BEATITUDE
A Commentary on St. Thomas' Theological

Summa, la Ilae, qq.1-54

By

R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P.
Translated by

PATRICK CUMMINS, O.S.B.
Monk of Conception Abbey

bibliotheca
fraternitas Sacerdotalis Sancti Tetri

B. HERDER BOOK GO.

z5 & 17 South Broadway, St. Louis 2, Mo.
and 33 Queen Square, London,

W. C.

This work is a translation of De Beatitudine, de actibus humanis
et habitibus by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., published by
Roberto Berruti & Co., Torino, Italy.

IMPRIMI POTEST

►p Stephen Schappler, O.S.B.
Abbot, Conception Abbey

IMPRIMATUR

►p Joseph E. Ritter, S.T.D.

Archbishop of St. Louis

November 4, 1955

Copyright © 1956 by B. Herder Book Co.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 56-9440

Printed in the United States of America
by Vail-Ballou Press, Binghamton, New York

CONTENTS
Introduction

I
II
III
IV

Nature of Moral Theology
Divisions of Moral Theology
Ethical Systems
The Four Chief Systems

3
9
«6
20

First Part: The Ultimate Goal
V The Ultimate Goal in General
VI Man’s Objective Beatitude
VII Man’s Subjective Beatitude
VIII Characteristics of Beatitude
IX Attaining Beatitude

33
64
82
108
120

Second Part: Human Acts
X Voluntary and Involuntary
XI Circumstances
XII Will and Its Object
XIII Will and Its Motives
XIV How is the Will Moved?
XV Other Acts of the Will

133
167
172
180
201
241

Third Part: Morality of Human Acts
XVI
XVII
XVIII

Sources of Good and Evil
Good and Evil in Interior Acts
Good and Evil in Exterior Acts
V

257
284
299

vi

CONTENTS

Fourth Part: Conscience
XIX
XX
XXI

Definition and Division
Dubious Conscience
Conscience and Probability

305
314
319

Fifth Part: The Passions
XXII The Passions in General
XXIII The Passions in Particular

327
330

Sixth Part: Habits
XXIV
XXV
XXVI
XXVII
XXVIII
XXIX

Habits in their Essence
Habits in their Subjects
The Source of Habits
The Growth of Habits
Corruption and Diminution of Habits
Habits, How Distinguished

33g
343
34g
357
367
a72

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
The Nature

of

Moral Theology

The second part of the Summa begins with a prologue which

outlines the purpose and scope of what is now called moral
theology. Hence we dwell here, first on the nature of moral
theology, and secondly on its divisions.
The word “image” (in the phrase “image of God”) signifies
man as endowed with intellect, free will, and self-mastery.
1 lence, having treated of God, who is man’s exemplar, we now
proceed to consider God’s image, man, namely, who is the
source of his own deeds, since he has free will and mastery of
self.1
What a sublime conception of moral theology! God’s lib­
erty in creation is the prototype of man’s free activities.
In the first part of the Summa, the Saint, treating of God’s
creatures, had shown how man is the imperfect image of
God, since, like God, man can know and love himself, thus
representing not only the divine nature, but also the divine
Trinity. Now he proceeds to show that man is God’s image,
not only by his higher faculties, but also in his free activities,
whereby he knows and loves not only himself, but also God,
as God knows and loves Himself. This knowledge and love are
indeed the final goal of all human life. But even here on earth
i saint differs from his fellows by that love wherewith he loves
not only himself, but God. From this sublime viewpoint
moral theology is the science of imitating God. It produces a
more and more perfect likeness of man to God. And this like­
ness would be man's goal even if God had not become man.
1 Q 93·

3

BEATITUDE

4

But how much more perfect is this likeness when imitation of
God has become imitation of Christi
A more scholastic description of moral theology can be
found in the first part: 1 “Although theology is more specula­
tive than practical, it is nevertheless practical, in its treatment
of human acts, by which man is led to perfect knowledge of
God wherein lies eternal blessedness." Again, in the second
question, outlining the entire Summa, he says: “We will speak
first of God, secondly of man’s journey to God, thirdly of
Christ who, as man, is our road to God."
Thus moral theology may be defined as that part of theol­
ogy which, guided by revelation, studies human acts as the
road to man’s supernatural goal. Or, more briefly: a theolog­
ical treatise which guides human acts to man’s supernatural
goal.
Moral theology, then, stands on a higher level than natural
ethics. Natural ethics guides man to his last natural goal,
which consists, not in the beatific vision and supernatural
love, but in the knowledge, perfect but abstract, of God as
the author of nature, and in the consequent natural love of
God above all else. Ethics, properly speaking, does not deal
with man as the image of the triune God. In the definition
given above, many theologians avoid the phrase “that part of
theology,” substituting for it “that branch of knowledge.”
Hence arises the following question: Does moral theology
differ specifically from dogmatic theology?
The distinction of moral and dogma became distinct in the
Summa. But some later theologians, Vasquez, for example,
maintained that moral and dogma are not two parts of one
science, but two distinct sciences. In line with this tendency,
moral theology, ignoring dogmatic questions (e.g., grace,
merit, the nature of infused virtue), often became a casuistic
treatise. In our view, casuistry is but an inferior exemplifica­
tion, just as asceticism and mysticism are superior exemplifica­
tions, of moral theology.
2Q.1, a.4.

NATURE OF MORAL THEOLOGY

5

Are dogma and moral two distinct branches of knowledge?
To this question our answer must be negative: theology is one
science, not many. The proof follows.
Scientific unity arises from unity in subject matter and
viewpoint. Now all things discussed in theology belong to one
and the same subject matter, God, and are approached from
one and the same viewpoint, revelation. When theology does
speak of creatures, it speaks of them only in their relation to
God, and draws its conclusions from the viewpoint of revela­
tion.
St. Thomas writes: Sacred doctrine remaining one, includes
the subject matter of all philosophic sciences, because it sees
them under the light of its own viewpoint. Hence, whereas
one philosophic science is speculative and another practical,
sacred doctrine is both speculative and practical, just as God,
by one and the same act, knows both Himself and His works.
But theology, since it treats principally of God and only sec­
ondarily of human acts, is more speculative than practical. It
deals with human acts as leading to that perfect knowledge of
God which is eternal blessedness.8
Dogma and moral, then, are but two parts, two branches, of
one and the same science. In each, under one and the same
light of revelation, the viewpoint is God: God either in Him­
self, or as efficient and exemplary source, or lastly, as the end,
purpose, and goal of our life.
Now God as God, as Deity, is an object higher than that
reality which is the object of metaphysics, higher than moral
good which is the object of ethics. Here appears the wonderful
hierarchy of knowledge: division below, unity on high. The­
ology, imprinted on the created mind by God, rises on high
above philosophy and history, and is subordinated only to the
uncreated mind of God.
It follows, then, that to consider dogma and moral as two
sciences is to ignore the sublimity and simplicity of moral
theology. Separated from dogma, reduced to casuistry, under
• la, q. 1, a. 4.

6

BEATITUDE

a kind of materialistic and statistic tendency, moral theology
loses its native elevation and dignity.
Here follow two corollaries. First corollary. Physical science
has many integral parts: mechanics, hydrostatics, hydrody­
namics, acoustics, optics, thermodynamics. Theology, too, re­
mains one science, notwithstanding the distinctions, that
between positive theology and systematic theology, and that
between dogmatic theology and moral theology.
Positive theology has three integral parts:
a) biblical, which assembles truths revealed in Holy Scrip­
ture;
b) patristic, which expounds the teaching of the Holy
Fathers;
c) symbolic, which examines ecclesiastical creeds, defini­
tions, and declarations.
Systematic theology has two integral parts:
a) dogmatic, which discourses on the articles of faith: God,
creation, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the sacraments,
the four last things;
b) moral, which deals with human acts in relation to man’s
supernatural goal. Mystical theology, and ascetical, and cas­
uistic, are subdivisions of moral theology. Here a brief word
on this distinction.
Moral theology is concerned with the laws of Christian life,
with the virtues, gifts, and sin. But it deals with universal
principles and does not, as does prudence, descend to particu­
lar applications.
Casuistic theology solves questions of conscience, and dis­
tinguishes degrees of obligation. Its tendency is negative, the
avoidance of sin, rather than positive, the cultivation of vir­
tue. It is not really distinguished from prudence, since pru­
dence is the source of a correct and secure conscience.
Ascetical theology teaches the road of Christian perfection
in its beginning and progress, by laying down practical rules
toward active purification and advance in virtue.
Mystical theology shows how the soul may reach the unitive

NATURE OF MORAL THEOLOGY

7

life, by passive purification and contemplation. Secondarily it
treats also of extraordinary contemplative graces. On this
mystical level, moral theology merges with dogma, with Scrip­
ture and tradition, with the Word of God, whence all theology
proceeds. Beginning and end coincide. The circle is closed.
Unity is preserved.
Second corollary. Deep knowledge of moral and mystical
theology presupposes deep knowledge of dogmatic theology,
on predestination, say, and on grace. Specialization does
indeed have its place, particularly in the lower sciences,
mathematics, say, in physics, and biology. But specialization
can be perilous in that highest science which is one and in­
divisible.
A doubt may here arise. Why does St. Thomas place moral
theology (his second part) between his two dogmatic parts
(first and third)? Why, in particular, does he place it before
the treatise on the Redemption and the Incarnation? Would
it not be better to treat all dogmatic questions first? Should
not theology teach imitation, not of God only, but also of
Christ?
To this difficulty, two answers:
1. The Incarnation presupposes not only the creation of
man, but also the relation of man to God as man’s supernat­
ural goal. Even if God had not decreed the Incarnation, the
moral law would still exist. God, without decreeing the In­
carnation, could have created angels and men in the state of
grace, in the supernatural order. The moral law, natural and
supernatural, arises necessarily from nature elevated by grace.
These indestructible moral truths, on the final goal, on hu­
man acts, on grace and infused virtue, on sin—these truths are
presuppositions of Redemption from sin.
2. Further, when you speak of the virtues in Christ, you
must first know the nature of virtue. Thus the Master of the
Sentences, since he has no explicit moral treatise, has to deal
by occasion with the virtues when writing on Christ. Hence
we need not wonder that St. Thomas, proceeding specula-

8

BEATITUDE

lively, distinguishes three parts: first, God; second, the ra­
tional creature’s movement to God; third, Christ, who, as
man, is our road to God. But St. Thomas, too, in treating
the sacrament of penance, deals with the virtue of penance,
with grace as specifically Christian, with carrying the cross in
penitential spirit. Thus he shows again that dogma and moral
are not two sciences, but one. Yet in practice it is good to ex­
pound dogma entirely before beginning moral.

CHAPTER II
Divisions of Moral Theology

The first division is that between a) moral in general (I—II),

and b) moral in particular (II—II). Why this distinction? “The
goal determines the road.” The final goal, first in intention
though last in attainment, must be treated before we study the
roads that lead to that end. Thus there arise four chief divi­
sions:
A. The final goal:
1. the final goal in general;
2. blessedness, i.e., attainment of the goal.
B. Human acts in themselves:
1. those characteristic of man
a) generically (voluntary and involuntary; circum­
stances);
b) specifically, (i) in relation to the goal (to will, to
intend, to enjoy); (2) as to means employed (to consent, to
choose, to command, to use); (3) in relation to morality.
2. those common to man and beast, i.e., the passions
a) generically (their subject, their differences, their
good and evil, their order of succession);
b) specifically, as found in the concupiscible passions
(love, hate, desire, joy, aversion, sadness) and in the irascible
[lassions (hope, despair, fear, audacity, anger).
C. Sources of human acts:
1. intrinsic sources (habits in general, virtues and gifts,
vices and sins);
2. extrinsic principles
a) God, by His Law (law in general, natural law, the
Old Law, the New Law);
9

ΙΟ

BEATITUDE

b) God, by grace (its necessity, essence and divisions;
its cause; its effects).
D. Human acts in particular:
1. theological virtues and correlative gifts;
2. cardinal virtues and correlative virtues and gifts;
3. states of life, state of perfection, charismatic graces.
This distribution is marked by perfect and progressive order.
This division is contrasted with that of previous authors and
with that of subsequent authors.
The chief Scriptural sources of moral theology are (a) the
Decalogue, (b) the Sermon on the Mount. In this sermon
Jesus proclaims, in all its sublimity, the New Law of love
which fulfills the Old Law of fear. The New Law penetrates
into man's interior, eschews even internal sins, commends
purity of intention, urges imitation of God: Be ye perfect as
your heavenly Father is perfect. Not perfect like the angels,
but perfect like God, since men have received participation,
not in angelic nature, but in divine nature.1
Patristic sources of moral theology are found, first, in com­
mentaries on the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, the
Gospels, and the epistles of St. Paul; secondly, in special
treatises on particular duties and virtues; thirdly, in oratorical
and ascetic exhortations on the full round of Christian mo­
rality. To illustrate. Clement of Alexandria; Tertullian (too
rigid, does not clearly distinguish precepts from counsels); St.
Cyprian and Lactantius; the Cappadocians; St. Ambrose (his
De Officiis, suggested by a Ciceronian title, but moving on a
higher level); St. Augustine (on the theological virtues, on
chastity and matrimony). Last, not least, St. Gregory the
Great, who, in his commentary (not scholastic, but allegorical)
on the book of Job, gave to medieval ascetics a full treatise of
moral theology.
The first scholastic treatise is that of St. John Damascene,
who wrote the first Summa. Its three parts are:
1 la-IIae, q. 107.

DIVISIONS OF MORAL THEOLOGY

11

1. a philosophical introduction (findings of the pagans);
2. heresies (a general exposition);
3. the orthodox faith, in three subdivisions: first, on God;
second, on creatures; third, on Christ and His sacraments.
The emphasis throughout is on dogma. Moral questions are
treated as occasion offers.
Peter the Lombard, whose Sentences remained the text­
book until the sixteenth century, follows the third division of
St. John Damascene. Peter’s general division, differing no­
tably from that of St. Thomas, seems to be based on the hu­
man will, and thus to be a division of moral theology. Yet, in
fact, he assigns no special part for moral questions, intermin­
gling them with dogmatic questions.
His general division, based on two acts of the will, namely,
to use and to enjoy, has three chief parts: (a) things to be en­
joyed (God, One and Triune); (b) things to be used (creatures
as means to attain the vision of God; (c) things to be both
enjoyed and used (the humanity of Christ, the sacraments, the
angels and the saints).
The chief moral questions he discusses are found, first, in
his treatise on the first man, where he dwells on grace, on sin,
on virtue and merit, on the acts of the will. Secondly, in his
treatise on Christ, where he dwells on faith, hope, and charity,
on the cardinal virtues, on the seven gifts, on the Ten Com­
mandments, on lying and perjury, on the Old Law and the
New. Thirdly, in his treatise on the sacraments, where he
discourses on heaven, purgatory, and hell.
Alexander of Hales, who retains Peter’s division and
method, shows progress beyond his master, but is still very
imperfect.
The innovation introduced by St. Thomas is twofold. First
he treats of God in Himself, God as the first reality, God in
three persons, God as Creator, before he turns to consider
God as the goal that is good and draws man to Himself. “Real­
ity comes before goodness.” Goodness is founded on reality, is

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BEATITUDE

a characteristic of reality. Goodness is reality, reality is perfect
and desirable. Goodness is counterfeit unless it is founded on
genuine reality.
Secondly St. Thomas assigns a second and special part to
moral, and treats this part scientifically, not oratorically. Thus
he lays a solid foundation for casuistry, for ascetic and mystic
theology, proceeding systematically from the universal to the
particular.
Historians, then, are right when they say that St. Thomas
was the first who systematized ethics, individual and social.
See as illustration his treatment of justice, and of prudence,
political, economic, and military. His social ideas deserve
deeper study today.
The work of St. Thomas was, we say, an innovation. But it
was not a revolution. It was the normal development of the
union between tradition and that perennial philosophy which
prepares theologians to proceed scientifically in matters of
faith and morals.
Yet three centuries elapsed before this great innovation
conquered the schools. Until the end of the sixteenth century,
the textbook in all schools, Dominican schools included, was
that of the Lombard. See the commentaries on tire Sentences,
from Capreolus to Soto.
Cajetan and Koelin were the first to comment on the
Summa. Yet this happy innovation made slow headway in the
schools, and did not have, even on noted authors, the influ­
ence it deserved. Let us look cursorily at these authors.
1. St. Raymond of Pennafort (thirteenth century) wrote a
casuistic guide for confessors. He was followed by many
others.
2. St. Antonine, O.P., archbishop of Florence, wrote a
Summa of moral theology. His method is ascetic, and he does
not always follow the doctrine of St. Thomas. A comparative
study of the two saints would be useful.
3. Mystic treatment of moral questions appears in Eckhart,
Tauler, Suso, Gerson, and Thomas a Kempis.

DIVISIONS OF MORAL THEOLOGY

13

4. When commentaries on St. Thomas replaced those on
the Lombard, many authors wrote moral Summas:
a) Cajetan, who had written a casuistic Summa, on sins.
b) Many commented on the second part of the Summa:
Victoria, Medina, Dominic Soto, Peter Soto, Ledesma, John
of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Suarez, Lugo, Gonet, Alex­
ander Natalis, Billuart. Billuart’s treatment, like that of many
others, is both scholastic and casuistic, while others (e.g., the
Salmanticenses) keep the two methods separated. Concina and
Patuzzi, two Thomists, contended strongly against probabilism. Many religious of various orders, also many diocesan
priests, wrote commentaries on the Summa.
5. The two centuries from 1650 to 1850 were devoted to
casuistry. Many authors in this period omit all doctrinal ques­
tions. Many deal almost exclusively with practical questions:
the law, conscience, probable conscience, cases of conscience,
the limits of obligation. Moral theology is the science rather
of avoiding sin than of cultivating virtue. This casuistic
method, inefficacious in urging men to lead good lives, tends
to laxism. Asceticism and mysticism lack foundation. Many
treatises, ascetic and mystic, have simply no doctrinal value.
6. But during this period there appeared a man, sent by
God to remedy the evils of casuistry. This man was St. Alphonsus Liguori, doctor of the Church, founder of the Redemptorists, renowed author of many works, ascetic and moral, highly
praised by various popes. He is rather practical than specula­
tive. As founder of equiprobabilism, he cleansed casuistry
from the defects of probabilism and laxism.
7. In our own day we find various practices.
a) Seminaries unite the two methods, scholastic and
casuistic, adding ascetic applications.
b) Universities generally give two distinct courses, one
scholastic, the other practical and casuistic. Some give also
special courses in ascetico-mystic theology.
8. When Leo XIII had, we might say, raised Thomism to
life, many authors followed St. Thomas. But textbooks gen­

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BEATITUDE

erally still labor under the defects of casuistry. They omit im­
portant doctrinal questions on human acts, on the passions, on
habits.
When asked for treatises on grace, infused virtue, and the
gifts, they send you to classes in dogma. But the question re­
turns: How can moral, if it refuses to dwell on the nature of
virtue and merit, proceed to a scientific explanation of human
acts as the road to a supernatural goal? Science rests on sources
and causes. Now the sources of salvific human acts are the in­
fused virtues. Look at the divisions in many moral textbooks.
You will find the following general division: on the last end,
on human acts, on laws, on conscience, on sins, on virtues in
general. Further, you will find a treatise on special moral,
which deals indeed with virtues, theological and cardinal, but
does not determine their nature, dwells, but all too briefly, on
their necessity, while it emphasizes the sins to be avoided. At
the end you find a treatise on the sacraments. The moral theol­
ogy of St. Thomas, it is clear, has not yet found a home in our
schools.
Three questions:
1. Why does St. Thomas place moral theology between two
dogmatic parts? This question was answered above.
2. Why does he prefer division by virtues to division by
precepts?
a) He does treat the precepts, first in the treatise on law,
secondly after each virtue.
b) He prefers the division by virtues, for three reasons.
i) Science rests on principles and causes. The prin­
ciples of human acts are the virtues, whence good deeds pro­
ceed, promptly, easily and gladly.
ii) Thus appear clearly the various functions of the
spiritual organism, in hierarchical form.
iii) Thus we lay the foundation of mysticism and
asceticism, which deal with the stages of progress in virtue.
3. But are not precepts the sources of human acts?

DIVISIONS OF MORAL THEOLOGY

15

a) Yes, but they are sources that regulate human acts,
not sources which produce these acts.
b) Many precepts of the Decalogue are, in their literal
sense, negative. Commenting on St. Paul’s word about the
letter that kills and the spirit that quickens, St. Thomas speaks
thus: “The mere law, without the Spirit who prints the law
on the heart, is an occasion of death.” Why? Because, learning
from the precept what we ought to do, we leave the deed un­
done.
c) There are, of course, affirmative precepts: Love God
and your neighbor. But the sublimity and fruitfulness of these
precepts are often neglected, and the emphasis remains on the
avoidance of vice. But vice is intelligible only by its opposi­
tion to virtue, just as darkness by its opposition to light. The
Decalogue, finally, while it does contain precepts on religion,
does not directly give precepts on faith, hope, and charity.

CHAPTER III
Ethical Systems

Before we study the articles of St. Thomas on the final goal,
we think it well to classify the various systems of natural
ethics. Such classification will serve to emphasize the impor­
tance and the timeliness of the saint’s teaching.
A. Ethics without sanction, without obligation.
1. Hedonism, founded on pleasurable good (Aristip­
pus, Fourier).
2. Utilitarianism.
a) Individual utilitarianism (Epicurus, Hobbes,
Bentham).
b) Social utilitarianism (Comte, Durkheim, LevyBruhl).
3. Good-for-its-own-sake (Stoics, Spinoza).
B. Ethics, with sanction and obligation.
1. Obligation arising:
a) from the human will, autonomous, by categorical
imperative (Kant).
b) from the divine will, which freely decrees the pre­
cepts of the Decalogue (Scotus), and all precepts (Occam,
fideists, theological positivists).
C. From good-in-itself, according to right reason, human
and divine.

REFLECTIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS
These systems, one excepted, are false: false, rather in what
they deny than in what they affirm, since they single out some
elements of moral reality, and neglect others. Aristotle, on the
contrary, and St. Thomas much more perfectly, embrace and
16

ETHICAL SYSTEMS

17

harmonize all aspects of morality. Hence the Thomistic eth­
ical system is universal,1 opposed to partial systems, as Catholic
doctrine is opposed to heretical doctrine. Heresy, as its name
implies, chooses one element of truth and rejects others.
Hedonism considers only the pleasurableness of good;
utilitarianism, only its usefulness, unconcerned with what is
by nature good (e.g., to tell the truth in the face of death).
Kant does indeed admit obligation, but finds for the obliga­
tion no objective foundation, which can be found only in
objective good, and ultimately only in the supreme good.
Others (e.g., Spinoza), while they admit the dependence of
our will on rational good, do so in a pantheistic fashion, with
consequent denial of obligation and free will. The fideists
(e.g., Occam) do admit moral obligation, but base this obliga­
tion, not on the immutability of nature, divine and human,
but on contingent positive law, and thus reach theological
positivism, which denies the immutability of natural law.
St. Thomas, on the contrary, admits all these aspects of
moral reality, and harmonizes them. The good is delightful
and useful, but is first of all good in itself. And thus, as good
in itself, it is the object of our will, the will being a rational
appetite implanted in man by the author of nature. And this
good-in-itself, discovered by reason, is the proximate founda­
tion of moral obligation. Further, since reason is right only
by its conformity with divine reason, i.e., with the eternal law,
the ultimate foundation of morality is God, who created and
ordained men to know and love the supreme good.
Further, the Saint admits contingent positive law, even in
the supernatural order. But he does not deny, rather he up­
holds, the necessity of natural law, whereby we are bound, not
merely by necessity of precept, but also by necessity of means,
to know and love God above all else, if we would attain eter­
nal life.
1 Some authors fear that the Church is becoming Thomistic! No, runs the
answer, Catholicism is not Thomism, but Thomism is Catholic, because it is
universal, not particularist. See P. H. Woroniechi, "La catholicité du
Thomisme,” Revue Thomiste, October, 1921, pp. 323-29.

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Elevated and universal, St. Thomas is also scientific. He
proceeds from the four causes:
a) Material cause, the subject matter, is human activity.
b) Formal cause, the viewpoint is the morality of human
acts, i.e., conformity to the supreme standard.
c) Efficient cause is twofold, directive and productive. The
directive cause is itself twofold, one ultimate, i.e., the eternal
law, one proximate, i.e., reason enlightened by faith. The
productive cause also is twofold, one radical, i.e., nature ele­
vated by grace, one proximate, i.e., virtue, infused and ac­
quired.
d) Final cause, the ultimate goal, i.e., the supreme good,
to be loved for its own sake, not merely for the delight or util­
ity which follows the possession of that good. This supreme
good is God, both in the order of nature and in the order of
grace.
Let us now enumerate, in descending order, the sources of
morality.
1. The eternal law, i.e., God
2. The natural law
3. Revelation: divine positive law
4. Human laws and customs
5. Church law and doctrine
6. Synderesis (conscience)
7. Prudence (the golden middle way)
8. Choice (ruled by justice)
g. Regulated passions (fortitude and temperance)
io. Performance of moral act.
Of these ten sources of morality, naturalism denies the third
and the fifth (revelation and Church doctrine). Positivism de­
nies the second (natural law). Kant denies the ontological
validity of the sixth (conscience, human reason).
Some intellectualists minimize the role of right will in
forming a good conscience. This view shows the inadequacy of
probability. St. Thomas shows clearly that moral and practical
truth arises, not directly from conformity with reality, but

ETHICAL SYSTEMS

19

from conformity with right appetite and will (in determining
the golden mean, in regard to temperance, say, or bravery, or
humility, or meekness). This view, which at first glance seems
to be a concession to subjectivism or pragmatism, rests in fact
on profound understanding of moral activity.
The ethical synthesis of St. Thomas, then, is not, like other
systems, particularistic. It is universal, it is scientific. It is but
the unfolding, the development, of common sense, of natural
reason, which contains all elements of morality, but does not
know how to systematize them. That is why the Church, ever
more insistently, prefers the teaching of St. Thomas.
Let us now proceed to a brief delineation of the aforesaid
systems, as contrasted with their refutation by him whom the
Church calls the Common Doctor.

CHAPTER IV
The Four Chief Systems
In ascending order, we examine here the four chief ethical
systems: Empiric Ethics, Kantian Ethics, Stoic Ethics, Fideistic Ethics.
A. Empiric ethics, which limits itself to that good which is
experienced as delightful (hedonism), or as useful and profit­
able (utilitarianism, individual or social).
Hedonism says that enjoyment is the motive and standard
of human acts. Man is made to do good and to avoid evil,
along the lines of sense-enjoyment. Thus Aristippus among
the ancients, Fourier, a socialist, among the moderns. The
latter describes the physical attractions of the passions, as
physicists speak of the attractions of the stars. This system
tends to cynical egoism, founded on identification of man
with God, forgetting that God is, and man is not, the supreme
good.
B. Utilitarianism. Individual utilitarianism says that man
must renounce pleasure in favor of tranquillity and security.
Thus of old the Sophists and Epicurus. The latter demands
moderation of passion, between too much and too little. Vir­
tue, he says, is the golden middle way, chosen, not for its own
sake, but solely to avoid harmful extremes. In this system
morality is rather a corpse than a living power. Among mod­
erns we find Hobbes and Bentham, whose first moral law is
temporal peace. Stuart Mill and Spencer look on social utili­
tarianism as the evolutionary goal of individual utilitarian­
ism. Grotius and Puffendorff formulate the first ethical
principle as follows: Man must worship and promote society.
We must live, says Comte, for others. Society, notwithstand­
20

FOUR CHIEF SYSTEMS

2i

ing its defects, must be loved above all else, as if society were
an evolving God. Obligation rests on human legislation. A
father’s right to educate his children, for example, is founded,
not on nature, but on the same human law which, in ancient
Rome, gave to the father the right to kill his son. Thus the
Neo-Comtists, Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim.
C. Empiric ethics refuted. Three reflections may suffice.
1. A virtual refutation lies in the philosophically estab­
lished proof that, as there is an essential distinction between
intellective life and sense life, so likewise between good-initself and good as pleasurable or useful.
Sense life knows only sense-goods, pleasurable and useful. It
does not know good-in-itself, which is known only by reason.
The evil of empiric ethics lies in its failure to recognize goodin-itself (testimony to truth in the face of death, for example,
as shown by Christ: “I am come to give testimony to the
truth”). Good-in-itself is the perfection of our rational activ­
ity, and is good even if it is not followed by pleasure or
utility.1
2. Empiric ethics cannot explain the testimony of con­
science which dictates, as a first and evident principle, that,
independently of consequences, good is to be done, evil to be
avoided. Empirics even contradict this principle. Denying
moral obligation, men will not eschew moral evil (secret theft,
for example, or betrayal of country) if they find evil to be
usefid.
3. Empiric ethics does not, and cannot, result in the happi­
ness it promises. That it does not was shown also by Spinoza
and Kant. The man who lives without a genuine moral ideal
is unhappy. His passions (desire, anger, envy) are uncon­
trolled, often contrary one to the other. He is self-centered in
his egoism, a slave to passing events, a slave to other men, who
can rob him of the sense-goods wherein he hoped to find hap­
piness.
1 Good is an analogous notion: primarily, it means "good-in-itself" (bonum
honestum), secondarily, it means "the pleasurable" (bonum delectabile), lastly,
it means "the useful” (bonum utile), fa, q.5, a.6.

22

BEATITUDE

Further, this system, even at best, simply cannot give man
happiness, because it cannot satisfy his higher faculties, his as­
pirations toward moral goodness and beauty, toward peace in
himself and peace in society, and society is not perfect enough
to be loved above all else.
Lastly, the only way to harmonize private with public util­
ity is to love good-in-itself. All men, as St. Augustine says, can
simultaneously possess good-in-itself, truth, for example, and
virtue, though they cannot so possess sense-goods, a house, for
example, or a held. Matter divides, spirit unites.
D. Kantian ethics refuted. Kantian ethics stands higher
than empiric ethics, since it admits moral obligations. But
the foundation it builds for this obligation, the so-called
categorical imperative, is subjective, not objective. Subjective
likewise are the three Kantian postulates of practical reason:
human liberty, a future life, and the existence of God the
Rewarder.
Kant begins by denying to speculative reason the power of
demonstrating either God’s existence, or free will, or moral
obligation as an internal fact, not merely of experience, but of
reason. Every sincere man finds in his own conscience an im­
perative, not conditional but absolute, which binds him to act
morally. Kant formulates this categorical imperative as fol­
lows: “Act so that your own moral attitude can be the prin­
ciple of universal legislation, act, that is, as you will all men to
act.”
Now this formula is not objective, based on the nature of
good, but is subjective. It is, Kant says, a synthetic-a-priori
judgment. We cannot, Kant explains, find the foundation of
moral obligation in God as Lawgiver and Final Goal. And if
obligation were imposed on us by God, our life would either
be slavery, or, since it would be drawn by the hope of happi­
ness, it would be mercenary, not, properly speaking, moral,
since it would be founded on pleasure or utility. Kant, it is
clear, does not see the sublimity of good-in-itself, which,
though it is also delightful, is desired primarily for its own

FOUR CHIEF SYSTEMS

23
sake. Kant thinks that the human will, in order to be truly
rational, moral, and free, must be its own law, otherwise it
falls into slavery. Thus the human will is autonomous, inde­
pendent of any higher and extrinsic law.
Individual man, then, is to judge whether his own activity
is or is not the standard of universal legislation. Individual
reason is the supreme arbiter of good and evil. Individual
will, as first moral cause, imposes obligation on itself.
1. Kantianism lacks foundation. Kant’s judgment, synthetic
but a priori, has no objective motive, because, as he says, it is
not evident, either a priori or a posteriori. But, if so, it is a
blind judgment. Now, since the object of the intellect is
reality, and the object of the will is good, obligation must
be rooted in objective reality, and ultimately in the supreme
good. Kantian ethics, then, deprived of a true, primary, and
objective standard, is like a landscape without the sun.
2. Absolute autonomy of the human will, unsubordinated
to the eternal law, imposing on itself its own moral obliga­
tion, is impossible in any creature, since all creatures depend
on God the supreme good. Kantianism leads to the errors
of subjectivism and individualism.
3. The promise of blessedness is not an ill-founded invita­
tion to a good life. The benefits God bestows are dispositions
which lead us to love God for His own sake. The supreme
good is indeed a delectable good, but only because it is goodin-itself.2
Hedonism, we have seen, aims at happiness, but excludes
obligation. Kantianism, vice versa, excludes happiness as
moral motive, and considers only subjective obligation. Each
is an extreme. The traditional and true doctrine rises on high
between these two extremes. It sees no incompatibility be­
tween happiness and obligation, but finds them both in the
supreme good, which commands supreme love and rewards
supreme love with supreme joy.
4. Man’s reason as supreme motive is a kind of self-worship.
2IIa-IIae, q.27, a.3. Cf. Cone. Trid., sess. 6, can. 31, Denzinger, no. 84.

24

BEATITUDE

Where God is not loved above all else, there can be no love
of good-in-itself, but only a proud preference for our own
subjective superiority. But if we love and seek the good-initself, then, a fortiori, we will seek and love that supreme
good which is the source of all goodness. Happiness cannot
be found in any created good, but only in the uncreated Good.
But a question arises: Do not Kant’s three postulates of
practical reason (free will, immortality of the soul, and God’s
existence) show him favorable to traditional and Christian
ethics? Does he not say that free will is implied in moral ob­
ligation; that the perfection demanded by the categorical im­
perative cannot be attained in this life: that in the next life
God alone can bind virtue and happiness into a stable unity?
The answer runs thus: Kant does indeed admit these postu­
lates, as rationally credible in the merely natural order. But
he admits them, not as foundations, but only as completions,
of his ethical system. Obligation rests, not on objective goodin-itself, but on man’s independent and autonomous will; not
on right reason as proximate norm of our will: not on the
eternal law as ultimate norm. Kantian ethics, therefore, re­
mains an arbitrary and subjective structure, an arctic region,
sad and cold. It lacks the strength of common sense and
Christian thought.
E. Stoic ethics refuted. Greek Stoics say that the highest
good lies in virtue, i.e., in our own rational activity, not in
things which are external and independent of ourselves. Even
under adverse fortune, they say, the wise man, in control of
his passions, finds joy in his own rational activity. A similar
system of rational eudaemonism appears in Spinoza, who
looks on divine good as immanent in ourselves. Pantheistic
and determinist, Spinoza denies free will and genuine moral
obligation. The moral law is not imperative, but optative. It
can be expressed as follows: “Would that men would live ra­
tionally! But many men do not, and cannot, attain clear and
distinct ideas on what is good.” Here are three reflections on
this system.

FOUR CHIEF SYSTEMS

25

1. It rests on pantheism. But God, far from being identified
with man, is man’s cause, efficient and final.8
2. Human virtue is not the supreme good. Virtue inheres
in the soul, of which it is not the substance, but an accident.
Hence virtue is participated good that has a beginning. Hence,
however noble, it is a particular and limited good, not the
supreme good.4
3. Stoicism denies the twofold testimony of conscience:
a) the moral obligation, based on the first principle of
practical reason, i.e., do good, avoid evil;
b) human freedom, based on the distinction between uni­
versal good (where man is not free), and limited good (where
man must freely choose).’
Question: Does not moral obligation have a sufficient foun­
dation in rational good, as the object of man’s free will? The
answer is: Yes, if you are looking at obligation’s proximate
source, but not if you are looking for its ultimate foundation.®
F. Fideism refuted. Fideism is not, properly speaking, a
system based on nature. It is rather a pseudo-supernatural
system proposed by the nominalists of the fifteenth century.
This system might be entitled theological positivism, since it
founds obligation only on God’s free will, on the divine posi­
tive law, made known by faith and therefore unknowable by
reason. Hence the name, fideism. On the surface fideism ex­
alts faith, but in truth it depreciates, not only reason, but
also the reasonableness of faith. Confounding the spheres of
reason and faith, conceiving reason as confined to mere sense
life, it becomes a pseudo-supernatural system.
In Occam’s radical nominalism, reason cannot transcend
sense-experience, cannot prove God’s existence or the spiritual
nature of the soul; hence it cannot be a foundation for moral
obligation. Teaching that all these truths come only by faith,
Occam prepared the way for Luther. The Jansenists retain
s la, q.2, a.3.
«Ia-IIae, q.2, a.7.
is Ia-IIae, q.94, a.2. Cf. Ia-IIae, q. 10, a.2.
e Cf. Ia-IIae, q.19, a.4.

26

BEATITUDE

elements of this fideism, as do likewise the nineteenth-century
traditionalists. But they are not as radical as is Occam himself,
who holds that the great precept of loving God above all else
is not only inaccessible to reason, but is in itself accidental
and contingent, so that God could if He willed command us
even to hate Him.
Similar is the view of Descartes, who says that the truth of
the principle of contradiction depends on God’s free will.
If so, then on God’s free will rests likewise the distinction
between good and evil.
Now listen to St. Thomas. “Will is guided by reason, in
man and in God. Hence the first source of all justice is the
wisdom of the divine mind, which gives to all His creatures
the right proportion to one another and to Himself. Hence
to say that justice depends simply on the divine will is equiva­
lent to saying that the divine will does not act according to
divine wisdom—a blasphemous assertion.” 7 In other words,
God, if He so willed, could be the supreme evil of the Manichaeans.
Thus fideism arrives at absolute contingency, wherein there
remains nothing necessary and stable, not even divine nature,
the first reality.
One element of this system remains in Scotus,8 who holds
indeed that the command to love God is immutable, but that
the commands concerning men are not. Thus homicide, theft,
fornication are not prohibited because they are evil, but are
evil only because they are prohibited. This view is opposed to
that of St. Thomas,8 who holds that God never issued orders
against the fifth, sixth, and seventh Commandments. Abra­
ham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, for example, came not
from his own choice, but from his role as instrument of God,
who is Lord of life and death. Similarly, the executioner, who
is the instrument of social authority, does not commit murder.
’ De veritate, q.23, a.6. Cf. Ia-IIae, q.gi-94.
s Opera, V, 19. 21,24.
θ Ia-IIae, q.94, a.4-6.

FOUR CHIEF SYSTEMS

27

G. Genera] conclusion. The doctrine of St. Thomas, its
sublimity and universality, is the best answer to the catechism
question: Why was man made? Man was made, not merely
for his own pleasure and delight (hedonism); not merely for
his own interests, individual or social (utilitarianism); not
merely to cultivate his own personal dignity (Kantianism);
nor for the sake of his own rational activity (the Stoics and
Spinoza). Man was made, first to love good for its own sake,
even if such love were not followed by delight or utility;
and, secondly, to have supreme love for the supreme good,
namely, God, who is man’s ultimate goal, natural and super­
natural.
This system harmonizes moral obligation and perfect bless­
edness, by basing both on one and the same foundation, that
supreme good, namely, which beatifies man by insisting on
man’s duty to love God above all else. God’s right to such love
is the source of all obligation.
The time we have spent on the foregoing ethical systems will
bear fruit in subsequent chapters wherein we shall develop
the Thomistic synthesis, and particularly in the chapters
which show the connection betw'een the treatise on man’s
ultimate goal and the treatise on law, eternal law, which is
the source of natural law.
H. One last question. What are the sources of traditional
ethics? Can we find its essentials, in particular its view on
the foundation of moral obligation, in Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle? Or is it based exclusively on religious tradition,
particularly on the Old Testament and the New?
Many historians of philosophy maintain that Socrates, Plato,
and Aristotle teach a mere rational eudaemonism, which in­
volves no moral obligation, obligation being a religious con­
cept rather than a moral one. Kant’s admission of the moral
obligation, they add, is inherited from Christianity.
The answer rests on a distinction. These three Greeks
knew the proximate foundation of moral obligation, namely,
right reason as commanding good-in-itself. But only implicitly

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BEATITUDE

did they speak of obligation’s ultimate source in a supreme
Lawgiver.
Socrates we know only through Plato. But we cannot deny
that Plato himself defended the objective foundation of
morality. The criminal who escapes punishment, says Plato,
is worse off than the criminal who undergoes punishment.
Why? Because by paying the penalty, he restores the order
of good which crime violated, and thus re-enters into the
region of good which ends in felicity. Thus Plato admits an
objective obligation, based on good-in-itself, which is the
standard of man’s rational activity. Further, the supreme
good which Plato admits is an implicit admission of a su­
preme standard, even though he does not speak explicitly of
a supreme Lawgiver and an eternal law.
Aristotle, too, though he speaks only implicitly and indis­
tinctly of the supreme Lawgiver, maintains the proximate
foundations of moral obligation. Good-in-itself, he often says,
is the goal aimed at by virtue. This good is not only potentially
lovable, but must be actually loved, since potency exists only
for the sake of act. Good-in-itself (e.g., telling the truth) is to
be done for its own sake, not merely for the joy that follows
doing. Joy is the ornament of deed, as beauty is the ornament
of youth. Joy is a consequence of the good act, but does not
constitute the goodness of the act.
St. Thomas says: The first and self-evident principle of
practical reason is the universal desirability of good. In other
words, good-in-itself, rational good, is an obligation laid on
man’s will by the Author of nature.10 This statement only
makes explicit what the Greeks left implicit.
Thus the explicit view of morality, founded on the eternal
law, is, in point of fact, speaking historically, religious rather
than philosophic, is based on the Testaments, the Old and the
New. The Sermon on the Mount, at the beginning of Christ’s
public life, promises men blessedness as the reward of right­
eousness. But the supreme precept is that of loving God with
iola-IIae, q.94, a. 2.

FOUR CHIEF SYSTEMS

29

heart, soul, mind, and strength. This precept harmonizes ob­
ligation and blessedness, each based on the supreme good,
which is the goal commanded by the eternal Lawgiver.
Our long Introduction ended, we now turn to examine the
questions dealing with man’s ultimate goal.

FIRST PART
THE ULTIMATE GOAL (I—II, q. 1-5)
The first question treats of the ultimate goal in gen­
eral, considered abstractly. The following questions
discuss the matter concretely: the term “blessedness,”
the beatifying object, the beatifying operation, the
characteristics of that operation, its attainment, its
inamissibility.

CHAPTER V
The Ultimate Goal in General
The eight articles may be thus divided: the first four explain

the relation of human acts to an ultimate goal, the last four
show that this goal is one, and only one.
An initial question arises: Do not these first seventeen ques­
tions treat of human acts from a viewpoint, not moral, but
merely psychological? Does he not begin the treatise on moral­
ity in question 18?
Answer: As found in human acts, yes, morality begins in
question 18. But his first five questions are a moral treatise on
the ultimate goal.
QUESTION 1
ART. 1. DOES MAN ACT PURPOSELY?

The answer runs thus: Only in view of a purpose to be
achieved can man act deliberately.

Preliminaries
The question is universal: Can man, acting deliberately,
ever exclude purpose from his act? Can any human act, which
must necessarily have a terminus, come into being without
that terminus pre-existing as intention and purpose in man’s
mind?
Purpose, then, as here considered, expresses the motive, the
reason why, of the human act. It does not mean a mere ter­
minus, as point means the end of a line, or as vacation means
the end of a school year, or as death, according to the material­
ists, is simply dissolution of the body.
33

34

BEATITUDE

Some think this question is useless. Rather, it is most im­
portant, since it deals with the very foundation of moral ob­
ligation, denied by Spinoza, and the impossibility, denied
by Duns Scotus, of any deliberate act being here and now
morally indifferent. This importance appears in the difficulties
raised by St. Thomas as he begins the question.
1. Purpose cannot be a cause, since cause must pre-exist
before effect. But purpose comes at the end, as something we
attain by our act.
In this difficulty lies the reason which later led Spinoza to
deny that God works for a purpose. All things, so Spinoza,
proceed from God geometrically, as the characteristics of a
circle proceed, without finality, from the essence of the circle.
But he overlooks the truth that geometry has nothing to do
with act or with motion.
2. Man surely engages in some actions unpurposely, simply
for their own sake, for example, play and recreation. And
contemplation, thus Aristotle, being itself the ultimate pur­
pose, has no purpose beyond itself.
3. Man often acts without deliberation, as when, e.g., he
inadvertently strokes his beard. Such acts, unintended, are
not done purposely.
A. The response is nevertheless affirmative. The thesis runs
thus: Man, acting freely, acts for a purpose.
1. Purpose, in the world of action, is parallel to first
principle in the world of speculation and contemplation. As
man’s mind is carried by principle to conclusion, so is man’s
will carried by purpose to the means needed for attaining
purpose. This rule suffers no exception. Hence no individual
act can ever be morally indifferent. It must be either good or
bad.
2. The foregoing argument is borrowed from Aristotle.
St. Thomas prepares by division for demonstration. We dis­
tinguish “human acts” from “actions of man.” Human acts
proceed from man as man, as distinct from irrational animals,
as being, by reason and free will, the master of his actions.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

35

Human acts properly speaking, proceeding from man’s free
choice, are consequently either meritorious or demeritorious,
worthy of praise or of blame.
But “actions of man” (inadvertently stroking one’s beard)
signify acts which, being indeliberate, do not characterize
human activity as human.

Three Thomistic Corollaries
a) All human acts are acts of man, but not vice versa.
b) Indeliberate acts proceeding from man’s mind and will
cannot properly be called human acts: first impulses to pride
and to unbelief; further, spontaneous acts of wonder, laugh­
ter, weeping, speaking; again, indeliberate blasphemy under
diabolic obsession; lastly, the acts of children before the age
of reason and the acts of the insane.
c) On the contrary, acts of eating, drinking, walking, though
they are common to man and beast, are human acts when
done deliberately.

Three Doubts

a) Man’s very first act of thought, which precedes his first
act of will—is this thought a human act? No, because man is
not master of that thought.
b) Is beatific love a human act? No, because that act is not
free, but necessary. It transcends freedom, hence is not meri­
torious, though it is morally good.
c) The acts of filial affection toward God, which are not,
properly speaking, deliberate, but are elicited by divine in­
spiration—are these human acts? Yes, because we freely con­
sent to them, and merit by them. Such acts, because they
transcend discursive deliberation, are still free.
B. The thesis demonstrated. All deliberate human acts
are here in question. Experience itself shows that men usually
act purposively. How frequently we hear: Why did you do
this? But here we are asking a universal question: Can man,

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BEATITUDE

acting freely, ever perform an unpurposeful act? The libertists say no, St. Thomas says yes, and his proof runs thus:
Since faculties are differentiated by their respective goals,
acts proceeding from any faculty aim at the goal of that fac­
ulty.
Now the goal of the will is good to be attained. Hence every
human act aims at some goal to be attained.
To illustrate the major of this argument: hearing is con­
cerned with sound, and only with sound: sight, exclusively
with color; mind, exclusively with the intelligible.
To illustrate the minor: the goal of the will is the good,
just as the goal of the intellect is the true. Will aims at the
good, be that good genuine or counterfeit. And the good, as
attracting the will, is purpose, is final cause. It is called good,
because it is desirable. It is called purpose and goal, because
it moves the will to seek ways and means.
But do not ways and means attract the will for their own
sake? If they do, they become an intermediate goal. But,
properly speaking, ways and means attract, not for their own
sake, but only for the sake of the end, the purpose, the goal.
The good which is the essential and adequate object of the
will, is found, secondarily, by participation, in ways and means.
Thus the conclusion stands: Every deliberate human act is
done for a purpose, to attain an end. Whatever is deliberately
willed is loved either as goal, or as way and means. This truth
is necessary and absolute, be the good genuine or counterfeit.
He who sins deliberately aims at some good, for example,
mere pleasure.
An Addition

Scotus rejects this doctrine. He distinguishes three genera
of the good: (a) the goal, (b) means and ways, (c) neither goal,
nor means and ways. Were God neither our goal nor our way,
He could still be loved by us with most genuine love. As
example of this pure and neutral love, Scotus points to the
inefficacious love of life in Christ when He said: “If it be

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

37

possible, let this chalice pass from Me. But not as I will, but
as Thou wilt.”
The answer runs thus: That inefficacious love of Christ
(and of the martyrs) was toward life as a goal, since life is in
the line of blessedness, which all men desire by nature. Any­
thing that is desirable can be loved only by its dependence,
actual or virtual, on the first and supreme good.
But, says the libertist, I will to will—nothing else. Answer:
Where no good, not even counterfeit good, is willed, there
no act of will is possible. Hence, to repeat, no individual
human act can be morally indifferent, i.e., neither good nor
bad. This is the common view, against Scotus, the Scotists, and
Vasquez. Man, whenever he acts, is bound to act for a good
purpose. Where such purpose is lacking (e.g., aa idle word),
the act is morally evil. Recreation is good when carried on
for a good purpose, otherwise it is bad.
A Confirmation

The thesis holds for all human acts, whether they aim at
the goal, or only at ways and means. Acts concerned with
choice of means are evidently done with purpose. Acts con­
cerned with the goal, simple volition and efficacious intention,
though they do not proceed from a preceding act, still owe
their existence to the goal. And they are virtually deliberate
by reason of previous knowledge which distinguishes good
from evil.
Solution of Difficulties

First. Goal, attained, comes after the act. Goal, intended,
comes before, and is cause (final cause) of the act.
Second. Contemplation is the possession of the beatifying
object, and joy is a consequence of possession. Hence the total
and complete goal has the three elements, object, possession,
joy, all welded into one whole. Joy, says St. Thomas, is the
will resting in the object attained. Hence joy, while it is not,
speaking rigorously, a human act, is nevertheless the com-

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BEATITUDE

pletion of the act, is a connatural result of possessing the goal.
Third. Indeliberate acts, although they do not proceed
from reason, still do proceed from some natural purpose, held
by the imagination, in the form of a habit mechanically ac­
quired.
Goal and Purpose

Definition and division. Goal is the final cause, which moves
man to act. Goals are divided, (a) objectively, (b) subjectively.
A. Objective divisions
1. The object itself (health):
a) The ultimate object (victory for the soldier, God
for man): the object which we desire (God, seen intuitively);
the act by which we possess the object (the beatific vision).
b) The intermediate object, desirable both for its
own sake and for some ulterior purpose (health for the sake
of virtue, virtue for the sake of God).
2. The individual for whom (e.g., a sick man) I desire
tire good object (health). This individual may be
a) superior to me (God, to whom we wish glory)
b) myself (to whom I will salvation)
c) inferior to me (a dog, to whom I wish health).1
B. Subjective divisions
i. The intention of the agent:
a) identified with the natural purpose of the deed
(alms to aid the poor): the purpose produced (health by the
act of the physician); the purpose obtained, but not produced
(pennant after contest);
b) the intention of the agent, not necessarily identi­
fied with the deed’s natural purpose (alms, for God’s sake, for
vainglory, simply to aid the poor): the agent’s primary in1 Christ died for us (who are inferior to Him), but this purpose is subordi­
nated to the glory of God. By hope we desire God for ourselves, who are in­
ferior to God, but we do so because God so wills. Contemplation is devoted
to apostolic action as inferior (finis cui), but to God as superior (finis cujus
gratia). Contemplation is not a medium, subordinated to action, but rather a
superabundant, fructifying cause of the apostolic action which is its effect.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

39

tention (participating in Mass to adore God, battle to defend
the fatherland); the agent’s secondary intention, subordinated
to his primary intention, not as a mere medium, but as effect,
or as natural consequence (honor and salary for the soldier.)
ART. 2. UNIVERSALITY OF PURPOSE

Preliminaries
The thesis is twofold: Purpose, known as purpose, charac­
terizes rational beings, but irrational beings act for a pur­
pose, to them unknown. Against the second assertion there
are three difficulties:
a) How can tilings work for a purpose to them unknown?
b) Only reason can seek ways and means.
c) Where there is no will, there purpose is impossible.
Thus we enter into the question of finality, as found in
inanimate nature, in vegetative life, in sense life. St. Thomas,
we recall, founded his fifth proof for God’s existence on this
principle. Experience, he says, shows us irrational beings,
plants and animals, which generally, if not always, follow a
steady line toward self-preservation, individual and racial.
Now such activity, unexplained by mere chance, shows that
such beings, without knowing it, are under the control of
purpose. Thus, following Aristotle, he shows the existence of
natural finality.
Here, in the present article, he shows that the principle of
finality is necessarily universal: every agent acts for a purpose.
This thesis is opposed by the materialists, by Spinoza, by all
who deny natural finality, even by some modern Scholastics,
who hold that this principle presupposes a proof of divine
providence.
This principle of finality is of fundamental importance, on
it rests the first principle of practical reason: Do good, avoid
evil.2
» la-IIae, q.94, a. a.

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The Argument

St. Thomas first cites Aristotle: not only intellect, but na­
ture too, acts for a purpose. Then he proceeds to show the
necessity of finality, and the mode of finality which separates
man from beast.
1. The necessity of finality. The argument is indirect. An
agent, capable of various acts, will never act at all unless it
is determined toward some one of its possible effects. For, if
the agent should produce a determined and suitable effect
(if the eye, e.g., could produce vision), without tending to that
one effect rather than to another, then this effect, unless in­
tended by nature, would be simply without reason for its
existence. And this tendency to definite effect must pre-exist
in its cause, not actually of course, but virtually, i.e., by the
faculty’s innate relation to one effect rather than to another.
Later we shall see that this passive and innate relationship of
faculty to act presupposes an active relationship in the Author
of nature.
Further. This principle of finality, just now demonstrated
indirectly, is, if we admit the right notion of agent and pur­
pose, in itself evident. Thus it is evident that sight is intended
to see, hearing to hear, gravity to hold the universe together.
Now this tendency to an advantageous act is the very principle
of finality. Faculty, potency, is defined by its tendency to act,
and act by its tendency to object. Sight, were it not for its
innate tendency to see, might just as well perform an act of
hearing. An acorn might grow into a pear tree, or a canine
embryo into a lion.
2. Human finality. Purpose, known as purpose, character­
izes rational beings. Purpose dictates ways and means. This
relationship of end and purpose to ways and means is an
intelligible entity, known only by an intelligence whose ob­
ject is, not color or sound, but the inner realities of things,
and their mutual relationships.
Animals do indeed know the sense-thing which is end and

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

41

purpose, the stall, for example, which draws the horse home.
Thus, without intelligence, they act intelligently, or rather,
we may say, they are driven intelligently. This intelligence in
an unintelligent world points to uncreated intelligence in
the Maker of that world.
Purposeful activity, then, has three levels:
a) the human level, where activity is formally directive;
b) the animal level, where the activity is directive, nonformally (materially);
c) the plant level, where the activity is merely executive.
A Recapitulation
All agents act for a purpose: some by knowing purpose as
purpose (intelligence uncreated and intelligence created),
some by knowing the thing which is purpose (animals); some
without knowing (plants and nonliving bodies).
Finality, then, is an analogous concept, found also on the
lowest level of existence. However imperfect it may be on
this lowest level, it is still a natural tendency to what is best.
It is clearest in racial tendencies, where the individual sacri­
fices its own life for its offspring, in the hen, for example,
gathering her brood under her wings against the hawk.
God and Finality

1. The effects of God are done for a purpose; namely, to
show forth God’s goodness in which they share.
2. God’s own operations, whether necessary or free, do
not, properly speaking, exist for a purpose, because they are
uncreated, hence have no cause, not even a final cause.
3. Still, in a sense, divine goodness is the purpose of God’s
free acts. That goodness, though it is not the cause, is still the
reason for God’s free acts. God, says St. Thomas, though He
is not moved by purpose, still acts for a purpose. God is not
His own cause, but He is His own reason.8
s “The world was created for God's glory.” D. 1805.

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What a splendid panorama! All things act purposively: God,
angel, man, animal, down to the tiniest realities.
ART. 3. DIFFERENTIATION BY PURPOSE

Preliminaries
On this article depend many subsequent questions: specific
distinction of virtuous act from wicked act, degrees of sinful
gravity, distinction of mortal sin from venial. The initial
difficulties are three.
1. Goal, purpose, is an extrinsic cause, whereas the differ­
entiating principle must be intrinsic.
2. That which specifies and differentiates comes before the
purposeful activity, whereas attainment of the goal comes
after.
3. Purpose would put each human act into one specific
class, whereas we know that one and the same act can be done
for different ends: objective, subjective, principal, secondary,
proximate, ultimate.

The Proof

Listen to St. Augustine: “As is our purpose, culpable or laud­
able, so are our deeds." * If we punish to satisfy our anger,
the deed is blameworthy. If we punish to preserve justice,
our deed is praiseworthy.
The argument in the corpus is not easy. It ascends from the
sense-world to the world of spirit and morality. And we must
rightly understand the analogy between the bodily act of
heating and the spiritual act of the human will. We are seek­
ing the universal metaphysical law of action as action.
The present article first puts down a universal law. Specifi­
cation, differentiation, arises, not from potency, but from act:
from the act which is form and nature, in substances; from the
acts which are source and terminus, when we deal with suc4 De moribus Ecclesiae, Bk. II, chap. 13.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

43

cessive things. Thus heating, as action, proceeds from the
actual heat of the agent, but, as passion, terminates in the
actual heat in the patient.
Applying this principle to human acts, we argue as follows.
Major. What is both source and terminus differentiates hu­
man acts.
Minor. Goal, purpose, is both the source and the terminus
of human acts.
Conclusion. Every human act, whether looked at as action
(which commands), or as passion (which is commanded), is
specifically differentiated by its goal and purpose.
The major is not merely a truth of experience (a radiator
heating the air in the room), but is likewise the expression
of a universal law, since any agent, acting by its own specific
nature, produces an effect like itself. Action is a specific ac­
tion, not by reason of the agent as efficient cause, but by
reason of the agent’s formal and constitutive principle. Pas­
sion, likewise, is a specific passion by reason of the patient’s
formal and constitutive principle.
The minor rests on the truth that, in human acts, the goal,
as aimed at by the will, is the formal and specific principle of
the will’s action. Further, by actually aiming at the goal, the
will moves itself to choose ways and means.
Question: Could not St. Thomas argue in a simpler fashion?
Could he not say: Actions, like powers and habits, are specifi­
cally differentiated by their goals and objects? Now purpose
and goal are the objects of the will. Hence all voluntary acts
are differentiated by their goal and purpose.
The answer is threefold.
a) Had he thus argued, he would have omitted the analogy
between action in the sense-world and action in the inner
world of the human will.
b) The metaphysical law of action as action would be
omitted.
c) We should not have had the distinction between a com-

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manding action and a commanded action (as when a man,
meditating a murder, passes through many acts, psychologi­
cally distinct, but morally one).

Difficulties Analyzed
1. The goal is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because
the intrinsic act is, by purpose, related to the goal. The goal,
as aimed at by purpose, is both the inner source and the inner
terminus of the act.
2. The goal comes after the human act in the order of at­
tainment, but not in the order of intention. The goal which
differentiates one human act from another is, properly speak­
ing, the goal as existing in the inner intention. As such it
differentiates also the execution which tends to the goal.
3. One and the same human act can be directed to different
goals, if these goals are hierarchically one, but it cannot be
directed to diverse proximate goals. And it is this proximate
and primary goal, not the remote goal, nor the proximate
secondary goal, which gives each human act its specific moral
nature. To illustrate. The stipend given to a priest for cele­
brating Mass is a secondary goal of his act. To kill a man in
order to preserve justice is a good act. But to kill a man in
order to satisfy anger is an evil act. The proximate primary
goal gives each human act its specific differentiation.
A Corollary

The apostolic life, since it cannot have two proximate and
primary goals, aims at contemplation as its primary purpose,
whereas its secondary purpose, arising necessarily from its
primary purpose, is to give to our neighbor the fruits of our
contemplation.
Two Difficulties Analyzed
i. The goal differentiates the internal act of intention and
the external act of execution. But does it differentiate both

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

45

in the same manner? Does not St. Thomas 5 say that the in­
terior act is differentiated by its purpose, and the exterior act
by its object: giving, as an example, a man’s intention (in­
ternal) of committing adultery, and then proceeding to steal
(external act) in order to have the money he needs for his pur­
pose?
The answer runs thus: In the present article no distinction
is yet drawn between the purpose of the agent, and the pur­
pose of the deed. To illustrate. When the thief intends simply
to steal, his purpose differentiates, not only his internal act,
but also his external act. But when his intention is to use
the ill-gotten money as a means to adultery, he commits two
sins, one of theft (differentiated by the money, which is the
purpose of the deed), and one of intended adultery (which is
his purpose as agent). But even in this case, his purpose as
agent (the intended adultery) differentiates also his external
act of theft, not indeed directly, but indirectly, through the
objective purpose of his sin of theft. The intention of the will,
says St. Thomas, is the soul, the form, of the external act,
because the will uses the corporeal members as instruments,
and external acts are moral acts only so far as they come from
the will. He concludes, quoting Aristotle: He who steals for
the sake of adultery is, speaking properly, more adulterer than
thief.
2. But is not purpose a mere circumstance,® and hence in­
capable of differentiating the human act? How, then, are we
to distinguish purpose as differentiating from purpose as mere
circumstance?
St. Thomas illustrates as follows: In theft, the fact that the
object stolen belongs to someone else is of the very essence
of the act, whereas the amount stolen is a circumstance. The
differentiating purpose, superadded by the agent, is not a cir­
cumstance. To act bravely simply because bravery is a duty
is not a circumstance. But the superadded purpose, to act
5 la-Hae, q. 18, a. 6.
e Ibid., q.7, a.3.

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bravely for country, or for Christ, is a circumstance, though
this circumstance may become the object of a higher virtue,
say, of charity.
But, it may be insisted, to act bravely for home or for altar,
seems to be more than a circumstance, since it is the brave
man’s personal purpose, which mediately, as said above, dif­
ferentiates the human act.
The answer is that the agent’s personal motive, which medi­
ately differentiates his deed, becomes also a circumstance of
his deed (e.g., bravery) when that deed, remaining objectively
one and the same, is performed, by one man to defend his
home, by another to defend his altar.7

Summary
Human acts are specifically differentiated by the goal at
which they aim: the commanding act, by the goal as first in
intention, as the motive source of tire act; the commanded
act, the execution, by the goal to be attained. This metaphysi­
cal proof given by St. Thomas, based on analysis of purpose
and goal, and illustrated by analogy with the sense-world, is
retained by many modern treatises, ethical and moral.
ART. 4- DOES HUMAN LIFE HAVE AN
ULTIMATE PURPOSE?

Preliminaries
We have seen that man, when he acts deliberately, always
aims at a goal which specifically differentiates his act. The
question now is: Does human life have an ultimate goal and
purpose? The answer to this question is, we may say, a new
stone, scientifically hewn and chiseled, and set in place, by
the architect who is steadily, stone by stone, building a temple
to God. One question at a time, each in its place, not too
early, not too late: such is the sober simplicity that marks St.
7 Ibid., q. 18, a.4. See Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on the present article
(art. 3). Dom Lottin's excellent works do not give sufficient attention to this
truth.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

47

Thomas in contrast to many of his commentators, whose haste
and precipitation end in confusion and complexity.
1. An ultimate goal seems impossible, because it would be
the highest good, and the good is essentially self-diffusive.
2. Since our mind in counting never comes to an ultimate
number, why must our will come to an ultimate good?
3. I can will something, then will myself to will it, and
so on ad infinitum. Hence voluntary action does not neces­
sarily aim at an ultimate end and goal.

Two Conclusions

A. In goals hierarchically ordered, it is impossible to pro­
ceed to infinity.
Before we take up the proof let us note its importance. It
involves a truth taught also by the “philosophy of action’’8
and the “method of immanence.’’ But Blondel's proof reaches
a certitude that is merely practical and subjective, whereas
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, reaches a certitude that is
speculative, universal, and objective. Thus the present article
initiates a demonstration of God’s existence, proceeding from
man’s natural desire for happiness. The demonstration here
initiated will be completed below, where we shall see that
beatitude cannot be found in any created good, but only in
uncreated good.0
The proof runs thus: Where there is no first in a causal
sequence, there can be no second causes, which act only when
acted upon by the first cause. But causes hierarchically or­
dered act only when acted upon by the first. Hence where
there is no first in a causal sequence, there can be no essentially
subordinated second causes.
In other words, infinite regression is impossible in a hier­
archy of causes. There must, in the nature of things, be an
ultimate goal, which here and now attracts for its own sake,
and not for the sake of some higher goal. Our conclusion,
« Blondel, L'action, 1893.
» Cf. infra, q.z, a.8, and q.3, a. 1.

