, an influential man
(Acts 17.34); a number of noble women (Acts 17.4; cf. 17.34);
45 Justin, Dial, cum Thryphone 110 and 117, says generically that
“there are absolutely no people of any kind” who do not adore
Christ crucified. Irenaeus, Against heresies 1.10. points out even
Egypt and Lybia. Tertullian, Against the Jews 7.4, mentions, among
several other barbarian peoples, “the places of the Bretons, not
reached by the Romans, . . . and many other hidden peoples and
provinces and islands, which are unknown to us and impossible to
number.”

51

Fundamental Theology
Crispus, the president of a synagogue I Acts 18.8 > ; Apollo, a
learned and eloquent man (Acts 8.24 f.); Flavius Clement, a
nobleman (Phil. 4.3); several “of the Caesar’s household”
(Phil. 4.22>; other noble people named by St. Paul in Rom.
16.1-25. Suetonius names the aforementioned Flavius Clement
and his wife Domitilla, a relative of emperor Domitian, both
killed under the same emperor (Life of Domitian 10.2; 15.1).
Tacitus mentions “Pomponia Graecina, a noble woman . . .
guilty of extreme superstition” (Annals 13.32). Eusebius of
Caesarea mentions “the mother of emperor Alexander [Alex­
ander Severus 222-235], Mammaea by name, a particularly
pious and religious woman” (Ecclesiastical History 6.21), in
whose “household there were many Christians” (ibid. 6.28),
and emperor “Philip [the Arab 244-249] ... a Christian,” as
well as his wife (ibid. 6.34,36). Among soldiers other docu­
ments mention “the lightning legion” (cf. Tertullian. Apol.
5.8-12), Nereus and Achilleus, the forty martyrs of Sebaste,
Sebastian and others.

In the second century the new religion finds its great Apolo­
gists among learned and outstanding men, such as Aristides,
Athenagoras, Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian; toward the
end of the same century a famous center of religious learning
is founded, namely the Alexandrian school (in which was
soon to flourish Origen, the greatest mind of oriental Christ­
ianity). In the year 197 Tertullian, addressing the pagans in
his apologetical work, does not hesitate to assert: “We are
outsiders [according to you], but we have already filled the
world and everything that is yours, cities, islands, forts, city
halls, assemblies, military camps themselves, regiments and
companies, imperial palace, senate, law courts. We have only
left the temples to you” (Apol. 37.4; cf. 1.7).
The great speed of this propagation is obvious, considering
the extension of the lands reached < the whole known or civil­
ized world) and the shortness of time, for as we have shown
above, this was sufficiently done in the apostolic age itself ( in
50 or 70 years), and at any rate less than three centuries after
Christ’s death (around 300) it was largely accomplished,
when at least a fifth (probably a half) of the population of
the Roman Empire was Christian.

52

Objective Intrinsic Criteria
The means of propagation were scanty. In human ways, the
means of rapid success are principally three, namely, pleasure,
wealth (which is also the basic factory of arms) and
honor, which correspond to the three concupiscences of man,
spoken of by St. John ( 1 Epist. 2.16 ). The Church did not have
and did not promise such things; she was preaching mortifi­
cation up to the sacrifice of one’s own life, she was poor in
her Founder, her apostles, most of her members, she was
despised and condemned by law and science, being considered
as a superstition, of Jewish origin and of sectarian character,
opposed to the socially accepted standards of religion, culture
and customs.
The obstacles to this propagation were serious. The internal
obstacle was precisely that the new religion had nothing to
offer of the naturally desirable, no pleasures, no wealth, no
honors. The general external obstacle was that the things she
had to offer were in open contradiction with the religious,
cultural and moral conditions of that time, and hence met
from the beginning with a stern opposition. This opposition
came from the Jewish and pagan sacerdotal cast, whose tem­
ples were deserted and profits diminishing, from the people,
whose customs were censured, from the philosophers, whose
superior hellenic culture was despised, and finally from the
public authorities, whose supreme and quasi-divine autonomy
was challenged. All these obstacles came together in the one
great and radical obstacle of the public and general persecu­
tions, to which any one of the aforesaid motives could furnish
the occasion and under which any ordinary religious or politi­
cal movement would have been doomed to fail.

The Catholic or universal unity of the Church in its three
constituent elements, government, faith and cult, is also his­
torically evident. In the very process of this swift and univer­
sal propagation, in which other societies or institutions by rea­
son of human passions and conditions would have met with
dissentions and divisions, and would have allowed them with­
in its limits in order to subsist, the Church constantly retain­
ed this threefold unity and carefully dropped from her mem­
bership any dissenting man or group, considering them no
longer as Christ’s followers.
53

Fundamental Theology
The unaltered stability of the Church is likewise warrented
by history. For, through twenty centuries the Church has
constantly retained the same essential features, that is, the
same essential identity of government, faith and cult, as the
primitive apostolic community established by Christ, notwith­
standing grave natural obstacles and reasons that seemed to
call for a change. These were in sequence of time, the persecu­
tions in the first three centuries, the great heresies of Arian­
ism, Nestorianism and Monophysitism, the rise and expansion
of Islamism, the Eastern Schism, medieval Caesaro-papism,
the Great Western Schism, the Protestant Reformation, the
French Revolution, and at last the combined assault of ration­
alism, liberalism, communism, atheism and laxism in our age.
2. Apologetical value of these objective intrinsic criteria.

Notwithstanding their marvelous and extraordinary charac­
ter and their preeminence over the subjective criteria, these
intrinsic objective criteria ( that is, generically the extraordin­
ary quality of the Christian doctrine in itself and in its fruits),
taken individually and separately as proposed above are not
evident and sufficient criteria of revelation (that is, of the
fact that God has revealed), but only very probable criteria.
On the contrary taken all together as one single fact having
multiple facets, that is, as the Church itself, they are not only
an evident and sufficient criterion, but also the primary cri­
terion of all, or as Vatican Council I puts it, “an incontestable
testimony” of revelation.

The reason why these criteria, taken each separately,44* arc
not evident nor sufficient, is because each one does not clearly
and visibly bear the character of a true miracle, or of the di­
rect and extraordinary intervention of God, and hence, abso­
lutely speaking, each could be attributed to a natural cause
46 Under the three general headings mentioned above (p. 42),
that is, sublime doctrine, marvelous fruits of sanctity, and extra­
ordinary qualities of the Church, we pointed out eight more parti­
cular criteria, namely, the origin of Christ's doctrine, this doctrine
in itself, Christ’s sanctity, sanctity of the members of the Church,
particular sanctity of martyrs, propagation of the Church, unity of
the Church, stability of the Church. Each one of these is an out­
standing probable criterion.
54

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

or to the confluence of several natural causes. This appears
from a close examination of the three individual criteria, men­
tioned above, that is, the sublimity of the doctrine, the mar­
velous fruits of sanctity produced by this doctrine (in the
Founder of the Church and in the members of the Church,
particularly in the martyrs) and the extraordinary qualities
of the Church, that is, its expansion, unity and stability.
No doubt the doctrine in itself bears an extraordinary char­
acter, both as to its origin in Christ and as to its articles, and
hence it strongly suggests and makes highly probable a sup­
ernatural and miraculous intervention of God in it; for no hu­
man or natural cause can suitably explain it.

Nevertheless such a miraculous intervention of God and
the exclusion of natural causes is not absolutely certain and
evident. First, because the object itself, that is, the doctrine
to be judged as a miracle, is something indefinite. For, if we
consider the natural truths of religion (which indeed cannot
be suitably known through natural reason alone, without sup­
ernatural miraculous revelation, as we have shown above,
pp. 11, 43), we cannot, a priori and exactly, determine what
combination of such truths and in what degree of perfection
and certitude they should be known by man in order to be able
to reach the end of his salvation. If we consider moreover the
supernatural truths, they are not clearly suitable, much less
perfect and harmonious to human reason, precisely on account
of their supernatural character, and need to be explained and
defended as to their own suitableness, particularly against the
attacks and mockery of infidels. The second reason is because
the appreciation or proper estimate of the value of a doctrine
is variable according to the different intellectual and moral
dispositions of men. Therefore it is open to the danger of sub­
jectivism and relativism, since what pleases one may displease
another, and every single religion rests peaceably in its own
philosophy judging it perfect and superior to others (see
above, p. 40).
Thus one could, without falling into impossibility, explain
the origin of the doctrine of Christ through the natural cause
of an extraordinary intellectual capacity, and its authoritative
efficacy through an extraordinary power of the will, as hap55

Fundamental Theology
period, although in much lower degree, in some of the other
founders of religions, as Mohammed or Buddha; and likewise
one might judge, without falling into impossibility, that the
religious truths taught by those two leaders are strictly suf­
ficient, though not perfect as Christ’s doctrine, to make man
able to attain the end of salvation.47

The extraordinary fruits of sanctity of the revealed doctrine,
shown in the Founder himself and in his followers, particu­
larly in the martyrs, suggest likewise and make highly prob­
able the supernatural character of this Christian doctrine; for
no natural cause can suitably explain them.

But again they are not of themselves an evident and suffic­
ient criterion of revelation, for the same reason of our inability
to prove with certainty the miraculous intervention of God
and the exclusion of natural causes, on account of the indefi­
nite and variable character of such criterion.
47 Vatican Council II discusses quite at length the various ele­
ments of religious truths found in Hinduism. Buddhism, and Islam,
and their connection with the Christian religion itself. (Declara­
tion on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions,
no. 2 f.; cf. Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, no. 16).
Recently J. H. Walgrave in his work Uji salut aux dimensions du
monde (trans, from the Dutch by E. Brutsaert. Paris 1970), affirmed
with a generous dose of exaggeration that divine revelation works
and God speaks also through what we call pagan religions, both of
the East and West, as Zoroastrianism, Hinduism. Buddhism, Islam.
On this same tendency to exaggerate the supernatural elements of
non-Christian religions is partially based the claim, now spreading
in Christian circles, for a renewal of Missiology or theology of the
missions, in the sense of a work of civilization rather than evangeli­
zation, since the uncultivated peoples would have in their non­
Christian religions enough means of salvation. (See a description
and criticism of this opinion in Civiltà Cattolica 121-4 [1970] 105110). Such a claim has certainly no foundation in the documents of
Vatican II mentioned above, in which it is only stated that “the pre­
cepts and laws [of non-Christian religions] . . . often reflect a ray of
that Truth which enlightens all men’’ and that “whatever goodness
and truth is found in them is considered by the Church as a prepara­
tion for the Gospel.’’
56

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

Absolutely speaking, Christ’s sanctity could be explained
'as far as it is knowable by men) in a natural way. which
would establish only his natural superiority above all men
and founders of other religions. The fruits of morality brought
by the Church to the world at large concern only natural
ethics; the sanctity of its members, both common and heroic,
may meet with subjective and different appreciation accord­
ing to the variety of people and philosophy ( thus monogamy,
fostered by the Church, is rejected by Mohammedans as a
source of divorce and immorality). The great sanctity and
heroism of martyrs is of course the strongest part of this cri­
terion, for no natural cause can invincibly explain it ( as pride,
or passion, or fanaticism, or hope of praise, or physical coer­
cion) considering the great number, the variety of the physi­
cal, moral and social conditions of martyrs, among them wo­
men and children, and especially their motive and manner of
suffering as explained above (pp. 48-50). But again this fact
could, absolutely speaking, be an effect of natural causes, as
of a deep conviction and enthusiasm about the Christian ideals,
higher indeed than the one found in martyrs of other religions
or human organizations. Moreover, finally, it is also subject
to a variable appreciation of its real value.48
The three properties of propagation, unity and stability of
the Church bear likewise a very extraordinary character,
especially if taken together, and consequently they make up a
very notable criterion of revelation or of the miraculous in­
tervention of God. For, considering all the elements involved
in them, no natural cause can be advanced to suitably explain
them.
48 It should be noled that, in the course of martyrdom, real and
certain physical miracles may occur, if for instance the sense of pain
is removed or suspended ( as happened in the martyrdom of Poly­
carp. Lawrence and Perpetua); in such cases martyrdom is an evi­
dent and sufficient criterion, not by itself, but by reason of such a
certain physical miracle. Besides, martyrdom itself is for us a sure
historical testimony of the preceding miracles and prophecies, which
were the reason why the martyrs had joined and defended their
faith; but in this sense martyrdom is not a criterion of revelation,
but only one of the means through which we come to the know­
ledge of the true criteria, that is, the miracles and the prophecies.

57

Fundamental Theology
Indeed the usual and principal causes of successful propa­
gation in the natural order are the three objects of human
concupiscense, namely, pleasure, wealth and honor, which the
Church did not and could not offer, as shown above, and its
necessary condition is the absence of major obstacles, especial­
ly from public authority, such as met by the Church ( see p.
53).
Nor can we consider as a sufficient cause and condition of
the propagation of the Church the attraction exercised by
some of its doctrines, as monotheism, syncretism, and uni­
versalism, or several fortunate historical circumtances, as the
diffusion of the Jewish communities in the Roman Empire,
to which connational Christians could easily emigrate, or the
organization of the Roman Empire, its political and cultural
unity, and the religious tolerance of its laws, which paved an
open and easy way to a speedy propagation. For the indubi­
table usefulness of these facts is not sufficient to explain such
an extraordinary expansion, in view of the aforesaid scanty
means and great obstacles. Moreover, those same facts could
be reverted and were actually reverted into major obstacles to
propagation; for the novelty and purity of the Christian doc­
trine and morality proved to be repugnant to the majority of
the people, both ignorant and learned, and to the sacerdotal
and political classes who considered the Christians as public
enemies; the new religion found opposition rather than help
in the Jewish communities; the unity of the Roman Empire
was also the greatest obstacle to propagation, favoring the gen­
eral persecutions which on account of this unity were easily
planned, effectively carried out and often renewed.
The Catholic or universal unity of the Church as to its
government, faith, and cult, cannot be suitably attributed to a
natural cause in view of human passions and natural circum­
stances which draw every human institution into factions and
parties within itself.
Likewise the unaltered stability of the Church, amid so
many historical conditions calling for change, cannot be suit­
ably explained through natural causes which would be no
other than the three aformentioned objects of human concupi­
scence, namely, pleasure, wealth, and honor, not offered nor
possessed by the Church. To the various exterior and interior
58

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

obstacles, urging for change or dissolution, the Church op­
posed no other means than the affirmation of its inflexible
doctrine, the defense of the divine laws, and the exhibition of
its proper virtues of confidence in divine help, patience in
trials, charity, and love for its own enemies.
Nor can we say that the cause of such great stability has
been the wise constitution and organization of the Church,
particularly the principle of supreme and unappealable
authority. For the question still remains how such wise or­
ganization and supreme authority, which was also the glory
and the force of the Roman Empire, was constantly kept un­
changed amid so many obstacles and historical circumstances,
and why the Church organization or the Church itself did not
fall or decay as the Roman Empire did. The same strengthen­
ing comparison can be applied to many other important cul­
tures and religions, some of which are entirely obsolete, as the
great pagan religions of the East and of the West; others have
become so aged and weakened that they survive in a state of
lifeless stability or they retain only a general outline of their
original features and vigor, although they have generally met
no sizeable obstacles and have sprung, been protected, and
kept alive by favorable causes and circumstances, as Budd­
hism, Islamism, and Judaism.
Notwithstanding its great force of persuasion and probabil­
ity, such a criterion is not evident nor sufficient in itself. The
reason is because these wonderful properties of the Church,
absolutely speaking, could be attributed to natural causes pro­
ducing an unusual and extraordinary effect, namely, the most
active, unifying and stable of all natural religious societies.
The marvelous expansion of the Church could perhaps be ex­
plained by a crafty and tenacious perserverance of its found­
ers in meeting or avoiding obstacles and even converting
them, as well as other favorable circumstances, into means of
propagation and expansion -a policy in which the genius of St.
Paul excelled. And persecution itself usually arouses among
people a reaction in favor of the persecuted. The unity of
the Church could perhaps be explained by an unusual and
traditional ability of the hierarchy in checking human passions
and the other causes of fraction and division, largely favored
both by the principles of a Unitarian faith and by the totalitar­

59

Fundamental Theology

ian organization under one supreme and unappealable author­
ity. The same causes could also explain the stability of the
Church. Moreover such an expansion, unity and stability is
also found to some extent in other religious cultures or soc­
ieties, as Buddhism, Islamism, and Judaism. The higher degree
or excellence in which these properties are found in Christian
religion does not necessarily prove its divine origin, but
only its natural superiority, for as philosophers say, “a higher
or lower degree of perfection does not change the nature of
things.”

