THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM
A Quarterly Review op Philosophy

EDITED BY

EDWARD A. PACE AND JAMES H. RYAN

VOLUME II

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHERS

EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE

A. LORENTZ
KURPRINZSTRASSE. 10. LEIPZIG. GERMANT

50

Religion and Values

preservation of God's values is to say that God has values, which
is to misunderstand the very nature of God.

God has nothing.

He is. God. in the strict sense of the term, has not even a value
for man.w for to say God has value for man is to distinguish
existence from value. God is everything to man, and without

God man is nothing. If man had a value for God, then God
is not God. for in such a view the ultimate perfection of God
would depend on man.

The failure of man to worship God

would then mean that God would lack the totality of His value,
and hence would be deprived of His total perfection.

It is

quite another thing to say that man may be pleasing to God.
In conclusion, the sacramental philosophy of St. Thomas
answers the best ideals of modern thought by bringing man
into prominence and making him the king of creation, but it

does not suffer from the defect of doing so at the expense of

God Himself. Man is still king of the universe, and God is
King of Men. Everything was made for man, and man was
made for God. The universe stands midway between the two
as the great sacrament of the natural order, the means by which

man elevates himself from a mere animal contentment with
thinss
realm where there are no
C that have value to the very
v
values but only God.

Fulton J. Sheen.
Tie Crthdic Cnicersity of America.

*Deus est finis return, non sicut aliquid constitutum, aut aliquid effec­
tum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur; sed hoc solo
modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur. (Contra Gentiles, lib. 3. c. 18.)

THE CONCEPT OF ORDER IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ST. THOMAS

O

F the concepts which Scholasticism inherited, developed
and transmitted, some, and not the least important, have

either been rejected outright or have been modified to such an

extent that, for modern speculation, they persist in name only.
Cause and substance, soul and freedom are examples.

Others

have survived, if not in the vigor of their former significance,
at least in their essential meaning.

of order.

Among these is the concept

Though institutions, the social and political embodi­

ments of order, totter or crumble, the idea itself does not vanish.

It takes new shapes.

If at times thought verges on confusion

and even philosophy becomes a “selva oscura” of systems, no one

imagines that the world has lapsed into chaos.

Muddle and

fuss as we may, nature seems to move on in her course.

And

the more we find out as to the way of her moving, the more
clearly do we perceive that it is the way of order.

The persistence of this concept may be explained by refer­
ence to the structure of our minds.

It is surely ‘‘one of the

fundamental ideas of intelligence.” 1

At any rate, we try to

discern order, or establish it, in the things which occupy our
thought.

Next to clearness of ideas, orderly sequence is the

requisite for the exercise of intelligence, while confusion is its

ruin.
This, however, does not imply that order is a purely subjective

affair, a form in the Kantian sense, with which we stamp our
perceptions of the external world or unravel as best we can a
tangle of reality.

If the concept is fundamental for our think­

ing it has also a fundamentum in re.

Otherwise, our searching

into the nature of things would long since have ended in failure
1 Lalande in Vocabulaire technique el critique de la
1926), s. v.

51

(Paris.

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

or even in the wearing down, by attrition with an orderlesa

reality, of the concept itself.
It is within reason to suppose, on the contrary, that the idea
of order, germinal in human intelligence, was developed through

contact with the outer world. It cleared up as man noted the
succession of day and night, of the seasons, of the correspond­
ing changes in vegetation and in other factors which formed
his physical environment.

These were beyond his control.

To

maintain himself he had to accept things as they came, antici­
pating their recurrence as far as he could and adjusting his

actions to their variations. Their regularity became by degrees
the norm of hisself-regulation.

Thus, long before he had begun

a systematic observation of natural events, and longer still

before he had asked himself the meaning of order, man had

taken for the pattern of his thought and the guide of his action,
the orderly process of nature—roughly at first, no doubt, and
yet with a gradual approach to more thorough adjustment as,

through success or failure, he attained to deeper insight.
The advance of knowledge has, on the whole, strengthened

the belief in objective order·.

As to the kind of order, the

special form of relation which holds things together and the

laws which appear in their cooperation, revision was often
needed. It has become more frequent and more drastic as the
methods of science have been freed from sources of error.

But

it has not weakened our conviction that order of some kind
exists and that it can be found if we better the way of our seek­
ing. Slow as the process of recasting may be, it does not justify

the claims of those materialists who asserted with Holbach, for
instance, that the order of nature is the product of our think­

ing. As Professor Henderson aptly says, “merely to explain

away the order of nature is no more satisfactory than to explain

away matter itself.”2
1 The Order of Nature, (Cambridge, 1917), p. 10. Cf. J. S. Mackenzie,
Elements of Constructive Philosophy, (London, 1917), p. 115.

f

53

Edward A. Pace

It is intelligible, then, that with increasing discernment of
order in nature, inquiry should turn from the facts and the
forms to consider anew the concept. If we are to discuss the
order of nature and still more if we are to determine how far
disorder exists, the logical procedure is to settle upon a concept
of order which may then serve as a criterion in any given case?
Order indeed is such a commonplace of experience that, for
everyday purposes, its meaning may be and is, taken for

granted.

