BOOKS DECEIVED
Anonymous. Whom Thou Seckest. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940.
Pp. 229. $2.00.
Carney, E. J. The Doctrine of St. Augustine on Sanctity. Washington,
D. C.: The Catholic University Press, 1945. Pp. 121.
Chambat, L. Les Missions des Personnes de la Sainte-Trinité selon S.
Thomas d’Aquin. Abbaye S. Wandrille: Editions de Fonloncllc, 1945.
Pp. 202.
Farrar, C. P., and Evans, Λ. P. Bibliography of English Translations from
Medieval Sources. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp.
534, with index. $7.50.
Giordani, I. St. Paul: Apostle and Martyr. New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1946. Pp. 286, with index. $2.50.

Kleinz, J. The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor. Washington,
D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. 147, with
index.

McWilliams, J. A. Physics and Philosophy. (Philosophical Studies of The
American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. II.) Washington,
D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1945. Pp. 148, with
index. $2.00.

Monette, A.-M. La Théorie des Premiers Principes selon Maine de Biran.
Ottawa: Les Editions de Lévrier, 1945. Pp. 240. $1.50.
Santayana, G. The Idea of Christ in the Gospels. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1946. Pp. 266, with index. $2.75.
Spellman, Francis Cardinal. Prayers and Poems.
Scribner’s Sons, 1946. Pp. 23. $1.00.

New York:

Charles

Til, C. Van. The New Modernism. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Co., 1946. Pp. 384, with index. $3.75.

836

THE THOMIST
Λ SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

Editors: The Dominican Fathers of the Province of St. Joseph
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

Vol. IX

JULY, 1946

No. 3

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

HE Church today is faced with its perennial problem of
clerical and religious vocations in a more than usually
acute stage. The problem itself, with its consequent
problems of fostering and promoting vocations, has theological
roots, the study of which goes far towards concentrating effort
on the heart of the problem; and, indeed, goes to the depths of
much of modern disorder within the family, the nation, and
society. It is the purpose of this study to expose those the­
ological roots to plain view.
Such an aim must not be interpreted as in any way a reflec­
tion on the highly intelligent attention the problem of eccle­
siastical vocations has been receiving in this country. I nder
the auspices of The Missionary Union of The Clergy, confer­
ences have been held in different parts of the country year by
year, and studies have been made from almost every angle of
the question of vocations? The acute needs of the Church for

T

1 Confer Vocation Conferences of September, 1944, for the conference held in
New York City; September, 1945. for the conference held in New Orleans; and
the forthcoming issue for the conference held in January, 1946, in Washington, D. C.
337

338

WALTER FARRELL

vocations have been brought out in these conferences with no
mincing of words; needs confirmed by fact and authority.
There has been complete honesty in the facing of the shortage
of vocations, and the possible causes of this shortage.
Most of the effort in these conferences has, naturally, been
concentrated on the promotion and fostering of vocations. The
encouragement of vocations is not a matter of selling indi­
viduals on a career of service, at great benefit to the individual
himself; nor has this mistake been made. It has been clearly
seen, and explicitly staled, that a vocation to the religious state
or to the priesthood is a supernatural gift; only God, then, can
be its author.
At the same time, there has been the entirely just conviction
of a human part to be played in the development or decay of
what God has given. It is along the line of this human part in
vocations that most of the studies of the Vocation Conferences
have proceeded. It has been seen that our human efforts must
revolve mostly around the removal of impediments to the ful­
fillment of vocations, encouraging the necessary dispositions
to their development, and nourishing their growth. A vocation
to the priesthood or religious life is nothing less than an invita­
tion to serve in the divine household. “ Religion is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of
God. . . . Wherefore those are called religious who give them­
selves up entirely to the divine service. ...” 2
Taking into consideration the essential nature of vocation
and the human efforts possible in its favor, we find a real point
of comparison with the war-time problem of morale. The
comparison, far from being tenuous, has real roots as we shall
see in the course of this study. The attempts to build up
morale, or to sustain it at a high level, were efforts to increase
the willingness of men to serve their country and even to make
great sacrifices in that service. On the basis of this much of a
’“Religio, autem, ... est quaedam virtus, per quam aliquis ad Dei servilium
et cultum aliquid exhibet. Et ideo antonomastice religiosi dicuntur illi qui se
totaliter mancipant divino servitio. ...” Summa Theol., II-II, q. 86, a. 1 corp.

Vimr ES OF Ί1ΙΚ Uf/t -KHOLO

Ή*

comparison, it, would seern that vexation, on it» human
could be seen as the fruit of high religion«» rnoraa- > <> <
efforts of men in the crises of combat were ** * n a- v.<- <r/·
high patriotic morale.
It is t rue ' hal i hroughout 111
throughly mysterious factor; certainly there wa· littk officia)
effort to give it a sharp definition. The effort· to footer jt «-y*
worthy of the vagueness of their goal. Among the mean* *mphasized, a large place was given to activities calculated to dis­
tract men — movies, theatrical skits, radio program·, officer/
clubs, and enlisted men’s beer gardens. Clothes, food, and bring
conditions were given much more attention than in any past
war. There was a strenuous and highly imp·
ffort to
keep the mail coming in. To a much lesser degree, there was
some educational effort toward the realization of the puip
of the war, the training, the methods adopted. All of these
things ui loubtedly played their part. Yet the results consis­
tently confounded the efforts of the morale builders. For high
morale was found
n who were in no position to be
distracted; who had little food, insufficient clothes, and miser­
able living conditions: and who were far beyond the reach of
the most zealous postman. On the contrary, the depths of
morale were often plumbed among the very men who were
within the fullest reach of the combined efforts of all the morale
builders.
There has been no such bumbling in the promotion and
fostering of vocations. Education in the meaning of religious
and priestly life is persistently stressed. Greater efforts are
being made to furnish adequate information and material for
first-hand appreciation of this or that community. With the
fundamental motivation of charity, loyalty, piety. self-sacrnce
and zeal have been stressed. Nevertl
vagueness, a confusion of incidental or dispositive oe :"<n

with essential and direct causes, that is unnecessary and not at
all helpful.
It seems possible to focus the efforts to foster and prvmotc

340

WALTER FARRELL

vocations still more sharply by unearthing the theological roots
of the human dispositions of vocations. A clear delineation of
the fundamental and essential elements should do away with
any least scattering of our thought and action in favor of
vocations. Actually, an investigation of the theological roots
of religious and priestly vocation not only contributes to the
work of fostering vocations but also lays the foundations for
highly important conclusions in several different fields of human
action. It will, for example, explain much that has been
mysterious about patriotic morale, give some penetrating in­
sights into family spirit and discipline, and give opportunities
for highly interesting speculations on social relationships. Nor
is the reason for this wide field of application obscure; in fact it
might be made completely clear, and be effectively summarized,
by saying that the theological roots of religious and priestly
vocation make clear the reason, beauty, and attractiveness of
all service to others.
The obvious note common to vocation and patriotic morale
is that of service. Nor is this just any kind of service. It is
service in the very humble sense of work to be done by a hand­
maid, a servant. It is significant that the statement of this
condition is made by theologians through the Latin word
jamulatus, a homely or terrible word according as it means the
state of being a servant or of being a slave.
At any rate, there are some plain implications in this common
note of service. There is, first of all, an essentially implied sub­
jection, a fulfilling of assigned tasks and obedience to orders.
This subjection itself is a kind of reverence and honor, even
when it is no more than an external subjection with external
reverence and honor; there is in it a recognition of superiority,
in fact, a superiority that has about it an air of clarity and
inviolability difficult to dispute. Vaguely, it is the kind of
superiority recognized in something that is old enough to reach
far back into the past; more sharply, it is the superiority
attached to a thing that reaches back to and beyond our begin­

nings and embraces them.

VIHTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

W

This type of superiority is readily seen by a man, w
ww·
nizes without difficulty that he did not start him^- f. As a
consequence, there is established an intimate kind of order in
a man’s life by this service demanded in the name of religion»
vocation and patriotic morale: it gives him a clear sight of what
is above him. If once a man sees clearly what is above him,
all that is above him, he knows beyond cavil what belong»
beneath him; and by that fact he knows his own place with
complete certitude.
The importance of a knowledge of his place is of incalculable
value to a man. Without it, he cannot recognize usurpers of
his life and his rights, let alone beat them off; nor can he
protect himself from making a wreck of his life and a fool of
himself through the assumption of roles for which he was never
fitted. In proportion to the importance of the hierarchy this
state of service reveals in a man’s life, there are extreme de­
mands made by it upon a man: results like combat sendee in
wartime or the holocaust of one’s life in religion approach the
utmost that can be asked of men; the reverence and honor
implied in subjection do not coi ■ ■ sily to the pride of man;
and order is never maintained without effort. If we are to find
the roots of vocation and patriotic morale, we must look to the
immediate sources of all good acts, that is, to the virtues: for
this is clearly a matter of solidly good action, and even* good
act is an act of virtue?
Specifically, then, it will be necessary to trace sendee to
others to the particular virtue from which it proceeds. If that
virtue is well understood, its proper acts clearly seen and
thoroughly analyzed, the ultimate reasons for the reverence,
honor, and consequent subjection demanded in the name of

service will be uncovered. Our procedure in this paper will lx'
as follows: 1) a determination of and an analysis of the :
<
of service, namely, religion, piety, patriotism, and observance
*. . . virtus et quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum redd l; ct >3co
necessc est dicere omnem actum bonum ad virtutem pertinere SvnwMt riwL
Π-ΙΙ, q. 81, a. i corp.