However, as stated above (p. 54), these three intrinsic
criteria, only probable in their individual force, if they are
taken together and combined into one single extraordinary
fact having multiple facets, make up an evident and sufficient
criterion, nay the primary criterion of revelation, because
they amount to a true and great miracle of the moral order,
easily discernible with moral certitude and suitable to the
intelligence of all people, namely, the Church itself, with all
that it implies.49 This is explicitly stated by Vatican Council
I as follows: “To the Catholic Church alone belong all those
many and marvelous things which have been divinely adapted
49 As we noted above, speaking of the fulfillment of human as­
pirations by the Christian doctrine (p. 40), such criteria, though
only probable if taken individually, are very useful and at time also
necessary to dispose the mind to the further examination of the ex­
trinsic criteria (miracles and prophecies), which will give the certi­
tude of the fact of revelation.
Besides, some of these intrinsic criteria, even taken individually,
can indirectly acquire the strength of evident criteria, not indeed
by themselves, but by being joined with the extrinsic criteria of
miracles and prophecies, as an evident sign of these. For some of
them are such that, unless true and extrinsic miracles had preceded
to convince men of the divine origin of Christian religion, they could
not be explained and would have no sufficient cause. Such are es­
pecially martyrdom as death voluntarily met for that religion (see
above, p. 57) and the extraordinary propagation of the same; for,
as St. Augustine argues “ad hominem” against those who deny mir­
acles: if there were no miracles "there would be this great and suf­
ficient miracle, that the whole world would have believed without
miracles” (City of God 22.5).
Thus the Church itself, taken as a whole with all it implies and
60

Objective Intrinsic Criteria

for the evident credibility of the Christian faith. Furthermore,
even the Church itself, because of its marvelous propagation,
its exceptional holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all
good things, and because of its Catholic unity and unaltered
stability, is one great and perpetual motive of credibility, and
an incontestable testimony of its own divine mission” (sess.3,
chap.3, Denz.3013; cf. Pius IX, Encycl. “Qui pluribus,” Denz.
2279).
The reason why these probable criteria taken together make
up an evident or certain criterion consisting in a true moral
miracle, is not because they join together their probabilities.
For an accumulation of probabilities taken materially can pro­
duce only a greater probability and not a certitude, even of
an inferior degree, as “no one can give what he does not have,”
according to philosophers, just as many flies do not make one
bird, however small. But if these probable criteria are consid­
ered formally as convergent, with their individual probabilit­
ies, O7i the same object, then they make up or rather they are
converted into a certain criterion of truth. The reason is that
such a convergence of probabilities on the same object could
not be explained by any other reason than the objective truth
itself; otherwise it would be an effect without a sufficient
cause. Hence it is by means of an extrinsic metaphysical prin­
ciple, namely, the principle of sufficient reason, that these var­
ious probable criteria arc changed into one single certain cri­
terion.

Thus the Church with all the wondrous facts and charact­
eristics that it implies ( fulfillment of human aspirations, sub­
lime doctrine and excellent sanctity, marvelous propagation,
unity and stability) becomes really an “incontestable testi­
mony” to revelation. It is the primary criterion clearly visible
to all, like a miraculous light showing the way to those who
search for truth with willing and open eyes, and like “a flag
set up above the nations” (Isa. 11.12; 5.26; cf. Vatican Council
supposes, including the physical miracles and prophecies themselves,
is like a compendium of all the criteria of revelation, and hence the
primary criterion, or the criterion by antonomasia.

61

Fundamental Theology

I, sess. 3, chap. 3).50 The light of such a criterion is so bright
that it is perceived in all its strength by the simple people,
without any distinct and scientific examination of the single
motives of credibility, through a sort of instinct or immediate
intuition, which is the proper and principal act of our intel­
lect.51

50 Regarding the practical manner, in which such a great motive
of credibility frequently and effectively works in contemporary
conversions, see D. Grasso, “Il fenomeno della Chiesa nelle con­
versioni contemporanee,” Problemi scelti di teologia contemporanea
(Roma 1954) 189-198.
51 About the nature and importance of the intellectual intuition in
general, see J. Maritain, The Peasant of the Garonne (trans, from
the French by M. Cuddihy and E. Hughes, New York 1968) 14-16,,
110 f., 137-139, 148 f.

62

XI
Objective Extrinsic Criteria of the

Fact of Revelation. Physical Miracles52

According to the division of criteria mentioned above (p.
25), physical miracles arc called extrinsic criteria because
they are found outside the revealed doctrine as such. As in the
two preceeding chapters, we shall consider first the existence
of physical miracles (or the historical truth of the deeds) and
then their apologetical value, that is whether they are evident
criteria or proofs of the fact of revelation.
52 Brinkmann, B., “Die Erkcnnbarkeit dor Wunder Jesu,” Scholaslik 29 (1954) 345-362.
Dhanis, E., Tractatio de miraculis. Romae 1952; “Un chaînon de la
preuve du miracle,” Problemi scelti di teologia contemporanea
(Roma 1954) 63-86; “Qu’est-ce qu’un miracle?” Gregorianum 40
(1959) 201-241.
Evely, L., L'évangile sans les mythes, Paris 1970.
Garrigou-Lagrange, R., “La grâce de la foi et le miracle. Trois
théories à propos de travaux récents,” Revue thomiste (1918) 289320.
Grant, R. M.. Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early
Christian Thought, Amsterdam 1952.
Hardon, J. A., "The Concept of Miracle from St. Augustine to Mod­
ern Apologetics.” Theological Studies 15 (1954) 229-257.
Latourellc, R., “Miracle et révélation,” Gregorianum 43 (1962) 492509; “Authenticité historique des miracles de Jésus: Essai de
Critériologie,” Gregorianum 54 (1973) 225-261.
Lhermitte, J., Le problème des miracles. Paris 1956.
Michel, A., “Miracle,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique 10-2
(Paris 1929) 1798-1859.

63

Fundamental Theology
This question is of the utmost importance to our apologetical
purpose, for two reasons. First, because the following chapter
on prophecies is largely dependent upon it, for prophecies are
simply one kind of miracle, although not physical but intel­
lectual. Secondly, because visible miracles arc the primary or
certain criteria of revelation, for all the subjective and in­
trinsic criteria previously considered, have been found only
probable, with the exception of the Church as such, which em­
braces all of them into a single criterion amounting to a moral
miracle.

As we noticed above (p. 24», all the importance and the
force of any criterion of revelation lies in its miraculous na­
ture, that is, in the fact that it involves an extraordinary and
direct intervention of God. In this sense, accordingly, there
is only one criterion of revelation, miracle itself, which is
found more or less probably or certainly in all the individual
criteria enumerated above (p. 25). Hence the subjective and
the intrinsic criteria are only probable criteria, because they
are only probable miracles, and extrinsic criteria are said to
be certain criteria, because they are certain miracles.

Before considering the two points just mentioned, that is,
the existence and the apologetical value of the physical mir­
acles, it is therefore fitting to give a brief explanation of
miracle in general, as to its nature and possibility.
1. Miracle in general.

A. Nature of miracle.
The word miracle ( in Latin “miraculum,” from “mirari,” to
wonder)53 etymologically means something that makes us
Monden, L., Le miracle, signe du salut, Bruges 1960.
Richardson, A., The Miracle Stories of the Gospel, London 1956.
Tonquedec, J. de, Introduction à l’étude du merveilleux et du mir­
acle, 3rd. ed., Paris 1923; Merveilleux métaphysique et miracle
chrétien, Paris 1955.
Van Hove, A., La doctrine du miracle chez Saint Thomas et son
accord avec les principes de la recherche scientifique, WeterenBruges-Paris 1927.
53 The word is used in the Latin Vulgate version of the Old Test­
ament (Ex. 11.7; Num.26.10; 1 Kgs.14.15; Job 33.1; Isa.21.4; 29.14:
64

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

wonder. It is properly and scientifically defined according to
St. Augustine and St. Thomas: "That which is done above the
order of powers established by God in all created nature.”*
54
What is proper and essential to miracle then, is its extra­
ordinary character, that is, the fact that it is outside and above any law or way of acting established by God in any creat­
ed nature. In this definition three elements must be carefully
noticed.
First, miracle is above the order of the powers of nature,
not necessarily above nature itself. Hence it is necessarily
supernatural as to the mode in which it is done (modally or
extrinsically supernatural), not necessarily as to the essence
of the thing done (essentially or intrinsically supernatural;
see footnote 9); hence the thing produced by a miracle can
be either essentially natural (as the healing of the body) or
essentially supernatural (as the healing of the soul, that is
the infusion of grace), provided in both cases it is done in a
supernatural way, that is, above the order of natural powers.
Second, miracle is something above the established order
of powers. Hence things that are done by God himself but ac­
cording to an established order, either natural or supernatural,
are not miracles, even if they are the most important effects
Jcr.23.32; 44.12), but not of the New Testament, in which miracles
are called, according to the meaning of the original Greek words,
works (John 5.20,36), powers (Matt.13.54,58), prodigies (Matt.24.24;
John 4.48), marvelous things (Matt.21.15), wonderful (or rather,
unexpected) things (Luke 5.26), signs (Matt.12.38 f.; 24.24; John
2.11,18,23). Among the Fathers St. Augustine adopted and used fre­
quently the word miracle, and hence it became classical and tech­
nical in theology and in the documents of the Magisterium since the
Middle Ages.
54 St. Augustine defines it: “I call a miracle whatever appears to
be difficult or unusual above the hope or the power of the one who
wonders.” (On the Utility of Believing 16.34). St. Thomas defines
it more strictly: "Miracle is properly called . . . that which is done
by God beyond the order of all created nature” (Sumina Theo!.,
p.l, q.110, a.4); the context shows that by "order of nature” St.
Thomas means "the acting order of nature,” that is, the power of
nature, the power established by God in all created nature.
65

Fundamental Theology

of God, as creation (which is the very constitution of the
natural order), his providence or government of created
things, his creation and infusion of a rational soul into the
body, man’s elevation (which is the very constitution of the
supernatural order), infusion of sanctifying grace into the
soul, justification, production of grace through the sacra­
ments, the infused light of faith, the light of the beatific vis­
ion. On the contrary the proper nature of miracle is found in
the following extraordinary effects: Incarnation, transsub­
stantiation, beatific vision if temporarily granted to someone
in this life (as it probably was to the Blessed Virgin), sudden
justification granted outside the established laws and dispo­
sitions (as probably was St. Paul’s justification on the road
to Damascus).
Thirdly, miracle is above the order of all created nature.
Hence it is an effect proper to God. Any extraordinary thing
produced by an angel or devil through his own natural power
and not as a mere instrument of God is not a miracle, because
it is done within the established order of one created nature.
From this definition we can draw two divisions of miracles.
The first and material division regards the nature of the
thing which is done. Thus miracle is divided into supernatural,
if the thing belongs to the essentially supernatural order (as
sanctifying grace), and natural, if the thing belongs to the
natural order, though it is done in a supernatural way. This is
subdivided into physical miracle (as healing and resurrec­
tion), intellectual miracle (as prophecy and knowledge of the
secrets of heart), and moral miracle (pertaining to the order
of morals, or of the will, as change of morals). The second and
formal division regards the manner in which a miracle is above the established order of the powers of all created nature,
or in which it surpasses the established manner of acting of
all created nature. Thus miracle is divided, in descending
gradation of perfection, into miracle as to substance (first
class miracle), if the very substance of the thing cannot bo
produced in any way or circumstance by a created cause (as
making two bodies occupy the same place, glorification of a
body similar to that which will take place in heaven, resur­
rection, transsubstantiation, or the Incarnation), miracle as to
subject only (second class miracle), if the substance of the
66

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
thing can be produced by nature, but not in this particular
subject (resurrection under another aspect,55 restoration of
sight to the blind, healing of the lame), and miracle as to man­
ner only (third class miracle), if the substance of the thing
can be produced by nature even in this particular subject, but
not in such manner, that is, either without natural means (as
cure from sickness without medicines, rain out of a clear sky),
or beyond natural proportion (as the multitude of frogs pro­
duced by Moses in Egypt), or suddenly without its natural
duration (as sudden cure from sickness).56

B. Possibility of miracle.57

This possibility follows from two combined reasons, that, is
from the fact that the natural laws (both physical and moral)
55 Resurrection can be considered in two ways; specifically as a
restitution of life to a dead. body, and thus it is a first class miracle,
and generically as uniting a soul to a body, and thus it would be a
second class miracle, inasmuch as nature can work this union, as it
does in every generation, but not in such subject, that is in a dead
body.
M This division is given and explained by St. Thomas, Summa
Theol.. p.1, q.105, a.8; C. Gent. 3.101; In 4 Sent.. dist.17. q.l, a.5, qal.
In another work, De potentia, q.6, a.2, ad 3. St. Thomas gives a
somewhat different division into miracles above nature, against
nature, and beyond, nature, which is based on the difficulty of per­
forming the work.
57 This is denied by two mutually opposer! forms of positive
Rationalism, which from different principles come to the same
conclusion, that is, philosophical Determinism. which affirms the
absolute stability of the natural laws and hence denies any pos­
sible exception or miracle, and philosophical Contingentism, which
denies any stability to such laws or even their very existence (con­
ceiving every phenomenon as standing by itself without any con­
nection with the others) and consequently denies any exception to
the law since there is no law. For the first system there is no ex­
ception because there is a fixed law, for the second there is no ex­
ception because there is no law.
Determinism takes two forms. Absolute Determinism denies the
very physical possibility of miracle; to this form belong all kinds
of Pantheism, both materialistic and idealistic, which reduces all
things, God and the world, to one being, evolving according to a
constant and unchangeable law. Relative Determinism denies only
67

Fundamental Theology

are merely contingent and changeable, and that God is omni­
potent, that is able to do anything which does not involve con­
tradiction. Indeed, all laws, either metaphysical, or physical,
or moral, have their own proper and intrinsic necessity on
which our certitude is based. But, unlike the metaphysical
laws ( which are rooted in and derived from the very essence
of things and hence allow no exception whatsoever) the neces­
sity of the physical and moral laws is only contingent or con­
ditional, as far as the attainment of their effect is concerned,
that is, it supposes that no other extrinsic cause or condition
interferes to counteract and impede their effect. Thus the phy­
sical law of gravity can be opposed by a natural agent, as man
the moral possibility of miracle, as something disagreeing with the
attributes of God, like dignity, wisdom, and goodness; to this form
belong the so-called Deists, who deny the particular providence of
God (Cherbury, Voltaire, and others), and the Optimists, who claim
that God created the best possible world, to whose laws therefore
there can be no exceptions (N. Malebranche, W. Leibniz). Absolute
Determinism is also in a practical way endorsed by Positivists, who
claim that the absolute fixity of natural laws is rigorously proved
through scientific induction (D. Hume, J. Stuart Mill).
Contingentism is likewise expressed under two forms. Religious
Contingentism, based on Agnosticism, considers miracle as a nat­
ural effect not yet explained by science, transformed by faith into
a religious symbol and considered as a special divine intervention
(Liberal Protestants, Modernists, and the Catholic defenders of the
method of immanence, as Blondel and Laberthonnière, mentioned
above, p. 39). Scientific Contingentism either denies the very exist­
ence of natural laws, considering the universe as a sort of confused
aggregate and succession of phenomena without any mutual depend­
ence or connection, so that anything can happen at any time, or, in
the milder and commoner form (as that of H. Poincaré and H. Berg­
son), denies only the fixity of such laws, on the same basis of a lack
of connection between phenomena, which makes the exception at
least impossible to detect.
Against these errors Vatican Council I defined: “If anyone shall
say that miracles are not possible, and hence that all accounts of
them, even those contained in Sacred Scripture, are to be banished
among fables and myths; or, that miracles can never be known with
certitude, and that the divine origin of Christian religion cannot be
rightly proved through them; let him be anathema” (sess.3, can.4 on
faith, Denz. 3034).
68

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

preventing a stone from falling, and the moral law of parental
love can be frustrated by the unusual perversion of a woman
killing her child < see footnote 21 ).