Any one can recognize the difference between arrange­

ment and clutter, and most people prefer tidiness to jumble.

But few are prepared to say just what order is, beyond keeping

“everything in its place.”

In fact, for the practical uses of

life, no scrutiny of the concept is needed.

The observance of

order is more important than the definition.
For philosophy the case is different.

The concept of order

is not only basic but it also is intertwined with many other ideas,

each of which is decisive for one’s whole view of nature and

life and duty.4

For teleology, of course, the idea of an orderly

world is indispensable.

But for mechanician! also it is, if not

openly avowed, at least implicit.

And the mechanistic philoso­

phy will make it as explicit as one could wish the moment it is
divested of any suggestion of purpose.

However we may

explain it, order exists; and the first step toward explanation,

and toward the discussion of any proposed explanation, is a

statement of what order means.

This should precede the

enumeration of the different kinds of order, though the mean­

ing itself must be applicable to them?

• “ L’ordre existe, c’est un fait. Mais d’autre part le désordre, qui nous
parait être moins que de l’ordre, serait, semble-t-il, de droit. L’existence
de l’ordre serait donc un mystère à éclaircir, en tous cas un problème à
poser.” Bergson, L’évolution créatrice (9ième. ed.. Paris; 1912). p. 252.
4 In the preface to his Ordnungslehre (1st ed.) Professor Hans Driesch
says : “ Zum allerersten ist Philosophie Selbstbesinnungslehre—Zura
zweiten ist Philosophie Ordnungslehre, das heisst Lehre von den Ordnungsformen dessen was ich mir gegenüber habe.”
8 Says Professor Driesch : “Die erste Leistung der Philosophie muss often-

54

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

The object of this paper is to show the place which the con­
cept of order holds in the philosophy of St. Thomas and to
exhibit the elements which his analysis of the concept brings
to view. It will be seen, I believe, that he anticipates more
than one of the questions which are now current and that his
thought concerning them retains its value.
As to the existence of order in nature, his position is clear.
Manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis nec aliquid eorum quae
naturaliter rebus conveniunt potest esse absque ordine quia natura est
causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate
de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem non
est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium.0

According to this, both the things of nature and all their
properties are characterized by order.

This is a fact of observa­

tion. It could not be otherwise for the reason that nature is the

cause of orderliness.

We indeed see that the course of nature is

orderly, but it is not our seeing that establishes order.

This is

so inherent in the whole process that when it is lacking we can

only conclude: non habet aliquem ordinem; ergo non est
secundum naturam.7

What is true in this respect of nature in general, applies with

particular force to the nature of man.

powers are many.

The soul is one but its

And since the Many derive from the One in

a certain order, it follows of necessity that order prevails among
the powers of the soul.

bar darin bestehen : Restlos die Gesamtheit der Ordnungszeichen am Etwaa
zu schauen, oder anders: restlos Rechenschaft davon. zu geben, was denn
das Wort vom geordneten Etwas eigentlich heisst.” Ordnungslehre (2 te
Aufl. Jena, 1923), p. 21.
• Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, VIII, 3.
’The statement—natura est causa ordinationis—might be taken to mean
that nature is the one sufficient cause of its orderliness; this, needless to
say, is not the thought of St. Thomas, as will later appear.

Edward A. Pace
Cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plure», ordine autem quodam ab
uno in multitudinem procedatur, necesse est inter potentias animae
ordinem esse.8

It is on this basis that St. Thomas explains the interdependence
of human faculties, their development and their relations to
their respective stimuli or objects.
Still more obvious is the application of the concept and prin­
ciple of order in the moral sphere. The entire ethical system
of St. Thomas centers upon the observance of debitus ordo.
This runs through his discussion of right and wrong, obligation
and law, virtue and reward, sin and punishment The funda­
mental difference between good and evil is thus stated:

Malum et honum in moralibus specificae differentiae ponuntur . . .
quia moralia a voluntate dependent: secundum hoc enim aliquid ad
genus moris pertinet quod est voluntarium. Voluntatis autem obiectum
est finis et bonum; unde a fine speciem moralia sortiuntur, sicut et
naturales actiones a forma principii activi, ut calefactio a calore. Quia
igitur bonum et malum dicuntur secundum ordinem ad finem, vel priva­
tionem ordinis, oportet quod in moralibus primae differentiae sint
bonum et malum.9
The same principle pervades the social structure.

Society is

organized upon a fourfold order, viz., of ruler and subjects, of
subjects among themselves, of one people to another, and, within

the household, of husband and wife, parent and child, master
and servant.