342

WALTER FARRELL

in that order; 2) a thorough study of the primary acts of each
of these virtues in order, namely, the first act of religion, the
first act of piety, and so on. In the study of the virtues, much
attention will be paid to the virtue of Religion for it is here that
St. Thomas has his most explicit treatment of the principles
involved in the service of others; much that will be said of the
other virtues is implicit in Thomas’ treatment of the virtue of
Religion, and thus dependent on a thorough understanding of
that virtue. The same will be true of the study of the acts of
the virtues. The act of devotion, which is the primary act of
the virtue of Religion, will be dealt with at considerable length;
most of the conclusions relative to the primary acts of the other
virtues of service are implicit in St. Thomas’ treatment of the
act of devotion. We begin our investigation with the virtue of
Religion because we have already seen that the very notion of
service to God, the essential notion of religious vocation, places
it squarely under the virtue of Religion/

******

•

X3

Virtue of Service to God—Religion
As St. Thomas analyzes the virtue of religion, he sees it as
primarily a matter of honesty. Its chief concern is with the
payment of an unpayable debt, or, at the very least, a recog­
nition of this debt. It has about it the flavor of justice in that
it has to do with our relations with another, namely God. It
measures up to the notion of justice inasmuch as it deals with
debts; but it falls far short of the equality of payment that
strict justice demands. It is, then, a virtue annexed to justice,
but distinct from it; a potential part of justice, falling short of
full payment but doggedly proceeding as best it may to the
straightforward dealing with debt that is the essential mark
of an honest man. St. Thomas has put this succinctly:
Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a prin­
cipal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in
4 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 86, a. 1 corp. Cf. footnote 2 supra.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

common with the principal virtue; and thi lecond .

343

- '//me

respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly
since justice is of one man to another, ... all the virtue* that are
directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect
be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice con­
sists in rendering to another his due according to equality, . . .
Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another p< ry>n
fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the
aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due.
For certain virtues there are which render another his due but
are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man
rendered to God as much as he owes Him. ... In this respect
religion is annexed to justice since, according to Tully, it consists
in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to tome tuperior

nature that men call divine.6

The debt, which is the sole concern of the virtue of religion,
is not to be described by a vague wave of the hand at the
wonders of the universe, the complexity of the life of man, or
the simplicity of a child. It can be laid on the line in so many
words, a challenge to the honesty of man, with no blurring of
the outlines of the debtor’s obligations. The virtue of religion
is concerned with the debt man owes God under the precise
formality of First Principle; God is the source, the start, the
beginning of man’s beginnings, the absolute first principle of
man’s being and of his guidance or direction to happiness.
*... in virtutibus quae adjunguntur alicui principali virtuti, duo sunt
sideranda: primo quidem, quod virtutes illae in aliquo cum principali virtute
veniant: eecundo, quod in aliquo deficiant a perfecta ratione ipsius. Qui*
justitia ad alterum est, . . . omnes virtutes quae ad alterum, possunt ratione
venientiac justitiae annecti. Ratio vero justitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri
datur quqd ei debetur secundum aequalitatem. . . .
Dupliciter ergo aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione justitiae deficit: udo
quidem modo, in quantum deficit a ratione aequalis; alio modo, in quantum deficit
a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt,
sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo quidem quidquid ab homine Deo red­
ditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse aequale, ut scilicet tantum homo ei
reddat, quantum debet. ... Et secundum hoc adjungitur justitiae rdigxx quae,
ut dicit Tullius, . . . superioris cujusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant curam
caeremoniamque affert. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. SO. a. unie.

344

WALTER FARRELL

. . it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under
one aspect, namely as the first principle of the creation and
government of things.” 0
. religion denotes properly a
relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound
as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should
be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose
when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing
in Him and confessing our faith.” 7
It is particularly important here to read the words of St.
Thomas most carefully, for it is essential to understand exactly
the precise nature of the debt with which religion has to deal.
Throughout its whole field, religion looks to the first principle
of men; that is the “ one aspect ” under which it pays reverence
to God. Even when referring to the last end of man, religion
does so, not under the formality of an infinite good to be pos­
sessed, but under the formality of a first principle of guidance
and government. It is a moral virtue which is properly about
means to the end, not the end itself.8 Unless this rigid limita­
tion of the object of religion is kept clearly in mind, it will be
extremely difficult to distinguish its activities from those of
charity, to speak accurately about its acts, and to establish
clearly the proper supremacy of religion.
From the fact that God is man’s first principle of being and
of government, we have a double statement of the divine excel­
lence. God is not infinitely good because He is the last end,
and so the first principle of direction or government; rather,
it is because of His infinite goodness that He is the last end.
8 Ad religionem autem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni Deo secundum unam
rationem, in quantum scilicet est primum principium creationis et gubernationis
rerum. Unde ipse dicit Malach. 1, G: 8» ego Pater, ubi honor incus? Patris enim
est producere et gubernare. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 3.
7. . . religio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est cui principaliter
alligari debemus tamquam indeficienti principio: ad quem etiam nostra electio
assidue dirigi debet sicut in ultimum finem; quem etiam négligentes peccando
amittimus, et credendo, et fidem protestando recuperare debemus. Ibid., a. 1.
Confer ibid., a. 1, ad Sum et 4um.
8... est virtus moralis, cujus est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Sumina
Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 5 corp.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

W»

On the other hand, as first principle of being, God ha* ah the
infinite excellence undeniable to the first cause,

Ί he rery/g-

nition of this divine excellence is the fundamental payment by

religion of man’s debt to God.
The good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and
to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely ‘dr­
passes all things and exceeds them in every way.·

By one and the same act man both serves and worships God for
worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due:
while service regards the subjection of man, who, by his condition­
is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two
belong all the acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all. man
bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to
God. ...10

This, then, is the double note of the religious debt man owes
to God: reverence for the divine excellence and subjection to
the divine principality. Actually, the two are different sides of
one and the same act of worship; and this act, in its essential
nature, is no more than an honest recognition of the first prin­
ciple of man’s being and government. By recognizing that
divine principality, man is at the same time protesting the
divine excellence which brought him into being and directs him
to happiness, and his own orderly position beneath that sup­
remely excellent Being.
The debt is paid by the acts of religion. Its payment is a
matter of honesty, a matter of order, and a matter of great
privilege. By it, the very foundation of all order is established
in a man’s moral life; he recognizes that his place in the world
• Bonum nutem nd quod ordinatur religio, est exhibere Deo debitum bouceea.
Honor nutem debetur alicui ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit
excellentia, in quantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omnmxxhrni
excessum. Summa Theol., II-II. q. SI. a. 4 corp.
10. . . eodem actu homo servit Deo et colit ipsum; nam cultus respicit De
excellentinm, cui reverentia debetur; servitus autem respicit subjectionem bocmr.is.
qui ex sua conditione obligatur ad exhibendam reverentiam Deo. Et ad haec duo
pertinent omnes actus qui religioni attribuuntur, quia per omnes homo psxMesUhv
divinam excellentiam et subjectionem sui ad Deum. ...
. Il-IL
q. 81, a. 3 ad 2um.

84G

WALTER FARRELL

is beneath God, while at the same time lit* has an insight into
his own dignity from the knowledge he has of his sources.
Obviously, man’s subjection to God is not a humiliation of
himself, since it is one and the same act of recognition of the
truth of divine excellence.

II·. l|

We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He
is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything),
but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and
honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; w herein its perfection
consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior;
for instance, the body is perfected by being quickened by the
soul . . .“
This is man’s place, this is where he belongs; and a man is not
humiliated, debased, or impeded in his progress to perfection
by being in his proper place any more than the human eye is
humiliated, debased, or impeded by being in its proper place in
a human head.
This is a paltry payment for so great a debt. Indeed, the
magnitude of the debt is itself a complete guarantee that our
payment will be inadequate.

Religion is ... a moral virtue . . . and observes a mean ... in
actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them.
And when I say equality, I do not mean absolute equality, because
it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality
in consideration of man’s ability and God’s acceptance.1

On this score, then, we need not be afraid of going too far;
since the debt exceeds our greatest efforts to liquidate it, there
can be no question of our ever paying too much.
11. . . Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus, non propter seipsum, quia ex
seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adjici potest, sed propter nos, quia
videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur, et honoramus, mens nostra ei subjicitur;
et in hoc ejus perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficitur per hoc quod subditur
suo superiori, sicut corpus per hoc quod vivicatur ab anima, . . . Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 81, a. 7 corp.
13. . . religio est virtus . . . moralis ... et medium in ipsa accipiatur . . .
secundum quamdam aequalitatem inter operationes quae sunt ad Deum. Dico
autem aequalitatem non absolute, quia Deo non potest tantum exhiberi, quantum
ei debetur, sed secundum quamdam considerationem humanae facultatis, ct divinae
acceptionis. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 5, ad Sum.

VIRTUES OF THE HOL'HEHOMJ

And il is possibh to have too n>u< h
Divine Worship, not ns regards the circumstance of quantity,
as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship u paid U>
whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in τ^'^'Λ <A
some other circumstance.1*

There can be no such thing as too much religion, though it i-*
possible to have serious neglect of things that must not be
neglected under the invalid excuse of religious exercises.
On the other hand, we are not to be blamed or dw ·υ ri?-,
at the miserly amount we can pay on our debt to our fini
principle.

Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: asd
therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of
justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise,
provided there be no failing on the part of his will.1*

A man who throws his life on the counter in payment 'i .
debt of religion is hardly making a princely gesture if we con­
sider the infinite infection and riches of God. What will this
add to the life of God?

