THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Studies in Sacred Theology

THE EUCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF PRE-SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of Sacred Theology of the Catholic
University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology.
by
REV. CHARLES E. SHEEDY, C.S.C.

Priest of the Congregation of Holy Cross

The Catholic University of America Press
Washington, D. C., 1947

!

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Studies in Sacred Theology
Second Series
No. 4

THE EUCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF PRE-SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of Sacred Theology of the Catholic
University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology.

by

REV. CHARLES E. SHEEDY, C.S.C.
Priest of the Congregation of Holy Cross

The Catholic University of America Press
Washingtori, D. C.» 1947

MARY IMMACULATE SEMINARY LIBRhKY
_ _ _ _ _ _ .NORTHAMPTON. PA,___

Imprimi potrai:
Thomas A. Steiner, c.s.c.
Provincial Superior

/ifljil tëbitat:
Eugene Burke, c.s.p., s.t.d.
Censor Deputatus

imprimatur:
Michael Joseph Curley,

d.d.

Archbishop of Baltimore and Washington

COPYRIGHT.

1947

BY
THE

CATHOLIC

UNIVERSITY

OF

AMERICA

1436 4

iv

PRESS.

INC.

Dedicated to my Mother
and
to the memory of my Father

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter I.

.................. ................ .................. _.................... —...............

Intellectual Life

in the

Pre-Scholastic Period.

1

1.

The Conservative Element: The Study of the Sacred Page.........

2.

The Element of Progress: The Dialectics of the Schools.............

Chapter II. Reason

and

Authority in the Pre-Scholastic Period 14

1.

The Principle of Harmony ........................................................... - 15

2.

Controversy in the Application of the Principle ........................... 23

Chapter III. The Theological Principles of Berengar
and of His Catholic Opponents ............................ 33

1.

General Characteristics of Procedure .....

2.

Scripture and Tradition .................................................................. 44

3.

Authority of the Church ................................................................ 50

4.

Dialectics ............................................................................................. 55

Chapter IV. The Controversy Concerning the
Substantial Conversion ............................................................

40

64

1.

The Berengarian Critique ................................................................ - 64

2.

The Orthodox Rejoinder ................................................................. 79

Chapter V. The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist
as Sacrament .................................................................. 98

-102

1.

The Pseudo-Realism of Berengar

2.

Orthodox Symbolism ......................................................................... 109

...............................

General Conclusions and Summary .....................

125

Bibliography ...........................

130

Index.............................................................................................................

.136

vii

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to set forth the contribution made by
the principal adversaries of Berengar of Tours to theological method,
and to the substance of Eucharistic doctrine as well, through their use
of rational arguments to explain and interpret the revealed data con­
cerning the Holy Eucharist. Both Berengar and his opponents knew
from the Fathers and pre-scholastic writers that reason had its place in
divine science; and at the same time the program of the medieval schools
provided them with a philosophical tool: not a finished metaphysic by
any means, but a stream of dialectical writings which had its prime
origin in the translations and commentaries of Boethius. Pushed to the
limit, and made at once the starting point and the court of highest
authority in religious inquiry—and this was the procedure of Berengar
—dialectics could lead to an exaggerated rationalism which would take
all mystery out of the Eucharist and reduce this great doctrine of faith
to the level of a truth comprehensible to unaided reason. But properly
ordered, and applied not for the determination of the content of faith,
but for its explanation and defense, the dialectical arguments of the
eleventh-century Eucharistic writers provided a bridge between the con­
servatism of the post-patristic period and the great syntheses of Chris­
tian wisdom which were to begin to appear in the twelfth century, and
reach their apex in the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
The problem of the relations between rational speculation and reli­
gious belief has engaged men’s minds since ancient times, and it has
been variously met at every stage of Christian history. In the ninth cen­
tury, the two orders of knowledge were thoroughly confused; writers
made little attempt to distinguish them in their discussion of religious
questions. Gradually as the distinction became more clearly marked be­
tween the area of purely rational research and that of faith, men began
to emphasize either the one or the other, according to individual differ­
ences of temperament and spirit. At the extremes, the dialecticians might
use logic to explain away the mysteries of religion, while ultra-conserva ­
tive writers would attempt to suppress all rational inquiry in favor of
a supine traditionalism. At the center, thle main stream of Catholic
tradition has constantly affirmed that there is no opposition between
faith and reason, but a perfect harmony : two orders of knowledge, that
IX

of reason, which knows natural truths by natural powers, and that of
faith, which knows mysteries revealed by God. The harmony which
exists between the two orders of knowledge, constantly affirmed by the
great writers of every age, received its definitive statement in the great
Constitution of the Vatican Council on the Catholic Faith : “The facul­
ty of reason, illuminated by faith, when it seeks assiduously, lovingly,
and soberly, can by God’s gift attain to some knowledge of the divine
mysteries, both by analogy with those things which it knows naturally,
and by the connection between the mysteries and with the ultimate end
of human life; but it is never able to comprehend these truths as it does
those which are its proper object” (Sess. Hi, Cap. 4, DB 1796).
But that harmony which has always been seen in principle has not
always been so successful in the application, and indeed the failure to
respect it lies at the root of all heresies. Beyond the particular problems
raised in theological disputation there may lie other problems more
general and more fundamental, so that the particular issues involved
are rather the occasion and the pretext of the conflict than its essential
object. This truth, that a particular conflict may conceal a deeper prob­
lem, is nowhere more clearly marked than in the Eucharistic controver­
sy of the eleventh century. Berengar and those who wrote against him
shared the same patristic data and the same scholastic training. Beren­
gar exaggerated the importance of rational speculation, tried to use it
to establish the content of the mystery of the Holy Eucharist, and thus
disqualified himself from any appreciation of the truth of the Mystery
of Faith. His principal adversaries, however, — Lanfranc, Guitmund of
Aversa, and especially Alger of Liège — accepted the mystery as re­
vealed in Scripture and tradition; but also followed Berengar on to
his own ground, gave him argument for argument, and were able
through the imperfect tool of dialectics to carry further much that had
not been developed thoroughly by the Fathers.

Since this study is concerned with theological method as well as
substance, it will be useful first to see the background of the protago­
nists, the pre-scholastic studies in theology and philosophy. Then will
follow an analysis of the Eucharistic theology of Berengar and of his
Catholic opponents, first, in the light of their theological principles,
their theory of religious knowledge; second, their teaching concerning
the doctrine of substantial conversion; and third, concerning the Eu­
charist as sacrament. We shall see in Berengar false principles leading
inevitably to erroneous conclusions. We shall see in his orthodox opX

ponent», on the other hand, important contributions to a clearer under­
standing of the nature of the Eucharistic conversion, the permanence
of the species, and the relations between the sacramentum tantum, the
res sacramenti, and the res-et-sacramentum. The Berengarian contro­
versy represents not only a long step forward in Eucharistic theology,
but a stage in the development of theology itself.

For their generosity and confidence in permitting him to pursue
graduate studies in Theology at the Catholic University of America, the
author wishes to express his filial gratitude to his major superiors in
the Congregation of Holy Cross, especially to the Very Reverend
Thomas A. Steiner, C.S.C., Provincial. He is also grateful to the Su­
perior at Holy Cross College, Washington, the Reverend Bernard
Ransing, C.S.C., S.T.D., and to his fellow priests and religious there,
especially the Reverend Joseph A. McCartney, C.S.C., for their help and
support during many happy months. The Reverend Eugene Burke,
C.S.P., S.T.D., Professor of Sacred Theology at the Catholic University
of America, under whose direction this dissertation was written, was
always patient, generous with his time, and extremely helpful. The
librarian of the Andover Theological College of Harvard University
was kind enough to lend the author, through the Interlibrary Loan,
their copy of Berengar’s De sacra coena, the only copy of this rare book
listed in the Union Catalogue as being in the United States.
To these persons and to all of his friends who helped in other ways,
the author wishes to express his thanks and a promise of his daily re­
membrance in the Holy Mass.

Notre Dame, Indiana.
Feast of Sts. Philip and James, 1947.

CHAPTER I
Intellectual Life

in the

Pre-Scholastic Period.

The period called pre-scholastic extends from the age of Charle­
magne to the appearance of the first scholastic syntheses in the twelfth
century.1 It begins with one renaissance, the Carolingian, and ends in
another, “the renaissance of the twelfth century.” Between the two ex­
tremes intervened a period of decline, the tenth century, “century of
iron,” perhaps the darkest age in European history; but the Carolin­
gian revival retained sufficient momentum to carry through and make
of the second renaissance a continuation and completion of the first.

Politically, this age saw the emergence of the medieval common­
wealth from the confusion of barbarism.2 Intellectually, it was extreme­
ly conservative, a period of compilation and reproductions, of great
dependence on the teachers of the patristic age. But at the same time
an element of progress could be seen in the gradual adaptation of the
Aristotelian dialectic to the study of revealed truth, a work of an intel­
lectual élite, having its roots in the Carolingian schools.3 Throughout
the pre-scholastic centuries the scholars had access to a stream of dialec­
tical writings which they began to use for the development, understand­
ing, and comprehension of the body of writings which they had inher­
ited from the Fathers.4

Thus in these centuries the elements of scholasticism were prepared,
and the spirit which was to animate it formed. Before the end of the
period a proper place would be assigned to the two factors which were
to become predominant in the elaboration of twelfth century synthetic
1 B. Haureau, Histoire de la philosophie scholastique, Paris, 1872, pp. 40-41.
“There were only two different stages in the scholastic period: the first beginning with
Alcuin and ending in the twelfth century, the second beginning with the thirteenth cen­
tury and ending at about the time of John Gerson.’’
2 C. Dawson, The Maying of Europe, New York (Sheed and Ward), 1934, Chap.
12, “The Restoration of the Western Empire and Carolingian Renaissance,” pp. 214233.
3 J. De Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique du XIle siècle, Etudes, Recherches,
et Documents, Paris, 1914, Chap. 1, “La préparation théologique du Xlle siècle,” pp.
1-66.
4 M. Grabmann, Die Ceschichte der Scholastischen Methode, Vol. 1, Freiburg-imBreisgau, 1909, p. 189.
1

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

works, especially the epochal manual of Peter Lombard. The first of
these two elements, a respect for traditional texts, was to owe much to
the Carolingian institutions; and the second, a dialectical finesse, was
the achievement of the pre-scholastic schools.56

1. The Conservative Element: The Study of the Sacred Page
The decline of western theology which took place immediately after
the death of St. Augustine in 430 was largely due to the vast polit­
ical and social upheavals which accompanied the invasions. As early as
the second century after Christ, the tribes of the outer lands were in
movement, and forces were being gathered which could only find out­
let in violent explosion. The storm burst in the third century: the
Empire, weakened by civil war and continual mutinies, was attacked
on every frontier; and Europe became the scene of a momentous strug­
gle between the dying Empire and the fresh vigor of the barbarian
hordes.'1 In 378, at Adrianople, the Gothic cavalrymen won a decisive
victory over the Roman infantry under Valens.7 Alaric, the Visigoth,
sacked Rome in 419 ;8 wave after wave of invaders rolled over the west.
During the fifth century, Burgundians, Visigoths, and Franks were in
Gaul;9 Vandals, Suevi, Alans, and Visigoths overran Spain;10 and the
Saxons invaded Britain, already weakened by the withdrawal of the
legions which had taken place in 426.11 In 429, The Vandals under
Gaiseric evacuated southern Spain to attack North Africa.12 In the
following year, when St. Augustine lay dying at Hippo, the invaders
were at the city’s gates, and within ten years the Vandals had become
masters of Africa.13 To conclude this brief sketch of the upheavals of
only one century, in 476 Odovaker exiled the last nominal emperor,
whose name, ironically, was Romulus, and finally Theodoric the Ostro­
goth set up a kingdom in Italy in 493 and restored some order to the
west.
5 De Ghellinck, op. cit., p. 6.
6 Dawson, op. cit., pp. 75-77.
7 Ibid., p. 87.
8 The Cambridge Medieval History (H. M. Gwatkin and J. P. Whitney, edd.),
vol. 1, "The Christian Roman Empire and the Foundation of the Teutonic Kingdoms."
New York. 1911, p. 273.
9 Ibid., pp. 277-303.
10 Ibid., p. 304.
11 Ibid., pp. 380-381.
12 Ibid., p. 305,
I » Ibid., pp. 306-307.

Intellectual Life in the Pre-Scholastic Period

3

It would be an exaggeration to set up the history of the invasions
as a story of complete and utter social disaster, since out of the mael­
strom was formed a vigorous Europe which exerted a world wide politi­
cal and cultural supremacy for many hundreds of years, a hegemony
which it has not even yet entirely lost. Nor were the invasions entirely
disastrous to the Catholic faith. In the midst of the convlusions, the
faith was preserved, and even extended; religious unity continued to
hold together the various members of that large family which the bar­
barians divided among themselves.14

But from the viewpoint of religion, the age of the invasions was a
time for missionary work, not for the development of theology. “It is
easy to see,” as Tixeront has pointed out, “that serene contemplation
and pure speculation cannot thrive in times such as these. . . . During
these ages and in these circumstances, it was no small merit to preserve
the traditions of the past and inculcate the rudiments of religious doc­
trine in the unruly neophytes who were then entering the Church.”15

Consequently, the sacred doctrine of these ages of invasion took the
form of a practical and simple summary of the teachings which had
been elaborated by the Fathers and theologians of earlier times.16
Two great names stand out, that of St. Leo (t461) and St. Gregory
(t604), both of them popes and Fathers of the Church, both deserv­
edly sumamed “the Great.” St. Leo, the more original of the two, is
one of the most profound doctors of the Incarnation, while St. Greg­
ory adapted the teaching of St. Augustine to the practical needs of
religion in his day.17
Apart from St. Leo, then, the writers of the pre-Carolingian theol­
ogy lack originality and individuality. They felt they could not add to
nor improve the work which had been done, and confined themselves
to collecting texts. The great men of this period, not to mention mere
copyists, are Boethius, Cassiodorus, St. Leo, St. Isidore of Seville, St.
Gregory the Great, Julian of Toledo, and the Venerable Bede.18 Boe­
thius and Cassiodorus were to have great influence in the formation
of western theology, but their influence was not in the field of sacred
doctrine precisely, and they were not official teachers.
14
Louis,
15
16
17
18

J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, tr. from the 5th French edition by H. L. B., St.
1916, vol. 3, p. 305.
Ibid., pp. 305. 312.
Ibid., p. 305.
Ibid., p. 306.
De Ghellinck, op. cit., p. 4.

4

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

The Carolingian age, extending from Charlemagne’s accession as
sole ruler of the Franks in 771, until the dissolution of the Empire in
887, has justly been termed a “renaissance,” but it would be a mistake
to think that during this century there took place any marked advance
in the teaching of theology. Indeed, throughout the ninth century, and
the tenth and eleventh as well, theological teaching was characterized
by the notes which we have marked in the preceding age, traditionalism
and dependence; and the intellectual progress which was doubtless
made took place in another quarter, the trivium and quadrivium of the
schools.
When we speak of “theology” during the Carolingian age we ought
not to think of a program of studies and a method of teaching such as
were to be offered by the universities of the thirteenth century. Even
the word “theology” was not to acquire its present meaning until the
twelfth century. Throughout the period which we have been discussing,
the term used to designate the sacred studies was “Pagina Sacra.” To­
wards the end of the eleventh century “quaestiones sacrae paginae”
began to appear, but it remained for Abelard to give us the term as
we understand it today: rational speculation concerning revealed data.
Even St. Thomas will adhere to an older terminology and will desig­
nate Christian teaching under the term “De sacra doctrina.”19

And in the age of Charlemagne, theological teaching, in the sense
of an orderly system of studies preceded by philosophy, simply did not
exist. Charlemagne issued many capitularies for the instruction of the
clergy, but the emphasis was on liturgical correctness, not on specula­
tion. Priests were required to know the Athanasian and Apostles’
Creed; they should know the Lord’s Prayer and be able to explain it;
they should know how to say Mass and apply the penitential discipline.
No higher ideal of literacy was demanded of them than that they be
able to write letters.20 For preaching, they had some translations into
the vernacular of certain patristic homilies, and their library was limited
to some biblical and liturgical works, a collection of canons, the peni­
tential, and some writings of the orthodox Fathers, especially the homi19 For the use of the term “theology” in the pre-scholastic times, see G. Paré, A.
Brunet, P. Tremblay, La renaissance du XII e siècle, les écoles et renseignement, Paris
and Ottawa, 1933, pp. 307-309. This valuable work is a complete revision of the work
of G. Robert, Les écoles et renseignement de la théologie pendant la premiere moitié
du Xlle siècle, Paris, 1909. Cf. De Ghellinck, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 66, and J. H.
Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. 2, London, 1903, p. 475.
20 Charlemagne, Capitula de doctrina clericorum (yr. 802), MGH (Legum) 1 :
107; also in PL 94: 249.

Iiilrlirt Inal Life in l/if Pre-Scholaslic Period

5

lies of St. Gregory.21 In the century of iron which followed the dissolu­
tion of the Carolingian Empire the program of priestly studies remained
what it had been before. As De Ghellinck sums it up, “Study of theol­
ogy was limited to the reading of the Scriptures and some Fathers, with
commentary, and the great care was that priests should know something
of the ritual, a knowledge which they had to acquire through their own
efforts or under the direction of a bishop or some older priest. There is
no question of a metaphysic of dogma, or even of an organic classifica­
tion of theology, and for a long time it will be so.”22 The Carolingian
century had produced at least men of the stature of John the Scot,
Paschasius Radbert and Ratramn, and Raban Maur; the succeeding
century produced one great scholar, Gerbert, and one *important theo­
logical work, the treatise on the Eucharist of Heriger of Lobbes, a
continuation of the Eucharist discussions begun by Paschasius and
Ratramn.23
One final aspect of pre-scholastic intellectual life is worthy of
comment before passing on to the investigation of its greatest contri­
bution, the program of the schools. This is the collection of texts and
the copying of manuscripts, a conservative work in the literal meaning
of the word, but of inestimable importance for the formation of scholas­
ticism and of western culture in general. Charlemagne Himself was
extremely zealous to secure the multiplication of manuscripts and the
use of correct texts. Indeed, we owe it to Charlemagne and Alcuin that
we are able to read medieval manuscripts; they replaced the variety of
illegible scripts of the Merovingian age with a new style of writing
which became almost standard throughout the western world : the Caro­
line minuscule, which originated perhaps in the Abbey of Corbie in
the second half of the eighth century, and provided the foundation of
the style we use today.24 Through the work of the monastic copyists of
the early Middle Ages most of Latin literature was preserved for us,
and the foundation was laid for what became and has continued to be
the literary tradition of the west
But the point at which the pre-scholastic period exerted its greatest
influence towards the formation of scholasticism was not its rudimen21 De Ghellinck, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
22 J. De Ghellinck, S.J., “Dialectique, théologie, et dogme au Xe-XIIe siècles,”
Beilrage zur Ceschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Festgabe Zum 60. Geburtstag
Clemens Bàumker, Münster, (Supplementband, 1913) pp. 79-99.
23 J. De Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique . . . , p. 35.
24 C. Dawson, op. ci!., p. 226.

6

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Cary program of theology, nor the copying of manuscripts, but the
genesis of philosophy which took place in the schools. The application
of liberal studies to the understanding of divine revelation was the
actual initiation of the program of scholasticism.
2. The Element of Progress: The Dialectics of the Schools
Even during the decline of the western Empire, humanistic studies
had flourished, but the march of the barbarian invader put an end to
the imperial studies as it did to the tottering Empire itself; and for a
long time scholarship on the Italian peninsula was to exist only in iso­
lated refuges, the studio of Boethius, the monastery of Cassiodorus in
Calabria, and in the papal court. When learning reappears, it will be
farther to the north and in a new setting, the humble cloister replacing
the brilliance of the imperial Athenaeum. For two centuries, Ireland
was “the one bright spot in the dark night which covered Europe.”2526
John the Scot and Clement came to the Frankish school from Ireland,
Alcuin from York, and missionary monks from Ireland and England,
St. Columba, St. Gall, and St. Boniface, restored studies at Luxeuil,
Saint Gall, and Fulda.
The great resurgence of learning in the west took place in the ninth
century and had its source and center at the court of Charlemagne and
his immediate successors. Charlemagne’s original intention, as we have
seen, was to improve the intellectual condition of the Frankish clergy;
but the accomplishment outstripped the purpose: libraries began to be
collected, scholars were imported from England and Ireland, Italy and
Spain, and a real revival of intellectual life began to take place.20 It is
true that the Carolingian renaissance, so far as the palace itself was
concerned, ended with the dissolution of the Frankish Empire, and was
not continued. But Charlemagne insisted on the establishment of
schools in the monasteries and cathedrals, and it was in these local
centers that intellectual life went on. From the ninth century onward,
25 M. De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd. English edition, transi, from
6th. French edition, E. Messenger, London, 1935, vol. 1, p. 50.
26 Cf. G. Brunhes, La foi chrétienne et la philosophie, au temps de la Renaissance
carolingienne, Paris, 1903, p. 10. “Doubtless certain elements of culture did not issue
from the court of Charlemagne. The monasteries founded in Germany by the disciples
of St. Boniface, those of Italy, the contact of Spain with Arabic civilization, and a cer­
tain permanence of rudimentary literary culture had prepared the way for a renaissance;
but the establishment of a degree of peace, which made it possible to profit from the
heritage of the past, and the creation of a current of intellectual activity from which
would result the literary renaissance of the west, are due certainly to the personal action
of Charlemagne and the churchmen who carried out his designs. ’

/nielle< Inal Life in the Pre-Scholastic Period

7

the story of medieval letters is the story of Tours, Fulda,
Reichenau, Fleury, Lorsch, and Corbie; of Metz, Cambrai, Rheims,
Auxerre, and Chartres — the monastic and cathedral schools.27
It is interesting to observe the process by which an institution may
gradually enlarge its external scope and influence, all the while remain­
ing true to its inner life and purpose. This process of evolution can be
clearly seen in the development of monasticism in the west. The cultiva­
tion of letters simply did not enter into the original program of monas­
ticism. As the monastic society was first conceived, a man did not
become a monk because he wished to teach or be taught; he became a
monk because he was anxious about his soul, and was willing to conse­
crate his life to God in a more perfect manner in order to be sure of
his soul’s salvation.28 “To flee, to be silent, to weep” — the monastery
was a haven, a place of refuge, and at the same time a protest against
the worldliness of a court Christianity which had fallen from the primi­
tive fervor. The only qualification demanded of an aspirant was that
he be truly seeking God. The rule of St. Benedict had nothing to say
about schools; not even the copying of books was part of the rule,
although it could and did enter into the prescribed program of manual
labor.29 It was not necessary for a monk, unless he was a cleric, to be
able to read and write. He did not lecture nor teach; he did not speak
at all, except to sing the daily praise of God in choir.
Obviously, the pursuit of studies, especially of profane and liberal
sciences, did not enter as primarily important into an institution such
as this. But as monasticism developed in the west, almost without knowing
it the Benedictine institution began to exercise social and cultural lead­
ership. The basic reason for what may be called this social potentiality
in monasticism can be found in the character of the institution itself as
St. Benedict adapted it to the west. The great law-giver rejected the
27 C. H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Cambridge, U.S.,
1933, p. 18.
28 Cardinal Newman, op. cit., p. 452, has written luminously concerning this aspect
of the monastic spirit. “I remind the reader, if I have not suffiicently done so already,
that the one object, immediate as well as ultimate, of Benedictine life, as history pre­
sents it to us, was to live in purity and die in peace. The monk proposed to himself no
great or systematic work, beyond that of saving his soul. ^Vhat he did more than that
was the accident of the hour, spontaneous acts of piety, the sparks of mercy or benefi­
cence, struck off in the heat, as it were, of his solemn religious toil, and done and over
almost as soon as they began to be. . . . He cared little for knowledge, even theological,
or for success, even though it be religious. It is the character of such a man to be
contented, resigned, patient, and incurious; to create or originate nothing; to live by
tradition.”
29 Haskins, op. cit., p. 34.

8

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

eremitical ideal, with its tendency to isolate the monk and insulate him
against contact with society, and adopted in its place the ideal of the
common life, in which the monastery itself formed a social unit, capable
of radiating its influence outside.30 The monasteries were areas of stabil­
ity in a social order as yet unformed; men saw the productivity of the
monastic life and began to depend on the monks and look to them for
guidance and direction. The monk had renounced the world, but found
himself responsible for its care.31
Moreover, there were elements in the character of the monastic
institution which required the rudiments of intellectual life. The nature
of monastic life required the possession of certain books: the Sacred
Scriptures and the liturgical books for singing in the choir. It must
have a school, for clerical novices at least, and some elementary text­
books. A certain number of monks must be able to read and write, to
copy charters and title deeds, to keep the register of monks and the
necrology. Every monastery needed a calendar of feasts; and the calen­
dar provided a useful framework for those random jottings which be­
came the annals of medieval history. “A library, a school, an archive,
the rudiments of a record of its own, these were incidental to the exist­
ence of the monastery and formed the nucleus of an intellectual life.”32
The Carolingian renaissance gave great impetus to these elements
already present in the monastic way of life. Gradually the schools were
formed, with the studies no longer limited to monastic recruits, but open
to extents also.33 The decreasing emphasis on merely manual labor, the
30 Abbot Cuthbert Butler, O.S.B., “Monasticism.” The Cambridge Medieval His­
tory , vol. 1, p. 525: “It was not the least of St. Benedict’s contributions to western
monachism that he introduced, with the modifications called for by differences of climate
and national character, a type of monachism, more akin to the Pachomian, in which
work of one kind or another, undertaken for its own sake, forms an essential part of the
life.”
31 Newman, op. cit., pp. 442-443: “And indeed a greater shock can hardly be
fancied than that which would overtake the peaceful inhabitants of the cloister on his
finding that, after all, he so intimately depended still upon this moribund world, which
he had renounced forever, that the changes which were taking place in its condition were
affecting his own. . . . They had retired into deserts, where they could have no enemies
but such as fast and prayer could subdue. . . . They had secured some refuge whence
they might look around at the sick world in the distance, and see it die. But when that
last hour came, it did but frustrate all their hopes, for, instead of an old world at a
distance, they found they had a young world close to them. The old order of things
died, sure enough; but then a new order took its place, and they themselves, by no will
or expectation of their own, were in no small measure responsible for its very life. The
lonely Benedictine rose from his knees, and found himself a city.” Cf. Haskins, op. cit.,
i* V32 I Inskins, op. cit., p. 36.
33 Paré. Brunet, Tremblay, op. cit., p. 40.

Intellectual Life in the Pre-Scholastic Period

9

elevation of a greater number of monks to the clerical state, developed
the old “lectio” of the rule into a true program of study.34
The monastic schools reached their peak in the generation which
followed the death of Charlemagne, among the pupils and successors
of Alcuin: men such as Einhard, Raban Maur of Fulda, Walafrid
Strabo, abbot of Reichenau, Servatus Lupus, abbot of Ferrières — it was
through them and men like them that scholarship in the ninth century
reached its highest development.35 The course of studies comprised the
liberal arts of Cicero and Varro, divided by Martianus Capella, and
after him by Alcuin, into the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic),
and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). The
arts course was designed for the formation of the clergy and was con­
sidered as preparatory to the study of the “pagina sacra.” Thus the
purpose of grammar was to enable clerics to read and understand the
Bible; rhetoric and dialectic would help them follow the arguments of
the Fathers; the course in music would make more beautiful the sacred
chant.36 Even arithmetic had its preparatory role: for a better under­
standing of the mystic numbers of the Bible.37
Towards the end of our period, late in the eleventh century, cultural
leadership passed from the monastery to the cathedral. The monastic
and cathedral schools are always mentioned together, but they were
radically different in their spirit, in their customs, and even sometimes
in the studies they inculcated. If the monasteries led the way at the
beginning of the pre-scholastic period, the cathedrals far eclipsed them
at the end.3839
There are a number of reasons for this change. One very obvious
reason was the rapid growth of cities, which took place at the end of
the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century. The monasteries
were abandoned to their rural isolation, and an intellectual isolation
followed.36 A second reason was the strong eleventh century movement
34 Ibid.
35 Dawson, op. cit., p. 228.
36 Brunhes, op. cit., p. 17.
37 De Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique . . . , p. 13. Cf. Alcuin, Epist. 83 ad
Carolum Magnum (yr. 798), PL 100: 272-273.
Note that not all the liberal arts were taught in every school ; indeed, not every
monastery had a school, and in certain monasteries, particularly towards the end of the
pre-scholastic period, all secular studies were prohibited. Cf. R. Heurtevent, Durand de
Troarn et les origines de l'hérésie bérengarienne, Paris, 1912, p. 32. But in a general
way, sufficient for a brief survey such as this, it is true to say that the trivium and
quadrivium represent the pre-scholastic schedule of studies.
38 Paré, etc., op. cit., p. 18.
39 Ibid., p. 40.

10

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

for monastic reform. Science and letters do not always go hand in hand
with spiritual fervor; indeed, the great monastic reformers regarded
studies as an obstacle to the full achievement of the monastic ideal, and
strove to eliminate the arts and poetry from the schools. The discipline
of the monastery was extremely rigid, not only for the monks in their
formation, but also for lay pupils.40 Meanwhile, the organization of the
cathedral chapters around the bishops had provided the secular clergy
with a stable centrality of organization similar to that of the monas­
tery, but free from its traditional rigidity. Milder customs grew; pupils
could choose their school and masters, and certain of the masters, Ful­
bert, for example, at Chartres, achieved great reputation. In every way
the cathedral schools were more attractive to the independent spirit of
the changing times. “The monastic institution and its schools, in the
twelfth century, lost contact with the new times; the spirit of initiative
and the feeling for progress passed into other hands; its science, at least
in a general way, was only a conservative erudition, hostile to dangerous
novelties.”41 Citeaux, where extern students were excluded and any but
sacred studies proscribed, is far removed from Fulda, Saint Gall, and
Reichenau. It is from the cathedral, and not from the monastery, that
the renaissance of the twelfth century, the end and the achievement of
the pre-scholastic period, will take its rise.
Dialectics was the rational discipline which more than any other was
to influence the development of scholasticism. St. Augustine had seen
in dialectics a value which lay not merely in subtlety of argumentation
but also in the approach to objective truth; and for him, as we shall see
in the next chapter, this value extended to the realm of religious truth
as well as to that of the things of nature. The pre-scholastic writers
knew St. Augustine’s estimate of the value of dialectics, and for them
the rational approach to truth consisted mainly in the dialectical
approach.

But this is not to say that the pre-scholastic philosophy consisted
exclusively in a discipline of logic. In the first place, the renaissance of
the ninth century was not even exclusively philosophical in nature, but
extended to all the branches of learning then known.42 Alcuin, Servatus
Lupus, and Walafrid Strabo were humanists as well versed in Vergil
40 Cf. Heurtevent, op. cii., pp. 30-31, for an interesting note on the discipline of
the late eleventh century monastic school, taken from the life of St. Anselm.
4 I Paré, etc., op. cit., p. 39.
42 De Wulf, op. cit., p. 116.

/tilrllet tuti/ l ife in the Pre-Scholaitic Period

11

as in the Fathers and dialectical writers. John the Scot was a scholar of
Greek, and in the century following, Notker Labeo was to become a
pioneer in the German language and Gerbert of Aurillac was to become
famous in mathematics. The scholars of the pre-scholastic age were all
monks and churchmen, but they were by no means exclusively concerned
with divine science or with the rational explanation of it.

And again, even in their philosophy they were not mere dialecti­
cians. It is true that separate philosophy, as an organized branch of
study, as we understand it today, existed only in a gradual and rather
scanty dialectical teaching; but it is a false view that this teaching repre­
sented the whole of philosophy. “It must not be forgotten that if works
of philosophy are rare, the writings of the Fathers and the Scriptures
contained a whole philosophy.”43 Instead of limiting the philosophy of
the time to logic, we should be more just in saying that in the study
of theology, at the school of the Fathers, were found the important
questions of philosophy, though not as autonomous branches as we
study them today.44
Nor was the pre-scholastic philosophy in its ninth century begin­
nings entirely Aristotelian in its inspiration and content. It seems on
the contrary to have been Platonist.45 The influence of Aristotle de­
pended upon the gradual reception of the various parts of the Aristo­
telian corpus, and even that influence came about indirectly, through
translations. The influence of Plato was also indirect : until the twelfth
century, only the Timaeus was known in the west, in the translation of
Boethius, and was exercised chiefly through the mediation of St. Augus­
tine, eagerly seized upon by John the Scot, through whom the first
period of the Middle Ages came into contact with the thought of Greek
mysticism.46 But the Platonist influence, with all of its importance in
the great philosophical question of universals, did not bear so directly
on the formation of scholasticism and the Eucharistic controversies as
the dialectics of Aristotle.

Finally, it cannot be said that the pre-scholastic philosophers were
entirely without metaphysics. It is true, they possessed neither the Meta­
physics of Aristotle, nor the De anima, nor the Physics; they possessed
43
44
45
46

Brunhes, op. cit., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 43.
J bid., p. 24.
De Wulf, op. cit., p. 135.

12

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

only the works on logic, as we shall see. Moreover, Boethius, through
whose translations the logic principally came to them, insisted on the
verbal side of logic. “The treatise on the predicaments,” he wrote, “is
concerned with words, not things.”4' But Boethius made no mistake
concerning the relation between the words and the things which they
signify. Words are signs of really existing things, and the things which
are signified by words constitute the genera of reality.47
48 Grabmann has
pointed out that all the important metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle
are to be found in germ in Boethius : scattered references to matter and
form, change, potentiality and actuality, personality, the four causes,
and of course, substance and the nine accidents, the categories of
being.49 One of the major points of this study is that Berengar of Tours
approached the Eucharist almost exclusively from the dialectical point
of view; but it was not precisely as a dialectician that he went astray:
the basic error of Berengar was a false metaphysical principle.

An intellectual culture, then, which was not exclusively philosophi­
cal; a philosophy which was not exclusively Aristotelian; an Aristotelianism which was not exclusively dialectical, but contained the seeds of
a metaphysic as well — with these qualifications made, it may be safely
asserted that the influence of the Aristotelian dialectic was predominant
in the development of the scholastic method, and in the rational argu­
ments which entered into the Eucharistic discussions of the eleventh
century. If Aristotle did not form entirely the substance of European
thought, he was at least responsible for its way of thinking, and in no
small part for its substance.50 And even more specifically, in the pre­
scholastic period the influence of Aristotle was largely, almost exclusive­
ly, felt in the field of dialectics. Throughout the period, that is, from
the beginning of the ninth century till the first quarter of the twelfth,
the medieval scholars possessed nothing of Aristotle except the logical
works of the Organon; and not all of them; and none of them in the
original, but only in Latin translations, adaptations, and manuals.51 It
was not until the twelfth century that this slender library was to be
47 Boethius, In categorias Aristotelis, 1, PL 64: 162 C.
48 /bid., 161, A, C.
49 Op. cit., p. 158.
50 P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'averroisme latin au Xllle siècle. Collec­
tanea Friburgensia, Fase. 8, Fribourg (Suisse), 1899, p. 22.
51 For detailed information concerning the tradition of Aristotelian dialectic in the
early Middle Ages, the reader is referred to an article by A. Van de Vyver, Les
étapes du développement philosophique du Haut Moyen Age,” Revue belge de philo­
logie et (Thistoire, 8 (1929), 425-452.

/niella lual Life in the Pre-Scholaillc Period

M

enriched with the discovery of the second part of the Organon and the
new metaphysics. Till then, the rational approach to revealed truth must
consist in the dialectical approach; in this approach can be seen the
beginnings of scholastic theology and the source of the rational argu­
ments which Berengar and his opponents in the eleventh century applied
to their study of the revealed doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.

See also De Ghellinck, “Reminiscences de la dialectique de Marius Victorinus dans
les conflits théologiques du Xie et du Xlle siècles,’’ Revue neo-scholastique, 18 (1911),
432-435.
On the importance of Aristotle in the formation of western culture, see P. Mandon­
net, «Siger de Brabant el Vaverroisme latin au XIIle siècle. Collectanea Friburgensia,
Fase. 7, Fribourg (Suisse), 1899, pp. 17-23.
On the special importance of Boethius as the prime mediator in the first tradition of
Aristotle to the west, see excellent chapters in E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle
Ages, pp. 135-180, E. S. Duckett, Cate wap to the Middle Ages, pp. 147-212, and
Grabmann, Die Ceschichte der Scholastischen Methode, pp. 148-177.
The work of A. Clerval, Les écoles de Chartres, Chartres, 1895, is of great value
for the study of intellectual life in pre-scholastic times.

CHAPTER II
Reason

and

Authority

in the

Pre-Scholastic Period

The ninth-century pioneers of scholasticism had at their disposal a
twofold intellectual tradition, the older tradition of the sacred page,
and the newer teaching of the liberal arts, of which dialectics occupied
the summit. It remained for them to bind the new philosophical knowl­
edge to that which was already acquired, and to direct the whole
towards intellectual unity. That this unifying ideal failed of an alto­
gether consistent and harmonious achievement is not at all due to any
divergence on principle among those who took part in the development,
for all agreed on the authority of Scripture and tradition and of the
Church,' and on the utility of rational speculation in the search for
divine truth. But at the same time the pre-scholastic writers were unable
to distinguish clearly between the two sources of knowledge, and the
inevitable mistakes and puerilities of the “dialecticians” led to an anti­
intellectual reaction on the part of those who favored a more conserva­
tive traditionalism. Throughout the period the principle of harmony
between faith and reason was kept in mind, and controversy resulted
only from its misapplication.
It is incorrect, therefore, to set up authority and reason as two con­
flicting sources of knowledge, as if a man in following authority was
compelled to abdicate his reason and in following reason must reject
the argument of authority. The object of faith, though not derived from
reason, requires the use of reason to express the truths of faith and
their relations to each other, and to draw out the conclusions implicitly
contained in the revealed principles. During the pre-scholastic centuries
the attempt was made to apply reason according to this principle of
harmony; and if the attempt issued in large part in theological contro­
versy, it was because ratiocination was still defective and immature.
In this chapter the attempt will be made to sketch briefly the initial
efforts which were made to bring the two orders of knowledge into one.
First we shall set down the great principle of harmony: the eminence
of authority and the value of reason as propaedeutic to divine science.
Then we shall attempt to explain that the dialectical controversies of
the age resulted either from an entire confusion between the two orders
of faith and reason, or from the exaggeration of reason’s role on the
14

Reason and Authority in the PreScholastic Period

15

part of certain “speculative” writers. The pre-scholastic philosopher­
theologians had no desire to contradict the teachings of the Church,
though there were tn certain of them tendencies which if exaggerated
might lead to heresy. Berengar of Tours was the first to construct of
rationalist tendencies the substance of his theology. No theologian be­
fore him would have dared, nor would the thought have occured to
any of them, to characterize a Council of the Church as a “council of
vanity” and “seat of Satan,” as he termed the Council held at Rome in
1059?
1. The Principle of Harmony

First, then, it must be pointed out that there was unanimous agree­
ment among pre-scholastic writers upon the inspiration and inerrancy
of the Scriptures, upon the absolute validity of the argument from
tradition, if correctly presented, and upon the final authority of the
Church as authoritative interpreter of apostolic doctrine. In these mat­
ters, as in many others, it was St. Augustine who provided the frame­
work of medieval thought.
St. Augustine had commanded the newly baptized to love the creed,
to study it faithfully, to learn it, and to be able to recite it from mem­
ory. They had it from no human source: the articles of faith which
appear in the creed are found “scattered through the divine Scrip­
tures.”12 It is the task of the teaching Church to collect the revealed
1 Lanfranc, De corpore ei sanguine Domini, PL 150: 426 A.
R. L. Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd.
ed., Revised, London, 1920, views the pre-scholastic controversy simply as a phase in
the perennial struggle between the authoritarian Church and freedom of thought. In this
opinion he is followed to some extent by A. J. Macdonald, Authority and Reason in
the Early Middle Ages, London, (Oxford University Press), 1933. Neither seems to
have particular care for the truth involved in the controversies, but each praises the free­
thinkers for their independence regardless of what they taught, even though their ideas
would have been extremely harmful to revealed Christianity if they had been permitted
to survive. Macdonald rightly blames the collapse of Eastern theology on the close
alliance which existed between state and Church in the Eastern Empire ; but he assigns
all credit for western development to writers outside the central stream : it was the
heretics who seized the banner of freedom and the spear of reason.
To answer Macdonald, it may be agreed that heresies provide an occasion for the
development of dogma by compelling the best minds in the Church to focus explicit
attention upon doctrines which previously had been viewed only in the oblique. But that
heresies are a positive cause of development; that error and truth must enter into a
necessary and inevitable conflict from which more truth is the necessary outcome: these
are relativistic claims which lead inevitably to a denial that any final truth can ever be
achieved in religious inquiry. — However, it should be added that in all his writings on
pre-scholastic theology, Macdonald is far more temperate than Poole.
2 St. Augustine, De symbolo, sermo ad catechumenos, 1, 1, PL 40 : 627: “Ista verba
quae audistis, per divinas Scripturas sparsa sunt.’’

16

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

doctrine and reduce it to unity, so that men may more easily retain
what they believe, and make profession of their faith.3 Moreover, the
Church must determine the canon of Scripture, both of the Old Testa­
ment and of the New.45 It is under the eye of the Church also that
must take place that consistent process of development by which the
creed is explained and fortified, against the heretics who have used the
very brevity of the creed as a basis for ambiguities.0 And in any doubt
as to the exact meaning of Scripture, the “rule of faith” is to be con­
sulted, which is found in clearer passages of Scripture, and in the
authority of the Church.6
The great doctor of the west also discussed the relation of faith to
natural knowledge, and emphasized the primacy of faith in the famous
passage which was to provide the leading principle for St. Anselm’s
theology, that we believe in order to understand, we do not understand
in order to believe.7 However, though faith is superior to knowledge
acquired through natural reason alone, reason has its legitimate part to
play in the knowledge of divine things. In reply to the request of Consentius for an explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity, he points out
that the request itself is evidence of Consentius’ view that the reason­
ing process must somehow enter into the discussion of the mystery. And
Augustine himself is in agreement with this since it is evident that God
does not despise that faculty in us which elevates us above lower crea­
tures. When we believe, we do not reject reason, since we would be
3 Ibid. : “sed inde [i.e. ex Scripturis divinis] collecta et ad unum redacta ne tar­
dorum hominum memoria laboraret; ut omnis homo possit dicere, possit tenere quod
credit.”
4 De scriptura sacra Speculum, Praefatio, CSEL 12: 3: “Quis ignorat in Scripturis
sanctis, id est, Legitimis, Propheticis, Evangelicis, et Apostolicis, auctoritate canonica
praeditis, quaedam sic esse posita, ut tantum scirentur et crederentur?”

