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EDWARD A. PACE AND JAMES H. RYAN

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preservation of God's values is to say that God has values, which is to misunderstand the very nature of God. God has nothing. He is. God, in the strict sense of the term, has not even a value for man. For to say God has value for man is to distinguish existence from value. God is everything to man, and without God man is nothing. If man had a value for God, then God is not God, for in such a view the ultimate perfection of God would depend on man. The failure of man to worship God would then mean that God would lack the totality of His value, and hence would be deprived of His total perfection. It is quite another thing to say that man may be pleasing to God.

In conclusion, the sacramental philosophy of St. Thomas answers the best ideals of modern thought by bringing man into prominence and making him the king of creation, but it does not suffer from the defect of doing so at the expense of God Himself. Man is still king of the universe, and God is King of Men. Everything was made for man, and man was made for God. The universe stands midway between the two as the great sacrament of the natural order, the means by which man elevates himself from a mere animal contentment with things that have value to the very realm where there are no values but only God.

FULTON J. SHEEN.

The Catholic University of America.

*Deus est finis reum, non sicut aliquid constitutum, aut aliquid effectum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur; sed hoc solo modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur. (*Contra Gentiles*, lib. 3. c. 18.)

THE CONCEPT OF ORDER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

OF the concepts which Scholasticism inherited, developed and transmitted, some, and not the least important, have either been rejected outright or have been modified to such an extent that, for modern speculation, they persist in name only. Cause and substance, soul and freedom are examples. Others have survived, if not in the vigor of their former significance, at least in their essential meaning. Among these is the concept of order. Though institutions, the social and political embodiments of order, totter or crumble, the idea itself does not vanish. It takes new shapes. If at times thought verges on confusion and even philosophy becomes a "selva oscura" of systems, no one imagines that the world has lapsed into chaos. Muddle and fuss as we may, nature seems to move on in her course. And the more we find out as to the way of her moving, the more clearly do we perceive that it is the way of order.

The persistence of this concept may be explained by reference to the structure of our minds. It is surely "one of the fundamental ideas of intelligence." ¹ At any rate, we try to discern order, or establish it, in the things which occupy our thought. Next to clearness of ideas, orderly sequence is the requisite for the exercise of intelligence, while confusion is its ruin.

This, however, does not imply that order is a purely subjective affair, a form in the Kantian sense, with which we stamp our perceptions of the external world or unravel as best we can a tangle of reality. If the concept is fundamental for our thinking it has also a *fundamentum in re*. Otherwise, our searching into the nature of things would long since have ended in failure

¹ Lalande in *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la*
1926), s. v.

(Paris.

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

or even in the wearing down, by attrition with an orderless reality, of the concept itself.

It is within reason to suppose, on the contrary, that the idea of order, germinal in human intelligence, was developed through contact with the outer world. It cleared up as man noted the succession of day and night, of the seasons, of the corresponding changes in vegetation and in other factors which formed his physical environment. These were beyond his control. To maintain himself he had to accept things as they came, anticipating their recurrence as far as he could and adjusting his actions to their variations. Their regularity became by degrees the norm of his self-regulation. Thus, long before he had begun a systematic observation of natural events, and longer still before he had asked himself the meaning of order, man had taken for the pattern of his thought and the guide of his action, the orderly process of nature—roughly at first, no doubt, and yet with a gradual approach to more thorough adjustment as, through success or failure, he attained to deeper insight.

The advance of knowledge has, on the whole, strengthened the belief in objective order. As to the kind of order, the special form of relation which holds things together and the laws which appear in their cooperation, revision was often needed. It has become more frequent and more drastic as the methods of science have been freed from sources of error. But it has not weakened our conviction that order of some kind exists and that it can be found if we better the way of our seeking. Slow as the process of recasting may be, it does not justify the claims of those materialists who asserted with Holbach, for instance, that the order of nature is the product of our thinking. As Professor Henderson aptly says, “merely to explain away the order of nature is no more satisfactory than to explain away matter itself.”¹

¹*The Order of Nature*, (Cambridge, 1917), p. 10. Cf. J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, (London, 1917), p. 115.

It is intelligible, then, that with increasing discernment of order in nature, inquiry should turn from the facts and the forms to consider anew the concept. If we are to discuss the order of nature and still more if we are to determine how far disorder exists, the logical procedure is to settle upon a concept of order which may then serve as a criterion in any given case? Order indeed is such a commonplace of experience that, for everyday purposes, its meaning may be and is, taken for granted. Any one can recognize the difference between arrangement and clutter, and most people prefer tidiness to jumble. But few are prepared to say just what order is, beyond keeping "everything in its place." In fact, for the practical uses of life, no scrutiny of the concept is needed. The observance of order is more important than the definition.