Hence, if there be an agent who would be able to counter­
act the action of any natural law and prevent it from reach­
ing its natural effect, and this in a way in which no created
agent can do it, there would be something done above the
order of powers of all created nature, that is, a miracle. But
God is such an agent, by reason of his omnipotence which ex­
tends itself to anything not involving contradiction. There­
fore miracle is possible. Miracle then would consist in a di­
rect action of God intervening into the course of natural causes
or laws, either by opposing to them such an obstacle which no
natural agent can oppose (as denying in such particular case
the very impulse of the first and primary cause, without which
no secondary cause can operate) ; or on the contrary by foster­
ing their action with such favorable conditions that their ef­
fect be produced in an extraordinary manner; or by produc­
ing their effect without them; or finally by producing a special
effect which they are unable to produce (cf. Summa Theol.,
p.l, q.105, a.6).

Futhermore, miracle is not only absolutely or physically
possible, on the basis of God’s omnipotence ( as we have
shown), but also relatively or morally so, inasmuch as, far
from being opposed to the other divine attributes, it perfectly
befits them. Indeed, an obstacle or exception to the establish­
ed order of natural laws does not disagree with the dignity
and loftiness of God. as if he should not descend to such parti­
cular things in the government of the world (as Deists claim),
or he should have created the most perfect world which would
need no exceptions or corrections (as Optimists teach). For,
on the one hand, the very particular providence of God shows
on the contrary the universality of his power, of his know-,
ledge, and of his care for creatures, and on the other hand
creation of the most perfect world is not possible, otherwise
God would no longer be omnipotent, being unable to do any­
thing better. Likewise miracle does not disagree with God’s
wisdom, as if by it God would reject what he once chose or
correct what he had not foreseen; nor with God’s goodness,
as if he would arbitrarily and violently intervene in the world
69

Fundamental Theology

to change the course of nature and check the natural exigen­
cies of things. For, on the contrary, God had foreseen and
wanted all the future changes and exceptions, which would
follow, in due time and manner, for a wise complement and
balance of the universe as well as for particular reasons prop­
er to each miracle, not least of all the very purpose of confirm­
ing his supernatural revelation, thus paving the way to faith
through the forces of nature. Hence miracle, as well as nature
itself, is a bright mirror of the divine perfections.

2. Christ’s miracles, as to their historical truth.
The supernatural origin of Christian religion can be proved
by any true miracle, worked in the Church at any time, for
the seal of God’s testimony stamped on any miracle is a suf­
ficient testimony. We will confine our consideration, however,
to the miracles narrated in the Gospel, for they are the major
testimony on whose strength and evidence the Church was
first built and propagated. Moreover, among such miracles we
leave out, as not necessary or less efficacious for our apolo­
getical purpose, those performed about Christ, as the several
wonders in Christ’s nativity, during his public life (voice
from heaven in his Baptism, during his preaching, in the
Transfiguration), and in his death (the darkening of the sun,
the earthquake).58
We consider only the physical miracles performed by Christ
himself, either in his own body or in other persons and things,
excluding of course all the many miracles mentioned only
generically (as in Matt. 4.23; 8.16; Mark 1.32-34; Luke 4.40 f.;
6.17-19; John 2,23; 6.2), which cannot be examined and given
apologetical value.

Among such miracles there are three major ones worked by
Christ in his own body, namely his Transfiguration, his
Resurrection, and his entrance into the closed cenacle, and
about thirty-five worked on other people or things, with a
great variety of subjects and matters. These concern cither
spiritual beings or demons, in people possessed by them, the
so-called demoniacs (at least six distinct miracles); or ir­
58 Almost 100 particular miracles, performed by Christ or about
Christ, before, in, and after resurrection, can be easily counted.
70

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
rational creatures (at least nine miracles, as multiplication of
loaves, change of water into wine, etc.); or men, that is, three
resuscitations, more than seven cures from defect or injury of
an organ (eyes, hearing, speech), many cures from various
and serious infirmities (as dropsy, leprosy, paralysis for 38
years, hemorrhage for 12 years, crippled condition for 18
years).
For the sake of our apologetical purpose we can point out
several groups of these miracles, and divide them according
to the degree of their supernatural character into the three
classes mentioned above (p. 66), namely; Miracles as to sub­
stance: the Transfiguration (Matt. 17.1-3); entrance into the
closed cenacle (John 20.19); resurrection; three resuscitations,
of Jairus’ daughter, of the son of the widow at Naim, and of
Lazarus (Matt.9.20-26; Luke 7.11-17; John 11.1-44). Miracles
as to subject: several cures from organic defect or injury
(eyes, hearing, speech), particularly of the man born blind
(John 9.1-38); change of water into wine (John 2.1-11); two
multiplications of loaves (Matt. 14.13-21; 15.32-39); the calm­
ing of the storm on the lake ( Matt.8.23-27) ; the walking upon
the sea (Matt. 14.22-23). Miracles as to manner; all other mir­
acles can be reduced to this class, especially the healing from
merely functional diseases. Deliverance from diabolic pos­
session is a more difficult type to classify, because such pos­
session is at times coupled with a functional or organic disease,
as in the epileptic demoniac, the dumb demoniac, the blind
and dumb demoniac (Matt.17.14-21; 9.32-34; 12.22-24).

The historical truth of such facts59 appears from external as
well as from internal criteria.
59 Among the aforementioned Rationalists who deny the possibil­
ity of miracles (p. 67), the older ones simply discard the historical
truth of all such miracles, attributing them to a fraud of Christ’s
disciples (H. S. Reimarus) or to a mere political fiction of the same
(H. E. G. Paulus and D. F. Strauss). The more recent ones (as Lib­
eral Protestants and Modernists, led by A. Harnack, Das Wesen des
Christentums [Leipzig 1902] 16 if.), generally distinguish between
different miracles. They deny the historical truth of the outstanding
miracles that are more difficult to explain, as the cure of the man
born blind, the three resuscitations, and especially Christ’s resur­
rection, to which they attribute some kind of natural error or legiti71

Fundamental Theology
The external criterion is the testimony both of the evange­
lists, whose direct knowledge of the facts and complete ver­
acity in relating them cannot reasonably be doubted, and of
the adversaries of Christ themselves (cf. John 3.2; Mark 6.14;
mate fiction, due to the aureole with which founders of religions
are usually adorned, to the general tendency among the Jews to
admit miracles and the fulfillment of ancient prophecies, and to the
beginning of a process of idealization of Christ’s deeds immediately
after his death. As regards the other easier miracles, they admit the
historical truth but deny their supernatural character, attributing
them to natural causes (see below, footnote 65).
Regarding Christ’s resurrection in particular, which implies the
two elements of true death and subsequent true life, a few of the
older Rationalists reject the truth of the death of Christ, invoking a
mere apparent death due to swooning or lethargy (thus H.E.G. Pau­
lus and F. Spitta), while the others generally concede the reality of
the death but deny directly the resurrection to new life, and explain
the contrary affirmation of the Gospel and of the apostles in three
general ways, namely:
1) Either through fraud of the disciples or of the Jews themselves,
who secretly removed from the tomb and hid the corpse (the fraud
theory held by Reimarus, Réville, Le Roy, O. Holtzmann).
2) Or through error of the disciples, deceived by some illusion
or vision (of a pathological, or mystical, or objective, or spiritistic
character), which made them believe they saw again Christ alive
(the error theory held by E. Renan, A. Meyer, R. Otto, E. von Dobschütz, R. A. Hoffmann).
3) Or through a mere but reasonable and legitimate fiction, by
which a new life was attributed to Christ (the fiction theory). Such
attribution arose in four ways. Either through the usual popular
legend, adorning the life of founders (mythical fiction, held by F.
Strauss, A. Meyer, A. Loisy). Or through the particular legend of
the “savior god” rising from the dead, which was common to sev­
eral hellenistic and oriental religions (religious-syncretistic fiction,
or theory of “Religiongeschichte,” held by W. Bousset and A. Loisy).
Or through a popular-literary fiction, that is, a legend fashioned
gradually by the addition of elements of popular literature to prim­
itive historical elements (theory of popular literary fiction, “Formengeschichte” or historical forms, held by M. Albert, L. Brun,
and E. Bichermann). Or through a religious symbolic process, tak­
ing originally Christ’s resurrection not as a physical fact but as an
ideal or symbol of spiritual resurrection and immortal life of Christ
with God (theory of symbolic fiction held by Harnack, Loisy and

72

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
John 11.47; Matt.27.42), who lacked neither the opportunity of
a strict examination of Christ’s miracles, nor the motive and
the will to make it, as is particularly evident in the two mir­
acles of the man born blind and of Lazarus. This testimony is
further confirmed by that of extrinsic sources close to the
the other Modernists condemned by Pius X. Dcnz. 3436 f.; and re­
cently by R. Bultmann. Théologie dea Ncucn Testaments (Tübingen
19581 305; Kerygma und Mythos [Hamburg 1960] 1, pp. 44-48, and
W. Marxsen, Die Auferstehung Jesu als historisches und als theologisches Problem [Gütersloh 1965] 20-35; Die Auferstehung Jesu
von Nazareth [Gütersloh 1968]).
This last theory, as expounded by Bultmann and Marxsen, has
influenced the doctrine or some recent Catholic writers who prefer
to abstain from the word “resurrection” and replace it with the
general word “life,” simply declaring that by the so-called Christ’s
resurrection it is meant only that Christ is still alive and lives for­
ever in a better state of glorification, and not that the individual
body of Christ came back to life.
Particular commotion and criticism among Catholic circles was
caused by the work of Xavier Léon-Dufour (a Scripture scholar),
Résurrection de Jésus et message nascal (Paris, 1971; second print­
ing with some corrections, 1972). The author keeps the word “resur­
rection” as the one in perfect harmony with the biblical narratives,
but changes its meaning, teaching that Christ’s resurrection, though
a real happening, is not a historical fact in the sense commonly ac­
cepted, namely a revival of the individual body of Christ. The in­
dividual or historical body of a man is not the real componant part
of the human being, but only a place or a means of communication
with other beings, while the real componant part of the human be­
ing is the universal or cosmic body. At the moment of death the
individual body, the corpse, is as it were absorbed by the universal
cosmic body, never to revive. Hence when Christ died, his individual
and historical body, forever dissolved, returned to the universal
cosmic body, which by virtue of the resurrection was transformed
and made glorious. Thus Christ’s resurrection is a real fact, but not
a historical fact in the sense of a revival of the dead body, histori­
cally ascertainable.
For a futher explanation and criticism of this opinion see J. Galot,
in Civiltà Cattolica (1972), vol. 2, pp. 527-540, C. M. Martini, ibid.,
vol. 3, pp. 125-135; Ch. Journet, in Nova et Vetera (1972) 304-311;
E. Pousset, in Nouvelle revue théologique (1972) 95-107; C. Spicq.
in Esprit et Vie (1972) 76-79; M.-M. Labourdette, in Revue
Thomiste 72 (1972) 619-633.

73

Fundamental Theologtj
facts, as the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 2.22; 3.12; 10.37f.; 2
Pet.1.16), and the second century tradition, unanimously re­
ferring to Christ’s miracles. The apologist Quadratus about the
year 124 even testifies that some of those cured by Christ were
still alive in his time ( this is quoted by Eusebius of Caesarea,
Eccles. Hist. 4.3). Also the Jewish historian Joseph Flavius,
writing about the year 93, recalls the miracles and resur­
rection of Christ.60

The internal criterion, that is, the close examination of the
narratives, shows the same historical truth. First of all,
Christ’s miracles are so numerous and so intimately connect­
ed with the other facts and words of Christ that they belong to
the very substance of the entire Gospel, which without them
would go crippled and unexplained; for Christ’s miracles were
the reason for the crowding of people around him and for
the opposition of the Pharisees, as well as the occasion for
him to hand on and confirm his various doctrines. In parti­
cular, if miracles were removed, the following pericopes
would have to be taken out or completely changed: the re­
proach to Chorozain and Bethsaida ( Matt.11.20-24), Christ’s
power over demons (Matt. 12.23-37), the eucharistie sermon
(John, chapter 6, which is almost wholly, vv.1-70, based on
the miracle of multiplication of loaves), the Pharisees’ exam­
ination about Christ on the occasion of the cure of the man
born blind (John, chap.9, in its entirety), the great commo­
tion of both the people and the Pharisees on account of the
resuscitation of Lazarus (John, chap. 11, in its entirety).

Secondly, the narratives of Christ’s miracles are in full
agreement with his character, messianic mission, and teach­
ing.
60 Antiquities 18.3.3: “At that same time Jesus lived, a wise man,
if however it is right to call him a man. For he was a performer of
wonderful deeds, a teacher of those who spontaneously accept the
truth; he drew to himself many Jews as well as many Gentiles. He
was the Christ. When Pilate had sentenced him, accused by the
leaders of our people, to the torture of the cross, they did not cease
to love him as they had done before. For he appeared to them alive
on the third day, according to the divine prophets who had foretold
these and other wondrous things about him.”
74

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

Thirdly, the historical truth of such miracles is also con­
firmed by the style or manner in which they are narrated, a
style which is simple, sober, life-like, spontaneous, detailed,
clothed in color and concrete circumstances, free from exag­
gerations, void of any pretence, deceit or contradiction, not­
withstanding the variety of the fourfold source. A particular
specimen of this style is found in the accounts of the Cana
wedding, of the multiplication of loaves and of the cure of
the man born blind (John 2.1-11; 6.1-13 and parallel texts in
the synoptics; 9.1-38).®1
As to Christ’s resurrection,92 the historical truth of the two
elements implied in it, namely, a true death and a true life
ei This internal coherence of the object and the style of the evan­
gelical narratives shows also the difference, as to their historical
truth, between Christ's miracles and those that are brought forth
by Rationalists, under the form of a skeptical objection, from rab­
binic and pagan history, as the miracles of the Pythagorian philo­
sopher Apollonius of Tyana, of emperors Hadrian and Vespasian, of
the oriental divinities Apollo, Isis, Asclepius Epidaurus, and of the
religious founders Budda and Mohammed. Cf. S. Tromp, De revela­
tione Christiana, ed. 5, pp. 239-241 (see bibliography, ibid., p. 421).
62 Braun, F., “La resurrection de Jésus devant la critique mod­
erne,” Vie spirituelle 63 (1940) 26-52.
Daniélou, J.. La résurrection, Paris 1969.
De Rosa, G. “Il cristiano di oggi di fronte alla risurrezione di
Christo,” Civiltà cattolica 121 (1970), vol. 3, pp. 365-377.
Fuller, R. H., The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, New
York 1971.
Haes, P. de, La résurrection de Jésus dans l’apologétique des cin­
quante dernières années, Rome 1953.
Kremer, J., “1st Jésus wirklich von don Totcn auferstanden?”, Stimmen der Zeit 94 (1969) 310-320.
Léon-Dufour, X., “Exégèse du Nouveau Testament. Autour de la
résurrection du Christ,” Recherches de science religieuse 57 (1969)
583-622; “Présence de Jésus ressuscité,” Etudes (1970) 593-614;
Résurrection de Jésus et message pascal, Paris 1971; second print­
ing with a few corrections, 1972.
Martini, C., Il problema storico della risurrezione negli studi recenti,
Roma 1959; “La testimonianza dei primi cristiani per la risur­
rezione di Gesù,” Ciuiltà Cattolica (1972), vol. 3, pp. 125-135.
Pousset, E., “La résurrection,” Nouvelle revue théologique 91 (1969)
75

Fundamental Theology
after death, is likewise evident from both evangelical and ex­
traevangelical testimony.
The evangelical witnesses of Christ's death are: the four
evangelists, saying that Christ on the cross “gave up his spirit”
( Matt.27.50; Mark 15.37; Luke 23.46; John 19.30); the soldiers,
who did not break his legs because they were certain of his
death (John 10.32-34); the centurion, who for the same rea­
son withdrew from guarding the cross (Mark 15.39»; Pilate,
inquiring from the centurion “whether he [Christ] was al­
ready dead” and hence “granting the body to Joseph [of Arimathea]” (Mark 15.44 f.); Mary, his mother, and the other
friends standing by the cross, whose love would have allowed
no doubt about his death; the Pharisees, who not only made
sure of his death, but tried to prevent even a simulated resur­
rection, asking Pilate to seal the tomb and have it guarded by
the soldiers ( Matt.27.62-66).