5 De fide et symbolo, 1, CSEL 41: 4: “Sed tractatio fidei ad muniendam Symbo­
lum valet: non ut ipsa pro symbolo gratiam Dei consequentibus memoriae mandanda et
reddenda tradatur; sed ut illa quae in Symbolo retinentur, contra haereticorum insidias
auctoritate catholica et munitore defensione custodiat.”
6 De doctrina Christiana, 3, 2, PL 34: 65: “Sed cum verba propria faciunt ambig­
uam Scripturam, primo videndum est ne male distinxerimus aut pronuntiaverimus. Cum
ergo adhibita intentio incertum esse perviderit quomodo distinguendum aut quomodo
pronuntiandum sit, consulat regulam fidei quam de Scripturarum planioribus locis et
Ecclesiae auctoritate percepit.”
7 In St. Joannis Evangelium, 40, 8, PL 35: 1690: “Quid promittit credentibus,
fratres? Et cognoscetis veritatem. Quid enim?—non illam cognoverant, quomodo credi­
derunt? Non quia cognoverunt crediderunt, sed ut cognoscerent, crediderunt. Credimus
enim ut cognoscamus, non cognoscimus ut credamus.”

Rfüâon Olid /Iudiori(v in dir Pre'Scholastic Period

17

unable even to believe unless we had reasoning minds.8 Faith in the
mysteries must precede our reasoning about them, but even here in a
sense reason precedes faith, since it is our reason which urges us to
believe.9
The pre-scholastic writers followed St. Augustine in acknowledging
the primary authority of Scripture and tradition and of the Church.
They do not generally treat of these matters systematically, in reflexive
studies of the nature of sacred science as such, but their theory of
knowledge appears most often in the course of separate polemics, in
which the opposing parties are reproached for their failure to follow
authority. Against the Adoptianists Alcuin cites St. Paul, Proclus, St.
Cyril, St. Hilary, and St. Jerome on the consubstantiality of the Father
and the Son, and asks how anyone could be called Catholic who would
reject such evangelical and traditional authority.10 There is, however,
no rejection of the principle of authority on the part of the adversaries
of the truth; rather Alcuin blames their misunderstanding of the
Fathers, whose meaning they twist to serve their own ends.11 The same
reproaches will be levelled against Berengar.

Moreover, the pre-scholastic writers upheld not only patristic author­
ity but also the authority of the Church. Prudentius of Troyes cites the
Fathers and synodal acts against the enemies of the truth.12 And he
signalizes the special authority of Roman synods.13 Jonas of Orleans
8 Ep. 120 ad Consentitivi. CSEL 34: 706: Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus
oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit inquam ut ideo cre­
damus, ne rationem accipiamus sive quaeramus; cum etiam credere non possemus, nisi
rationales animas haberemus.”
9 Ibid. : “Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas
ratione percipere nondum valemus, . . . fides praecedat rationem, ... et hoc utique
rationis est. Proinde ut fides praecedat rationem, rationabiliter iussum est . . .(quia)
ratio qua hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem.”
10 Alcuin, Adversus Felicem, 4, 8,PL 101 : 181 D: “Quomodo catholicus aestimare
potest, qui et tantorum doctorum testimoniis non credit, nec divinae per evangélicas pagi­
nas consensit veritati?”
11 Adversus Elipandum, 2, 5, PL 101 : 261 CD: “Igitur non solum sanctae Scriptu­
rae inviolabile sacramentum prava interpretatione maculare niteris, verum etiam sanctorum
Patrum multis in locis catholicos sensus depravatos, et ad tui erroris trahere suffragium;
. . . veluti in duobos sanctorum Patrum sublimiumque doctorum testimoniis, id est, beati
Ambrosii et sancti Augustini verbis ostendi potest. Quam impie, et ab eorum intelligentia
longissime interpretaris, quod illi catholico stylo in suis litteris nobis exaratum reli­
querunt?”
12 Prudentius of Troyes, De praedestinatione contra J. Scotum, PL 115: 1013
CD: “Quanta enim contra diversas haereses maiores nostri egerint, testantur multis totius
orbis Patribus sancto spiritu aggregata, testantur acta synodica attestantur etiam doctorum
probabilium scripta veridica.”
13 Ibid., 1013 D.

IB

7'he Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

insists that the magisterium of the Church supplies the rule of faith,14
that he himself argues “reasonably” upon the basis of Scripture and
tradition,1516
and that anyone who would subvert such authority is unrea­
17
sonable, an author of divisions and superstitions, and guilty of giving
scandal to the people.10
If any pre-scholastic writer can be effectively cited to show there
was no dispute during those centuries concerning the principle of
authority, it is surely Joannes Scotus Eriugena, or John the Scot. For
this remarkable man, the most brilliant of the ninth century scholars,
and surely the best educated, knowing Greek as well as Latin, has been a
storm center of discussion down the centuries, his views always held in
suspicion by the orthodox, and adopted by the heretics as their own.
Berengar claimed erroneously to find in him the justification of his own
doctrine, as we shall see, and in our own day a Catholic philosopher
such as De Wulf calls him the “father of medieval rationalism.”1 ‘

It is undeniable that certain tendencies existed in his thought which
could be exaggerated into heresy, but here it is sufficient to point out
that John the Scot was not a rationalist in principle, that he did not
attempt to explain the mysteries away, and was not an opponent of
authority as a source of religious knowledge. After speaking of the ten
categories of being, he insists that God is not properly contained in any
of them.18 The divine mysteries are therefore entirely beyond the grasp
of our natural power to understand. Faith is the way to knowledge of
God.19 He refuses to accept Plato’s definition of the angels, because it
14 Jonas of Orleans, De cultu imaginum, 1, PL 106; 309 C: Utique, etsi non ut
pridem fidei catholicae regulam, ecclesiasticas traditiones quam venenatis telis per eumdem
discipulum suum jaculari nisus sit, breviter memorandum est.*’ (The disciple of Felix is
Claudius of Turin, against whom this treatise is written.)
15 Ibid., Lib. 2, col. 362 C: “Hactenus stylo prosecutionis nostrae ex auctoritate
divina et sanctorum Patrum doctrina . . . ineptis et stolidissimis oppositionibus rationabil­
iter obviasse sufficiat.”
16 Ibid., Lib. 1, col. 314 D: Ille namque qui irrationabiliter subjectarum sibi plebi­
um mentes scandalizare traditionesque ecclesiasticas tam impudenter reprehendere . . .
et auctor schismatum ac superstitionum judicandus est."
17 History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. I, p. 324.
18 John the Scot, De divisione naturae, I, 15, PL 122: 463 C: “Clare conspicio,
nulla ratione categorias de natura ineffabili proprie posse praedicari. Nam si aliqua
categoriarum de Deo proprie praedicaretur, necessarius genus esse Deus sequeretur. Deus
autem nec genus, nec species, nec accidens est. Nulla igitur categoria proprie Deum
significare potest."
19 Com. in Evang. see. Joan., PL 122: 305 A: “Non per aliam viam Dominus
corda hominum ingreditur, nisi per fidem, quae via est Domini.

Reason and A ti fhoríly in the Pre-Scholastic Period

19

cannot be proved valid by the authority of Scripture and tradition,20
and he will not comment on the salvation or conversion of the devil,
because he says nothing certain upon this point is found in tradition.21
This great man is not therefore to be too easily adjudged a heretic,
nor ought it be said that he places reason above tradition without quali­
fication. He disclaims any intention to teach what is contrary to patris­
tic authority, nor to admit definitively that there is conflict among the
Fathers;22 however, he is not clear upon the authority of the magister­
ium of the Church, the proximate rule of faith, in settling apparent con­
flicts, and may be said thereby to open the way to possible exaggerations
of private interpretation.23 And his concept of the divine Wisdom as
the common source both of reason and authority can lead to an illuminism which heretical teachers may adopt as the sole criterion of
truth.24
To sum up, then, the pre-scholastic position with regard to the value
of traditional teaching as a source of religious knowledge, it may be
said that they all held in principle for the infallibility of the tradition
of the Fathers, however they might disagree as to what that tradition
really was. Moreover, it was generally agreed that the teaching Church,
whether it was a question of the great Councils of previous centuries or
of provincial Councils — with special authority ascribed to the Roman
councils under the presidency of the Popes — had power to determine
authoritatively the rule of faith,25 though some tendency towards a

20 De divisione naturae, PL 122: 762 C: “Quamvis Plato angelum definiat animae
rationale et immortale: sed quod auctoritate S. Scripturae sanctorumque Patrum, probare
non possumus, inter certas naturarum speculationes, quoniam temerarium est, accipere
non debemus.”
21 Ibid., col. 941 B: “De salute autem eius [i.e. diaboli] aut conversione, seu in
causam suam reditu propterea nihil definire presumimus, quoniam neque divinae historiae,
neque sanctorum Patrum, qui eam exposuere, certam de hoc auctoritatem habemus; atque
ideo illam obscuritatem silentio honorificamus, ne forte, quae extra nos sunt, quaerere
cenantes, plus cadere in errorem, quam ascendere in veritatem nobis contingat.”
22 Ibid., col. 8 D: “Qui sensui quamvis sanctum Augustinum refragari videatur non
omnino tamen, quoniam sancti Basilii est, a nobis repellitur. Non enim nostrum est, de
intellectibus sanctorum Patrum dijudicare, sed eos pie et venerabiliter suscipere.”
23 Ibid.: “. . . non tamen prohibemur eligere, quod magis videtur divinis eloquiis
rationis consideratione convenire.”
24 Ibid., col. 511 B: “Nulla itaque auctoritas te terreat ab his, quae certae contem­
plationis rationabilis suasio edocet. Vera enim auctoritas rectae rationi non obsistit neque
recta ratio verae auctoritati. Ambo siquidem ex uno fonte, divina videlicet sapientia,
manare dubium non est.”
25 A. J. Macdonald, Reason and Authority in the Early Middle Ages, p. 5.

20

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

weakening of ecclesiastical authority might be found in the neoPlatonist illuminism of John the Scot. And finally, unanimous agree­
ment on the inspiration and inerrancy of Holy Scripture, however un­
systematically those concepts might have been understood. When any
writer is accused by others of rejecting this weight of authority, it is
not so much a question of rejecting the principle as of a culpable misin­
terpretation, or a twisting of authority to serve his own ends.

If there was substantial agreement among pre-scholastic scholars on
the need for fidelity to traditional teaching, they also agreed in assign­
ing a legitimate place to natural reason in the pursuit of knowledge.
But the role of reason was not autonomous: secular wisdom was not
an end in itself, but a means towards a clearer understanding and pres­
entation of religious data. Consequently, all who treat of early medieval
philosophy speak of the function of natural reason as “propaedeutic”
to divine science. This propaedeutic function was assigned not only to
disciplines which we would today classify as philosophical, but also
to studies of profane letters and natural science, as these branches were
then understood.26
26 R. L. Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, pp.
2, 3, 4, 6, 21, etc., has much to say about the rejection of classical learning by the medi­
eval Church. The rise of the western Church was accompanied by a rapid decline in the
study of classical letters. Rhetorical schools died out; the clergy monopolized educa­
tion. The Church was altogether inimical to the philosophical spirit. Philosophy was a
danger and a snare. If the Church had absorbed and purified the culture of Rome, it
might have elevated and refined the barbarians who overran Europe; as it happened,
however, the Church was but a step less barbaric than the Teutonic tribes it faced.
Cassiodorus opposed this scorn for classical letters, but St. Gregory the Great’s influ­
ence made the discrediting of classical culture complete. — If Poole wishes to commend
a teacher in the main stream of Catholic tradition, he tries to take him out of the Catho­
lic tradition; for example, in his comments on St. Anselm, p. 91, Poole denies that St.
Anselm is a “scholastic,’’ and calls him “the last of the Fathers’’ instead of the pioneer
of developed scholasticism which he is.
The charges of Poole reflect an attitude of mind once almost universal among non­
Catholics, but gradually falling into the discard as medieval scholarship becomes more
disinterested. — It is true that some Fathers seemed to wish a complete break with pagan
learning. They were deeply imbued with the Pauline idea that Christianity was not a
philosophy but a life, that the wisdom of the Cross was foolishness to the pagan philoso­
pher. Paganism was the adversary in the field; it had its philosophy, and consequently
that philosophy must be attacked. But at the same time Christianity was extremely rich
in its ideas, and drew converts who were themselves philosophers. Clement and Origen,
and the Latin apologists for example. We see in the development of Christian wisdom a
rather paradoxical attack on classical culture carried on by Christians who were them­
selves first-rate classicists. This inconsistency is only apparent, and was inevitable in an
incipient Christian culture. It has often been pointed out that Tertullian denouncing
rhetoric is himself a superb rhetorician, and that St. Gregory making little of the impor­
tance of the grammar of the Bible uses perfect grammar himself. — The reader is
referred to treatments of this topic in E. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle

Reason atuì Authority in the Pre-Scholaslic Period

21

As in the realm of authority, so in that of the value of human
reason, St. Augustine formed medieval thought. If pagan philosophy
has in it anything of truth, this is not to be feared, but to be taken over
by the Christians as rightful possessors,27 just as the Israelites at the
divine command took over the spoils of the Egyptians.28 Not all of the
teachings of the Gentiles are to be shunned as superstitions: the liberal
disciplines may be put to the service of the truth, and even the ethical
teachings of the philosophers contain much that is true regarding the
worship of God.29 And St. Augustine says rightly that the advice which
he gives them is not new or revolutionary, but merely a recommenda­
tion that they continue the practice long since adopted by the greatest
Christian writers, both Greek and Latin.30
In the De ordine, St. Augustine not only commends the usefulness
of profane science, but holds it an essential possession in one who
would be worthy of the title of learned.31 Here he is not speaking of
rational knowledge in a general way, as equated with common sense,
but as a technical science to be learned from the seven liberal disciplines.
27 De doctrina Christiana, 2, 40, 60-61, PL 34: 63: “Philosophi autem qui vocan­
tur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accomodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum
formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis tamquam injustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindi­
canda.”
28 This comparison, dating from patristic times (Cf. St. Jerome, Ep. 70, ad Mag­
num oratorem urbis Romanae, PL 22: 667, and St. Augustine, loe cit.), served through­
out the Middle Ages as the Scriptural justification for the propaedeutic role of the seven
liberal arts. It is found in Cassiodorus, De inst. div. lit., 28, PL 70: 1142; Alcuin, Ep.
307, MGH (Epistolae) 4: 470; Walafrid Strabo, Clossa ordinaria, PL 113: 193, 220221, 474; Prudentius of Troyes, De praed. contra J. Scolum, PL 115: 1016; Raban
Maur, De cler. inst., 3, 26, PL 107: 404; Rathier of Verona, Ep. 3, PL 136: 650;
St. Peter Damian, Serm. 6 de S. Eleuchadio, PL 144: 540-541. For other citations, see
De Ghellinck, Le mouvement théologique . .
Chap. 1, Appendix B, pp. 67-70.
29 De doctrina Christiana, 2, 40, PL 34: 63: “sed etiam liberales disciplinas usui
veritates aptiores, et quaedam praecepta utilissima continent deque ipso uno Deo colendo
nonnulla vera inveniuntur apud eos.”
30 Ibid.; “Nam quid aliud fecerunt multi boni fideles nostri? Nonne adspicimus
quanto auro argento et veste suffarcinatus exierit de Aegypto Cyprianus doctor suavis­
simus et martyr beatissimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius,
ut de vivis taceam? quanto innumerabiles Graeci?”
31 De ordine, 2, 16, CSEL 63: 177: “Eruditi dignissimus nomine non temere iam
quaerit illa divina, non iam credenda solum, sed etiam contemplanda, mtelligenda, atque
retinenda.”
Ages, New York, 1938, and E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages, Chapters 1
and 2 (see especially p. 64).
The charge of Poole that the Church failed to adopt the civilization of Rome in
order to civilize the barbarians is a curious inversion of the much more common asser­
tion that the Church simply took over the imperial structure bodily and made of the
imperium a papal theocracy. For a brilliant apologetical analysis of this practice of
levelling contrary charges against the Church, see G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, New
York, 1941, Chapter 6, “The Paradoxes of Christianity.”

2.L

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

He speaks in the De ordine of the propaedeutic role of reason only
after he has defined and distinguished the seven liberal arts. And for
the propaedeutic function, the art of dialectics holds the highest place.
It is the art of definition, of analysis, of synthesis; its function to make
an orderly arrangement of knowledge; it protects the truth against the
assaults of error; it teaches one to teach and another to learn. It is the
discipline of disciplines, the instrument of knowledge.32 The systema­
tized knowledge which it gives is indispensable to one who would pur­
sue safely the knowledge of God and of man.33 Dialectic is of
value in every inquiry into sacred science,34 but it must be applied with
care, so as to avoid willful quibbling and childish ostentation.35 For the
use of the liberal arts is most difficult, and demands constant applica­
tion and unremitting study from one’s earliest days.36
For the pre-scholastic theologians, the principal value of the liberal
arts consisted in the refutation of heresies.37 And the most brilliant
among all of the ninth-century scholars assigned a threefold function
to the dialectical art : to make doubtful things clear, to serve in ancillary
role the progress of rational investigation, and to give orderly arrange­
ment to acquired knowledge.38 But John the Scot follows St. Augus­
32 Ibid., 2, 13, CSEL 63: 174: “Nam earn definiendo distribuendo colligendo non
solum digesserat atque ordinarat, verum ab omni etiam falsitatis ireptione defenderat.
Quando ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda, nisi ipsa sua prius quasi quaedam machina­
menta et instrumenta distingueret, notaret, digereret, proderetque ipsam disciplinam dis­
ciplinarum, quam dialecticam vocant? Haec docet docere, haec docet discere.”
33 Ibid., 2, 16, p. 177: “Quisquis autem vel adhuc servus cupiditatum et inhians
rebus pereuntibus; vel iam ista fugiens casteque vivens nesciens tamen, quid sit nihil,
quid informis materia, quid formatum exanime, quid corpus, quid exanime in corpore
. . . quisquis ista nesciens, non dico de summo illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo, sed
de anima ipsa sua quarere ac disputare voluerit, tantum errabit quantum errari plurimum
potest.”
34 De doctrina Christiana, 2, 31, 48, PL 34: 57-58: “sed disputationis disciplina
ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in litteris sanctis sunt penetranda et dissolvenda."
35 Ibid. : “tantum ibi cavenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio
decipiendi adversarium.”
36 De ordine, 2, 16, CSEL 63: 178: “usum earum assequi difficillimum est nisi ei
qui ab ipsa pueritia ingeniosissimus instantissime atque constantissime operam dederit."
37 Alcuin, De grammatica, PL 101 : 853D: “Sunt igitur gradus, quos quaeritis, et
. . . grammatica, rhetorica, dialectica, arithmetica, geometrica, musica, et astrologia. . .
Iis quoque sancti et catholici nostrae fidei doctores et defensores omnibus haeresiarchis in
contentionibus publicis semper superiores exstiterunt.”
Cf. Raban Maur, De inst. cler., 3, 20, PL 107: 379 C D.
38 John the Scot, De div. naturae, PL 122 : 474 D: “Non tarn late patent dialectici
loci, ut undecumque dialecticus animus in natura rerum argumentum, quod rei dubiae
facit fidem, repererit, locum argumenti esse desribat, seu argumenti sedem.”
Ibid., 475 A: Dialectica est communium animi conceptionum rationabilium diligens
investigatrixque disciplina.”
Ibid., 486 B: “Dialecticae . . . proprietas est, rerum omnium, quae intelligi possunt,
naturas dividere, coniungere, discernere, propriusque locos unicuique distribuere."

Ke<i.v>ti and Authority in the Pre-Scholastic Period

23

tine in warning against an improper use of dialectics. Both the moral
virtues and the arts, he says, are alike in having their origin from God,
but they differ in that virtues cannot be ill used, while dialectics can be
used for good or for evil, for good in the discernment of truth, for evil
in the confusion of the simple through false arguments.39
This, then, is the principle of harmony upon which there was
substantial agreement among the pre-scholastic scholars: authority —
whether Scriptural, patristic, or conciliar — must be followed, and rea­
son has its legitimate propaedeutic and polemic functions in the pursuit
of religious knowledge. Yet it is a fact that in the application of that
principle there was no agreement at all. The intellectual life of the three
pre-scholastic centuries issued in bitter theological disputations and irre­
concilable opposition.40

2. Controversy in the Application of the Principle
The controversies of the pre-scholastic period cannot be explained
by any difference of background or education among the men who took
part in them. They were the same men who were building the school
culture. They all had the same background: St. Augustine and the
Latin tradition of the Fathers, and the gradual tradition of Aristotelian
logic—a community of inspiration which cannot explain theological
conflicts. Two causes seem best to explain the diversity of thought
39 Ibid., 382 BC: “Potest enim aliquis in disciplina, verbi causa, disputandi, quae
dicitur dialectica, peritus, quae nullo dubitante a Deo homini donatur, si voluerit, bene
uti, quoniam ad hoc certissime data est dum ea' ignorantes eam erudit, vera falsaque
discernit confusa dividit, separata collingit, in omnibus veritatem inquirit. Potest e con­
trario perniciose vivere (uti) ad quod non est data, dum falsa pro veris approbans, alios
in errorem mittat. . . .”
Further testimonies to the values of dialectics, in addition to those cited supra, n. 28,
are the following: St. Isidore, Etymologiae, 1, 2, and 22-23, etc., PL 82: 74, 128 C,
140-154; Pope Eugene II, Deer., MGH (Leges) 2: app. p. 100; Heriger of Lobbes,
De corp, el sang. Dom., 7, PL 139: 185 B. The attitude of Lanfranc and Berengar
will be brought out in Chapter 3 of this study.
40 G. Brunhes, La foi chrétienne et la philosophie, au temps de la Renaissance
carolingienne, pp. 25-26: “The personal exercise of intellectual activity in the ninth
century is carried on almost exclusively in connection with theological controversies. If
we except a few pages of Fredegise and the De divisione naturae of John the Scot,
where, moreover, philosophy and theology are continually intermingled, we can say that
all the writings of this period, over and above mere school-books, are works of polemic
and religious controversy.” The history of thought in the ninth century, and in the
eleventh as well, is necessarily the history of the theological controversies which fill it.
The substance of these controversies does not concern us here, except in so far as the
methods used have bearing on the formation of scholasticism. The great theological
questions were those of Images (Jonas of Orleans vs. Agobard of Lyons and Claudius
of Turin; of the “Filioque” (Theodulph of Orleans); of Adoptianism (Alcuin vs.
Felix and Elipand) ; of Predestination (Hincmar and Raban Maur vs. Gottschalk) ;
and of the Eucharist (Paschasius vs. Ratramn).

24

The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

among these scholars: first, the fact that throughout the period there
was almost completely absent a definite distinction between the domains
of philosophy and of Christian faith; and second, a characteristic of the
incipient dialectic itself, which led certain “speculative” writers to exag­
gerate the role of reason, and aroused immediate reaction on the part
of more “practical” and conservative scholars.
The question of the relation of reason and authority was compli­
cated first by the almost general failure of pre-scholastic theologians to
distinguish clearly between the two orders of knowledge. In the ninth
century, “religion and philosophy are not . . . two disciplines entirely
distinct and heterogeneous as we consider them today. To understand
the minds of these authors,, we must put aside our habitual mode of
thinking. . . . For Alcuin, for Raban Maur, for all their pupils, the basic
thought, the point of departure of all their reflections is the community
of object, of method, of conditions of research, between philosophy and
religious knowledge, or what may be called ‘theology’.”41 In the educa­
tion which they received, philosophical data are confused pell-mell with
the data of faith, and the same confusion is apparent in their literature :
it is not at all uncommon for a ninth-century writer to include in what
he considers to be a closely reasoned argument based on natural reason
alone a premise which contains a mystery knowable only by faith. Thus
it is that some writers, without knowing it, tend to suppress the proper
object of faith by absorbing it into demonstrations of reason, while
others deny reason its legitimate authority in favor of an absolute
dependence on faith.
It is evident that for Alcuin and Raban Maur no clear distinction
existed between philosophy and religious knowledge. It is true that
Alcuin’s definition of philosophy is acceptable even from the modern
viewpoint of separate philosophy, since its religious implications might
well apply to the branch called natural theology :
Philosophia est naturarum inquisitio, rerum humanarum divinarum­
que cognitio, quantum homini possibile est aestimare.42

But immediately he takes philosophy out of the realm of pure specula­
tion by attaching to philosophy moral implications, and giving it a
religious definition :
Est quoque philosophia honestas vitae, studium bene vivendi, medi41 G. Brunhes, op. cit., p. 53.
42 Alcuin, De dialectica, PL 101: 952 A. Cf. almost identical definition in Raban
M aur, De universo, 15, 1, PL 111 : 416.

Reason and Authority/ in the Pre-Scholaslic Period

25

tatio mortis, contemptus saeculi, quod magis convenit Christianis, qui
saeculi ambitione calcata, disciplinabili similitudine futurae patriae
vivunt.43

And it is not merely in the moral order that Alcuin identifies philoso­
phy and religious knowledge. More radically yet, when he divides phil­
osophy into three parts, he places the sacred books within one or other
of the classifications.44 The result of his definition and division is that
for him philosophy is nothing else but universal science, that it compre­
hends the whole ensemble of human knowledge. His definition of phil­
osophy includes all the branches of the liberal arts, including disciplines
now considered scientific rather than philosophical.4'5
With such a concept of philosophy as universal science, lacking
any distinction from religious knowledge, it is not surprising to see
Alcuin make a free use of dialectical arguments in matters of faith.
Speaking of the category of relation, he argues that the co-etemity of
the Son with the Father is a conclusion of dialectical necessity.46
43 Ibid. This moral definition is reproduced by Raban Maur, PL 111 : 416. Further
indication that Raban Maur did not distinguish religious from philosophical knowledge
is found in the fact that he taught the necessity of divine grace to arrive at any truth:
De videndo Deum, I, PL 112: 1280.
44 Ibid. “Carolus: ‘In quot partes dividitur philosophia? Ale.: ‘In tres: physicam,
ethicam, et logicam ... in his quippe generibus philosophiae etiam eloquia divina con­
sistunt. . . . Nam aut de natura disputare solent ut in Genesi et in Ecclesiaste; aut de
moribus, ut in Proverbiis et in omnibus sparsim libribus; aut de logica pro qua nostri
theologicam sibi vindicant ut in Canticis canticorum et sancto Evangelio.’ ”

45 Schematically, Alcuin divides philosophy as follows (Ibid.,) :
physical

philosophy

¿ ethical
I logical
I

arithmetic
geometry
music
astronomy
prudence
justice
temperance
fortitude
(dialectic
) rhetoric

46 De dialectica, 5, PL 101 ; 959: “Et sciendum est quod semper relativa vel simul
nasci vel simul exstingui oportet, ut subtracto servo dominus non est; remoto domino nec
servus apparet. Ita de patre et filio. Ac ideo secundum hanc categoriae regulam miranda
est Arii, vel magis miseranda, et eius quoque sociorum stulta caecitas; asserentes Filium
secundum tempus Patri esse posteriorem ; dum omnino constat secundum dialecticam
simul consempiternum esse Filium cum Patre. Et si Deus Pater (quod nec illorum impie­
tas suadebat negare) aeternus est, utique et Filius aeternus est secundum dialecticae
rationis necessitatem.” — For other examples of Alcuin’s free use of dialectical argu­
ments in matters of faith without any attempt to distinguish between the two sources of
knowledge, see PL 100: 431-436 (Redemption) and MGH (Epist. Karol. Aevi) 2:
337 ff. (Adoptianism, the divine sonship, and the virginal birth.)

26

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Alcuin’s failure to distinguish between philosophical and religious
knowledge is apparent in his discussions with his pupil Fredegise.4748
Fredegise brought to the question of the Trinity an entirely rational
approach from which all mystery was excluded. It is not so significant
that Alcuin should have made some response to Fredegise, but it is
significant that he should have answered his objections one by one, with­
out stating as a principle to answer them all the distinction between
the realm of philosophy and that of faith. Alcuin himself seems wholly
unconscious of the danger that lurked in the confusion of the two do­
mains. Neither Alcuin nor Agobard of Lyons accuses Fredegise of un­
orthodoxy. Fredegise is not an “adversary” of the faith; Alcuin and
Agobard are not “opponents” of dialectics. Granted that the questions
raised by Fredegise were puerile, taken in themselves, yet they hinted at
great problems. Fredegise had been taught dialectics, and he wanted to
apply it to the hilt. He had learned his philosophy and theology pellmell : no one had distinguished for him their respective fields.
It has been pointed out that John the Scot was not an adversary
of the principle of authority, especially that of Scripture and the
Fathers, and that he spoke of dialectics as occupying an ancillary place.
But more categorically than anyone else he identified philosophy and
religious knowledge,49 and in some passages he seems to give preced­
ence to reason over authority as ultimate source of religious knowl­
edge.50 It is an oversimplification to set down such passages as evi47 Fredegise is the author of one of the few works of separate philosophy of the
Carolingian age, De nihilo el tenebris, PL 105: 751-756 a work of pure speculation,
meant to prove the real existence of nothing and darkness. Fredegise is the outstanding
Carolingian example of the “speculative ’ rationalizing tendency. His writing has no
moral or educative purpose; he brings to properly religious questions a pretentious dia­
lectical approach which is backed up with rudimentary dialectical skill. His practice was
to adopt an absurdly literal interpretation of Scripture, and then to argue to his con­
clusion through a puerile process of logic-chopping. For example, he argues (753 C)
that darkness must exist because it says in Genesis that darkness was upon the face of
the deep; (754 C) because David says that the Lord sends darkness (“Si non sunt,’’
asks Fredegise, “quomodo mittuntur?’’); and (754D) because Christ says that the
wicked shall be cast out into the exterior darkness “Extra enim, unde exterius derivatus
est, locum significat.*’)
48 Ep. ad Fredegisum, PL 101 : 57-64.
49 John the Scot, De praed., 1,5, 1, PL 122: 357-358: “Quid est aliud de philo­
sophia tractare, nisi verae religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa, Deus,
et humiliter colitur, et rationabiliter investigatur regulas exponere? Conficitur inde, veram
esse philosophiam veram religionem, convertimque veram religionem esse veram philo­
sophiam.”
50 De divisione naturae, 1, 69, PL 122: 513 B: “Rationem priorem esse natura
. . . didicimus . . . auctoritate siquidem ex vera ratione processit, ratio vero nunquam ex
auctoritate. Omnes enim auctoritas quae vera ratione non approbatur infirma videtur
esse. Vera autem ratio, quoniam suis virtutibus data atque immutabilis munitur, nullius
auctoritas astipulatione roborari indiget.’’

Reason and /lidAoríty in the Pre-Scholastic Period

27

dence that John the Scot is a rationalist and an adversary of Scripture
and tradition; yet there appear in his theory of knowledge an individ­
ualism and illuminism which are not in the Catholic tradition.51 John
the Scot cannot be called unorthodox or heretical, but he did continue
the confusion between the two realms : for him, faith and reason have
not two objects formally distinct, and no clear distinction exists between
the natural and supernatural order. Brunhes finds in this confusion the
explanation of John the Scot’s enthusiastic reception by the heretics and
the suspicion with which he has always been viewed by the orthodox.
“He condemns himself to be misunderstood in his good intentions by
the orthodox, and to become naturally the patron of those who in cem
turies to come, put themselves in opposition to the general current of
theological thought.”52 And in fact, notwithstanding his superior bril­
liance and education, his contemporaries were to have a greater influence
on the formation of western theological thought. He was too closely
attached to the past, while they were in touch with new problems. Giv­
ing themselves at first too naively to dialectics to explain the mysteries
of faith, they felt its dangers by experience of the individualism of John
and the heresies of others, and they set about establishing a harmony
between the two fields of knowledge.
The second factor that led to theological controversy during the
pre-scholastic period was the tendency of certain writers to adopt an
exaggerated position eithfcr in favor of dialectics or against it. It must
be remembered that rational speculation, avowedly legitimate in prin­
ciple, did not appear in the pre-scholastic period as mere common sense,
or even as a system of thought Christian in origin, but as a technical
discipline from the pagan past. The thought of Aristotle and Plato
formed the framework of philosophical speculation, with Aristotle bear­
ing the predominant part. Mandonnet has pointed out that one of
the striking characteristics of medieval intellectual life is the diversity
of attitude in the presence of ideas and systems handed down from clas­
sical antiquity.53 Nothwithstanding its excellence, the work of Aristotle
possessed within it certain characteristics, which would arouse violent
opposition. It was established on a basis of abstract and experimental
science : hence it would be offensive to mystics. It was conceived apart
51 For statements of the priority of reason over authority, see De divisione naturae,
cols. 513 BC, 511 B, 781 CD. Cf. Macdonald, Reason and Authority in the Earty
Middle Ages, p. 47, and Brunhes, op. cit., p. 173.
52 Brunhes, op. cit., p. 173.
53 Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au XIH e siècle, p. 19.

¿H

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

from any religious system: hence it would leave outside of considera­
tion some of the philosophical truths which the great monotheistic re­
ligions placed at the foundation of their beliefs. Wherever Aristotle
appeared, the same reactions took place with astonishing regularity.54
At the beginning, Aristotle by the power of his thought makes his en­
trance and captivates minds. As the work proceeds, it evokes from
religious souls opposition sometimes to the point of declared war; while
on the other hand minds drawn to independent speculation, or inclined
to use it even across the boundaries of religious teaching, accept it whole
and entire as the symbol of liberty of thought, and seek to apply its ir­
resistible laws to faith. Finally, between the two extremes, the most
clear-sighted thinkers, convinced of the value of Aristotle, were at the
same time bold enough to judge him and respectful enough to religion
not to transgress it—and thus brought the two into accord.
Along the same line of thought, the theory of Brunhes is admirably
complementary to that of Mandonnet. Brunhes explains the double
tendency of the period not only in the temperament of the men involv­
ed, but also in the various positions which they held in the Church and
the various responsibilities which bound them. Some men, Agobard,
Hincmar, Prudentius, for example, were bishops, without leisure for
disinterested speculation. They were interested in forming Christians,
and their philosophy was geared to the practical. Hence, in them phil­
osophy will have a moral application, and their scholarly work will con­
sist in the mere copying or abridgement of past works, without much
creative thought. And they will take exception to novelties of specula­
tion which might disturb the beliefs of the faithful.

On the other hand, there were men not involved in social responsi­
bilities, the monk, Gottschalk, for example, and the scholar, John the
Scot. These men might cultivate reason more boldly, and develop dia­
lectics more independently. This dialectical movement in its earliest
stages was mainly a movement of monks : they alone had sufficient leis­
ure, once the work of clearing and civilizing was well on its way to ac­
complishment. Necessarily their interest led to dialectics: it appealed
to their combative barbarian instincts, it gave itself to methodical hand­
ling; and finally, it was available, the only systematized discipline with
which the independent mind could exercise itself upon the body of ac­
quired truth, which was entirely religious.55
54 Ibid., p. 23.
55 G. Brunhes, op. cit.. pp. 71-83.

Remoti and /I1tlhoriIp iti llic Pre Scholastic Period

29

Thus we see that despite an agreement in principle and theory on
the legitimacy of rational speculation in religious matters, the intellec­
tual temper of the age tended towards a divergence in application and
practice, and towards the formation of opposed schools, the “practicáis”
and the “spéculatives.” The former were conservative, adhering to tra­
dition and authority, the later radical, eager to try their skill at the en­
trancing game of logic, even though the most sacred of beliefs provided
the object for their speculation.
The struggle against the rationalizing tendencies of ninth-century
dialecticians was carried on in the provincial Councils and in the writing
of individual scholars. Against the Adoptianist heresy, which per­
sisted in emphasizing the humanity of Christ to the detriment of the di­
vine nature, the Council of Frankfort rightly insisted that both natures
enter into the mystery of the Incarnation.56 The great scholar, Ser­
vatus Lupus, abbot of Ferrières, writes to Charles the Bald that Catholic
faith in the doctrine of predestination is founded on Scripture and tra­
dition; as do Prudentius of Troyes, and Florus of Lyons.57 One result
of the “practical” tendency was to remove from the competence of pure
reason the data of certain mysteries. This was the result achieved at
the Councils, and if the “practicáis” did not succeed in breaking down
all opposition, they were able at least to reduce the heretics to silence.
Felix and Gottschalk must renounce their ideas, or at least keep silence.
The importance of the silence imposed on the heretics was to impose
a limit to the domain of reason and to draw a line of demarcation. As
source of religious knowledge, reason and tradition began to be regarded
as distinct, though the relations of the two were not any too clearly
worked out.58
56 Cone. Francofordiensis Epistola sinodica ad praesules Hispaniae missa, refuta­
toria prioris epistolae eorumdem, PL 101: 1331 B: “Sanctus Augustinus dicit in ser­
mone de nativitate Christi: merito, dilectissimi, miranda est salvatoris nostri Nativitas,
non solum illa divina, de qua dictum est: In principio erat Verbum; sed etiam illa
humana, de qua idem dicit Evangelista: Verbum caro factum est. Unde et propheta,
generationem quis enarrabit? Divina enim magis fide veneranda sunt quam ratione in­
vestiganda.”
57 Servatus Lupus, Ep. 128, PL 119: 605 B: Hanc fidem [de praedestinatione|
tenuerunt Ecclesiae catholicae invictissimi defensores. Hanc ego minimus omnium cus­
todio . . . nec . . . inaniter, hoc est, vanae gloriae studio cupio innotescere, . . . sed as­
serendae veritatis intuitu quod in divinis auctoritatibus eorumque sensum sequentibus
praecellentissimis auctoribus Deo inspirante deprehendi quaerentibus absque contentione
manifesto.”
Cf. Prudentius, De praed. contra J. Scotum, PL 115: 1013-1014; 1021; and
Florus, Adv. J. Scotum Erig., PL 119: 101.
58 Brunhes, op. cil., pp. 65-69; 125.

i0

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Florus, the deacon of Lyons, was one of those who in the ninth
century adopted the moderate position and at the same time contributed
greatly to the knowledge of the real distinction between the formal
object of faith and that of natural reason. He disputed against the
oversimplified theology of Hincmar and against the excessive subtlety
of John the Scot as well. He did not deny all utility to dialectics, but
insisted that it may be used only for a deeper understanding of the
truths already believed on the motive of faith.59
In the tenth century, the question of religious knowledge began in
general to revolve more closely about that doctrine where it was to re­
ceive its greatest test, the doctrine of the Eucharist. Rathier of Verona
took an anti-dialectical position, arguing that the Eucharist is a mystery
to be received by faith, and not to be reasoned about;60 but Heriger of
Lobbes not only proclaimed the utility of this discipline even in ques­
tions bearing on the Mystery of Faith, but also assigned to dialectics
divine origin, since it emanates from a law of nature laid down by the
Author of all the arts.61 And in his treatise on the Eucharist, written
to conciliate Paschasius and Ratramn, Heriger made stout use of dia­
lectics.62

At the beginning of the eleventh century, Fulbert, the great master at
Chartres, expressed a wise and moderate viewpoint which proves that
the extreme rationalism of Berengar of Tours cannot be explained from
the teaching which he received from Fulbert. In his letter to Adeo59 Florus, Adv. J. Scot. Erig., PL 119: 230 D-231 A: “Quod non ideo dicimus
quasi nihil in illis etiam litteris humanis inveniatur veritas, aut illae disciplinae non habe­
ant aliquam utilitatem ad indagandam veritatem; sed quia omni fideli homini primum
vigilantissime discenda est veritas fidei ex auctoritate Scripturarum Dei: ut quid postea de
eisdem humanis litteris legere, aut sciri necesse fuerit, totum ex illa divina auctoritate et
fidei veritate dijudicetur; ut si quid ibi ab eius regula non discedat absque periculo
recipiatur, quidquid ab ea dissonare inveniatur quasi mortiferum respuatur. Quisquis
autem putat se absque verae fidei cognitione, absque Scripturae sanctae fidelissima auc­
toritate absque paternae doctrinae studiosissima institutione solis humanis litteris et discip­
linis indagare posse veritatem Dei, et fidei integritatem, procul dubio seipsum illudit et
decipit; et dum vult videri quasi inventor veritatis, magister erroris efficitur.”
60 Rathier of Verona, Ep. Ia ad Patricium, PL 136 : 648 A: “De ceteris, quaeso
ne solliciteris, quandoquidem mysterium esse audis, et hoc fidei; nam si mysterium est,
non valet comprehendi: si fidei, debet credi, non vero discuti.”
61 Heriger of Lobbes, De corpore et sanguine Domini [wrongly attributed to Cer­
beri] PL 139: 185 B: “Non enim ars illa, quae dividit genera in species et species in
genera resolvit, ab humanis machinationibus est facta; sed in natura rerum ab Auctore
omnium artium, quae verae artes sunt, et a sapientibus inventa, et ad utilitatem solveris
rerum indaginis est usitata.”
62 Ibid., 188 D: Sed iam forti syllogismo quod praemisimus, concludamus. Dixe­
ramus Dominum non de spiritualibus escis, sed de carnalibus dixisse, omne quod intrat
in os, et reliqua.”

Reason tuiti Authority in the Pre-Scholastic Period

31

datus,63 Fulbert writes that the divine counsels are incomprehensibly
deep, and merely human wisdom cannot fathom them. Many, he says,
are attempting to scrutinize these depths, and are falling into the dark­
ness of error. Worldly wisdom, outwardly eloquent, inwardly empty,
is always seeking, and never finding, because the depths of the divine
mysteries are revealed not to human disputation, but to the eyes of
faith. Three things are necessary for spiritual progress, and in them
all salvation consists : to understand and to firmly hold the mystery of
the Trinity and the oneness of God; to know the nature of Baptism; and
to understand the two sacraments of life, in which the Body and Blood
of the Lord are contained. Many are examining even these three truths,
trusting more to carnal sense than to faith, are falling into error, and
are neither perceiving the truth, nor enjoying the virtue of the sacra­
ments. These are masters of error, preferring darkness to light. But
along with such exhortations to humility and faith, Fulbert strongly
encouraged the development of rational speculation: in the library of
Chartres as in no other center was centralized the entire tradition of
dialectics which had come down through Boethius and Cassiodorus, and
Isidore and Alcuin.
The eleventh century witnessed a tremendous expansion of dialectic­
al argument applied to divine mysteries. The fascination of dialectics
was intense, and some minds were so overcome as to subordinate even
the Bible to reason, which became the basis of their approach to faith.
Among the doctrines which became subject to criticism were those con­
cerning the divinity and the virginal birth of Christ.64 We do not have
much direct knowledge of the teachings of these “dialectici modemi,”
but find repeated references to them in the writings of their orthpdox
adversaries, principally St. Peter Damian, Manegold of Lautenbach,
and Othloh of Ratisbon.65 St. Peter Damian is the eleventh century
writer who most staunchly opposed the excesses of the dialecticians. But
St. Peter Damian must not be set down unreservedly as an adversary
of secular learning. True, he gave it a secondary place, but he sought
63 PL 141 : 196-197. The authenticity of this letter is verified in Clerval, Les
Écoles de Chartres, p. 42. It is cited by Durand of Troam in PL 149: 1405, and at­
tributed by Durand to Fulbert.
64 See De Ghellinck, “Reminiscences de la dialectique de Marius Victorinus dans
les conflits théologiques du Xie et du Xlle siècles,’’ Revue neo-scholastique, 18 (1911)
432-435.
65 See, for example, St. Peter Damian, PL 145: 603 CD, 611 B; PL 144: 362
A; Manegold of Lautenbach, PL 155: 163 A; Othloh of Ratisbon, PL 146 : 60-62.