For philosophy the case is different. The concept of order is not only basic but it also is intertwined with many other ideas, each of which is decisive for one's whole view of nature and life and duty.⁴ For teleology, of course, the idea of an orderly world is indispensable. But for mechanician! also it is, if not openly avowed, at least implicit. And the mechanistic philosophy will make it as explicit as one could wish the moment it is divested of any suggestion of purpose. However we may explain it, order exists; and the first step toward explanation, and toward the discussion of any proposed explanation, is a statement of what order means. This should precede the enumeration of the different kinds of order, though the meaning itself must be applicable to them?

* "L'ordre existe, c'est un fait. Mais d'autre part le désordre, qui nous paraît être moins que de l'ordre, serait, semble-t-il, de droit. L'existence de l'ordre serait donc un mystère à éclaircir, en tous cas un problème à poser." Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice* (9ième. ed.. Paris; 1912). p. 252.

⁴ In the preface to his *Ordnungslehre* (1st ed.) Professor Hans Driesch says: "Zum allerersten ist Philosophie Selbstbesinnungslehre—Zura zweiten ist Philosophie Ordnungslehre, das heisst Lehre von den Ordnungsformen dessen was ich mir gegenüber habe."

⁸ Says Professor Driesch: "Die erste Leistung der Philosophie muss often-

The object of this paper is to show the place which the concept of order holds in the philosophy of St. Thomas and to exhibit the elements which his analysis of the concept brings to view. It will be seen, I believe, that he anticipates more than one of the questions which are now current and that his thought concerning them retains its value.

As to the existence of order in nature, his position is clear.

Manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt potest esse absque ordine quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium.⁰

According to this, both the things of nature and all their properties are characterized by order. This is a fact of observation. It could not be otherwise for the reason that nature is the cause of orderliness. We indeed see that the course of nature is orderly, but it is not our seeing that establishes order. This is so inherent in the whole process that when it is lacking we can only conclude: non habet aliquem ordinem; ergo non est secundum naturam.⁷

What is true in this respect of nature in general, applies with particular force to the nature of man. The soul is one but its powers are many. And since the Many derive from the One in a certain order, it follows of necessity that order prevails among the powers of the soul.

bar darin bestehen: Restlos die Gesamtheit der Ordnungszeichen am Etwaa zu schauen, oder anders: restlos Rechenschaft davon, zu geben, was denn das Wort vom geordneten Etwas eigentlich heisst." *Ordnungslehre* (2te Aufl. Jena, 1923), p. 21.

⁰ Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, VIII, 3.

⁷ The statement—*natura est causa ordinationis*—might be taken to mean that nature is the one sufficient cause of its orderliness; this, needless to say, is not the thought of St. Thomas, as will later appear.

Edward A. Pace

Cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plure», ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur, necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse.⁸

It is on this basis that St. Thomas explains the interdependence of human faculties, their development and their relations to their respective stimuli or objects.

Still more obvious is the application of the concept and principle of order in the moral sphere. The entire ethical system of St. Thomas centers upon the observance of *debitus ordo*. This runs through his discussion of right and wrong, obligation and law, virtue and reward, sin and punishment. The fundamental difference between good and evil is thus stated:

Malum et bonum in moralibus specificae differentiae ponuntur . . . quia moralia a voluntate dependent: secundum hoc enim aliquid ad genus moris pertinet quod est voluntarium. Voluntatis autem obiectum est finis et bonum; unde a fine speciem moralia sortiuntur, sicut et naturales actiones a forma principii activi, ut calefactio a calore. Quia igitur bonum et malum dicuntur secundum ordinem ad finem, vel privationem ordinis, oportet quod in moralibus primae differentiae sint bonum et malum.⁹

The same principle pervades the social structure. Society is organized upon a fourfold order, viz., of ruler and subjects, of subjects among themselves, of one people to another, and, within the household, of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. To determine and maintain the relations which these several orders imply is the object of law.¹⁰

Religion, finally, consists in the observance of the order through which the creature is related to the Creator: "religio importat ordinem ad Deum." ¹¹ God is the author of human life, of man's faculties and of society. He is also the ultimate

⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I, 77, 4.

• *Contra Gentiles*, III, 9.

¹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, Ia-IIae, 104, 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, IIa-IIae, 81, 1.

end for which all these exist and in which their various purposes are brought to fulfillment.

