General introduction into the divisions of the tract.
• The first part of the Summa Theologiae treats of God as the primary and formal object of theology, and is then divided into three
parts: 1) De Deo Uno (divine essence as one); 2) De Deo Trino (processions ad intra)’, and 3) De Deo Creatore (processions ad extra).
o Since theology treats of God based on revelation, it is appropriate that it deal first with God as He is in Himself (His
essence) and His operations ad intra (Trinity of Persons) before dealing with His operations ad extra (creation and
governance).
■
As operation follows being, so mode of operation follows mode of being.
• Threefold division of the tract De Deo Creatore’. 1) production of creatures; 2) distinction of things in general and particular, which
is sub-divided into the tracts on angels, corporeal creatures in general, and man; and 3) conservation and governance of things in
general and particular.
o As can be observed, the tract considers production of being created ex nihilo followed by the distinction of things and
how multitude proceeds from supreme unity.

On the First Cause of all being (q.44) [ch.18]
• A. 1. Whether it is necessay that every being be created by God?
o The question pretty much amounts to as to whether God is the efficient cause of all being; the question may seem
redundant in light of the tract De Deo Uno, but an objection arises over the fact that there appears to be many things
absolutely necessary in the world (e.g., the mathematical reality of a circle), which admits of no efficient cause.
o It is clear from Holy Writ and the Creeds that God created the world and all things therein (cf. Gen 1:1; Exo 20:11;
Isaiah 44:24; Ps 145:6;Jn 1:3).
o False solutions to the question:
■ Pantheism. God is on a and the same substance with the world so that creation is manifestations of quasi­
accidents or finite modes of God, whether the world became God by ascending evolution or God became the
world by descending evolution.
• REFUTATION (cf. la q.l aa.6-8): God must be the first, immovable, most simple efficient cause
since, as Pure Act, He is His own action and being and thus is distinct in fact and essence from the
mutable and composite creation.
o Efficient causes remain extrinsic to their effects, nor can God have accidents, since this
implies potency which is incompatible with His pure actuality.
■
Dualism’. The world came from eternal prime matter, which is as necessary as God is, which is coordinated to God
rather than subordinated. (Refutation below in A.2)
o God must be the efficient cause of all created being (expansion on the fourth argument for God’s existence, q.2 a.3).
■ Whatever is in anything by participation is caused by that being to whom this thing belongs essentially; in
things we find participated being of greater or lesser degrees, which admits of a being who exists essentially,
without participation, and the cause of all things — God.
• Multitude of similar and diverse things is dependent upon superior unity, since tilings tliat are diverse
among themselves do not agree in any one thing except bv the cause uniting them.
•
Uncaused union of diverse things is impossible.
■ That which is in anything by participation is effectively caused in it by the being that has this thing essentially.
• God and God alone is being essentially, who is ipsum esse subsistens, which cannot be anything other
than one; God must then be the efficient cause of all being.
• That which is by participation is efficiently from tliat which is being essentially.
o ad 1: Relationship to a cause {not principle as is the case with divine processions) is a property of contingent being, which
is defined as being that is able to be or not be; thus contingent being is from another.
o ad2·. Although that it appears that there are things in the world which are absolutely necessary and do not require an
efficient cause (e.g, a demonstrated conclusion), we must admit, however, that these things have a cause for necessity
and thus are not absolute in themselves.
o ad3: Mathematics abstracts from an efficient cause but does not deny it; it abstracts only because it considers the essence
and not the existence of numbers and geometric figures, nor does it consider motion but only the final cause of numbers
and figure.
• A.2. Whetherprime matter is created ly God?
o The efficient cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings is their cause with respect to everything that pertains to their
being.
God is the cause of all beings and all that pertains to their beings; if they are material beings, then prime matter
pertains to their being.
God therefore must be the efficient cause of prime matter.

In response to dualism, prime matter is not coordinated with God’s eternity; it is not properly created, but con-created
while the material suppositum, of which it is a part, is created.
■
Matter has an idea in God but the idea is nothing other than the idea of the composite, since matter in itself
neither has being nor is knowable (cf. la q.15 a.3 ad 3).
A.3. Whether God is the exemplary cause of things, or whether there are other models besides Him?
o Models of natural things are not outside God, since the models of tilings are the divine ideas existing in the divine mind.
■ A model is necessary for the production of anything so that the effect will attain a determined form.
■
It is evident that the things that are produced naturally attain determined forms (e.g. rose, lion); thus they have
an exemplary cause in the divine wisdom, which planned the order of the universe, as an agent never acts
without an end.
• Concretely, if in the production of a natural thing, a directing idea or model was not necessary, the
natural thing would not attain a determined form; thus what would direct an acorn towards producing
an oak rather than a pear tree? Sorry Mr. Kant...
o To Mr. Hegel’s ridiculous idea that the directing ideas are immanent within pantheistic evolution itself, it is answered
that as this directing idea would be synonymous with a passive ordering (e.g. acorn to oak), such an ordering already
admits of an active ordering from God who alone knows the natures of the being of tilings, and the nature of means to
an end.
■
Furthermore, Mr. Hegel’s idea would lead to not only the production of new beings, but more beingfrom less being,
this is absurd.
A. 4. Whether God is thefinal cause of all things?
o God created all things for an uncreated end, but every end has the nature of good; therefore God created on account of
His uncreated goodness in order to manifest His uncreated perfection through the good that He imparts to creatures.
o Every agent acts for an end, and the end of the agent is the same as the end of the patient inasmuch as die patient
acquires what the agent imprints.
■
Since God is in no way passive (cannot receive anything), He can act no other end other than to communicate
His goodness, which other beings seek to communicate in; thus the divine goodness, which is communicated,
is the end of all things.
o Furthermore, the love of God gives and does not properly receive since it is not perfected by anything.
o In response to Mr. Kant’s ludicrous assessment that if God is the end of all things (that is, He created man on account
of man). He is guilty· of transcendent egoism, we reply:
■
Egoism is an inordinate love of oneself, loving self more than the supreme good; God cannot love Himself
more than the supreme good since He is identified with it, which admits of no tome of egoism whatsoever.
■
Further, if God failed to love His own goodness above all things, He would love a created good more, which is
gravely sinful; this is supremely absurd, since grave sin is the aversion from supreme good to created good.
■
Kant actually militates upon God’s supreme liberality, since God created with no need to create, and He made all
things to manifest His goodness.
o

•

•

On the emanation of things (q.45) [ch.19]
• A. 1. Whether to create is to make somethingfirom nothing?
o Holy Writ affirms the fact that creation is from nothing; the Genesis account is clear that creation was not made from
pre-existing matter and the testimony of the prophets excludes any kind of dualism, among other examples (cf. 2 Macc
7:28; Ps 32^6, 9; Ps 103; Ps 113:3; Jn 1:3; Acts 4:24)
o The councils of Lateran IV, Florence, and Vatican I affirm the creation of things ex nihilo by God (cf. Deng. 428, 706,
1782 ff).
o Argument from reason:
■ The production of the entire being of any thing is from no being just as the production of a man is not from a
man.
■ By creation, it is understood the production of the entire being of something (cf. la q.44 a.2); hence, by­
creation we understand the production of a thing out of nothing
o ad 1: creation in its propel' sense signifies the production of a ting from nothing, equivocally, creation can pertain to the
change of one thing from another (e.g. a man is created a bishop).
o ad2'. Change receives its species and dignity from the reference to that toward which it tends (terminus ad quern); hence,
since creation produces the total being of a thing, it is more perfect than generation, which produces the one begotten
from a presupposed subject.
o ad 3: Ex nihilo is understood in two ways:
■
after nothing, thus designating an order and not a material cause.

more profoundly, as out of no presupposed subject, designating a negated material cause.
• The suppositum underlying creation is the divine ideas, and thus creation isfrom the material nothing but
notfrom the ideal nothing.
• Thus when creation is said to be out of nothing, it does not mean out of nothing of its own possibility, for this
is impossible (e.g. a square circle), but rather out of no presupposed pre-existing subject; creation
must fall within the real possibility of creatures (a non-repugnance to being).
Whether God can create anything?
° It is not only possible but necessary that all things are created by God from nothing.
■
If God acted from presupposed subjects, it follows that that subject would not be caused by Him; but since
there can be nothing outside God that is not caused by Him, God must produce beings from nothing,
■ Heaven and earth could not exist except by creation from nothing, as these cannot account for their own
existence
° ad 1 Nothing is madefrom nothing applies to creation in the sense of causality, meaning that nothing cannot be made without
a cause.
° ad 2: Creation is not a change, for change presupposes a subject different now than before.
° ad 3: Although whatever is made must first become, and all becoming presupposes a subject, when there is neither
change nor movement (as in creation) there is no priority of time of the becoming with respect to the actual making.
° ad 4: There is not an impassible distance between nothing and the finite thing produced since nothing is a negative terminus
and the distance is negatively infinite, which can be overcome by an infinite active potency.
Whether creation is anything in the creature?
° Creation in the creature is nothing more than a real relation of dependence to the Creator (cf. q.13 a. 7)
■
If motion in action and passion is prescinded from, nothing remains but the relation of the effect to the agent.
■
Since creation is out of no presupposed subject, it is without motion or change, and therefore creation in the
creature is nothing but a certain relation to the Creator.
° ad 1: Creation taken actively is considered in two ways:
■ As an action formally immanent in God. the act is identified with the divine substance, since it is not an accident and
certainly not a temporal accident in God (who is pure Act).
■ As an action that is virtually transient, it posits an effect ad extra and thus this action has the perfection of a
formally transient action without its imperfections.
• God’s action is from eternity but His effects are not; this is because His effects are brought about
when God from eternity arranged and freely disposed it to be, since the making of a thing is
determined by the intellect (which includes the instant of making) which is executed by the command
of the will.
Whether to be created is proper to composite and subsistent beings?
o The things that are properly created are subsisting beings, not accidents, nor prime matter, nor the forms of sensible
things.
■ Being properly belongs to subsistences whether they are simple or composite; a subsisting being is that which
is, or that which has being (whereas forms and accidents are those by which something is such).
■ becoming and creation belong to those things to which being belongs.
• Becoming is ordered to the being of a thing and what becomes is that which will be.
•
Creation does not presuppose a subject, so it is becoming in an improper sense.
Whether only God can create?
o Creation belongs only to God alone to such an extent that no creature can create, whether by its own power or
instrumentally.
■ Being taken absolutely is an effect proper to God; as creation is production of being absolutely, it is an act
proper to God.
• The most universal effects are to be reduced to the more universal and primary causes as belonging to
them; as absolute being is the most universal effect, it is the proper effect of the most universal cause,
God.
An instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the principle agent unless it operates
dispositively toward the effect by something proper to itself.
o Since there is no subject to be disposed, no creature can act dispositively toward the effect of
the Creator; thus a creature cannot create instrumentally.
o Any instrument has a certain priority with regard to the effect of the principle agent toward
which it disposes (e.g. a saw disposes toward the effect of the carpenter, to make a bench);
■

■~·

A.3.

A. 4.

A.5.

•

•

•

there is no way for a creature to dispose toward the effect of God’s creative act itself, if
creation is understood correctlyA. 6. Whether creation is proper to any divine Person whatever?
o All the causal things are common to the entire Trinity (hence why the Triune nature of God cannot be known from
effects, since God’s effects ad extra proceed from God as one).
■ Holy Writ and the definitions of councils attest to this (cf. Wis 1:3; Jn 1:3; Col 1:16; Heb 1:10; Dents. 19, 48, 77,
79, 281, 284, 421).
■
Since even- agent acts in a manner similar to itself, the principle of an action can be known from an effect.
• To create is to produce the being of a things as being thus creation belongs to God according to His
being which is His essence and is common to all three Persons.
o Each divine Person is said by appropriation to have a special causality with regard to creatures.
■
God operates through intelligence and will (procession of the Word and the Holy Ghost, respectively); hence
God is said to create through His Son and through the Holy Ghost.
o ad2·. Creation is attributed to the Father as not having creative power from another; to the Son as having power from
another; and to the Holy Ghost as having power from the Father and the Son.
A. 7. Whether it is necessary tofind a vestige ofi the Trinity in creation?
o Vestiges represent causality of the cause and not its form; thus there is a vestige of the Trinity in creatures, supposing the
Trinity has been revealed (so we know what to look for), and since everything as a substance in a particular species and is
ordered to a good end.
A. 8. Whether creation is mingled in the works of nature and art?
o Creation is not mingled in the works of nature and art; creation is found only in the production of a spiritual soul.
■ The soul is intrinsically independent of any organism in its specific act, and therefore it is also independent of
the organism in its being and its becoming because operation follows being.