M

/ he Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

it for himself and encouraged it for others; and he sent his nephew to
Gaul to gain it.66
As a final comment on the theory of religious knowledge in prescholastic times, it may be said that the men did not realize they were
creating problems by their confusion between philosophy and faith.
They lacked the experience to make classifications, and they did not
possess the instruments of work. It was only the danger of heresy born
of this confusion that caused them to feel the gravity and the importance
of the problems. It must be granted that the arguments of the “dia­
lectici” in the eleventh century amounted more to an intellectual gym­
nastic sought for its own sake than to a serious development of theo­
logical method. But if a master should appear who would push the
rational principle to the limit of a virtual rejection of traditional teach­
ing; and if he should in turn be opposed by men who were as well
versed in dialectics as himself, but who accepted the teaching of the
Catholic Church as the proximate rule of faith—from such a conflict
we might rightfully expect to see a clarification of method and a sub­
stantial advance in theology. The eleventh century provided such a con­
flict in the Berengarian controversy, and out of it resulted a long step
towards the flowering of scholasticiasm, and a rich development of
Eucharistic theology.
66 J. P. Whitney, Hildebrandine Essays, Cambridge, Engl., 1932, Ch. 5, “Peren­
nar of Tours, pp. 158-179. Cf. St. Peter Damian, Opuse. 14, PL 145: 334 and Opuse.
/5, PL 145: 350.
x

CHAPTER III
The Theological Principles of Berengar
and of His Catholic Opponents

It is established that the pre-scholastic theologians agreed in assign­
ing a lawful function to rational speculation in the search for religious
truth. Authority was of paramount importance, of course : the author­
ity of God revealing, through Scripture and authentic tradition; and
more proximately, the authority of the teaching Church, official inter­
preter of the divine word. But the traditional authorities needed to be
organized, systematized, clarified : the divine message was scattered
through the Scriptures, the creeds were short; upon some points the
Church had not spoken. For this work of analysis and synthesis, the
scholars had at their disposal an imperfect philosophical instrument, the
dialectics of the schools. Their theory of religious knowledge may be
expressed hierarchically: first, the inviolability of authority; second, the
utility of reason, in an auxiliary and dependent role. If any writer
seemed to invert the order, it was not because he had it in mind to
contradict the divine tradition in the name of reason, but because in
the inevitable confusion which attended upon the birth of a new science
he failed to distinguish adequately between the competencies of the
two orders of knowledge.
Consequently, if it happens that in the middle of the eleventh
century Berengar of Tours will make a strong appeal to reason, he can­
not upon this ground alone be called a pioneer. In applying the sci­
ence of logic to theology he was merely continuing an established prin­
ciple. But in building his theology on logic, in placing dialectics as
the foundation and first principle of his theology, he inverted the order
beyond all question, and thus separated himself from the pre-scholastic
stream. That is the basic position of this study: that the error of
Berengar of Tours lay at a deeper level than any aspect of Eucharistic
theology which was involved. He was a heretic on principle before
he touched the Eucharist. In rejecting the traditional teaching and ap­
proaching the Mystery of Faith from the viewpoint of an immature
philosophy, he fell into a philosophical error which was in tum the
deep reason for his theological error. The purpose of this study is to
establish this position.
33

14

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

It is incorrect, then, to speak of a positive contribution by Berengar
to theology or to the scholastic method. On the contrary, his direct
influence was inimical to both: by his excessive reliance on dialectics,
he gave strength to the reaction against intellectualism which was going
on in the monasteries. One can at most speak of an indirect contribu­
tion, since his errors called forth in reply a series of excellent mono­
graphs which otherwise might never have been written. These were the
work of men themselves skilled in dialectics, able to face the heresiarch
on his own ground; but at the same time they were the work of Cath­
olics, who retained the proper balance between legitimate rational in­
quiry and the authority of tradition : which in theology is reason’s sta­
bilizing norm. The great development of theology which resulted from
the Berengarian controversy received its impetus, not from the heretic,
but from his Catholic opponents. Their philosophy was no more ma­
ture than that of Berengar, but they used it in dependence on faith;
and through the harmony which they effected between the two elements,
faith and reason, they were able to carry the Eucharistic theology to
a point of development which it had not reached before.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this study to set down at
length the history of the Berengarian controversy. That has already
been written.1 But a brief survey of the literature is necessary to mark
1 A. J. Macdonald, Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine, London,
1930: an extensive and detailed historical study, it fixes the events of the controversy;
but on the historical side it exaggerates the importance of political considerations, and
on the doctrinal side it attempts to present the Berengarian doctrine as the genuine medi­
eval tradition, and the Paschasian-Lanfranc doctrine as a gross and contradictory
innovation.
R. Heurtevent, Durand de Troarn et les origines de l'hérésie bérengarienne, Paris,
1912: an excellent study, includes the ninth century background, but covers only the
early stages of the controversy, 1047-1060.
J. Geiselmann, Die Eucharististielehre der Vorscholastifc, Paderborn, 1926: exhaus­
tive study of entire pre-scholastic Eucharistic theology.
M. Cappuyns, “Bérenger de Tours,” Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclési­
astique (DHGE), 8 (1934) 385-407: summarizes authentic history of the controversy,
including the findings of Macdonald; has a selected, up-to-date bibliography.
F. Vernet, “Bérenger de Tours,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (DTC), 2
(1905) 722r742; G. Sauvage, C.S.C., “Berengarius of Tours,’ The Catholic Encyclo­
pedia, 2 (1907) 487-489.
Berengar (ca. 1000-1088) studied at Chartres under Fulbert; Scholasticus at St.
Martin’s School at Tours, 1031; Archdeacon of Angers, 1041. His Eucharistic teach­
ings first came under ecclesiastical notice at Council of Rome in 1050. There his
doctrine was condemned along with that of John the Scot (Ratramn). Further condem­
nations at Vercelli (1050), Pans (1051), Rome (1059), Rome (1079), where he
signed a formula in which the words substantialiter converti appear for the first time m
an ecclesiastical document (DB 355). Retired from public life, and died about 1088,
at peace with the church. He was of blameless life, angelic purity, extremely charitable
to the poor. But the evidence points to a great fund of intellectual pride in Berengar.

The Theological Principles of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

35

out clearly the limits of this study. That Berengar held unorthodox
views on the Eucharist seems to have become widely known as early
as 1047-1048. At about this time, an old friend of Berengar, Adelmann
of Liege, who had studied with Berengar under Fulbert at Chartres,
wrote him a mild and solicitous letter, to which he received a scornful
reply. Other literature appeared between 1048 and 1060: letters and
treatises were written by Hugh, Bishop of Langres, Ascelin of Chartres,
Wolphelm of Brauweiler, Theoduin of Liège, Anastasius, a monk of
Cluny, and Durand, the abbot of Troarn.2 The tracts and letters of
these early opponents of Berengar are valuable for the history of the
controversy; but with the exception of that of Durand they are quite
short and tentative in character, and contain nothing which is not
better expressed by the greater writers of the second stage of the contro­
versy. They will not enter into this study.
Our direct knowledge of the teaching of Berengar is derived from
four sources: some early correspondence; extracts surviving from a
short, lost opusculum, written shortly after the Roman Council of 1059,
cited by Lanf rane in his own treatise which is a reply to this lost opuscu­
lum; the lengthy De sacra coena, a polemic against Lanfranc, written
after Lanfranc’s treatise had appeared and before 1079 ;3 and finally, a
2 Adelmann, De Eucharistiae sacramento ad Berengarium epistola, Heurtevent, op.
cit., Appendix 2, pp. 287 if. (Berengar’s reply is in Martène and Durand, Thesaurus
novus anecdotarum, Paris, 1717, 4: 109-113); Hugh, Tractatus de corpore et sanguine
Christi contra Berengarium, PL 142: 1321-1331 ; Ascelin, Epistola ad Berengarium, PL
150: 66 (Berengar’s reply is in the same place); Wolphelm, Epistola de sacramento
Eucharistiae contra errores Berengarii, PL 154: 414; Theoduin, Ad Henricum regem
contra Brunonem el Berengarium epistola, De corpore et sanguine Domini, PL 146:
1439-1442; Anastasius, Epistola ad Giraldum abbatem. De veritate corporis et sangui­
nis Christi Domini, PL 149: 433-436; Durand, Liber de corpore el sanguine Christi
contra Berengarium et ejus sectatores, PL 149: 1375-1424.

3 It is necessary to note this detail of chronology if we are to understand the precise
nature of the personal struggle between Berengar and Lanfranc. The treatise of Lan­
franc was written about 1066-1069, not in reply to the De Sacra coena, which had not
yet been written, but to the lost opusculum ; and the De sacra coena is in turn a reply
to Lanfranc. In our own study, however, we will not be bound by that chronology, but
will develop the teaching of Berengar before that of Lanfranc, citing in the main the
De sacra coena. This inversion of chronological order is justifiable, since no radical
change took place in Berengar’s views between the date of the lost opusculum and that
of the De sacra coena, but only a development in his own understanding of them. The
De sacra coena represents the thought of Berengar in its achieved form.
The edition used in this study is the following: Berengarii Turonensis de sacra coena
adversus Lanfrancum liber posterior, (edd. A. F. and F. Th. Vischer), Berlin, 1834.
A new edition of the De sacra coena, by W. H. Beekenkamp, Coll. Kerichistorische
studien, Dee I.’s Gravenhage, Nyhoff, 1941, was not available for this study. Accord­
ing to the review of De Ghellinck, Nouvelle revue théologique, 68 (1946) 359-360,
this Beekenkamp edition has not eliminated all of the difficulties of the Vischer edition.

36

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

brief memorial of the events of 1078-1079, written by Berengar shortly
after the Roman Council of 1079.4
The great work of Berengar is the De sacra coena, an extremely rare
book, edited in its entirety only once (until the appearance of the Beekenkamp edition of 1941), since the discovery in 1770 of the only extant
manuscript. Considered entirely apart from the doctrine which it pre­
sents, the De sacra coena is a wretched book, extremely lengthy and pro­
lix, written in abominable Latin without any semblance of order or con­
secutive development, a solid block of 290 octavo pages in the Vischer
edition of 1834, without a single heading, often trailing along for pages
on end without so much as a paragraph division, and worst of all, made
entirely tedious by the constant repetition of its themes—one often feels
he is reading over and over again the same page. But from the very
repetitions it is possible to isolate many of Berengar’s leading ideas and
put them in order.
The three great works of anti-Berengarian controversy are the
treatises of Lanfranc of Bee, Guitmund of Aversa, and Alger of Liege.5
4 This last source has been edited by Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus aneedotarum, 4: 103-109.

5 Lanfranc, De corpore ei sanguine Domini adversus Berengarium Turonensem, PL
150: 407-442. Lanfranc (ca. 1005-1089) was born at Pavia, studied humanities and
law, and practiced as an advocate at Pavia; about 1035 he went to France, and for a
time taught in the schools at Avranches and later at Rouen. In 1042 he entered the Ben­
edictine monastery at Bee, where he became prior and scholasticus. The controversy
with Berengar won great acclaim for Lanfranc and his school. In 1059 Duke William
of Normandy made him abbot of St. Stephen at Caen. He went with William to
Britain in 1066, became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1070, and held that position till
his death. His treatise is a polemic work in twenty-three chapters, of which the first
seventeen are in dialogue form, between Lanfranc and Berengar, quoting the lost
opusculum.
Guitmund, De corporis ei sanguinis Christi verilate in Eucharistia, libri tres, PL
149: 1427-1494; Sanctorum patrum opuscula selecta (ed. H. Hurter, S.J.) 38, Inns­
bruck, 1879. Guitmund was a pupil of Lanfranc at Bee, and monk of the Abbey at
Evreaux. The details of his life are obscure. He seems to have gone to England with
the Conqueror, and to have been named Archbishop of Rouen, but he never filled the
see. He went to Rome, and was named Cardinal and Archbishop of Aversa by Pope
Gregory VII. The date of his death is unknown, but there was another Bishop at
Aversa in 1095. The De corpore was written between 1073-1078. It is a lengthier work
than Lanfranc’s, also in dialogue form, between Guitmund and a pupil, “Roger.”
Alger, De sacramentis corporis et sanguinis Dominici, PL 180: 739-854; Sanctorum
patrum opuscula selecta (ed. H. Hurter, S.J.) 23, Innsbruck, 1873. Alger (ca. 10701131), deacon and scholasticus of the Chapter of St. Bartholomew at Liège, canon of
Liege (1091-1121). About 1121, refusing many offers of preferment, he entered the
monastery at Cluny, became a priest there, and died about ten years later. All of his
works seem to have been written before he entered Cluny. Besides his Eucharistic work,
he is also important in the history of Canon Law. The De sacramentis is the longest and
best organized work of the three, in three books, of which the third contains material on

Kiir I

al Dtltniplf* <•/ lirtritgitf anti of //ii ( athollc Opponents

37

Of the three, I ..infranc’s is the earliest, and the only one written in
direct, personal contact with the adversary. As early as 1049, Berengar
wrote a letter to Lanfranc, prior of Bee, friendly and familiar in tone,
saying that he had heard from Ingelran of Chartres that Lanfranc re­
jected the teaching of John the Scot on the Eucharist.6* He suggested
that Lanfranc was not very well versed in the Scriptures, and that if
Lanfranc rejected the teaching of John the Scot, he must also Hold as
heretical the teaching of St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine,
not to mention others.
The reference in the letter to John the Scot makes necessary a brief
mention of the background of the controversy. It seems certain that
the Liber Joannis Scoti, of which Berengar and Lanfranc speak, and
which was burned at the Council of Vercelli, is not John the Scot’s
but the treatise of a ninth century monk of Corbie, Ratramn.1 This
treatise was written in reply to the famous work of Paschasius Radbert,
abbot of Corbie, De corpore et sanguine Domini. As upon many
other points, the Eucharistic ideas of John the Scot are obscure, but he
seems to have written no special work on the Eucharist, and he did not
figure in the ninth century controversy, except perhaps as a “spectator
sympathetic to Ratramn.”9
It is impossible fully to understand the Berengarian controversy
without taking account of its roots in the Radbert-Ratramn controversy
of the ninth century. There is no doubt that Berengar based his Euchar­
istic theology on that of Ratramn, although he thought Ratramn’s work
to be that of John the Scot; while the adversaries of Berengar followed
Paschasius. But this is not to say that the views of Berengar would
necessarily have been accepted by Ratramn. The teaching of Ratramn
is extremely obscure, and Catholic writers, while not attempting to
6
7
8
9
vain,

This letter may be found in Dacher’s notes on the life of Lanfranc, PL 150: 63.
Ratramnus, De corpore ei sanguine Domini, PL 121: 103-170.
PL 120: 1255-1350.
M. Cappuyns, O.S.B., jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, et sa pensée, Lou­
1935, p. 91. Cf. Heurtevent, op. cit., Appendix I, pp. 251-285.

the validity of sacraments of the unworthy, entirely untouched by Lanfranc and Guit­
mund.
Since the titles of these works are so similar, they will henceforth be cited only with
the author’s name, abbreviated, then volume and column.
Few special studies have been made in recent years of the Eucharistic doctrine of
any of these men. One recent work is that of L. Brigué, Alger de Liège, un théologien
de l'eucharistie au debut du X//e siècle, Paris, 1936. See a review of this work by
Dom Cappuyns, Bulletin de théologie ançienne ei médiévale, 3 (1937-1940) No. 748.

38

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

square Paschasius and Ratramn at every point, generally hold that they
can be reconciled in substance.
Similarly, one ought not to speak without qualification of two
opposed “currents” of Eucharistic tradition, that of “Ambrosian real­
ism” (St. Ambrose, St. Gregory, Paschasius, Haymo of Halberstadt,
Rathier of Verona, Lanfranc), and that of “Augustinian symbolism”
(St. Augustine, St. Isidore, John the Scot, Raban Maur, and Berengar). To say that the Augustinian “current” favored a symbolical
presence, while the Ambrosian “current” favored a real presence, is an
oversimplification, an attempt to read into earlier literature the subject
matter of later controversies. No one would hold that the two great
western Fathers were opposed in their Eucharistic teaching; and if later
writers cited one or the other of them to support their own views, it is
a question of emphasis, of the direction of their thought, and of the
purpose of their work.10
To return, then, to the letter of Berengar to Lanfranc, the latter’s
account of the history of the letter is interesting on account of the
information it gives us of his personal relations with Berengar. Accord­
ing to Lanfranc, when the letter was delivered at Bee, he was not
tlüere to receive it, having already gone to Rome to see the Pope, per­
haps to attend the Council, perhaps on other business. At any rate,
the Council of 1050, concerned with the teachings of Berengar, was
then in progress, and Lanfranc took part in its discussions. Meanwhile,
at Bee the letter was handed over to “some clerics” for delivery to Lan­
franc at Rome. They opened and read it on the way, turned it over
to some officials, and to Lanfranc’s surprise it was publicly read in the
Council. He says then that some doubt was raised about his own
orthodoxy, since he had received so familiar a letter from a heretic, and
he was called upon to express his own views, which he did to the satis­
faction of all.11 In the De sacra coena Berengar ridiculed this story,
saying with some justice that he found it difficult to believe the contents
of the letter were such as to incriminate Lanfranc; but at the Council
the writings of John the Scot (Ratramn) were condemned, Berengar
was excommunicated, and an antagonism between the two men was es­
tablished which was to endure for almost twenty years.
10 On this important question, see F. Vernet, "L'eucharistie du Xie à la fin du
Xle siècle,” DTC 5: 1222-1223. Cf. Heurtevent, op. cil., pl. 168, n. 1, and M. de la
Taille, Mysterium Fidei, Paris, 1924, p. 407, n. 1.
11 Lanf. PL 150: 413.

I lie I licologh-ti I *iimiplc.i o/ licrcngtit and of //is Catholic Opponents

39

I ..mirane took part in various anti-Berengarian discussions in France
during the 1050s, and sometime after 1059 wrote his treatise against the
opusculum which Berengar had written soon after the Roman Council
of that year had condemned him once more.12 Lanfranc seems to have
dropped Berengar shortly after his own treatise was written, and to
have devoted the rest of his life to ecclesiastical affairs. There is no ex­
isting indication that he ever read the De sacra coena, which was an
attack on him.
The treatises of Guitmund and Alger are entirely lacking in the
spirit of personal polemic which marked the work of Lanfranc and
Berengar. They are much longer than Lanfranc’s, more complete, make
freer use of the dialectical method, and claim to take account of subtle­
ties and refinements which grew out of the original error.13 But the
classification together of these three writers, Lanfranc, Guitmund, and
Alger, is traditional, going back to the tribute of Peter the Venerable,
abbot of Cluny in the twelfth century: concerning the Body of the
Lord, Lanfranc had written bene, plene, perfecte; Guitmund melius,
plenius, perfectius; and Alger optime, plenissime, perfectissime.14

In the remaining part of our study, therefore, we shall attempt to
compare and contrast the ideas of Berengar and of his Catholic oppon­
ents. We shall study first their theological principles, their general
method of procedure, their attitude towards the authority of Scripture
and Tradition, and of the Church, and their opinions of the proper
place of dialectics in theological science. It was at this deep level of
principle that issue was really joined; and the controversy over the sub­
stantial conversion and the nature of the sacrament, the two great
aspects of Eucharistic theology involved, flowed directly out of their
theological principles. We shall study Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger
not separately, in distinct sections, but compositely, showing among
them relationship, dependence, and development. Nor shall we study
them directly in the light of their patrology, but rather in that of the
12 The Migne edition of Lanfranc carries an account of the final Council of 1079,
and the profession of faith imposed upon Berengar at that time. This is an interpola­
tion, and probably represents an addition to the original work made after 1079 by
Lanfranc himself. According to Macdonald, Lanfranc, A Study of His Life, Worfy,
and Writing, London, 1944, the treatise of Lanfranc was written after 1059 and before
1062, when Lanfranc went to Caen, where his sojourn was too broken by other work
to have allowed time for it.
13 Guit, PL 149: 1430 CD: Alg, Prologue. PL 180: 739 D - 739 C.
14 Petrus Venerabilis, Epistola sive tractatus contra Petrobusianos, PL 189: 789
CD.

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

40

specific contributions which dialectical reasoning permitted them to
make to the theology of the Eucharist. In this way we should arrive
at a better understanding of the Catholic reply to the first clear-cut
Eucharistic heresy in the history of dogma; and we shall see in our
writers the high point of Catholic thought at the dawn of scholasticism.
1.

General Characteristics of Procedure

The theological method of Berengar of Tours is marked by an in­
tensely personal and individualistic approach. In the De sacra coena
he almost invariably introduces doctrinal assertions with the term, “Ego
inquio.” It may be argued that this personal approach is to be ex­
pected in a work of this kind, a treatise of personal polemic against Lanfranc; yet it is noteworthy that Lanfranc himself never bases doctrinal
assertions on his own personal authority nor advances them as his own
opinions, but rather states them either impersonally, as tlie faith of the
Church, or in the first person plural, as the universal belief of Cath­
olics.15 Berengar claims for himself, as a gift of God, a special in­
ward apprehension of the truth, and asserts that he was the only man
of wisdom among the madmen who condemned him.16 There is an
abundance of personal invective on both sides of the controversy; it
can be found in Lanfranc and to some extent in Guitmund, though the
later work of Alger is entirely free from it. But it is safe to say that
Berengar outdoes all of his opponents in personal abuse: the word
vecordia, “madness,” appears on almost every page of the De sacra
coena.

Concerning the necessity of faith as fundamental approach to the
Mystery of Faith, Berengar has little to say. The necessity of faith re­
ceives no special treatment in the De sacra coena, if indeed any sub­
ject may be said to have received special treatment in a work so poorly
organized. The response of faith, in the sense of an assent of the mind
15 Lanf. PL 150: 419 A: “Confitetur enim Ecclesia . .
427 C: “Sic enim
credimus . . .” 430 C: “Credimus igitur terrenas substantias . .
16 £)e sacra coena (henceforth: D.s.c.) p. 74: “Sed quidquid scribas tu . . . in­
digne nomine vomitus aut volutabri, sed non indignum nomine perceptionis, donante
patre misericordiarum, intimae veritatis.” Both Lanfranc and Guitmund have noted this
individualism in Berengar’s theology, and the gnostic tendency which it represents. Lanf.
PL 150: 412 B: “. . . verum hanc lucem [fidei] tenebrosa mens tua nequit comprehen­
dere, despectis caeteris, putans se solam sapientem esse.” Guit, PL 149: 1428 D : “. . .
maluit esse sub aliqua admiratione hominum haereticus, quam sub oculis Dei private
vivere Catholicus."
D.s.c., p. 74: “. . . concilio dixisse non nesciam: compressus indoctorum grege con­
ticui, veritus, ne merito haberer insanus, si sapiens inter insanos videri contenderem."

The Theological Principles of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

41

to the existence of an objective Eucharistic reality, does not appear in
Berengar’s treatise at all; and if he mentions the virtue of faith in pass­
ing, it is only with reference to the disposition of the faithful recipient
entering into the symbolic meaning of the sacrament. Berengar ridicules
the notion of any miracle connected with the Eucharist, not merely in
the sense of a subjective appearance of real flesh upon the altar, but also
in that of a change of elements. Such a miracle would be unworthy of
God.17 There is not the slightest Scriptural warrant for understanding
any miraculous occurrence to have taken place in the Eucharist.18
Between the procedure of Berengar and that of his Catholic oppon­
ents the contrast is extreme. He had laughed at faith, they assert, had
tried to comprehend everything by reason.19 For them, on the other
hand, the sacrament of the altar is above all the “Mystery of Faith.”20
There are areas of the Eucharistic reality which are wholly impenetrable
to reason, and can only be humbly believed. The Eucharist is a network
of mysteries. It is a fact that Christ is received on earth, yet He re­
mains whole and entire in heaven. It is a fact that bread is changed into
His Body, and wine into His Blood, and that the nature of the ele­
ments undergoes a change. But if the manner be sought through
which these marvels are accomplished, the response must be, “The just
man, who lives by faith, does not seek to pry into his faith with argu­
ments, nor to grasp it with his reason.”21 In his insistence on the im­
penetrability of the sacrament to rational inquiry, Lanfranc indeed
sealed off from the investigation certain questions which actually did
lie within the field of legitimate rational speculation, and thus left to
17 Ibid., p. 96: “Per miraculum dicis ista fieri, admirationi debere; verius dixisses
ad iniuriam et contemptum dei.”
18 Ibid., p. 97: "Vere dicitur angelum satané in angelum se lucis transfigurare quia
dixisti, quasi non contra veritatem per miraculum ista fieri; da de propheta, de apostolo,
de evangelista locum aliquem, unde manifestissimum sit, . . .”
19 Lanf. PL 150: 427 B: “. . . fidem arridere, rationibus omnia velle compre­
hendere.”
20 Ibid., 421 D: "Si quaeris modum quo id fieri potest, breviter ad praesens respon­
deo: Mysterium fidei credi salubriter potest, vestigari utiliter non potest.”
Guit. PL 149: 1439 B: "Nam et ipse Dominus noster Jesus Christus sacramenti
haec, mysterium fidei appellavit. Ut quid ergo mysterium, nisi quia occultum? Ut quid
fidei, nisi quod hoc non carnis oculo, sed intuitu fidei convenit comtemplari?
21 Lanf. PL 150: 427 A: “Quonammodo panis efficiatur caro vinumque convertatur
in sanguinem, utriusque essentialiter mutata natura, justus, qui ex fide vivit, nciulari argu­
mentis et concipere ratione non quaerit.”
Cf. Alg. PL 180: 820 D: "Quod quia ineffabile est, quomodo <<>ipus Christi hic
fiat, et ibi manet, ad intelligentiam spiritualem et fidem talia cogitant* •» revocat, qui etsi
sciri non potest, credi potest.”

42

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

others the development of fields which he did not dare to touch. Lanfranc’s hesitancies will appear from time to time in this study.

In the view of the opponents of Berengar, the Eucharist has been
given by God to mankind in such a mysterious form precisely in order
that we may have the opportunity to exercise our faith, and thus more
surely attain to the reward of faith.22 The test of faith is to hold
strongly to the revealed truth, even though it be contrary to the evi­
dence of sense, even though it be beyond the capacity of the intelligence
to grasp; this acceptance is indeed an agony for our minds, but the
grace of God makes it possible.23 For what merit would there be for
us if everything in the Eucharist were visible?—visible miracles are not
for the faithful, but for infidels.24 As Lanfranc says,
The faithful Catholic prefers to approach the heavenly mysteries by
faith, so as to be able finally to attain to faith’s reward, than without
faith to waste time laboring to understand things which cannot be under­
stood; since he knows that it is written: “Seek not the things that are
too high for thee. . . .” (Eccl. 3:22)25

The prologue of Alger’s treatise is given over almost entirely to ex­
hortations to faith. A catalogue of the mysteries involved in the Catholic
doctrine of the Eucharist is closed with the words, “But these things
hidden to reason are manifest to faith.”26 Alger’s work is characterized
by a beauty of style and emotional appeal which are lacking in the
more arid and more controversial treatises of Lanfranc and Guitmund—
one of the good reasons, doubtless, why Peter the Venerable awarded
the palm to the scholasticus of Liège among the opponents of Berengar.
Consequently, his appeals to faith in the Eucharist are graceful and
winning. He argues from the grades of perfection among creatures:
we surpass the beasts and are not understood by them; so God in­
22 Guit., PL 149: 1439 A: “Atque ita quandiu in agone fidei certamus, quandiu
peregrinamur a Domino, fidem nostram sedulo convenit exerceri, quatenus exercendo
erudiatur, erudiendo pascatur, pascendo augeatur, augendo perficiatur, perfecta coro­
netur.”
23 Alg. 820 D: “Sicque dum exteriorum sensuum testimonio non acquiescit, nec
interiore inquisitione comprehendus, de veritate non titubat ; fit per Dei gratiam, ut in
tali suo agone fides nostra exerceatur. . . .”
24 Guit. 1439 A: “Denique manifesta miracula non propter fideles, sed propter in­
fideles.”
25 Lanf. 427 A: “. . . mavult enim coelistibus mysteriis fidem adhibere, ut ad fidei
praemia valeat quandoque pervenire, quam fide omissa in comprehendis iis, quae com­
prehendi non possunt, supervacue laborare, sciens scriptum esse: Altiora te ne quaesieris.
. . . (Eccl. 3:22).“
26 Alg. 741 B: “Sed haec rationi caeca, fidei sunt manifestata.”

/ he ! Geological Principles of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

43

finitely surpasses us, and we cannot hope to understand his designs.2'
He argues from the interdependence of the senses of the body. The
eye apprehends color, the ear is responsive to sound. The ear does not
see th,e wagon pass, the eye does not hear the rumble of its wheels—
are there, therefore, no wagon and no sound? Does the whole world
not exist because we do not see all of it at once? Just as our senses
ought not to judge each other, so our intellect ought not to judge of
that which is incomprehensible to it.27
28

And finally, with regard to the question of faith, Guitmund lays
down as basic principle of the Catholic approach to the Eucharist the
famous dictum of St. Augustine, the credo ut intelligam, which was to
become the charter of developed scholasticism in the mind of St.
Anselm. As Guitmund puts it :
For Christ did not command you to understand, but to believe. His
is the care how that be done which He wishes to be done. Yours is not
to discuss, but humbly to believe. . . . For you do not understand that
later you may believe; you believe in order afterwards to understand.29

And since the opponents of Berengar approach the Eucharist from
the viewpoint of the common faith of the Church, in contrast to Berengar’s intense personalism, we may expect to find in them a more ob­
jective method. It has already been remarked that their judgments are
not presented as personal opinions, but as the faith of the Church. Their
attitude is that of men setting forth a belief not of their own making—
a belief which they are convinced will exist forever whether they defend
it or not—hence we see in their writing a serene lucidity far different
from the “Ego inquio” and turgid repetitions of Berengar.

Consequently, when our authors make a statement of the method
which they intend to pursue, they say they will appeal to authority as
well as to reason.30 When Alger takes up the “new and absurd” error
of impanationism, he says it is to be destroyed at the root, through
27 Ibid., 742 A.
28 Alg. 742 D: “Ut sicut illa incomprehensibilia sunt sensibus non minus esse cre­
duntur, sic quae sunt incomprehensibilia intellectibus humanis non minus esse credantur."

29 Guit. 1441 C: “Non enim praecepit tibi Christus: Intellige, sed crede. Ejus est
curare quomodo id quod fieri vult, fiat tuum est autem non discutere, sed humiliter crede­
re, quia quidquid omnino fieri vult, fiat. Non enim intelligendum esi, ut postmodum
credas: sed prius credendum, ut postmodum intelligas.
30 Lanf. 414 B: "... de hac re opportunius tibi respondebo, cum fidem hanc,
auctore Deo, divinis auctoribus et manifestis rationibus veram esse monstravero."

44

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

reason and authority.31 When at Rome in 1050 Lanfranc was called
upon to express his own convictions regarding the Holy Eucharist, he
tells us that he was instructed to do so “more by means of sacred author­
ities than by arguments.”32
In the third book of Guitmund’s treatise, there is an example of prescholastic theological method at its highest point, where it was about
to enter into scholasticism proper. Guitmund sets down first the state­
ment of his theological principles, the loci theologici on which he means
to build, and the status quaestionis; 33 then the proofs;34 and finally
the conclusion to the whole treatise in the form of a syllogism.35

2.

Scripture and Tradition

Despite the extremely personal character of his method, Berengar
professed the highest regard for the authority of Scripture and Tradi­
tion. He lays it down as a principle that the Holy Spirit speaks in
Scripture.36 Scripture is the sovereign authority which one must not
oppose; the Holy Scriptures are endowed with the inescapable weight
of authority.37 But it is not enough simply to know and repeat the
texts : one must be endowed with sufficient perception to be able to ex­
tract from them their meaning. The Scriptures abound in figurative
language, which demands a spiritual and not a carnal interpretation. If
the Holy Scriptures are interpreted in the physical sense, they no longer
nourish but destroy, since there is in the Gospel a letter that kills.38
31 Alg. 754 B: “Quae haeresis, quia nova et absurda est, rationibus et auctoritati­
bus, prout Deus aspiraverit, radicitus est exstirpanda.”
32 Lanf. 413 B. “Post haec praecepit papa [Leo IX, at Council of Rome, 1050]
ut ego surgerem, pravi rumoris a me maculam abstergerem, fidem meam exponerem, ex­
positam plus sacris auctoritatibus quam argumentis probarem.”
33 Guit. 1469 AB: 1) “consuetudo catholicae fidei;’’ 2) “de sanctis scripturis [in­
cluding Tradition] ; 3) “propria argumenta.”
Ibid., 1) “corpus Christi verum in substantia sua, non in umbra Berengariana;’’ 2)
“contra impanatores.”
34 Ibid., 1469-1488: 1) from Tradition; 2) from miracles; 3) from liturgy; 4)
fiom the authority of the Church; 5) from reason; the Catholic doctrine is established
by demonstration that the position of the “umbratici” and the “impanatores” is absurd.
35 Ibid., 1489 CD.
36 D.S.C., p. 161.
37 Ibid., p. 57 : “. . . non mea, non tua sed evangelica apostolicaque simul autenticarum scripturarum, quibus contra ire fas non sit.”
Ibid., p. 245: “Dum enim dicis, absumi panem in altari per corruptionem subjecti
. . . contra propheticae, evangelicae, ut caeteros taceam, indeclinabile pondus auctori­
tatis.”
38 Ibid., p. 270: “Agnoscite, quia figurae sunt, quae in divinis voluminibus scripta
sunt, ideo tamquam spirituales et non carnales intelligite, quae dicuntur.”
Ibid., “Si enim quasi carnales ista suscipitis, laedunt vos, non alunt; est enim in
evangeliis litera, quae occidat.”

The I hcological Principles of Merengar an J of His Catholic Opponents

45

For Berengar then, the Bible is a rule of faith of the highest authority,
but it is not of exclusive or even of final authority; its data must be
tested in the light of some standard which is itself non-Scriptural; and
the precise determination of what that standard is to be lies at the heart
of the Berengarian theology.39

It would be false to assert that Berengar attempted to build up a
system of Eucharistic theology without reference to the tradition of
the Fathers. He replies to Lanfranc’s reproach that he has little re­
spect for traditional authority by saying that this is a lie : he has used
the sacred authorities in framing his argument whierever there was a
need.40 As we saw in the letter to Lanfranc of 1049, he claimed from
the earliest days of the controversy that his teaching had the support of
the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine and St. Ambrose. It is not
difficult for us to see how he might have claimed the patronage of St.
Augustine, since his theory of the nature of the sacrament is simply the
Augustinian teaching of the sign, pushed to a limit which would ex­
clude any objective presence of Christ’s Body under the Eucharistic spe­
cies. But his affection for St. Ambrose is harder to explain, since the
writings of this Father contain unmistakeably the doctrine of sub­
stantial conversion. Yet if it is a fact that both Fathers are cited
abundantly in the De sacra coena, it is also true that St. Ambrose ap­
pears even more often than St. Augustine. It may be that Berengar
realized that he was faced with a special problem in St. Ambrose, and
wished to meet it as well as he could.
In his treatment of St. Ambrose, therefore, Berengar is extremely
selective, choosing only passages which seem to support his theory and
rejecting the rest, or twisting the meaning of passages which seem to
bear against him. Thus, for example, he introduces a strained and
tortuous dialectical discussion of an unmistakeably “realist” text of St.
Ambrose in the De mysteriis with thè following admission :
39 Cf. Macdonald, op. cit., p. 219, where he gives us an advance hint to the nature
of the Berengarian standard of interpretation: “When we estimate his contribution to the
progress of the Evangelical principle, we shall find it not so much in the appeal to
Scripture as the final authority for belief — although he never loses an opportunity to
quote the Bible----but in the demand for freedom whereby the individual may open
the books of Scripture and there judge for himself the meaning of God’s word. The
Evangelical principle of the freedom of private judgment was originated in the Middle
Ages by Berengar.”
40 D.S.C., p. 100: “Manifestum fiet, divinitate propitia, illud de < nluiuuia scribere
te, non de veritate, ubi deducendi sacras auctoritates in medium n<-.alate inde agendi
locus occurerit.”

46

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

With these premises, the passage must be understood to bear against
you, even though certain expressions [of St. Ambrose] are so ob­
scure that it is difficult or even impossible for me to interpret them
according to a norm of manifest meaning.41

But the Archdeacon of Angers felt that he was on stronger ground
when he came to deal with an ambiguous text of the De sacramentis:
You see, therefore, how effective is the word of Christ. If then, there
is so much power in Christ’s word that things should begin to exist
which did not exist at all, how much more effective is it that they should
remain what they were and be changed into something else?42

The ambiguity, of course, is in the last phrase, “that they should remain
what they were and be changed into something else.” Berengar inter­
preted the passage to mean that the Eucharistic elements remain what
they are substantially, but acquire a new religious value through conse­
cration; just as the water of Baptism does not cease to be water, but
acquires the virtus Christi through the consecration of the priest. And
41 ¡bid., p. 176: “His praefixis, illud contra te oportet intendi, etiam si nonulla
extent ita obscura ut difficile vel impossibile sit mihi, ad normam manifestorum inter­
pretari.”

The peculiar elliptical phrase, ad normam ea manifestorum interpretari, is character­
istic of Berengar. It has been translated here, “according to a norm of manifest mean­
ing.” Justification of that translation will be made in an important context, infra, pp.
58-59.

The “obscure” passage of St. Ambrose in question is that from the De mysteriis, 9,
(J. Quasten, ed., Monumenta eucharistica et liturgica vetustissima, part 3, Florilegium
Patristicum tam Veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens. Fase. 7, Bonn, 1936, pp.
133-134: “Forte dicas: Aliud video, quomodo tu mihi adseris, quod Christi corpus acci­
piam? Et hoc nobis adhuc superest ut probemus. Quantis igitur utimur exemplis? Probe­
mus non hos esse, quod natura formavit, sed quod benedictio consecravit, maioremque
vim esse benedictionis quam naturae; quia benedictione etiam natura ipsa mutatur.” And
the rest of the chapter.
Even a writer so favorable to Berengar as Macdonald has noted Berengar’s attempt
“to twist the Ambrosian realism to support his own interpretation” (op. cit., p. 327). J.
Schnitzer, Berengar von Tours, sein Leben und seine Lehre, Stuttgart, 1892, p. 291,
analyzes Berengar’s dialectical handling of this Ambrosian passage.
42 St. Ambrose, De sacramentis, 4, 4, J. Quasten, op. cit., p. 159: “Vides ergo
quam operatorius sit sermo Christi. Si ergo tanta vis est in sermone Domini Jesu, ut inci­
perent esse, quae non erant, quanto magis operatorius est, ut sint, quae erant, et in aliud
commutentur?”
Cf. Lanfranc’s suggested reading of the text, PL 150: 420 D-421 A: “In quibus­
dam tamen. codicibus praefata sententia verbis aliis invenitur hoc modo: ‘Si igitur tanta
vis est in sermone Domini Jesus ut inciperent esse quae non erant, quanto magis opera­
torius est ut quae erant in aliud commutentur’?” A suggestion repeated by P. Battifol,
Etudes d'histoire et de théologie positive, 2nd series, Paris, 1905, p. 104. But the text is
coi rect.

7 he I hcological Principles of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

47

he assails the contrary interpretation of Lanfranc.43 Then in reply
to Lanfranc’s accusation that he has twisted the meaning by taking the
passage out of its context,44 he is compelled to admit that he has not
cited Ambrose verbatim, but claims he Has cited him only partially for
the sake of brevity.45
The discussion between Lanfranc and Berengar of the ambiguous
text of the De sacramentis brings out clearly the radical opposition be­
tween the two men in their approach to tradition. Lanfranc rightly in­
sists that the passage should be placed in its context,46 and points out
that any but a realist interpretation of the text would contradict previous
expressions in the same chapter; while Berengar seizes upon the text be­
cause it seems to provide some support for his own view, and then dis­
cusses it in isolation from the rest. Lanfranc has astutely noted this
characteristic of the Berengarian exegesis, and has put his finger on the
radical source of it.47 And Macdonald agrees that Lanfranc’s criticism
is correct.48
The reliance of the anti-Berengarian writers on the tradition of the
Fathers was enormous. In this aspect of their teaching is brought out
that objectivity which was their great aim. Perhaps they had been so
impressed by the novelty inherent in the ideas of Berengar that they
were doubly anxious to avoid giving the impression of interpreting the
divine word “according to their own sense.”49 The witness of tradition
is added to the words of Christ because often His own words do not
43 D.S.C., pp. 180-181 : “Scribis enim in eo, quod dicit beatus Ambrosius: si opera­
torius est Christi sermo ut inciperent esse quae non erant, multo magis operatorius est,
ut sint quae erant, et in aliud commutentur, subaudiri oportere: specie, ut ita legatur: ut
sint specie. Si dissimulare volueris, hoc te dixisse contra eruditionem tuam, adtnirationem
facis.’’
44 Lanf. PL 150: 420 C: “. . . perspicaciter agnoscat qua fraude fingis non in­
venta; qua astutia depravis inventa qua pervicacia in illud detorquere conaris quaecum­
que relinquis illaesa.’’
45 D.S.C., p. 184:
. . quod facere manifestum non possem, si dans operam brevi­
tati objectionem, quam sibi beatus Ambrosius fieri voluit, totiusque ad objecta responsi­
onis non prosequerer seriem.”
46 Lanf. 420 B: “Sextum quoque De sacramentis librum in quo opere praefatum
mendacium eum dixesse medaciter affirmasti, sic incipit. . ..
47 Ibid., 408 AB: “. . . sententias . . . sacris doctoribus attribuis dicens: Hoc vel
hoc in illo, seu illo opere testatur Augustinus, Gregorius, Hieronymus. ... Ibi enim
conquiesceret omnis versuta tergiversatio . . . quae de Scripturis sanctis te sumere non­
numquam dicis; aut penitus esse falsa, aut aliqua ex parte, prout ratio tui negotii postu­
lat, depravata.”
48 Op. cit., p. 324: “[Berengar] contends that the doctrine of a change of essence
does not appear in the teaching of that writer [Ambrose], yet he was only able to arrive
at that conclusion by a partial use of his own principle of interpretation. He selects
Ambrosian statements which are relevant to his own theory and disregards the rest.”
49 Alg. PL 180: 776 C: “. . . ne meo sensu interpretari videar, exponit Augustinus
in sermone 27 super Joannem. . . .”