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then, is simply a corollary from the universal principle of
causality, efficient or final. Formulated for efficient causality,
the principle runs thus: Anything that has a beginning comes
from a pre-existing source of its existence, and, ultimately,
from an uncreated source. Formulated for final causality, the
principle runs thus: Every agent acts to reach a goal, and ulti­
mately for a goal aimed at for its own sake, not for the sake
of something else.
Further, the conclusion holds good in the order both of
intention and of execution. In the order of intention, it runs
thus: Where there is no goal to attract the appetite, the ap­
petite is simply not attracted. Now the first source of inten­
tion is the ultimate goal. Were there no ultimate goal, there
would be nothing to attract the appetite.
In the order of execution, thus: Where there is no motive
for execution, execution can simply not begin. Now the first
motive in execution is its relation to the final goal. Without
this goal, no agent would begin anything.
To illustrate. A sick man willing health, calls a doctor.
Health he wishes, let us say, to pursue his studies. Study, to
know the truth, the supreme Truth; supreme Truth, in or­
der to reach beatitude; and beatitude, for God’s glory. God’s
glory, beyond which there is nothing higher, is the first
source in this particular causal sequence.
Again, in efficient causality: The cart is drawn by a horse,
the horse is supported by the earth, the earth by the sun, the
sun by some other center. Can we go on thus forever? No.
There must be a first source which needs no support, which
is its own activity and hence its own unreceived existence.
And without this first cause, there would be no second and
subordinated causes, which move, draw, and support only by
some higher causality. Looked at vertically, not horizontally,
the lowest motion on earth is but the lowest rung on a living
stairway, which ends in an eternal and unchangeable and
coexistent source of all that is below itself.
But when God creates, is there not an infinite process down­

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

49

wards? No. On the stairway of creation there is a lowest step.
The supreme goodness is indeed infinitely self-diffusive. But
that goodness is the source of divine liberty, which is ruled
by divine wisdom.
B. Second conclusion. In a causal sequence where causes
are related, not essentially, but accidentally, there can be a
process ad infinitum.
An example, to illustrate. I wish to learn Latin, then Greek,
then Hebrew, then Arabic. Then I abandon languages in
favor of mathematics, or metaphysics, or law, or medicine.
Then, like Faust, I abandon knowledge in favor of pleasure
or riches. Lastly, I return to literature and science. In such
a sequence, there is no essential dependence of one step on
another, hence there can be a process without limit.
Another example, in efficient causality. Cause per se of the
son is the father, whereas the grandfather is cause per accidens.
St. Thomas 10 explains: Man generates as man, not as son of
another man. Adam, son of no man, generated children. And
the grandfather may be dead when his son generates a grand­
son. All fathers stand on the same level, each being a particular
agent in the long line of generations. Thus an infinite series,
man generated from man, is not impossible. But it would be
impossible if the generation of one man depended, not merely
on his father, but also on the elements, and on the sun, and
so ad infinitum.
Here we may add, following Aristotle and Aquinas, that
the impossibility of an infinite and eternal series of trans­
formations cannot be demonstrated. Sea water into clouds,
clouds into rain, and then repeat and repeat again, without
limit. For such a series we need only the existence of sun and
water. If these two existed from eternity, evaporation could
be without beginning, but not without origin, since each
evaporation would depend on the eternal Prime Mover. Thus
Aristotle was led from the existence of motion to the exist­
ence of God, while he simultaneously admitted that motion
10 la, q.46, a.2, ad 711m.

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had no beginning, and thus reveals the infinite power of the
Prime Mover. Hence we must clearly distinguish vertical de­
pendence, which is limited, from horizontal dependence,
which is unlimited. Thus the soul, considered horizontally,
will never have a last volition, but each volition depends,
vertically considered, on the ultimate goal of each separate
volition.
The initial difficulties should by now have disappeared. In
the Saint’s answer to the second difficulty, we may note that
infinity in numbers is an accident of number as such, and
accident which may happen to any number if you add a unit
to it. Any number, though necessarily unequal to all other
numbers, is still equal to all others by being a number.
In the third reply we may note an example of accidental
subordination. A scrupulous man, preparing a sermon, speaks
thus: Since I may be laboring in pride, I ought to elicit an
act of humility. But is not this humility itself an act of pride,
since I wish to be more humble than others? I must pause to
examine myself. But does not this examination itself proceed
from pride? And thus ad infinitum.
ART. 5. CAN ONE MAN HAVE MANY ULTIMATE PURPOSES?

Unity, keystone unity, is here in question. We ask: first,
can one man have many ultimate purposes (art. 5); second,
is man’s every act directed to that last end (art. 6); third, do
all men have one and the same goal (art. 7); fourth, do all
creatures have the same ultimate goal (art. 8).
Can one man, either actually or virtually, aim simultane­
ously at many and diverse ultimates? That is the precise ques­
tion in the present article. The question is posed from the
subjective angle (purpose), but in relation to the objective
angle (goal).

Initial Difficulties
1. St. Augustine refers to some writers who defend four
ultimates: pleasure, tranquillity, natural goods, and virtue.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

51

2. There are many ultimates which are not mutually ex­
clusive.
3. Man can successively choose as his goal, first, pleasure,
second, virtue. If man has free will, why can he not choose
pleasure and virtue also simultaneously?
The Demonstration
A. By authorities. “No one can serve two masters.” 11 God
and Mammon are mutually exclusive. They “whose belly is
their God” cannot have virtue as their goal. “He who is not
with Me is against Me.” This sentence excludes indifference
and neutrality in relation to one last goal.
B. The argument. The argument is threefold. St. Thomas
generally gives but one reason, the formal demonstrative
medium. When he gives a number of reasons he orders them,
not by mechanical juxtaposition, but by organic intercon­
nection. The three operative terms in this article are, first,
perfect good, second, the first natural good, third, the first
differentiating good. “Perfect good,” the very definition of
ultimate purpose, is the terminus ad quern. “The first natural
good,” the very nature of the will, is the terminus a quo. “The
first differentiating good,” i.e., the source which makes acts
human, is the transition from the ad quern to the a quo. The
first reason is the more fundamental and formal. The other
two are confirmations.
These three reasons can be given simultaneously, as follows:
No man can simultaneously desire (a) two goods, each of
which is perfectly satiative, leaving nothing to be desired;
(b) two first and perfect goods, each of which is naturally de­
sirable; (c) two first and primary goods, each of which is the
prime genus of human appetite. But the ultimate goal is a
good that perfectly satiates all desires; the first good that is
naturally desirable; the good that constitutes the prime genus
of human appetites. Therefore it is impossible that one man’s
will can simultaneously have two diverse ultimate goals.
11 Matt. 6:24.

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Clarifications

The ultimate purpose, we say, is a good which perfectly
satiates all desires, in the sense that it excludes, not all other
goods, but all goods not subordinated to itself. Thus the carnal
sinner, who finds in lust his ultimate purpose, may desire also
food, drink, honors, and riches, but all these as subordinated
to lust. But full subordination of all else to one vice is perhaps
a rare occurrence, since the sinner’s ultimate purpose is not
the object of each particular sin, but rather selfishness, that
is, the love of self above all else, even above God.
Again: When we say that the ultimate goal is the first object
naturally desired, and that it is the good which constitutes
the prime genus of human appetites, we mean that every
man’s first and natural desire is to be happy, and that there­
fore, even though unconsciously, he tends to love God more
than himself, because natural inclination as such is always
good and right.
A Confirmation

The ultimate goal is never subordinated to any other goal,
but puts all else in subordination to itself. But in the hypothe­
sis of two such ultimate goals, neither could be subordinated
to the other. Hence the hypothesis of two (or more) ultimate
goals is an absurd hypothesis.

Initial Difficulties Answered
1. Pleasure, tranquillity, and virtue can be considered as
partial constituents of one whole.
2. Health, virtue, and God are not indeed mutually ex­
clusive. But perfect good, the ultimate goal, does exclude all
and everything unsubordinated to itself.
3. Man is free, yes, even after he has chosen an ultimate
goal. But freedom cannot bring two contradictories into simul­
taneous existence. Now two ultimates, each perfectly satiating,

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

53

are contradictories. Each would, and each would not, be per­
fectly satiative.

Three Further Difficulties
1. Cannot man, being free, desire a second ultimate, as

something overabundant and superfluous? No. That which
is overabundant and superfluous cannot be an ultimate
goal, which must necessarily be the principal object of the
will.
2. One and the same man, for instance, guilty of theft,
homicide, and adultery, may have for each of these three sins
a separate and disparate motive. If so, will he not have in view
three ultimate goals?
The answer is again no. The positive root of all sin is
selfishness, i.e., the love of self above all else, and this selfish­
ness, this egoism, is the sinner’s ultimate goal, to which all
his sins are subordinated. Egoism, scorning God, builds the
City of Babylon, as love of God and scorn of self build the
City of God. Love of God, the virtue of charity, binds all
virtues into one. Egoism, selfishness, counterfeit love of self,
is the source and goal of all sin.
3. But what of him who sins venially? He does not lose
God as his ultimate goal, yet his sinful act, since it does not
have God as goal, must be done for some created good, which
is therefore a second ultimate goal.
Full answer to this difficulty will come in the next article.
For the moment, let us note 12 that the goal of venial sin is
not the love of a created good above all else, for that is the
goal of mortal sin. Nor is God the goal, except negatively, in
the sense that venial sin does not destroy man’s relation to
God as goal. But the goal of venial sin is good in general, seen
here and now as satisfying man’s desire.
The present article deals formally and primarily with man’s
last end, i.e., with perfect good, whenever found. Only second12 With Cajetan, Contenson, Billuart, Sylvius, and others.

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arily is it concerned with the object wherein perfect good is
found.
ART. 6. DOES MAN WILL HIS EVERY ACT FOR A

LAST END?

In every deliberate act, man acts for a purpose. The ques­
tion now is: Does man will all his acts for one ultimate pur­
pose? We expect an affirmative answer, but we must first note
the initial difficulties, which were later developed by Scotus
against St. Thomas.

Initial Difficulties
1. Man sometimes acts jocosely, and jocose acts are not
done for an ultimate purpose. Scotus later says: Jocose acts
are indifferent acts, not only specifically, but also as found
in the individual who indulges in them.
2. Any speculative branch of knowledge (e.g., mathematics
or metaphysics) is pursued for its own sake, but is not never­
theless an ultimate goal.
3. Man does not always think of an ultimate goal. How,
then, can he always act for such a goal?
The Argument

St. Thomas begins by quoting St. Augustine, who says that
the ultimate goal is that by reason of which all other things
are loved.
The conclusion runs thus: Whatever man deliberately de­
sires, he desires for an ultimate goal, at least virtually and im­
plicitly (this last phrase is from the third solution).
We present first, the arguments of St. Thomas; secondly
their interpretation, since on this last point his commentators
do not entirely agree.
There are two proofs. The first runs thus: Anything a man
desires he desires because it seems to be a good thing. But if
what he desires is not that perfect good which is his ultimate
purpose, then it must be something subordinated to that per­

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

55

feet good and ultimate purpose. Hence whatever man de­
liberately desires, he desires by reason of his ultimate goal.
To explain. A beginning, in any line, is subordinated to
consummation. Examples are, in nature, the germ of a plant,
in art, the foundation of a building.
Primarily, as we said above, the conclusion holds good of
the subjective ultimate purpose, and only secondarily of the
object wherein blessedness is to be found, and this in diverse
modes, since the man who desires may be either a viator or
one of the blessed or one of the damned. Thus the blessed,
who see God face to face, cannot sin, even venially, whereas
a damned soul, loving itself selfishly above all else, cannot do
any good deed. The viator wills everything for his own sub­
jective beatitude, and can sin venially, though such acts
neither turn him away from God nor yet lead him to God.
The second proof proceeds thus: The ultimate purpose is
the prime mover in eliciting desire. Now secondary movers,
second causes, move only as moved by the prime mover. Hence
only as subordinated to the ultimate goal can secondary mo­
tives move man’s will.
Here, again, we are dealing primarily with the formal last
end, and only secondarily with the object wherein that formal
end is found. But note that the mother-idea is becoming ever
more distinct.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Jocose actions aim at the good of the man who does
them, whether that good is genuine (e.g., to study better) or
counterfeit (to enjoy more a life of luxury).
2. Knowledge for its own sake is in opposition to the
utility aimed at by the mechanical arts. Speculative knowl­
edge, then, while thus distinguished by its proximate pur­
pose, aims ultimately at the good state of him who pursues it.
Here enters a scholion, on the purpose of meditation. Medi­
tation may be an act of the virtue of prudence, entered into
in order to do one’s duty better. But it may also be an act

BEATITUDE
5θ
of the virtue of faith, entered into in order to love God better.
But love of God is related to love of neighbor, not as a means
to an end, but as pre-eminent cause to its effect.
3. Even when he is not actually thinking of his ultimate
goal, man’s every deliberate act arises in him in virtue of that
ultimate goal (yirtualiter). The traveler’s destination governs
his every step, whatever he may be thinking of at every
step.

Difficulties Raised by Scotus

Against St. Thomas, Scotus holds that man can act de­
liberately without aiming at beatitude and even against be­
atitude. He argues thus:
1. The will follows the intellect. But the intellect may not
be thinking of beatitude.
We answer thus: The will follows the intellect, yes, but in
two ways: either by actual intention (when the intellect is
thinking of purpose), or by virtual intention (when the intel­
lect is not thinking of purpose).
2. The will follows the intellect. But the intellect can
think of something in itself good, without thinking of it as
good toward a goal.
We answer: “Without thinking of an object wherein that
good exists,” yes; but without thinking of that good as part of
his own happiness, no. Beginning necessarily aims at consum­
mation.
3. Even while he remains certain that beatitude is found
only in God, a man can will, for instance, the sin of fornica­
tion. Now such a man wills something against beatitude.
We answer: “Against the object wherein beatitude is
found,” yes; against his own desire for beatitude, no. Such
a man, here and now, tries to find happiness in sin.
Further Difficulties
A good deed, done by a sinner, must be done, at least vir­
tually, for God. But the sinner, who remains a sinner, has

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

57

something created as his goal. Hence a man may have two
ultimate goals.
Answer: The sinner’s good deed has God as ultimate goal,
in a certain sense, yes (since the object of that deed meets
with God’s approval); but, simply and absolutely, no (be­
cause, not even virtually, is the good deed done for God loved
above all else). This man cannot serve two masters. All his
deeds, good and bad, are done for one last goal, namely, him­
self, loved selfishly.
But, the arguer continues, since created good is not the ob­
ject of the sinner’s good deed, created good is no longer his
last goal.
Answer: His last goal is still his own love of self above all
else; but, since he is not confirmed in evil, he can still act
against his own evil goal, but not against his own desire for
beatitude.
But, so the arguer again, man can simply not act for his
own beatitude, because the will tends not to happiness in the
abstract, but to the concrete object which gives happiness. To
illustrate. A bath, to reach its purpose, must not remain in
abstract thought, but must become a concrete reality.
Answer: If beatitude were aimed at without relation to
me, the concrete agent, then it would remain in the abstract,
yes; but otherwise, no. When I act, I want beatitude, not in
the abstract for men in general, but for me, the concrete self.
It remains true, though, that this desire for happiness does
not become fully and simply efficacious until I choose an ob­
ject (God or myself) wherein I am to find this happiness.
But, the arguer insists, intermediate motives, like inter­
mediate agents, must be concrete and existing realities.
Answer: “Like intermediate agents’’ is an ambiguous
phrase. Physical agents, having physical causality, must be
concrete and existing realities. But intermediate moral mo­
tives, exercising final causality, move simply by being known.
Here lies condemnation of Quietism, which tells the holy
soul to love God without any thought of its own beatitude.

58

BEATITUDE

The holy soul must love its own beatitude, but subordinates
that beatitude to the glory of God, whom it loves more than
it loves itself.
A fourth insistence: Do we not often choose some particu­
lar good without thinking at all of any ultimates?
Answer: Without thinking of ultimates expressly and ex­
plicitly, yes; without thinking of them implicitly and tacitly,
no.
Fifth and last insistence: But if man is free, why can he
not refuse to will his own happiness?
Answer: Man can refuse to exercise his freedom, yes (by
going to sleep, or by getting drunk); but if he exercises his
power of choice, he must choose something in some way sub­
ordinated to his own well-being.
Venial Sin

When the just man, who finds his happiness in God, still
commits venial sin, is God in some way the object of that
sin? Some Thomists say yes, and explain: God is the object,
not positively but negatively, permissively, and habitually,
since venial sin does not destroy the sinner’s habit of charity.
We hold that these expressions, though not false, are still im­
proper, because God cannot, in any proper sense, be the ob­
ject of sin. These authors fail to distinguish clearly the state
of man as wayfarer from his state of blessedness or of damna­
tion.
A better solution is given by Cajetan, who is followed by
Billuart, Sylvius, and Contenson: namely, that everything a
man does, venial sin included, is done for man’s well-being,
but not necessarily for that object wherein his well-being is
found. The present article, says Cajetan, deals primarily with
man’s desire for happiness, whereas the question of the object
which will satisfy that desire is the precise question in the
next article.
To illustrate. The Christian, in the state of mortal sin,
can elicit an act of hope, the ultimate end of which is God,
inefficaciously loved. But the sense of our thesis here is that the

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

5g

ultimate aim of every human act is the object which we
efficaciously intend. No one can serve two masters.
St. Thomas on Venial Sin
The acts of a Christian are either good or bad. If good,
they aim at God, either perfectly or imperfectly. If bad,
they are either venially bad (and have no ultimate concrete
aim), or then, mortally bad (and aim at some created good
as ultimate). The ultimate in anyone’s venial sin is his own
well-being, not found here and now simply in God (else it
would not be sin at all), nor simply in created good loved
supremely (else it would be grievous sin). But if venial sin
has no ultimate concrete end, then venial sin is impossible.
Impossible, the Saint replies, in the angels, yes; in men who
are still wayfarers, no. Man, the wayfarer, does not, like the
angel, have intuitive knowledge, which sees instantaneously
all conclusions in their principles, all acts in their last con­
crete end. Hence, while angels, if they sin, must sin mortally,
men, as long as they are wayfarers, can sin, not only grievously,
but also venially.
In conclusion, we give three more statements from the
Saint.1*
a) In venial sin man does not aim at created good as his
last concrete end.
b) In venial sin man aims at created good, not as one en­
joying (because he does not find in it his last goal), but as
one using (since, while he retains his habitual relation to
God, he actually does the deed for his own well-being).
c) Venial sin does not have created good as its ultimate
goal.
APPENDIX

Virtual Intention
“Habitual intention’’ is a term used by many moderns to
signify the intention, explicit or implicit, which St. Thomas
calls “virtual intention.”
isia-IIae, q.8g, a. i.

62

BEATITUDE

The Argument
A. St. Augustine: All men agree in aiming at one last end,
their own well-being.14
B. Two conclusions.
First. All men aim at one and the same formal end, be­
cause each desires his own happiness, his own well-being, his
own perfect state.
Second. All men do not aim at the same material end,
at one and the same object, wherein to find their own well­
being: as beatifying object, some aim at riches, some at pleas­
ure, some at knowledge. Few choose God, who alone, as we
shall see, can give happiness, even in the order of nature.
A Corollary

As man is, so man chooses. To the babe, milk means sweet­
ness. Later his intellect first knows milk as a reality, and his
will first desires that reality as good. What holds good of the
babe, holds good of all men: as they are, so they choose.
Initial Difficulties Analyzed

1. The sinner turns away from the truly beatifying object,
but not from his desire of his own well-being, which he seeks
in counterfeit beatifying objects.
2. The active life by its proximate purpose differs from the
contemplative, but each has the same ultimate goal in God.
3. Each man’s acts belong to him individually, yes. But
nature, the source of activity, is the same in all men, and
tends to the same goal in all men. And intellect and will, the
faculties by which nature acts, tend likewise to one goal, intel­
lect to the true, will to the good.
ART. 8. DO ALL CREATURES HAVE THE SAME

ULTIMATE GOAL?

The object which is the goal is one and the same for all
creatures, namely, their Creator who made them in order to
M Df Trinitate. Bk. ΧΙΠ. chan. Λ.

ULTIMATE GOAL IN GENERAL

63

manifest, each in its own way, their Creator’s goodness. “The
creature, as creature, belongs to God, and as such is inclined
to love its Creator more than it loves itself.16
But in the mode of attaining this goal, creatures differ. God
can be possessed, properly speaking, only by acts of intellect
and will, and of these acts irrational creatures are incapable.
Recapitulation

1. Man, acting deliberately, always aims at his own well­
being as ultimate purpose.
2. Voluntary acts are specifically differentiated by their ob­
jects.
3. Human life has one ultimate goal.
4. No man can aim simultaneously at two ultimate goals.
5. Man, acting deliberately, wills all his actions for one last
end, his own well-being.
6. All men agree in desiring each his own well-being, but
not in the object wherein to find their well-being.
7. All creatures have God as their ultimate goal, though
not all can know God.
All these articles proceed from one fundamental idea, the
mother-idea, evolving from that idea, as bodily organs evolve
from the embryo.
1* la, q.6o, a.5.

CHAPTER VI
Man’s Objective Beatitude

PROLOGUE
The first five questions in this part of the Summa are con­

cerned with the following:
1. primarily, with man’s formal, subjective well-being;
2. with the object wherein this well-being can be found;
3. with the activity, the beatific vision, whereby God is
possessed;
4. with the characteristics of the act whereby we possess
God;
5. with the attainment of this possession, its possibility, and
its degrees.
THE PRESENT QUESTION

These eight articles are concerned with four possibly beati­
fying objects:
a) with external goods, the goods of fortune, namely, riches
(art. 1); honors (art. 3); fame and glory (art. 3); power over
men (art. 4);
b) with bodily goods (art. 5) and sense-delights (art. 6);
c) with soul-goods, virtue, and knowledge (art. 7);
d) with any created good whatsoever (art. 8).
DIVISION OF GOODNESS

1. The good, as identified with reality, is divided into the
ten categories of reality (substance, quality, etc.).
2. The good, as good, has three divisions, based on:
64

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

65

a) its perfection, by reason of which good is either fully
good, or only in a certain sense (wine, deficient, but still wine);
b) its desirability, by reason of which good is good in
itself, or good as giving mere pleasure, or, finally, good as
the road to higher good;
c) its standard (right reason), by reason of which good is
either moral or immoral or indifferent. Moral good, identified
with good in itself, is found in man on three levels: in man
as substance (the good of self-preservation); in man as animal
(the good of begetting and educating children); in man as
endowed with reason (the good of justice toward God and
men).
The good-in-itself, even though it were not delightful or
useful, is man’s proximate standard and first duty, simply
because man is endowed with reason.
ART. 1, 2, 3, 4. CAN EXTERNAL GOODS BE
man’s BEATIFYING OBJECT?

A. The reply of revelation is clear: “Blessed are the poor in
spirit, those who mourn, . . . those who suffer persecution.”
“What doth it profit a fool to have riches, since he cannot buy
wisdom?” 1
B. Reason itself sees this truth. If “blessedness means that
perfect good which totally satiates man’s longings,” then, for
three reasons, external goods are not the beatifying object.
1. Goods found in bad men cannot be the beatifying
object. But external goods are possessed, not only by good
men, but also by bad men.
2. Goods that are incomplete are not the beatifying ob­
ject. But external goods are incomplete (they do not, e.g.,
include health and wisdom).
3. Goods that, while useful, are insecure and transitory
cannot be the beatifying object. But external goods, while
useful, are insecure and transitory.
This last argument condemns utilitarianism, which sets
1 Prov. 17:16.

BEATITUDE

66

up usefulness as the supreme standard of morality and hap­
piness.
Looking at particular external goods, we argue thus:
The external goods of fortune are more gloriously lost than
retained. The Apostle looks on temporal goods as manure,
which, heaped up, stinks, but when scattered on the field, is
transformed into bountiful harvests. This holds good, not only
of riches, but also of honors, dignities, and power over men.
How many popes, writes Gonet, died soon after their supreme
elevation. Thus pass all the glories of the world. We add a
particularized proof for the first four articles.
1. Wealth cannot be the beatifying object. Wealth, money,
the reward of human art and industry, is intended to serve
natural wealth: food, drink, clothing, shelter. These in turn,
as means of self-preservation, are subordinated to man, inferior
to man. Gold, in contrast to wisdom, is but a small heap of
sand. Fools think otherwise. But human standards should not
be set up by fools.
Further, wealth, however great, longs for ever greater
wealth. Its insufficiency is best known by its owner. But the
beatifying object, the more it is possessed, the more it is loved
and appreciated.
2. Honors cannot be the beatifying object. Honor, to be
genuine, presupposes virtue. In contrast to the ambitious man,
the magnanimous man aims, not at honor, but at honorable
deeds, which he esteems much more than the honor which
may or may not follow. “If you would be first, become a
servant.” Humble yourself, if you would be exalted.
3. Human glory is not the beatifying object. Glory rests
on human knowledge, often defective. Again, true glory does
not cause, rather it presupposes, that excellence which is the
source of blessedness. The canonized glory of the saint pre­
supposes the saint’s beatitude.
Divine glory, by contrast, God’s approving knowledge, is
the cause of the saint’s beatitude. “1 will deliver him, glorify
him, show him that I am his savior.” 2 To St. Thomas, still on
2 Pc 1E*IK

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

67

earth, Christ spoke the glorifying words: “Thou hast written
well of Me.” Genuinely glorious is he whom God commends.
4. Power over others is not the beatifying object. Rulers
often misuse their power. Power is attended by cares and fears.
Power is exercised over others, and is therefore a transitive
thing, which presupposes an excellence immanent in the
ruler who is to lead others to beatitude. The genuine “super­
man” is the supernatural man, who rules in superhuman
fashion, as instrument of the Holy Spirit. Only he who serves
God can rule men. Blessed are the meek, the humble, the
obedient. “Blessed those who rule others:” Christ never said
that.
Summary: External goods, the goods of fortune, may serve
as instruments in attaining beatitude, but can never be the
beatifying object.
ART. 5. BODILY EXCELLENCE IS NOT THE

BEATIFYING OBJECT

Materialists, who hold that man’s death is the end of his
existence, must find the beatifying object in man’s bodily ex­
cellence. Against them we argue as follows:
A. Common sense sees that man, in some real way, sur­
passes the animal world. But in bodily excellences man often
yields to beasts: to the elephant, in duration; to the lion, in
strength.
Our opponents insist that in brain power, the chief bodily
excellence, man transcends all beasts. Here enters the two­
fold argument of the present corpus.
B. 1. The primary purpose of the ship is the ship’s destina­
tion, not the ship’s preservation. The example illustrates a
principle: Destination is more important than self-preserva­
tion. Nothing less than the supreme good, which man does
not have but only desires, can be the beatifying object. Man,
who is limited in so many ways, cannot be the supreme good.
Hence his bodily excellences (health, strength, speed, skill)
cannot be the beatifying object.
2. Man’s soul is more imnortant than his hndv since nn his

BEATITUDE

68

immortal and subsistent soul depends the existence of his body.
Even if, therefore, self-preservation were the beatifying ob­
ject, bodily excellence could not be that object.
Difficulties Analyzed

1. As external goods are subordinated to the body, so is the
body subordinated to the soul.
2. Existence is higher than life, yes, if you are talking of
God’s unreceived existence. But no, if you are talking of that
received existence, shared in even by the stone.
3. Not self-preservation, but assimilation to the Creator, is
the creature’s ultimate purpose.
ART. 6. PLEASURE IS NOT THE BEATIFYING OBJECT

The word “pleasure,” which means primarily sense-pleasure,
includes in its wider meaning also intellectual pleasure, poetic
and philosophical pleasure. Pleasure, says Aristotle, is the
natural consequence of any operation perfect in its kind.

Initial Difficulties
1. Pleasure, since it is sought for its own sake, must be the
beatifying object.
2. Pleasure, since it makes man scorn all other goods, must
be the beatifying object.
3. Pleasure, since it is the goal of all men, whether wise or
foolish, must be the beatifying object.
These objections stem from the hedonists, especially
Epicurus.
The Response

A. Boethius 3 and Plato 4 are our authorities. The supreme
good, says Plato, cannot be found in pleasure, because pleasure
can be evil.
B. We have two proofs.
3 Bk. Ill, no. 7.
4 De voluptate, 21b.

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

69

1. Pleasure, since it presupposes the possession of good,
is indeed a characteristic of beatitude, but cannot be the es­
sence of beatitude. Pleasure arises from some possession, pres­
ent (in re) or future (in spe) or past (in memoria). Just as, to
quote Aristotle, beauty does not constitute youthful vitality,
but is a consequence which manifests that vitality, so likewise
is pleasure the consequence and expression of successful
activity.
2. Much less can corporeal pleasure be the beatifying
object. Man’s soul, transcending matter, rises above all sensetransmitted pleasure, to the pleasures attained by man’s in­
tellect in the possession of universal truth, and by man’s will
in the possession of the universal good. “All irrational beings
taken together, the firmament, the stars, the earth and all its
kingdoms, are of less value than the lowest of spirits, since the
spirit knows that entire irrational world, and also knows it­
self, whereas the corporeal world knows nothing at all.” ·

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Is pleasure aimed at for its own sake? As an inseparable
consequence of the good possessed, yes. As direct and formal
motive of activity, no. Eating, to illustrate, by aiming at
corporeal preservation, results in the pleasure which mani­
fests the good act performed. Thus, if we distinguish the joys
of heaven from the possession of God, of which those joys are
the inseparable consequences, we see how the saints love
themselves as a consequence of the love they have for God.
2. Is corporeal pleasure the chief motive of human appetite?
If chief motive means, “motive the most easily perceived,”
yes. If it means, “motive in itself most noble and effective,” no.
3. Is pleasure the most universal motive? As an inseparable
consequence of aiming at the good, yes. As something to which
good itself is subordinated, no.
The greatest pleasure, then, the highest joy, results from the
possession of the supreme good. But this highest joy must be
» Pascal. Pensées.

70

BEATITUDE

distinguished, both from the supreme good (the beatifying
object), and from the possession of that object (by the beatific
vision).
ART. 7. IS VIRTUE THE BEATIFYING OBJECT?

Preliminaries
The controversy here is with the Stoics, ancient and modern.
Rational activity, life according to man’s nature, was the
watchword of the ancient Stoics. Permanent fortitude of will
results in harmony with all men. “Man sacred to man” con­
demns slavery. Harmony with all men leads to harmony with
the whole universe, since divine reason (here pantheism enters)
is the soul of the universe.
The wise man, then, the Stoic philosopher, transcends the
limits of family, city, and country, and becomes a cosmopoli­
tan, a citizen of the universe, subject only to fate, which leads
him who is willing, and drags him who is unwilling. Passion,
the Stoic says, since it is the enemy of virtue, must be destroyed,
by patience and abstinence. Says Epictetus: Sustain and ab­
stain. Be a man, strong against passion and pleasure, tranquil
in fortune and misfortune. Pleasure and pain are meaningless.
Virtue is its own reward.
This ancient Stoic school was indeed a school of courage
and constancy, but it was likewise a school of pride. Further, it
denied free will by its pantheism, its universal determinism,
which ended in fatalism. As an ethical system, although it
seemed to be superhuman, it was in truth inhuman, indifferent
when faced with human joy and pain.
Echoes of this ancient Stoicism are still heard in later times.
Spinoza’s system, though he ascends to contemplation of divine
good, is still pantheistic, since he looks on man’s intelligence
as a mode of divine thought; Spinoza’s system, like ancient
Stoicism, denies free will and merit.
Stoic elements remain also in Kant’s ethical system, wherein
man’s rational dignity is the supreme motive of man’s activity.
Thus this system leads to “anthropolatry,” to the worship of

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

71

man, just as the altruism of Comte leads to “sociolatry,” to
the worship of society.
What are the arguments which seem to show that virtue is
the beatifying object? Three such arguments are noted by St.
Thomas:
1. The beatifying object, since it can be neither external
good nor bodily excellence, must be an intrinsic good in man’s
soul.
2. Since we love a person more than the gift we give him,
and therefore love our own person more than we love all other
goods, the beatifying object must be our own personal virtue
and value.
3. Since beatitude means perfection, and perfection is some­
thing intrinsic in man’s soul, beatitude must consist in virtue.
Virtue, Soul-good, Cannot Be the Beatifying Object

A. Our authority is St. Augustine: Man, and all that is in
man, must be loved for the sake of God, who is infinitely better
than man, and from whom comes all good that man has.0
We have two conclusions, one concerned with the beatifying
object, the other with subjective beatitude.
A. The soul itself, being a potentiality capable of receiving
knowledge and virtue, cannot be its own actual and beatifying
object.
Further, all soul-goods (knowledge, virtue), taken singly or
collectively, are not a perfect and universal good, and cannot,
therefore, be the beatifying object. In God alone, says Cajetan,
is found unlimited and absolute good, whereas created goods
are necessarily limited. Man’s nature, says St. Thomas, desires
complete goodness, but the object which gives that complete
goodness is not determined by nature. All soul-goods, says
Koellin, are limited, and hence cannot satiate man’s desire.
Just as the adequate object of the intellect, as Billuart says, is
simply all truth, so the adequate object of the will is simply
eCf. Ila-IIae, q.26, a. 3.

BEATITUDE

all good, and God alone, since He precontains all created good,
is simply and absolutely all good.
Inductively, too, we reach the same conclusion. Look at the
values inherent in the soul (powers, habits, acts, all knowledge,
scientific or artistic, all virtues, even the most heroic): each of
these, being an accident, not only is a limited good, but has an
ulterior purpose: powers and habits end in acts; intellectual
acts end in truth, and ultimately in the supreme truth; volun­
tary acts end in goodness, and ultimately in the supreme and
unlimited good, to which are subordinated all good in all
souls, and all single virtues, all prudence, justice, fortitude, and
temperance.
Against the ancient Stoics, then, and against our modern
subjectivists, we must maintain that the virtues, all and singly,
are subordinated to the supreme Good which is their ultimate
goal. Virtue is the road to happiness, but the road is not the
goal. Virtue aims at regulating, not at satiating, man’s appetites
and desires. Beatitude is the reward of virtue, but virtue is not
itself beatitude.
B. Beatitude, considered formally and subjectively, inheres
in the soul. Since formal beatitude means to possess and enjoy
supreme Good, and since man possesses this Good by his in­
tellect and will, we must conclude that formal beatitude resides
and inheres in man’s soul.
Here we must note, with Koellin: “Not human act as such,
but act as possessing infinite Good, can satisfy man’s desires.
Possession (the finis quo), and the object possessed or desired
(finis qui) are not two separate goals, but rather two related
aspects of one and the same goal.”
A Corollary

The Stoics, ancient and modern, put too much value on
themselves, do not look high enough to see God, the supreme
Good. Even in Nietzsche’s “superman” nothing is found to
transcend man. The only genuine “superman” is the super­
natural man, the saint, who lives, not for himself, but for God,
who lives and acts for God, his friend supreme.

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

73

Difficulties Analyzed

1. Goods are external, bodily, and spiritual. This enumera­
tion is incomplete unless it includes God, the supreme good.
2. When we give a gift to a friend, we love the friend as
him to whom (finis cut), but we love the gift as what we give
(finis qui). Thus, in friendship with God, by the virtue of
charity, we wish to give God His own infinite goodness, and,
secondarily, to give that same infinite goodness both to our­
selves and to our neighbor.
3. Man’s perfection is something intrinsic in man. Yes, if
you are talking about formal, subjective beatitude; no, if you
are talking about the beatifying object.
ART. 8. NOTHING CREATED CAN BE THE

BEATIFYING OBJECT

Initial Difficulties
1. Each lower level of creation finds its goal in the next
higher level: vegetation in sense-activity, sense-activity (artistic
imagination, say) in rational activity. Hence man ought to find
his goal in the next higher level of creation, i.e., in the angels.
2. Man, being but a part of the universe, should find his
goal in that universe, since parts exist for the sake of the whole.
3. Man’s natural desire, since it is created and limited, can­
not receive a good which is uncreated and unlimited.
Proof of the Thesis
A. The Lord is my portion forever.7 Patristic texts are
numerous. Two sentences of St. Augustine are often quoted:
“As the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of man.”
“Thou hast made us, O Lord, for Thyself, and restless is our
heart till it rests in Thee.” 8 To the question of Christ ad­
dressed to St. Thomas: “What shall be thy reward,” the Saint
replied: “Nothing but Thyself, O Lord.”
i Ps. 15 and Ps. 72.
e Confess., Bk. I.

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B. Nothing created can be the beatifying object, because
nothing created can satiate man’s natural desire.
This argument rests on the principle that natural desires are
never in vain. Man’s will aims at the universal good, just as
man’s mind aims at universal truth. And universal good, good
that totally satiates desire, cannot be found in any or all created
and limited goods.
Here we must again note that the word “good” is not used
as an abstract predicate, because the will aims at the good
actually existing in the concrete object. Nor does the word
“good” refer directly to God, who is the total plenitude of
goodness. What the word does directly refer to is good as such,
good unlimited, uncontracted. And the conclusion is that such
unlimited good, existing as an actual and concrete object, is
to be found in God and God alone.
We may add this reflection. Let us suppose all the limited
goods of the universe to be multiplied to infinity. Such an
infinity of finite goods, were it even an actual infinity, would
never be an infinite good, just as an actually infinite number
of irrational animals would never make one man, or as an in­
finite number of fools would never make one sage.
Here lies the source of that deep dissatisfaction and bore­
dom which are the intolerable burden of worldly men. Only in
God can the human heart find rest.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. The human will, like the angelic will, aims at that uni­
versal and unlimited good which is found in God alone. The
intuitive vision of even the highest angel could never satiate
man’s desire, because the angel is and remains a creature.
2. The universe in relation to its parts may be an inter­
mediate goal, but never an ultimate goal. Thus, whereas the
active life serves society, the contemplative life aims directly
at glorifying God, the supreme good. Again, schism, a sin
against ecclesiastical society, is not as great a sin as is infidelity,
which is a sin against God.

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

75

Here enters a question: Does the human individual exist
to serve society (communism), or does society exist to serve the
individual (liberalism)?
Communism and liberalism are two extremes. Between and
above these extremes runs the golden middle way. The in­
dividual, in temporal matters, serves society; but in eternal
things he rises above civil society, since he is a fellow citizen
of the saints, a member of the household of God. In defense
of his country the citizen must be willing even to shed his
blood. But civil authority, on the otherhand, while its proxi­
mate goal is the well-being of society, has as its ultimate goal
that eternal life which is the end of all human activity. Man’s
active life, then, his lower and external life, is subordinated
to society. But man’s contemplative life, his higher and in­
ternal life, transcends civil life.
Here we note the distinction between “individual” and
“person.” The animal is an individual, but not a person. Man
is both an individual and a person. Man, as an individual, is
subordinated to society, whereas society is subordinated to
man as a person. Thus in the spiritual order (as person) man is
bound to provide first for himself, whereas in the temporal
order (as individual) man is praiseworthy when he is generous
in providing for his neighbor. Again, virginity excels matri­
mony, because divine values surpass human values. And pri­
vate spiritual good stands higher than common civil good.
Here too lies the reason why the secrets of man’s heart are
not really parts of the universe, and hence cannot naturally be
known.
3. Man is incapable of receiving an uncreated and infinite
good. Yes, we answer, if he is to receive it intrinsically, as an
attribute of his inner self. But no, if he is to receive it as
object, eternally distinct from himself. Thus, even in the
natural order, we would know and love God as our beatifying
object.
But is not man’s desire a limited and finite thing? Limited,
yes, as a being, but still so insatiable that it cannot be satiated

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even with an actually infinite number of finite and limited
values.
But, you may insist, subjective beatitude, being finite,
should be satisfied with a beatifying object which is finite.
Answer: Subjective beatitude, as an elicited act, is finite, yes,
yet so that its object is not finite.
But then, you insist, man would have to possess infinite
knowledge of God. This does not follow. Only God’s knowl­
edge of Himself is infinite.
But then a lower saint would desire a higher knowledge of
God. No. The lowest saint is fully satiated, just as the man with
the least hunger is satiated, though he eats less than others.
But, lastly, the saint who possesses God still has other desires:
glorification of his body, e.g., and the salvation of his relatives.
Answer: He desires these things as consequence and extension
of his possession of God, yes. In any other sense, no. All goods
that man can desire pre-exist in God, in higher fashion than
they exist in themselves.

Corollaries
1. Temporal goods are to be sought only as ways and means
to spiritual values.
2. External goods, while looked upon by the Stoics as in no
sense good, are good as instruments of higher goods.
3. Temporal goods are not the reward of virtue, and their
loss is not primarily the punishment of sin.
4. God distributes temporal good and evil in such fashion
as to promote virtue.
5. Temporal goods given to a sinner, though often in fact
tending to evil, are intended to lead him back to God.
6. Spiritual goods are permanently satiative, but temporal
goods are not.
7. Temporal goods attract in anticipation, but disgust when
actually attained. Spiritual goods act inversely.
8. Spiritual goods do not taste well to those whose appetite
is spoiled by sense-indulgence.

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77

9. Spiritual goods, but not corporeal goods, remain full and
entire when shared with others. Two men cannot simultane­
ously own one and the same house, or eat one and the same
article of food. But two men can simultaneously possess wis­
dom, virtue, and God. Matter divides, spirit unites.·
APPENDIX

Plato and Aristotle on the Supreme Good
Plato. Plato 10 sets up a stairway of beauty: from love of
bodily beauty (sounds and colors) man rises to beauty of soul,
because bodily beauty comes from the soul, which gives the
body motion and life. Further, soul-beauty comes from noble
deeds, noble deeds from elevated doctrines and precepts, and
elevated doctrines depend on the highest branch of knowledge,
which has as object self-subsistent beauty and good. What
felicity it would be, he cries out, what a blessed vision would
be his, who beholds beauty itself, beauty pure, perfect, and
simple, uncontaminated by human flesh, by colors, by all
mortal trifles, a beauty uniformly permanent and divine!
Would not such a man be truly virtuous, truly a friend of God,
truly an immortal among mortal men?
Thus Plato, following Socrates in condemning sophistic
utilitarianism, holds that beatitude does not consist chiefly in
sense-pleasure, though it includes higher pleasures. Further,
he holds that God, the supreme good, is man’s beatifying ob­
ject, to be attained by him who by virtuous life imitates God.
And the supreme virtue, higher than temperance, fortitude,
justice, prudence, is that wisdom which is chiefly occupied with
the contemplation of the supreme good.
Further, Plato affirms the immortality of the soul, since even
here on earth man’s mind knows unchangeable and universal
truth. Good souls, after death, are rewarded by association with
the gods, but wicked souls will be tortured. But will punish9On these corollaries, cf. Ia-IIae, q.87, a.7, and Ila-IIae, q.20, a.4, and la,
q.28, a.4.
10 Convivium, chap. 29.

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ment be eternal? Here Plato speaks uncertainly, basing his
view on traditional myths. Thus he speaks of souls which,
though evil, can still be cured, and hence return to a new body
for a new trial (metempsychosis, transmigration of souls). But,
although at times he speaks plainly both of eternal punishment
and eternal reward, he elsewhere seems to say that all souls
will ultimately attain beatitude.
To understand Plato, while we acknowledge his genius, we
must recall two errors: first, his absolute and exaggerated
realism which leads to pantheism: secondly, his exaggerated
dualism, which, while favoring the immortality of the soul,
still looks on the body, not as the soul's substantial instrument,
but rather as a burden and hindrance. Yet, notwithstanding
these aberrations, Plato definitely finds man’s beatifying ob­
ject in God, the Author of nature, known, not abstractly, but
concretely and intuitively. Further, although he does not
speak of the eternal law as the supreme law of morality, his
philosophy does lead naturally to God as the supreme moral
norm, since God formed the universe and all its laws.
Aristotle.11 How does man reach that beatitude which his
nature desires? Not by pleasure or by riches or by power or
even by virtue, but, as Plato said, by contemplating God.
Dispositions for this contemplation are the moral virtues, and
secondarily, bodily health and sufficiency of external goods.
Contemplation is beatitude, because it is the highest act of
man’s highest faculty, exercised on the highest of objects,
namely, the supreme good. Contemplation is characterized by
its permanency, its delightfulness, its self-sufficiency, its su­
premacy. The contemplative life is full human life, almost a
superhuman and divine life, because man’s mind is something
divine, even while man is mortal. Let man live by what is best
in his soul, his intellect, by which he is man. Soul-life, mind­
life, is of all lives the best and most delightful. Little at best
is man’s knowledge of higher beings, but that little is more
lovely and desirable than all man can know of lower beings.
11 Ethica ad Nicomachum, Bk. I, chaps. 2-7; Bk. X, chap. 7.

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

79

These affirmations, as being in harmony with truth, become,
in St. Thomas, the natural foundation of supernatural
morality.
But Aristotle speaks only of beatitude in the present life. On
the future life he is silent. Since the soul is the form of the
body, how can the separated soul think, since it cannot employ
as instruments the sense-powers which reside in the body? Nor
does he speak explicitly of the supreme standard of morality,
though he maintains that justice is something objective, based
on nature. Nor did he reach an explicit knowledge of creation.
DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS AS PROOF OF GOD’S EXISTENCE

Preliminaries

1. This proof is virtually identified with St. Thomas’ fourth
way, which shows the necessary dependence of imperfect goods
on an actual infinite Good, which makes them one in good­
ness. St. Thomas, like Plato, rises from multitude to unity,
from composition to simplicity, from received good to the
Good unreceived.
2. From the viewpoint of morality, we present this argu­
ment as follows: Since natural desire can never be in vain, and
since all men naturally desire beatitude, there must exist an
objective being that is infinitely perfect, a being that man can
possess, love, and enjoy.
This argument12 rests first, on inductive evidence, secondly,
on metaphysical evidence. Inductively, we take examples: the
natural desire of life for air, of self-preservation for food, of
the ox for grass, of the lion for meat. We quote illustrations
from the words of Christ: the birds of heaven, fed by the
heavenly Father, the foxes who have their burrows. We quote
the Psalms and Job: The swallow finds a house, the dove a
nest, the young crows find food. To all these illustrations, the
cynic, pointing to individual cases of starvation, fails to see
12 Father Gredt’s formulations of this argument (Elementa, Vol. Π) are not
quite correct and precise.

8o

BEATITUDE

that exceptions prove the law, that the natural desire of living
things for life is not a desire that is idle and in vain, but a
desire that is fulfilled in the endless propagation of the race.
But do all men naturally desire beatitude? Again, induction
says yes. Neither sensual pleasure nor riches, nor honor nor
power nor science nor even friendship can satisfy man’s natural
desire, which remains unsatiated until its rests in the supreme
good. All else is “vanity of vanities” and affliction of spirit.
Metaphysically considered, our two propositions are like­
wise evident. A natural desire cannot be in vain, because nature
tends to an object that is real, not merely imaginary. If any
action could be without some natural purpose, it could not
exist at all, since everything that exists has a sufficient reason
for its existence. This truth is particularly true in relative
beings, like desire or sight or hearing, since their whole nature
is a tendency to something else which is their object. Thus the
human will’s natural tendency cannot be idle and in vain.
Again. Good exists in actually existing objects. Hence, since
man’s desire tends to good as such, to a boundless and un­
limited good, this infinite good really exists.

Clarifications

This argument rests, not on man’s natural desire to see God
face to face, but on man’s desire for natural happiness, a desire
which is innate, identified with the will itself, a desire which
is quasi-infinite, insatiable by any finite good. Seen thus, this
argument is an apodictic proof of God’s existence. “One sigh
of man’s soul for perfect happiness is a supergeometric demon­
stration of the existence of God.” Supergeometric, we say, be­
cause it is metaphysical, based on principles on which depend
mathematical principles. Metaphysical, yet simple, since
Christ’s word, that “the clean of heart will see God,” holds
good proportionally also in the natural order.
Is our argument identical with that of Blondel and others,
who try to prove God’s existence from man’s immanent desire
for God? Superficially, yes, in reality, no. These philosophers,

OBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

81

since in various degrees they follow Kant in doubting the
validity of speculative reason, affirm in its stead the primacy
of practical reason, which, objectively insufficient, is neverthe­
less a subjectively sufficient basis for moral life. This con­
clusion, they add, is then confirmed by moral life itself, which
finds experimentally that God satiates man’s aspirations.
But, we must ask, if in the order of thought you mistrust
even the principle of contradiction, what assurance can you
have in the order of action? If your speculative mind is fallible,
how can your will, which follows your mind, be sure and in­
fallible?
To summarize. The existence of God is proved by man’s
natural desire for an actually existing supreme good. God,
known as the Author of nature, is the presupposition of man’s
knowledge of God as the Author of grace?’
13 God as being, as reality, is infinitely simple. But God as intelligible ob­
ject is seen in one way by reason, in another way by faith, and in a third
way by the beatific vision.

CHAPTER VII
What is Beatitude Considered Formally,
Subjectively? (q. 3)

PRELIMINARIES
Seven notable answers have been given to the question: In

what does formal beatitude essentially consist? Two answers
find that essence in an uncreated Good, which is either a re­
ception of the Divinity into the essence 1 of the soul, or an un
created knowledge of God, communicated to us by our own
unitive act.2
Five answers find this essence in a created good, which is,
either
a) a habit which deifies the essence of the soul; 3 or
b) the beatific vision; 4 or
c) the beatifying love of friendship with God; ’ or
d) the enjoyment and fruition of God; or
e) equally in the vision of God and the love of God.e
Let us begin with a synopsis of the doctrine of St. Thomas.
Formal, subjective beatitude,
1. is the created possession of uncreated Good;
2. this possession is an activity; but
3. not a sense-activity, though it is preceded and followed
by sense-activity;
4. this activity is exercised by the intellect, whereas the
consequent delight is an activity of the will;
1 Henry of Ghent. Peter Lombard’s view of charity as something uncreated.
2 Master Bonae Spei and some Belgian Carmelites.
3 St. Bonaventure (IV Sent., dist. 49, a. 1, q.i, n.5.)
« Thomists, Bellarmine, Becanus, Vasquez, Tostatus, and others.
» Scotus.
® Molina, Suarez, who thus attempt to harmonize Thomas and Scotus.

8s

FORMAL AND SUBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

83

5. it is an activity of the speculative intellect rather than of
the practical intellect;
6. it is not the natural metaphysical knowledge of God,
though this knowledge may be called imperfect beatitude;
7. it does not consist in knowing the angels;
8. but it does consist in the immediate vision of God.
These eight assertions are to be proved in the eight articles
which follow.
art. 1.
Whereas God, the beatifying object, is indeed uncreated,
unchangeable, and eternal, man's possession of this object has
a beginning, and is therefore something created. Man’s own
beatitude is received from God. Hence the blessed soul loves
God more than it loves itself. The soul’s ultimate end is the
possession of God.
art. 2.
As preliminary, let us note the six initial difficulties. How
can this possession of God be called an activity? Let us enu­
merate the difficulties.
1. The possession of God is called “eternal life;” and life
means the nature, not the mere activity, of the living thing.
2. Boethius calls beatitude “a state;” and state (permanent
condition) is surely distinct from activity.
3. Beatitude is intrinsic, whereas activity is something ex­
trinsic, something that passes from the agent into the patient.
4. Beatitude is permanent, activity passes away.
5. Beatitude is one and indivisible, whereas activities are
many (to understand, to will, to enjoy).
6. Beatitude goes on uninterrupted, whereas activities come
to an end (in sleep, e.g., or in some other activity).
The Affirmative Proof

A. Our authority is Aristotle: Felicity is the activity of
man’s most perfect power.7 This definition of natural felicity
’ Ethica, X, c.7.

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84

holds good likewise of supernatural felicity. This is eternal
life, that they know Thee, the one true God.8 The clean of
heart will see God.® Blessed souls see the divine essence, by a
vision that is intuitive.10
B. Since perfection consists in act, not potentiality, and
since man’s beatitude is his ultimate perfection, beatitude
must be an activity. Agere sequitur esse: activity is the pur­
pose of existence. Possession of the beatifying object is the
highest kind of activity.
Objections Analyzed

1. Life is of the very nature of a living thing; yes, when you
divide substances into living and nonliving. But life means
activity, when you look at the purpose for which substance
exists. By its purpose, its activity, you distinguish active life
from contemplative life.
2. Beatitude is a state (a permanent condition); yes, if you
are giving a broad definition of the beatifying object, of all
the values that are subordinated to God. But formal, subjec­
tive beatitude consists essentially, not in possessing an aggre­
gate of goods, but in possessing the supreme good by the
highest activity of our highest faculty.
3. Beatitude is an immanent activity, not a transient activ­
ity. This latter, which is truly said to be “in the agent,” is
yet more truly said to come “from the agent.” Immanent ac­
tion (sensation, understanding, will) is both from and in the
agent, perfects the agent, and can constitute his subjective
beatitude. Thus man’s immanent contemplative life stands
higher than his transient active life. And the celebration of
Mass stands higher than preaching.
4. Whereas beatitude is permanent, activity passes away.
Yes, if you refer to this life’s activity; no, if you refer to the
activity of life eternal, an activity which is measured, not by
s John 17:3.
» Matt. 5:8.
10 D. 530.

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85

time, but by eternity. Like God’s eternity, the beatific vision
is entire and simultaneous, and the light of glory, which is
its source, is not subject to variation.
5 and 6. The answer is similar. The activities of the blessed
soul are indeed many, but only one of them, the vision
whereby it possesses God, constitutes beatitude, and suffers
no interruption. The other activities of the blessed soul
(thoughts about creatures) are subject to interruption and
time.

Henry of Ghent and the Magister Bonae Spei
Many mystics seem to say that the soul’s intimate union
with God takes place, not in the operative faculties, but in
the very essence of the soul, where sanctifying grace resides.
Thus to Henry of Ghent is assigned this statement: Subjective
beatitude consists in a descent of Divinity into the essence of
the soul.
This view is contrary to authority, which finds beatitude,
not in essence, but in operation: The blessed see God, know
God, have intuitive vision of God. It is contrary likewise to
reason. God is present in the essence of the soul by producing
the soul’s existence, or by granting it sanctifying grace. But
this descent of God, since it is found in just men here on earth
and in the souls in purgatory, cannot be essential beatitude.
Further, the human soul, being a created existence, can oper­
ate only by faculties distinct from itself. Action is not identi­
fied with existence, action follows existence. The view which
is attributed to Henry of Ghent has no probability.
The same sentence must be passed on the Magister Bonae
Spei, who finds beatitude in an uncreated understanding of
God, communicated to the soul by the soul’s own act of
union with God. Against this view, let us note two truths.
1. Beatitude, the vision of God, is a vital act, performed by
a created soul. But an uncreated understanding, being identi­
fied with God Himself, can never be an act performed by a
creature.

BEATITUDE

86

2. God, the Uncreated, cannot be the effect of a created
intellect, or the form of a created intellect. God is the effi­
cient and the final cause of the universe, but cannot be either
the material or the formal cause. Even in the hypostatic union,
the divine Word, far from being the form of Christ’s human­
ity, is simply the act which terminates and renders incom­
municable the human nature of Christ.
These two views, then, that of Henry of Ghent and that of
Magister Bonae Spei, lead to the pantheism of Spinoza,11 who
says: “Man’s intellectual love for God is identified with the
love whereby God loves Himself.”
To conclude. Formal, subjective beatitude is an activity, an
operation, immanent, not transitive, eternal, not transient,
forever new and forever delightful: an everlasting midday fol­
lowed by no night.
ART. 3. IS IT SENSE-ACTIVITY?

Here we note three brief conclusions:
1. Sense-operations, limited to the corporeal world, cannot
be the beatifying operation.
2. But sense-operations, since they are the prerequisites of
intellectual operations, belong antecedently to the beatific
operation.
3. Lastly, since after the resurrection the soul’s beatitude
overflows on the body, sense-operations belong to perfect be­
atitude as consequences.
These distinct adverbs, “essentially,” “antecedently,” and
“consequently” throw light also on other questions. For ex­
ample, our love of desire belongs to charity, not essentially
(because charity is disinterested friendship), but antecedently
(because if God were not our own supreme good we could not
love Him), and also consequently (because for love of God we
love our own soul, and desire eternal life for ourselves). Again,
many elements which do not constitute the mystic state still
belong to that state antecedently or consequently.
11 Elhica, pars 5a, pr. 36.

FORMAL AND SUBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

87

ART. 4. BY WHAT FACULTY IS THIS ACTIVITY EXERCISED:
BY THE INTELLECT OR BY THE WILL?

Preliminaries
On this question Thomists and Scotists are at odds. St.
Thomas holds that the beatifying activity is essentially an
operation of the intellect, whereas Scotus says it is essentially
an act of love, an act of the will. The view of St. Thomas rests
on two previous positions.
1. The notion of truth is more absolute, more independent,
more universal, than the notion of good. The good presup­
poses truth and reality. Hence the truth, as object of the mind,
antecedes the good, though no concrete thing can be perfect
unless it is good.
2. Hence, by reason of its object, the intellect is, speaking
simply, a higher faculty than the will.
Scotus,12 looking at the concrete subject rather than the
differentiating object, denies these two positions of St.
Thomas. The notion of truth, says Scotus, is not nobler than
the notion of good. Hence the will, since it is the seat of char­
ity, the highest of all virtues, is, speaking simply, a faculty
higher than the intellect.

Initial Difficulties
1. Beatitude, since it is peace, belongs, like joy, to the will.
2. Again, since it is the highest good, it belongs to the will.
3. Again, since among the faculties the will is the prime
mover, and the prime mover is also the last end, beatitude
must belong to the will.
4. Again, since charity, the highest virtue, is in the will,
beatitude too must belong to the will.
5. Lastly, since he is blessed who has all he wills and who
wills nothing evil, the beatific operation must be an act of
the will.
12IV Sent., dist. 49, q.4. See Cajetan on la, q.82, a. 3.

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The Affirmative Argument

A. Scripture favors our position: To know God is life
eternal. Show us the Father. The clean of heart see God. We
are like God, because we see Him.13 These texts, although they
do not distinguish beatitude from its qualities, surely favor
the intellect as the beatifying faculty.
Patristic texts likewise favor our position: Life eternal
comes from seeing God.14 The highest contemplation consti­
tutes human felicity.15 To live blessedly means to possess by
knowledge that which is eternal.1® Mental possession means
possession by knowledge.
B. In the body of the article we have, first, a distinction,
then two conclusions. As we must distinguish man’s essence
(i.e., rationality) from his characteristics (i.e., laughter, won­
der, and speech), so must we likewise distinguish the essence
of beatitude from its characteristics. The essence of beatitude
is the possession of the beatifying object. From this essential
possession flow many characteristics: love, joy, bodily glory.
First conclusion. The essence of beatitude cannot be found
in any act of the will, but only in an act of the intellect. The
proof runs thus: The attainment and possession of the beatify­
ing object cannot be an act of the will. Why not? For two
reasons, one a priori, the other a posteriori. The first reason
is that the acts of the will either antecede possession (in the
form of desire), or presuppose possession (in the form of joy).
Here lies the difference between intellect and will. The
intellect draws its object to itself, becomes that object, intentionaliter, either by an intermediate ideal species, or with­
out medium (in the beatific vision). But the will is drawn to
the object as it is in itself. Love, says St. Augustine, is a weight,
bending me to the object I love. The will, then, is either seek1» John 17:3; 14:8; Matt. 5:8; I John, 3:2.
1« Irenaeus, Adv. haer., Bk. 4, chap. 37.
1» Cyril of Alexandria, Contr. Jul., 1. 3.
re Aug., in his Octoginta quaestiones, q.35.

FORMAL AND SUBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

89

ing possession or enjoying possession, whereas the intellect
apprehends, seizes, possesses the object.
To speak concretely. A saint (e.g., St. Teresa) who on earth
enjoyed high intellectual visions, must experience the im­
mediate vision of God as something entirely new. Her previ­
ous visions being based on faith, not sight, are like nonseeing
in comparison. Even the highest faith (as in Our Lady) can­
not see. Only the beatific vision can see.
Further, love effects union; yes, but an effective union, not
an objective union. Objective union is effected by the vision,
and this union is necessarily followed by the joy of mutual
inhesion: My beloved to me, and I to him.17 Even on earth
(think of Mary) this mutual inhesion can be very intimate,
but can never constitute perfect beatitude.
The second reason, a posteriori, rests on analogy with pos­
session in the sense order. The child’s desire for a coin is not
possession. He attains and possesses when he holds it in his
hand, and possession is followed by joy. Again, the eye pos­
sesses color, the ear possesses sound, the palate possesses flavor.
Now as sense is related to sense-good, so intellect is related to
intellective good. An intellective being, therefore, attains and
possesses the beatifying object, not by its will, but by its in­
tellect.
Second conclusion. But to the will belongs that joy which
is a consequence and characteristic of blessedness. Joy, since
it follows the possession of supreme truth, is the consumma­
tion of blessedness. “Rejoicing in the truth” is Augustine’s
definition of beatitude. Joy is a characteristic, which follows
beatitude but does not constitute it.

Difficulties Analyzed
These objections are: first, the initial difficulties proposed
by St. Thomas; second, those proposed by Scotus; third, those
proposed by Suarez.
17 Cant, of Cant., 2:16.

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Initial Difficulties

1. Peace and joy, which belong to the will, are a necessary
consequence of beatitude, but not the essence of beatitude.
2. God, as good, is the object of the will, yes; an object at­
tainable without the mediation of the intellect, no.
3. Among man’s faculties, the will is the prime mover, yes,
yet so that the will cannot do by itself the work which it com­
mands the intellect to do.
4. Love for God is better than knowledge of God: here on
earth, where by faith we move toward God, yes; in heaven,
where we see and possess God, no.
5. Blessed is he who has all he desires: yes, but he has them,
possesses them, by knowing them, not by willing them. His
will is either a disposition for possession, or a consequence of
possession.
Difficulties Proposed by Scotus

1. Attaining God is twofold: by knowledge, which is first
in the order of time; by love, which is first in the order of
perfection. Answer: Love for the beatifying object is not,
speaking properly, the same thing as attaining that object.
Love either precedes attaining or follows attainment.
2. Love implies rest, and resting in God is blessedness.
Answer: Resting in God is the consequence, not the essence,
of the beatifying operation. Love, since it abstracts from the
object’s presence or absence, cannot be attainment of the ob­
ject.
But, the objector insists, love, according to Augustine,
Denis, and Aquinas, is “the virtue which unites lovers.” An­
swer: Love is union, affective union. But love causes real and
objective union. Love moves the intellect to attain experi­
mentally the object which love desires.
3. The will desires its own act more than it desires the
act of the intellect. Answer: Desires its own act more, as a

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91

command to the intellect to see and possess, yes; but other­
wise, no.
4. The will is more perfect than the intellect, because the
will is, first, not abstractive, but concrete; secondly, it is the
mover of the intellect; thirdly, it is free. Answer: The will is
more perfect than the intellect: simply speaking, no; secun­
dum quid, yes.
To explain. It is true that the good, the object of the will,
does not, like the intellect, abstract from actual existence.
But the object of the intellect (truth, reality) is more inde­
pendent, primary, and universal, than is the good, which is
the object of the will. Mere concreteness of object does not
prove the superiority of the will, otherwise the sense-powers
would be more perfect than the intellect, the horticulturist
than the metaphysician. The will, as efficient cause, moves the
intellect, but the intellect, as final cause, moves the will. The
intellect plans, the will executes.
Again, freedom is indeed in the will, but the source, root,
and cause of freedom are the intellect’s power of deliberation.
Cause is higher than effect, root is higher than fruit. Withered
root leads to dead tree.
Lastly, beatific love is not a free act, but a necessary act,
which rises above freedom, just as God’s internal and neces­
sary acts are superior to His external and free acts.
5. Charity, love of God, is more perfect than knowledge of
God: on the road to heaven, yes; in heaven itself, no. St.
Thomas speaks: When the thing where good resides is more
noble than the soul, will is more noble than intellect. But
when the good thing is less noble than the soul, intellect is
higher than will. Hence, here on earth love of God is better
than knowledge, whereas knowledge of the corporeal world
is better than love of that world. Speaking simply, however,
where objects are equal, the intellect is more noble than the
will. In heaven, souls differ in degrees of grace, love, and
vision; but vision, speaking simply, is more perfect than love.

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6. Charity, in the will, is more perfect than faith, which is
in the intellect. Answer: Faith is imperfect knowledge. As
imperfect, yes, faith is lower than charity; but, as knowledge,
it is higher than charity. Faculties must be weighed by their
adequate objects. Thus sight, speaking simply, is higher than
hearing, but listening to a symphony of Beethoven is higher
than the sight of a commonplace movie.18
7. The seraphim, named from burning love, precede the
cherubim, named from perfect knowledge. Answer: Let it
pass; what does it prove? If answer be called for, let us simply
say that charity on earth stands higher than faith.
8. Vision is the road to love. Answer. As means to end (in
final causality), no. As cause to effect (in efficient causality),
or as essence to characteristic (informal causality), yes. Love,
on earth, longs for the vision. Love, in heaven, follows the
vision.
9. Vision reaches its perfection by love: its consequent per­
fection, yes; its essential perfection, no.
10. Friendship, loving God for His own sake, loves Him
more than it loves its own vision. Yes, but, in so doing, friend­
ship ascribes to God its own already established beatitude.
Friendship for God, a free act here on earth, is in heaven a
necessary act. The blessed soul, seeing God, must love Him
above all else. Friendship for God, like impeccability, is a
necessary consequence of the vision.
11. Beatific love, since it comes later than vision, is more
perfect than vision. Not so, we answer, if it comes as a charac­
teristic of the essential beatitude constituted by vision.
12. But you cannot deny that love is the ultimate act of the
soul in heaven. No, I cannot deny, I affirm. But, I must add,
love is the ultimate, not in the line of attaining and possessing,
but in the line of resting and rejoicing.
13. If hatred of God is worse than the absence of vision,
then charity is better than vision. Answer: You are confound18 Voluntarism leads ultimately to Protestantism, to positivism, to the denial
of the natural law and of immutable morality.