On the duration of created beings (q.46) [ch.20]
• A.l. Whether the world of creatures was always?
o Lateran IV defined that the universe was not created from eternity, and that God at the beginning of time created all
things from nothing; Vatican I reasserts this (cf. Deny. 428,1783).
o It is not necessary that the world be eternal and thus it is not impossible that the world began.
■
Since the will of God is the cause of things, it is not necessary that anything be unless it be necessary that God
wills them so.
■ As it is not necessary for God to will anything except Himself, it is not necessary that the world be always, but
only at the moment God willed from eternity.
o ad 7: The real possibility of the world before it came to be is not real passive potency (e.g. prime matter), but a non­
repugnance to being.
o ad 2·. Incorruptible beings receive existence from God’s free will and are not incorruptible in the sense that they had no
origin.
o ad 3: Prime matter is ungenerated and begins by creation and can be annihilated.
o ad 4·. A vacuum did not exist before creation because a vacuum supposes certain corporeal beings between which there
are unoccupied places.
■ The real possibility of creation is merely non-repugnance to being that is realizable.
o ad5·. If God were an agent acting only through His nature and not by intellect and will, effects (such as creation) would
follow by necessity; this is evidently not the case.
■
Since God acts through His will. He can by His eternal will produce a non-etemal effect, just as His intellect
understands a non-etemal being.
o ad 6·. God as the universal agent produces both the things and the time; the world more clearly leads to the knowledge of
the divine creating power if it has a beginning, for such would require a cause.
o ad 7'. Time began with the movement of creation itself, for time is the measure of such movement.
• A. 2. Whether it is an article offaith that the world began?
o We only know by faith that God did not create the world from eternity.
■ Articles of faith are distinguished from the preambles of faith by the fact that articles cannot be demonstrated.
■ Natural reason can prove all things outside God are from God and from this follows that God produced these
things from nothing.
■ The idea of creation includes three truths: 1) God created the universe from nothing; 2) the creative act was
completely and wholly free; and 3) it was not from eternity (this third truth is not demonstrable).

The beginning of the world cannot be proved except on the part of the world or on the part of God; neither of these is
demonstrable though:
■
on the part of the world', the principle of demonstration is the definition of a thing; but as the definition of any
created thing abstracts from the here and now, it is impossible to demonstrate the beginning of the world from
this standpoint.
■
on the part of God, the cause:, the most free will of God, when it is not manifested in act, cannot be investigated by
our reason; since God fully created the world at a time He chose, it is inaccessible to our reason and cannot be
demonstrated.
• Man has no certain access to contingent futures, which depend on God’s free will which is made
manifest by fact.
o ad 7: If creation were from eternity, God would have priority only of nature and causality but not of time with respect to
the world.
o ad 5: An eternal world would not be equal to God in eternity since the life of the world is made up of successions and
the existence of the world would not be entirely at the same moment.
A.3. Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
o The phrase in the beginning from Genesis is taken in three senses:
■ As the beginning of time itself (Basil, Ambrose).
■
In the principle, that is, the Son, who is the exemplary principle (Augustine, Jerome).
■ As before all things, in the beginning of time, all things were created at once.

o

•

On the distinction of things in general (q. 47) [ch. 21]
• A.l. Whether the multitude or the distinction of things isfrom God?
o The problem of the origin of the multitude of things cannot be solved without the idea of free creation; the distinction
of things and multitude are from the intention of God, the first Agent.
■
Specific distinction of things cannot be explained by a material cause; from this we can defeat the materialists
(ascending evolution).
• Any distinction in matter must be referred to some higher cause; matter is moved and perfected, not
of its own which is evident, but by another who confers on it vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life
(since these are superior to matter).
o Matter is always in potency to other determinations and is the real capacity for receiving a
perfection and thus it cannot be the first distinction of things.
•
Furthermore, matter is because of form and not vice-versa (as relation of potency to act); since the
distinction of things takes place through the specific forms, matter is on the account of the distinction
in tilings.
o Matter is thus the principle of individuation and is ordered to the multitude of corporeal
species; matter is because of the distinction of forms.
■ The distinction of things does not come from God as acting by a necessity· of nature; from this, we can counter
the descending evolutionist position (Avicenna, modem pantheism).
• Creation belongs to God alone and the total being of anything cannot be produced except by creation
from nothing.
o Creation is not emanation (since this implies material causality which does not apply to
God); God is the sole efficient and final cause of creation.
o God thus does not become the world nor is the world made from God’s substance (and thus
the world is not divine).
• Totality and distinction cannot arise by chance either, but from a first cause, since chance, as a cause
per accidens, presupposes a cause ordered perse to its effect.
o If chance was the cause of distinction and totality, then there would be no finality in the
world, and natural agents would tend to a determined and fitting end without any reason;
this implies that order is determined from absence of order, more would come from less,
and the perfect from the imperfect, which is ridiculous.
• Distinction in things cannot come from the form of secondary causes, since these do not exist of
themselves and their own distinction must be attributed to something higher.
• Distinction in the created order is not due to God acting by a necessity of His nature:
o Natural agents act according to specific being for as long as they possess that mode of being.
o Since God is infinite, He would only act of necessity of nature if Fie were to cause some
infinite being, which is absurd; hence God does not act by a necessity of nature, but the

effects determined by His infinite perfection proceed according to the determination of His
intellect and will.
■ Nor does the distinction of things come from God operating by a necessity of wisdom (counters the absolute
optimist position of Plato and Leibniz).
• Goodness of God is not obligated to this universe in such a way that God could not make a better or
worse universe; the universe as it exists is the best of those things that are, and this is due to the
goodness of God.
• The divine goodness is an end that is disproportionately in excess of created things and is thus not
determined to some order of things.
o Overall, the distinction of things arises from the free intention of the Creator.
■ As a free agent can produce distinct effects according to whatever distinct forms he understands, so God, who
has the most perfect and complete understanding of forms, desired to manifest His goodness through diverse
creatures.
■ Hence, the distinction is due to the free intention of God; nor does this multitude of things militate upon
God’s unity and simplicity since such things understood by God do not effect a real distinction in Him.
■
Furthermore, it is only by way of multitude that the divine goodness is adequately represented (relatively
speaking), since no one thing has the capacity to manifest all the facets of God’s goodness.
A. 2. Whether the inequality of things isfrom God?
o The divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe and therefore
the divine wisdom is also the cause of the inequality.
■ Against the Manicheans, Origen held that God had created all spiritual beings that were, at the start, all equal,
but those who sinned were bound to bodies; this is obviously false:
• Tliis would mean that the totality of beings is not due to the communication of God’s goodness to
creatures but for punishment of sin; thus the beauty of creation would be the result ofsin and not the
act of the highest cause, God.
o Specific and formal distinction is more important that material or numerical distinction since matter is on account of
form and individuals of a species of compatible beings are for the conservation of the species.
■
Formal distinctions always require inequality or subordination of forms; therefore, the inequality of beings is
required for the perfection of the universe so that in different ways the wisdom of God might make known His
goodness.
o ad 1: The more perfect agent produces his perfect total effect, but he produces it with a subordination of parts; hence
the universe is more perfect with angels, men, animals, plants, and minerals than if there were only angels and all of them
were equal.
■
Even at that, all the angels could not be equal, for there is a particular subordination of forms since angels are
pure subsisting forms; as individuation takes place through matter, so in angels there can only be one individual
in each angelic species, giving rise to a perfect hierarchy or subordination.
o ad2: Processions in God ad intra are equal because the entire divine nature is communicated to each diiine Person;
processions ad extra must be unequal since a creature is an inadequate manifestation of the divine goodness (even Arius
knew this).
o ad 3: The primitive inequality is not unjust since it is due to the perfection of the universe (e.g., one man inclined towards
fortitude and requires meekness, another inclined towards meekness and requires fortitude).
■ This demonstrates that God’s justice is distributive (and not commutative as the liberals like to think!)
according to the requirements of the common good, established by God according to His own law.
A. 3. Whether there is an order of agents in creatures?
o In creatures, the subordination of agents corresponds to the subordination of ends.
■ The active powers, as well as the qualities and forms, attributed to things would be futile if they effected
nothing; God acts through the mediation of creatures because of the abundance of His goodness inasmuch as
He communicates the dignity of causality on His creatures.
■ The more perfect are compared to the less perfect as act to potency, and it is the nature of something in act to act upon
a thing in potency, hence the inequality permits things to act according to nature (or b acted upon) which is a
perfection.
• Hence, it is necessary that one creature act on another by the power of God, the first Agent.
o It is clear from the above that, since every agent acts for an end, every cause directs its effects to its end, since there is an
order of ends according to the order of agents; thus it is necessary that man be directed to the ultimate end by the
movement of the First Mover.

Furthermore, this denies the substantial unity of the universe which pantheism claims; as pantheism denies efficient and
final causality of the world, it therefore denies the dynamic unity of the world which participates in efficient and final
causality.
A.4. Whether there is only one world?
o The world is unique due to the divine ordination to one and the same end.
■ All tilings that are from God have a relation to one another and to God Himself; all things are coordinated and
subordinated and constitute a complete whole, the universe.
■ Thus the unit\ of the world is a unity of order.
o ad 1: God cannot make many worlds without some relation to one another, or at the very least coordinated to the same
ultimate end, since it is the part of the wise being to put things in order.
o ad2: There would be no reason for God to make two worlds only numerically distinct, since a material multitude has no
definite terminus as it can always be increased; material multitude must be ordered to something higher as matter is
ordered towards form.
o

•

On the governance of things in general (q.103) [ch. 22]
• A.l. Whether the world is «oremed by anyone?
o The world is governed, as is clearly evident from Holy Writ; it can further be proved from reason as follows:
■
Means are not ordered towards an end except by a governing intellect which understands the nature of means;
it is evident that the world is governed by one intelligence since the world possesses many means excellentlyordered to a good end.
■
Furthermore, since divine goodness produces things into being, it pertains to it to lead things to their end,
which is to rule or govern.
o ad 3: Natural things possess a certain necessity by which they are determined to one end (e.g., an eye towards seeing),
which constitutes the reason for the existence of these means that are ordered to itself.
■
Ordering such as found in creation presupposes an ordering intelligence, otherwise the intelligibility in things
would come from non-intelligence, order from non-order, which is absurd.
• A. 2. Whether the end orgovernance of the world is something outside the world?
o God Himself is the final end of the governance of the world.
■
Since ever)· agent acts for a proportionate end, the end corresponds to the principle; as the efficient principle of
the world is a cause extrinsic to it, the final end of the world is also some good extrinsic to it.
• The order of subordination among agents must correspond to the order of ends; thus corresponding
to the supreme and universal agent (God) is a universal ultimate end (the manifestation of supreme
goodness through the good imparted to things).
o ad 2: The order of the universe is its proximate end, but the ultimate end is God Himself (or the manifestation of divine
goodness).
• A.3. Whether the world is governed by one?
o It is necessary that the governance of the world ordered to the supreme good should be the best, which is through one being.
■
Governance is the direction of those who are governed to a good which supposes unity as against dissolution;
the cause of unity- is one per se, since several beings cannot agree unless they are united in some way.
■
Imperfect rule suffices for perfect subjects, but a perfect rule is needed for the imperfect and for the multitude
which in itself remains imperfect.
o ad2 (against the Manicheans): Created things are frequently at variance with one another with regard to proximate ends,
but nevertheless agree inasmuch as they are coordinated in the one order of the universe and ordered to the final end;
hence the variance in no way proves the existence of some evil principle.
• A. 4. Whether the effect of divine governance is one only orplural?
o The principle (unitary) effect of divine governance, through the conservation and movement of things, is that creatures
are assimilated to God through participation in good.
o The particular effects of divine governance are countless.
• A. 5. Whether all things are subject to the divine governance?
o As there can be nothing that is not created by God, so there can be nothing that is not subject to His governance; as
there is nothing that is not ordered to the divine goodness as to its end, so it is impossible that any being should be
outside the divine governance.
o ad /: Nothing happens by chance or fate from God’s viewpoint; the casual takes place only in view- of other causes.
o ad2: God has care for all creatures, but not in the same manner.
o ad3: The rational creature as a secondary cause governs itself, but over and above this it is governed by God, the first
Cause.

•

•

•

A.6. Whether all things are directly governed by one?
o Providence extends directly to all things, but with regard to execution of it, God governs inferior beings by way of
superior beings (secondary causality).
■
Government is better which communicates to certain things the dignity of causality· with regard to other things.
A. 7. Whether anything can happen beyond the order of divine governance?
o Since God is the first and most universal cause (without whom secondary causes cannot act), it is impossible that
anything can happen beyond the order of divine governance (this would imply something possessing greater power than
God or God being in ignorance of something).
A.8. Whether anything can work against the order of the divine governance?
o Nothing can resist the order of divine governance as it proceeds from God, the universal cause of the good, but a being
can resist this order as it proceeds from a particular cause.
o ad 1: deformity is permitted by God for the sake of a greater good, at least with regard to the end of the whole universe,
and thus sinners do not oppose the divine governance in general but only in a particular instance (lienee any deviation
from the divine order will ultimately return to it in another way).