In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him.
the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because
it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of
its usefulness to Him. but for the sake of His glory, and on account
of its usefulness to us.1*
On both counts, then, this is the supreme religious gesture:
for by it a man has given all that he has to give, and he has
by that fact touched the peak of moral perfection, if only for
the moment of his victorious surrender.
*· Ibid.
14. . . laus virtutis in voluntate consistit, non autem in potestate; et xieo àeSœsv
ab aequalitate, quae est medium justitiae, propter defectum potestatis. non <£·μηΜ
laudem virtutis, si non fuerit defectus ex parte voluntatis. Swr,-a Γ»,λ ;
a. 6, ad lum.
11. . . in his quae exhibentur aliis propter eorum utilitatem, est exl:biba
laudabilior quae fit magis indigenti, quia est utilior. Deo autem non ev.-^tur
aliquid propter ejus utilitatem, sed propter ejus gloriam. nostram autem uùbtataw
Ibid., ad 2um. Confer supra. footnote 11.

WALTER FARRELL

The virtue of religion is a household virtue. It puts man in
his proper place as a servant in the divine household, busying
him in that humble service that is yet his greatest perfection
and at the same time his full tribute of reverence and honor
to the divine excellence. Religion is busy about the household
tasks. “ God is related to religion not as matter or object, but
as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue
whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is pro­
perly about things referred to the end.” 10 Faith, hope, and
charity, looking directly to God as to their object, are the
superiors of the virtue of religion; religion bows to them and
moves at their command. But this is the only obeisance
religion need make in the company of virtues.
In the busy moral life of man, the life consumed in handling
the means to the end of man, religion stands supreme.
Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being
ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end, the better
it is. Now moral virtues . . . are about matters that arc ordered
to God as to their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than
the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions arc directly and im­
mediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among
the moral virtues.17

This, then, comes first: before justice and all its other allied
virtues, before temperance and its allied virtues, before forti­
tude and its allies, before prudence itself; for this is the funda­
mental virtue for the orderly conduct of man’s moral life.
It is important to notice that for a man thus to apply him­
self and his acts to God by religion, two conditions are essential.
10. . . Deus non comparatus ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel objectum,
sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cujus objectum est ultimus
finis; sed est virtus moralis, cujus est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 5 corp. Confer ibid., ad lum.
17... ea quae sunt ad finem, sortiuntur bonitatem ex ordine in finem; et ideo
quanto sunt fini propinquiora, tanto sunt meliora. Virtutes autem morales, . . .
sunt circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de
propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes morales, in quantum operatur ea
quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeminet inter alias virtutes morales. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. 0 corp.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

*W4

For cleanness is necessary in order that the mind b<·
*/>
God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with infr-nor thmgt,

even as all things depreciatt by admixture with ba <■ '■ ■
instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the
mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from
inferior things; and hence it is that without cleanness the mind
cannot be applied to God. . . . Again, firmness is required for the
mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last
end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most im­
movable. . . .18

Without this spiritual cleanliness and stability, religion will not
play a predominant role in a man’s life, which is to say that
human life will be fundamentally disordered throughout.
With this cleanliness and stability, however, religion
proceed to its acts: internal acts, which are religion’s principal
and per se acts; and the external acts which are secondary and
ordered to the internal acts.

Now iht' human mind, in order to b< united to God, net - I
guided by the sensible world. . . . Wherefore in the Divine wor­
ship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man’s mind
may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means
of which he is united to God Therefon th<
take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially,
while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the
internal acts.18 These external things are offered to God, not as
though He stood in need of them. . . . but as signs of the internal
and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God.
*" Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur, quia mens
humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus conjungitur, sicut quaelibet res
ex im mixtione pejoris sordescit, ut argentuni ex innnixtione plumbi. Oportet autem
quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit
conjungi. Et ideo mens sine munditia Deo applicari non potest. .
Firmitas
etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur; applicat enim ei sicut ultimo
fini et primo principio; hujusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse Swnwx
Theol., II-II, q. 81, a. S corp
18 Mens autem humana indiget, ad hoc quod conjungatur Deo. sensiKiuru
manuductione, ... Et ideo in divino cultu nccesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti.
ut eis quasi signis quibusdam mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus, qu bus
Deo conjungitur. Et ideo religio habet quidem interiores actus quasi pr e pales, et
per se ad religionem pertinentes; exteriores vero actus quasi secundarios, et ad in­
teriores actus ordinatos. Summa Theol., II-II. q. 81. a. 7 corp.

Hence Augustine says: The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or
sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice.20

Man, being what he is, must have external religious acts; but
these will always remain secondary and ordered to the internal
acts by which he is religiously united to God, i. e., by which lie
reverences and honors God, subjecting himself.
Looking back, now at the virtue of religion (from which
vocation springs) we see it as a virtue working at the payment
of the debt due to God as the First Principle of our being and
government. It does this by its tribute of reverence and honor
for the excellence of God, of subjection for the divine princi­
pality; both by the single act of worship, which is no more than
the honest recognition of God’s superior place.
Religion, then, is a matter of honesty in meeting one’s debts;
it is a matter of order, of hierarchy in a man’s life, in recogniz­
ing the superiority of the first principle; and a matter of privi­
lege, for by that very subjection which puts order in a man’s
life, he is himself perfected.
The debt religion deals with is unpayable of its very nature;
obviously, we cannot in our turn be first principle to God. We
can never, then, pay too much on that debt; there can be no
excess in the matter of religion, there can be only abuses of the
circumstances of time, place and so on in the placing of religious
acts. On the other hand, there is no room for despair at the
paltriness of our best efforts in meeting this debt, for the
measure of our efforts is not our power to pay but our willing­
ness to acknowledge the debt and offer what we have.
Religion is a moral virtue, busy with the means by which
a man strides to his last end. So, it is beneath the theological
virtues which soar directly to that last end. But it is supreme
among all the moral virtues because, among them, it approaches
most closely to the end of man’s whole life. Its external acts
ao. . . hujusmodi exteriora non exhibentur Deo, quasi his indigeat: . . . Sed
exhibentur Deo tamquam signa quaedam interiorum, et spiritualium operum, quae
per se Deus acceptat. Unde Augustinus dicit in 10 de Civ. Dei, cap. 5, parum a
prine.: Sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum
est. Ibid., ad 2um.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

351

(necessary because man is what he is, a creature of body and
soul) exist only for the internal acts by which rnan actually
pays the debt clue to God, the debt of worship. For these acts,
internal and external, he needs cleanliness and stability. In
proportion as he plunges into things beneath him, he becomes
increasingly incapable of religious acts; as he fixes his hold on
wavering supports, he has less capacity to hold fast to the im­
movable principles of his being and government.
This summary of the characteristics of the virtue of religion
will, as we shall sec, take on peculiar significance in dealing with
the household virtues that establish order in the domestic, the
patriotic, and the social world. For what has been said of re­
ligion relative to the whole life of man is proportionately true
of these virtues in their own proper sphere. It is time now to
look at these virtues and their origin in some detail.

******
Objects of Service Other Than God
Under God, man has other principles of his being and govern­
ment which, by the very fact of sharing in the principality of
God, lay solid claim to reverence and subjection from men.
The descent from religion through these other virtues will be a
gradual one proportioned to the lessening share in the divine
principality enjoyed by these other principles.

. . . whatever man renders to God is due. yet it cannot be equal,
as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him. ... In
this respect religion is annexed to justice. . . . Secondly, it is not
possible to make to one’s parents an equal return of what one owes
to them ... ; and thus piety is annexed to justice, for thereby, as
Tully says (Zoc. cit.), a man renders service and constant dejerence
to his kindred and the ivcll-wishcrs of his country. Thirdly, accord­
ing to the Philosopher, man is unable to offer an equal meed for
virtue, and thus observance is annexed to justice, consisting accord­
ing to Tully (Zoc. cit.) in the deference and honor rendered to those
who excel in worth.21
,l. . . quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse
aequale, ut scilicet tantum homo ci reddat, quantum debet. ... Et secundum hoc

852

WALTER FARRELL

. . . according to the various excellences of those persons to whom
something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of
virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes
of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is
found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,
exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of
father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of genera­
tion, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the
perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of
dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things:
for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander
of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning
and so forth. . . . Therefore, just as, in a manner beneath religion,
whereby worship is given to God, we find piety, whereby we honor
our parents, so under piety we find observance, whereby reverence
and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.22
God is the absolutely first principle of our being and govern­
ment. This divine principality is shared by our parents, as the
first in the line of secondary causes; it is further shared by our
country; and, in varying degrees, by individual men. From
all of these we, in some sense, spring; by all of them we are
guided to happiness, governed. To all of them, then, in lessen­
ing degrees, we owe unpayable debts.
adjungitur justitiae religio. . . . Secundo, parentibus non potest secundum aequali­
tatem recompensari quod eis debetur ... ; et sic adjungitur justitiae pietas, per
quam, ut Tullius dicit loc. cit. sanguine junctis patriacquae benevolis officium et
diligens tribuitur cultus. Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recom­
pensari ab homine virtus ... et sic adjungitur justitiae observantia, per quam, ut
Tullius dicit, loc. sup. cit., homines aliqua dignitate antecedentes quodam cultu cl
honore dignantur. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 80, a. 1.
22. . . necesse est ut eo modo per quemdam ordinatum descensum distinguantur
virtutes, sicut excellentia personarum quibus est aliquid reddendum. Sicut autem
carnalis pater particulariter participat rationem principii, quae universaliter in­
venitur in Deo. ita etiam persona quae quantum ad aliquid providentiam circa nos
gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris, quia pater est principium et
generationis, et educationis, et disciplinae, et omnium quae ad perfectionem humanae
vitae pertinent; persona autem in dignitate constituta est sicut principium guberna­
tionis respectu aliquarum rerum; sicut princeps civitatis in rebus civilibus, dux
autem exercitus in rebus bellicis, magister autem in disciplinis; et simile est in aliis.
. . . Et ideo sicut sub religione, per quam cultus tribuitur Deo, quodammodo
invenitur pietas, per quam coluntur parentes, ita sub pietate invenitur observantia,
per quam cultus et honor exhibetur personis in dignitate constitutis. Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUKEHOU)

