On the Existence of God (la q.2)
A. 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
In answer to this question, we must consider how a proposition is self-evident:
• In itself and tn us: that the predicate is included in the subject is due to the knowledge of the essence of
the subject, e.g., Man is an animal.
• In itself though not to us'. since the essence of the subject cannot be known, knowledge that the predicate
is included in the subject is lacking, e.g., God exists.
Since these propositions are not self-evident to us, these need to be demonstrated from effects
(which are more known) to the cause (less known).
Thus to prove the existence of God, we must demonstrate it from His effects since we are
unable to know the cause as it is (aposteriori).
ad 1: To know that God exists, although in a confused way, is evident from nature; although man has a desire for
beatitude, this desire cannot conclusively recognize God is the end of it.
A.2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Demonstration is possible in two ways:
• From cause to effect (a priori)'. not possible in proving God’s existence.
• From effect to cause (aposteriori): since the essence of God is not known (the cause), we have to argue
from His better-known effects to arrive at the cause; thus God’s existence can be demonstrated this
way.
ad 3: God’s effects are notproportionate to His causality which is infinite; therefore, a perfect knowledge of God
cannot be apprehended by His effects.
A.3. Whether God exists?
The existence of God can be demonstrably proved in 5 ways:

1. From motion'. All things possess motion.
Motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality; anything reduced to
actuality must be done from something already actual (non dabet quod non babel · ).
Nothing can, at the same time and in the same respect, be in a state of actuality and
potentiality; this would make something both the mover and moved in the same respect,
which is impossible.
An infinite line of contingent movers is impossible, as there would be no first mover and
thus no other mover; hence it is necessary to arrive at a First Mover who possesses
actuality from nothing else, that is, God.
2. From nature of efficient cause: Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.
Causality without effect is contrary to reason, as every agent must act for an end; hence
an infinite line of efficient causes results in no ultimate cause and hence no ultimate
effect.
It is necessary to admit a First Efficient Cause, which is God, upon which all effects
happen and are carried through to their end.
3. From possibility and necessity. Nothing is the cause of its own existence.
Evident that all things have the capacity to not exist and thus are not capable of always
existing.
Anything that exists is brought into existence by something already existing, since these
at one time did not exist.
Impossible to have infinite line of contingent existence, and thus all existence must come
from something necessarily possessing existence, which is God.
4. Gradation ofperfection
The qualifiers more and less are said of different things to the degree that they possess a
maximum; the more a quality a thing has, the greater its being.

The maximum of any genus is the cause of all in that genus.
It follows that there must exist something which is to all beings the cause of their being,
goodness, and all other perfections, which is God.
5. Governance of the world
All things act towards an end, whether they be intelligent or not; anything unintelligent is
guided towards its end by something intelligent (e.g., an arrow is shot at a target by the
archer)
Thus the intelligent being, who establishes an end and guides all created things to it is
called God.
ad 2'. Nature works for a determinate end under direction of a higher agent, so whatever is done by
nature, including voluntary movements of rational creatures, is traceable back to God.
On the Simplicity of God (la q.3)
A. 1. Whether God is a body?
The manner of existence is the next consideration after determining the existence of something.
God cannot be a body for three reasons:
1. All bodies require being moved by something else (i.e., the very fact of being brought
into existence).
2. A body is always in potentiality to be or not to be, and this is incompatible with God as
the First Being.
3. Animate bodies are not animate in virtue of being a body, but are animated by something
else; this is incompatible with God’s nobility.
ad 1: Holy Writ attributes the dimensions of corporeal quantity to God in a metaphorical sense:
depth, His power of knowing hidden things; height, the transcendence of His excelling power; length, duration
of His existence; breadth, His act of love for all.
ad 2: Man is not said to be in God’s image due to his body, but in virtue of his incorporeal powers of
reason and will.
ad 3: Holy Writ metaphorically attributes corporeal parts to God to describe His actions (e.g., God’s
“eyes” refer to His capacity to see all things, including hidden thought).
ad 4: In the same manner, attributions to posture describe other powers: sitting, His
unchangeableness and dominion; standing, His inability to be overcome (which also points to God’s inability to
be acted upon, pointing to His pure actuality and omnipotent active power).
ad 5: God is drawn to or from according to the dispositions of our soul, not by a local movement of a
body.
A.2. Whether God is composed of matter andform?
Matter cannot exist in God for three reasons:
1. Matter is in potentiality and this is incompatible with His pure actuality.
2. Matter owes its perfection to its form, thus making the perfections and goodness of
matter to be participated; God is the essential Good which excludes all possibility of
participation.
3. Matter acts in virtue of its form and thus its agency is attributed to its form; God is
primarily and essentially an agent and thus also a form primarily and essentially.
ad 2\ Passions are attributed to God metaphorically on account of a similitude of effect (e.g., effect
of punishment is attributed to God “being angry”).
A. 3. Whether God is the same as His essence and nature ?
Only in material things does individual determination lie outside specific determination; thus the

production of an individual requires a principle of individuation.
EXAMPLE: Although Jane and Allison are beings, they possess a specific difference which
makes them human, and a principle of individuation which distinguishes them into two material
substances, one being Jane and the other being Allison.
In angels, the specific and individual determinations are identical, and thus each angel is its own
species (la q.50 a.4).
In God, individuality is identical with His essence', otherwise, this would attribute an objective
composition in God which thus points to potentiality.
From this, it is possible to perceive how one God (divine nature) exists in three Persons, as
the individuality of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are identical with that selfsame divine
nature.
Further, these distinctions are virtual and do not imply an objective composition in the
Godhead.
ad 1: Since man requires discursive reasoning in order to learn, we have to treat of simple things as
though they were composite, but this does not affect their objective simplicity.
A.4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God?
The Divine Essence cannot be conceived as not existing; the notion of a merely possible God or one
composed of essence and existence involves a contradiction:
1. If God’s essence and existence differed, then God’s existence must be caused:
by some exterior agent', this is impossible since God it the first Efficient cause.
by its essential constituent principles', this is impossible since nothing can be the
sufficient cause of its own existence if its very existence is, in fact, caused.
2. If God’s essence and existence differed, this would imply potentiality in God, which is
impossible since He is pure Act.
3. If God’s essence and existence differed, this would imply participated being', this is
impossible since God is the First Being from which all being comes.
ad 2'. Esse means one of two things:
1. As the act of being itself we cannot understand God in this way.
2. As the composition of a proposition by the mindjoining a subject andpredicate'. God can
be understood this way since we can know that God is from His effects.
A. 5. Whether God is contained in a genus?
A thing is confined by giving the class (genus) to which it belongs, and a specific characteristic that
differentiates it from other members of the genus.
As a genus is prior to what it contains, God cannot be defined, since nothing is prior to Him:
1. Genus and specific difference constitute a composition, as actuality and potentiality; there
can be no potentiality in God.
2. If God were a genus, He would be in the genus being, since this refers to His essence;
however, no specific difference can exist distinct from being except non-being, which
cannot be a difference in respect to God.
3. All things in the same genus agree in essence of the genus but differ in existence (e.g.
man and horse), but God’s essence and existence are the same.
A. 6. Whether there are any accidents in God?
It is the function of an accident to perfect the substance to which it inheres, by giving it something it
does not possess in itself (thus actualizing a potential of a substance).
This cannot occur in God since He is incapable of being perfected; God therefore is what He has.
Nor can God have essential accidents (e.g., risability in man) which are caused by constituent

principles of the subject; nothing can be caused in God since He is the first Cause.
A. 7 Whether God is altogether simple?
God’s absolute simplicity can be shown in five ways:
1. There can be no composition of quantitative parts in God, nor composition of matter and
form, nature and supposit (that is, a unified whole), essence and existence, genus and
difference, or subject and accident, as has already been established.
2. Every composite is posterior to its parts, but God is the First Being to which nothing is
prior.
3. All composites necessarily have a cause which unites the parts, but God is uncaused.
4. Composition implies potentiality, which is impossible in God.
5. Nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts (e.g., The arm has a
man.), but God is what He has (essence identical with His attributes).
ad 2: In the created order, perfections of composite things are better than simple things, because the
perfections of created goodness
cannot be found in simple things.
A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?
God rules all things without commingling with them for three reasons:
1. God as the first Efficient cause cannot be identical with the form of the thing caused,
since the form of a created thing is merely potential while God is pure Act.
2. It belongs to God to act primarily and substantially; if He entered into a composite, it
would be the composite acting rather than Him (as an arm acts in virtue of a man).
3. As no part of a compound can be absolutely primal in being, if God were to enter a
compound, He would contradict His primal being.
ad 3: God is absolutely diverse in being from primary matter, as the latter is pure potentiality to
being while God is the pure Actuality of being.
On the perfection of God (la q.4)
A. 1. Whether God is perfect?
Perfection can be considered in three ways:
1. All being, in the sense that it exists, is perfect, as non-being is imperfect simpliciter.
2. As the sum total of all the excellences a being ought to have, of which lack of constitutes
imperfection.
3. As the possession andfinition of all excellences in their superlative degree: this pertains
exclusively to God.
God’s perfections differ from creaturely perfections in three ways:
1. God possesses His perfections of, from, and through Himself, while creatures acquire
theirs by creation and development.
4. God unites within Himself every existing and conceivable perfection, while creatures are
limited to categories.
5. God’s measure and end of His perfections are within His very essence, while the
creatures are external to themselves.
God as the first principle in the order of efficient cause must be the most perfect, since He is most
actual (since actuality is the standard of perfection).
ad I: Perfection when applied to creatures signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality.
ad 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for by it any potentiality is able to be reduced to act.
A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?