On the conservation of creatures (q.104) [ch. 23]
• A.l. Whether creatures need to be conserved in being by God?
o God indirectly conserves corruptible things by removing them from corruptive principles; directly andper se, God
conserves all creatures, including creatures that are corruptible.
■ Every- effect that depends on a certain cause not only according to its becoming but also directly according to its
being needs to be conserved directly by that cause; as every creature is dependent upon God for its being, every
creature needs to be conserved directly by God.
o adl·. The potency to non-being is not positively in incorruptible things, but God can remove His conserving influence
from them.
o ad 2'. God cannot communicate to a creature that it continue in being after the divine action ceases, just as He cannot
will Himself not to be a cause of something.
o ad 3·. Corruptible beings are due to their matter tending towards another form; God conserves these indirectly by
removing that which may corrupt them.
o ad 4·. God’s conservation is not a new action, but the continuation of the action which confers being, an action without
movement or time.
• A.2. Whether God conserves every creature directly?
o God directly conserves the very· being o tings inasmuch as it is being, but other agents subordinate to God conserve
being as such being (e.g. sun conserves life on earth).
• A.3. Whether God could reduce anything to nothing?
o As God created creatures and conserves being, He is free to cease supplying being to creatures which would reduce
them to nothing; annihilation is not an action but a cessation of conservation.
•
A. 4. Whether anything is ever reduced to nothing?
o Although it is within His power, it is inappropriate for God to annihilate things:
■
Corruption of material beings is not annihilation since their matter remains; nor are immaterial beings
annihilated since there is no potency for non-being since they are created incorruptible.
■ Annihilation does not pertain to the manifestation of God’s glory and grace, so there is never a motive for God
to annihilate something.
o ad 3: Forms of corporeal things, which cease to exist by the corruption of the composite, are not annihilated; they
remain in potency of the matter.
On the change of creatures by God (q.105) [ch. 24]
• A.l. Whether God can directly move matter to theform?
o A being in passive potency can be reduced to act by that active potency which has this being in its power; since matter is
under the power of God inasmuch as it is produced by Him, matter can be reduced to act by divine power.
o ad 1: Angels do not possess creative power over matter directly; thus they cannot change water into wine by a direct
action on the matter itself.
o ad 2·. God acts directly by His will and intellect and He not only knows the individual natures of things but also their
particular form which is to be imprinted upon the slime of the earth.
• A.2. Whether God can directly move a body?
o God has complete dominion over matter and the created order, and thus He can move bodies directly by contact of
power (including the will of rational beings).

•

•

•

•

•

•

A. 3. Whether God directly moves the created intellect?
o God moves the created intelligence for two reasons:
■ As the first intelligence, He gives the creature the power of intellection.
■
Because He is the supreme intelligible in whom other intelligibles pre-exist intelligibly and from whom these
intelligibles are derived for other intellects.
A. 4. Whether God can move the created will?
o God moves the created will for two reasons:
■
On the part of the object, the will is not adequately or efficaciously moved except by God because God alone is the
universal good being which exceeds the capacity of the will.
■
God alone can move the will bp inclining it interiorly, just as He alone is the cause of the power of willing; only the
supreme agent can move beings to the final end, to the universal good.
o ad 7: God does not force the will by moving it because He gives the will an inclination that is proper to it, and in accord
with this inclination He moves the will from within.
o ad 2: To be moved voluntarily is to be moved of oneself, that is, by an intrinsic principle (which is a secondary cause
which is moved by a first cause).
o ad 3·. If the will were to be moved by God in such a way that it did not move itself as a secondary cause, the acts of the
will would not be imputed for merit or demerit.
A.5. Whether God operates in every operation?
o Operation always follows being and mode of operation always follows mode of being.
■
God alone, who is beingper se, operates of Himself without any superior movement, whereas the creature,
which has being by participation, does not operate independently except by divine movement.
A.6. Whether God can do things outside the orderfound in things?
o God is the omnipotent free cause upon whom the application of all hypothetically necessary law depends (these laws
constitute the order of action of all created nature), and the divine liberty is not bound by this order of action.
■ Thus God can act without regard to the order established in created nature, or in lay terms, God can work
miracles.
■
God, however, cannot act without regard to metaphysical and mathematical principles (e.g. a square circle),
because these principles are not hypothetically but absolutely necessary.
A. 7. Whether everything that God does outside the natural order of things is a miracle?
o Everything that God does outside the natural order of creation is miraculous, since a miracle is defined as a sensible fact
produced in the world by God outside the order of action found in created nature.
A. 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another?
o Miracles are classified and ranked according to the degree in which they exceed the powers of nature:
■ Those exceeding powers of nature with regard to substance of the fact which nature can no way accomplish
(e.g. glorification of the body).
■ Those in regard to the subject in which they take place which is in accord with nature but exceeds its power
(e.g. resurrection of the body, for while nature causes life, it cannot do so in a corpse).
■ Those in regard to the manner in which they take place but wholly in accord with the nature but beyond its
natural power (e.g. nature can heal a broken arm, but not overnight).

On the distinction of things in particular (q.48) [ch.25]
BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL
DISTINCTION IN PARTICULAR

•

BEWTEEN SPIRITUAL AND CORPOREAL NATURE
Preliminary remarks.
o Evil is the privation of some good that is owing and moral evil is the privation of moral rectitude; God, since He is the
highest good, would in no way allow any evil in His works unless He were so omnipotent and so good that He could
turn evil into good.
o Matter is not evil for three reasons:
■
with regard toform: Under a form, matter participates in being and beauty and is thus not an evil; without a form,
matter is a receptive capacity of the form and cannot destroy or corrupt anything, and is therefore good.
■
with regard to God: If the matter which the Neo-Platonists call non-being is not, then it is neither good nor bad; if it
is, then it is produced by a good God and must therefore be good.
■
with regard to the good of the universe: Matter is necessary for material creatures which brings about the perfection of
the universe; inasmuch as it enters into the order of the universe, it is good.

A.l. Whether evil is any kind of nature?
o Evil is not any thing but is simply the privation of good.
■
Good and being are convertible; since evil is opposed to good, it is not something positive but rather the
negation or privation of good.
• Every nature desires to preserve its being and perfection and hence good is everything that is; thus all
being and every perfection is something good and evil is the privation of that good.
o ad 7: Evil is the opposition of privation between being and non-being, not the negation (e.g. it is not evil for man to lack
the strength proper to a lion).
o ad 4·. Evil acts in corrupting the good, but it does not act effectively, nor does it act for an end except by reason of a
connected good.
o ad 5: Evil does not pertain to the order of the universe except by reason of some connected good (e.g. an injustice shows
forth more clearly the beauty of justice).
A.2. Whether evil isfound in things?
o The perfection of the universe requires that there be certain things which can be deficient in goodness and from tills is
concluded that evil is found in things.
■ The inequality of things manifests the perfection of the universe; each thing has a degree of indefectible
goodness and some degree of defectible goodness.
■ The nature of evil is that some being is deficient of some good; therefore, in things we find evil and this is in
agreement with the perfection of the universe, serving to manifest the divine goodness in various grades of
goodness.
o ad 1: Evil is not a pure negation but the privation of an owing good in an apt subject; Leibniz’s expression of
metaphysical evil the imperfection of any creature inasmuch as it did not possess every perfection is rejected (e.g.
according to Leibniz, wood suffers from metaphysical evil because it does not possess knowledge, nor has the capacity
for acquiring it).
o ad3: God makes that which is better in the whole, and in the parts with relation to the whole universe; thus He can
make things better substantively, but not better adverbially, since F (e cannot act with greater wisdom or goodness,
■ The divine permission for evil is congruous in two ways.
• on the part of the material cause/ subject. It is of the very nature of things, as established by God, that those
things which can be deficient are sometimes deficient.
• on the part of the end. God, as the ultimate good, would not permit evil in any of His works unless He
was able to make good come from evil; otherwise, the divine permission would not be holy.
o The Christian solution to the problem of evil ultimately requires faith illumined by
understanding since many of the goods resulting will not be seen clearly until one possesses
Heaven and the merit of the Incarnation is grasped.
o God’s permission for evil is a sustaining permission in order that He may elicit good things
from it; this permission is only permission in an analogical sense and has an affinity with
tolerance, but in no way is He the direct cause by concession, dispensation, or indulgence.
A. 3. Whether evil is in the good as in the subject?
o Good is the subject of evil:
■ The privation is in some subject which is in some way being and good.
• The subject of the privation, like the form, is being in potency, either simply (prime matter) or
secundum quid.
• Being in potency is some kind of good, since it is ordered to the good or to a form, which is a kind of
perfection.
■ Evil is the removal of good, both negatively and privatively.
•
It is not evil if it pertains to only the negation of a good (e.g. a rational goat); imperfection is not a
good, but it does not follow that it is evil except when there is an absence of a perfection that
something should have.
• Hence, evil is in the good as in a subject.
A. 4. Whether evil corrupts good completely?
o Good is threefold:
■
as opposed to evil and totally removed bp evil: A complete privation removes the good entirely (e.g, total darkness
excludes light, mortal sin excludes grace, original sin excludes original justice).
■
as the subject of evil and not even decreased bp the evil: privation must take place within an apt subject which
presupposes that the nature of the subject remain (if the subject is destroyed, there is no longer any privation);

thus the nature of our will cannot become evil, even in the damned, for the will retains its ordination to the
universal good which specifies it.
■
as the aptitude of the subject to good which can be decreased but not entirely removed by nil: The diminution of the subject’s
aptitude to good is not a quantitative but a qualitative loss by contrary dispositions.
• Contrary dispositions, even when multiplied to infinity, do not destroy the nature of the subject as
long as the subject remains, nor do they destroy the root of this aptitude of the subject to the good.
o The nature of a thing is the root of aptitude (e.g. humidity makes wood less and less
combustible until the wood rots, losing its nature and thus the aptitude to combustibility).
o Habitual sin does not destroy man’s soul, his faculties, and their respective aptitude to virtue,
but can decrease the aptitude towards performing virtuous acts in proportion to the habit.
o The damned possess a natural inclination to virtue, or else they would possess no remorse of
conscience.
• Hence the natural aptitude to virtue always remains as long as the soul does, even though this aptitude
is diminished extrinsically by actual sin, and especially habitual sin.
A. 5. Whether evil is completely divided into that ofpenalty and guilt?
o Good consists in perfection, in first act (in the form and integrity of a thing) or in the second act (in proper operations);
as evil is the privation of an owing good, evil consists in some subtraction from the form or integrity or in the
subtraction of some proper operation.
o The conclusion that evil is either guilt or penalty is limited to voluntary beings (since physical evils occur in animals such
as blindness).
■ Evil is the object of the will (something considered as good which is not) and has special reference to the will.
■ With this reference to the will, evil is divided into two categories:
• evil which isfrom the will denoting a disorder of the will’s operations which is called guilt.
• evil which is against the will, denoting a privation of form or integrity of the culpable voluntary agent,
which is called penalty.
■ Hence, evil in voluntary things is correctly divided into guilt and penalty.
• The proximate genus of penalty is an evil opposed to the will of the one punished; the specific
difference is determined by comparing the penalty with guilt.
o The guilt is the evil of the voluntary act itself; the penalty is the evil of the voluntary agent
consequent on the evil of the action.
o Guilt is according to the will whereas penalty is contrary to it; guilt is in the acting, the
penalty is in the suffering.
■
In regards to the trials of the just, penalty is not to be taken simply (since this supposes guilt) but rather secundum
quid since these evils are medicinal as someone suffers the loss of a minor good in order to obtain a greater one;
Chrysostom enumerates eight reasons for the trials of the just: 1) as a remedy against pride; 2) remedy against
vainglory; 3) that the virtue and power of God may show forth in weak men; 4) that the patience of the just
and the purity of their intention may be manifested; 5) that the just man may fix his thoughts on the life to
come and the eternal reward in the face of almost no earthly reward; 6) that those who mourn may be consoled
by the tribulations of the saints; 7) that the saints also have a nature like us; 8) that we may distinguish the true
evils and the true good from the false.
• Penalty simply considered differs from the trials of the just in three ways:
o It is an evil inflicted for committed sin.
o It is something repugnant to the will.
o It is from an extrinsic principle which inflicts an afflictive suffering.
• Thus penalty is defined properly as an evil inflictedfor some committedfault orguilt by an extrinsicprinciple
against the natural inclination of the culpable agent.
A. 6. Whetherpenalty has more of evil than guilt has?
o Guilt partakes more of the nature of evil than any penalty, whether it be the penalty of the senses, of loss, or damnation.
■ That by which a man becomes evil in his will is a greater evil than the privation of any one of the things he
uses; as it is by guilt that man becomes evil in his will, guilt then is a greater evil than penalty.
• The greater the evil, the greater the privation of a greater good something ought to possess.
• Good consists essentially in act; man’s ultimate act is his operation and it is the will which moves all
of man’s other faculties to operation.