48

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

carry their own explanation: sometimes He spoke literally, sometimes
figuratively, though always truly. He distinguished among His audi­
tors: to some it was given to understand the mystery of the Kingdom
of God, to others only in parables.50 And if the saints found it not a
useless task to write at length upon the Scriptures, we ought not find it
useless to study their interpretations. For the more certainly the Chris­
tian faith is known, the more useful it becomes; and the testimony of
authority lends greater certitude to our knowledge.5152The witness of
the Fathers is of the greatest value to confirm faith and to desroy
heresy.02 The two principles which must be followed in interpreting
patristic literature are, first, that obscure texts are to be interpreted in
the light of clearer texts;53 and second, that the entire context of the
author must be used.5455Both of these principles are in marked contrast
to the practice of Berengar already noted of cutting the patristic teach­
ings to suit his own notions. A third principle that the Fathers be inter­
preted in accordance with the authority of the teaching Church, will be
discussed separately.
It must be confessed that the patrology of our authors is marred by
improper citations and the attribution of apocryphal matter to Fathers
of the Church.05 One of the most curious instances of this sort of error
in scholarship is that of Alger attributing to St. Augustine, “in libro
sententiarum Prosperi,” a text of Lanfranc which Alger must have read,
without attribution to St. Augustine, in Lanfranc’s own work.56 Mis50 Ibid., 777 C: “Testimonio Christi testes alios adhibere praesumpsi; sed quia ipse
quidem semper vere, aliquando tamen loquitur proprie, aliquando figurate, auditoresque
suos ita discrevit, ut his datum sit nosse mysterium regni Dei, caeteris autem in para­
bolis. ...”
51 Ibid., "Quod ipsis sanctis non pigrum fuit scribere, necessarium duxi repetere; ut
ipse intellectus, veritatis non meae videatur praesumptionis, sed catholicae auctoritatis,
eorum qui crediderunt, et ita salvari meruerunt; quia fides Christiana quo fit certior, eo
est utilior. Ut ergo certior sit, aliorum sanctorum subdatur auctoritas.”
52 Guit., PL 149: 1469 AB: “Sed quoniam et valde multa ad roborandas adhuc
partes nostras, et adversariorum diruendas, Deo adjuvante, addi possunt ... de sanctis
Scripturis adhuc aliqua proferemus. . . .”
53 Lanf. PL 150: 419 D: “Et quidem si de sacramentis seu caeteris de quibus
Ambrosius scripsit omnes revolvas libros quos Ecclesia in usu nunc habet, tale aliquid
ab Ambrosio dictum, taliterque expositum nusquam reperire valebit. . . . Accipe potius
quid in libro De mysteriis sive initiandis dicat.”
54 Alg., 757 A: “Ut videamus B. Ambrosium sibi vel aliis sanctis non esse con­
trarium, verba sua in ordine suo ponamus.”
55 See M. Lepin, L'Idée du sacrifice de la Messe, d'après les théologiens, depuis
l'origine jusqu'à nos jours, 2nd. ed., Paris, 1926, Appendix, pp. 759 ff., for examples of
this. Paschasius Radbert is often cited as St. Augustine. Faustus of Rietz is invariably
cited under the name of Eusebius of Emessa, and the treatise of St. John Chrysostom o»
the priesthood is attributed to St. Basil.
56 Alg., 792 D. Lanf., 424 A.

I Ih I hrhli>n¡i al Trliuiplr» <>/ litirugar nnd of Hin Catholic Opponents

49

takes of this sort were common during the early Middle Ages. In his
preface to the Migne edition of Alger, Malou writes that we ought
readily to condone Alger’s mistakes : books were scarce in his time, and
besides, Alger never proffers apocryphal testimonies without at the same
time fully and acutely establishing his position upon genuine sources.'”
If the patristic documentation of our authors is rich, their use of
Scripture is rather scanty. As Turmel writes, “In his attack on the doc­
trine of the real presence, or at least that of transubstantiation, (Berengar) had appealed principally to the weapons of sense, of reason, and
of tradition. As it happens always, the defense was modelled on the
attack . . . All those who rallied to refute the heresiarch placed them­
selves almost exclusively upon the double terrain of tradition and of
reason.”58 There are, however, short Scriptural arguments in all of
them. When Lanfranc is about to go forward with his positive proof of
the doctrine of the substantial change, he sets down first his argument
from Scripture, based upon the words of institution,59 but only a few
uncommented lines are given to it, followed by pages of patristic argu­
ment. Guitmund has a short commentary on the pronoun “hoc” of
the words of institution. The heretics claimed it to be a relative pro­
noun denoting the substance considered independently of accidents.
Against them, Guitmund alleges the authority of the “dialecticians”
and of Donatus for his position that the pronoun does not relate to
any determined substance, but is merely demonstrative.60 Again Guit­
mund calls on the words of institution against the impanationists :
Christ said: “This is My Body.” He did not say: “In this My Body
lies concealed.” He did not say: “In this wine is My Blood,” but He
said: “This is My Blood.”61

And finally, Alger gives us what is rare among these writers, a short
commentary on the words of institution in the form of a paraphrase.62
57 J. B. Malou. PL 180: 735.
58 J. Turmel, Histoire de la théologie positive, depuis l'origine jusqu'à Concile de
Trente, 3rd. ed., Paris, 1904, p. 310.
59 Lanf., 439 D.
60 Guit., 1467 A: “Hoc enim pronomen non est ad supradicta relativum sed tan­
tummodo demonstrativum.” Cf. 1436 BC.
61 Ibid., 1484 C: “. . . ait [Christus] : Hoc est corpus meum. Non ait: In hoc
latet corpus meum. Nec dixit: In hoc vino est sanguis meus, sed dixit: Hic est sanguis
meus.”
62 Alg., PL 180: 776 A: “Non futurum praedico, non absens aliquid denuntio, sed
hoc quod praesentialiter do, est corpus meum, non figuratum, sed verum, ipsum quod
pro vobis tradetus. Hic est sanguis meus, idem ipse, qui pro nobis effundetur, addens
etiam proprie proprium suae carnis et sanguinis effectum, scilicet in remissionem pecca­
torum.”

MARY LVMACU’ ATT SEM'NARY L'BBARY

50

The Eu( huri-ilit Controversy of the Eleventh Century

3.

Authority of the Church.

Upon the principle of the authority of Scripture and tradition, Ber­
engar and his opponents were at least in verbal agreement, though they
differed widely in their application of the principle. But upon the ques­
tion of the magisterium of the church, which is the proximate rule of
faith, their positions were flatly contradictory. Berengar had nothing
but contempt for the magisterium, whether its authority was brought to
bear on him in a general way, through the common consent of the faith­
ful—the authority of the ecclesia discens—or in a particular way, in
the Councils of the ecclesia docens which were called to deal specifically
with his teachings. It was inevitable that his independent and indivi­
dualistic spirit would clash with a belief that was popular, and with
formulas which were imposed on him in the name of authority.

In the first place, the faith of Catholics, the common consent of
the faithful, is itself a norm by which the true import of Catholic tra­
dition may be discovered. Berengar knew the faith of the Church: it
was everywhere around him, it was in the air he breathed. But to say
to him that his teachings contradicted the universal belief of Catholics
was to say nothing at all. “Why be wrong with all the world,” he
would have answered, “if all the world is wrong?”63 It is the opinion
of Lanfranc, says Berengar, that an idea which has been a matter
of routine acceptance is for that reason more probably true; but Lan­
franc is wrong in identifying a crowd of fools with the Church.64 The
majority is not always right, he insists, and cites in support of this
conclusion the experience of the Church in Africa, where during the
heresies of the fourth century, the multitude favored error, while only
as few retained the Catholic truth.65

Then the Archdeacon transfers to the Councils which dealt with his
teachings his contempt for the ineptitude of the crowd. It is a rare
63 A. Clerval, Les Écoles de Chartres, p. 131 : Tout autre [from that of Fulbert]
était le méthode de Bérenger. Pour lui, l’autorité ne comptait pas, ni en exégèse, ni en
théologie. ‘A quoi bon se tromper avec tout le monde,’ disait-il un jour, ‘si tout le monde
se trompe.’ ”
64 D.S.C., pp. 34-35: “Quod usitatam ecclesiae fidem non.dubitas dicere, et, si quae
usitatiora, ea debeant esse probabiliora . . . iam dixi superius, ineptorum in ecclesia
turbas non esse ecclesiam.’’
65 Ibid., p. 34:
. . de multitudine quantacunque quorumcunque superius iam
respondi, eam veritati nunquam praejudicare, adversarios Caeciliani multitudinem maxi­
mam habuisse . . . non defuisse post illum multitudinem beato in Affrica Cipriano. . . .
An argument which appears with the most tiresome repetition in almost identical terms,
in many of the early pages of the De sacra coena.

I hr I

ni PiHhìplc» iif Berengar and of Hit Catholic Opponents

51

thing indeed to find the majority in possession of the truth; and this
incapacity extends as well to Councils of the Church, which lack that
inward perception which is necessary for a diligent inquiry into the
truth.66 Lanfranc has called the Council of Rome of 1059 “the
Church”—he might better have referred to it as an errant mob. And
the Council of Vercelli of 1050 was an assembly of simpletons, a coun­
cil of vanity, a hubbub.6'

Not only towards the Councils but also towards the Holy See itself
was Berengar lacking both in respect and obedience. Cited by Pope
St. Leo IX to appear before the Council of Vercelli, he refused to ap­
pear, and gave as his reason the canonical cause that a cleric cannot
be summoned before a tribunal outside of his province.68 He says that
at Rome in 1050 he found Pope St. Leo anything but a holy father, not
even an honest man; and he applies to the Pope the words of Our Lord
condemning the Pharisees, “The father from whom you are is the
devil.”69 After the council of Rome in 1059 he composed a written
refutation, the pamphlet answered by Lanfranc, in which he sharply
attacked the Roman Church and Pope Nicholas II, and in the De sacra
coena he accused Pope Nicholas of levity, of ignorance, and of un66 Ibid., p. 59:
. vix unquam in multitudine satis bene quaesitam inventamque
veritatem; . . . multitudinem non esse idoneam satis ad diligentiorem veritatis inquisi­
tionem atque perceptionem.”
67 Ibid., p. 49: “ . . . ecclesiae dicis, quod turbae erraticae verius dicere potuisti.”
Ibid., p. 43:
. concilio vanitatis . .
p. 44:
. . ad Vercellicum tumultum
illum convenerint.”
Cf. Bernold of Constance, PL 148: 1456, Durand of Troarn, PL 149: 1422, Lan­
franc, PL 150: 426; 422. In connection with Berengar’s attitude towards the Roman
Church Harnack has a curious note (History of Dogma, vol. 6, transi, from 3rd German
edition, W. M’Gilchrist, London, 1899): ‘‘With the dialectic there mingle the begin­
nings of a more independent, a critical view of history. Yet Berengar meddles with no
decree of any Council. Only the decrees connected with his subject are ridiculed by
him.” If Harnack is referring to General Councils, it must be said that the time of
Berengar was not the time of General Councils: none had been held since IV Constanti­
nople, in 869; none would be held till I Lateran in 1123. It has already been shown
(supra, p. 17) that the churchmen of the pre-scholastic centuries had great respect for
provincial Councils, especially those presided over by the Pope or his legate, and
regarded them as possessing great weight. If Berengar ridiculed only ‘‘the decrees con­
nected with his subject,” it is because these were the only decrees which might conceiv­
ably have concerned him.

68 D.S.C., p. 41 : “Pervenerat enim ad me, praecepisse Leonem illum, ut ego Vercel­
lensi illi conventui, in quo tamen nullam papae debebam obedientiam, non deesem.
Dissuaserant secundum ecclesiastica iura, secundum quae nullus extra provinciam ad
iudicium ire cogendus est, personae ecclesiasticae, dissuaserant amici.”
69 Ibid., pp. 33-34: “Ego papam minime sanctam ... et, ut alterius aliquid audeam
secundum illum, qui dixit: vos ex diabolo patre estis, minime virum probum expritiH
sum.” Cf. p. 48.

The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

52

worthy conduct.7 0 And finally, after the death of Pope Alexander II
and the accession of Gregory VII, there came from Rome to Berengar
an instruction to keep silence, which did not prevent him from again
propounding his views before a synod at Poitiers, in January, 1076.'1
It is clear, then, that Berengar rejected entirely the authority of the
teaching Church as possessing any normative value for discovering the
meaning of the message contained in Scripture and tradition. On this
account at least, it is now demonstrated that the error of Berengar lay
far deeper than a false view merely of Eucharistic doctrine : it attacked
one of the foundations of Catholic belief, the living magisterium of the
Church as proximate rule of faith. In his refusal to allow special auth­
ority to the Roman See—indeed, in his avowed contempt for the Roman
See—he exceeded all other rationalizing dialecticians of the pre-scholast­
ic period, to whom decision by Rome meant an end of controversy.
Lanfranc observed this fundamental error of Berengar, and marked
it as the particular note of his heresy, distinguishing Berengar from the
heretics of history. Berengar had given over to contempt the Holy
Roman Church, had called it a church of demons, a council of vanity,
a seat of Satan. Heretics and schismatics of the past had been guilty
of no such impiety as this, says Lanfranc. Even though some might
have wandered from the truth and fallen into error, yet all of them had
held the see of Peter in the highest honor, nor had any dared to speak
or write such blasphemy against it.70
72 It is useless for Berengar to assert
71
that the doctrine which he attacks is the opinion of a vulgar mob, and
that his own teaching corresponds to that of some ideal Church, for the
opinion of Paschasius and Lanfranc is precisely that which has been held
by all orders and ranks in the existing Church, with the exception of a
few heretics and schismatics.73 The fact is that Berengar is rejecting
not an opinion, but the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and is sep­
arating himself from it.74
The modem writer, Ebersolt, places this rejection of ecclesiastical
authority at the root of the Berengarian doctrine, an attack not merely
on the traditional Eucharistic teaching, but at the deeper level of the
70 Ibid., p. 71: “. . . nimiaque levitate Nicolaus ille, de cuius ineruditione et morum
indignitate facile mihi non insuSicienter scribere.”

71
72
73
74

M. Cappuyns, "Bérenger de Tours," DHGE 8: 394.
Lanf., PL 150 : 426 BC.
Ibid.. 414 A.
Ibid: Cf. 409 C; 410 B.

The / heological Principies of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

53

foundations of Catholic belief.75 And this is indeed true: the Berengarian heresy, seen in its principles, was two-sided, and the rejection of
ecclesiastical authority was its negative side.
Upon this question of the authority of the Church, as upon the
Eucharistic doctrine itself, the antithesis between the two parties was
complete. Berengar rejected the authority of the Church entirely; for
his opponents the authority of the Church was the one great norm to
which every interpretation must be adjusted.
The teaching of the
Church is the rule of faith.'6 Berengar had despised the opinion to
which he had been forced to submit at Rome in 1059 as that of a vulgar
mob; to this Lanfranc replies with a ringing expression of the Catholic
spirit :
When you say, “The Burgundian [Cardinal Humbert] was of the
opinion of the mob, of Paschasius and Lanfranc,” you are including me
also among the mob; now I want you most certainly to know, and my
friends and the Church of Christ to believe: I should far prefer to be
an oafish and simple-minded Catholic with the crowd than a fastidious
and inquisitive heretic with you.77

If the teaching authority of the Church is the proximate rule of
faith, then more specifically adherence to the Roman Church is the actual
test of orthodoxy.78 The text from St. Matthew, Tu es Petrus ..may
have a wider application, says Lanfranc, than to the Church at Rome,
and it is so held by some Catholic writers; but its principal import is to
give special authority to the canons and decrees of the Popes.79 Lan­
franc, Guitmund, and Alger all cite against Berengar thè decrees of
the Councils by which he was condemned and the professions of faith
75 J. Ebersolt, “Essai sur Bérenger de Tours et la controverse sacramentaire au Xle
siècle,” Revue de l'histoire des Religions, 48 (1903) 163: “[Berengar] donnait ainsi le
droit à l’individu de se soustraire à une autorité par amour de la vérité. Bérenger niait
par ce fait le dogme de l’infallibilité. De quel droit en effet l’Église s’est elle arrogé le
monopole de la vérité?”
76 Lanf., 407 B: ”... et ad veram fidem quam sancta Ecclesia praedicare non
cessat.”
Guit., PL 149: 1469 A. “Quicumque enim vult salvus esse, sicut sancti Patres sanx­
erunt, et totius concinit mundus, necesse est ut teneat catholicam fidem.”
77 Lanf., 414 BC: “Porro autem quod dicis. Erat autum Burgundus in sententia
vulgi, Paschasii atque Lanfranci, me etiam cum vulgo deputas, certissimum habeto tu,
indubitanter credant amici mei, atque Eccleisa Christi, . . . mallem tamen cum vulgo esse
rusticus et idiota Catholicus quam tecum existere curialis atque facetus haereticus.”
78 Lanf., 410 B: “. . . haeriticum esse omnem hominem qui a Romana et universali
Ecclesia, in fidei doctrina, discordat.”
79 ¡bid., 426 D: [After citing Mt. 16: 18-19, Tu es Petrus . . .] “Quae tametsi
de pastoribus sanctae Ecclesiae dicta esse credantur, et a quibusdam catholicis exponan­
tur, praecipue tamen de Romana ecclesia intelligenda esse sacri canones et pontificum
decreta testantur.”

54

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

which he made before the Councils.80 And Lanfranc cites in succession
the Popes who have dealt with the Berengarian heresy.81
The Archdeacon of Angers had ridiculed the common belief of
Catholics as in any sense a guarantee of truth; it was a rare thing for
the multitude to possess the truth. Against this gnostic tendency, typ­
ical of heresy, the Catholics allege the universal consent of the faithful
as having a share in the authoritative teaching of the Church. Indeed,
this common consent of itself should be enough to carry conviction
of the truth.82 The whole Church, in the East and in the West, has
held to one common belief concerning the Eucharist. If such a common
faith should be proved false, then either the Catholic Church has never
existed or it has perished, for an error in belief upon a point of such
magnitude must surely be fatal. But no Catholic would consent to
either alternative.83
One other species of the argument from authority should be consid­
ered before we pass on to the examination of the attitude of our authors
towards the place of dialectics in theology. This is the argument from
Eucharistic miracles, closely related to that from universal consent, and
equally despised by Berengar. Eucharistic legends, in which some vis­
ible change is reported to have taken place on the altar, were current
in the Middle Ages. In some of them, Christ appeared in the form
of a lovely child, to reward the faith of a believer; in others the Euchar­
istic species were reported to have changed into a dry cinder, to prevent
the sacrament from being profaned.84 In the minds of some modern
critics, the existence of these legends has provided further evidence for
the credulity of the Middle Ages, and their use as proofs for the real
presence confirmation of the absurdity of the Catholic doctrine.
But
80 Lanf., PL 150: 410 D -411 C; Guit., PL 149: 1486 D- 1487 A; Alg„ PL
180: 760 C; 796 D- 797 B.
81 Lanf., 413 CD: “Ab hac sententia nunquam discessit sanctus Leo in omnibus
conciliis suis. . . . Quae sententia non effugit successorem quoque suum felicis memoriae
papam Victorem. . . . Porro quid de hac re tempore Nicolai gestum sit, breviter supra
reseravi.”
8.2 Guit., 1469 A: “Quocirca hostium machinis, Deo auxiliante, copiose frustratis,
etiam si nil amplius adderemus, sola tibi catholicae fidei sufficere generalis consuetudo
deberet.”
83 Lanf., 441 A: “Interroga universos qui Latinae linguae nostrarumve litterarum
notitiam perceperunt. Interroga Graecos, Armenos, seu cujuslibet quoscumque Christianos
homines; uno ore hanc fidem se testantur habere. Porro si universalis Ecclesiae fides
falsa existit, aut nunquam fuit catholica Ecclesia, aut periit. Nihil namque efficacius ad
interitum animarum quam perniciosus error. Sed non fuisse, aut perisse Ecclesiam, cathol­
icus nemo consenserit.” Cf. Alg., PL 180:780 A.
84 For a historical summary of these legends, see Roach, W., “Eucharistic Tradi­
tion in the Perlesvaus” Zeitschrift fur Romanische Philologie, 59 (1939) 10-56.

I he I hcological Principles of Berengar and of His Catholic Opponents

55

the theological—as distinguished from the moral—importance of the
Eucharistic legends has been vastly exaggerated.85 We can see their
exact import in the treatise of the opponents of Berengar.
The argument from Eucharistic miracles appears in Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger. But in none of these are the legendary marvels
brought forth as direct proofs of the truth of the real presence. Our
authors say expressly that they do not possess equal weight with the
authentic writings.86 They are not, in fact, necessary to the proof,
since the Catholic doctrine is adequately established without them.87
Yet they portray graphically a picture of reality, and are therefore “con­
gruous to the Catholic faith.”88 If they had not expressed truly the
content of the universal belief, the stories of them would have been sup­
pressed.
From such a cautious use of this legendary material, it can be clearly
seen that Eucharistic legends played but a small part in the medieval
theology of the Eucharist. They were not offered directly as proofs of
the Catholic doctrine; indeed, the question as to whether they really
happened—though our authors would never have denied that they did
—did not affect the issue at all. Their value was secondary, auxiliary;
they were part of the heritage òf the faithful; they illustrated and mani­
fested the faith of the Church.

3. Dialectics
Thus far we have seen in the principles of the Berengarian theology
an abundant use of Scripture and tradition, along with an insistence
that the sacred writings do not always carry their meaning openly, but
85 Roach, ibid., shows that the miracles were never used as theological “proofs,”
but that their purpose was mainly to edify. With one exception, the miraculous narra­
tives contained in the treatise of Paschasius Radbertus are shown to have been the work
of later interpolators: Roach, ibid., p. 28.
86 Lanf., 435 D: “Quae scripturae tametsi illam excelcissimam auctoritatis arcem
non obtinet qua donatae sunt quas propheticas seu apostólicas nuncupamus. . . .” Cf.
Alg., 779 D.
87 Alg., 779 C: “Quamvis enim ipsius Christi et tot sanctorum testimoniis, et uni­
versalis etiam Ecclesiae catholica fide, quae ab initio conversionis suae ita credidit, et ita
salvata est, sufficienter adstructum sit, quod vera caro Christi verusque sanguis in mensa
Dominica immoletur. . .

88 Ibid., “. . . ne quis tamen perversor aliter intelligeret vel exponeret, facta sunt a
Deo congrua huic nostrae fidei miracula, . . .” Cf. Lanf., 435 D, Guit., 1480 BC. Guitmund seems to allow greater force to these Eucharistic miracles, and Roach (loc. cit., p.
45) says that they received “a more serious acceptance” after the Berengarian contro­
versy than before--- an acceptance due chiefly to the “vigorous defense” of them by
Guitmund, as a “competent theologian ”

56

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

need to be interpreted according to some norm. We have seen the
flat rejection of the authority of the Church and of the consent of
Catholics as useful norms of interpretation, since according to Berengar
the secrets of divine science are but seldom in the possession of the vul­
gar mob. Consequently, we must now discover what is the norm of
interpretation for Berengar, what is the standard against which Revela­
tion is to be tested in order to acquire its inner meaning. And we shall
find that he places at the basis of his search for truth the principles and
methods of an immature philosophy, the dialectics of the schools. The
secrets of the Kingdom of God are to be known, if at all, through
the acuteness and penetration of the individual inquiring mind.89
89 Historians of dogma, Catholic and Protestant, and historians of logic have paid
their respects to Berengar’s avowed fidelity to tradition, but have been forced to con­
clude that he accorded it a secondary place:
Cappuyns, “Bérenger de Tours,’’ DHGE 8, 400: Berengar cannot be called ration­
alist or nominalist. His Eucharistic ideology is of Augustinian origin. It is true he in­
herited from Fulbert a cultus for dialectics, yet he does not go so far as to contradict
in its name Scripture and the Fathers. Yet Cappuyns admits that in the context of the
passage he cites in favor of Berengar’s regard for tradition appears one of Berengar’s
strongest statements in favor of the superiority of reason.
Harnack, o. cit., p. 46: Berengar did not revolt against authority, but tried to
rescue the true tradition of the Church from the embraces of a “bad routine ... a coarse
and superstitious realism.” Yet Harnack finds “combined with this interest . . . the
pleasure of thinking, and the daring reliance on dialectics, as on ‘reason’ in general. As
theologians, Berengar and his followers were Augustinians, but at the same time, Beren­
gar had an enjoyment in criticism as such, and a confidence in ‘science’ that were not
Augustinian.”

Macdonald, op. cit., p. 98: Berengar’s devoiton to tradition was sincere, but quali­
fied by his conviction that reason must be applied if the truth underlying the words is to
be reached. And this rationalism becomes the basis of the Berengarian system: “In the
De sacra coena we shall see that this application of the dialectical method, in order to
supplement the authority of tradition . . . becomes the foundation of the whole system
of Berengar’s exegesis.” p. 219: “The evangelical principle of the freedom of private
judgment was originated in the Middle Ages by Berengar. ’
Ebersolt, loc. cit., pp. 168-169: “It is true then to say that Berengar did not admit
the authority of Scripture except in so far as it was conformed to reason.” Thanks to
reason we can know the truth in an “immediate manner.”

Vemet, “Bérenger de Tours,” DTC 2: 728: “Berengar tested the data of faith in
the crucible of reason.”
Geiselmann, Die Eucharislielehre der Vorscholastify, p. 290: “Dialectics becomes
. . . the ground principle of his work, . . . the epitome of knowledge.”
Grabmann, Die Ceschichle der Scholastischen Methode, 1, p. 219: “Dialectics is
for him the reason, the essence, and the measure of all knowledge.”
Franti, C., Ceschichle der Logi^ im Abenlande, vol. II, Leipzig, 1861, p. 72: Ber­
engar “set himself against all authority in the sphere of knowledge, no matter what the
authority might be; and in opposition to all tradition . . . recognized as the exclusive
measure of truth only his own power of thought.” (Note that the historian of logic is
bolder in his statements than the historians of dogma. Reuter is similarly bold. See the
interesting comment on Reuter in Harnack, op. cit., p. 46, n. 4).

/7in 7 lieologhul Principle» of Berengar and of Hit Catholic Opponents

57

Berengar’s theology is almost entirely inspired by his devotion to
the supremacy of the rational faculty in man. The faculty of intellect
is the glory of man. If man enjoys a position of honor in creation it
is because he is endowed with intellect.90 If Berengar was convinced of
anything, it was of the eminence of reason.9192
93
In three extremely important pages of the De sacra coena—pp. 100102—Berengar sets down explicitly the basic principles upon which his
Eucharistic theology was erected. He says :
It is clearly the property of a great heart to have recourse to dialectic
in all things, because to have recourse to dialectic is to have recourse to
reason; and he who refuses this recourse, since it is in the faculty of
reason that he is made in the image of God, abandons his own proper
glory, and cannot be renewed from day to day in the image of God.32

One phrase in this assertion requires special attention, the phrase,
“in all things,” per omnia. It is admitted—indeed the scholastic method
is built on this—that one may reason profitably upon the meaning of
Scripture and tradition, and upon the divine Mysteries. But we can­
not hold that necessarily our reasoning must lead only to conclusions
which unaided reason can adequately explain. That is the very formula
of rationalism : to subject the divine Mysteries to the limited powers of
the finite mind, to deny the revealed character of doctrines which can­
not be rationally apprehended. This seems to be the significance of the
per omnia in the statement of Berengar—not an obiter dictum by any
means, but an emphatic statement of his conviction, repeated in many
ways in the context.
Another important expressior/of the fundamental theological prin­
ciple of Berengar is the following:
You do not hesitate to write of me that I neglect sacred authorities;
it shall become clear with the divine assistance that this accusation is a
lie and not the truth, since I have placed sacred authorities in my argu­
ment wherever the need arose. But to act by reason in the apprehension
90 D.S.C., p. 221 : “Homo in honore positus, id est, intellectu praeditus.”

Ibid., p. 222: “Intellectualitas interioris hominis decus.”

91 Ibid., p. 53: “. . . eminentia rationis . .
92 Ibid., p. 101 : “Maxime plane cordis est, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere,
quia confugere ad eam, ad rationem est confugere, quo qui not confugit, cum secundum
rationem sit factus ad imaginem Dei, suum honorem reliquit, nec potest renovari de die
in diem ad imaginem Dei.”

93 Cf. Heurtevent, op. cit., p. 201.

58

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

of divine truth is incomparably superior, since [then} the thing is evi­
dent — that no one will deny unless madness has blinded him.84

The first part of this passage is the one noted by Cappuyns against the
application of the term “rationalist” to Berengar.94
95 But Berengar’s in­
sistence on his regard for authority is followed immediately by a state­
ment of the “incomparable” eminence of reason. The elliptical phrase,
“quia in evidenti res est,” casts considerable light upon Berengar’s
theory of religious knowledge. It is a technical phrase with Berengar,
appearing several times in the De sacra coena.96 A thing is evident if
it can be clearly seen, either properly, by the senses, or, in a transferred
sense, by obvious and clear-cut demonstration, so as to exclude the pos­
sibility of hidden meaning.97 The construction which Berengar adopts,
“in” with the ablative, “in evidenti,” is a rhetorical device to heighten
and emphasize the meaning. This construction can be found in Claud­
ius Donatus and in St. Augustine.98
If we examine Berengar’s meaning it seems we must come to the con94 D.S.C., p. 100: “Quod relinquere me, inquio ego, sacras auctoritates non dubitas
scribere, manifestum fiet divinitate propicia, illud de calumnia scribere te, non de veri­
tate, ubi deducendi sacras auctoritates in medium necessitate inde agendi locus occurrerit,
quanquam ratione agere in perceptione veritatis incomparabiliter superius esse, quia in
evidenti res est, sine vecordiae coecitate nullus negaverit.”
In the English translation which appears in our text, the “res,” which is said to be
“in evidenti,” is taken to refer to the “perceptio veritatis,” rather than to the “ratione
agere” — the causal “quia” seems to demand this reading. Thus the sense would be: if
one acts by reason, he achieves a solution which is “in evidenti.”
95 Note 89 supra.
96 D.S.C., p. 215: “In evidenti res est, quoque verba convolvas, luce clarius beati
Ambrosii sententia eminet” — in connection with Berengar’s dialectical distortion of the
realist passage from De myst., 9, “Et hoc quod conficimus corpus, ex virgine est.”
D.S.C., p. 245: “Dum enim dicis absumi panem . . . contra perspicuae evidentiam
veritatis quia in evidenti res est.”
97 Thesaurus linguae latinae (Teubner), 5: 1036: evidens: apertus, dilucidus,
patens; id quod cerni potest; proprie, de iis fere rebus quae visu percipiuntur; translate,
id quod manifestum, perspicuum, apertum.
Diefenbach, Clossarium latino-Cermanicum, mediae et infimae aetatis, Frankfort-onMain, 1857, p. 212: evidens: merklich (perceptible, perceivable, sensible.)
Ernont and Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine, Paris, 1932, p.
299: evidens: (distinct, visible, in bodily form).
98 T. Claudius Donatus, Commentum Vergilii Aeneidos, (ed. Fabricius), Basle,
1561: 1, 50, p. 26, 16: ultionis spes in evidenti constituta; 1, 560, p. 111, 23: aperuit
quod fuerit in evidenti; 1, 705, p. 138, 4: in evidenti est . . . quanta . . . fuerit multi­
tudo.”
St. Augustine, In Joannis Evagelium, 32, 6, PL 35: 1644: “Sed quid est quod ait.
Non enim erat spiritus datus, quia Jesus nondum erat glorificatus? In evidenti est intel­
lectus. Non enim non erat Spiritus Dei, qui erat apud Deum; sed nondum erat in eis
qui crediderant in Jesum” — a passage in which St. Augustine wishes to remove any
thought of a hidden or mysterious meaning from the words of Our Lord in St. John
7: 39.

I hr I hmlnyii ni

/*r/nc

nf Hr frugar find of

//il

Catholic Opponents

59

elusion: to follow reason in religious inquiry is better than to follow
authority, because the result of rational inquiry is a clear and patent
demonstration, while dependence on authority might lead to obscure
and hidden meaning—in short, to mystery. It is difficult to take any
other meaning out of the text." If he had used conditional phraseol­
ogy, his assertion could be understood in a Catholic sense. There is
no reason why one should follow authority if the matter is evident.99
100
But he has expressed himself in the most general terms : reason is in­
comparably superior to authority because the truth then becomes evi­
dent. This is a statement of rationalism; given wider extension than
Berengar thought to give it, it would lead to the rejection of all mystery
in religion and thus to skepticism.

Berengar is always emphatic upon the superiority of reason over
authority. A man of spirit would prefer to perish, if he had the option,
rather than to yield to authority.101 The argument from authority is
a poor substitute for that from reason, and the same superiority exists
in the relation between reason and faith.102

Taking into account, then, the superiority of rational inquiry over
traditional teaching as clearly held by Berengar, we may expect to find
in his Eucharistic theology a rationalism far more extreme than that of
any Catholic author. To cite Hamack, “Here, for the first time, the
categories ‘subiectum’, ‘quod in subiecto’, ‘de subiecto’, the distinction of
‘esse’ from ‘secundum quod esse’, in short the dialectical manipulations
of the notion of substance (according to Porphyry, Boethius, etc.) were

99 Here there is a close similarity to the passage noted above at p. 46, n. 41, where
Berengar says it is difficult or even impossible for him to interpret St. Ambrose id
normam . . . manifestorum. It seems that “mani festo rum” would have the same meaning
as “in evidenti;” and Berengar’s meaning would be: It is difficult to interpret St. Am­
brose according to a norm of manifest meaning—in other words, so as to exclude all
mystery. Cf. Ebersolt, loc. cit., pp. 168-9. "This faculty of reason is necessary in his
eyes to discover the true meaning of Scripture; thanks to it we can know the truth in an
immediate manner.”

100 S. Th., 2-2, q. 1, aa. 4 & 5.
101 D.S.C. 102: “Circa dialecticam, quantum oportet, satagenti de videndo luce
clarius Deo et anima spondere in eodem libro minime dubitavit Augustinus, nec sequen­
dus in eo es ulli cordato homini, ut malit auctoritatibus circa aliqua credere, quam ratione,
si optio sibi datur, perire.”

102 Jbid., p. 215: “Cede auctoritati, si ad rationem non sufficis.” p. 214: “Si non
sufficis quod dico, ratione comprehendere.” p. 230: . . . oportet to hoc fide tenere, si
ratiocinari non sufficis.”

GO

I he I'.ihhmiilii

of the I'.lwcnth Century

applied to a dogma in the west.”103 Berengar was far from the first to
apply dialectics to dogma, but it is true, as Geiselmann has pointed out,
that this dialectical treatment, which had been considered by earlier
writers as an aid and handmaid to divine science, became in Berengar
the foundation stone of his work.104 And since the philosophy upon
which he based his thought was immature and undeveloped, it led him
into philosophical error which was the radical cause of his Eucharistic
heresy. In connection with the Mystery of Faith, it was fatal for Ber­
engar “to laugh at faith, to will to comprehend everything through
reason.”105

When we study the attitude toward dialectics of Berengar’s oppo­
nents, we have the impression that the farther removed the writer from
the heresiarch himself, the less self-conscious he was upon this problem.
Guitmund, for example, uses dialectical arguments constantly, matterof-factly, without apology or justification. His language is always that
of the dialecticians of the schools, and in some respects his terminology
is an improvement on that of the arch-dialectician Berengar, substituting,
for example, the term “accidens” for the more cumbrous “quod in
subiecto est” of Berengar.106 Guitmund claims that he will establish
the truth of his position by means of the strongest possible demonstra­
tion, the “ratio necessaria;” but he saves himself from rationalism by
saying he will prove by “necessary reason” only the fact that God has
done what He willed to do, which was to effect a substantial change;
but how He has done it remains an impenetrable mystery.107 Alger of
Liege, no less than Guitmund, pursues his theological method without
any particular attempt to explain it : authority and reason—an elaborate
collection of patristic texts, and a free use of dialectic to explain them.
Only Lanfranc, who met the adversary face to face, who recognized
with clearest penetration the fundamental error of the heresiarch, is selfconscious upon the question of method, and expresses himself as ex103 Op. cit., p. 46. Cf. Lanfranc’s comment, PL 150: 418 D: “Quod vero dialec­
tica verba, affirmationem, praedicatum, subjectum, caeteraque in hunc modum tractatui
tantae rei laboras inserere, propter nihil aliud videris id facere nisi ut hac occasione
peritum te disputandi imperitis valeas suadere.”
104 Op. cit., p. 290.
105 Lanf. 427 B :
. fidem arridere, rationibus omnia velle comprehendere.”
106 Guit., PL 149: 1450 B, etc.
107 Ibid., 1441 C: “Quod eum voluisse Deum ipso adjuvante opportuno loco mon­
straverimus, sive possit intellegi quomodo fiat, sive non possit, obtinebimus tamen necessaria
ratione quoniam fecit. Non enim satis argumento est, si nostrae indirimitatis caecitas id
nunquam in hac vita capere valeat, quominus debeas credere, si manifestae rationis neces­
sitas, rem ita ut diximus, probavit esse.”

I ht

«il Pfliiilplm of IUreii||Uf <m<l of Ilis Catholic Opponents

61

trcinely reluctant to undertake a dialectical defense of the Catholic doc­
trine. Some historians of dogma have seen in this reluctance of Lan­
franc to use rational arguments the weakness of his work.108 It is
rather difficult to expain, in view of Lanfranc’s reputation as a dialec­
tician. He had received an excellent education in liberal arts and in
law, and was known as an accomplished advocate. Sigebert of Getnbloux signalizes in Lanfranc’s commentaries on St. Paul his use of the
dialectical method;109 though Lanfranc, in the same connection, claim­
ed that he wished to follow the teaching of the Holy Spirit, as St. Paul
did, rather than the rules of liberal arts.110
Lanfranc has set down his viewpoint on the question of the dialect­
ical method in an interesting passage of his treatise. He says that he
would far prefer the entire controversy to be carried on through the
appeal to sacred authorities, rather than through dialectical arguments;
and he calls God and his conscience to witness that this is the truth.111
He makes the rather odd assertion that even in matters where a dialec­
tical procedure would be both legitimate and suitable, he should prefer
to “conceal the art,” and try to achieve the end without using the means,
lest he give the impression of confiding more in reason than in author­
ity.112 Yet he is willing to acknowledge that the utility of dialectics,
even in questions of faith has the high authority of St. Augustine in its
favor; he feels that he can give Berengar as much as he takes from him;
and therefore he will follow him onto that ground with reluctance,
108 E. Amann and A. Gaudel, “Lanfranc,” DTC 8: 2658: ‘It is regrettable that
by reaction against the exaggerated confidence of Berengar in dialectics, the abbot of
St. Stephen uses it so scantily himself to explain, defend and interpret his faith: before
the ‘how’ of the mystery and the miracle, he is satisfied with appealing to another mira­
cle, taking an attitude of humble reserve, and confessing the uselessness of speculation.
In this he is of his time, and Hugh of St. Victor, a century later, will use the same
language (PL 176: 462). The philosophy which will permit St. Thomas to propose a
rational explanation of the Eucharist dogma is not yet known.”
109 Sigebert, Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis, PL 160: 582: “Lanfrancus dialec­
ticus et Cantuarensis archiepiscopus Paulum apostolum exposuit, et ubicumque opportuni­
tas locorum occurit, secundum leges dialecticae proponit, assumit, concludit.”
110 Lanfranc, In D. Pauli Epistolas commentarium, PL 150: 163 B: “LJnde pro­
cul dubio est non eum regulas artium saecularium in scribendo vel loquendo cogitasse,
sed per doctrinam Spiritus Sancti . . . talia et taliter dixisse, quae per singula expon­
erem. . .
111 Lanf., 416 D: “Et quidem de mysterio fidei auditurus ac responsurus quae ad
rem debeant pertinere, mallem audiere ac respondere sacras auctoritates quam dialecticas
rationes.”
Ibid., 417 A: “Sed testis mihi est Deus, et conscientia mea. . . .”
112 Ibid., “Etsi quando materia disputandi talis est up (per) hujus artis regulas
valeat enucleatius explicari, in quantum possum, per aequipollentias propositionum tego
artem, ne videar magis arte quam veritate sanctorumque Patrum auctoritate confidere.”

/ hr I'i/t hiiritlii CoHtroVrr*)) of the I .leveiilh (ruling

(i2

knowing as he does that some will lay his dialectical arguments to
pride rather than to real necessity.113
With such a cautious preamble, we are not surprised to see in Lan­
franc many expressions of the uselessness of attempting to penetrate
deeply into the Mystery of the Eucharist;114 and a general treatment
which, though quite useful in preparing the ground, left much room for
development in those writers who would follow.115
Nevertheless, in the one pitched battle which he had with Berengar
on a point of purely formal dialectics, Lanfranc clearly came out on top.
In the lost opusculum against which Lanfranc’s treatise was written,
Berengar claimed to find in the Humbertian formula of 1059 an open
contradiction according to the laws of dialectical reasoning. The Hum­
bertian formula was, in part:
Panis et vinum, quae ponuntur in altari, post consecrationem {solum­
modo] stmt verum Christi corpus et sanguis.116

Berengar’s point was that where the two terms of an affirmative propo­
sition are united by a copula of identity, the subject must be contained
in the predicate, or the whole proposition will break down. That is to
say, when Humbert affirmed that the bread and wine of the altar
are the Body and Blood of Christ, he also affirms by that very statement
that the bread and wine remain. However, when the Archdeacon ex­
pressed his argument in form, he took as his major a particular negation,
rather than a universal : “Not every proposition can stand if part breaks
down;” rather than, “No proposition can stand if part breaks down.”
So that Berengar’s argument was, in form:
MAJOR: Not every proposition can stand if part breaks down.
But the proposition, “The bread and wine of the altar are
[only] the Body and Blood of Christ,” is an affirmation consisting of
subject and predicate.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, even though the Burgundian [Humbert]
attempted to deny that the bread and wine remain, yet by his
affirmation he simply confirms that they do remain.117
minor:

Lanfranc answered this formal argument by pointing out its fatal defect
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid., 421, 427 etc.