All created perfections are in God, and this is two ways:
1. All created perfections include the perfection of being, because things are perfect because
they have being in some fashion.
2. Whatever perfection exists in an effect, must be found in the effective cause:
Pure perfections, which can be notionally intensified to an infinite degree, are
contained in God formally, along with the transcendents and proximate notions (e.g., Being).
Mixed perfections are in God virtually, which must first be put through a logical
refinement by negation in order to apply these to God metaphorically, since these are bound essentially with
matter and potency (e.g., perfect sorrow).
A. 3. Whether any creature can be like God?
All created things, insofar as they are beings, are like God who is the first and universal principle of
being; the order of grace brings about a greater participation in His likeness for the rational creature.
ad 2'. God is related to creatures by His transcendence of every genus, and as the principle of all
genera.
ad 3: Likeness of creatures to God is based on analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas
other beings are beings by participation.

On goodness in general (la q.5)
A. 1. Whether goodness differs really from being?
Goodness and being differ only in idea.
The essence of goodness consists in the fact that it is in some way desirable; desirability
arises from the consideration of a thing as perfecting.
Anything that is perfecting must possess actuality (non-being cannot perfect being), so thus a
thing is perfecting or desirable insofar as it exists.
Goodness thus is the consideration of being under the aspect of desirableness.
ad 1: Goodness signifies perfection which is desirable, and thus that which has ultimate perfection is
said to be simply good.
ad 2'. Goodness is a form insofar as absolute goodness must signify complete actuality.
A. 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?
In the order of apprehension, being is prior to goodness:
• Being is the first thing conceived by the intellect, since anything is knowable
inasmuch as it is actual.
• The desirability of the being is then considered as to whether it is perfecting or not
(goodness).
ad P. In the order of causality, goodness is prior to being, as is the end to the form, since the
causality of being extends only to things which are actual.
ad 3: Nothing can be truly desired except being, since non-being is unable to be perfective in any
way.
A. 3. Whether every being is good?
All beings, insofar as they exist, are good, as actuality is a perfection, which implies desirability and
goodness.
ad 2'. Something is said to be evil because it lacks some element of being which it should have',
however, it cannot be called evil because it exists.
ad 3: Prime matter is only potentially good and cannot therefore be so desired since it possesses no
actuality.
ad 4: Mathematical entities possess only logical existence, since these are abstracted from motion

and matter, and thus do not possess goodness since these are not actual.
A. 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?
Desirability possesses an aspect of an end; since goodness is what all things desire(beatitude falls
under good), it is evident that it possesses the aspect of an end.
ad Γ. Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally, as these both pertain to the form of
a thing.
These differ logically, as goodness considers a thing as pertaining to the appetites (whether it
is desirable), while beauty relates to the cogitative faculty as it considers the thing as possessing due proportion,
clarity, and integrity.
A. 5. Whether the essence ofgoodness consists in mode, species, and order?
In order for a thing to be perfect and good, it must possess a form and all that precedes and follows
upon that form:
1. mode, the determination of a thing (has to exist in some sort of way by which it can be
understood).
2. species', signifies the form itself from which desirability is determined.
3. order', acts in accord with form towards an end.
EXAMPLE: A diamond is a rock (mode), that because of its rarity, value and composition (species),
is a more perfect way to symbolize the stability of matrimony (order, which implies a higher level ofgoodness),
ad 1: By way of mode, species, and order, things possess being and goodness.
ad 2: All perceptions of goodness can be broken down in the three constituent considerations,
whether being the highest good of a thing (man, as made by and for God), or its lower goods (man, as
intelligent, capable of solving problems).
ad 4: Things are evil either because they lack congruity with their form or because they are out of
place.
A. 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into honest, useful, andpleasant?
This threefold determination deals with human goodness, from the standpoint of the termination of
the movements of the appetites:
1. Useful: those which are sought after as means towards an end (e.g. a hammer is needed to
put together a birdhouse).
2. Honest: those things upon which the appetites rest in possession of (e.g. Beatific Vision).
3. Pleasant', those things upon which the appetite rests in the enjoyment of the rest itself.

On the goodness of God (la q.6)
> A. 1. Whether God is good?
• God is the first effective cause of all things; the aspects of supreme goodness and desirability
belong to Him.
• The perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent; all
existence comes from God from Whom all perfection arises.
• ad P. Mode, species, and order belong to the essence of a caused good', since good is in God as
its cause, it belongs to God to impose mode, species, and order on the goods of creatures.
> A. 2. Whether God is the supreme Good?
• Good is attributed to God as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the First Cause, who
exists above any genus of differentiation (thus He is Goodness simply) and above any order of
things (thus He is supremely good).
• Goodness does not flow from God as an univocal agent (since He is different from the genus and
species of His effects), but as an equivocal one, as he distributes His goodness by His effects in

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> A.3.
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•
> A.4.
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different degrees.
ad I: A real relation does not exist between God and His creatures, but between creation and
Him; thus God’s diffusion of His goodness does not add anything to Him but merely a relation
of idea between Him and creatures.
Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?
Perfection of a thing is threefold:
1. According to constitution of its own being: God’s essence is His existence.
2. In respect to necessary accidents requiredfor the operations of a thing: God possesses
no accidents, as all things are essential to Him.
3. Attainment to something else as an end: God is not directed towards anything as an end.
Since God has every kind of perfection essentially, it follows that He alone is good essentially.
Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
All things can be called being and good insofar as they participate in God’s own being and
goodness.
This participation or similitude of divine goodness is formally the goodness of the thing itself, by
which it is said to be good; thus from the one goodness of God comes the formal goodness of all
other things.

On the infinity of God (la q.7)
'r A. 1. Whether God is infinite?
• Infinity is considered under the aspect of matter and form:
1. In regards to matter: matter is in a way made finite by form, as prior to this it is in
potentiality to receive many forms.
• Since the form actualizes the matter, the matter is perfected; thus infinite when
predicated of matter has the nature of something imperfect (formless matter).
2. In regards to form: form is contracted by matter, as the form undetermined by matter has
the nature of something perfect and infinite.
• Since God is not received into and limited by anything, as He is His own
subsistent being, it is clear therefore that God is perfect and infinite.
• ad 2: Infinite when predicated of quantity implies the infinite when predicated of matter, and thus
this cannot be said of God, who does not have matter.
A.2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?
• Things outside God can be relatively infinite but not absolutely.
• As matter is determined and limited by form, the matter still retains potential to possess
an infinite number of accidentalforms (e.g., wood has a relative infinity as far as it is
potential to an infinite number of shapes).
• Created forms that do not possess matter (e g. angels) are contracted by contingent being
into a determined nature; these forms possess relative infinity in respect to the accidents
the nature receives (e.g. degrees of intelligence in angels).
• ad I: Created nature excludes absolute infinity, since created nature must be limited in some
way; since the two are mutually exclusive, God cannot create something that is absolutely
infinite.
• ad 2: Although an act of the intellect (operation) can extend to the infinite, it is still limited by
the nature and form it possesses.
• ad 3: Prime matter is not absolutely infinite because its potentiality extends only to natural

(created) forms.
> A.3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?
• The essence of a created being cannot be infinite because its essence is terminated in species by a
form, and confined to individuality by matter.
• In regard to infinite magnitudes, two considerations:
1. Naturally (matter andform) ', all natural bodies possess a determined substantial form
from which determined accidents flow; the quantity of the body must be determinate then
since it is accidental to the determined substance.
2. Mathematically (quantity)', any mathematical entity must possess a figure by which it is
determined and actual, and thus it cannot exist with infinite magnitude.
• ad 2'. Although infinity is not against the nature of magnitude simply, it is contrary to any thing
possessing magnitude (since the thing has to be confined in some way).
• ad 3: It is conceivable to divide a magnitude infinitely, but not as to add to it, as the parts must
take the form of a whole.
> A.4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
• It is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, either absolutely or accidentally:
• Created multitude is comprehended under the intention of the Creator; an infinite
multitude would be aimless and thus would imply that God acts without aim.
• A potentially infinite multitude can exist from the division of matter (or the continuous
with regard to time).
On the existence of God in things (la q.8)
> A. 1. Whether God is in all things?
• God is in all things, not as part of their essence or accidentally (pantheism), but as an agent
present to that which it works upon, and must be joined to that especially wherein it acts
immediately.
• As long as a thing has being, God must be in the thing by sustaining its existence.
• ad 1: God exceeds all creation due to the sublimity of His nature, but is in all creation as the
cause and maintenance of its being.
• ad -k. God is in demons only by way of preserving their existence, but does not enter into that
which they have deformed by their own fault.
> A.2. Whether God is everywhere?
• God is said to be omnipresent in two ways:
1. He is in every place by giving it existence and locative power.
2. God fills every place by giving it being which does not exclude the co-presence of other
being (e.g. a man in afield'. God gives locative power to the field and being to the man
who stands within it).
• ad 1: Spiritual beings (angels) are in a place by contact of power and not by measure of quantity.
• ad 3; Totality of essence is not commensurate with totality of place; as the soul is whole in each
part of the body, so God is whole in all things and in each one.
A. 3. Whether God is omnipresent by essence, presence, and power?
• God is in a thing in two ways:
1. As an efficient cause'. God is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all
as the cause of their being.
2. As the object of operation in the operator'. God is in all things by His power as all things

are subject to His power, and He is in all things by His presence as nothing can escape
His eye (since He holds all things in being).
• ad 2'. Two modes of presence are distinguished as a thing can be present by substance (essence)
but not by sight (presence), e.g. a man is present in a house in essence although he is not present
in every room.
'r A.4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
• To be everywhere primarily and absolutely is proper to God alone, since all places possess
actuality in virtue of God supplying existence to them.