?>5'5

. . Man becomes a debtor to other men in vanoua way>, ar^ording to their varions excellence and the various benefit» received
from them. On both counts God holds first place for He λ
supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and
government. In the second place, the principles of our bemg ar*d
government arc our parents and our country, that have given ut
birth and nourishment. Consequently man is delitor chiefly to hh
parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to
religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the
second place, to give honor to one’s parents and one’s country?3

Virtue of Service in the Home—Piety
The virtue of piety, as it is spoken of by St. Thomas, extends
to both parents and country. However, since in ordinary usage
we speak of piety towards country as patriotism, throughout
the rest of this paper we shall reserve the word “ piety ” for
piety towards parents, calling piety towards country “ patrio­
tism.” 24
Piety, then, ranking immediately below religion among these
virtues dealing with unpayable debts, has for its work towards
parents in the narrower field of domestic life what religion does
towards God in the whole field of moral life/' What has been
said of the virtue of religion can be said, preserving the proper
proportion, of the virtue of piety; it has exactly the same task,
in a narrower and secondary field, to be performed in propor­
tionately the same way.
”... homo efficitur diversimode aliis debitor, secundum corum diversam excel­
lent iam et diversa beneficia ab eis suscepta. In utroque autem Deus summum
obtinet locum; qui et excellentissimus est, et est nobis essendi et gubernationis prin­
cipium; secundario vero nostri osse et gubernationis principia sunt parentes et patria,
a quibus et in qua nati et nutriti sumus. Et ideo post Deum est bomo maxime
debitor parentibus et patriae. Unde sicut ad religionem pertinet cultum Deo
exhibere, ita secundario gradu ad pietatem pertinet exhibere cultum parentibus et
patriae. Summa Theol., ibid., q. 101. a. 1. Cf. ibid.. q. SI. a. 4.
’* The question as to whether the difference between piety and patriotism is
merely verbal or real, with its consequent question of one or two virtues expressed
by these words, is a matter of discussion among theologians.
55 Cf. supra, footnotes 22 and 23.

354

WALTER FARRELL

. . . the good to which religion is directed is to give due honor to
God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence:
and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely
surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to
Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that
different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind to
a father, another to the king, and so on.20

Like religion, then, piety is a matter of honesty, of order, and
of privilege. It is a matter of honesty, for it is a matter of
paying a debt: the debt we owe our parents as principles of our
being and government. More concretely, we owe them rever­
ence and subjection; reverence for their excellence (or superiority
to us) as principles, and subjection by reason of that princi­
pality. Both of these, reverence and subjection, are actually
paid in one and the same act of veneration or honor, just as
religion in its one act of worship both reverences God and
subjects man to Him. There is a sharp difference here between
the subjection of a man to parents as a principle of direction
and the subjection involved in the reverence paid to a principle
of being.

The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular
power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father
being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should
be compared with the divine power from which all things derive
their being.27
A father is a principle of being immediately under God as first
principle; but he is a principle of external government only
mediately, under the state which is the immediate participant
”. . . Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio, est exhibere Deo debitum
honorem. Honor autem debetur alicui ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit
singularis excellentia, in quantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omni­
modum excessum. Unde ei debetur specialis honor; sicut in rebus humanis videmus
quod diversis excellentiis personarum diversus honor debetur, alius quidem patri,
alius regi, et sic de aliis. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 81, a. 4.
^Princeps comparatur ad patrem, sicut universalis virtus ad particularem,
quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, non autem quantum ad hoc quod pater est
principium generationis; sic enim comparatur ad ipsum virtus divina, quae est
omnium productiva in esse. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 102, a. 3, ad lum.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

855

of the principality of God as first principle of direction or gov­
ernment. The reason for this is not hard to see. 'I he governing
principle of all means (with which these virtues of the unpay­
able debts alone deal) is the end. Now God is the final end <Λ
man, and so the first principle of direction or government; the
state is an intermediary end further ordered to the final end of
man’s happiness, and, as an end, can be a limited principle of
direction or government; but parents are in no sense an end
of the children. What principality they have in government
will be participated from the state, or exercised by way of
regency during the immature years of the child.2* This last is
of no small importance; it really means that the dependency of
the child under this aspect, and so its obligation to honor, rever­
ence, and give subjection, is quite complete during these years,
though it steadily diminishes with maturity. The obligation to
honor, reverence, and subjection to parents as principles of
being endures unchanged for all time.
In this regard, a full statement of the parents’ principality of
being reveals the great responsibility this principality lays upon
the parents.
. . a father is the principle of generation, of
education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection
of human life: ..z\ In the ordinary discipline and training of
children, the father is acting as a principle of being, not as a
governor; whoever exercises any share of this training and
discipline is really sharing in the principality of the father as
principle of being.80
In this matter of the unpayable debt to parents, it is also
true that there can be no such thing as overpaying the debt;
there cannot be too much of piety. What abuses creep in here
·· Ibid.
”... pater est principium et generationis, et educationis, et disciplinae, et
omnium quae ad perfectionem humanae vitae pertinent. Summa Thcol.., II-II. q.
102, a. 1.
•° “ . . . so too a person who, in some way exercises providence in one respect,
partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the prin­
ciple of generation, etc.” (ita etiam persona quae quantum ad aliquid prondentiaia
circa nos gerit, particulariter participat proprietatem patris, quia pater est prin­
cipium cl generationis, etc.) Summa Thcol.. Ibid.

WALTER FARRELL

are due to other circumstances than the circumstance of quan­
tity. The debt is unpayable by its very nature; it cannot be
overpaid. The very best we can give in payment will still .seem
paltry; yet, our payment is not to be judged by our incapacity
but by our will to pay the debt.31
Piety, like religion, is a matter of order. It docs for the
domestic sphere what religion does for all of moral life; showing
man clearly what is above him, and by that fact making plain
his own place in the domestic circle. It establishes, then, the
fundamental order in the home. The child is beneath the
parent, the son beneath the father, in a subjection of reverence
and honor; yet that subjection is not to the child’s degradation
but to its perfection. For the payment of this debt to parents,
like the payment of the religious debt to God, is not for the
perfection of the parents or their utility, but primarily for the
perfection of the child.32 Our reverence and honor and subjec­
tion add nothing to the principality of the parents; they add
much to the perfection of ourselves.33 True enough, parents
have not the infinite perfection of God, and so there is none of
the same impossibility of our working for their benefit. But
this payment of the debt of piety will, of itself, do no more for
the parents than ease a little of the hunger of the human heart
for appreciation and gratitude. Accidentally, it may indeed
happen that our parents have dire need of our assistance; in
that case, in the name of the honor we owe them as principles,
we are obliged to come to their assistance. But this is by way
of exception and accidentally: in themselves, the parents are,
in their capacity of principles, to provide for the child, not the
child for the parent.
We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both
essentially and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which
is due to a father as such; and since he is his son’s superior through
being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and
service. Accidentally, that is due to a father which it befits him to
receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he
11 Confer supra, footnotes 12 and 14.
” Confer supra, footnote 11.

33 Ibid.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

'557

be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and
U» hit
cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; ar*d
so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of i^rvict
due.’*
Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and bit son in the
relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for
a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to sup­
port him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay
by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on hit
father is accidental, arising from some momentary’ necessity, where­
in he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time
beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of
their children, but children of their parents.*5

Just as religion does not look primarily to the goodness of
God but to His excellence and principality, so piety does not
look primarily to the goodness of parents; goodness is the proper
object of love, not of piety. This reverence, honor, and sub­
jection owed to parents is not in itself dependent on love for
the parents; it is a debt that flows from their very position as
principles of being and direction. Love, of course, will increase
piety, and piety will usually lead to love and the increase of
love. But this right to the payment made by piety, is not one
which the parents surrender by the character of their lives/·
14. . . parentibus . . . aliquid debetur dupliciter: uno modo per te, alio modo
per accidens. Per se quidem debetur eis id quod decet patrem, in quantum pater
est: qui cum sit sui>erior, quasi principium filii existens, debetur ei a filio reverentia
et obsequium. Per accidens autem aliquid debetur patri, quod decet eum accipere
secundum aliquid quod ei accidit; puta si sit infirmus, quod visitetur et ejus cura­
tioni intendatur; si sit pauper, quod sustentetur, et sic de aliis hujusmodi, quae
omnia sub debito obsequio continentur. Summa Th eoi., II-II, q. 101, a. i. Confer
ibid., ad lum.
”... quia pater habet rationem principii, filius autem habet rationem a prin­
cipio ex is tent is, ideo per se patri convenit ut subveniat filio; et propter hoc noa
solum ad horam debet ei subvenire sed ad totam suam vitam, quod est tbesaurixare.
Sed quod filius aliquid conferat patri, hoc est per accidens ratione alicujus necessi­
tatis instantis, in qua tenetur ei subvenire, non autem thesaurixarr quasi m kxipnquum, quia naturaliter non parentes filiorum, soil filii parentum sunt snocesswes.
Summa Thcol., II-II. q. 101. a. 2, ad Sum.
’· “ The object of love is the good: the object of honor or reverence, hoarver. is
something excellent.” (. . . objectum amoris est bonum; objectum autem honoris
vel reverentiae est aliquid excellens.) Summa Thcol., II-II. q. SI. a 4. ad Sum.
Confer ibid., q. 82, a. 2, ad 2um.