The universe, including man and all things else, contains numerous forms and gradations of good. Each in its own measure possesses somewhat of utility, beauty or other desirable quality. But that in which the good of the universe as a whole consists, that which sums up and excels all particular forms and degrees of good, is order: "bonum et optimum universi consistit in ordine partium ipsius ad invicem." 12* So much for the internal structure of the world; the best thing in it is the order which holds its parts together. But again this ordered universe is related to its Source. Hence along with its structural arrangement it is held in existence and directed toward a supreme purpose by the First Cause.

Bonum universi consistit in duplici ordine, scilicet in ordine partium universi ad invicem et in ordine totius universi ad finem, qui est ipse Deus.¹⁸

For St. Thomas, then, order is the dominant note in the entire scale of being. He finds it in all that is and he makes it the norm of all that ought to be. To understand and appreciate his philosophy, it is necessary to know what he means by "order."

In his choice of terms he respected common usage, according to the rule: "Significatio nominis accipienda est ab eo quod intendunt communiter loquentes per illud nomen significare."¹⁴ Consequently, he paid much attention to word origins. Often, though not invariably, he begins his analysis of a concept by tracing the etymology of the corresponding term. Thus, "lex a legendo vocata est quia scripta est."¹⁵ Or again, "dicitur lex

¹² *Contra Gentiles*, II, 39.

¹³ *Sent. I*, 44, 12 c.

¹⁴ Commentary on Aristotle's *Libri Posteriorum Analyticorum*, I, 4.

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, Ia-IIae, 90, 4, ad 3m.

a ligando quia obligat ad agendum.”¹⁰ Similarly: “nomen naturae a nascendo est dictum vel sumptum. Unde primo eat impositum hoc nomen ad significandum generationem viventium, quae nativitas vel pullulatio dicitur, ut dicatur natura quasi nascitura.”¹⁷

He does not seem to have laid stress on the derivation of “ordo.” He knew in what sense it had been used by the writers of the classic age and by the Fathers. In various discussions, especially of the moral virtues,¹⁸ he introduces passages taken from Cicero, and he must have been familiar with the *De Officiis*,¹⁹ for he quotes it. Probably, then, he had noted that Cicero, alluding to the philosophy of the Stoics, reports their definition of order in these terms: “Ordinem sic definiunt; compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis.”¹⁹ It is a putting together of things in their proper places. The “apta et accommodata loca” are those which are in keeping with the nature and properties of things or adapted to the purpose of the “compositio.” Each thing fits into its place with respect to the others, and each place is suited to that which fills it. This evidently corresponds with the general idea of “order” as the term is commonly applied to spatial arrangement, e. g. of rooms in a dwelling, of books in a library, etc.

The same idea of collocation appears in St. Augustine’s definition which St. Thomas cites in his commentary on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard.²⁰ The point under discussion is a theological one—“utrum in personis divinis sit ordo.” On the negative side St. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, XIX, cap. 13) is quoted as saying: “Ordo est parium dispariumque sua cuique tribuens loca dispositio.” The *paria* and *disparia* are more

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 90, 1 c.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, III, 2, 1e.

¹⁸ See e. g. *Summa Theol.*, IIa-IIae.

¹⁸ *De Officiis*, I, 40.

⁸⁰ *Sent.* I, dist. 20, p. 1, art. 2.

specific than the *res* of the *Stoics*; but the spatial factor and the appropriateness of each place are elements which these definitions have in common. *St. Thomas* in solving the difficulty based on *St. Augustine's* statement, does not criticize the definition or deny its correctness: he simply points out that it refers to *spatial order and consequently has no weight* as an objection against his own position, which is affirmative.

His *chief* concern, apparently, is to single out the elements of order and to show how these are found in its various forms. *Commenting on the text of the "Sentences" (loc. cit.)* he says:

Ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet, rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum secundum quos aliquid altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis ex qua etiam ordo in speciem contrahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de aliis.

This passage is one among several in which the concept is analyzed. They are in substantial agreement, though differing in their emphasis of the elements.

Of the three factors which order includes the "before" and the "after" are mentioned first. The priority may be spatial (*secundum locum*), or temporal (*secundum tempus*), or of any other sort (*secundum omnia huiusmodi*); i. e., wherever one precedes and another, or a series, follows. This suggests that order consists not so much in the intrinsic nature of things as in their mutual reference. Beforeness and afterness in any series are relations. They are not constituent parts of objects, nor accidents which inhere in things as do, e. g., quality and quantity. They are spans that spring into being when one thing is here and another there, or when this *now* glides by and

a new one comes on. Like other relations, they exist not as *aliquid*, but as *ad aliquid*.²¹

The second item brought out by analysis is distinctness, this term being used in its literal meaning as the opposite of identity and of unity. Elsewhere St. Thomas states that: "in ratione distinctionis est negatio; distincta enim sunt quorum unum non est aliud."²² More explicitly in discussing the **One** and the **Many** he points out that distinctness involves a twofold negation: each of the *distincta* is one, *i. e.*, undivided in itself, and it is not any other.