On the immutability of God (la q.9)
> A. 1. Whether God is altogether immutable?
• Anything that is changed or can be changed is in some way potential, which is incompatible with
God’s pure Actuality; therefore He must be altogether immutable..
'r K.2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone ?
• Any created thing is mutable in four ways:
1. in regards to substantial being (corruptible), which applies to the material world.
2. In regards to locality.
3. In regards to the ordering towards an end or application ofpower, which applies to
angels.
4. In regards to change from existence to non-existence, which applies to all beings.
• God is evidently not mutable in any of these ways, and thus it belongs to Him alone to be
immutable.
On the eternity of God (la q.10)
> A. 1. Whether eternity is defined as “the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable
life"?
• Since man lives and thinks of things in respect to time, we must reach knowledge of eternity by
way of time.
• Something not subject to change can have no before or after, since both would imply
change
• This would admit of no succession either, since it can be inferred that eternity has neither
beginning nor end, and must therefore be simultaneously whole; thus the definition is
appropriate.
• ad 3: Eternity is called a simultaneous whole, not because it possesses parts, but because it lacks
nothing.
> A. 2. Whether God is eternal?
• Since God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal; as God is His own
act of being, so He is also His own eternity.
• ad 1: God as the author of eternity is said in reference to the participated eternity of His creatures
by way of their natures (angels, man).
• ad 2\ God reigns beyond eternity is taken to mean that He reigns beyond any age and conception
of time.
> A.3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
• Eternity properly belongs to God alone as it follows upon His absolute immutability.
• Eternity is participated in in three ways:
1. By receiving immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist (earth, soul,

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> A. 4.
•

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> A.5.
•

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> A.6.
•

angel).
2. By excessive length of duration.
3. By possessing unchangeableness in being or operation by the order of grace (the blessed).
ad 2: Hell’s fires are eternal by way of time and never end.
ad 3: The true and necessary are eternal as these are contained in the divine intellect.
Whether eternity differsfrom time?
Eternity differs from time in two ways:
1. Accidentally, time possesses a beginning and an end while eternity does not.
2. Substantially and essentially: eternity is the measure ofpermanent being and is thus
simultaneously whole; time is the measure of movement and change.
ad 3: as any being recedes from permanence of being, it becomes subject to change, thus
receding from eternity into the realm of time.
The difference of aeviternity and time.
Aeviternity is considered to be the mean between eternity and time:
• Some beings recede less from permanence of being than others (e.g., angels) and are less
subject to change.
• However, such beings are still subject to some degree of potentiality (e.g. place,
existence, intelligence, operative power) and exist in aeviternity.
ad 2\ Aeviternity is simultaneously whole, but is also compatible with the terms before and after;
thus it is not equivalent to eternity which is not compatible with these terms..
Whether there is only one aeviternity?
There is only one aeviternity, since it is the most simple element of measure of its genus (e.g. all
corporeal things are measured by time, which is the most simple element of measure of
movement or change).

On the unity of God (la q.ll)
> A. 1. Whether one adds anything to being?
• One does not add any reality to being but is merely a negation of division; thus one means
undivided being.
• ad 1: If by one we mean “quantity” then it does add something to being (under the genus of
quantity) whereas one convertible with being does not.
• ad 2: Things which are divisible in one manner can be indivisible in another (e.g. man’s body
can be divided, but not his soul).
> A.2. Whether one and many are opposed to each other?
• One and many are opposing terms, as one denotes indivisibility while many suggests division:
1. Quantitatively: one is the principle of number as multitude refers to number (measure vs.
measured).
2. Metaphysically: one convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation
(undivided vs. divided).
> A. 3. Whether God is one ?
• God can be shown to be one is three ways:
1. By His simplicity, what makes God Himself is incommunicable to others.
2. By His infinity ofperfection', multiple “Gods” would necessarily have to differ, which
would imply one possessing what another lacks (in order to tell them apart); this cannot
be as it contradicts perfection.
3. By the unity of the world: all things are reduced to an established order by one better than

•

the many; order of perfection must be established by one most perfect, which is God.
ad 2: One as denoting quantity cannot be predicated of God since it falls under the genus of
mathematics, which God exceeds.

•

Although one convertible with being denotes a privation of multiplicity, such a privation
points to the perfection of God.
> A.4. Whether God is supremely one?
• Anything that is supremely one must possess two qualities:
1. Supremely being'. God’s being is not determined by an adjoining nature and is self­
sub si stent.
2. Supremely indivisible: God cannot be divided actually, potentially, or by any other mode
of division.
On how God is known by us (la q.12)
> A. 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
• Anything is knowable to the degree of its actuality; since God is pure Act, He must be supremely
knowable.
• As the eye does not exhaust the supreme visibility of the sun, so the created intellect cannot
exhaust the supreme intelligibility of God:
1. Ultimate beatitude of man consists in the possession of the highest good with the highest
faculty; if we could not see or know God in virtue of our rationality, it would contradict
God as Last end.
2. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of things; inability to see the First Cause
would frustrate this natural desire placed there by God.
• ad 3: God can be known, but is beyond comprehension (exhaustive knowledge).
• ad 4: The created intellect can be proportioned to know God in virtue of an effect relating to a
cause.
> A. 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?
• The vision of God is considered from two standpoints:
1. On the part of the receiver of the vision: God as the Author of the intellect can be seen by
way of the lumen gloriae, which strengthens the intellect to see God without a similitude
or image.
2. On the part of the object seen: The lumen gloriae is necessary because God cannot be
seen by way of any created similitude or image:
i. Because the higher order of things cannot be know by similitudes of the lower
order (e.g. a corporeal body does no good in the understanding of the angelic
essence)
ii. Because God’s uncreated essence and existence are identical, no created form can
be the similitude representing the essence of God.
iii. As the divine essence contains in itself whatever can be understood by the created
intellect, any created similitude would end up limiting this in some way.
> A. 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen by the bodily eye?
• The sense of sight pertains to things corporeal, and thus spiritual things go beyond its capacities.
• Since God is spiritual and incorporeal, He cannot be seen by way of sense (or imagination since
phantasms are based on sense knowledge) but only by way of the intellect.
> A.4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the divine essence?

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To know self-sub si stent being is natural to God alone, as this is beyond the natural capacity of a
created intellect.
In order to see the essence of God, God must supply the created intellect with grace (hence He
unites Himself to the intellect) whereby He renders Himself intelligible to it.
ad 3: Corporeal senses cannot be raised up to the realm of incorporeality; however, the intellect,
as it is a spiritual power, can be raised up above its nature by grace.
Whether a created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?
Anything raised beyond the capacity of its nature must be prepared by some disposition beyond
its nature (e.g., heat is necessary in order to set something ablaze).
God must add some supernatural disposition to the intellect in order that it be raised up to behold
the vision of Him; this augmenting of the intellect is called the light of illumination.
ad 1: The light of illumination does not add intelligibility to God, but rather disposes the created
intellect to His intelligibility (the change occurs on the part of the creature).
ad 2: The light of illumination does not create a similitude by which God is seen, but perfects the
intellect and strengthens it in order to behold Him.
Whether one sees the essence of God more perfectly than another?
The essence of God is seen in differing degrees according to the capacity of the strengthened
intellect to see Him, and not by way of a more perfect similitude.
• The intellect which has more lumen gloriae will see God more perfectly, and this is based
on the degree of charity it possesses.
• Greater charity points to greater desire to see its object; thus the lumen gloriae is
proportionate to the desire which stems from charity.
Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?
To comprehend something means to perfectly know it to the degree which it can be known.
Since God is infinitely knowable, His intelligibility exceeds the capacity of the created intellect,
and thus the created intellect cannot exhaust His intelligibility.
God’s essence is known to the degree the created lumen gloriae admits; but this created light can
in no way be infinite, and thus God cannot be known as He knows Himself.
ad 7: Comprehension is taken in a twofold way:
1. Strictly and properly, as the comprehended is in the comprehensor, it is evident that God
cannot be comprehended this way since the infinite cannot be contained in the finite.
2. As opposed to non-attainment anyone is said to comprehend something when it is
attained; in this loose sense God is
comprehended in the blessed.
ad 2\ God is called incomprehensible due to the fact that He is not and cannot be seen as
perfectly as He is capable of being seen.
ad 3: In the vision of God, the intellect is able to recognize God’s infinite existence and
knowability (since these are identical with His essence); but this does not mean that the seer
arrives at an exhaustive knowledge (e.g. One can know a mathematical proof is demonstrable
without knowing how to demonstrate it).
Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?
All things which are seen in God as an effect are seen their cause; the more completely a cause is
understood, the more the effects are (e.g. one who thoroughly understands a math problem can
easily arrive at and understand its solution).
An intellect can know all effects of a cause and the reasons for them if it understands the cause

wholly; God however is unable to be wholly comprehended.
Thus no created intellect can know all that God does or can do (e.g., knowledge of potentialities),
but only to the degree that it sees God according to the lumen gloriae.
• ad 2'. A glace at a mirror does not reveal all that is contained in the mirror, unless that glace were
to somehow comprehend it altogether.
• ad 4'. The intellect’s natural desire to know everything in their causes pertains to the knowledge
of the species and genera of things, and their types, this is satisfied in the perfection and vision
of God.
• This desire does not extend to knowledge of singulars or the realm ofpotentiality, as
these do not serve to perfect the intellect.
A.9. Whether what is seen in God is seen through any similitude?
• As God is not seen by way of similitude, neither are the things seen in Him, for all things are
comprehensible by way of the divine essence.
A. 10. Whether all things are seen simultaneously in the essence of God?
• As one idea can encompass many things, all things are seen simultaneously in the vision of God,
since nothing is singularly seen by way of a similitude.
• ad 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; many things understood
by one idea are understood simultaneously.
A. 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?
• Mode of knowledge follows the mode of nature of the knower; our intellect knows only by what
has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form.
• Thus knowledge of God by any created similitude is not the vision of His essence, which makes
it impossible for the intellect while on earth to see the essence of God.
• ad 1: In Holy Writ, a man is said to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the
senses or imagination which takes on a similitude representing the divinity, but this is not the
divine essence.
A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?
• The created intellect cannot be led by sense to the essence of God, for the sensible effects of God
do not equal the power of God as their cause.
• However, since these effects are determinate upon God as their cause, natural reason can be led
to know that God exists and what necessarily must belong to Him as first Cause of all being
• ad 7: Unaided reason is unable to determine what God is, but can determine whether He is and
what comes from that.
A. 13. Whether a higher knowledge of God can be obtained by grace ?
• Grace builds on the nature of the intellect and perfects it:
1. Intellect’s natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light.
2. By grace, images in the imagination are divinely formed which expresses divine things
better than those images received from sensible objects.
• ad 7: Grace in this life still does not permit one to know God’s essence, but permits one to know
Him more fully by way of demonstration of His more excellent effects.
• ad 2'. Revelation of grace permits of a fuller knowledge of God by way of infusion of the divine
light to see things more clearly and aptly by which the cause is better known.
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On the names of God (la q.13)
'k- A. 1. Whether a name can be given to God?

