Contributors

CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT is Professor of Political Science at Carleton College in Northfield. Minnesota. She has published articles on Aristotle. Tocqueville, Nietzsche, and various classic American novelists.

ARLENE W. SAXONHOUSE is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. In addition to several articles on ancient Greek literature and philosophy, she has written a book on Women *in the History of Political Thought: Ancient Greece to Machiavelli.*

MARY P. NICHOLS is the Visiting Scholar for Honors Education at the University of Delaware. Her writings include *Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate,* as well as articles on Rousseau and Shakespeare.

ANN P. CHARNEY is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rosary College, River Forest, Illinois. She is currently editing a collection of essays on Aristotle's *Politics.*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., is Professor of Government at Harvard University. His books include *Statesmanship and Party Government, The Spirit of Liberalism,* and *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders.*

DAVID LOWENTHAL is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. He has edited and translated Montesquieu's *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline.*

TIMOTHY FULLER is Professor of Political Science at Colorado College. He edits the *International Hobbes Association Newsletter* and has published on liberalism, authority, and the nature of modern political philosophy.

NATHAN TARCOV is Associate Professor of Political Science and in the College at the University of Chicago. He is author of *Locke's Education for Liberty.*

MICHAEL GILLESPIE is Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University and author of *Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History.*

WERNER DANNHAUSER is Professor of Government at Cornell University and author of *Nietzsche's View of Socrates.*

Edited by

Catherine H. Zuckert

^^-^ndcrstanding the

Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche

Yale University Press

New Haven and London

authoritative prejudices" ("Interpretive Essay," p. 387). But it is not clear to me that the city in speech has any room for Socrates. For example, it has its own set of authoritative prejudices, such as the one-man, one-art formula, to say nothing of the noble lie. Although the city's rulers may understand that the noble lie is a lie salutary for the city and that the members of the city are not descended from the same mother, do they understand that its teaching about homogeneity and simplicity is untrue? This is a teaching, I would argue, that their mathematical education makes them inclined to accept.

8. Commentators typically believe that Socrates' presentation of the philosopher-kings' education is, in the words of H. B. Joseph, "what Plato thought that a philosophic—i.c., the highest—education should be." (*Knowledge and (he Good in Plato's Republic,* reprint of the 1948 Oxford University Press edition [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981], p. 1). John Burnet suggests that Socrates here gives the curriculum of the Academy itself (*Platonism* [Berkeley: The University of California Press. 1928], pp. 101-02).

9. Annas tries to assimilate the Socratic conversation to the study included in the philosopher-kings' education. She is not deterred by the fact that the two understandings of dialectic "at first glance do not happily go together" (*An Introduction to Plato's Republic,* p. 282).

ANN P.
CHARNEY

IV

Spiritedness and Piety in Aristotle

In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle begins his consideration of the political role and meaning of spiritedness with a critique of the Homeric heroes. He questions both the identification of the Homeric hero's spiritedness with courage and the piety of the hero's conception of the gods. Through Aristotle's analysis of the qualities mistaken for courage, the Homeric hero is shown to be moved by spiritedness stemming from fear of the bad opinion of others, and his piety is shown to be a hope for the favorable opinion of the gods. This spiritedness and this piety turn out to be the opposite sides of the same coin: the desire for immortality. Aristotle replaces Homeric courage with true courage derived from one's own reason (the highest manifestation of which is philosophy), but he is silent about the nature of true piety. Instead, he advocates an earthly justice, which prevents injustice and promotes mutual assistance, and the self-sufficiency that comes through contemplation or philosophy. Spiritedness and piety converge in the imitation of the gods. This convergence illuminates the relation between one's own and the good. Rational self-love and a just concern for others coalesce in the magnanimous man who through spiritedness joins the parts of the city in friendship. The magnanimous man also brings the city and the philosopher together by educating the city in the noble or the beautiful. The activity of the magnanimous man is the physical and human reflection of immortality. To maintain both the good of the individual and the well-being of the city

is the essence of spiritedness. To dedicate oneself to sustaining such a balance deserves the title of true piety.

Spiritedness, Piety, and the Homeric Hero

Aristotle's judgment on spiritedness is indicated in his first extended discussion of the moral virtues, where he relegates spiritedness to the third remove from the virtue of courage.' Courage is a mean between fear and confidence. An excess *of* fearlessness has no name but could be called madness or insensitivity to pain; an excess of confidence in the face of fearful things is rashness; excessive fear is cowardice, as is defective confidence. Although others might be called courageous metaphorically, the courageous man, unfrightened, faces death in battle where there are dangers against which one can defend oneself or die nobly. Spiritedness is ranked among the five illusory types of courage. The first type has two aspects: political courage attaches, on the one hand, to citizens who face death for the sake of honors or for evading penalties or shame. On the other hand, it attaches to troops who fear the certain pain that will be inflicted on them by their generals if they do not fight—a compulsory political courage. The apparent courage of seasoned troops whose experience tells them they are in no danger is second, followed by spiritedness. Fourth is the courage of the sanguine, who have an unfounded confidence in their own powers. The apparent courage of the sanguine is parallel to the fifth type, the courage of the ignorant, who face danger without realizing the gravity of the situation. The sanguine and the ignorant have an unfounded confidence in their surroundings.