To determine and maintain the relations which

these several orders imply is the object of law.10
Religion, finally, consists in the observance of the order

through which the creature is related to the Creator: ‘‘religio
importat ordinem ad Deum.” 11 God is the author of human
life, of man’s faculties and of society. He is also the ultimate

8 Summa Thcol., I, 77, 4.
• Contra Gentiles, III, 9.
10 Summa Thcol., Ia-IIae, 104, 4.
11 Ibid., Ila-IIae, 81, 1.

56

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

end for which all these exist and in which their various purposes
are brought to fulfillment.
The universe, including man and all things else, contains
numerous forms and gradations of good. Each in its own meas­
ure possesses somewhat of utility, beauty or other desirable
quality. But that in which the good of the universe as a whole
consists, that which sums up and excels all particular forms and
degrees of good, is order: “bonum et optimum universi consistit
in ordine partium ipsius ad invicem.” 11
12* So much for the
internal structure of the world;.the best thing in it is the order
which holds its parts together.

is related to its Source.

But again this ordered universe

Hence along with its structural

arrangement it is held in existence and directed toward a
supreme purpose by the First Cause.

Bonum universi consistit in duplici ordine, scilicet in ordine partium
universi ad invicem et in ordine totius universi ad finem, qui est ipse
Deus.18
For St. Thomas, then, order is the dominant note in the
entire scale of being.

He finds it in all that is and he makes

it the norm of all that ought to be.

To understand and appre­

ciate his philosophy, it is necessary to know what he means by

“order.”

In his choice of terms he respected common usage, according

to the rule: “Significatio nominis accipienda est ab eo quod

intendunt communiter loquentes per illud nomen significare.”14
Consequently, he paid much attention to word origins.

Often,

though not invariably, he begins his analysis of a concept by

tracing the etymology of the corresponding term.

legendo vocata est quia scripta est.” 15

Thus, “lex a

Or again, “dicitur lex

11 Contra Gentiles, II, 39.
“Sent. I, 44, 12 c.
14 Commentary on Aristotle’s Libri Posteriorum Analyticorum, I, 4.
“Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, 90, 4, ad 3m.

57

Edward A. Pace

a ligando quia obligat ad agendum.” 10 Similarly: “nomen
naturae a nascendo est dictum vel sumptum. Unde primo eat
impositum hoc nomen ad significandum generationem viven­
tium, quae nativitas vel pullulatio dicitur, ut dicatur natura
quasi nascitura. ” 17
He does not seem to have laid stress on the derivation of
“ordo.” He knew in what sense it had been used by the writers
of the classic age and by the Fathers. In various discussions,
especially of the moral virtues,18 he introduces passages taken
from Cicero, and he must have been familiar with the iCDe
Officiis,” for he quotes it.

Probably, then, he had noted that

Cicero, alluding to the philosophy of the Stoics, reports their
definition of order in these terms: “Ordinem sic definiunt; com­

positionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis.” 19

ting together of things in their proper places.

It is a put­
The “ apta et

accommodata loca ” are those which are in keeping with the
nature and properties of things or adapted to the purpose of

the “compositio.”

Each thing fits into its place with respect to

the others, and each place is suited to that which fills it.

This

evidently corresponds with the general idea of “order” as the

term is commonly applied to spatial arrangement, e. g. of rooms
in a dwelling, of books in a library, etc.

The same idea of collocation appears in St. Augustine’s defi­
nition which St. Thomas cites in his commentary on the “Sen­

tences” of Peter Lombard.20

The point under discussion is a

theological one—“utrum in personis divinis sit ordo.”

On the

negative side St. Augustine (De. Civ. Dei. XIX, cap. 13) is

quoted as saying: “Ordo est parium dispariumque sua cuique

tribuens loca dispositio.”

The paria and disparia are more

18 Ibid., 90, 1 c.
11 Ibid., Ill, 2, le.
18 See e. g. Summa ThcoL, Ila-IIae.
18 De Officiis, I, 40.
80 Sent. I, dist. 20, p. 1, art. 2.

58

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

specific than the res of the Stoics; but the spatial factor and the
appropriateness of each place are elements which these defini­
tions have in common. St. Thomas in solving the difficulty
based on St. Augustine’s statement, does not criticize the defi­
nition or deny its correctness : he simply points out that it refers
to spatial order and consequently has no weight as an objection
against his own position, which is affirmative.

His chief concern, apparently, is to single out the elements of

order and to show how these are found in its various forms.
Commenting on the text of the “ Sentences ” (loc. cit.) he says:

Ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet, rationem prioris et pos­
terioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo ali­
quorum secundum quos aliquid altero prius dicitur et secundum locum
et secundum tempus et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Includit etiam
distinctionem quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc
magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio
rationem ordinis ex qua etiam ordo in speciem contrahitur. Unde unus
est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum
originem, et sic de aliis.

This passage is one among several in which the concept is

analyzed.

They are in substantial agreement, though differing

in their emphasis of the elements.

b

Of the three factors which order includes the “before” and
the “after” are mentioned first.

The priority may be spatial

(secundum locum), or temporal (secundum tempus), or of any
other sort (secundum omnia huiusmodi) ; i. e., wherever one

precedes and another, or a series, follows.

This suggests that

order consists not so much in the intrinsic nature of things as

in their mutual reference.
series are relations.

Beforeness and afterness in any

They are not constituent parts of objects,

nor accidents which inhere in things as do, e. g., quality and

quantity.