Even if Christ’s previous torments, as crowning with thorns,
scourging, painful walking to the place of crucifixion, cruci­
fixion itself, three hours of agony, had not been sufficient to
cause death, but only a sort of syncope or lethargy, which is
extremely improbable, a certain death would have violently
followed from the piercing of his side with a lance and the
consequent flowing of blood (John 19.34) and from suffo­
cation due to the wrapping of the body in linen cloths and
spices ( mixture of myrrh and aloes, weighing about a hundred
pounds; John 19.39 f.) and its stay in the closed sepulchre.
Confirmation is added by extraevangelical testimony, parti­
cularly by the preaching of the apostles, ocular witnesses, who
threw the unchallenged accusation at the Jewish people, wit­
nesses themselves and executors: “Him . . you have crucified
and slain by the hands of wicked men” (Acts 2.23), “The
author of life you killed, whom God has raised from the dead”
( Acts 3.15).
1009-1044.
Ponthot, J., “Les traditions évangéliques sur la resurrection du
Christ,” Lumen vitae 20 (1965) 649-673; 21 (1966) 99-118.
Résurrection (La) du Christ et l’exégèse moderne (collective work),
Paris 1969.

76

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
Christ’s true life after death (and hence his resurrection) is
shown by the fact that the tomb was found empty, without
the body being removed by anyone, and that the body ap­
peared again alive to the disciples.

After Christ’s body was truly buried (as shown by the
Gospel's description), the tomb was found empty, as testified
both by the four evangelists (Matt. 27.57-60; Mark 15.42-46;
Luke 23.50-55; John 19.38-42) and by the Pharisees them­
selves, who bribed the soldiers, telling them: “Say, ‘His dis­
ciples came by night and stole him while we were sleeping’”
(Matt.28.13). The body was not removed, neither by the dis­
ciples, as is evident from this same confession of the Pharisees
and from the strict vigilance of the military guard (recently
enforced by an edict of Caesar Augustus or Tiberius against
violators of tombs), nor by the Pharisees themselves in order
to prevent any such action on the part of the disciples. This is
evident from the same vigilance of the guard and from the
fact that later the Pharisees would have brought forth the
body in order to refute the disciples’ affirmation on the resur­
rection.

The apparition of the living body of Christ is testified by
the same four evangelists, whose veracity is warranted and
fraud excluded by the general simple and spontaneous char­
acter of the Gospel, mentioned above (p. 75). Nine distinct
apparitions are narrated in the Gospel: to Mary Magdalen
(Mark 16.9; John 20.11-17), to the pious women (Matt.28.9),
to Peter (Luke 24.34), to two disciples on their way to Em­
maus ( Mark 16.12; Luke 24.13-33), to the disciples in the cen­
acle. twice (Mark 16.14; Luke 24.36-43; John 20.19-29), to the
disciples by the Sea of Tiberias (John 21.1-14), to the
apostles on a mountain of Galilee (Matt.28.16 f.; Mark 16.15),
to the same immediately before the Ascension (Mark 16.19;
Luke 24.44-52). Besides St. Paul testifies to three other ap­
paritions, that is, to more than 500 disciples, to James, and to
himself (1 Cor.15.6-8; 5.5-7). Hence there were 12 distinct ap­
paritions in all, six of which were made to the whole group
of the disciples or apostles.
The truth of the testimony is warranted by the authority of
the witnesses, that is, by the veracity of the disciples, for in
77

Fundamental Theology
their lives there is nothing that would suggest possibility of
falsehood or fiction, and by their knowledge of the facts,
which were external, visible and even collective apparitions.63
63 Hence the aforementioned error-theory and fiction-theory ad­
vanced by Rationalists and Modernists (p. 72 ) do not stand critical
examination and the only logical course for them would be to re­
ject or completely reshape the Gospel text itself.
Thus a pathological error of the disciples has no foundation, since
they were not disposed to hallucination by reason of their mental
balance and physical health, nor were they even thinking about the
resurrection foretold by Christ, as is clear from their first move­
ment of incredulity when they saw Christ again (Mark 16.13; Luke
24.11, 21-26, 37-41; John 20.27-29). Besides, hallucinations do not
happen to many witnesses at the same time, nor to all the senses at
the same time, nor to the same person many times or for a long time.
Mythical fiction (as that found in the fables about Aeneas, Rom­
ulus, and others) is something which does not endure but degen­
erates with time. It cannot deceive prudent men but only the popu­
lar fancy. It has some value in building up history or literature, but
not interior convictions, ardent faith and a program or rule of life
itself.
Likewise, religious-syncretistic fiction has no foundation, for it
cannot be shown why and how the Christian religion would derive
one of its fundamental truths from abhorred idolatrous religions,
and how such adoption could have been made in so short a time.
Popular-literary fiction would also require a long time to develop
and transform the original historical elements, while Christ’s resur­
rection was commonly believed in the Church shortly after his
death, as is clear from St. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians
(15.3-11), written about the year 56.
Symbolic fiction does not agree with the historical character of
the Gospel narrative, nor can it be said that such historical charact­
er is a later evolution of the primitive symbolic sense given to
Christ’s resurrection, for there was no sufficient time for such an
evolution and the primitive Pauline teaching about the resurrection
bears the same historical character. The first epistle to the Corin­
thians was written between the year 55 and the year 57, several
years before the Gospels and the Acts: hence 1 Cor 15.3 f. is the
oldest Christian testimony of Christ’s resurrection.
Regarding the aforementioned doubt or denial of some recent
Catholic scholars about the historicity of Christ’s resurrection, note
the following. This resurrection, as the revival of Christ’s individual
body, is not directly a historical fact, historically ascertainable, in78

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

2. Apologetical value of Christ’s miracles.
The physical miracles performed by Christ are evident and
sufficient criterion of revelation, on account of their evident
supernatural character.

As we noted above (p. 24), an evident and sufficient criter­
ion of revelation is made up of three necessary elements, that
is, its historical, philosophical and relative truth. Therefore,
the deeds which we call physical miracles of Christ are provasmuch as no one witnessed or properly could witness the actual
reunion of Christ’s soul to his dead body. It is, however, a fact in­
directly historical, of which we can acquire a moral certitude, as a
conclusion from various facts which arc directly historical, namely,
the death and burial, the empty sepulcher, the apparitions and the
conviction of the disciples about Christ’s true resurrection.
The general anthropological conception, advanced by the chief
dissenter, Léon-Dufour, does not agree with either philosophical or
theological safe doctrine. The human soul can inform only a de­
termined individual body, not an indefinite cosmic matter. The
Church Magisterium has clearly defined that the human nature
is “composed of spirit and body’’ (Council of Lateran IV, repeated
by Vatican I, Denz. 800, 3002); hence the physical individual body
is a componant part of man. The Council of Lateran IV defines also
that “all men shall resurrect in those same proper bodies, which
they now have” (Denz. 801).
As regards Christ directly, the same Council defines that he
“resurrected in his flesh” (Denz. 801), therefore, in his historical
and individual body and not in a universal cosmic matter which is
not flesh. The traditional doctrine teaches that the Word of God as­
sumed a human nature composed of soul and individual body, from
which he was never separated, even after the mutual separation of
soul and body through death. If Christ’s soul after his death would
be united to the universal cosmic matter, there would result a
monstrous union of the Word with the universe, a sort of “panchristism,” and Christ’s body would be the universe itself, assumed
and transfigured by his Divinity. All our faith, piety, and liturgy
are based on the individual humanity and body in which Christ
was born, in which he spoke the words of divine revelation, suf­
fered, died and offered his sacrifice on the Cross, and in which he
remains with us in the eucharistie sacrament and sacrifice. All this
would fall with the disappearence of the individual and historical
body of Christ into the universal and cosmic matter.
79

Fundamental Theology
ed to be evident and sufficient criterion of revelation, if we
prove, first, their historical truth, or that they actually took
place as they are narrated in the Gospel; second, their philo­
sophical truth, or that they are true miracles, that is things
done by God alone (at least as principal cause) above the
order of powers and laws established by him in all created
nature; third, their relative truth, or that they were perform­
ed by Christ with the manifested intention of proving the fact
of revelation, that is, that God was speaking through him. If
these three things are certain, then the fact of revelation is
also certain, because Christ’s testimony would be approved
and endorsed by God, who cannot bear witness to falsehood.6,1
64 It is of course possible that God permit abuse of the gift of
miracles by a man (as he permits abuse of the sacramental charact­
er by a priest), if for instance an apostate from the faith, in order
to confirm his new false doctrine, would appeal to miracles perform­
ed by him when he was an apostle of the same faith. It is even pos­
sible that God work some miracles on a member or through a mem­
ber of a false religion, as St. Thomas admits (Summa Theol., p. 2-2,
q.178, a.2, ad 3: De potentia. q.6, a.5. obj.5 and ad 5). Some believe
that such was the case of the Hindu ascetic, Sundar Singh (cf. Re­
cherches de science religieuse 12 (1922) 1-29).
Rut these and similar things can be permitted by Gnd only if no
confirmation of false doctrines or religions would result from them,
considering the facts and their circumstances; otherwise God would
be witness to falsehood.
Thus, in the case of an apostate appealing to his past miracles
for confirmation of his new false doctrine, the fallacy of his argu­
ment is clearly shown by the difference and distance between the
situation in which he once performed the miracle and his present
situation in which he appeals to the old miracle as a sign of his new
doctrine. Miracles that are said to happen in false religions are us­
ually false miracles because they are performed in such a way or
in such circumstances that, if they were true, false religions would
be approved by God. But, out of such circumstances, God can per­
form a miracle on a member or through a member of a false re­
ligion for different particular purposes, for instance to reward or
show an outstanding virtue of an individual (as chastity, charity
toward the neighbor, religious behavior), or even to show the pre­
sence of a particular element of truth found in that false religion,
providing this religion as a whole does not receive any confirmation
from the miracle in view of the circumstances in which it is per­
formed.
80

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
The historical truth of Christ’s miracles has just been prov­
ed.

Their relative truth can be easily shown, for the whole life
of Christ in his words and deeds tends precisely to prove his
messianic and divine mission. Christ generically and explicitly
declares to perform his miracles in order to prove his divine
mission; John 5.36: “The works which the Father has given
me to accomplish, these very works that I do, bear witness to
me, that the Father has sent me;” John 15.24: “If I had not
done among them works such as no one else has done, they
would have no sin. But now they have seen, and have hated
both me and my Father” (cf. 10.25,37,38; 14.12). The same
declaration is vividly contained in Christ’s words to John’s
disciples asking him whether he was the Messiah to come, to
whom he simply answered that his miracles proved who he
was (Matt. 11.2-5), and in his reproach to the cities of Israel,
such as Capharnaum, for having seen his miracles and not
believed ( Matt. 11.20,23).
Christ makes the same explicit declaration in regard to
some particular and outstanding miracles. Thus he heals the
paralytic “that you may know that the Son of Man has power
on earth to forgive sins” (Matt.9.6); he cures the blind be­
cause “the works of God were to be made manifest in him”
(John 9.3; cf. 9.36); he brings Lazarus back to life “because
of the people who stand around . . . that they may believe
that you have sent me” (John 11.42). Referring to his resur­
rection he explicitly says: “An evil and adulterous generation
demands a sign, and no sign shall be given it but the sign of
Jonas the prophet. For even as Jonas was in the belly of the
fish three days and three nights, so will the Son of Man be
three days and three nights in the heart of the earth” (Matt.
12.39 f.); and predicting to the apostles his return to them
after death, he says: “And now I have told you before it
comes to pass, that when it has come to pass you may believe”
(John 14.29).

The same relative truth is implicitly contained in the three
following circumstances. First, the very fact that someone
works miracles while preaching a doctrine turns necessarily
into a confirmation of his doctrine, and hence he implicitly

81

Fundamental Theology

intends such reference and confirmation. Secondly, the whole
doctrine of Christ and much of his dispute with the Pharisees
about his divine mission hinge upon miracles ( see above, p.
74) which are, therefore, considered as the credentials of his
divine mission. This is the reason why the Pharisees tried to
deny the true miraculous nature of the wonders performed
by Christ, attributing them to Beelzebub (Matt. 12.24) and
they spurned with threatening words the remark of the blind
telling them: “Why, herein is the marvel, that you do not
know where he is from, and yet he opened my eyes” (John
9.30). Third, the messianic expectation among the people was
such that its fulfillment had to be shown by miracles; this is
the reason why to John’s disciples inquiring whether he was
the Messias Christ gave no other answer than referring them
to his miracles (Matt.11.2-5). Not much later “a man among
the Pharisees, Nicodemus by name, a ruler of the Jews . . .
came to Jesus at night and said to him, ‘Rabbi, we know that
you have come a teacher from God, for no one can work these
signs that you work unless God be with him’” (John 3.1 f.).

The philosophical truth of Christ’s miracles,®5 namely that
they are unmistakably true miracles, due only to the direct
action of God, is the most important as well as the most dif­
ficult point to be proved, considering on the one hand that we
do not see God operating and on the other hand we do not
know how far is to be extended or limited the power of created
causes, whether physical, human, or angelic.
However, although we do not know positively and univer­
sally what created nature can do through its proper powers
and in any circumstance, we can know negatively what this
65 As we noted in footnote 59, Rationalists, denying the very
possibility of any miracle, logically reject the philosophical truth
of all Christ’s miracles, and for this reason they discard even the
historical truth of those outstanding miracles for which they find
no explanation and they attribute the others to natural causes, that
is, either to natural powers not yet known, or to mental suggestion,
or to occultism. Thus among others E. Renan, Vie de Jésus (éd. 14,
Paris 1873) 268-270; A Harnack. Das Wesen des Christentums (Leip­
zig 1902) 16 ff., with other Liberal Protestants; A. Loisy, L’Evangile
et VEglise (éd. 5. Paris 1930) 16-23, with other Modernists.
82

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

particular nature cannot do absolutely and taken in itself,
with regard to a specific object or in a particular circumstance.
Indeed, if we consider the specific object or effect of some
of Christ’s miracles, we can have an absolute certitude that
no created cause can produce it, a certitude derived from meta­
physical principles as well as from common sense which is
called “the perennial philosophy” and is the basis of meta­
physics itself. For in those miracles which we mentioned above (p. 71) under the name of miracles as to substance and
miracles as to subject, as they stand out and as they are judg­
ed by common sense itself, there takes place a universal effect,
that is a change in the depths of “being” itself or in the very
nature and essence of a thing, which, therefore, by the meta­
physical principle of the necessary proportion between cause
and effect, calls necessarily for a universal cause, that is, God
himself. For God is the proper cause of being as such and of
the nature and essence of things.
Thus, referring to the major miracles of the two classes,
Christ’s Transfiguration (or bodily glorification) implies some
change in the essence of quantity, so that it may exhibit out­
wardly those extraordinary properties of brightness and color
which it docs not possess in its natural way (Matt.17.2: “And
his face shone as the sun, and his garments became white as
snow”). In Christ’s entrance into the closed cenacle after the
Resurrection there was for one moment a sort of compéné­
tration of the body of Christ with the wall or door through
which he entered, and hence the presence of two bodies in the
same place, which cannot happen unless there is some change
in the essence of quantity of either body, preventing it from
occupying its natural place. Christ’s Resurrection, as well as
the three resuscitations he worked on others, requires neces­
sarily a change or a direct touch in the very essence of the
body to draw it back from corruption and dispose it again for
the infusion of the rational soul.

Similar substantial change or touch is required in the cure
of organic defects, especially in completely reshaping an or­
gan, as in a man born blind; for organs are immediately root­
ed in the substance of man. The same change is required in
the sudden transformation of water into wine and multiplica83

Fundamental Theology
lion of the bread, for both effects naturally take place only
through a slow process of various substantial changes. The
two last miracles mentioned above, that is the calming of the
storm on the lake and the walking upon the sea, require only
a change in the essence of the quantity of the wind and of the
water, by which the law of gravity is checked or regulated.