•

■

Thus a man is said to be good by reason of his good will that tends to the good of the whole man,
and not just some specific faculty; hence by the privation of a good will a man is rendered completely
evil.
Prooffrom the efficient cause of the penalty (God), who is not the author ofguilt.
• That which is the greater evil is opposed to the greater good and cannot have God as its cause; the
evil of guilt is directly opposed to the uncreated good, whereas the evil of penalty is opposed to the
created or uncreated good of the mature and is caused by God.
o Sin is opposed to the fulfillment of the divine will and the divine love by which the divine
good is loved in itself and not only as it is participated in bv the creature; God must be loved
more than ourselves and on account of Himself, formally and finally.
o For condign satisfaction, the act of satisfaction must have infinite efficacy, as belonging to
both God and man.
FORMALLY - IMPOSSIBLE
OF THE UNCREATED GOOD
OBJECTIVELY - BY MORTAL SIN

PRIVATION

OF THE UNCREATED GOOD - PAIN OF LOSS
OF THE GOOD OF THE CREATURE
OF THE CREATED GOOD - PAIN OF SENSE

On the cause of evil (q.49) [ch.26]
• A.l. Whethergood can be the cause of evil?
o The reply to this question is divided into four parts by which the conclusion reached is that good is the accidental
efficient cause and material cause of evil.
■ It is necessary to point out that evety evil has some kind of cause.
• The fact than anything is deficient in its natural and due disposition can arise only from some cause
that draws that draws the thing outside its disposition.
• Since evil is the deficiency of some good that is due, evil must have some kind of cause and nothing
can be a cause unless it is being and good in some way.
■ Evil has neither aformal nor afinal cause since it is the privation ofform and the privation of right ordination to an end.
• Evil is permitted by God on account of a greater good, but the evil itself is not useful nor is it of itself
ordered to the greater good.
• Rather, evil is only the occasion and the condition sine qua non of some greater good; conditions and
occasions differ from causes inasmuch as they have no influence on the effect neither efficiently,
finally, formally, or materially.
■ Evil has a material cause, and this is evident because evil is the privation in an apt subject, and thus it is in goof as a subject.
■ Evil has an efficient cause per accidens (not per sej, which is some good.
• It is obvious that evil cannot have an efficient cause perse because such a cause would be in some way
both being and good, of which evil is the very privation of, and produces some good.
• Evil in a thing cannot be produced except by the agent or the matter as considered with regard to the
form and end.
PRINCIPLE (e.g. weakness in walking)
FROM DEFECT OF AGENT
INSTRUMENTAL (e.g. lameness)
GOOD AS EFFICIENT CAUSE
PER ACCIDENS OF EVIL

FROM POWER OF AGENT PER SE
PRODUCING AN OPPOSITE FORM
(e.g. sun drying up fruit).
IN THE EFFECT

OF THE AGENT AND
THE ACT (poor speech)
BY DEFECT

OF THE MATTER
(a monster)

Conclusions drawn from the chart in regard of the manner of being accidental.
o It is accidental that a proper agent be defective; the deficiency happens to a good thing
which per se has the power to act.
o It is accidental that matter be disposed to properly receive the action of the agent.
o It is accidental that the privation of a form take place by a contrary agent (e.g. form of house
destroyed by contrary agent fire); the contrary agent tends to induce its proper form but
does not per se tend to the privation of the opposite form (which follows necessarily).
• Good is thus the material cause and efficient cause per aeddens of evil; the fact that a thing is deficient
in its natural and proper disposition can arise only from some cause that draws it away from that
disposition.
o Overall, the efficient cause per aeddens of evil arises from some good acting per se towards its
proper effect which draws another thing or agent away per aeddens from its proper disposition
(e.g. fire consumes a house).
° add. The good tree that our Lord refers to pertains to the will that is morally good which must produce good fruit; a will
that is physically good (in virtue of its nature, origin, and end) cannot be the cause of evil per se but only per accidens
when it recedes from a worthy good under the influence or attraction of some delectable unworthy good (which
corrupts the moral good of the will).
■ The fact that anything departs from its natural and due disposition comes only from some cause that draws the
thing away from its proper disposition.
° ad 2·. One of two contraries per se cannot be the cause of the other, but only per aeddens, as the good of fire brings about
tlie evil of a house’s destruction.
° ad 3: Defect of a voluntary action proceeds from the fact that the will does not subject itself in act to its rule; this defect
is not identified with guilt, but is followed by guilt because the will operated with this defect or fault.
A.2. Whether the highest good, which is God, is the cause of evil?
° God is not the cause of the evil that consists in the defects of action, that is, the evil of guilt.
■
Scripture confirms this in various places and Trent condemned the contrary in response to the Calvinists,
Jansenists, and Protestants; the Third Council of Valencia defined God to be the author of the penalties but
not the guilt (cf. Denz. 322, 804, 816, 1092).
■ The evil which consists in the defect of the action is always caused by the defect of the agent; such action only
possesses a cause per aeddens and not per se.
• In free agents, the evil of a voluntary act comes from the defect of the operation (a will deficient in
act, failing to subject itself in act to its rule).
• God is the agent who is absolutely indefectible and never deficient.
• He cannot be the cause of defect directly, since He cannot move either morally or physically to sin as
sin, that is, to something inordinate under the aspect of privation; nor directly, that is, through
negligence or carelessness, because divine negligence implies a contradiction.
o If God were to command the impossible, then sin would be unavoidable and would not be
sin then; nor would man incur a punishment, especially for eternity.
o It is even impossible for God to hypothetically be the cause of sin, because sin is outside the
adequate object of the divine omnipotence which can only produce being and goodness and
not the privation of these.
■
God converges and inclines all things to Himself as their last end; God cannot
directly cause any sin since every sin is a departure from the order to God as last
end.
• God, as the indefectible cause cannot be cause of evil of guilt, because this evil denies the order of
divine good which God wills above all things; otherwise, God would be a defective cause and would
depart from Himself which is impossible (since God is essential goodness itself).
■
God cannot be the indirect cause of sin.
• To be the indirect cause of sin is to refrain from preventing it when we can and should prevent it.
• According to His wisdom and justice, God is not bound to prevent the sins which He permits; it
pertains to His providence that He permit certain defects in particular things lest the perfect good of
the universe be impeded.
o God wills and causes per aeddens physical evil and the evil of penalty.
■
God wills and causes per se and principally the good of the universe, which requires defectible things that are
sometimes deficient, and God wills and causes the order of justice which requires that penalty be inflicted upon
sinners.

•

Thus God wills and causes as a consequence and quasiper accidens physical evil and the evil of penalty; evil per
accidens (notper se\) is ordered to the good and the fact that some good ensues from sin is beyond the intention
of the sinner.
A. 3. W'hether then is one supnme evil which is the cause ofeviR
o There in not, nor can there be, a first principle of evil.
■ Rrom the notion ofgood: Good and being are convertible; however, a first evil principle would be evil in essence
and in no way good which implies that this first evil principle would not be being and would not exist.
■ Pmm the notion of evil: If evil were integral being, or if it completely corrupted the good in which it is, it would
destroy itself, for evil cannot be except in a subject; supreme evil would be integral being which is contradictory
■ Îrom the notion offirstprinciple: A first principle cannot be caused per accidens by another, nor can it be mere
accidental cause.
• Evil is caused per accidens by good, that is, by a defective agent or by a contrary agent; likewise, evil can
only be a cause per accidens by reason of an annexed good.
• The notion of evil is therefore repugnant to the notion of a first principle.
o The essential problem with the Manicheans is that they failed to consider the most universal cause of being as being, and
dealt only with final and efficient particular efficient causes; they could not figure out that what could be harmful with
regard to some particular being may be useful with regard to some particular good.

DeAngelis (qq. 50-64,106-114)
On the existence and substance of angels [ch. 27]
• 27-1. The existence of the angels.
o The Old and New Testaments both clearly attest to the existence of the angels.
o Concerning the angels, the Church teaches three tilings: 1) that they exist, are created, and are spiritual; 2) that they are
not propagated; 3) that the devil was good when he was created (cf. Lateran IV, Dent?. 428)
• 27-2. The angelic intellect.
o Angels cannot err with regard to things that belong or do not belong naturally to things, but can err about things that are
entirely free and contingent (which is only in the domain of the infinite knowledge of God who knows all possibilities),
such as secrets of the heart and future free acts.
o The proper object of the angel’s intellect is the essence of the angel itself (unlike ours, which has the essence of sensible
things as its object).
■ Hence, whereas the human idea abstracts from the sense particular, angelic ideas are naturally impressed on the
angel and is at the same time universal and concrete (representation of species and individual).
■ Thus angelic ideas are participations in the divine ideas according to which God is the cause of things; angels
then know by simple intuition and not discursive reason, seeing the properties of things in their essence.
* 27-3. The creation and substance of the angels (q.61 aa.2-3; q.50).
o Lateran IV defined angels as not having been created from eternity and were probably created with corporeal creatures
because they are part of the universe and no part is perfect if separated from the whole (cf. Denp. 428).
o The number of angels exceeds the number of corporeal creatures since a greater number of more perfect things befits
the perfection of the universe, and were created to attain eternal happiness and glorify God primarily; secondarily, they
guard over men and corporeal creation since it is fitting for inferior beings to be governed by superior ones.
* 27-4. The angels are pure spirits without a body (q.50 a.l).
o Perfection of the universe requires intellectual creatures to be able to know God, and a purely intellectual creature that is
one genus of being.
■
Intellection is not an act of the body or any corporeal power, so union of a body is not part of the intellectual
substance as such.
■
Since man is an intellectual being composed of body and soul, it is fitting that there be an intellectual nature
that is purely spiritual since such is superior and more perfect; any genus (intellectual nature) where something
imperfect is found implies the pre-existence of that corresponding perfection in that genus.
27-5. Absolute immateriality of angels (q.50 a.2).
o Operation follows being, or mode of operation follows mode of being.
■
Intellection is an operation that is totally immaterial and intrinsically independent of matter, because it is
specified of a universal object, by intelligible being, which abstracts from all matter.
■ The intellect is able to know the first principles of being, which are absolutely necessary and universal, above all
contingent and particular being and can know the reason for the being of things.
■ Hence a spiritual and intellectual substance (such as an angel) is entirely immaterial.

•

•

•

27-6. Assuming of bodies by angels.
o Angels assume bodies at times, but in these instances are only accidentally united to the matter which they move but do
not vitally inform (as is proper to die soul).
27-7. Whether angels differ in species? (q.50 a.4)
o There cannot be two angels of the same species, since those things that are of the same species and differ in number are
the same in form but different in respect to matter, since an act is not multiplied except by the potency in which it is
received.
■ As angels are not composed of matter and form, it is impossible that two angels be of the same species; all
angels thus differ in species according to the different grades of intellectual nature and intellectual power.
o Nor can a parallel be drawn between a separated human soul and an angel, since the soul has a transcendental relation to
its body by which it is individuated, while the substance of an angel possesses no such relation.
27-8. Whether an angel is in aplace? (q.52 a.l)
o Since angels are immaterial and incorporeal, it cannot be in a place according to its substance (quantitative contact) since
it does not have quantity.
o Rather, angels are in a place inasmuch as it locally moves some body by dynamic contact of its power (virtually transient
operation).

On the angel’s cognitive faculty [ch. 28]

•

•

•

28-1. Whether the angel’s intellection is its substance?
o The angel’s intellection is not its substance and such can be proved in three ways:
■
directly. Action is the ultimate actuality of an agent and operative power just as being is the ultimate actuality of an
essence; this only applies to God who is Pure Act, who is His own action (ultimate actuality) and being.
■ from consideration of not only action itself but intellection: If the intellection of an angel was its substance, it would be
subsistent as its substance; but subsisting intellection can only be one and unique and thus the substance of an
angel would not be distinct from God or from the substance of other angels.
■ from thefact that operationfollows being: Since the being of no creature is its substance, the intellection (operation)
of an angel is not its substance.
28-2. Whether the intellection of an angel is its being?
o This is impossible since an angel’s being is limited, whereas its intellection is infinite intentionally and extends to every
intelligible being as its adequate object.
■
If the intellection of an angel was of such great perfection that it would be its substance, it would be one,
because it would identify in itself three absolute simple perfections: spiritual nature, intellection, and
subsistence; this is impossible, for these are only identified in God which was proved earlier.
28-3. Whether the angel’s intellectivefaculty is his essence?
o A faculty is understood with reference to the act, and because of the different faculties which are essentially ordered to
these acts.
■ Essence is ordered towards being or existence, whereas the intellect is ordered to intellection, which in the
created order is distinct from being because it presupposes being; thus an angel’s intellective faculty cannot be
its essence.