358

WALTER FARRELL

How far should that respect for parents go? Well, at the very
least, it must include not only honor, but all the becoming acts
that rule the relations of one man to another. “. . . in venera­
tion, there is to be understood not only honor, but also what­
ever else pertains to the becoming acts by which one man is
ordered to another.”3T
Like religion, piety also demands, as conditions dispositive
to its activity, a certain cleanliness and stability. After all,
it is looking to what is above; the sordidness that infects the
mind from commerce with what is beneath man is no prepara­
tion for consideration of superior things. Moreover, the whole
activity of piety circles around the principles of man’s being
and government; and principles, as stable, enduring elements
in a man’s life, demand a firmness and loyalty from the man
who would hold fast to them.38 As with the acts of religion,
where the external ones are ordered to and exist for the internal
acts, so in the acts of piety; the honor, reverence, and sub­
jection externally manifested are for the internal by which
alone a man takes his proper place in the family, really venerat­
ing the parents to whom he is so hopelessly indebted.30 The
debt of piety extends beyond parents to all blood relations, yet
never loses that essential aspect of a debt to parents; for the
veneration we give blood relations is precisely because of their
relationship to common parents.40
A house without piety can hardly lay title to the hallowed
name of home. It is lacking in fundamental order; it is not so
much disordered as in chaos. No one really belongs here, for
no one has his place in such an establishment. The child’s
"... in cultu non solum intelligitur honor, sed eliam quaccumque alia quae
pertinent ad decentes actus quibus homo ad alium ordinatur. Summa Thcol., Π-ΙΙ,
q. 102, a. 2, ad lum.
M Confer supra, footnote 18.
’· Confer supra, footnote 19.
40 “The honor due to our parents includes the honor given to all our kindred, since
our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents.” (In cultu autem
parentum includitur cultus omnium consanguineorum, quia etiam consanguinei ex
hoc dicuntur quod ex eisdem parentibus processerunt. . . .) Summa Thcol., II-II,
q. 101, a. 1.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

'Wt

rights are as vague as his obligation; the parents’ n^pondbifities as dimly seen as their duties. It is a topsy-turvy domestic
world committed to a condition of civil war and selfish rivalry.
It is a dishonest establishment, since it has eliminated the funda­
mental honesty involved in the recognition of the fundamental
domestic debt. It is no place of privilege or perfection for the
child, who is given no reason here for that reverence, honor and
subjection that would do so much to perfect him; there is no
hierarchy here, the child must fight for what he can get, and,
of course, the child loses, never more emphatically than when
he has his way.
♦

♦♦♦♦♦

Virtue oj Service to Country—Patriotism

Patriotism, or piety towards one’s country, is the next virtue
in the descending scale of these virtues which deal with unpay­
able debts. It operates in the particularized field delimited by
the principality of one’s country in the being and government
of a man. It is a principle of being in a tertian’ sense, below
the secondary principles who are the parents; it is a principle
of government in a secondary sense, beneath the first principle
of government who is God. This has all been explained in the
past few pages. In this sense, a man’s country is one of his
sources, his principles; as such it lays valid claim in justice to
reverence, honor and subjection from him. The facing of this
debt is, in the patriotic field, a matter of order, honesty, and
privilege as it was in the domestic and religious domains.
The common good is not the object of patriotism, any more
than the goodness of God, or the welfare of the parents is the
object of religion and piety. These virtues do not look to the
good but to the excellent by reason of principality: what pat­
riotism aims at is the recognition of the superiority of one's
country, in the limited field of its superiority, and the subjection
of man in that same limited field. Patriotism, then, is not
primarily a matter of love of country as it is a matter of service
to country, fundamentally, the service implied in the veneration

860

;I,

WALTER FARRELL

of country that includes reverence, honor and subjection. Love
of country contributes to patriotism, as patriotism docs to love
of country; but they must be clearly distinguished, as charity
and religion must be distinguished, if we are to understand the
true place and dignity of patriotism.
Preserving the proper proportions, all that was said of religion
and of piety must be repeated of patriotism. It guarantees
the fundamental order in the national scene, showing a man his
proper place by insisting on what is above him; t hereby letting
him know with certainty what is beneath him, that he might
protect his rights as well as fulfill his duties. Patriotism is
primarily a matter of honesty, not of sentiment; there cannot
be too much of it, nor is the least offering to be despised if the
will behind it is above the reproach of stinginess or selfishness
in payment of this unpayable debt.
It, too, has its external and internal acts, of which the exter­
nal are ordered to the internal. In our usual consideration of
patriotic acts, we concentrate on the good to the state coming
from them; actually, they exist for the internal act of patrio­
tism by which a man really pays on the debt to his principles
of being and government. For the payment of this debt is not
for the utility of the principles but of the debtors to those prin­
ciples; it does not, itself, add to the principality of the state,
but it does, in itself, add considerably to the perfection of the
citizen. For the object of patriotism is not the common good,
but the debt owed to the principality of the state; it exists for
the ordering of a man within the national life, and for the
ordering of all his acts that contribute to that national life.41
For the activity of patriotism, it is necessary to have, by way
of disposition, a certain cleanliness and stability, on proportion­
ately the same grounds as was outlined above for the activities
of the virtues of religion and piety. For patriotism, too, looks
41 “ Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of
being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common
good
pietas se extendit ad patriam, secundum quod est nobis quoddam
essendi principium; sed justitia legalis respicit bonum patriae, secundum quod est
bonum commune: . . .) Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 101, a. 8, ad Sum.

VIRTUEH OF THE HOUSEHOLD

361

to superior principles; cleanliness is essential for the viwjft
of superior things, stability for the continued conta/A with
principles.
Without patriotism, the nation is no longer a community
but a mob whose members are intent on destroying each other.
There is no order, no hierarchy, no basis for anything but cbao*.
No reverence, honor or subjection. Consequently, the national
life of the community is basically undermined by a fundamental
dishonesty which totally disregards the fundamental debt of the
citizen. The individual citizen, of course, loses; he has no place
here, all the privileges of his place and the perfection of it is
denied him; he cannot detect usurpers of his rights, nor defend
himself against them. The national life going on about him
must be as terrifying to the individual citizen as the ravings of
a maniac are to a sane, normal person.*’

Virtue of Service to Men—Observance
The virtue of observance has to do with a double debt, the
debt owed to those in authority and that owed to superiors in
virtue and knowledge. St. Thomas insists that both are unpay­
able, but not for the same reason: the virtuous and the learned
cannot, on that score alone, lay claim to principality over other
men; while those constituted in authority unquestionably do
participate in the principality of the state.

. . . the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does
not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but
merely a certain excellence in himself.41
*43

It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects.
Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: . . . But
41A detailed analysis of the virtue of patriotism can be found in QueHtwr
Citizenship in St. Thomas, by Gerard Joubert, 0. P„ Catholic Univ, Press (Wash­
ington, 1942).
43 Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet perfectionem scientiae vd virtutis. noa
sortitur rationem principii quantum ad alios, sed solum quamdam eJXeUentiaa ia
se ipso. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 102. a, 1, ad 2um.

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WALTER FARRELL

every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which
is moved. Wherefore a person in a position of dignity is an object
of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of
position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as
regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence
there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of
excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is
due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying
his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty,
for the benefits we receive from him.4*
The man constituted in authority, precisely as such, parti­
cipates the principality of the state. When service to him is
viewed formally in relation to the common good, that service
is a work of patriotism and deserves no further treatment here.
But when it is viewed in a more personal fashion, in relation,
namely, to the glory or utility of the one constituted in author­
ity, then it comes squarely under observance. It is in just this
way that we are talking about the principality of legitimately
constituted superiors and the debt owed them when we speak
of the virtue of observance.44
45*
48 In this sense there is little dif­
ficulty appreciating the validity of the superiority to which
the debt of reverence and subjection are due. It is a shared
principality—shared either with the parents or with the state
according to the particular office and work of this individual
44... ad eos qui sunt in dignitate constituti, pertinet gulicrnare subditos.
Gubernare autem est movere aliquos in debitum finem, . . . Omne autem movens
habet excellentiam quamdam et virtutem supra id quod movetur. Unde oportet
quod in eo qui est in dignitati constitutus, primo consideretur excellentia status
cum quadam potestate in subditos; secundo, ipsum gubernationis officium. Ratione
igitur excellentiae debetur ei honor, qui est quaedam recognitio excellentiae alicujus;
ratione autem officii gubernationis, debetur ei cultus, qui in quodam obsequio con­
sistit, dum, scilicet aliquis obedit eorum imperio, et vicem beneficiis eorum pro suo
modo rependit. Sumina Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. 2.
48. . . personis in dignitate constitutis potest aliquid exhiberi dupliciter: uno
modo in ordine ad bonum commune, puta cum aliquis eis servit in administratione
reipublicae: et hoc jam non pertinet ad observantiam, sed ad pietatem, quae cultum
exhibet non solum patri, sed etiam patriae. Alio modo exhibetur aliquid personis
in dignitate constitutis pertinens specialiter ad personalem eorum utilitate vel
gloriam: et hoc proprie pertinet ad observantiam secundum quod a pietate distin­
guitur. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. 3.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

MS

superior—and partakes of the same character of a debt beyond
our power to pay. All that was said, then, of religion, piety,
and patriotism, carefully preserving the proper proportion of
a steadily diminishing principality, must be said of the virtue
of observance in regard to those constituted in authority. It
hardly seems necessary to repeat those details again in this
paper, particularly if it is kept in mind that all these virtues are
concerned with a fundamental order, and that their absence
means chaos in the particular field of action proper to each
virtue.
The debt owed to the learned and virtuous is, however,
another matter. St. Thomas himself insisted that such pre­
eminence did not give one man principality over another, as we
have noted on the preceding page. It might be argued that
excellence in learning and knowledge, in whomever it is found,
is a kind of principle to others by way of inspiration and emula­
tion moving other men to greater efforts. St. Thomas seems
to suggest that this excellence in learning and virtue makes men
potentially constituted in authority,44 though he does not press
the point as the basis for honor and reverence to these people;
he merely uses this as an explanation of why he reduces such
honor and reverence to the virtue of observance.
The real reason whv
* men incur a debt to the virtuous and
learned is not because of the principality they enjoy over other
men, but simply because virtue and learning are things for
which no payment can be made. The implication plainly made
here is that such excellence is a boon to those who haven’t got
it, as well as a perfection of those who have.47 In this light,
44 “ Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for
positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excel­
lence whatever belongs to the same virtue.” (Verum, quia per scientiam et virtutem,
el omnia alia hujusmodi aliquis idoneus redditur ad dignitatis statum, reverentia
quae propter quamcumquc excellentiam aliquibus exhibetur, ad eandem xirtutem
pertinet.) Summa Theol., II-II, q. UH, a. 1, ad ium.
47 “ It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those
to whom we owe any thing. Now this cannot be done to the \irtnous. and to those
who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God.
nor to our parents." (. . . ad justitiam specialem proprie sumptam pertinet reddere