They are spans that spring into being when one

thing is here and another there, or when this now glides by and

Edward Λ. Pace

59

a new one comes on. Like other relations, they exist not as
aliquid, but as ad aliquid.21
The second item brought out by analysis is distinctness, this
term being used in its literal meaning as the opposite of identity
and of unity. Elsewhere St. Thomas states that: “in ratione
distinctionis est negatio; distincta enim sunt quorum unum non
est aliud.” 22 More explicitly in discussing the One and the
Many he points out that distinctness involves a twofold nega­
tion : each of the distincta is one, i. e., undivided in itself, and it
is not any other.

Unum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil
superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspond­
ons addit supra res quae dicuntur multae quod unaquaeque earum sit
una et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinc­
tionis.23
Order, then, is possible only where things are distinct from

one another.

More exactly, however, as St. Thomas is careful

to note, distinctness is a presupposition of order rather than a
constituent part of its meaning.

distincta, when order supervenes.

Things are already there, as

It does not make their dis­

tinctness or account for their discrete existence; it arranges

them.
Without some sort of arrangement, the manifold is simply

chaos.

“Ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est con­

fusio.” 24

Though things be tumbled about in confusion worse

91 Cf. Bertrand Russell’s statement: “The essential characteristics of a
relation which is to give rise to order may be discovered by considering
that in respect of such a relation we must be able to say, of any two terms
in the class which is to be ordered, that one ‘ precedes ’ and the other ‘ fol­
lows.’” Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London, 1919). p. 31.
The words cited occur in Chapter IV, which has for title, “ The Definition
of Order.”
89 Contra Gentiles, I, 7.
98 De Potentia, IX, 7.
94 Summa Thcol., I, 42, 3.

60

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

confounded, they are still many and they arc distinct from one
another. Each has a position as regards its neighbors: it is
above or below them, in touch with them or at measurable dis­
tance. If the collection is chaotic, this is because it lacks some
feature which is essential to order.
Distinctness does not mean diversity in the absolute sense.
Order requires that the members agree in some respect : other­
wise they could not be brought into relation. Hence St.
Thomas gives another enumeration of the requisites, as follows:

Considerandum est quod ad ordinem tria concurrunt. Primo quidem
distinctio cum convenientia; secundo, cooperatio; tertio, finis. Dico
autem distinctionem cum convenientia, quia ubi non est distinctio, ordo
locum non habet. Si autem quae distinguuntur in nullo convenirent,
unius ordinis non essent.25

The “distinctio” is limited by “convenientia,” i. e. the posses­
sion by the members of some characteristic which is present in

all, though not necessarily in the same degree.

There may be

also identity in nature, as when human beings are classified on

the basis of nationality.

But even apart from such identity

things can be set in order with respect to some accidental prop­

erty.

It may further be noted that this second analysis refers to
order of the dynamic sort.
view to cooperation.

The members are arranged with a

While each has a function of its own, this

is bound up with the activities of the rest ; and all are directed
towards the realization of a common purpose.26

The third requisite is the ratio ordinis.

In this context

“ratio” means the specifying element according to which things
” De dirinw nominibus, Cap. IV, Leet. I.
MCf. Driesch: “Ordnungsein heisst Bestandteile haben, welche jeweils als
diese selbigen da sind und welche voneinander als soseiende verschieden
sind; sie sind soviele und haben unter sich und zur Ordnung als Ganzem
jeweils eindeutige Beziehung; sie sind teilweise durch andere Bestandteile
notwendig begründet, das heisst mitgesetzt. Op. cit., p. 83.

Edward Λ. Pace

61

are arranged in this particular way. It is not identical with
plan or purpose or design, though it may be determined by these
and serve for their realization. They are extrinsic as causes
by which and for which order is established. But the ratio is
within the order, like the principle of classification. Whence
it comes and why it was put there, may or may not appear. To
assign its source and purpose is to offer an explanation in which
a “reason.” is given ; but that will be “ratio” in a different sense.
This, however, does not imply that the ratio as being intrinsic
to a given order is of the essence of each member and conse­
quently that each by its very nature demands and admits of one
arrangement only. The qualities in which things agree or differ
are various. Any one of them may suggest a way of ordering.
Books, e. g., may be arranged according to content, color of
binding, size, date of publication, or any other characteristic
which is found generically in all, while presented in different
specific forms by this group or that, as under the ratio of color,

for instance, there are placed in separate groups the reds, greens,

blues and so on.

Among the possible rationes there is a difference as regards
their applicability to objects of a given kind.

Size can be used

as the basis of arrangement for bulky things, but not for colors.

Bodies can be arranged according to weight, but sounds cannot.

While, therefore, order is extrinsic, it depends in part upon the
character of the objects.

Within the limits fixed by their

nature, things can be arranged in many ways. It is their indif­

ference to this or that collocation that makes it possible for us

to set them in groups or series according to a principle which
we select.

The ratio is then imposed by an external agency and

the order so established is a resultant of two factors, our pur­
pose and the nature of the ordinata.
Once established, order includes and subsists in relation.