On the means of angelic cognition [ch. 29]
• 29-1. IF hether angels know all things by their essence as God does?
o Only the essence of God as infinite comprehends all things in itself; in knowing Himself, God knows all possibilities and
actual things because this is the same as knowing what He can do, does, and has done.
o As it is evident then that (created) angelic intellects cannot do these things, these must be perfected by some species or
representative likeness of things.
• 29-2. Whether angels understand through species takenfrom things?
o Operation follows being and mode of operation follows mode of being.
■ The angel’s mode of being is absolutely immaterial and independent of the body and thus his mode of
operation and understanding is also without any acceptance from a body, but is by an intelligible influx from
God, the Author of nature.
• These ideas impressed on the angelic intellect from God represent only existences and are suited to
represent futures inasmuch as these futures are derived from the divine ideas and when they will be
according to the divine will (not future contingents!).
• 29-3. Whether the higher angels know mm by universal species than the lower angels?
o The perfection of an angel’s knowledge depends on its universality.

Superior beings are those closer to and more like God; as God know s all things by one eternal intuitive act in
His essence, so among superior intellects, the higher know by fewer and more universal species.
• Titus it is the case when a person has a more comprehensive (universal) grasp of a science so that
many tilings are included under one concept (e.g. being able to solve a complex math problem in very
few steps).
• By more universal and fewer ideas, the higher angels know many things very distinctly and without
confusion since this universal knowledge is acquired directly from the highest means, God.
29-4. Whether angels naturally know future contingent beings and the secrets of hearts? (q. 57, aa.3,4)
O Future contingent beings cannot be known certainly by the angels either in their causes or in themselves, but they can
possess some conjectural knowledge.
■
Not in created causes because these are contingent and indifferent; not in uncreated causes (God’s free decree)
because these are naturally inaccessible to every created intellect.
■
Not in themselves, for in this way future contingents are known only by God inasmuch as God’s knowledge
alone embraces all time.
o Hidden secrets belong to a higher order known to God alone; such secrets as free are not necessarily connected with our
wills, and as immanent are not connected with exterior beings.
■ Hence, such secrets have no connection with the parts of the universe and are not accessible to the intellect of
the angels, good or bad.

■

•

On the love of the angels (q.60) [ch. 30]
• 30-1. The will and liberty of the angels.
o The angels possess a will as the inclination to the good intellectually known; like the intellect, the angel’s will is a faculty
distinct from the substance and is free.
o The angel’s liberty· of choice follows the intellect inasmuch as the intellect is able to judge the universal nature of the
good; the judgment remains undetermined with regard to an object here and now that is not good in every part.
■ As angels do not have bodies, they do not possess a sensitive appetite.
• 30-2. The angel’s natural and elective love.
o The angels possess a natural love which is an inclination conferred on the angel by the author of nature; they possess an
elective love consequent on this natural love that is concerned with an object here and now that is not good in every
part. (Natural love founded on natural union and natural dependence on God.)
o
\ngels love themselves by a natural love that is necessary with regard to the specification of that love because the angel
cannot consider anything in itself (or God) that would move it to a hatred of itself (or God).
o Demons do not desire non-being (evil) directly since the aspect of good is excluded from non-being; however, they
desire non-being indirectly in their torments, desiring non-being by reason of their self-love and not out of hatred for
self.
• 30-3. Whether by its natural love the angel loves God more than itsef? (q.60 a.3)
o The fundamental natural inclination in every creature is right and remain right; although sin weakens it, it never wholly
destroys it.
■
Everything that naturally (according to nature) belongs to another inclines more to that which it belongs than
to itself (analogically, the hand will defend the body at its own expense).
■ As every creature naturally belongs to God, every creature naturally inclines to the love of God, the author of
nature, more than to the love of itself; for rational agents, infused charity perfects the inclination while nonrational agents seek the love of God by carrying out the operations proper to their being and nature.
o The angel desires God for itself but on account of God, its natural ultimate end; nature reflects on itself not only in
regard to its own individuality but rather with regard to the universal in itself as a part of the universe ordered to the
good of the universe and for the manifestation of God’s goodness.
On the merits of the angels [ch. 31]
• 31-1. Whether the good angels merited their happiness? (q.62 a.4)
o The ultimate end must be attained by merit; as happiness for the intellectual creature is the ultimate end that is not
effected by attained (which consists in the Beatific Vision), angels must merit happiness.
• 31-2. Whether the angels merited in thefirst instant? (q.62 a.5)
o Angelic time (aeviterity) is the measure of the succession of the thoughts and affections of the angels; an angelic instant
can last any varied amount of time (equivalent to the experience of ecstasy).
o In all the angels, the first operation was good because the first operation was under special inspiration of God.

This first operation was without full merit because the angels had yet to move themselves; at this movement
(instant), some turned to God with full merit while others, inflated with pride, turned from Him.
o One act of the angels (in the second movement) is sufficient for full merit or demerit.
■
Grace perfect nature according to the mode of nature; as it is characteristic of the angelic nature to acquire a
natural perfection not discursively (like man) but immediately in one act, so in the second movement the angel
committed one fully meritorious act or one gravely sinful act that merited Heaven or hell, respectively.
31-3. Whether the angels attainedgrace and glory according to the quantity of their natures'? (q.62 a.6)
o This seems to be reasonable since the angelic movement of the will cannot be impeded or retarded by an inordinate
passion; thus the nature moves according to its entire power.
■
Hence, the angels that have a better nature turned to God with more power and more effectively.
■

On the guilt and obstinacy of the devils [ch. 32]
• 32-1. Whether the nil ofguilt can he in the angels? (q.63 a.l)
o Only that will which is the rule of its own action is unable to depart from proper rectitude; as only God’s will is the will
of its own action because it has no superior end, any created will can sin (since these are directed to superior ends).
o Angels cannot sin directly against the natural law:
* Because the angels always see the natural law intuitively in their own essence and thus cannot be in error or
ignorance about the natural law.
■
Because the angel naturally and efficaciously loves God as the author of nature more than itself, and this love
virtually contains the fulfillment of the entire natural law.
o
\iigels can sin indirectly against the natural law by sinning directly against the supernatural law which the angel does not
know with intuitive evidence but in obscurity of faith of which they can err.
■ Thus the angels sinned by inordinately desiring their own excellence (or preferring their natural happiness as
derived from the power of their natures to the supernatural happiness God offered).
• 32-2. Whether the angels could sin in thefirst instant? (q.63 aa.5,6)
o The angels operated under a special divine inspiration in the first instant and this first cognition was not the application
from the created will; thus they could not sin.
o The angels who sinned did so in the second instant under full deliberation.
• 32-3. Whether the angels could have sinned venially?
o Since angelic intellects are not discursive, it sees conclusions in principles intuitively and it beholds means as they are in
the order to an end.
■ Thus angels cannot sin venially but only mortally, since there cannot be a deordination with regard to the
means (venial sin) unless there is also a deordination with regard to the end.
• 32-4. The obstinacy of the devils (q.64 a.2)
o The devils are obstinate in evil as our Lord’s words attest to in Mt 25:41: Departfrom Me you cursed into everlastingfire which
was preparedfor the devil and his angels.
o The angels remain obstinate not only because of God’s denial of grace to them (extrinsic), but because of this connatural
mode of judging irrevocably and adhering to an end with an inflexible decision.
■ The appetitive faculty is in all things proportionate to the apprehending faculty by which it is moved.
■ Angels apprehend immoveable and intuitively those things that we apprehend discursively; thus an angel sees
intuitively and not successively all those things that pertain to the choice of a thing.
■ Thus when an angel judges something to be an end loved above all things, it sees all considerations before
judging, and the will of the angel is then fixed immovably to the end upon judgment.
On the illumination of the angels (q.106) [ch. 33]
• Higher angels possess a more universal species which represent greater areas of the intelligible world in a more simple manner;
they have a higher understanding of the truth and are able to explain these more perfect concepts.
o Thus the higher angels are able to illuminate the lower angels by manifesting their simple intelligibles in such a way that
the lower angels see more clearly (similar to the way a teacher leads the student to understand a concept, except the angel
attains to something/w.c? unknown to him beyond the light of his own intellect, whereas a human teacher makes known
what is per accidens unknown to the pupil).
o This illumination does not entail the infusion of a new light of nature or grace as God does, but only a strengthening of
the lower angel’s intellect in the degree of knowledge and an elevation of the lower angel to a more perfect manner of
intellection.
o Higher angels illumine the lower ones in regard to the state of nature, grace, and accidental glory since good is selfdiffusive.

On the hierarchy of angels (q.108) [ch. 34]
• A hierarchy pertains to a multitude ordered and arranged under a leader and is said to be one inasmuch as the multitude is able to
perceive the government of the leader in one and the same way.
• The hierarchical structure is based on the threefold mode of angelic illumination and cognition:
o Angels that draw the light of truth immediatelyfrom God: seraphim, cherubim, thrones.
o Angels that draw the light of truthfrom more universal created causes: dominations, virtues, powers.
o Angels that draw the light of truthfrom particular causes', principalities, archangels, angels.
•
Fallen angels retain this subordination since it is proper to angelic nature because of their common wickedness.
On the guardian angels (q.113) [ch. 35]
• 35-1. The guardianship of angels.
o Ps 90:11 and Mt 18:10 testify to the existence of guardian angels and Tradition testifies to them as well, including the
establishment of the fact of guardian angels.
o Guardian angels are fitting in that God tends to govern the lower beings through the higher; as man is also a wayfarer in
this earthly life, so God grants protection of angels to assist him on reaching his goal.
■
St. Basil testifies that each member of the faithful possesses his own guardian angel (Contra Eunomium 3,1); it
is further held that sinners and infidels have them as well to prevent them from doing greater harm.
• 35-2. Duties of the guardian angels.
o The guardian angels illuminate the intellect by adapting truths to our understanding, by representing truths by likenesses
of sensible things, by suggesting good thoughts, and exciting the will to good by admonition and persuasion.
o They also supply occasions for good and remove evil ones, bring our prayers to God, inflict remedial penalties, help us
at the hour of death, and lead the soul to Heaven or purgatory.
On the assaults of the devils (q.114) [ch. 36]
• A.l. Whether men are assailed by demons?
o Demons attempt to impede the progress of men due to envy, but no assault is permitted by God without His
permission, who makes use of the evils to bring forth greater gpod.
o Attacks are waged by instigating man to sin (demons can only tempt and not move the will directly); these attacks are
permitted in order to punish men for sin as well (as sin cedes dominion to the powers of hell).
• A.2. Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
o To tempt is the characteristic of demons; although they cannot move the will, they can to some extent affect man’s
lower powers by which the will is inclined, although it is in no way compelled.
• A. 3. Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?
o Not all sins arise from temptation directly; some rise out of the disorders of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and
the pride of life.
• A. 4. Whether the demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?
o The demons can seduce men by cunning and deception, not by true miracles, but by sensational acts that are within their
power over the created order that can appear miraculous to man (although these acts always in some subtle way fall
short of the manner that our Lord worked miracles).

De Homine
On the corporeal creature (qq. 65-74) [ch. 37]
• Preliminary analysis of the historical character of Genesis 1 -3 (cf. Denp_ 2121 -28 on the statement of the Biblical Commission, 30 June 1909).
o The first three chapters present the constitution of tilings and the order of creation in a non-scientific manner; these
chapters present an historical-popular narrative adapted to the understanding of the people for whom it was written at
the time.
■ These chapters are historical since they contain the narrative of things that actually happened and this narrative
corresponds to objective reality and historical truth.
• The style and historical form of Genesis support this thesis; since the events related about the sons of
Adam, Noah, etc. are historical, there is no reason to hail the first three chapters as fable.
• There is a peculiar connection between the first three chapters and the rest of the book, connecting
the origin of the human race with the origin of the Jewish people.