115 E. Amann and A. Gau del, loe. cit., col. 2658: “Lanfranc is satisfied to expose
clearly the object of faith. As for seeking out the nature of the substantial conversion of
the bread and wine, how it is done, he believes that a useless task: the believer ought
not to occupy himself with scrutinizing such a mystery.”
116 This is Berengar’s phrasing, cited from his opusculum by Lanfranc, 418 C.
The word solummodo has been placed in brackets, because it is Berengar’s word, not
Humbert’s; it did not appear in formula of 1059, and Lanfranc will call this to Beren­
gar’s attention repeatedly in developing his theory of the Eucharist as a Sacrament.
117 Lanf., 416 D: 418 C.

I lu I he hinnii til

/'füiópIcA

ht

eiigui (itui of //¡* ( alholic Opponents

63

in form : it is impossible to conclude anything from two particular prem­
ises. If Berengar is to conclude anything from his argument, he must
make his major premise a universal negation.118 It must be confessed
that the whole discussion was rather trivial. Berengar’s argument, even
apart from its defect of form, contained a patent sophism. Humbert’s
formula might not have been happily chosen, leaving out as it did any
direct reference to a change; but its meaning was clear, and Berengar’s
argument failed to take account of the words of consecration, a practical
proposition, by which the real presence of Christ’s Body and Blood is
brought about. No Catholic would hold that Humbert’s proposition,
“The bread and wine of the altar are the Body and Blood of Christ,”
is a simply speculative proposition expressing identity. And Lanfranc’s
reply equally overlooks the main weakness of the argument and attacks
it for its defect of form. In fact, the argument would not have been
stronger even if it had been properly laid. But the discussion is inter­
esting in the light that it casts upon the love of our authors for match­
ing wits in dialectics, and it contains a key point in Berengar’s attack
on the doctrine of a substantial change. At any rate, in the De sacra
coena the Archdeacon admits that he had laid the argument improperly,
and sets about with great zeal to recast it, though he criticizes Lanfranc
for attacking the argument upon the form rather than the substance.119
118 Ibid., 417 D: “Adhuc alio argumento probare contendis panem vinumque post
consecrationem in principalibus permanere essentiis, dicens, ‘Non enim constare poterit
affirmatio omnis, parte subruta.’ Ad cujus rei probationem non oportuit inferri particu­
larem negationem, qua de praesenti quaestione nihil collogitur, sed universalem potius,
per quam enuntiatur, nulla affirmatio constare poterit parte subruta. Age, enim particu­
laris sit negatio tua . . . rursus assumptio tua: Panis et vinum altaris solummodo sunt
sacramentum, vel panis et vinum altaris solummodo sunt verum Christi corpus et sanguis
utrumque affrmatio est. His duabus particularibus praecedentibus, poterisne regulariter
concludere, parte subruta, ea non posse constare? Absit! In nulla quippe syllogismorum
figura, praecedentibus duabus particularibus, consequenter infertur conclusio ulla. Male
igitur eam collocasti.’’
119 D.S.C., p. 110: “. . . quod male syllogismum collocaverim, moram facis, circa
rem ipsam nec transeunter agas.’’
Macdonald, op. cil., pp. 292-3, discusses the point in the light of the various opin­
ions of nineteenth century historians of logic. In a note on p. 293, he cites De Ghellinck,
“Dialectique et dogme au Xe - XIle siècle,’’ p. 78, as the source for a statement that De
Ghellinck thinks this criticism the best part of Lanfranc’s treatise, which is otherwise
inferior to that of Alger. But it is difficult to draw that precise meaning from De Ghellinck’s comment in that place.
The attitude of R. L. Poole, in Illustrations of Medieval Thought and Learning has
been discussed before (p. 20, n. 26). It is to be expected that Poole would deny any
merit to Lanfranc as a dialectician in comparison with Berengar. He writes (p. 90) :
“Archbishop Lanfranc, a learned man and a good lawyer, was greatest in the practical
affairs of the state: in dialectical warfare he showed but poorly. He vanquished Beren­
gar by transparent sophisms. Logic in his hands was an imperfect instrument which he
had not fully learned to use.”

CHAPTER IV
The Controversy Concerning

1.

the

Substantial Conversion

The Berengarian Critique

In its general structure, the Eurcharistic theology of Berengar of
Tours presents a double aspect, consisting negatively in a dialectical at­
tack on the doctrine of the substantial conversion, which he thought
contradictory and absurd; and positively, in an attempt to build up a
theology of the Eucharist as sacrament, mere sign and symbol. It is
true that the two aspects are not entirely distinct : his theory of the
Eucharist as sacrament provided him with what he considered one of
his strongest arguments against a substantial conversion, since it is of
the essence of a sacrament that it point to some reality which is not con­
tained within itself. The logical mind of Berengar balked at the idea
that the Eucharist be at one and the same time the Body of Christ and
the sacrament of the Body of Christ. The two aspects are, however,
clearly recognizeable in his teaching, and they will be taken up re­
spectively in this and the following chapter. It should perhaps be re­
marked also that it is wholly fair to Berengar to discuss his system
almost exclusively from the viewpoint of his dialectics, with little atten­
tion to his scriptural and patristic documentation. His opinion of the
relative importance of reason and authority has been sufficiently deter­
mined. One thing is certainly true of Berengar, whatever its final im­
port will be : he built on reason, not on faith.
The negative aspect of his thought, the criticism of the theory of
substantial change, may itself be subdivided into a threefold argumen­
tation: first, an argument of the metaphysical order, based upon his
concept of being; second, an argument drawn from a dialectical analysis
of the concept of change; and third, a dialectical attack upon the lan­
guage of the Humbertian formula of 1059. The three arguments are
closely related, dovetailing at many points; but the first is basic and
fundamental, the philosophical position upon which Berengar erected
his system. The section of this chapter, then, which concerns the teach­
ing of Berengar, will consist in an analysis of his three principal argu­
ments against the doctrine of a substantial conversion.
It has already been pointed out that dialectics, although it was the
principal element, did not however constitute the totaliy of pre-scholast64

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

65

ic philosophy. It is true that the pre-scholastic philosophers, following
Boethius, thought of logic as concerned mainly with words, not things;
but since words are the signs of reality, they could not resist speculating
upon the nature of the reality that lay behind the words. Grabmann
has remarked that all the important elements of a whole philosophy are
to be found in germ in Boethius. Consequently it is not at all surpris­
ing that Berengar, attempting to analyze rationally the Eucharist, a con­
crete object which appears to the senses as a fragment of bread and a
cup of wine, should have permitted himself to speculate about the mean­
ing of concrete being as such. In the De sacra coena, therefore, whether
he was fully aware of it or not,1 Berengar introduced into the formulas
of the dialectical procedure a metaphysical principle.
The Berengarian concept of being appears in certain important
passages of the De sacra coena which require a careful analysis :
(p. 211:) “Omne compactum ex
materia et forma, aliud est in eo
quod est, aliud in eo quod aliquid
est; nec posse aliquid esse si con­
tigerit ipsum non esse, id est, quod
secundum sublectum non sit, minime
secundum accidens esse.”
(p. 92) “Constat autem omne,
quod constet ex materia et forma,
vel quarumcumque proprietatum con­
fluentia, ipsum quod est maxime de­
bere formae, et si esse per corrupti­
onem subiecti desierit, maxime illud
quoque amissioni formae necessario
imputari.”

The
with the
intricate
extricate

Everything composed of matter and
form, is one thing in that it is, an­
other in that it is something. And it
rannot be something if it no longer
exists; that is, whatever does not exist
is a subject cannot exist as an
iccident.
Everything which is composed of
matter and form, or of the coming
together of the properties of a thing,
owes its {determined] existence main­
ly to the form; and if it ceases to
exist through a destruction of the sub­
ject, this also is due mainly to the
loss of form.2

inherent difficulty of these two passages, dealing as they do
primal constituents of being, is greatly increased by Berengar’s
style and terminology; but it is possible and necessary to
the exact meaning of Berengar.

For Berengar, then, the corporeal object is composed of matter and
form: “omne compactum ex materia et forma”—these are the two
principles of being. Matter is the principle of existence of a thing as
1 Geiselmann, op. cit., p. 360: “wenn auch unbewusst.”
2 Obviously the meaning here is not that everything is two things, onr limi m. and
one that is something. The attempt has Ipeen made to translate the two nnsnagm litri ally,
to avoid the introduction of new terminology by way of paraphrase. Whal i « a. • i tied
is a twofold principle of being. Cf. D.s.c., pp. 70, 92.

66

The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

yet undetermined: “aliud est in eo quod est;” while form is the prin­
ciple of specification, by which a thing becomes a determined something :
“aliud in eo quod aliquid est.” Thus “materia” indicates merely thata-thing-is, while it is the task of the correlative principle, “forma,” to
determine what-a-thing-is® The form of bread, for example, is that
principle by which bread is, not a stone, not flesh, but bread.3
4 Matter
gives to an object existence, while form gives to it specific and de­
termined existence.5

Thus, in the metaphysics of Berengar, the essential principles of
corporeal substance are matter and form. Berengar does not use the
abstract term, “substance;” but his concrete term, “subiectum,” is noth­
ing other than substance individualized and existing in a determined
thing. Matter and form must come togther if the subject is to exist.
And the precise function of the form is to determine the specific
character of the subject, to determine what-it-is.

But it is of capital importance to observe that in his discussion of
“forma” Berengar fails to distinguish between substantial form and
those additional and non-essential determinations which philosophy calls
accidental forms. For Berengar, the form includes all of the ordinary
properties of the corporeal object: “vel quarumcumque proprietatum
confluentia.” The form gives shape to the object, size, color, all of
those properties by which we recognize an object for what it is and
distinguish it from others. Accidental forms enter into the essential
composition of the “subiectum,” and it is therefore unthinkable that the
subject itself should pass away, and that the accidents should remain:
“quod secundum subiectum non sit, minime secundum accidens esse.” 6
Berengar’s “subiectum,” then, is a determined corporeal substance com­
posed of matter and form as essential principles. But Berengar’s
“forma” includes accidental forms as well as substantial form. And
3 Cf. Geiselmann, op. cit., p. 338: “Materia ist Prinzip des Seins (esse), forma des
Soseins (aliquid esse).
4 D.S.C., p. 93.

5 Cf. the different explanation of Macdonald, op. cit., p. 317: “According to
Berengar, everything has two properties. It is one thing in that which it is. It is an­
other thing in the sense in which anything is. . . . His meaning is that everything is one
thing in its special identity, and another thing so far as it shares its “materia” or sub­
stance with everything else — so far as it is universal.” But Macdonald’s introduction of
the universal idea into Berengar’s “esse aliquid” seems unsatisfactory. Berengar is
speaking only of the essential principles which constitute the being of a determined
object.
6 It is significant here that Berengar uses the term “accidens,” while overlooking its
obvious philosophical denotation : that is, a non-essential principle of determination.

The Controversa Concerning the Substantial Conversion

67

from this we must conclude that Berengar wholly failed to discern the
real distinction between substance and accident.
This metaphysical error is the explanation of Berengar’s thoroughly
sensist concept of being. In the Aristotelian system which was to pre­
vail in scholastic philosophy, the senses do not come into direct and
immediate contact with substance considered precisely as substance. The
senses perceive only the accidental, the changing and the moving; while
the inner reality of things, the substance itself, is the pure object of
the intellect, since only the intellect can apprehend being-as such, sub
ratione entis. It is true that sense perception provides normally the
only trustworthy basis upon which a judgment as to the substance may
be founded, and in this sense, we know substance through the accidents.
But nevertheless, the substance, the object of intellect, remains really
distinct from the accident, the object of sense; and when this concept
of being is applied to the Eucharist, it effectually precludes the charge
of intellectual absurdity.'

But the thought of Berengar is far removed from this. For Berengar,
it is not true to say that the proper object of sight is a “colored
object,” and that the intellectual faculty must enter in by a process of
abstraction, however instantaneous that may be, to discover its inward
essence. Rather, the eye pierces to the essence itself : the corporeal ob­
ject is sensible by its essence; it is all that the senses tell us it is, and it
is nothing but that. If anyone sees the color of marble, he does not
see merely the color, but the marble itself, since the reason why he is*
7 The difference between the Berengarian and the scholastic concept of being is
brought out in the following table:

Berengarian

Scholastic
ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING

Constituting “Substance"
MATTER: principle of undetermined
existence: “Ipsum Esse.’’

MATTER: undetermined principle which
receives the substantial form.

FORM:
principle of determination:
“Aliquid Esse.
Includes both substantial and accidental forms — in fact,
no distinction is made between them.

FORM: the principle of determination
which gives specific character to matter,

NON-ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING

NONE

ACCIDENTS: additional determini»li<»n«
of substance which arc really
i
from substance. Their nctunl
from substance in the I iicIwhimI
fore, does not involve n «
■••I». i....

68

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

able to see the color is that he sees the marble, the subject.8 If your
face is colored black, I cannot see the color unless I also see your face.9
It is altogether clear that in no way can color be seen, unless the colored
object is also seen.10
In his application to the Eucharist of this concept of being, Berengar
was of course compelled to hold as metaphysically absurd Lanfranc’s
doctrine of total change of “inner essence,” while the “visible appear­
ances” remain.11 The bread cannot cease to be bread and yet retain,
as Lanfranc says, “certain qualities” of bread, for these qualities pertain
to the essential form of bread, and if the qualities are present, the bread
is present too.12 Lanfranc is so stupid as to assert that the flesh of
Christ is sensibly on the altar, that the flesh is colored, that the color
is seen—and yet that the flesh itself remains invisible.13 But in the
estimation of Berengar his own logic is inexorable. If anything is sen­
sibly on the altar it must be seen; and if anything is seen, it cannot
be other than its appearances proclaim it to be.14 Berengar of course
erred in attributing to the Catholics the belief that after the Consecra­
tion the accidents of bread inhere in Christ’s Body as their subject;15
8 D.S.C., p. 182: “Quis videns colorem marmoris . . . vel quodcumque in subiecto
illo sit marmore, contendat vecordissimus, se colorem illum et non marmor videre, cum
causa videndi coloris cuiuscunque, quod in subiecto est, subiecti ipsius visio sit?”
9 Ibid., p. 127: “. . . si supervestiatur facies tua colore Aethiopis, necesse est faciem
tuam videri, si colorem illum constituerit videri.”
10 D.S.C., p. 171: ‘‘Et apud eruditos enim constat, et eis, qui vecordes non sint,
omnino est perceptibile, nulla ratione colorem videri, nisi contingat etiam coloratum
videri.”
Harnack, op. cít, p. 49, n. 4, has an interesting note on Berengar’s sensist meta­
physics: “Here Berengar emphasized the correct logical reflection, ‘quod in subjecto erat
superesse quacunque ratione non potest corrupto subjecto,’ (D.s.c., p. 93) i.e. when the
substance is destroyed, the essential attributes (taste, color, form) cannot remain behind;
or p. 59: ‘non potest res ulla aliquid esse, si desinat ipsum esse.’ Even Protestant his­
torians will take no account of such reasons.”
11 Berengar’s statement of Lanfranc’s doctrine appears in D.s.c., p. 92: ‘‘Posse
aliquid absumi per corruptionem subiecti, cuius tamen proprietates minime absumantur,
revera supersint.” Cf. p. 93.
12 D.s.c., p. 92: “Quod autem scribis: cuius nonnullas retinet qualitates . . . multum
te errare manifestas.”
D.s.c., p. 93 : “Contra nunquam quilibet panis esse per corruptionem subiecti desinet,
nisi id, per quod non lapis, non caro, sed panis, erat, forte amiserit.”
13 Ibid., p. 182: “Quid porro vecordius dici potuit, quam quod tu dicis, carnem esse
sensualiter in altari, et eam carnem colorem habere, eumque colorem, qui in subjecto sit
carne, videri oculis corporis, ut caro ipsa maneat invisibilis?”
14 Ibid., p. 127: Dicebas enim portiunculam illam carnis Christi panis esse colore
adopertam, quod dicens, asserere eam invisibilem non poteras.”
15 D.s.c., p. 182: “. . . et eam carnem colorem habere, eumque colorem, qui in
subiecto sit carne. . . .**

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

69

but this is a finer point of Catholic doctrine which he could not well
have learned from Lanfranc’s treatise. Lanfranc had not handled it ex­
plicitly; the point awaited clarification from Alger of Liege.
Berengar’s second argument against the doctrine of substantial con­
version was drawn from his analysis of the concept of change as it was
conceived in the dialectical tradition. According to the pseudo-Augustinian Categoriae decem,16 the process of “movement,”17 or substitution,
by which one concrete object begins to exist in place of another, is ac­
complished in one of three ways : the passage from non-being to being :
“generatio subiecti,” from being to non-being: “corruptio subiecti,” or
from being to being: “subiectum in subiectum.”18 Only the last of these
may properly be called “change,” since it alone involves two terms really
existing. The author of the Categoriae decem distinguishes “immuta­
tion,” which is the process of substitution generally considered, from
“commutation,” or change, and makes the latter a species of the
former.19
When Berengar studied Lanfranc’s doctrine in the light of these
distinctions, he concluded that the theory of a substantial change of
bread and wine did not involve true change at all, but a double process,
a substitution of one subject in place of another. The bread ceases to
exist by a destruction of the subject; the Body of Christ begins to exist
by a generation of the subject.20 According to Lanfranc, the effect of
consecration is that the elements, the bread and wine, cease to exist in
their own proper nature.21 The elements are therefore annihilated as
substantial principles,22 but continue to exist as accidents.23 And to
replace them the Body and Blood of Christ enter in their own proper
being.24 But such a process must truly involve a new beginning of the
Body of Christ, a true generatio subjecti, an effect which results from
16 [St. Augustine], Categoriae decem, PL 32: 1419-1440.

17 Ibid., col. 1439: “De motu.”

18 Ibid., “Omnis immutatio ... fit tribus modis: aut ex non subiecto in subiectum;
. . . aut ex subiecto in non subiectum; . . . aut ex subiecto in subiectum, ut est motus.’’
19 Ibid., col. 1440: “Namque immutatio genus est, commutatio species subiecta
motui, quam immutationis speciem diximus.”
20 D.s.c., p. 90: “. . . fit de pane per generationem subiecti sui et corruptionem
subiecti ipsius panis. ...
¡
21 Ibid., p. 122: “secundum proprietatem naturae.”
22 Ibid., p. 69: “quasi consecratio aliqua illud, quod consecretur, per corruptionem
subiecti absumat.”
23 Ibid., p. 220: “minime secundum subiectum, secundum materialem proprietatem,
sed secundum accidens.”
24 Ibid.-. ' ‘cruorem secundum materialem proprietatem.”

70

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

the destruction of the bread, as a cause.25 On no point is Berengar
more insistent than that the realist doctrine involves an innovation on
the part of Christ’s Body and Blood, a beginning of existence for Christ
Himself26—and such a thing, of course, is impossible.

Along with his view of a double process of destruction and genera­
tion went Berengar’s grossly materialistic conception of the theory of his
opponents. He attributed gratuitously to Paschasius and Lanfranc the
opinion that after the Consecration, the Body of Christ begins to exist
on the altar, not in its entirety, but in “little pieces : ”
According to the error of the mob, and of the monk, Paschasius,
there is nothing in the altar after the Consecration but a little portion
of Flesh and Blood.27

It is true that at rare intervals he seems to fall away from this position," s
but generally he alludes to the orthodox view in the crudest terms,29 and
the portiuncula carnis et sanguinis appears endlessly repeated throughout
his treatise.30

But such a view as he understood it—that the bread and wine should
be annihilated, that the Body of Christ, or a portion of it, should begin
to exist sensibly on the altar, and yet itself remain unseen—was mon­
strous to Berengar, and entangled in contradition. In the first
place it seemed to him incompatible with divine Providence that God
should annihilate an existing thing.31 And even if bread could be de­
stroyed it was even more absurd that the Body of Christ should have a
new beginning on the altar. The thought of a beginning of Christ’s
Body is incompatible with the Christian religion.32 Christ has been
in heaven for a thousand years, seated at the right hand of His Father
in glorious immortality. He will leave the heavenly throne only for the
25 Ibid., p. 94: “causa fuerunt generationi.”

26 Ibid., p. 245: “quia in evidenti res est, Christi corpus . . . minime nunc posse
incipere. . . .”
Ibid.: “tu desipis nunc primum esse incipere.”
Ibid., p. 90: “nec potest usquequaque nunc incipere esse.”
Cf. pp. 91, 200, 203, 244, 252, etc.
27 Ibid., p. 174: “Secundum errorem vulgi atque Paschasii monachi, nichil esse in
altari post consecrationem nisi portiunculam carnis et sanguinis."
28 D.S.C., p. 245: “Christi corpus, tam pro toto, quam pro parte.”
29 Ibid., p .281 : “in ipsam Christi corporis massam.”
30 Ibid., pp. 45, 81, 84, 109, 114, 119, 127, 130, 140, 168, 189, 194, 197, 203.
242.
31 Ibid., p. 246.
32 Ibid., p. 91. 96 1f.

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

71

last judgment. Before the end of time, therefore, a presence of Christ’s
Body on earth is impossible.33

Moreover, it is the view of Lanfranc, according to Berengar, that
a little portion of Christ’s flesh is on the altar, and that this little por­
tion is broken by the hands of the priest and tom by the teeth of the
faithful. But such a view would destroy the impassibility of the Risen
Body of the Saviour. The Flesh of Christ is imperishable; it is no
longer subject to suffering.34 Portions of His Body cannot be on the
altar unless His Body is cut up in heaven and the pieces placed on the
altar.35 But the Body of Christ cannot be cut up into sections, because
it is incorruptible.

And further, continues Berengar, even in the supposition that the
Body of Christ in the Eucharist is not cut up into sections, but is whole
and entire in one Host, then it could not at the same time be present in
other Hosts.36 For Berengar, every corporeal object is essentially subject
to the laws of space, and the heavenly Body of Christ is no exception.
If the Body of Christ were actually present on the altar, there would
be in existence at the same time a million bodies of Christ.37 Lan­
franc calls the Eucharistic Flesh invisible, but the glorious Body of
Christ, though incorruptible, is visible and palpable, entirely subject to
corporality.38 It is impossible that the Body should be sensibly present
on the altar; and if it were sensibly present, it would have to be sensibly
seen.39
There is another process by which one object may begin to exist in
33 Ibid., pp. 90-91 : “Non ergo caro Christi, quae per mille iam annos constat im­
mortalitate, nec potest usquequaque nunc incipere esse, fit de pane per generationem
subiecti sui et corruptionem subiecti ipsium panis, quia caro illa nec absumi potest, quia
immortalis et incorruptibilis est, ut destructa et restituta, iterum esse incipiat.’’
Cf. pp. 94 tf., 148 f.. 203, 244.

34 Ibid., p. 34: “incorruptibile.” Cf. p. 206; p. 45; “impassibilitatem evangeliza!
Paulus.”
35 Ibid., p. 200: “Portiunculam Christi in altari adesse, fieri non potest, nisi in coelo
corpus Christi desecetur et desecta de eo particula ad altare submittatur.”
Cf. pp. 203, 244.
36 Ibid., p. 158: “nec ultra per partes desecari contingat;” p. 145: “insecabile quia
incorruptibile.”
37 Ibid., p. 198.
38 Ibid., p. 247: “minimeque portiunculam ipsam videri, videri tamen colorem, qui
sit in subiecto;” p. 195: “visibile et palpabile.” Cf. pp. 199, 200, 247.
39 Ibid., p. 158: "tu tamen inconcessibilis hoc fecisti, qui negare persistis, carnem
Christi rl sanguinem, qune adesse post consecrationem in sacrificio tu confingis sensualiter,
viden oculis coiporis in altari.”
( I. pp 149, 198 if.. 244. etc.

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The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

place of another, not through a double process of annihilation and sub­
stitution, but through a change of form. Gold can become a ring, brass
a dish, marble can be shaped into a pear, and wood into a table. In each
of these cases, the original material remains, and has simply received
a new form through the workmanship of a divine or human artificer.40
But such a process is exactly the opposite of the change which Lanfranc
alleges to have taken place in the Eucharist, where the material is said
to have changed, while the form remains. And the original objection
of Berengar applies again : “non potest res aliquid esse, si desinat ipsum
esse.”41 Moreover, to assert that Christ’s Body could take up new qual­
ities, the form of bread, for example, would suppose some perfectibility in
Him, some lack which new forms could supply.42 But such a thought is
degrading to Christ.
In sum, Berengar’s critique of realism based upon the dialectical an­
alysis of the concept of change led him to the conclusion that the ortho­
dox opinion was contradictory at every point. That bread and wine
should be destroyed and replaced by Christ’s Body beginning to exist
upon the altar is contradictory to the immortality of Christ in glory for
a thousand years. That little pieces of His Body should be really pres­
ent on the altar would destroy His impassibility and incorruptibility.
On the other hand, a view that His Body is in the Eucharist whole and
entire would annul the unity of the Body, since a corporeal object, sub­
ject to the laws of space, can exist in only one place at a time. Again,
the theory that Christ’s Body is invisible on the altar, though clothed
with the accidents of bread, would oppose the corporality of Christ’s
glorified Body, and would lead to the further absurdity that the essen­
tial properties of an object may remain even though the object itself has
ceased to exist. And finally, it will be useless for his opponents to claim
that there is involved here a simple change a subiecto in subiectum,
since such a change requires necessarily that its final term be something
which did not exist before the change took place, and is brought into
existence through a change of form. But in this alleged Eucharistic
change, the term, the Body of Christ, is already in existence, while no
40 D.s.c., p. 79: “iure materiae nomine appelantur, quod facta sunt de materia, quia
non amisit ipsa materia formam suam, ut per corruptionem subiecti transiret in aliud, sed
idem subiectum propter eam, quam habebat, aliam nutu divino aut artificis studio formam
accepit.”
41 Jbid., p. 59.
42 Jbid., p. 95: ‘‘qui Christi corpus asserit adhuc esse corruptioni vel generationi
obnoxium, vel quarumcumque qualitatum vel collineationum, quas prius non habuerit,
susceptivum. . .

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

73

change of form takes place. This is a pattern of absurdity to Berengar,
unworthy of God, and incomprehensible to reason.
Berengar’s third major point in his argument against the substantial
conversion consisted in an attack on the phrasing of the formula to
which he had been compelled to give assent at Rome in 1059. This
formula is of primary importance in the history of the controversy.43
We have already seen how Lanfranc formally demolished Berengar’s
poorly phrased argument in the earlier treatise; and we shall see the
term solummodo of the formula entering into the dispute concerning
the nature of the sacrament. But we are interested here in its use by
Berengar as an argument against the substantial conversion.

The formula of 1059 was the work of Cardinal Humbert. In its
positive part, this formula carried the phrase,
The bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after the Conse­
cration, are not only a sacrament, but also the true Body and Blood of
Our Lord, Jesus Christ.44

In the earlier opusculum, Berengar attempted to turn this expression
against Humbert, saying that “the enemy of truth willy-nilly asserts
the truth.”45 Humbert, the enemy of truth, intended to deny that the
bread and wine remain; but by placing bread and wine as subject of an
affirmative proposition he merely asserted that they do remain. Thus
Humbert, against his will, testified to the truth, namely that the bread
and wine remain.
In the De sacra coena, Berengar rectified the error of form which
43 Lanf., PL 150: 410D—411 A: “Ego Berengarius, indignus diaconus Ecclesiae
Sancti Mauricii Andegavensis, cognoscens veram catholicam et apostolicam fidem, anath­
ematizo omnem haeresim, praecipue eam de qua hactenus infamatus sum, quae astruere
conatur panem et vinum quae in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem solummodo sacra­
mentum, et non verum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Jesu Christi esse, nec posse
sensualiter in solo sacramento manibus sacerdotum tractari, vel frangi, aut fidelium denti­
bus atteri. Consentio autem sanctae Romanae et apostolicae sedi, et ore et corde profi­
teor de sacramentis Dominicae mensae eam fidem tenere quam dominus et venerabilis
papa Nicolaus, et haec sancta synodus auctoritate evangelica et apostolica tenendam
tradidit, mihique firmavit; scilicet panem et vinum quae in altari ponuntur, post conse­
crationem non solum sacramentum, sed etiam verum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri
Jesu Christi esse, et sensualiter non solum sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacer­
dotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri, jurans per sanctam et homoousion
Trinitatem, et per haec sacrosancta Christi Evangelia. Eos vero qui contra hanc fidem
vrnriint, cum dogmatibus et sectatoribus suis aeterno anathemate dignos esse pronuntio.
Quod si rgo ipse aliquando aliquid contra haec sentire aut praedicare praesumpsero,
subjaceam canonum severitati. Lecto et perlecto sponte subscripsi."
Il Lanf., PL IMi 411 A
Ibhl , 41 I H "Qllia velitatis inimicus, velit nolit, veiilalem assalii."

74

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

had weakened his earlier phrasing of the argument and pressed home
the point in all its strength. Here he uses a general negation, not a mere
particular: “No affirmation can stand if part breaks down.”46 A prop­
osition must stand as a whole in its subject and in its predicate. If
Humbert sets up as his subject “the bread and wine of the altar,” and
as his predicate “are true Body and Blood of Christ,” he cannot deny
either term.4’ Berengar uses as an example the proposition, “Christus
vincit.” If the proposition is to stand as a whole, then “Christus” must
stand and “vincit” must stand.48

Therefore, the formula as Humbert and Lanfranc understand it,
ends in a contradiction in terms. If they hold that there is no bread
on the altar after the Consecration, but only the Body of Christ, they
are saying that that which no longer exists is something; they attempt
to give some determination to nothingness, which is absurd. The rule
of dialectics, closely related to Berengar’s concept of being, is invincible :
Whatever exists, is one thing in that it is, another in that it is some­
thing; and it cannot be anything if it does not exist.49

If the bread and wine of the altar are the true Body and Blood of
Christ, the bread and wine remain. If you say Socrates is just, you say
he is something; but he cannot be just if he does not exist.50

But Berengar does not entirely reject the proposition, “The bread
and wine are the true Body and Blood of Christ.” The proposition in­
deed is true, but not as Humbert and Lanfranc understand it. If a
term is predicated of another term of which it is not predicable literally,
the relation is therefore “tropical,” or symbolical. In the Gospels, Christ
is called lion, lamb, chief corner-stone, and the Apostle says that the
46 D.s.c., p. 21 1 : “Omnis affirmatio non constabit parte subruta.”
Cf. p. 234: “Omnis enuntiatio amissa parte altera utra, praedicatum dico atque subiectum, constare non poterit.”

47 Ibid., p. 107 f. Cf. pp. 30 f, 85.
48 Ibid., p. 107: “Ita cum enuntiatio, quae dicit: Christus vincit, duas habeat partes,
subiectum id, quod est Christus, praedicatum, quod est: vincit, quicumque mihi id totum
dederit, quod est: Christus vincit, necessario ad eam partem, quae est Christus, et eam,
quae est; vincit, dedisse convincitur.”

49 Ibid., p. 70: “verumque invincibiliter manet, omne, quod est, aliud est in eo,
quod est, aliud in eo quod aliquid est, nec posse quippiam aliquid esse, cui contingat
ipsum non esse.”
50 Ibid., “Ac per hoc cum dicitur, panis in altari consecratus ... est Christi corpus,
omni veritate panis superesse conceditur. Verbi gratia, si enuntias: Socrates iustus est,
aliquid eum esse constitutisti. nec potest iustus esse, si contingat Socratem non esse

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

75

rock was Christ; these predicates are all figures of speech.51 Similarly,
in the proposition, “The bread is the Body of Christ,” there is a literal
term and a figurative term, and the subject cannot be said to have passed
out of existence.52
Some of the older Catholic writers, Mabillon, for example, have
found in Berengar’s readiness to accept the language of realism, indica­
tion that he accepted the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist, while he rejected substantial conversion. At the Synod of
Tours, held in 1054 under the presidency of Hildebrand, he was per­
mitted to swear to a realistic formula which contained no reference to
the disappearance of the bread and wine. Berengar constantly affirmed
that the bread and wine of the altar after Consecration are the
Body and Blood of Christ.5354
56He even spoke of a conversion as having
55
taken place in the Eucharist. But he insists that there be careful un­
derstanding of what he means by conversion, since his interpretation is
different from that of Lanfranc.For Berengar, the conversion that
takes place in the Eucharist is “through Consecration,” and is closely
connected with his theory of the sacrament.50 The Eucharist through
Consecration becomes the sanctifiying Body of Christ, but in no such
way that the bread ceases to exist;57 and after the Consecration, the
51 D.s.c., p. 83: “Constat enim apud eruditionem tuam, non minus tropica locutione
dici: panis, qui ponitur in altari, post consecrationem est corpus Christi et vinum san­
guis, quum dicitur: Christus est leo, Christus est agnus, Christus est summus angularis
lapis, totique illi tropicae locutionis generi unum patere, non amplius, exitum.”
Cf. pp. 84, 234, 279.

Cf. Ep. ad Adelm., Marlène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, 4: 111B;
112A.
52 D.s.c., p. 70: “Utrumlibet horum concesseris, panem superesse post consecra­
tionem in mensa dominica, omni procul dubio concessisti, multumque a seipso dissidet,
qui dicit, panem in altari materialiter absumi.”
53 Ibid., p. 52: “Scripsi ergo ego ipse, quod iurarem: panis atque vinum altaris
post consecrationem sunt corpus Christi et sanguis.”
54 Ibid., pp. 56-57: “Quod de conversione, . . . ego interim dico: panem et vinum
per consecrationem converti in altari in verum Christi corpus et sanguinem.”
55 Ibid., p. 57: “Dum dicis, converti in veram Christi carnem et sanguinem, quam
diceres conversionem, (est enim multiplex et vera conversio) minime assignasti.”

56 Ibid., p. 161 : “Est ergo vero procul dubio panis et vini per consecrationem
allnris conversio in corpus Christi et sanguinem, sed attendendum quod dicitur: per con
srcralionem, quia hic est huius conversionis modus."
57 Ibid., p. 97: “Sed non ut i|»*r panis per corruptionem esse (lesinai panis, sed iioii
ut corpus < luisti nun incipiat per generationem sui, quia ante lot lempoin beata constans
immorlalilalr, non potrai coipus illud etiam nunc incipere,”

76

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

bread is called bread in a proper way of speaking, but the Body of
Christ, “tropically,” or figuratively.5S
In spite of his protestations of belief in the presence of Christ in
the Eucharist, it is clear therefore that he thought of the Eucharist as
no more than a symbol of Christ’s Body, which itself remains in heaven.
Vernet suggests that in his earlier stage of development, Berengar held
for a vague impanationism.58
59 But this belief cannot be found in his
developed thought. A presence of Christ’s historical Body on the altar
in some other way than through substantial change would be for him
as contradictory as a presence through substantial change. The Body
of Christ cannot possibly be in heaven and on earth at the same time.
When we analyze Berengar’s concept of the Eucharist as sacrament,
we shall see more clearly the meaning of “conversion” in his understand­
ing of the term; but it is sufficient to point out here that it involved no
idea of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist beyond that of a symbol.
In the three arguments which have been analyzed consisted the sub­
stance of the Berengarian critique of the orthodox doctrine of sub­
stantial conversion. The latter two arguments are within the field of
formal dialectics, the first in that border land where the pre-scholastic
dialectics merged into immature metaphysical concepts. Berengar failed
to achieve a true concept of the Holy Eucharist because his philosophy
was unable to distinguish in a concrete object between its essential com­
ponents and its non-essential qualities. This failure of his philosophy
made the Eucharist an extremely difficult concept for him; but his rejec­
tion of the magisterium of the Church made him a heretic. It is true
that during the pre-scholastic period the terms “materia” and “forma,”
“substantia” and “accidens,” did not have the meaning which the Aris­
totelian metaphysics, as yet unknown, would give them. But the neces­
sary distinctions were present in the traditional literature of the Euchar­
ist, where a line had been drawn between the inner reality, which had
been bread and wine, but which becomes the Body and Blood of Christ,
and the accidental elements which remain.

But these distinctions were impossible in the philosophy of Berengar.
In his identification of “accidens” with “forma,” the accident is not a
non-essential qualification of the subject, but enters into its essential
58 ibid.. p. 87:
. ubi panem, qui proprie panis appelletur, corpus etiam Christi,
sed tropica locutione, quantum ad eam propositionem, quae enuntiat: panis altaris post
consecrationem est corpus Christi, nulla falsitate dissimulat appellari.” Cf. p. 84.
59 “Bérenger de Tours,” DTC 5: 727-728.

I lie (

Concerning the Substantial Conversion

77

composition. Thus his philosophy is thoroughly sensist and empirical.
Sensible experience is the only sure means of knowledge. Nothing ex­
ists except what can be seen and touched, and the senses perceive at
once and directly not only the accidents, but the hidden reality in its
entirely.60

Nearly all writers who have discussed the Berengarian controversy
have pointed out the nominalist tendency in his philosophy—tendency,
rather than actuality, since developed nominalism had not yet appeared.
If the senses, which perceive only the particular, grasp nevertheless the
total reality of being, then it would seem that for Berengar nothing is
universal but all is individual. If the universal, then, has no reality, it
becomes a mere concept, or perhaps a name. Doubtless Berengar did
not advert to the general implications of his Eucharistic theory, and
that is why some writers have spoken of a “special nominalism, limited
to a single point.”61
Some writers have seen in Berengar’s sensism, combined with his
thoroughgoing nationalism and rejection of traditional authority, a ten­
dency towards skepticism, or the denial of mysterious elements in re­
ligion.62 This does not seem entirely implausible.63 If the real pres­
ence of Our Lord in the Eucharist is to be rejected because it is contrary
to the evidence of the senses, then the doctrine of the hypostatic union
might be rejected on similar grounds. If we are to trust Guitmund of
Aversa, Berengar’s insistence on the full corporality of the glorified
60 Clerval, Les Écoles de Chartres, pp. 119-120, notes that Berengar, in spite of his
declarations upon the dignity of reason, is in reality as much opposed to reason as to
authority: from intellectualism he passes to sensism.
Cf. Heitz, Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Béren­
ger de Tours à S. Thomas d'Aquin, p. 4; and Heurtevent, op. cil., p. 42.
Cf. Guitmund, PL 149: 1485A: “Illi quippe judicium sensuum transcendere non
valentes, tanquam ex infirmitate errasse videri possunt.”
61 Vernet, DTC 5: 729, citing de Rémusat, Abelard, Paris, 1845, 1: 358: “un
nominalisme spécial ou restraint à une seule question.”
Harnack, op. cil., p. 49, speaks of Berengar’s nominalist tendency; admits the logi­
cal correctness of his position, but dismisses its metaphysical value with the comment,
‘‘Even Protestant historians will take no account of such reasons.”
Geiselmann, op. cit., p. 339, n. 1, speaks of Berengar’s “covert nominalism.”
Cf. Clerval, op. cit., p. 120.
62 Faivre, E., La question de l'autorité au moÿen-age, Paris, 1890, p. 37; Reuter,
H., Ceschichie der religiòsen Auffylarung in Mittelaller, 2 vols., Berlin, 1875-1877, 1 : 97.

63 Harnack, op. cit., p. 46, and Macdonald, op. cit., p. 303, n. 3, emphatically
reject these suggestions of Faivre and Reuter. However, it is to the purpose of both
Harnack and Macdonald to save Berengar’s orthodoxy as a believer in revealed reli­
gion, while maintaining his separation from the Catholic Church.

78

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Body of Christ led him to contradict the Gospel on at least one point :
that of the appearance of the Risen Lord to the Apostles januis clausis.64
Geiselmann says that Berengar rejected the doctrine of the preservation
of the integrity of Mary’s body in the birth of Our Lord, in his conten­
tion that it would have been impossible for Christ to have been bom
utero clauso.65 But the attribution of further heresies to Berengar is
based at most on hints and rumors found in the writings of his contem­
poraries, and in certain obscure statements of his own. One can justi­
fiably speak only of a tendency towards skepticism, necessarily con­
nected with his rationalism and his rejection of the authority of the
Church.
Berengar was of course wholly unjustified in his attribution to Paschasius and Lanfranc of the crudely materialistic theory of a real pres­
ence of portions of Christ’s Body on the altar. Although Paschasius in­
sisted on a physical presence, he was equally insistent on the spiritual
mode of that presence, and Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger, as we
shall see, were even more emphatic upon the integrity of Christ’s Body
under the Eucharistic species. Berengar’s misunderstanding is in large
part traceable to the language of the Humbertian formula of 1059:
. et sensualiter non solum sacramento, sed in veritate manibus sacer­
dotum tractari, frangi, et fidelium dentibus atteri.” The language of
the formula was far from perfect: it provided ground for a capharnaitic misinterpretation of the traditional view, and it was entirely silent
upon the mode of the presence of Our Lord through a substantial con­
version. But it was drawn up in such form precisely to prevent equivo­
cation by Berengar, who was always willing to swear to his belief that
the Body of Christ was really present, so long as this did not disturb the
continuance of the bread and wine.66 The Anglican writer Darwell
Stone has pointed out that such realistic expressions as appear in the
formula of 1059 “were used by many as clumsy ways of expressing the
64 Guitmund, *PL 149: 1480B: “Sed quid mirum, si Patrum historias Berengarius
et sui despiciunt qui Evangelio etiam contradicunt, dicentes nullatenus debere credi quod
ibi legitur intrasse ad discipulos Dominum Jesum januis clausis (Jn. 20: 19?”).
65 Op. cit., p. 333. Cf. D.S.C., p. 290.
Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 215-216, interprets Geiselmann as saying that Berengar
denied the virginal birth. Macdonald replies that Berengar had no intention to trifle
with this doctrine, but only to dismiss current errors which held Christ to have been
bom as a developed man, in some miraculous way analogous to the formation of Eve
from Adam’s side. But Geiselmann’s point seems to deal with the virginal birth only in
the broad sense of the physical integrity of Mary not only ante partum but in partu.
Cf. Cone. Lateranense (649), DB 256.
66 See the luminous comment of St. Thomas on this formula in Sum. Theol., 3,
q.77, a.7, ad 3.

The C oliliovrrajp ( <»n< crniiiy llic Substantial Conversion

79

conviction that the Sacrament which is so held and broken and crushed
is the Body and Blood of Christ.”67

2.