This emerges from the special ratio upon which the order is
founded.

Thus, if things are ordered according to size, the

62

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

relation will be that of larger and smaller; if according to
weight, it will be that of heavier and lighter. The relation may
hold between group and group or between one member and
another within each of the groups. The ratio ordinis may not
appear at the first glance. One may have to ask—on what
principle are the paintings, for instance, in this gallery

arranged ? The answer is got through a study of the relations
which exist among the different sections and among the paint­
ings in each section, delation is thus the expression, in con­

crete form, of the ratio.
In the philosophy of St. Thomas the concept of relation is

closely bound up with that of order, so much so that at times
order is said to be a species of relation, while at other times
relation is explained under the generic term of order.

Thus, in

treating of the relations between creatures and God, he con­
cludes: “Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse;

hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est.” 27

But in replying in the

same article to an objection, he speaks of “ ipsa relatio quae
nihil est aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad aliam.” 28

For the better understanding of his position it should be
recalled that relation is one of the ten “praedicamenta,” or

categories, which comprise the various modes of being : substance
and the nine sorts of accident.

Relation is one of the nine.

Like the rest it offers two different aspects.

trait common to them all, which is inherence.

First, there is the
For the accident,

to be = to be in. It does not hold itself up by its own existabil­
ity: it is held by something else.

Hence, it cannot be stripped

off and made to stand on its own feet.

You cannot peel away

the length of a plank and set it up as so much longness any more

than you can pare off the movement from a spinning top and
say, there goes pure motion.

These are feats of abstraction :

they are not performed on real things.
” De Potentia, VII, 9.

So relation qua acci-

88 Ibid., ad 7m.

63

Edward A. Pace

dent sticks to a subject : it cannot step out and be a thing in ita
own right.
Second, however, there is the ratio propria of each kind of
accident—the characteristic whereby it is distinguished from
the other kinds. This, for all except relation, is a modification,
in one way or another, of the subject in itself. The accidents
have their whole existence, modality and function at home with­
out any turning or looking abroad. But the case of relation is
different. Its peculiarity is just this towardness, clinging to
one subject yet reaching out to something else. It is essentially
astride. As St. Thomas puts it: “Ratio propria relationis non
accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est sed
secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.” 29 This double
character of relation is further described:
inquantum accidens est, habet quod sit in subiecto, non autem inquan­
tum est relatio vel ordo, sed solum quod ad aliud sit quasi in illud
transiens et quodammodo rei relatae assistens. Et ita relatio est aliquid
inhaerens, licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio.30
In consequence of this spread-out-ncss, relation has the weak­

est sort of existence—“esse debilissimum.”

Of entity it has

the least—“minimum habet de ente inter omnia genera.” 31
Because of its tenuity, it needs to be supported by other acci­

dents.

When we speak of larger and smaller, we denote a rela­

tion based on quantity. When we refer the house to the builder,
or, more generally, the effect to the cause, the relation rests upon

action.
Thus, in seeking the foundations of order we find, to begin
with, relation.

Baek of relation or underlying it we come upon

a more sturdy sort of accident, one of the strictly domestic

inhérents.

Finally, beneath them all is the subject, the res

relata.

20 Summa Theol., I, 28, 2.
80 De Potentia, VII, 9, ad 7m.

81 Ibid., IX. 5. ad 2m.

64

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

There remains to be considered the question as to the multi­

plicity and variety of orders. In an order actually existing, the
ratio determines the relation between member and member.

But where an order is in the nascent state or just about to be,
it must get its character as well as its start from something
that is already there. The order must have a source.

Ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium.
Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter scilicet secundum situm, ut
punctus; secundum intellectum ut principium demonstrationis; et
secundum causas singulas; tia etiam dicitur ordo.32
“Principium ” has a variety of meanings.

In its widest sense,

it means that from which or in which a thing, in any way
whatsoever, begins: “Omne cnim a quo aliquid procedit quo­

cumque modo dicimus esse principium.” 33
in a point and proceeds from it.

Dawn is the beginning of day.

Unity initiates the number series.
are antecedents but not causes.

A line originates

In these cases, the initials

They lead and they are followed

by others; they do not produce their followers.
a principium; but the converse is not true.

Every cause is

The reason is that

“cause” implies a diversity of substance and a dependence

of one thing on another, while a principium ” as such implies
neither.

In omnibus enim causae generibus, semper invenitur distantia inter
causam et id cuius est causa, secundum aliquam perfectionem aut vir­
tutem. Sed nomine principii utimur etiam in his quae nullam huiusmodi differentiam habent, sed solum secundum quemdam ordinem; sicut
cum dicimus punctum esse principium lineae, vel etiam cum dicimus
primam partem lineae esse principium lineae.34
So far, then, as the inner structure of an order is concerned,
the relation of member to member is not necessarily causal.
The point from which a line begins does not generate the next

“ Summa Theol., I, 42, 3.
” Zdid., I, 33, 1.

“Hid., ad Im.