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A name can be given to something insofar as it can be understood, since the name, as a word, is
a sign of an idea that stands for an intelligible conception.
God, insofar as He can be understood, can be named in reference to creation (effect naming a
cause), but in no way do these name signify the divine essence as it truly is.
ad 1: God has no name (or is above being named properly) since His divine essence supercedes
anything we can understand about Him.
ad 2: Any name given to God fails to express His mode of being (ipsum esse subsistens), abstract
names point to His simplicity while concrete names point to His substance and perfection (e.g.,
All-Wise, Almighty, etc.).
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?
Negative names applied to God (e.g., “Sinless”) signify His relation to creatures and our distance
from Him, and thus do not signify His substance.
Affirmative names signify the divine substance, even though these also fall short of a full
representation of Him
• These names attribute the pre-existence of what is named to be in God before creation
(e.g. to say that God is good is not because He causes goodness, but because He is good
essentially).
Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?
Two things to be considered in regard to the application of names to God:
1. Perfections which the name signifies (e.g., goodness)', such names belong properly to
God and belong primarily to Him.
2. Mode of signification of the name', this applies more to creatures and are not primarily
said of God.
• For example, God is said to be wise, denoting a perfection of knowledge of a
highest cause; in its mode of signification, wisdom is accidental to the created
intellect, contained in a genus and species. Since God is not in a genus, wisdom
in its mode of signification cannot be applied to God properly.
Whether names applied to God are synonymous?
Ideas that are signified in names are conceptions in the intellect of the thing signified by the
name.
Our intellect knows God from creatures; the perfections we conceive exist in God unitedly and
simply, whereas such perfections are received by creatures in varying degrees.
All perfections that exist in God are identified in His essence, but are not destructive of each
other (e.g., being does not crowd out goodness)', thus the names applied to God are not
synonymous, as they consider Him (whole and entire) under different aspects.
ad P. Synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; names applied to God signify one
thing under various aspects.
ad 3: God is one in reality, yet multiple in idea, since our intellect apprehends Him in a
composite manner.
Whether what is said of God and creatures is univocally predicated of them ?
Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures, since the creature falls far short
from the similitude of the Creator (e.g., when God is said to be wise, we do not signify anything
distinct from His essence, power and existence; the same cannot be said of a rational creature).
Neither can names be predicated of God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as any
knowledge of God from creatures would be subject to the equivocation and we would know

nothing at all.
Names predicated of God and creatures are therefore analogical (i.e., according to proportion),
for whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to the relation of the creature to God
(as effect to cause).
A. 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicatedprimarily of creatures?
• All names applied metaphorically to God (e.g., angry) are applied to creatures, as such names
denote a similitude of the creature.
• Names applied properly to God are applied to Him primarily in regards to what the name
signifies (e.g. goodness, causally and substantially); these are applied primarily to creatures in
regards to the thing naming (knowledge of creatures applied to God).
A.7. Whether names that imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?
• Names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity
(e.g., Lord).
• This implies no change in God, but a change in the creature; God is outside the whole corder of
creation, so creatures have a real relation to Him, but not vice-versa; God’s relation to
creatures is one of idea inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.
• ad L. Temporal names applied to God are of 2 classes:
1. As signifying the divine substance directly, these point to the action of God (e.g., Creator,
Savior).
2. As signifying the divine substance indirectly, these presuppose the divine substance,
pointing to a habitude between creature and God (e.g., Lord).
• ad 5: Since the relation of subjection from creature to God is a real one, God is Lord in reality,
and according to the manner in which the creature is subjected to Him.
A. 8. Whether the name “God” is a name of the nature?
• The name God is considered in two ways:
1. As operation·, since God is known by us through His effects, He is called God by us due
to acknowledgment of His universal providence over all things.
2. As nature·, after the consideration of God’s operation is the name God imposed to stand
for the divine nature.
• ad 2 \ Things can be named according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties
and effects; God stands for the divine nature as it signifies something as existing above, as the
principle of, and as removed from all things.
> A.9. Whether this name “God” is communicable?
• The name God is incommunicable in reality since it denotes the divine nature which cannot be
multiplied (no more than a name of a particular individual is communicable to another).
• The name God can be communicable only by way of opinion and only by way of similitude (e.g.,
those sharing in divinity by likeness, as attributed to angels or the blessed).
• ad 3: Names signifying perfections do not signify the divine nature absolutely, and are thus
communicable.
r A. 10. Whether the name “God” is applied to Him univocally by nature, by participation, or according
to opinion?
• God is predicated solely and uniquely of God Himself alone
• God is predicated analogically of idols according to the false opinion of idolaters (thinking other
things to be God which are not), and predicated analogically of the just in reference to a certain
participated likeness in the divinity by way of grace.
> A. 11. Whether the Tetragrammaton (Ego Sum Qui Sum) is the most proper name of God?

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The Tetragrammaton is the most proper name of God for three reasons:
1. On account of its signification: the name signifies simply existence itself; God alone is
His existence which is identified with His essence.
2. On account of its universality: it comprehends all other names, as the less determinate the
name, the more universal and absolute it is, and thus the more properly it is applied to
God.
3. It signifies present existence, expressing God’s eternity, and all that follows from that.
ad 1: The Tetragrammaton is most properly the name of God in reference to the Source from
whence it comes.
ad 2: Existence considered absolutely is prior to the idea of cause; thus the Tetragrammaton is
God’s principal name absolutely, even above Supreme Good.
Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
True affirmative propositions can be formed about God:
• In every affirmative proposition, the predicate and subject signify in some way the same
thing in reality, and different things in idea.
• Thus in reference to God, as our intellect knows God according to different conceptions
which are predicable of His unity, various affirmative propositions can be said of Him.
ad 3: Our intellect is not false in forming composition in ideas concerning God; it understands
simple things in a composite manner while not considering them as composite things.

On God’s Knowledge (la q.14)
> A. 1. Whether there is knowledge in God?
• There exists the most perfect knowledge in God because He has the highest degree of
immateriality.
• Forms which are more immaterial approach more closely a kind of infinity; the degree of
immateriality corresponds to the degree of cognition (e.g., sense receives images free
from matter, reason is able to abstract and is immaterial).
• ad 1: Knowledge is not a quality or habit in God, but substantial and pure act.
• ad 3: The mode of divine essence is higher than that of creatures; thus divine knowledge does
not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge.
> A. 2. Whether God understands Himself?
• God is pure act, and thus His intellect and its object are identical; He does not lack the
intelligible species (as we do when understanding something only partially) nor does the
intelligible species differ from the intellect (as in our case).
• Hence the intelligible species must be the divine intellect itself and, as God is always present to
Himself, He understands Himself through Himself.
• ad2: In created intellects, the intelligible species perfects the intellect; but as God’s intellect is
not subject to potentiality, the divine intellect is its own perfection and its own intelligible object.
• ad 3: God is pure act in the order of existence and of intelligible objects, thus understanding
Himself through Himself.
> A. 3. Whether God comprehends Himself?
• A thing is comprehended when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable, and everything is
knowable according to its actuality.
• God’s cognitive power is as great as His actuality is knowable; thus God must perfectly grasp
His infinite knowability and thus perfectly comprehend Himself.

ad 1: God is said to be comprehended by Himself forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden.
ad 2'. God is said to be finite to Himself by way ofproportion, as He does not exceed His nature,
just as anything does not exceed their own nature naturally.
A.4. Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?
• God’s intellect must be identical with His substance; if it was not, something other than Himself
would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, which admits of potency in God, which
is impossible.
• Thus in God, the intellect and the object understood and intelligible species and His act of
understanding are identical.
A. 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself?
• If God perfectly understands Himself (the highest intelligible), then He must perfectly know His
power, which means that He must know to what His power extends.
• Whatever effects pre-exist in God (as in the first cause) must be His act of understanding, for an
intelligent cause must understand the effects of its causality.
• ad 2\ Things outside God are understood by Him inasmuch as the essence of God contains their
images.
A.6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?
• To know a thing in general and not in particular is to have imperfect knowledge of it; if God’s
knowledge of things other than Himself was only universal and not special, His understanding
would not be perfect, which is impossible.
• Whatever perfection exists in a creature is contained and pre-exists in God in an excelling
manner.
• Included in this is what makes each thing distinguishable from each other; thus every
form whereby each thing is constituted its own species is a perfection.
• If God knows Himself perfectly, He must therefore know all the ways His perfection can
be shared by others and all modes of being; hence God must know all things with proper
knowledge in their distinction from each other.
A.7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
• Discursion considered in two ways:
1. succession simply, whereby one moves from known to unknown in order to understand
the unknown.
2. causality, arriving at conclusions by way of principles.
• Neither of these apply to God, as He sees all things all at once and not successively, and from the
fact that He sees the effects in Himself as in their cause.
• As discursive reasoning implies finding out the unknown from the known, it would be
impossible for God to not know something and thus this excludes discursive knowledge in Him.
A. 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
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The knowledge of God is the cause of things, just as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of the art
produced.
• As God’s being and understanding are the same, His knowledge is the cause ot things insofar as His will is
joined to it.
• ad 2: Although God’s knowledge is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are, as God designated that these
come into existence at some point and are not eternal.
A. 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?
• God knows all things that are either in His power or within His creatures’ power, or else He would not have
comprehensive knowledge of Himself; hence He knows things that are not actual.