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93

ing two orders. In the moral order, hatred of God (and indeed
any vice), is worse than absence of vision. But absence of
vision, eternal damnation, since it deprives man of ultimate
perfection, is the worst of all physical evils. Further, charity
in heaven is no longer a free and moral act, but an act which
transcends freedom and merit. Again, privation of vision is
privation of the highest conceivable good, a good found only
in heaven.
14. But, since the moral order is higher than the physical
order, charity must be higher than vision. Answer: Although
the moral order is higher than the physical and inanimate
order, it is not higher, rather, is lower, than the intellectual
order. And all acts in heaven, beatific vision and beatific love,
are, properly speaking, not moral, but supramoral.
15. Fruition, peace, and impeccability How from the act,
not of the intellect, but of the will. Answer: But that act of
the will, the primary characteristic of beatitude, and the
source of all other characteristics, arises from the act of the
intellect.
Here enters a question, suggested by the principles of St.
Thomas himself. In natural beatitude would not love for
God stand higher than knowledge of God? No, runs the
answer, because love, by its very nature, either precedes pos­
session or follows possession. To illustrate. The hypostatic
union, though it is higher than the beatific vision, is not es­
sential beatitude, because it does not possess God as intelligi­
ble object. Similarly, love of God as the Author of nature
would be a necessary consequence of natural contemplation.
St. Thomas, following Aristotle, finds natural beatitude to
consist in contemplation, since contemplation is an act of
man’s highest power, namely, the intellect. Hence supernatu­
ral charity is the only kind of love which stands higher than
contemplation. Natural love of God is measured by natural
knowledge of God.
Objections proposed by Suarez. To reconcile Scotus with
Aquinas, Suarez maintains that beatitude consists equally in

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two acts, namely, vision of God and love for God. A general
answer runs thus: The act of the will is subordinated to the
act of the intellect, which it presupposes. Hence vision and
love cannot equally constitute beatitude. Again, the possession
of the beatifying object cannot consist in two operations
equally perfect, because if the two are specifically different,
then one must be more perfect, and if the two are only
numerically distinct, one of the two is superfluous.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Vision and love, as two partial causes, concur in attain­
ing God. Answer: Since God is indivisible, He cannot be
possessed by two partial causes. God entire is possessed by
vision. Of this entire possession, love (the second operation)
is a consequent characteristic.
2. Two operations are better than one. Answer: If you are
looking at the state of blessedness, yes; if you are looking at
the essence of blessedness, no. Vision, the essence, the root,
precontains love and all other characteristics.
3. Vision alone does not satiate all the desires of the blessed
soul. Answer: Vision, looked at as separated from its charac­
teristics, I grant; looked at as possession, necessarily followed
by love and joy, I deny.
4. But if God, absolutely speaking, would refuse concur­
rence with the blessed soul’s act of love, then that soul would
still be essentially blessed: surely an absurd conclusion. An­
swer: Absurd, yes, if you confound essential beatitude with
consummate beatitude. A baby, although it is essentially a
man, is not a full-grown man.
Conclusion

Notwithstanding the difficulties raised by Scotus, by Suarez,
and by others, the doctrine of St. Thomas still stands. It is
held by many theologians (Bellarmine, Becanus, Tostatus,
Vasquez) who do not belong to the school that is strictly
Thomistic.

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95

Our defense of the intellect as the beatifying faculty has
led us to anticipate the following articles, which maintain that
beatitude is a contemplative activity (a. 5), is not a mere meta­
physical knowledge (a. 6), consists essentially in the immediated vision of God.
ART. 5. IS BEATITUDE AN ACTIVITY OF THE
CONTEMPLATIVE INTELLECT?

The practical intellect is concerned with making, the specu­
lative intellect with knowing. God cannot be made, but He
can be known. Hence contemplation is its own end, whereas
actions aim at producing, not directly at knowing. Man shares
contemplation with God and the angels. Action he shares with
animals, who also labor for their own self-preservation.
Even the imperfect happiness of the present life lies chiefly
in contemplation, and only secondarily in practical activity,
whereby man rules his passions and forms his character. In
heaven, then, a fortiori, contemplation transcends action.
Contemplation, thus Augustine,18 is promised to us as the
goal of all activity, as eternal and perfect enjoyment. Let
modern pragmatism take notice.
ART. 6. CAN METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE BE

CALLED BEATITUDE?

Metaphysical knowledge, even in its highest reaches, rests
on principles, abstract principles, derived from the sense­
world. Now such principles can never raise man to perfect
knowledge of God, but only to a knowledge that is negative,
or relative, or at best analogical. Negatively we know God as
nonfmite, nonmutable, nonvisible. Relatively we know Him
as supremely good and true. Analogically we know Him as
precontaining, in infinite fashion, all the perfections we find
in creatures.
No wonder, then, that even perfect metaphysical knowledge
is clouded with obscurities. God is unchangeable, and still
19 De Trin., Bk. I, chap. 10, initio.

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free. God has infallible knowledge of the future, yet man is
free. God is omnipotently good, yet He permits evil. His
mercy is boundless, yet His justice is inexorable. These ob­
scurities, though they are antinomies, not contradictions, con­
stitute that supreme philosophical mystery which is the source
of the natural desire, conditional and inefficacious, to see the
very essence of God, the Author of nature. Metaphysics alone,
then, while it is the source of imperfect beatitude, can never
give man perfect beatitude.

A Difficulty Analyzed
Felicity, since it is the act of our highest faculty in its
highest object, must consist in the knowledge of God. Yes,
but on earth this felicity remains imperfect. Even if man had
been left in the merely natural state, with perfect knowledge
and love of God, he would never have perfect beatitude, which
arises only from intuitive vision. In point of fact, however,
as revelation teaches, man is destined for supernatural felic­
ity. Natural felicity is proportioned to human nature, but
supernatural felicity, since it transcends all created natures,
is attained, not by man's natural powers, but by God’s gener­
osity.20 Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, heart doth not
suspect, what God holds ready for those who love Him.
ART. 7. BEATITUDE DOES NOT CONSIST IN KNOWING
THE ANGELS

Revelation: “Let him who glories glory in this, that he
knows Me.” 21 “When He shall appear we shall be like Him,
because we shall see Him as He is.” 22
Reason. To contemplate limited and participated existences
cannot constitute the perfection of our intellect. But the
angels have participated existence and therefore participated
20 cf. la, q.23, a. 1; la-IIae, q.62, a.i; De veritate, q.14, a.2.
2· Jeremias, 9:24.
22 1 John, 3:2.

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97

truth. Angels can illumine us, but only as far as they are in­
struments of God. Even if we knew angelic nature intuitively,
as the angel sees himself, our knowledge of God would still
be analogical, negative, and relative. Hence there would al­
ways remain the desire of knowing God in Himself.
ART. 8. FORMAL BEATITUDE CONSISTS IN THE VISION

OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

Difficulties. Man seems capable, not of the immediate vision
of God, but only of mystic and obscure contemplation of
God. To see God without medium seems to be an incommuni­
cable perfection of God.
Revelation. “We see now as in a mirror, but then face to
face.” 23 “The blessed in heaven see God clearly, one and
triune, as He is.” 24 "The blessed in heaven see the divine
essence, with a vision that is intuitive and face-to-face, a vision
not mediated by any creature but by the divine essence show­
ing itself without medium openly and clearly.” 25
Propositions Condemned

1. “Every intellectual nature is in itself naturally blessed,
and the soul does not need the elevating light of glory in order
to see and enjoy God.” 20
2. “The exaltation of human nature to share in divine na­
ture, since it was due to the integrity of man’s primal condi­
tion, should be called natural and not supernatural.” 27
3. “Absurd is the view of those who say that man was,
from the beginning, by a supernatural and gratuitous gift,
raised above the condition of his nature, in order to adore
God in faith, hope, and charity.” 28
23 I Cor., 13:12.
*< Cone. Flor. (D. 693).
2s Benedict XII (D. 530).
20 D. 475·
2t Ibid., 1023.
28 Ibid.

9»

BEATITUDE

4. “The integrity of the primal creation was not an undue
exaltation of human nature, but was man’s natural condi­
tion." 29
5. “The grace of Adam is a consequence of creation, due to
Adam’s perfect nature.” 80
According to these condemned propositions man’s ultimate
natural end is identified with his supernatural end, and the
beatific vision is not only possible, but is due to us by justice,
since it corresponds with our natural efficacious desire, and
consequently is not intrinsically supernatural.
This doctrine of Baius reappears among the Modernists.
“Catholic men are found who, while they reject immanence
as a doctrine, nevertheless use it in apologetics, and so in­
cautiously as to admit in human nature, not only a capacity
for the supernatural order (a capacity which Catholic apolo­
gists, under proper modifications, have always maintained),
but also a true and genuine exigency, and thus find in our
nature itself the germ of the supernatural.” 81
The beatific vision, then, the immediate vision of God, is
indeed possible and welcome, is the reward promised to us,
but is a gift which transcends the powers and exigencies, not
only of human nature, but also of angelic nature. It is con­
summated grace, altogether gratuitous, because it pleased
God’s infinite goodness to raise man to a supernatural end.
St. Thomas. In support of his doctrine, Baius quotes the
present article. Let us look more closely at the Saint’s teach­
ing on the existence of the beatific vision. In this article St.
Thomas does not intend to prove by mere reason the exist­
ence or the possibility of the beatific vision, since mysteries,
because they are intrinsically supernatural, cannot be demon­
strated by the natural light of reason, not even after revela­
tion. Thus the Vatican Council: “Divine mysteries, by their
very nature, so exceed the created intellect, that even after
2» Ibid., 1026.
so Ibid., 1383.
>1 Encyclical Pascendi (D. 2103).

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99

revelation has been given and faith has been accepted, these
mysteries remain veiled by faith, wrapped in a kind of dark­
ness as long as we are pilgrims on earth, because we walk by
faith and not by sight.” 82
Mysteries intrinsically supernatural include, not only the
Blessed Trinity, but also the Incarnation, the Redemption,
and the life of grace and glory. Grace and glory, since they are
real and formal participations in the divine nature, in the
intimate life of God, cannot be proved by reason alone even
after revelation.
Why is demonstration excluded? Because what is super­
natural in its substance is supernatural also in its cognosci­
bility. How, then, can the theologian defend these mysteries?
He can do three things: first, he can show that they are con­
tained in the deposit of revelation; secondly, he can give some
understanding by analogies with nature; thirdly, in answer to
those who speak against the faith, he can show that their views
are either false or inconclusive.
Illustrative Texts

1. ‘‘Sacred doctrine uses human reason, not to prove the
faith, but to manifest other truths contained in the faith.” 88
2. “The Trinity supposed, reason can illustrate, but not
prove.” 84
The mode of arguing in this article differs slightly from
the mode followed in the first part. The argument in question
twelve of the first part runs thus: Natural desire cannot be in
vain, cannot tend to the impossible. But man has a natural
desire to know, not only that there is a first cause, but also
what it is. In the Prima Secundae the argument may be ex­
pressed as follows: Man is not perfectly happy as long as some­
thing remains to be desired. But man has a natural desire to
know, not only that there is a first cause, but also what it is.
82 Cf. Cone. Vat. (D. 1785 sqq.)
83 la, q.i, a.8.
s-ι la, q.32, a.5. Cf. De veritate, q. 14, a.z; Contra Gentes, 1 I, c.8; la-IIae,
q. 114, a.2.

lOO

BEATITUDE

The principle here invoked is the principle of finality. If
every agent acts for a goal, then natural desire cannot be
empty or vain, otherwise it would tend to something and
still tend to nothing. Natural desire is not fictitious (like, say,
the desire to have wings), but is based on nature itself, which
cannot be fallacious, just as the intellect is never deceived re­
garding the principle of contradiction. This argument has its
own difficulties. It seems to prove either too much or not
enough. Two difficulties arise, one minor, one major.
The minor difficulty. If we understand this natural desire
to be an efficacious desire, then we prove too much. We fall
back into the heresy of Baius, which claims that the beatific
vision is due to human nature, just as is the immortality of
the soul, or God’s concursus with created causes. On the
other hand, if this natural desire is conditional and ineffica­
cious, then it can be frustrated, and the argument does not
prove enough. Nay, the question arises whether nature has
even an inefficacious desire to see God. God causes natural
things, not by necessity of nature, but by intellect and will.
Now this truth is known by metaphysics or natural theology,
and thus we would not have even an argument of con­
venience in favor of the beatific vision (which is beyond the
ken of philosophy).

Answer to This Difficulty

i. Even the most perfect abstractive knowledge would re­
main analogical, involving great obscurity regarding the
intimate harmony among God’s attributes: immutability and
liberty, a free act which still is not contingent, omnipotent
goodness and permission of evil, infinite mercy and infinite
justice. Of each divine attribute we know rather that it is
than what it is. From this obscurity arises a natural desire
to see the essence of God, the Author of nature. I say, the
Author of nature, for God as triune, as the Author of grace,
cannot be known by reason alone, and hence the vision of

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101

God as triune cannot be naturally desired. This natural
desire remains in the angels even when their natural cogni­
tion has been consummated, and their natural cognition is
much more perfect than ours.
2. What kind of natural desire does St. Thomas have in
mind? As background for answering this question, let us
give, in synopsis, various meanings of the term “desire.” De­
sire may be
A. supernatural, as coming from charity or as coming from
hope. It may be
B. natural
1. as innate or
2. as elicited, and
a. necessary, or
b. free, and if free, cither efficacious or inefficacious,
and implicit or explicit.
Cajetan says that, in our present article, the term “desire”
means “supernatural desire,” connatural to us under grace.
Scotus says that it means an "innate natural desire of the
beatific vision.” Baius says that it means a “natural and
efficacious desire.” Thomists say that it means a “desire, nat­
ural but inefficacious.”
We follow this last view. St. Thomas is speaking, not of an
efficacious natural desire, but of a natural desire which is
conditional and inefficacious, of velleity, which, absolutely
speaking, might be frustrated, and would in fact have been
left unfulfilled had not God pleased to raise man to a super­
natural end. Thus understood, the argument proves neither
too much nor too little, since it is not apodictic, but is per­
suasive. There cannot be a natural efficacious desire except in
relation to a good that is proportioned to nature and due
to it.
Illustrative Texts, i. Thomas. “Eternal life is a good ex­
ceeding the proportions of created nature, because it exceeds
even the cognition and desire of nature.” Again

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2. “Man cannot merit eternal life without grace, nor pre­
pare himself without the aid of grace for grace.” 35
3. “No rational creature can have a motion of the will
directly ordained to that beatitude unless this creature is
moved by a supernatural agent, namely, the aid of grace.” 36
4. “There is another good which exceeds the proportions
of human nature, which natural powers do not suffice either
to think of or to desire.” 37
5. “Nothing can be ordained to a certain end unless there
pre-exist in it a proportion to that end, which may create
desire of the goal. Hence man’s initial step toward eternal
life is infused faith.” 38
These texts show clearly that Baius was wrong in citing St.
Thomas for his view. The term “natural desire,” as used by
St. Thomas, although it does not mean “efficacious desire,”
does not, on the other hand, mean the “innate desire” ad­
mitted by Scotus, namely, an inclination of the will anteceding all cognition and all elicited desire, since it is clear from
the text of St. Thomas that the desire of which he is speaking
follows cognition of the effects of God and of the existence of
God, whereas appetite is directed only to beatitude in com­
mon.
Hence, as Thomists commonly say since the time of Baius,
we are dealing here with a natural desire, not innate, but
elicited, not efficacious, but conditional and inefficacious.
Now this conditional and inefficacious desire supposes a
judgment both on the goodness and on the natural unattain­
ability of the desired object. Man might say: “Oh, this won­
drous vision of God: if only I could attain it.” Finally, this
velleity would be either explicit or implicit: implicit, when it
is known confusedly; explicit, when the object is known.
This velleity seems to be expressed in this passage of Plato:
s» Ibid., q. 109, a. 5, 6.
se la, q.62, a. 2.
st De veritate, q. 14, a.2.
ss ibid.

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103

“How blessed would that vision be, could a man be granted
to see beauty itself, beauty unalloyed, and divine! Would not
this man be the friend of God? Would he not deserve to be
called immortal?” 39
Conclusion. Hence, as Thomists commonly teach, man nat­
urally desires to see the essence of God, the Author of nature,
yet this desire is not innate, but elicited, conditional, and
inefficacious. But even this desire, although conditional and
inefficacious, cannot, it seems, be vain, cannot tend to some­
thing impossible. Thus the argument is persuasive of the pos­
sibility of the beatific vision, of the existence of a potentiality
which can be elevated to the supernatural vision.
A doubt. Why is this argument not apodictic but only per­
suasive? All Thomists agree that this article does not prove
apodictically the fact of our elevation to the beatific vision.
Some few, however, hold that it does prove apodictically the
possibility of this elevation, since it would be absurd to admit
such a natural desire if the vision were impossible. Answer.
The general answer runs thus: The existence and the intrinsic
possibility of mysteries which are essentially supernatural can­
not be demonstrated by reason even after revelation has been
given. But life eternal, the beatific vision, participation in the
divine nature, is a mystery intrinsically supernatural. Hence
this vision is impossible without the light of glory, and by
reason alone we cannot prove the possibility of the light of
glory, though we can defend that possibility.
A special reason runs thus: The aforesaid desire, since it is
conditional, does not prove apodictically the possibility of
this vision, but presupposes the hypothesis of this possibility.
Yet this desire, since it is natural, since it does not proceed
from mere phantasy, or from one individual’s philosophical
knowledge, but is found in all wise men, it becomes a very
probable and persuasive proof that the vision of God, the
Author of nature, is a possibility. We cannot, from reason
so Convivium, c.29.

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alone, prove that the adequate object of intellect is not only
reality as reality, the object of metaphysics, but also reality
in its whole latitude, containing the Trinity clearly seen.40

Synopsis of Opinions
Natural desire is either:
A. innate
1. and in some way efficacious, because intuitive vision,
while it is a natural goal of man’s desire, is supernatural in
mode of attainment (thus the Augustinians, Noris and Berti);
2. and inefficacious, because intuitive vision, while it is
the universal human goal, is not universally known, hence
not efficaciously desired (thus Scotus); or
B. elicited and
1. natural secundum quid, because, while it does not
reach out beyond our natural powers, it still arises connaturally when the effects of grace have been revealed (thus
Cajetan against Scotus);
2. simply natural, because it follows knowledge of nat­
ural effects (Thomists in general).

Opinions Examined
1. The Augustinian opinion, closely related to Baianism,
does not preserve the absolute distinction of the natural
order from the supernatural order, and denies the principle
of finality, that every agent acts for a proportionate end. God
as Author of nature, would have given us an innate desire
for an end to which, as Author of nature, He could not lead
us.
2. Nor does the opinion of Scotus sufficiently preserve the
distinction between the two orders, because this distinction,
according to him, is not necessary but free, depending on
God's free will, since God could have given us the light of
glory as a human characteristic. But then, our intellect would
<®Cf. Salmanticenses, in lam, q. 12, a.i.

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105

naturally have the same formal and proper object as has the
divine intellect, and would thus be a created God: a view
which leads to pantheism.

Further Reflections

1. This desire, being inborn, should be efficacious, since a
desire is inefficacious only by proceeding from a conditional
judgment. Innate desire, since it does not proceed from cog­
nition, cannot be conditional and inefficacious.
2. This innate desire involves contradiction. It would be
essentially supernatural, differentiated by a supernatural ob­
ject. The very nature of the human will would be ordained,
not only to good in general, but positively and naturally to
the vision of God. Similarly, the active obediential potency
held by Suarez would be something positive and essentially
natural, and at the same time essentially supernatural.
3. Cajetan’s opinion seems to be an excessive reaction
against Scotus. St. Thomas, expounding the mode in which
this desire arises, speaks of the supposed knowledge of effects,
not supernatural, but natural: a desire which is simply nat­
ural, but inefficacious. Cajetan himself seems to grant this
when he says: “The human intellect, knowing that God
exists, and desiring naturally to know what God is, obeys a
natural desire which leads us, when we see an effect, to know
the cause of that effect.” 41
4. Following Ferrariensis and Banez, and the Thomists
who wrote at the time of Baius, we hold that man could have
been created in a purely natural state, and that therefore
grace, as its name implies, is a gift simply gratuitous, not due
to us or to the angels, but supremely harmonious with
created nature.
Two Corollaries

First. The obediential potency, the elevability of our na­
ture to the order of grace, is not active, but passive, an
41 In lam-IIae, q.3, a. 8.

io6

BEATITUDE

aptitude, that is, to receive from God whatever God wills to
give. Thus our nature has obediential potency for the hy­
postatic union. Second. Obediential potency is immediately
directed, not to any supernatural object or act, but to the
supreme Agent whom it obeys. Hence the human soul is
positively and immediately ordained to a supernatural act
only after its elevation to faith and grace.
The foregoing opinions may be thus summarized.
St. Thomas: Grace is gratuitous and harmonious. Semi­
naturalism: At least the possibility of revelation can be
demonstrated. Scotism: The distinction between the two
orders is contingent. The Augustinians: Latent confusion of
the two orders. Pelagianism: Denial of all supernaturalness of
Christian life. Pseudo-supernaturalism (Protestants, Baius,
the Jansenists): Supernaturalness does not transcend the
exigencies of our nature.
The principal objection against our doctrine runs thus:
The beatific vision, since it is in supremest harmony with
our nature, must be proportioned to that nature, and not
gratuitous. Were it not so proportioned, it would not be
harmonious, but inharmonious, violent, or indifferent,
neither good nor evil. Answer. Supernatural harmony, by
reason of its very gratuity transcends natural harmony, and
is the most profound of all harmonies. Only God can unite
two things that are apparently opposite, the highest kind of
harmony and the highest reach of gratuitousness. Super­
natural gifts perfect us more than do natural gifts. They
perfect our soul at its deepest and highest, namely at the
point where supernatural life is inserted. The elevation of
the obediential capacity to the supernatural level, in the
hypostatic union, say, or in the infusion of grace, presup­
poses an active power that is infinite, just as does creation
from nothing. Obediential potency, then, is nothing else than
the essence of the soul, capable of receiving whatever God
wills.
Here lies the ultimate root of our solution. We are dealing

FORMAL AND SUBJECTIVE BEATITUDE

107

with a mystery which lies on the confines of two orders, in­
finitely distant one from the other. But this much we must
say: Supernatural is what exceeds the proportions of finite
nature, by gratuitously perfecting the obediential capacity
of that nature. Grace perfects our nature, does not destroy it.

Corollaries
1. Had man been created in a merely natural state, his
lack of the supernatural would not have been painful: first,
because only velleity would be frustrated; secondly, the velleity itself would not be entirely in vain, because it would
lead men to adore the hidden mysteries of God's hidden life.
If, on the contrary, that desire were innate and efficacious,
then a merely natural state would be impossible, since God
would owe it to Himself to elevate us to the life of grace.
2. After elevation to the supernatural order, privation of
the beatific vision is not painful in the present life, because
the radical order of our life does not yet demand that we
enjoy this vision; but, even on the earth, the saints, from the
efficacious ardor of their charity, desire to be dissolved and
to be with Christ.
3. This privation is very painful in purgatory because the
radical order of the supernatural life demands that the soul
enjoy this vision immediately after death. This purgatorial
pain of loss is like that of extreme hunger or thirst.
4. A fortiori, perpetual privation in hell is supreme misery,
simultaneously against nature and against grace. The super­
natural and the contranatural are radically opposed. Even
the natural law says that we are to obey all God’s commands,
hence to lose our supernatural end is simultaneously to lose
our natural end. To confuse the supernatural gifts of God
with things that are contrary to nature is to confuse true
religion with stupid superstition, to confuse the beatific
vision with supreme misery.

CHAPTER VIII
The

Characteristics of Beatitude (q.

4)

Division of the Question. It has two parts. In the first four

articles we deal with delight and love as consequences of the
beatific vision. In the following four, we deal with the ex­
tension of this beatitude, to the body, to external goods, to
the society of friends.
ART. 1. IS DELIGHT A NECESSARY

CONSEQUENCE OF BEATITUDE?

Yes, because the will necessarily finds joy in the possession
of good. “Beatitude is joy in the truth,” in the possession of
reality. We must clearly distinguish the essence of beatitude
from its concomitants and consequences, just as the essence
of the mystical state must be distinguished from its accidental
phenomena (e.g., ecstasy or ligature).
ART. 2. THE CHIEF ELEMENT IN BEATITUDE

Conclusion. Vision is more important than joy. Vision is
the cause, joy is the effect, and stands higher than effect.
Again, the will finds joy in an operation because of the good­
ness of that operation. Goodness is not pursued for the sake
of joy and rest, but vice versa, since otherwise the very act
of the will would be its own goal or purpose. Joy cannot be
the first object of the will, just as the act of sight cannot be
the first visible object of sight.
Objections Analyzed

1. Joy is operative perfection, and perfection stands higher
than the thing perfected. Answer. Joy is operative perfection,
108

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

109

i. a perfection which follows operation. “Joy follows per­
e.,
fect operation, as beauty follows youth.” Here lies the error
of the hedonists and sensualists, who reduce good in itself to
good that is merely delightful.
2. Animals, since they do not know the good as such, desire
operations merely as delightful. Is, then, their activity not
rightly ordained by God? Answer. God, the Author of na­
ture, who knows most perfectly good-in-itself, adds joy to
activity in order to draw creatures to right operations. “The
hen gathers her chickens under her wing,” and thus uncon­
sciously does what is good in itself, whereas a woman, who
defends her children under similar circumstances, does con­
sciously what is good in itself.
3. Charity seeks God for His own sake, even though joy
is a necessary consequence. Thus we refute the Quietists and
Kant, who wish to exclude from pure love the desire of all
reward. Joy, fruition, is no goal to which God is subordin­
ated, but can nevertheless be legitimately desired, as a con­
sequence inseparable from God and the vision of God.
ART. 3. DOES BEATITUDE INCLUDE COMPREHENSION?

Conclusion. Beatitude includes comprehension, not in the
sense of comprehensive vision, but in the sense, that the
blessed are called comprehensors, since they cling to God
inseparably. Vision corresponds to faith, comprehension to
hope, and fruition to charity. Comprehension belongs to the
will, is a relation resulting in the will from the vision.
The beatific vision itself cannot be comprehensive, because
the light of glory, being a created and finite thing, cannot
produce an infinite comprehension. We see God entire, but
not entirely, just as, to illustrate, a man may know an entire
proposition (subject, predicate, and verb) without knowing it
totally, without profound penetration into its full meaning.

BEATITUDE

1 ΙΟ

ART. 4. RECTITUDE OF WILL IS INCLUDED IN BEATITUDE,

BOTH ANTECEDENTLY AND CONSEQUENTLY

Authority. “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see
God.” 1 “Pursue peace and holiness, without which no one
shall see God.” 2
Rectitude as prerequired. To reach its goal, an agent must
be properly orientated toward that goal, as matter is toward
form. Now rectitude of will implies proper orientation to­
ward man's last goal.
Rectitude as consequence. Ultimate beatitude consists in
the vision of the divine essence. Now the will of him who sees
the essence of God necessarily possesses rectitude, i.e., it loves
whatever it loves in relation to God, and finds it impossible
to sin.
Here we are opposed by Scotus, who holds that even
beatific love is not necessary but free, at least in its exercise,
and that the blessed are not impeccable intrinsically, namely,
by the vision of God, but only extrinsically, since God con­
tinues perpetually to rectify their will. This view is founded
on voluntarism, which says that the will in itself is higher
than the intellect. In virtue of this principle, Scotus holds
that the Father and Son freely breathe forth the Holy Spirit.
Does Scotus not see that, under this view, the Holy Ghost
would not necessarily be God?
Let us look at the efficacy of the Thomistic argument, and
the solution of Scotistic objections. St. Thomas: The essence
of goodness is related to those who see God in the same way
as good-in-general is related to wayfarers. As wayfarers can­
not turn away from the idea of good, so those who see God
cannot turn away from the essence of God. Further, since
God contains in Himself the whole reality of good in a much
more excellent way than it is contained in the abstract knowl­
edge of good, the will is necessitated by an object outside of
which nothing is desirable. But while this vision removes the
1 Matt. 5:8.
2 Heb. 18:14.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

111

possibility of sinning, it does not take away liberty in relation
to particular goods. A blessed soul may turn from one friend
to another. Christ on earth, enjoying the beatific vision,
though He could not sin, could still freely choose His apos­
tles: “Not you have chosen me, but I have chosen you.”
Objection. Granting the necessity of specification, would
there not still remain the liberty of exercise, so that the
blessed soul, if it willed, could interrupt its act of loving
God? Answer: No. In order to interrupt this act, the blessed
soul would have to retain indifference of judgment, i.e., be
able to see some shade of evil, either in the supreme good
clearly seen, or in its act of loving that good. Now, neither in
that object nor in that act can the blessed soul detect the
slightest shade of evil, of tedium or weariness. Hence the
blessed act of loving God, necessary both in nature and in
exercise, is an act which necessarily transcends liberty, just as
the love whereby God loves Himself transcends liberty. This
truth is a proof from on high that man’s will has a boundless
profundity, infinite in relation to its object, since created
goods attract it only superficially, and thus it responds freely
to their invitation, whereas God seen clearly attracts it in­
vincibly.
Is there a parallel truth in natural beatitude? Would God,
unseen, but known perfectly, be loved necessarily, say, by an
angel? St. Thomas speaks as follows: “It is natural for the
angel to turn with love towards God, the Author of his exist­
ence: but to turn towards God as the object of supernatural
beatitude is a gift of grace coming from gratuitous love.” 8 It
seems, then, that the angel’s natural love of God would be a
necessary love, at least as regards specification; but it is not
so clear that it is necessary as regards exercise.

Two Corollaries

i. The blessed are absolutely and intrinsically impeccable.
It is of faith that at least extrinsic impeccability is necessary
for beatitude. “That he might present to Himself a glorious
*Ia, q.63, a. 1, ad sum.

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BEATITUDE

church, not having spot or wrinkle.” 4 These words are com­
monly understood of the Church triumphant. Again, “He
regenerated us unto living hope, unto an inheritance incor­
ruptible and undefiled, that cannot fade.” 6 Beatitude would
not be beatitude if it could admit sin, and hence punishment.
Scotus did not doubt the existence of impeccability, but
said that it came from without, namely, from the aid of God
preserving the blessed soul from sin, as it preserved the
Blessed Virgin Mary from sin on earth. Thomists, on the
contrary, hold that the blessed are intrinsically impeccable,
because of the vision of God and the necessary love that fol­
lows it. There can be no sin in the will, unless there be in the
intellect a defective knowledge, a defective dictate, arising
from error, ignorance, inconsideration. But the intellect
which sees God clearly cannot be defective, for in God it sees
everything that belongs to our perfection, and there is no
interruption of this vision because it is eternal life. In a word,
he who clearly sees the supreme good, here and now neces­
sarily lovable, cannot turn away from it, cannot sin, other­
wise he would not look on God as the supreme good.
2. We desire the vision of God, not only as the delightful
reward of a virtuous life, as Kant objected, but as the pos­
session of the highest good-in-itself.
The first series of Scotistic objections is against the neces­
sity of exercise in regard to beatific love. The second series is
against the intrinsic impeccability of the blessed.
First Series

i. No object moves the will as regards exercise. Answer:
The object does not move the will to exercise without the
mediation of the will itself, we grant. We likewise grant that,
even under this mediation, the object, if finite, does not
necessarily move the will. But we deny that the will can re­
main unmoved when faced with an infinite object.
Indifferent judgment can come from a twofold cause. First,
4 Eph. 5:27.
si Pet. 1:4. Cf. D. 530.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

113

from the imperfections of our knowledge (as appears in those
first motions which are indeliberate): secondly, from the per­
fection of our vision of the highest good which transcends
the natural capacity of our will. Thus beatific love is not free.
It transcends merit. But it is not forced, rather it is in the
highest degree spontaneous and vital.
2. Augustine says: Will does not exist unless it is free.®
Answer: From the truth that the will is free it does not follow
that it is free in its every act, just as from the truth that our
intellect is discursive it does not follow that it is discursive
in its every act.
3. A necessary act cannot have degrees of intensity, because
it proceeds from the entire capacity of the will. Answer: We
must deny this statement. The natural motion of a falling
stone increases in rapidity, the motion of brutes increases as
they more vehemently desire their prey, and the same truth
is seen in the indeliberate motions of the will. Similarly,
beatific love, though it flows from the entire capacity of the
will, can be more intense in one of the blessed than in an­
other, by reason of a more intense degree of glory and charity.
Nor can the blessed on a lower level desire a higher degree
of glory and charity, because each is completely satiated with
his own reward and predestination. A man who is less hungry
eats less, but is equally satisfied.
4. But love in heaven is identical with love on earth. An­
swer: Yes, but to love on earth God appears under one view­
point as good and on the other as the Lawgiver who forbids
what pleases the sinner.
5. But toward beatitude in common the will retains lib­
erty of exercise. Answer: Toward explicit love of beatitude,
yes; toward a virtual and implicit love, no. Here on earth
when the will refrains from actual and explicit love of beati­
tude in favor of some other thought, it acts thus for its own
good and thus implicitly for its own beatitude.
6. Christ’s love for God, being meritorious, was free, though
it proceeded from the beatific vision.
• Enchiridion, chap. 105.

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BEATITUDE

Two answers. The first runs thus: Christ’s love of God as
God was not free; but it was free as reason for loving creatures.
Thus it is with God’s love of Himself: while this act is neces­
sary, it is still freely exercised in relation to creatures. And as
God, though free to create, is impeccable, so Christ was free in
His love unto death for souls, yet simultaneously intrinsically
impeccable by reason of His beatific vision and divine per­
sonality. Similarly, the blessed in heaven necessarily love God
and freely love creatures: freely, we say, but impeccably, since
they love creatures only in relation to God. But their love for
creatures is not meritorious, because they are no longer in via,
whereas Christ was simultaneously wayfarer and comprehensor. The second answer runs thus: As ruled by the beatific
vision, Christ’s love of God was not free: but it was free as
ruled by infused knowledge, which is an analogical cognition.
John of St. Thomas says that each of these views is prob­
able.7 The second view is simply an addition to the first view.
Yet the first solution seems to be more profound. Loving God
considered in Himself differs much from loving God as the
reason for loving creatures. It is more difficult to love our
neighbor, a Pharisee, say, for God’s sake than it is to love God
Himself. In relation to creatures judgment remains sus­
pended, the creature being lovable under one viewpoint, but
not under another until the free will overcomes this indif­
ference. But the free will of the blessed, profoundly rectified
by the beatific vision, is confirmed in good. Hence it acts as it
should, impeccably and freely, in such external services as
are free. The necessity which remains is a necessity of pre­
cept, a necessity of infallibility and consequence, like that
under efficacious grace, which does not destroy liberty but
actualizes it.
7. Love that is free is more perfect than love that is neces­
sary. Answer: Yes, if the necessity arises from imperfect
cognition (as in sudden indeliberate acts); but no, if the
necessity arises from perfect cognition of the highest good.
To explain. Liberty is a dominating indifference of the
τ In Illam, q. 18, a.4.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

u5

will in relation to particular goods. But the will cannot have
this dominating indifference in relation to God seen clearly.
Beatific love, then, is necessary, and thus is higher than love
which is free, and is not below liberty but above it. Further,
necessary love precontains eminently the very foundation of
liberty, because the will is free in relation to particular goods
only by its necessary relation to universal good, which in
reality is found in God alone. In illustration, take Aristotle’s
word, that metaphysics is something useless, meaning that it is
not below but above utility.
8. But God can let vision continue, and still hinder love,
by suspending His own concursus. Answer: God could do
this, considering His absolute power, just as He could an­
nihilate all creatures. But from this it does not follow that
beatific love is not a necessary characteristic that follows
vision. And God’s wisdom will never allow Him to deny this
concursus, just as it will not allow Him to annihilate the
blessed in heaven, or to create a soul without its character­
istics and faculties.

Second Series
Scotistic objections against the intrinsic impeccability of
the saints.
1. The power of sinning is essential to created liberty.
Answer: The power of sinning is the defectibility of liberty;
it is not a characteristic of liberty as such. God is free, and
yet impeccable.
2. Law is not imposed except on those who are capable of
transgression. Answer: This we simply deny. On the blessed,
law is imposed because they love to act in subjection to God.
3. Since liberty is related to contraries, the blessed are
capable of nonfulfillment of law. Answer: Liberty is related
to contraries in the divided sense, yes; i.e., it can chose one
thing after another. But in the composite sense, no, because
it cannot choose simultaneously two opposed courses. To ex­
plain. The soul cannot exercise simultaneously the beatific
vision and nonfulfillment of the divine nrecent. Rut this

BEATITUDE

116

does not mean that the blessed in heaven, or Christ on earth,
can sin or transgress the precept. The soul that sees God can
obey freely, but, even in the divided sense, cannot disobey,
though it retains the capacity of nonobedience and non­
fulfillment.
A parallel truth is that of man’s antecedent potency to
resist efficacious grace, not in the sense that he can directly
impede the efficacy of grace, but in this sense, that he retains
the power not to do that to which he is determined by grace,
because judgment remains indifferent, and God wills that
what is done by grace be done freely. As a precept which
would take away liberty would destroy its own nature, so
efficacious grace, if it did not actualize but destroyed libeity,
would destroy its own nature.
4. To be able to omit the act commanded is to be able to
sin. Answer: To be able to omit the command by disobedi­
ence (the contrary of obedience) is to be able to sin, we grant.
But to be able to omit the command by nonobedience (the
negation of obedience) is to be able to sin, we deny.
There is a great difference between being able not to obey
by negation, and being able to disobey, by a contrary act of
commission, or by a privative act of omission. For example, if
I am in no way subject to a certain superior, my nonobedi­
ence is not sinful. At the other extreme, the soul is most pro­
foundly subject to God, retaining the power of nonobedience
in things which do not attract invincibly. But when the thing
is commanded, then, notwithstanding the command, the will
remains free.
ART. 5. THE BODY, WHILE IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR

PERFECT BEATITUDE, STILL SERVES TO
INCREASE BEATITUDE

Authority. “Blessed are those who have died in the Lord.” ·
“While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord.” ·
« Apoc. 14:13.
» II Cor. 5:6.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

117

“I am straitened on both sides, having a desire to be dis­
solved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better, but to
abide still in the flesh is needful for you.” 10 ‘‘By apostolic
authority we define that all the blessed even before the re­
sumption of their bodies . . . have seen and still see the
divine essence by intuitive vision . . . and this before the
general judgment, without intermission, and from then on
into eternity.” 11 Some writers (Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians) thought that the face-to-face vision would be deferred
until the resurrection. This question reappeared at the time
of John XXII. While some authors say, not without founda­
tion, that the pontiff hesitated regarding this question, it is
nevertheless certain that he never defined his view ex
cathedra.
Theological proof. Our intellect needs the body only be­
cause it needs the sense-images furnished by the imagination.
Now the divine essence cannot be seen by means of sense­
images. The principle here invoked is from reason, and the
application is a truth of faith. Hence many Thomists hold
that this theological conclusion could not be defined as
dogma were it not revealed in equivalent terms in Scripture
or tradition, in this instance by St. Paul.
Yet the body is required for the fullness of beatitude.
Why? Because the soul is more perfect in its nature when it
informs the body, which was created for the soul. The sep­
arated soul has “a desire to rule its body.” The body sub­
serves the soul, since the soul is on the very lowest level of
intelligence, to which corresponds the lowest level of intelligi­
bility.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. The separated soul, being subsistent, can have a perfect
operation, even though it does not have a perfect nature. But
it is not a person, since person signifies complete nature.
10 Phil. 1:23.
u Benedict XII. Cf. D. 530, 693, 984.

BEATITUDE

118

2. The soul’s fruition overflows on the body. The sepa­
rated soul remains individual: it is this soul, the soul of Peter
rather than of Paul, by a transcendental relation to its own
body.
3. The desire of the separated soul, while it rests in the
possession of God objectively, is not totally at rest subjec­
tively. Hence, when the body rises, the soul’s beatitude
grows, not intensively, but extensively.
4. Some separated souls may see God more clearly than do
the inferior angels, because, while they have an intellect nat­
urally less keen, they have a greater light of glory.
ART. 6. IS BODILY PERFECTION NECESSARY

FOR BEATITUDE?

Conclusion: Beatitude, in every way perfect, requires per­
fect disposition of body.
Authority: St. Paul enumerates the four gifts of the glori­
fied body: 1. impassibility (“It is sown in corruption, it rises
in incorruption”); 2. brightness (“It is sown in dishonor, it
shall rise in glory”); 3. agility (“It is sown in weakness, it
shall rise in power”); 4. subtility (“It is sown a natural body,
it shall rise a spiritual body”).12
Reason: These gifts are necessary: first, that the flesh no
longer weigh down the soul and turn it away from contempla­
tion; secondly, that the soul, the form of the body and its
principle of life, may communicate to its body a share in its
own beatitude.
Impassibility excludes corruption, passion, pain. Subtility
enables the body to penetrate another body (Christ entering
though the doors were closed). Agility renders the body
capable of the swiftest motion (though not instantaneous).
By brightness the body becomes luminous, like a crystal, re­
vealing its wonderful organization.
Aureoles. This overflowing glory carries from the soul a
special beauty into the body. This beauty, particularly as it
121 Cor. 15:42.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BEATITUDE

119

appears in the glorified head, is an accidental glory, super­
added to the essential glory, symbolized by the golden crown.
This aureole, representing a special victory, is threefold:
against the world, against the flesh, and against the devil.
Those who conquered the world, wear the aureole of martyrs.
Those whose teaching conquered the devil, wear the aureole
of doctors.
ART. 7. ARE EXTERIOR GOODS NECESSARY FOR BEATITUDE?

For perfect beatitude external goods are in no wise re­
quired, since the body is no longer animal, but spiritual. Yet
heaven, the empyrean, is a place of supremest beauty. Food
and drink and riches are metaphors, to express spiritual
goods: “Eat, O friends, drink, and be inebriated.” 13
ART. 8. IS THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS
NECESSARY FOR BEATITUDE?

The society of friends is not necessary for perfect beatitude,
since the soul possesses entire plenitude of perfection in God.
Yet the society of friends adds an accidental and concomitant
fullness, since the blessed see one another and rejoice in one
another’s company.
Why does man need friends on earth? Not for the sake of
utility, since he is sufficient unto himself. Nor for the sake
of delight, because his own deeds give him supreme delight.
But he needs friends in order to benefit them, to be inspired
by them unto good, and to be aided by them in doing good.
Virtuous friendship, as distinct from friendship founded on
delight or utility, is based on good-in-itself. Higher still is
that friendship which is supernatural, founded on God Him­
self. This friendship constitutes the Church triumphant, the
home of perfect beatitude.
is Cant, of Cant. 5:1.

CHAPTER IX
On Attaining Beatitude (q.

5)

eight articles, the first four deal with the attain­
ability and inamissibility of beatitude; the last four, with the
means whereby man attains beatitude.
Of

these

ART. 1. CAN MAN ATTAIN BEATITUDE?

The affirmative answer is a truth of faith. A persuasive
argument is based on our natural inefficacious desire of see­
ing God. The adequate object of our intellect is all reality,
including the vision of the Blessed Trinity.
ART. 2. CAN ONE MAN BE MORE BLESSED

THAN ANOTHER?

One man can be more blessed than another, not indeed
in the object possessed, but in the measure of that possession.
Authority. The thesis is of faith, against Jovinian and the
pseudo-Reformers. “The souls of the just see God, triune and
one, clearly as He is, but one more perfectly than another
by reason of diversity of merit." 1 “He who says that by good
works eternal life, and the attainment of life eternal, and in­
crease of glory cannot be merited, let him be anathema.” 2
Scripture abounds in this line. “In the house of my father
there are many mansions.” 8 “God will render to each one
according to his works.” 4 “He who shows sparingly will reap
sparingly. He who sows in blessings will reap in blessings." 5
“Star differs from star in brightness.” 8
1 Council of Trent. D. 693.
2 Ibid., D. 842.
a John 14:2.
«Matt. 16:27.
» Il Cor. 5:10; 9:6.
« I Cor. 15:41.
120

ON ATTAINING BEATITUDE

121

Reason. Enjoyment follows disposition, the remote disposi­
tion of merit and the proximate disposition of glory. Since
the beatific vision is absolutely supernatural, its greater in­
tensity depends, not on greater natural vigor of intellect, but
on the more intense light infused into it. Obediential capac­
ity is equally gratuitous for angels and for men. But does not
he who comes last receive as much as those who labored the
whole day? Answer: This parable pictures the gratuitousness
of objective beatitude, not the degree. The degree of glory
depends on the degree of charity at death. Sudden conver­
sions (the good thief on Mount Calvary and the public
sinner) may include a surpassing degree of grace and merit.
ART. 3. CAN ANYONE IN THIS LIFE BE BLESSED?

Answer: Perfect beatitude is not possible in this life. This
sentence is of faith. Against the Beghards and Beguines, the
following proposition was condemned: “Every intellectual
nature is in itself naturally blessed, and the soul does not
need the light of glory to elevate it to see God and to enjoy
Him in bliss.” 7 Scripture is eloquent on the miseries of this
life: “Man, born of woman, lives a short time and is replete
with many miseries." 8 Since man cannot understand except
by turning to sense-images, he cannot, in this life, come to
the vision of God’s essence. Yet, notwithstanding ignorance,
inordinate affections, suffering, and fear of death, man can
still in this life have a kind of participation in future beati­
tude, by reason of hope and charity, especially if he reaches
the unitive way, as is clear from the lives of the saints.
ART. 4. CAN PERFECT BEATITUDE BE LOST?

Inamissibility, the cause of perpetuity, is a truth of faith,
expressed by the Gospel term “eternal life,” by the symbol,
“I believe in life everlasting,” and by the statement of Bene­
dict XII that the beatific vision suffers no interruption.·
7 D. 471.
e Job 14:1.
» D. 530.

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Scripture speaks often of this inamissibility: “The just will
go into eternal life.’’10 “I give them eternal life.” 11 “The
many who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake, some
unto eternal life, others unto shame and opprobrium.”12
“Blessed are those who live in Thy house, O Lord, forever
and forever they will praise Thee.” 12
Is this inamissibility intrinsic or extrinsic? Scotists, fol­
lowed later by Molina and Suarez, tend to depreciate the
supernatural gifts of God, their elevation above the order of
nature, in contrast to St. Thomas, who gives to the gifts of
God all their sublimity, and amplitude, and intrinsic in­
amissibility. Man naturally desires to retain the good he has,
without fear of losing it. But beatitude is perfect good, satis­
fying all desires and excluding all evils. Hence beatitude in­
cludes inamissibility and excludes all fear of loss.
1. The argument rests, not on a contingent decree of God,
but on the very nature of beatitude. The greatest fortune
granted for one day only, or for a month, or for a year, would
not make a man blessed. Even a transient glimpse of the
beatific vision did not make St. Paul blessed.
2. The beatific vision, arising from the permanent light of
glory, can cease only in one of these three ways: by reason of
him who sees; by reason of God withdrawing the vision; or
by reason of some created cause corrupting the vision. But
it cannot cease in any of these ways.
The beatific vision cannot cease on the part of him who
sees, because the will simply cannot find in the beatific vision
any tiling deficient or unpleasant. It cannot cease on the part
of God, considering His ordinary power, because to act thus
would be to inflict punishment, and punishment presup­
poses guilt, and the blessed are impeccable. Nor can it cease
by reason of a created cause, because the beatific vision unites
io Mau. 25:46.
n John 10:28.
12 Dan. 12:3. Cf. Eccli. 31:10.
is Ps. 83:5. Cf. Wisd. 5:16.

ON ATTAINING BEATITUDE

123

the blessed soul immediately with God, elevating it above all
created agents, above all demonic influence.
Confirmations. First, the sources of the beatific vision are
absolutely spiritual and incorruptible: namely, the intellec­
tive soul, the intellect, the permanent light of glory, the
divine essence taking the place of the impressed and ex­
pressed species. Hence the beatific vision is absolutely and
intrinsically immutable.
Second, charity, which is the beginning of eternal life, is
in itself incorruptible. Here on earth it can be lost, but only
by mortal sin, since we carry this treasure in earthen vessels.
But the treasure, in itself, is the beginning of eternal life, and
the charity of Christ, preserving us in life, is stronger than
every temptation. “Who shall separate us from the love of
Christ? Neither death nor life nor angels nor principalities
nor any other creature can separate us from the love of God
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.” 14 If these words are
spoken of eternal life as begun here below, how much more
true they are of eternal life there where sin is impossible!
How is the beatific vision measured? Not by time, whether
continuous or discrete, but by participated eternity, which
infinitely transcends our continuous time and also the dis­
crete time of the angels. In this eternity, the vision is one
unbroken instant, of which a remote image can be found in
the life of union as led by saints on earth.
Eternity is the perfect possession of interminable life, a
possession that is simultaneously whole and perfect. The dis­
crete time of the angels measures their succession of thoughts
and affections. Continuous time, the measure of motion, is
constituted by the flowing now. The one single instant of
immutable eternity is related to continuous time, as is the
apex of a cone to its base.
Corollary. The term “eternal life” is very profound. “Eter­
nal” means intrinsically invariable, simultaneously whole,
1« Rom. 8:35.

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altogether without succession. It is variable only extrinsically,
by the absolute power of God, who, as He began it, can also
cease to support it, by suspending His own concursus. This
He will never do, because there is no motive for doing so.
God will never annihilate the human nature of Christ, or of
the Blessed Virgin. This annihilation is not a contradiction if
we look at matter and form, but it is if we look at purpose.
Even the beatific vision, granted for a transient moment, as it
was possibly granted to St. Paul, is measured by participated
eternity, because it contains in itself no succession.
Scotist Objections Analyzed

1. That which has potency to nonexistence can be lost.
Yes, if the potency is intrinsic; but no, if it is merely ex­
trinsic.
2. Since the beatific vision is not a debt due to any crea­
ture, it can be lost. Answer: If it is not due, either in its col­
lation or in its conservation, we grant. But if it is due to the
subject at least as far as conservation goes, then we deny. It
is true that the beatific vision is given gratuitously, since God
gratuitously gave us the principle of merit, namely, grace. But
the beatific vision is due to the blessed as a reward, and as an
eternal reward, given even to children by reason of the merits
of Christ.
3. Form received into a nonconnatural subject can be lost.
Answer: If the form is in itself corruptible, I grant. If the form
is in itself incorruptible like charity, I subdistinguish: if you
can assign a cause why it should be lost, I grant; otherwise, I
deny. Charity, on earth, is lost by mortal sin, but sin is im­
possible in heaven.
4. Whatever is received is received in the manner of the
recipient. Yes, if the gift is subordinated to the recipient; no,
if the gift subordinates the recipient to itself. To explain. The
light of glory subjects to itself the intellect, and thereby ele­
vates the will to immobility in good. Thus vision differs from
grace on earth, which is dependent on man’s subjective will.

ON ATTAINING BEATITUDE

125

The Word, united to the humanity of Christ, does not par­
ticipate in the latter’s mutability, but communicates to it
its own immutability.
5. St. Paul’s vision was lost, because it was transient. But
the vision of the blessed is of the same species. Answer: St.
Paul had the blessed vision by a miraculous privilege,
granted: as an ordinary grace, denied. The vision given to St.
Paul was not the reward of perfect beatitude. The life of
glory, given miraculously and transiently, does not have the
immobility of a habit, because it does not flow from habitual
grace as a characteristic.
6. The light of glory is not more inamissible than habitual
grace, which can be lost. Answer: Grace on earth is amissible,
not by reason of itself, but by reason of the changeable sub­
ject in which it is. But the habitual grace of a soul con­
firmed in good, as was the Blessed Virgin on earth, or as are
the souls in purgatory, or as are the blessed who see God
clearly and cannot sin: this habitual grace cannot be lost.
Corollary. Heavenly bliss has three principal character­
istics. First, love for God, necessary also in its exercise, a love
which transcends liberty and merit, like the love whereby
God loves Himself. Secondly, intrinsic impeccability. Thirdly,
intrinsic inamissibility. Thus we explain the last words of the
Creed, “I believe in eternal life.” St. Augustine dwells on the
perpetual newness of eternal life. The joy of entering into
heaven lasts forever. It is eternal springtime, always new, al­
ways young, insatiably satiating.
ART. 5. CAN A CREATURE BY HIS NATURAL POWERS
ATTAIN BEATITUDE?

Neither man nor angel can attain the beatitude of the
fatherland by his natural powers. This conclusion is a truth
of faith, against the Beghards. It is founded on the text of St.
Paul: “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard.” 15 Reason agrees.
Reason can prove, not indeed the existence or the possibility
I Cor. 2:9.

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of the beatific vision, but its supernaturalness, namely, that
it is naturally unattainable. Cognition means that the ob­
ject known exists in the knowing subject, by reason of the
subject’s immateriality. But God’s immateriality infinitely
transcends the immateriality of the created intellect. Like the
eye of the owl to the sun, so is the created intellect to un­
created Light. Hence the infinite abyss between natural
cognition and the beatific vision. Natural knowledge, though
it should grow to infinity in its own line, would still not be
one step nearer to the vision of God, just as a polygon, in­
scribed in a circle, could never be identified with the cir­
cumference, because a line can never become a point, and a
line is divisible into infinity.
ART. 6. CAN MAN ATTAIN BEATITUDE BY THE ACTION
OF SOME HIGHER CREATURE?

Man cannot attain beatitude by the action of some higher
creature. This is again a truth of faith. “God gives grace and
glory.” 18 God alone is the author of grace and of glory. Grace
and glory are participations in the divine nature which, much
more wonderfully than physical miracles, transcend all cre­
ated powers. Corporeal vision, given miraculously to a man
born blind, is a natural thing, though supernaturally re­
stored, whereas grace is essentially supernatural.
Angels can dispose man toward attaining his last end, but
the order of agents corresponds to the order of goals, and
only the supreme Agent can efficaciously lead the creature to
its ultimate goal.
Why cannot a blessed angel communicate to us a participa­
tion in his light of glory? The angel, even naturally, can
communicate to us good thoughts, also in relation to super­
natural mysteries. But he cannot communicate to us super­
natural light, except instrumentally, as do the sacraments,
because this effect transcends the angel’s proper form, natural
or supernatural. Light illuminates, but not everything that
is illumined can in turn illuminate others.
ie Ps. 8s: 12.

ON ATTAINING BEATITUDE

127

ART. 7. ARE GOOD WORKS PREREQUIRED FOR BEATITUDE?

The affirmative answer is of faith, against the Calvinists.17
“If you know these things, you will be blessed if you do
them.’’18 The creature cannot naturally have supernatural
beatitude, but must strive to reach it, and beatitude is the
reward of good works. Christ, indeed, in the first moment of
His conception, enjoyed the beatific vision. But this was an
extraordinary grace, like the creation of the first individuals
in each species, and it was restricted to Christ, because He is
the God-man, and the head of humanity.
ART. 8. DOES EVERY MAN DESIRE BEATITUDE?

First conclusion. Every man desires beatitude in common.
The reason is that, thus to will beatitude, is nothing else than
willing that the will be satiated. But this every man wills,
as is clear both by experience and by reason, since the object
of the will is universal good, not limited to this or that particu­
lar good.
Second conclusion. Not all men will that special beatitude
which is found in God alone, since some men will pleasure
or riches or honor, instead of God.
Summary

The essence of beatitude consists in the beatific vision. Its
principal characteristics are fruition, impeccability, and inamissibility. The attainment of beatitude, not possible by na­
ture, is possible therefore only by grace, which, when it is
consummated, is called glory. May God in mercy grant to us
all this greatest of all His gifts.
Supplement
On Natural Beatitude

What would constitute that beatitude which can be at­
tained by the powers of nature, in cooperation with the natu17 Cone. Trident, sess. 6, can. 26.
is John 13:17. Cf. Matt. 7:21; Luke 11:28; Rom. 2:13; Gal. 5:6; James 3:24·

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ral help of God? In the case of men, it would consist in perfect
cognition of God, the Author of nature, and in a consequent
love of God, the source of all natural good. For the angels, it
would consist in the natural cognition of God as the Author
of each angel’s individual nature, and in the natural love
proportionate to this cognition. God is the objective beatitude
of men and angels, both in the order of nature and in the
order of grace. The creature’s will is like a point from which
infinite lines of desire reach out in every direction. Divine
goodness, even as naturally known, is the circumference which
unites it itself all these myriads of lines.
The Sahnanticenses pose three questions: first, is natural
beatitude possible; second, in what natural operation would
it consist; third, in what state would men attain natural be­
atitude? Answer: Within the order of nature there is possible
an operation, to which, however imperfectly, the name “be­
atitude” can properly be applied. For this view they cite
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Du­
randus, Scotus, Cajetan, Bellarmine, Banez, and Suarez. They
conclude: “The distinction between natural beatitude and
supernatural beatitude is commonly received.” The chief rea­
son for this assertion, taken from St. Thomas, runs thus: The
rational creature, since it is by its nature ordained to some
last end in its own order, must be able to attain that end, and
this attainment is natural beatitude.
They cite Vasquez to the contrary. Neither in men nor in
angels does Vasquez admit any beatitude except supernatural
beatitude. He rejects the common distinction between natural
and supernatural, which all other theologians admit. This
singular opinion of Vasquez has been renewed in our days by
Henry de Lubac, who maintains that human nature is not a
defined essence, with necessary characteristics and propor­
tioned natural end, but rather an essence open to indefinite
progress.10 Traditional theologians reply thus: Then not even
1» Le Surnaturel, 1946, pp. 434 f.; 485-87; 252-54. Cf. in confutation, P.
Boyer, S.J. (Gregorianum, 1947, pp. 390 sqq.); P. Gagnebet, O.P. (Revue
Thomiste, 1948, 1949).

ON ATTAINING BEATITUDE

129

God would have a definite and clear idea of human nature,
He would know only human individuals, as was maintained
by the nominalists of the fifteenth century, especially by Oc­
cam. Further: then there would no longer be a natural right,
distinct from divine positive right, nor would natural ethics
be immutable. Juridic positivism, the offspring of nominalism,
would be true. Lastly, since the supernatural is defined by
the Church as a perfection which transcends the natural, if
there is no longer human nature nor angelic nature, then
there is no longer anything properly speaking supernatural.
The distinction between the natural order and the order of
grace, far from being a Thomistic invention, is thus pro­
claimed by the Vatican Council: “The perpetual teaching
of the Catholic Church has held, and still holds, that there
is a twofold order of cognition, distinct, not only in source,
but also in object.” 20 And the encyclical Humani generis re­
jects the opinion of those who corrupt the “genuine gratuitous­
ness of the supernatural order," since they maintain that God
could not create an intellectual creature without calling it
to the beatific vision.
20 D. 1808.

SECOND PART
HUMAN ACTS

CHAPTER X
Voluntary and Involuntary (q.

6)

This question is divided into two parts. First part, where is

voluntariness to be found? This question is treated in the
first three articles: first, is voluntariness to be found in human
acts; second, is it also to be found in brute animals; third,
can there be voluntariness without any act? Second part:
Things which can cause involuntariness or reduce voluntari­
ness: Can the will suffer violence (art. 4)? Can violence cause
involuntariness (art. 5)? Can fear cause involuntariness (art.
6)? Can concupiscence cause involuntariness (art. 7)?
ART. 1. ARE HUMAN ACTS VOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries
Here we have the definition of the voluntary act. After the
first three articles on the nature of voluntariness, we discuss
tire divisions of voluntariness, divisions which are commonly
proposed today, and which are founded in the doctrine of St.
Thomas. This process is the normal one. Step by step St.
Thomas proceeds to a methodical definition of voluntariness,
whereas modern theologians often presuppose the definition
already found and received. The difficulty of the question
appears in the objections. Voluntary is that which proceeds
from our will, that is, from a principle intrinsic in us. But
man is moved to act from without, that is, either by the pro­
posed object, or by a precedent motion, either corporeal (e.g.,
to avoid cold or heat), or spiritual, since man needs to be
moved by God in order to act at all.
‘S3

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BEATITUDE

The Affirmative Argument
A. Authority. St. Damascene says that “voluntary is an act
proceeding from the will under the direction of reason.”
B. Voluntariness is found in the highest degree in human
acts. When we say “in the highest degree,” we are speaking of
man’s relation, not to God, but to brutes. The conclusion is
proved as follows. Man has within himself the principle, not
only of acting, but of acting for a purpose, since he knows the
end and purpose of his work. Hence, since voluntary means
something that proceeds from an intrinsic principle accom­
panied by knowledge of the end, voluntariness is found in
the highest degree in human acts.
To explain the principle here invoked we must notice the
divisions of motion. Intrinsic motion is either vital or nonvital. Vital movements are of two kinds, one cognitive, when
the agent knows, either purpose as purpose (man), or knows
only the thing which is purpose (animal). Second, vital motion,
which is noncognitive (the plant which preserves itself by
assimilating food). Next the nonvital movements which are
still intrinsic (the stone which falls by gravity). Finally, we
have extrinsic motion (the stone moving upward).
The minor is a nominal definition of voluntariness, namely,
motion which comes from the agent’s own inclination. But
this one element is not sufficient. The vital action of the plant,
for example, nutrition, is not voluntary. Hence voluntariness
requires also knowledge of the end. Thus we say, in some real
sense, that animals perform voluntary acts (this dog wills to
eat).
In response to the third difficulty, we say that man moves
himself to his end, even though, first, the object must be pro­
posed to him, and, second, he must be premoved by God. Man
has in himself, not the first cause of his act, but a created in­
trinsic principle of acting under knowledge of purpose. And
thus man knows, not merely the thing which is his purpose,

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY

i35

but knows it as purpose, as precontaining the relation of means
to the purpose he intends.
ART. 2. ARE THE ACTS OF ANIMALS VOLUNTARY?

Conclusion: the imperfect voluntary is found in brutes but
the perfect voluntary only in men.
A. Authority. Aristotle says that boys and brutes share in
the voluntary.1 Boys, it is understood, before the use of rea­
son. The same view is expressed by St. Damascene and Nemesius.
B. The argument. In order to have a voluntary act, the
principle of the act must be within, with knowledge of the
end. Now in brute animals there is at least an imperfect
knowledge of the end, since by their sense-powers, especially
by their instincts, they know the thing which is the end,
though they do not know the end as end, i.e., they do not
know the proportion between the act and its purpose. Hence
in brute animals we find an imperfect voluntary. Only in
man who deliberates can we find the perfect voluntary. Only
man knows purpose as purpose, not only in the abstract, but
also in the concrete (for example, the cook preparing a meal).
Objection: The brutes have no will and therefore they have
no voluntariness. The answer runs thus: Brutes have no will,
because will signifies rational appetite; while ‘voluntary’ gets
its name from the will, it has a wider signification, namely,
that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowl­
edge of the end, and in this sense it is found, analogically and
imperfectly, also in brute animals.
Certain authors say that voluntariness is found univocally
in brutes and men. This statement does not seem to be true,
because “voluntary” follows knowledge and appetite. Now
cognition and appetite are analogical terms when applied to
the two orders, sensitive and intellective: analogical, because
based on a similitude of proportion. Cognition is not one
i/// Eth., c. i.

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BEATITUDE

univocal notion, it is not a genus, diversified by differences
which lie outside the genus. In this analogous sense, cogni­
tion can be claimed even for God. Thus John of St. Thomas
speaks as follows: “Some hold that the voluntary is spoken
analogically of man and brute, or metaphorically, as the
meadow is said to laugh.” To us it seems that “voluntary” is
an analogical term, it is used, not metaphorically, but prop­
erly, as is the term “cognition.” Sense-cognition is cognition,
properly so called, not a mere metaphor. Yet this cognition
agrees only analogically with intellective cognition. Thus
compare also the word “life,” which is predicated, analogi­
cally but properly, of God, of the angels, of our mind, of ani­
mals, of plants. It can, of course, become a mere metaphor
when we speak, say, of living water.
St. Thomas says: “Voluntariness is found by the philosopher
in brutes, not as coming from the will, but as opposed to
violence, so that we can speak of the acts of brutes and chil­
dren as voluntary, because they act spontaneously, though
without an act of choice.” 2 Voluntary is here identified with
the spontaneous. This seems to be the meaning of Cajetan
where he says: “Simply speaking, we can deny that brutes
move themselves to their end. The statement is true only
secundum quid.” 3 And St. Thomas says; “In things which do
not have the use of reason there is neither voluntariness nor
involuntariness.” 4 From all these considerations it seems to
follow that voluntariness is found in brutes only analogically.

Definition of Voluntariness

Voluntary is that which comes from an intrinsic principle
under knowledge of purpose. The voluntary is perfect when
an end is known, not only materially, but formally as an end.
The intrinsic principle is, in the case of perfect voluntariness,
man’s spiritual will, which is guided by reason. In the case of
veritate, q.24, a.2, ad mm.
» Art. 1, no. 6.
♦ Ia-IIae, q.6, a. 7, ad sum.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY

137

the imperfect voluntary of brutes, it is their sense-appetite,
guided by instinct (thus the sheep flees from the wolf).
This definition of the voluntary is legitimate, it follows the
laws of logic. For, by nominal definition, popular definition,
voluntary is that which proceeds from the will, or from the
inclination of the agent.
A real definition is reached by the division of natural mo­
tion proceeding from a natural internal inclination of the
agent which moves and acts. Now the principle of motion
is twofold: efficient or final. Hence those things are perfectly
moved by an intrinsic principle in which we find these two­
fold principles, efficient (in the inclination or appetite), and
final (rational knowledge of the end).
The correctness of this definition is confirmed when we
compare the voluntary with other similar or dissimilar mo­
tions. Here we institute a comparison that is inductive and
ascending. Voluntary is contrasted
A. as an intrinsic principle (a) with the violent (where the
principle is external, counter to inclination); (b) with the ob­
ject willed, but not produced by the agent (rainfall).
B. As proceeding from knowledge (a) against vegetative
life (sleep, digestion, respiration); (b) against the mere spon­
taneous (first motions of passion, preceding all advertence).
ART. 3. CAN THERE BE VOLUNTARINESS WHERE

THERE IS NO ACT?

Conclusion. A thing can be voluntary without any act, even
without any internal act, if we speak simply and objectively.
We have two arguments. First, from common principles. This
proof runs as follows: Anything which is under our control is
said to be voluntary. But man is master of his action and his
nonaction, of his willing and nonwilling. Therefore, as will­
ing is voluntary, so also is nonwilling, so far as it is under
man’s dominion. Therefore a man is culpable, not only when
he does evil, but also when he does not do the good which
he should do.