Edward Λ. Pace

ί’Λ

point, and much less does it determine the direction, form or
length of the line. In the nature of the point there is nothing
that decides which of the countless possible lines shall originate
from it.

Where the relation is causal, the resulting order is of a dif­

ferent kind.

If A produces B then A is not only prior to B, but

also by its action brings B into existence.

part of B is one of dependence.

The relation on the

Since, moreover, u omne agens

agit sibi simile,” the effect is related to the cause as like to like.

The cause naturally tends to reproduce itself as far as possible in

The principle of action is the form which deter­

the effect.

mines the specific nature of the agent.

Hence, by its action the

cause propagates and perpetuates its species.

It operates in its

own behalf, since it gains through this increasing and multiply­

ing.

If by acting it confers benefit, this in turn redounds to

the agent’s own profit.

The order, therefore, which is based on

the causal relation involves the element of good: omne agens

agit propter bomum.” 35

Here we come in view of the teleological aspect of order.
Whenever we arrange things, we act with a purpose.

It may be

that we simply want things to look tidy instead of helter skelter:

and in that case order itself is our aim.
therefore desirable.

It is a good thing and

But again the arrangement may be a means

toward an end over and above the establishment of order, as

when a machine is constructed to do a certain kind of work.
The adjustment of part to part is determined by the machinist

in view of the purpose which the machine as a whole is designed
to accomplish.

The ratio ordinis is not merely suggested by

the qualities of the elements, their hardness, rigidity, elasticity,

durability and the rest: it is rather dictated and imposed by the
purpose.

Adjustment of parts is governed by adaptation of the

entire structure to a particular kind of operation or production.
” Contra Gentiles, III, 3.

3

66

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

Each part indeed retains its natural properties, but its shape,
position and connections are given it with reference to the

cooperation of all the parts.

Its movement is a contribution.

It thus exemplifies the principle, “ quaelibet pars invenitur esse

propter suum totum”; or again, “omnis pars ordinatur ad

totum.”3β
To understand any piece of mechanism we must know what

it is supposed to do. The fact that it is nicely arranged or that

the parts are delicately adjusted may elicit our admiration.
But our inspection will lead to no satisfactory conclusion unless

we find out what it is for.

The order which its parts exhibit

suffices to show that it was made for something.

When we have

learned what that something is, we are able to see why the parts
were put together in this particular way.

Failure, however, to

discover the why does not justify us in concluding that the

machine has no purpose.

From our ignorance as to what he

intended we cannot properly infer that the machinist intended
nothing.
Suppose that we study the mechanism in detail and finally

discover its purpose. Our knowledge will then correspond with
that of the machinist but the process will be reversed.

What

came into his mind first was the idea, let us say, of a high speed
engine. He next thought out the arrangement of the parts, pro­

cured the materials, made the parts in accordance with his plan
and fitted them together.

We, on the contrary, begin by exam­

ining the arrangement and, if necessary, the nature of the
materials employed. We finish by discovering the purpose.

In

other words, we end where the maker began.

Once we know what he intended we are able to judge how far
he has succeeded.

We have a basis for our criticism of the

M Contra Gentiles, III, 64; Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, 90, 2. As Professor
Hobhouse states it: “The system as a whole is governed by a certain
purpose, which it serves in its completeness and only in its completeness.
Development and Purpose (London, 1913), p. 29G.

VI

Edward A. Pace

machine on the score of efficiency. The order is there ; whether
it is good, better or best depends on its relation to the end pro­
posed.

Where it is perfectly adapted, it furnishes the ground

of another estimate: it enables us to appraise the ability,
ingenuity and skill of its author.

It may also reveal certain

traits of character, such as patience and tenacity.

But as

regards goodness or evil in the moral sense, it, simply qua order,

The highest efficiency may be shown in com­

tells us nothing.

passing the lowest of ends.

plot.

Such is the “merit” of a well laid

The orderly sequence of actions is, in one sense, good;

in another, it is vitiated by reason of the end.

The purpose

itself gets its value through its relation to a more comprehensive

order.

Is order anything more than a concept?

Granting that we

can look upon things as though they were arranged in a definite

way, is the orderliness out there in them, or is it merely a device
of our thought which we project into the objects?

As to the

perception of order, that of course is our own mental affair.

If

the beings which we set in order have intelligence like our own.
they can perceive, as we do, that they are parts of the rank
and file, members of the class, and so on.

how they are related and why.

They may know just

But this does not of itself prove

that the order among them is something real.
convenient or useful fiction and nothing more.

It may be a
A fortiori,

where the members are devoid of intelligence, there can be no
question on this point.

One might as well ask whether the

springs and wheels of a watch are aware that they are parts of

a mechanism.

It is just our way of “putting things to right”

that makes us believe we have put something into them that was

not there before.

And so when we discern the “orderly course”

of nature we incline to think that nature has a scheme of her

own and had it before we came on the scene.

Here again the problem pivots on the status of relations.

If

these are simply of our devising, they are not even the weakest

68

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

of entities; they are no entities at all apart from our thought.
In that case, order likewise would be entirely our privato con­
cern.