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WALTER FARRELL

observance furnishes a fundamental principle of order to the
social life of men. It is highly unlikely that we shall ever meet
a man who is inferior to us in every way; that is, in every
man there will be some title to superiority on the basis of which
he has just claim to the payment we reserve for unpayable
debts, namely, honor and reverence, with a certain amount of
subjection. It is worth noting that there is no question here of
mineral, plant, or animal excellence in our neighbors; but of
excellence of mind and will, the distinctively spiritual excel­
lencies. Contempt for men, then, would necessarily involve an
inversion of the social order possible only in a condition of
blindness that would obscure all of another man’s excellency.
******
Primary Act of Religion—Devotion (Religious Morale)
These household virtues of religion, piety, patriotism, and
observance are the virtues which attend to the orderly manage­
ment of a man’s life with God, with his family, with his fellow
citizens, and with his fellow men. As virtues, they are good
habits which, therefore, exist for the acts which spring from
them. As we have seen, all of them have both internal and
external acts, of which the external exist for the internal acts.
aequale ei cui aliquid debetur. Quod quidem non potest fieri ad virtuosos cl ad
eos qui bene statu dignitatis utuntur, sicut nec ad Deum, nec ad parentes.) Summa
Theol., II-II, q. 102, a. 1, ad Sum.
“ Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; . . . For
certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render
equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be
equal. . . . Secondly, it is not possible to make to one’s parents an equal return.
. . . Thirdly . . . man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue. ...” (Dupli­
citer ergo aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione justitiae deficit a ratione
aequalis; uno modo, in quantum deficit a ratione debiti. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes
quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt, sed non possunt reddere aequale. Et primo
quidem quidquid ab homine Deo redditur, debitum est, non tamen potest esse
aequale . . . Secundo, parentibus non potest secundum aequalitatem recompcnsari.
. . . Tertio, non potest secundum aequale praemium recompensari ab homine
virtus. . . .) Summa Theol., II-II, q. 80, a. unie.

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965

Among these internal acts, one will be first. This one act, then,
is the immediate reason for the existence of the virtue and for
all the other acts of the virtue; in the analysis of that one act,
we have the quintessence of the virtue and all its activity.
We have seen the ordered interrelation of these virtues; they
begin with religion and descend in a gradual scale proportioned
to the gradually diminishing participation in the principality
that in its fullness is proper to God. What is said of one of
them can be said of all the others, keeping the proper propor­
tion of the principles to which they make payment on an un­
payable debt. This same thing, then, will be true of the acts of
these virtues, and particularly of the first act to which all others
are ordered; what can be said, for instance, of the first act of
religion can also be said of the first act of piety, of patriotism,
and of observance—always keeping the proper proportion of
these virtues. If, then, we can obtain a sharp, accurate know­
ledge of the first act of religion, we have the key to the secret of
the orderly management of all man’s relations with others: with
God, with family, with country, with fellow men.
This first act of religion is called devotion.48
Devotion comes from the idea of dedication and those were called
devout or devoted who in some way dedicated themselves to God
so as to be utterly His. Therefore devotion is nothing other than
promptitude of will in those things that concern the worship of God.
Since it is evident that this is a special act, it follows that devotion
is a special act of the will.40
“ An exhausthe study of the texts of St. Thomas to trace the development of his
thought on devotion can be found in “ The Thomistic Concept of Devotion.’' by
John W. Curran, O.P., The Thomist, Vol. IT, no. 3 & 4 (July, 1940 and October,
1940). This study is of considerable importance, for St. Thomas’ solution of the
problem of devotion is one of his strikingly original contributions to theoloccal
thought.
4i Devotio dicitur a devovendo: unde devoti dicuntur qui seipsos quodammodo
Deo devovent ut ei se totaliter subdant; . . . Unde devotio nihil aliud esse videtur
quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famu­
latum. . . . Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei
servitium pertinet, est quidem specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus
voluntatis.” Summa Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. I.

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WALTER FARRELL

Devotion is the net of the will by which man offers himself to God
to serve Him Who is the ultimate end.00

We are not far wrong in the use of the word in its adjectival
form, speaking of a devout prayer, a devoted wife, a devoted
patriot, devoted children; for in all of these cases we are em­
phasizing the reverence, honor and subjection that is expressed
in particularly willing service.
Devotion is the first and most important act of religion. The
internal acts, as we have seen, are the most important acts of
religion; of these there are just two, namely, devotion and
prayer. Devotion is the more important of these two.
The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, . . . and
therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other
powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of
the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and
consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which
belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion,
since by it religion directs man’s intellect to God.01

It is easy to understand the importance of the key position of
devotion if we follow the three immediate implications of its
source in the will of man. It subjects the will of the creature to
the Creator; the whole will, for devotion has no other material
than willing to offer. Now the whole moral life of a man is suc­
cessful or unsuccessful according to the nod his will gives to
virtue or to vice; the consent of the will is, by devotion, given to
the service of God. Thus, the whole moral life of a man is
offered in the act of devotion/2 We must be careful here not to
identify devotion with its heroic degree, just as we must not
80. . . devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei servien­
dum, qui est ultimus finis, . . . Ibid., ad lum.
81. . . voluntas movet alias potentias animae in suum finem, ... et ideo religio,
quae est in voluntate, ordinat actus aliarum potentiarum ad Dei reverentiam. Inter
alias autem potentias animae intellectus altior est, et voluntati propinquior; et ideo
post devotionem, quae perlinet ad ipsam voluntatem, oratio quae pertinet ad partem
intellectivam, est praecipua inter actus religionis, per quam religio intellectum
hominis movet in Deum. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 83, a. 3, ad lum.
82 Curran, “The Thomistic Concept of Devotion,” The Thomist, II, 4, p. 554,
574, 578.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

507

identify charity with heroic sanctity. Any degree of devotion
offers the whole will of man to the service of God, as any degree
of charity loves God above all things; and devotion is, in fact,
found in beginners and the imperfect, as also is true charity.
Devotion not only offers the whole will, it offers a prompt
will. Devotion offers the will itself to God. “ And since it is im­
possible to conceive of sluggishness in such an offering, a special
promptitude is to be found in devotion,” not as a mere acci­
dental mode of the act of devotion, but as part and parcel of
that act.
Finally, devotion stamps a mode upon every other act of
religion, and every other act that is ordered to the service of
God.

The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing
moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their
acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end. moves both itself
and whatever is directed to the end. . . . Wherefore, since
devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the
service of God Who is the last end. it follows that devotion pre­
scribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will
itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers
that are moved by the will.54
The mode imposed by devotion on every other act of religion is
that of prompt, even eager, service.
Obviously, then, devotion is not to be detected by touch,
sight or smell; the “ odor of sanctity ” is a purely metaphorical
description. This act of religion is an act of the will; not a
matter of emotion. Without it there are no acts of religion:
the payments on the unpayable debt of religion are made with
prompt will or they arc not made at all. This act of devotion is
M Ibid., pp, 576, 577.
“ . . . movens imponit modum motui mobilis. Voluntas autem movet alias vires
animne ad suos actus; et voluntas secundum quod est finis, movet seipsam ad ea
quae sunt ad finem. ... Et ideo cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis
seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum, qui est ultimus finis, consequens est quod devotio
imponat modum humanis actibus, sive sint actus ipsius voluntatis circa ea quae
sunt ad finem, sive etiam sint actus aliarum potentiarum, quae a voluntate
moventur. Summa Thcol., II-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad lum.

the core of man’s religious life; that life stands or falls with the
presence or absence of devotion.
This act of devotion in its highest degree is what we mean by
the human side of religious vocation. This eager will to serve
God, carried to the length of stripping oneself of all else that
the service might be complete, is what we mean when we say
that this person has a vocation. This is the thing to be fostered,
protected, nourished for the good of the Church and the wel­
fare of men. This is religious morale in its highest form. To
know the causes of devotion, to be aware of the threats to it and
the impediments that hinder it, is to be in a position to work
most effectively in the cause of vocations.
God is the principal and extrinsic cause of this all-important
act of devotion. Nevertheless, there is much to be done on our
side, both by way of causing devotion and by way of removing
the impediments to it. Considering the fundamental importance
of devotion for all of a man’s religious and moral life, the
concrete determination of our possibilities in its production is
worthy of the most careful consideration.
First of all, we can, obviously, prepare ourselves.
It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his
matter or instrument, but also to prepare opportunities for that
good use.65

He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those
against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing
himself to devotion, docs not do what he can to be heard by God,
wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or in­
discretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously
and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence
towards Him.66
85 Ad virluosum pertinet non solum convenienter uti sua materia vel instrumento,
sed etiam praeparare opportunitates ad bene utendum; . . . Summa Thcol., 11-11.
q. 117, a. 3, ad 2um.
ee Ille qui ante orationem animam suam non praeparat, dimittendo quid adversum
aliquam habet, vel alias ad devotionem se non disponendo, non facit quod in se
est, ut exaudiatur a Deo; et ideo quasi interpretative tentât Deum. Et quamvis
hujusmodi interpretativa tentatio videatur ex praesumptione seu indiscretione pro-

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

309

Our preparation, in other words, must at least connut in re­
moving the impediments to devotion. Where there is no con­
crete impediment, there still must be some positive preparation
for this first and all-important act of religion.
Among the impediments mentioned, just in passing, by St.
Thomas are all those inferior things that enmesh the mind of
man and debase it,67 since without purity the mind cannot be
applied to God. Then, too, there is the consideration of all
foreign matters that distract the mind from things that are apt
to awaken the love of God within us.*’ Perhaps some of the
most powerful impediments to devotion are to be found in those
things that contribute, at least in their disordered state, to selfsufficiency and presumption.