For Aristotle, then, spiritedness is different from courage. Courage is deliberate and, fully aware of the dangers, stands firm; spiritedness is impetuous, driven it would seem by fear or pain. When driven by pain, spiritedness seeks revenge or a desperate salvation. As wild beasts are emboldened by pain, so spirited men rush blindly into dangerous situations. Such a blind attack cannot be called courageous, says Aristotle, any more than

can the hunger of the asses who attack the wheatfields oblivious to cudgels or the daring of the lustful adulterer.2 Rather than a fixed disposition to face nobly the dangers of war and death, spiritedness in this sense is a brutish response to pain. Aristotle's example of the wounded animal emphasizes the irrational aspect of spiritedness (cf. 1147a!!–20). Despite this Aristotle says that the courageous man is essentially spirited *(thymoeidês),* adding to natural spiritedness reason, purpose, and choice and action for the sake of the noble. Nevertheless, whatever the nature of spiritedness may be, it is in itself not the moral virtue of courage.

It is not only spiritedness that is demoted in the section on courage, but also those spirited men who were considered to be courage incarnate, the Homeric heroes. Homer is not quoted in those passages where Aristotle speaks of true courage but only in the passages on political courage and spiritedness. His heroes serve as examples in Aristotle's remarks on both kinds of political courage. The first quotation presents Hector's fear of shame: "Polydamus will be the first to flout me" *(Iliad* XXII. too). Hector, well aware of the inferiority of his strength to Achilles', refuses to hide from Achilles for fear that Polydamus will blame him, for his earlier Zeus-abetted overconfidence that caused the Trojans to overextend themselves. Despite the fact that his sense of shame further endangers the Trojans, he resolves to fight Achilles in order to know "which one the Olympians will give glory to"—a surprising reason, given Achilles' manifest physical superiority.'

Aristotle next cites a passage quoting Diomedes that has much to do with Hector: "Hector will make his boast at Troy hereafter, 'By me was Tydeus' son' " *(Iliad* VIII. 148). Diomedes bravely attempted to rescue old, courageous Nestor from Hector. He is so successful that he almost kills Hector. This arouses Zeus, who dotes on Hector, to throw a lightning bolt to scare off Diomedes. He convinces Nestor to retreat, but Diomedes is afraid Hector will boast of his victory. It takes three more lightning bolts to persuade Diomedes, partly because Hector is indeed taunting him. Hector and the Trojans take heart from Zeus' signs, and the Achaeans would have been routed had not Zeus

at the last minute sent a sign to renew their hope. Both passages that Aristotle cites concern occasions when the sense of shame or fear of blame causes the heroes to act contrary to good military strategy. We see Hector both jeering and fearing jeers: the Homeric heroes can use this weapon because they are so vulnerable to it.

In the section on compulsory political courage, Aristotle, after quoting Hector and Diomedes correctly, ascribes to Hector a threat made by Agamemnon: "Whomsoever I sec cowering far from the battle. He will be certain not to escape the dogs" (i 116334). This is a studied error on Aristotle's part intended to show the connection between the two kinds of political courage.[4] In addition, Aristotle changes the Homeric passage. The original reads: "Whomsoever I see tarry by the curved ships *willingly* far from the battle, He then will be certain not to escape the dogs *and birds" (Iliad* II.391, italics mine).[5] In compulsory political courage, the commanders make the fear of battle secondary to fear of the certain death they will inflict on cowards. Aristotle removes the word *willingly* from the Homeric passage, because neither the courage nor the cowardice of political courage is voluntarily chosen, and he substitutes the word "cowering." He indicates that even the bravest acts of political courage are a form of cowardice, a blind, unreasoning flight from pain.[6] But since shame is also a kind of pain (as are civil penalties), the first kind of political courage is also the result of the fear of pain, its actions as little reasoned as—albeit more noble than—the actions of compulsory political courage.

The wish to avoid civil penalties or military firing squads is prudent, as is the fear of shame, if such a consideration is the result of a reasoned assessment of its correctness. As the Homeric allusions show, however, Aristotle objects to political courage because of its dogmatic, dog-like qualities. Just as dogs bark at all strangers, so political courage avoids all punishments no matter what the consequences, and it fears all adverse opinion no matter how ill-informed or ill-willed. Moreover, the slightest omen encourages Homeric heroes beyond reason or discourages them beyond ingenuity. The defective character of the political

courage that stands in awe of the opinions of others is underscored at the end of Book IV, where Aristotle asserts that awe is not a virtue? Aristotle attributes Agamemnon's threat to Hector in order to indicate the connection between these two kinds of political courage. The common thread is the lack of reason informing any of the actions. Hector is also used because he is susceptible to the inducements of political courage and because he of all the heroes is most harmed by his dependence on omens and opinions.