•

•

•

The testimony of the Old and New Testaments, along with near unanimous agreement of the Fathers,
the traditional standpoint of the Israelites, and the Tradition of the Church support the historicity of
Genesis.
o The chapters are not scientific but popular, for it was not the intention of the inspired writer to teach the inner
constitution of things (physical sciences) but to give the people of the time a presentation in the language of the time and
adapted to the understanding of the time.
■ No need exists to establish a positive harmony between the Mosaic narrative and the natural sciences since
there is no proof that Moses wished to follow a chronological order; however, the order delineated in Genesis
is a logical one, distinguishing between a threefold operation of creation, distinction, and ornamentation.
Overall synopsis of qq. 65-74.
o These questions are supported by the arguments put forth in De Deo Uno about the divine nature and also in qq. 44-47;
thus the truths posited are as follows:
■
God created all things, visible and invisible, and the divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
■ The corporeal forms which bodies have in their original production were produced immediately by God;
matter was never without a substantial form otherwise being would be in act without act, which is a
contradiction.
■ Time began with movement, of which it is the measure.
Transformism and the origin op life.
o Absolute transformism (vertical/ascending evolution; Darwin, Huxley): This theory comes from a radical materialism,
holding matter to be uncaused, existing of itself from all eternity, and that from it by successive transformations have
issued different living beings, that is, vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life. Refutation follows:
■ This theory contradicts faith and reason inasmuch as it denies all intervention by God; it directly opposes the
dogma of creation since it teaches matter to be uncaused and eternal.
■ This theory also contradicts all the proofs of God’s existence since it posits that more was created by less and
the perfect from the imperfect.
■ This theory also contradicts the principle of identity, the principle of reason of being, of efficient causality, and
of finality; as it implies an ascending evolution (a new distinct species arising from another), it posits the
emergence of a more perfect being without any reason, without an efficient cause, and without order.
■ This theory destroys the intelligibility of all things, leaving all to haphazard chance and supplying no reason for
the evident and ingenious subordination and coordination in nature.
• Order presupposes an intelligent cause per se; chance is a cause per accidens, accidentally connected to
the cause per se, and cannot be the first cause of the order of things.
• If this were the case, order would come from disorder and intelligibility from non-intelligibility.
o Moderate transformism (horizontal/descending evolution): This theory holds matter to be caused and created by God, that
it is not eternal, and the first living beings were created by God and that He intervened in a special way to produce
sensitive life in the formation of the human body and the sensitive soul; production of various species of plants and
animals derive from successive transformations from the first living beings.
■ Tliis theory does not oppose the teachings of the Faith; Genesis maintains that although there were some
differences in species that God created, it does not assert that all species (of plant life) were immediately
created by God; hence the theory does no violence to the principle of causality.
■
Tliis theory is in congruity with the creation of man, since it admits of a direct action of God; man’s specific
difference is clearly understood since it is not immersed in matter, that is, his rationality.
• Man’s rationality is a form of intellectuality and intelligence is distinctly intelligible to itself because it
is essentially ordered to the cognition of intelligible being itself and the raison d’etre of things.
• Hence, the human soul, the principle of rationality, cannot be educed from the potency of matter (as
opposed to the specific form of plants and animals adduced from matter by generation).
o The confusion of Darwin's theory is evident since it reduces man to a mere animal and can make no account
for his rationality.

On man and the spirituality and immortality of the soul (q.75) [ch. 38]
•
The spirituality of the soul.
o The spirituality of the soul is affirmed by Holy Writ.
■
God formed the body of Adam and breathed the breath of life (the soul) into him, which is of the spiritual
order since man was made in the image and likeness of God who is a spirit.
■ The wisdom and prophetical books attest to this along with 2 Macc 12:43-46 (cf. Ezec 37:10; Wis 3:1-4; 5:16;
9:15; Prov 12:28; Eccles 12:7; Ecclus 3:19).

Christ posits the human soul to be distinct from the body in Mt 10:28: Fearye not them that kill the body but not the
soul..St. Paul attests to it in 1 Cor 2:11.
o Lateran IV declared man to be composed of body and soul (cf. Deny. 428).
o Proof of St. Thomas on the spirituality of the soul.
■ Whatever is received in another is received after the manner in which it is received; thus whatever is known is
known according to the form it has in the one who knows.
■ The intellective soul knows a thing in its absolute nature; for example, a stone is known absolutely as a stone,
that is, in the intellective soul the form of the stone is absolute according to its formal nature.
■ Thus the intellective soul is an absolute form and not composed of matter and form; if it were, the forms of
things would be received in it as individuals and the soul would only know the individual, as is the case with the
sensitive powers.
• Only the intellect can know the intelligible being of things and the first necessary and universal
principle of being.
• And since the intellect knows itself essentially related to the immaterial, it must be immaterial; its
object is the intelligibility of things arrived at by abstraction from all matter and thus it is entirely
immaterial and intrinsically independent of the organism since mode of operation follows upon mode
of being.
o The imagination cannot attain to the knowledge of a necessary and universal principle (e.g., principle of causality,
knowledge of the precepts of the natural law); this must be attributed to the soul.
■ As the soul can know the nature of all bodies, it is fitting that it have nothing of these things in her nature,
because these would naturally impede the knowledge of other things (as the tongue infected with a bitter taste
makes all things taste bitter).
■ The intellect reflects back on itself by complete reflection and understands itself not only with regard to a part
but with regard to its totality, which is not within the power of any body which is only moved in respect to
parts.
■ The soul received by way of the intellect the conception of wholly spiritual and immaterial things, e.g., revealed
mysteries of the infinite value of the Redemption.
■ The object of the will is not only the sensible good, but following the intellect, also the moral, reasonable, and
spiritual good as regulated by the virtues; the soul is also drawn naturally to spiritual objects than to corporeal
things.
■ The will remains free with regard to every object that is not good in every respect, which reveals that the will
can only be filled by the clear vision of God.
■ A moral conscience can only be attributed to an immaterial and spiritual nature, as moral laws cannot be
imposed on blind matter since these require the medium of reason.
The incorruptibility of the soul (q.75 a. 6).
o The incorruptibility of the soul follows from its intrinsic independence of matter.
■ Every simple and subsisting form is incorruptible per se and per accidens, as the human soul is simple, subsisting,
and independent of matter, it cannot be corrupted per se (because of its simplicity) or per accidens when the
composite is corrupted.
o It is within God’s absolute power to annihilate a soul since such an act is not repugnant and the soul requires
preservation from God; however, God freely established laws that permit for the preservation of creatures incorruptible
perse and per acadens, and although He could annihilate it, such an act is not good in itself or directed to a greater gpod.
■
Furthermore, the intellect understands being absolutely and as it is in all time; thus every such being that has an
intellect naturally desires it to be at all times.
■
Since a natural desire cannot be futile, every intellectual substance is incorruptible.
o Human souls, since they are spiritual, are not in potency of matter or are produced by generation.
■
Souls are produced directly by God ex nihilo (no pre-existing subject); that which operated independently of
matter also exists and is produced independently of matter.

■

•

On the union of the soul with the body (q.76) [ch. 39]
• It is an article offaith, defined by the Council ofDienne (1311-2), that the intellective soul is per se and essentially theform of the body (cf. Deny. 481).
o The human soul is the form of the human body, or the soul is substantially united to the body as form to matter, not like
a mover to a tiling moved, but constituting one nature with a body.
o This union is per se and not through another, nor through the mediation of a sensitive or vegetative principle, but
directly and immediately through the soul.

The union is essential, that is, by the essence of the soul and not through some faculty, so that the essence of the soul is
the radical (root) principle of the vegetative and sensitive operations together with the body with which it is united.
The rational soul is the onlyform of the human body.
o There is only one soul in man because if any other substantial form existed beforehand it would imply that the soul is
only accidentally united to the body.
o That by which anything is primarily operated is the form to which the operation is attributed; it is evident that by which
the body lives primarily is the soul.
o It is the soul by which we are nourished, feel, move, and think, and it is the same man who perceives that he thinks and
feels; feeling cannot take place without the medium of the body.
o If the intellect was not united to the body, except as the mover of the body, the person would not be absolutely one
(supposit/individual) and consequently he would not be a simple being (on account of its nature).
The rational soul is not immersed in the matter.
o The more noble a form is, the more it dominates the corporeal matter and the less it is immersed in it, and the more it
excels the matter by its operation and power.
o The soul communicates that being in which it subsists to the corporeal matter; for this reason, when the body is
destroyed, the soul retains its own being which is not true of other forms.
■ When it is separated from the body, the soul remains individuated, because it preserves its natural relation to a
specific body rather than another (unlike angels which are their own species).
o The substantial form confers being absolutely; if another substantial form existed beforehand in the matter by which the
subject of the soul would be in act, it implies that the soul does not confer being absolutely and would not be the
substantial form.
■ That which is perse one (one nature) does not come into being out of two acts but out of potency and act.
It isfitting that the intellective soul be united to a proper bodyfor the purpose of sensation to become a human body.
o The intellective soul is the lowest grade of intellectual substances and therefore its proportionate object is the lowest
intelligible being of sensible things, knowable through the senses.
o Thus the intellective soul has power of intellection and sensation, the latter which requires a corporeal body.
Overall, the rational soul is united to the body in such a way that it is the only substantialform of the body, and through thisform, man is man.
o This form confers on man ever)· essential degree of perfection; the soul confers on the body the act of being by which it
itself is.
o

•

•

•

•

On the faculties of the soul (qq. 77-83) [ch. 40]
•
Thefaculties, acts, and habits are specified by theformal object to which they are essentially ordered, that is, by theformal object which they touch on
immediately and theformal motive under which they attain their object.
o In other words, the relative is specified to absolute to which it is essentially ordered; from this, several conclusions can
be drawn:
■ The faculties are really distinguished from the soul, because as the soul is ordered to its own being, the faculties
are ordered to operation, and operation presupposes being and is distinct from it.
■ No creature is immediately operative; to operate, it requires an operative faculty.
• The human soul cannot understand except through the intellective faculty, nor can it will expect
through the will.
• The essence of the soul is the real capacity for existence; likewise, the intellect is the real capacity for
knowing the truth and the will is the real capacity for willing the proposed good.
• Hence, the faculties of the soul are really distinct from each other according to their formal objects.
•
The difference between the intellective and sensitivefaculties is due to the objects; intelligible being is not within the grasp of the sensitivefaculties.
o The same applies to the rational and sensitive appetites, as the will, directed by the intellect, is specified by the universal
good (which is known only by the intellect), whereas the sensitive appetites (irascible and concup is cible) are directed by
the cogitative sensitive faculties and is specified by only sensible, delectable, and useful goods.
• Liberty.
o From the doctrine on the intellect and will, St. Thomas derives his teaching on liberty.
■ Acts are specified by their formal objects; if an object is proposed to the will that is not good in every respect,
the will is not necessarily drawn to it (cf. lallae q.10 a.2); hence, liberty is that dominating indifference of the
will with regard to an object proposed by reason as not good in ever)· way.
• This indifference must first be considered with regard to the will willing or not willing the object in
question; the indifference is potential in the free faculty and actual in the free act.

•

o

o

While the will actually wills the object, it still wills it freely with a dominating indifference that is now
not potential but actual.
• Liberty arises from the disproportion that exists between the will specified by the universal good and
the will specified by some particular good which is good under one aspect and lacking in another.
• This indifference is wholly active and actual in the divine will, save for the things that God wills
necessarily (His being, etc.).
■
God cannot force the created will to will a particular object proposed with indifference of judgment since this
implies a contradiction in the power of the will as proposed by the object.
The relation of choice to the final practical judgment.
■ The will follows the intellect and it desires the good that satisfies it in every way thus satiating the rational
appetite.
■ The will freely chooses among several goods that are proposed as desirable to the changeable judgment; the
choice allows the final practical judgment and the will effects that which is final.
■ The intellect and the will are not coordinated but the will is subordinated to the intellect in such a way that the
final practical judgment about an object not good in every way is free and not compelling this is the
indifference of the judgment which is followed by the dominating indifference of the will (from which liberty is
derived).
Molina’s chief error with liberty of the will arises from his failure to consider the object by which the free act is specified.