Unum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res quae dicuntur multae quod unaquaeque earum sit una et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis.²³

Order, then, is possible only where things are distinct from one another. More exactly, however, as St. Thomas is careful to note, distinctness is a presupposition of order rather than a constituent part of its meaning. Things are already there, as *distincta*, when order supervenes. It does not make their distinctness or account for their discrete existence; it arranges them.

Without some sort of arrangement, the manifold is simply chaos. "Ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio."²⁴ Though things be tumbled about in confusion worse

²¹ Cf. Bertrand Russell's statement: "The essential characteristics of a relation which is to give rise to order may be discovered by considering that in respect of such a relation we must be able to say, of any two terms in the class which is to be ordered, that one 'precedes' and the other 'follows.'" *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London, 1919). p. 31. The words cited occur in Chapter IV, which has for title, "The Definition of Order."

²² *Contra Gentiles*, I, 7.

²³ *De Potentia*, IX, 7.

²⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, 42, 3.

confounded, they are still many and they are distinct from one another. Each has a position as regards its neighbors: it is above or below them, in touch with them or at measurable distance. If the collection is chaotic, this is because it lacks some feature which is essential to order.

Distinctness does not mean diversity in the absolute sense. Order requires that the members agree in some respect: otherwise they could not be brought into relation. Hence St. Thomas gives another enumeration of the requisites, as follows:

Considerandum est quod ad ordinem tria concurrunt. Primo quidem distinctio cum convenientia; secundo, cooperatio; tertio, finis. Dico autem distinctionem cum convenientia, quia ubi non est distinctio, ordo locum non habet. Si autem quae distinguuntur in nullo convenient, unius ordinis non essent.²⁵

The "distinctio" is limited by "convenientia," i. e. the possession by the members of some characteristic which is present in all, though not necessarily in the same degree. There may be also identity in nature, as when human beings are classified on the basis of nationality. But even apart from such identity things can be set in order with respect to some accidental property.

It may further be noted that this second analysis refers to order of the dynamic sort. The members are arranged with a view to cooperation. While each has a function of its own, this is bound up with the activities of the rest; and all are directed towards the realization of a common purpose.²⁶

The third requisite is the *ratio ordinis*. In this context "ratio" means the specifying element according to which things

²⁵ *De divinis nominibus*, Cap. IV, Leet. I.

²⁶ Cf. Driesch: "Ordnungsein heisst Bestandteile haben, welche jeweils als diese selbigen da sind und welche voneinander als sossende verschieden sind; sie sind sovieler und haben unter sich und zur Ordnung als Ganzem jeweils eindeutige Beziehung; sie sind teilweise durch andere Bestandteile notwendig begründet, das heisst mitgesetzt. *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

are arranged in this particular way. **It** is not identical with plan or purpose or design, though it may be determined by these and serve for their realization. They are extrinsic as causes by which and for which order is established. But the ratio is within the order, like the principle of classification. Whence it comes and why it was put there, may or may not appear. To assign its source and purpose is to offer an explanation in which a "reason." is given ; but that will be "ratio" in a different sense.

This, however, does not imply that the ratio as being intrinsic to a given order is of the essence of each member and consequently that each by its very nature demands and admits of one arrangement only. The qualities in which things agree or differ are various. Any one of them may suggest a way of ordering. Books, e. g., may be arranged according to content, color of binding, size, date of publication, or any other characteristic which is found generically in all, while presented in different specific forms by this group or that, as under the ratio of color, for instance, there are placed in separate groups the reds, greens, blues and so on.

Among the possible rationes there is a difference as regards their applicability to objects of a given kind. Size can be used as the basis of arrangement for bulky things, but not for colors. Bodies can be arranged according to weight, but sounds cannot. While, therefore, order is extrinsic, it depends in part upon the character of the objects. Within the limits fixed by their nature, things can be arranged in many ways. **It** is their indifference to this or that collocation that makes it possible for us to set them in groups or series according to a principle which we select. The ratio is then imposed by an external agency and the order so established is a resultant of two factors, our purpose and the nature of the ordinata.