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BEATITUDE

An argument more direct and proper, runs as follows:
Voluntary is that which comes from the will with knowledge
of purpose. But a thing can be indirectly from the will, when
man does not place an act which he can and should place. To
illustrate: The sinking of a ship comes indirectly from the will
of the pilot, if he does not will to guide it as he should and
can. Thus a thing can be voluntary without any act, internal
or external. A sin of omission does not require an act of nolition, because then the omission would be directly willed. That
the omission may be indirectly willed, it suffices that the agent,
who can and should (e.g., go to Mass) does not do so.
In answer to the second difficulty we note the difference
between “willing-not-to” and “not-willing-to.” Willing-not-to
is an act, not-willing-to is the absence of act. Here an ob­
jection enters. It seems that to “will-not-to” constitutes rather
an involuntary act. The answer is that sometimes it does. A
man who wills not to write can be forced to write, and thus
does something involuntary. But sometimes willing-not-to
constitutes a voluntary: I will-not-to go to Mass. Again, in
the third difficulty, not to consider is voluntary, when man
can and should consider.
Corollary. That omission be voluntary, it is required and
suffices that a man knowingly omits a work which he could
do, for instance, going to Mass on a ferial day. That the omis­
sion be not only voluntary, but also culpable, three things
are required: first, that the agent could act; second, that he
had a duty to act; third, that he did not act. Thus Sylvius.
Similar are the words of Cajetan: “To constitute an act, in­
directly culpable, three elements concur: first, ability; second,
duty; third, not willing. Hence we must diligently consider
whether the agent should, and when he should, hinder an
omission. Thus divine permission of sin is without fault. God
certainly can hinder all sin. He does not hinder, but He is
not bound to hinder. Rather, as St. Augustine says, God, be­
ing infinitely good, would in no wise allow anything evil in

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY

139

His works, were He not so omnipotent and good as to draw
good even from evil.

A Doubt

Can omission be indirectly voluntary without some act
which is its cause or occasion? Many disciples of St. Thomas
answer negatively. These Thomists say that, whereas St.
Thomas had answered affirmatively in his earlier writings, he
later changed his view. Now, in point of fact, St. Thomas in
the Summa says this: “For the essence of a sin of omission
there is not required per se any act, as when, to illustrate, a
man at the hour when he is bound to go to church, does not
in any way think of going or of not going to church.” 5
“But if,” St. Thomas adds, “in the sin of omission we under­
stand also the occasions or causes of omitting, then in a sin
of omission there must be some act. To illustrate. A man does
not will to go to church, because he wills to play at the mo­
ment, or because he stayed up late last night, and in conse­
quence does not go in the morning to church. And then this
act, interior or exterior, is per accidens the cause of the omis­
sion. But judgment on tilings is to be given by what they are
per se and not by that which they are per accidens. Hence we
can say truly that there can be sin without any act at all.”
Objections
1. But certainly at times it seems that there is no act which
is cause or occasion of the culpable omission. To be guilty, it
suffices that a man can and should consider and will, whereas
in fact he does not consider and does not will. Answer: For
the sin of omission some act is required, at least per accidens.
When an object is proposed by the intellect, for instance, the
obligation of going to Mass on Sunday, the will can have
three relations to that act. First, to will; second, to will not;
third, not to will. Now to will and to will not are acts, and
s la-IIae, q.71, a.5.

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in this latter case the omission is directly willed. Not to will
is the suspension of act, whether of volition or nolition. But,
so Thomists argue, this determination to suspension cannot
exist without some act. If the will would in no way determine
itself to suspend the act, there would be no exercise of liberty
and we would be dealing with a voluntariness that is merely
potential. But, possibly, it seldom happens that we deal with
this act to suspend an act, because generally the omission of
the precept takes place because he who omits wishes to do
something else, say, to sleep.
2. That the omission be voluntary it suffices that a man
can act and does not act. But here there is no act. The an­
swer is: If the omission is to be voluntary, the man must be
able to do the objective deed and does not do it, this I grant;
but the man remains without any subjective determination,
this I deny. The agent certainly determines himself at least
not to place the act. The exercise of liberty cannot be without
all act, otherwise the will would remain as it were dead, free
only as a power. Thus God omits voluntarily to hinder the
sins of men, and permits them for higher motives of His wis­
dom, namely, to manifest His mercy or His justice.
First corollary: That an effect be voluntary, it must proceed
either physically or morally from the will.
Second corollary: The effect which follows or accompanies
the omission is not voluntary, unless there is an obligation to
impede that effect, or unless the omission is chosen purposely
as a means to this effect.
Here, then, we have the proof that this effect does not pro­
ceed either physically or morally from the will: not physically,
because the agent exercises no influence; not morally, unless
there is an obligation for the agent to hinder this effect. To
illustrate: God omits voluntarily to hinder the sins of men,
yet these sins are not voluntary on the part of God, because
God is not bound to hinder these sins, but can permit them
in view of a greater good.
Further, from positive and fully voluntary acts there may

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follow several effects which are not voluntary, since there is
no obligation to hinder them. To illustrate: The sacrilege
of a bad priest is not voluntary to the penitent who asks for
the sacrament. Motions of concupiscence which follow the
confessor’s hearing of confessions, or the physician’s care of
the sick, are not voluntary in the confessor or in the physician,
because they are not bound to hinder these effects, since their
duties are causes per accidens of the unintended effects.
But when an omission which is voluntary and not culpable
is chosen as means to a certain effect, then such effect is volun­
tary, because it is directly willed. To illustrate: A man who
stays away from the fire in order to suffer cold for the sake
of mortification. The cold is willed per se, and the mortifica­
tion is voluntary.

Divisions of Voluntariness
The voluntary is either perfect or imperfect. The perfect
voluntary is either necessary (beatific love, love of beatitude in
general) or free. The free voluntary is either direct or indirect.
The direct voluntary is either voluntary in its cause or volun­
tary in itself, and this in two fashions: positive (voZo), or nega­
tive (nolo). The positive includes the voluntary simpliciter
(consequent will), and the voluntary secundum quid (ante­
cedent will). The indirect voluntary is negative (sinking of a
ship by reason of lack of vigilance). The imperfect voluntary
is twofold: first, in human emotions, which are either semi­
deliberate, or entirely indeliberate; second, the imperfect
voluntary (the spontaneous as found in brutes). The six most
important of these divisions are to be explained.
Divisions arising from: 1. degrees of cognition; 2. degrees
of advertence; 3. degrees of freedom; 4. modes of influence;
5. modes of termination; 6. modes of willing.

1. Degrees of Cognition
By reason of cognition the voluntary is divided into the
perfect and the imperfect voluntary, according as cognition is

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142
either perfect, knowing the purpose and the proportion of
means to that purpose, or is imperfect, when it apprehends,
as animals do, the thing which is the purpose but not as pur­
pose.
Thus the imperfect voluntary belongs to brutes, but it is
found also in men, motions which are either indeliberate,
e., such motions as antecede advertence, or in motions that
i.
are semi-deliberate of which we are only imperfectly con­
scious, because, for example, we have not waked up entirely.
This imperfect voluntary appears in infants, in lunatics, in
drunkards, in those suffering from hallucination or obsession.
But deliberate motions elicited with full advertence are fully
voluntary. Some authors note that half-insane people may still
be responsible, in matters where judgment and deliberation
are still free. This holds good, particularly at the beginning of
the disease, as regards moral and religious standards.

2. Degrees of Advertence
Even full advertence may be either distinct or confused, ac­
cording as the morality of the object is perceived distinctly
or confusedly. To illustrate. He who throws a stone from a
window, foreseeing that he will thus wound his passing enemy,
adverts distinctly to the malice of the act. But if he does the
act surmising that possibly some passer-by may be wounded,
he does not advert except confusedly to the likelihood of
wounding his enemy.

3. Degrees of Freedom
By reason of the object proposed, the voluntary is divided
into the necessary voluntary, (for example, the desire of be­
atitude here on earth and beatific love in heaven), and the
free voluntary, an act, namely, that is immune, not only from
coercion, but from the natural necessity of instinct, or of any
power determined to one line.
Here enters a doubt considered by Billuart: Is the perfect

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143

voluntary identical with the free? An affirmative answer is
given by a few, who deny that the necessary voluntary is per­
fect. Thomists reply by distinguishing two classes of the neces­
sary voluntary: first, what arises from imperfect cognition
as in brutes and children); second, that which originates from
perfect cognition. This voluntary, they hold, is not imperfect,
but in the highest degree perfect. Examples are the love by
which God loves Himself, and breathes the Holy Spirit,
also the love whereby the blessed love God clearly seen in
paradise.
4. Modes of Influence

By reason of influence, the free voluntary is either direct or
indirect, according as the will has, or has not, a direct influence
on the thing willed. What is only indirectly willed is willed
for something else. Example: the omission of Mass when I
will to do something else, as, for instance, to read a profane
book. I do not will to go to Mass, but I do not say directly:
"I will not go to Mass.”
Further, the direct voluntary is twofold, either immediate
or mediate. It is immediate when I will the object in itself,
either positively (I will go to Mass), or negatively (I will not
go to Mass). But this direct voluntary is mediate when I will
something, not in itself, but in its cause. Example: I will to
drink immoderately, though I foresee that drunkenness will
be the cause of a quarrel. In this case the quarrel is willed
in its cause.
Here we must note that many authors confound the indirect
voluntary and the voluntary in cause, because each resembles
the other, and because the omission indirectly willed, as we
said above, presupposes some act of the will as cause, or at
least as occasion. But according to St. Thomas there is a differ­
ence. The voluntary in cause is not indirect but direct, though
not immediate. To illustrate. The demonstration from motion
to God’s existence is not indirect but direct, though medi-

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144
ated. Voluntary in cause is the foreseen effect of a positive
action willed in itself. Indirect voluntary is the foreseen effect
of an omission. We must here pause to discuss the following
relevant principles.
1. The voluntary, either indirect or in cause, can be good.
And the effect foreseen as good increases the goodness of the
whole act. But theologians generally deal rather with these
two voluntaries under the aspect of evil, in order to tell us
when the evil effect is to be avoided.
2. An evil effect, willed only in its cause, is imputable as
guilt, under three conditions; first, the agent was bound to
foresee this effect at least confusedly; second, the agent was
able not to place the cause; third, he was bound to hinder the
effect.
First condition. Nothing is willed unless foreknown. A
physician or confessor, conscious that he lacks the necessary
knowledge, foresees, indistinctly, the evil effects that may
follow. The surgeon, conscious that he has not studied suffi­
ciently the conditions required by the operation, is responsi­
ble for the evil effect that may come from his negligence.
Thus foresight and circumspection are parts of prudence.
But when the agent cannot foresee the evil effect, then this
effect is not imputed to him as guilt. Drunkenness is not in­
directly voluntary in him who is ignorant of the special power
of a certain wine and thus becomes inebriated (as happened
to Noe).
Second condition. The agent who is morally bound to
place the cause is not responsible for the effect. A priest is
not guilty of sacrilege when he gives Communion to a sinner
whose unworthiness he knows only from confession, because
he is bound to preserve the sacramental secret.
Third condition. The agent must be bound to hinder the
effect. If he is not thus bound, the effect is not imputable. In­
ordinate motions of sensuality, in a physician, say, or con­
fessor, are not imputable when they arise from the exercise of
duty.

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145

Third Principle
It is allowed to place an act, in itself good or indifferent,
from which follow two effects, one good, the other evil, pro­
vided the good effect is immediate, i.e., is not mediated by the
evil effect; provided further that there be present a grave rea­
son for acting, and that the agent’s purpose be good. Four
conditions are here laid down.
First condition. The act in itself must be good or indifferent.
For if it be in itself evil, it can never become licit. We are never
allowed to lie, to blaspheme, to commit fornication, even
though a good effect may follow. The reason is clear. Evil is
not allowed as road to good.
How do we judge whether the act in itself is evil or not? By
its moral object. To illustrate. Hypnotic sleep, voluntarily
produced in another, is it something morally indifferent or is it
evil? The more probable opinion, based on various responses
of the Holy Office, is that hypnotism is sometimes natural, not
diabolical, not absolutely to be condemned. Thus we can use
this medium if the reason be proportionately grave (not mere
curiosity), and if there is no intention of evil, and if there is no
diabolical intervention.
Second condition. The good effect must be immediate, i.e.,
not follow from the evil effect. Though at times good may
follow from an evil effect, we are still not allowed to place the
cause, since the evil effect would be directly intended as
medium, and evil may not be done that good may result.
Illustrations: to slay an infant in the womb, in order to save
the life of the mother; to cause an abortion, in order to save
honor: these acts are illicit. But a man need not abstain from
riding, even though sensual disturbance may follow, an evil
which he permits and to which he does not consent.
If the effect is only physically evil, not morally, it is licit
as medium. Thus, if there is no other way to save your life, you
may kill an unjust aggressor.
Third condition. The purpose of the agent must be a good

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146

one. The confessor, intending the salvation of souls, can be
permissive in relation to temptations which may follow. He
does not desire these temptations, but detests them.
Fourth condition. There must be a cause proportionately
grave for acting and permitting the evil effect. The reason is
that the evil effect, though not intended, is a material sin, and
not rarely brings on the danger of formal sin. To illustrate. A
very urgent cause is required for a maidservant to go on exer­
cising her service in a home where she is often solicited by a
son of the family, since she is in proximate peril of sinning
mortally. But for an action which only remotely and lightly
tends toward an evil effect, less urgent reason is required. This
question on voluntary in cause is not negligible.

5. Modes of Production
Under this heading we distinguish the positive voluntary
from the negative voluntary. To illustrate. A positive volun­
tary act is that of theft. A negative voluntary act is that of an
administrator, who knows that goods in his charge are being
stolen and neglects to hinder such thievery.
This negative voluntary can be either direct (when I say “I
will not go to Mass”) or indirect (when I do not go to Mass,
because I will something else). This negative voluntary ap­
pears in two kinds of negligence: first, in regard to what we
can and should do, second in regard to what we can and should
consider. Here lies a probable explanation of a difficult doc­
trine of St. Thomas on the first motions of sensuality. If, he
says, consideration was possible and binding, then these sensual
motions are minor venial sins.0 “It is manifest,” he continues,
“that the act of sensuality can be voluntary, since sensuality
by its nature can be controlled by the will.” 7 Now reason, in
the waking state, is bound to advert to the motions of the
soul. If, therefore, due advertence is not present, we have a sin
against prudence, an omission in some way voluntary. Again,
« la-IIae, q.74, a. 3, ad sum.
11bid.

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147

St. Thomas says, that, if reason resists sensual motions there is
no sin.8 But, he adds, reason, if watchful, can be aware of and
avoid each individual inordinate motion, but not the whole
series as a unit.9
Many Thomists require at least an interpretative influence
of the will if a motion of sensuality is to be a sin. Others say
that it is a venial sin even when there is no sin in the will. To
us it seems that there is no sin unless there is at least a negative
voluntary, by neglecting resistance or consideration. We can
avoid this negligence in each and every particular case, but
not in the whole series as a unit.

6. Modes of Willing
Here we have two divisions: the simple voluntary and the
voluntary secundum quid.
The simple voluntary arises when the object, considered in
all its circumstances, is simply willed, although it may be
associated with some difficulty or discomfort. For example, I
wish to study theology, not withstanding the difficulties I must
conquer. The voluntary secundum quid is a conditional voli­
tion, a mere velleity.
Certain authors 10 depart here from the terminology of St.
Thomas. Voluntary secundum quid, they say, is an object at
which the will aims with reluctance. They illustrate with these
examples: I will to take medicine, even though it is bitter. I
throw my wares into the sea in order to save my life. St.
Thomas, on the contrary, says that to throw away goods when
in danger of shipwreck is a simple voluntary act, and only
secundum quid involuntary. Why? Because the sailor truly
wills, though reluctantly, to act as he does act. St. Thomas
would invert the example. The preservation of goods at the
time of danger is voluntary secundum quid.
Thus the voluntary secundum quid is reduced to the cone De malo, q.7, a. 6, ad 6um.
8 See note 6.
10 Prümmer, Manuale theologiae moralis (first edition), I, 38.

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i48

ditional or antecedent voluntary. St. Thomas writes: “Ante­
cedently God wills all men to be saved, whereas consequently
He wishes some to be condemned, according to the exigence
of His justice. Thus the just judge wills, antecedently, all
men to live, but, consequently, he wills the murderer to be put
to death.” 11 St. Thomas adds: What we will antecedently, we
do not will simply, but only secundum quid, because will is
related to objects as they are in themselves. Now objects in
themselves are individual and particular. Hence when we will
an object simply, we choose it with all its particular circum­
stances. The just judge simply wills the murderer to be put
to death, but, in a certain sense, secundum quid, wills him to
live, namely, in as far as he is a man. To will secundum quid is
a velleity rather than an absolute act of the will. And thus
it is clear that, whatever God wills simply, comes to pass,
whereas what He wills antecedently does not always come to
pass.12
The simple voluntary, we conclude, is identified with the
consequent or efficacious voluntary, whereas the voluntary
secundum quid is identified with the antecedent, conditional,
and inefficacious voluntary. The merchant who throws his
wares into the sea to save his life, says conditionally: “I wish
I could save these wares, but, in point of fact, I choose defi­
nitely to throw them into the sea.”
The Involuntary and Its Causes
The involuntary must be distinguished from the non­
voluntary. St. Thomas says that nonvoluntary means simply
the absence of the act of the will. But the involuntary means
that the will is contrary to the object proposed. Hence upon
the involuntary there follows sadness, which does not always
follow the nonvoluntary.
The involuntary is divided into the simply involuntary and
tire involuntary secundum quid. The simple involuntary is a
11 la, q. 19, a.6, ad lum.
12 Ibid.

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149

proposal which the will resists with all its might. To illustrate.
He who is forced by external violence to immolate to an idol
exercises an action that is simply involuntary. Involuntary
secundum quid is a proposal which the will resists under one
aspect, but which it still goes on to will simply, in order to
avoid a greater evil. Example is again the merchant throwing
his wares into the sea in order to save his life. This act is
involuntary secundum quid, but is simply voluntary, here and
now, in order to preserve his life.
The Causes of the Involuntary (art. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
We distinguish four causes of the involuntary: force, fear,
concupiscence, ignorance.
ART. 4. CAN THE WILL SUFFER VIOLENCE?

Whereas external members can be overcome by force, the
question here is: Can the will itself suffer coercion? And by
coercion we mean that species of violence to which cognitive
beings may be subjected. A plant may indeed suffer violence,
but not coercion.
Violence, generically, is defined by Aristotle as follows: an
act whose principle is outside, against the inclination of the
patient, who contributes nothing to the result. Hence violence
adds something to necessity. Necessity means determination to
one act, without power toward the opposite act. Thus the
necessary can be spontaneous. To illustrate. The brute animal
necessarily, but spontaneously, desires food. But under vio­
lence, the act comes from an extrinsic principle, against the in­
clination of the patient. Thus the necessary is twofold, namely,
either violent or spontaneous.
When we have thus defined violence, it might seem (so the
first objection) that the will can be forced at least by God.
Further, the Molinists say that it would be thus forced if there
were such a thing as a predetermining physical premotion.
Further, (thus the third objection) the motion of the will to
sin is against nature and therefore violent.

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BEATITUDE

Our Thesis
Violence can be inflicted upon the will’s commanded acts,
but not on the will’s own elicited acts.
Proof of the first part. By exterior violence the members
can be impeded from following the command of the will. To
illustrate. Someone may close my eyes, so that I cannot see, or
he may open my eyes, compelling me to look upon something
obscene against my will. Then this sight, though it proceeds
from my visual power, is called violent, since it is against the
inclination of my will.
Objection. But then this sight is not an act commanded by
the will. Therefore violence cannot be effectual against the
will, even in commanded acts. Answer: We distinguish the
antecedent. It is not an act commanded by the will actually,
we grant. Not commanded even potentially, we deny. But the
conclusion deals with acts either actually or potentially com­
manded. Acts actually commanded by the will can be pre­
vented by violence. Since the will resists, they come to pass
only by the force of an external agent. In possession or ob­
session, for example, demonic violence exercised on the or­
ganism or imagination, can compel speech or prevent motion.
But, says St. Thomas, although the devil can compel a man
to do an act which is sinful, he cannot compel man to sin.
When reason is bound, nothing that man does can be imputed
to him as sinful.18
Proof of the second part. The will can suffer no violence in
its own elicited acts (to will, to intend, to choose). No power,
created or uncreated, can force the will to elicit an act. The act
elicited by the will is nothing else than the will’s own inclina­
tion, actually proceeding from the will under knowledge of
the end, whereas an act that is forced must come from an ex­
terior principle, against the inclination of the patient. An act
elicited by the will, and at the same time forced, implies a
contradiction. This conclusion is confirmed by analogy with
the natural inclination of noncognitive things. By force the
13 la, q. 114, a. 1; la-IIae, q.8o, a. 1. 3.

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151

stone goes up, but it goes down by its natural inclination,
natural gravity.
This doctrine is found in Augustine (the text cited in sed
contra est). Also in St. Anselm, who says: “An unwilling man
can not-will anything, because he cannot will, willing not-towill.” 14
But can God, who moves from within, force the will? All
theologians agree that God, using an instrument of justice
(e.g., fire) can inflict punishment against the will of the patient.
Thus the sufferings of hell are contrary to the will of its
victims. These punishments are violent at least secundum quid
as being against a particular inclination of the condemned
soul, but nevertheless they are according to the order of jus­
tice.
Certain theologians hold that God, as universal mover, can
force the will. The acts thus forced, they say, though they are
in harmony with potency and with the fundamental inclina­
tion of the will to universal good, may still be against the
will’s inclination to a particular good. Further, Suarez and
Molina say that, if God premoves and predetermines the will,
the acts thus caused would not be free, and God would be the
author of violence.
St. Thomas replies: God, who is more powerful than the
human will, can move the human will. Again, he says: “As
long as judgment remains indifferent, it is impossible that
God can so premove as to force the will. Such an act would no
longer be free. As long as judgment remains indifferent, the
will is not limited to this object. God clearly seen by vision
is the only object which removes this indifference of judg­
ment.” 15
Further, as it is a contradiction for the will to desire an ob­
ject not proposed by the intellect, so it is also a contradiction
that the will desire an object under some aspect not proposed
to it by the intellect. Otherwise the will would cease to be a
rational appetite, and would act without cognition.
n De libero arbitrio, Bk. VI.
i» De veritate, q.22, a. 5, 8.

BEATITUDE

15 2

Objections

1. God can deny cooperation, say, with the act whereby
the blessed love God in heaven. This cessation would be
forced. Answer: First, the force here in question would not be
positive compulsion to an elicited act, but a negative impeding
of the act to be elicited. Second, such cessation would not be,
properly speaking, violence. As it is natural for a second cause
to act under the influence of the first cause, so it is natural (or
supernatural or preternatural) not to act when the influence
of the first cause is removed. Thus it is when fire does not
burn, or when hungry lions do not devour.
2. God can produce in the will of Judas, who at the time
hates John, a love for John. This act would be forced, that is,
against the inclination of Judas. Answer: God can do this by
changing the evil inclination of Judas into a good inclination.
But He cannot do this, and at the same time preserve the con­
trary volition. When God changes the will, He brings it about
that in place of the preceding inclination, there follows an­
other inclination. Thus “the heart of the king is in God’s
hand, and whithersoever God wills He can turn it.” 19
3. Sin is against man’s natural inclination, but is neverthe­
less an act elicited by man’s will. Answer: Sin is against man’s
partial inclination to good-in-itself, yes; it is against man’s
adequate inclination to good in common, no. Man wills sin
as an apparent good.
ART. 5. CAN VIOLENCE CAUSE INVOLUNTARINESS?

Preliminaries

From this fifth article to the end of the question we deal with
the four causes of the involuntary, namely, violence, fear,
concupiscence, and ignorance.
When we say that violence or fear or concupiscence or
ignorance causes tire involuntary (at least as regards com10 Prov. ϊΐ:ι.

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153

manded acts), we do not mean to say that these causes physically
influence the act of the will. But they do move, either physi­
cally or morally, to an act in some way contrary to the inclina­
tion of the will. Thus when fear moves man to throw goods
into the sea, his act is involuntary secundum quid, because of
his inclination to preserve his goods.
Thesis. Absolute violence causes the simply involuntary in
commanded acts. Example: the man who, against his own
persevering inclination, is forced to sacrifice to an idol. This
conclusion is to be understood of absolute violence, such,
namely, that the victim, with all his efforts, cannot overcome
it. We are not treating of violence secundum quid, which a
man is able to overcome if he resists as far as he can. Absolute
violence causes the simple involuntary, violence secundum
quid causes the involuntary secundum quid. Martyrdom is
involuntary secundum quid, but simply voluntary, just as is
loss of goods from fear of shipwreck. The arguments follow.
A. Our authorities are Aristotle and St. Damascene.
B. From reason. A voluntary act comes from an intrinsic
principle, in agreement with the will’s inclination. But that
which is absolutely violent comes from an extrinsic principle,
and against the will’s inclination. Therefore that which is ab­
solutely violent is not voluntary in an agent capable of cogni­
tion, just as it is not natural in things which lack cognition.
1. Objections. Our conclusion holds good only for acts com­
manded by the will, not for elicited acts.
2. Note that a thing can be natural, or voluntary, in two
ways, one active, the other passive.
3. An act can be violent secundum quid, and still voluntary
simply. A man, climbing a hill, is performing an act violent
secundum quid, since the body naturally tends downward, but
the act is simply voluntary, by reason of the man’s intention
and inclination.
Question. Does violence make the sufferings of the martyrs
involuntary? Answer: The martyrs did not suffer absolute
violence, but only relative violence, violence secundum quid.

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BEATITUDE

The martyrs, had they so willed, could have escaped violence,
namely, by denying their faith. But they voluntarily endured
death for God’s sake. Hence they did not suffer absolute vio­
lence, but they did overcome the greatest violence secundum
quid. Everything that is born of God conquers the world, and
this is the victory which conquers the world, our faith.17 ,
On the contrary, when the martyr’s hand is forced open to
sacrifice to an idol, this sacrifice is simply involuntary, if the
man resists as far as he can.
The same truth holds good of a woman in relation to the
man who violates her. If she resists as far as she can, the viola­
tion is involuntary. If she does not so resist, she consents to sin.
If you command me to be violated against my will, said St.
Lucy, my chastity will have a double crown. The body cannot
be soiled except with the permission of the mind.
A man who is forced to receive baptism receives it validly,
and therefore voluntarily. Answer: To receive baptism validly,
he must first put away his contrary disinclination.
A clarification: When is a woman culpable in relation to
an aggressor? She is not allowed to kill her oppressor, because
the integrity of the flesh is a lower good than life itself. But
she can resist by cries, blows, and wounds, and she is bound to
this resistance. But if there is peril to her own life or fame, and
if there is no danger of interior consent, the woman is not
bound to extreme exterior resistance, because exterior re­
sistance is an affirmative precept, which does not oblige to loss
of life or fame. But if the danger of interior consent is present,
the woman is bound to resist even at the expense of life and
fame. It is better to lose corporeal life than the life of grace.

Corollaries

1. If all resistance, interior and exterior, is unavailing, then
violence is absolute, and causes the simply involuntary, because
the act is not free and therefore not imputable.
2. If the person resists exteriorly, but not interiorly, the
ΜI John 5:4.

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155

voluntary is indeed diminished but not taken away. If under
violence the person is altogether passive, not cooperating, and
not resisting except interiorly, then the act can still be imput­
able when there is an obligation to resist exteriorly, in order
to prevent scandal (for example, in matters of faith), or of
consent (in matters of chastity).
ART. 6. DOES FEAR CAUSE THE INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries
An act done from fear differs from an act done with fear.
The merchant begins his voyage with fear, but not from fear.
But when, in a storm, he throws his goods overboard, he acts
from fear.

Difficulties

Three difficulties present themselves: 1. Fear seems to be
related to the future as force is to the present. 2. A deed done
from fear seems to be in itself involuntary. 3. Such a deed is
voluntary only under condition, and hence is voluntary only
secundum quid, not simply.
Our Thesis

Deeds done from fear are simply voluntary, but secundum
quid involuntary.
A. Authorities. Nemesius and Aristotle speak thus: “Deeds
done from fear are voluntary rather than involuntary.”
B. Reason. That deed is simply voluntary which, here and
now, is chosen by the will. Now the deed done from fear is,
here and now, chosen by the will, though that deed, seen in
itself abstractly, is against the will’s inclination. Therefore the
deed done from fear is simply voluntary and yet involuntary
secundum quid.
To explain. The simple voluntary act deals with objective
good, clothed, here and now, with all its circumstances. The
voluntary secundum quid deals with the object, not as it is

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BEATITUDE

here and now, but as it is in the intellect abstractly, denuded
of its actual and objective circumstances.
Note that we are not speaking here of fear so extreme as to
make deliberation impossible. Acts done from such fear are
not in any sense voluntary.
A confirmation. Acts done from fear are willed absolutely
and efficaciously. The will is against them only inefficaciously
and conditionally. The merchant wills efficaciously to lose his
goods, though he would will to retain them were there no
danger of shipwreck. A deed willed efficaciously is simply
voluntary, and only secundum quid involuntary.
Difficulties Analyzed
1. In acts done from fear, the will consents. In acts done
under violence, the will does not consent.
2. An object in itself involuntary may become simply volun­
tary.
3. An act done here and now from fear is absolutely willed,
conditionally non-willed.
Special Difficulties

1. Fear of hell leads many men to sorrow for sin and ob­
servance of the law. Now this sorrow and observance are in no
way involuntary. Hence acts done from fear need not be in­
voluntary secundum quid. Answer: Even in this case the will
remains conditioned: Were there no hell, I would sin. While
the man in this condition is not good, his sorrow and obser­
vance are good, just as faith in a sinner is good, even while
the man remains bad.
2. But a deed which is simply voluntary cannot in any real
sense be involuntary. Answer: The adverb “simply” does not
mean “totally.” It means “principally and efficaciously.”
3. Contracts entered into under grave fear are invalid, and
therefore simply involuntary. Answer: Such contracts, even
when they are not invalid by natural law, are made invalid by
positive law. Natural law itself cancels gratuitous contracts, if

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157

such contracts result from fear unjustly threatened, because
gratuitousness presupposes full freedom.
Grave fear unjustly inflicted invalidates matrimony, some
say by natural law, others, by ecclesiastical law.
1. Corollaries. Grave fear, in matters prohibited by the
natural law, does not entirely excuse from sin, because the act
remains simply voluntary. Example: one who from fear of
death denies the faith or commits perjury or fornication. But
fear does diminish the voluntary, in the degree in which the
fear is grave. It even destroys the voluntary if it takes away the
faculty of deliberation.
2. Grave fear, in matters which are evil only because pro­
hibited, generally excuses from all sin, because positive laws
do not oblige under grave loss. Under fear of death or of
infamy, a man is not bound by the law of fasting, say, or of
Sunday Mass.
3. But at times even positive laws oblige a man to risk or
lose his life. But such cases contain an element of the natural
law. For example, a soldier must face his country’s enemy.
Again, a Christian, ordered to eat meat on Friday, if the com­
mand comes from scorn of religion.
ART. 7. DOES CONCUPISCENCE MAKE THE

ACT INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

By concupiscence we here understand those passions which
incline us to follow a certain line of activity. Concupiscence
is thus opposed to fear, the latter being motion away from
evil.
Concupiscence is either antecedent (which precedes the mo­
tion of the will) or consequent (which follows the act of the
will). Consequent concupiscence is the sign and effect of an
intense voluntary act, which excites a corresponding passion
(e.g., anger) in the inferior appetite. Here we deal only with
antecedent concupiscence.

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BEATITUDE

A Twofold Conclusion

First. Antecedent concupiscence of itself inclines rather to
the voluntary than to the involuntary, because it attracts the
will to that which concupiscence desires. Thus it increases the
imperfect voluntary, whether in brutes or in man.
Second. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the perfect
voluntary, because it weakens judgment. It may even coerce
judgment completely (e.g., in hysteria or extreme anger). In
any case, it distracts the intellect from attention to the reasons
for good.
AN APPENDIX

Question: Do habits, good or bad, increase voluntariness?
Habit is an acquired operation quality, a quality hard to
change, which man uses when he wills, and by which he is
inclined to perform similar acts, good or bad, virtuous or
vicious.
Habits are found, not only in the sense appetite, but also in
the intellect and the will. As regards the influence of habits
upon liberty, under the moral aspect of imputability, we must
make a number of distinctions. Habit either remains volun­
tary, or, if it has been efficaciously retracted, still influences
materially.
Conclusions
1. Habit, good or bad, unless retracted, increases the volun­
tary, because it gives to the will facility and propensity to act,
and takes away all repugnance. Nor does it diminish liberty,
because it has been acquired freely and is freely preserved.
2. A good habit perfects liberty, since it inclines the agent
to act according to right reason, and diminishes the power of
sinning, which is a defect of liberty.
3. An evil habit increases sin, because he who sins from a
habit not retracted sins with greater inclination and delight,

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159

but not with less liberty. The man who sins by habit, and not
merely from a momentary impulse, sins by malice.
4. An evil habit, efficaciously retracted but still exerting
material influence, remains as a temperamental disposition,
which diminishes the voluntary because it partially impedes
deliberation. Acts which flow from it indeliberately (for in­
stance, blasphemy or excess in drinking) are no longer imputed
as guilt, because they are not free in their principle. But the
man is bound to do his utmost toward eradicating his bad
habits.

Heredity and Temperament
Heredity transmits certain inclinations which, while directly
physical, are indirectly moral (e.g., the inclination to anger or
to lust). Many determinists maintain that children simply can­
not resist their hereditary passions.
To this we must reply: As long as the use of reason remains,
there remains likewise the power of deliberating and choosing,
even against hereditary inclinations. This truth is clear by the
testimony of conscience and many historical facts. Christian
discipline has often overcome and transformed the hereditary
inclinations of barbarians. That which is born of flesh is flesh,
and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.18
Still we must grant that hereditary inclinations do lessen
liberty by disturbing judgment. Men under this handicap are
to be treated kindly. Their temptations need the aid of special
grace.

Heredity

By heredity we here understand psychopathic tendencies,
transmitted by parents to children. From parents insane or
alcoholic or neuropathic, or drunk at the moment of con­
ception, children may have an organic predisposition to any
of these evils, a certain psychopathic tendency, especially in
is John 3:6.

16ο

BEATITUDE

the form of disordered imagination and sensibility, of ob­
session, tendencies, for instance, to suicide.
Immediate heredity, i.e., from parents alone, may be simple
(from one parent) or double (from each parent). Maternal
heredity is probably more frequent and more grave. Mediate
heredity, if it has grown through several generations, is called
accumulated heredity.
Heredity is progressive, when the aforesaid disposition con­
tinually grows, and tends to the annihilation of the family. Or
it is regressive, when corrected by a happy marriage, as it were
by the infusion of new blood. In a family where insanity is
hereditary, children are sometimes immune, and even dis­
tinguished by great genius. The sickness transmitted can be a
disposition to insanity or to general paralysis or to neurosis
or to syphilis or to alcoholism. General paralysis often arises
from hereditary syphilis.
Modern theories tend to consider pathological heredity as
the effect of disturbed nutrition, or of intoxication in the
embryo. Intoxication in the blood may result in delirium, or
give rise to forms of nerve-tension.

Temperament

Temperament is the complex of all inclinations directly
physical, which arise, either from heredity or from the in­
dividual organism. These inclinations are based in matter
signed with quantity which, according to Thomists, is the
principle of individuation. This individuation, since it lies
below direct intelligibility, cannot be defined, just as God
cannot be defined, since He stands higher than the created
intellect. Temperaments differ by predominance of nerve­
power or of blood or of bile or of lymph. Some men are thus
prompt to begin, but without perseverance. Others are ener­
getic and persevering, and others sluggish.
These native dispositions can be modified by education, by
external circumstances, by individual effort. Thus arises char­
acter, which is a stable complex of these native propensities,

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161

as fixed by education and the individual’s own will. Virtuous
character is related to temperament, as in Latin the word vir
is related to the word homo. Vir, like virtus (virtue), originally
signified man as distinguished from woman. Cicero uses the
word “virility” to express character and vigor of soul. Homo,
on the contrary, means any member of the human race, man
or woman. The word seems related to humus (the soil). Char­
acter, then, is the seal which man (vir) imposes upon his humus,
his temperament. Christian character is constituted by the
virtues, moral and theological.
Temperament, like antecedent passion, lessens free will.
Character, on the contrary, like a voluntary habit not retracted,
increases the voluntary and does not diminish freedom. Good
character perfects liberty, evil character not retracted increases
sin.

Character Education

Hereditary inclinations are modified by parents, teachers
and society, under three forms.
1. The inculcation of principles, good and bad. This is a
truth of the greatest importance, if, as Aristotle says, the boy’s
mind is a blackboard where nothing has been written. The
enemies of the Church recognize this importance by claiming
a legal monopoly in education.
2. The second influence of education is that of giving ex­
ample which allures imitation.
3. Third, the education of passions, either by moderation
or by perversion, not only by example or by inculcation of
principles, but by commands, properly so called, given by
parents and teachers.
Finally, the individual Christian educates his own character,
by acquiring virtue, by prayer and the sacraments, which in­
crease infused virtues. For example:
1. The spirit of faith, hope, and charity grows by medita­
tion, by acting from good motives, natural and supernatural.
2. The continual practice of prudence, natural and Chris­

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BEATITUDE

tian, which directs the moral virtues to a supernatural end.
Negative prudence is not sufficient, operative prudence is re­
quired. The phrase “he is prudent,” is often misused to express
a negative prudence, employed in avoiding the discomforts
of life, as, for example, by Epicureans.
3. Moderation of the passions, that the man may have true
temperance and fortitude. Passions are not to be extinguished,
because man is to be moved toward good, not only by his will,
but also by his sense-appetites, regulated and commanded by
virtue. God gave us sensibility to attain our purpose in life.
4. Frequent consideration of the rights of others, in a spirit
of justice, and love of our neighbor’s sanctification, in the
spirit of charity.

Pathological Conditions
Modern authors tend to consider pathological conditions as
directly affecting the will. Indecision, or any particular pro­
pensity, is looked on as sickness of the will. Such a view denies
or ignores the spirituality of the soul. We must clearly dis­
tinguish physical sickness from vice, which is an evil habit of
the will itself. Vice has in it more than mere sickness. Speak­
ing properly, sickness is in the body, but only analogically in
the soul, as far as the will is evilly disposed.19
Certain pathological states impede more directly the exer­
cise of judgment and will. Thus indecision (aboulia) affects
the will, as insanity does the intellect. Others less directly im­
pede the exercise of liberty, for instance, neurasthenia, hyste­
ria, epilepsy. But even here a crisis may make the use of reason
impossible. Those who undergo hypnosis, and afterward carry
out the suggestions of the hypnotist, probably suffer only a
diminution of liberty. But even when liberty is entirely taken
away, we must still consider whether the deeds done are volun­
tary in cause (by the patient’s imprudent consent to be hyp­
notized). Each case is to be examined by the experience of
10 la-IIae, q.71, a.i, ad gum.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY

163

those suffering from die sickness, by the testimony of experts
and physicians.
ART. 8. DOES IGNORANCE MAKE THE

ACr INVOLUNTARY?

Preliminaries

Ignorance is the lack of knowledge that is due; for instance,
absence of theological knowledge in a priest or of medical
knowledge in a physician. Thus ignorance is distinguished
from nescience, which is a mere absence of knowledge, for in­
stance, in the insane. It is likewise distinguished from error,
which is not only negation or privation of knowledge, but is a
contrary disposition.
Divisions of Ignorance
St. Thomas speaks of three kinds of ignorance: antecedent,
concomitant, and consequent. Modern theologians prefer to
speak of ignorance, vincible or invincible. But these two modes
of division can be harmonized.
1. By relation to its object, ignorance is ignorantia juris
(when the law is unknown, when, e.g., I do not know that ex­
communicated persons are to be avoided).
2. Second, ignorance of fact. To illustrate. I know the law,
but do not know that Peter, for example, is excommunicated.
3. Two other kinds of ignorance are distinguished by their
relation to the will. Here we have, first, consequent ignorance,
that is, ignorance willed and vincible. And this itself has two
classes: ignorance, directly willed, i.e., pretended ignorance, or,
then, indirectly willed, arising from negligence, which can be
either grave or light.
4. Distinct from consequent ignorance is ignorance that is
nonconsequent, i.e., not willed, and invincible. Also this
ignorance is of two kinds. First, antecedent ignorance, when
the deed is indeed done but would not be done if there were

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BEATITUDE

knowledge. For example, I kill a friend while invincibly I
think that I am killing a deer. Second, concomitant ignorance,
when, e.g., I kill my enemy, thinking invincibly that I am
killing a deer, but so minded that I would have done the deed
even if I had known that it was my enemy.

Principles Regarding Ignorance

First Principle

Consequent ignorance, directly willed and vincible, causes
the simply voluntary and the involuntary secundum quid.
Such ignorance does not take away freedom and imputability.
But ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntari­
ness.
Ignorance directly willed is itself voluntary. Willing the
cause, I will the effect. For example; a physician, negligent in
removing his ignorance, wishes in cause the death which
follows from this ignorance.
Nevertheless this consequent ignorance, when indirectly
willed, is in some way against the inclination of the agent. If
he had known, the deed would not have been done. Hence
ignorance indirectly willed lessens freedom and voluntariness.
Thus ignorance arising from light negligence may reduce a sin
objectively to a venial sin. But crass ignorance cannot be so
excused. If, however, ignorance is so affected that even in its
absence the work would still be done, then it does not lessen
the voluntary. Example: a man wills not to know the law in
order to sin without remorse. Here we have full imputability.
This first principle is thus divided by some modern theo­
logians. Ignorance actually vincible does not remove freedom
but lessens it. Ignorance here and now invincible, whereas
formerly it was vincible, results in an act voluntary in cause.
To illustrate. The physician, who during his medical educa­
tion neglected study, does not incur the sin of homicide in that
instant when he gives a medicine which produces death: but

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165

he willed the effects of his ignorance when he neglected study.
The same hold good of the confessor who has gravely neglected
the study of theology.

Second Principle
Ignorance nonconsequent, not willed, invincible, causes
the involuntary simply or at least the nonvoluntary. This
principle has two subdivisions. First: Ignorance invincible and
antecedent, since it is itself involuntary, causes the involuntary
simply. For nothing is willed unless it is foreknown at least in
its cause. Further, the deed proceeding from this ignorance is
against the agent’s inclination, actual or habitual or inter­
pretative. This is evident in the example already adduced: I
kill a friend, because invincibly I think I am killing a deer, but
would not have killed him had I known him to be my friend.
Second: Invincible ignorance concomitant makes the act, not
simply voluntary nor simply involuntary, but nonvoluntary.
This is clear from the example of the man who, invincibly
thinking that he is killing a deer, kills instead an enemy whom
he would have killed anyhow had he known it. Such ignorance
does not take away all will of sin. Therefore the act is not
simply involuntary. But neither is the act simply voluntary,
because the ignorance itself is not voluntary.
Corollary. In this last case, the man who kills his enemy,
invincibly thinking that he is killing a wild beast, while he is
guilty of intended homicide is excused from actual homicide,
and hence from punishment and censures, which are not in­
flicted except on account of the external act.
A Final Conclusion
In every sin there is voluntary ignorance of choice, not as
regards the law, but as regards the law’s application to the here
and now. Here and now we choose something that is simply
evil, and only good secundum quid. Thus, misled by passion,
a man judges that it is good to steal or to lie.

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BEATITUDE

Thus we harmonize the word of Plato and Aristotle that
“every evil man is ignorant,” with the saying of Augustine that
“all sin is voluntary.”
A brief synopsis, i. Consequent ignorance causes the simply
voluntary. 2. Antecedent ignorance causes the simply involun­
tary. 3. Concomitant ignorance causes the nonvoluntary.

CHAPTER XI
The Circumstances of Human Acts (q.

7)

PRELIMINARIES
The nature of any human act is affected by its circumstances.

Certain circumstances change the very species of an act: theft
becomes sacrilege, when committed in a holy place. Other
circumstances notably increase the gravity of the act: to steal
a thousand dollars is a greater sin than to steal a few cents.
Others are only lightly aggravating: to steal thirty cents
rather than twenty-five.
ART. 1. WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCE CAN BE AN ACCIDENT

OF HUMAN ACTS?

Response. Circumstance is an accident of the human act,
affecting the morality of that act. We explain the definition.
Circumstance is called an accident, because it lies outside the
substance of the act, surrounds the act, as it were (circumstare,
the Latin verb, means to stand around). It affects the human
act, but does not constitute the essence. If it were the source
of essential morality, it would no longer be a circumstance,
but would either specifically differentiate the act, or would be
the purpose of the deed. The purpose of the agent, when it is
not identical with the purpose of the work, is a circumstance.
Examples: to steal in order to pay money to a prostitute, or,
on the contrary, in order to give alms. A circumstance affects
the act morally, that is, modifies it in relation to moral stand­
ards. A mere physical circumstance does not affect morality.
Example: A man giving alms in gold or in silver, with the
right hand or with the left.
167

168

BEATITUDE
ART. 2. THEOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Circumstances modify acts, first, in relation to man’s last
end. To illustrate: alms, not for a mere human end, but for
God. Second, in relation to good and evil. By an evil circum­
stance an act, by its object good, can become evil. For in­
stance, I teach the truth, but with the purpose of attaining
human glory. Third, as regards merit and demerit.
ART. 3. CIRCUMSTANCES FORMULATED: WHO, WHAT,

WHERE, BY WHOSE AID, WHY, HOW AND WHEN

This division is founded on the definition of circumstance.
The seven circumstances are reduced by St. Thomas to three
chief classes. First, circumstances that modify the act itself.
Second, those that modify the causes of the act. Third, those
circumstances that modify the effect of the act.
1. Circumstances of the act itself. Such circumstances func­
tion, first, as a measure of time (when: a festival day, a pro­
longed period), or as measure of place (where: in public, in a
sacred place). Secondly, circumstances affect the act in the
manner of a quality (how: intensely, remissly, from contempt,
or ignorance).
2. Circumstances that affect causes. If the cause is final, we
have the circumstance “why” (the personal purpose of the
agent). If the cause is the efficient principal cause, we have
the circumstance of “who” (a priest, a married man). If the
cause is the instrumental cause, we have the circumstance “by
whose aid” (demon, poison, sword).
3. Circumstances that modify the effect. Here we have the
circumstance “what” (a sacred thing, a profane thing). To il­
lustrate. The circumstance called "what” does not denote
that the thing stolen belongs to someone else, but that it is
either sacred or profane, large or small. The circumstance
“who” designates the quality of the agent (a priest or a lay­
man). The circumstance “why” designates a purpose, not in-

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS

169

trinsic in the deed itself, but extrinsic, namely, the purpose
of the agent (stealing in order to get drunk).
ART. 4. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF CIRCUMSTANCES?

The principal circumstances are "why” and “what,” since
they more nearly modify voluntariness. Hence the chief cir­
cumstance is “why” as affecting purpose. Next in importance
is “what,” as modifying the effect destined for such a purpose.
Other circumstances are ordered by their nearness to “why”
and “what.”

Human Acts Considered Psychologically

Human acts are either elicited by the will or commanded
by the will. Acts elicited deal either with the end and are
therefore divided into three classes, (namely, to will, to en­
joy, to intend), or with the means employed (namely, to
choose, to counsel, to consent, to use).
Although intention precedes fruition, we treat of fruition
first, because it deals simply with the end, whereas intention
implies relation to means. Thus God enjoys His own good­
ness before He intends to manifest that goodness. St. Thomas
treats of choice in connection with counsel, which guides
choice. Consent sometimes precedes choice, when, namely,
pleasing means are open, and the agent must choose between
them.

Twelve Successive Acts
Will

Intellect

Order of Intention

1. Judgment (this goal is desirable).
3. Judgment (this goal is attainable).

2. Inefficacious desire (e.g.,
for rain).
4. Efficacious intention (I
will attain this goal).

ιγο

BEATITUDE

Order of Choice
5. Counsel (many choices
6. Consent (to one of these
are open).
various choices).
7. Practical judgment (this
8. Choice (I select this
is the best means).
means).
Order of Execution
9. Command (follow this 10. Active use (the will
path).
moves to take this path).
11. Attainment of goal.
12. Fruition (enjoyment of
goal attained).

This classification is of great importance in many ques­
tions. For instance, in the problem of free will, since the last
practical judgment is within our power. Similarly, in dealing
with indeliberate acts, with temptation, in analyzing the act
of faith, in predestination, where we distinguish the order of
intention and the order of execution, and even in the forms
of government in civil society or in the Church. In regard to
counsel, St. Thomas prefers a union of aristocracy and the
popular elements (senators and representatives). But as re­
gards command, unity is needed, lest there be discussion with­
out end.
Question. Why does St. Thomas not treat these acts in their
chronological and concrete order?
1. He is here following the theoretical and abstract or­
der, treating professedly acts that belong, not to the intel­
lect, but to the will. Hence he treats the command and com­
manded acts,1 after the question of use,2 although, it is true
chronologically, command enters in at the beginning of exe­
cution.
2. Since he first speaks of acts elicited regarding the goal,
1Q-«7·
»Q.i6.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS

171

he speaks of fruition 3 at the beginning, although this act be­
longs chronologically at the end.
3. He treats of fruition before treating of intention,4 be­
cause fruition is concerned with the end simply, whereas in­
tention deals with the end in relation to ways and means.
4. He treats counsel3 after choice,® because choice is an
elicited act of the will.
5. He treats consent ’ after choice, because often there is
only one suitable medium to the end. In this case the two
acts are not distinguished.
6. As consent is some times distinguished from choice, so
likewise we distinguish counsel from the last practical judg­
ment. Thus we have perfect harmony between the chronolog­
ical, concrete succession generally admitted and the order of
St. Thomas, who treats each act theoretically and abstractly.
Finally we must notice that, in the first three 8 questions on
the will, St. Thomas professedly treats only of simple voli­
tion. But even while he thus treats of volition, St. Thomas
adds many points regarding the volitional power. Choice, for
instance, is a kind of volition, although not every volition is
choice. Treating of the first volition, he speaks of volition as
a genus. Similarly, treating of the angels who are the first
of creatures, he deals with matters that belong in common to
all created things. Treating of the first sacrament, namely, of
baptism, he speaks of the sacraments in general. Similarly,
Aristotle, treating of the vegetative soul, deals with the soul
in general.
3Q.11.
« Q. 12.
®Q>4·
®Q.i3·

7Q.>5.
8Q.8-10.

CHAPTER XII
The Will

and

Its Object (q.

8)

ART. 1. CAN THE WILL DESIRE EVIL?

Preliminaries

that the will can aim at evil, just as sight, for in­
stance, aims not only at white but also at black, since one
and the same power deals with opposites. Again, according to
Aristotle, it is a characteristic of rational powers to deal with
opposites, with truth and falsehood, with evil and good.
Further, goodness and reality are convertible, and our will
chooses negations of reality, for instance, not to walk, not to
speak.
For our thesis we might quote Dionysius,1 who says that
evil is not aimed at by the will, that all things desire only
good. But how are these assertions to be harmonized with
the difficulties just now proposed? Dionysius seems at first
sight to deny the existence of sin and vice. And if, as Spinoza
and Hegel maintain, the object of sin is not an evil, but only a
lesser good, the sinner himself would be merely a man charac­
terized by his indistinct power of thinking. Thus we would
have absolute and unlimited optimism.
Thesis. It is not necessary that the object of the will be in
very truth a good, but only that it be apprehended as a good.
The will cannot will evil as evil. This is the common doc­
trine, admitted also by St. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and
Gabriel Biel, and rejected only by some nominalists.
A. Authority. The word of Dionysius (see above) had al­
ready been expressed by Aristotle. St. Augustine 2 says: So
It

seems

1 De div. nom., c.4.
2 Enchirid. c. 105.
172

WILL AND OBJECT

173

much do we want to be blessed, that we cannot will to be
miserable. Not even the demon can will evil as evil.
B. By reason we prove, first, that the will always aims at
good. Every appetite is inclined to something agreeable. The
will is an appetite. Hence it aims only at what is good and
agreeable. The will, however, can aim at apparent good.
What is really evil, for instance, theft, is often looked upon
as good. But the w'ill is an appetite that follows, not upon
a natural form (as does the natural appetite of the plant), but
upon an apprehended form (as does sense-appetite). There­
fore the will, like sense-appetite, can aim at something that is
only apparently good.
Corollary. Natural appetite follows the natural form, which
always tends to perfection and to real good. But whereas our
natural appetite is always right, its object is the lowest kind
of good. The will, however, is related to a higher good, which
it attains freely, and can therefore turn aside from true good.
But, notwithstanding the possibility of sin, the will tran­
scends natural appetite, by reason of its universal object.
Confirmation. We must judge the adequate object of the
will, just as, proportionally, we judge the adequate object of
the intellect, or of the sense-appetite. The adequate object of
the intellect is reality and truth, at least apparent truth. The
adequate object of the sense-appetite is sense-good, suitable
and agreeable, at least apparently. Hence the adequate object
of the will is good, either really or at least apparently. The
object is not, as maintained by some nominalists, reality as
abstracting from good and evil. We cannot will evil except
under the aspect of an apparent good.
Difficulties Analyzed
1. Good and evil as opposites belong to the same power.
Answer: Belong to the same power, if they are related in the
same way to both, yes. The will aims at both good and evil,
but not in the same way. Will, volition, aims at good. Non­
will, nolition, refuses evil.

VJ4

BEATITUDE

2. The will is a rational power, and therefore deals with
good and with evil. Answer: The will aims at good and at evil,
but at evil only under the aspect of an apparent good, I grant.
Aims at evil as evil, I deny.
The following difficulties are urged.
a. He who hates his enemy wishes him evil as evil. Answer.
He wishes evil as the evil of his enemy, yes; as evil to himself,
no.
b. The envious man is saddened by the prosperity of an­
other under the aspect of good. Therefore sometimes the will
flees from good. Answer: The envious man is sad at the good
of another as good for that neighbor, yes; as good for himself,
no.
c. Sin committed by malice is distinguished from sin com­
mitted by passion or ignorance. But he who sins by passion
wishes moral evil only as a sense-good, and he who sins by
ignorance wishes evil because he believes it to be good.
Therefore malice, differing from these two kinds of evil,
chooses evil as an offense against God. Answer: That conse­
quence does not follow. These three kinds of sin are distin­
guished, not by their object, but by the dispositions of the
sinner. He who sins by passion is moved by that passion to
sin, and he who sins by ignorance sins by responsible lack of
knowledge. But he who sins from malice, not from passion
and not from ignorance, while he knows that this thing is evil
and forbidden, still wills it as suitable to his present evil dis­
position, to manifest his own liberty (e.g., his pertinacious
selfishness and pride).
3. The will aims also at nonexistent things, for instance,
not to walk, not to speak. But such acts cannot aim at good
because good and reality are convertible. Answer. In non­
existence, in self-destruction, it is not possible to find any
positive aspect of good, I grant; any negative aspect, the lack
of evil, 1 deny. Those who will anything under a not-good
aspect, do so because to lack evil is good. Demons, e.g., will

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175

nonexistence as liberation from their miseries. They desire
not to be miserable. This seems to them to be good.
The objection is urged: He who hates God, wills evil as
evil. Answer: He who hates God, the judge who punishes sin,
wishes to escape punishment, and this would be a good.
Corollary

The good that is only apparent good is really evil, not
merely a minor good. Apparent good attracts more, the more
it has the appearance of good. Greatest perversity arises when
the greatest evil is pursued under the appearance of good:
absolute liberalism, for example, the negation of all rights of
God, under the guise of charity, namely, to avoid divisions
among men. Since charity is the highest of all virtues, counter­
feit charity is the greatest of evils. As such, it will characterize
Antichrist, under whom even the elect, were it possible, will
be led into error. Beware of false prophets in the garments of
sheep. By their fruits you shall know them.3 Test all things,
keep only that which is good.4 Do not believe every spirit, but
test the spirits to see if they be from God.5 All these evils are
founded on the truth that evil is proposed under the appear­
ance of good. Open materialism, manifestly absurd, is less
dangerous than an idealism which flaunts Christian words,
but denies their reality. Liberalism denies the obligation, laid
on the individual and on society, to embrace revelation suffi­
ciently proposed. Liberty of cult is an evil, to be tolerated in
order to avoid a greater evil. It is not the ideal condition. On
this point Lamennais was condemned. Liberalism, indifferentism, skepticism, lead many to confound true charity with
false.
May certain tenets of liberalism be retained in practical
life, on the plea that the rights of God and of God’s Church
3 Matt. 7:15.
< I Thess. 5:21.
5 I John 4:1.

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are allowed in our schools? In practical life, so these men say,
the hypothesis of liberty for all cults is to be admitted. An­
swer: If the assertion were true, then it would also be true to
say that though theft is simply evil, still, in hypothesis, and in
practical life, we must allow theft to be justifiable. What is
needed in life is not liberalism, but prudence. Prudence
never allows any deed against man’s ultimate goal, but it does
tolerate one evil in order to avoid a greater evil. Our thesis
is not a mere speculative ideal, to be abandoned in practice.
The rights of God, the exigencies of eternal salvation, enun­
ciate the very goal of human life. True religion is to be em­
braced, not only by individuals but by society. In attaining
this end, prudence dictates toleration of an evil to avoid a
greater evil. But to abandon the thesis as something merely
ideal, something only for the schools, is in reality to turn
mankind away from the end of human life. It would be op­
portunism, receding farther and farther from the love of God
and of souls.
We must keep the efficacious intention of attaining the
end. Liberty flows from the authority of God, but license
leads to the servitude of corruption.
ART. 2. is THE WILL CONCERNED WITH PURPOSE ONLY?

Preliminaries
Granting that the will aims only at good, either true good
or apparent good, we now ask whether the will deals only
with the end or also with means. It seems that it deals only
with the end, according to Aristotle, since means belong to
another genus of goods, namely, not to good-in-itself, or to
delightful good, but to the useful good. Thus we distinguish
arts concerned with the end, navigation, for instance, from
arts concerned with means, say, ship building. We answer
by a double conclusion. First: The will as a power deals
with both the end and the means, since both are good.
Secondly: The first act of the will, properly speaking, aims

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177

only at the end. The first simple volition is carried toward
that which is willed for its own sake. But the means are not
good except in relation to the end. Confirmation. In intel­
ligence, the first act deals with principles, and the second act
with conclusions. But in the order of appetibility the end
has the same place as principle has in the order of intelligi­
bility. The useful and the good-in-itself belongs to the same
power, because one is subordinated to the other, just as
color and light in relation to the power of vision. And one
and the same operative habit (art) deals both with its own
proper end and with the means to attain this end. Hence there
can be no neutral act, no act which tends to an object which is
neither end nor medium. Whatever we will, is in some way
related to our desire for beatitude.
ART. 3. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ONE AND THE SAME ACT

TOWARD PURPOSE AND MEANS?

Preliminaries

When we wish one thing for the sake of another, for in­
stance, medicine for the sake of health, is there one act of the
will directed to both objects, or are there two simultaneous
volitions, one of which is the reason and motive of the other?
This article illustrates the conciliation of liberty and im­
peccability in Christ. Many Thomists say that Christ, way­
farer and comprehensor, necessarily loved God clearly seen
in Himself, but that He freely loved God as the reason for
loving creatures, and hence for loving the sacrifice of the
cross. God’s own love of self is necessary in relation to His
own goodness, but is free in relation to creatures. This ques­
tion influences spirituality also. When we will anything
virtually on account of God, do we by that same act will God
Himself?
Three conclusions. 1. The will is carried toward the end
in a twofold manner, first, to the end absolutely, secondly,
to the end as reason for willing the means. Here there is no

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difficulty, for our will can be carried toward God absolutely,
and by reason of this to love of neighbor.
2. The act by which the will is carried toward the end
absolutely is distinct from the act by which it chooses the
means. The reason is that we can think of the end absolutely,
before we begin to consider the ways and means. Sometimes
the first act precedes the choice of means even in time. Then
it is called simple volition, distinct from choice which is
concerned with means. To illustrate. First, I will health;
secondly, I will to call a physician. Similarly, in the intellect:
first, I know principles intuitively; secondly, I know con­
clusions drawn from these principles.
3. The motion of the will which we call choice aims
simultaneously at end and means, because in this case the
medium is willed, not for its own sake, but only for the end.
To illustrate. The sick man cannot will bitter medicine un­
less he simultaneously wills health as the reason for choosing
the medicine. Again, we cannot love our neighbor for God’s
sake unless we love God as the reason for loving our neighbor.
Thus every act of a man who has charity, even though he is
not thinking actually of God, is an act, not only of religion,
but also of charity, because his will, virtually, not merely
habitually, is centered on God. The will aims at medium and
at end by one and the same act.

A Confirmation

By one and the same act of vision we see color and light.
Light is simultaneously the tvhat (quod) and the whereby
(quo). Again, by one and the same act we know, not only the
conclusion, but also the principle, not absolutely, but as our
reason for knowing the conclusion. Again, by one and the
same act, I believe that God is triune and I believe God when
He reveals the Trinity, an act wherein God’s authority is
simultaneously the what and the whereby. By one and the
same simple act I believe God who reveals and the God
whom He reveals.

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179

Here enters a doubt. Is the act of desiring the end in the
means a simple volition or a choice? For instance, to desire
health in the offered medicine. The answer runs thus: To
desire medicine on account of health is an act of choice. To
wish absolutely for health in an offered medicine is a simple
volition. Again, when God is clearly seen in some great saint,
not only is this saint loved for God’s sake, but God Himself
is loved in this saint. Hence the word: Wonderful is God in
His saints. And when a principle is seen clearly in a con­
clusion, not only is the conclusion known from the prin­
ciple, but in that conclusion we see the principle absolutely.

CHAPTER XIII
By What Motives the Will Is Moved (q.

9)

PRELIMINARIES
In this article, says Cajetan, St. Thomas considers, not only

the objective motive of the will, but also the different causes
of volition. Chief among these causes is the volitive faculty
itself. This question has two parts. The first deals with
intrinsic causes, namely, the intellect, the sense-appetite, the
will itself. The second part deals with causes that are ex­
trinsic, under three headings. Is the will moved by some ex­
terior principle (object, God)? Is it moved by the heavenly
bodies or atmospheric agents? Is it moved by God alone as
exterior principle, or is it also moved by the angels or the
demons? Throughout the present question two general theses
are to be distinguished.
First. As regards the essence of its acts (the differentiating
element), the will is moved directly by the intellect, indi­
rectly by the sense-appetite and external corporeal agents.
Second. As regards the existence of its act (quoad exer­
citium), the will is moved only by itself and God, by no
other cause. In the following question, these two general
theses are particularized as follows:
1. The will is differentiated. This may be (a) necessarily,
by three objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in com­
mon, by particular goods which precede deliberation (art. 1
and 2); (b) non-necessarily, by two objects: by partial good
(not evidently connected with beatitude in common), by
passion (art. 2).
2. The will is exercised. This may be (a) necessarily, by
180

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

181

two objects: by God seen clearly, by beatitude in common
(art. 4); (b) non-necessarily, by a partial good, not evidently
connected with beatitude in common (art. 4).
ART. 1. IS THE WILL MOVED BY THE INTELLECT?

Preliminaries
It seems that the will cannot be moved by the intellect,
because, first, we often know a good and still have no desire
to attain it. Secondly, imagination often proposes an object
without moving the appetite. Thirdly, we would have a
vicious circle: if the will moves die intellect, then it cannot
be moved by the intellect.
The response is affirmative. First, by authority.1 The ob­
ject understood is an “unmoved mover” whereas the will is
a "moved mover.” The will moves the other faculties to act,
but itself is moved, as regards specific difference, by the good
proposed by the intellect. In the body of the article we have
three conclusions.
First conclusion. We must distinguish exercise of the act
from specification of the act. St. Augustine, indeed, uses the
term delectatio victrix, be that delight heavenly or carnal.
The Saint seems to understand by this term the object which
attracts rather than the efficient cause. But clearly we must
make a distinction. By my color I can objectively move the
eye of another man, but I cannot move him, efficiently, to
exercise his power of seeing. The teacher can move ob­
jectively the intellect of his pupil, but only God can move
that intellect subjectively to exercise its act.
Proof of the conclusion. Anything that is in potentiality
must be moved in order to be reduced to act. But the
faculties of the soul are in a twofold potentiality: first, as
regards exercise, namely, to act or not to act: secondly, as re­
gards differentiation, namely, to do this or that. Consequently
the faculties of the soul need to be moved under two aspects.
1 Aristotle, De anima, Bk. HI.

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First, subjectively toward exercise, secondly, objectively to
specific differentiation.
Second conclusion. The will moves the intellect, and other
powers, as regards exercise. When active powers are hier­
archically ordered, that power which aims at the universal
end moves to their exercise those powers which are directed
to particular ends, just as the leader of an army moves
soldiers subordinated to him. Now the will is directed toward
good in common, whereas every other power is directed to­
ward some special good, the eye, for instance, to perceive
colors, the intellect to know the truth. Consequently the
will must move to their exercise all powers of the soul, ex­
cept the vegetative powers, which are not subject to our will.
This conclusion does not imply that the will is the prin­
cipium quod, i.e., the acting man. But man, by his will,
moves other faculties to their exercise.
Third conclusion. The intellect moves the will as regards
the differentiating specification. Why? Because the intellect
proposes the object to the will. Thus we have the adage, noth­
ing willed unless pre-known. Specification in natural action,
water getting hot, or cow begetting calf, comes from the
specific form of the agent. But specification of an act of the
will comes from the form of the object proposed to it by
the intellect.
Objections Analyzed

1. If it be said that the intellect at times proposes a good
and the will is not moved, we answer that the intellect
moves, not to exercising the act, but as controlling specifica­
tion, and even then not of necessity, if we are dealing with a
particular good.
2. The intellect which moves the will is not the speculative
intellect, but the practical, which proposes a certain good as
here and now desirable.
3. The will moves the intellect, and is moved by the in­

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183

tellect, without any vicious circle, because the two move­
ments are in different genera. The will moves the intellect to
the existence of the act, because the truth to be known is a
certain particular good. But the intellect moves the will to
specification, because the good itself is a particular truth.
This mutual relation of causality between will and intellect
must be kept in mind when we prove free will, or show the
mutual relation between choice and the last practical judg­
ment. This mutual relationship solves also many objections
of the voluntarists, who hold that intellect does not attain
truth except under the influence of the will even as regards
specification. What they say is true of prudential judgment,
where truth means conformity with right appetite, even
while speculative error remains in the intellect. It is true like­
wise of faith, since the object does not sufficiently move the
will, and also of the quasi-experimental knowledge founded
on the gift of wisdom. But it is not true of the speculative
intellect, which deals with first principles, and with con­
clusions demonstrated from these principles.
Three Doubts
1. What kind of causality does the intellect exercise in
moving the will as regards specification? The more probable
opinion is that given by Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Banez,
Gonet, and Billuart, namely, that the intellect exercises a
causality which is final and extrinsically formal, but not
efficient. The intellect, says St. Thomas,2 moves the will, not
as an efficient cause, but as a final cause, by proposing to the
will the object which is the goal. Cajetan indeed holds that
the intellect moves the will also by a certain kind of efficient
causality, since the known object concurs with the will to
specify the volition, almost as the species impressa effectively
concurs with the intellect to differentiate the act of the in­
tellect. But, we must answer, this proposal of the object is
» Contra Gentes, I, 72.