These characteristics of political courage are close to Aristotle's conception of spiritedness as rooted in fear or pain or certain desires. In part, this is why Homeric passages appear also in Aristotle's discussion of spiritedness. Two of these passages refer to the spiritedness imparted to the combatants by the gods in the *Iliad*." Spiritedness engendered by a belief in the arbitrary, vengeful Homeric gods does not elicit the knowledge and reasoning requisite to true courage. This belief is based on an unreasoning hope for physical participation in the eternal. And behind that desire for immortality lies a greater fear for the destruction of the body than of the soul. As political courage is the capitulation to man's passions, so spiritedness is the appeasement of the passions of the gods. Aristotle blames the Homeric heroes for failure to attend properly to the soul. Though Hector is pained by the blame of Polydamus, he does not learn from the pain how to avoid bringing new harm upon his city. His mistake in facing Achilles, thus leaving Troy leaderless, is a mistake he has made before: he allows his trust in omens to cloud his rational powers of assessment. He is not courageous enough to be afraid. Diomedes' fear of obloquy also has a physical root. Diomedes dreads the opinion of his enemies, not of his fellow citizens. His shame is based on the fear of what others can do to the weak. His self-assessment comes to depend on the assessment of others, his purpose to influence that assessment. His soul is enslaved to others.

What, then, is courage? Courage is a mean between the extremes of fear and confidence, Aristotle says. The vices attached to courage, though, arc excesses of these extremes: cour-

age is the only moral virtue the extremes of which themselves have extremes and are therefore not simply bad. The vice concurrent with courage is not confidence: it is an excess or defect of confidence. Thus, there can be an appropriate amount of fear on certain occasions. One of these occasions could be facing death; Aristotle would then be calling into question the citizen's duty to defend the city. But Aristotle says that the courageous man is without terror when facing a noble death, and that the noblest death is in battle. Though it is courageous to fear some things, it is not courageous to fear armed combat. Moreover, the courageous man is also without terror (but not without pain [1117b 10–16]) when facing such dangers as death at sea, where defending oneself or dying nobly is not possible. Though death is the "most fearful thing," the courageous man does not fear it.

Aristotle's examination of the moral virtues, beginning with courage, is prefaced by a discussion of voluntary actions or the possibility of human freedom. Courage differs from spiritedness in that courage includes reason as well as passion, despite the fact that courage is a virtue of the irrational part of the soul. Reason, not spiritedness, is the touchstone of courage. But courage from the perspective of reason looks quite different from political courage. Courage is concerned with facing death nobly; but it also includes the strength to flee death when it is fitting to do so. It is the ability to judge dispassionately, free from opinion or shame, the right time, reason, and manner of enduring or fearing the right things (m .sbzo). If one ought not to fear anything not due to oneself, and if death is yet fearful, then the courageous man judges the occasion for facing death using standards supplied by reason. The courageous man might well avoid a battle in order to win the war. Certainly he would not be impetuous but would be "slow to act, and only in the great and notable deeds" (ii24b2$). Courage must be accompanied by knowledge—which is not the same as saying that courage is knowledge.|"

The occasions for fear arc "above the human" (111 $b8), things feared by everyone with intelligence. These are the oc-

casions for the courage that fears to the appropriate degree—that is neither excessive nor deficient in fearing, both of which show a lack of intellect. These above human things are the divine. It is possible "to fear such things too much and too little; and also to fear things that are not fearful as if they were fearful" (1115614). Fearing the divine too much results in paralysis because of the vastness of the unknown. The belief that they are loved by the gods causes the rash spiritedness of the Homeric heroes: they feared such things too little. Believing that the gods are evil or ill-willed toward humans is to fear things not fearful. The proper attitude, an appropriate amount of fear," is best depicted in Aristotle's description of courage. Aristotle restores or reconstitutes spiritedness when he declares both that a courage stemming from spiritedness seems most natural, and that when spiritedness is combined with rational choice and a view of the end, it really is courage. Spiritedness combined with intellect is needed to philosophize in the face of the knowledge of one's ignorance about the gods. The philosopher, however, pursues the truth as the ass his grain or the adulterer his beloved, a sign that the truth is pleasant. One kind of spiritedness is kindled by desire.