Once established, order includes and subsists in relation. This emerges from the special ratio upon which the order is founded. Thus, if things are ordered according to size, the

relation will be that of larger and smaller; if according to weight, it will be that of heavier and lighter. The relation may hold between group and group or between one member and another within each of the groups. The ratio ordinis may not appear at the first glance. One may have to ask—on what principle are the paintings, for instance, in this gallery arranged? The answer is got through a study of the relations which exist among the different sections and among the paintings in each section, relation is thus the expression, in concrete form, of the ratio.

In the philosophy of St. Thomas the concept of relation is closely bound up with that of order, so much so that at times order is said to be a species of relation, while at other times relation is explained under the generic term of order. Thus, in treating of the relations between creatures and God, he concludes: "Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est." 27 But in replying in the same article to an objection, he speaks of "ipsa relatio quae nihil est aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad aliam." 28

For the better understanding of his position it should be recalled that relation is one of the ten "praedicamenta," or categories, which comprise the various modes of being: substance and the nine sorts of accident. Relation is one of the nine. Like the rest it offers two different aspects. First, there is the trait common to them all, which is inherence. For the accident, to be = to be in. It does not hold itself up by its own existability: it is held by something else. Hence, it cannot be stripped off and made to stand on its own feet. You cannot peel away the length of a plank and set it up as so much longness any more than you can pare off the movement from a spinning top and say, there goes pure motion. These are feats of abstraction: they are not performed on real things. So relation qua acci-

²⁷ *De Potentia*, VII, 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 7m.

dent sticks to a subject: it cannot step out and be a thing in its own right.

Second, however, there is the *ratio propria* of each kind of accident—the characteristic whereby it is distinguished from the other kinds. This, for all except relation, is a modification, in one way or another, of the subject in itself. The accidents have their whole existence, modality and function at home without any turning or looking abroad. But the case of relation is different. Its peculiarity is just this towardness, clinging to one subject yet reaching out to something else. It is essentially astride. As St. Thomas puts it: “Ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.”²⁹ This double character of relation is further described:

inquantum accidens est, habet quod sit in subiecto, non autem inquantum est relatio vel ordo, sed solum quod ad aliud sit quasi in illud transiens et quodammodo rei relatae assistens. Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens, licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio.³⁰

In consequence of this spread-out-ness, relation has the weakest sort of existence—“esse debilissimum.” Of entity it has the least—“minimum habet de ente inter omnia genera.”³¹ Because of its tenuity, it needs to be supported by other accidents. When we speak of larger and smaller, we denote a relation based on quantity. When we refer the house to the builder, or, more generally, the effect to the cause, the relation rests upon action.

Thus, in seeking the foundations of order we find, to begin with, relation. Back of relation or underlying it we come upon a more sturdy sort of accident, one of the strictly domestic inhérents. Finally, beneath them all is the subject, the *res relata*.

²⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I, 28, 2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, IX, 5, ad 2m.

³⁰ *De Potentia*, VII, 9, ad 7m.

There remains to be considered the question as to the multiplicity and variety of orders. In an order actually existing, the *ratio determines the* relation between member and member. But where an order is in the nascent state or just about to be, it must get its character as well as its start from something that is already there. The order must have a source.

Ordo semper dicitur per comparisonem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus; secundum intellectum ut principium demonstrationis; et secundum causas singulas; tunc etiam dicitur ordo.³²

“Principium” has a variety of meanings. In its widest sense, it means that from which or in which a thing, in any way whatsoever, begins: “Omne enim a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo dicimus esse principium.”³³ A line originates in a point and proceeds from it. Dawn is the beginning of day. Unity initiates the number series. In these cases, the initials are antecedents but not causes. They lead and they are followed by others; they do not produce their followers. Every cause is a principium; but the converse is not true. The reason is that “cause” implies a diversity of substance and a dependence of one thing on another, while a principium” as such implies neither.

In omnibus enim causae generibus, semper invenitur distantia inter causam et id cuius est causa, secundum aliquam perfectionem aut virtutem. Sed nomine principii utimur etiam in his quae nullam huiusmodi differentiam habent, sed solum secundum quemdam ordinem; sicut cum dicimus punctum esse principium lineae, vel etiam cum dicimus primam partem lineae esse principium lineae.³⁴

So far, then, as the inner structure of an order is concerned, the relation of member to member is not necessarily causal. The point from which a line begins does not generate the next

³² *Summa Theol.*, I, 42, 3.

³³ *Zdid.*, I, 33, 1.

³⁴ *Hid.*, ad 1m.

point, and much less does it determine the direction, form or length of the line. In the nature of the point there is nothing that decides which of the countless possible lines shall originate from it.