BEATITUDE

184

effective only in an improper sense, since it is not an action,
but only a disposition, required that this differentiated act
be elicited by the will. To concur effectively in the proper
sense, the object proposed by the intellect would have to be
intrinsic in the intellect, just as is the species impressa.
2. Is the action whereby the will moves the other faculties
formally transitive, or only virtually transitive? Active use
is not an action formally transitive, for the act of the will
does not pass out of the will. It does not pass into the sense­
appetite, e.g., so as to be terminated there, whereas the action
of heating is terminatively in the wood that is heated. The
act of the will (just as God’s creative action) is formally im­
manent and only virtually transitive. The effect it produces is
called "passive use.”
3. Does the will move other faculties only by a certain
sympathy, or does it imprint something real? Probably it
does imprint something real,3 since the inferior powers are
compared to the will as instruments to a principal agent.
Sympathy is not sufficient to move powers which resist, for
instance, a distracted intellect or a disordered sense-appetite.
Such a resistance is not overcome except by a real immutation. God moves our will by an action formally immanent
but virtually transitive, but this transitive action produces
something real in the creature, namely, the reduction of the
power to act. The will is first an eliciting power, then by this
imprint it actually elicits the operation.
ART. 2. IS THE WILL MOVED BY SENSE-APPETITE?

Preliminaries
It seems that the will cannot be moved by sense-appetite:
first, because the higher cannot be moved by the lower;
secondly, because a particular agent cannot move a universal
agent; thirdly, we would have a vicious circle, because sense­
appetite is itself moved by the will.
« la-IIac, q. 16, a. 1.

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

185

Ττυο Affirmative Conclusions

First conclusion. The object of the sense-appetite moves
the will by the mediating judgment of the intellect. Proof.
Any object understood by the intellect as good can dif­
ferentiate the act of the will. Now when passion is aroused
in the sense-appetite, the intellect apprehends as desirable an
object which it would not so judge were passion absent.
Therefore the sense-appetite moves the will by means of the
intellect.
Here we may appeal to experience. In a fit of anger a man
judges that revenge is a good thing, a judgment he would not
pass if he were in a peaceful state. Similarly, the man who
desires lust. As man is, so he chooses. Each one judges prac­
tically according to his predominant inclination. Contrast
the man who has the virtue of temperance with the sinner
who knows the law of temperance, but who, nevertheless, as
ultimate practical judgment, says that intemperance is here
and now good. Truth in the practical intellect is conformity
with right appetite.4 A fortiori this is true of the command
that comes after the last practical judgment.
Objections Analyzed
The sense-appetite can move the will only by the mediating
intellect. But it can attract the will, since the choice is con­
cerned with a limited good.
Second conclusion. The will moves the sense-appetite by
a control which is diplomatic, not despotic. St. Thomas 5 ex­
plains. The soul’s power over the body is despotic, because
the members of the body (hand, foot) cannot resist the com­
mand of the soul. But reason’s control of the passions is
diplomatic, because the sense-appetite is able to resist the
command of reason, since, in man as in brute, it is moved by
instinct, imagination, and sense. Thus we feel or imagine
4 la-IIae, q.57, a.5, ad 311m. Cf. Cajetan, in lam-IIae, q.58, a.5.
5 la, q.81, a. 3, ad sum. Cf. la-Hae, q. 17, a.7.

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something delightful which reason forbids, or something
saddening which reason commands. Thus passion, not des­
potically, but only diplomatically, can be led to obey reason.
ART. 3. DOES THE WILL MOVE ITSELF?

Preliminaries
The response is affirmative, at least as regards some acts
of the will. Two difficulties present themselves. 1. Since what­
ever is moved is moved by something else, we would, by al­
lowing the will to move itself, destroy the first way for
demonstrating the existence of a prime mover. 2. The will
would be moved by two movers, each equal, namely, intel­
lect and will itself.

T hesis
Particular acts. The proof is twofold. First, the will as
free is the mistress of its own acts. Hence it has power either
to will or not to will. Such power would be impossible if
the will could not move itself. Secondly, the special nature of
our will. Will, in the world of appetite, is like principle in
the world of intelligence. The intellect, by knowing prin­
ciple, reduces itself from potential to actual knowledge of
conclusions, and thus moves itself. Hence the will, by willing
the end, moves itself to will ways and means.
This self-motion toward choice, being a created act, does
not, of course, exclude the causality of God, which is the
first cause of all created acts, necessary or free.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Nothing moves itself. Yes, where only one act is in ques­
tion. But the will, willing the end, moves itself to will the
means.
2. The will would thus be moved by two immediate mo­
tors. Yes, but in different orders. The will is moved by the

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187

intellect as to the kind of act it performs, but by itself to the
exercise of that act.
Note that this article is of great importance in distinguish­
ing mystical acts (where the will does not move itself, but is
moved by operating grace) from ascetic acts (where the will
moves itself, under cooperating grace).®
A difficulty remains regarding the first volition of the end.
Does the will move itself to its first volition, when man comes
to the use of reason, or again, to its first volition in any new
undertaking, or to its first volition after sleep? The answer
is that here the will cannot move itself, but is moved only by
God, though the will elicits the act.
ART. 4. IS THE WILL MOVED BY ANY

EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE?

Preliminaries

That the will is moved specifically by some exterior ob­
ject is manifest. But we ask whether the will is moved by
some exterior principle to exercise its act. The answer seems
to be negative. First, it is the nature of the voluntary act to
come from an intrinsic principle. Secondly, such an act seems
to be forced, and violent volition is a contradiction. Thirdly,
the will moves itself sufficiently, hence does not need to be
moved by anything external to itself.
Thesis. To exercise its act, the will must be moved by an
exterior mover, namely, by God. The argument runs as fol­
lows. That which is in potentiality to act needs to be pre­
moved by something that is already in act. To choose means,
the will moves itself, because it is already in act by willing
the end. Now, in relation to the first volition of man’s whole
life, an act which presupposes no anterior act of the will, the
will is in potentiality. To this first volition, the will cannot
move itself, but must be moved by the supreme motor, that
ela-IIae, q. 111, a. a.

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is by God, the Author of nature and of will. This truth is
affirmed also by Aristotle (or one of his disciples),’ and is
confirmed by revelation which says: In God we live, and
move, and are.8

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Voluntary motion, like natural motion, must be from
an intrinsic principle. From an intrinsic principle, as second
cause, granted; as first cause, denied. The very first volition of
our whole life comes from the will as second cause. But the
will, which elicits this first volition, does not move itself to it.
It moves itself when it proceeds from one act to another,
when from the volition of the end it chooses the means.
The divine premotion does not reduce the will from po­
tentiality to that act which is the operation itself. Premotion
moves the will from potential eliciting to actual eliciting,
just as wood becomes ignited, and then ignites other things.
Three elements must be distinguished: first, the divine mo­
tion; second, the motion in the creature which is a passion;
third, the operation vitally elicited.
2. The will, moved by some exterior principle, would be
subject to violence. Yes, but only if it be against its own in­
clination. Under the motion of God the will itself acts.
3. The will is sufficiently moved by itself. To its first
volition, no.
But, says the arguer, the first volition cannot be immedi­
ately from God, for this first volition presupposes intellectual
cognition of the good, and this cognition presupposes the
motion of the will which applies the intellect to consider and
thus we have an infinite process. Answer: We need no in­
finite process. The intellect is simply first.8 Knowledge al­
ways precedes volition, but volition does not always precede
knowledge. The source of our first act of knowledge is an
? Ethica Eudem, Bk. VII, chap. 14.
e Acts 17:28.
» la, q.82, a.4, ad gum.

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

189

intellective principle, higher than our own intellect; and this
is God.
4. The first volition that follows the use of reason is not
only a vital act, but also an act that is free and meritorious,
as is clear in the case of Christ and the angels. Now to exercise
a vital, free, and meritorious act, the will must not only elicit
the act, but must also move itself to the act. Answer: This is
required for a deliberate act, granted; for a free act, denied.
Explanation. This first volition, if it deals with beatitude
in common, is free only as regards its exercise. If it deals with
the ultimate end in the concrete, it is free also as regards
specification. The act is free when the object is not proposed
as absolutely good. Thus an object proposed by the inspiration
of the Holy Ghost may precede the first deliberation. Then
the will, already in volition to the common end, moves itself
to deliberate, and this second act is not only free, but delib­
erate, with full dominion and full merit. Thus St. Thomas
says that in their first instant of life angels could not sin, be­
cause their first act came immediately from God. Nor did
that act have full dominion and full merit. But their second
act was either sin, as in the demons, or fully meritorious, as
in the angels. Further, acts performed under the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, especially if they come after prayer disposing
for them, are free and fully meritorious, although not dis­
cursively deliberate, since they come from a special inspira­
tion.
The difficulty is urged. Man can sin in the first instant of
the use of reason. Therefore in that instant man moves him­
self, otherwise sin would be traced to God as its author.
The answer runs thus. Man can sin in the first physical in­
stant of the use of reason, denied; in the first moral instant,
granted. In his first use of reason man passes from a con­
fused cognition of good in common to a distinct cognition
of good-in-itself. Hence this knowledge is not acquired in
one physical instant, but in one moral instant, that is, a cer­
tain length of time, shorter or longer, depending on the

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subject’s mental penetration. Hence that moral instant con­
sists of many physical instants, at least two. In the first,
wherein he is especially moved by God, man cannot sin. But
in the following instant he can sin, because by his first act,
elicited by God’s special motion, he can by his own counsel
move himself as he pleases.

Two Doubts
i. Does God move the will only in that first volition, or
also in others? Answer: God moves to that first volition in a
special manner. To all other volitions God moves at least as
first and universal mover, since the will is always a second
cause.
But God’s premotion is not an indifferent premotion. God
moves in different fashions, according as man’s volitions are
sins, or acts naturally good, or acts disposing for justification,
or acts fully supernatural and meritorious. Again, in one
fashion to the act of virtue, in another fashion to the act of
the gifts, in still another fashion to acts which resist tempta­
tion. All these acts differ in goodness, and all good in all
volitions comes from God, the supreme good.
God is not the cause of sin, but only of the physical entity
underlying the sin. But God is the cause of all virtue, and of
all acts which are in any way good. All that God wills He
does. Nothing happens, either in heaven or on earth, unless
God Himself does it in mercy (if it is good), or allows it to
happen in justice (if it is a sin).
Molina 1011
fell into error, by rejecting premotion and sub­
stituting for it a simultaneous concursus (two men drawing a
ship). Those also are in error who admit only a premotion
indifferent to good or to evil. From this would follow the
proposition which Molina thought he had found in a genuine
work of St. Justin,11 namely, that our deeds, good or evil,
10 Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 23.
11 The work is apocryphal, from some Pelagian author. Thus the preface
in Migne.

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

iQ1

though they presuppose the general concursus of God, still
come from our free will alone as their particular cause, and
are not to be attributed to God.
God is the author of all that is good, even of merely natural
good, which requires a greater natural aid than does the
material act of sin. How much more is God the source of
supernatural good! Without Me you can do nothing.12 We
cannot even think anything as from ourselves, but our suf­
ficiency is from God.13 What hast thou that thou hast not
received? 14
Molina’s proposition is radically opposed to the definitions
of the Council of Orange against the Pelagians and Semi­
Pelagians. No one has of his own anything but lies and sin.15
God does many good things in man which man does not do,
but man does nothing that is good unless God grants him the
doing.15 Surely that which is most perfect in the created
order, namely, man’s good use of grace, must come from God
as its source. Contrast with this truth the following proposi­
tions. “With an aid that is equal in both cases, it can happen
that one man called will be converted and another not. With
a minor aid of grace one can rise, whereas another with even
greater grace does not rise but remains obdurate.” 17 “Of two
similarly called, one may accept the grace and the other re­
fuse. In this case the act is said to be from liberty alone, not
that he who accepts receives by his liberty alone, but that
only from liberty does this distinction arise, not from the
diversity of the divine aid which precedes.” 18
2. Does God specially move man to the first volition of
each day, or each new undertaking? In a new undertaking
God sometimes moves in a special manner, so suddenly that
the will does not move itself.
12 John 15:5.
is II Cor. 3:5.
1« I Cor. 4:7.
15 D. 195.
15 D. 193.
17 Concordia, s. v. Auxilium.
i«Lessius, De gratia efficaci, c. 18, n.7.

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BEATITUDE

a) Now this takes place in three ways: First, in super­
natural motions, where no supernatural act precedes, but
rather a contrary disposition. Instances: an infidel moved to­
ward faith, a sinner toward penance. Such effects are due
solely to operating grace. But when our mind is moved, and
then moves, the operation is due to cooperating grace. Some­
times, at the beginning of the day, after sleep, we are granted
operating grace, and then at once also cooperating grace.
But it is not always thus. A sinful thought of sin at the be­
ginning of the day, concerned indeed with beatitude in
common, may immediately afterwards entertain a sinful pur­
pose.
b) Second, in natural motions God sometimes suddenly
gives men an entirely new thought. This can happen at man’s
first wakeful moment.
c) In many cases the will moves itself, from a preceding
virtual intention to some new undertaking, without a special
motion from God. An instance is the man who suddenly con­
sents to a new sin at the first moral instant after sleep. Since
sin cannot come from God’s special movement, it must come
from the sinner’s will moving itself from some inordinate pre­
ceding act, which still remains, at least virtually.
ART. 5. IS THE WILL MOVED BY THE CORPOREAL WORLD?

Preliminaries
The question of fate.18 This question today would be pro­
posed probably as follows: Is the will affected by atmospheric
agents, for instance, by hot winds? It would seem so, first, be­
cause our bodies are under the influence of atmospheric
variations, the source of which is the diffusion of solar heat.
Secondly, voluntary bodily motions cannot be traced back
to prime physical agents, unless these agents affect also the
will. Thirdly, it can be foreseen that under the influence of
certain winds, suicides will increase.
>» See la, q. 116, a.4.

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

193

Further, materialists say that the existence of free will is
refuted by the principle of the conservation of energy, ac­
cording to which the world's total energy, potential and
actual, remains always the same. Now if human liberty ex­
ercised an influence on our body, the quantity of energy
would be increased. Similarly, the existence of a First Mover
would augment the quantity of energy. Against these views
stands the authority of Damascene,20 who says that the cor­
poreal universe is not the cause of our actions.
First thesis: The corporeal world, as object, moves the will.
The sense-world, and our own organs, are subject to our
corporeal environment, in particular, to atmospheric varia­
tions. Under these variations, the passions of the sense­
appetite attract the will objectively.
Second thesis: The corporeal world cannot force the will to
act. No corporeal agent can force the spiritual faculty, which
is independent of corporeal organs. Even objectively, the
imagination cannot move the intellect except through the
mediation of the intellect agent. Sense-powers, since they act
by corporeal organs, can be moved by atmospheric variations,
which involve variations in the organs themselves.
Corollary
Fate can be admitted, if we define it as “the mediation of
second causes toward effects foreseen by divine knowledge.”
Hence all events subject to second causes are subject to fate.
But deeds done immediately by God are not subject to fate.
The more removed a created thing is from the first mind, the
more deeply is it bound in the bonds of fate, more subject to
the necessity of second causes.
Divine motion, then, far from enslaving, liberates the
created will from the fatality of material causes. Molina’s
scientia media, on the contrary, admits a determinism by
circumstances, a determinism which comes, not from God
on high, but from the lowest creatures.
m De

fide orthod., II, 7.

BEATITUDE

194

Difficulties Analyzed
1. The multiform motions of our will are reduced to one
uniform cause, namely, to God, but not to the corporeal uni­
verse.
2. Many men follow passion, which varies with atmos­
pheric influence. Predictions based on this fact often come
true. But the wise man “rules the stars," by resisting passion.
3. In modern terms, this same difficulty runs thus: The
physical energy of the universe is unchangeable. Answer:
Physical energy produced by physical energy, yes. But ex­
perimental science cannot prove that the invisible influence
of God, the First Mover, or that of our will, does not exist.
Physicists acknowledge that it has never been proved that
the world is a closed system, that is, separated from all in­
visible influences.
ART. 6. IS GOD THE ONLY EXTERIOR PRINCIPLE
THAT MOVES THE WILL?

Preliminaries
It seems that God is not the only principle which moves
the will. First, the human will can be moved by the angels.
Secondly, our intellect can be illuminated by the angels.
Thirdly, if the will were moved by God alone, it would never
be moved to evil. But the response is affirmative. In the Sed
contra we hear St. Paul: “It is God who works in us both to
will and to do.” 21 St. Paul here excludes four false under­
standings. Namely, first, that man, by free will, can be saved
without divine aid; second, that man is necessitated by fate
or providence; third, the Pelagian error, that to will comes
from us, but to do comes from God; fourth, that God does
no good in us except in response to our merits, whereas else­
where St. Paul tells us that salvation belongs, not to him
who wills, or to him who runs, but to God who shows
21 Phil. 2:13.

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

195

mercy.22 Similarly, Isaias: “Lord, Thou hast done all our
works for us.’’23 And the Psalm: “Strengthen, O Lord, that
which Thou hast wrought in us.”24 And Christ Himself:
“Without Me you can do nothing.” “No one can come to Me
unless the Father who sent Me, draw him.” 25

Thesis
The only exterior principle that moves the will is God
alone. Since the motion of the will, like every natural mo­
tion, comes from within, it cannot be produced except by
the will and tire Author of the will. But God alone is the
Author of the will. Hence only by God can the will be moved
to exercise its act.
To explain. To produce an intrinsic motion in the will,
there must be an immediate power over the will itself. But
the only cause that has this immediate power is God. Why?
Because God alone, being the immediate and universal
Creator and Preserver, can change the creature which He
creates and preserves. Examples are: first, transubstantiation;
secondly, multiplying the loaves; thirdly, the vital operations
of plant life; fourthly, resurrection of the dead.
Objection. But man, who is not the creator of the stone,
can move the stone downwards, though this motion is nat­
ural and intrinsic in the stone. Answer: Either the motion is
more rapid than it would be by the natural weight of the
stone, or it is not more rapid. If it is more rapid, the move­
ment is not natural for the stone. If it is not more rapid,
then he who throws it only removes an impediment. Thus
the principle stands clear: motion cannot be produced ex­
cept by the proximate agent from which it proceeds, and
from that agent’s Creator and Preserver.
But is God the only Author of the will? Yes. First, by na­
ture, the will is a spiritual power of the rational soul. But
22 Rom. 9:16.
23 Isa. 26:1a.
2« Ps. 67:29.
John 15:5; 6:44.

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BEATITUDE

God alone is the Author of the spiritual soul, and therefore
of the will, which is a characteristic of that soul. Secondly,
the will being a universal agent, destined for a universal
good, cannot be produced except by the most universal of
agents, namely, God. Hence God alone can move the created
will. Demons cannot change the will of man intrinsically,
but only extrinsically, by persuasion, by influencing the im­
agination, or by exciting the humors of the body, and thus
indirectly arousing passion.
Corollary

Only God scrutinizes the heart of man. The will of the
rational creature belongs to God alone, hence things which
depend upon the will alone are known only to God. The
secrets of the heart are not necessarily connected with the
external course of the world or with the essence of the soul,
since they are free. Properly speaking, they are not parts of
the universe, and therefore cannot be known even by the
angels, though the angels know all the parts of the universe.
Difficulties Analyzed
1. The angel is indeed higher than man, but not high
enough to be the cause of our will. Hence the angel can move
our will only objectively, by persuasion, not subjectively, by
causing the act itself.
2. Likewise the angel can illumine our intellect objec­
tively, by proposing an object in some higher and more uni­
versal way than a human teacher could, for instance, by
manifesting to a soul some beautiful metaphysical synthesis.
But the angel cannot intrinsically move our intellect. This
belongs to God alone. But if the angel can move our will
objectively, by persuasion, like a mother, how much more is
it true of God?
The Third Response

This third response is famous in the history of theology. It
is cited by Molinists to prove that St. Thomas never ad­

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197

mitted physical predetermination, but only a general con­
cursus, or an indifferent premotion. This response contains
three affirmations.
1. “As Universal Mover, God moves man’s will to uni­
versal good. Without this universal motion man cannot will
anything.”
2. “By his own reason man determines himself to will this
or that good, a good that is either real or apparent.”
3. "At times, in a special manner, God moves some men to
choose definitely an object which is good, as is clear in those
whom He moves by grace.”
Let us consider, first, the Molinistic interpretation of this
text, secondly, the Thomistic interpretation. Many Molinists
conclude thus: St. Thomas admits physical premotion only
for that first act whereby the will wills good in common.
After this first act, premotion would be indifferent, i.e., man,
of himself alone, determines himself either to good or to
evil. Otherwise, they say, human freedom would be destroyed.
Into man’s salutary act, God enters, first objectively, by the
moral attraction of grace, secondly subjectively, by a simul­
taneous concursus or by an indifferent premotion. These
views presuppose, as we have said above, a gratuitous defini­
tion of free will. Nor can they stand unless we admit Molina’s
theory regarding scientia media.
The Thomistic interpretation rests on three propositions.
1. As universal Mover, God moves the will of man to uni­
versal good, and without this universal motion man cannot
do anything. In this proposition there is no difficulty. This
motion is required for any act, good or bad. But even under
this first proposition we reject simultaneous concursus (two
horses drawing a boat), and we affirm a previous concursus,
at least an indifferent concursus. God moves the will, whereas
one horse does not move the other.
2. Man by reason determines himself to this or that good,
real or apparent. But man does this as proximate agent, not
as sole agent. God’s premotion antecedes man’s deed, and this
premotion is not indifferent, otherwise God would not be in

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BEATITUDE

any higher way the author of virtue than He would be the
author of vice.
To understand this Thomistic interpretation we must dis­
tinguish six different ways in which the will is moved by God.
Three of these ways are in the natural order, and three in
the supernatural order. In the natural order we have, first,
God’s motion to good in common. Here a man cannot sin,
but only elicits a vital act, as a desire of beatitude. Secondly,
God moves the will to determine itself, either to a true good
or to an apparent good. In this case the will moves itself and
is capable of sin. Thirdly, God moves by a special inspiration,
in moral, or poetical, or philosophical, or military under­
takings.
In the supernatural order God moves the will, first, to turn
itself toward its supernatural end. In this case the will does
not move itself by virtue of a previous act, but disposes it­
self by operating grace and free consent. Secondly, God
moves the will to exercise infused virtues. Here the will
moves itself. Lastly, God moves the soul to exercise the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. In this case the will does not move itself,
but freely consents.
Under divine efficacious premotion to good, the will never
sins, but (against the Jansenists) it can sin, if it wills to resist.
Nor is there any obscurity in the present response after what
has been said. The will is sufficient source of its own act, in
its own order, namely, as proximate agent. Hence, when the
will moves itself from intention of end to choice of means, it
moves itself as a second cause, under the influence of the
First Cause. God alone moves the will interiorly.
The will is not moved in the same way toward sin and to­
ward the virtuous act. God is not the cause of sin, either
directly or indirectly, though He is the cause of whatever
physical entity there is in the sinful act. God is not the cause
of the defects in an action which comes from a deficient sec­
ond cause. To illustrate. The will causes the motion of man’s
members, but not his stumbling or lameness. The lameness

MOTIVES WHICH MOVE WILL

igg

comes from the crooked leg. But in every state, natural or
supernatural, man needs the divine aid to do good. And the
divine aid in the man who does good differs from the aid
given to the man who, by divine permission, commits sin.
The objection to which St. Thomas is replying runs thus:
If God alone moved the will, the will would never be moved
toward evil. He replies: The will is moved by God alone as
exterior principle, but is moved by itself as intrinsic prin­
ciple, sometimes to real good, sometimes to apparent good.
Here lies the possibility of sin. But there can be no sin in
that first act whereby the will is moved by God and not by
itself, as, for instance, in the first instant in the life of an
angel, or where the will first wills good-in-common.
3. God sometimes, in a special manner, moves a soul to
determinately will something good, “as when He moves by
grace.” Now this proposition deals precisely with the special
motion which is found, either in the beginning of moral life,
or at the beginning of conversion, or in the superhuman re­
sponse to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, where there is no
deliberation. These are the effects of operating grace. But the
effects of our will, when it both moves and is moved, are the
effects of cooperating grace. But operating grace naturally
leads to cooperating graces.
In summary, we say that the will cannot be determined by
itself alone. First, because such determination requires some
mediating act whereby the will moves and determines itself.
And of that mediating act we would have to inquire by what
more remote principle it is determined. Secondly, because
the will as a power is indifferent and indetermined, and all
determination depends on the supreme determination of the
first agent, who is Pure Act. But with this motion of God
presupposed, the will is the proper cause of its own act as
individually mine or thine. But this same act, as entity, comes
from the supreme entity, and as good from the supreme
good. Thus the entire act is both from God and from the
will, as from two causes, one of which is totally subordinated

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BEATITUDE

to the other, not from coordinated causes, illustrated by the
two horses drawing the wagon.
The Molinistic view is based on a false definition of
created liberty, a definition opposed to the principle of ef­
ficient and universal divine causality, and opposed likewise
to the principle of divine predilection, namely, no created
being can be better than another unless it is more loved by
God.

CHAPTER XIV

How Is

the

Will Moved? (q. io)

PRELIMINARIES
have determined the cause whereby the will is moved,
both objectively and subjectively. Now we have to treat of
the modes under which the will is moved, one mode being
that of necessity, the other that of freedom.1
In summary, these four articles run thus. Looked at ob­
jectively, the will is moved of necessity: first, by God clearly
seen; secondly, by beatitude in common; thirdly, by a par­
ticular good where the judgment does not remain indif­
ferent. And it is moved freely, first, by a particular good
where the judgment remains indifferent; secondly by passion.
Looked at subjectively, the will is moved of necessity: first by
beatitude in common; secondly by God seen clearly. And it
is moved freely by a particular good, a good which, here and
now, is not necessarily connected with beatitude in common.

We

ART. 1. IS THE WILL MOVED TO ANY ACT NATURALLY,
LE., NOT FREELY?

Thesis. The will desires naturally, by the necessity of ob­
jective specification. Elements which are not per se and nat­
urally intrinsic are reduced to something that is intrinsic by
nature. Now the will has free motions, which are not there
necessarily and naturally. Nature comes first, on all levels of
reality. Thus, as we speak of the nature of God, of the nature
1 Throughout this question the phrase "non ex necessitate" means "freely.”
St. Thomas writes: "determinat non ex necessitate.” He does not write (pace
P. D’Ales, S.J.): "non ad unum determinat."
201

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BEATITUDE

of the soul, of the nature of the intellect, so we speak here
of the nature of the will. Further, on every level of reality
we reduce all that is diverse and mutable to a source that is
one, uniform, and immutable, otherwise we have an infinite
process. As the intellect has an act that is natural and neces­
sary, so must the will itself have some natural act.
Corollary

We must look at the will as nature and as free. Will as na­
ture desires a necessary good. Will as free desires freely any
good that is not necessary. This same distinction we find in
the divine will, which necessarily loves divine goodness, but
freely loves created goodness.
What, then, does the will naturally and necessarily desire?
Three things: first, good in common; secondly, its ultimate
end or goal, that is, beatitude in common, independently of
any explicit notion of God; thirdly, existence, life, truth, and
other natural goods, considered in themselves, though these
goods may, by accidental circumstances, be seen as evils.
ART. 2. IS THE WILL MOVED NECESSARILY BY ITS OBJECT?

Definition of Liberty
Liberty in general is exemption from necessity. Freedom
from legal necessity gives us moral liberty, namely, the
absence of obligation. Freedom from elicitive necessity gives
us psychological liberty, i.e., free will itself. Let us look at
this distinction more in detail.
1. Moral liberty means, first, exemption from law, either
from civil law (e.g., the right of possessing, testating, buying,
selling, marrying); or secondly, from political law (the right
to participate in the government of our country); or thirdly,
from restrictions on liberty of conscience and of thought (the
right of professing one’s own religious faith).
2. Moral liberty may also mean, secondly, exemption from

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203

servitude, either from external servitude (slavery, imprison­
ment), or from the internal servitude of sin (“he who sins is
the slave of sin”).
3. Psychological liberty is, first, exemption from necessity,
whether of acting at all (I can will or not), or from acting
under specific differentiation (to love or to hate, to pray or
to study). Psychological liberty is, secondly, exemption from
external violence.
Freedom from necessity is also called the freedom of indif­
ference, since under the very act of willing (under obedience,
say) there remains real power to the opposite. Since this
liberty of choice is based on freedom of judgment, indif­
ference of judgment, it is called liberum arbitrium (free
judgment).
God’s freedom is not a faculty, not a potentiality which
goes over into act. It is an act of choice which retains full
freedom to the opposite. Freedom remains under the act al­
ready elicited, otherwise God, whose act is eternal, could
never create freely. The free act, even after it is determined,
remains free. Molinists disregard this truth.

Errors Regarding the Freedom of the Will
These errors are of two opposite kinds: determinism and
indeterminism. Let us look, first, at the divisions of deter­
minism. Here we find, first, divine determinism. Protestant
determinism says that grace compels the will after original
sin. Thus Wiclif, Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius. The
only liberty that remains is freedom from external force.
Pantheistic determinism holds that all things proceed under
necessity from the substance of God. Thus the Stoics, Spinoza,
and Hegel.
Human determinism has three forms. First, psychological
determinism, which holds that the last practical judgment is
determined infallibly by the strongest motive. Thus Leibnitz.
Second, physical and physiological determinism (from tern-

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BEATITUDE

perament, from physical circumstances, from the principle
of causality, from the principle of the conservation of energy).
Third, statistic determinism, which claims to foresee the
number of future homicides, suicides, thefts, marriages.
Divisions of Indeterminism
Pelagian indeterminism holds that human freedom is in­
clined equally to good or evil; that human liberty would be
unreasonably limited if we affirmed the necessity of prevenient grace for conversion; that human liberty was not
harmed by original sin.
Libertinarian indeterminism holds that freedom can
choose without any motive; or that the primary distinction
between good and evil comes from the free will of God; or
that the primary distinction between good and evil rests on
God’s free will; or that impeccability would destroy liberty,
since liberty contains essentially the power of sinning.
Question. Did St. Thomas know these errors against free
will? The answer is affirmative, as is clear from the objections
in this article, and from the twenty-four questions in his
treatise De malo.

Preliminaries
We are here treating of natural necessity, namely, whether
the will is moved necessarily by its object, as a physical thing
is changed and moved by a physical cause, or as the faculty of
sight is moved by its object. Now it might seem that the will
is moved necessarily by its object. First, the object is a suffi­
cient motive, and any sufficient motive moves of necessity, a
necessity, not indeed metaphysical or physical, but moral.
Secondly, since the intellect is necessarily moved by its ob­
ject, even by a particular truth, the will too must be moved of
necessity by a particular good which, here and now, is evi­
dently connected with beatitude. Thirdly, since the last end
in common is necessarily desired, and the end is the reason
for willing the means, the means also are desired of necessity.

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205

Our Authorities

Aristotle says that the will, since it is a rational power, is
related to opposites, and hence is not of necessity moved to­
ward one or the other.2 God speaks to Cain: The lust thereof
(of sin) shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion
over it? God leaves man in the hand of his own counsel? The
Church condemned this Jansenistic proposition: For merit
or demerit in the state of fallen nature, there is required, not
freedom from necessity, but only freedom from coercion?
First thesis. The will is moved to act of necessity by no ob­
ject except God seen clearly. This conclusion is clear from
experience. We are not bound even to think of any one ob­
ject, much less to will it. But if we do will anything, then, at
least virtually, we will it by reason of beatitude in common.
Second thesis. Objectively (and a fortiori subjectively) the
will cannot be moved necessarily by any good proposed by
reason as particular and limited.
The proof that will here follow is a metaphysical proof,
based on experience. Moderns tend to ignore the foundation
of the solution, namely, that the adequate object of the will
is universal good. Further, they do not look on the will as a
rational appetite, since they divide faculties into three,
namely, intellect, will, and sensibility, and under sensibility
they place, not only the passions of the sense-appetite, but
also the higher inclinations of the rational appetites. This
division, originating from Rousseau, is merely phenomenal,
and is false, since it no longer observes the distinction be­
tween intellectual life and sense life.
The Argument
The will is not moved necessarily, as regards differentia­
tion, except by an object here and now proposed as univer2 IX Metaph.
s Gen. 4:7.
♦ Eccli. 15:14.
» D. 1094.

2o6

BEATITUDE

sally good, in no way evil. Now all particular goods, since
they are in some way limited, can be looked upon as not
good. The principle here invoked has two foundations. First,
the relation of faculty to adequate and differentiating object;
secondly, from analogy with sight and intellect. Sight is differ­
entiated specifically only by an object completely and actually
colored. The intellect is differentiated specifically only by
necessary and evident truth, not by mere probability. Only
manifest evidence necessitates the intellect. Since mysteries
remain obscure, it is possible to doubt the truths of faith.
A particular good may be good-in-itself, but also difficult
and arduous. Or it may be delightful or useful, not good-initself. And even if it is in itself entirely good (existence, life,
intelligence), it can still be seen as not good because of at­
tendant evils. Such particular and limited goods cannot neces­
sarily move a faculty of unlimited capacity.

First Corollary

Here on earth God Himself is, under one aspect, good, but
under another is evil (to the sinner, e.g., who is displeased by
God’s commands). Here man’s judgment is mutable and free.
Only God clearly seen can invincibly attract our will, down
to its deepest roots, whereas particular goods can attract it
only superficially.
In a purely natural order, man, we may suppose, would,
after probation, be preserved from practical error, and would
not depart from God known in the mirror of creation. In il­
lustration, we may point to those saints who, while still on
earth, were confirmed in grace.
The dominating indifference of the will in relation to par­
ticular goods is first potential and then actual. The act, elic­
ited and determined, still remains free, because its object is
particular, not universal. Thus the man who is seated retains,
even while he sits, the power to stand, though he cannot si­
multaneously sit and stand. Similarly, under efficacious grace,
where there is transition from potential indifference to actual

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207

indifference, the mode of freedom remains under the act it­
self. In God there is actual dominating indifference, but not
potential. If potential indifference were of the essence of free­
dom, God could not be free, since His act is both free and
eternal.
Second Corollary

Our will has a quasi-infinity, since only the infinite God
seen clearly can adequately fill its capacity. The will’s free act
is man’s response to the impotent solicitation coming from
finite good. A particular good, augmented as far as conceiv­
able, will never become a universal good, good under every
aspect, a good that necessarily attracts our will.
Question. What is the demonstrative medium in proving
free will? Answer: This demonstrative medium is the infinite
disproportion between particular good and universal good.
In other words, there is no objective reason infallibly deter­
mining the transition of the will from universal good to par­
ticular good. Though on earth we do not possess God as seen,
we are nevertheless destined for Him, so that it is impossible
to find our beatitude in any finite good. Thus the martyrs
showed their freedom by despising all finite goods and over­
coming all torments.

Four Doubts

First. Wherein does this metaphysical demonstration differ
from the spontaneous knowledge of common sense? Answer:
The difference is the distinction between confused and dis­
tinct, between natural intelligence and philosophical reason.
Natural intelligence recognizes, confusedly, the disproportion
between the particular good and the universal good. Thus we
experience that this particular good cannot in every way sat­
isfy our rational appetite.
Objection. But consciousness recognizes only the act al­
ready elicited which is already determined. Hence we can
have no consciousness of potential liberty. Answer: Con­

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sciousness knows, not only the elicited choice after it has been
made, but also the entire course of deliberation, wherein
choice is the terminus. Knowing this successive deliberation,
consciousness perceives, confusedly at least, the infinite dis­
proportion between the particular and the universal. Even in
cases where there is no antecedent deliberation, but docile
and free acceptance of divine inspiration, we should still have
experience of liberty, of freedom, that is, either to accept or
to reject that inspiration. Thus we experience that we stand
freely, because we know that we can choose the opposite,
namely, not to stand. And God knows experimentally He is
free, though His choice never passes from potentiality to act.
Second. What is the relation of the last practical judgment
to the act of choice? Answer: Among the Thomistic theses
one runs as follows: “The will does not precede, but follows,
the intellect. The will necessarily desires only what is pre­
sented as being in every way good. Thus among the various
goods, desired by mutable judgment, the will chooses freely.
Choice therefore follows the ultimate practical judgment.
But the will itself makes that judgment to be the last.”
This proposition, a compendium of our thesis, is, in its first
part, against Suarez, who holds, as we shall see later, that when
two equal goods are proposed to the will, the will can choose
one of them without any ultimate practical judgment direct­
ing this choice rather than the opposite. His view cannot
stand, because it is against the principle that nothing is willed
unless foreknown, and that nothing can be more loved than
another unless it is foreknown as more suitable here and now,
though only, it may be, for an accidental reason and the sub­
jective disposition of the man who chooses. The last part of
the proposition is against Leibnitz, that is, against psychologi­
cal determinism, which denies that the last practical judg­
ment comes from the will itself.
Third. By what act does the will make this judgment to be
the last? Many Thomists answer (e.g., the Salmanticenses)
that this act of the will is free, otherwise the judgment itself

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209

would not be free. Hence the act of the will which thus deter­
mines the ultimate judgment, regarding this particular me­
dium, is not the intention of the goal, nor the consent given
in globo to different ways and means. But it is the very choice
of this determined medium, because choice in general acts as
formal extrinsic cause, anteceding the ultimate practical judg­
ment. This judgment does not direct the will unless the will
chooses thus to be directed. Causes are reciprocal, since they
are in various genera of causality.
But if the last practical judgment comes from a special in­
spiration of the gift of counsel, it is still free and mutable, not
in the sense that it is fully and completely in our power, but
in the sense that it deals with an object not in every way good,
an object which man freely accepts.
Fourth. What about motions of the will that are altogether
sudden or imperfectly free? Are they sins, at least venial sins?
One answer is that these acts are not free. But the proper an­
swer demands a distinction. Most certainly these acts are not
fully deliberate, but an act can be non-deliberate and still
free. We note some instances. The first act in the life of an an­
gel where, without deliberation, there is an indifferent judg­
ment and a certain domination, though not complete. Again,
human acts under the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not delib­
erate, but still free and meritorious. Hence the proper answer
to the question runs thus: These sudden motions are imper­
fectly free, if indifference of judgment still remains, that is,
attention to the twofold aspect of the object, good in the one
way, not good in another. If this attention is absent, these acts
are not even imperfectly free.
But there remains a difficult question. Is man bound to be
always attentive to sudden motions that arise, let us say from
sensuality or temptations against faith? The answer of St.
Thomas runs thus: “The corruption remaining from original
sin does not impede rational man from repressing any single
inordinate motion of sensuality if he foresees it: he can divert
his thought to something else, some other inordinate motion

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may arise. For instance, when a man changes his thought from
carnal delight to the study of knowledge, there may arise an
emotion of unpremeditated vainglory. Hence by reason of
this corruption man cannot avoid all these motions. But such
emotion is in some way sinful, since he is able to avoid each
single motion that arises.” 6 If he does not avoid each single
motion, there is at least a negligence against prudence. And
a fortiori, if the sudden motion is not in sensuality but in the
will. ‘‘A sudden motion of infidelity is a venial sin.”
The Roots of Freedom

Here we must distinguish extrinsic roots of liberty from
intrinsic. The extrinsic root of liberty is the supreme efficacy
of the divine will, which is the cause of created things and of
all their modes. The intrinsic roots are two, one remote, the
other proximate. The remote root of liberty is the immate­
riality of intellectual natures: human, angelic, divine. The
proximate root is either causal or subjective. The causal root
is the intellect’s knowledge of universal good. The subjective
root is the will’s amplitude and capacity for universal and
absolute good, the will’s pre-eminence above all particular
and limited good.

Definitions of Liberty
First: Liberty is self-control, self-mastery, dominion over
self. Second: Free will is a faculty of will and of reason. It be­
longs to reason as origin and norm; but formally to the will,
because only the will can choose. Third: Liberty is a rational
power related to opposites, to act or not to act. Fourth: Free
will is a faculty elective of means, presupposing direction with
relation to the goal. The phrase, direction “with relation to
the goal” shows that turning away from the goal is a defect of
liberty. Free will is more perfect in God and Christ and the
angels than it is in those who can sin. Power to sin is not of
«Ia-IIae, q.74, a.3.

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211

the essence of liberty, but a defect of liberty, just as error is
not essential to reason, but a defect of reason.
The Molinistic Definition

Liberty is a faculty which, presupposing all elements neces­
sary for action, can either act or not act. This definition is,
first, novel; secondly, ambiguous; thirdly, when explained
Molinistically, a begging of the question; fourthly, contrary
to the universal causality of God; fifthly, an offense against
the very principle of causality.
As to novelty, it is not found among the scholastic doctors
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As to ambiguity, note,
first, the word “presupposing,” which does not distinguish
the order of time from the order of nature. A prerequisite of
a free act, not in time but in nature, is the divine premotion
and the last practical judgment. Another ambiguous expres­
sion is “can act or not act,” which expresses, either the di­
vided sense, i.e., antecedent power, or then the composite
sense, i.e., consequent power.
Molinists and Congruists interpret in the following fashion.
Liberty is a faculty which, presupposing all things necessary,
not only in time but also in nature, can still act or not act
even in the composite sense. They explain: Supposing a con­
gruous grace inclining to act, and supposing the ultimate
practical judgment, the will not only retains the power of act­
ing, but can even cause the nonexistence of the act. Molina,
against the principle of predilection, speaks thus: “Under
equal aid, one man is converted and another not. Yes, even
under a smaller aid, one can rise, whereas the other, even
under a greater aid, does not rise but remains obdurate.” 7
Thomists on the contrary, understand as follows: Liberty is a
faculty which, presupposing in time all things necessary for
acting, can still act or not act in the composite sense; but
which, presupposing all things required by nature, can act or
t Concordia, s. v. Auxilium.

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not act, only in the divided sense. They explain. Under effica­
cious grace and the last practical judgment, we retain the
power of not acting, but we cannot make the act nonexistent.
An example is the man who is sitting: he retains the power to
stand, but he cannot simultaneously sit and stand.
This definition, as it stands, holds good only in regard to
prerequisites in time, otherwise it begs the question, and
denies the principle of predilection, which declares that no
one can be better than another unless he is more loved by
God. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” Further,
it would deny the universal causality of God.

Two Doubts
First. Can the will, placed twice under the same circum­
stances and dispositions prerequired in time, act differently
in each case? The response is affirmative. It is commonly ad­
mitted by theologians, as a corollary of the preceding defini­
tion, as there explained.
Second. Can the liberty of indifference be harmonized with
scientia media? No. Scientia media presupposes a circumstan­
tial determinism, because in this theory God can foresee the
future infallibly only by examining the circumstances in
which a man will be placed. This theory involves a threefold
impossibility. First, the free determination would be a good
not proceeding from God. Secondly, God’s intelligence would
be that of passive spectator, whose knowledge is not cause but
effect. Thirdly, human liberty would be destroyed, by its sub­
jection to circumstantial determinism. But, says Thomas, no
created being can be better than another if it be not loved
more by God.8 He who labors more has more of grace, but
that he does labor more is an effect of some higher cause.
Dominating Indifference

The constituting element of free will is its full dominion
over its own acts. This dominating indifference may be consla, q.20, a.3.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

213

sidered in relation, either to the object or to the act. In rela­
tion to the object, we have either objective indifference (in
the object) or formal indifference (in the will itself). In rela­
tion to act, we have either passive and potential indifference
(in the faculty), or active, actual indifference (in the act of
choice itself).
Potential indifference is the state of the will, when the will
is idle and inactive. This inactive indifference is not essential
to liberty as such. It is rather an imperfection, since every
potentiality is perfected by the act for which it exists. Other­
wise it would follow that God, who is always in act, would not
be free. Further, it would follow that our will, as often as it
acts, would lose liberty, by losing potential and passive in­
difference.
Actual and active indifference appears when the will acts,
but still retains power not to act. This indifference is not
taken away by grace, but is given by grace. Grace moves, not
only that the act take place, but that it take place freely. Po­
tential indifference, on which Molinists insist, is not of such
great importance, since it does not exist in God, nor in us
when we freely choose.
Question: Which kind of indifference is essential to free­
dom? Our answer is fivefold.
1. Freedom of choice demands that indifference which ex­
cludes natural necessity, determined to one course. Freedom
of will differs from that spontaneity which brutes have by
natural instinct. Nature causes by being what it is, but the
will causes, not by its natural form, but by its own super­
added determination, mediated by the intellect. Jansenists re­
ply that the mere light of reason suffices to lift the will above
nature, and thus indifference is not required. But they fail to
see that the will has, not only free acts, but also necessary
acts, determined by its essence, for instance, the love of beati­
tude. “The longing for the last goal is not of those things
which we are masters of.” ·
8 la, q.81, a.i, ad gum.

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2. Objective indifference is required for freedom of will.
It is impossible for the will to aim freely at an object proposed
to it as altogether good and lovable. It can aim freely only at
those goods which are proposed, under one aspect as good,
under another at least as apparently deficient. Further, the
act of the will is free only so far as the judgment from which
liberty proceeds is itself free, i.e., in the power of the will.
And this judgment is not in the power of the will if objective
indifference is absent. But, so runs the question, can we not
reflect on the act even without objective indifference? An­
swer: The intellect can reflect upon a necessary judgment by
a cognitive reflection, yes; by a judicative and deliberative
cognition, no. To illustrate. We cannot dissent from the prin­
ciple of contradiction, or from a geometrical conclusion. As­
sent or dissent is in our power when the thing apprehended
does not sufficiently convince the intellect.
3. Formal and subjective indifference is required for lib­
erty, because it follows objective indifference. Otherwise the
will would not tend with indifference to the object; it would
not determine itself, but would be determined by its nature.
4. Moral indifference is not the essence of liberty, but
rather its imperfection. To follow evil is not of the very na­
ture of a power destined for good. The free will is destined
to follow good, just as reason is destined to pursue truth. In
God, in Christ, in the blessed, we find the most perfect free­
dom united with supreme impeccability.
5. Freedom of will does not necessarily require differenti­
ating indifference, but it does demand indifference toward
placing the act. The will brings forth this act, not because it
exists, not by a determination of nature, but because, by its
own counsel, it chooses to perform this act.
Objection. The desire for the last goal does not belong to
those things of which we are masters. Still we are free to exer­
cise this act. Answer: Free, yes, but only so far as we can re­
fuse to think of beatitude. If we do think of it, the judgment
is not indifferent, and tire will of its own nature is necessi­
tated toward this act.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

2’5

Is Equilibrium Necessary for Freedom?

Some say that subjective indifference means equilibrium,
and that efficacious grace, by determining the will to one
thing, takes away this equilibrium. Answer: We do not find
this term, either in Scripture, or in the definitions of the
Church, or in St. Augustine, or in St. Thomas. Further, if by
equilibrium we are to understand equality of inclination and
facility, and even of faculty in the Molinistic sense, then the
notion is false. Molina says, we remember, that under equal
aid, one may be converted and another not. Or, again, that
by the aid of a smaller grace one man can rise, whereas
another, under a greater aid does not rise, and remains ob­
durate. Now these sentences are against the principle of predi­
lection: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” and
also against the principle of the universal causality of God.
But if by equilibrium we understand the power of resisting
any grace, and the power of conquering any temptation with
God’s help, in this sense we admit equilibrium, because it is
then nothing else but the active indifference which is not
taken away by efficacious grace, since under efficacious grace
there remains a real power to the opposite. But the term is
not well chosen.

Analysis of Psychological Determinism
So far we have seen that human liberty is based on reason,
and have also seen the various kinds of indifference. Now we
pass to the second part of the article, which harmonizes hu­
man liberty with the influence of sufficient motive. The main
objection, proposed by Leibnitz, is found already in St.
Thomas.

Analysis of Difficulties

A truly sufficient motive moves by necessity. But a particu­
lar good is related to the will as a sufficient motive. Answer:
If it fills the entire capacity of the mobile thing, then it
moves by necessity, granted. But if it is only relatively suffi-

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cient, if it does not fill the entire capacity of the mobile
thing, then we deny that it moves by necessity.
Eight Replies
1. The will is moved by its object, as sense-appetite by its
object. Now the appetite of a hungry dog does not, by the
fact that it is insatiable, remain free while eating a morsel
of bread. In parallel manner, then, the will does not, by the
fact that it is destined for universal good, remain free in rela­
tion to a particular good. Answer: The will is moved by its
object, if you presuppose the indifference of judgment
founded on the cognition of universal good, granted: other­
wise, denied. This nominalistic objection shows that sensual­
ism cannot admit liberty, but only spontaneity.
2. The will is moved by good, as the intellect is by truth.
Now the intellect, though destined for universal truth, is not
free regarding a particular truth. Answer: The intellect is not
free in relation to demonstrated truth, I grant; in relation
to mere opinion, I deny. Note, further, that the intellect
draws things to itself and thus reduces many truths to the
necessity of prime principles. The will, on the contrary, is
drawn to the thing wherein the good exists. That good is al­
ways finite, unless it be God.
5. But that liberty or indifference of judgment in relation
to particular good does not remain. Proof: Aesthetic admira­
tion, though destined for universal beauty, is of necessity
aroused by particular works of art, Michelangelo’s statue of
Moses, say, or by one of Beethoven’s symphonies. In parallel
manner, then, the will, though destined for universal good,
is drawn necessarily by certain particular goods. We distin­
guish: Drawn by particular goods in any way imperfect, we
deny. By particular goods, in every way good (existence, life,
intelligence), per se, we grant; but note that these goods can,
per accidens, be refused.
4. But the natural desire of the end takes away indifference
of judgment. I grant, as regards specification. But, granting

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217

likewise that the end is the reason for necessarily willing the
means, here and now necessary for beatitude, (as existence,
life, intelligence), I deny such necessity toward other means
and ways.
5. But the practical judgment must always be necessary,
otherwise ethics would be a system not necessary, but arbi­
trary. Answer: The standard of the will must be necessary as
regards principles and conclusions, but not as regards the
practical judgment of prudence. And I explain. The judg­
ment that is speculativo-practical belongs to moral science,
and proceeds from the awareness of the sinner. But the judg­
ment that is practico-practical is determined by prudence, and
is not here and now psychologically necessary. To illustrate.
The sinner, though speculatively he admits that justice must
be observed by all men, especially toward himself, neverthe­
less, in practice, judges that his injustice toward another is
simply good for himself. He can repeat the words of the poet:
I see the better way, and I approve, but nevertheless I follow
the worse.
6. By the principles of causality and sufficient reason this
indifference is taken away. A cause, under one and the same
set of circumstances, cannot produce different effects. An­
swer: A cause determined by nature to one line of causality,
granted; otherwise denied.
7. But the will cannot choose unless it is determined by
the intellect, and the intellect, granted the same circum­
stances, cannot change its judgment. Answer: Cannot, if the
circumstances of the object are here and now infallibly de­
termined, granted; otherwise denied.
8. Individual circumstances infallibly determine the act,
because the object cannot be chosen unless it is judged to be
better than another. Answer: Unless it is judged absolutely
better, I deny. Better in relation to the will which is here and
now acting, I grant. The last practical judgment depends on
the actual disposition, good or bad, of liberty itself. He who
wills an object can also non-will it, to manifest his liberty.

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Particular good furnishes no motive that infallibly deter­
mines the will. This truth is especially apparent in acts where
we find the greatest liberty, particularly in God.

Two Doubts
i. Must choice be always governed by the last practical
judgment? Thomists answer in the affirmative, against Suarez.
The last judgment immediately directing election is pre­
required, because nothing can be willed unless it can be pre­
known as good and suitable. But, says Suarez, when two goods
are proposed as here and now equal, the will can choose one
without any reason, simply because it wills. Stat pro ratione
voluntas. Answer: The phrase ‘‘because it wills” modifies, not
only the agent, but also the object. The will always chooses
‘‘because it wills,” if you look at the act subjectively, even
when it chooses a greater or an equal good. The phrase “be­
cause it wills” concurs as an objective motive. If the man is
asked why he selects this minor good in preference to a major
good, he will give for the reason and motive “because I will.”
His motive for the choice is his own pleasure which he ap­
plies to one object and not to another. Stat pro ratione
voluntas.
Man’s pleasure, we note, is often against the rule of reason,
whereas God's pleasure, though infinitely free, is always con­
formed to infinite wisdom, and wisdom judges that, in mat­
ters which cannot necessarily be determined, it is right to act
according to one’s pleasure. To illustrate. God creates a man
at this instant rather than before or after; or He gives to one
a degree of glory which He does not give to another.
But, Suarez insists, God, without any last practical judg­
ment, chooses this world in preference to a better world. An­
swer: God chooses a world, less good objectively, granted; by
a motive less good, no. To explain. This world, though in­
trinsically less good than other worlds which God could have
chosen, is nevertheless better, if you look at God’s motive,
since it shows God’s pleasure applied to this world and not to

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

219

another. In matters of liberality and grace, the will of the
donor becomes objective motive.
Further, the divine will does not, as does our will, presup­
pose goodness, but makes and creates that goodness, by loving
and choosing it. God pours the goodness of His own choice
into our free choice. God does not choose creatures because
they are more or less good, but creatures are more or less good
because God loves them more or less. God has greater love
for better things, but better things are better because they
are more loved by God.
Answering Leibnitz
God would be neither wise nor good, says Leibnitz, had He
not created the best possible world. The answer is that God
cannot make any created good absolutely better, because no
created good is the highest possible good. God can always
make something better than the thing He has already made.
But He cannot act better, that is, He cannot act with greater
wisdom and power. The external glory of God rests on the
free counsel of His will. Supreme wisdom “delights to play
in the universe.” 10 What God chooses among created goods is
formally better, that is, more according to His will, but it is
not always materially better. To illustrate. What obedience
commands is not always materially the better course; but it is
formally the better.

A Final Doubt
Supposing a free and efficacious intention of the goal, and
only one medium to reach this goal, is the act of the will in
such cases necessary or free? For example, a man wills health,
and sees that it can be attained only by amputation. The an­
swer is that, as the case is here stated, the man’s decision for
amputation is a necessary act, because the will cannot effica­
ciously will the impossible. If he refuses, then he has with­
drawn his free and efficacious intention to attain health.
loProv. 8:23.

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220

ART. 3. IS THE WILL MOVED NECESSARILY

BY THE SENSE-APPETITE?

Preliminaries
This article is against physical and physiological determin­
ism. The objections are thus proposed by St. Thomas.
1. The authority of St. Paul: “Not the good which I will
do I do, but the evil which I will not, that I do.” St. Paul
is speaking of the concupiscence which follows original sin.
2. Aristotle says: “As man is, so does man choose.” Now it is
not in the power of the will immediately to cast off passion.
The thesis is negative. In the Sed contra we have God’s
words to Cain: “Why art thou angry? Under thee shall be thy
appetite, and thou shalt control it.” 11 Then follow three con­
clusions.
1. A man whose reason is totally bound by passion is neces­
sarily moved by the sense-appetite. Where reason is bound,
we cannot have indifference of judgment, and hence no volun­
tary act. Man is then like a brute animal.
2. When the judgment of reason is not entirely impeded
by passion, man is moved by sense-appetite, not necessarily,
but freely. The object attracts him strongly, but leaves his
judgment indifferent and mutable. But the liberty decreases
as the impulse of passion increases.
3. If an act of the will is present it does not of necessity
follow passion. From this third conclusion it is clear that St.
Thomas does not admit that sudden motions of the will are
necessary.
Difficulties Analyzed

1. St. Thomas, explaining the Pauline phrase, “the evil
which I will not, that I do,” notes that the will cannot pre­
vent movements of concupiscence from arising. The first mo­
tions of sensuality are not sins, if man immediately resists and
turns his thought elsewhere. The following proposition has
u Gen. 4:11.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

221

been condemned: “Evil desires, which reason does not con­
sent to, which man suffers against his will, are nevertheless
prohibited by the precept “thou shalt not covet.” 12
13
In an opposite direction Molinos says: “Under tempta­
tions, even furious temptations, the soul is not bound to re­
sist.” 13 Condemned is likewise another proposition of Moli­
nos wherein he denies that first motions of sensuality can
exist after the purification of the soul.14 This condemnation
of Baius and Quesnel shows that concupiscence, being a habit
(gomes'), is not properly speaking sin, and that the first mo­
tions of sensuality are not sins if man resists and turns his
thought elsewhere.
2. Our will has not the power to banish passion immedi­
ately. Answer: The judgment of reason remains in some way
free, and hence can refrain from following passion.
3. The will can be moved to a particular good, without
any passion in the sense-appetite. A sick man, with no appe­
tite, nevertheless wills to eat in order to sustain life, or to
drink bitter medicine though it nauseates him.
We have solved the objections raised by physical or physi­
ological determinism by recalling the source of free will, i.e.,
the indifference, the mutability, of judgment. If such judg­
ment is absent, the act is no longer voluntary. Thus we see
the harmony between free will and motive objectively suffi­
cient. This motive is relatively sufficient for a free choice, but
not absolutely sufficient to necessitate the will. Two finite
goods, however unequal, are both equally distant from in­
finite good.
ART. 4. MUST THE WILL BE MOVED BY GOD TO ITS ACT?

Preliminaries
Here we are to solve the objections of Calvin and Luther
against efficacious grace, objections renewed by Molinists
12 D. 1050. 1051. 1074. 1075. 1393.
13 D. 1257. 1261.
1·* D. 1276.

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against Thomists, objections already stated by St. Thomas.
For in this article we are treating not only of liberty from
coercion, that is, of spontaneity, but also of freedom from
necessity.
Objections

1. An irresistible agent moves of necessity. But God is an
irresistible agent. This objection is raised by Calvinists and
Lutherans. Molinists agree on the principle involved, namely,
that God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, would
move of necessity. But they differ from heretics in the appli­
cation, namely, that grace is intrinsically efficacious. This is
affirmed by the heretics, denied by the Molinists. We, how­
ever, reject the principle, admitted by Protestants and Molin­
ists.
Protestantism says: God, moving by intrinsically efficacious
grace, moves of necessity. But grace is intrinsically efficacious.
Molinism says: God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace,
moves of necessity. But God does not move by necessity.
Hence grace is not intrinsically efficacious. Thomism says:
God, moving by intrinsically efficacious grace, moves not of
necessity. But grace is intrinsically efficacious. Hence God
moves not of necessity.
2. The operation of God would be inefficacious if the will
refused that to which God is moving. But the operation of
God is not inefficacious.
Thesis
God moves the will, yet so that He does not determine it
to necessity. We prove this first by authority. “God from the
beginning created man, and left him in the hand of his own
counsel.” 15 Again, we have the definition of the Council of
Trent against the early Protestants: If anyone says that the
free will of man, moved by God, does not cooperate by as­
senting to God’s calling, whereby man prepares himself for
isEccli. 15:14.

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223

the grace of justification, or says that man cannot dissent if
he wills, but that, like something inanimate, he does nothing
at all and is merely passive, A.S.1®
Molinists say that the Council is here treating of efficacious
grace, first, because the grace in question is one with which
man de facto cooperates, and secondly, because the Council
is treating of that grace which, according to Luther and Cal­
vin, would destroy liberty. From this conception of the Coun­
cil’s meaning, they argue that man can resist efficacious grace
in the composite sense, thereby rendering it inefficacious.

A Manifold Reply

1. Were this position true, the Council would have also
condemned Thomism. But the supreme pontiffs, especially
Benedict XV and Clement XII, declared that the Thomistic
doctrine was in no way condemned by the Council of Trent,
nor by the bull Unigenitus against the Jansenists.
2. This Molinistic objection was proposed already by Pela­
gians and Semi-Pelagians against Augustine.
3. Among the fathers of the Council were many Thomists
and Augustinians, who certainly did not wish to condemn
Thomism. And in the redaction of these canons on justifica­
tion, one of the collaborators was the Thomistic Soto.
4. We grant that in this canon there is question of effica­
cious grace, and we answer that, according to the Molinists,
man under that grace which is efficacious, though he can in­
deed dissent, does not in fact dissent. Otherwise this grace
would no longer be efficacious, not even by extrinsic denomi­
nation, but would be merely sufficient. In the Molinistic view
this grace is indeed not efficacious except by our consent fore­
known by God through scientia media. But this prevision,
depending on our consent, posits a dependence in God, which
we cannot admit.
5. The fathers of the Council are probably speaking, not
only of efficacious grace, but of grace intrinsically efficacious.
ieD.814.

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The meaning of the canon would be, against Luther, that
this grace, intrinsically efficacious, does not take away free
will, since man can dissent, i.e., he retains power for the op­
posite; he is not an inanimate thing, merely passive.
The fathers of the Council certainly knew that Luther and
Calvin defended grace per se efficacious, and from this prin­
ciple inferred the destruction of liberty. Hence arises a di­
lemma. The fathers of the Council judged, either that the
doctrine of antecedent grace, that is, grace per se efficacious, is
heretical, or that the Protestant consequence, namely, that
efficacious grace destroys liberty, is heretical. That the first
alternative is not their meaning is clear. They would have
had to proscribe such a traditional doctrine in express terms;
this they did not. Hence the second alternative holds good,
namely, the fathers of the Council say that it is heretical to
affirm that intrinsically efficacious grace destroys liberty.
Now from this conciliar condemnation it does not follow
that Molinism, in its positive part, is a heresy; but it does
follow that its objections against Thomism do not preserve
the meaning of the Council. It is an illegitimate heretical con­
clusion to say that efficacious grace destroys liberty.
Again, the Council, treating of perseverance, declares:
“God, unless men fail in corresponding to His grace, just as
He began the good work, so will He bring it to perfection,
since ‘He works both to will and to do.’ ” 17 How can this
proposition of the Council be harmonized with the proposi­
tion of Molina, namely, that under equal aid, or even smaller
aid, one man is converted and another not. Were it so, God
would have begun equally in these two men a good work,
and one of these would of himself bring the work to comple­
tion.
To see the mind of the Church, let us return to ancient
times, and particularly to the Second Council of Orange,
against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. The twentieth
canon of the Council says: "No one has of his own anything
if D.806. Cf. Phil. 2:13.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

225

except deceit and sin. But if man has anything of truth and
justice, it must come from that fountain which we thirst for
here in the wilderness, in order that, bedewed by its drops,
we may not faint in the way.” 18 The many texts cited by the
Council against the Semi-Pelagians hold good likewise against
Molinis ts.
In favor of grace intrinsically efficacious, many other texts
are cited, not only by Thomists, but also by Augustinians. St.
Augustine himself, commenting on the words, “I will take
from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh,”
speaks thus: “This grace, given secretly to human hearts by
divine generosity, has as first purpose to take away hardness
of heart.” 19 Now God cannot infallibly attain this purpose by
concurring indifferently, by a decree which awaits or presup­
poses consent given by man, since according to Scripture, it
is God who takes away the hardness of the human heart.
Divine Providence, says St. Thomas, works in all things in­
fallibly.20
Against Lessius

Lessius speaks thus: “When of two men similarly called,
one accepts the grace offered and the other refuses, then we
say rightly that the decision comes from liberty alone. Not
that he who accepts, accepts only by his liberty, but because
by his liberty alone does this difference arise, not from the
diversity of the aid which precedes.” 21
This view, Thomists repeat, is against the principle of pre­
dilection: “I will have mercy on whom I will.” 22 It is also
against St. Paul’s word: “What hast thou that thou hast not
received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if
thou hadst not received?” Listen to St. Augustine: “Why God
draws this man and not that man, judge not unless you would
IS D. 176 sq. 193. 195.
10 De praedest. sanctorum, c.8.
20 De malo, q.6, a. 1, ad 311m.
21 De gratia efficaci, c. 18, n.7.
22 Exod. 33:19.