The Orthodox Rejoiner

In this section, an effort will be made to develop the teaching of
Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger concerning the doctrine of substantial
conversion. The inquiry will be directed along three lines: first, the
analysis of the conversion as it is found in these writers; second, their
teaching concerning the condition of Christ’s Body in the Eucharist;
and third, their study of the Eucharistic accidents. In a certain sense,
the three great anti-Berengarian writers may be handled collectively,
since their teaching taken together represents the actual position of tradi­
tional theology at a critical moment of the history of dogma. But from
another aspect, they must be studied individually, since at every point
development may be seen among them : of Guitmund and Alger upon
Lanfranc, and sometimes of Alger upon both of his predecessors. These
points of development will be noted in the course of our study.
Further, the adversaries of Berengar will be studied here, not directly
in the light of their patrology, which forms the greatest part of their
work, but in that of dialectics; and our purpose will be to bring out
the personal contribution which rational speculation enabled each of
them to make to the deeper understanding of the traditional Eucharistic
doctrine. This method of procedure is dictated by our general aim,
which is to study the Berengarian controversy in the framework of pre­
scholastic theology and the pre-scholastic method. But it is admittedly
a partial study, and it has certain disadvantages.

In the first place, the Eucharistic theology of Berengar, as we have
seen, is rooted in a philosophical error, his failure to see a real distinc­
tion between the corporeal substance and its accidents, and his conse­
quent conviction that a separation of the two would be contradictory.
But we will look in vain in Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger for a
simply philosophical reply to this philosophical error. Their philosophy
was not sufficiently advanced to set up such a thesis. For them the
actual separation which takes place in the Eucharist is a fact contained
67 A History of the. Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, London, 1909, 2 vols., 1:
258.
Harnack, op. cit., p. 47, n.2, is therefore unfair when he speaks of the proposition.
“The Eucharist is the mystery (sacramentum) in which there is no mystery, but all
takes place vere et sensualiter," as representing “the fundamental thought of Berengar’s
opponents.”

80

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

in Scripture and tradition, and taught by the Church. The philosophical
truth that this actual separation, known by faith, was not contradictory
to reason, was implicit in their teaching, and would not indeed become
thoroughly explicit for a century or more after their time. It has been
remarked already that it is thoroughly fair to Berengar to treat his
Eucharistic theology exclusively from the viewpoint of dialectics. But
this is not true of his adversaries. For them the argument from tradi­
tion is conclusive, and the chain of patristic evidence which they helped
forge is even today of great value in showing the perennial constancy of
the Catholic doctrines of the real presence and transubstantiation.
Moreover, it is somewhat unsatisfactory to handle the teaching of
Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger as a collective response in controversy
to the heresy of Berengar. Their writing lacks the direct point for point
refutation that should be present in all controversial writing. Lanfranc
alone attacks the heretic directly, citing him word for word. But his
attack is directed against an earlier work, not the achieved doctrine of
Berengar as we find it in the De sacra coena. And besides, his avowed
reluctance to use dialectical arguments leads him to subside into silence
before the actual end of inquiry has been reached. As for the succes­
sors of Lanfranc, although their treatises were written after the De sacra
coena had appeared, yet they give no direct and undeniable evidence of
having read it. The only citation of Berengar which appears in Alger
of Liege is taken not from the De sacra coena, but from the earlier
pamphlet, as Alger doubtless found it in Lanfranc’s treatise.68 And be­
sides, both Guitmund and Alger wrote against a broader background,
concerning themselves not merely with Berengar, but also with the “Berengariani,” those mysterious disciples of Berengar who developed his
teaching and refined it.69

There is, however, great value even in a partial study of these writers.
In their Eucharistic doctrine, they carried the analysis of the doctrine
of substantial conversion to a point appreciably in advance of the simpler
formulas of the Fathers and of Paschasius Radbert; and through a more
careful study of the mode of the real presence they effectually removed
all carnal and capharnaitic elements from the realist doctrine as Beren­
gar had misinterpreted it. In the broader framework of the history of
theology, they stand at the gateway to developed scholasticism, and, in
a context of the greatest theological importance, they provide a passage
68 Alg., PL 180 : 791 CD-Lanf., PL 150: 436A.
69 See, for example, Guit., PL 149: 1430 CD; Alg., PL 180 : 739 D-740 B.

The (Oh/mhtmV C<>n< rrfiinÿ the Substantial Converaion

HI

between the conservative tradition which preceded them, and the great
progress which was to follow.
With the range of inquiry thus marked out, it is to the purpose now
to study our authors’ analysis of the Catholic doctrine of substantial con­
version. The term “substantial conversion” is used throughout, because
of course “transubstantiation” does not yet exist in the language of
Eucharistic theology. However, if the term itself is lacking, the concept
of transubstantiation is clearly contained in the writings of Lanfranc,
Guitmund, and Alger. They hold it to be the faith of the Church
throughout the world that bread and wine are placed on the altar to be
consecrated; but in the course of the consecration these elements are
incomprehensibly and ineffably changed into the substance of the Body
and Blood of Christ,70 the same Body which was born of the Virgin,71
and which hung upon the Cross.72 In their abundant formulations of
the doctrine of substantial conversion, various terms are used to desig­
nate the change. The bread and wine are “transferred” into Christ; they
are “transformed,” “converted,” “substantially changed” into the Flesh
and Blood of Christ.73 The change operates so that after it takes place
the elements cease to be what they were;74 and the change is effected in
the consecration, through the priestly benediction. '5

But the substantial conversion which takes place in the Eucharist
affects only the inner reality of the sacramental elements; the external
species, or appearances, remain unchanged. In distinguishing the sacra­
mental reality from the species, our authors make use of a text, which
had also been used by Berengar, from the Ambrosian De sacramentis:
“ut sint quae erant, et in aliud commutentur.”76 Berengar had taken
this to mean that the bread and wine remain what they were essentially,
70 Lanf., 419 A: “Confitetur enim Ecclesia, toto terrarum orbe diffusa, panem et
vinum ad sacrandum, incomprebensibiliter et ineffabiliter in substantiam camis et sangui­
nis commutari.’’
71 Ibid., 415 A.
72 Ibid., 428 B.
73 Guit., PL 149: 1436 B: “Christus panem et vinum . . . transferre in corpus et
sanguinem suum.” Cf. 1431 C.
Ibid., 1431 D: “ut videlicet in carnem et sanguinem suum panem vinumque trans­
formet.”
Guit., PL 149: 1488 B: “Sed panem et vinum altaris Domini in corpus et sanguinem
Christi substantialiter commutari.”
Alg., PL 180: 741 B: “qui elementa bruta panis et vini in suam convertit sub­
stantiam.”
74 Alg., 808 C: “Panis enim et vini substantia in corpus et sanguinem Christi con­
versa, dum facta est quod non erat, desistit esse quod fuerat.”
75 Lanf., 423 C: “Inter sacrandum vero converti in Christi carnem et sanguinem,
quas utrasque res benedictio consecravit.”

HZ

The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

but acquire new value by becoming a sacrament, a symbol of Christ’s
Body. Against this new interpretation, Lanfranc argues that no one in
his right mind could believe that a thing could be changed into some­
thing else without ceasing to be what it was.76
77 Then he sets down the
traditional interpretation :
[Ambrose] testifies that they remain what they were in their visible
appearance, but that they are changed in their inner essence into the
nature of those things which they had not been before.78

Alger of Liège is subtler than Lanfranc in discussing the same text.
Lanfranc had simply asked how a thing could change and remain the
same. But Alter distinguishes a substantial change from an accidental
change.79 And since in the Eucharist the accidents do not change, but
remain the same, therefore it is the substance of bread which ceases to
be.80 His explanation of the passage is then the same as that of Lan­
franc, with some variation of terminology.81
The most complete statement of the orthodox doctrine of substantial
conversion is contained in the long profession of faith of Lanfranc:
We believe, therefore, that the earthly substances upon the table of
the Lord are divinely sanctified through the priestly mystery and the
divine power, and are ineffably, incomprehensibly, and marvellously
changed into the essence of the Body of the Lord. The former appear­
ances and certain other qualities remain, that recipients may not refrain
from receiving through horror and disgust, and that believers may attain
to the ampler rewards of faith. Meanwhile the Body of the Lord
remains in heaven at the right hand of the Father, immortal, inviolate,
entire, untouched, and unhurt. And so, the Body of Christ on the altar
may be called the same Body which was bom of the Virgin, and not the
same. It is the same in essence, and in the propriety and power of its
true nature; it is not the same if considered in its appearances of bread
76 Supra, p. 46.
77 Lanf., 419 D: “Quis enim compos sui credit rem aliquam converti in dliam, nec
tamen in ea parte desinere esse quod erat?”
78 Ibid., 420 D: “Esse quidem secundum visibilem speciem testatur quae erant,
commutari vero secundum interiorem essentiam in naturam illarum rerum quae antea
non erant.”
79 PL 180 : 756 D: "Quidquid enim mutatur in aliud, in aliquo desinit esse quod
fuerat sive substantialiter, sive accidentaliter.”
80 Ibid., 757 A: "Sed in pane et vino cum in corpus Christi mutantur, accidentia
esse non desinunt, sed omnia remanent: ergo panis et vini substantia esse desinit.”
81 Ibid., 756 D: “secundum formam et caeteras suas qualitates ibidem remanentes,
et secundum substantiam in aliud mutentur,”
Note that Alger, like Berengar, uses "forma” as synonymous with "accidens,” but of
course without holding it to be inseparable from substance.

7 he < iniAovmu Cum

iibiH II10 Hiibulanltai Co»iverii»ii

B)

and wine, and the other qualities mentioned above. 1 his faith the
Catholic and universal Church has held from the earliest times, and
holds now.82

In this excellent formula is seen the chief contribution of Lanfranc
to the literature of the controversy. It contains in summary fashion the
doctrine of substantial conversion and the permanence of the accidents;
it effectively repudiates any capharnaitic interpretation by distinguishing
two modes of being of the Body of Christ, the natural and the sacra­
mental. And finally, it is set forth not as an opinion, but as a dogma
of the Catholic Church. Thus, Lanfranc charts the course, lays out the
field of inquiry; and every point of development in Guitmund and Alger
will be within the area marked out in Lanfranc’s profession of faith.
But the mere statement of his faith marks the end of inquiry for Lan­
franc. He will not push his investigations any further. How bread and
wine can be changed into Flesh and Blood; how the nature of the two
elements can be essentially changed, are mysteries of faith : the just man
does not seek to inquire into them.83 It is enough for Lanfranc to say
that the divine omnipotence, operating miraculously, can effect such a
marvellous change.84
Both Guitmund and Alger attempt to analyze the change, however.
Guitmund’s procedure is first to refute the theory of impanationism,
which would hold that both the substance of bread and the substance
of Christ’s Body are present in the consecrated Host. Such a theory is
contrary to reason, to the institution of Christ, to the apostolic preach­
ing, and to the universal consent of the faithful.85 It is revealed, not
82 Lanf., 430 C: “Credimus igitur terrenas substantias, quae in mensa Dominica,
per sacerdotale mysterium, divinitus sanctificantur, ineffabiliter, incomprehensibiliter,
mirabiliter, operante superna potentia, converti in essentiam Dominici corporis, reservatis
ipsarum rerum speciebus, et quibusdam aliis qualitatibus, ne percipientes cruda et cruenta,
horrerent, et ut credentes fidei praemia ampliora perciperent, ipso tamen Dominico cor­
pore existente in coelestibus ad dextream Patris, immortali, inviolato, integro incontami­
nato, illaeso; ut vere dici possit, et ipsum corpus quod de virgine sumptum sumere, et
tamen non ipsum. Ipsum quidem, quantum ad essentiam veraeque naturae proprietatem
atque virtutem; non ipsum autem, si species panis vinique speciem, caeteraque superius
comprehense; hanc fidem tenuit a priscis temporibus, et nunc tenet Ecclesia, quae per
totum diffusa orbem catholica nominatur.”
83 Lanf., 427 A: “Quonamodo panis efficiatur caro vinumque convertatur in san­
guinem, utriusque essentialiter mutata natura, justus, qui ex fide vivit, scrutari argumentis
et concipere ratione non quaerit.”
84 Ibid., “Divina tamen potentia mirabiliter operante fieri posse concedit.”
85 Guit., PL 149: 142 B: “At impanari vel invinari Christum nulla . . . expetit
ratio, nec prophetae praedixerunt, nec Christus ostendit, nec apostoli praedicaverunt, nec
mundus, exceptis his paucissimus haereticis, credidit.”

84

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

that the Body and Blood of the Lord lie hidden in the bread and wine,
but that the bread and wine are changed into the Body and Blood.86
Besides rejecting impanationism as an explanation of the real pres­
ence, Guitmund enters upon a deeper penetration through an analysis
of the concept of change. Berenger also had done this; but it is signifi­
cant that whereas Berengar’s analysis was based on the distinctions
found in the dialectical tradition, Guitmund’s is founded on Scripture.87
The first three kinds of change noted by Guitmund correspond to the
“generatio subiecti,” “corruptio subiecti,” and subiectum in subiectum”
of Berengar.88 But there is a fourth type of conversion, altogether
unique and known by faith, in which that which exists is changed into
something which is already in existence—the process in which bread and
wine are changed into the Body and Blood of Christ.89
Guitmund then sets up a claim that the Eucharistic conversion,
though mysterious, is easier for us to believe than either creation or
annihilation, since it involves two terms instead of only one.90 Thus
the Eucharist is more closely akin to the third type of change, the “sub­
jectum in subjectum,” which is most familiar to us. And he concludes
that if God can create, if He can annihilate—acts extremely difficult for
us to understand; then we ought also to believe Him able, if He wills,
to effect a change which seems easier for us to understand.91

86 Ibid., 1482: “. . . non in pane et vino corpus et sanguinem Domini latere, sed
panem et vinum in corpus et sanguinem Domini commutari docuit.”

87 Ibid., 1443 C: ‘‘Quattuor enim . . . rerum mutationes substantivas sive efficientias
nobis Scriptura divina commendat.”
88 Ibid., 1443 C: “omnino nihil in id quod sunt;” “de eo quod sunt . . . redire in
nihilum possunt;” 1444 B: “substantiae in eas quae non erant substantias . . . transeunt.”
89 Ibid., 1444 B: “Quarta vero mutatio est, quia id quod est transit in id quod nihil­
ominus est, sicut panem et vinum virtute divina in corpus Christi proprium singulari
potentia credimus commutari."

90 Ibid., 1444 C: “Illae enim duo aliqua habet; istae unum tantum.”
91 Guit., 1444 C: “illi quae usitatissima est, multo vicinior atque similior.”
Ibid., 1445 A: “facilius et intelligibilius si voluit, fecit.”
Billot, De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, 1, ed. 6, Rome, 1924, p. 368, says transubstantiation
is a more difficult truth than creation: in the latter, no positive contrary consideration
enters in to hinder assent, but there is lacking only a similar example; in the former,
however, there is a positive consideration contrary to our experience: that one subject
changes into another without any essential principle remaining common to both subjects.

The Controversy Concerning the Substantial Conversion

85

Alger of Liège also carries the analysis of the substantial change
considerably farther than Lanfranc. First he distinguishes the Euchar­
ist from Baptism and Confirmation. These two sacraments do not
possess Christ substantially, but only in His power. Only the sacrament
of the bread and wine is so changed as substantially to cease to be what
it was; its substance becomes the Body of Christ, while its form remains,
and signifies the Body of Christ and contains it.92
Alger then rejects the theory of those who hold that Christ assumes
the appearance or form of bread on the altar, as the divine Word
assumed the appearance or form of flesh in the virginal womb: as the
Word was made Flesh, so is bread made the same Flesh. Alger, too,
holds that the Word was made Flesh, and the bread becomes the same
Flesh, but in a vastly different way :
The Word was made Flesh, and was bom, flesh from flesh; the
Word assumed flesh, it was not changed into flesh. It became what it
had not been before, without ceasing to be what it was. But bread be­
comes the same Flesh: it is not born as flesh, nor does it assume flesh,
but is changed into flesh. It becomes what it had not been before, in
such a way as to cease to be what it was.93*

Moreover, in the virginal womb, the divine Word assumed the appear­
ance or form of flesh along with the substance, while on the altar, the
substance alone of the bread is changed, while its appearance or form
•
94
remains.
Further, Alger distinguishes the Eucharistic change from the natural
change which takes place when food is brought into the body. In this
he is opposing the singular conception of those who held that the
eucharistie bread is changed into “new flesh” of Christ, as ordinary
food is changed into bodily tissue. But the change which takes place in
the Eucharist per gratiam is far different from that which takes place
92 Alg., PL 180: 761 A: “ita mutatur, ut substantialiter sit quod ante fuerat; sed
substantia eius corpus Christi fiat, forma vero remanens ipsum significet et contineat.’’

93 lbid.t 755 AB: “Revera enim Verbum fit caro, et panis fit eadem caro; sed
longe diverso modo. Verbum fit caro, et nascitur caro de carne, assumendo carnem, non
mutatum in carnem : sic factum quod non fuerat, ut non desisteret esse quod erat. Panis
autem fit eadem caro, non nascitur caro, nec assumit carnem, sed mutatur in carnem; sic
factus quod non erat, ut desistat esse quod fuerit.
«4 Ibid., 755 CD: ' “cum in utero sumpserit speciem vel formam cum substantia, in
altari vero speciem vrl formam pani» mutala el non permanente substantia.*'

86

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

per naturam. For in the digestive process, says Alger, even as it con­
cerned the natural Body of Christ on earth, food is changed into new
flesh, not through a change of substance but of form, and the flesh
which results is natural flesh, subject to corruption.95 And he continues,
But in the sacrament of the altar, the substance is changed and not
the form, the bread and wine do not become new flesh; but the existing
substance of bread and wine is changed into the pre-existing substance
of the Body of Christ.96

And Alger adds the important note that the “novelty” which befalls the
bread in no way entails newness of existence on the part of Christ, and
the change in the bread causes no change in Christ.97

Thus, there is involved in this rejection of a ridiculous error an im­
portant clarification of the doctrine of transubstantiation—namely that
in the eucharistie conversion the entire action is exercised on the bread;
no action is exercised on Christ’s Body : no “bringing” of Christ to the
altar, no “production” or “reproduction” of Christ’s Body on the
altar.98
Alger’s positive analysis of the substantial conversion is based on
the De mysteriis of St. Ambrose.99 In Chapter 9, Ambrose, wishing to
illustrate the eucharistie change, had made use of Old Testament anal­
ogies. Moses had held a rod and it became a serpent; he touched a
rock and water gushed forth. St. Ambrose argues that if the human
benediction of Moses was so powerful as to change the nature of things,
how much more powerful must be the divine consecration effected
through the words of Christ. Further, the sermo Christi was able to
95 Ibid., 766 C: “In stomacho enim Christi panis et vinum, non mutata vel defici­
ente substantia, sed forma, novam carnem et novum sanguinem, corruptioni aliquatenus
obnoxium, sicut in caeteris hominibus generavit.’’
Here it should be noted that Alger does not mean to deny that in a natural trans­
formation the form alone, i.e. the accidents, are changed. He only means to point out
that in every natural transformation something of the transformed element subsists, the
terminus a quo never disappears completely. While in the Eucharist, on the contrary,
only the appearances of bread and wine remain. Cf. Brigué, Alger de Liege, p. 81.
96 Ibid., “in sacramento autem, mutata substantia non forma, panis et vinum non fit
nova caro et novus sanguis, sed existens substantia panis et vini mutatur in coexistentem
substantiam corporis Christi.”
97 Alg., 766 C: “ita ut novitate sua nihil in ipso innovat, mutatione sua nihil
immutet.’’
98 Cf. de la Taille, op. cit., p. 637, Billot, op. cit., pp. 346-349. Alger’s teaching
here contains that “purity” of concept of transubstantiation, which was current among
the “veteres scholastici,” and which Billott and de la Taille have emphasized, as opposed
to the complicated processes of certain “recentiores.”

/'Ac ( 'onlroversp Concerning the Substantial Conversion

87

create all things from nothing; it should also be able to perform the
lesser marvel of changing the natures of things which exist already. And
Ambrose concludes, with regard to the Eucharist: “Et hoc quod con­
ficimus ex virgine est.”

Alger says that Ambrose has distinguished three types of divine
activity: creation, mutation, and the eucharistie conversion. God has
ceased creating;99
100 He has communicated to creatures as secondary
causes the power to effect substantial changes through a change of form
(mutation) ;101 the third change, entirely unique, is exclusively the pre­
rogative of the divine word spoken in consecration :102
The Body of Christ in the sacrament is not believed to be created,
as in the primary origin of nature; nor is the bread changed in form, as
in the usual process which God has communicated to nature; but in an
entirely new and unheard of way the substance of bread is so changed
into the substance of the Body of Christ as to cease to be bread, except
in appearance, while the Body of Christ remains entirely unchanged.103

Thus it is clear that Alger of Liège has carried the analysis of the
substantial conversion to a point of development considerably in ad­
vance of Lanfranc and even of Guitmund. He has refuted impanationism, has distinguished the eucharistie conversion from creation and from
natural processes of change which are effected through a change of
form, and has emphasized the fact that the change affects the bread only
and not at all the Body of Christ. It is only then that Alger, as Lan­
franc had done at a much earlier stage in the inquiry, sets a limit to
rational investigation. If one seeks to know how a corruptible thing can
be changed into an incorruptible thing; an existing thing into a pre­
-existing Body;104 how the new can be changed into the old without
99 J. Quasten, ed., Monumenta eucharistica et liturgica vetustissima. Pars III.
(Florilegium Patristicum, Fase. 7), Bonn, 1936, pp. 133-135.
100 Alg. PL 180; 768 A: “quorum quia ab altero quievit.”
101 Ibid., “alterum naturae communicavit.”
102 Ibid., “Tertium privilegium divini sermonis adseribens subiecit.”
103 Ibid., 786 AB: "Nec de nihilo credatur corpus Christi creari in sacramento,
secundum primariae naturae originem, nec panis formam mutari secundum naturae communictam consuetudinem ; sed novo et inaudito modo ita mutari substantiam panis in
substantiam corporis Christi, ut panis non sit, sed appareat esse quod fuerat, et corpus
Christi non desistat esse quod erat."
For an analysis of Berengar’s explanation of the same Ambrosian passage, see
Schnitzer, Berengar von Tours, p. 291. Berengar twisted the clear meaning of Ambrose
beyond all recognition.
104 Ibid., 766 D: “Existens in coexistentem.”

88

The Eucharistic Controversy of t/ic Eleventh Century

change or innovation of the latter;100 the answer must be that these
things are part of the mystery of faith. And Alger cites Lanfranc’s
words, which he attributes, however, to Augustine, “in libro Sententi­
arum Prosperi.” 105
106
In answer to the crudity of Berengar’s conception of the realist
doctrine of the real presence, Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger made
important contributions to the better understanding of the actual con­
dition of Christ’s Body in the Eucharist. Berengar had held that the
idea of a physical presence of Christ upon the altar necessarily involved
an absurd multi-locality of Christ’s Body and the denial of His con­
tinued presence in heaven in glory until the end of time. Moreover,
the opinion which Berengar attributed to his opponents of a presence of
little portions of the Body would destroy the impassibility of Christ’s
glorified Body.
In opposition to these views, it was the work of Lanfranc, as usual,
to lay the groundwork for development by pointing out that the pres­
ence, though real and substantial, is entirely invisible and spiritual; and
that Christ’s presence on earth does not at all conflict with His in­
corruptible life in heaven. Lanfranc places the fundamental distinction
between the visible thing which is seen, the species of bread and wine,
and the invisible reality which is adored, the Flesh and Blood of
Christ.107 The error of the people of Caphamaum, says Lanfranc, lay
in the fact that they failed to make this distinction. They thought that
the Lord commanded them to eat, in the ordinary way, the Flesh which
they saw, and to drink the Blood which His persecutors were to shed.108
This misapprehension the Lord reproved when He told them that the
spirit gives life while the flesh profits nothing. The Body of Christ in
the Eucharist is not the object of sense perception. What is seen is the
corporeal species, but what is adored is Christ.

And because the eucharistie presence is spiritual and invisible, it
is entirely compatible with Christ’s remaining in the glory of heaven
105 Ibid., “nova in antiquam sine illius innovatione vel mutatione.’’
106 Ibid.: “respondet tibi Augustinus in libro sententiarum Prosperi: ‘si quaeris
modum quo id possit fieri, breviter ad praesens respondeo: mysterium fidei est, credi
salubriter potest, investigari utiliter non potest.’ ’’
107 Lanf., PL 150: 423 C: “Nos etenim in specie panis et vini quam videmus,
res invisibiles, id est Christi carnem et sanguinem, honoramus.’’
Cf. 421 B, and Alg., PL 180: 772 A, C; 820 D.
108 Lanf., PL 150: 434 B: “aut bestiali more, aut humano, corpus comedere quod
videbant, aut bibere sanguinem quem persequentes fusuri erant.”

77n‘ Conlrovcrsp Concerning the Substantial Conversion

89

until the end of time.109 In the earlier treatise, Berengar had objected
that if the bread is changed into Christ’s Body, then either the bread
must be raised up to heaven or the Body must come down to earth.
Lanfranc refuses to accept the dilemma, but characteristically makes no
attempt to penetrate into the question raised. How it is possible that
Christ can be in heaven and on earth at the same time is an impenetrable
mystery; Berengar’s objection is based on human wisdom, not divine.110

But Alger of Liege makes some attempt to solve the problem of the
twofold presence. In the first place, he recognizes the existence of the
problem when he says that every corporeal object must be related to a
place. But he rejects the Berengarian view that the Body of Christ in
its present state is fully corporeal and in every way subject to the laws
of space. Even our own bodies after the resurrection will be endowed
with remarkable spirituality and agility, free from the sluggishness of
movement which afflicts us now.112 If this will be true of ourselves, it
is even now much more true of the glorified Body of the omnipotent
Christ, our Head.

But if from the argument so far one might conclude that Alger held
for a presence by local motion, he quickly repudiates the idea. No
glorified body—not even the Body of Christ in its natural state—can
pass from one place to another without leaving the place where it
was.113114Christ is present in the Eucharist, not by passing from place
to place, but remaining where He was, He wills to be on earth also in
the sacrament. He is present, wholly, entirely, and substantially, in
heaven and on earth.111
The simultaneous presence of a body in many places would be con­
tradictory if all the presences were held to be formally identical. Alger
escapes the contradiction by distinguishing two different modes of being
of the Body of Christ; the human form and the sacramental form. This
109 Ibid., 422 B: Procul avertat Deus ab Ecclesia sua talem sententiam [Capharnaiticam] : Sic nempe in terris immolatum Christum manducamus et bibimus, ut in coeles­
tibus ad dexteram Patris integer semper existât et vivus.”
Cf. 421 D, 427 C, 430 C; Alg., 780 C, D.
110 Ibid., 439 C: ‘‘secundum humanam sapientiam, non secundum divinam.”
Hl Alg., PL 180: 780 C: ‘‘Quamvis enim omne corpus* omnisque creatura localis
sit.”
781 A: ‘‘ipsamque carnem, cum sit localis.”
112 Ibid., 782 B: ‘‘nulla sua tarditate impediantur.”
113 Ibid., 782 C: “ut inde recedit unde remaneat.”
114 Ibid., Non de loco ad locum transeundo sed ibi, ubi est remanendo, et alibi
. . . existendo, tota et integra, et substantialiter sit et in coelo et in terra.”

90

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

distinction had been made without particular stress by Lanfranc in his
long profession of faith, but Alger emphasizes it and illustrates it. At
the Last Supper, Christ, in human form, gave His Body to the disciples
in sacramental form.115 Thus the Body which they received from His
hands was identical with the Body of Christ which stood before them,
and at the same time it was different.116 Today He is in heaven in that
human form in which He appeared before the disciples, but whether in
the human forjn or in the sacramental form, it is the same Christ in both
places, in heaven and on earth.11 '
Guitmund of Aversa contributed to the study of the character of
the eucharistie presence explicit statements of the integrity of Christ’s
Body in the Host. Contrary to the opinion of Berengar, the realists did
not hold for a presence of portions of Christ’s Body, but a presence
whole and entire :
The whole Host is the Body of Christ, in such a way, however, that
each separate particle is the whole Body of Christ. And three separated
particles are not three Bodies, but one Body.118

Guitmund uses Berengar’s word “portiuncula,” but in such a way as to
preclude any caphamaitic interpretation.119 If one communicant re­
ceives Holy Communion, he receives the entire Body of Christ; if two
receive, or if many receive, all receive the same Body without distinc­
tion.120 And Guitmund adds that this is true even though a thousand
Masses be celebrated at the same time,121 in answer, perhaps, to the at­
tempted reductio in absurdum placed by Berengar in the De sacra coena.
Guitmund uses an analogy drawn from human speech to illustrate the
115 Ibid., 781 B: “forma illa humana, in qua Christus, coenans cum discipulis,
tradidit illis seipsum in sacramento.”
116 Ibid., “quasi alium et tamen eundem.”
117 Ibid., “uno loco est in coelis ad dexteram Patris integra, sicut integra fuit in
coena, quando in sacramento comedebatur a discipulis ; et tamen et in humana, et in
sacramentali forma, idem verus utrobique Christus, et in coelo et in terris.”
Cf. Cone, trid., Sess. XIII, Cap. 1, DB 874: “Ad dextram Patris in coelis assideat
iuxta modum existendi naturalem, et ut multis nihilominus aliis in locis sacramentaliter
praesens.”
118 Guit., PL 149: 1434 A: “Ita ergo tota hostia est corpus Christi, ut nihilominus
unaquaeque particula separata sit totum corpus Christi. Nec tamen tres particulae sepa­
ratae sunt tria corpora, sed unum corpus. ’
Cf. Alg., PL 180: 783 AB.
119 Ibid., “Possumus* quoque dicere tantumdem esse in una quasi portiuncula quan­
tum erat in hostia tota.”
120 Guit., PL 149, 1434 D: “Totum unus, totum duo, totum plures, sine diminutione percipiunt.”
121 Ibid., “Idem quoque dicimus, etsi mille missae eodem tempore celebrentur.”
In this comment is found one of a few scattered hints that Guitmund might have
read the De sacra coena.

f hv (,'onlrovtni)) (. viiicrning the Substantial Conversion

91

totality of Christ’s presence in heaven and in the consecrated Host. We
know by daily experience that it is possible for us to express a thought
to many at the same time and yet retain it whole and entire within our
own mind. And even though we have many hearers, all receive the
same word.122 If this is so of the frail and transitory word of man, it
is much more so of the unique and coetemal Word of the omnipotent
God, that He can share Himself with many, and yet remain whole and
entire and unchanged, in heaven. Guitmund does not claim that his
argument explains the mystery, but asserts only that it serves to make
the mystery credible, or not incredible.123
The important question of concomitance is raised by the twofold
consecration of the Eucharistic species, the bread into the Body and the
wine into the Blood. Does this mean that Christ is only partially pres­
ent under each species? Lanfranc speaks of the condition of Christ’s
Body in the Eucharist as if he thought that under the species of bread
only the Body is found, and under the species of wine only the
Blood.124 Guitmund surely understood the doctrine correctly, but his
references are only to the totality of Christ’s presence under the conse­
crated Host.125 But Alger is the first to affirm explicitly the doctrine
of concomitance, by placing a distinction which would enter into the
official teaching of magisterium at the Council of Trent.126 Alger in­
troduces the problem in the form of a question:
The question is raised why the bread is consecrated into Flesh and
the wine into Blood, in such a way that the former is called Flesh per
se, and the latter Blood per se, when the whole Christ is received in the
Flesh and the whole Christ in the Blood, and there are not two Christs
divided, but one sole Christ under each species.127

In this passage it is clear that Alger’s distinction is precisely the same
122 Guit., 1435 B: "ut qui in corde nostro latens nobis solus cognitus erat, per
vocem aliis etiam manifestari possit eodem tempore et totus in corde nostro remanet, et
totus aeque mille hominibus cum assumpta voce sua quantum in se est, ita apparere
potest."
Cf. Alg., 784 C:
123 Ibid., 1435 C: "et si capere non posset, habere incredibile [nemo] debet."
124 PL 150: 428 B, 414 B.
Cf. Amann and Gaudel, "Lanfranc," DTC 8 : 2659.
125 Guit., 1433 C, D.
126 Cone, trid., Sess. XIII, Cap. 3, DB 876, and en. 3, DB 885.
127 Alg., PL 180 : 825 D—826 A: “Quaeritur quoque quare panis in carnem, vinum
in sanguinem per se consecrentur, ut illud per se caro, et illud per se sanguis dicatur,
cum in came totus Christus, et in sanguine totus Christus sumi credatur, nec tamen
divisim duo Christi, sed in utroque unus solus Christus?"

92

The Eucharistic Co/i/rover,iy <>/ the Eleventh Century

as that which the Council of Trent will place, with the substitution of
the term, “vi verborum,” for Alger’s “caro et sanguis per se.” And Al­
ger answers his question by saying that the double consecration is per­
formed in this way for two reasons : in imitation of the practice of Christ
Himself at the Last Supper,128 and in connection with the Catholic doc­
trine of the Eucharist as sacrament and sacrifice.129 When the species
of bread is torn with the teeth, the Body of Christ broken in the Passion
is signified ; and when the species of wine is received into the mouths of
the faithful, it is a figure of the Blood flowing from Christ’s side.130 Thus
Alger properly relates the duality of the Eucharistic species to the Pas­
sion of Christ as a sign; yet it must be noted that he considers this
significance not with reference to the consecration itself, but to the com­
munion of priest and people.
In summary, there is a notable development among the anti-Berengarian writers in the delineation of the character of the real presence.
Lanfranc denied any conflict between the simultaneous presence of
Christ in heaven and in the Eucharist, but regarded it as an impenetra­
ble mystery; while Alger makes a real contribution in the distinction be­
tween the two modes, or forms, of being, the “forma humana” and the
“forma sacramentalis.” Guitmund shows that the gross misunderstand­
ing of Berengar—the “portiuncula camis”—is entirely out of accord
with the traditional doctrine, by insisting that Christ is present whole
and entire even under the divided species; and Alger in turn follows
with an explicit statement of the important doctrine of concomitance.
The mystery remains,131 but real progress has been made. The
ultimate explanation can only be found in the omnipotent divine will.
In this connection, finally, Alger more than once distinguishes a two­
fold omnipotence in Christ, one by reason of His Divinity, the divine
power of the Incarnate Word, and the other even in His Humanity:
for to Him all power has been given in heaven and on earth.132
128 Ibid., 826 A: “quia iste mos inolevit in Ecclesia ab ipso Christo, qui corpus
sum et sanguinem divisim consecravit et dedit.”
129 Ibid., “ad discretionem figurae.”
130 Ibid., “ut panis dum dentibus teritur, carnem Christi in passione attritam, et dum
vinum in ore fidelium funditur, sanguinem de latere Christi fusum signaret.”
Cf. 826 B, C, 785 C.
131 Ibid., 783 B: “Quomodo tamen corpus Christi et coelo et mundo praesens, et
dividatur indivisum et sumatur inconsumptum ratio stupet, fides ipsa miratur.”
132 Alg., PL 180: 783 B: “Sed ex adjunctae divinitatis potentia quae ubique totapraesens est in corpore suo spirituali, imo per omnipotentiam sibi collatam; divino iam
facto id fieri posse, non diffidens veneratur.”
Cf. 785 B: “omnipotentiae, quae Christo etiam pro carnis parte collata est." 782
BC, 783 B.

The Confi ovarsy Coiiceniifig the Substantial Conversion

9J

'I’he objective reality of the accidents of bread and wine is an essen­
tial element in the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence. Previous to
the eleventh century little study had been made of the Eucharistic species
as such: pre-scholastic writers were content to say that one must not
judge of the reality from what appears to the senses. In the Eucharist,
one thing is seen, another is believed. But Lanfranc, Guitmund, and
Alger, induced perhaps by Berengar’s identification of the sensible phen­
omena with the total reality, treat specially of the eucharistie accidents.
Beyond the simple question of the fact of the permanence of the acci­
dents, two other questions are principally involved. The first concerns
the real existence of the accidents after consecration, and the second con­
cerns the corruption of the accidents, either through digestion, profana­
tion, or similar process. Alger of Liege discusses the first of these two
questions in language which later scholasticism will hardly improve;
but in reply to the second question both Guitmund and Alger fall into a
curious error which subsequent writers will correct.

It is settled that the opponents of Berengar held that the total real­
ity of the bread and wine is changed into the total reality of the Body
and Blood. After the consecration, there is no bread on the Altar, but
only the Body of Christ.133 Yet something remains of the bread, not
its substance, its reality, but certain non-essential properties distinct from
the reality and actually separated from it. These residual elements of
the bread and wine are given a variety of designations. Lanfranc refers
to the “species” of bread and wine, and certain other “qualities.” The
terminology of Alger in this matter is strongly influenced by that of
Lanfranc. He also speaks of the “species” of bread and wine, the
“qualities,” and he describes the qualities as “accidental.” Alger, like
Berengar, uses the term “forma” to characterize the eucharistie accidents,
without however identifying “forma” so understood with the essential
constituents of the subject. Guitmund’s terminology is more advanced
than that of Lanfranc and Alger. Besides using their terms, he adopts
the language which will become fixed in scholastic terminology: the
accidents of bread and wine remain.134
133 Ibid., 755 D: “Panis enim et vinum in sacramento jam non sunt, sed ante

fuerunt.”
134 Lanf., PL 150: 430 C: “reservatis ipsarum rerum speciebus, et quibusdam
aliis qualitatibus.”
Cf. 424 B, 416 C; Alg., PL 180: 755 D, 760 B, 809 B; Guit., PL 149: 1450 A.
Alg., 809 D: “accidentales qualitates;” 755 D: “species vel forma panis et vini;”
759 C: “forma panis.”
Guit., 1481 B: “caetera quaedam accidentia;" 1450 B: “ipsa accidentia."

94

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Notwithstanding differences of terminology, all three agree in their
teaching. “Species,” “forma,” “qualities,” “accidents,” all mean the
sartie thing: the appearances which remain on the altar after the sub­
stantial conversion has taken place. If the sacred writings sometimes
refer to the Eucharist as “bread” even after the consecration, this is not
a substantial but a figurative predication. The sacrament is “confected”
from bread and retains some of its qualities;135 moreover it is the bread
of eternal life and the bread of angels.136
Lanfranc and Guitmund did not discuss the reality of the eucharistie
accidents beyond stating the mere fact of their permanence. Alger, on
the other hand, contributes the valuable teaching that the accidents re­
main as accidents per se without a subject. The senses are not deceived
in the Eucharist:
The sacrifice of the Church . . . contains truly and naturally the
Body and Blood of Christ, but also truly and naturally the appear­
ance of the elements which were before.137

Alger entirely rejects the idea of a phantasmal presence of the acci­
dents.138 That which is present upon the altar is real; any other con­
clusion would be contrary to reason. We must hold for the reality of
the sacramental appearances, for the merit of faith would be lessened if
the bread wholly vanished from the altar; and something visible and real
is necessary for the eucharistie sacrifice and for Holy Communion.139
But if the appearance of bread and wine are real, and if they are
accidents, then in what subject do they exist? This is a question which
“dialecticians” would raise, and Alger introduces his solution by a ref­
erence to the dialecticians of his day :
But the dialecticians ask, if the substance of bread is changed into
the Body of Christ, so that there is no longer any bread, in what sub­
ject then do these qualities remain that they should retain the color and
135 Alg., 755 D: “ex eo conficitur, ejusque nonnullas retinet qualitates.” The term
“conficitur” is easily understood, but cannot well be translated into English.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 760 B: “Sacrificium enim Ecclesiae . . . vere et naturaliter continet
corpus Christi et sanguinem, et nihilominus vere et naturaliter elementorum eamdem
fuerat speciem.”
138 Ibid., 759 D: “Phantastica enim illusio magicis congruit et diabolicis fraudibus.”
Cf. 758 D.
139 Ibid., 758 D: “Non enim superesset aliquid visibile, circa quod mystica passionis
signa . . . compleri, vel infirmis viaticum dari; nec caetera quae visibiliter et salubriter
. . . valerent administrari.”
Cf. 759 BC.

¡'hr ConlroVertji Concerning llir Subetanlial Conversion

95

taste of bread, since the substance of the sacrament itself, that is, the
Body of Christ, neither looks like bread nor tastes like bread? The an­
swer to this question is that as God is marvellous in all things, so is
He in this. He causes the accidental qualities in His sacrament to exist
of themselves, which in other things is impossible.140

In no other matter, perhaps, does Alger show himself so far in ad­
vance of earlier writers. They had discussed the permanence of the
species only in general terms, without analysis, often in such a way as to
give the impression that the senses are somehow deceived in the Euchar­
ist. But Alger sets out the problem in philosophical language (“in quo
fundamento remanent qualitates?”) and solves it in the same terms that
will prevail in the schools.141
Although Guitmund and Alger were always careful to avoid confu­
sion between the invisible Body of Christ and the visible species, yet both
of them fell into the error of attributing incorruptibilty even to the spe­
cies.142 The question arises in connection with the normal reception
of the sacrament, and also with profanations of one kind and another.
Guitmund and Alger thought it would be humiliating to the Body of
Christ to hold that the Eucharist could undergo the same processes as
natural food. Consequently they hold that the eucharistie species can­
not nourish the body,143 nor can they be devoured by animals.144 Alger
tries to find support for this view by analyzing the concept of accidental
change. Any change or corruption which would seem to befall the con­
secrated species must be an accidental change, since the sacramental ac­
cidents exist in themselves without a subject. But he says that a corrup­
tion of accidents is not necessarily involved in an accidental change:
a simple alternation may take place in which one accident merely sue140 Ibid., 809 D-810 A: “Sed quaerunt dialectici, cum substantia panis in corpus
Christi conversa, iam non sit panis, in quo fundamento remanent qualitates ut idem qui
fuerat panis color et sapor habeant fundari et existere, cum substantia ipsius sacra­
menti, id est, corpus Christi, nec colore panis sit coloratum, nec sapore sapidum. Ad
quod respondendum est quod sicut Deus in omnibus est mirabilis, sic et in istis. Facit
enim in suo sacramento accidentales qualitates existere per se, quod in caeteris est im­
possibile.”
141 Cf. Jensen, F., “Eucharistiques (Accidents)’” DTC 5: 1377.

142 Alg., 813 C: “nec solum corpori Christi, sed et ipsi sacramento visibili eadem
causa mucorem negamus et putredinem.”
Cf. 809 B; Guit., 1445-1447.
143 Guit., 1453 A; Alg., 808, 813 C.