Where the relation is causal, the resulting order is of a different kind. If A produces B then A is not only prior to B, but also by its action brings B into existence. The relation on the part of B is one of dependence. Since, moreover, *omne agens agit sibi simile*," the effect is related to the cause as like to like. The cause naturally tends to reproduce itself as far as possible in the effect. The principle of action is the form which determines the specific nature of the agent. Hence, by its action the cause propagates and perpetuates its species. It operates in its own behalf, since it gains through this increasing and multiplying. If by acting it confers benefit, this in turn redounds to the agent's own profit. The order, therefore, which is based on the causal relation involves the element of good: *omne agens agit propter bonum*." 35

Here we come in view of the teleological aspect of order. Whenever we arrange things, we act with a purpose. It may be that we simply want things to look tidy instead of helter skelter: and in that case order itself is our aim. It is a good thing and therefore desirable. But again the arrangement may be a means toward an end over and above the establishment of order, as when a machine is constructed to do a certain kind of work. The adjustment of part to part is determined by the machinist in view of the purpose which the machine as a whole is designed to accomplish. The *ratio ordinis* is not merely suggested by the qualities of the elements, their hardness, rigidity, elasticity, durability and the rest: it is rather dictated and imposed by the purpose. Adjustment of parts is governed by adaptation of the entire structure to a particular kind of operation or production.

" *Contra Gentiles*, III, 3.

Each part indeed retains its natural properties, but its shape, position and connections are given it with reference to the cooperation of all the parts. Its movement is a contribution. It thus exemplifies the principle, “*quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum*”; or again, “*omnis pars ordinatur ad totum.*”³⁶

To understand any piece of mechanism we must know what it is supposed to do. The fact that it is nicely arranged or that the parts are delicately adjusted may elicit our admiration. But our inspection will lead to no satisfactory conclusion unless we find out what it is for. The order which its parts exhibit suffices to show that it was made for something. When we have learned what that something is, we are able to see why the parts were put together in this particular way. Failure, however, to discover the why does not justify us in concluding that the machine has no purpose. From our ignorance as to what he intended we cannot properly infer that the machinist intended nothing.

Suppose that we study the mechanism in detail and finally discover its purpose. Our knowledge will then correspond with that of the machinist but the process will be reversed. What came into his mind first was the idea, let us say, of a high speed engine. He next thought out the arrangement of the parts, procured the materials, made the parts in accordance with his plan and fitted them together. We, on the contrary, begin by examining the arrangement and, if necessary, the nature of the materials employed. We finish by discovering the purpose. In other words, we end where the maker began.

Once we know what he intended we are able to judge how far he has succeeded. We have a basis for our criticism of the

M Contra Gentiles, III, 64; *Summa Theol.*, Ia-IIae, 90, 2. As Professor Hobhouse states it: “The system as a whole is governed by a certain purpose, which it serves in its completeness and only in its completeness. *Development and Purpose* (London, 1913), p. 29G.

machine on the score of efficiency. The order is there; whether it is good, better or best depends on its relation to the end proposed. Where it is perfectly adapted, it furnishes the ground of another estimate: it enables us to appraise the ability, ingenuity and skill of its author. It may also reveal certain traits of character, such as patience and tenacity. But as regards goodness or evil in the moral sense, it, simply qua order, tells us nothing. The highest efficiency may be shown in compassing the lowest of ends. Such is the "merit" of a well laid plot. The orderly sequence of actions is, in one sense, good; in another, it is vitiated by reason of the end. The purpose itself gets its value through its relation to a more comprehensive order.

Is order anything more than a concept? Granting that we can look upon things as though they were arranged in a definite way, is the orderliness out there in them, or is it merely a device of our thought which we project into the objects? As to the perception of order, that of course is our own mental affair. If the beings which we set in order have intelligence like our own, they can perceive, as we do, that they are parts of the rank and file, members of the class, and so on. They may know just how they are related and why. But this does not of itself prove that the order among them is something real. It may be a convenient or useful fiction and nothing more. A fortiori, where the members are devoid of intelligence, there can be no question on this point. One might as well ask whether the springs and wheels of a watch are aware that they are parts of a mechanism. It is just our way of "putting things to right" that makes us believe we have put something into them that was not there before. And so when we discern the "orderly course" of nature we incline to think that nature has a scheme of her own and had it before we came on the scene.

Here again the problem pivots on the status of relations. If these are simply of our devising, they are not even the weakest

of entities; they are no entities at all apart from our thought. In that case, order likewise would be entirely our privato concern. We might call it a necessity of thought, whereas in truth it would be at most a luxury for imagination. No harm would come of our linking fancy unto fancy nor any violation of logical precept. For all that, order would remain where the concept originated—in the mind.