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BEATITUDE

misjudge." 23 Thomists add that, according to St. Paul, God
Himself, by His election and grace, distinguishes one man
from the other, whereas Molinism supposes that one, Peter,
say, is distinguished from Judas by liberty alone, so that God’s
role is reduced to placing Peter in circumstances wherein
God foresees, by scientia media, that Peter will consent.
Who distinguishes thee? 24 To this question St. Thomas re­
plies: “Thou canst not distinguish thyself from the mass of
lost men. Hence thou hast no reason for being proud against
another, or for making thyself superior to another.” Again,
“No created thing could be better than another unless it were
more loved by God, whose love is the cause of all created
goodness.”
Here enter some beautiful words of Bossuet: “We must
bring our intellect into captivity before the great mystery of
grace, and admit that there is a twofold grace, one sufficient,
the other efficacious, the first of which leaves our will inex­
cusable before God, while the second hinders us from glory­
ing in ourselves.” 25
“O God, I thank Thee that I am not like the rest of
men.” 28 These words St. Augustine often quoted against the
Semi-Pelagians. Del Prado,27 quoting the same text against
the Molinists, shows how men should pray if the principles of
Molina were true.
The Thesis

God, moving the will to choose, does not determine it to
necessity, but so that its motion remains contingent, except in
its natural movements. God moves all creatures according to
their condition, necessary causes to necessary effects, contin­
gent causes to contingent effects. But the will is an active
principle, not determined by nature to one line of activity.
23 In Joan., tract. 26, initio.
2« I Cor. 4:7.
2s Oeuvres complètes, I, 643.
2« Luke 18:4.
22 De gratia el lib. arbitr. HI, p. 14g.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

227

Notice that St. Thomas does not say that God moves the
will according to scientia media. Neither does Leo XIII. St.
Thomas had spoken thus: “Since the divine will is most effica­
cious, that which God wills not only follows, but follows in
that manner in which God wishes it to follow. But God wills
that some things follow necessarily and some things contin­
gently.” 28
Harmony between the infallible divine decree and our
liberty is founded on the transcendent efficacy of the divine
causality. The mystery lies, not in man, but in God. This
efficacy of divine causality transcends all created causality,
even angelic causality, just as free determination is predicated
only analogically of God, angel, and man.
St. Thomas leads our intellect toward this mystery when
he says that, already in the created order, “the more a cause
is efficacious, the more does effect follow cause, not only sub­
stantially, but also modally.” 28 To illustrate. Dissimilarity of
son to father is on account of weakness in the father, whereas,
if the father is strong and sound, his son is similar to him also
in modes and accidents. In certain families we find that the
son is the living image of the father. A great military leader
(Themistocles, Caesar, Napoleon) communicates to his sol­
diers his own victorious modes. Michelangelo, Beethoven,
Dante, Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, each in his own line,
communicates to his disciples the mode and spirit of his
power. A mother leads her son, a wife leads her husband, to
choose freely what she wil Is and as she wills. Hence the ironi­
cal proverb: What the wife wills, God wills.
Passages from St. Thomas

1. “Since the will of God is most efficacious, not only does
that follow which God wills to follow, but it follows in the
manner which God wills. But God wills certain things to hap­
pen necessarily, others contingently, that there be order in
ze la, q.19, a.8. Cf. la, q.22, a.4; Periherm. I, lect. 14; Metaph. IV, lect. 3.
2» Ibid.

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BEATITUDE

things, to complete the beauty of the universe.” 80 Hence for
some effects He creates necessary causes, and for other things,
contingent causes.
2. “Necessary and contingent are characteristics that follow
being as being. Hence these modes, contingency and necessity,
fall under the provision of God, the universal provider, but
not under the provision of particular causes. Not only the
power of freedom, but the very act of freedom, is reduced to
God as its cause.” 81
sj. "The divine will must be understood as transcending
the entire order of the universe, as a cause that penetrates the
depths of reality and all its differences. But the fundamental
differences of reality are possibility and necessity, which,
therefore, are caused by the divine will itself.” 82
4. “Free will is indeed the cause of its own motion, because
man by free will moves himself to act. But free will need not
be the first cause of that which is free, just as a cause need not
be a first cause in order to be a cause. God, the first cause,
moves both natural causes and voluntary causes. As He does
not take away from natural causes their naturalness, so by
moving voluntary causes He does not take away their volun­
tariness, rather He produces their voluntariness. He works in
each being according to its nature.” 88
Question. How does God, moving thus, produce this free
mode? Answer: The will tends to a particular good, with
actual and active dominating indifference, and this indiffer­
ence is based on the destination of the will to universal good,
to beatitude in common. But God moves the will, first, by
priority of nature, by arousing in it the desire of beatitude in
common; secondly, by posteriority of nature, by moving the
will to determine itself by its own deliberation, with domi­
nating indifference to the particular good. Thus God is the
cause, not only of potential indifference, but also of actual
so Ibid.
sila, q.22, a.4, ad jum et 4111η.
32 Periherm., I, lect. 14.
33 la, q.83, a.i, ad 311m.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

229

indifference. He actuates liberty, does not destroy it. He
moves the will from within, according to its natural inclina­
tion toward its adequate object, before He moves it to deter­
mine itself by way of deliberation to an inadequate object.
Two Further Fundamental Arguments

1. Every good that is in us comes from God as its cause.
But nothing in us is better than our free consent to good
deeds. Therefore this free consent comes from God as cause.
2. Were it not so, our will would be the first source of its
choice, and God would depend on our will, known by scientia
media. God’s indifferent concursus would be determined by
our liberty, and our liberty would be the sole cause of dis­
crimination between good consent and evil consent.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. When God moves efficaciously, nothing can resist Him
and therefore God moves of necessity. St. Thomas does not
answer as does Cardinal Billot. The latter answers that God
moves only to universal good, not to particular good. Nor
does St. Thomas say that the divine motion is fallibly effica­
cious. What St. Thomas does say is this: “The will of God ex­
tends, not only to the deed, but also to the mode which suits
the nature of the thing moved. It would be more contradic­
tory to divine motion if the will were moved of necessity,
which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved
freely as suits its nature.” 84
2. But, say our adversaries, grace, if it is per se efficacious,
destroys liberty. St. Thomas replies: “On the contrary, grace,
precisely because it is most efficacious, makes our action to be
free, produces the free mode of our action.” 88 God actualizes
our liberty, does not destroy it. To illustrate this doctrine,
think of the conversion of Magdalen, of the good thief, or
better still, of the consent given by the Blessed Virgin on the
la, q. 19, a. 8.
»» Ibid.

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day of the Annunciation. God touches our created liberty
with a virginal contact, which contains no violence. Just as,
by the operation of the Holy Spirit, the Blessed Virgin con­
ceived and brought forth without damage to her virginity, so
under the grace of the Holy Spirit our liberty remains un­
harmed. God does not violate liberty, but preserves, elevates,
vivifies, sanctifies, and strengthens liberty. To depreciate the
strength of efficacious grace would be to reduce its sweetness,
because the two, strength and sweetness, are intimately con­
nected in the most profound harmony.
3. It is impossible that the will should not will the object
toward which God moves it, since God’s operation cannot be
inefficacious. We answer with St. Thomas, not that the mo­
tion of God is indifferent and moves only to universal good,
or that grace is only fallibly efficacious, but that, in St.
Thomas’ own words: “If God moves the will to a certain act,
it is incompatible with this position that the will shall not
be moved. Yet it is not simply impossible.” The will cannot
resist in the composite sense, namely, it cannot combine
actual resistance with efficacious grace. But it can resist in the
divided sense, because there remains a real power to the
opposite. While, as the Council of Trent says, “it can resist if
it wills,” yet, under efficacious grace it never as a fact resists,
just as a man sitting can stand, but not sit and stand simul­
taneously.
Further Objections Analyzed

1. “God, moving the will, does not force it, because He
gives to the will its own inclination.” 38
2. “To be moved voluntarily is to be moved intrinsically,
yes; but this intrinsic principle can come from another and
extrinsic principle.” 87
3. “If the will were so moved by another as not to be
moved by itself, then the works of the will would not count
s« la, q. 105, a.4.
a? Ibid.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

231

as merits or demerits. But since the fact that it is moved by
another does not exclude self-motion, merit or demerit is not
taken away.” 38
4. “God moves the will immutably by the efficacy of His
moving power, which cannot fail. But by the nature of the
will which is moved, a will which is indifferent to various
lines of activity, we do not have necessity but liberty.” 89
5. “When the Holy Spirit moves the soul to love God,
charity has impeccability, since the Holy Spirit infallibly does
whatever He wills. Hence these two things can never be si­
multaneous: the Holy Spirit moves to an act of charity and
the will simultaneously loses charity by sin. For the gift of
perseverance is one of the benefits of God, benefits whereby
all who are liberated are most certainly liberated.” 40
6. “Every action of the will, so far as it is action, is not only
from the will as immediate agent, but from God as the first
agent, who is more powerful than the will. If, then, the will
can change its act, much more can God.” 41
7. “Only God can change the inclination of the will to an­
other line as He wills.” 42 But even God, we may add, cannot
make simultaneous these two things: an indifferent judgment
in the intellect and a necessary act in the will. As it is a con­
tradiction that the will should will an unknown object, so it
is a contradiction that the will should will it in any other way
than as it is known. If the will necessarily willed that which
is proposed by an indifferent judgment, the will would no
longer be a rational appetite. It is a contradiction that the
will adhere necessarily to an object which is not proposed as
good from every angle.
But then, says the objector, even sinful acts would come
from God. Answer: God is the cause of the physical entity of
sin, but not of sin itself. Sin is a defect, a deformity. But de­
ss Ibid.
so De malo, q.6, a. 1, ad gum.
io Ia-IIae, q.24, a. 11.
«1 Ibid., a.9.
«2 Ia-IIae, q.79, a. 2.

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feet comes from a deficient cause, not an efficient cause. Lame­
ness has its cause in the crooked bone, not in the lame man’s
motive power.4’
But would there be sin if God did not permit it? No, but
God permits it, does not impede it; first, because it is not
wonderful that if a thing is defectible it should at times really
fail; secondly, it belongs to the universal provider to permit
certain evils, in order that from them there may arise greater
good. The treason of Judas, the pagan persecutions, are per­
mitted in order that the patience of Christ and the martyrs
may infallibly manifest God’s attributes of mercy and jus­
tice.44
The Nature of Premotion
We distinguish two questions, one principal, the other
secondary. The principal doctrine is that divine decrees are
of themselves efficacious, that grace is of itself efficacious. This
efficacy of grace comes from the omnipotent will of God, in­
dependently of the consent of the creature and of scientia
media. This truth we defend as a theological doctrine, con­
nected with the principles of faith, a doctrine proximately
definable, and with us agree nearly all theological schools, the
Molinistic school excepted. Thus certain Augustinians ex­
plain the intrinsic efficacy of grace, not by physical premo­
tion, but by victorious delectation.
The second doctrine runs thus: Efficacious grace must be
explained by premotion, i.e., physical predetermination. This
is a philosophical thesis, since it cannot be proved by revela­
tion alone. In this secondary thesis we dissent, not only from
Molinists and Congruists, but also from many other theolo­
gians who, while rejecting scientia media and admitting in­
trinsically efficacious grace, explain that efficaciousness by a
multitude of moral aids, or by moral causality, or by in­
deliberate acts, or by victorious delectation, not by physical
premotion.
«s la-IIae, q.22, a.2, ad 2um.
44 De Deo. diss. 8. a. k: De vratia. diss. K. a.7.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

233

Molinists confound this secondary question with the pri­
mary question on grace of itself efficacious. Billuart answers:
“Let Molinists finally acknowledge that the grace necessary
for salvation is not indifferent and determinable by the hu­
man will, but that, on the contrary, the human will is thereby
infallibly determined, independently of scientia media. If
they admit this, then they may reject physical predetermina­
tion, either absolutely, or at least in relation to acts that are
materially sinful. Then, while as philosophers we will con­
tinue to oppose them, we will be their friends as theologians,
and will not call for a new Congregatio de Auxiliis." 45 After
these essential declarations let us see what this divine motion
is on the part of God and what it is on the part of the crea­
ture.
1. The divine action by which God influences second
causes is really identified with the divine essence. It is an
action formally immanent and virtually transitive. The proof
runs as follows. There can be no accident in God. God is His
own intelligence, His own will, His own activity. Hence His
action ad extra is formally immanent, because identified with
the divine essence.4’ But it is virtually transitive, because it
places an effect ad extra. God’s power is the source of created
effects, but not the source of God’s action. In God there is
no novelty of action, but only a novelty of effects outside of
God.
In creatures, on the contrary, an act that is formally transi­
tive, e.g., heating, is an accident proceeding from the agent
and terminating in the patient. God’s action on second
causes, transcending the action of created things, is really a
superaction, just as God is supertruth and supergood. This
position is admitted by all theologians, though they do not
define analogy in the same way.
Hence divine action is in itself just as unknowable as is
the divine essence. We know it analogically, in what it
shares with creative action, and we know it negatively and
«la, q.25, a. 1, ad gum; Cf. Contra Gentes, II, 23, 31, 35.
« la-IIae, q.110, a.a.

BEATITUDE
234
relatively in its characteristics, namely, that it is an action un­
caused, a supreme action, the source of all created action, a
self-subsisting action. We know what it is not, rather than
what it is. Molinists impugn this view, calling it Bannesianism, as if divine motion agreed with created motion uni­
vocally.
2. What is divine motion as found in the creature? Is it a
created thing? Some theologians deny this, saying that the
extrinsic assistance of God is sufficient, and that the free
creature simply wills what divine liberty wills by a certain
sympathy with the divine will. Thus those who follow Scotus.
Others say that moral causality suffices, that is, either God’s
attraction by a celestial delectation, or by many moral aids,
or by arou :ng indeliberate acts which dispose us to choose.
’spond: You do not explain how God obtains
Tho.,
infallibly
■<od effect He wills. Nothing attracts the will
______
, .
God seen clearly. Even without victorious
infallibly
delectation
‘en desire good, even supernatural good,
in aridity of i
:t, say, or in the dark night of the soul.
Actual grace, c
K or cooperative, is not God, but an
effect of God, an
pt our act, but it is the cause of our
act. This is the de
>f St. Thomas. Listen to the texts
that here follow.
1. “By the gratuito
of God man is aided by being
moved to know, to will,
This gratuitous effect in man
is not a quality, but a i.
>f the soul. The act of the
mover, in the thing movec
ion.” 47
2. “That divine effect wh
reated thing acts, has a
passing and incomplete existe,
he existence of colors
in the air, and the existence ol
he instrument of the
artist. It is a power, a vis, where
cond cause, as instrument of the first cause, brings
o existence. Just
as a created thing cannot preserve ii
rer can it operate without a divine operation.” 48
47 De potentia, q.j, a.7, ad 711m.
Contra Gentes, III, 150.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

235

3. “The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the
movable thing, both in idea and in reality. Our advance in
good works is owing to the divine aid which antecedes our
works.” 48
4. “The ultimate in goodness and perfection to be at­
tained by a second agent is that which it can do by power of
the first agent. The fullest reach of the second agent comes
from the first agent.” 50
Created transitive action has three elements. Motion-action
(heating proceeding from lire); motion-passion (heating as a
passion in the thing that is heated); consequent operation
(whereby the heated wood itself heats another piece of wood).
Created immanent operation also has three elements: Mo­
tion-action (a colored object moves sight); motion-passion
(the sense of sight receives species impressa); consequent op­
eration (the act of sight).
Created action becomes an analogy of divine action. As
wood does not heat unless it is itself preheated, and as sense
does not act unless it previously receives an impression from
the object, so no second cause can work unless premoved
by God. And so it is that here too three elements must be dis­
tinguished: motion-action (the divine action, formally im­
manent and virtually transitive); motion-passion (when will
is moved from potential willing to actual willing); the elic­
ited operation of the will (which under the motion of God
elicits vitally and freely its own act of volition).
To explain. The divine motion, considered outside of God,
is in the created thing moved. And this motion-passion, what­
ever adversaries say, is not to be confounded with the opera­
tion elicited by the will. In motion-passion the will is moved,
whereas in operation the will itself operates.
But then, runs the objection, the will is not the mistress
of its act, because this motion-passion is produced in it by
God without it. Answer: This motion received from God can
Ibid., 66.
De potentia, q.$, a.7.

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relatively in its characteristics, namely, that it is an action un­
caused, a supreme action, the source of all created action, a
self-subsisting action. We know what it is not, rather than
what it is. Molinists impugn this view, calling it Bannesianism, as if divine motion agreed with created motion uni­
vocally.
2. What is divine motion as found in the creature? Is it a
created thing? Some theologians deny this, saying that the
extrinsic assistance of God is sufficient, and that the free
creature simply wills what divine liberty wills by a certain
sympathy with the divine will. Thus those who follow Scotus.
Others say that moral causality suffices, that is, either God’s
attraction by a celestial delectation, or by many moral aids,
or by arousing indeliberate acts which dispose us to choose.
Thomists respond: You do not explain how God obtains
infallibly the good effect He wills. Nothing attracts the will
infallibly except God seen clearly. Even without victorious
delectation men often desire good, even supernatural good,
in aridity of the spirit, say, or in the dark night of the soul.
Actual grace, operative or cooperative, is not God, but an
effect of God, and it is not our act, but it is the cause of our
act. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas. Listen to the texts
that here follow.
1. “By the gratuitous will of God man is aided by being
moved to know, to will, to do. This gratuitous effect in man
is not a quality, but a motion of the soul. The act of the
mover, in the thing moved, is motion.” 47
2. “That divine effect whereby a created thing acts, has a
passing and incomplete existence, like the existence of colors
in the air, and the existence of art in the instrument of the
artist. It is a power, a vis, whereby the second cause, as in­
strument of the first cause, brings its act into existence. Just
as a created thing cannot preserve itself, neither can it oper­
ate without a divine operation.” 48
« De potentia, q.3, a.7, ad 711m.
*8 Contra Genies, III, 150.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

235

3. “The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the
movable thing, both in idea and in reality. Our advance in
good works is owing to the divine aid which antecedes our
works.’’49
4. “The ultimate in goodness and perfection to be at­
tained by a second agent is that which it can do by power of
the first agent. The fullest reach of the second agent comes
from the first agent.” 50
Created transitive action has three elements. Motion-action
(heating proceeding from fire); motion-passion (heating as a
passion in the thing that is heated); consequent operation
(whereby the heated wood itself heats another piece of wood).
Created immanent operation also has three elements: Mo­
tion-action (a colored object moves sight); motion-passion
(the sense of sight receives species impressa); consequent op­
eration (the act of sight).
Created action becomes an analogy of divine action. As
wood does not heat unless it is itself preheated, and as sense
does not act unless it previously receives an impression from
the object, so no second cause can work unless premoved
by God. And so it is that here too three elements must be dis­
tinguished: motion-action (the divine action, formally im­
manent and virtually transitive); motion-passion (when will
is moved from potential willing to actual willing); the elic­
ited operation of the will (which under the motion of God
elicits vitally and freely its own act of volition).
To explain. The divine motion, considered outside of God,
is in the created thing moved. And this motion-passion, what­
ever adversaries say, is not to be confounded with the opera­
tion elicited by the will. In motion-passion the will is moved,
whereas in operation the will itself operates.
But then, runs the objection, the will is not the mistress
of its act, because this motion-passion is produced in it by
God without it. Answer: This motion received from God can
4® Ibid., 66.
60De potentia, q.$, a.7.

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be called a motion of the soul, but it is not an act of the will.
The will is not mistress of its own passive power, but it is
mistress of its own active volition. The divine motion is not
in our power, but we are in the power of God.
We must not, then, confuse the passive actualization of the
will by God with the action elicited by the will. And note
well that God adapts His divine motion to the freedom of our
will. God does not determine our choice, as if the will would
in no way determine itself. God infallibly moves the will to
self-determination. God, says St. Thomas, ‘‘is the cause of
every created action in four ways. First, He gives the power
of action; secondly, He preserves that power; thirdly, He ap­
plies the power to action; fourthly, by His power all other
powers act. Created causes concur as it were instrumentally
to produce existence which is the proper effect of God.” 01
Question: Does premotion precede our act, or is it a mere
simultaneous concursus? Answer: The divine premotion pre­
cedes our act, not in time, but in causality. To move and to
be moved are simultaneous in time because one and the same
reality is from the mover and in the movable thing. But the
priority of causality is evident. The patient would not be
moved if the agent did not move. And the patient cannot act
unless it is premoved to act. Wood cannot heat unless it is
first heated. The eye cannot see unless it is moved by the ob­
ject. But the divine motion which first operates, then co­
operates, is, even as cooperating, prior in causality to our
action with which it cooperates.52
St. Thomas uses the word “motion,” not “premotion,” be­
cause in his mind all motion by priority of causality is pre­
motion. The particle “pre” is tautological, but we retain it in
order to distinguish the divine motion from the merely
simultaneous concursus of Molina, which indeed precedes its
effect, but in no way precedes the production of our opera­
tion. God and the will, according to Molina, are like two
»1 De veritate, q.27, a.5. ad 1 um.
»2 See note 48.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

237

horses drawing a cart. One horse does not move the other,
but both move the cart. This conception, however, does not
in any way explain how the will passes from potentiality to
act. Our will is not its own act, and therefore needs to be
premoved in order to act.
Here we must note an error in terminology. Father Sertillanges, O.P., says that many Thomists use the word “premotio physica” to signify the action of God.08 This usage,
according to him, involves a triple verbal heresy: the particle
“pre” is improper, because there is no priority of time; mo­
tion, because we are dealing, not with motion but with crea­
tion; physical, because the action is not physical, but rather
metaphysical. We have answered this difficulty above. The
particle “pre” signifies merely priority of nature. Motion is
well chosen; it is the term used by St. Thomas. And it is
false to say that the action is creation, because creation pre­
supposes nothing as its terminus a quo. If our acts were
created, they would in no way come from us vitally, and we
would have to admit occasionalism, because only God would
be the agent. Finally, the term “physical” is in opposition,
not to metaphysical, but to moral.
Question: Is the divine premotion the same thing as pre­
determination? Listen to Zigliara: “There are some who
grant premotion, but are horrified at the term ‘predetermina­
tion.’ Now these authors tremble with fear where there is no
fear. They do not understand the premotion which they ad­
mit, nor the predetermination which they refuse.” 64 Pre­
motion is identical with predetermination. It expresses
relation to the divine omnipotence which moves; predeter­
mination expresses the divine will, the predetermining de­
cree which precedes the act, by priority, not of time, but
of causality, and that from eternity. The divine intellect
conceives, the divine will predetermines, omnipotence pre­
moves.
53 S. Thoma d'Aquin, I, p. 265.
«Surnm. phil., II. pp. 461, 504.

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The word “predetermination ” is not an invention of
Thomists, but is found in St. Thomas himself. Here are his
words: “Damascene, following St. Gregory of Nyssa, says that
God foreknows our deeds, but does not predetermine them.
These words have this meaning: Our deeds are subject to the
determination of divine providence, but not in such fashion
as to receive necessity from this determination.”65 The
saint’s mind is that God predetermines, not only our free
future actions, especially meritorious actions, but also their
free mode. Eternity precedes time by a priority, not of time,
but of causality and order.

A Middle Interpretation

This interpretation was proposed by three cardinals: Pecci,
Satolli, and Lorenzelli.

Preliminaries
Molinism says that God’s grace is efficacious, not of itself,
but from its effect, namely, from our consent, preknown by
scientia media. Congruism retains from Molinism the term
scientia media, but distinguishes congruous grace from in­
congruous. Congruous grace, though not infallibly efficacious,
agrees with the temperament and disposition of the subject,
and thus, as moral benefit, surpasses incongruous grace.
Finally, syncretism, as proposed by the three cardinals and
their disciples, joins Thomism in rejecting scientia media
and admitting grace intrinsically efficacious, but does not al­
low to grace even a priority of nature.
Against this syncretism, we have elsewhere 5® discussed this
dilemma: “God either determines or is determined; there is
no middle way. If God does not determine, then He is de­
termined by our foreknown consent. Hence theologians who
will not admit predetermining decrees, must, willy-nilly, ad­
mit scientia media.”
For the moment let the following synopsis suffice.
ss Contra Gentes, III, c.90, in fine.
so De gratia, 1945, pp. 363-74.

HOW IS WILL MOVED?

239

Thomism
Paquet

Satolli

Suarez
Occasionalism
Pantheism

Molinism
Atheistic Evolutionism

This synopsis shows that Thomism is an elevation, rising
not only above grave errors and heresies contrary to one an­
other, but also above the opinions of theologians, and in
particular, against eclecticism, which tries to find a medium,
but does not reach the summit. Satolli rejects scientia media,
but, while he admits intrinsically efficacious grace, he denies
to that grace any priority, even that of nature. Paquet fol­
lows the same road, but comes more closely to real Thomism.
A Summary

These authors are mistaken in trying to find this doctrine
in Cajetan. St. Thomas does not use the word “premotion”
because for him every motion is premotion. Cooperating
grace has a priority of causality in relation to our act. This
syncretism leads to scientia media, whether they will or no.
But they say, God, without any predetermining decree,
can know a free futuribility. Answer: God, without prede­
termining decree, could not know which of two possible
contradictories would come to pass, whether Peter, in such
and such circumstances, would sin or not. The futuribile is
more than the simply possible thing, because of two possible
things, contradictorily opposed, it expresses the definite out­
come in such and such circumstances.
Conclusion

In the words of St. Augustine, cited by the Council of
Trent: “God does not command impossibilities, but by com-

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BEATITUDE

manding He admonishes thee to do what thou canst, and to
ask for what thou canst not.” 87 God’s saving will is universal.
Sin never arises from the insufficiency of the divine aid. Such
insufficiency would presuppose divine negligence, which
would be a contradiction in terms, a negation of divine
providence and of God Himself. On the other hand no one
could be in any way better than another had he not received
more from God: “What hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived?” 68 The mystery remains, namely, the intimate har­
mony of infinite justice, infinite mercy, and supreme liberty.
This harmony, this transcendent eminence of God, this in­
timate life of God, cannot be seen except in the Fatherland.
»7 D.804.
5» I Cor. 4:7.

CHAPTER XV
Other Acts Elicited by the Will (q. 11-17)

FRUITION (Q. 11)
Fruition is concerned with the end simply, whereas inten­

tion is concerned with ways and means. God enjoys Him­
self, but He does not intend Himself. Fruition, derived from
"fruit,” from the tree’s perfection, is essentially delight in the
end attained, a delight which presupposes the possession of
the end by the apprehensive faculty. It is the act of the lover
resting in possession of his desire. The animal’s enjoyment of
its food is fruition, but an imperfect fruition. Complete
fruition is concerned only with the last end; incomplete
fruition is from an intermediate end, for instance, from a
medicine which is tasty. In relation to the last end, we dis­
tinguish imperfect fruition, based on hope, from perfect
fruition, arising from possession in reality.
INTENTION (Q. 12)

Intention is the efficacious desire to employ the proper
means for attaining the goal. Thus it is distinguished from
simple volition, which is a mere complacency in the good
without relation to ways and means. Inefficaciously, I can
wish rain, but I cannot intend it. The natural desire for the
beatific vision is an act of the will, but not an efficacious
intention.
Intention can be concerned either with the last end or
with an intermediate end. The right intention is called the
eye of the soul: “If thine eye be simple, thy whole body will

BEATITUDE

242

be lightsome.” 1 It is called the eye of the soul because it
presupposes right knowledge of the last end. By right inten­
tion our works are lucid before God, by evil intention they
become dark.
A doubt. St. Thomas says: ‘‘If we take two unrelated things,
man can intend many ends.” Answer: At first view these
words seem to say that man can intend two ultimate ends.
But if so, then the will would have simultaneously two un­
related acts: an impossibility. Alvarez, with others, answers
thus: “The will can simultaneously intend many things, pro­
vided they agree in some element which is willed primarily
and per se.” Thus tire will can desire two ends for the tongue,
namely, speech and taste, because this organ serves both
purposes. A medium may be intended because it is suitable
for many ends.
ART. 4, 5· IS THE INTENTION OF THE END IDENTICAL
WITH THE ACT OF THE WILL TOWARD THAT END?

Answer: If we will the medium solely on account of the
end, then there is one act, namely, choice. But if we will
separately, first the end and then the means, then there are
two acts: intention of the end and choice of means. In article
five we read that brutes intend materially the end, but tend
executively to the thing which is the end, but not as end.
Intention, therefore, belongs to animals, not formally, but
executively.
Corollary. In order that choice be right and efficacious,
and a fortiori that command shall be right and efficacious in
dealing with means, there is prerequired a right and effica­
cious intention of the end. Hence prudence, which is ob­
ligated to reach a right and efficacious command, presupposes
right appetite, that is, an intention which is right and effica­
cious.
» Matt. 6:22.

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

243

THE ACT OF CHOICE (Q. 13)
Presupposed efficacious intention of the end, four acts are
concerned with means: first, counsel, that is, consultation by
the intellect on the means suitable for reaching the end;
second, consent, which follows counsel, whereby these means
are accepted as a unit; third, a discerning judgment in the
intellect, which discovers the medium that is most apt;
fourth, choice in the will, which accepts this medium. The
act of choice, presupposing the judgment by which it is
directed, is substantially an act of the will, because it deals
with a good, and only the will aims at the good. But choice,
properly speaking, deals only with means subject to delibera­
tion. The physician does not deliberate on restoring health,
but on the means suited to attain this end. Now man can
deliberate on the ordination of his whole life toward his last
end. “When man begins to have the use of reason, the first
thing that occurs to him is to think of himself, to ordain him­
self to the right end.” 2 In this case the object of deliberation
and choice is not, properly speaking, the last end, but the
ordination of our life to this end. Similarly, a man may
choose virtue instead of vice, in relation to beatitude in com­
mon. Choice is concerned only with those things which are
subject to us, or at least are subject to our appointment, as
when we elect the superior of a community.

THE ACT OF COUNSEL (Q. 14)
1. Counsel is an inquisition of reason to prepare choice.
Reason does not proffer its judgment without preceding in­
vestigation.
Doubt. Does counsel include intrinsically the act of judg­
ment? There is a difficulty here in solving the doubt. St.
Thomas,3 following Aristotle, says that eubulia is a power that
zla-IIae, q.89, a. 6.
>Ia-IIae, q.56, a.6; la-IIae, q.51, a.i and 2.

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counsels, but is distinguished from synesis which judges well
in practical matters. Cajetan solves the difficulty thus: Hu­
man counsel includes inquisition and judgment, whereas
divine counsel is a judgment without inquisition. According
to the common way of speaking, the act of counsel remains
incomplete unless followed by an act of judgment on the
medium to be chosen. Counsel is a practical syllogism, and
the practical judgment is the conclusion of this, syllogism.
When many suitable media appear, counsel may approve
them in globo, before the ultimate, practical judgment de­
termines which of the proposed media is the better: in this
case there are two acts, and the qualities of counsel are dis­
tinct from the qualities of the ultimate judgment. Counsel,
examining many different means, all of them apt, may con­
sult many men: a king, for example, profits by a great di­
versity of competent ministers, in order to see all aspects of
the affair, and all the motives pro and con. But out of this
multitude of counsels the king himself pronounces the ul­
timate practical judgment. Counsel comes from many sources,
whereas the ultimate judgment comes from one, the mon­
arch.
A second doubt. Does every deliberate choice involve a
practical judgment? The answer is affirmative.4 Simple ap­
prehension of good does not suffice. Without an affirmative
judgment “this is to be done,” “this is to be refused,” choice
would lack direction. Alvarez says that also the act of com­
mand belongs to all deliberate acts.
Even for the act of faith four judgments are prerequired:
first, this statement is credible; second, men are bound to
believe this statement; third, I am bound, here and now, to
believe this statement; fourth, if I believe this statement,
then I say “I believe.” "No one believes the mysteries of faith
unless he sees that they are to be believed, either by the
evidence of miracles or by some similar evidence.” ’
4la-IIae, q.g, a.i, ad zum.
4Ila-IIae, q.i, a.4, ad zum.

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

245
But do we not thus start an infinite process? No. “We re­
gress to the first act of the will, which does not depend upon
the command of reason, but comes from instinct of nature,
or from something higher than nature, namely, God who
inspires the act.” ·
Art. 2. Counsel, like choice, deals, not with the end, but
only with means. The end in practical matters is like prin­
ciple in speculative matters. Counsel is a practical syllogism,
which presupposes the intention of the end.
Art. 3. Counsel deals only with things subject to our con­
trol. It does not deal at all with things that are necessary and
universal.
Art. 4. Counsel does not deal with everything we do, but
only with matters of some importance. As regards matters of
minor importance, the adage holds good: “Little is reputed as
nothing.” Lack of order in little things is not always a venial
sin; it can be a mere imperfection.
Art. 5. Counsel proceeds analytically. Analytical order be­
gins with something that is prior in cognition but posterior
in existence. Now the principle in counsel is the end, which,
in intention, is prior to counsel, but posterior in existence.
The order of deliberation, then, descends from the end in­
tended to the first medium, whereas the order of execution is
just the inverse. It ascends from the lowest medium to ulti­
mate attainment. In the order of execution, life is first, study
and knowledge second. But, in the order of intention, phil­
osophical contemplation, and, a fortiori, Christian contem­
plation, stand higher than material or economic life. For the
sake of this higher life, public executive power preserves
peace in the state.
Art. 6. Counsel cannot proceed to infinity. It begins with
principles of practical reason, and terminates in practical
conclusions. Neglect of this conclusion constitutes scrupu­
losity. Is this good deed done out of pride? Ah, but even ask­
ing myself this question may be owing to false humility!
• la-IIae, q. 17, a.5, ad gum.

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A doubt. May we counsel a lesser evil in order to avoid a
greater? On this matter we find two extreme opinions. Some
say that the lesser evil in relation to the greater is really good.
Others deny, for various reasons. The lesser evil, even if com­
pared with the greater evil, is still an evil, hence cannot be
chosen, but at best be tolerated. This reason seems to be
apodictic, if we are dealing with acts that are intrinsically
evil. St. Thomas, proving that a lie is always a sin, that we
cannot licitly lie even to avoid a homicide, continues thus:
“We are not allowed to do anything illicit to avoid danger or
harm. We are not allowed to tell a lie in order to deliver
another from peril. But we are allowed to hide the truth
prudently.”7 A minor physical evil may be counseled to
avoid a greater evil. But he who counsels a lesser moral evil
is the cause of that evil, and therefore sins.
Third opinion. This opinion is affirmative, but with many
limitations. For this view, which Alvarez says is the more
common Thomistic view, we note three considerations. First,
Aristotle says that the lesser evil in comparison with a greater
is really a good, supposing that we cannot avoid both evils
and as long as we cannot avoid them. Secondly, the lesser
evil shall not be intrinsically evil. In elections, for example,
we cannot approve a program that is intrinsically evil in
order to prevent one that is worse. Thirdly, the two evils
must threaten one and the same person. Thus, in Jeremias,8
ten men gave Ismael their treasures that he might not kill
them. But Lot sinned, so St. Augustine says, when he coun­
seled the men of Sodom to abuse his daughters in order to
avoid the sin of sodomy. Still, when only a slight danger
threatens a third person, we can counsel a lesser evil, at least
a physical evil, in order to avoid a greater evil.
In summary, prudence must decide. In elections, for ex­
ample, a person may commend a good candidate, so that men
may not be tempted to choose between two evil candidates.
’ Ia-IIae. q.no, a.3, ad 411m.
e Chap. 41.

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

247

THE ACT OF CONSENT (Q. 15)

Here, briefly, are the four conclusions of St. Thomas. 1.
Consent is an act of the appetitive power. 2. Consent, properly
speaking, is not found in brute animals. 3. Consent, properly
speaking, deals, not with the end, but with the means to the
end, thus differing from intention. 4. Consent to the act be­
longs to the higher reason, because consent is the final sen­
tence on what is to be done. As long as the proposal is still
subject to judgment, we do not have the final sentence. Con­
sent to the act belongs to the higher reason, which includes
also the will. Thus consent to mortal sin always belongs to
higher reason, at least indirectly or negatively or imputatively. The higher judge revokes the unjust sentence of the
lower judge, otherwise the higher judge himself becomes
guilty. Thus mortal sin is always aversion from the last end,
which higher reason is bound to consider.®
THE ACT OF USING (Q. 16)

We distinguish active use, which belongs to the will, from
passive use, which belongs to the executive faculties. And we
deal here directly with active use. Here, briefly, are the four
articles of St. Thomas. 1. Active use properly belongs to the
will, because the will moves other powers to their operations.
Active use is an act, formally immanent and virtually transi­
tive. 2. This act, properly speaking, is not found in brutes,
because brutes do not know purpose or utility as such. 3. Use
is concerned with media, with the means useful to an end.
We do not use the end, we enjoy it. The last end, indeed, is
useless, properly speaking, because it is above utility, not
below. Thus Aristotle says that metaphysics is useless, that is,
it is above utility and is sought for its own sake, thus dif­
fering from the arts, especially the mechanical arts. But meta­
physics uses logic, as theology uses sciences lower than itself.
» Ia-IIae, q.74, a. 7.

j>48

BEATITUDE

The superior uses the inferior, but the inferior, properly
speaking, does not use the superior. 4. Use differs from
choice, and follows it. Choice belongs to the order of second
intention, namely, deliberation, whereas active use belongs to
the order of execution. In choice the will possesses the end
affectively, but in active use it tends to the end effectively.
Choice is concerned with the medium as future, whereas use
deals with the same medium as present. Use, here and now,
overcomes the difficulties bound in execution itself. Many
men choose easily, but fail in carrying out their choice.
Further, we choose first those media that are nearer to the
end, and then descend to the lower media. To attain health,
I first choose a physician, and then tell a servant to call him,
and so on. In the order of execution, on the contrary, I first
call the servant. God predestines first to glory, but in the
order of execution, glory comes last. Again, since the acts of
the will are self-reflective, in each act we can distinguish con­
sent, choice, and use: the will consents to choose, and consents
to consent, and uses itself to consent and to choose, and these
acts are all destined to that which is first. Again, the will uses
reason to deliberate, and this use precedes choice. Then,
deliberation ended, the will freely uses reason to direct
choice, and thus the ultimate judgment is free.
Cajetan, commenting on this article, gives a division of the
twelve acts which nearly coincides with what is commonly
admitted. But he does not sufficiently notice that every act
of the will is preceded by a correlative act of the intellect.
ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (Q. 17)
The command here in question is not a political command,
whereby a king or a superior commands his subjects, but that
personal command whereby man governs himself and his
powers, which we call self-government, self-control. The
present question is perfectly ordered.
Art. 1. Some theologians, Suarez and Vasquez, for ex­

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

249

ample, say that command is not a special act, since the pre­
ceding judgment directs choice. Thomists, and many others,
say that command is a special act, belonging to the intellect,
but presupposing an act of the will.
Three conclusions.
First. Acts of the will and acts of the reason interact on one
another, in virtue of the axiom: Causes are mutual causes,
though in diverse genera.
Second. Command is an act of reason, because order, ar­
rangement, intimation belong to reason, and command is a
kind of intimation. Command differs from the practical
judgment, as the two following propositions differ: One says,
“this is to be done,” for example, tomorrow; the other says,
“do this, here and now.”
Third. Command presupposes an act of the will, because
the first mover among the powers of the soul is the will itself.
Now the command moves to execution, at least secondarily
and participatively.
Suarez objects: No other act of the intellect is required but
that of the practical judgment. Answer: Since nothing can be
willed unless it is foreknown, a special act of the will presup­
pose a special act of the intellect. Hence active use, being a
special act of the will, distinct from choice, presupposes a
special act of the intellect, distinct from practical judgment.
Cajetan notes that the act of command includes three ele­
ments: to ordain, to intimate, to move. It ordains execution
of media, here and now, not like choice, but in the inverse
order, beginning with the lowest and ascending to the high­
est. Secondly, command intimates execution by saying, not
indicatively “This must be done,” but imperatively, “Do
this.” To intimate is to announce, to manifest, and this is an
act belonging to the intellect. Thirdly, command moves to­
ward execution. This act belongs, secondarily and partic­
ipatively, to the intellect by reason of the preceding act of
choice, the power of which remains in the subsequent act.
Therefore command is a special act, an act of reason, which

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presupposes an act of the will. Thus St. Thomas says that
prayer is, properly speaking, an act of the intellect, being a
quasi-command of an inferior to a superior.10
Corollary. The order of execution is clearly distinguished
from the order of choice, because active use is distinguished
from choice. Thus a new order begins. Suarez did not suf­
ficiently notice this truth. The reason is that in the order of
execution new difficulties arise, which demand not only a new
effort of the will, but also a new ordination and intimation of
the intellect. Many men judge well and choose well, but fail
in execution, by reason of these new difficulties, many of
which could not be foreseen, or, if foreseen, did not then
move as they do now when they are present. Thus execution
demands a new direction of reason, a direction distinct from
the practical judgment, almost as existence is distinct from
essence. The command “Do this,” here and now, deals with
media as present, whereas the judgment, "This should be
done,” deals with these same media as future.
Confirmation. Just as a prince or a superior must not only
judge that something is to be done, but must also command
it, so in our personal life, since nothing is willed unless fore­
known, command is the ultimate intimating judgment.
Six Objections

1. Since we should not multiply realities without necessity,
the practical judgment, if continued, suffices to direct the
execution. Answer: The practical judgment would suffice if
you disregard all ensuing difficulties.
2. But the preceding practical judgment, as distinct from
speculative judgment, had already considered the media in
their here and now. Answer: The practical judgment had
already considered the media, as here and now desirable, I
grant: as here and now to be carried out, I deny.
3. But even for execution thus understood, an act of the
will suffices, that act, namely, which we call active use. An10 Ha-Hae, q.83, a. 1.

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

251
swer: To move toward execution belongs, properly and
primarily, to the will, I grant: belongs to the will, secondarily
and participatively, I deny.
4. Decree is the same as command, and decree belongs to
the will. Thus even Thomists speak of the decrees of the
divine will. We distinguish. Decree, in the wider sense, be­
longs to the will, yes; decree, in the proper sense, belongs to
the will, no. Decree in the wider sense is identical with the
choice of the will, and thus precedes execution.
5. St. Thomas himself writes as follows: “Let us consider
the acts commanded by the will.’’ Answer: The will com­
mands, in a wider sense, by moving, yes. A command, even
taken strictly, does belong to the will, not substantially, but
causatively and originally, because from the will it gets its
power of moving. Thus law is an act of reason, but also an
expression of the lawgiver’s will. Command, dominion, as
intimating and directing, belongs to the intellect, but, as
moving, it belongs to the will.
6. Charity commands all other virtues, and charity is in
the will. Answer: Charity commands in the wider sense of
the word, that is, it moves just as the will does. But when it
commands in the proper sense, it does so by a mediating act
of the intellect, i.e., of faith or of infused prudence. The in­
tellect differentiates the act of the will, but exercises its act
under the influence of the will.
Art. 2. Command does not belong to the brute order, be­
cause only reason can ordain and arrange.
Art. 3. Command precedes use, which it directs. But the
acts, both of reason and of will, are self-reflective.
Art. 4. The command and the act commanded constitute
one human moral act, just as two physical acts make one
moral act, by being mutually related, as are matter and form,
or body and soul. Thus we explain the unity of the mystical
body, expressed by St. Paul when he says; “I live, yet not I,
but Christ lives in me.” This unity is more than a unity
secundum quid. Christ and His living members constitute

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one reality, not in the physical order, but in the moral or­
der.
Art. 5-g. What acts are subject to command? These acts
are divided into four classes: acts of the will, of reason, of
sense-appetite, of the body.
1. Acts of the will: in a wide sense, consent and choice are
commanded: in the proper sense, active use is commanded.
2. Acts of the reason: first, as regards exercise: sudden
thoughts, continued or not; and deliberate study. Then, as
regards specification, we have opinion, the act of faith, the
last practical judgment.
3. Acts of the sense-appetite: acts which depend on rea­
son’s power over die imagination, but not acts arising from
indisposed organs, or from unforeseen acts of the imagina­
tion.
4. External acts, depending, not on the vegetative powers,
but on the sense-powers, e.g., acts of our hands and feet. Acts
of the vegetative soul are not subject to the command of
reason, because they are not mediated by knowledge, and de­
pend on dispositions of the body which are not in our power.
This synopsis is explained in the following articles.
Art. 5. Acts of the will can be commanded, with the ex­
ception of the first volition wherein man does not move him­
self but is moved by God. But this act is not deliberate,
though surely it can be free. Intention and choice are com­
manded in a wider sense, because they are preceded by a
command in the strict sense. Active use follows this com­
mand. Per accidens, however, choice itself can be com­
manded, when a man who is slow in choosing finally says
to himself: “You must choose, now choose.”
Art. 6. Acts of reason can be commanded in three different
ways.
1. Thoughts that arise unforeseen come under the com­
mand of reason, to be admitted or refused or continued or
interrupted. Thus it is with the first thought of all moral
life, to which God moves us immediately. Thus also with

OTHER ELICITED ACTS

153

many divine inspirations; thus also with evil thoughts, arising
from temptation, by means of the imagination.
2. Certain acts of reason can be commanded only as re­
gards exercise. But evident truths necessitate assent. Thus it
is with principles and demonstrated conclusions. But ad­
herence is free tvhen we are dealing with opinions or with
inevident postulates.
3. Certain acts of reason are commanded even as regards
objective specification. Thus it is with opinion, and the act
of faith, and the ultimate practical judgment.
Art. 7. Some acts of the sense-appetite can be commanded,
but not those acts which necessarily arise from dispositions
of the body, from too great heat, or from illness, or from
unforeseen motions of concupiscence. On the contrary, those
acts are subject to our command which arise from the im­
agination, for the imagination can be ruled by reason.
Here we pause to notice more clearly the doctrine of St
Thomas concerning the first motions of sensuality. He speaks
as follows: “It happens at times that the motions of the sense­
appetite are suddenly aroused by imagination or sense. Such
motions are not under the command of reason, but could
have been impeded if reason had foreseen them.” Now since
human reason, even when diligent, cannot foresee every­
thing, the first motions of sensuality are not always sinful.
“Reason’s control of the passions is not despotic but dip­
lomatic.” “Imagination, the stronger it is, the more it is sub­
ject to reason. But tvhen the imagination is weak, by reason
of indisposition of its organ, it may fail in forming ap­
propriate images.”
Art. 8. The acts of the vegetative soul and of the cor­
relative organs are not subject to the command of reason. We
cannot command nutrition, or growth, or the movement of
the heart, or the natural alterations of the organs of genera­
tion. In the state of innocence, by a supernatural privilege,
concupiscence was perfectly subject to reason, but original
sin left nature to itself.

BEATITUDE
254
Art. g. The acts of the external members (hands, feet,
head), since they are controlled by the sense-powers, just as
in brutes, are subject to command, by reason of their de­
pendence on the imagination, which can be controlled by
reason.
Corollary. Man’s dominion over himself and over his acts
justifies the statement quoted by St. Thomas from Boethius.
“Those levels of creation which are nearest to the First Mind
transcend the order of fate. The farther away creation is from
the First Mind, the more is it bound by the ropes of fate, by
the necessity arising from second causes.” 11
The wise man rules the stars.12 Contemplation, elevating
the mind to God, frees the soul from the fatality of the laws
of nature. Here lies the progressive perfectibility of the hu­
man personality.
nia, q. 116, a.4.
12 la-IIae, q.9, a.5.

THIRD PART
MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

I

CHAPTER XVI
Sources

of

Good and Evil (q.

18)

PRELIMINARIES

So far we have studied, psychologically, the twelve acts
which concur to form one deliberate and consummate moral
act. Now we are to consider these acts morally, under three
heads: in their genus (q. 18), in their specific differences, in­
terior and exterior (qq. 19 and 20), in their consequences,
namely, merit and sin (q. 21).
These thirty articles, which at first sight may seem repe­
titious, are in reality very original. Certain modern historians
forget that without speculative penetration you cannot know
St. Thomas even historically.

ERRORS REGARDING MORALITY
These errors can be reduced to five. Hedonism (morality
based on pleasure); utilitarianism (founded on utility, either
personal or social); subjectivism (founded on the categorical
imperative of conscience); eudaemonism (founded on ra­
tional beatitude, but lacking sanction, freedom, and obliga­
tion); fideism (founded on God’s positive law).
Above these errors stands traditional ethics, that is, moral­
ity founded on good-in-itself, guided by right reason as
proximate standard, and by the eternal law as supreme
standard.
The Syllabus 1 condemns absolute evolutionism, according
to which God Himself comes into existence by the evolution
of humanity. God is one and the same thing with the world,
1D.1756-1764.

*57

BEATITUDE

258

spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, truth with false­
hood, evil with good, justice with injustice. St. Thomas
synthesizes all the truths found scattered in other systems,
finding these systems true in what they affirm, false in what
they deny. Here follows a synopsis of that synthesis.

Eternal Law
Natural Law

Human Law
Custom
Reason
Faith
Conscience
Desire for Beatitude
Hope
Charity
Natural Love of God
Moral Theology
Moral Science

Prudence
The Will
Justice
Sense Powers
Temperance
Fortitude
The Moral Act
ART. 1. HUMAN ACTS, INTRINSICALLY GOOD

OR INTRINSICALLY BAD?

Preliminaries
Here we meet two errors, mutually opposed. Followers of
Spinoza hold that no action is morally evil because man has
no liberty. Men do evil only when they do not know what is
good. The arguments in favor of this absolute optimism
(really, a very sad thing) are identical with the objections
which open this article: first, evil does not act except by virtue
of good; secondly, nothing acts except so far as it is actual,
and therefore good; thirdly, evil cannot be a cause. Thus
murder would not be morally evil, but only a lesser good, an

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259

imperfection. Scotus modifies, saying that no action is intrin­
sically evil except to hate God.
The opposite error is that of Luther and Calvin, who say
that all works done before justification are really sins,2 and
that, in all his deeds, even the just man sins, at least venially,
or even mortally, and hence deserves eternal punishment, and
is not condemned only because God does not impute these
works unto condemnation.·’ These propositions have been
condemned as heretical.
Thesis: Some Actions Are Morally Good, Some Are Evil.
Authority: “Every one who does evil hates the light, and
does not come to the light, that his works may not be con­
demned. But he who does the truth comes to the light, that
his works may be made manifest, because they are done in
God.” ‘
Reason speaks thus: Every voluntary action which lacks the
fullness of the reality due to it is deficient in good, is morally
bad. But among human actions many are thus deficient, in
quantity (refusing to pay a debt), or in place (theft in church).
Hence not every human act is morally good. This argument is
independent of divine positive precepts.
God’s fullness of being rests on simple deity, hence God
alone can in no way be deficient. The creature’s plentitude
arises, not from simplicity, but from many different factors:
its substance, its faculties, its acts. Hence creatures can fall
away from the fullness due to them. Just as blindness, e.g., is a
physical evil, so the human act, while it is a reality which
comes from God, is simply evil, mortally or venially, if it lacks
the plentitude due to it.
But note 5 that what is simply good and even meritorious
(for instance, a remiss act of charity) may still be imperfect.
A man who has five talents, but acts as if he had only two,
performs an act that is simply good, though it is deficient in
intensity. Such an act is an imperfection, but not a venial sin.
2 Ibid., 817.
3 Ibid., 835.
«John 3:20.
» la, q.5, a. 1, ad lum.

26ο

BEATITUDE

Some recent writers, neglecting this truth, maintain that, ac­
cording to the doctrine of St. Thomas, there is no distinction
between imperfection and venial sin. To speak thus is to con­
found counsel with precept, to confound a positive precept
with a negative precept.
Difficulties Analyzed

1. An act that is simply evil is secundum quid good, being
a reality in the physical order. But, since it lacks the rectitude
due to it, it is morally evil, not a minor good.
2. The blind man who walks possesses a good in so far as
he can walk, thus differing from the paralytic, but his deed
of walking lacks perfection.
3. An evil action may result in a physical good (adultery
begetting a child), but looked at morally it is simply evil,
since it lacks direction by reason.
First corollary. Spinoza and Hegel confound the simple
evil with a lesser good. In Hegel’s evolutionistic terms, thesis
and antithesis are good in their time, but less good than the
higher synthesis which follows. Art, which can very often be
pantheistic, is a thesis; while religion, a metaphorical repre­
sentation of God, is an antithesis; and evolutionistic philos­
ophy is the synthesis. Each is good in its time. Even the crimes
of the French and the Russian Revolution, while they are a
lesser good than Christian sanctity, are not simply evil.
This doctrine comes from denying the distinction between
being and non-being, which are identified in the “becoming”
(fieri) of creative evolution. Hence follows also the denial of
the distinction between truth and falsehood, between good
and evil. Thus materialism would not be simply false, but
true for its time, for its moment. The crimes of Bolshevism
would not be simply evil, but only an evil secundum quid
when a higher synthesis appears.
Second corollary. If we remove the metaphysical primacy
of reality in relation to becoming, we destroy radically the
distinction between moral good and moral evil. Modernists

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

261

speak thus: “Truth is not more immutable than man himself,
since with him, and in him, and through him truth is
evolved.” e The traditional doctrine teaches that, in virtue of
the principle of contradiction, there is absolute opposition
between reality and nothing, between the simply true and
the simply false, between the simply good and the simply evil.
The opposite doctrine of absolute evolutionism, condemned
in the Syllabus,7 runs thus: “No supreme, wise, and provident
divinity exists, no divinity distinct from this universe. God,
identified with nature, and hence subject to change, really
comes into existence in man and in the world. All things are
God and have the very substance of God. As God is identified
with the world, so is spirit identified with matter, necessity
with liberty, truth with falsehood, good with evil, justice with
injustice.”
The Essence of Morality

What is the moral essence of human action as distinguished
from its physical entity? Nominalists answer, either that
morality is an extrinsic denomination, as paper becomes
money by an extrinsic denomination derived from the will
of the prince, or morality is a mere relation of reason, hence
identified with liberty itself. Others say that morality is a
predicamental relation. Thomists hold that morality is a real
transcendental relation to its objective standard. This thesis
can be proved, indirectly and directly.
Indirect proof. First. Moral goodness consists in a plentitude of being, arising from relation to the end which is its
objective standard. Now, though the end is an extrinsic cause,
still the right proportion to that end, the relation to that end,
inheres in the action itself. Moral goodness is in truth a posi­
tive perfection, existing objectively in human acts, caused by
human virtue and God’s grace. Second. Morality presupposes
liberty, but is not identified with liberty. Liberty is indeed
• D.2058.
T Ibid., 1701.

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BEATITUDE

the indispensable subject of morality, because necessary acts
are not subject to moral standards. But we must first conceive
liberty before we can conceive morality. By the very fact that
we conceive an act as going forth from the will under an in­
different judgment, we conceive that act as free, but not yet as
moral, because we do not as yet conceive the standard to
which that act is subject. To illustrate: think of an act of theft
performed with the intention of adultery. Here we have a
twofold moral evil, but only one free act. We grant, how­
ever, that every free act is a moral act and every moral act is
a free act, because, as we will see later, every act done freely
is either morally good or morally evil, at least by the agent’s
intention.
Direct proof. Morality consists formally in a transcendental
and real relation to its objective standard. Preserving proper
proportion, we must speak of act in its moral essence as we
speak of act in its natural essence. But act, in its natural es­
sence, is a transcendental relation to its objective standard.
As sight is related to a colored object, as intellect to reality,
as volition to good, so moral volition is a transcendental rela­
tion to the objective moral standard.
This relation is not one of reason, it exists in the moral act
itself, independently of man’s thought. The saint differs from
the criminal, not only in idea, but in fact. Further, it is not a
predicamental relation, accidentally superadded. It is related
to its object, not merely as a terminus, but as its differentiat­
ing specification. An illustration: think of an act of charity,
transcendentally related to God as its object.
Objection: The full goodness of the human act is surely not
a mere relation. Answer: This fullness, while it cannot rest
on a mere predicamental relation, does arise from the truth
that human reason is essentially and transcendentally related
to its object.
The Different Kinds of Morality

Goodness and malice are the two differences ordinarily as­
signed. Should we also speak of indifference as a species of

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

263

morality? Answer: Moral evil can be considered, either as
something positive, namely, a transcendental relation to an
object dissonant from moral standards, or as something priva­
tive, the privation of harmony and rectitude.
Take a sin of commission. Is its essence something positive?
Our own view is affirmative, supported by many Thomists:
Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, Massoulié, Gonet, Billuart, whereas the negative
answer is held by Sylvius, Contenson, Bancel.
Does indifference constitute a species of morality? We af­
firm, with John of St. Thomas, Contenson, Billuart, and
many others, against the Salmanticenses and Gonet.
Proof. An act that is indifferent proceeds from a deliberate
will, under subjection to a moral standard which does not
command or prohibit, but only permits. Such an act, indiffer­
ent in its object, is still subject to the permissive moral law.
Hence indifference is a species of morality. “If we speak of a
moral act according to its species, then not every moral act
is good or evil, but some acts are indifferent.” 8
Summary. Moral goodness is a transcendental relation to
an object which conforms to the law. Moral evil is a tran­
scendental relation to an object forbidden by law. Moral in­
difference is a transcendental relation to an object permitted
by the law.

THE SOURCES OF MORALITY (Q. 18)
ART. 1. WHETHER HUMAN ACTS ARE GOOD OR SOME

OF THEM BAD

Preliminaries

St. Thomas assigns three sources: object, circumstance, and
purpose. The purpose here in mind is not that objective pur­
pose which is identified with the object, but the subjective
purpose which is the principal circumstance. This has not
been sufficiently noted by historians who have recently
s De malo, q.2, a.5.

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BEATITUDE

treated of this part of the Summa. The primary and essential
source of morality is the natural object of the act: God, for
an act of charity, our neighbor’s good (in giving alms), our
neighbor’s harm (in stealing).
Chief among secondary sources is the subjective purpose
of the agent, in three ways. A good act becomes evil by an evil
intention (to give alms for the sake of vanity). An evil act does
not become good by a good intention (to lie in order to save
our neighbor’s life). One and the same act can have two
species, either of goodness or of malice, one from the object
and the other from the purpose (to give alms in order to
satisfy for sin).
Another secondary source are circumstances, which either
aggravate or diminish goodness or evil in the same species (to
steal much or to steal little), or which even change the very
species of the moral act (to steal a sacred tiling or in a sacred
place).
In one and the same act, we may have a multiple morality.
An act, good by its object and purpose (e.g., almsgiving), be­
comes venially evil, for example, by vainglory. Such an act,
though it is meritorious of eternal life, is simultaneously an
evil secundum quid, an evil which must undergo temporal
punishment.
ART. 2. man’s ACTION DERIVES ITS FIRST AND ESSENTIAL

GOODNESS OR BADNESS FROM ITS NATURAL OBJECT

Preliminaries

By object we understand the direct and primary goal of the
act. Thus God is the object of charity, our neighbor’s prop­
erty is the object of theft. And we are now looking at this
object, not physically, but morally, for example, at our neigh­
bor’s property, not as a car or a purse, but as something taken
from its unwilling master. One and the same act considered
physically (e.g., killing a man) is morally good if done for the
sake of justice by an executioner, or morally evil when done

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

265

by an assassin. Our thesis, then, asserts that the primary and
essential goodness or evil of the human act flows from the
moral object of that act.
Authority speaks: "They have become abominable as the
things which they love.” · They love adultery, say, or the
property of another. Reason speaks: As a natural thing is spe­
cifically distinguished by its form, so action by the object to
which it essentially tends. This principle holds, not only for
first and essential goodness, but also for first and essential evil,
since malice is opposed to goodness. As the first physical evil
is lack of substantial form (a monster generated instead of a
man), so the first moral evil is lack of conformity with the
act’s natural standard.
To explain. Action is specifically differentiated by its ob­
ject. This truth holds good, not only for actions, but also for
potentialities and habits. This principle, which Reginaldus 10
lays down as the third of the three fundamental principles of
St. Thomas, illumines all psychology, ethics, and moral the­
ology.
We here suppose that there are differentiated species in
created things, and that essence is the primary constituent ele­
ment. The nominalists, Occam, Peter de Alliaco, and Gerson,
say that essences are not knowable. Evolutionists say that the
essences of things are not stable, yea, that all essences are
united in a universal flux, so that from a monkey a man can
be generated. Here too it would follow that there is no objec­
tive difference between good and evil. This is explicitly af­
firmed by Occam: No act is morally good or evil by its genus,
that is, by its object. It has its goodness or evil only from the
positive law of God known by revelation. This theological
positivism is held by Scotus, who excepts only two acts, the
love of God and the hatred of God. It seems, according to
Scotus,11 that the essences of creatures depend on the free will
» Osee 9:11.
10 De tribus principiis S. Thomae.
11 Opera, XIX, 148; XXIV, 377; XXI, 537.

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BEATITUDE

of God. God could have so created man that a son would be
bound to kill his aged father, in order to deliver him from
the miseries of life. Positivists and evolutionists, since they
reject the positive law of God known by revelation, cannot
recognize any moral obligation.
Let us add here that this primary objective morality does
not change even if circumstances and purpose change. Thus
adultery is primarily and essentially an evil by reason of its
object, that is, intercourse with another man’s wife. Nature
remains invariable, while circumstances and purpose change.
Objections Analyzed
1. In natural objects considered physically there is no
moral evil. But in these same objects, seen as standards of hu­
man activity, there is moral evil.
2. When we use the word “matter,” we mean, not the mat­
ter “from which” (ex qua), but the matter “concerning
which” (circa quam).
3. Although the goodness of the action is not caused by the
goodness of the effect, still the proportion of the action to its
effect is the reason for the goodness of the action, because the
object differentiates the action as it is in intention. The cau­
sality of the effect is formal and final, not efficient.
4. Moral goodness or malice comes, not from the object,
but from the law. Answer: From the law mediately, as its
standard, but immediately from the object as specificating
form, because action is a motion and a way to the object.
But note that the specificating object may be either goodin-itself, or good only because it is commanded (fasting on
Saturday rather than on some other day). The object goodin-itself exercises immediate differentiation, whereas the ob­
ject good-by-law differentiates mediately.
5. The human act receives its primary morality from the
goal to which it tends, while the object is willed only on ac­
count of the end. Hence morality comes primarily from the
purpose. Thus certain historians, who distort a doctrine com­

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

267

monly admitted. Answer: What the human act directly re­
gards is the objective end (finis operis}, not the subjective end
(finis operantis}. The objective end coincides with the object.
The subjective end enters as an accident. Almsgiving aims,
directly and primarily, to relieve the poor. To this objective
purpose may be added a subjective purpose, the intention,
say, of satisfying for sin.
6. When a man says, “I wish to live right” or “I do not
wish to live right,” his act does not have its specific goodness
or malice from the object, otherwise this will would precon­
tain the goodness of all virtues or the malice of all vices.
Answer: The act, “I wish to live right,” has indeed many ma­
terial objects, but it is differentiated specifically by the com­
mon object, namely, good-in-itself, just as metaphysics, say,
is specifically differentiated by being and reality.
A doubt. From what habit does this act come, namely, ‘‘I
wish to live right?” Answer: If this act follows justification, it
comes from charity. If it precedes justification, it comes from
the will alone, as naturally inclined to good-in-itself. The op­
posite act, “I do not wish to live right,” gets its specific differ­
ence from useful or delightful good. No one can choose evil as
evil.
ART. 3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL GOODNESS OR BADNESS

Pre Um inaries
Circumstance is an accident which affects the human act in
its essential morality. Seven circumstances are enumerated:
who, what, where, by what aid, why, how, and when. To il­
lustrate: the agent is a priest, the object is sacred, the place
is public or sacred, the instrument is invocation of the demon,
the purpose of the agent is evil, the mode is intense, say, or
scornful, the time is a festival day, or a longer or shorter pe­
riod.
Thesis: The human act derives some goodness or evil from
circumstances.

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Authority. In almsgiving or fasting or prayer, Christ for­
bids the intention of vainglory. The virtuous man acts as he
should, and when he should, and according to other circum­
stances.12
Reason. We must judge of goodness or evil in human acts
by analogy with goodness or evil in natural things. But natu­
ral things are good or evil not only by their substantial form
but also by their accidents, e.g., proportion in members, in
stature, figure and color. Similarly theft is always bad, but
theft in a sacred place is worse.
ART. 4. PURPOSE AS CIRCUMSTANCE

Purpose stands here, not for the natural and objective pur­
pose of the deed, but for the subjective intention of the
agent.
Thesis. The human act derives goodness or evil from the
agent’s subjective purpose.
Authority. “Beware of doing justice in order to be seen
by men.” “If thine eye is evil, thy whole body is in dark­
ness.” 13
Reason. In dependent things, just as their existence de­
pends on agent and form, so does their goodness depend on
their purpose. Thus everything created depends on at least
three causes: one intrinsic (form), two extrinsic (agent and
purpose). But things that are relative, while they are specifi­
cally differentiated by their objective purpose, are also related
to and dependent on, the agent’s purpose as extrinsic goal.
First corollary. In human action we must distinguish a
fourfold goodness: 1. according to genus, looking at the ac­
tion physically; 2. in its moral species, which comes from its
objective goal; 3. in its circumstances, which are its accidents;
4. in its subjective purpose.
But does not St. Thomas say that the subjective purpose is
itself a circumstance? Answer: Yes, this purpose is a circumAristotle, Eth. Π, 6.
ss Matt. 6:t.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

269

stance as related to the commanded exterior act, but not as
related to die interior act, the intention. Thus when a man
gives alms for vainglory, this vainglory is a circumstance of
the exterior act, but since it specificates the intention im­
mediately, it also mediately specificates the exterior act.
Hence the agent’s personal purpose, while it is a circum­
stance, must be distinguished from other circumstances, since
it may pass over into a specificating element.
Second corollary. An action is not simply good unless all
four kinds of goodness concur. Proof lies in the often quoted
word of Denis, namely, good arises from full cause, evil from
any defect. Now defect may arise from any lack of conformity
with the moral law.
To explain. 1. The aforesaid deformity arises, not only
from the object, but also from circumstances and purpose.
The act is an evil act, even though it may be good in its ob­
ject and circumstances, if it is evil by the subjective purpose
of the agent. Further, action is simply evil, if it is good only
by the purpose of the agent, but intrinsically evil from its
object (a lie, say, in order to save the life of our neighbor).
2. An action can be simply good, according to all the afore­
said kinds of goodness, and yet be imperfect in its mode (e.g.,
a remiss act of charity, or refusal of an unbinding inspira­
tion). Such an act is an imperfection, but not a venial sin.
3. Further, an action may be simply good, in all the preced­
ing four ways, if you consider its principal element, but it
can at the same time be venially culpable from a secondary
standpoint (e.g., a sermon, good by object, purpose, and cir­
cumstances, but venially sinful by a sudden movement of
vanity or impatience). Such an act is simply good and meri­
torious, but with an attendant evil which calls for temporal
punishment. Martyrdom itself may be disturbed by slight
motions of impatience or cowardice, which are not in con­
formity with right reason.
Objection. But then venial sin is an act distinct from the
work which is simply good. Answer: It can be a distinct act,

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BEATITUDE

but it can also be a secondary mode in the principal act (e.g.,
complacency, or a bitter tone, in defending the truth). Is the
martyr to be deprived of his crown because of a passing emo­
tion of cowardice? It is true that martyrdom, in the last in­
stant, satisfies for all venial sins, but even before this last
instant the act was simply good. Further, if a slight deordina­
tion suffices to make the whole act simply bad, we could
hardly find any good act even in holy men. And this conclu­
sion is palpably absurd. How very few, even in the most
heroic saints, are deeds unaffected by vainglory, for instance,
or selfishness, or self-complacency, or remissness, or excess, or
precipitation, or inconsideration! How few are penitents
whose penance is not accompanied by some defect or excess!
How few superiors correct with no excess of zeal or anger!
How few preachers are unmoved by self-complacency! How
few are men who pray without distraction!
ART. 5. GOOD AND EVIL DIFFERENTIATE HUMAN ACTS

SPECIFICALLY

Preliminaries
We have seen that human acts receive their goodness or
malice from object and purpose. The precise question now is
this: Is the morality arising from the object specific? Is the
act, for instance, of killing an innocent man intrinsically and
essentially evil? Would it remain evil even if God would re­
voke all positive precepts? Scotus 14 says no. He holds that no
act is evil by object alone, no act except to hate God. He adds
that killing, if God revoked all positive precepts, would not
be evil. St. Thomas holds the opposite view, as is clear from
the objections preceding this article.
1. Good and evil exist in acts just as they do in things. But
in things good and evil do not diversify species. To illus­
trate: A man who is well and man who is dying belong to the
same species.
1« See note 11.