We might call it a necessity of thought, whereas in truth

it would be at most a luxury for imagination.

No harm would

come of our linking fancy unto fancy nor any violation of logi­

cal precept.

For all that, order would remain where the con­

cept originated—in the mind.
As against this view, St. Thomas holds that “Ordo princi­

palius invenitur in ipsis rebus et ex eis derivatur ad cognitionem
nostram.” 87

The significant word here is “principalius.”

is somewhat more emphatic than “principaliter. ”

It

It suggests

that order is not only originally in things, but that it is there

independently of our thinking.

tive.

Our knowledge of it is deriva*

This, however, would apply only to an order constructed

by an agency other than our own.

Where it is of our making,

it is known to us before it appears among the objects, since we
select the ratio ordinis and through it determine the relations
in which it is expressed.

The matter becomes clearer when we note the distinction on

which St. Thomas insists between “ relatio real is ” and “ relatio
rationis,” i. e. real relation and conceptual relation.

ferent situations then may arise.

Three dif

The first is that in which the

relation is purely conceptual, as when a thing is said to be the
same as itself.

The identity in this case does not imply any

real betweenness on the part of the terms, but simply that the
mind apprehends the thing a first time and then a second time,
and attaches the label of sameness to two percepts of a thing
which has not budged in the least from its unity.

If the relation

were a real something, it, in turn, would beget with itself a new
relation of identity and this another and so forth ad infinitum,

like the images of an object placed between two mirrors.
Purely conceptual also is the relation of genus and species.

8T Summa TheoL, Ila-IIae, 26, 7, ad 2m.

Edward A. Pace

Vi

When wc say that man is a species of animal we express a rela­
tion which the mind by taking thought establishes. It is
grounded in rerum natura, but as a relation it merely refers
one concept to another. The same is true, evidently, of the con­
nection which one foresees between future objects or events.
To say that A will happen before B is to set up a relation of
priority ; but this, so far, is a purely mental affair. Though the
prediction may be verified, neither of the terms is yet in exist­
ence. The beforeness of A and the afterness of B have even
less reality than the terms themselves. The combination belongs
entirely to what St. Thomas calls the “ordo intellectuum.”

The second situation is that in which both terms are actual

existents.

I f each of them offers the characteristic upon which

the relation is founded, this is real and bilateral. It holds, e. g.,

between a rod ten feet long and another rod five feet long. They

are related on the basis of their length which, apart from any

measuring, is found really in both.

And, generally speaking,

the relations determined by quantity are real on one side and

on the other.

Similarly, in the case of relations which are due

to action, the terms are related, and really, on their own account,

whether we think about them or not.

Thus, a real relation

exists between the motor and the thing which it moves, between

the sculptor and the statue which he produces, between the

father and the child which he begets.

This, obviously, does not

mean that the relation has the same mode or significance in
both of the relata.

Causality is a real relation, but it does not

imply for the cause what it implies for the effect.

Distinct from these two types of relation and intermediate

between them is the third, which in one term is real (res
naturae), in the other merely conceptual (res rationis tantum''.

“Et hoc,” says St. Thomas, “contingit quandocumque duo
extrema non sunt unius ordinis.” 3S His favorite illustration

••Summe Theol., I, 13, 7.

70

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

under this head is taken from the cognitive functions. Sense
and sensible object are both real; but the latter, as a thing exist­
ing in nature, is outside the sphere of sensibility. Whether it is
sensed or not makes no difference to it. A flower may bloom
unseen: it blooms none the less. Its blooming docs not depend
upon its being a visual stimulus, nor is it affected by the visual
process. In the flower, therefore, as a term, the relation is not
real: it is thought-in by the mind. But the sense organ under­
goes change. The quality of the sensation is determined by the
stimulus and by the momentary condition of the receptor.
Accordingly, the relation, on the part of the seeing subject, is
real.
For intellectual cognition the situation is of the same sort.

The knowledge relation is real for the knowing mind, conceptual
for the object. The latter is in no wise affected by our concep­

tion of it. The whole travail of our thinking is within us.

The

resultant ideas may correspond with their objects or differ from

them widely. From time to time our knowledge must be recast.
But the objects suffer no change either by reason of our thinking

or in consequence of its revision.

Other instances cited by St. Thomas are that of a man stand­

ing at the side of a column or in front of his portrait.

To be at

the right or at the left involves a relation which is real in the

man but not in the column.

Conversely, his portrait is likened

to him, not he to it, and therefore the relation is real in it only.