144 Guit., 1448 D.

96

77ic Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

ceeds the other.145 If whiteness is changed into blackness, the whiteness
does not corrupt, but simply gives way to the blackness. An analogous
situation is the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove, or
of fire; as soon as the purpose of the manifestation was achieved, the
visible forms simply passed away. No less exalted conception is to be
held of the visible forms which conceal the real presence of the Body of
Christ.146
Alger does not deny that the species must undergo some change,
must pass away, since they are not eternal.147 But he holds for what
he calls a “simple passing away,” so as to protect the species from cor­
ruption.148 Similarly, both Guitmund and Alger are willing to admit
that an apparent corruption of the species takes place.149 But this ap­
parent corruption is permitted by God either to stir up faith, or to
awaken remorse and repentance in the person responsible for the appar­
ent corruption: perhaps a cleric who in disobedience to ecclesiastical
regulation has kept the consecrated species too long.150 The conse­
crated species remain incorrupt even though someone may actually see
them apparently being devoured by mice.151 If such a thing happens,
the species are either taken by the angels to heaven, or they simply dis­
appear.152

In taking up this position, Alger and Guitmund ran counter to
reason and experience, and their opinion was rejected by subsequent the­
ologians. Geiselmann suggests that the language of the Humbertian
formula prevented Guitmund from arriving at an absolute distinction
between the accidents and the sacramental substance.153 The same
reasoning would hold for Alger. It is a strange lapse, seeing that both
Guitmund and Alger were emphatically correct upon the real point at
145 Alg., 809 B: “non fit corruptione secessus, sed sola sui alteratione defectus.”
146 Ibid., 809 C.
147 Ibid., 813 C: “Ipsis vero speciebus, cum non sint aeternae, defectum negare
possumus.”
148 Ibid., “sed ipsum defectum ita dicimus simplicem, ut nullam foeditatis admitta­
mus corruptionem.”
149 Alg., 813 D; Guit., 1446 C, 1448 D.
150 Guit., 1448 CD; Alg., 812 A, C.
151 Guit., 1448 D: “Quod si aliquando velut corrosa videantur, responderi potest,
id non esse corrosa.”
152 Ibid.; cf. 1453 A; Alg., 813 B.
153 Op. cit., p. 395.

Tilt ( Orili ovcrsÿ Concerning the Substantial Conversion

97

issue, namely that no corruption of the species, real or apparent, can
affect the Body of Christ.154 In their formulations of this matter, if
they had substituted simple affirmations of the fact for such terms as
“seem to be corrupted” and “apparent corruption,” they would have
expressed the truth clearly and precisely.155 This is the one notably
weak link in their reasoning; it reveals the immaturity of their philoso­
phy, and points to the need for further development. But at the same
time it should cause no one to overlook the real contributions which
Guitmund and Alger made to the development of eucharistie theology.

154 Guit., 1449 AB: “Si placet Christo ... ut haec sacramenta absque sui cor­
ruptione a bestiis sive avibus comedi possint: quid hoc ad veritatem, quam credimus,
Dominici corporis obstat?
Cf. 1450 AB; Alg., 811 B, 812 C.
155 Cf. F. Jensen, loe. cit., 1383-1387 for further development of this point. Also
St. Thomas, Summa theologiae, 3, q. 80, a.3, ad 3.

CHAPTER V:
The Controversy Concerning The Eucharist as a Sacrament

The central issue in the controversy with Berengar was that o£
the substantial conversion, and upon this point the positions of the
two parties were flatly opposed. Berengar rejected the doctrine of sub­
stantial conversion because it was contrary to the evidence of the senses.
What is seen upon the altar is bread and wine; but it is impossible that
an object should be other than its appearances proclaim it to be; hence
bread and wine remain upon the altar. Lanfranc and his successors held
on the other hand that through the consecration the bread and wine are
marvellously changed into the substance of the Body and Blood of
Christ, and that nothing remains of the bread and wine save their
unessential qualities, their appearances or accidents.
But, pivotal as this issue was, it did not exhaust the subject matter
of the controversy. Instead the question of the substantial conversion
was in a cerain sense merely introductory to a further issue and a fur­
ther controversy. For the Eucharist has not come down through the
Christian ages as an absolute and unrelated gift; it has come down as
part of the divinely instituted economy of the sacraments. And in the
sacraments two elements must be found, that of the visible sign and
that of the invisible reality. Any theologian who enters upon a study of
the Eucharist must see to it that both of these elements enter genuinely
into his system. If a writer approaches the Eucharist from the viewpoint
of the visible sign, he must find a reality which is actually and efficaci­
ously produced by means of the visible sign. If another writer stresses
the reality, the substantial presence of the Body of the Lord, he must
find some place for a genuine Eucharistic symbolism. At the extremes,
two solutions must be avoided: a bare symbolism, which would deny
all reality to the sacrament, and an exaggerated realism, which would
identify the invisible Body with the visible sign.
In this chapter a brief study will be made of the solutions advanced
by Berengar and his opponents to meet their respective problems. Beren­
gar, the advocate of symbolism (umbraticus, as Guitmund calls him),
must find some reality in the Eucharist, actually produced by the effica­
cious sign. Lanfranc and his successors, realists (or, in the strong term
of Geiselmann, metabolists—Metabolikers), must develop a genuine
98

Tin1 ( finl/oih'MV CAficerniflg lhe Eucharist an Sacrament

*)*)

Eucharistic symbolism. Guitmund of Aversa has summed up the prob­
lems of this chapter in one sentence:
Hic fortasse respondebit umbraticus, quod et dicere solitus est: Si
figura est, quomodo veritas? Si sacramentum, quomodo veritas?1

Pourrat has devoted a few pages of his Theology of the Sacraments
to a study of the confusion which was introduced into pre-scholastic sac­
ramental theology by the prevalence of the definition of a sacrament
given by St. Isidore of Seville.2 It is true that St. Isidore reproduced
verbally the Augustinian definition of the sacrament as a sign;3 but in
his development of the term, following the etymological procedure which
was customary with him, St. Isidore neglected the concept of the sign
and considered the sacraments under the aspect of secret, or mystery.
“Sacramentum” for Isidore was derived from “secretum”; and Baptism,
Confirmation, and Holy Eucharist are sacraments because in them the
divine action is concealed under the cover of material elements. This
does not mean that Isidore’s conception permitted a confusion between
the visible sacrament and invisible grace; nor did he fail to realize that
the visible rite produces the grace in an efficacious manner. But be­
cause the Isidorean definition placed the idea of the sign in the back­
ground, there resulted from it a less precise notion of the sacraments.

The authors of the Carolingian period adopted the Isidorean defini­
tion unanimously.4 Its legitimacy was not in question in the Euchar­
istic controversy of the ninth century, since both Paschasius and Ratramn used it.5 Hence the weakness of the Isidorean concept did not
lie so much in the field of Eucharistic theology as in that of sacramental
theology in general : (it was suited indeed to the thing defined, but not
exclusively to the thing defined). Following this concept, everything
which contains a hidden action of the divinity could be called a sacra­
ment. For Paschasius Radbert, Holy Scripture was a sacrament, be1 Guit., PL 149: 1457 D.
2 P. Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments, pp. 35-37. Cf. A. Michel, "Sacra­
ments," DTC 14: 525.
3 Isidore, Etymol., lib. 6, cap. 19, n. 39, PL 82: 255 C. "Sacrmnrntum est in
aliqua celebratione, cum res gesta ita fit ut aliquid significare inteiligntur, quod sancte
accipiendum est.”
Cf. St. Augustine, Epist. 55 ad inquisitiones Januarii, (ed. A. Goldbacher, 1895)
CSEL 34: 170.
4 A. Michel, loe cit., col. 527. Raban Maur, De inst. clericorum. I. 24, PL 107:
309. Jonas of Orleans, De inst. laicali, 1, 7, PL 106: 134.
5 Radbert, De corp, et sang. Domini, PL 120: 1275 A. Ral i unni, De corp, et sang.
Domini, PL 121: 146 C- 147 A.

100

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

cause under the letter of the Scriptures the Holy Spirit works efficacious­
ly; and the Incarnation was a sacrament, because in the visible humanity
of Jesus Christ the divinity acts interiorly in secret. In this broad sense
all the mysteries of the Catholic faith might be called sacraments, and
the confusion which resulted could not but impede the development of
sacramental theology. For, as Pourrat writes, “whenever the definition
departed from the idea of sign, it lost something of its precision.”6
With this background, it seems altogether remarkable that the Beren­
garian writers on both sides should have returned with one accord, as it
were, to the Augustinian concept of the sacrament as a sign.
Two definitions prevailed among the writers with whom this study is
concerned. The first is literally of Augustinian origin :
Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum
signum est.7

This definition is found in practically identical form in Lanfranc8 and
Alger.9 The definition of sacrament as sacrum signum does not appear
in Berengar of Tours, although Lanfranc cites from the earlier opus­
culum a definition of identical purport:
Signacula quidem rerum divinarum sunt visibilia, sed res invisibiles in
eis honorantur.10

The other definition of a sacrament which found widest acceptance
among eleventh and twelfth century writers seems to have originated
with Berengar himself. It is :
Est enim sacramentum praescribente beato Augustino invisibilis gratiae
visibilis forma.11

Berenger attributes the definition to St. Augustine without specifying
the source. Doubtless it is of Augustinian spirit,12 but it is not to be
found verbally in St. Augustine’s writings, and De Ghellinck holds it to
have been an original expression of Berengar.13
6 Op. cit., pp. 36-37.
7 St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, 10, 5, (ed. E. Hoffman, 1899), CSEL 40: 452.
8 PL 150: 422 D. (Michel, loe. cit., col. 528, improperly cites this as col. 415;
also he wrongly cites Guilmund’s definition of sacrament as PL 149: 1147 — it should
be 1475 C.)
9 PL 180: 751 C.
10 Berengar cited by Lanfranc, PL 150: 423 A.
11 D.S.C., p. 114. Cf. pp. 192, 193.
12 See, for example, St. Augustine, Epist. 98 ad Bonifacium (ed. A. Goldbacher,
1895) CSEL 34 (2): 521; Quaestionum in Heptateuchum libri VII (ed. I. Zycha,
1895) CSEL 28 (2): 305.
13 J. De Ghellinck, S.J., “Une chapitre dans l’histoire de la definition des sacraments
au Xlle siècle,” Melanges Mandonnet, Bibliothèque thomiste 14 (1930), p. 87.

/Iit ( i*nh«*VFMV ( «iHKinihlf the I

ihIhiiÍM

ili SiKiafiirnl

101

In this definition, the word “forma” should be understood in accordante with Berengar’s (and Alger’s) usage of the term as “that
which falls under the senses, the visible appearance;” and the definition
may then be translated, “A sacrament is the visible expression of in­
visible grace.” This Berengarian definition has been traced by De
Ghellinick14 into Ives of Chartres, Alger of Liège,15 Gratian, Abelard,
and Peter Lombard. Doubtless the great success of the definition is
due to the Augustinian patronage under which Berengar placed it : it is
invariably cited in connection with the genuine definition from the De
civitate Dei, but with only a general indication of the source: “Item
alibi . .
There is no conclusive evidence that Alger of Liège had
ever read the De sacra coena. It seems therefore that he found the defi­
nition in Ives of Chartres, and indeed doubtless it was through the
canonical collections of Ives that Berengar’s definition entered into the
medieval stream.

From this brief sketch of the history of sacramental theology in the
pre-scholastic period, it is clear that Berengar and his opponents were
in accord at one point, namely in the return to the Augustinian concept
of the sacrament as sign. It should not be denied that Berengar him­
self played a positive part in this development, but it would be exag­
gerated to claim from him a dominant influence. Rather there seems
to have taken place a spontaneous and rapid return to a more worthy
concept of sacrament than that of St. Isidore, a development which is all
the more surprising in view of the fact that the eleventh century writers
had no immediate forerunners upon whom to depend.

But if our authors agreed in their definition of the sacrament, their
paths diverged in the development of the idea. Berengar, obsessed
with the concept of the sacrament as symbol, attempted to find reality
in the Eucharist through a dialectical manipulation of the concepts of
conversion and consecration. Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Alger, on the
other hand, their faith rooted in the substantial presence, found a gen­
uine and traditional symbolism in the fact that the Lord’s real Body,
present in the Eucharist and producing great effects in the Eucharist, is
present nevertheless and produces these effects under a sign.
These considerations open up for study a large area of inquiry, al­
most every aspect of which is deserving of lengthy special study. Con­
14 Ibid.
15 PL 180: 751 C.

102

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

sequently, a single chapter can do no more than set down the general
structure of this theology as it appears in the Berengarian writers, and
thus perhaps trace the lines which special study should follow. And
again, in accordance with our purpose, the inquiry will be limited to
those aspects of the subject in which the theological reasoning of our
authors is called particularly into play.

1.

The Pseudo-Realism of Berengar

The theory of Berengar of Tours concerning the Eucharist as sacra­
ment can be set down in a series of propositions. The Holy Eucharist,
after the consecration as before, is bread and wine, not the Body of
Christ, but the sign of the Body of Christ. Through consecration, the
material elements receive a “conversion,” not of their natural being, but
of their spiritual significance : they are endowed as symbols with the
value of Christ’s Body under the aspect of His passion. The effect of
the sacrament is the contemplative union of the mind with Christ, the
“repose” of the soul in the thought of the Incarnation and Passion. In
this section, then, will be developed in turn the Berengarian doctrines of
the Eucharistic sign, of the conversion, and of the spiritual reception.

Lanfranc had contrasted the Berengarian and orthodox Eucharistic
theology in the following terms :
You deny the Body and Blood, and place the total reality in the
sacrament alone; while we acknowledge the sacrament, and yet faith­
fully and truly proclaim the reality of the Body and Blood.16

Similarly, the Roman profession of faith of 1059 called upon Berengar
to renounce all heresy,
. . . particularly that of which I am accused, which would attempt to
establish that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after
the consecration, are only a sacrament, and not the true Body and Blood
of Our Lord Jesus Christ.17

Lanfranc’s meaning, and Humbert’s in the Roman formula, was that
Berengar emphasized one truth about the Eucharist to the utter exclu­
sion of the other. The Eucharist is a sacrament, and it is also the true
Body and Blood of Christ. If Berengar rejects the reality of the Body
16 Lanf., PL 150: 418 D: “Nam et tu carnem et sanguinem negas, in solo sacra­
mento rem totam constituens; et nos sacramentum fatemur, et tamen utriusque veritatem
fideliter ac veraciter confitemur.’’
17 Supra, Ch. iv, n. 43, p. 73.

Ih? I unii hi*, i iU ( imi i1 iniiij/ l/ii1 /¿in Imiial <m ,Sii< num'iit

101

and Blood, he therefore holds for a bare symbolism, or, in Lanfranc’s
language, he “places the total reality in the sacrament alone.”
But Berengar rejected these criticisms as meaningless. There can be
no such thing as a “sacrament alone,” for the total function of a sacra­
ment is to designate something else—the res sacramenti—which is differ­
ent and distinct from it, and of which it bears the likeness. The term
sacrament does not denote a subject, but it says something about an
existing thing; it is a designation of relation, or, in the language of Ber­
engar with which we are now familiar, a sacrament is not ipsum esse, but
aliquid esse.18
19 Just as the term father is meaningless apart from refer­
ence to the child, so sacramentum must be considered in relation to the
res sacramenti—that something be mere sacrament, or solummodo sac­
ramentum, is unthinkable.
The sacrament exists then only as a visible expression which brings
something else to consciousness. Berengar underlines the word con­
sciousness: the sacrament brings the res sacramenti to the mind; it does
not contain the res sacramenti in any realistic manner.1'9 The sacra­
ments do not contain the res, but rather, through their representative
function, put the mind of the receiver in relation to the res. Berengar
saw in the doctrine of Lanfranc—that the Eucharist should be at once
the sacrament of the Body of Christ and the real Body of Christ—a fatal
subversion of the concept of the sacrament as sign. But in putting forth
this criticism, Berengar assumed that realism identified formally the
Eucharistic sign and the reality of the Body and Blood—an unfounded
assumption, as we shall see.
Moreover, the sacrament is a visible sign, a material being, corporeal,
mutable, and temporal, while the Body of Christ, the res sacramenti, is
invisible, immutable, eternal. It is simply impossible that this material
element should be the glorious Body of Christ. Here we see once more
the grossly materialistic interpretation which Berengar placed upon the
teaching of Lanfranc :
It must be remembered that according to Augustine the sacrament
is something visible, temporal, and mutable. Yet you assert the sacra­
ment to be the Body of Christ — a little portion of His Flesh newly
brought into being on the altar. (Here there is a gap in the text.) No
18 D.S.C., p. 251. Cf. P. 81 f.
19 Act. Cone. Rom., Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, 4: 110

B: "aliud in cognitionem venire, non ait in manum, in os, in dentem, sed in cognitionem."

KM

The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

matter how stupid you are, you will not dare to affirm the Body of
Christ, either in whole or in part, subject to time or to change.20

In his insistence that the res sacramenti is not substantially present
under the visible sign, Berengar drew an exact parallel between the sac­
raments of Baptism and Holy Eucharist.21 Through the consecration
which takes place in Baptism, there is effected a change of the baptismal
elements into the death and resurrection of Christ, not in their real ac­
tuality, but in a symbol. And just as there is in Baptism no presence of
the actual death of Christ, neither is there the presence of the actual
Blood of Christ in the Eucharist.22
Thus Berengar insisted upon the sacrament as sign, its visibility and
transiency, its relative character. But the Body of Christ is the absolute,
the res sacramenti, spiritual and invisible. It cannot be in heaven and
earth at the same time. The res sacramenti, therefore, is not on the altar;
and what is seen upon the altar is bread.

But Berengar emphatically denied he held “bread alone” to exist
upon the altar. The sacrament is bread, yes, but not bread alone.23 It
is at this second point of the Eucharistic theology that realistic language
begins to appear in the writings of Berengar. We have already seen how
ready he was to affirm that after the consecration the true Body and
Blood of Christ are present on the altar; even that the bread and wine
are changed, or converted, into the true Body and Blood of Christ.24
Now we must inquire into the precise nature of this Berengarian “con­
version.”
For Berengar, the conversion which takes place in the Eucharist is
brought about by consecration, the principle which constitutes the sacra­
ment in being. But in his analysis of the concept of consecration, he
argues in a fashion quite similar to his discussion of the nature of a sac­
rament. To consecrate does not mean to cause a being to exist, but to
20 D.s.c., p. 114: “. . . quod sacramentum attendi oportet auctore Augustino esse
visibile, temporale, mutabile aliquid. Corpus enim Christi, cuius sacramentum esse
asseris portiunculam recens factam in altari tibi ipsi contrarius, . . . nulla vecordia
tempore obnoxium mutabileque esse vel pro parte vel pro toto affirmare audebis.”
21 Ibid., p. 128: “De sacramento regenerationis pervenit (Ambrosius) ad tractan­
dum de sacramento refectionis per omnia comparabile.” Cf. pp. 128, 156, 151-2.
22 Berengar cited by Lanfranc, PL 150: 439 A: “Non est autem vera Christi mors
in baptismo. Igitur nec verus eius sanguis in hoc sacramento.” Cf. D.s.c., pp. 150, 155,
157.
23 D.s.c., p. 207: “non nego panem esse, sed affirmo non solum.”
24 Supra, p. 75.

1 he Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

105

act upon a being which is already in existence; it is a transitive action,
and presupposes a being as its subject :
Consecration, or the action of consecrating is not a subject, but it is in
a subject.25

And, in an argument precisely the same as that with which he criticized
Humbertian formula,26 he concludes that the consecrated object must
remain after the consecration.27 If bread and wine receive a consecra­
tion, bread and wine continue to exist ; and after the consecration bread
and wine are on the altar.

And yet through this consecration there takes place a “conversion”
of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. Berengar at­
tempts to resolve the apparent contradiction by playing again upon the
meaning of a word, this time the term “conversio.” He says that con­
version is not an univocal concept, but is subject to many qualifica­
tions.28 Not every conversion is such as to result in the destruction of
one subject and the coming into existence of another. When God said,
“Ad vos convertar,” He did not say that His essence would cease to
exist, but He merely announced a change of His position with regard
to the Hebrew people. If Saul becomes Paul, there does not take place
a cessation of one human nature and the coming into being of another,
but simply a change in his relation to God. In these examples of con­
version, there is neither a corruptio subiecti nor a generatio subiecti.29
And the conversion which takes place in the Eucharist is of a similar
kind. It is not a physical change, but a spiritual conversion :
According to nature, that which you see with bodily eyes is bread;
but considering the divine blessing, that bread is the Body of Christ,
after which you must strive with the eyes of your soul, the eyes of
faith.30

The effect of consecration, the term of the conversion, is that the bread
25 D.s.c., p. 210: “consecratio vel consecrari subiectum non est, sed in subiecto.”
Cf. pp. 188, 217.
26 Supra, p. 74: ". . . non poterit constare omnis affirmatio parte subruta."
27 D.s.c., p. 216: "Nec convincere poteris adesse consecrationem, ubi consecratum
auferes." Cf. p. 91.
28 Supra, p. 75, nn. 55, 56.
29 D.s.c., p. 146: “Nulla in his secundum corruptio, nulla secundum subiectum
generatio." Cf. p. 145.
30 Ibid., p. 177: “Quantum ad naturam, panis est, quod tu vides oculis corporis;
quantum ad divinam benedictionem, ipse panis est corpus Christi, quod attendere debes
oculis cordis, oculis fidei.

106

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

and wine become sacraments. “The bread consecrated on the altar is a
sacrament.”31 And Berengar is willing to venerate as the Body of
Christ this material bread become a sacrament through consecration.32
The bread and wine indeed are the Body and Blood of Christ, but only
because they are sacraments33—that is, signs of the Body and Blood.

The real meaning of consecration and conversion, then, is that the
bread and wine, remaining what they were in their material being, acquire
a new value, that of the Body of Christ. By means of the consecration,
the elements possess a higher meaning, a superior worth. Before the con­
secration, the bread and wine were mere material elements, devoid of re­
ligious significance; through consecration they acquire the value of a
means of salvation.34

Here we are at the center of Berengar’s theory of the Eucharist as
sacrament. Through consecration, the material elements, are “carried
to a higher plane;”35 before consecration “the bread and wine possessed
no efficacy for eternal life; after consecration they have that efficacy.”36
Berengar draws an analogy from the Incarnation of the Word :
The Word made Flesh assumed what it was not without ceasing to
be what it was. Similarly, the bread consecrated on the altar loses its
profaneness, its inefficacy, but not its proper nature; and it acquires as
it were in place of that nature a divinely increased dignity and worth.37

And to this spiritual conversion there corresponds a purely spiritual
reception of the Eucharist. We do not receive the actual Body of Christ
in Holy Communion; we receive only material bread and wine. The
31 Ibid., p. 68: “. . . panis in altari consecratus est sacramentum.”
32 Ibid., p. 34: “sensualem panem consecratione altaris factum sacramentum esse
profiteor corpus Christi.”
33 Ibid., p. 143: “. . . corpus et sanguinem, quia sacramenta.”
34 Macdonald, Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine, p. 321 :
“Through the mystery of the consecration a change takes place in the effectiveness of
the elements, and through this operation they become a sacrament, the pledge of salva­
tion and the medium of spiritual life. The consecrated or sacramental bread and wine
have a religious value.”
35 D.s.c., p. 116: “. . . in melius provehi.” Cf. Acta Cone. Rom., Martène and
Durand, op. cit., 4: 107 A, C; Lanf., PL 150: 419 C: D.s.c., pp. 98, 109, 141, 156,
163, 165, 179, 279.
36 Ibid., p. 145: “Inefficax erat panis natura ante consecrationem ad vitam aeternam,
post consecrationem efficax.”
37 Jbid., pp. 98-99: “Denique verbum caro factum assumpsit, quod non erat, non
amittens, quod erat, et panis consecratus in altari amisit vilitatem, amisit inefficaciam,
non amisit naturae proprietatem, cui naturae quasi loco, quasi fundamento dignitas divi­
nitus augeretur et efficacia.”

7 he Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

107

real efficacy of the sacrament is to operate “in thought,” in the con­
templation of the believer.38 Through the physical reception of the
bread and wine, made a symbol of Christ crucified through consecration,
the thought of the believer is borne towards Christ and is absorbed in
Him. And the effect of this contemplation is to provide the faithful
person with the strongest motive to imitate the virtues of Christ and to
regulate his life according to the example of the crucified Savior :
“Through the physical eating and drinking of the material elements,
you recall to mind the spiritual eating and drinking of the Flesh and
Blood of Christ which takes place in the soul. While you refresh your­
self interiorly upon the thought of the Incarnation of the Word and
His Passion, you ought also order your interior life with the same
humility as that with which the Word became Flesh, and with His
patience in the shedding of His Blood. How you ought to excel in
patience, and be absorbed in these things, and find joy in them, just as
in physical food and drink your body finds repose.39*

By way of a critical summary, it may be remarked first that the sub­
jective character of Berengar’s sacramental theology is manifest. His
system does not permit the passage of an objective gift from God to the
receiver, whether that gift be considered as the reception of the Body of
Christ or of grace through the sacrament. The believer finds for himself
refreshment and repose in the thought of the Incarnation and Passion ;4,)
38 Ibid., p. 287 :
. praesta ut . . . cogitatione sumamus . . . corpus tuum.” p.
157: ‘‘Ad cordis devotionem, ad cordis contuitum necessario te trahit (b. Ambrosius),
ubi venientes ad accipienda sacramenta altaris adoratur.”
39 Ibid., p. 223:
. . ut per comestionem et bibitionem corporalem, quae fit per
res exteriores, per panem et vinum, commonefacias te spiritualis comestionis et bibitionis,
quae fit in mente, de Christi carne et sanguine, dum te reficis, in interiori tuo incarna­
tione verbi et passione, ut secundum humilitatem per quam verbum caro factum est et
secundum patientiam per quam sanguinem fudit interioris tui vitam instituas, quanta debes
emineas patientia ut in eis tibi adquiescas, in eis tibi adgaudeas, sicut in exteriori tuo,
in cibis tibi et potibus, adquiescis.”
Cf. pp. 148, 157, 237, 238, 250, 255, 274; Lanf. PL 150 : 440 C.
Cf. also Zwingli, Illustrissimis Cermaniae Princip. in Conciliis Aug. Congreg., p.
546 (cited by Mohler, J. A., Symbolism, ed. 5, tr. by J. B. Robertson, London, 1906,
p. 250) : “Quo factum est ut veteres dixerint corpus Christi vere esset in coena ; id
autem . . . cum propter istam . . . certam fidei contemplationem, quae Christum ipsum in
cruce propter nos deficientem nihil minus praesentem videt, quam Stephanus carnalibus
oculis ad dexteram Patris regnantem videret. Et adseverare audeo, hanc Stephano reve­
lationem et exhibitionem sensibiliter esse factam, ut nobis exemplum esset, fidelibus, cum
pro se paterentur eo semper modo fore, non sensibiliter, sed contemplatione et solatio
fidei.”
The similarity is striking between the Berengarian doctrine and that of the 16th
century Swiss reformer, whose Eucharistic symbolism became almost standard in Protes­
tant theology.
■40 D.s.c., p. 255: “Reficiendo se, acquiscendo sibi in incarnatione et passione
verbi.”

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The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

thus the sacramental realization in its entirety begins and ends within the
religious consciousness of the believer. This is not a doctrine of the ap­
plication to the recipient of the merits of Christ through the direct effic­
acy of the visible sacrament; but rather the visible sacrament is a means
of stimulation for the mind, to awaken in it the remembrance of the
Incarnation and Passion of Christ.41
Thus the “conversion” of which Berengar writes is exclusively in the
moral order, and affects not the sacramental elements, but the sentiments
of the believer with relation to the elements. The analogies of moral con­
version which Berengar himself used to describe his concepts of conver­
sion—that of God turning towards His people and of Saul becoming
Paul—are therefore apt descriptions of his theology, a system in which
the traditional doctrine of the sacrament as efficacious symbol plays no
part.42
Finally, Berengar’s subjective Eucharistic theology, along with his in­
sistence on a total parity between Holy Eucharist and Baptism, raise
certain questions concerning his attitude towards the sacraments in com­
muni, and even towards the fundamental doctrines of revealed Christ­
ianity in general. It has been mentioned in the course of this study that
contemporaries of Berengar attributed to him errors in other fields than
that of Eucharistic theology, but that we have no proof of this for
lack of documentation. Yet the assertion of Theoduin of Liège, re­
peated by Guitmund of Aversa, that Berengar denied the efficacy of in­
fant baptism, is entirely consistent with his Eucharistic theology.43 For
Berengar, there is no passage of an objective gift in the Eucharist; the
total efficacy of the sacrament depends upon the contemplation of the
recipient. Yet he insists that Baptism and the Eucharist are wholly on
a par. Hence it would seem he might hold the baptism of infants in­
effectual, since they are incapable of contemplation. And even further,
Berengar’s insistence on the moral element of the Eucharist, on its value
only as a graphic representation of the Passion of Christ for the contem­
41 Cappuyns, M., “Bérenger de Tours,’’ DHGE 8: 403-4: “Il s’agit moins de ce
que la théologie postérieure à appellé une application des merites du Christ que d’une
sorte de suggestion bienfaisante, par le moyen de symboles, de ce que le Christ est pour
nous et nous engage à être, dans son incarnation et sa passion.’’
42 Harnack, op. cit., p. 49, has had considerable difficulty with the Berengarian
concept of conversion. He writes: “Yet the tropical view . . . was not equivalent for
Berengar to the symbolical. ... A ‘conversio’ takes place; but for Berengar this ex­
pression has certainly an unusual sense,’’ etc. And in note 5 on the same page: “It must
be assumed that it [i.e. the ‘conversio’] rests on an accommodation; for although there
answers to the sacrament a res sacramenti, which is created by the consecration, yet it is
certainly not a question of transmutation,’’ etc.
43 Theoduin, Ad Henricum regem contra Brunonem et Berengarium, PL 146:

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

109

plation of the recipient, throws some doubt on his orthodoxy concerning
the objective character of revealed Christianity in general. Indeed, Geiselmann goes so far as to assert that, not only for the Eucharist, but also
for the Incarnation and the redeeming Passion themselves, Berengar
acknowledged not a real, but only a moral, or “didactic” meaning.44
The heresy of Berengar emphasizes once more the striking truth that
the mysteries of Christianity are not a collection of disparate articles but
an integrated pattern, and the denial of one is likely to cause the sub­
version of the whole.
2.

Orthodox Symbolism

Any discussion of Eucharistic symbolism among the opponents of
Berengar must be rooted in the same thought which guided them, the
thought of the substantial conversion. The Body of Christ is actually
and substantially in the Eucharist, and the presence is achieved through
substantial conversion. But the further fact is that the Body of Christ is
also present under a sign, under appearances not its own, in a signifying
mystery. Consequently, it is not simply heretical to say that the Body
of Christ is present “in figure,” if the term figure be applied to the visible
sign and not to the substance of the Body and Blood of Christ. The
idea which the Council of Trent later condemned was that of a presence
simply—“tantummodo”—in figure, in such a way as to exclude the
reality of the substance.
A Catholic discussion of the sacrament, must, therefore, take account
of both elements, the reality and the figure. In this final section, we
shall see how this was done by Lanfranc, Guitmund and Alger. We
shall study their sacramental doctrine in three stages: first, a work of
analysis, of sharp division between the visible sign and the invisible sub­
stance; second, a work of synthesis, of the bringing together of the vis­
ible sign and the invisible substance, not to confuse them, but to show
that the effects of the Eucharist are attributable not to the visible sign but
to the Body of Christ under the sign; third, the effects of the Eucharist,
the object and work of Christ in this sacrament. This threefold de­
velopment corresponds to the medieval distinction, still current, in which
the Holy Eucharist is studied under the aspect of sacramentum tantum,
of sacramentum-et-res, and of res tantum. Our study will emphasize
44 Op. cit., p. 352: “Erkennt dock Berengar der Menscherwerdung und dem
Erlosungsleiden nicht dingliche, sondern nur didaktische Bedeutung zu.”
1429 A. Cf. Vernet, loe. cit., col. 727.

110

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

the ratio signi, since it is in this that orthodox symbolism in its active
sense is found; and will merely indicate our authors’ treatment of the
third, the ratio significati, since under this aspect are comprised great
Eucharistic truths which deserve and are receiving much special study.

Every discussion of the personal controversy between Lanfranc and
Berengar must begin with the Roman formula of 1059. We have seen
that the language of this formula gave Berengar what he considered
one of his most conclusive arguments against the substantial conver­
sion.45 Again, in the preceding section of this chapter, we saw that the
term “solummodo sacramentum” of that formula provided the point of
departure for Berengar’s exposition of his own sacramental doctrine.46
But now, even at the risk of wearisome repetition, we must go over the
same ground once more, since this formula—or rather Berengar’s mis­
quotation of it—gave Lanfranc the opportunity to express his own view
of the Eucharist as sacrament.

In describing the condemned teaching of Berengar, the Roman form­
ula made use of the expression, “solummodo sacramentum et non verum
corpus et sanguinem.”47 But when Berengar himself cited the formula,
in the earlier opusculum of which we have only quotations in Lanfranc’s
treatise, he inserted the word “solummodo” to modify “verum corpus et
sanguinem” as well as “sacramentum.” So that in Berengar’s citation
the formula read, “solummodo sacramentum et non SOLUMMODO
verum corpus et sanguinem.” The effect of Berengar’s introduction of
this single word was to set up an absolute opposition between the sacra­
ment and the Body and Blood, so as to make the affirmation of the one
involve necessarily the denial of the other. If this Berengarian dichot­
omy could be sustained, then he would be right in attributing to Hum­
bert, to Lanfranc, and to his Catholic opponents in general a doctrine of
exaggerated realism.

But Lanfranc emphatically rejected the dilemma thrust upon him by
Berengar. In the early chapters of his treatise he asserts repeatedly that
Berengar had done nothing more than set up a straw man. The Church
does not hold to the reality of the Body and Blood in such a way as to
deny the sacrament; the term “solummodo corpus et sanguinem” did
not appear in the formula at all :
45 Supra, pp. 73-74.
46 Supra, p. 103.
47 See once more, the language of the formula, cited, p. 73.

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

III

The other expressions [Humbert} used, but the adverb solummodo
he did not place there at all. Hence whatever in your lying way you
attempt to conclude or infer from that word . . . totally breaks down.48

Lanfranc then sets down in broad and sweeping terms the Catholic doc­
trine of the Eucharist as sacrament. In this expression we see a valuable
preliminary sketch and outline of the entire subject presently under dis­
cussion, similar in its scope and importance to Lanfranc’s profession of
faith in the substantial conversion. We see in it also a correct phrasing of
the status questionis as it existed between himself and Berengar :
The first proposition, in which it is said: “the bread and wine of the
altar are only sacraments,” is your opinion and that of your disciples.
But the latter proposition, which states, “the bread and wine of the
altar are only the true Body and Blood of Christ,” is no one’s opinion.
For the Church of Christ believes that the bread is changed into Flesh,
and the wine into Blood, in such wise as also to acknowledge the Eucha­
rist to be a sacrament, of the Lord’s Passion, of the divine propitiation,
of peace and unity, and finally of the Body and Blood taken from the
Virgin. But each of these significations is achieved in its own distinct
way.49

The Eucharist, then, is not only reality but also sacrament. And Lan­
franc specifies that he accepts the term “sacrament” in the Augustinian
sense which is acceptable to Berengar: the sacrament is a sign.50 As
sign, it signifies not one thing only, but a variety of things, and these
various significations are not identical : in other words, Lanfranc states
in general terms that the Eucharist is not a commemorative sign of the
Passion in exactly the same way that it is a demonstrative sign of peace
and unity among Christians. Within this general framework is con­
tained the entire teaching of the anti-Berengarian writers concerning the
significance of the Eucharist as sacrament.
48 PL 150: 419 B: ‘‘Caetera namque dixit, adverbium solummodo nequaquam
posuit. Quidquid igitur ex mendacio te mendaciter astruente colligitur, quidquid infertur,
necessario totum dispargitur, infirmatur, cassatur.”
Cf. 416 B, 417 BC, 418 D.
49 Ibid., 415 A: ‘‘Prior quidem sententia, per quam dicitur: Panis et vinum altaris
solummodo sacramenta sunt, tua est, tuorumque sequacium. Posterior vero quae enuntiat:
Panis et vinum altaris solummodo sunt verum Christi corpus et sanguis, nullius hominum
est. Nam . . . Ecclesia Christi, sic panem in carnem, vinum credit converti in sanguinem,
ut tamen salubriter credat et veraciter recognoscat sacramentum esse Dominicae passionis,
divinae propitiationis, concordiae et unitatis, postremo assumptae de Virgine carnis ac
sanguinis singula suis distinctisque modis. . .
Cf. 416 C, 418 D.
50 Ibid., 422 C: ‘‘Et nos sacramentum, de quo agimus, sacrum esse signum credimus,
et credendum suademus.”

112

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

In attempting to analyze more closely the elements that enter into
the sacrament, Lanfranc adopts the distinction which had already been
used by Berengar :
The sacrifice of the Church is made up of (confici) two elements,
. . . the visible appearance of the species, and the invisible Flesh and
Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the sacramentum and the res-sacramenti — and the res (to use your very words) is the Body of Christ.51

Berengar also had used the term “sacrament” to designate the visible
species, and Body of Christ to denote the invisible res. But for Beren­
gar the visible sacrament merely signified the invisible res, which was in
heaven and not on the altar. While in Lanfranc’s view, both elements
are actually present in a mysterious manner in the Host, which is at the
same time the sacrament signifying the res and the res itself.
Alger of Liège discusses more fully than Lanfranc the Eucharistic
sacrament as a sign. The procedure of Alger is to set forth points of
similarity between the Eucharist and other sacraments; then to contrast
the Eucharist with other sacraments both of the Old Law and of the
New; and finally to distinguish sharply within the Eucharist itself, the
visible sign from the invisible reality.
Like other sacraments the Eucharist is a sign.52 Like other sacraments
the Eucharist is a transient gift which is meant to endure only during
the present life.53 The sacrament of the altar has been instituted to
show forth the death of the Lord only until He comes, because then,
when we shall see Him face to face, there will be no further need of
mysteries.54 It is in this sense of the temporal character of the sacra­
ment that Alger interprets the meaning of the Post-Communion for
Ember Saturday in September:
Perficiant in nobis, Domine, quaesumus, tua sacramenta quod con­
tinent, ut quae nunc species gerimus, rerum veritate capiamus.
51 Ibid., 421 BC: ", . . sacrificium scilicet Ecclesiae duobus confici, duobus con­
stare, visibili elementorum specie, et invisibili Domini nostri Jesu Christi carne et san­
guine, sacramento et res sacramenti ; quae res (ut verbis tuis utar) est corpus Christi."
52 Alg., PL 180: 716 D: ‘‘Constat ipsum sacramentum sicut caetera esse signifi­
cativum.”
53 Ibid., 762 C: “Nec solum comparatur sacramentum corporis Christi caeteris
sacramentis consignificando, sed et in corpore Christi aeternaliter non permanendo . . .
non in corpore Christi manere perpetualiter, sed post hanc vitam omnino desinere creditur, sicut et caetera sacramenta."
54 Ibid., 746 A: "Quia ergo hoc sacramentum non est in aeternum mors Christi
annuntianda, sed tantum donec veniat, quia postea nullis mysteriis egebimus, constat
illud transitorium esse signum et temporale, quo tantum egemus nunc, dura videmus per
speculum et in aenigmate."

I lu I »ui h <<»'«■ r a V ( *«»••<■*• nifi# the Fiitltafi»l (Il ,Sm iiirnrril

IM

Alger takes the “ventas” of this prayer as meaning the total manifesta­
tion of the truth. We possess the “veritas” of the Body and Blood even
during this life, but we have it under the shadow of the sacramental ap­
pearances. At the end of time we shall possess the same “veritas,” in
manifest vision, face to face.55
If the Eucharist is like other sacraments in its character of imperman­
ence, it is unlike them in other respects. The manna of the Old Law
and the Eucharist of the New are alike in that which they signify, name­
ly, Christ,
. . . but the sacrament of the bread signifies Christ more intimately
than the manna, since the manna signified Christ to come, while the
bread signifies Him actually present. The manna signified Christ only in
an external way, while the bread is substantially converted into the Body
of Christ, and thus formally signifies the Body of Christ.56

The sacraments of the Old Law merely foreshadowed in figure the reality
which was to come; in the New Law is given the reality along with the
figure ; and in the glorious future life we shall have the reality unveiled.
The Old Testament promised the reality but did not give it. The New
Testament gives the reality, but does not manifest it. The future life
will manifest the same reality in intuitive vision.5'
Alger further distinguishes the sacrament of the Eucharist from the
other sacraments of the New Law. In so far as their material being is
concerned, the other sacraments are figures only; their natures are not
changed so as to become what they signify. The water of Baptism and
the oil of confirmation remain what they were : they signify the Holy
Spirit, but they do not contain Him essentially; they possess Him in
figure and in power. And Alger continues :
Only the sacrament of the bread and wine is so changed as substan­
tially to cease to be what it was before; its substance becomes the Body
of Christ; its external appearance, however, remains, and signifies the
Body of Christ and contains it.58
55 Ibid., 762 D: “Frustra oraremus, ut quod nunc specie geritur, rerum veritate
capiamus, si ibi etiam hujus sacramenti haberemus umbram, ubi facie ad faciem sicut est
videre speramus Christi gloriam.”
Similarly Lanf., PL 150: 435 B. Cf. Guitmund’s different interpretation of the
prayer, PL 149: 1468, and de la Taille, Mysterium Fidei, p. 486.
56 Ibid., 762 AB : “Cum tamen sacramentum panis familiarius significet Christum
quam manna, quia manna futurum, panis praesentem, manna tantum extrinsecus, panis
ita ut substantialiter sit conversus in corpus Christi, et formaliter significet corpus Christi.”
57 Ibid., 763 AB.
58 Ibid., 761 A: “Solum sacramentum panis et vini ita mutatur ut substantialiter
non sit quod ante fuerat; sed substantia ejus corpus Christi fiat, forma vero remanens
ipsum significet et contineat.”

I 14

The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Having thus laid down the preliminary distinctions, Alger then pro­
ceeds to give his analysis of the Eucharistic sacrament :
The form of bread and wine and the other qualities remaining —
these alone can truly be called sacramentum. The invisible substance,
however, which is contained under this sacrament, and into which the
substance of bread and wine is changed — this can truly be called, and
it is, the Body of Christ.59

Like Lanfranc, then, Alger distinguishes two elements in the Eucharist,
the sacramentum tantum, which is the species of bread and wine as in­
formed by consecration, and the invisible substance of the Body and
Blood of Christ.