One or another modern theologian, granting that only God
can produce such essential changes, denies that we can prove
with certitude that such changes actually take place and they
are not only apparent, due to a prodigious action of an angelic
creature, who would, for instance, quickly substitute wine for
water or bring loaves of bread from another place.00
Such an explanation certainly cannot be applied to some of
the above miracles, as entrance into the closed cenacle, resus­
citation, and healing of the man born blind. For, the same body
of Christ which was outside is said to be inside the cenacle;
the same man who was dead is said to be alive; the same man
who had no sight is said to have it. Besides, if we were to ex­
plain such miracles as merely apparent facts due to the action
of angelic creatures, we should say, for instance, that an angel
removed the wall before the body of Christ and then replac­
ed it, or produced only an appearance of Christ’s body before
the apostles, and likewise that Lazarus actually did not rise,
but an angel took his body away from the tomb and produced
an appearance of Lazarus which apparently exercised all the
functions of life and lasted as long as Lazarus was seen to live,
and finally that the blind man did not have the sight, but an
angel constantly produced in him an illusion of vision so that
all the exterior objects would continually appear to him as if
he had the sight. Such an explanation would not only useless­
ly multiply extraordinary things, but would seem also repug­
nant to common sense, since deception and illusion cannot last
long.
00 Thus Van Hove, op. cit. (above, p. 64) 300, stating: “If we con­
sider miraculous facts only under their exterior appearances, we
could attribute most of them to an action of spiritual substances
(angels] . . . Substantial transformations themselves do not exclude
an explanation of this kind.”
84

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
Even the change of water into wine and the multiplication
of bread, as well as other miracles, like instantaneous cures
performed by Christ, have to be taken in their obvious sense.
For. if all such things were not certain miracles just because
they could absolutely be explained by a surreptitious inter­
vention of an angelic creature, it would affect also the certi­
tude we have of the daily events of our life, and I would not
be certain, for instance, that I see, walk, eat, and that other
men do these things in like manner, since possibly without
my knowledge all such things are merely apparently done by
an angelic creature. All of which is against common sense and
out of the range of a sane mind.

As regards the miracles of the third class which we called
miracles as to manner (most of the remaining miracles, as
cures from some organic injuries of eyes, hearing and speech,
and especially from functional diseases, as paralysis, dropsy,
leprosy, fever), their supernatural character is known with
certainty, not from the mere consideration of their object, for,
absolutely speaking, this could be produced by a created cause,
physical, human or angelic, but from the circumstances, both
physical and moral, which accompany them and which prove
that a particular deed cannot be produced in such a way by
any created cause.
The physical circumstances can lx? reduced to three, that is,
the great difficulty of the deed, the absence of natural and
usual means in performing it, and its sudden, complete and
permanent character. All three are found in Christ’s miracles.
The difficulty of the deed is clearly shown in the various cures
from diseases, especially of the man sick with paralysis for 38
years (John 5.1 ff. ), of the woman crippled for 18 years (Luke
13.10-17), and of the woman with a hemorrhage for 12 years
(Matt. 9.20-22). The absence of natural and usual means, as
medicines and other treatment, is evident; the son of the cen­
turion and the son of the Jewish ruler arc cured from a dis­
tance, the paralytic and the leper are cured by a single word,
the lepers and the woman with the hemorrhage by touch
alone, the deaf mute by touch and spittle. The cure in all
cases was instantaneous, complete and permanent; no sign to
the contrary is shown, which would have been the occasion
for doubt or incrimination on the part of the Pharisees. The
85

Fundamental Theology
same circumstances are found proportionally in miracles per­
formed about irrational creatures, as the extraordinary catch
of fish (Luke 5.1-11; John 21.1-11), the barren fig tree (Matt.
21.18-22), the shekel found in the mouth of the fish (Matt. 17.
24-27); these were likewise difficult deeds, performed without
the usual means and crowned by immediate and perfect re­
sults. The same circumstances appear in miracles regarding
spiritual creatures or demons in the cure of demoniacs, which
moreover show Christ’s power over such creatures and hence
a clearer sign of their supernatural character.

The moral circumstances are the morality of the perform­
er, the goodness of the deed, its purpose, the way of acting,
the means, place and time of the action; from such circum­
stances, which render a deed morally good or bad, one can
judge whether or not it is from God or supernatural. Christ’s
miracles proceed from a holy man, seeking in them no gain,
glory or revenge; they contain nothing immoral, harmful, dis­
honorable, useless, or ridiculous; they were performed for a
religious purpose, in a fitting manner, with no vain, unworthy
or violent means, in the right place and at the right time.®7
07 Hence the three natural causes proposed by Rationalists (see
footnote 65) did not have any influence in Christ’s miracles.
Unknown natural powers could not work, at least in such physi­
cal circumstances as those which accompanied Christ’s deeds.
Mental suggestion (or the medical method called psychothera­
peutic) cannot explain miracles about irrational creatures, about
the expulsion of demons from demoniacs, about organic deseases
(as blindness, deafness, dumbness, cut off ear); to which we can
associate some deseases mingled with an organic injury (as paraly­
sis, atrophy, leprosy, dropsy, flow of blood). Hence there remain
only the merely functional infirmities, or rather those that are more
directly connected with nervous disorder, on which suggestion may
have its psychological influence. However, suggestion is effective
only in a subject psychologically apt, present, prepared by the ac­
tion of the one using suggestion, who moreover works slowly and
patiently and obtains his effect gradually and only imperfectly.
Such characteristics are alien to Christ’s miracles.
Occultism (alias spiritism, hypnotism, animal magnetism, ani­
mism), both as a doctrine and a practice, is based on an occult power
through which extraordinary effects are obtained. Such effects
are either physical, as telekinesis (motion of a material thing done

86

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

at a distance by the will alone), levitation (by which a body is
raised and kept in air without support), and materialization (for­
mation of a new body from the fluid mass emitted by the body of
the “medium”); or psychical, as telepathy (communication of
thought to distant persons), and clairvoyance (knowledge of things
distant in time or place or condition, as thoughts or secrets of heart).
Christ’s miracles cannot be explained by such an occult power.
The object is different as is clear especially for the above mentioned
miracles of first and second classes (resuscitation, cure of organic
diseases, change of water into wino, etc.). Particularly physical and
moral circumstances are different; thus in spiritistic sessions things
are done by a psychopathic or abnormal person (called “medium")
working in an abnormal state of nervous prostration or excitement
(called “trance”); total or partial fraud often takes place; the action
is performed in an unbecoming manner, either frivolous or ambig­
uous or secret, often in the dark: the end is not religious but super­
stitious and a general shunning of religion.
87

XII
Objective Extrinsic Criteria of the

Fact of Revelation. Prophecies68

In the above mentioned division of criterion (p. 25) we plac­
ed prophecy, along with physical miracles, as an objective ex­
trinsic criterion of revelation. For, on the one hand it is a true
miracle, although of the intellectual order, and on the other
hand, it is also exteriorly recognizable with certainty by rea­
son of the sensible manifestation of both the knowledge of a
future event and its fulfillment. Thus it approaches physical
miracle itself, making with it a double and primary criterion
of revelation. Just as in the preceding chapter we will first
give a brief explanation of prophecy in general, as to its nature
and possibility, and then proceed to the two points of our
apologetical treatment, namely, the existence of prophecies
(or the historical truth of the predictions of future events
and of their fulfillment) and its apologetical value, that is,
whether they are evident criteria or proofs of the fact of reve­
lation.
68 Bacht, H., “Wahres und falsches Prophetentum,” Bibllca 32
(1951) 237-2G2.
Bûche), W., “Natürliches Vorauswissen zukünftiger Erelgnisse,"
Scholastik 30 (1955) 233-240.
Gils, F., Jésus prophète d’après les évangiles synoptiques. Louvain
1957.
Mangenot, E., “Prophétie—Prophétisme,” Dictionnaire de la Bible
5 (Paris 1912) 728-747.
Michel, A., “Prophétie,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique XIII-1
(Paris 1936) 708-737.
Touzard, J., Comment utiliser l’argument prophétique, Paris 1911.
88

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
1. Prophecy in general.

A. Nature of prophecy.

The word prophecy ( in Greek “Prophetéia,” derived either
from the verb “profâino,” I manifest before time or for a per­
son, or from the verb “prôphemi,” I speak before time or for
a person) etymologically means either prediction of the fu­
ture or speech for another person as a legate. Both senses are
biblical; thus Isaiah and Jeremiah are called prophets because
they predicted the future, while Elias and Eliseus arc called
prophets because they were speaking as legates of God with­
out particularly predicting the future. Likewise both senses
arc patristic and theological, although the first ( that is, pre­
diction of future events) prevailed in theology, in the docu­
ments of the Magisterium and also in popular language.
In this sense prophecy is properly and strictly defined:
Certain knowledge and exterior manifestation of a contingent
future event. (Cf. Summa Theol., p.2-2, q.171, a.1-3). Two
elements integrate this definition, that is, knowledge of the
future and manifestation of this knowledge to others. The
first element which is primary and essential, as being mirac­
ulous, implies two effects in the mind of the subject, that is,
the infusion of a supernatural light, proportioned to the object
to be known (hence a light modally supernatural, as explain­
ed above, p. 6; and thus prophecy is a true miracle of the
intellectual order, as noted above, p. 66), and the presentation
of such an object, that is, of a contingent future event (or an
event depending on the free will alone and therefore com­
pletely undetermined or contingent). The second element is
evidently not miraculous nor essential to prophecy as such
(hence if God manifests the future to a man who keeps it
secret to himself, there is still a prophecy), but it is essentially
required for prophecy as a sign, that is for its apologetical
value, for which moreover the historical and visible fulfill­
ment of the prediction is required. Hence two things are re­
quired in prophecy, taken apologetically as a criterion of rev­
elation, namely, prediction (certain knowledge and exterior
manifestation) of a contingent future event, and its evident
historical fulfillment.

Prophecy, a member of the division of miracle (that is an
89

I
Fundamental Theology

intellectual miracle, as explained above, p. 66), cannot be
divided essentially, that is, on the part of the supernatural
light which is the same for the knowledge of all future events,
but it is divided accidentally, both according to the way its
object is presented to the subject, that is, whether directly in
the intellect, or through the imagination, or through the ex­
terior senses (intellectual, imaginary, or sensible, prophecy),
and to the state of the subject, when receiving from God the
knowledge of the future, that is, whether he is in wakefulness,
or in sleep, or in esctasy.
B. The possibility of prophecy69 derives necessarily from
two combined truths, namely, from the natural truth that God,
by reason of the perfection of his knowledge and the univer­
sality of his providence, knows all future events, and from the
The above mentioned Rationalists, who reject the possibility of
miracles in general (see, p. G7), deny consequently the possibility of
this particular intellectual miracle. This denial, found likewise in
other systems, springs directly from three sources.
The first is Fatalism, which denies liberty and contingency of
things and hence removes the very object of prophecy, that is, fu­
ture contingent event. Such fatalism is common to Pantheists, among whom Baruch Spinoza (Theological Political Treatises, chaps.
1 and 6) directly attacked the possibility of miracle in general and
of prophecies in particular.
The second and opposite source is a kind of theological Contin­
gent ism. denying to God a definite knowledge of the future as some­
thing incompatible with human freedom and leading to fatalism.
Thus Marcus Tullius Cicero (refuted by St. Augustine, City of God
5.9) among Stoics; Celsus, enemy of Christian doctrines (refuted by
Origen, Against Celsus 2.20); Sochi fans among the first Protestants;
Voltaire among Deists; Kant, founder of agnostic rationalism
(Anthropology, §39).
The third source is generically Agnosticism, common to Ration­
alists and Liberal Protestants (as Schleiermacher, Wegschneider,
Kuenen, Lange, Sabatier), who, abstracting from the speculative
possibility of prophecy, deny directly its practical possibility or its
discernibility, hence inferring (hat prophecy has no objective value,
but only a moral value and sense, as being an expression of the
deep faith and morality of the men we call prophets.
Vatican Council I teaches the existence and the probative value of
both miracles and prophecies: ‘‘In order that the ‘obedience’ of our
90

I

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

supernatural truth that God can reveal to man things pertain­
ing to the supernatural order (as shown above, p. 5 ff.).
2. Christ's prophecies, as to their historical truth.

The supernatural origin of the Christian religion can be
proved by any true prophecy made in the Church at any time,
because the seal of God’s testimony stamped on any prophecy
is a sufficient testimony. However, we shall confine our con­
sideration to the prophecies made by Christ himself, as being
together with his physical miracles the major testimony on
whose strength and evidence the Church itself was first built
and propagated.*70
faith should be ‘consonant with reason' [cf.Rom.12.1] God has will­
ed that to the internal aids of the Holy Spirit there should be joined
external proofs of his revelation, namely: divine deeds, especially
miracles and prophecies which, because they clearly show forth the
omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God. are most certain signs
of a divine revelation and are suited to the intelligence of all” (sess.
3, chap.3, Denz. 3009).
70 Hence we leave out of our considerations:
First the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament about Christ,
which taken all together would likewise make up an evident and
sufficient criterion of Christian revelation, but only by the aid of
a more careful and scientific examination, required by their less
precise character (see below, pp. 101-105).
Second, the prophecies made by Christ but not pct fulfilled (like
the prophecy about the perpetuity of the Church, as distinct from its
longevity and enduring stability which is already actual, as well as
the prophecy about things regarding the end of the world), because
before their fulfillment they cannot be proved as true prophecies
and hence they have no apologetical value, as we noted above (p.
89).
Third, that manifold and marvelous manifestation of past and pre­
sent hidden things, often made by Christ, especially of the secrets
of hearts, as the sins of the Samaritan woman (John 4.18-19, 29,
39), the interior suspicion of a Pharisee (Luke 11.38 f.), the interior
scorn of Simon the Pharisee about the sinful woman washing
Christ’s feet (Luke 7.39 f.), the hostile thoughts of the Pharisees on
various occasions (Matt. 9.4: 12.25: Luke 6.8), Judas’ interior plan
of betrayal (John 13.18). This manifestation is not about the future
and hence not properly prophecy; moreover, although it is an out­
standing miracle of the intellectual order and can be used as a cri­
91

Fundamental Theology

Although at first sight less noticeable than miracles, Christ’s
prophecies are equally scattered throughout the Gospel and
are no less evident as to the definite prediction of future
events and its exact fulfillment, which are the two require­
ments of a prophecy under its historical aspect. A great har­
vest of such prophecies can be gathered under a threefold
heading.

First in importance are the prophecies about Christ himself,
namely, about his passion and resurrection.
Christ’s passion is predicted not only indefinitely as to the
mere fact (Matt. 9.15; 17.12; 20.22, 28; 21.33-45; 26.29; John
2.19; 3.14; 8.28; 10.17; 12.24,32), but also with the addition of
very particular circumstances, as Judas’ betrayal, Peter’s de­
nial, Christ’s deliverance into the hands of the Jewish leaders
and his condemnation by them, his subsequent deliverance to
the Gentiles themselves and his being mocked and spit upon
by them, the scourging and the crucifixion. All these circum­
stances are gathered in Mark 10.32-34: “And again taking
the Twelve, he began to tell them what would happen to him,
saying, ‘Behold we are going up to Jerusalem, and the Son of
Man will be betrayed to the chief priests and the Scribes; and
they will condemn him to death, and will deliver him to the
Gentiles; and they will mock him, and spit upon him, and
scourge him, and put him to death; and on the third day he
will rise again.’ ” The same prophecy is found in Matthew
(20.18ff.) and Luke (18.31-33) with the addition of the cir­
cumstance of crucifixion by Matthew. All four evangelists
relate Judas’ betrayal and Peter’s denial. This prophecy in all
its details was fulfilled to the letter, as is clear from the last
chapters of the three Synoptics.

Christ’s resurrection is likewise predicted both indefinitely
(John 10.17; 11.25; 12.24; 14.19; 16.16) and with the particu­
lar circumstance of time, that is, "on the third day,”71 empha­
terion of revelation, its apologeical value is not too great, because
its miraculous character is not too clear.
71 The expression “on the third day” is found in Matt. 16.21;
Mark 10.34; Luke 9.22. The evangelists use also other equivalent
expressions, as “until the third day,” “in three days,” “for three
92

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
sized by the double figure of the rebuilding in three days of
the destroyed temple (John 2.19,21) and of the prophet Jonas
who was in the belly of the fish for three days and three nights
(Matt. 12.39 f., quoted above, p. 117; cf. Luke 11.29 f.). This
prophecy was brought up by the Pharisees themselves, both
before the court of Caiphas, as an accusation (Matt. 26.61; cf.
27.40), and before Pilate, as a precaution, for they asked him
to have the sepulcher guarded for three days, because "that
deceiver said: After three days I will rise again” (Matt. 27.63
f.). Also the apparition after the resurrection was predicted
(Matt. 26.32; Mark 14.28). This prophecy was likewise ful­
filled to the letter, as we have shown above (pp. 75-78).