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God further knows all things past or future, as He sees all of time in one vision.
By simple intelligence, God’s knowledge extends to the merely possible, as which will never be or never were.
ad 3: It is in the knowledge of God whether a thing was, is, or will be, as well as not that they be, but that it is
possible (God merely wills some things to be possible, but never actual.)
Whether God knows eiil things?
Whoever knows a thing perfectly must know what is accidental to it; as some good things can be corrupted
accidentally by evil, God must know evil things by way of His knowledge of the good (e.g., darkness is known
by way of light).
ad 2\ God is not the cause of evil, but the good by which evil is known.
ad 4·. Evil is not in itself knowable, since it is a privation of good; hence it is not defined or known except by
way of good.
Whether God knows singular things?
God’s knowledge extends as far as His causality, since He knows His power; as His active power extends
both to universal forms and to matter (individuating principle), God’s knowledge extends to singular things
■which are individualized by matter.
Whether God can know infinite things?
Those things which are possible to God and to creatures are infinite; as God knows all these things, both
actual and possible, He knows infinite things.
Further, by His vision, God knows actually and simultaneously all the thoughts and affections of immortal
souls, which are multiplied to infinity.
ad /: God’s knowledge of the infinite is simultaneous and not in the matter of enumeration by parts.
ad 2: It is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite; thus the infinite, in a way, is
made finite by that which is able to comprehend it.
Whether the knowledge of God is offuture contingent things?
A thing is said to be contingent in two ways:

1. in itself insofar as it is in act (thus present).
2. as it is in its cause', in this way can something be considered as future.
God knows all contingent things in both ways, since His knowledge is measured by eternity and
all things are subject to the divine sight in their presentality.
ad J : Things known by God are contingent in relation to their proximate causes, while their
remote and first cause (God’s knowledge) is necessary.
ad 3: Things reduced to act in time which are known by us successively are known by God in
eternity (e.g., a man on a high road sees who is approaching more comprehensively than
someone lower down).
Whether God knows enunciable things?
God knows whatever is in our power to perform (as powers of creation are included in His
power); since it is a power of our intellect to form enunciations, it follows that God knows all
enunciations that can be formed.
God understands all these things by simple intelligence, since He understands the essence of
each thing.
Whether the knowledge of God is variable ?
Since God’s knowledge is self-subsistent intelligence, and is identified with His unchangeable
self-subsistent Being, it follows that His knowledge is unchangeable.
ad 1: Created things are in God in an invariable manner, while their manner of existence is
variable in themselves.
ad 2: God invariably knows the variability of things, since this is the way He created them.
ad 3: It does not admit of change in the divine knowledge that God knows one thing to sometime

be and not to be; hence there is no change in knowing an enunciable proposition to be sometimes
true and at other times false.
> A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?
• In regard to Himself, God has speculative knowledge only, since He is not operable.
• In regard to things ad extra, two considerations:
1. He has speculative knowledge of all things, as He knows not only how things are made,
but also what they are.
2. He has practical knowledge of all things made or that will be made in reference to the end
they are made for; as regards the things that are merely possible, God possesses practical
knowledge, but only in reference to the object and mode, not the end (since they are not
actual).
On ideas (la q.15)
> A. 1. Whether there are ideas?
• By ideas, what is meant is the forms of things, existing apart from themselves (e.g. a builder has
an ideas of a house before constructing it).
• Since the world was not made by chance but by God acting by His intellect, there must exist a
form to the likeness of which the world was made; in this the notion of an idea consists.
• ad 1: God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself (this would
imply potency in the divine intellect).
• ad 2: God’s essence is the operative principle of all things except Himself (since He is not
operable); thus His essence is like an idea with respect to other things, but not Himself.
• ad 3: The divine idea is identical with God’s essence, as known and is capable of participation
and imitation in various ways ad extra.
"r- K.2. Whether ideas are many?
• There cannot be any idea of a whole unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the
whole is made; thus the divine mind must possess proper ideas of all things.
• This plurality of ideas does not do violence to the divine simplicity, as God knows His essence
perfectly and according to every mode in which it can be known and participated in by His
creatures in some degree of likeness (plurality of ideas flowing from a simple and perfect
conception of Himself).
• ad 1: Ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same
essence.
A A.3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?
• An idea is twofold as it exists in the mind of God:
1. As an exemplar ', as the principle of the making of all things, each pertains to everything
made by God at any time.
2. As a type (ratio) ', as the principle of knowledge, it has respect to all things known by
God; as God has proper types of all things that He knows, He must possess ideas of all
these things.
• ad 1'. Evil has no type/ratio in God, since evil is known by way of the type of good.
• ad 2'. God does not possess ideas as exemplars of all things which will never be actual·, these
ideas are only types.
On truth (la q.16)
> A. 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
• Truth resides formally and primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things as they relate to the

intellect.
All things are measured by the divine intellect and divine ideas, and these measure our intellect,
which is said to be true insofar as it is in conformity with them.
• EXAMPLE: A stone is called true when it possesses the nature of a stone, according to
the perception of its nature in the divine intellect.
A.2. Whether the truth only resides in the intellect composing and dividing?
• Truth is defined as the conformity of the intellect to the thing, and to know this conformity is to
know truth.
• This conformity is achieved by the intellect composing and dividing, for with any
proposition, the intellect either applies or removes from the thing signified by the subject
some form signified by the predicate:
• EXAMPLE: The rock is hard. The intellect, apprehending what the word rock stands
for, applies the predicate hard to it, and determines that the statement is true, since
hardness is a quality of rocks (like the ones in my head).
A.3. Whether true and being are convertible terms?
• As good is convertible with being, considering being under the notion of desirability, so true is
convertible with being, considering the relation of being to the intellect (intelligibility)', thus
anything, to the degree it possesses being, is knowable.
• ad T. The true that is in things is convertible with being in regard to substance', the true that is in
the intellect is convertible with being in regard to relation between manifestation and
manifested.
• ad 3 : The true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also, since being
is included in the idea of the true (e.g., one can know who a person is, without knowing anything
about them outside of their name).
A.4. Whether the good is logically prior to the true?
• True and good differ logically, as what is in more things is prior logically; thus true is in more
things than the good (for not all things are desirable).
• Two considerations in this regard:
1. True is more closely related to being than good, for true regards being itself simply and
immediately.
2. Knowledge naturally precedes appetite', as true regards knowledge, it precedes good
which regards the appetitive consideration of desirability.
• ad T. In the order of things desirable, good is prior to the true, as true is considered under the
aspect of goodness.
• ad 2'. The intellect apprehends being, understands it, then desires it; thus being, truth, and
goodness follow in that order absolutely.
A. 5. Whether God is truth?
• God is truth itself because His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but is the very
subsistent act of His intellect (cannot get any closer than that).
• God’s act of understanding is the cause of every other being and intellect, which also points to
His being the supreme Truth in the ontological, logical, and moral orders.
A.6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
• Truth which is absolutely one is found only int the divine intellect since it is the measure of all
things; thus all things are true by one primary truth.
• There are many truths in the created intellect, corresponding to the number of things known,

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which are measured by the one truth found in the divine intellect.
> A. 7. Whether created truth is eternal?
• There are two aspects to consider in answer to this question:
1. Positively, eternal truth is proper to and found only in the uncreated divine Intellect,
which alone is eternal.
2. Negatively, some things are said to be of eternal truth because these abstract from both
place and time (e.g., the nature of a circle, mathematical truths (2+2=4)), but again, these
fall under the scope of the divine intellect which knows these necessary truths from
eternity.
• Thus all truths have their foundation in something eternal, that is, the First Truth which, as the
universal cause, contains within itself all truth.
> A.8. Whether truth is immutable?
• The truth of the divine intellect is immutable, whereas our intellect changes from truth to falsity
which occurs in two ways:
1. When a false opinion is arrived at about something which in itself has not changed (e.g.,
believing someone to have three hands when they only have two).
2. When the thing is changed, but not the opinion (e.g., believing a person to still be a baby
when he has reached mature adulthood).
• The truth of the divine intellect is according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is
altogether immutable;
this affirms the immutability of both the divine intellect and the
nature of things, which correspond to the divine ideas.
On Falsity (la q.17)
> A. 1. Whether falsity exists in things?
• Natural things, insofar as they exist, cannot be false since they are from God and in conformity
to the nature He created them.
• In relation to the created intellect, things can be called false in two ways:
1. Because they are signified by what is false.
2. Because of an incorrect resemblance to the truth (e.g., Brass is calledfalse-gold).
• ad 1: A thing compared to the intellect is said to be true with respect to what it is and false in
respect to what it is not.
• ad 3: Things cannot be false in respect to the divine intellect, or else these would be false simply,
which is impossible (God cannot make something that is false)', things are false relatively in
respect to the created intellect.
P A.2. Whether there is falsity in the senses?
• Falsity is not formally in the senses, since these do not compare one thing with another (which is
the job of the intellect).
• Accidentally, the senses can apprehend something as being unlike it truly is (by defective organ
or by an abnormal way in which the object is proposed to the faculty (e.g., distance, optical
illusions like a pencil sticking out of a glass of water that appears broken)).
> A. 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect?
• The intellect cannot be false in the simple apprehension of a thing, but in something consequent
upon it, i.e., in composition, division, or judgment, whereby something is attributed to a thing
that does not belong to it; this occurs in two ways:
1. Application to one thing the definition proper to another thing (e.g., A man has four sides
andfour right angles).

2. Composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive (e.g., A man is a
reasonable, four-footed animal).
A.4. Whether true andfalse are contraries?
• Truth and falsity are contraries, since both determine the subject and assert something about it
(whether correctly or incorrectly in respect to adequate or inadequate apprehension).
• ad 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; what is apprehended is the truth of the intellect
(wherein truth primarily resides); the false pertains to that which is not apprehended.
θη the life of God (la q.18)
A. 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
• Living things move themselves to their actions, which is contrary to lifeless things which must
be moved and drawn by another; hence not all natural things possess life (e.g., a rock).
A.2. Whether life is an operation?
• Life is substantial to living things (first actuality), manifested accidentally by vital operations
(second actuality).
• ad 2'. Vital operations pertain to those acts whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue
of which the operator produces such operations of itself.

> A.3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?
• A thing is said to live insofar as it operates of itself and not as moved by another; the more
perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life in that thing.
• Since God’s very act of understanding is His very nature which, in virtue of what it naturally
possesses, is not determined by another, He must have life in the most perfect degree, since His
intellect is always actual.
• It is also evident that since things have life, and God created these things, He too must have life,
and most fully, because He cannot bestow on creatures what He naturally would lack.
> A. 4. Whether all things are life in God?
• All things that proceed from God have their life in Him, according to the ideal being they have in
His act of understanding (in His divine idea); thus all things live in and through God.
• ad -k. Bad things are known by God by way of types of good things, and therefore do not possess
life as bad things, but on account of goodness which has been corrupted by the fault of the
subject.

On the will of God (la q.19)
> A. 1. Whether there is will in God?
• Since there is an intellect in God, so also must a will be attributed to Him; this is of faith, as Holy
Writ and Vatican I testify to this.
• Three difficulties and their solutions in regard to the divine will:
1. The object of the will is the end, but no end can be attributed to God.
• God is not His own end (as a cause cannot be its own end), but is the end with
respect to all things made by Him.
• For the divine goodness to be loved and made manifest is the reason for divine
volition, in the same sense that immutability is the reason for God’s eternity, and
immateriality the reason for His subsistent intellection; this makes the divine
goodness a virtual but not formal cause of the divine will.
2. The will is the appetitive faculty which is for something not possessed; this implies a lack

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of something (imperfection) which cannot be said of God.
• Will is said to be in God as having always good which is its object, since it is
identified with the divine essence; the will is not confined to seeking what it does
not possess but also to delighting in what it does already possess.
3. The will moves and is moved by the intellect, but God is the first cause of movement and
is unmoved.
• The created will is distinct from its objects and are related as moveable to mover;
in the divine will, however, both will and object are identified.
• Since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another but by itself
alone; moved here must be taken in the sense as understanding and willing are
said to be movement.
Whether God wills things apartfrom Himself?
Natural things have not only a natural inclination to acquire their proper good and to rest therein
when possessed, but also to diffuse their own good among others; thus it pertains to the will to
diffuse the good possessed.
If this occurs in natural things so far as they are capable, then supereminently does this apply to
the divine will, which communicates by likeness its own good to others.
• Thus God wills Himself to be and others to be, and wills Himself as the end and other
things as ordered towards that end.
ad 2\ God wills things apart from Himself for the sake of the end (divine goodness), but this does
not mean anything else moves His will except that divine goodness; thus He wills things apart
from Himself by willing His own goodness (as He understands things apart from Himself by
understanding His own essence).
Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
A thing is said to be necessary in two ways:
1. absolutely, this is determined from the relation of terms, as the predicate forms part of the
definition of the subject (e.g., Man is an animal), or if the subject forms part of the notion
of the predicate (e.g., A whole number is even or odd).
• In regard to this, the divine will has a necessary relation to divine goodness; thus
God necessarily and absolutely wills His goodness, which is not contingent upon
any other thing.
2. by supposition: a thing acquires the character of necessity in regard to something else
being supposed (e.g., IfI wish to become a certifiedpilot, going to flight school becomes
a necessity').
• In regard to God, willing things apart from Himself is not necessary absolutely.
• But supposing He wills something, it becomes necessary by supposition, since He
is unable to not will it (change His mind) since He is immutable.
ad 2·. God does not have to will things on account of His goodness, since His goodness can exist
without other things.
Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
God acts by His will and not by necessity of His nature, and this in three ways:
1. from the very order of active causes: God as the first Agent must act by the intellect and
will, by which all things are directed towards an end (whether known, as in the case of
rational beings, or unknown, as in the case of irrational or non-sentient) and given means
to reach it.
2. from the disposition of a natural agent. The nature of an act is in accord with the nature

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of an agent; thus if God acted by nature rather than by intellect and will, He would
produce an infinite effect in being which is impossible.
3. by the relation of effects to their cause: Effects proceed from the agent that causes them
insofar as they pre-exist in the agent; God’s being is His intellect and effects pre-exist in
Him after the mode of the intellect, which is the will, for it pertains to the will to put into
act whatever the intellect has conceived.
ad 3: Goodness is the object of the will, and thus God’s goodness is the reason for His willing all
things.
Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
There is no efficient cause of the divine will, that is, God does not will x on account of y, but
instead wisely wills x to be a means to y.
• The will follows from the intellect, and the divine intellect knows both principles and
conclusions in one intuitive act.
• Thus in God, the willing of the end is not the cause of another act, that is, the willing of
the means, for He understands the effect in the cause; to understand the cause is not the
cause of God’s understanding.
• EXAMPLE: God does not will the Incarnation on account of man’s salvation, but
He wills the Incarnation to be a means to man’s salvation.
ad 2\ God wills effects to proceed from the definite causes for preservation of order; thus it is not
unreasonable for Him to employ secondary causes for the fulfillment ofHis will, provided that
these are considered as dependent upon His will (this is where the Protestants go off track,
especially with their conception of grace).
Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
In the order of forms, although a thing may fall short of a particular form, it cannot fall short of a
universal form (e.g., Although a thing may not be a man, it nevertheless is a being).
Likewise, in the order of active causes, although something may fall short of a particular active
cause, it does not fall outside the order of universal cause; thus an effect can in no way escape
the order of universal cause (e.g., All men die; although Jonny survived the train wreck, he would
eventually die of old age).
• Since the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine
will not produce its effect; thus that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
order returns in another (e.g., Unrepentant lustful men will glorify God in hell on account
ofHis justice).
ad 1: God wills all men to be saved can be taken in three ways:
1. In a restricted sense, in that there is no man saved whose salvation is not willed by God
(St. Augustine).
2. A.s' applying to every class of individuals, but not every individual of each class.
3. As understood in the same sense of the antecedent will of God (St. John Damascene):
• Simpliciter, antecedent and consequent will cannot be applied to God, since this
would imply a composition and also a mutability of His will (this distinction must
be remembered!).
• Secundum quid, these can be applied in regard from the perspective of the things
willed:
In this sense, as a just judge antecedently wills all men to live but
consequently wills the guilty murderer executed, so God antecedently
wills the salvation of all, but consequently wills some damned on

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account of His justice.
• Thus what God wills simply takes place always but not always what He wills
antecedently.
A. 7. Whether the w ill of God is changeable ?
• The will of God is entirely unchangeable; the relation between the will and change must be
considered in two ways:
1. As to will that things be changed', it is possible to will a thing to be done now and its
contrary later, while the will remains permanently the same; this is possible in God (refer
to ad 1 below).
2. As to change the will·, one begins to will what one has not willed previously, and this
happens by change in the knowledge or disposition of substance of the one willing; this is
impossible in God, as His substance and knowledge are entirely immutable.
• ad 1: God’s words of repenting (Gen 6:7) are to be understood metaphorically; as repenting is
taken in the sense of destroying what one has made, so one can make a thing while at the same
time intending to destroy it later with no change in the will; thus God foresaw the sins which He
decreed would be punished.
• ad 2: God can will something to be conditioned without changing His will; thus since Ninevah
repented, it did not receive what would have come to it had it remained in sin.
A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
• The divine will is perfectly efficacious; thus all things are done that God wills and in the manner
that He wills them.
• God has freely arranged that some effects be brought about by necessary causes and other
effects by contingent causes.
• God can thus will certain effects to happen contingently; since God wills things
contingently, they happen as such and not because of a proximate contingent cause in
itself.
A.9. Whether God wills evils?
• God wills no good more than His own goodness, but He can also will one good more than
another.
• God does not will the evil of sin which is the privation of right order towards the divine good;
however, He can will evil ofnatural defect or punishment by willing the good to which such
evils are attached, such as justice (in the case of punishment) and the preservation of the natural
order (in the case of corruption).
• ad 1: Evil is only accidentally ordered towards good; that which is good is not the evil which
God permits, but God’s holy permission.
A. 10. Whether God has fi-ee will?
• God necessarily wills His own goodness; but it is evident that He does not will other things
necessarily; thus, He possesses free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
A. 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
• Certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically because of a likeness of a
certain effect (e.g., Anger is attributed to God when He punishes).
• What is usually with us an expression of will is sometimes metaphorically called will in God
(e.g., a divine precept is called God’s will).
• Will in its proper sense is called will ofgood pleasure and will taken metaphorically is the will of
expression.
A. 12. Whether five expressions of the will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

Since there are five ways which the will of man makes itself known, the five are denominated
with regard to the divine will as an expression of that will; hence precept, counsel, prohibition,
permission, and operation can be said of the divine will in relation to man.