As against this view, St. Thomas holds that “Ordo principalis invenitur in ipsis rebus et ex eis derivatur ad cognitionem nostram.”⁸⁷ The significant word here is “principalis.” It is somewhat more emphatic than “principaliter.” It suggests that order is not only originally in things, but that it is there independently of our thinking. Our knowledge of it is derivative. This, however, would apply only to an order constructed by an agency other than our own. Where it is of our making, it is known to us before it appears among the objects, since we select the ratio ordinis and through it determine the relations in which it is expressed.

The matter becomes clearer when we note the distinction on which St. Thomas insists between “relatio realis” and “relatio rationis,” i. e. real relation and conceptual relation. Three different situations then may arise. The first is that in which the relation is purely conceptual, as when a thing is said to be the same as itself. The identity in this case does not imply any real betweenness on the part of the terms, but simply that the mind apprehends the thing a first time and then a second time, and attaches the label of sameness to two percepts of a thing which has not budged in the least from its unity. If the relation were a real something, it, in turn, would beget with itself a new relation of identity and this another and so forth ad infinitum, like the images of an object placed between two mirrors.

Purely conceptual also is the relation of genus and species.

⁸⁷ *Summa Theol.*, IIa-IIae, 26, 7, ad 2m.

When we say that man is a species of animal we express a relation which the mind by taking thought establishes. It is grounded *in rerum natura*, but as a relation it merely refers one concept to another. The same is true, evidently, of the connection which one foresees between future objects or events. To say that A will happen before B is to set up a relation of priority ; but this, so far, is a purely mental affair. Though the prediction may be verified, neither of the terms is yet in existence. The beforeness of A and the afterness of B have even less reality than the terms themselves. The combination belongs entirely to what St. Thomas calls the "ordo intellectuum."

The second situation is that in which both terms are actual existents. If each of them offers the characteristic upon which the relation is founded, this is real and bilateral. It holds, e. g., between a rod ten feet long and another rod five feet long. They are related on the basis of their length which, apart from any measuring, is found really in both. And, generally speaking, the relations determined by quantity are real on one side and on the other. Similarly, in the case of relations which are due to action, the terms are related, and really, on their own account, whether we think about them or not. Thus, a real relation exists between the motor and the thing which it moves, between the sculptor and the statue which he produces, between the father and the child which he begets. This, obviously, does not mean that the relation has the same mode or significance in both of the relata. Causality is a real relation, but it does not imply for the cause what it implies for the effect.

Distinct from these two types of relation and intermediate between them is the third, which in one term is real (*res naturae*), in the other merely conceptual (*res rationis tantum*). "Et hoc," says St. Thomas, "contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis." § His favorite illustration

••Summe *Theol.*, I, 13, 7.

under *this head is taken from the cognitive functions.* *Sense and sensible object* are both real; but the latter, as a thing existing in nature, is outside the sphere of sensibility. Whether it is sensed or not makes no difference to it. A flower may bloom unseen: it blooms none the less. Its blooming does not depend upon its being a visual stimulus, nor is it affected by the visual process. In the flower, therefore, as a term, the relation is not real: it is thought-in by the mind. But the sense organ undergoes change. The quality of the sensation is determined by the stimulus and by the momentary condition of the receptor. Accordingly, the relation, on the part of the seeing subject, is real.

For intellectual cognition the situation is of the same sort. The knowledge relation is real for the knowing mind, conceptual for the object. The latter is in no wise affected by our conception of it. The whole travail of our thinking is within us. The resultant ideas may correspond with their objects or differ from them widely. From time to time our knowledge must be recast. But the objects suffer no change either by reason of our thinking or in consequence of its revision.

Other instances cited by St. Thomas are that of a man standing at the side of a column or in front of his portrait. To be at the right or at the left involves a relation which is real in the man but not in the column. Conversely, his portrait is likened to him, not he to it, and therefore the relation is real in it only. To enhance the resemblance the artist retouches his canvas.