On how the soul knows itself (qq. 84-88) [ch. 41]
•
Objects of the intellect.
o The adequate object of the intellect, as intellect, is intelligible being in the entire extent of being thus we can know God
naturally as the first cause and, by the elevation of grace, we can know Him supematurally by direct vision.
o The proportionate object of the human intellect, as human, is the essence of sensible things due to our intellect’s uniting
with the senses.
■ Thus God and spiritual substances are naturally known by analogy·; while the soul is united to the body, it
knows spiritual things indirectly (unlike the angel) and therefore it conceives spiritual being as immaterial,
pointing to the fact that the soul first knows the nature of material tilings.
•
The soul as united to the body does not know itself through its essence but through act; if the contrary was the case, its spirituality would befully evident
to it in this state.
o Whatever is knowable is knowable as it is in act; thus as each spiritual substance is in act by its essence, so each one is
intelligible by its essence.
■
God as pure act and first cause knows Himself and all thing through His essence; angels know themselves
through their essence but not all thing through their essence as God does.
o It is connatural for the human intellect in its present state to be concerned with material and sensible things, and
therefore our intellect knows itself inasmuch as it is in act by means of the species abstracted by the agent intellect and,
through the mediation of these intelligible species, the possible intellect understands.
o After the separation of the soul from the body, the soul will know itself through itself.
On the separated soul (q.89) [ch. 42]
• 42-1. The subsistence of the separated soul.
o Every simple form that is intrinsically independent of matter (in operation, being, and production) subsists
independently of matter and continues to exist after separation from the body; as the human soul is intrinsically
independent of matter and is a simple form, the human soul subsists after the dissolution of the matter.
■ The human soul is individuated by its essential (not accidental!) relation to a particular body (because its very
nature requires a body), even when the body no longer exists (hence we see the fittingness of the resurrection
of tlie body).
■
It is more natural for the soul and body to be united, for the human soul (as the lowest of the rational
intellects) has for its proportionate object the lowest intelligible being which requires the use of the senses.
• 42-2. The knowledge of the separated soul.
o The principle to keep in mind here is that the human intellect is the lowest of the rational intellects although it is purely
spiritual.
o The state of the faculties of the separated soul.
■
Sensitive operations of the internal and external senses do not remain in the separated soul; the sensitive
faculties remain only accidentally (in root).

•

•

The sensitive faculties are only in act in the human composite, along with their respective habits (e.g.,
recollecting of sensitive memory); these are present in the separated soul radically.
■
Separated souls retain their higher faculties and their respective acts which are purely spiritual (the intellect and
the will) and their respective habits (acquired virtue and knowledge, infused virtues).
• The natural exercise of the faculties is impeded to some extent since the soul loses the cooperation of
the imagination and sensitive memory, which is helpful in the knowledge that is obtained from the
species abstracted from sensible tilings.
•
It is possible, as many good theologians hold, that the separated soul, in order to overcome this
impediment, receives from God certain infused species in the instant of separation (similar to the
species given to angels, but of a lower kind).
o The fact that the separated soul sees itself intuitively enables it to reflect upon its own essence and know God as the
author of nature with perfect certitude.
■ Tliis compensates for the difficult!· of making use of acquired ideas that normally need the cooperation of the
imagination and when the intellect makes use of infused ideas that are too sublime for its capal iili ties.
o Separated souls know individual things through infused species but only those to which they are in some way
determined either by previous knowledge, some affection, natural relation, or divine ordination, because everything that
is received is done so according to the mode of the recipient.
■ The souls in purgatory thus do not know what is happening to us on earth, since by divine ordination and
mode of being, they are segregated from the intercourse with the living and joined in the intercourse with
spiritual substances which are separated from the body (although they can be solicitous for the living).
■
It is probable that the souls of the blessed know what is happening here on earth; since they are most perfectly
in accord with divine justice however, they are not saddened nor do they interest themselves in the affairs of
the living except when the disposition of divine justice requires it.
42-3. The immutable will of the separated soul.
o By the fact that the soul is separated from the body, it becomes subject to the normal conditions of intellectual life of a
pure spiritual creature.
■
In the separated soul, the intellect no longer apprehends discursively and by abstraction, nor does the will
adhere moveably, since the separated souls are similar (but not identical!) to angels both with regard to the
manner of intellection and the indivisibility of the appetites.
■
Hence the soul possesses full knowledge of its state, as to whether it has merited eternal union with God (of
whose vision the will necessarily moves to because He is good in every- respect) or to eternal damnation due to
its ill-disposition (lack of grace) to receive the Beatific Vision.
• When the disposition remains by which something is desired as a final end, the desire for that end
cannot be moved, because the final end is desired above all things and a person cannot be withdrawn
from the desire of an ultimate end by something more desirable.
o The soul remains in a mutable state while joined with the body; hence transitory dispositions
of the passions and habits can be removed and vices eradicated since the body serves the
soul on its proper operations and enables it to move towards perfection.
o Thus when the soul is separated from the body, it is no longer in a state of movement to an
end but now it quiesces in the attained end; the will then will be immobile with regard to the
desire of the ultimate end because its dispositions towards the end sought will be immobile.
o Hence, the immutability of the separated soul is explained by the soul’s manner of
immutability? considering the final end.

On the origin of man (qq. 90-94) [ch. 43]
• 43-1. The creation oj ourfirstparents.
o The direct creation of a soul ex nihilo is a dogma of the Faith according to the universal teaching of the Church; the
fathers and the theologians hold the peculiar creation of the body by? a special direct action of God.
o The human body was produced directly by God and admirably equipped to serve the rational soul and its operations
(sensitive life at the service of the intellectual life).
■ Aquinas clearly observes that in place of hands, claws, and fur, man possesses reason and hands which
demonstrate his nobility above other material creatures; furthermore, man’s erect posture and uplifted face
points to his consideration of all things, unlike the downcast eyes of animals.
■ Man is made in God’s image by reason of his intellectual nature by which he can know and love God, albeit
imperfectly, as God loves Himself; man made in the image of God in four ways:
•
Inasmuch as he possesses the ability to know God.

•
•
•
•

•

Inasmuch as man knows and loves God supematurally by faith and charity.
Inasmuch as man perfectly knows and loves God in the light of glory and in the charity of Heaven.
Inasmuch as man in understanding himself produces a word and by loving himself produces love,
which bears resemblance to the Trinity.

43-2. Unity of the human race.
o Holy Writ testifies to the entire human race possessing its origin in one proto-parent, Adam; this truth is an article of
Faith.
o All men possess various signs of specific identity of whatever race or color, including the same anatomical structure,
physiological functions, laws of generation, unlimited fecundity, speech faculties, power of reasoning, etc.; color, race
and intelligence levels are accidental.
o Scriptures are silent and the Church has made no declaration in regard to the age of the human race.
43-3. The production of the soul.
o The Church formally posits the human soul to be created by God when it is infused into the body; four considerations
follow from this:
■
The soul is notpart of the divine substance: God is pure act and purely spiritual, having no diversity in Himself, and
therefore there is nothing in Him from which the soul could be produced as a from a material cause.
• God cannot be a material cause to be perfected, nor a participating or informing formal cause; He is
simply an extrinsic cause this is the efficient and final cause of all being.
■
The soul cannot comefrom human seed: It is impossible that the active power present in the matter extend its activity
to the production of an immaterial effect.
• It is obvious that the intellective principle in man (the soul) transcends matter, for it has an operation
in which the body does not communicate.
■
The soul of the infant cannot comefrom the soul of the parents by emanation because the soul is a simple substance,
without parts, from which nothing can be taken; creative power belongs to God alone.
■ Parents have no causality (even instrumental) in the direct creation of the soul: The soul is directly created by God from
nothing; parents serve to dispose the matter of the embryo (by the fusion of the gametes) to receive the
spiritual soul.
• Parents are said to generate a human being because from their own substance they produce the body
of an infant disposed in such a way (by virtue of the law of nature) to the creation and infusion of the
soul, transmitting human nature.

On man’s elevation to the supernatural state (qq. 95-99) [ch.44]
• 44-1. What is meant by the term supernatural.
o Supernatural commonly means that which is above nature taken collectively, that is, what is above the laws of nature; the
Church’s definitions expand on this:
■ The supernatural is that which is above every created nature, as exceeding the powers and exigencies of every
created nature, although it does not exceed the passive and perfectible capacity of our nature, nor is it
incongruous to our nature.
■
Supematurality is twofold:
• That of miracles, which exceeds the efficient powers of causality of any created nature, but do not
exceed the cognitive powers of man’s nature.
• That of mysteries strictly so-called, of grace and glory which exceed both the efficient causality and
cognitive powers of atty created intellectual nature.
■ Hence the supernatural is that which exceeds the powers and exigencies of nature and is able to perfect nature
gratuitously.
• Relative sipematurality pertains to things which exceed man’s nature but not angels, and so such angelic
works could appear supernatural to man.
• Absolute supematurality is that which exceeds the properties of all created and creatable nature, and
pertains only to God.

UNCREATED

(God as One, Triune, Incarnate Word)

AS TO SUBSTANCE
LIGHT OF GLORY
CREATED

GRACE, INFUSED VIRTUES, GIFTS

ABSOULTE SUPERNATURAL
END

NATURAL ACTS

AGENT

MIRACLES AS TO SUBSTANCE (glorification of body)
MIRACLES AS TO SUBJECT (non-glorious resurrection)
MIRACLES AS TO MODE (sudden cure)

supernaturally ordered towards a
supernatural end (acquired temperance directed to eternal life under
influence of charity)

AS TO MODE

Distinction between natural and supernatural orders.
■ The natural order pertains to the disposition of the various created natures with regard to before and after in
relation to God as the author and end of these natures.
• For man, the natural final end is the possession of God as known discursively and loved naturally
above all tings (hence natural religion does not end in Heaven!).
■ The supernatural order pertain to the fitting disposition of those things that exceed the properties of created
nature in relation to God as He is their author and end.
• For man, the supernatural order consists in :
o The end as possession of God by intuitive vision.
o The first agent, God, and the second agent, man elevated by grace.
o The objective means, that is, external revelation, the Sacraments, and an organization (the
Church) authorized and ordered towards their safeguarding.
o The subjective means, that is, the infused virtues, actual grace, and the gifts.
o The law or system of precepts by which the supernatural end is reached (hence why dogs do
not go to Heaven).
o Harmony exists between the order of nature and the order of grace because both have God as their origin; faith
presupposes supernatural knowledge just as grace presupposes nature and perfection presupposes the perfectible (cf. la
q.2 a.2 ad 1).
44-2. Different states off human nature in relation to grace.
o Several states of nature are distinguished:
■
Pure nature: the nature itself with its intrinsic principles and those that follow or are due nature, but without
grace and the preternatural gifts; in this state man possesses a natural end and the means to attain it, along with
the natural law although he would be subject to ignorance, concupiscence, sickness, and death.
■ integral nature. This perfects the pure state in such a way that the body is perfectly subjected to the soul and the
appetites to reason, freeing it from sickness, death, concupiscence, and ignorance (hence integrity implies no
deviation from perfection).
• Integrity is a perfection in the natural order which is gratuitous and preternatural, although not
elevating the nature to the supernatural order by grace.
■ Holiness and originaljustice. The state in which grace and the preternatural gifts of integrity are conferred together;
Adam existed in this state de facto.
■
Unredeemedfallen nature. The state despoiled of sanctifying grace, infused virtues, and the gift of integrity, giving
rise to ignorance of intellect, malice of will, concupiscence in the concupiscible appetite, and weakness in the
irascible appetite.
■
Redeemed nature The state endowed with sanctifying grace (by Baptism) by the redemptive work of Christ, the
infused virtues, and gifts, but without the gift of integrity presently; integrity will be restored after the
resurrection of the body in glory.
44-3. Whetherfirst parents were constituted in a state oj holiness andjustice and ifit was supernatural^
o The first man was created without sin, possessing free will, endowed with the supernatural gifts of integrity and
immortality.
■
God could have created man without supernatural grace; to preserve his primitive state, man needed grace and
his merits were not purely human and natural.