On God’s Love (la q.20)
> A. 1. Whether love exists in God?
• Love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty, regarding good
universally, whether possessed or not; thus all appetitive movements presuppose love as their
root and origin.
• Since will is formally in God, love must formally be in Him:
• As love is nothing else but the inclination to the good not yet had or complacency in the
possessed good (which is the case of God), it is manifest that love formally and eminently
exists in God.
• ad 7: Love in God pertains to an act of the intellective appetite (will) and cannot be said to be a
passion.
> A. 2. Whether God loves all things?
• All existing things, insofar as they exist are good, since existence itself is a good along with any
perfection a thing possesses.
• To love anything is to will the good for that thing; since God wills at least the good of existence
to all things that are, were, or will be, God properly loves all existing things.
• ad 3: God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship, but only with love of
desire by which they are ordered to rational creatures and to Himself, He does not need them,
but loves them on account of His goodness and the services that they render to man according to
their nature.
• ad 4\ The same thing can be loved in one aspect and hated in another; in this way God loves
sinners in so far as they possess existence, and hates them insofar as they fall short of good on
account sin.
> A.3. Whether God loves all things equally?
• A thing may be loved more or less in two ways:
1. on the part of the act of the will itself In this way God loves all things equally because
He loves all things by an act of the will which is one, simple, and always the same.
2. on the part of the good itself which is willedfor the beloved. In this way God loves some
things more in accordance with the degree of good He wills for it; this is evident in that
some things are better than others in the order of creation (and also in the order of grace).
• ad 7: God has equal care of all because He administers all things with a like wisdom and
goodness.
A.4. Whether God always loves more the better things?
• Everything loves what is like it; since God’s will is the cause of goodness in things, it is evident
that He loves more the better things because of the greater goodness He bestows on them.
• ad 7: Christ is loved more by God than the entire created universe; His excellence did not
diminish due to the death He was delivered up to, but it was, in fact, increased because by it
Christ became a glorious conqueror.
• ad 2\ God did not become Incarnate because He loved man more, absolutely speaking, but
because the needs of man were greater.

On the justice and mercy of God (la q.21)

y A. 1. Whether there is justice in God?
• Two kinds of justice are discussed with reference to God:
1. commutative ', directs exchange and intercourse of business among equals; this kind of
justice is not attributable to God.
2. distributive', pertains to a ruler/steward giving to each what his rank deserves; this applies
most perfectly to God, for it is evident that He gives to all existing things what is proper
to the condition of each, preserving the nature of each with the powers that properly
belong to it.
• ad 1: Moral virtues that apply to the passions (e.g., temperance) are said metaphorically of God,
while the moral virtues that apply to the will (e.g., justice, magnificence, liberality) can properly
be said of God.
• ad 3: All things are directed to God, as He is not directed to other things.
• It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom
require, and what manifests His goodness.
• It is due to a created thing that it possess what is ordered to it, but this in no way makes
God a debtor, but the creature, for its nature and what is required of it is ordered to God.
r Κ.Ί. Whether the justice of God is truth?
• Since the divine intellect is the rule and measure of things, the truth of these things consists in
their conformity to the divine intellect.
• As our works are called just in virtue of their conformity to the divine law, God’s justice
established things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His
justice; thus God’s justice is fittingly called truth.
> A. 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God?
• Mercy is attributed to God in effect, but not as an affection of passion.
• One who is merciful seeks to dispel the misery of another (removal of defects), and this is
properly attributed to God, not by way of sorrow, but by His will.
• Defects are removed by the bestowing of a perfection one has upon another, and this act is done
in four ways when attributed to God:
1. absolutely, pertains to God’s goodness.
2. proportionally, pertains to God’s justice.
3. gratuitously, pertains to God’s liberality, since He bestows His perfections upon others
not for His use.
4. directly, this pertains to mercy properly, and in this way is God said to be merciful.
• ad 2'. God’s mercy does not destroy justice, but adds to it for by His mercy the order of justice is
restored (e.g., the Incarnation).
r A.4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy andjustice?
• Whatever is done by God in created things is done according to the proper order and proportion
wherein consists the idea of justice; thus justice must exist in all of God’s works.
• Divine justice is founded upon mercy, and presupposes the work of mercy:
• God out of the abundance of His goodness bestows upon rational creatures what is due to
them more bountifully than is proportionate to their natural needs (that is, the order of
justice demands less than what the divine goodness actually does confer).
• Thus anything due to creatures is dependent solely upon the goodness of the divine will
that has gratuitously created and ordained us to a supernatural end, and hence all of God’s
works have mercy as the primary source.

On the providence of God (la q.22)
"r A. 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?
• The order that governs existing (created) things is itself a created good; as God is its cause, every
effect must pre-exist in Him (since His intellect comprehends cause and effect simultaneously).
• The order of things towards their end must therefore pre-exist in God (as effect to cause)
and this is properly called providence.
• ad 1: Prudence and providence belong to God in the manner that He issues a command towards
the ordering of things towards an end by use of right reason.
• ad 2: God’s providence is the reason of order, which is eternal, whereas divine government,
which is the execution of the order, is predicated of God in time, wince it implies a relation to
already existing things.
> A. 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?
• Since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
causality of the first agent extends (e.g., A contractor effects the building of a house to its
completion, overlooking all types ofwork needed to be done).
• The causality of God (the First Agent) extends to all things down to particulars and last details;
thus inasmuch as all things exist, they must (as an effect from the agent acting towards an end)
must be subject to God’s ordering or providence.
• ad 7: Nothing can escape the order of universal cause, although it can escape the order of
particular cause; hence no effect takes place not intended by the universal cause.
• ad 2'. God provides universally for all being and thus it belongs to His providence to permit
certain defects in particular effects to effect the universal good.
• Evil is permitted by God insofar as the perfect good of the universe is brought about (e.g.,
There would be no patience of martyrs if there was no tyrannical persecution).
• ad 4'. Man is said to have been left to himself (Ecclus 15:14), not as being exempt from divine
providence, but in virtue of his free will by which he can make a choice and take counsel.
• Since God is the cause of free will, however, it follows that everything happening from
the exercise of free will is subject to the providence of God and does not escape His
universal causality.
> A. 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything?
• Two things belong to providence:
1. order of things foreordained towards an end'. In this regard, God has immediate
providence over everything, because His intellect contains the types of all things,
providing them with the causality to produce certain effects.
2. the execution of the order (government)'. God’s providence is more remote in certain
aspects to this regard, as He imparts the dignity of secondary causality to His creatures by
which His providence is carried out (e.g., Marriage is the institution by which God
perpetuates the human race).
• ad2'. Secondary causes must fall under God’s immediate provision, since they themselves are
effects of the primary cause.
> A. 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?
• As it is in the nature of some things (as determined by God) to be contingent, if God imposed
necessity on such things it would destroy their contingency.
• After divine goodness, the principal goodness in things themselves consists in the perfection of

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the universe; for this, divine providence produces every grade of being.
• As this is the case, it follows that being can be either of necessity or contingency (as
specified by their causes); hence providence does not impose necessity on all things.
ad 2'. The fact that some things are ordained to happen contingently does not mean that divine
providence changes, such that all things happen as foreseen, whether by necessity or
contingently.
ad 3: Because divine providence is unchangeable does not render our prayers useless, but is the
very reason why we should pray: For we pray, not that we may change the divine disposition,
but that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, (cf Ilallae q. 83 a.2)

On Predestination (la q.23)
A.l. Whether men are predestined by God?
• It belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, and this has a twofold consideration:

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1. end proportionate to created nature, which can be attained by the power of a thing.
2. end which exceeds all proportion andfaculties of created nature,', this pertains to eternal
life for the rational creature.
• Since it is obvious that a thing cannot attain to something beyond its capabilities,
it must be directed by another (e.g., an arrow directed by an archer to the target)',
hence a rational creature must be directed and led by God towards eternal
happiness.
• This type of ordering in the divine mind by which a rational creature is brought to
its supernatural end is called predestination, as the type pre-exists in the divine
mind before being effected to destine (direct) something to the end.
ad 2'. It is improper to attribute predestination to irrational creatures, as these are not capable of
attaining eternal life (sorry EP A).
Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?
Predestination is a part of providence; as providence is not anything in the things provided for
but is a type in the mind of the provider, so is the case with predestination (e.g., the ordering
belongs to the provider, not to the one being provided for).
The execution of the order predestined is active in the provider (God), and is passive in us.
ad 4'. Predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object;
grace does not belong to the essence of predestination.
Whether God reprobates any man?
It belongs to God’s providence, as the universal provider, to permit (for the general good of the
universe) the failure among defectible things that are subjected to His providence.
• It is evident that intellectual creatures are of their nature defectible; thus it belongs to
God’s providence to permit that some through their own fault fail to attain their end, and
to inflict the penalty of damnation for their sin.
• In this way some are reprobated, as it includes the will to permit one to fall into sin and
impose the punishment of damnation for it.
ad 1'. God wills eternal life to all antecedently, but not consequently or efficaciously (since it can
be lost by the fault of the subject); hence this excludes any case for God positively decreeing to
exclude someone from eternal salvation.
ad 2: Reprobation is the cause of abandonment by God, that is, after sin and on account of it.
Whether the predestined are chosen by God?
Predestination supposes election in the order of reason, which presupposes love; nothing is