Piety, Spiritedness, and the Aristotelian City

Fearing the gods in the appropriate manner seems to be the definition of piety. Piety, manifesting itself as philosophy, is no longer fitting or needed to support the courage to face death in battle. Does any place remain for piety in the political domain? There is, in all of Aristotle's discussions of virtue, no virtue of Piety. In keeping with this omission, there is little mention of the gods or the requirements of religion in other areas where they might be expected. Advice on the religious arrangements of the city in the *Politics* is minimal. Religious magistrates are brought into Aristotle's discussion of the magistracy in Book VI, but not in his more prominent discussion of it in Book IV. In his consideration of the parts necessary to the "regime ac-

cording to prayer" in Book VII, Aristotle lists the priests in his first enumeration but omits them in his summary count. Even when he remarks on the need for officers to order the city's religious observances, he makes no mention of the form or content of these religious arrangements, still less connecting them with the ends of the city.[12]

One would also expect reference to the gods in the context of justice and the laws in view of Aristotle's association with Plato. The inquiry into justice in Plato's *Republic* ends with, and seems to depend on, the theological myth of Book X. In the *Laws,* the laws endure not because they arc just but because the citizens are pious. Plato's Socrates does not neglect considerations of piety in relation to the justice of the individual or to stability and excellence in the community. In Aristotle's account of justice *(Nicomachean Ethics,* Book V), in contrast, the only named divinities are the Graces *(Charites),* goddesses of joy, natural beauty, and bodily grace. The Graces are presented as a symbol or reminder of requital in a prelude to the discussion of corrective justice in the exchange of goods. Association for exchange is not possible without proportional reciprocity. The city, too, requires proportionate requital to remain together: if men cannot requite evil for evil, they think themselves slaves; if they cannot do good for good, there is no sharing, without which the city cannot long endure. "This is why they put a shrine of the Graces in a public place [literally, "at our feet"], so that there be a repayment. For this is peculiar to grace: one must not only return a service in gratitude, but another time initiate the favor" (113332). Though the Graces are divine, their purpose is not to remind us of the gods but to recall our duties to our fellow men.

Aristotle refers to religious matters again in Book V, in his discussion of political justice. Political justice or right has two parts, the natural and the conventional. The just by nature concerns the unchangeable things ("the natural has everywhere the same force" (1134bzo]); conventional right derives its force from its decree. Aristotle's refusal to give examples of natural right has been the source of difficulty and controversy. The examples

of conventionally just actions, however, point to the general dictates of natural right. Among the examples of the conventional arc "to sacrifice one goat, and not two sheep; and such special legislation as sacrificing to Brasidas" (i 134618-24). When Aristotle speaks of sacrifice in general, he looks not at the gods to whom one sacrifices, nor to the reason for sacrificing, but at the objects to be sacrificed. When he considers the recipient of a sacrifice, he looks at a particular human being, Brasidas, the Spartan general.

The omission of the gods and the mention of a contemporary war hero carry through the perspective in Aristotle's discussion of courage. In Homer the gods bestow immortal glory on the heroes; in the *Ethics* the bestowal of glory is a part of the city's justice that is connected to natural right." Though the honors given by Amphipolis occur after Brasidas' death, it is important that the city memorialize him. Gratitude is needed to indicate to potential defenders that the city will reward them in return for their deeds. The treachery toward Athens by Alcibiades (who is nowhere mentioned in the *Ethics* or *Politics) is* the result of mutual ingratitude between the city and the great man.[14] The Graces and natural right arc conjoined; together they replace the divine in justice. Aristotle pushes to their limits the solely human grounds and supports for the highest achievements of social and individual self-sufficiency.

Grace is a giving that does not have some return in mind.[15] It would be simply another form of exchange if it were performed for the sake of receiving a reward, even the reward of gratitude. But Aristotle says that the Graces require the initiation of a favor and not merely the repayment of one. Because the hero risks and sometimes gives his life for the city, his action must be gracious in a literal sense. The initiation of a favor by the city, however, would conflict with justice (1131325-32). With regard to freely given favors, the Graces are a reminder to the citizens, not to the city. Alcibiades' failure to understand this constitutes his one lapse of prudence. The city's gratitude on this account must be of the strongest kind. The elevation of the defender to almost divine status is necessary in order that the

defender not devote his talents to merely private challenges. Athens' failure to recognize this in Alcibiades' case was one of its many foolish acts.'6

Grace as gratitude, moreover, is necessary for the city both to preserve itself and to live well. In addition to heroes, the city needs benefactors, especially those who are munificent. Outfitting the triremes, they help defend the city. Adorning the tragic chorus in purple, they provide the city with beauty in the arts. The munificence of the gift is the donor's original reward, but the city cannot say to the giver, as the tyrant Dionysius said to the musician, "I have already paid you by the pleasure I have given you." The city must honor the donor "or else there is no sharing and it is sharing which makes [the city] last."|

Requiting evil with evil is the province of justice and the laws. Aristotle's passage on the Graces is ambiguous about this kind of requital. If outside the reach of the laws, one evil can be that of undeserved good fortune. Aristotle discusses this in Book II of the *Ethics.* Righteous indignation is pain felt at undeserved flourishing by another; envy is pain at any flourishing by another (uo8bi-6). These emotions can be a source of division in the city. The shrine of the Graces is a reminder that the good of the city erases the distinction between righteous indignation and envy, a helpful reminder when one is on the threshold of indignation. The Graces show that the flourishing of any citizen is the flourishing of the city; they exhort one to rejoice in another's good fortune as in the good fortune of a friend. The recipient is reminded, too, to be grateful to the city for his good fortune. His gift to the city constitutes such a recognition and shows all citizens their connection with his good fortune. The Graces, then, indicate a pious relation of giving and honoring, but this relation exists between the citizens and the city rather than between the gods and men.