To enhance the resemblance the artist retouches his canvas.
Quaedam sunt ad quae quidem alia ordinantur et non e converso,
quia sunt omnino extrinseca ab illo genere actionum vel virtutum quas
consequitur talis ordo; sicut patet quod scientia refertur ad scibile,
quia sciens, per actum intelligibilem, ordinem habet ad rem scitam quae
est extra animam. Ipsa vero res quae est extra animam omnino non
attingitur a tali actu, cum actus intellectus non sit transiens in
exteriorem materiam mutandam; unde et ipsa res quae est extra animam,
omnino est extra genus intelligibile. Et propter hoc relatio quae con­

71

Edward Λ. Pace

sequitur actum intellectus, non potest esse in ea; et similis ratio est de
sensu et sensibili. Licet enim sensibile immutet organum sensus in sua
actione, et propter hoc habeat relationem ad ipsum, sicut et alia agentia
naturalia ad ea quae patiuntur ab eis, alteratio tamen organi non perfieit
sensum in actu, sed perficitur per actum virtutis sensitivae, cuius sensi­
bile quod est extra animam, omnino est expers. Similiter homo com­
paratur ad columnam ut dexter, ratione virtutis motivae quae est in
homine, secundum quam competit ei dextrum et sinistrum, ante et retro,
sursum et deorsum. Et ideo huiusmodi relationes in homine vel animali
reales sunt, non autem in re quae tali virtute caret. Similiter nummus
est extra genus illius actionis per quam fit pretium, quae est conventio
inter aliquos homines facta; homo etiam est extra genus artificialium
actionum per quas sibi imago constituitur. Et ideo nec homo habet
relationem ad suam imaginem, nec nummus ad pretium sed e con­
trario.30
From the foregoing distinction it is clear that St. Thomas

does not ascribe to all relations the same degree of reality.
Some he confines to the intellect ; others he apportions between
intellect and object ; and a third sort he regards as real entities
existing between real things.

Concerning these last, however,

he introduces a further distinction.

In some instances the ratio

or ground of the relation is the same in both terms. This is the
case with quantitative relations, since quantity as such, i. e. as a

property of bodies, is of the same nature in all bodies, however
they may differ in having more or less of it. Otherwise, no defi­
nite meaning could attach to “larger” and “smaller.”

The case is different where relation arises through action.

The pull is not the same for the horse as it is for the carriage ;
nor is teaching identical in process with learning, even where

the pupil is stirred to self-activity.

“It is more blessed to give

than to receive” has a metaphysical as well as a moral import.

And, generally stated: “In illis tantum mutua realis relatio
invenitur in quibus ex utraque parte est eadem ratio ordinis

unius ad alterum.” 40

” Dc Potentia, VII, 10; Cf. Summa ThcoL, I, 13. 7.
"De Potentia, VII, 10.

72

Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

The implications for epistemology are easily seen. Without
entering upon this phase of the subject, one may note that
according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, our knowledge is valid
in proportion to the exactness and fullness with which the rela­
tions among our thoughts correspond to the order which pre­
vails among things. But again, if the “optimum universi” is
order, knowledge must get its highest value through its cor­
respondence with the relations which that order implies.

The

special sciences have, undoubtedly, a service to render by
explaining the relations which each finds in its own domain.
Philosophy has a wider field in studying the universal order.
For this reason it surpasses other forms of knowledge both in

difficulty and in dignity.

Compared with them, it is of higher

import, just as the general welfare is superior to that of the

individual; or, as St. Thomas expresses it, “sicut in rebus
humanis bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius.”41

Edward A. Pace.
The Catholic University of America.

41 Contra Gentiles, II, 42.

BOOK REVIEWS
Die Kategorienlehre Eduard von Hartmanns und ihre Bedeutung fuer
die Philosophic dcr Gegenwart. By Johannes Hessen. Vol. 17:
Wissen u. Forschen. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Pp. 140.

This is a study of Hartmann’s metaphysics or Kategorienlehre, the
most important and mature work of a philosopher who is more
generally known only as the philosopher of the Unconscious. Hart­
mann is strictly intellectualistic and objectivistic after the manner of
Aristotle, but differs immensely from the latter in the derivation of
the categories.
The prevailing negative dogmatism of the psychological schools
which denied the possibility of transcending immediate experience, a
belief strengthened by the teachings of positivism imported into Ger­
many via England, refused to pay any attention to Hartmann’s re­
markable system of metaphysics. The author believes that Hartmann
is finally coming into his own (just as the vitalistic theories are re­
viving after a long reign of mechanism). Hartmann holds fast to
the possibility and necessity of objectivistic metaphysics. He con­
siders one after another, naive realism (represented among contemp­
orary Scholastics by Gredt and termed by him natural realism), trans­
cendental idealism, solipsism, spiritualism, etc. to show their insuffi­
ciency and to arrive at transcendental realism. This he considers an
hypothesis, but the most probable one; to ask for more is to demand
the absolute intelligence of God for mortal man.
The categories are found by abstraction. As such they belong to
the sphere of the unconscious and appear only as determinations of
conscious contents, from which they must be abstracted a posteriori.
The a priori knowledge of categories to which Kant and his followers
pretended is impossible. They are the “conscious representative ele­
ments of inductively gained unconscious category functions.” The
unconscious category functions are not innate; they are the activities
of the impersonal reason, and are therefore supra-individual in origin.
Hartmann consistently remains the philosopher of the Unconscious
Spirit. Hartmann then establishes the categories of quality, quantity,
of space, relation etc., and finally of causality, finality, and sub­
stantiality.
73