Secondly there are several general or particular prophecies
about the disciples, all of them exactly fulfilled. The general
prophecies concern the Church, that is, the rejection of the
Jews, the conversion of the Gentiles, the expansion and sta­
bility of the Church (Matt. 8.11; 16.18 f.; 24.14; 26.13; Mark
13.10; 14.9; Luke 13.29; 24.46 f.; John 10.16; 12.32). Less gen­
eral prophecies are about the apostles as a group, like their
flight during the passion (Matt. 26.31), the coming of the
Holy Spirit upon them (John 7.39; 14.16 f.; Luke 24.49; Acts
1.8; cf. 2.1 ff. ), the power of miracles ( Mark 16.17). Particular
or individual prophecies regard Judas’ betrayal and Peter’s
denial (see above), Peter’s primacy (Matt. 16.18 f.) and mart­
yrdom (John 21.18 f.), the martyrdom of Zebedee’s sons,
which happened to James in a bloody manner and to John unbloodily (John 21.18-23; Acts 4.13; 5.18,40; Apoc. 1.9).
Thirdly, two prophecies regard the Jewish people, namely
the spiritual downfall of Israel or the transferring of the king­
dom of God to the Gentiles, fulfilled in the foundation and
propagation of the new Church (Matt. 8.10-12; 21.43; 24.14;
Mark 13.10; Luke 21.24) and the temporal ruin of the Jewish
nation with the destruction of Jerusalem and its temple (Matt.
24.1-35; Luke 19.41-44; 21.20-33), which was fulfilled in all
its predicted circumstances almost within a generation. This
second prophecy deserves particular attention because of its
days,” “after three days” (Matt.27.63), “three days and three nights”
(Matt. 12.40). There is no opposition between these expressions, be­
cause even a part of the day used to be counted as a day.

93

Fundamental Theology
importance as an historical event and of an exegetical difficul­
ty involved in it.
Its importance is evident from the detailed description of
the destruction of Jerusalem and its fulfillment to the letter.
According to the prophecy, there would be false prophets among the Jews, famines and earthquakes, a siege of the city
by a Gentile army, complete destruction of Jerusalem and its
temple, and captivity of the Jewish people among the nations.
This all happened in the year 70, forty years after Christ’s
death. The general fact is attested by Roman history, accord­
ing to which Jerusalem underwent a double attack of the Ro­
man army in 66 and in 67-70, and after a long siege was cap­
tured and destroyed by Titus, afterwards emperor, who carv­
ed the event in his triumphal arch, still standing in the Roman
Forum. The details, given by the Jewis historian Joseph Fla­
vius in his work The Jewish War, are, as predicted by Christ,
the advent of false prophets before and during the siege (ibid.
6.5.2 f.), pestilence and famine (ibid. 6.9.3), destruction of the
temple and most of the city, with the exception of a few towers
and part of the wall, left as a sign of victory and for the use
of the Roman garrison (7.1.1),72 death of the majority of the
population (1,100,000 persons) and captivity of the rest (97,000), destined either to be sold into slavery, or to do hard
mining work in Egypt, or to the cruelties of amphitheaters,
or to enhance the Roman triumph of Titus himself ( ibid. 6.9.2
f.).

The exegetical difficulty in this prophecy arises from the
fact that some of the elements mingled with it do not fit the
72 A further destruction of the towers themselves followed under
emperor Hadrian after the year 117 on account of the rebellion of
the pseudoprophet Bar Chochba. The complete destruction of what
was left took place under emperor Julien the Apostate in 363, when
the Jews, encouraged by this emperor, began to dig up the very
foundations of the temple with the purpose of building a new one;
in which attempt they were checked by preternatural balls of fire
bursting out of the grounds, as is attested by Ammianus Marcellinus, an attendant of Julian the Apostate, Hist. 23.1, St. Gregory
Nazianzen, Oration about Julian 2.4, Socrates, Ecclesiastical History
3.20, and Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History 5.22.

94

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
end of Jerusalem but rather the end of the world, as “the com­
ing of the Son of Man” or the second advent of Christ, the
advent of false christs who “will show great signs and wond­
ers,” the darkening of the sun and the moon, the shaking of
the skies, the general resurrection (Matt. 24.23-35); all of
which is said to happen within a generation: “Amen I say
to you, this generation will not pass away till all these things
have been accomplished.” (Matt. 24.34; Mark 13.30; Luke
21.32). From this it would seem on the one hand that Christ
himself, deceived by some eschatological ideas and tenden­
cies, made a prophecy only about the end of the world within
a generation, which in fact was not fulfilled, and on the other
hand the first Christians, witnessing the end of Jerusalem
instead of the end of the world, reshaped in an awkward man­
ner Christ’s original prophecy into a prophecy about the end
of Jerusalem itself and introduced it into the Gospel. Such is
the objection of Rationalists and Modernists.
However, on the one hand it is generally accepted as certain
that the three Synoptic Gospels were written before the year
70, therefore before the destruction of Jerusalem,73 and on the
other hand the Gospel text is entirely genuine and not fal­
sified by later interpolations, as serious exegetes show. This
is confirmed, in our case, by the internal examination of the
text itself; for, if it had been interpolated or reshaped after
the destruction of Jerusalem, it would not be apparently so
vague, confused and mixed up, that the exegetes are embar­
rassed and disagree among themselves as to what exactly is
referred to the end of Jerusalem, to the end of the world, and
to both, especially with regard to that difficult assertion clos­
ing the entire pericopc: “Amen I say to you, this generation
will not pass away till all these things have been accomplish­
ed.”

One thing is certain, namely that the Gospel text brings to­
gether a double prophecy, one about the end of Jerusalem (as
73 The approximate chronology of the Gospels and of the Acts
of the Apostles is as follows: Matthew's Aramaic and lost gospel in
the year 40-50; Matthew’s Greek and present gospel in the year
62-70; Mark’s gospel, 64-70; Luke’s gospel, 65-70; John’s gospel, 90100; Acts of the Apostles, 62-63.

95

Fundamental Theology

is clear especially in Luke’s pericope) and the other about the
end of the world, and that the first has been fulfilled even
within a generation.74
The historical truth75 of such prophecies appears from ex­
ternal as well as from internal criteria in the same way as the
historical truth of the physical miracles. Hence whatever has
been said above about Christ's miracles (pp. 71-78) holds
proportionally here as regards Christ’s prophecies.
3. Apologetical value of Christ's prophecies.
Christ's prophecies, as implying both prediction of contin­
gent future events and its actual fulfillment, are evident and
sufficient criterion of revelation, on account of their evident
miraculous character.
As we stated above, speaking of miracles (p. 79 f.), this
apologetical value is based on three necessary elements, name­
74 Our apologetical purpose allows little importance to the ques­
tion disputed among exegetes, as to the sense of “present genera­
tion.” Some say that the present generation has to be referred to the
prophecy about the end o£ Jerusalem; in which case it retains its
proper and historical sense and strengthens the prophecy with the
circumstance of time, matching the facts. Some on the contrary hold
that it refers to the other prophecy about the end of the world; in
which case the present generation is taken in an eschatological
sense, meaning that the Jewish people, or mankind itself, will not
come to an end before Christ's second advent takes place. Finally,
other exegetes refer the present generation to both prophecies al
once; in which case it takes a typical or prophetic sense, meaning
that the present historical generation will not pass until both things
happen, that is the end of Jerusalem in itself and the end of the
world in its figure, which is shown in the end of Jerusalem.
75 Among the aforementioned Rationalists and Agnostics, who re­
ject the possibility of prophecies (p. 90), some radically deny the
historical truth of Christ’s predictions, gratuitously attributing them
to later invention or fiction, interpolated into the Gospel after the
various events took place, to express faith in Christ or to extol his
dignity. Thus H. E. G. Paulus, D. F. Strauss, R. Bultmann, A. A.
Jülicher, followed by Modernists, who say that such prophecies have
their origin from the later pauline doctrine of the atoning character
of Christ’s death, which, according to the desire of the faithful,
ought to have been foreseen and predicted by Christ himself.

96

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

ly, the historical, philosophical, and relative truth. In other
words, it has to be certain that the prophecies were made and
fulfilled, that they are true miracles (although of the intel­
lectual order), and that they were made by Christ with the
manifested purpose of proving the fact of revelation, or that
God was speaking through him. If these three things are cer­
tain, the fact of revelation is certain, otherwise God himself,
by his miraculous intervention involved in the prophecies,
would approve and endorse falsehood.
The historical truth has just been shown.
The relative truth is of itself implicit in the fact that Christ
was making his prophecies in the actual exercise of his preach­
ing as God’s legate, for, this very fact turned naturally into a
confirmation of his mission, and therefore he implicitly in­
tended such reference or confirmation. Besides, this was also
explicitly declared by him on several occasions; thus, after
predicting Judas’ betrayal, Christ added: “I tell you now be­
fore it comes to pass, that when it has come to pass you may
believe that I am he” (John 13.19); predicting to the apostles
his return to them after death, he declared : “And now I have
told you before it comes to pass, that when it has come to pass
you may believe” (John 14.29); predicting to them their fu­
ture trials and persecutions, he repeated the same declaration:
“But these things I have spoken to you, that when the time
for them has come you may remember that I told you.” (John
16.4). He predicted his resurrection as the greatest sign of his
mission, thus equivalently making both, the fact of the resur­
rection and its prediction, the sign of his mission. (Matt. 12.39,
quoted on p. 81 ).

The philosophical truth of Christ’s prophecies,76 namely,
that they are unmistakably true miracles, due to the direct
76 Moderate Rationalists, who grant the historical truth, deny
necessarily the philosophical truth of such prophecies, attributing
them to a natural power of prevision or divination, accidentally
coupled with a lucky chance.
Such power, cause of natural prophecies, would be accompanied
in some extraordinary men either by fraud and imposture, which
impels them to usurp a divine mission, or by a mere innocent illus­
ion, which creates in their imagination a fictitious divine mission,
97

Fundamental Theology
intervention of God who alone can know contingent future
events, is proved by the exclusion of natural causes, which
have to be reduced to a mere conjecture, based on a particular
power of divination (either connatural or occult, that is, hyp­
notic or spiritistic, or even diabolic) coupled with a lucky
chance.

Such exclusion appears from the consideration of the sub­
ject. or firmity of his prediction, of the object, which is purely
contingent and very particular, and of the nature of chance,
which is something essentially inconsistent. Indeed, it is im­
possible, naturally and merely conjecturing, to predict, firmly,
definitely and with detailed circumstances, an event which
is dependent upon the free will of God or men, remote in time,
and not favored by circumstances of time and place. Besides,
on the supposition that one would arbitrarily and temerariously venture such conjecture, it is impossible that such event
would happen de facto and merely by chance, especially when
it is a question of several and various predictions, for, chance
is by definition something essentially inconsistent: things that
happen by chance are not determined and constant.77 But
or by an unusual religious exaltation, caused by a deeper faith and
producing a kind of interior persuasion of some divine mission as­
signed to them.
According to this last and more common theory (developed es­
pecially by A. Kuenen and A. Sabatier) prophecy is the product of
a natural and universal phenomenon of providential and normal
course of history, according to which some outstanding men (as Con­
fucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, Plato, Christ, Mohammed) connaturally
rise up and express their own religious experience and aspirations,
also under the form of prophecy or prediction of the future, so that
it represents an object of hope rather than the knowledge of an ob­
ject.
77 From such close examination of the subject and the object it is
not difficult to distinguish and detect false prophecies, proceeding
either from a human and probable conjecture (due to levity, temer­
ity, imposture, illusion, religious exaltation), or from occult natural
power of divination (as in hypnotism and spiritism), or even from
diabolic intervention. These are all reduced essentially to a mere
conjecture, proceeding from a natural perspicacity of created in­
tellect (human or angelic), having no firm and definite character,
bearing on an indefinite object which favorable circumstances of
98

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

Christ’s prophecies carry the aforesaid complex and definite
character in their subject and object, as a cursory examination
of some of them will show; therefore, they are not due to a
mere natural conjecture, coupled with a lucky chance.
Christ’s resurrection could not be conjectured in any way,
considering that the very object can happen only by the power
and the free will of God, and is favored by no natural circum­
stances or dispositions. Hence it is even outside the reach of
any chance.

Christ’s passion bears unusual and unexpected circum­
stances which would defy any conjecture, namely: condem­
nation, notwithstanding his great popularity with the people
up to the Sunday before his death; condemnation to death
itself, rather than to exile, as was possible; death by crucifix­
ion (not stoning), unusual among the Jews and proper to the
time and place make naturally probable, and at times meeting by a
lucky chance with an accidental fulfillment of their object.
Such are for instance the famous Sibylline Oracles of the ancient
Greek religion (whose collection “Sibylline Books” was lost in the
burning of the Roman Capitol in 183 B.C.; cf. H. Leclercq in Dic­
tionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie 12-2, col. 22092224), partially scattered with obscurity and ambiguity, and partial­
ly interpolated after the events had taken place.
However, it is not impossible that God would permit true proph­
ecies also in false religions (as we noted above about miracles, p.
80), providing they would not turn into a direct confirmation of
such religions. It may even happen that a pagan or an enemy of
the true religion is impelled by God to utter (consciously or un­
consciously) a prophecy about or in behalf of the true religion. Such
were the predictions of the pagan soothsayer Balaam, whom God
compelled to make an outstanding messianic prophecy (Num. 24.1519; cf. 2 Pct. 2.15 f.: Apoc. 2.14). Caiphas’ words who. while condem­
ning Christ, “prophesied that Jesus was to die for the nation" (John
11.51), and, according to St. Augustine (City of God 10.27; 18.23)
and St. Thomas ( Summa Theol.. p. 2-2, q.172, a.6, ad 1), some of the
Sibylline Oracles, especially the famous oracle of the Cumoean Si­
byl, predicting “the great new order of times about to be born,”
which the poet Virgil quotes and applies to the time of emperor
Augustus in his fourth eclogue. This belief in Sibylline Oracles in­
spired the medieval verses of our Latin liturgy: “Dies irae. dies ilia,
solvet saeclum in favilla, teste David cum Sibylla.”
99

Fundamental Theology

Romans; condemnation and death by the Gentiles, not by the
Jews themselves, as it would have been logical and as Pilate
himself objected to the Jews (John 18.31); derision, spitting,
scourging, which are very detailed and entirely contingent
circumstances. Nor can one say that Christ knew from the
Old Testament about the passion and death of the Messiah;
for, on the one hand, all such particular circumstances are
not contained in the messianic prophecies and hence they
make up a prophecy by themselves, and on the other hand
the fact that Christ said that the passion and death prophecied
about the Messiah were going to be fulfilled in his own person,
constitutes a new prophecy by itself. At any rate, what kind
of chance would be able to bring about such passion with such
particular circumstances?
Regarding Judas’ betrayal, although Christ through his keen
sense of observation could have gradually detected Judas’ dis­
loyalty and particularly his greediness (cf. John 12.4-6), he
could not naturally foresee, at least for sure and so long be­
fore it happened (cf. John 6.71 f.), that he was going to be­
tray him. For, Judas had concealed his plan so long and so
well that the other apostles had no suspicion at all (cf. Matt.
26.22) and he could even to the end converse familiarly with
them and with Christ (cf. John 12.4-8).

Peter’s denial, rather than that of any other apostle, could
not have been naturally foreseen, in view of his particular at­
tachment to Christ, shown in several instances, as when he
confessed Christ’s divinity (Matt. 16.16-19: “Blessed are you,
Simon Bar-Jona”), when he indignantly discarded the pos­
sibility of Christ’s passion (Matt. 16.22: “Far be it from you,
O Lord; this will never happen to you”), and especially when
to Christ explicitly predicting his denial he vehemently pro­
tested : “Even if I should have to die with you, I will not deny
you.” (Matt. 26.35). Much less the particular circumstance
of the cock’s triple crowing could have been naturally con­
jectured.