Aristotle relates contemplation to the divine in Book X of the *Ethics.*'* Yet even here nothing like the Homeric gods is encountered, and there is no discussion of the need for piety. Contemplation is an activity of the intellect, the divine on the human level. It is self-sufficient and above action, as the gods

are. One who contemplates is akin to the gods and is therefore most loved by the gods. This relationship to the gods consists not in the observance of religious rites in humble awe, but in seeking to know and to contemplate all things. The human being must not merely look up to but must also ascend to the level of the gods. While contemplation can be an appropriate and even spirited stance toward the gods, it cannot be a common one: very few can participate in this activity and only alone. The two outlets of the divine, contemplation and gratitude, diverge in their expression. Graditude culminates in gracious reciprocity; contemplation, by its movement toward unchanging self-sufficiency, seems to negate the message of the Graces. Aristotle's twofold depiction of the gods, as both inactive and loving, indicates this divergence. But, as with the spiritedness and piety of the heroes, these two activities expressing the divine arc animated by the same desire: immortality. That desire has many forms including that of spiritedness. The city must strive for immortality in self-perpetuation. The citizen too adulates life, as long as he thinks that immortality consists of his body's not dying. The immortality of the philosopher, on the other hand, is his participation in the eternal through contemplation. There is no extrinsic reward for this activity or otherworldly punishment for its absence. Nor does contemplation—although it involves prudence—guard him against chance, ward off misfortune, or preserve the body in its earthly identity.

However, this relationship to the divine through contemplation seems to endanger the very gods who the citizens believe are the guarantors of their immortality.[1M] The disjunction between the philosopher and the city lies in the constitutive nature of each: the essence of philosophy is knowledge, of the city its laws; the means of philosophy must be continual questioning, of the city command and obedience. What sort of relationship can there be between the requirements of the two with respect to piety? Since the philosopher must be a part of the city as well as outside it (questioning it and encompassing it through his knowledge), the problem resolves itself into a question of the unity of the city. What can hold the city together? The difficulty

exists not only between the philosopher and the city but also between the citizen and the city in their different requirements for self-preservation and for freedom.

The Unity of Spiritedness and Piety

A common belief in the gods, a common piety, could be an admirable source of unity for the city.2" The alliance of the city with the gods, the city claims, gives the citizen a double guarantee of immortality: the citizen will live through the continued existence and renown of the city and, even with the demise of the city, the gods will assure his journey beyond this world. The gods are counted upon to provide the spectrum of self-preservation to the city, from minimal bodily needs through the luxuries of good fortune to immortality, however understood. In connecting immortality to self-preservation, however, the city—again because its reason for being is the preservation of the body—necessarily views immortality in terms of the body and material goods. That this view is, in fact, the opinion of human immortality held by many shows the general harmony between most human beings and the city. It also causes, paradoxically, the profound, almost paralyzing fear of death that holds most men: if the body is primary, its death is the primary evil. Finally, it gives rise to unfulfillablc hopes that cause these same adherents to be willing to see others die. The political uses of piety make the divine subservient to political ends—and to the wrong political ends. The gods in the service of the political destroy both the divine and the city. The spiritedness stemming from such piety knows no distinction between friend and enemy, knowledge and opinion.

Nor does Aristotle claim that it is piety that holds the city together. Instead, he refers to the elements that he has severed from the divine. Proportionate requital holds the city together. Good for good, evil for evil, and grace arc necessary to the city. The citizens arc devoted to the city, and the city preserves the citizens' freedom. Good citizens arc enabled by law to exile bad

citizens. The initiator of a favor to the city is honored above his fellow citizens.

But more than reciprocity is needed to establish unity. The need that holds the city together can be satisfied by imports from abroad (1133327). Mere exchange of goods can be effected among strangers. The insufficiency of reciprocity is confirmed by Aristotle, who says in Books VIII and IX of the *Ethics* that the claim of justice is superseded by the claim of friendship. The core of political justice is shown to be friendship. Concord or like-mindedness among citizens is the friendship necessary to prevent faction, and concord requires more than justice, exchange, or requital. Concord requires not merely that each person want or think the same thing—for example, it is not concord that each citizen should want to get the highest price possible for his products or as much freedom as possible within the security of the state—but that each want the same thing in relation to the same person. Concord is a distributive or constitutive relation. Only the particular declaration, "I want Pittacus to rule"—and even Pittacus must agree—can evoke the similarity of mind that unites the city. "Concord is, then, about the practical things, those connected to great matters, and capable of being shared by both or by all" (1167329).