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directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists.
• The ordering of election and love differ between man and God, however:
• Regarding man, the will is incited to love by the good which already exists, and
therefore we choose someone to love; thus in man, election precedes love.
• Regarding God, love precedes election, for His will (by which in loving He
wishes good to someone) is the cause of that good possessed by some in
preference to others; thus God wills the good of eternal life by His love, and by
His election wills this good to some in preference to others.
ad 1: If the communication of divine goodness is considered in general, God communicates His
goodness without election; if such communication be considered specifically to a particular
good, He does so by election.
ad 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will. (la
q.19 a.6 ad 2)
Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause ofpredestination?
There is no distinction between what flows from free will and what is of predestination, just as
there is no distinction between what flows from secondary cause and what flows from a first
cause (in both cases, the former is included in the latter).
God’s providence produces effects through secondary causes; hence the effects of predestination
must be considered in two ways:
1. in particular ·. There is no reason why one effect of predestination cannot be the reason or
cause of another effect.
• Considered from another angle, the subsequent effect is the reason (final cause) of
the previous effect; the previous effect is the meritorious cause of the subsequent.
• Concretely, glory is the final cause of merits, and merits dispose one to the
attainment of glory; hence God preordained to give glory (final cause) on account
of merit andpreordained to give grace (meritorious cause) to merit glory (final
cause).
• Thus foreknowledge of merit is not the cause of predestination, but the grace
willed by God by which one is predestined to achieve eternal life.
2. in general'. It is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination should have any
cause as coming from us, since whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation
(i.e., grace) is all included under the effect of predestination.
ad 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general; in
particular effects, one effect is the reason of another.
ad 3: Two conclusions are drawn from this article:
1. God made all things in order to manifest His goodness, which must be done in many
ways since created things cannot attain to the simplicity’ of God.
• God’s goodness, inasmuch as it is self-diffusive, is the foundation for His mercy;
inasmuch as He has the indisputable right to be loved above all things, constitutes
the foundation for His justice.
• Hence God’s goodness is manifested in His mercy by predestining some to eternal
life; in His justice by reprobating some to punishment (by their own fault).
2. Why God chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except by the
mystery of the divine will.
• It depends on the simple will of God what particular part of matter is under form

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of earth, body, etc., just like the will of the artificer determines which of two
identical stones is put in the lower part of the wall and which in the higher part.
• Hence the degrees of goodness found in men is not theirs in their own right; since
God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, one thing would not be better than
another if God did not will so.
Whether predestination is certain?
Not all things subject to providence (of which predestination is a part) happen of necessity, since
some things God orders to be contingent.
However, the order that God assigns (necessary and contingent effects) by His will is certain and
predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; hence divine knowledge and will do not
destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible (thus free
will is preserved).
Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
God alone possesses certain and formal knowledge of the number of the elect, since every agent
intends to make something finite; whoever intends some definite measure in effect thinks out
some definite number in the essential parts, which are required for the perfection of the whole.
ad 3: Absolutely speaking, the number of the elect is very great, as testified to in Apoc. 7:4; in
comparison with the number of the reprobate, in the opinion of Aquinas and Augustine, the
number of elect is small, since the good that exceeds the common state of nature is found in the
minority rather than the majority.
Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
No one is predestined by the prayers of the saints, since predestination depends solely on God’s
good pleasure.
However, the prayers of the saints can obtain certain effects of predestination; and thus whatever
helps that person towards salvation falls under the order ofpredestination, whether it is one’s
own prayers or those of others
Thus the saints, by praying for others, are God’s assistants.

On the book of life (la q.24)
> A. 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
• In Holy Writ, the book of life is a metaphorical expression for the knowledge of God by which
He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life.
• ad 4'. Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing; the latter implies
the knowledge of predestination.
> A. 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life ofglory of the predestined?
• Predestination does not regard the life of grace except so far as it is directed to glory; hence those
who have grace, but through their own fault fail to obtain glory do not fall under predestination,
and thus are not included in the book of life.
> A.3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
• Those who are ordained by grace to eternal life but fail to reach it by their own fault are said to
be blotted out of the book of life.
• This blotting out is not referred to God as if He foreknew a thing and afterwards knew it not, but
is referred to the thing known, because God knows one to be first ordained to eternal life and
then to lose it by sin.
On the power of God (la q.25)

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>

>

>

A. 1. Whether there is power in God?
• Power is twofold:
1. Passive', not possible in God, as He is not capable of being acted upon, a this would
imply potentiality.
2. Active', this is applicable to God in the highest degree, since He is pure Act, simply and in
all ways perfect.
• ad 2'. God’s action ad extra is formally immanent and virtually transitive inasmuch as it produces
an effect.
• ad 3: God’s active power is the principle of effect ad extra, but not as it is a principle of God’s
action, for God’s action is His essence.
• ad 4'. God’s power differs logically from His knowledge and will, but is not really distinct from
them, in that the consideration of the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of
His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
A.2. Whether the power of God is infinite?
• The more perfect an agent has the form by which it acts, the greater is its power to act (e.g., The
hotter something is, the greater capacity it has to heat something else).
• God’s essence, by which He acts, is infinite, and thus His power must be infinitely perfect.
• ad 2'. Since God is not a univocal agent (that is, nothing agrees with Him in genus or species),
His effect is always less than His power.
• Nevertheless, God’s infinite power is manifested in the mode of producing things
inasmuch as He produces something out of nothing, or from no presupposed subject.
• Nor is God bound to produce any effect to render His power effectual, since a thing is
said to be ineffectual if it fails to attain the end it is ordered towards; God’s power is not
ordained towards and end, but rather is the end of the effects produced by it.
A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?
• God’s power falls under the domain of the possible since only something possible can be
reduced to act; hence since all being comes from God (as His essence possesses all perfection of
being), it is evident that His power extends to all things, by which He is called Almighty or
Omnipotent.
• ad 1: God is omnipotent in regards to His active power; the fact that He is immovable or
impassible does not do any violence to His omnipotence.
• ad 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; any such act is repugnant to omnipotence.
• ad 3: God’s mercy is the foundation of all divine works, since nothing is due to anyone save on
account of something already given him gratis by God.
• ad 4'. The wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature it judges
to be impossible to God.
A.4. Whether God can make the past not to have been?
• Anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under the realm of God’s omnipotence;
making the past not to have been implies a contradiction and falls outside of the possible, and
thus out of God’s omnipotence.
• ad 2'. Things that were one time in the realm of possibility but no longer are, were one time
within the power of God and no longer are (e.g., It was possible for a soul to acquire merit while
still on earth, but after its death it can no longer do so).
A. 5. Whether God can do what He does not?
• The whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end.

•

•

•
'r- A.6.
•

•
•

The manifestation of divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportions things created;
thus the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events
could happen.
ad 1: whatever is not in itself a contradiction in terms is absolutely possible and thus possible by
God’s power.
• However, God’s power is ordained by His wisdom, so He does not do things contrary to
it although it is within His ability (e.g., creation of a rational soul in hell, annihilation of a
soul or an angel).
ad 3: although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, it is well
within God’s power to do other things and impose upon them another order.
Whether God can do better than what He does?
There are three points to consider in response to the question:
1. God cannot make a thing essentially better than itself, since the specific difference by
which it is constituted in its essence does not admit of increase or decrease (e.g., God
cannot make the number four greater than it is).
2. God can make things He has made better accidentally, such as making a man wiser or
more virtuous.
3. Absolutely speaking, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him
(e.g., He can create a more perfect angel).
ad Γ. God cannot make things better, if better is taken as an adverb implying the manner of
making; thus God cannot make things from greater wisdom or knowledge.
ad 4\ Christ’s humanity and the Blessed Mother possess a certain dignity from the infinite good
in virtue of the hypostatic order; hence nothing can exceed these dignities because there cannot
be anything better than God.

On the divine beatitude (la q.26)
> A. 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God?
• Beatitude pertains to the perfect good of an intellectual nature, which is capable of knowing that
it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses and has control of its actions; hence
intellectual agents know the end, and not merely the thing which is the end, and are thus capable
of possessing the end.
• Beatitude therefore applies most perfectly to God, since He is the most perfect being possessing
the highest degree of intelligence; thus God possesses the supreme good with perfect
intelligence.
• ad 2·. As God has being, though not begotten, so He has beatitude, although not acquired by
merit.
> A.2. Whether God is called blessed in respect to His intellect?
• Beatitude is the perfect good of an intellectual nature.
• That which is most perfect in an intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which
in some sense it grasps all things.
• Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding.
• In God, to be and to understand is one and the same thing, and thus God adequately
comprehends Himself and understands all things in Himself as the cause; hence beatitude must
be assigned to God in respect to His intellect.
> A.3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

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•
> A. 4.
•

•

•

God is objectively the beatitude if all the blessed; everyone is blessed by the sole fact that he
understands God.
God is not formally their beatitude, since this consists in the Beatific Vision which admits of
different degrees.
Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?
Whatever is desirable in whatever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a
more eminent degree in the divine beatitude.
As to contemplative happiness, God possess a continual and most certain contemplation of
Himself and of all things else; as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole
universe.
ad 1: A particular kind of beatitude is regarded as false according to the degree which it falls
short of the idea of true beatitude; thus it is not in God in this way.
• However, whatever semblance it may possess to the true beatitude, the whole of it pre­
exists in the divine beatitude.

Nisi Dominus aedificaverit domum, in vanum laboraverunt qui aedificant eum.
Sit nomen Domini benedictum in saecula. Arnen.

TRACTUS DE DEO UNO

A complied outline in accordance with the tract as laid out in the
Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas
la qq. 2-26
with commentary and explanations taken from the dogmatic treatise
The One Godby Rev. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.

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Quid retribuam Domino pro omnibus quae retribuit mihi?
A.D. MMI