But much more emphatically than Lanfranc, Alger insists on the real
distinction between the visible sacramentum and the invisible Body of
Christ. They are not unum et idem, but aliud et aliud.60 Alger holds
that it is far from the Catholic position to identify the transient species
of bread and wine with the substance of the changeless Body of
Christ.61 And if sometimes the species are called the Body of Christ,
this must be understood as a figurative and not a true predication.62
Here Alger, to refute the Berengarian charge of exaggerated realism,
is employing a sharp scholastic distinction between the species, taken pre­
cisely as species (“praecisive,” in the scholastic term) and the Body and
Blood of Christ which they signify and contain. He uses this distinc­
tion to explain a difficulty which Berengar had drawn from the letter of
St. Augustine to Boniface. If Augustine says in that letter that the
sacrament of the Body and Blood is the Body and Blood “secundum
quemdam modum,” he is referring to the visible form and appearance of
the elements—which indeed are not the Body and Blood of Christ, ex­
cept figuratively and by a certain likeness. But the substance which
59 Ibid., 752 C: “Formam panis et vini et caderas elementorum remanentes et visi­
biles qualitates, sacramentum tantummodo vere dici et esse: substantiam autem illam
invisibilem, quae ipso sacramento operta est, et in quam panis et vini substantia translata
est, vere et proprie dici et esse corpus Christi testatur Augustinus.”
60 Ibid., 752 D: “Quae ergo duo esse approbat, visibile sacramentum et invisibilem
rem sacramenti, non unum et idem, sed aliud et aliud esse demonstrat.
61 Ibid., 753 C: “Absit ergo ut transitoria species panis et vin, sit vera substantia
vel vera species immutabilis Christi.”

62 Ibid.: “Sed si aliquando dicitur corpus Christi, nuncupative et non vere oportet
intclligi.”

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

115

these species contain, and into which the substance of bread and wine
is changed, is truly and properly the Body of Christ.63

Again, Alger insists that these two elements do not enter into com­
position with one another, but remain distinct. The failure to make this
distinction is responsible for the error of the impanationists, who, through
an improper use of terms and analogies, try to bring the sacramentum
and the res sacramenti into composition.64 It is one thing to say that
the Body of Christ is both reality and figure. It is another to say that
man is a body and soul. There is a grammatical similarity between these
two expressons, but they are utterly unlike in meaning.65 Body and
soul enter into composition to form one human nature ; but the accidents
of bread in this sacrament are not part of the Body, nor are they acci­
dents of the Body—they are only the sign of the Body.
To sum up the teaching of Lanfranc and Alger at this first stage of
the inquiry, it is clear that they distinguish between two elements in the
sacrament, really distinct, the sacramentum tantum, which is the visible
species of bread and wine remaining after the consecration, and the res
sacramenti, which is the invisible substance of the Body of Christ. There
is no confusion or composition between these two elements; the sacra­
mentum is not the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ is not the
sacramentum; but the Body of Christ is the invisible res, and the species
are its sign.

With this background and this emphatic distinction in our minds, we
are at first sight startled to see Lanfranc, and Guitmund and Alger after
him, assert that the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is itself a sacrament
and a sign.66 In their attribution to the actual Body of Christ of a truly
63 Ibid., 753 D: “In quo notandum est sacramentum corporis Christi, secundum
quemdam modum, id est, similitudinarie et nuncupative, non proprie corpus Christi
vocari, quantum ad elementorum speciem et formam: quod tamen vere et proprie corpus
Christi vocatur et creditur, quantum ad substantiam quam continet et in quam panis et
vini substantia conversa est.”
64 Ibid., 754 C:
. ex indifferenti et impropria usurpatione nominum vel simili­
tudinum ... de sacramento et re sacramenti ita loquuntur, ut prave intelligentibus, quasi
in unum quid accipiantur.”
65 Ibid., “Sed cum dicitur, ‘corpus Christi est veritas et figura,’ numquid pro una
persona accipiendum est, sicut cum dicitur, ‘homo est corpus et anima?’ Similis quidem
est grammatica sed non similis intelligentia.”
66 Lanf., PL 150: 424 C: “Christus ergo Christi est sacramentum."
Guit., PL 149: 1458 A: “Cum sit verum Christi corpus, dicatur et signum.”
Alg., PL 180: 792 D: “Verum corpus Christi invisibile ... sit sacramentum visi­
bilis cor|x>ris Christi.”

116

//ir I in hiiritiit Ciiriirovrrajj <»/ ihr llcvcnlh Ccnlury

sacramental function we believe we find their principal contribution to
the study of the Eucharist as sacrament, and the heart and center of an
orthodox Eucharistic symbolism : the doctrine, namely, of the real Body
of Christ as sacramentum-et-res in the economy of this sacrament. None
of them uses the actual term, and none of them seems to have grasped
the full significance of the idea; consequently we must leave for the
moment the simple examination of their texts and attempt to interpret
the ideas which must have led them to call the actual Body of Christ the
sacramentum of itself.

From all that we have seen so far, it might appear that Lanfranc and
Alger are in agreement with Berengar in assigning a distinction of two
elements in the Eucharist, both really distinct : the sacramentum, or the
sensible sign, and the invisible res sacramenti, or the Body of Christ.
But of course they explained these two terms differently. Lanfranc and
Alger placed both of the sacramental elements in actual connection with
the consecrated species : after the consecration, the substance of Christ’s
Body and Blood is actually present under the species in much the same
way as the substance of bread and wine was actually present under them
before the consecration—with the exception, of course, that the accidents
of bread and wine do not inhere in the Body and Blood of Christ as
formerly they did in the bread and wine, but by the divine power are
miraculously sustained in themselves. But as we have seen, Berengar
placed no such actual connection. For Berengar, there is between the
consecrated species and the res sacramenti no more than a moral con­
nection: through the consecrated species one is reminded of the im­
molated Savior; one contemplates His sufferings, becomes absorbed in
the thought of them, and determines henceforth to regulate his life with
a similar humility and patience.
Thus, in brief, for Berengar, the sensible sign is bread, and the res
sacramenti is not on the altar but is in heaven only. While for Lanfranc
and Alger, the sensible sign is not bread, but the accidents of bread, and
the res sacramenti is actually made present on the altar through the consecratory words. The event of the real presence does not induce any
change in Christ, but only in the bread through the substantial conver­
sion. And in the permanent sacrament the actual Body of Christ re­
mains present as long as the species themselves remain in being. With
regard to the consecrated species, therefore, the Body of Christ is the res,
and the species themselves are its sacramentum, or sign.
But even as distinguished from the Berengarian view, it is apparent

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

117

that the distinction of the sacrament into two elements—sacramentum
and res sacramenti—is not sufficient to express the entire richness of the
Eucharistic symbolism. For this distinction would make the significative
power of the sacrament end in the designation of Christ’s presence on
the altar. But to bring about Christ’s presence on the altar is not the
end of the sacramental process. The end of that process must be to
produce some effect in us who receive. In the opening paragraphs of
this section, we cited Lanfranc saying that the Eucharist as sacrament is
significant of many things—of the Lord’s Passion, of the divine propitia­
tion, of concord and unity—in addition to the effect merely of bringing
about the real presence on the altar. Consequently, the Body of Christ
existing on the altar cannot be called simply the res sacramenti; but the
significance of the sacrament must be thrown forward, as it were, so as
to signify effects which are produced in us, the actual destinaries of the
sacrament. If, as Lanfranc says, concord and unity among Christians
are signified by this sacrament, then concord and unity must be the res
sacramenti, or at least must enter into the res sacramenti.
Moreover, if certain great effects are produced in us through the sac­
rament, these effects must be attributed to the Body of Christ as their
cause, and not merely to our participation in the sacramentum tantum as
sharply distinguished from the Body of Christ. For the sacramentum ton­
turn, even as informed by the words of consecration, is only the accidents
of bread and wine, and these accidents are efficacious only by reason of
the underlying substance of the Body and Blood of Christ, which they
signify and contain. The accidents of bread and wine are not a life­
giving sacrament, but the Body and Blood of Christ, signified and con­
tained under these transient species, are the bread of eternal life.
And finally, if the res sacramenti is something produced in us,
and does not merely terminate in the substantial conversion; and if the
production of the res sacramenti must be attributed to the Body of
Christ as its cause; then it must be attributed to the sacrament also, be­
cause Christ in the Eucharist does not act on our souls absolutely, but
only in connection with the sacrament itself.
For all these reasons, therefore, it becomes clear that the division
of the sacrament into sacramentum tantum and res sacramenti (Body of
Christ) in insufficient. The Body of Christ itself must enter into the in­
ternal economy of the sacrament. The Body of Christ must in fact be
the sacrament, producing its effect in us. With regard to the consecratory action, the Body of Christ is res. But with regard to us the Body
of Christ under the visible species is sacramentum.

I 18

The Eucharutic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

If these principles are kept in mind, it may be easier to understand
the somewhat startling assertion of Lanfranc that the “Body of Christ
in the Eucharist is a sacrament of itself.” We believe we see in this
statement of Lanfranc an imperfect foreshadowing of a doctrine which
was to receive rich development in later medieval writers, and which is
an important element in Catholic Eucharistic theology today : the doc­
trine, namely, of the Body of Christ as sacramentum-et-res in the Eucha­
rist.87

In their scientific treatment of the Eucharist, medieval theologians in­
serted between the two elements sacramentum tantum and res tantum,
a third element, which is sacramentum-et-res, the true Body of Christ
under the sacramental species. This middle element is totally lacking
in Berengar’s theology, and its presence in Lanfranc, Guitmund, and
Alger is, we think, the key to the controversy concerning the Eucharist
as sacrament. The stumbling-block for Berengar was his inability to un­
derstand how the sacrament could be at one and the same time symbol
and reality, and to save the symbol he abandoned the reality. But here
in the doctrine of the sacramentum-et-res, are both elements. The Body
of Christ in the Eucharist is the reality, because its presence is assured
through the substantial conversion. But the Body of Christ is sacrament,
and therefore sign, because it is present under a sensible sign, under ap­
pearances not its own. And the Body of Christ it is that under these
appearances produces the great effects that are summed up in the term
res tantum. Thus the Eucharistic Body of Christ may be called the sac­
rament of the Body of Christ, not so as to relate the Eucharistic Body
merely to the historical Body, but to the whole Christ, the Mysical Body,
since the final end and product of the sacrament is to bring about the
incorporation of the faithful in Christ. The Body of Christ in the
Eucharist is the sacrament of His Mystical Body, which is the Church.
Here is an efficacious symbolism surpassing even that of Baptism : a par­
ticipation of the believer in Christ, not only in His power, but in the
very reality of His divine Person, under the symbolic elements.

We believe this doctrine is found actually, if not in the literal terms67
67 The doctrine of the sacramentum-et-res is clearly taught in Hugh of St. Victor,
De sacramentis Christianae fidei, 2, 8, PL 176: 466-467. Cf. Summa sententiarum, 6, 3,
PL 176: 140. M. de la Taille, Mysterium Fidei, pp. 507-510, traces development from
Lanfranc through Guitmund, Alger, William of St. Thierry, Innocent III, and Thomas
Waldensis. For modem importance of sacramentum-et-res doctrine, see L. Billot, De
Sacramentis Ecclesiae, ed. 6, vol. I, pp. 105-115, 321. Cf. also H. De Lubac, Corpus
Mÿsticum, L'Eucharistie et L'Église au Moyen Age, Paris (Aubier), 1944, pp. 83-84,
118, 128.

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

119

themselves, in Lanfranc’s insistence that Christ is the sacrament of Him­
self :
The sacrament of the Body of Christ is His Flesh, which we receive
in the sacrament, concealed under the appearance of bread; and His
Blood which we drink under the appearance and taste of wine. The
Flesh is the sacrament of the Flesh, and the Blood is the sacrament of
the Blood.68

More surprisingly still, Lanfranc asserts that the invisible Body of Christ
in the Eucharist is the sign of the visible and palpable Body.
By the invisible, intelligible, spiritual Flesh and Blood, is signified
the visible and palpable Body, manifestly full of grace and divine
Majesty.69

The immediate objection to this doctrine is that an invisible thing can­
not be a sign of a visible thing.70 Lanfranc answers this objection cor­
rectly by relating the significative power of the Body of Christ to the
visible species: “sacramentum corporis Christi . . . caro ejus est, quam
FORMA PANIS OPERTAM . . . accipimus.”
The Body of Christ
in the Eucharist is indeed invisible, but it is somehow made visible
through its connection with the species, and can thus fulfill the function
of a sign.71

But when Lanfranc applies the signifying power of the Body of Christ
to a res, or thing signified, he relates it back to the natural, historical
(“corpus visible, palpabile”) Body of Christ immolated:
When the Body is broken, and is distributed for the salvation of the
people; and when the Blood is poured from the chalice and received
into the mouths of the faithful, His death on the Cross, and the shed­
ding of the Blood from His side, are symbolized.72
68 PL 150: 423 D: "Sacramentum corporis Christi . . . caro ejus est, quam forma
panis opertam, in sacramento accipimus, et sanguis ejus quem sub vini specie ac sapore
potamus. Caro videlicet carnis, et sanguis sacramentum est sanguinis.”
69 Ibid., 424 A: "Carne et sanguine, utroque invisibili, intelligibili, spirituali, signi­
ficatur Redemptoris corpus visibile, palpabile, manifeste plenum gratia et divina majes­
tate.”
70 See this objection made to Lanfranc’s teaching by Gerhoch of Reichersbcrg,
cited in de la Taille, op cit., p. 507.
71 Billot, op.cif., p. 115, note “Sacramentum-et-res est sensibile solum per acci­
dens, ratione scilicet sacramenti exterioris cum quo nexum habet necessarium ntqur infal­
libilem. . . .” Cf. De la Taille, op. cit., p. 510.
72 Lanf., 424 A: "Quorum alterum quidem dum frangitur, rt in populi salutem
dividitur; alterum vero effusum de calice ab ore fidelium sumitur, mois rpis in cruce, et
sanguinis ejus de latere emanatio figuratur.”

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The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

Now it is true indeed that the Eucharist is the commemorative sign of
Christ in His passion and death—that is the sacrifice of the Mass; and it
is true that the Sacrifice of the Cross, which finds its mystical prolonga­
tion in the Mass, is the radical source and cause of all the effects which
the Eucharist produces in those who participate in it. But the full value of
the concept of Christ’s Body as sacramentum-et-res has not been ex­
pressed until its significance has been thrown forward to embrace us who
share in the actual life of Christ through the sacrament. Thus Lanfranc’s approach is only partial and imperfect, and Alger of Liège simply
repeats Lanfranc.73 For a richer development we must go to Guitmund
of Aversa.
Guitmund begins by agreeing with Lanfranc that it is no obstacle to
our faith to hold that the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is both sacra­
ment and reality.74 He says that Scripture refers to Christ, even in His
historical existence, as a sign, signum cui contradicteur.7576In the Eucha­
rist, then, He is the Sign of Salvation,'1' which is the fruit of the Re­
demption applied to us.77 The glorified Christ in heaven now in His Hu­
manity and Divinity is the Sign of the Eternal Covenant between God
and man.78 And in the Eucharist, He is the Sign of the Peace which
we enjoy as sharing in the covenant. '9 Finally, His natural Body bom
of Mary was the Sign of His Mystical Body, which is the Church.8081
And
in the Eucharist, He is the Sign of that same Mystical Body, incor­
porating us as members of Christ our Head,
for as often as we receive it, we show ourselves to be Christians,
that is, spiritually reborn. Consequently, we declare ourselves crucified
with Christ, and dead with Him, and buried with Him through Bap­
tism unto death — but also we declare that we have risen with Him!8!
73 PL 180 : 792 A, C, D.
74 Guit., PL 149: 1457 C, 1458 A, 1460 CD.
75 Ibid.. 1457 D: "Non legistis in Evangelio ipsum Christum signum appellari.

. . . signum cui contradictor?"
76 Ibid., 1458 B: "Simile quoque ratione cibum altaris Domini . . . ejusdem
salutis nostrae credimus significativum."
77 Ibid., 1458 A: “Christus enim, quoniam seipsum pro nobis obtulit, factum est
nobis signum redemptionis.”
78 Ibid., “Christus denique inter Deum et homines mediator . . . signum est foederis
sempiterni."
79 Ibid., 1458 C: “. . . hujus tam saluberrimae pacis, sacrosancta altaris oblatio a
. . . signum cui contradicetur?”
80 Ibid., 1459 BD: ". . . ipsum suum proprium, quod de beata Virgine sumpserat
corpus, corporis sui, quod est Ecclesia, signum est, et figura et sacramentum."
81 Ibid.: “. . . quia quotiescumque id sumimus, nos utique Christianos esse, id est,
spiritualiter natos ostendimus. Consequenter ergo et concrucifixos, et conmortuos et consepultos Domino nostro, per baptismum in mortem, sed et consurrexisse nos declaramus.'

Tilt Con Iro verjp Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

121

In this beautiful analogy in three stages we see unfolded some of the
riches of the Catholic Eucharistic symbolism. The Holy Eucharist is
the continuation of the Incarnation and Redemption; through this sacra­
ment are actually applied to our souls the benefits which the Incarnate
Redeemer won for the world in objective fashion on the Cross. This is
not a bare symbolism, as it was for Berengar, a mere memorial of Christ
and an inducement to imitate His virtues. The actual presence of Christ
in the sacrament is the guarantee of the reality of our hopes. When we
participate in His Body under the sacramental appearances, we actually
share His life, as Guitmund points out, and enter in a most real and
intimate fashion into the mysteries of His Passion, and Death, and
Resurrection.

This presentation seems to us to explain the insistence of Lanfranc,
Guitmund and Alger that the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is a sac­
rament of itself. We may then conclude this section on the Body of
Christ as sacramentum-et-res with Guitmund’s analysis of the internal
economy of our sacrament:
Wherever the Eucharist is called the sacrament of the Body of
Christ, or wherever similar language is used, we so interpret it: the
Eucharist is the sacrament which is the Body of the Lord, so as to be
truly His Body, and sacrament of other things, namely of the further
benefits of which we have been speaking.82

We will close our study of orthodox Eucharistic symbolism with a
brief survey of the “benefits” of which Guitmund has been speaking, the
res sacramenti, a term which designates the final end and object of
Christ’s work in His sacrament.

The res sacramenti may be viewed as multiple or as one. We have
seen Lanfranc’s assertion that the Eucharist is the sign of many things :
of the Lord’s Passion, of the divine propitiation, of peace and unity. But
in fact, all these benefits are adequately summed up in one formula : the
sacrament of the Eucharist is the sign of the union of the faithful with
Christ, as members with their Head, of their participation in His divine
life, and their sharing in His Mysteries. The technical term, “grace,”
as effect of the Eucharist is seldom found in the anti-Berengarian
82 Ibid., 1460 B: “Ubi sane invenitur eucharistia dici sacramentum corporis Domini,
aut constructionem verborum, sic resolvimus: Eucharistia est sacramentum quod est
corpus Domini, ut ipsa quidem sit vere corpus Domini, sacramentum vero sit aliarum
rerum, praedictorum videlicet bonorum.”

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The Eucharistie Controversy of the Eleventh Century

writers,83 but they speak often of eternal life, of salvation, of union with
Christ; and in reality these terms are synonymous. For the grace of the
Christian life is union with Christ, which is eternal life possessed even in
the present time, and the source and principle of salvation. The multi­
plicity of the res sacrament is found in the fact that the grace of union
is signified by this sacrament in various ways. It is signified in its cause :
and thus the Eucharist is the sign of the Lord’s Passion; in its present
actuality, and the Eucharist is the sign of the union of the faithful with
Christ and His Church; and in its future splendor, and the Eucharist is
the pledge of eternal life and the guarantee of the glorious resurrection
of the Body. This manifold significance of the Eucharist is clearly
found in our writers; here we shall indicate their teaching along general
lines, and cite references for further inquiry into this vast subject.
The Holy Eucharist is the sign of the Passion of Christ. This, of
course, is the Sacrifice of the Mass. It should surprise no one to find that
the early medieval writers assign no special treatment to the Eucharist
precisely as a sacrifice. For them it was patent that the Body of Christ
is possessed now by the Church under the aspect of His death; the sac­
ramentum was the sacrifice, and the sacrifice was real because the pres­
ence of the immolated Christ under the sacramental appearances was
real.84 Here the doctrine of the sacramentum-et-res is extremely im­
portant : the Body of Christ is offered up in reality because it is present
in reality, but it is offered up symbolically, because it is present under a
sign.
The teachings of Lanfranc, Guitmund and Alger on the Eucharistic
sacrifice are a valuable part of that great medieval tradition which mod­
em writers, such as Billot, Vonier, and Masure have done so much to
restore. A passage from Alger will illustrate their basic doctrine :
It is to be noted that our daily sacrifice is said to be the same as that
which Christ offered once upon the Cross, if we consider it from the
point of view of the same true substance of the Body of Christ, on the
Cross and upon the altar. But our daily sacrifice is called also a repre­
sentation of His sacrifice, that is, a figure or an expression. This does
not constitute an essentially different Christ in the Mass and on the
Cross, but simply shows that the same Christ who was once immolated
83 But see Alg., PL 180: 751 A, 774 A.
84 A. Vonier, Sketches and Studies in Theology, London, (Burns, Oates, and

Washbourne), 1940, pp. 80, 83.
Cf. C. V. Héris, Le mystère du Christ, Paris, (Desclée), 1928, p. 338.

The Controversy Concerning the Eucharist as Sacrament

123

and offered upon the Cross, is daily immolated and offered upon the
altar, but in a different manner. There He was offered in the reality of
the Passion in which He was slain for us; here He is offered in the
figure and image of His Passion. Christ does not really suffer again in
the Mass; but the memory of His Passion is daily kept by us.85

The Eucharist is the sign of our union with Christ and His Church.
This is the present effect of the Eucharist, the effect which is produced in
the souls of those who receive. Repeatedly our authors use the language
of Christ in John 6 as proof that the reception of the Body of Christ
actually produces in us union with Christ and our abiding in Him.86
Alger of Liege adds the valuable observation that our union with Christ
in this sacrament is achieved primarily with His sacred Humanity, but
that through the humanity we become partakers of the divinity and
sharers of the divine nature.87 Both Lanfranc and Alger stress the two­
fold reception of the Eucharist, in ore and in corde. One is as necessary
as the other.88 If the spiritual reception is said to be more important
than the corporal, this does not mean that the Christ we receive into our
souls is different from the Christ of the Eucharistic communion; but only
that the spiritual reception is always productive of grace, while the cor­
poreal reception may fail to produce grace because of the evil disposi­
tions of the communicant.89 And finally, the sacrament is only pro­
ductive if it results in a union of charity and love among the members
of the Mystical Body of Christ. For in this sacrament we are united
85 Alg., PL 180: 786 D: “Notandum ergo quia quotidianum nostrum sacrificium
idem ipsum dicit cum co, quo Christus semel oblatus est in cruce, quantum ad eamdem
veram hic et ibi corporis Christi substantiam: quod vero nostrum quotidianum illius semel
oblati dicit esse exemplum, id est figuram vel formam; non dicit ut hic vel ibi essentialiter
alium Christum constituat, sed ut eumdem in cruce semel, in altari quotidie alio modo
immolari et offerì ostendat; ibi in veritate passionis qua pro nobis occisus est hic in
figura et imitatione passionis ipsius, qua Christus non iterum vere patitur, sed ipsius vere
memoriae memoria passionis quotidie nobis iteratur.’’

On the Sacrifice of the Mass, see Lanf., PL 150: 423-425; Guit., PL 149:
1455; Alg., PL 180: 786, 795-796.

8G Lanf., 425 D, 427 D, 429 A; Guit., 1492 AB; Alg., 769 D, 770 D, 772 D,
774.
87 774 D: “. . . incorporat, sicut corporis et animae Dominicae, sic etiam ipsius
divinitatis suae. . . .”
Cf. M. J. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity, (tr. by C. Vollert, S.J.), St.
Louis (Herder), 1946, p. 526.

88 Lanf., 425 CD: “Utraque comestio necessaria, utraque fructuosa. Altera indiget
alterius, ut boni aliquid operetur.’’
89 Alg., 773 D, 774 A, cf. 749 D - 750 A.
On union with Christ as effect of this sacrament, see Lanf., 425, 427 D, 429 B( ;
Guit., 1492; Alg., 749-751, 769-774, 794.

124

Thr Eucharistie CoMrowrip of ihr Eleventh Crnltirÿ

with Christ in His capacity of Head, and the union with the Head
necessarily includes a union with the other members.9'0
And at last, the Eucharist is the sign of the glorious resurrection of
the Body, and of eternal life. Alger writes that although the Eucharist
is primarily spiritual food, yet it profits the body also. And he cites the
promise of the Savior that he who eats this food will not be defrauded
of eternal life, but Christ will raise him up in the last day.90
91 Thus the
faithful person is united to Christ in all the Mysteries of His life, not
only the sorrowful Mysteries of the Passion, but also the glorious Mys­
teries of His Resurrection and Ascension : and the Eucharist is the proof
that He has really loved us in finem. Finally, it is worthy of note that
Alger requires the moral element of a pure and holy life in those who
participate in the Eucharist; not in Berengar’s sense of the moral ele­
ment as the chief benefit of the Eucharist, but in that of a good disposi­
tion on the part of those who receive :
Thus it is certain that with Him and through Him we shall obtain
a like glory of dignity in eternal life, if with Him and through Him we
strive to preserve a like grace of innocence in this life.92

90 On the unity of the Mystical Body, cf. Lanf., 425; Guit., 1459-1461; Alg.,
749, 794.
91 774 B: “Quod autem ad corpus attinet, nec ei vita aeterna fraudetur, sed
in resurrectione mortuorum in novissimo die.”
92 747 D : Certumque esset, hoc pacto nos cum ipso per ipsum, in vita aeterna,
similem dignitatis obtinere gloriam, si cum ipso per ipsum, in hac vita similem innocen­
tiae servare voluerimus gratiam . . . maxime cum ipse moriturus . . . vitae aeternae
pactum nobis assignaverit, et ipse a mortuis resurgendo, in se capite nostro, quomodo
corpus suum glorificare deberet ostenderit.”

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
Although theological controversies generally bear on particular doc­
trines of faith or morals, yet invariably broader problems and more
fundamental oppositions underlie the special questions at issue. Very
often the events and movements of secular history will exert profound
influence even in the realm of theology. For example, the rise of the
Protestant heresy in northern Europe coincided with a growing spirit
of nationalism which resulted from the discoveries of new continents
and the expansion of national trade. Again, the intellectual spirit and
temper of an age will influence its theology. Nineteenth-century ration­
alism and modernism grew out of the thought that the progress of nat­
ural science had rendered obsolete any system of supernatural and re­
vealed religion. At the bottom of every heresy there is the idea, either
expressed or implied, that human science and supernatural mystery are
unalterably opposed, and heresy will issue either in the flat rejection of
the mystery or the attempt to give it a purely rational explanation.

Needless to say, the influence of extraneous factors becomes crucial,
and an apparent conflict between faith and reason is experienced, only
among heterodox theologians. Only a theology which is exclusively
man-made needs to be cut to fit the latest development of natural sci­
ence or secular history. Over it all and through it all, the perennial the­
ology is richly present in the world, making steady progress, but at
peace and undisturbed because it has been founded upon changeless
principles revealed by God.

But the fact remains that it is impossible to understand any theologi­
cal controversy apart from the historical and intellectual context in
which it had its place.
The context of the Berengarian controversy was the pre-scholastic
period, extending from the ninth century to the twelfth, a period of tran­
sition between the conservatism of the post-patristic age and the great
expansion of scholasticism which took place in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. The pre-scholastic scholars had at their disposal two sources
of knowledge, Holy Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, and a
gradual but sporadic stream of Aristotelian dialectics—not the meta­
physics—which came to them principally through the translations and
125

126

The. Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century

commentaries of Boethius. Scholastic theology was born of the union
between Reason and Authority which took place in the pre-scholastic
period. The pre-scholastic writers had patristic authority for their con­
viction that the two sources did not conflict, but could be harmonized
into one cohesive body of knowledge. Authority was of primary im­
portance, of course: nothing must be taught except what had been
revealed by God in Scripture and tradition, and proposed for belief by
the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. But reason had its law­
ful role, ancillary, auxiliary, and propaedeutic, for the better under­
standing and expression of revealed doctrine.
It was possible, however, in the confusion which necessarily accom­
panied the early stages of this theological science, for a writer to exag­
gerate the role of reason and apply the principles and methods of an
immature philosophy even against the stream of traditional authority.
And Berengar of Tours, eleventh-century scholasticus of Tours and
arch-deacon of Angers, a man of blameless life but of bold and inde­
pendent spirit, delighted with dialectics, stands as the ablest of the anti­
authoritarian dialectical school. Berengar attempted to explain the
Eucharist, the Mystery of Faith, wholly in the light of the principles of
the philosophy which he had learned, rejected tradition and the teaching
of the Church, and fell inevitably into heresy.
The heresy of Berengar of Tours is cumulative: it begins on the
deep level of the principles of theological knowledge, and expresses itself
in his theory of the Eucharist.

In the first place, then, Berengar built on reason, not on faith. It
is true that he paid lip-service to traditional teaching, and attempted to
square his doctrine with it, but he emphatically proclaimed the “incom­
parable superiority” of reason to traditional authority as a source of re­
ligious knowledge. And when the magisterium was brought to bear
upon his teaching, he renounced the Church altogether and rejected its
authority.

And further, the “reason” upon which he built consisted in an im­
mature philosophical system, the dialectics of the schools. Berengar
simply did not know metaphysics, and yet his basic Eucharistic error
was in the metaphysical order. His was a sensist metaphysics, the be­
lief that the proper object of sensible experience is being in its totality,
that the senses grasp not only the appearances of an object but also its

Cenerai Conclusions and Summary

127

essence, in a direct and immediate manner. Thus, the distinction be­
tween substance and accident was lost on him, and he was led to regard
as absurd a doctrine which held for a change of substance while the
accidents remained. His inability to understand the traditional teaching
of a real presence of Christ’s Body and Blood in specie aliena led him
to adopt a crude and materialistic interpretation of the doctrine of sub­
stantial conversion; and his dialectical criticism of the formulas of real­
ism (his argument that “if bread is called the Body of Christ, then bread
must remain”) is mere logic-chopping and a playing with words.
But Berengar had to take account of the realistic language of the
Fathers, and thus built up a positive theory of the Eucharist as mere sign
and symbol. Through the consecration there takes place a conversion,
not of the Eucharistic elements themselves, but of the sentiment of the
believer with respect to them. The elements remain what they had been
before, but they become the Body and Blood of Christ in the contempla­
tion of the recipient, and are endowed for him with the value of Christ’s
passion and death. Thus the conversion is purely in the moral order,
and the Eucharistic activity begins and ends within the consciousness of
the believer himself. The subjective character of Berengar’s Eucharistic
theology renders suspect his sacramental theology in general, since the
idea of the efficacious symbol is excluded; and his sensist metaphysics
throws some doubt upon the orthodoxy of his belief in supernatural re­
ligion. If nothing exists save that which can be grasped by the senses,
then mysteries and their revelation are impossible.
The philosophy of the opponents of Berengar was no more mature
than his. They accepted the doctrine of substantial conversion, not be­
cause their reason made it evident, but because the doctrine was con­
tained in Scripture and tradition, and was taught by the Church and be­
lieved by the faithful. No more can be said today. The real distinc­
tion between substance and accident does not prove the Catholic doc­
trine of the Eucharist, but it effectually prevents any adversary from
proving in a conclusive manner that it contains a contradiction in terms.
The Mystery of Faith remains.

But the exercise of dialectics enabled the adversaries of Berengar to
clarify and organize the revealed teaching, and carry it to a point of de­
velopment considerably in advance of the Fathers and post-patristic
writers. In the first place, they teach that the doctrine of substantial
conversion does not involve creation nor local movement, but a simple

128

7 hr liuchari.'ltc Controvert of the Eleventh Century

change of the substance of bread and wine into the substance of Christ’s
Body and Blood. Thus they distinguish two modes of being of Christ’s
Body, the natural mode, in which His Body is in heaven in glorious
immortality at the right hand of the Father; and the sacramental mode,
in which He is present in many places on earth. And the presence of
Christ on earth does not involve change on His part since the change
is altogether on the part of the bread.
And further, against the capharnaitic interpretation of Berengar,
they teach that since the presence of Christ’s Body is not bound by
the dimensions of the bread, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is
not a partial but a total presence. Christ is whole and entire in the
Host and in every particle; moreover, in the doctrine of concommitance
as introduced by Alger, His living Body is present under the appear­
ance of wine, and His living Blood under the appearance of bread. The
two-fold consecration does not affect the totality of Christ’s presence,
bu is done in imitation of the Savior’s practice at the Last Supper, and
for the sake of the significance of the Passion.
Although the substance of bread and wine is changed into the sub­
stance of Body and Blood, yet the accidents of bread retain a real and
not phantasmal existence in their proper character as accidents. And
Alger of Liege adds the important clarification that the accidents after
the consecration do not inhere in any substance but by the divine omni­
potence are miraculously sustained in themselves.
And finally, the Catholic opponents of Berengar effectively conclude
the series of pre-scholastic discussions of the veritas and the figura, by
saying that there is in this sacrament both the reality and the symbol:
the reality, because Christ’s Body is actually present, the symbol, be­
cause He is present under the sign of bread and wine. Thus the Holy
Eucharist is the true Body and Blood of Christ; but as sacrament, under
the sacramental symbols, it is the sign of many things, of the Lord’s
passion, of the union of the faithful with Christ, and of the unity of the
Mystical Body, the bond of love which should unite all those who par­
take of the one heavenly bread.

But the importance of the Berengarian controversy cannot be con­
fined merely to the field of Eucharistic theology. It had a great bearing
on the development of scholasticism and the scholastic method. During
this controversy much was done to clarify the relative competencies of

Cenerai Conclusions and Summary

129

the two sources of knowledge, reason and authority. The dialectical ex­
cesses of Berengar were inimical to the development of theology, since
they might have aroused anti-intellectual reaction and a suspicion of
rational inquiry of any kind. But it is simply providential that his errors
evoked replies from men as skillful in dialectics as himself who were at
the same time men of faith, Catholics, and first-rate theologians. It is
true to say that the Berengarian controversy provided a bridge between
the monographic literature of the pre-scholastic period and the great
theological syntheses which were soon to make their first appearance.

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'■ >
130

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l ite Eiidiarhtic Centravano u/ lln< llcvviilli ( enliiiy

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INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES

Bernold of Constance, 51
Billot, L., 84, 86, 118
Boethius, 3, 12
Brigué, L., 36
Brunhes, G., 6, 9, 11, 23, 24, 28, 29
Butler, Cuthbert, O.S.B., 8

Abelard, 101
Adelmann of Liege, 35
Alcuin, 17, 21, 24, 25
Alexander II, Pope, 52
Alger of Liege, concomitance, 91-92
Eucharist as sacrament, 112-115
eucharistie accidents, 94-96
faith in the Eucharist, 42
life, 36
method, 43-44
mode of real presence, 89-90
Sacrifice of the Mass, 122-123
Scripture, 49
substantial conversion, 82, 85-87
Tradition, 48-49
Amann, E., 61
Ambrose, St., 38, 45, 46, 86
Anastasius of Cluny, 35
Aristotle, 11
Ascelin of Chartres, 35
Augustine, St., 15, 16, 21, 22, 38, 43, 45.
58, 114
Authority, in the pre-scholastic period, 1520
of the Church, 17
of Scripture and Tradition, 17

Cambridge Medieval History, 2
Cappuyns, M., 34, 36, 37, 52, 56, 58. 108
Carolingian Renaissance, 1, 6
Cassiodorus, 3, 21
Charlemagne, 4, 5, 6
Chesterton, G. K., 21
Cicero, 9
Clerval, A., 13, 31, 50, 77
Concomitance, doctrine of, 91-92
Condition of Christ’s Body in the Eucha­
rist, 88-90

Dawson, C., 1, 2, 9
De Ghellinck, J„ S.J., 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 12,
31, 35, 100
De Lubac, H., 118
De Wulf, M., 6, 10, 11, 18
Dialectics, 10, 31
Duckett, E. S„ 13
Durand of Troarn, 35, 51

Barbarian invasions, 2
Batiffol, P. ,46
Bede, St., 3
Beekenkamp, W. H., 35, 36
Benedict, St., 7
Berengar of Tours, authority of the
Church, 50-52
“conversion,” 104-106
criticism of Humbert’s formula,
73-74
definition of sacrament, 100
dialectical analysis of “conversion,”
69-73
dialectics, 55-60
faith, 40
function of sacrament, 103-104
individualism, 40
life, 34
rationalism, 77-78, 108-109
rejection of real presence, 76
Scripture, 44
sensist concept of being, 65-68
spiritual reception, 106-107
substantial conversion, 64-79
Tradition, 45-47
works, 35-35
Berengarian controversy, 34-39

Ebersolt, J., 56
Eucharist, accidents, 92-97
Ambrose and Augustine, 38
Berengarian doctrine, 64-79, 102-109
Orthodox doctrine, 79-97, 109-124
Paschasian-Ratramn controversy,
37-38
res sacramenti, 121-124
sacramentum-et-res, 115-121
state of Christ’s Body, 88-92
substantial conversion, 81-88
symbol and reality, 109-111
Eucharistic miracles, 54-55

Faivre, E., 77
Florus of Lyons, 29
Fredegise, 26
Fulbert of Chartres, 30, 31, 35
Gaudel, A., 61
Geiselmann, J., 34, 56, 65, 66, 77, 98, 109
Gerbert, 5, 11
Gilson, E., 20
Grabmann, M., 1, 12, 13, 56, 65
Gratian, 101
Gregory, the Great, St., 3, 38, 52
Gregory VII, St. Pope, 75
136

Index of Subjects and Proper Names

Guitmund of Aversa, accidents, 93, 95-96
dialectics, 60
eucharistie miracles, 55
faith in the Eucharist, 43
life, 36
sacramentum-et-res, 120-121
Scripture, 49
substantia] conversion, 83-84
state of Christ’s Body in the Eucha­
rist, 90-91
Tradition, 48

137

Martène and Durand, 35, 36
Martianus Capella, 9
Medieval schools, 7-10
Michel, A., 99
Mohler, J , 107
Monasticism, 7
Newman, J. H., 7, 8
Nicholas, II, Pope, 51
Notker Labeo, 11
Othloh of Ratisbon, 31

Hamack, A., 51, 56, 59, 68, 77, 79, 108
Haskins, C. H., 7, 8
Haureau, B., 1
Haymo of Halberstadt, 38
Heitz, Th., 77
Heriger of Lobbes, 5, 30
Héris, C. V., O.P., 122
Heurtevent, R., 10, 34, 57
Hugh of Langres, 35
Hugh of St. Victor, 118
Humbert, Cardinal, 53, 62, 73
Humbertian formula of 1059, 62-63, 73,
110
Hurter, H., S.J., 36

Isidore, St., 3, 23, 38, 99
Ives of Chartres, 101
Jensen, F., 95, 97
Jerome, St., 21
John the Scot, 11, 18, 19, 26-27, 34, 37,
38
Jonas of Orleans, 17
Julian of Toledo, 3
Lanfranc, authority of the Church, 52-53
Body of Christ a sacrament, 119
controversy with Berengar, 37, 38-39
definition of sacrament, 100
dialectics, 61-63
Eucharist as sacrament, 111-115
eucharistie accidents, 93-94
faith in the Eucharist, 42
life, 36
res sacramenti, 121
state of Christ’s Body in the Eucha­
rist, 88
substantial conversion, 82-83
Tradition, 47
Leo, the Great, St., 3
Leo IX, St., Pope, 44, 51
Lepin, M., 48

Macdonald, A. J., 34, 39, 45, 46, 47, 56,
66, 78, 106
Malou, J. B., 49
Mandonnet, P., O.P., 12, 13, 27
Manegold of Lautenbach, 31

Paré, G., 4, 8, 9, 10
Paris, Synod of, 34
Paschasius Radbert, 5, 37, 38
controversy with Ratramn, 37-38
Peter Damian, St., 21, 31
Peter the Venerable, 39, 42
Plato, 11
Poitiers, Synod of, 52
Poole, R. L., 15, 20, 63
Pourrat, P., 99
Prantl, C., 56
Pre-scholastic period, intellectual life, au­
thority, 15-20
background, 2-3
Carolingian renaissance, 6-7
collection of texts, 5
confusion between theology and phi­
losophy, 24-25
conservative element, 2-6
decline of western theology, 2-3
dialectics, 10, 12, 27, 29, 30, 31
exaggerations pro and contra dia­
lectics, 27-29
element of progress, 6-13
extent, 1
general characteristics, 1
monastic and cathedral schools, 7-10
philosophy, 10-12
theological controversies, 23
theology, 4-5
Prudentius of Troyes, 17, 21, 29

Quasten, J., 46, 87
Raban Maur, 5, 21, 25, 38
Rand, E. K., 13, 21
Rathier of Verona, 21, 30, 38
Ratramn, 5, 34, 37
Real presence, rejection by Berengar, 76
Reason and Authority in the pre-scholastic
period, St. Augustine, 15-17, 21-22
confusion of theology with philosophy,
24-27
controversies, 23-32
exaggerations pro and contra dia­
lectics, 27-32

I JH

The I tu hurittii ('onfrovc MV <’/ lh<» / /‘•vrní/i (riifiny

John the Scot, 18-19
pre-scholastic writers, 17-19, 22-23
principle of harmony, 15-23
reason, 20-23
Res sacramenti, 121-123
Reuter, H., 77
Roach, W., 54, 55
Rome, Council of, (1050) 38, 44
(1059) 34, 35, 39, 51
(1079) 34, 36

Sacraments in pre-scholastic theology,
99-101
Sacramentum-et-res, 116-121
Sauvage, G., C.S.C., 34
Scheeben, M. J., 123
Schnitzer, J., 46, 87
Servatus Lupus, 9, 10, 29
Sigebert of Gembloux, 61
Stone, Darwell, 78
Substantial conversion, 81-88
Summa sententiarum, 118

Taille, M.. de la, S.J., 86. 118, 119
Theoduin of Liège, 35, 108
Theology pre-scholastic, 4
Thomas, St., 4, 78, 97
Tixeront, J., 3
Tours, Synod of, 75
Transubstantiation, 81
Trent, Council of, 91
Tunnel, J., 49
Van de Vyver, A., 12
Varro, 9
Vercelli, Council of, 34, 37, 51
Vemet, F., 34, 38, 56, 77, 109
Vischer, A. F. and F. Th., 35, 36
Vonier, A., 122
Walafrid Strabo, 9, 10, 21
Whitney, J. P., 32
Wolphelm of Brauweiler, 35

¿wingli, 107