The basis for friendship in the city is spiritedness, "for spiritedness is the capacity of the soul whereby we arc friends."[21] Aristotle in the *Politics* reinstates the benefits of spiritedness that he had denigrated in connection with heroic courage. Discussing the desired character or nature of the citizens in the regime according to prayer, Aristotle praises the Greeks. Rather than having only a spirited nature *(ihytnoeidës)* and thus being unable to rule politically, or only intelligence and thus being continuously dominated, the Greek nature has both these capacities in an appropriate mixture; thus the Greeks are easily educated in virtue by the legislator. Political rule and freedom arc the fitting aims of the good city. It is through spiritedness, Aristotle continues, "that rule and freedom are in all cases acquired: for spiritedness is able to rule and it is indomitable."–

The spiritedness whereby citizens are friends is not the

reactive fear or anger of the animal described by Aristotle as epitomizing false courage, nor is it the willful opposition to whatever is not one's own. Political spiritedness exists on the high plane of magnanimity. The magnanimous man occupies the peak of the moral virtues. He claims and deserves the highest honors, but he is moved to act only by those deeds that arc great and notable. He chooses to own beautiful but unprofitable things as a sign of self-sufficiency. He speaks freely or with irony because he cares more for the truth than for what people think of him. Although they can be angered by the slights and injuries inflicted by their friends, the magnanimous by nature arc harsh only to doers of injustice.[23] Political spiritedness is the source of justice as well as of friendship.

The key to the unity of the city, then, is the magnanimous man, who is spirited and intelligent and thus able to rule and to remain free. If the city is the replacement for the Homeric gods who care for the human things, the magnanimous man replaces the Homeric heroes. But the magnanimous man is above the honors of the city, nor does he fear the city's blame. He is his own complete judge. His actions are inspired by their greatness and not by his desire for honor, although they arc the actions which the city honors.[24] Above all, the magnanimous man can provide political rule and freedom in a way that harmonizes these competing elements, that unites the various and dissimilar parts of the city, and that brings together to the extent possible the good of the individual and the common good.

Through his great and notable actions, the magnanimous man provides a focal point for the spiritedness of the many that stems from the love of one's own. Rather than degenerating into an invidious selfishness, the spiritedness led by the magnanimous man is harnessed to the defense of the city. The many and the city are essentially connected: the many arc the body of the city and its military followers, as the military leaders, the judges, and the deliberators—the decent—are its soul. This brings the city closer to the many: when the many claim that they arc the city, there is a truth to this claim that is tied to their shared ends.[25] The magnanimous man provides a more proximate sup-

port than the gods for the natural piety of the many, through which they are induced to just action and are inclined toward the divine.

Aristotle does not believe one can simply depend on admiration of the magnanimous man to bring the many to justice. But when he writes of the inability of the many to be made law-abiding by persuasion, his alternative is "laws with teeth," and certainly not a Myth of Er. In the *Metaphysics,* Aristotle scorns using gods as "a means of persuading the many and as something useful for the laws and for matters of expediency."[2"] He prefers, perhaps for reasons of piety, that punishment of lawbreakers be administered by human hands. He says that "almost the most necessary and most difficult of all offices is the one concerned with the execution of judgment upon persons cast in suits and those posted as defaulters according to the lists, and with the guarding of the prisoners [literally, "of the bodies"]." Human law-enforcers have the most difficult of all offices. They cannot sec into human hearts, and a political rather than a divine system of punishment provides a temporary but fortunately unreliable ring of Gygcs to the unjust; nevertheless, the judgment of human law-enforcers is here and now, and their lacunae do not call into question the justice, impartiality, or the existence itself of the gods. Thus because the many are ruled by their bodies through their passions, and because the many epitomize the body, which is the cause and end of the city, it seems certain that Aristotle's religious arrangements in the city aim toward the gods' representing not reward or retribution but necessity.[2] With this necessity comes a kind of freedom that is not present in Homeric piety. The element of fear is attenuated by the clement of responsibility—to a degree the citizens' fate depends on their own actions—and by the fact that the city is present and comprehensible to them. And the city, dependent on the distinction between the possible and the impossible, is able to discern the importance of reason.

While the many are in awe of the power and success of the magnanimous man, the decent are attracted to him through their love of the noble, and it is through this passion that they can be

led to virtue. For they are open to the persuasion of reason or intelligence through its intrinsic beauty. When Aristotle speaks of the education of the decent in Book X of the *Ethics* he is completely silent about piety. What takes its place is an education in the noble or the beautiful. This education is more in keeping with the true nature of the divine and does not have the drawbacks in respect to the decent that conventional piety docs. It is an education toward an object that is an end in itself. It requires activity on the part of the educated, who must search out the beautiful and strive to make their own lives noble. The standard is something outside themselves, not self-gratification. Because it leads the educated outside themselves, it keeps them from making the comparisons with others that can lead to righteous indignation.[28]

It must be stressed that acting for the sake of the noble is not the same as acting for the sake of honor. As is the case with courageous actions, the judgment of the nobility of one's actions depends on one's own knowledge of nobility or beauty: it docs not depend on the favor of others—and it is thus vulnerable neither to the objections that make honor an unsuitable standard nor to the fluctuating demands of honor that make the life of the seeker of honor uncertain, inconstant, and liable to stray from the guidance of the noble toward the allure of the opinions of others.