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271

2. Evil is a privation, and therefore cannot constitute the
specific difference of any sin except that of omission.
Scotus and the nominalists, departing from tradition, pre­
pared the way for the positivists, who deny specific distinction
between good and evil. Evil, they say, is mere ignorance of
what is useful and delightful. Taine said that virtue and vice
are natural effects, like sugar and arsenic, arsenic not being
specifically injurious, since in small quantities it can be used
as a remedy.
Thesis. Good and evil diversify moral acts specifically.
Authority. Aristotle: “Habits that are similar bring forth
acts that are similar.” Now a good habit differs specifically
from a bad habit, generosity, for example, from prodigality.
The Holy See 15 has condemned the proposition of the laxists,
who hold that masturbation, fornication, and onanism are
not intrinsically evil by their object. The following proposi­
tions were condemned by Innocent XI: ie 1. Fornication is
evil only because it is forbidden. 2. Masturbation is not pro­
hibited by the law of nature. Hence if God had not forbidden
it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory. The
Holy Office 17 condemned the following propositions: 1. It is
probable that the onanistic use of matrimony is not prohib­
ited by the natural law. The response says that the proposi­
tion is scandalous and erroneous, and implicitly condemned
by Innocent XI. 2. To a further question, whether the im­
perfect use of matrimony, whether onanistic or sodomistic, be
licit, the answer was, “illicit because intrinsically evil.”
Hence we can no longer hold the following sentences: No
act is evil by its object except to hate God: No act against
creatures is mortally sinful by its nature, but only by divine
precept. Adultery and murder would not be sins if God re­
called His positive precept.
Reason. Acts are specifically differentiated by their objects.
is D. 1198.
ie/bid., 1199.
it Ibid.

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BEATITUDE

Good and evil constitute a specific difference in objects as re­
lated to right reason. Hence certain acts are essentially in
harmony with reason, just as their objects are. Certain acts are
not reasonable.
In this argument right reason is assigned as the proximate
foundation of obligation. Good-in-itself belongs essentially to
right reason, whereas evil does not. For the rational animal,
that is good which belongs to him by reason, and evil is that
which disagrees with right reason.
First corollary. The first principle of ethics is “do good,
avoid evil,” that is, “live according to reason.”
Second corollary. If, as maintained by empiricism and posi­
tivism, reason were not essentially distinct from imagination,
then men, not knowing the specific difference between good
and moral evil, would not know that good in itself is some­
thing higher than delectable or useful good.
Third corollary. Spinoza’s denial of free will destroys the
specific distinction between good and evil, since liberty is a
conditio sine qua non of morality. In Spinoza’s view, Bolshe­
vism would be nothing more than a kind of sickness.
Fourth corollary. Here appears the essential distinction be­
tween the natural law, impressed on our nature, and the
divine positive law. This corollary is against Scotus, Occam,
Peter of Alliaco, and Gerson.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Even in objects of nature, good and evil are essentially
diverse. A dead body and a living body do not belong to the
same species.
2. How can evil, which is a privation, constitute the spe­
cific difference, not only of the sin of omission, but also that
of commission? Answer: Since evil is a privation of good that
is due to the subject, an act is called evil in its species, not be­
cause it has no object, but because it has an object that is not
in harmony with reason. Thus the object can positively con­
stitute the species of an evil act.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

273

Cajetan quotes St. Thomas: 18 Good and evil are not con­
stitutive differences except in the moral world, where acts
receive their species from their objective purpose. Now, since
good is the reason why an object is end and purpose, good
and evil are the specific differences in the moral world. But
good is end and purpose per se, whereas evil is so only in so
far as it removes the end which is due. The remotion of this
due end constitutes a species, but only because it is united to
an undue end.
Evil as evil is not a constitutive difference, but only by
reason of the good in which it is found. The sin of commis­
sion is aversion from God with conversion to that created
good by which the sin of commission is differentiated.19 Thus
sin is distinguished by its opposite virtue, and virtue by its
object. Hence the formal constituent of a sin of commission
is not privation, but the positive thing which is the basis of
the privation, the positive tendency to an object which does
not agree with right reason.
ART. 6. THE INTENTION IS DIFFERENTIATED

BY PERSONAL PURPOSE

Preliminaries
Does the personal purpose diversify human acts specifically,
or is it merely a circumstance? Much depends on this ques­
tion. On it depends, for example, the question whether two
sins are to be declared in confession or only one.

Objections
1. Acts are differentiated by the object, and the personal
purpose is not identified with the object.
2. It seems to be a mere accidental blemish that a man
gives alms for vainglory; hence, notwithstanding this sub­
jective purpose, the act remains essentially good.
is la, q.48, a. 1, ad sum.
io Ia-IIae, q.72, a. 1.

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3. Acts which differ specifically can be devoted to vain­
glory.
Two conclusions. First: Intention, the interior act of the
will, is specificated by personal purpose. Second: The exterior
act, the commanded act, is differentiated, directly by the ob­
ject, indirectly by the subjective purpose.
The first conclusion is proved thus: Acts are differentiated
by their object, and the subjective purpose is, properly speak­
ing, the object of the intention, the interior act of the will.
This truth holds good, not only for intention, but for every
interior act of the will. To illustrate: A man commands him­
self to give alms for vainglory. Here we have, first, intention
commanding choice, then choice, commanding a second sub­
ordinated choice, the choice of a subordinated means. Again,
I will to have health; hence, secondly, I wish a physician;
thirdly, I call a servant to seek the physician.
The second conclusion is proved thus: The act of the will
is the formal and vivifying element, of which the exterior act
is the material. Now the interior act is differentiated by sub­
jective purpose. But the exterior act, although it remains
immediately differentiated by its proper object, is differenti­
ated, mediately and formally, by the purpose. The will uses
the bodily members as instruments, and exterior acts enter
the field of morality only as subject to the will. The act which
commands and the act which is commanded, though they are
physically two acts, are still only one moral act. This explains,
if we are not mistaken, the concept of moral person. A col­
lege of physicians, physically multiple, has a moral unity. A
similar truth holds true of the mystical body.
Corollary. One who steals in order to commit adultery is an
adulterer rather than a thief, because adultery, the subjective
purpose, is the form of which theft is the material. In this
case there are two sins specifically distinct, to be declared in
confession.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

275

ART. 7. DIFFERENTIATION BY OBJECT IS SOMETIMES
SUBORDINATED TO DIFFERENTIATION BY PURPOSE

At other times one and the same act is in two disparate
species. First conclusion. The species of good which comes
from objective purpose is subordinated to the species which
comes from subjective purpose. Thus theft may be subordi­
nated to avarice. And the acts of all the other virtues are sub­
ordinated per se to the object of charity.
Second conclusion. That species of goodness which comes
from an object ordained per accidens to such and such an end
is not contained under that other species as genus. He who
steals in order to commit adultery unites in his act two dis­
parate kinds of malice.

Corollaries

1. A choice good by the object becomes sordid by an evil
intention.
2. An evil choice is not made good by a good intention,
though its malice is diminished. Illustration: the man who
steals in order to give alms. The end does not justify the
means, when the means are intrinsically evil.
3. One and the same act can have two kinds of goodness or
malice, one from the object, the other from the purpose. Il­
lustration: to give alms (an act of mercy) in order to satisfy
for sin (an act of penance), or for love of God and neighbor
(an act of charity).
4. An act, good in object, purpose, and circumstances, re­
mains simply good and meritorious, even if there supervenes
secondarily something venially sinful, a tinge, say, of vain­
glory or of impatience.
Two Doubts

1. Is it a venial sin, or only an imperfection, to choose a
lesser good when counsel invites to a greater good? Illustra­
tion: A physician hears Mass for nine days to obtain a special

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grace. He finds that this exercise was no impediment to his
work. Would it be better to continue hearing Mass? But, he
says, I am not obliged to this, and I can well use this time for
the study of medicine, a minor good indeed, but still a good,
not an evil. Some authors say that in this case there is a venial
sin, but of the lightest kind. Thus they deny the distinction
between imperfection and venial sin, since a lesser good here
and now takes on the nature of evil. Others deny this view.
The act of the physician, they say, who uses his time, not to
hear daily Mass, but to study medicine, is a good act, differ­
entiated by a good object, by a legitimate motive. We em­
brace this second answer.
2. Is it licit to choose a minor evil in order to escape a
major evil? The answer here is now clearer. The affirmative
answer again comes from the relativists, for whom the lesser
evil, in comparison with the greater evil, becomes a good.
Those who are rigorists in regard to the lesser good become
laxists on the minor evil. Such is the confusion to which rela­
tivism leads. Others reply correctly, and negatively, namely,
we are not allowed to choose the minor evil to avoid the
greater when the minor evil is itself evil by its object. Only
under the three following conditions may we choose a minor
evil in order to avoid a major evil: (a) both evils cannot be
avoided: (b) the lesser evil is not intrinsically evil: (c) the
two evils must threaten one and the same person. Moses
rightly counseled repudiation of a wife in order to avoid her
death. But Lot committed sin when he counseled the men of
Sodom to abuse his daughters in order to keep these men
from sodomy with Lot’s guests.
ART. 8. SOME ACTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INDIFFERENT

Preliminaries

“Indifferent” signifies an act that, morally, is neither good
nor bad. “Specifically” signifies the act in relation to its ob­

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

277

ject, not in relation to the individual agent. The affirmative
answer is by far the more common.
Authority. “Continence is good, lust is bad, indifferent is
the act of walking.” 20 Condemned is the proposition of Huss
which denies the existence of acts indifferent in their na­
ture.21
Reason. Act is differentiated by its object in relation to
right reason. Now there are acts which do not include either
harmony or disharmony with reason, for instance, to walk,
to write, to speak. Such acts, therefore, are in themselves in­
different, morally neither good nor bad.
Objections Analyzed
Since between things privatively opposed, between light
and darkness, there is no medium, and since good and evil
are privatively opposed, there can be no medium. Answer: If
you are talking of things already existing, of darkness in rela­
tion to light, of death in relation to life: Yes, there is no
medium. But in things that are coming into existence, no.
For there is an intermediate indisposition between health
and serious illness. Similarly, an indifferent act, like walking,
becomes evil when it subserves theft. The evil purpose does
not take away objective indifference, but the act, here and
now, has become simply evil.
2. But there is no habit specifically indifferent, and there­
fore no act. Here we deny parity. Habits are acquired by in­
dividual acts, and individual acts are never indifferent. The
exercise even of the mechanical arts is not indifferent in the
individual.
Corollary. Acts specifically indifferent antecede all laws
natural or positive. Before any divine positive law an act can
be specifically good or evil. This truth condemns Occam and
other nominalists, for instance, Gerson and Peter of Alliaco,
who say that no act is in its genus evil, not even that of hating
1.

20 St. Jerome, Epist. 89.
21 D.642.

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BEATITUDE

God, but only the evil which is positively prohibited by God.
It likewise condemns Scotus, who says that no act is perfectly
good in its genus, that is, by its object alone, except to love
God, and no act is evil by its genus, that is, by its object
alone, except to hate God. These views lead to moral indifferentism and positivism.
ART. 9. NO HUMAN ACT IS INDIVIDUALLY INDIFFERENT

Preliminaries
We are not treating of indeliberate acts, such as stroking
one’s beard or moving one’s foot, from an impulse of nature
or of imagination. These are not human acts, and hence are
indifferent even in the individual. Nor are we dealing with
acts which are indifferent in relation to supernatural merit or
demerit, with acts ethically good, of the infidel or of the sin­
ner, e.g., almsgiving, as a natural good, but without subordi­
nation to a supernatural end. Our thesis is the common one,
against Scotus and Vasquez. It is taught by St. Bellarmine,
Suarez, Valentia, St. Alphonsus, and by many recent authors:
Müller, Bouquillon, Simar, Noldin, Lehmkuhl, and Frins.
Authority. “Of every idle word men will give an account in
the day of judgment.” 22 St. Gregory explains: “Idle words
are those which lack utility or necessity or piety.” If it does
not lack these qualities, it is good. Hence every word is either
good or evil. Speech, in itself indifferent, is never so in the
individual, supposing him to speak deliberately, not merely
mechanically, without consciousness. “Whether you eat or
drink or do anything else, do it all for the glory of God.” 23
All that we do must, at least virtually and implicitly, be done
for the glory of God.
Reason. As often as a man acts deliberately, he is bound to
direct his action to a good end. If he does this, the action will
be good, supposing that it is not evil by object or circum22 Matt. 12:36.
23 I Cor. 10:31.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

279

stances. If he does not do so, his act will be evil, because it
lacks proper personal purpose and goal. Hence there is not,
and cannot be, an act that is indifferent in the individual.
The principle here is that man, as often as he acts deliber­
ately, acts for a purpose which he establishes by a judgment
of his reason. Otherwise his act would take place by chance,
and there would be no reason why he would do one thing
rather than another, or there would be only an unconscious
finality, as in life that is merely vegetative or sensitive. Fur­
ther, man, acting deliberately, must aim at an end that is in
itself good and not merely indifferent, because he must act as
man, as a rational agent, whereas if he neglects to act by
reason he acts as a beast.
The application is clear: every deliberate act in the indi­
vidual either stands under the dictate of right reason or not.
If the first, then it is good; if the second, then it is evil.
Hence, even if the act be indifferent by its object, it becomes
good or evil by the purpose of the agent. Man acts according
to nature only when he acts according to reason.
Corollaries

1. To act deliberately merely for sense-delight as an end
is evil. This corollary follows from the condemnation of the
following propositions. 1. Matrimonial intercourse exercised
merely for pleasure is not even venially sinful. 2. To eat and
drink to satiety, simply and solely for pleasure, is not a sin,
supposing that it does not harm the health.24 Man’s will is in­
tended, not to serve the senses, but to command them. Man is
not indeed forbidden to have sensible delight in exercising
operations necessary for the preservation either of the indi­
vidual or of the species, but he is forbidden to seek these de­
lights as his end, as brute animals do. And even the pursuit
of truth, simply on account of the delight annexed to it,
would be the vice of curiosity.
2. This doctrine is very consoling for men of good will. All
« D.1159.

28ο

BEATITUDE

deliberate acts, even the smallest, if they are not sins, are
morally good. Thus the just man merits daily an augmenta­
tion of grace and glory. This consolation fails if, with Scotus,
we hold that some acts, otherwise morally good, are indiffer­
ent even in the individual.
A doubt. But is man bound to direct all his acts, not only
to a good end, but also to God, at least virtually and implic­
itly? The answer is affirmative, and opposed to two opposite
errors. Baius and the Jansenists say that man must turn all
his acts to God actually, otherwise his acts are sins, since by
reason of the corruption of nature, there is no medium be­
tween heavenly charity and vitiated cupidity. Hence “all the
deeds of infidels are sins.” This proposition was condemned
by St. Pius V.25
The opposite error, taught by many Jesuits, says that man
is not bound to direct all his acts to God even virtually, but
that it suffices that they be done for something in itself good.
Some (e.g., Noldin) even say that the act remains good even
though the man does not intend good-in-itself, but only the
delight or the advantage he gains from it. This last view is
not safe, for the following proposition has been condemned:
The marriage act, exercised merely for pleasure, lacks all
guilt, even venial.2® The view of Thomists, admitted also by
many other theologians, runs thus: Man is bound to direct all
his acts to an end which, at least implicitly, is directed to
God. Why? Because a last end has been assigned to man by
his Creator, an end to which he must tend in all his acts. But
this direction and ordination need not be actual and explicit;
it suffices that it be implicit, as far as man sees his actions as
conformable to right reason and eternal law. Delight is for
the sake of the operation, not e converso. “Whether you eat
or drink, or do anything else, do it all for the glory of God.” 27
Nor is it required that a man daily elicit an explicit proposal
« Ibid., 1025.
20 See note 24 supra.
271 Cor. 10:21.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

281

to do everything to God’s glory. It suffices that, at proper
times, he elicit an act of faith and charity, acts which contain
implicitly the virtual intention.
Analysis of Objections

1. There is no obligation without precept. But there is no
precept, natural or positive, to direct every action toward
a good end. Here we simply say that there is such a precept.
2. There is no positive precept to direct every action to an
end good-in-itself. The words of St. Paul, on eating and drink­
ing, are not a precept but only a counsel. Answer: The words
of the Apostle are preceptive, because the word "do” (facite)
in Holy Scripture signifies everywhere a precept, and because
man, even in the natural order, must do all his deeds for his
last end, which is God; a fortiori in the supernatural order.
3. But in the natural order there is no precept to do any­
thing for God’s sake. For instance, when a man sneezes, or
attends to a need of nature, is he bound to think of his last
goal? Answer: Right reason dictates proper care of physical
needs for the sake of health.
4. “Act according to reason” is an affirmative precept,
which indeed binds always, but not at each moment. Answer:
This precept is simultaneously negative, namely, “Do not act
idly,” do not act without reason. Hence it binds man in all
his deliberate acts.
5. This precept, thus understood, would be too rigorous,
would be an intolerable burden. It would result in innumer­
able venial sins, or would be perpetual occasion for scruple.
Answer: The one essential requirement is the general inten­
tion to live according to right reason. This general intention
remains virtually, unless it be revoked by contrary intention.
Further, many inferior actions (spitting, eating, drinking)
often occur indeliberately. Hence, on the contrary, this doc­
trine is one that consoles. All deliberate acts, even the small­
est, unless they are sinful, are morally good and meritorious.
6. These inferior actions (spitting, drinking) cannot be

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BEATITUDE

made the object of a vow; therefore they are not morally
good. Answer: A vow must be devoted, not only to good, but
to a higher good.
7. The omission of an act which is not commanded (for
instance, to hear Mass on a week day), is not evil, but neither
is it good, because its opposite (e.g., to hear Mass) is a good.
Therefore such omission is indifferent. Answer: The omis­
sion is good if it comes from a reasonable motive, otherwise
it is evil. It is evil if it comes from laziness or disgust or con­
tempt, and so on. But it is good if it comes from care for
health, or from any other rational motive, and thus, though
less perfect, it still remains meritorious. The just man is not
bound always to the maximum of generosity possible here
and now.
8. A man can be invincibly ignorant of the precept that he
must always act for a good end. Now suppose this man to
perform an act, indifferent by object and purpose, for in­
stance, to walk through a field. This act is not good, since it is
indifferent in object and purpose, nor is it evil, because it
proceeds from invincible ignorance. Answer: Some Thomists
hold (e.g., Alvarez) that such an act is per accidens possible,
and that St. Thomas is speaking only of what is true per se.
But it seems better, with Medina, Billuart and Priimmer, to
deny the possibility of such invincible ignorance. The age of
reason brings obligation to act according to the principles of
reason.
ART. 10. SOME CIRCUMSTANCES DIFFERENTIATE ACTS

SPECIFICALLY

Authority. The Council of Trent28 defines the circum­
stances which change the species of a sin (e.g., theft in a sacred
place) and says that they are necessary matter in confession.
Reason. Morality arises from relationship to right reason.
Now certain circumstances, independently of the moral
species derived from the object, carry with them a special
28 D.917.

SOURCES OF GOOD AND EVIL

283

relationship of harmony or disharmony with reason, the prox­
imate standard of morals. Such circumstances change the na­
ture of the act. They do this by superadding a new species to
the act (adultery superadded to theft) by turning a specifically
indifferent act into an act that is good (walking for health’s
sake), or by destroying the primary species of a good act (alms­
giving merely for vainglory).

Objections Analyzed

1. Accidents do not create a species, and circumstances are
nothing but accidents. Answer: Circumstance is an accident:
an accident which can become a principal condition of the
object, yes; otherwise, no.
2. But one thing cannot be in different species. A thing
that is absolute, I grant; a thing that is relative, proceeding
from a twofold consideration of reason, I deny.
ART. II. SOME CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT CHANGE THE
NATURE OF THE ACT, BUT ONLY AUGMENT OR

DIMINISH ITS GOODNESS OR EVIL

Certain circumstances, considered apart from the specific
nature of the act, do not change that nature, but do influence
its gravity. The amount stolen, e.g., determines the difference
between grave sin and venial sin.
Corollary. Circumstances changing the nature of sin are
matter for confession, as are also, according to the more com­
mon and safe view, those circumstances that notably increase
the evil. As illustrations, take an act of hatred extending over
years, or a long unbroken period spent in impurity.

CHAPTER XVII
Good

and

Evil

in

Interior Acts (q. 19)

This question has two parts. In the first four articles we ask:

Does the will’s goodness depend: (a) on the object; (b) on the
object alone; (c) on right reason; (d) on the eternal law. In the
remaining six articles we answer difficulties about the fore­
going principles: (a) Does erroneous reason oblige? (b) Is the
will that follows erroneous reason evil? (c) Does the goodness
of choice depend on the intention of the end? (d) Does the
quantity of good in the choice follow the quantity of good
in the intention? (e) Does the goodness of the human will
depend on the divine will? (f) Must the human will always
be in harmony with the divine will in the object willed?
ART. 1. THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON

ITS OBJECT

Preliminaries
On first view, this article seems merely a repetition of the
preceding question. But here, treating only of the interior
act as distinguished from the exterior, St. Thomas wishes to
show the relation of the foregoing articles with those that fol­
low.
Authority. Aristotle says: “Justice is the virtue by which
we will to do things that are just.’’
Reason: The specific difference among acts of the will fol­
lows the object proposed by reason. Just as truth and error
differentiate per se the acts of reason, so do good and evil dif­
ferentiate per se the acts of the will, the objects of which are
necessarily subject to tire order of reason.
284

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

285

Corollary. Acts are intrinsically good if their object is al­
ways conformable to reason (e.g., to love God or to pay debts).
But we must notice, as said above, that this traditional objec­
tivism is opposed to Kantian subjectivism. The Kantian
standard is not the objective nature of good, but the cate­
gorical imperative, which is a subjective judgment, synthetic,
and a priori, namely: “Act in all things so that the moral di­
rection of your will can be a principle for common and pub­
lic legislation.” But this moral direction cannot be valid for
all men unless it is based on the objectivity of right reason.
The act of the will is differentiated, not by reason as such, but
by the object subject to measurement by reason. To illus­
trate: The amount of food is measured by its relation to
reason’s standard of health.
ART. 2. GOODNESS OF INTENTION DEPENDS ON THE OBJECT

AIMED AT BY PERSONAL PURPOSE

On the object alone depends direct goodness or malice,
and, for the interior act, intention, the object is nothing but
the purpose of the agent. The essential good and evil of the
interior act of the will must be taken primarily from that
which is intended by the will primo and per se.
ART. 3. THE GOODNESS OF THE WILL DEPENDS ON REASON,
THAT IS, ON THE OBJECT PROPOSED BY REASON

Preliminaries

The proximate rule of morality, practical reason, has three
elements: first, synderesis, the habit of first principles; second,
moral knowledge which arises from these principles; third,
conscience, the act of the practical reason, dictating some­
thing to be here and now done or avoided. In the supernatu­
ral order, synderesis becomes faith, moral knowledge becomes
moral theology, and natural conscience becomes Christian
conscience. This latter, in the just man, is an act of infused
prudence subserved by acquired prudence. Since the forma­

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BEATITUDE

tion of conscience belongs properly to the treatise on pru­
dence, only general questions belong to this treatise on
human acts.
Authority. St. Hilary speaks: "Unregulated is the will un­
less subject to reason.”
Reason. The object of the will is proposed to it by reason;
hence the will’s goodness depends on the object of the inten­
tion. To explain. Nothing is willed unless foreknown. The
will tends to universal good only because the intellect knows
universal good. The will is regulated by practical reason, just
as speculative reason is directed to the cognition of truth.

Difficulties Analyzed

Although the good as good belongs primarily to the will,
nevertheless the good as true belongs to reason before it can
belong to the will, because the will, being a blind faculty,
must be directed by reason.
2. The goodness of the practical intellect, that is, truth
conformed to right appetite, depends on the goodness of the
will. When we praise a man as just, we speak of him as a man
of good will rather than of good intellect. This objection is
repeated today by pragmatism and the philosophy of action.
Answer: The goodness of the practical intellect is truth con­
formed to right appetite. If you are speaking of the judgment
of prudence, yes; if you are speaking of the judgment of
moral science, no. The right moral judgment, here and now,
comes from the virtue of prudence. But prudence cannot per­
form this duty unless the will is guided by the other virtues
(justice, fortitude, and temperance).
3. How does direction by moral science differ from direc­
tion by prudence? Moral science shows us the goal to be
aimed at, whether that goal be the ultimate end of all human
endeavor, or the goal of any particular virtue. Thus the truth
of moral science rests on objective conformity to reality. But
prudence directs tire choice of right ways and means, here and
now, and its truth consists in man’s personal intention to

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

287

reach the right goal even if, as in the case of invincible igno­
rance, his intention lacks conformity with objective reality.
Example: a man invincibly ignorant of the special strength
of the liquor set before him. Conformity with right intention
justifies his drinking, even though he thereby becomes drunk.
His judgment was practically true, by conformity with right
intention, though speculatively false in relation to reality.
This truth, of great importance in forming conscience, is
neglected by many probabilists. They insist too exclusively
on the value of the moral virtues: on the truth, say, that the
chaste man, by being chaste, judges correctly on matters of
chastity, and the humble man on matters of humility. Now
this is a part of the truth, a part contained in the teaching of
Blondel, who defines truth as “equation of mind and life.”
This truth is verified only of the truth of prudence, and, in
some measure, of the gift of wisdom, which gift nevertheless
presupposes faith as conformed to divine reality.
Summary. Goodness of will depends on right reason, that
is, on synderesis and on moral science. But reason in the prac­
tical order, that is, under prudence, depends upon correct
intention, whereby the rectitude of universal principles de­
scends to the particular deed to be performed here and now.
ART. 4. THE WILL’S GOODNESS DEPENDS ON THE ETERNAL
LAW AS ITS SUPREME STANDARD

Preliminaries

This thesis is denied by independent ethics, independent
not only of revealed religion, but even of the concept of God
and of every metaphysical concept. Kant, for example, holds
that the supreme foundation of moral foundation is the cate­
gorical imperative, the absolute autonomy of our will. Thus
man would be like God: he would be bound, not by any
superior, but only by himself, to act wisely, i.e., according to
right reason. Were obligation imposed on us by God, our
life, being a servitude, spent to obtain a delightful reward,

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would not be, properly speaking, a moral life, would not be
worthy of man’s dignity.
The objections which Kant here raises against traditional
ethics are, at bottom, identical with those which St. Thomas
puts at the head of this article: i. Reason alone is a self-suffi­
cient standard. 2. Whereas measure must be proportioned to
the thing measured, the eternal law is not so proportioned.
3. The standard of human activity must be most clear and
certain, whereas the eternal law is unknown to us.
Against these arguments, agnostic and positivistic, we de­
fend our thesis: Goodness of the human will depends on the
eternal law as its supreme standard.
Authority. Sin, says St. Augustine, is a word or deed or de­
sire against the eternal law. The following proposition was
condemned: “A philosophical sin, a moral sin, is a human act
out of harmony with rational nature and right reason. The­
ological sin is free transgression of the divine law. Philosophi­
cal sin, however grave, in a man who ignores God, or does not
think actually of God, is a grave sin, but it is not an offense
against God. It is not a mortal sin dissolving our friendship
with God, nor does it deserve eternal punishment.” 1 From
this condemnation it is clear that there cannot be a sin merely
philosophical, that is, a sin against reason but not against the
eternal law. Therefore the eternal law is the supreme stand­
ard of human morality. The following proposition is also
condemned: “The laws of morality do not need divine sanc­
tion, nor need human laws be in harmony with the natural
law, or receive their obligation from God.” 2
Reason. In a series of causes, one subordinated to the other,
the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second
cause. But human reason regulates the human will only by
dependence on eternal law, which is divine reason. To ex­
plain. Human reason can rightly command good to be done
and evil to be avoided, only by appealing to conformity with
1 Ibid., 1290.
* Ibid., 1756.

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

289

the eternal law. Human reason is a second cause, not the
first. And the order of subordination of agents corresponds
to the order of goals. Hence movement to universal good, to
the last end, must come from the first cause of morality, that
is, from God.
Corollary. The obligation of the natural law begins with
God’s will to create man. God promulgates the natural law
by imprinting it on man’s mind.

Independent Ethics

Objections Analyzed
The objections formulated by St. Thomas are repeated by
independent ethics.
1. The one standard of human action is human reason.
Answer: Yes, if you are talking of a proximate standard, sub­
ordinated to a higher standard.
2. The measure must be proportioned to the thing meas­
ured. But the eternal law is not proportioned to human will.
Answer: Not proportioned as proximate measure, granted;
otherwise, denied.
3. The eternal law is not the supreme standard, because
the first and essential goodness of an act comes from its ob­
ject, and an object in itself good is independent of the eternal
law. Answer: Goodness comes from an object, good by moral
standards, yes; good by mere physical standards, no.
4. To tell the truth is morally good independent of God’s
creative free act. Answer: God is free to create, or not to
create. But if He creates rational beings, He must will them
to live rationally.
5. Veracity is morally binding on God Himself, before He
promulgates the eternal law. Answer; God’s veracity is identi­
fied with God’s wisdom. And obligation, properly speaking,
does not exist for God, since God has no superior, though He
does owe it to Himself to act wisely.
6. The standard of morality must be known naturally, and

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from the very beginning of moral life. Answer: Must be
known even from the beginning of moral life, at least in its
first principle, i.e., do good, avoid evil, I grant, though I hold
that revelation is morally necessary if all men are to know,
explicitly and unerringly, the fullness of the natural law.
7. But even this first principle of the eternal law, since it is
admitted by the authority of reason, is subordinated to rea­
son. Thus even obedience to God is good, not because it is
commanded by God, but because it is a dictate of our reason.
Hence the supreme foundation, even of religious certitude, is
human reason.3 Answer: The authority of human reason dis­
covers the divine reason, whose authority transcends alto­
gether the authority of our reason.
8. If the goodness of the will depended on the eternal law,
our will would have to be conformed to the divine will in
every object which it wills. Thus I would have to will the
eternal damnation of my father if God wills it. This is an un­
desirable conclusion. Answer: Ultimately, I will all evils
which Providence permits, but, here and now, under particu­
lar reasons which I must consider, I do not will what God
wills, but I will what God wills me to will.
A Related Question
Does conscience prove a posteriori the existence of a su­
preme legislator?

Preliminaries
Many traditional authors answer affirmatively. Among
those who answer negatively is Father Billot, S.J.4 The back­
ground of this denial is the following thesis: Many men are
invincibly ignorant of God’s existence, and of the first pre­
cepts of the natural law, and are invincibly ignorant of these
truths even up to death. Such men never reach the age of
reason, as far as morality goes. Atrocious crimes, in such men,
s Thus Victor Cousin.
* De natura et ratione peccati personalis, pp. 23 sqq.

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

2gi

would be only material sins. Moral evil, he says, cannot be
conceived, unless we anteriorly know God who obliges.
This concept of Father Billot seems to presuppose that the
obligation of the natural law is founded on a special divine
law, while we say it rests on God’s general creative will. Oth­
erwise, he adds, we should again fall into the theory of “phil­
osophical sin,” i.e., a man could sin against right reason,
without sinning against God whom he would not yet know.
Answer: Notwithstanding these objections, we maintain
that the existence of God can be proved from the fact of
moral obligation known by conscience. Let us note, first of
all, that proofs of God’s existence can begin with any fact,
whether in the sense order, or in tire intellectual and moral
order. Man’s intellective soul leads us to a supreme intellect.
What participates (the fourth way), what is changeable (the
first way), and what is imperfect (the third and fourth way),
demand the pre-existence of something immovable and per­
fect. Now the human soul is intellective by participation, be­
cause only one of its parts is intellective: and it is imperfect,
because it does not understand everything and because it pro­
ceeds from potentiality to act.
Uniting the five ways, we speak thus: Whatever is changed
is changed by another; whatever begins to cause needs to be
moved toward causing; every contingent thing is caused by a
necessary thing; everything imperfect or composed of parts
is caused by a perfect and most simple thing. But the human
intellect and will are changeable, contingent, imperfect, yet
are destined for universal truth and universal good. Hence
the human soul depends on the prime mover, on the prime
cause, on the prime necessary being, on the supreme and most
perfect being, on the supreme ordinator.
This fivefold demonstration can be applied also in the field
of practical reason. On a superior cause depends whatever is
moved or begins to cause, or is contingent, or is imperfect, or
is ordained to another. Now practical reason begins with the
first principle, i.e., good is to be done, evil is to be avoided,

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and then begins to regulate our activity by this principle.
Further, it is contingent and imperfect, and is related to the
truth as the will is to the good. Hence our practical reason,
in knowing and commanding good, commands by virtue of a
supreme cause, namely, God the Legislator.
Objections Analyzed
1. This demonstration proceeds, not from moral obliga­
tion, but from the various imperfections of our practical
reason. Answer: It proceeds from the imperfections of our
practical reason, in its action considered psychologically, no;
in its action as commanding and regulating, yes. Practical
reason not only shows us the good, but also commands us to
do that good. But it commands as a second cause, which does
not act except in virtue of the first cause.
2. But we cannot know moral obligation unless we know
God beforehand. Answer: Unless we know God, from the
very obligation itself, yes; otherwise, no. To explain. Obliga­
tion is knowable in two ways: a priori and a posteriori. A
priori, we know it either from its supreme foundation in
God, or then in its proximate foundation, in the self-evident
principle that good is to be done, and evil to be avoided. A
posteriori we know it in the joy of a good conscience, in the
remorse of conscience, in the insufficiency of human legisla­
tion which itself needs regulation. But note that the principle
of doing good and avoiding evil is a principle, not a mere
conclusion.6 Without this principle man would have no duty
to live according to reason.
3. But obligation, known a posteriori, and a priori in its
proximate foundation, is known, not as a moral obligation,
but only as a rational imperative, not yet morally obliging.
Answer: This obligation cannot be known perfectly, a priori,
in its supreme cause, unless we first know God. But it can be
known in its proximate foundation, which is immediately evi­
dent, namely, in remorse of conscience. Knowing the obliga<> Ia-IIae, q.94, a.2.

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

293

tion, we simultaneously know, a posteriori, the existence of
God the Obligator, precisely because there is no obligation
without a superior who obliges.
4. But thus we would have the sin that is called philosoph­
ical, because man could know his action to be against right
reason, without knowing that it is against the eternal law.
Answer: He can know this without knowing the eternal law
distinctly, but not without knowing, at least confusedly, the
existence of God the Legislator. My practical reason sees at
once that I am not the source of a law that binds all men, in­
dividually and collectively. Since, then, practical reason
knows that it commands as second cause, it follows that phil­
osophical sin is impossible. If God can be known from the
wonderful ordination of plants and animals to their own
proper functions, why can He not be known from the natu­
ral ordination of our will to God?
ART. 5. ANY ACT OF THE WILL AGAINST REASON, RIGHT

OR WRONG IS ALWAYS EVIL

Preliminaries
At this point modern manuals introduce a treatise on con­
science. Aquinas is writing, not a manual of practical
theology, but a speculative treatise on morality. His treat­
ment is here universal, but later we will meet questions on
the principles of human acts: law and virtue, and the relation
of prudence to the other virtues. Justice, fortitude, and tem­
perance cannot exist without prudence to direct them, nor
can prudence exist without these moral virtues. The special
treatise on prudence will be, concomitantly, a treatise on
right and certain conscience.
In the present general treatise on human acts, the only
truth needing proof is that moral activity demands a con­
science that is right and certain. The precise question in this
article runs thus: Is our will evil when it is against erroneous
reason? Does an erring conscience oblige? The answer is that

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294

any act of the will discordant with reason, right or wrong, is
always evil. In other words, we are never allowed to act
against conscience, even though the conscience be erroneous.
The reason is that the will is a blind power, which follows
the lead of reason. Nothing can be willed except as fore­
known. Hence, if reason erroneously proposes a line of activ­
ity as evil, the will is still bound to avoid that line. Similarly,
when reason proposes an object as good and tire will refuses,
the will will be evil. If reason, for example, tells a man er­
roneously that he is bound to save his neighbor’s life by a lie,
he is bound to tell that lie. Again, a man who eats food which
he tliinks forbidden, sins, says St. Paul,0 because he is not act­
ing from faith, that is, from conscience (so the Fathers com­
monly interpret this text). Conscience is the proximate and
immediate standard for human actions, since it applies the
law here and now. To act against conscience is to act against
the law.
ART. 6. CONSCIENCE VOLUNTARILY ERRONEOUS DOES

NOT EXCUSE FROM SIN

The argument is a distinction between conscience invin­
cibly erroneous and conscience which is voluntarily in error.
Man can never act against conscience, but he can and should
lay aside any erroneousness of which he is aware, or should be
aware.
ART. 7, 8. GOODNESS IN CHOOSING WAYS AND MEANS

DEPENDS ON THE GOODNESS OF INTENTION

In article seven we show that goodness in choosing means
depends on the antecedent intention of the goal. This rela­
tion to the goal is the source of goodness in the object willed.
Example: a man who fasts for love of God. Article eight asks
this question: Is the goodness of choice equal to the goodness
of intention? Answer: The quantity of goodness, whether it
comes from the object or the mode of intention, while it does
o Rom. 14:23.

GOOD AND EVIL INTERIOR ACTS

295

not necessarily descend fully into the act of choice and execu­
tion, does nevertheless overflow on the act of choice and ex­
ecution, in the degree in which these acts tend to the goal to
which the intention is directed.
Corollary. In order that the entire goodness of intention
overflow on election and execution, the ways and means must
be directed, not only to the proximate object, but also to the
goal of the intention. Thus genuine Christians do not act
from natural precipitation, but keep even their exterior acts
directed to that last goal which is the object of charity.
ART. 9. GOODNESS OF WILL DEPENDS ON CONFORMITY
WITH god’s WILL

Authority comes from our Lord’s words in Gethsemane:
“Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.” The argument runs thus:
All action is judged by its relation to its standard, and the
divine will is the standard, the first rule and measure, of every
act of man’s will.7 What does this truth mean for men, pagans
particularly, who do not know the true God? Answer: If they
ordain their actions to the highest good which they know,
these actions are morally good, otherwise they are bad.
ART. 10. THIS CONFORMITY MUST BE FOUND IN WHAT IS

GOOD BY ITS VERY NATURE

Preliminaries
Objections. 1. We cannot will what we do not know, and
often we do not know what God wills. 2. When God wills the
condemnation of a man whom he foresees will die in mortal
sin, is this man bound to will his own damnation? 3. When
God wills my father’s death, would I not be unfilial if I also
willed that death?
Contrary objections. 1. That man has the right heart who
wills what God wills. 2. Since the will is differentiated by its
object, if man must conform his will to the divine will,
1 De veritate, q.23, a.7.

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then he must also conform his will to the object of God’s
will.
First thesis. Our will must be conformed to God’s will
formally, i.e., by willing the good-in-itself. Proof: Since man
must will everything for the sake of good-in-itself, he who
knowingly wills a good, not good-in-itself, formally wills evil.
Action is judged rather by its form than by its matter. But he
who aims at good-in-itself aims, at least implicitly, at the
supreme good.
Second thesis. Our will is not bound to conformity with the
divine will materially unless this object is known by precept
or prohibition.
This truth was not understood by the Quietists, who said
that conforming our will to the divine will means sacrificing
our own interests, even our eternal interests. Proof: Will
tends to its object as proposed by reason. Now one and the
same object can be good from the standpoint of God, the uni­
versal provider, and still not be good from the standpoint of
man as viator.
The death of a robber, to illustrate, is necessary to the
common good, but injurious to the robber’s family. The
judge wills the death of the murderer, but the murderer’s
wife, tvhose duty it is to care for the family, does not will her
husband’s death. Similarly, the universal provider permits
evils in view of greater good, to manifest His mercy and jus­
tice. Though God allows my father to die in heresy, I cannot
will that death. A fortiori I cannot will my own damnation.
Thus, in the object willed, though I seem to recede from the
divine will, I am indirectly in harmony with that will, since,
here and now, I will not what God wills, but what God wills
me to will.
Corollary. Opposite wills of different men can each be
good. St. Philip Neri and St. Charles Borromeo, attempting
to found an institute of priests, differed in their ideas, hence
each made his own foundation. The more saintly men are,

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297

the more must they agree to disagree, each insisting on what
God wills him to do.
Objections Analyzed

1. While sense-appetite can refuse what God wills, the ob­
ject of deliberate will must be conformed to God’s will. An­
swer: Conformed to God’s will as our reason for willing, yes;
but not necessarily in the material object, unless there be a
precept. When Christ said, “Let this chalice pass from Me,”
He shrank from death as material object, but embraced death
as willed by divine Providence.
2. The object formally willed is the most universal aspect
under which all particular reasons are contained. Now, since,
we are bound to conform in the formal object, we are bound
to conform also in the material object. Answer: The formal
object is the most universal reason, in causing, yes; in being,
no.
3. In the Lord’s Prayer we say, "Thy will be done on earth
as it is in heaven.” But in heaven the blessed are conformed
to the divine will also in the material object. Answer: The
blessed in heaven are conformed, even in the material object,
to God’s will because, knowing God’s will perfectly, they are
no longer bound by temporal considerations, since they ad­
here fixedly and immovably to God's will in everything, even
in the manifestation of His justice. But this privilege does
not belong to those still on earth.
4. But is it not better to be conformed to the divine will
also in the material object? Answer: Yes, when such conform­
ity is licit, in willing, for example, my own humiliation or
the advantage of religious obedience, which means formal
conformity even in the smallest details of life.
5. When does material conformity become illicit? First,
when the material object, sin, say, is only permitted by God
and not positively willed. Secondly, when we are dealing with
an opposite precept. Thus I am not allowed to will damna-

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tion, my own or that of another. Again, since charity binds
me, I am not allowed to will, either for myself or my neigh­
bor, an evil which would deprive us of confession or com­
munion.
6. Supposing we are not bound to material conformity,
may we continue in this attitude? Answer: If the thing is
irrevocably done, no. We can only be sad about it, and wish
it were not, if that were possible. But if the thing has not yet
been done, yes, we can and should labor against it. Even
saints, to whom God has revealed their death, should and
would take remedies against sickness.
In preaching, let us avoid subleties. Christians in general
understand that we may not will our own damnation, that
we must all labor toward salvation. Yet the distinctions in the
present article are necessary, particularly in confuting the
errors of the Quietists, on sacrificing our own good, our eter­
nal salvation. To our people let us urge conformity to the
divine will of sign, namely, the precepts and counsels of the
Gospel, the spirit of humility, mildness, and patience, and
blessings offered to the poor, to the meek, to the victims of
persecution.
7. When the deed in question is known by revelation, what
conformity is required? Answer: Although we cannot strive
against God’s will or permission, we must still strive against
the deed considered materially, as far as it depends on par­
ticular causes. Peter, after the revelation of his threefold
denial, was still bound to strive against sin. And Christ, fore­
knowing His own crucifixion, still prayed that the chalice
might pass from Him.

CHAPTER XVIII
Good and Evil in Exterior Acts (Q.20)
ART. 1. FIRST CONCLUSION. GOOD AND EVIL ARE FIRST

FOUND IN THE INTERIOR ACT

This is true, whether we consider the goal intended, or the

ways and means undertaken. The exterior act, being the effect
of the will, derives its good or evil from the will.
Second conclusion. But if we consider the exterior act in
its object as presented by reason, then its good or evil comes,
not from our will, but from the object which differentiates
our will. Good intention does not justify a medium that is in
itself evil.
This twofold conclusion is based on the distinction be­
tween differentiation by purpose and differentiation by ob­
ject. For instance, in almsgiving the exterior act, as object,
antecedes the will, whereas, as effect, it follows the will.
ART. 2. EXTERIOR GOOD AND EVIL IN RELATION

TO THE WILL

We must steer between two extremes: the subjectivism
which justifies even evil deeds by a good intention, and the
pragmatism which judges only by external results.
Four conclusions, i. The good or evil which the exterior
act derives from the purpose depends altogether on the will.
2. The good or evil which the exterior act derives from object
and circumstances depends on conformity with right reason.
Robbing the rich is wrong, even if it is done with a good in­
tention, such as almsgiving. 3. The exterior act is not simply
good unless the act of the will is good, in its purpose, in its
object, and in its principal circumstances. The exterior act is
«99

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simply evil if the will is evil, either by its subjective purpose,
or by its object, or by a principal circumstance.
ART. 3. INTERRELATIONS OF EXTERIOR ACT

TO INTERIOR ACT

Four conclusions. 1. These two acts, interior and exterior,
looked at morally, are one act, though physically they are dis­
tinct. The act of the will is the formal element, and the ex­
terior act is the material element, but form and matter form
one reality. 2. One and the same act can contain different
kinds of goodness or of evil. 3. Interior goodness or evil is not
identified with exterior goodness or evil except when good­
ness or evil arises merely from subjective purpose. 4. When
the exterior act is good by its object and circumstances, its
goodness differs from that interior goodness which arises from
subjective purpose.
ART. 4. DOES THE EXTERIOR ACT INCREASE THE GOODNESS

OR EVIL OF THE INTERIOR ACT?

This article carries great spiritual importance. Suppose a
man robbed of money meant for almsgiving: Is he less good
before God than if he had in fact given the alms? Again: Does
actual martyrdom add goodness to a man’s efficacious desire to
die for Christ? Or, once more, does actual theft increase the
evil of the desire to steal? 1
On this matter, some fail by defect; namely, the Quietists,
who hold that all exterior works are useless. Others err by ex­
cess, not considering the greater importance of the interior
act.
First conclusion. The exterior act, precisely as execution of
the interior act, does not add goodness or evil in relation to
the essential reward or punishment.
Authority. Abraham 2 is praised as if he had in fact immo1 De malo, q.2, ad 8um; Il Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a.3.
» Gen. 22:11.

GOOD AND EVIL EXTERIOR ACTS

301

lated his son. He who looks on a woman to lust after her has
already committed adultery with her in his heart.3
Reason. The exterior act, as object, has already been willed
internally. As a mere external act, it has only an extrinsic
goodness or evil, denominated from the goodness or evil of
the interior act. The interior act alone has intrinsic liberty,
whereas use of the members can be violently impeded. Virtue,
like grace and glory, is independent of human violence. “If
I be violated against my will, my crown of chastity is two­
fold.” «
But, let us note, in the absence of external occasion for
merit, also the will to merit is often absent, whereas the ex­
ternal occasion tends to renew the interior act, which is then
perfected in the exterior termination.
Second conclusion. The exterior act gives an accidental in­
crease to the interior act.
Reason. All tendencies are perfected by attaining their ter­
minus. Actual martyrdom does bring to the martyr, not only a
reward, but also the aureole of martyrs, which is an accidental
reward, an additional joy.
Are we bound to confess external acts of evil? Yes, because:
first, evil is ordinarily intensified and multiplied by the ex­
terior act; secondly, the exterior act is an evident sign of effi­
cacious will; thirdly, because of harm done to others; fourthly
by reason of greater adherence to sin, and a more difficult
cure. The confessor is not merely a judge, but also a physi­
cian.
This doctrine is exaggerated by the Quietists, who hold that
external acts, even though they proceed from an interior will,
are still useless. This doctrine is clearly wrong, because also
exterior acts are commanded by the laW· That man lacks good
will who can act and does not.
« Matt. 5:28.
«St. Lucy.

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ART. 5. DO RESULTS AFFECT EXTERIOR GOODNESS

AND EVIL?

The answer is affirmative, if the result has been foreseen
and intended, or if it should have been foreseen. But if the
result is accidental, and is in no way intended, it adds neither
goodness nor evil, since it is in no way voluntary.
ART. 6. CONCLUSION

One and the same physical act may be morally manifold.
Example: the act of walking, morally good by good intention,
may, by change of intention, become morally evil.

The Consequences of Human Acts in the Line of
Goodness and Evil (q. 2z)
Four conclusions. 1. Relation to its end makes the human
act either right or wrong. 2. Voluntary acts are either praise­
worthy or blameworthy. 3. By retributive justice, human acts
are either meritorious or demeritorious, in relation to men.
4. By retributive divine justice, human acts are meritorious
or demeritorious in relation to God, “who will bring all
things to judgment, be they good or bad.” 5 “Man is not or­
dained to the political community in his entire being, hence
his acts are not necessarily meritorious or demeritorious in
relation to the political community. But man in his entirety
is ordained toward God; hence his every act is meritorious or
demeritorious before God.” ’ “Man is a person, not merely
an individual. And persons are born to know and love God.” 7
0 Eccli. 11 :g.
eAd sum.
’ Etienne Gilson.

FOURTH PART
CONSCIENCE

CHAPTER XIX
Definition

and

Division

Definition. Conscience is a practical judgment, which pro­
ceeds from common moral principles, and which, here and
now, commands good and forbids evil.
Explanation. First. Conscience dictates and regulates both
choice and execution: of the three acts of prudence, namely,
counsel, judgment, command,1 the second, that is, judgment,
coincides with conscience that is right and certain, though
conscience exists imperfectly also in those who do not yet
have prudence acquired or infused. The phrase, “man must
form his conscience before he acts,” means that he must form
a right judgment.
Second. The subject of conscience is practical reason, not
the will nor the speculative intellect.
Third. It proceeds from common principles, furnished by
faith, or by natural reason, or by a moral conclusion. Con­
science is not identified with the habit (synderesis) of prime
moral principles. Conscience can err, synderesis cannot err.
Synderesis is a spark enkindled by the Creator in the minds of
all men, a spark which cannot be extinguished as long as man
retains his reason, and which remains in the condemned as
a worm that cannot die.
Further, speaking properly, neither moral science nor the
virtue of prudence is subject to error. Error arises, not from
these habits, but from some other source, such as precipita­
tion, which does not use moral science or prudence as it
should. Imprudent judgment comes, not from prudence, but
from imprudence. Conscience, on the contrary, can be erroilla-IIae, q.47, a. 8.
3°5

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neous, an erroneous application of true principles to a par­
ticular case.
Fourth. Conscience judges goodness or evil, either of the
act already done, or of the act to be done. Whatever con­
science, after due diligence, judges to be in harmony with
law, is subjectively good, even though it be objectively evil.
Thus conscience, even when it is invincibly erroneous, is the
subjective standard implanted by God. It is, as it were, the
voice of God, intimating to us how His law is to be applied in
this particular case.

DIVISIONS OF CONSCIENCE
OBJECTIVE DIVISION

A. True and right conscience.
1. In relation to obligation.
a. When binding, it is called commanding con­
science or forbidding conscience;
b. when not binding, it is called permitting con­
science or advising conscience.
2. In relation to act, it is called (a) antecedent con­
science (when it deals with an act not yet done), (b) conse­
quent conscience (when it deals with a deed already done or
omitted).
B. Erroneous conscience.
1. When it is excessive, it is called (a) scrupulous con­
science (futile fear of evil), (b) perplexed conscience (seeing
sin on both sides).
2. When it is defective, it is called (a) lax conscience
(judging too easily that there is no sin), (b) hardened con­
science (by sinful habit), (c) pharisaical conscience (making
great sins small, and small sins great).
SUBJECTIVE DIVISIONS

A. Certain conscience (acting prudently, without fear)
B. Uncertain conscience, which is called i. probable con-

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

307

science (judges, with fear, an act as licit or illicit), 2. dubious
conscience (not assenting to either side); it is either specula­
tively dubious or practically dubious.
Let us note that a conscience speculatively probable can
become practically certain, here and now, by a reflex prin­
ciple. To illustrate. I can judge speculatively that it is illicit
to confer baptism with rose-water. This is an abstract judg­
ment, speculativo-practical. But if I am dealing with an in­
fant about to die, and all other material be absent, I judge
practically that, here and now, under these circumstances, it
is right to confer baptism with this dubious material. In this
decision I am guided by the reflex principle: “Sacraments
are for the sake of men.” Hence in the case of necessity, I can
give baptism even with dubious matter.
TRUE AND RIGHT CONSCIENCE

1. Here we must solve some doubts. Is a conscience which
is practically true necessarily also right? The answer is affirma­
tive. Practical truth, rectitude, arises from conformity with
right intention according to law. But note that a judgment
can be speculatively true, and still be rash. Example. A judge
condemns to death a man whom he believes, but on slight
grounds, to be a murderer, or a traitor. The judge’s con­
science is speculatively true, but not morally correct.
2. Can a conscience that is practically true and right still
be speculatively false? The answer is affirmative. Speculative
truth means harmony with objective reality. But practical
truth, prudential truth, means conformity with a right inten­
tion, made with due diligence and attention. Now only this
practical truth is the object of conscience. But such a con­
science can be speculatively false. To illustrate. A judge, un­
der invincible ignorance, decides that this man is a murderer.
When Jacob took Lia for his wife, his error was speculative,
not practical.
3. But are we not arguing in a circle? Will and intention
are right only by conformity with right reason. The answer

BEATITUDE

3o8

is, no. Practical judgment, the prudential judgment, dealing
only with ways and means, is true by its subjective conform­
ity with right will, with right intention. But this right will
itself, this right intention, means objective conformity with
moral science, and this means conformity with reality, with
human nature, with natural law. Let us note the three levels
of truth.
1. Speculative truth, objective conformity to reality, in
synderesis and moral knowledge. Example: Temperance is
man’s duty.
2. Truth in the will, regulated by the moral science, say, of
temperance.
3. Practical truth, conformity with the right intention.
Here and now, I must observe the just medium between ex­
cess and defect.
Question. In the development of moral virtue, temperance,
for example, is the virtue regulated immediately by moral
science, or by initial prudence? Answer. In relation to the
goal, initial temperance is regulated by synderesis and moral
knowledge.2 But in relation to ways and means, initial tem­
perance is regulated by prudence. Causes are mutually causes.
Further, the four cardinal virtues grow together, since,
whether initial or perfect, they are inseparable, and grow
simultaneously, like the four fingers on one hand.3
PRINCIPLES OF CONSCIENCE

1. Man is bound to have a right conscience, a conscience in
harmony with the law of God, the voice of God. Hence con­
science must be formed by serious study of the laws which
govern life. But ordinary diligence suffices.
2. Supposing conscience to be right, man is bound to fol­
low that conscience, whether it commands or forbids. Con­
science, being the application of the law, here and now, is as
binding as is the law itself.
2 Ibid., a.6.
3 la-IIae, q.66, a.s.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

309

Modem manuals give little space to the virtues, in particu­
lar to the virtue of prudence. Thus, in favor of practicality,
they neglect the deeper reasons for the truth which they de­
fend. Much of the doctrine of St. Thomas on conscience is
found in his treatise on the virtue of prudence.
IS MAN BOUND TO OBEY AN ERRONEOUS CONSCIENCE?

Preliminaries. Synderesis, the knowledge of first principles,
cannot err, but conscience, the application of those principles,
can err. Examples. A man who concludes from Christ’s words
on swearing that he cannot, here and now, take an oath be­
fore a tribunal, even if legitimate authority commands the
oath. Again. A man who concludes from the law of charity
that he is bound, here and now, to tell a lie in order to save
his neighbor’s life. In such and similar cases conscience,
though erroneous, is still binding. If the error is vincible, the
man is bound to renounce the error before acting. But he is
not allowed to act against his erroneous conscience, even if
the error is vincible.
Authority. That which does not come from faith (i.e., from
conscience) is sin.4
Reason. The will is evil when it aims at an object pro­
posed by reason as evil. An object proposed by conscience,
even by erroneous conscience, is an object proposed by rea­
son. Hence the will, if not in harmony with conscience, true
or erroneous, is always evil.
Goodness or evil in the will comes from the object as pro­
posed by reason, because nothing can be willed by the will
unless it is foreknown by reason. Further, by definition, con­
science is the proximate and immediate standard of human
acts, because it applies the law here and now, dictating that
the act is either an evil to be avoided, or a good to be done.
Hence we are never allowed to act against conscience, even
though conscience be erroneous. Examples. If erroneous rea­
son proposes abstinence from fornication as evil, the will dis‘ Rom. 14:23.

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cordant with this dictate is evil. Again. When belief in Christ
is proposed as evil by erroneous reason, the will is related to
this belief as evil, not because the belief is evil in itself, but
because it is evil as apprehended here and now by reason.
Briefly, the argument runs thus: That man sins who wills sin
and is attached to it. But he who acts against his conscience,
even if it be erroneous, wills sin, because he wills a thing
which he judges to be a sin.
Objections Analyzed

1. Reason that errs does not come from the eternal law,
and therefore is not binding. Answer: Reason that errs comes
from the eternal law, not by objective truth, but by subjective
judgment, and is, even though erroneous, still binding.
2. The precept of reason in error is against a higher law.
Answer: Is against a higher law, and this opposition is known,
I deny; this opposition is not known, I grant.
3. A man can believe invincibly that to love God above all
things is a sin. Answer: This statement we simply deny. A
man who knows that love for God means inclination toward
God cannot simultaneously think that such love is against
God.
Corollary. One who thinks, erroneously, that the day is a
day of fast, and still acts against his conscience, sins formally,
because he scorns a precept which he thinks to exist. One who
thinks that Christianity is not revealed by God cannot legiti­
mately believe, because he has no sufficient credibility and
his act would be against prudence. But if he thinks that the
divine origin of Christianity is seriously probable, he is bound
to inquire and to pray.
THE WILL IN HARMONY WITH ERRONEOUS REASON
IS GOOD

First conclusion. The will, if it agrees with invincibly erro­
neous reason is good. Proof. Good and evil are in an act as
they are willed. But under invincible error, evil is not willed
as evil, but is willed as eood. Conscience, invincibly in error.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

311

while it is speculatively false, is practically true. The sin in
this case is not formal, but only material.
Corollary. A man who, under invincible error, thinks it his
duty to tell a lie (e.g., to save his friend), would commit sin
by refusing to lie.
Second conclusion. We are not allowed to follow a con­
science that is vincibly erroneous. Proof. Good and evil de­
pend on voluntariness. But vincible error does not make the
evil involuntary, because the man exposes himself to the peril
of sin. He must put away his erroneous conscience, by prayer,
deliberation, and counsel. If he must act, let him choose the
less probably evil.
Doubt. In what sense is it true to say that we must revere
every man’s conscience? Answer: From the truth that con­
science is always binding it does not follow that we can follow
conscience if its error can be cured. Rather, we must reform
and correct that conscience. Otherwise we fall into liberalism,
that is, into denial of divine law. This denial, at least implic­
itly, speaks thus: “Whether God speaks in the Gospel, whether
Catholic doctrine is revealed or not, is of little importance; I
intend to enjoy my liberty.’’ Such a position gives to error
the rights that belong to truth alone, to erroneous sects the
rights that belong to revelation alone. The pretext of intel­
lectual liberty minimizes, even destroys, the supremacy of
truth. Under the pretext of charity we leave the field to un­
believers who themselves fight against the faith. People begin
to say that no religion can sufficiently manifest its own divine
origin. Man feels that he is excused from sin when he says:
“I do not believe” or “I cannot believe,” 5 Liberty or error
has become liberty of perdition.
CONSCIENCE ON THE PART OF THE SUBJECT

On Certain Conscience

First conclusion. We are never allowed to act with a con­
science that is practically doubtful, or probable, or even prac5 D. 1690. Diet, de théol. cath., s. v. Conscience.

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BEATITUDE

tically more probable. This is the common conclusion, even
among probabilists.
Authority. Again St. Paul’s text: “What is not from faith
(that is, from good conscience), is sin.” St. Augustine: “To do
a deed, uncertain whether it is a sin, is certainly a sin.” 8 St.
Alphonse: 7 “He who acts with a dubious conscience, com­
mits a sin of the same species and gravity as the matter on
which he doubts, because he who exposes himself to the dan­
ger of sin has already sinned: He who loves danger will perish
therein.” 8 We add that the sin is less grave than if he were
certain.
Reason, i. An act against prudence is sinful. But he who
acts with a conscience practically dubious, or practically prob­
able, or more probable, does not act prudently, for the act of
prudence is always practically true and certain.
2. He w'ho acts thus exposes himself to the proximate dan­
ger of sinning formally. By doing what he reasonably suspects
to be a sin, he virtually wills sin, just as a man who would
take a drink, though very probably not poisoned, would im­
prudently expose himself to the danger of death.
Second conclusion. Indirect moral certitude suffices, if di­
rect certitude is unattainable. Moral certitude differs from
metaphysical and physical certitude. Metaphysical certitude
excludes all possibility of error. Examples: Good is to be
done, God is to be worshiped. Physical certitude excludes er­
ror in the physical order. Examples: I shall die, the sun will
rise tomorrow. Moral certitude is based on human habits and
dispositions. Example: I am certain that my friend, whom I
know perfectly well, is not, here and now, telling me a lie.
But this moral certitude is twofold: speculative or practical.
Speculative certitude means harmony with objective reality,
as known by reliable testimony. Example: This man is a mur­
derer, hence it is right and just that the judge inflict on this
man the punishment of death.
• De bapt. contra Donatistas, c.6, n.6.
T Theol. mor., Bk. I, n.22.
8 Eccli. 3:27.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

313

Practical certitude means harmony with right intention
and due diligence. Example: Obedience to a man whom, mis­
takenly, we hold to be legitimately elected. This practical
certitude can exist, with or without speculative certitude. If
speculative certitude is absent, practical certitude, based on
reflex principles, is always attainable. Example: In doubt
whether a superior’s command is licit, the presumption
stands for the superior.
This wider certitude may be called “probable certitude’’ if,
following Aristotle and St. Thomas, we make “probable” the
equivalent of “commonly admitted.”
Why does our thesis say that practical certitude, even if im­
perfect, is ordinarily sufficient? St. Thomas answers: “We
must not seek for the same kind of certitude in all matters.
The field of prudence is that of particular and contingent
things.” 0 Now in this field no certitude can silence all ques­
tioning. We add the restriction “ordinarily speaking,” be­
cause in certain cases the use of probability is not licit.
» Ha-IIae, q.4.7, a.9, ad 211m.

CHAPTER XX
Dubious Conscience

Dubious conscience means a suspension of our intellect, as­

senting to neither part of a contradiction. Probabilists use
the term “probable opinion’’ to express what is, in reality,
only a doubt, a suspension of judgment.

DIVISIONS OF DOUBT
A. Objective doubt is
1. by its nature either (a) a dubium juris, i.e., is there,
or is there not, a law in this matter? or (b) a dubium facti,
e., is the alleged fact true or not true? or
i.
2. by its universality (a) a speculative doubt (is paint­
ing, say, a servile work?) or (b) a practical doubt (am I al­
lowed, say, to read this book here and now?)
B. Subjective doubt is positive doubt, i.e., with serious rea­
son pro and con, or negative doubt, i.e., a mere hesitation,
for slight and insufficient reason (e.g., a priest, who conscien­
tiously fulfills his daily office, but cannot recall explicitly
whether he said Sext today).
Thesis. We are never allowed to act with a conscience that
is practically doubtful. Positive doubts must be removed by
reflex principles. This conclusion, held by nearly all Catholic
theologians, including the probabilists, is a mere corollary of
the preceding conclusion, namely, that to act licitly we need
a conscience that is practically certain.
Proofs, i. “That which does not come from faith (i.e., from
persuasion of licitness) is sin.” 2. To act with dubious con­
science is a sin against prudence. 3. Such action exposes the
agent to the danger of sin.
5*4

DUBIOUS CONSCIENCE

315

Corollary. Sin thus committed is of the same species as sin
committed with a certain conscience. He who doubts whether
his contemplated act is perjury commits the sin of perjury.
Interpretatively he wills the sin to which he exposes himself.
But do not scrupulous people often act with fear of sin, and
yet do not sin? Answer: Under a fear that is merely specula­
tive and inconsequential, yes. Under a fear that is practical
and reasonable, no. Let such victims simply obey their con­
fessors.
HOW TO SOLVE PRACTICAL DOUBTS

Doubt can be solved in two ways: first directly, (by con­
sultation, by reading, by reflection); secondly, if the direct
way is impossible, then indirectly, by the aid of reflex prin­
ciples. But if even this cannot solve the doubt and if action
cannot be deferred, then, to exclude the peril of sin, we must
choose the safer part, i.e., the part which includes observance
of the doubtful law.
THE CHIEF REFLEX PRINCIPLES
Reflex principles are general norms which solve the ques­
tion, not directly and intrinsically, but indirectly and extrinsically.
First principle. A dubious law does not bind. This prin­
ciple was exaggerated by the laxists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini), who applied it without exception in all the fields of
action, whereas more rigid probabilists (many Dominicans
of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century
Concina and Batuzzi) rejected this principle entirely. The
Holy See, under Innocent XI, in the year 1679, before the
birth of St. Alphonsus (1696-1787) condemned the applica­
tion of this principle in four lines of action: first, the validity
of the sacraments; secondly, in matters necessary for salvation
(acts of faith and charity); thirdly, in dealing with certain
rights of a third person; fourthly, when we are bound to

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BEATITUDE

avoid grave peril of spiritual or temporal harm, either to our­
selves or to others.
With these four exceptions, this principle is a legitimate
way of solving practical doubts. Probabilists, indeed, hold
that this principle by itself suffices by itself alone, whereas
other theologians demand the addition of the principle, that
the condition of the possessor is the better. With St. Alphonsus we say that a dubious law does not bind if we are dealing
with a doubt in the strict sense, i.e., if there is equal probabil­
ity that the law was never passed, because in this case liberty
is in possession. But equal probability that the law has ceased
does not suffice, because then the law is in possession.
Second principle. When there is doubt we must stand on
that side where stands the presumption, i.e., arguments and
signs which prevail until the contrary is clearly proved. This
principle has many equivalent formulas, i. Man is presumed
to be good until he is proved to be evil. 2. Crime is not to be
presumed, but to be proved. 3. In doubt, we must favor the
accused. 4. In doubt concerning the rectitude of a superior’s
command, presumption stands for the superior. 5. In doubt,
presumption stands for the validity of the act (for the validity
of religious profession if, for instance, the religious begins to
doubt whether he had sufficient intention and sufficient
knowledge). 6. In doubt, presumption stands for the usual
and the ordinary.
Third principle. In doubt the condition of the possessor
is the better. This principle, the foundation of aequiprobabilism, taught by St. Alphonsus, finds particular application in
the field of justice. Men generally watch over the possessions
they are entitled to, and positive law favors the possessor, that
lawsuits may not become interminable. Thus far all theolo­
gians agree. But the probabilists hold that this principle is
valid only in matters of justice, whereas the aequiprobabilists
extend it also to other fields.
According to St. Alphonsus, law and liberty can be consid­
ered two possessors. The law binds until it ceases to be law.