Quaedam sunt ad quae quidem alia ordinantur et non e converso, quia sunt omnino extrinseca ab illo genere actionum vel virtutum quas consequitur talis ordo; sicut patet quod scientia refertur ad scibile, quia sciens, per actum intelligibilem, ordinem habet ad rem scitam quae est extra animam. Ipsa vero res quae est extra animam omnino non attingitur a tali actu, cum actus intellectus non sit transiens in exteriorem materiam mutandam; unde et ipsa res quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile. Et propter hoc relatio quae con-

sequitur actum intellectus, non potest esse in ea; et similis ratio est de sensu et sensibili. Licet enim sensibile immutet organum sensus in sua actione, et propter hoc habeat relationem ad ipsum, sicut et alia agentia naturalia ad ea quae patiuntur ab eis, alteratio tamen organi non perficit sensum in actu, sed perficitur per actum virtutis sensitivae, cuius sensibile quod est extra animam, omnino est expers. Similiter homo comparatur ad columnam ut dexter, ratione virtutis motivae quae est in homine, secundum quam competit ei dextrum et sinistrum, ante et retro, sursum et deorsum. Et ideo huiusmodi relationes in homine vel animali reales sunt, non autem in re quae tali virtute caret. Similiter nummus est extra genus illius actionis per quam fit pretium, quae est conventio inter aliquos homines facta; homo etiam est extra genus artificialium actionum per quas sibi imago constituitur. Et ideo nec homo habet relationem ad suam imaginem, nec nummus ad pretium sed e contrario.³⁰

From the foregoing distinction it is clear that St. Thomas does not ascribe to all relations the same degree of reality. Some he confines to the intellect; others he apportions between intellect and object; and a third sort he regards as real entities existing between real things. Concerning these last, however, he introduces a further distinction. In some instances the ratio or ground of the relation is the same in both terms. This is the case with quantitative relations, since quantity as such, i. e. as a property of bodies, is of the same nature in all bodies, however they may differ in having more or less of it. Otherwise, no definite meaning could attach to "larger" and "smaller."

The case is different where relation arises through action. The pull is not the same for the horse as it is for the carriage; nor is teaching identical in process with learning, even where the pupil is stirred to self-activity. "It is more blessed to give than to receive" has a metaphysical as well as a moral import. And, generally stated: "In illis tantum mutua realis relatio invenitur in quibus ex utraque parte est eadem ratio ordinis unius ad alterum."⁴⁰

³⁰ *De Potentia*, VII, 10; Cf. *Summa ThcoL*, I, 13, 7.

⁴⁰ *De Potentia*, VII, 10.

The implications for epistemology are easily seen. Without entering upon this phase of the subject, one may note that according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, our knowledge is valid in proportion to the exactness and fullness with which the relations among our thoughts correspond to the order which prevails among things. But again, if the "optimum universi" is order, knowledge must get its highest value through its correspondence with the relations which that order implies. The special sciences have, undoubtedly, a service to render by explaining the relations which each finds in its own domain. Philosophy has a wider field in studying the universal order. For this reason it surpasses other forms of knowledge both in difficulty and in dignity. Compared with them, it is of higher import, just as the general welfare is superior to that of the individual; or, as St. Thomas expresses it, "sicut in rebus humanis bonum gentis est *divinius* quam bonum unius."⁴

Edward A. Pace.

The Catholic University of America.

⁴ *Contra Gentiles*, II, 42.

BOOK REVIEWS

Die Kategorienlehre Eduard von Hartmanns und ihre Bedeutung fuer die Philosophie der Gegenwart. By JOHANNES HESSEN. Vol. 17: Wissen u. Forschen. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Pp. 140.

This is a study of Hartmann's metaphysics or *Kategorienlehre*, the most important and mature work of a philosopher who is more generally known only as the philosopher of the Unconscious. Hartmann is strictly intellectualistic and objectivistic after the manner of Aristotle, but differs immensely from the latter in the derivation of the categories.

The prevailing negative dogmatism of the psychological schools which denied the possibility of transcending immediate experience, a belief strengthened by the teachings of positivism imported into Germany via England, refused to pay any attention to Hartmann's remarkable system of metaphysics. The author believes that Hartmann is finally coming into his own (just as the vitalistic theories are reviving after a long reign of mechanism). Hartmann holds fast to the possibility and necessity of objectivistic metaphysics. He considers one after another, naive realism (represented among contemporary Scholastics by Gredt and termed by him natural realism), transcendental idealism, solipsism, spiritualism, etc. to show their insufficiency and to arrive at transcendental realism. This he considers an hypothesis, but the most probable one; to ask for more is to demand the absolute intelligence of God for mortal man.

The categories are found by abstraction. As such they belong to the sphere of the unconscious and appear only as determinations of conscious contents, from which they must be abstracted a posteriori. The a priori knowledge of categories to which Kant and his followers pretended is impossible. They are the "conscious representative elements of inductively gained unconscious category functions." The unconscious category functions are not innate; they are the activities of the impersonal reason, and are therefore supra-individual in origin. Hartmann consistently remains the philosopher of the Unconscious Spirit. Hartmann then establishes the categories of quality, quantity, of space, relation etc., and finally of causality, finality, and substantiality.