Science, and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an
occasion of self-confidence, so that he docs not wholly surrender
himself to God. The result is that such-like things sometimes
occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women
devotion abounds by repressing pride.5®
With these impediments eliminated, we are ready, on our
side, to put the positive causes of devotion to work. One of
these is, of course, love.

. . . charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one
prompt to serve one’s friend) and feeds on devotion. Even as all
friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and con­
sideration of friendly deeds.®0
venire, tamcn hoc ipsum nd irreverentiam Dei pertinet quod homo praesumptuose
et sine debita diligentia sc habeat in his quae ad Deum pertinent. Sumwa Thcol^
II-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad Sum.
BTSumma Thcol., II-II, q. 81, a. 8 corp. vid. supra, footnote IS.
“ . . . the consideration of anything whatsoever that does not pertain to things
apt to awaken our love of God but distracts our mind from them impedes devotion
(consideratio quorumeumque ad hoc non pertinentium, sed ab eis mentem dis­
trahentium, impedit devotionem.) Summa Thcol.. II-II. q. Si, a. 3. ad lum.
·· Scientia et quidquid aliud ad magnitudinem pertinet, occasio est quod homo
confidat de seipso; et ideo non totaliter se Deo tradat. Et inde est quod hujusmodi
quandoque occasionaliter devotionem impediunt; et in simplicibus et mulieribus
devotio abundat, elationem comprimendo. Summa Thcol.. II-II. q. Si, a. S. ad Sum.
*°. . . charitas et devotionem causât, in quantum ex amore aliquis redditur
3

870

λ\ ALTER FARRELL

. . . this consideration (of God’s goodness) awakens love which is
the proximate cause of devotion.01
The root cause of devotion, however, from the aspect of our
part in it, is meditation. The matter is so important that wo

had better let St. Thomas talk for himself at some length.

But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs he meditation or
contemplation. For it was slated above that devotion is an act of
the will to the effect that man surrenders himself promptly to the
service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some con­
sideration. since the object of the will is a good understood. . . .
Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so
far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrender­
ing himself to God’s service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads
him thereto. The one is the consideration of God’s goodness and
loving kindness . . . and this consideration awakens love which
is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that
of man’s own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean
on God . . . and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby
man is hindered from submitting to God. because he leans on his
own strength.02
Matters concerning the Godhead arc, in themselves, the strongest
incentive to love and consequently to devotion, because God is
supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind
that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also

promptus nd serviendum amico, et etiam per devotionem charilas nutritur; sicut et
quaelibet amicitia conservatur cl augetur per amicabilium operum exercitium cl
meditationem. Summa Theol., II-II, q, 82, a. 2, ad 2um.
*x. . . haec consideratio excitat dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa.
Ibid., a. 8, corp.
“Causa autem intrinseca ex parte nostra oportet quod sit meditatio seu con­
templatio. Dictum est enim art. 1 huj. quaest. quod devotio est quidam voluntatis
actus ad hoc quod homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium Omnis autem
actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum
est objectum voluntatis. ... Et ideo nccessc est quod meditatio sit devotionis
causa, in quantum scilicet homo per meditationem concipit quod se tradat divino
obsequio. Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio: una quidem quae est ex
parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius ... et haec consideratio excitat
dilectionem, quae est proxima devotionis causa. Alia vero est ex parte hominis con­
siderantis suos defectus, ex quibus indiget ut Deo innitatur ... ; et hnee con­
sideratio excludit praesumptionem, per quam aliquis impeditur ne Deo se subjiciat,
dum suae virtuti innilur. Sumina Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 3.

571

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

i,, the I-·'c of I>h 1111 ^ing bj m<
known to ut ( ’hit ! among these is the I

(

ing to the words of the Preface, that through knowing Go<l <nUy
we may be caught up to the love oj thing· invisible, Wherefore

matters relating to Christ’s humanity art thi chief inceni v< to
devotion, lending us thither ns n guiding hand, although devotion
itself hns for its object matters concerning the Godhead/*

Meditation, then, from our side is the principal cause of
devotion. Il is to be noticed that St. Thomas has not made an
exhaustive nor exclusive statement of the material for the
meditation which leads to devotion; he has done no more than
lay down the most general principles. From these principles,
the world itself is laid open as a book for our meditation: any­
thing that pertains to the goodness of God, to His loving kind­
ness, and (though Thomas took this as obvious after all that
was said on the virtue of religion and its object) anything that
pertains to the excellence of the first principle. On the other
hand, all that pertains to the defects of man will also lead to
devotion to one who carefully considers them. By way of ex­
ample, St. Thomas >ay> that the very things that are an occa­
sion of impeding devotion can be a cause of its increase: “If
a man perfectly subjects his knowledge, or any other per­
fection whatever, to God, from that very fact, his devotion is
increased.” ' The strong language of St. Thomas makes the
formidable conclusion inescapable: without meditation there
can be no devotion.
******

“ Ea quae sunt Divinitatis, sunt secundum sc maxime excitantia dilectionem, et.
]Χ'Γ consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus; sed ex debilitate
mentis humanae est quod sicut indiget manuductioncm ad cognitionem divinorum,
ita nd dilectionem per aliqua sensibilia nobis nota: inter quae praecipuum est
humanitas Christi, secundum quod in Praefatione dicitur. I t, <f t. m runWifar Drm
cognoscimus, per hunc in invisibilium amorem rapiamur. Et ideo ea quae periment
ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cujusdam manuductionis, maxime dewlxmeoi
excitant; cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ca quae sunt Divinitatis consistat
Ibid., ad tum.
e‘Si tamen scientiam et quamcumque aliam perfectionem homo perferte Deo
subdat, cx hoc ipso devotio augetur. Summa Theol., Π-Π. q St, a 3 ad Sum

WALTER FARRELL

Primary Act of Piety—Domestic Devotion {Domestic Morale)
\Ne have seen the exact parallel and the intimate interdepen­
dence of the virtues that deal with the settlement of unpayable
debts—religion, piety, patriotism, and observance. They are
arranged in a descending grade, with a steadily more limited
held; but so exactly parallel that what is said of one can be said
of another, keeping in mind the difference in the field of each
virtue. This same thing is, obviously, also true of the principal
act of each of these virtues. All of them demand reverence and
subjection to principles of being and operation; and that rever­
ence and subjection is primarily in the will of men. “It belongs
to the same virtue to will to do something, and to have the will
prompt to do it, because both acts have the same object.”M
From this, St. Thomas concludes that devotion is an act of
religion; it can be as validly concluded that each of these house­
hold virtues has a parallel act of devotion which can be accu­
rately described from the detailed description St. Thomas has
already given of religious devotion.
To escape the dangers of ambiguity, let us use the word
“morale” instead of “devotion” to describe the first act of
each of these virtues; thus, we shall talk of religious morale,
domestic or filial morale, patriotic morale, and social morale.
We are now in a position to delineate in detail what Thomas
makes clear only in principle concerning the acts of these virtues
under religion.

Domestic or filial morale, then, is the prompt will to give one­
self to the service of parents. It effects both the reverence of
parents and the subjection of children in one and the same act of
veneration or service. It is a matter of order, putting both
children and parents in their proper place in the family hier­
archy; a matter of honesty, the payment of a debt due to the
parents as principles of being and government—and this in®6... ad eamdem virtutem pertinet velle facere aliquid, et promptam volun­
tatem habere ad illud faciendum, quia utriusque actus est idem objectum. Stnnmu
Theol., II-II, q. 82, a. 2. Confer ibid., q. 81, a. 1, ad 3um; q. 101, a. 1; q. 102, a. 1.

VIRTUE', OF THE HOUSEHOLD

chides generation, education, discipline, and all things that
pertain to the perfection of human life; M a matter of privilege,
for it is precisely in this subjection to a superior that the child 1%
himself perfected.
This domestic morale is the first act of the virtue of piety.
From it, and through it, all other acts that pertain to, or are
ordered to, the family must flow; and this under pain of there
being no family acts at all. Domestic morale puts its stamp of
promptitude on all other moral acts pertaining to the family,
marking them with a mode of willingness that is proper to
domestic morale and shared by all other family acts; for it is
the mover to the ends of the family, and its characteristics are
the characteristics of all motion to the family goals.
Mon ox ' i. all other famib
. both inti
exist for the sustenance and increase of this family morale. It is
internal and first; all external acts are ordered to the internal,
and all internal acts ordered to the first internal act. The
obedience, respect, courtesy and so on which is demanded of
children in the name of piety, in fact all that pertains to the
perfection of the child’s life, are not for show, not for the grati­
fication of the parents, but for the domestic morale which is
piety’s act of devotion; ultimately, then, for the reverence of
parents through the perfection of the child in its inner act of
domestic morale.
Domestic morale is caused by love and causes love. It is,
above all, brought about through meditation (or loxing
thought) on the excellence of the parents as principles, on the
initial and enduring dependence of the child on the parents, and
on all things that reveal or emphasize either this excellence or
this dependence. It is caused and increased by a conscientious
preparation for family acts, and particularly for this supreme
act of domestic morale. Its impediments will be all base things
that enslave the mind and heart of man. things beneath the
level and dignity of the family; for purity is an essential for the
consideration of such superior things as the principles of our
ee Summa Theol., II-II, q. 10i, a. 1.