The expansion and stability of the Church could not have
been naturally foreseen, in view of the scanty means at her
disposal and the great obstacles she would encounter. (See
above, p. 53).
100

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

The destruction of Jerusalem and its temple, center and base
of so flourishing a people and religion, could in no way have
been naturally foreseen, much less with so many and detailed
circumstances. Notwithstanding the Roman yoke and its for­
eign character, political relations between the Jews and the
Romans were not such as to suggest an imminent war, particu­
larly because the war power of the Jewish people was so slight
in comparison with that of the Romans that hardly could
anyone think of a happy outcome of any war or rebellion.
Furthermore, the wise Roman policy was to preserve the
temples and particular monuments of the conquered peoples,
even though they destroyed the cities and overturned their
walls; but the temple of Jerusalem was completely destroyed
by the fury of the soldiers against the explicit will of Titus
himself, who entering the burning city was able to save only
the upper towers. As the Jewish historian Joseph Flavius sad­
ly remarks, no other city ever destroyed by the Romans met
with such disaster. (The Jewish War, prologue).
We said above (p. 91) that we were not taking into con­
sideration the messianic prophecies about Christ in the Old
Testament, on account of their less precise character. How­
ever, as a complement of the present question on Christian
prophecies, a word is to be added about these prophecies re­
garding their proper apologetical value.78
70 The most important and clearest messianic prophecies are found
in eighteen passages, distributed as follows:
Five prophecies in the patriarchal period: Gen. 3.15 (“the seed of
the woman”); Gen. 22.17 f. (all nations blessed in the seed of Abra­
ham); Gen. 49.8-12 (the King rising from the tribe of Judah); Num.
24.17-19 (the star rising from the family of Jacob; Balaam’s oracle);
Deut. 18.18 (the coming of the future prophet, similar to Moses).
Three prophecies in the Davidic period: Ps. 2.6-9 (the divine
King); Ps. 15.9-11 (the resurrection of God’s Servant): Ps. 109.1-4
(the divine King and the Priest according to the order of Melchisedcch).
Ten prophecies in the period of the prophets strictly so-called: Isa.
7.14 (the virgin birth of Emmanuel); Isa. 9.1-2, 6-7 (the royal birth
of the prince of peace); Isa. 11.1-5 (the coming of the Prophet, son
of David, filled with the Holy Spirit); Isa., chap. 53 entirely (the
“Man of sorrows” and his passion); Jer. 23.5 f. (the King, son of
101

Fundamental Theology
Indeed, the messianic prophecies about Christ are of them­
selves an evident and sufficient criterion of revelation, be­
cause their historical, philosophical and relative truth can be
known with certainty.
The historical truth appears evident from a general and
complete view of them, as converging into a symmetrical and
continuous unity of books in which they are contained, of
people to which they are directed, and especially of the ob­
ject which they declare.*79 The prophetic books make up an
organic collection, gradually built by various authors of dif­
ferent character and writing in different circumstances until
about the third century before Christ. The persons to whom
the prophecies are addressed are one and the same Jewish peo­
ple in its continuous and consistent history, with which the
books themselves are intimately connected. The object of such
prophecies is one and the same messianic hope of a future
period of glory, peace and salvation, and such hope is made
dependent on a definite person, whose character and attrib­
utes, at first outlined generically under the double aspect of
savior and king (prophecies of the patriarchal period), were
subsequently and progressively determined (prophecies of
the Davidic period and of the time of men specifically called
prophets), so that this person is distinctly said to be king,
prophet and priest, Son of God, to originate in the tribe of
Judah, from the line of David, by a virgin mother, in the town
of Bethlehem, and one who would suffer and rise. Even dis­
cordant attributes are candidly and without hesitation pre­
dicted of him, as son of a woman and Son of God, son of David
and David’s Lord, humble and glorious, suffering and trium­
David); Ezech. 34.23 f. (the son of David, good shepherd); Dan. 9.2427 (the Holy of Holies, coming to restore the cult, after 70 weeks);
Mich. 5.2 (Bethlehem, birthplace of the Messias); Zach. 9.9 f. (the
King Messias, riding a donkey); Mai. 3.1-3; appendix 5 (the King’s
precursor).
79 At least three of these prophecies, namely Pa. 2.1-9; Ps. 109.
1-4; and Isa. 53, considered apart in themselves, show an evident
character of historical truth, because they have a literal messianic
sense which could only arbitrarily be denied, while the others could
possibly be understood only in a typical sense, and hence they would
need to be considered in the overall prophetical picture.
102

Objective Extrinsic Criteria
phant, dying and rising.
The fulfillment of such prophecies in the person and life of
Christ is shown with details in the Gospel and is explicitly
claimed by Christ himself. Christ's genealogy is traced back
to David, Judah, Jacob, Abraham, and Adam, thus showing
the fulfillment of the first prophecies about the seed of the
woman who was to come to save the race (Gen. 3.15), the
seed of Abraham in which all nations would be blessed ( Gen.
22.17 f.), the star rising from the family of Jacob (Num. 24.1719), the leader coming from the tribe of Judah ( Gen. 49.8-12),
the son and heir of David (Isa. 11,1-5; Jer. 23.5; Ezech. 34.23
f.; 37.24 f.).
Christ had his precursor in .John the Baptist, according to
the prophecy of Malachias (3.1-3; and appendix 5; both texts
arc referred to John by Christ himself, Matt. 11.10; 17.10-13);
he was born in Bethlehem, the birthplace of David, according
to Michcas (5.2), and of a virgin mother according to Isaias
(7,14).
Christ explicitly claimed that he was the prophecied Mes­
siah and was recognized as such by others (sec above, p. 29).
In his life he exercised the triple proper office of the Messiah
announced by the prophets, that is, the magisterial or prophet­
ical office (according to Deut. 18.18; Isa. 11.1-5); the priestly
office (according to Ps. 109.4; Isa., chap. 53 about the “man
of sorrows’ dying for his people; Ezech. 34.23 f. about the good
shepherd; Dan. 9.24-27 about the 70 weeks), by dying on the
cross, instituting the eucharistie sacrifice, substituting a new
cult for the old; the royal office (according to Gen. 49.8-12;
Num. 24.17-19; Ps. 2.6-9; 109.1-4; Isa. 9.1 ff.; Jer. 23.5; Mich.
5.2; Zach. 9.9 f.), entering Jerusalem triumphantly (accord­
ing to Zach. 9.9 f.) and declaring to Pilate that he was a king,
though not of a temporal kingdom. Besides, he affirmed to
be the Son of God (according to Ps. 2.6-9).
Christ ended his life through his passion as the "man of
sorrows,” “despised and rejected by men” (according to Isaias,
chap. 53); but he did not know the corruption of the grave
and arose from the dead (according to Ps. 15.9-11).

The philosophical truth, or miraculous character, of these
prophecies is shown by the exclusion of a natural cause, that
103

Fundamental Theology
is, of conjecture coupled with lucky chance (as above, p. 981.
For, it is impossible to explain through such a cause the con­
sistency of those prophecies, notwithstanding the course of
so many centuries, nor their mutual concordance, notwith­
standing the great variety of prophets as to their character,
time and other circumstances, in predicting long before the
time (a minimum of 260 years before Christ), a fact combin­
ing many elements ( the various attributes and deeds of the
Messiah) and several detailed circumstances (place of birth,
precursor, virgin conception, resurrection), depending on the
free will of men, or even of God alone ( virginal conception,
ressurrection ), some of which were indifferent or undesirable
to the people (birth in a small town, humility, ignominious
passion and death, universality of the Kingdom opposed to
the Jewish nationalistic ideals). Besides, even if these prop­
hecies were one great and arbitrary conjecture, continued by
many people and for so many centuries, it would still be im­
possible that its fulfillment should happen by a mere lucky
chance, for, things do not happen fully and determinately by
chance.

The relative truth of the same prophecies, namely, their
connection with Christ’s doctrine which gives to them their
proper strength as a criterion of Christian revelation, is con­
tained immediately in their very fulfillment in Christ, and
thus implicitly in the intention of the prophets themselves.
For, from the fact that these prophecies were fulfilled in
Christ ( and hence that Christ is the legate of God announced
by the prophets) it follows necessarily that his teaching is
from God and contains divine revelation. Besides, through his
own miracles and prophecies, Christ proved that he was the
legate of truth announced by the prophets and thus the Old
Testament prophecies themselves received a divine confirma­
tion.

On account of its apologetical value, the argument drawn
from messianic prophecies has been constant and customary
in Christian apologetics since the beginning. Christ himself
insistently appealed to these prophecies as fulfilled in his per­
son, both for his personal defense against the Jews denying
his divine mission and for the instruction of the disciples and
the Church. He solemnly said to the Jews: “You search the
104

Objective Extrinsic Criteria

Scriptures, because in them you think that you have life ever­
lasting. And it is they that bear witness to me, yet you arc not
willing to come to me that you may have life.” (John 5.39 f.).
And to his disciples after the resurrection: “These are the
words which I spoke to you while I was yet with you, that all
things must be fulfilled that are written in the Law of Moses
and the Prophets and the Psalms concerning me . . . Thus it
is written; and thus the Christ should suffer, and should rise
again from the dead on the third day, and repentance and
remission of sins should be preached in his name to all the
nations” (Luke 24.44-47).

105

XIII
Conclusion

On the. obligation of believing the revelation made
by God and the genesis of the act of supernatural
faith, prepared by the judgment of credibility.
As was shown above (p. vii), the formal object or the in­
trinsic purpose of Apologetics is to prove the evident credi­
bility of the fact of revelation through evident criteria, or to
show how a man can arrive at a sure judgment of the credi­
bility of revelation. But there is also an extrinsic purpose to it,
namely, to lead man to the act of supernatural faith itself. For
this act cannot be elicited unless he has first acquired a rat­
ional evidence of the fact of revelation and elicited a certain
judgment about the credibility of this fact (see above, p. 18).
However, the passage from this natural judgment of credi­
bility to the supernatural act of faith is neither necessary nor
immediate, otherwise the supernatural act of faith would re­
solve itself into and be originated by an act of natural reason.
Hence there must come, between them, an impelling act of
the free will and a subsequent practical judgment by which
a man affirms the obligation to believe what the speculative
judgment shows as credible.

The entire process of the conversion of a man to faith in­
cludes the following steps. Since the natural law itself obliges
a man to accept whatever it pleases God to reveal, even a
truth of the supernatural order, as soon as he conceives a
founded doubt about his natural religious belief and a solid
probability about the truth of the supernatural Christian re­
ligion, he is obliged, not of course to believe as yet (since a
doubtful law does not bind), but to inquire into the matter,
106

Conclusion
in order to expel bis doubt and to form a sure judgment about
it. After this inquiry, consisting in a careful consideration of
the various criteria of the revealed religion, which arc of
themselves objectively evident and subjectively adapted to
the intelligence of all, he is able to elicit the speculative judg­
ment of credibility about this revealed religion (“Revelation
is evidently credible”), and for this he docs not need the help
of grace, which however is easily granted to him. (Sec above,
p. 22).

Then, recalling the aforesaid obligation of obedience to God
revealing, from this speculative judgment he proceeds under
the influence of the will and the necessary help of grace to
elicit the practical judgment, that is, the judgment about the
personal obligation to believe this credible revelation (“Rev­
elation is to be believed by me here and now”). This practical
judgment is already something essentially supernatural and a
proximate disposition to faith. Finally, under the influence of
the will, he elicits in the intellect an act of command to believe,
such as precedes any efficacious action of man (“Believe it”),
which opens the door to faith and which, under the renewed
influence of the will and of grace, is immediately followed by
the act of faith (“I believe”).
The speculative judgment of credibility does not neces­
sarily bring in the act of faith, for the will can resist the move­
ment of grace and interrupt the course of conversion; on the
contrary the practical judgment is necessarily followed by
faith, because it is the cause of the election of the will, under
which the command of believing is given and the door is open
to faith.
From such a process of acts and from what was said above
(pp. viii, 19) it is evident that, although the natural judgment
of credibility is a necessary prerequisite to the supernatural
act of faith, it is in no way the cause of this act or the principle
into which faith is resolved. Faith and reason live in the same
intellect in a friendly symbiosis, keeping their distinct rights
and objects: the judgment of credbility discharges its duties
to faith, first by paving the way to it and then by remaining
under that supernatural light as its rational and extrinsic
foundation.
107

Glossary of Technical Words
Occurring In This Treatise

Agnosticism (from the Greek “a,” a negative prefix, and
“ghignôsco,” I know; hence, I do not know) is a philosophical
system which denies the capacity of our mind to know objec­
tive truth. It is divided into Positivistic Agonosticism (as that
of Comte and Spencer), which restricts our knowledge to ex­
perimental facts, and Rationalistic Agnosticism (founded by
Kant), which limits our objective knowledge to an undeter­
mined phenomenon, which makes an impression on our senses,
so that all the definite concepts we have (as God, the soul,
etc.) are merely subjective forms, and we cannot know
whether they have a corresponding objective reality outside
our mind. In this system, supernatural order, revelation, mir­
acles, prophecies, are things whose reality cannot be ascertain­
ed. This mitigated form of Rationalism of the Kantian char­
acter was adopted among Catholics by Modernism, condemned
in 1907 by Pius X.
Analogy means similarity of concepts and is opposed to univocity, which is identity of concepts. It is important to notice
that an analogical concept is not necessarily metaphorical ( as
when we say: Peter is a fox), but it can be also proper; thus,
if we say: Peter is son of Paul, and Christ is Son of God, the
concept of sonship is proper to both Peter and Christ, although
not univocal, but only analogical, inasmuch as sonship is truly
found in Peter and Christ, but in different ways.
Apologetics, which etymologically means defense, is the
technical name of the first part of theology which deals with
the defense of revelation as a whole, against Rationalism,
108

Glossary of Technical Words

which denies the possibility of revelation. The defense of a
particular revealed truth is more properly called apology.
Deism, etymologically from the Latin “Deus” (God), has
taken historically a weakened sense in comparison to Theism,
etymologically from the Greek “Theos” (God). Theism is the
right philosophical system about God (called theodicy), while
Deism is a rationalistic conception of the Divinity, which mu­
tilates God in his nature and attributes in various ways, among
which is found the denial of his providence (Deists were the
Socinians, Cherbury, Collins, Voltaire, Rousseau). In this sys­
tem revelation, miracles, prophecies, have no sense.

Essence, nature, substance of a thing are practically the
same and signify the proper constituent clement of something.
Formally, however, this same clement is called essence in re­
lation and opposition to existence; it is called nature in rela­
tion to the acts or operations flowing from it; it is called sub­
stance in relation and opposition to the accidents placed in it.
Thus body and soul together are the essence of man, making
him capable to exist, they arc also the nature from which flow
all his actions (as understanding, willing, seeing, hearing,
walking, talking), and finally they are his substance, in which
all his accidens are received ( as intellect, will, senses, quanti­
ty, sensible qualities).
Faith subjectively is a supernatural and theological virtue
dealing directly with God (as charity and hope), which makes
us able to elicit the act of assenting to what God reveals ( the
act of faith). Objectively it is the revealed truth to which we
give our supernatural assent. In this sense, which is the same
as the objective revelation, we speak of truths of faith, articles
of faith, symbols of faith (the Creed). In both senses Christ­
ians arc called the faithful.

Fatalinm is a philosophical system denying the contingency
of things and consequently freedom in man. The world is con­
ceived as a whole, enveloping and whirling in its rigid course
all its parts, man included, and destiny or fate is the inescap­
able law of the universe. All Pantheism, whether materialistic
109

Fundamental Theology
or idealistic, is a fatalistic system, and such also is Stoicism. In
this system, revelation, miracle, prophecy, have no meaning.

Immanentism is a philosophical religious system which re­
duces all reality to the subject (subjectivism). It began with
Descartes, received a particular form with Kant, and reached
its peak in the idealistic Pantheism of Hegel. It took a differ­
ent form in Pragmatism (especially with William James),
which is a general tendency to consider everything from the
practical viewpoint, that is, in terms of action, seeking in ac­
tion itself the reason of truth and certainty. It was recently
adopted in Catholic Apologetics, especially by M. Blondel
(+1949) and L. Laberthonnière (+1932), under the name of
“method of immanence” or “Apologetics of immanence,”
which gives undue importance and preference to the subjec­
tive criteria (satisfactions of human aspirations) over the ob­
jective extrinsic criteria (miracles and prophecies) in prov­
ing the divine origin of Christian religion.
Miracle, etymologically wonder, theologically is something
which is above the established order of powers of every creat­
ed nature and hence cannot be done but by God. Any wonder
done by angels or demons or men is not a miracle, unless they
work as instruments of God. Also things done by God himself
according to an order established by him, are not miracles,
such as creation, elevation, justification. Hence the proper and
specific note of a miracle is its extraordinary character, that
is, its being outside the order and laws established by God in
all created things.
Modernism is a heresy which consciously or unconsciously
arose among Catholics at the beginning of this century and
was condemned by Pius X in 1910 in the Decree “Lamentabili”
and in the Encyclical “Pascendi.” It is based on three philoso­
phical principles or systems, that is, Kantian agnosticism,
which denies the possibility of objective knowledge, immanen­
tism, which makes God and religion an effect of an inner sense
or conscience, and evolutionism, which teaches that reality
does not consist in being but in becoming. Hence religion with
all its dogmas is only a fruit of a blind conscience, continually
110

Glossary of Technical Words
developing and expressing itself in new formulas without an
objective reality that could be ascertained. In this system,
supernatural order, revelation, miracles, prophecies, have no
objective but only symbolic value.