Moreover, an education in the noble or the love of the beautiful provides the right education about the gods. Most references to the gods in the *Ethics* either emphasize the remoteness of the gods from human affairs or liken human beings to the gods: imitation is the sincerest form of piety. Aristotle's discussion of education in Book VIII of the *Politics* is also silent about piety. The gods are mentioned only as standards to learn from in the arts; such learning is the political parallel to emulation of the gods by seeking to know and by the activity of contemplation. The gods are the intellect; their reflection is the beautiful. That customary piety is rejected as the proper education for the decent is playfully corroborated by Aristotle when he rejects the Phrygian mode of music as "enthusiastic" and as appealing to

those passions that lead to frenzy. Rather than speaking explicitly of the Phrygian mode, Aristotle criticizes the Phrygian composer Olympus. Aristotle is so fond of homonymic jokes that one may suspect he is criticizing Olympus, the home of the Homeric gods, for engendering excessive enthusiasms; he thus warns against an education in Homeric piety.[30]

The highest human attainment on the political level lies in the exercise of intellectual virtue of prudence and moral virtue of magnanimity, or greatness of soul. Prudence and magnanimity are each shared by the magnanimous man and the philosopher. The philosopher has a theoretical prudence with regard to the knowledge of the good political life; he has a practical prudence with regard to his own good. His magnanimity lies in the truth and greatness of his activity and in the relation of that activity to all human beings. The magnanimous man, through the greatness of his soul and his love of the truth, is receptive to philosophy, although his first object is the spirited care for his own city, and his love of truth stems from the concern for his own soul. He can act as a link between the city and philosophy and can bring to the city, as the philosopher cannot, the benefits of philosophy, rendered safe—but thereby less true—for the city. Moreover, the magnanimous man can relay to the decent the noble character of the political likenesses of philosophy's truths. In this indirect way, philosophy provides the true basis for self-preservation: self-love based on one's own goodness. The magnanimous man provides an object for the concord of desires; in so doing, he provides for the true basis for friendship in the city: the most just articulation possible among the parts of the city.[31]

The shrine of the Graces represents the relation of spiritedness and piety to the city. In Greek myth, the Graces were associated with Aphrodite, Eros, and Dionysus. In Athens the armed youths swore their allegiance to their country before the Graces.[32] The many and the decent need each other for the defense of the city. They also need each other to give the city's justice the elements it needs, exchange and virtue—though this is perhaps not so easily remembered. The Graces, connected in Athens both with the requirements of war and with the beauties

of nature and the refinements of art, serve to remind of the mutual need on all levels of those who are part of the city. Perhaps the most urgent need is to honor the city's outstanding human beings, the magnanimous. Through their command of the many, they preserve the city from both attack and corruption. Through their leadership of the decent, they give the city just rulers and cause it to live well. Through their openness to philosophy and their moderation of its truths for the sake of their own city, they allow the city to participate in immortality.

Notes

1. Aristotle, *NicomacheanEthics,* trans. H. Rackman, ad edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). hereafter cited as *NE,* 111535 ff. For some passages I have used my own translation. All parenthetical citations in the text refer to the *Nichomachean Ethics,* unless otherwise attributed.
2. *NE* 1116b23-i 11733. These similes, which to say the least arc unexpected, are only the surface glimmers of the strangeness of Aristotle's entire presentation of courage and its extremes.
3. Certainty about Achilles' superiority is expressed by Hector's father and mother before Hector faces Achilles. Although one may doubt the wisdom of the timing of their observations. Hector's parents seem to have a greater awareness of the actual situation than he does.
4. The two types of political courage arc oh the surface more different from each other than arc the separate categories of the experienced and the sanguine. If they had been counted separately, however, spiritedness would not have been the central pseudo-courage, nor would it have corresponded numerically to Hesiod's golden age. Cf. Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: University ofChicago Press. Midway Reprints, 1977). PP· 129-30.
5. The Greek for *birds* also means *omens,* because birds were the primary source of signs given by the gods.
6. Cf. Robert K. Faulkner, "Spontaneity. Justice and Coercion: On *Nicomachean Ethics,* Books lll and V," in *Coercion,* Nomos XIV. eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972). pp. 81-106.