374

WALTEIÎ FAKKELL

being and government. It will be impeded by any exaggeration
of the child’s independence; and everything that contributes to
the glorification of the child’s own capacities can easily be an
occasion of the presumption that nullifies the possibility of
domestic morale. What lowers the child’s estimation of his
parents will certainly undermine, if not destroy, domestic
morale. And this domestic morale will be seriously hindered
by all that distracts the mind from the fundamental consider­
ations of parental excellence and filial subjection; things, for
instance, like a home that for most of the time has nobody in it,
extremes of amusement, activities outside the home, or ceaseless
activity within the home. Domestic morale demands, and
cultivates, a certain firmness and stability, for it swings around
the principles of being and government.

******
Primary Act of Patriotism—Patriotic Devotion
(Patriotic Morale)

The same body of truth that has been established concerning
religious devotion is applicable, with the proper limitations, to
the first act of the virtue of patriotism, patriotic devotion or
patriotic morale. It is the prompt will to serve one’s country.
It is the very first act of the virtue of patriotism, the first and
fundamental subjection that fixes a man’s proper place, estab­
lishing the hierarchy of patriotism. With this act order is estab­
lished and continued; inferior things cannot usurp places above
men, men can know their rights and their duties. It, too, is a
matter of order, of honesty which makes payment on an unpay­
able debt, and of privilege, perfecting the citizen by the very
subjection to a superior. It recognizes one’s country as a prin­
ciple of being and of government; in that recognition there is
implied the reverence for excellence and the subjection to
principality which make up the essence of the honor due to

one’s country.
It is the first and most fundamental act of the virtue of

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

375

patriotism. From it, all other acts that pertain to or are ord*rM
to one’s country must flow; and all other acts, internal or ex­
ternal, are ordered to and exist for this internal act of patriot?:
morale. We have made much of civil obedience, of military
service, of political duties, and rightly so. Yet, in emphasizing
these things, it must not be overlooked that their absence is
much more damaging to the delinquent citizen than it is to the
country; for all these external things are for the internal act of
patriotic morale which perfects the individual citizen.
Morale building, then, in the sense of patriotic morale, is not
really a mysterious affair. Love of country will cause patriotic
morale, and will be caused by patriotic morale; but the two
arc not so closely tied together as to be inextricable. Love
is not the spring from which patriotic morale flows; its reverence
and subjection are due to the country under the precise aspect
of a principle of being and government. It is not unusual to find
an intense patriotic morale in men who have been very badly
treated by their country; whatever the treatment received, it
still remains true that this country is a principle of thdr b·
and government.
The immediate and most direct cause of patriotic morale
from our side is meditation, reiterated consideration of the ex­
cellence of that principle of our being and its consequent
superiority in that limited field, and our dependence on and
subjection to it. Immersion in baser things, in interests inimical
to country, or beneath the dignity of patriotic thought is cer­
tainly an impediment to the development of patriotic morale:
for without purity, men cannot apply their minds to superior
things. What lowers our country and its leaders in our estima­
tion is a definite impediment to morale, undermining our esti­
mation of their excellence; it should be a grave threat indeed to
the common good that would justify revelation of things that
go far to impede patriotic morale. Again, what tends to
exaggerate our independence of our country, in the political
field in which we depend on it, is again hindrance to political
morale, fostering a political presumption that is basically false.

—

· V*

Then, too, there must be some preparation of soul for the
placing of patriotic acts, particularly of the first act which is
patriotic morale. And there must be a certain firmness or
stability on the part of the citizens in this matter, since they are
here dealing with things as enduring and immobile as principles.
A nation that attempts to exist without patriotic morale, i. e.,
without the first act of patriotism, is hoping for the impossible;
in fact, it is to all practical purposes already dead. Where
patriotic morale is at a low ebb, that is, where this first act of
patriotism is a lukewarm, flaccid thing, the country will be dis­
ordered, dishonest, and debasing to its citizens. Λ semblance
of external order might be kept by a reign of terror, and for a
short time; but the fundamental principles of order have been
disregarded. Here there is no place for a man; and so, no place
for his superiors or his inferiors. There is no hope for justice
where the fundamental debts of the citizens are denied. There
is none of the perfecting action of discipline. The external acts
won by paternal bribery or terroristic brutality are by no stretch
of the imagination ordered to the perfection of the individual
citizen. This is a nation which is the enemy of its citizens, and
whose citizens are everyone an enemy of the nation.

******
Primary Act of Observance—Social Devotion (Social Morale)
Social morale, the first act of the virtue of observance, has
the same role to play in the relationship of individual men that
domestic morale plays in the family and patriotic morale in the
state. It furnishes the foundation of mutual respect among
men, recognizing and respecting superiority of virtue and learn­
ing, and the universal scope of men’s varying excellencies. It,
too, demands purity, abstraction of mind from baser things,
and a certain stability. It, too, springs from love and causes
love; it, too, demands meditation on the excellencies of men and
the subjection of ourselves. It is a matter of order, of honesty,
and of the privilege of perfection. Without it, men are enemies.

VIRTUES OF THE HOUSEHOLD

377

No surer confirmation of this need be sought than the tragic
effectiveness of the tale-bearer and the gossip who focus men’s
minds, not on the excellencies of men, but on their deficiencies;
of the braggart who focuses his attention on his own excel­
lencies and blinds himself to his inferiority to other men better
in one way or another. A veneer of civilization may hide this
enmity of man to man for a time; but it is not possible to make
fundamental disorder appear orderly. All other acts pertaining
to or ordered to the social life of men must flow from and be
ordered to this social morale, which imprints its eager stamp on
every act in the properly ordered social life of men. It is a
prompt will to serve men, recognizing the just grounds of that
service and perfecting itself in that recognition.
*««*««

Conclusion
Before concluding this brief study, one more implication of its
investigation of the virtues of service should be pointed out,
that is, the very close interdependence of these virtues in a
gradually descending scale. Piety hangs from religion as the
superiority of parents hangs from their share in the principality
of God; patriotism hangs from piety and religion; observance
from religion, piety, and patriotism. Obviously, if religion is
cut off at the top of this chain, the rest will not hang in mid­
air; if the debt due to God is denied, the shared debt due to
others will hardly be taken seriously. The collapse of morale
in our time has its fundamental causes; it will not be stayed by
superficial remedies.
The obvious conclusion of this study has been the identifica­
tion of religious vocation, on its human side, with an intense act
of devotion, the primary act of the virtue of religion. And the
recognition of the first act of the virtue of patriotism as that
mysterious thing which the moderns identified vaguely as
“ morale ” has been seen as nothing other than patriotic devo

WALTER FARRELL

tion, an act of virtue to be cultivated through the cultivation
of the virtue.

In the course of this double clarification, much has been said
of all the virtues of the household, the virtues dedicated to the
service of others in payment on unpayable debts: the virtues
of religion, piety, patriotism, and observance with their proper
acts. There is still much to learn about these virtues and the
morale which is their first and fundamental act. Indeed, this
study has been hardly more than an opening up of horizons for
further and much more profound thinking on the household
virtues through the explicit statement of what St. Thomas left
implicit in his treatment of these virtues. The further implica­
tions of such an explicit statement arc so vast as to furnish
abundant material for profound and extensive study. That
further study must, however, be left to other and more capable

hands.

Walter Farrell, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies.
Washington, D. C.

WAYS TO KNOW GOD
THE “SYMBOLIC THEOLOGY” OF DIONYSII S THE AREOPAGITE
AND ITS FACTUAL PRESUPPOSITIONS*

I. Preparatory Considerations
1. The Areopagitica. One may distinguish three main
spiritual currents which powerfully fashioned Western men1 The author, Sister Theresia Benedicta a Cruce, OCD, who in the world wa*
Dr, Edith Stein, mailed the manuscript of this article to Profeasor Msna Farter,
the editor of the Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, in the
fall of 1911, Prof Farber submitted it to the present translator for use ax>d
publication. Since then no reliable information has been obtainable on the fate
the author suffered. She had left the Carmelite convent at Lindenthal-Gologae
and found refuge in the convent of Echt in Holland. Because of her Jewish descent
cither she was forced to leave Germany or it was considered prudent to hare her
leave. It has been reported, by apparently reliable sources, that she wa* later
arrested by the Germans and put in a concentration camp in Poland, where the
is said to have died, presumably being killed. But no definite confirmation of this
has reached this country. On Dr Stein's previous work in philosophy and her
intellectual and religious development, see the article by J Collins. “ Edith Sten
and the Adxance of Phenomenology,” Thought, 1942, XVH, 6Si; also “The Fate
of Edith Stein,” ibid., 1943, XVIII, 324.
The study presented here is obviously intended as a sort of introduction to
further investigations into the problem indicated by the title. Whether any cl
these studies are extant we do not know; a great work on ontology, to which the
author referred in a letter to Professor Farber of the same date as this manuscript,
was completed The printing of it, however, was forbidden by the German authori­
ties; the fate of the book is unknown at the present time. This information is owed
to the courtesy of Professor Farber.
The reader acquainted with Husserl's phenomenology will recognize his influence
in the present article. It seems to have been the intention of the author to make
use of certain ideas, dex eloped within Husserl’s school, for the elucidation of meta­
physical and theological problems. Her having grown up. as it were, in the
atmosphere of phenomenology*—she was for many years Professor Husserl's assistant
—causes the author to use a certain technical language the rendering of which
into English is not always easy. It has been the endeavor of the translator to
avoid such technicalities as far as possible, so as to make the text intelligible to
those not acquainted with this particular branch of contemporary philosophy. Any­
one who wishes to know more about it should consult Marvin Farber's
as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline. Buffalo. 192$. Although there
remain certain passages in connection with which some explanation or comment
might be desirable, the translator has refrained from adding anything to the original
text. R. Allers.

379