Mystery etymologically and generically means something
hidden, especially to knowledge, hence a secret. In theology
it is taken with regard to God’s revelation, and it means some­
thing which is so secret to us that it cannot be known without
God’s revelation. If after God’s revelation such thing is per­
fectly clear to us (for instance if God reveals to me that in about a year or two there will be again a general war), it is a
mystery in a broader sense; if on the the contrary it still re­
mains obscure as to its intimate nature, it is a mystery in the
strict sense. Such are Trinity, Incarnation, revelation, grace,
justification, beatific vision, etc., which we call the mysteries
of our faith precisely because even after revelation they re­
main secret and unknown as to their intimate nature, and be­
fore the beatific vision arc not seen but only believed through
the obscure light of faith. All such mysteries are intrinsically
supernatural.
Object of a science, or rather of any knowing faculty, is the
subject matter under consideration. Material object is the con­
crete subject under consideration without distinction, as the
concrete body which I see with my eyes. The formal object is
that particular aspect or quality which is considered in the
subject, as color under which my eyes see a body. The formal
light is the degree of immateriality found in the formal object,
which makes this object knowable, for, knowing consists in
abstracting or separating an object from its material condi­
tions.

Optimism is a theological system, held by the Protestant W.
Leibniz ( + 1716) and the Catholic N. Malebranche (+1715),
which teaches that God was morally forced by his own good­
ness and dignity to create the best possible world ( in the case
that he chose to create, as he did). Hence the natural laws, be­
ing the best, are immutable and exceptions to them, that is,
miracles, are impossible. What appears to be a miracle is only
an effect of angelic creatures or of natural laws still unknown.
Ill

Fundamental Theology
Rationalism is a general philosophico-theological system
proclaiming the absolute autonomy of the natural reason, to
whose judgment all knowable object and truth is subject, in­
cluding God and his world. In such system, which embraces
various extreme or mitigated forms from Deism to Atheism,
supernatural order and its connections, as revelation, miracles,
prophecies, have no meaning at all. Rationalism takes two gen­
eral forms. One extreme, or Positive Rationalism, especially
pantheistic, either materialistic (as that of E. Haeckel) or
idealistic ( as that of Hegel ), which denies the existence of God
and of the supernatural order, identifying God with the
world. The other mitigated, or Agnostic Rationalism, which
denies the existence of God and of the supernatural order only
practically, by denying that we can know such supernatural
objects, even if they exist.

In the question of miracles Positive Rationalism takes two
different forms, from which the denial of miracles equally fol­
lows. One is Determinism, which affirms the absolute fixity
of the natural laws, allowing no exceptions; the other is Con·
tingentism, which affirms the absolute instability of those
laws, or rather their nonexistence, and therefore the impos­
sibility of exceptions to nonextant laws.
Revelation is taken either actively, for the action of God re­
vealing, or passively, for its effect in man. The passive revela­
tion is taken again in two ways, namely, objectively, for the
object or truth presented to the intellect of man, and subjec­
tively, for the supernatural light infused in the intellect to en­
able it to understand such truth. Hence flows the difference
between revelation and the other two divine lights or helps,
namely, inspiration. given to the hagiographers who wrote the
Holy Scripture, and assistance of the Holy Spirit, given to the
infallible Magisterium of the Church. In the three cases the
subject is preserved from error. But in revelation, man re­
ceives the knowledge of a truth. In inspiration he receives no
knowledge but he is only moved by God in such manner as
to write without error things that he already knows and also
with such influence as to become only an instrument of God,
principal author of the writing. In the case of the assistance
of the Holy Spirit the Magisterium receives no revelation nor
112

Glossary of Technical Words
inspiration but merely an assistance (cither supernatural or
natural, but ever providential) by which it is preserved from
error in its pronouncements.

Supernatural in the strict and absolute theological sense is
that which is above all created nature and its powers. If it is
above created nature itself, it is said to be essentially super­
natural (as Trinity, Incarnation, revelation of strict mysteries,
sanctifying grace); if it is only above the powers of nature, it
is said to be modally supernatural (as physical miracles and
prophecies). All things that we call supernatural (faith, mys­
teries, revelation, truths, graces of all kinds, lights, helps, vir­
tues, etc.) belong to either of these two kinds of supernaturality.

113

Analytical Index

Analogy. Our analogical concepts have an objective value also
when they are used to express revelation, 3, 7 f. An analog­
ical concept can be either purely metaphorical or proper,
footnote 6
Apologetics. Meaning and use of the name, footnote 1. Its def­
inition and object, vii f. It is an extension or a fundamental
part of theology, vi. Its purpose is to prove the credibility
of revelation, vi-viii, 15, 106. See Credibility, Criteria

Augustine (St.). On the necessity of the judgment of credibil­
ity, prior to faith, footnote 24. Definition of miracle, 65,
footnote 54. Words are the principal signs of the mind, 2.
Man’s heart is restless until it rests in God, 37

Civilization. See Culture
Certitude. Absolute certitude is founded on the nature of
things, while conditional certitude is founded only in physi­
cal and moral laws, and hence it is divided into physical and
moral certitude, footnote 21. Moral certitude of the fact of
revelation is necessary for eliciting the act of supernatural
faith, 17-21. This extrinsic certitude is essentially different
from the intrinsic certitude of faith itself, footnote 2. Con­
vergent probabilities may produce a true certitude, 61
Christ. The question of the historical Christ is still brought up
from time to time, footnote 29. Christ’s holiness and out­
standing virtues as a criterion of the divine origin of his
religion, 46 f. The origin of his doctrine and the manner of
his teaching show a wondrous character, 42 f. His testimony
about his divine mission, 28-31. The exercise of his mag114

Analytical Index
isterial function, 30 f. As to Christ’s miracles, prophecies,
and resurrection, see these three entries. Besides prophecies,
Christ made many miraculous manifestations of past and
present hidden events, footnote 70

Church. The Church, in itself and as a whole, represents a
great miracle of the moral order, and hence a certain and
outstanding criterion of its divine origin, 21, 60-62. Probable
criteria of its divine origin are its sublime doctrine, 42-46,
55 f., its sanctity. 47-50, 56 f., its expansion, unity, and stabil­
ity, 50-54, 57-60. Number of the persecutions and of the
martyrs of the Church, 48 f. In about seventy years after
Christ’s death the Church reached the limits of the civilized
Roman world, 50 f. and at the beginning of the fourth cen­
tury at least the fifth of the population of the Roman empire
was Christian, 51 f.
Credibility. Notion, 15 f. Credibility of the fact of revelation
is the proper object of Apologetics, vi-viii, 14, 106. It is the
rational and necessary foundation of the supernatural faith,
17-21. The proper meaning of “Reasonable submission,”
stressed by St. Paul (Rom. 12.1), 12, footnote 13. See Cri­
teria. Faith.
Criteria. General notion and division of the criteria of revela­
tion, 24 f. They are called signs, or motives of credibility,
or criteria of revelation, footnote 28. Strictly speaking there
is only one criterion of revelation, namely, miracle, 24, 39,
41, 54, 64, 79. Subjective criteria (fulfillment of human
aspirations) are only probable criteria, contrary to a recent
opinion exaggerating their importance, 38-41, footnote 38.
Objective intrinsic criteria (doctrine, sanctity and other
qualities of the Church) are likewise only probable criteria,
54-62. However, such probable criteria are very useful in
practice, footnote 49. The only certain criteria are physical
miracles and prophecies; see these entries

Culture. The Church with its revealed doctrines has always
fostered culture and civilization, 34-37. There is a threefold
culture and civilization, namely, corporal, intellectual, and
moral; Catholic peoples are expected to be superior to others
115

Fundamental Theology

only in moral civilization and in that part of the intellectual
civilization which regards religion, 36 f. The Church has re­
stored and improved the morals of the world, 47 f.

Desire of God, naturally felt by man, is the sign of his capa­
city to be elevated to a supernatural order, 9. About this
natural desire much has been written in recent years, foot­
note 12
Faith. The rational certitude of the fact of revelation is nec­
essary for eliciting the act of supernatural faith, 17-21. How­
ever, faith is not directly based on or reduced to such ration­
al credibility, 19, 107, footnotes 2 and 25. The genesis of
divine faith in the intellect follows several natural and
supernatural steps, footnote 2, 19, 106 f. Faith and reason
stand in full agreement in the same human intellect, 8, 11 f.,
20. Demons have a natural faith, based on the evident judg­
ment of the fact of revelation, 23. See Intellect, Reason

Grace is not necessary for eliciting the judgment of evident
credibility of revelation, 22 f.

Intellect. God's revelation involves the infusion of a superna­
tural light in the intellect, 4, 8-10. The human intellect has
a radical capacity to reach something beyond its natural
specific object, 9. The natural light and activity of the in­
tellect is in no way disturbed by the infusion of the super­
natural light of revelation, 8, 11 f., 19 f. See Credibility,
Faith. Reason. Revelation, Supernatural
E

Martyr. Notion of martyrdom, footnote 41. Martyrs are an
outstanding motive of credibility of the Christian religion,
48-50. Their history, motive, and manner of suffering, 48-50.
Number of persecutions and of martyrs, 48 f., footnote 43

Messias. Meaning and use of this title, footnote 31, given to
Christ in the gospels, 28 f. The concept of Messias in the
Ο. T., 29 f.

Miracle. Biblical use of this word, footnote 53. Nature and di­
vision of miracle, 64-67. The specific character of miracle is
116

Analytical Index
to be something extraordinary, that is, beyond the laws
established by God in all created nature, 65 f. Creation, in­
fusion of soul in the body, elevation, justification, are not
miracles, 65 f. Any extraordinary thing produced by angels
or demons is not a miracle, 66. Physical miracle is only modally supernatural, footnote 8. The principal division of mir­
acles is into miracle as to substance, as to subject, and as
to manner, 66 f., 71, 83. The possibility of miracle is based
on the contingency of the physical laws and on the omnipo­
tence of God, 67 f. Miracle is not opposed to God’s wisdom
and goodness, 69 f. The possibility of miracle is denied by
Rationalists under two opposed forms of Determinism and
Contingentism, footnotes 57 and 59. They attribute miracles
either to fiction or to natural causes, as unknown forces of
nature, mental suggestion, or occultism, footnotes 65 and
67. False or true miracles in pagan religions, footnotes 61
and 64. Christ’s miracles are historically true, 71-78. The
great variety of his miracles, 70 f. His greatest miracle is
his own resurrection; see this entry. Christ’s miracles are
evident and certain proof of the divine origin of his religion,
79-87. In several of these miracles there takes place a uni­
versal effect, which cannot be produced but by God, the
universal cause, 83-85. See Prophecy, Supernatural

Modernism. See Rationalism
Mystery, as to its notion and division, footnote 8. See Super­
natural

Natural Laws. Physical and moral laws, unlike the metaphy­
sical, are contingent, and hence they allow exceptions, like
miracles, 67-69. Among rationalistic systems, Determinism
teaches absolute fixity of the laws of nature, while Con­
tingentism holds their complete instability; in both cases
the possibility of miracle is denied, footnote 57. See Miracle

Necessity, either physical or moral, footnote 14
Obediential Potency, as to its notion, 9, footnote 10, and as a
basis of supernatural elevation and revelation, 8 f.

117

Fundamental Theology
Pagans. The imperfect ethics of the great pagan philosophers,
such as Plato and Aristotle, footnote 40. False miracles and
prophecies and possibility of true miracles and prophecies
among pagans, footnotes 61 and 77. Various religious truths
found in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, as expounded by
Vatican II, footnote 47

Prophecy. Notion and division, 89 f. Its proper object is a con­
tingent future event, depending on the free will of God or
man, 89. As a criterion of revelation it requires not only the
prediction of a future event but also its fulfillment, 89. Its
possibility is based on the universal knowledge of God and
of its revelation to man, 90 f. Christ’s prophecies are his­
torically true, 91-96. His principal prophecy regards his
own resurrection, 92 f.; among other prophecies particular
importance is to be given to the one about the destruction
of Jerusalem, 93-96, 101, footnotes 72-74. Christ’s prophecies
are certain criteria of the divine origin of his religion, for
no natural cause can account for them, 96-101. The mes­
sianic prophecies of the Ο. T. are also certain criteria of the
same truth, 101-105; they are found especially in eighteen
passages of the patriarchal, Davidic, and prophetical eras,
footnote 78 f. Distinction between true and false prophecies,
footnote 77. Rationalism denies the trueness of prophecies,
on the basis of Fatalism, or Contingentism, or Agnosticism,
footnote 69, and attributes them to natural divination, ac­
companied by fraud, illusion, or religious exaltation, foot­
note 76
Rationalism teaches the following: There is no supernatural
order (Positive Rationalism) or at least it cannot be known
by man (Agnostic Rationalism, like Modernism), footnote
7. Revelation is not necessary nor fitting, but rather harm­
ful to human reason, 11, footnote 33. Miracle is not possible,
because the laws of nature are either absolutely fixed (De­
terminism), or completely contingent (Contingentism),
footnote 57. Christ’s miracles are either historically not true,
or they can be explained through natural causes, footnotes
59, 63, 65, 67. Christ’s resurrection can be attributed to
fraud, error, or fiction, footnotes 59, 63. Prophecies can be
attributed to natural divination, coupled with fraud, illus118

Analytical Index
ion, or religious exaltation, footnotes 76, 77

Reason is perfected by revelation, both in the speculative and
in the practical order, 11-14, 32-37. Without revelation,
natural reason cannot suitably reach natural truths con­
cerning religion and morals, 13 f. See Faith, Intellect, Reve­
lation
Religion. Christian religion compared to other religions and
cultures, 36 f., 38, 40, 45 f., 55, 56, 60. It is in no way derived
from other religions or philosophies, 45 f.

Resurrection can be considered as a miracle either of the first
or of the second class, footnote 55. Christ’s resurrection is
historically true, 75-78. Its miraculous character is evident
from the fact that in it a universal effect takes place, which
requires a universal cause, God alone, 83. Rationalists deny
its historical truth, attributing it to fraud, error, or fiction,
footnotes 59 and 63. Christ’s prophecy about his resurrec­
tion, 92 f., 99. See Miracle

Revelation. Biblical concept of revelation, 1 f., and its defini­
tion, 2-4. Vatican II did not change the traditional definition
of revelation as being essentially a speech of God, 2 f., foot­
note 5. Distinction of revelation from inspiration and assis­
tance of the Holy Spirit, 4. With respect to theology, revela­
tion is its light, principle, and foundation, vi. See Faith, In­
tellect, Reason, Supernatural

Sanctity, as a fruit of Christian religion, 48-50, and a criterion
of its divine origin, 56 f., 60. See Martyrs
Supernatural. Notion and division, footnote 8. Various super­
natural lights in human intellect, 3 f. The existence of a
supernatural order follows from the very existence of God
as transcending the proper object of the human intellect,
6 f. Physical miracles are supernatural not essentially but
modally, 75. The supernatural truths of Christian religion
are in full harmony with natural truths, 43-45. See Faith,
Reason, Revelation

119

Fundamental Theology
Tertulian testifies to the extraordinary expansion of the
Church at his time, 52, footnote 45. His famous axiom about
“the soul being naturally Christian,” 34, 37

Thomas Aquinas (St.) on definition and division of miracle,
65, footnotes 54 and 56; on necessity of revelation for the
suitable knowledge of natural truths, footnote 17
Vatican I. Definition of revelation, 2, its possibility, 7, fitting­
ness and necessity, 11 f., 13, footnote 17. Existence of evident
criteria of revelation, especially miracles and prophecies,
footnotes 2 and 69. The Church promotes human culture,
footnote 33
Vatican IL Definition of revelation, 2 f. On the necessity of
divine help for preparation to faith, footnote 27. Revealed
doctrine fulfills the human aspirations and is fitting to the
present conditions of the world, 33-35. In pagan religions,
as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, are found several ele­
ments of truth,footnote 47

120