7. NE i I28bi τ–13. The desire for honor as a cause of political courage is in fact the same: glory prolongs life.
8. NE ti28bio-35. Cf. Thomas L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 518, n. 55; see also pp. 439-41, 448-49.
9. The third passage is from the Odyssey, the context of which may indicate the kind of spiritedness which underlies the love of one's own family or country. The last passage, origin unknown—"his blood boiled"—seems to depict the spiritedness which is indistinguishable from anger. These passages do serve to indicate the great range of meaning of the word *thymos,* from love to hatred, from body and soul. Cf. Richard John Cunliffe, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), s.v. *thymos.*
10. NE 11 i6b3-23; 1144b24-30. Cf. 110729-27. Aristotle uses the word *deos* (terror—the sensation of fear) instead of *photos. Phobos* connotes a display of fear, especially through flight. Knowing himself to be without *deos,* the courageous man is free to flee the battle for the sake of wise strategy. Cf. *Liddel and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon,* abridged (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871, 1963), s.v. *phohos.*
11. Gauthier and Jolif explain the thrust of *hypokenein* as underscoring the fearful character of that which the courageous man endures: he stands, as it were, underneath the object he faces. Even if he has fallen, he still remains defiant. René Antoine Gauthier and Jean Yves Jolif, eds. and trans., *L'Ethique à Nicomaque,* 2d ed. (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970), vol. Il, p. 225.
12. Aristotle, *Politics,* trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), hereafter cited as *Pol.·,* 1328612-13, 1329328-34; 1329235-39; 1322b18-38; 1299b14-1300a10. Leo Strauss, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
13. Aristotle's use of Brxsidas as his example indicates the importance of the city to one's pursuit of glory: Thucydides emphasizes that Amphipolis intensified Brasidas' honors by obliterating the honors previously given its founder. The Brasidas example complicates the question of honors, however, because Amphipolis' tribute was also due to its fear of Sparta. This sort of complication is intrinsic to the natural right of the city. Thucydides. V.x-xi. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary,* 2d edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). hereafter cited as *OCD;* s.v. "Brasidas."
14. OCD, s.v. "Alcibiades." Leo Strauss, "Preliminary Observations on the Gods in Thucydides' Work," in *Studies in Platonic Political*

Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 102-04. Aristotle's silence on Alcibiades might be a sign that he writes primarily from the point of view of the city in these works.

15. Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric,* trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), hereafter cited as *Rhet.;* 1385320. Aristotle distinguishes this type of action, benevolence, from the kind of action arising from pity or the feeling that a similar evil might befall oneself. *Rhet.* 1385618. *Pol.* 1320325-616; 1267338-b9; 126365-14-
16. Joseph Cropscy, "Justice and Friendship in the *Niconiacliean Ethics" Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). PP· 261-62, 264. Alcibiades is mentioned in the *Rhetoric* as having descendants who became mad: his offspring were for him an even less certain road to immortality than his political deeds. *Rhet.* 1390630.
17· NE 1122334-35; 112266; 1122615-35; 1164314-23.
18. *NE* 1177312-117822; 1179323-33.
19. *Aristotle's Metaphysics,* trans. I lippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), hereafter cited as *Met.,* 1072614-30; 102561-1026233. *Pol.* 1266631-1267318. *NE* 1111621-23; 1124313-17; 1177627-117832.
20. Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Social Contract,* I.vi-vii.
21. *Pol.* 1327641.
22. *Pol.* 1327618-1328322. If spiritedness facilitates rule as well as preventing domination, one might wonder what the place of intellect is. But although the ability to rule belongs to spiritedness, the ability to rule politically requires intelligence in addition. Aristotle, I believe, is pointing to the distinction between general domination and the power to arrange and govern a city so that it achieves virtue, that is, the good of the city and of its citizens. Needless to say, this latter would require knowledge of what virtue is. Again, the importance of reason as an aspect of any virtue is made clear.
23. *NE* 1123333-25317. *Pol.* 132828-18. Cf. pp. 8-9 and n. 10 above.
24. NE 112421-20; 1124623-27; 1125311-13. *Pol.* 1312322-30. That the philosopher is also magnanimous is shown, among other ways, by the words Aristotle uses to describe both the magnanimous man and Socrates.
25. *Pol.* 1290621-1291613.
26. *Met.* 107461-10. *NE* 1179611-21; 1179630-118034; 118034-24.
27. *Pol. 1321640-1322334. NE* 118024-15. Cf. Alfarabi, *The Philosophy*

of Plato and Aristotle, trans. M. Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), II.x.

28. *Pol.* 1340314-19, NE 117964-11. 30-32. *The noble* and *the beautiful* arc the same word in Greek.
29. NE 1095623-30; 112435-13.
30. NE noibio-35, etc. *Pol.* 133967-9; 134038-12, 65; 134162-8; 1342233-612. *Met.* 984615; 106563-4; 1074624-25.
31. NE 1140225-29. 1141329-34, 625-30; 1123635-112435, 25-29; 1166315-23. For another view of virtue in the city. cf. Thomas A. Pangle, op. cit., pp. 385, 389, 399. The magnanimous man bridges the city through the creation of a tension within himself—rather than a domination—of the disparate elements of his soul, and a tension within the city of—rather than a tyranny over—the disparate natures of its inhabitants. Cf. NE 112467-8, 25-27 with *Pot.* 1312339.
32. OCD, s.v. “Charites. "Catherine B. Avery, cd., *The Neto Century Handbook of Greek Mythology and Legend* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972), s.v. “Charites."