o

•

•

Holy Writ supports this; the Old Testament states what the New Testament clarifies: 1) prior to sin a certain
familiarity existed between God an man (Gen 2:18-24; 3:8); 2) that man was made in the image of God; 3) that
man was created righteous, loving God above all things.
o Righteousness or justice in which man was created in originally consisted in the subjection of reason to God, the
subjection of the lower powers to reason, and the subjection of the body to the soul.
■ The first subjection (reason to God) is the cause of the others and thus it is not fitting for it to remain after the
disorder of sin was introduced; thus the first subjection was gratuitous and not natural because the effect
cannot be greater than the cause.
■ The fact that the perfection was supernatural is supported by the fact that it is repugnant for the entire human
race to suffer (and be deprived of the perfections necessary to attain its natural end) if the sin of one man was
merely natural.
■ Hence in the state of innocence, Adam had all the virtues by which reason is ordered towards God and by
which the lower powers are disposed accordingly to the rule of reason.
44-4. The gift of integrity.
o In addition to sanctifying grace, our first parents possessed the gift of integrity by which they were perfected beyond the
requirements of the order of nature.
■ The four gifts that comprise integrity bear directly upon the body and soul; to the body, the first parents had
immunity from death and pain and some dominion over animals and the forces of nature; to the soul, they
possessed immunity from concupiscence and ignorance (of what could be naturally known).
■ These four gifts comprise a harmony of order, found in the threefold subjection of the soul to God by grace,
the lower powers to the soul, and the body to the soul; the loss of one results in the loss of the others.
o Immunityfrom death (q.97 a.l).
■ Adam and Eve, although mortal, were immune from the necessity of dying, being preserved from it as long as
they remained in the state of grace and would enter into heavenly bliss after probation.
• Gen 2:16 explicitly affirms this: Tor in whatsoever day thou shall eat of it, thou shall die the death', Rom 5:12-17
further affirms death to be the penalty of sin.
■ As long as the soul remained perfectly subject to God, it was fitting that in the beginning a power should be
given to the soul by which the body could be preserved better than the nature of corporeal matter.
• As a material composite, the body was by nature mortal and subject to corruption; Adam’s body was
not indissoluble by some force of immortality existing in him, but by a supernatural power supplied to
the soul by God by which the soul preserved the body from corruption as long as the soul was subject
to God.
• The preservation from death is not as perfect as in a glorified body, for the glorified body has no
requirement of food.
o Immunityfrom the pain and miseries oflife (q.97 a. 2).
■
Immortality presupposes the immunity from pain and disease that dispose to death; Holy Writ affirms that
Adam and Eve enjoyed abundance of good things in their earthly paradise, were active without growing weary,
had dominion over the created order, and were untouched with sorrows associated with sin (cf. Gen 2:8,15;
1:26; Eccles 17:3ff.)
■ Man’s body as a material composite is by nature passible and mortal; as long as the soul remained subject to
God, He protected the body from all harm.
• Man enjoyed dominion over all animals both in regard to right andpower and the exercise and use of that
power, for he was able to command them and they would obey (since less perfect beings are subject to
higher ones).
• Sin greatly weakened this dominion (due to the rebellion of the soul against God; the punishment
truly fits the crime).
o Immunityfrom inordinate concupiscence.
■ Holy Writ attests to the fact that Adam and Eve became embarrassed of their nudity after the Fall; before the
Fall, as the Fathers observe, Adam and Eve were immune from concupiscence and from the tumult of
inordinate passions.
■ As long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to it; this subjection was not natural,
or else the subjection would have remained after the Fall.
• Reason is influenced by the political dominion of the irascible and concupiscible parts because the
sensitive appetite has its own nature and can resist the command of reason (due to the ordering of
different objects).

■

•

The sensitive appetite is moved by knowledge under the direction of reason and by the imagination
and senses; thus the irascible and concupiscible parts oppose reason at times because we feel and
imagine something delectable which reason forbids, or something unpleasant which reason
commands.
o Immunityfrom ignorance.
■
Ignorance pertains to the lack of knowledge that one should have in view of his age and state in life; Adam
possessed the natural knowledge proportionate to his state for the perfect government of himself and for the
easy instruction of his progeny.
■ Holy Writ is indicative of the fact that Adam was created as an adult, and that he possessed a sufficient
knowledge to distinguish the various animals and name them; this knowledge had to be infused.
• Gen 2:19 points to the familiarity Adam had with God, and Ecclus 17:1-8 is referent to the counsel,
knowledge, wisdom, and understanding God had bestowed upon Adam.
• The Fathers also affirm Adam’s knowledge to be of the highest order.
■ The first things were established by God not only so that they might exist in themselves, but that they might be
principles of other things, they were produced in such a perfect state to effect this.
• Hence it follows that the first man was produced in a perfect state in regard to his body and soul so
that he would be able to immediately instruct and rule; Adam had knowledge of supernatural things
(by way of phantasm) as was necessary to govern the human race in that perfect state (but this did not
include knowledge of God and the angels in their essences nor future contingents, as these were not
necessary to the state).
• The righteousness of the first state was not compatible with any deception in the intellect; the
deception of the woman, although preceding the sin in deed, followed upon the sin of internal elation.
•
It further follows that it was befitting Adam, who was bestowed with perfection of body, to be
bestowed with perfection of intellect.
o Overall, God joined the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body that the soul might rule the body, and,
if some obstacle to this rule should arise from the defect of nature, it would be removed by God’s special and
supernatural beneficence.
44-5. The condition of offspring in the state ofinnocence.
o Original justice, in which man was established, was an accident belonging to the nature of the species, not indeed caused by
the principles of the species but as a certain gift divinely conferred on the entire nature.
■
Following upon the principle that opposites follow upon the same genus, original sin (opposite of original
justice) is said to be the sin of nature (not the individual person), and hence is carried on by the parents to the
offspring; similarly, the children would have been like the parents with regard to original justice had the state so
remained.
■ Thus the children bom in this state enjoyed the same perfections of their parents; thus they were not
confirmed in grace nor did they have perfect knowledge at birth, but were quickly able to acquire perfect
knowledge (due to human mode of learning).
44-6. W'hether sanctifyinggrace was a gift of nature or apersonal gift in Adam?
o Trent declared that Adam’s sin was not personal only, but affected his whole posterity (cf. Deng: 789), and that he
forfeited for himself and us the holiness and posterity which he possessed (in congruity with Rom 5:12).
■ Thus Adam lost for himself and us sanctifying grace and integrity of nature which points to the fact that Adam
received sanctifying grace not only as a personal gift but also as a hereditary gift of nature.
o Trent further declared original sin to be the death of the soul, a privation of the life of grace; thus original sin is the
privation of original justice, since sanctifyinggrace is intrinsically related to this justice.
■ Baptism remits original sin by conferring sanctifying grace as its principle effect, but it is evident that integrity is
not restored; if original sin consisted formally in the privation of integrity, it would thus be restored by
Baptism, which clearly is not the case since concupiscence remains.
o Vatican I reiterates these theses: that which is said to pertain to the nature of original sin is not only the negative lack of
sanctifying grace but the privation of grace, that is, the lack of holiness, which according to God’s ordination was to be
in all Adam’s posterity; Adam’s descendants are deprived of this grace.

On the fall of man (qq. 100-102) [ch. 45]
• 45-1. The sin of ourfirstparents.
o The literal historical sense of Genesis cannot be doubted, especially in regard to those things which refer to the
foundations of the Christian religion, e.g, the original justice of Adam and Eve, integrity, test of obedience by God, the

transgression of God’s command with the persuasion of the devil, the consequence of sin, and the promise of the
Redeemer, (cf. Deux 2123)
■ The sense of Scripture is clear as to the mortal gravity of Adam’s sin due to the purpose of the commandment
of God (testing obedience which is the subjection of the will), the grave punishment (loss of grace and
privileges), the consequences of the sin for the entire human race, and because the perfection of the first state
should have made it easy to avoid sin.
o The sin of the first parents was that of pride because the inordinately desired to be like God in the knowledge of good
and evil and wished to govern themselves by reason alone instead of obeying the divine commandment by reason of
faith.
■ Although tliis sin was not more grave than all others according to its species, it took on the greatest gravity
because of the perfection of the state of the person who committed the sin.
• The sensitive appetite was completely subject to reason and the will and thus the inordination could
only arise from the will, by the disordered desire of one’s own excellence (pride of life).
• There was in Eve curiosity and disloyalty and in Adam an inordinate love for his wife; thus the eating
of the fruit was entirely secondary and no disproportion exists between the sin and punishment.
45-2. The existence of original sin and its effect in Adam’s posterity.
o All men naturally bom of Adam (except the Blessed Mother) by their conception contract some sin, which is correctly
called original sin or sin of nature, and which brings with it the privation of sanctifying grace and the gift of integrity.
■ The entire Old Testament announces the promised Redeemer and this supposes the fall of the human race and
this is more explicitly revealed in the New Testament (check your nearest Bible).
o Original sin is transmitted to us and is in each of us together with the privation of the preternatural gifts of nature.
■ Reason alone is left wanting in conclusive proof of original sin which remains a mystery in the proper sense;
the miseries of this life are only probable signs of the existence of original sin.
■ With the help of Rom 5:12-21, St. Thomas draws an analogy to explain (but not prove) the transmission of
original sin (cf. lallae q.81 a.l):
• All men who are born of Adam can be regarded as one man inasmuch as they are in one nature,
which they have received from their first parent; thus many men are derived from Adam as the several
members of one body.
• The action of one bodily member (e.g. a hand) is consequent upon the will of the soul which moves
the member; thus also the inordination which is in man generated from Adam is consequent upon the
will of our first parent who moves (by the movement of generation) all men who are derived from
him by origin.
• Thus, original sin is not the sin of this particular person except inasmuch as this person receives his
nature from the first parent; hence it is called the sin of nature.
■ Human nature is transmitted by virtue of the seed and together with it the infection of nature; thus Adam’s first
sin (and not his successive ones) is passed on to his posterity.
• Adam was the physical head of the human race, and also the head of an elevated nature, under this aspect,
Adam is the moral head of the human race for, had he not sinned, he would have communicated
human nature together with the gifts of nature when he communicated natural life.
45-3. The nature of original sin.
o Erroneous theories.
■ Early Protestants maintained that original sin consists in a vehement concupiscence which extinguishes free will
(cf. Deny 776, 792).
■ The Jansenists qualified this further, holding freewill to be so weakened by original sin that it is necessarily drawn
to earthly pleasures unless it is strengthened by efficacious grace.
■
Other theories are combinations of these two in varying degrees, which in some way try to excuse man from
the responsibility of trying to work out his salvation by the means God has provided for him.
o The formal constituent of a thing is the root of the other things that pertain to it.
■ The privation of original justice which implies the subjection of the will to God is the root of the inordination
of the lower powers and of the penalties that pertain to original sin.
■ When grace was removed, the rebellion of the flesh followed; thus the formal constituent of original sin is the
privation of original justice with its subjection of the mind to God, and therefore it is essentially the death of
the soul, which the Second Council of Orange so declared.
• Concupiscence is a consequence of original sin inasmuch as the rebellion of the flesh follows the
termination of the will’s subjection to God.

•

The privation of grace is the formal element of original sin, and the effect of a voluntary and culpable
act committed by Adam; thus original sin is not an act but a sinful state which directly infects our own
nature and indirectly infects our person.
o In its formal aspect, original sin is the habitual turning away from the ultimate supernatural end as voluntary by the will
of the head of the human race; furthermore, it cannot be in one more than another since the privation of original justice
is equal in all (total) although concupiscence may be stronger in some more than others because of bodily constitution.
o Original sin primarily is in the essence rather than in the powers of the soul because it is transmitted by generation, of
which man is the terminus of whose soul is the substantial form.
■
Original sin infects the will first and then redounds to the lower powers which are infected in special ways
(lienee the differentiation among the virtues and vices, although all have pride as their root).
45-4. Consequences ojc original sin.
o The good of nature is threefold:
■ The principles of nature, by which the nature is constituted and the properties caused by these principles, i.e.
the powers of the soul.
■ The inclination man possesses towards virtue.
■ The gift of original justice.
o Original sin has no effect on the first good, it weakens or diminishes the second, and wholly destroys the third; hence,
man was wounded in his natural endowments although he preserved his nature and the nature of his faculties.
■
Inasmuch as reason was deprived of its order to truth, we suffer ignorance; inasmuch as the will was deprived
of its order to the good, we suffer the wound of malice.
■
Inasmuch as the irascible appetite was deprived of its order to the difficult, we suffer the wound of weakness
(with its various forms of effeminacy); inasmuch as concupiscence was deprived of its order to the delectable
moderated by reason, we suffer disordered concupiscence.
45-5. Synopsis of original sin.
o Original sin is not repugnant to divine justice because it is the privation of the grace and the preternatural gifts which
were not owing to our nature; God granted these gifts gratuitously to Adam provided he did not forfeit them by sin.
o Original sin is not repugnant to God’s wisdom or goodness.
■ Nothing prohibits man from being brought to something higher after sin; God permits sin and evil in order
that He might elicit something greater or better.
■ Before the Incarnation, it was not possible to determine what good a priori God intended for allowing original
sin; after it, the Incarnation shows clearly that God permitted sin to abound so that grace could even more
abound.
■ As grace serves to configure a soul to God (especially sanctifying grace), so the abundance of it further served
to manifest God’s goodness and glory which is deserving of all praise.
o Existence of original sin solves the enigma of the coexistence in man of such great frailty and misery and such strong
aspiration for the sublime.

+
Nisi Dominus aedificaverit domum, in vanum laboraverunt qui aedificant eam.
Sit nomen Domini benedictum in saecula. Arnen.

TRACTUS DE DEO CREATORE

A complied outline based on the second part of the dogmatic treatise
The Trinity and God the Creator by Rev. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.
in accordance with the
Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas
Ia qq. 44-119

+
Quid retribuam Domino pro omnibus quae retribuit mihi?
A.D. MMII