DUBIOUS CONSCIENCE

317

But liberty acts freely until a new law is promulgated. Thus
man is not strictly bound to confess a sin that is dubiously
mortal, since liberty is in possession. But if he is certain that
the sin is mortal, whereas he doubts seriously that he has ever
confessed it, he is bound to confession, because the law of
confession is in possession, a law which he does not satisfy
by a dubious fulfillment. When liberty is in doubtful posses­
sion, the law is certainly in possession, and vice versa.
Subordination of reflex principles. All reflex principles can
be reduced to one: Find that line where presumption is in
possession. The principle of dubious law holds good only
where there is a true presumption for liberty, where, namely,
we doubt, not whether the law has ceased, but whether it ever
existed. The reflex principle of presumption has many ad­
vantages: it is admitted by theologians, it is easily understood
by unlettered people, it operates in the civil courts, it was
common in all schools before the controversies concerning
probabilism, and we may hope, by its aid, to end the inter­
minable quarrels between different moral systems. Now let
us put the eight reflex principles in proper subordination.
1. In doubt, stand where stands presumption.
2. In doubt, the condition of the possessor is the better,
because there stands presumption.
3. In doubt, favor the accused, because for fiim stands pre­
sumption.
4. In doubt, presumption stands on the side of the superior.
5. In doubt, follow daily and ordinary experience.
6. In doubt, stand for the validity of the act.
7. In doubt, amplify the favorable, restrict the unfavorable.
8. A doubtful law does not bind, i.e., a law that is doubtful
in its very existence.
Question. What relation is there between these reflex prin­
ciples and the doctrine of St. Thomas, who bases conscience
on the truth of prudential judgment, which means conform­
ity with right intention? Answer: These reflex principles are
useful in establishing this conformity. Conformity with right

3j8

BEATITUDE

intention, he says, moves the intellect to due diligence in find­
ing the law and the law’s application to the here and now.
Where direct principles are lacking, we fall back on reflex
principles, i.e., we ask on what side stands presumption. But
what are we to do when all these principles do not go beyond
probability? We can still attain practical certitude by con­
formity with a good and virtuous will. As man is, so man
wills. The chaste man judges rightly in matters of chastity.
Rectitude in moral science descends in vital manner from
right will down to practical judgment, in the here and now.

CHAPTER XXI
Probable Conscience

PRELIMINARIES
Opinion is an act of the intellect which favors one line of a

contradiction while fearing that the other may be erroneous,
e., adherence must outweigh fear of error. An opinion ethi­
i.
cally probable must rest on a good foundation, worthy of ac­
ceptance by a prudent man, even though there be fear of
error. But the term “good foundation” varies with differ­
ent systems: probabiliorism, probabilism, aequiprobabilism.
Probabilism holds that a less probable opinion suffices, if only
it is seriously probable. Probabiliorists reply: An opinion less
probable, faced with a more probable opinion, is not, prop­
erly speaking, here and now probable, since the fear of error
is greater than the inclination to adhere, and thus the opinion
is merely voluntary, not rational. To solve this difficulty, let
us note the divisions of probable opinion.
A. In view of the object, opinion is
1. absolutely probable (i.e., in itself, where fear is based
on lack of sufficient proof);
2. comparatively probable (i.e., as faced with an op­
posite probability, which engenders fear). An opinion com­
paratively probable may be most probable, or more probable,
or equally probable, or less probable.
B. In view of the motive, opinion is
1. intrinsically probable (i.e., as seen by reason), or
2. extrinsically probable (i.e., as based on the authority
of approved teachers).
What is meant by “the safer opinion?” The safer opinion is
3>9

32O

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that which favors the law. The less safe opinion is that which
favors liberty. Hence the more probable opinion is not al­
ways the safer.
What is meant by "the more probable opinion?” It is that
opinion which rests on the more solid reasons. Here appears
clearly the distinction between probabilism and probabiliorism. Probabiliorism holds that the foundation necessary for
an opinion ethically probable is not to be found except in a
more probable opinion, because the opinion less probable,
when faced with an opinion more probable, is no longer ethi­
cally probable. If proposition A is to me probably true, then
proposition B, opposed to it contradictorily, is not probable,
but probably false. When probabilists argue that the opinion
less probable can still be accepted as seriously probable, the
probabiliorists reply thus: Opinion, by its very nature, cannot
abstract from the fear raised by the opposite opinion. Hence
an opinion wherein fear of error predominates is not ration­
ally and ethically probable, and can be accepted only by going
against the virtue of prudence.

THE USE OF PROBABILITY
First conclusion. The use of probability is illicit when
there is danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided. Proof of
this thesis, commonly admitted, lies in the condemnation of
laxism.1 Probability is condemned in dealing with the four
following cases.
1. In conferring the sacraments. As far as we can, we
are bound to safeguard the validity of the sacraments; other­
wise we are in danger of inflicting grave harm on our neigh­
bor, and of being irreverent.
2. In assuring salvation. In peril of eternal damnation, the
safer part must be chosen. The following proposition has
been condemned: The infidel is excused from infidelity if he
is led by a less probable opinion.2 The unbeliever is bound
1 D. 1151, 1154.
2 Ibid., 1154.

PROBABLE CONSCIENCE

321

to search for the truth and to pray. He sins against faith if he
does not use the means necessary for reaching it. Thus St.
Alphonsus.
3. In the certain rights of a third person. We must favor
the accused man as long as crime has not been proved. Even
in civil cases the judge is bound by the more probable opin­
ion. The laxist view, that he can follow an opinion less prob­
able, has been condemned.3
4. In dangers spiritual or temporal. We are not allowed,
without grave necessity, to run the risk of probable death
(say, by taking a doubtfully poisoned drink).
These four cases limit the reflex principle that a dubious
law does not bind. The general principle runs thus: Where
law and obligation are certain, the principle of probability
does not apply.

A THOMISTIC FORMULATION*
Probability is illicit in matters where the measure of action
is an objective medium, that is, correspondence, not to the
interior dispositions of the agent, but to external reality. My
neighbor’s rights are an objective medium not dependent on
my conscience. If 1 owe him one hundred dollars, no prob­
ability can change that amount.
By contrast, in matters of fortitude and temperance, we
determine the golden mean, not objectively, but subjectively,
by the agent’s interior dispositions, passions, and age. The
measure of food and drink varies with age, season, and occu­
pation. Here lies the field of prudence, and prudence oper­
ates among probabilities. But, let us repeat, the objective
medium which rules justice, rules likewise the four cases
treated above, where the safer part must always be chosen.
Second conclusion. Probabilism is licit when we are not
dealing with matters excepted in the foregoing conclusion.
Here lies the field of prudence, which measures the proper
8 Ibid., 1152. 1126.
♦ Ia-IIae, q.6o, a. 2; Ila-IIae, q.58, a. 10; q.57, a.i.

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proportion of act to agent. But here, too, we find extremes
that have been condemned, namely, rigorism and laxism.
Rigorism says that, in doubt, the safer side, the side which
favors law, is always to be followed. Rigorism 5 forbids us to
follow even the most probable of probable opinions, even
when the very existence of the law is dubious. How unreason­
able! Such a system would make life itself intolerable. Lax­
ism e speaks thus: For prudent action, a tenuous probability
suffices. But, we ask, is it a mark of prudent men to be guided
by tenuous probabilities? A conscience thus guided would be
a conscience practically doubtful, and hence illicit. Excluding
these extremes, we find three systems admitted in the Church.
1. Probabiliorism, which will depart from a safe view only
for a more probable view. It urges two reasons. First, the less
probable is not really probable. Secondly, we would thus be
in danger of transgressing the law.
2. Aequiprobabilism, which says we are allowed to aban­
don the safe view when an equally probable view is in posses­
sion. Hence, in doubt concerning the existence of a law, we
can follow the aequiprobabilism in favor of liberty, and in
doubt concerning the cessation of law, we are to follow the
opinion equally probable in favor of the law. This system,
impugned by Billuart and admitted by Father Beaudouin, is
really in harmony with the views of St. Thomas, and is sup­
ported by the great authority of St. Alphonsus, who is a doc­
tor of the Church. This system is based on the principles of
possession and presumption, perfected by prudence acting in
conformity with right will and right intention. As man is, so
man wills.
3. Probabilism, which holds that we are allowed to follow
any view that is seriously probable, since a dubious law does
not bind. This rule, they add, is not a norm of perfection,
but tire lowest degree of obligation.
Here we must demur. This system offends, not only per» D. 1293.
»Ibid., 1153.

PROBABLE CONSCIENCE

323

fection, but the very essence of prudence, which is not a mere
counsel, but a strict obligation. The prudent man, since he is
bound to act licitly, is likewise bound to seek and follow the
truth, or then to stay as closely as he can to the truth. To act
otherwise is to favor laxism.
Against probabilism stands the great authority of St. Alphonsus, who, beginning as a probabilist, ended by confuting
probabilism. Liberty, against a law in possession, is not a lib­
erty which liberates. While we are free to choose a lesser good,
we are not free to look upon a probable obligation as no
obligation.

FIFTH PART
THE PASSIONS

CHAPTER XXII
The Passions in General (q. 22-25)

Passions may be considered, psychologically, or morally, or
ascetically.
1. Psychologically. Passion is a motion of the sense-appetite,
arising from the imagination of good or evil, accompanied by
corporeal transmutation. Moderns often give to passions the
name of emotions, restricting the word “passion” to desig­
nate vehement or prolonged emotions.
Sense-appetite is the formal element of passion; the corpo­
real mutation is the material element.

DIVISION OF PASSIONS
Passions are either concupiscible or irascible.
A. Concupiscible passions are caused by
1. a sense-good, which attracts (a) simply, and is called
love, (b) when absent, and is called desire; (c) when present,
and is called gladness.
2. a sense-evil, which repels (a) simply, and is called
hatred; (b) when absent, and is called aversion; (c) when pres­
ent, and is called sadness.
B. Irascible passions are caused by
1. a sense-good that is difficult, but (a) attainable, and is
called hope; or (b) unattainable, and is called despair.
2. a sense-evil that is arduous, but (a) still easy to repel
(audacity); or hard to repel (fear); or present, and calling for
vengeance (anger).
First among all passions, and the origin of all others, is
sense-love. Without love, no desire and no joy, no hatred, no
aversion, no sadness. Again, in the irascible passions, without
327

BEATITUDE

328

love there is neither hope nor despair, neither fear nor audac­
ity, no rising up in anger.
2. Moral view. Here we meet a twofold error, one by de­
fect, and the other by excess. The hedonists hold that all pas­
sions are morally legitimate expansions of our nature. Thus
Aristippus among the ancients, Fourrier and Saint Simon
among the moderns. By excess, the Stoics condemn all pas­
sions, as being opposed to reason and nature, and hence to be
eradicated. Aristotle holds that passions in themselves are
neither morally good nor morally evil, though some of them
are naturally laudable, e.g., commiseration and modesty.
They become morally good when they are commanded or
directed by reason, otherwise they become morally evil. St.
Thomas 1 evolves this doctrine under three headings.
a) Passions in themselves are indifferent to moral good or
evil, since morality depends on the laws discovered by reason.
Anger uncontrolled by reason is bad, but subject to reason
(in Christ, say), it is good.
b) Passions become voluntary by relation to reason. Un­
regulated by reason, they degenerate into vice (pleasure be­
comes gluttony or lust).
c) Passions, commanded and moderated by right will, are
aids to virtue. Thus we find them in Christ, who felt sadness
even unto death, and whose anger drove the moneylenders
out of the temple. Rejoice, says St. Paul, with those who re­
joice, weep with those who weep. But when unregulated, or
when commanded by evil will, passions become the roots of
vices, especially of capital vices.
ART. 3. DOES PASSION INCREASE OR DIMINISH THE

GOODNESS OR THE EVIL OF AN ACT?

(Q. 24)

It might seem that passion always diminishes the goodness
of the act, first, because passion perturbs reason; secondly, be­
cause we must imitate God in whom there are no passions;
1 la-IIae, q.24, a. 1, 2.

PASSIONS IN GENERAL

329

thirdly, since he who sins in passion sins less, it seems that he
who does good passionately does a lesser good.
Conclusion. The perfection of moral good requires the co­
operation of man’s sense-appetite.
Proof. Moral good grows by the number of its cooperating
sources, and sense-appetite, subject to reason, is such a source.
Passion that antecedes reason is not voluntary, and such
passion may indeed cloud the judgment and diminish re­
sponsibility. But when passion follows upon deliberate
choice, it does increase either the goodness or the evil of the
action. Perfection requires that all passions be regulated by
reason, just as are the external members. My heart and my
flesh, says the Psalmist, exult in the living God. Thus forti­
tude established a just medium between the defects of fear
and the excesses of audacity. Saints are men of strong pas­
sions, but passions inspired by zeal for the glory of God and
the salvation of souls.
Ascetical view. The passions, in themselves morally indif­
ferent, are not to be eradicated, as if they were vices or sins,
but are to be regulated, moderated, educated, to be like
trained horses driven by reason and faith.
Corollary. Training must be proportioned to its purpose.
Even extreme anger or sadness or fear need not go beyond
right reason. Moses was very angry at the adoration of the
calf. The zeal and indignation of Phineas was praiseworthy.
Heli was not sufficiently indignant against his children.
Jeremias was often very sad, and rightly so. Christ drove the
sellers from the Temple, was sad unto death, wept over
Jerusalem, moaned in spirit.

CHAPTER XXIII
The Passions in Particular (q.
love

26-49)

(q. 26-28)

Love is complacency in good. It is divided as follows:

A. Elicited love, which follows either
1. intellective cognition, in the form of friendship (I
love my neighbor for his sake), or in the form of concupiscence
(I love for my own advantage); or
2. sense-cognition, either in the form of animal friend­
ship (the hen protecting her brood), or in the form of animal
concupiscence (the hungry dog seeking a bone).
B. Innate love, which antecedes all cognition and is identi­
fied with the natural inclination of each created being toward
its own proper object (the love of a falling stone for its cen­
ter). Modern authors express this innate natural love by such
terms as attraction, affinity, coherence.
Sources of love. The chief source, the object and motive, is
sense-good. Two conditions are added: first, cognition, be­
cause the object moves only as it is known; secondly, simili­
tude, since every living thing loves that which is like itself.
Actual similitude causes the love of friendship, whereby two
become one, either by nature or by cooperation. Potential
similitude causes rather the love of concupiscence, as found,
say, in the disciple toward his master, whose knowledge he
desires for himself, whereas the master’s love is that of friend­
ship: as examples, think of Plato loving Aristotle, of Christ
loving Peter.
But if, so runs an objection, bricklayers hate one another,
similitude is not the cause of love. Similitude, we answer, re330

PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR

331

mains by nature the source of love, while it may still, as an
accidental impediment, be the source of dislike and hatred.
Quarrels arise, not from similitude, but from pride.
The effects of love. St. Thomas notes six effects. 1. Union.
This union is either affective, constituted by love itself, even
though the object be absent, or real union, by the presence
of the object loved. Affective love moves the lover to seek
real union. Thus love for God moves men to desire the
beatific vision.
2. Adherence. The lover tries to penetrate into the interior
of the loved object, to know it, to find his delight in it.
3. Ecstasy. The lover is drawn outside himself, first by
knowledge beyond his proper measure, secondly by affection,
whereby he goes forth from himself. This is true even in the
love of concupiscence, but much more in the love of friend­
ship. Ecstasy in the saints is a normal effect of their burning
love for God.
4. Zeal is an ardor against everything that is opposed to
love. In the form of envy, it belongs to the love of con­
cupiscence. In the form of zeal for God’s glory and the salva­
tion of souls, it belongs to the love of friendship.
5. The lover’s lesion. Richard of St. Victor seems to say
that all intense love is violent. But the love of supreme good,
even when intense, is not in itself violent, though it may, by
concomitant passion, become violent and inflict a wound on
the lover. Similar effects of love appear in “melting of the
heart,” that the beloved can enter in; in fruition, if the be­
loved is present; in languor, if the beloved is absent; in
fervor, an intense desire of possession.
6. General influence. Love, the root of all affections, pene­
trates and animates the lover’s entire life and activity.
Hatred (q. 29) is aversion from evil. It is opposed to love
and takes on two forms: abomination (e.g., of cruelty), and
enmity (willing evil to a foe). Hatred is born of love, since
only something which we love can make its contrary hateful.
Desire (q. 30), often called concupiscence, is affection to­

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BEATITUDE

ward an absent good. Its opposite is flight. Can concupiscence
be infinite? St. Thomas distinguishes. Natural concupiscence
(e.g., for food or for sexual pleasure) can never be infinite
actually, though it can be infinite potentially: “He who
drinks of this water shall thirst again.” But unnatural con­
cupiscence, which follows, not sense, but wrong reason, is
altogether infinite, since reason has no bounds, and can seek
infinite beatitude, not in the infinite God, but in finite things,
for instance, in riches. Thus a man may desire to be rich
without any limit. Reason apprehends the universal, hence
man’s concupiscence, when disordered, is greater than con­
cupiscence in brutes, because man, even in dealing with
lower goods, seeks, as it were unconsciously, an infinite good.
Such love often turns into hatred, because finite good cannot
give infinite beatitude.
Delight (q. 31-34). Delectation is the rest which follows
possession. When possession comes by the intellect, this rest
and quiet is called joy. This rest in the possessed good is not
cessation from all act, but is a state of complacency in the
good attained. Delight is something positive, not merely
cessation of pain, as was maintained by Epicurus, Kant,
Schopenhauer, and other pessimists.
Plato says that delight is motion rather than rest. St.
Thomas 1 answers: Since motion is an uncompleted act, de­
light would not be the ultimate perfection. But experience
shows that delight, especially intellectual delight, joy in truth
at last attained, is the ultimate emotion. St. Thomas adds that
Plato failed to distinguish the ultimate objective end, which
is God, from the ultimate subjective end, which is the pos­
session of God, a possession which is followed by supreme
delight and joy. Here lies the golden middle way between
Epicurus and Plato. Delight is not cessation of pain, nor
motion toward good, but rest in the goal now attained.
Is intellectual delight greater than sense-delight? In itself,
yes, because it is more noble, solid, and penetrating. But in
1Q-34> a· 8·

PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR

333

relation to man in his present state, sense-delight is greater,
because it is more easily experienced, particularly in its
corporeal effects, in its remedial power against pain and sad­
ness. Hence men who cannot reach spiritual joy, which be­
longs to the virtuous, turn aside to corporeal delight.
Scholion. What is tire source of those abnormal perversions
which sometimes afflict men, such as delight in eating dust or
charcoal, or in bestial and sodomistic intercourse? These
corruptions of nature arise from one of two sources: a bodily
disease or evil dispositions of soul.2
Causes of delight (q. 32). Six causes are assigned: 1. har­
monious activity; 2. variety, change; 3. hope; 4. memory; 5.
congenial association; 6. wonder and admiration. But these
six sources are not exhaustive. Active love of neighbor is a
never-ending source of joy. Service to fellow men reacts on
our own legitimate self-love, teaches us to grow in over­
flowing charity, enables us to penetrate this teaching of
Christ, quoted by St. Paul: It is better to give than to receive.
The effects of delight (q. 33): expansion of the heart; thirst
(“he who drinks of this water will thirst again”); hindrance to
the use of reason, if the delight is corporeal and vehement.
But, in general, delight is the perfection of operation, as
beauty is of youth.
Delights, good and evil (q. 34). Delight is good if its object
is good and reasonable, otherwise it is evil. The highest kind
of delight is delight in truth, especially delight in God pos­
sessed in eternal life. Man is judged good or evil by the ob­
jects that give him joy. He who rejoices in earthly things is
earthly, he who rejoices in heavenly things is heavenly. He
who rejoices in God is God’s son and God’s friend.
Sadness and pain (q. 35-39). Pain is a motion of the sense­
appetite, arising from the apprehension of present evil. It
must not be confused with physical evil, which is a privation
in the organism. Pain is something positive, a motion of the
sense-appetite, opposed to delight. Sadness is a special kind of
2Q.31, a.7.

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BEATITUDE

pain, as joy is a species of delight. Contemplation itself is
faced with no contrary sadness, though it may be impeded
by bodily weariness.
Speaking per se, the desire of delight is stronger than
aversion from sadness, because good is willed for its own sake,
but evil is shunned as a privation of good. All natural mo­
tion is more intense as it approaches the goal. But per ac­
cidens we shun sadness more than we desire delight, since
sadness impedes every kind of delight. Similarly mental pain
is in itself keener than bodily pain, just as spiritual delight is
in itself higher than sense-delight. But quoad nos the contrary
is true, because exterior pain is felt more keenly.
There are four species of sadness: (a) compassion, which
is sadness for our neighbor’s evil; (b) envy, sadness at our
neighbor’s good; (c) anxiety, which sinks the soul in present
evil; (d) sloth, which weighs man down in the face of duty
that seems to be too heavy. From sloth comes laxity, intel­
lectual or spiritual.
Causes of sadness. We distinguish four causes: (a) loss; (b)
concupiscence, whereby delay saddens us; (c) love, desiring a
union not yet attained; (d) external power, that keeps us
from our goal.
Effects of pain. Pain (a) lessens the power to learn; (b)
weighs on the soul; (c) weakens operation or even impedes.
Remedies of sadness. Sadness is mitigated in many ways:
by opposite joys, by weeping and mourning, by the com­
passion of friends, by sleep, by the contemplation of truth
and future beatitude.
Sadness, good and evil. Though sadness is in itself a kind
of evil, sadness over sin is good. Blessed are they who mourn.
Such sadness acts like medicine. The greatest evil is not the
sadness of punishment, but the sadness of guilt. From the
concupiscible passions we now pass to the irascible passions.
Hope and despair (q. 40). Hope arises from a loved object,
hard to attain. Its opposite is despair, which considers at­

PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR

335

tainment impossible. Hope, properly speaking, rests on man’s
own power, whereas expectation looks to help from others.
Hope is abundant in youth, and in the state of inebriety, in
those who lack experience of difficulties, easily supposing they
will obtain what they want. Descartes, in his youth, fondly
hoped to re-create all philosophy!
Hope and love. Hope in relation to its object is caused by
the love of concupiscence. But in relation to the person
through whom that object is expected to be attained, it leads
to love and friendship. Thus the theological virtue of hope
disposes us for charity, and it presupposes faith.
Hope aids operation, first because its object is good and
though difficult to obtain, still possible; secondly because it
evokes delight, which aids operation.
Fear (q. 41-44) is a motion of the appetite faced with evil
that cannot easily be resisted. The species of fear are six: dis­
couragement (fears the burdens of duty), shame, regret,
hesitation, stupor, agony (there is no escape).
Fear of punishment differs from fear of guilt. Man can fear
even fear, just as he can love love. Fear arises, not only from
love, but also from experience of our own defects. Fear has
many effects: shrinking, paleness, loss of voice, dryness of
throat, hair standing on end, unconsciousness, even sudden
gray hair. Fear uncontrolled leads to despair.
Audacity (q. 45) is a motion whereby the soul goes out to
conquer a great evil, here and now imminent. Such victory is
necessary to attain the purpose of hope. Animals which have
a small heart, says Aristotle, are audacious, while those that
have a large heart are timid. And lovers of wine are dis­
tinguished by audacity.
How does audacity differ from fortitude? The audacious
are more prompt to begin than to sustain, because of perils
they did not anticipate. Comparing the two acts of fortitude,
to attack and to sustain, we find that the latter is more im­
portant and more difficult. The brave differ from the auda-

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BEATITUDE

cious in this: In beginning, they seem to be remiss, because
they attack, not with passion, but with deliberation. But
actually faced with danger, they resist better.
Anger (q. 46-48) is an appetite for vengeance, accompanied
by heat around the heart. Anger has no passion contrary to
itself, because it deals with evil difficult to avoid and al­
ready present. In this situation the soul either sinks down in
sadness, or by anger conquers the evil. Anger is natural by
the law of self-preservation. Mildness, on the contrary, is less
natural, and is a virtue to be acquired. The physical disposi­
tion to anger is a choleric temperament.
Anger, though it is much less grave than hatred, is much
more impetuous. Hatred wills evil to neighbor as his evil, but
anger considers this evil as a right required by justice. The
angry man, after accomplishing vengeance, feels mercy, but
not so the man who hates.
The species of anger are two: bitterness and fury. Fury
never rests till it has finished its task of punishment. The
angry man, says Aristotle, is sharp, bitter, and difficult to deal
with.
Causes of anger. The principal cause is contempt for our
neighbor, arising from the thought of our own excellence.
Hence men in high station are prone to anger, as are also rich
men, orators, and poets. Sickly people are disposed to anger,
since they are more easily saddened.
The effects of anger are four: delight in the hope of venge­
ance, rush of blood to the heart, disturbance of mind and
body, taciturnity.
Thus we conclude the treatise on the passions. Passions are
to be regulated by reason: “Under thee shall be thy appetite.”
Passions, thus regulated, become virtues, in the form of
temperance and fortitude. Acquired virtues are a participa­
tion in the light of reason, and infused virtues are a par­
ticipation in the uncreated light of God. But if the passions,
intended as servants and handmaids, act instead as masters
and mistresses, they become vices and corruptions.

SIXTH PART
HABITS

CHAPTER XXIV
Habits

in

Their Essence (q. 49)

PROLOGUE
Having now considered those acts that are characteristic of

man, and those that are common to men and brutes, we must
now deal with the sources of these acts. These sources are
two: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The intrinsic principle
is either power or habit. As powers have already been treated,
we have now to deal with habits. Treatment of the extrinsic
principle, namely, God who instructs by law and aids by
grace, is matter for another book.
The present treatise has three divisions: habits in general
(q. 49-54), virtues in general (q. 55-70), vices and sins (q.
71-89).
The treatise on habits in general has four divisions: 1.
habits in their essence (q. 49); habits in their subject (q. 50);
habits in their cause (q. 51-53); habits in their distinction
(q· 54)·

THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS TREATISE
Since habit is the genus both of virtue and of vice, we can­
not rightly know either virtue or vice unless we first know
what habit is, and how one habit is distinguished from an­
other.
This treatise is difficult, and it is comparatively neglected.
Cajetan and Koellin did indeed write on these articles, as did
John of St. Thomas; but the Salmanticenses, Alvarez, Gonet,
and Billuart have nothing to say on this subject.
Comparison with modern theories must be our first step,
339

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BEATITUDE

for three reasons: first, moderns generally have no explicit
treatment on habits, speaking rather of custom; secondly, be­
cause moderns tend to opposite extremes, either of passivity
or of activity, whereas St. Thomas harmonizes these two
aspects; thirdly, because moderns, particularly the phenomenalists, deny the existence of soul-faculties, and consequently
of habits, appealing instead to subconsciousness and method.
Like quacks who prescribe remedies by mere tradition, since
they are not masters of medical science, many moderns seem
to think that ethical science, far from being a single science,
is a mere juxtaposition of unrelated conclusions. These men
have lost the scientific spirit.
To illustrate. Vasquez had lost the notion of habit, when
he said that, even when infused faith is lost, the habit of
theology can still remain. The truth is that, when faith is
lost, there remains only the corpse of theology, namely, a
certain material arrangement of ideas, since theology lives
only by faith itself. Modern terms, “habitude,” “usage,”
“custom,” correspond rather to the Latin “consuetudo” than
to the Latin “habitus.” The word “habitus” is not easy to
translate. It signifies a disposition, permanent and difficult
to change.
We must dwell here on two opposed theories. Some mod­
erns, like Descartes and Comte, hold that habit is something
passive, a phenomenon of inertia, meaning that a body re­
mains where it now is, in a condition of rest or of motion,
unless an extrinsic cause disturb this condition. A projectile
dropped into a vacuum would have a habit of everlasting
motion. Habit would thus be nothing but the passive per­
severance of matter in its present state. Scientific habit would
be nothing but the passive persistence of certain modifica­
tions in the nerve centers. Descartes puts method in the place
of habit, as if mechanical control of method guaranteed pos­
session of science.
An opposite extreme, borrowing from Aristotle and Leib­
nitz, says that habit is a law of activity, whereby living beings
incline to remain in their present state or action. Habit,

ESSENCE OF HABITS

34ι

then, would be, not a mere passive perseverance, but a
tendency to repetition of acts (“using the same path twice”).
Thus habit would not be found in inanimate bodies, but
only in living things, in animals, especially domestic animals,
and particularly in human attitudes, intellectual or moral.
This second theory is not satisfied with Cartesian passivity,
which does not explain the tendency of habit to act, to be
second nature, to establish continuity in human life, to make
progress and education possible. Good habits, by strengthen­
ing the will, strengthen also liberty.
This second theory harmonizes better with the view of St.
Thomas,1 though he admits, not only operative habits, but
also entitative habits, bodily health, say, and sanctifying
grace. St. Thomas speaks thus: Habit cannot be produced in
an agent (e.g., fire) whose principle is merely active. But in
an agent with two principles, one active, one passive, habits
can arise. Multiplied acts generate a certain quality in the
passive principle, and this quality is called habit. Thus habits
of virtue arise in the appetitive powers under the influence
of reason, and scientific habits arise in the intellect under the
repeated influence of self-evident propositions.
How profound St. Thomas here appears! Moderns, gen­
erally, do not rise above experimental psychology, whereas
St. Thomas is metaphysical, and, of course, more difficult.
Other moderns, positivists and phenomenalists, deny even
the existence of habits. They reduce substance, faculties, and
habits to a mere succession of phenomena, and thus arrive at
absolute nominalism. Many positivists recur to subconscious
psychological phenomena, as the source, for instance, of
mathematical virtuosity.
Against phenomenalism in general we argue thus: Whereas
our sense-powers are limited to phenomena (color, sound,
and so on), our intellect apprehends the reality, the sub­
stance, existing under phenomena. Now finite substance is
not immediately operative, but acts by powers and faculties
distinct from itself. Its existence is not identified with its
1 Q.51, a.2.

BEATITUDE

342

activity, since existence is one, whereas activity is manifold.
But if existence and activity are really distinct, distinct must
be likewise their correlative potentialities, i.e., the substance
which underlies existence, and the operative faculties which
underlie activity. Such faculties are intellect and will. And if
we have faculties, we can also have habits in these faculties,
for instance, science in the intellect, justice in the will,
chastity in the sense-appetite.
HABITS IN GENERAL (Q. 49)
This question has four articles. Is habit a quality? Is it a
determined species of quality? Is habit necessarily related to
act? Are habits necessary?
ART. 1. IS HABIT A QUALITY?

Habit does not seem to be a quality. First, because habit,
from the Latin word "habere,” indicates possession, and we
possess not only qualities, but also quantity, money, and so
on. Secondly, because habit is that ultimate predicament,
which expresses a mode of clothing. Thirdly, habit means
disposition, which seems to refer to corporeal attitude.
Authority. Habit is a quality difficult to change.2
Reason. From the nominal definition we pass on to the
three meanings which the word “habit” may have: pos­
session, a garment, a disposition either to good or evil.
1. "Habere” (to possess) is an element common to diverse
categories, and hence is found among the post-predicaments.
2. “Habit” signifies garment, and thus constitutes a special
category, whereby man is said to be clothed or armed. In this
meaning, habit is not quality, or quantity, or action, or pas­
sion, but a mere relation.
3. Habit is used to express, not a possession of something
external, but a mode of self-possession, and such self-pos­
session is a kind of quality, belonging to the highest genus of
quality.
2 De categ., c.6, n.4.

ESSENCE OF HABITS

343

Aristotle’s definition runs thus: Habit is a disposition,
whereby the subject is disposed, well or ill, either in itself or
in relation to something else? When we say “habit does not
make the monk,” we mean external habit. But internal good
habits do make the monk.
ART. 2. IS HABIT A DEFINITE SPECIES OF QUALITY?

Quality is distinct from substance, quantity, action, pas­
sion, relation, and so on. The category of quality contains
four species: habit and disposition; power and impotence;
sense-qualities; form and figure. Why these four? Because
there are four modes whereby a substance can be disposed in
itself.
1. To be good or evil in relation to its nature: habit and
disposition.
2. To be disposed well or ill in its operation: power and
impotence.
3. To be well disposed in relation to sense-alteration
(color, heat, sound, odor, taste): sense-qualities.
4. As limiting quantity: form and figure.
Habit here comes before power, because it expresses an
immediate relationship to the nature of the substance. Habit
(e.g., science) can be changed only with difficulty, whereas
disposition (opinion) can easily be changed, though, by rea­
son of passion, opinion may, per accidens, be very tenacious.
But habits may begin in the form of dispositions. Science, in
the pupil, exists first as a disposition, and only when rooted
in the subject does it become a habit. The same truth holds
good in the development of moral virtues.
ART. 3. DOES HABIT INCLUDE NECESSARILY
RELATIONSHIP TO ACT?

All habits, whether entitative or operative, are related to
act. i. Entitative habits, since they dispose the substance in
itself, have a consequent relation to act, because activity is
the purpose of nature. Thus health and sickness, beauty and
» In Met., V (IV). c.20. lect.

n mfi.

344

BEATITUDE

ugliness, habitual grace and its privation, although they are
entitative habits, still have consequent relationship to act.
2. Operative habits, since they dispose the operative powers,
have as their chief purpose a relationship to act.
ART. 4. ARE HABITS NECESSARY?

First conclusion. Where operative power is distinct from
operation and is not limited to one operation, there habits
are necessary, since otherwise the power would remain un­
determined and idle, whereas it should act promptly and
easily, and in various directions: for instance, the intellect in
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the will in justice,
religion, and temperance.
In God, who is His own activity, as He is His own exist­
ence, habits cannot exist. Nor do natural agents, which are
restricted to one effect, need a habit (e.g., external senses or
the vegetative powers).
Second conclusion. Entitative habits are necessary when
the subject needs them in order to be well disposed in itself,
i.e., when many elements concur in forming that disposi­
tion. Thus health is an entitative habit, since it implies a
definite proportion among many factors. Beauty, too, is an
entitative habit. For example, loss of eyelashes or eyebrows
suffices to mar tire beauty of the human face.
Proceeding metaphysically, from the distinction between
faculty and act, we have established these truths: Habit is a
quality, a special kind of quality, either operative or entita­
tive, each necessary in its place. Only by reduction to meta­
physics does psychology qualify as a perfect science,
simultaneously inductive and deductive.

CHAPTER XXV
Habits and

Their

Subjects (q.

50)

ART. 1. HABITS IN THE BODY

First conclusion. The body has entitative habits, such as
health and beauty.
Second conclusion. No operative habit exists principally in
the body as subject. Operative powers which are not limited
to one line of activity belong either to the soul alone (intel­
lect and will) or to the soul principally (in the inferior
faculties only as subject to the will). Thus temperance and
fortitude exist principally in the soul, and only secondarily
in the body.
Here lies an error of materialism, which reduces habits to
mere modifications of the organism, particularly of the nerve
centers. But the emotion of modesty is not identified with
the virtue of chastity, nor sense-commiseration with the vir­
tue of mercy, which belongs in the highest degree to God.
ART. 2. CAN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL BE
THE SUBJECT OF HABITS?

First conclusion. No natural entitative habit, but only that
supernatural entitative habit which we call sanctifying grace,
is received into the essence of the soul. The human soul is the
complete form of human nature, and cannot receive any
better disposition. But sanctifying grace deifies the very es­
sence of the soul, thus preceding the infused virtues, just as
the soul's essence precedes the powers of the soul. As man’s
intellective power participates in divine knowledge by the
virtue of faith, as man’s will shares in divine love through
the virtue of charity, so man’s soul itself participates in the
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BEATITUDE

divine nature by the grace of regeneration and re-creation.
Second conclusion. Operative habits are not in the essence
of the soul, but in its faculties, because the soul is not im­
mediately operative.
ART. 3. CAN THE SENSE-POWERS BE SUBJECTS OF HABIT?

Conclusion. The sense-powers, though in themselves in­
capable of supporting habits, can do so as directed by reason,
since reason can turn them to various lines of activity. Thus
temperance and fortitude exist in the sense-appetite, as ruled
by reason and will. The same direction develops memory and
artistic imagination. But neither the external senses, nor the
vegetative powers, can be subjects of habit, because their
activity is one and unvaried.
ART. 4. INTELLECTUAL HABITS

Intellectual habits are five: The habit of first principles,
wisdom, science, prudence, and art. Averroes falsified this
Aristotelian doctrine by positing one single possible intellect
for all men, thus denying personal immortality. Further,
since men differ in wisdom, knowledge, prudence, and art,
Averroes said that these habits are not in the possible intel­
lect, which is one, but only in the internal senses, imagina­
tion and memory, whereas Aristotle holds that these virtues
are in that part of the soul which is rational by its essence,
namely, in the intellect, not in the internal senses, which are
rational only by participation.
Conclusion. Habit belongs to the power which performs
the act, and intelligence is the act proper to the intellect. All
ideas retained in the intellectual memory are habits. In a
secondary, dispositive sense, habit exists in the imagination,
which prepares the object for the possible intellect.
First corollary. Profound treatment of the nature of sci­
ence, the nature of metaphysics, the nature of theology, and
the division of sciences is impossible unless we realize the
importance of habit. Habit, far from being a mere mechan­

HABITS AND SUBJECTS

347

ical juxtaposition of ideas, is rather a simple, vital, soul­
quality, essentially related to one formal object, whence it
derives its unity. Thus theology, resting on virtual revelation,
is one indivisible science. Dogmatic theology, moral theology,
hermeneutics, and so on, are but different aspects of one and
the same vital habit, namely, the habit of faith, which is an
impression of the knowledge possessed by God and the
blessed. When the formal motive of faith ceases, virtual
revelation also ceases. When the theologian becomes a here­
tic, he retains, not the habit of theology, but a mere collec­
tion of statements which have authority only from his own
private judgment.
Second corollary. How many distinct sciences are there?
As many as there are scientific habits, specifically distinct.
Moderns often treat the integral parts of one science as if
they were diverse sciences, as if dogma, let us say, and moral
theology, and exegesis, were three distinct sciences. In one
and the same science there can, of course, be many parts, like
tire branches of a tree, and in this sense we distinguish posi­
tive theology from speculative theology. But any excessive
emphasis on specialization destroys unity and life of the in­
tellectual habit. Synthesis becomes impossible, and many dif­
ficulties arise regarding the relations of these partial sciences
one to another: difficulties which cannot be met except by the
direction of a higher habit, whose integral parts have been
separated without justification.
ART. 5. ARE THERE HABITS IN THE WILL?

The answer is, yes. By nature the will is determined only
to universal good, not to this or that particular good. Habits
enter in to set the will definitely on a particular line of ac­
tivity, such as justice or charity or hope or religion: and all
habits, whatever their subject, depend on the will for their
exercise, since habit is a possession which man uses when he
pleases.
Were the will a mere agent, like the agent-intellect, it

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would not need a habit. But the will is not only a moving
thing, it is also a moved thing. Even to its first act the will is
moved objectively, by the good proposed by the intellect.
Secondly, by intention the will moves itself to choose means.
ART. 6. DO THE ANGELS NEED HABITS?

The angels need operative habits, and also the entitative
habit of sanctifying grace. While by his nature the angel
understands his own essence, he still needs grace if he is to
know and love God supernaturally. Thus as long as he is on
the way to beatitude, the angel needs the habits of faith,
hope, and charity. And when he has been beatified, he still
needs the habit of sanctifying grace and charity.
General conclusion. Operative habits are necessary in fac­
ulties which need to be determined toward good activity.
These faculties are: first, the will; second, the intellect; third,
the sense-appetite; and fourth, the internal senses. Entitative
habits exists in the body, in the form of health or beauty. But
they are unnecessary in the essence of the soul, unless the
soul is raised to the supernatural level.

CHAPTER XXVI
The Source

of

Habits (q. 51)

ART. 1. DO HABITS COME FROM NATURE?

Opposite errors meet us here. Plato and Descartes hold that

our primary ideas are innate, not abstracted from sense­
activity. Leibnitz, too, says that these first principles are in
us, at least virtually, before sense-cognition. Opposed to this
excess is the view of sensists and empiricists, who admit no
essential distinction between intellect and sense. Let us first
note a twofold meaning of the word "natural.” 1. A thing can
be natural according to the nature of the species, for in­
stance, “man is a risible being.” 2. A thing can be natural
according to the nature of the individual, for instance,
“Socrates is healthy.”
First conclusion. Man has entitative habits, some (like
health) totally from nature, others partly from nature (health
restored by medicine).
Second conclusion. No operative habits come totally from
nature. Here man differs from the angel, whose ideas come
totally from its nature, a privilege unsuited to human nature,
because the human intellect naturally uses sense-activity.
Man’s proper object is the lowest of intelligible objects, those
mediated by sense qualities. A man born blind can have no
direct knowledge of color. Here lies condemnation of the
theory of innate ideas.
Third conclusion. Some human operative habits arise
partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle.
The habit of first principles, for instance, the principle that
the whole is greater than a part, is a natural and inevitable
possession, not a mere empirical association, reiterated by
849

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BEATITUDE

tradition. The habit of first principles is an indivisible nat­
ural quality, not divided into parts. But it is not totally from
nature, as would be an innate idea.
A comparison may illustrate. Just as nutrition is a natural
act of the soul when food is offered, so the knowledge of first
principles is a natural act, which receives its food only when,
on coming to the age of reason, it derives its first ideas from
experience. Then there flows into the possible intellect that
quality which we call the habit of first principles. Thus we
steer between the two extremes of innatism and sensism:
innatism, which says that all our ideas are inborn; sensism,
which denies the essential superiority of intellect over sense.
But the human will has no need of a natural habit, because
in the very inclination of the will to universal good proposed
by reason, we have the seeds of virtue, the roots from which
grow the habits of justice, temperance, and fortitude. Some
operative habits, while they arise from individual nature,
depend partly on a well-disposed organism: a truth expressed
by the proverb, “Poets are born, not made.” Similarly, some
men are naturally disposed to chastity or mildness. Not all
operative habits, however, are natural. Science, for instance,
is not a gift of nature, since it arises only from demonstration,
and hence is properly styled an acquired habit.
ART. 2. DO HABITS ARISE FROM ACTS?

Again we meet two opposite views. One view, based on the
inertia of matter, derives habit from the passivity of the sub­
ject. The other view says that habits (e.g., carpentry) are
caused by activity, by repetition of acts. St. Thomas begins
with three objections in favor of the theory of passivity,
i. Quality depends on the receptiveness of the subject,
whereas activity is not a receiving, but a giving. 2. A faculty,
which by acting would cause a habit, would be simultane­
ously mover and the thing moved. 3. Effect cannot be nobler
than cause, and habit is something nobler than the act which
precedes.

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351

Against these objections stands the affirmation of Aristotle,1
that the habits of virtues and vices are caused by acts. St.
Thomas finds partial truth in each theory, harmonizing them,
not in the fashion of eclecticism, but in a higher synthesis.
First conclusion. An agent whose only principle is active
cannot develop habits. Stones and plants, to illustrate, neither
develop new customs nor lose old ones. A stone falls always
the same way, the plant nourishes itself always in the same
way.
Second conclusion. An agent which has both active and
passive principles can develop habits in its passive principle.
This statement is proved, first, by experience. The will,
moved by reason, develops the habit of justice. And the sense­
appetite develops temperance and fortitude. Moved by the
habit of first principles, the intellect develops the habit of
drawing scientific conclusions.
The statement is proved, secondly, by argument. Every­
thing that is moved by another is disposed by the act of that
agent. Men have faculties which are moved, either by another
faculty, or by themselves as already in act. Hence multiplied
acts result in habits in the power which is moved. Nor is the
habit nobler than its cause. Reason itself is a nobler principle
than the moral virtue generated by repeated acts. And the
habit of first principles is nobler than the knowledge of con­
clusions. Moral virtue is a participation in reason, and the
habit of knowledge is a participation in the light of first
principles.
Pedagogical Corollaries

1. To learn is not simply to remember. Here we oppose
Plato who, since he did not distinguish potential knowledge
from actual knowledge, said that knowledge pre-existed in
the pupil’s mind, hence the teacher’s work would be that of
reminding, not of instilling.
The teacher is perfect in proportion to his power of re1II Eth., cc. 1 and a.

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ducing the truth to higher and more universal principles,
since under this influence the disciple acquires the habits of
science and wisdom. Great teachers are instruments in a kind
of natural revelation, whereas hardly any intellectual forma­
tion comes from a teacher who is satisfied with the positivist
or empirist approach. Facts unrelated to principles, while
they furnish materials for science, can never become science,
can never result in scientific synthesis.
3. Pedagogical theories are three: the traditional one
(Aristotelian-Thomistic), the innatism of Plato, and empiri­
cism. Against the traditional theory, which regards the human
intellect as the lowest of intellects, Plato sins by excess, the
empiricists by defect.
ART. 3. CAN HABIT BE PRODUCED BY ONE ACT?

Preliminaries. It seems so: 1. By one demonstration we
create science, at least one scientific conclusion. 2. One in­
tense act is equivalent to many acts less intense. 3. By one act
a man becomes sick or well; and sickness, like health, is a
habit. But, as “one swallow does not make spring,” so one
day does not make a man virtuous.
First conclusion. In no appetitive power can the habit of
virtue be generated by one act. One act of reason cannot
totally conquer any appetitive power, because the appetitive
power is multiple and variable. Only gradually, like fire in
damp material, or water dripping on rock, can reason create
that second nature which we call habit. Reason’s first act
produces a disposition, the second act strengthens that dis­
position, and the series must continue to a final act, strong
enough to turn the disposition into a permanent quality, dif­
ficult to change.
To illustrate. One set of circumstances demands that we
act humbly, another set that we act magnanimously. Magna­
nimity is not ambition, just as humility is not pusillanimity.
Multiplied and repeated acts of reason are required before
both humility and magnanimity become man’s second na-

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353

ture. The term “second nature” is illuminating. As nature
imitates God, so the virtuous man imitates nature, whose un­
changeable laws are God’s own creation.

Two Corollaries

1. All virtues are fields of slow development. Justice, un­
broken recognition of our neighbor’s rights, becomes a habit
only under the persistent prodding of reason. Only after long
training does religion become a virtue, independent of sensi­
ble devotion. The same road is marked out for temperance,
fortitude, meekness, patience, and chastity, which develop
only by a long-continued restraint on sensuality.
2. Disposition, although it is the necessary road to habit, is
never identified with habit, which is the goal of all dispositive
activity. A moral habit is thus distinguished from a scientific
habit, which can be generated by one act.
Here we meet a mystery, which permeates all levels of crea­
tion. It is just as difficult to draw the line between ultimate
disposition and habit, as it was for biologists finally to deter­
mine that the sponge, say, is not the apex of vegetative life,
but one of the lowest forms of senselife. But, admitting this
concrete difficulty, vegetative life still remains specifically
distinct from senselife, and licit mental restriction still re­
mains distinct from a lie.
Second conclusion. Science can be caused by one act, but
opinion cannot. One proposition, if self-evident, convinces
the intellect, though this one scientific conclusion can grow,
both in intensity and in extension, by application to other
conclusions. In illustration, we may refer to the subordina­
tion of all second causes, including the human will, to God
the First Cause. But, though conviction may be immediate,
the scientific habit, by reason of external dependence on
sense powers, becomes firmly established only by repeated
acts.
As similar instances of a metaphysical habit established by
one act we may note: first, being as being, reality as reality,

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BEATITUDE

is the precise object of ontology. Secondly, in God alone is
essence identified with existence. Opinion, too, is a habit, but
it cannot be established by one act, because it depends on
probable propositions.
Third conclusion. Only by repeated acts can habits be
established in the lotver cognitive powers, particularly in the
memory. Experience is sufficient proof for this statement.
But we must note the terminology of Aristotle,2 who uses the
word “passive intellect” to express a sense-power, which ap­
plies memory and imagination to concrete and particular
problems. This power, he says, is subject to corruption, as
are all sense-powers. Averroes, erroneously identifying this
“passive intellect” with “possible intellect,” concluded that
Aristotle had denied personal immortality.
Reason argues thus: Because organic powers depend on
matter, the principle of corruption, they need much repeti­
tion to become fixed in one definite direction. Here lies the
reason why men differ in the power of imagination. What
Aristotle 3 calls a “dry” memory does not easily receive, but
preserves well what it has received, whereas a “wet” memory
receives easily, but also loses easily. Climates, dry and wet,
may serve as illustrations.
Fourth conclusion. Bodily habits can be caused by one act
if the active element is very strong. One dose of strong medi­
cine may restore health. Inversely, one blow may destroy
health.
Corollary

A widespread error confounds instruction with education.
Instruction aims at intellectual habits, which can be gen­
erated, often by a single act. But education, which aims at
moral habits in the will and in the sense-powers, is a long
and slow process. To suppose that children who are merely
instructed, not educated, will become good citizens, with
2 De anima, III, c.5, Icct. 10.
s De memoria.

SOURCE OF HABITS

355
well developed moral and religious habits, is a fatal error.
Imagine parents who would exercise no care over their chil­
dren’s food, because, forsooth, these children, as adults, will
suddenly be capable of self-control.
ART. 4· ARE SOME HABITS INFUSED BY GOD?

It is of faith 4 that the process of justification includes the
infusion of virtues: faith, hope, and charity, and so on. These
virtues are qualities permanently inherent in the soul or in
its faculties, though it does not seem certain by faith that
these qualities are in the strictest sense habits, since the
Council does not use the words “quality” and “habit.” But
while the demands of faith are met by holding that sancti­
fying grace is an habitual internal gift, it is still theologically
certain that grace and its consequent gifts are habits.
First conclusion. Supernatural habits cannot arise except
by infusion. Habits, natural or supernatural, must be pro­
portioned to the end for which they dispose us. But natural
habits acquired by repeated acts can never dispose us to a
supernatural end. Supernatural habits, therefore, cannot arise
except from supernatural infusion. This truth holds good of
even the highest angel, even if he should have been created
from eternity.
Second conclusion. Habits which are in themselves natural
may arise from infusion. Such habits (e.g., sudden mastery of
a strange tongue) are said to be infused per accidens. Adam
must have had many such habits.

First Corollary
A habit infused per accidens is of the same species as an
acquired habit, just as the eyes given to a man born blind
are specifically the same as natural eyes. But habits per se
infused are also per se supernatural, not supernatural only in
their mode (such as origin by miracle), but supernatural in
their very essence.
4 Cone. Trid., sess. 6, can. 8.

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Second Corollary
While infused habits are simply indispensable for merito­
rious acts, still certain salutary acts, not yet meritorious, may,
under actual grace, arise even before justification and in­
fused habits.
Question. Do the acts arising from an infused habit beget
another habit of the same species? Answer: No, because one
and the same subject cannot have two forms of the same
species. Acts produced by an infused habit simply strengthen
the pre-existing habit.

CHAPTER XXVII
The Growth

of

Habits (q. 52)

In three articles we ask: Do habits grow? Do they grow by

addition? Does each and every act of the habit increase the
habit? This question is difficult, but important, especially in
its pedagogical consequences.
ART. 1. DO HABITS GROW?

It seems that habits cannot grow. First, growth, augmenta­
tion, is a quantitative term, whereas habit is a quality. Sec­
ondly, habit is a kind of perfection, and perfection, since it
means an ultimate, does not admit degrees. Thirdly, qualita­
tive augmentation would at best be nothing but alteration.
Authority sustains our thesis. “Lord, increase our faith."
“Grow in grace and in the knowledge of God." 1 “Fructify in
every good work and grow in the knowledge of God." 2 The
Council of Trent: He who says that the justice received from
God cannot be augmented before God by good works, let him
be anathema.3
Conclusion. 1. Certain habits can be augmented in ex­
tension, e.g., knowledge, which becomes greater by being ex­
tended to new conclusions. 2. All habits grow in intensity as
they are more and more rooted in the subject. Thus charity
becomes more intense, knowledge becomes more profound.
The foundations of this demonstration are thus proposed by
St. Thomas.
a) While it is true that augmentation, in its primary mean·1
1II Peter, 3:18.
2 Col. 1:10.
> D.834. 842.
357

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BEATITUDE

ing, belongs to quantity, still, in an analogical and true sense,
it belongs also to spiritual qualities, since we know spiritual
things only by analogy with the sense-world.
b) Perfection of quality or form can be considered in two
ways. First, abstractly, as form. Thus we say knowledge is
small or great. Secondly, concretely, as participated by the
subject. Thus we say that a man is more or less healthy, or
that one philosopher is more profound than another.
Here we find four fields of thought, i. Plotinus and other
Platonists hold that habit grows in itself. 2. Some think that
habits are not augmented in themselves, but only more
deeply participated in by the subject. 3. A medium between
the two foregoing views is that of the Stoics, who say that cer­
tain habits, arts and sciences, are also in themselves aug­
mented in extension, but that other habits, virtues, are
augmented only in intensity. 4. Others hold that immaterial
qualities and forms do not admit variation in degree, but that
material forms do admit variation.
To find the truth here, St. Thomas appeals to the great
principle which governs specification of qualities. It runs
thus: The specificating element must be something stable
and indivisible. Things below this point are in a lower
species, things above this point are in a higher species. To
illustrate. Rationality is the element that differentiates man.
Animals, without rationality, are below men. Angels, who
transcend rationality, are above men. Now qualitative hier­
archies are governed by the same principle. Species are like
numbers. Add one, subtract one, and you have a different
species. Of this principle we have two applications, one on
absolute qualities, the other on relative qualities.
1. A form or quality that is absolute does not admit of
more or less, and is incapable of augmentation. Thus it is
with the human soul: below it is the brute animal; above it
is the angel.
2. A quality that is relative, i.e., differentiated by its essen­
tial object or terminus, while it may increase as it approaches

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359

its goal, remains specifically the same, because its terminus is
one. Thus motion in any line is more intense or more remiss,
and health grows better by greater harmony with the nature
wherein it exists.
Here rests the first part of our conclusion, namely: certain
habits can be augmented extensively, i.e., can be extended to
new termini under the same formal object. Thus grow arts
and sciences. Thus theology in itself was greater in the thir­
teenth century than it was in the eighth century.
On this point, then, the Stoics were right: extensive aug­
mentation takes place when the habit is extended to a new
material object under the same formal aspect, that is, in arts
and sciences. But this extensive augmentation does not find
place in moral and theological virtues, because the man who
has, e.g., the moral virtue of temperance, has it in relation to
all objects of temperance, and he who has even the lowest
degree of charity reaches out to all objects that can be loved
by charity. This same truth governs the virtues of hope and
faith. Since the death of the apostles, the smallest level of
faith embraces all objects to be believed, though there can
be a transition from implicit to explicit.
The second part of the conclusion treats of intensive aug­
mentation. It says: As shared by the subject, some qualities
and some forms admit degrees, but others do not. Forms par­
ticipated substantially are incapable of intensification and re­
mission. But here, too, we appeal to the general principle of
specification, namely, that the differentiating element must
be stable and indivisible. From this principle it follows that
substantial forms do not admit variational degrees. A rational
soul makes man to be a man, and nothing else. It follows
further also that accidental forms which are in themselves in­
divisible do not admit degrees. Each number is constituted
by an indivisible unity. Geometric figures cannot be more or
less triangular or circular. Thirdly, it follows that habits
(sciences and virtues), since they do not give substantial spe­
cies to the subject, and do not in their nature include indi­

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visibility, may be possessed in various degrees by different
men.
Recapitulation

First conclusion. Certain habits grow in extension. Proof.
That quality can be increased in itself which can be extended
to one to more or fewer termini under the same formal ob­
ject. Now certain habits, namely, sciences and arts, can be
extended to more or fewer termini under the same formal
object.
Second conclusion. All habits can be increased in intensity.
Proof. Any quality that does not give its subject a substantial
differentiation, and which does not in its nature include in­
divisibility, can grow in intensity. Now every habit is a qual­
ity which does not give its subject substantial differentiation,
and does not in its nature include indivisibility.
ART. 2. ARE HABITS AUGMENTED BY ADDITION?

Preliminaries
It seems that even intensive augmentation takes place by
addition, i. The term “augmentation” is a quantitative term,
and quantity is not augmented except by addition. 2. The
agent, unless he produces augmentation by addition, would
produce nothing. 3. A white thing becomes more white by
the addition of a greater whiteness, just as a heap of coins or
grain grows by addition.
Contrary authority. A thing already hot becomes hotter
without any addition of heat newly produced.4
First conclusion. Sciences and arts are augmented in ex­
tension by the addition of a new conclusion, but not by a
new partial habit. Geometry may serve as an example. Anal­
ogy confirms the thesis. Motion can increase, not only in ve­
locity, but can also be extended in space and time.
Let us note that this extensive augment does not take place
* Aristotle, IV Phys., cap. IX.

GROWTH OF HABITS

361

by a collection of many qualities, but by a new mode and
manner of one and the same habit.
All Thomists defend this view against Vasquez and the
nominalists, and also against Scotus and Suarez, who hold
that the habit of science is not a simple quality, but an aggre­
gation of many particular habits.
Corollary. St. Thomas,6 holding that theology is one simple
habit, by reason of its formal object quod and quo, is in direct
opposition to those moderns who say that sacred theology is
a collection of many sciences. Each of these two conceptions
dictates its own mentality and pedagogical method. One is
satisfied with unrelated acquisitions, the other unifies the
spirit.
Second conclusion. Intensive augmentation, arising from
deeper participation of the subject in the form, does not take
place by the addition of form to form. This Thomistic view,
held by many outside the Thomistic school, is against Duran­
dus, who holds that intensive augmentation takes place by
generation of a new and more perfect quality, and also against
Scotus, Suarez, and Vasquez, who hold that augmentation
takes place by the addition of a new qualitative entity. The
thesis is proved, first directly, secondly indirectly.
Direct proof. The law of augmentation follows the law of
production. A thing becomes hot by participating in the form
already present. Form is not that which is, but that by which
a thing is so and so. Rotundity is not an existing thing, but
is that whereby a round thing is round. It is impossible to
make rotundity, but it is possible to make a round thing.
Again, humanity is not generated, but this man, the subject
which participates in humanity.
We must therefore conclude that intensive augmentation
of quality does not take place, as Durandus wills, by genera­
tion of a new form, nor by the addition of a new entity, as
Scotus, Suarez, and Vasquez maintain.
Indirect proof. If intensive augmentation took place by
5 Ia, q.i, a.3.

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BEATITUDE

addition, this would be owing either to the form or to the
subject, but neither view is possible. Any addition owing to
form would vary the species. And any addition owing to the
subject would presuppose some part of the subject to receive
the form which it had so far lacked, and we would be dealing
again with extensive augmentation. Hence generation (or
augmentation) of habit does not mean that one part is gener­
ated after another part, but that the subject participates more
and more perfectly in the quality.
Only a rude imagination can think of charity, say, as a heap
of minor little charities. Again, this new partial charity is
either more perfect than the pre-existing or not. If it is more
perfect, the pre-existing is superfluous. But if it is not more
perfect, it cannot make the subject more perfect, but will be
a mere extension of the form, an extension which is incon­
ceivable in a spiritual subject.
The growth of charity is growth, not in size, but in perfec­
tion. Charity grows intense by being more deeply rooted in
the subject. As trees grow by deepening their roots, charity
grows by penetrating ever more deeply into the potentialities
of the will. As charity grows, sin becomes ever more difficult.
One and the same man is successively an infant, a boy, a
youth, and an adult, not by the advent of a new partial man,
but by advance to a more perfect state of life. And so, too,
one and the same quality may grow from remissness to inten­
sity, not by the advent of a new partial quality, but by ad­
vance to a more perfect mode of being. In the phrase “degrees
of charity,” degrees means, not a partial quality, but a higher
mode of perfection. Each new degree contains virtually all
degrees lower than itself. Even if, by a miracle, charity were
separated from its subject, it would still be rooted in its sub­
ject, not actually, but aptitudinally.
Corollary. The opposition between these two theories be­
gets two opposed pedagogical systems and methods: One,
mechanical and external, proceeding by juxtaposition of acts
and exercises, the other, dynamic and internal, guided by the

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363

purified formal object of the science or of the virtue. The
first method, unless corrected by the second, will not lead
to the unitive life, but only to multiplied and unorganized
perfections.
ART. 3. DOES EACH AND EVERY ACT INCREASE
THE HABIT?

This question faces modern theories, on progress in civili­
zation, in science, in philosophy, in theology.
Preliminaries

It seems that each and every act increases the habit: first,
when cause is multiplied, effect also is multiplied; secondly,
all acts that proceed from one and the same habit are similar;
thirdly, one similar thing is increased by another similar thing.
But the response is negative: Not every act increases habit.
Authority. “Some acts proceeding from habit diminish the
habit.” e As illustration, think of the fourteenth century,
which did little to develop philosophy and theology, which
rather, in Occam, saw a great regress that prepared the way
for Luther. What holds good in society, holds good likewise
in the individual.
Reason. Only an act as intense as the habit can increase
the habit. Cause must be proportioned to effect. If a remiss
act caused increase of habit, more would be produced from
less, the more perfect from the imperfect.
To illustrate. A man with a habit equal, say, to ten talents
sometimes works remissly, from negligence or tepidity, as if
he had only two talents. Hence not every act proceeding from
a habit augments that habit.
Second conclusion. An act equal or superior in intensity
to the habit either increases the habit or disposes proximately
to such increase.
Third conclusion. But if the intensity of the act is not pro­
portioned to the intensity of the habit, such an act does not disfl Il Eth., c. 2.

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BEATITUDE

pose proximately to increase of the habit, but rather for its
decrease. This conclusion is against the modern dogma of
necessary progress. We are dealing here with the physical dis­
position necessary to increase habit. We are not dealing with
merit, because, as will be said later, an act of charity, even
though remiss, is still meritorious. Yet it disposes to decrease,
since it opens the road to contraries. Every act of charity, says
St. Thomas,7 even though it be remiss, merits eternal life and
an increase of charity. Charity, however, is not always in­
creased at once, but only when the subject endeavors to reach
such an increase. In illustration, we may point to the laborer
who daily increases in riches, because daily he acquires a new
right to a reward or merit, though in fact he does not receive
this reward except at the end of the week.
We must here notice the difference between an acquired
habit and an infused habit. Our acts, just as they are the phys­
ical cause of an acquired habit, so likewise they are the physi­
cal cause of increase in the habit. But since our acts, even
under actual grace, are not the physical cause of an infused
habit, but only dispositions for its infusion, they are likewise
not physical causes, but only dispositions for the increase of
charity. Hence a remiss act of charity, while it is meritorious,
does not dispose us to an increase of charity except remotely,
and may even dispose us for a decrease of the habit, since he
who works remissly easily yields to contrary acts whereby the
habit is corrupted. Thus imperfections may be dangerous.
We must progress, in order not to regress. Unless the boy
grows, he remains an abnormal man.

St. Thomas and Suarez
Suarez maintains that by each and every act, however re­
miss, the habit is at once increased. And he differs again from
St. Thomas on this question: Does the precept of charity bind
a man to greater charity even up to the time of death? To
this question St. Thomas answers affirmatively, since the per7 Ila-IIae, q.24; la-IIae, q. 114, a.8.

GROWTH OF HABITS

365

fection of charity falls under precept, at least as an ultimate
goal. Suarez denies, saying that the perfection of charity does
not fall under precept even as a goal. Perfection of charity, he
adds, is a counsel, not a precept.
The doctrine of St. Thomas, rejected by Suarez, leads to a
very important corollary in the spiritual life. It runs thus: ·
The rate of increase in virtue should be continually acceler­
ated, as it was in the saints, and especially in the Blessed
Virgin. Growth in faith (or in any virtue) corresponds to
natural motion, where rate of increase is measured by near­
ness to the goal, whereas the contrary holds good of violent
motion. “The nearer you see the day approaching,” says
Scripture.· And again, "The path of the just, like a shining
light, grows unto perfect day.” 10
Why does natural motion grow ever more intense? Be­
cause the goal attracts it ever more strongly. A stone falls ever
more rapidly, whereas thrown upward by force, it rises ever
more slowly. Man’s soul, says St. Thomas, tends more ve­
hemently to joy than it flees from sadness, hence is drawn
more strongly by God the nearer it comes to Him.
Material gravitation illustrates spiritual gravitation. If the
velocity of a falling body is equivalent to 20 in the first sec­
ond, it will be 40 in the second that follows, 60 in the third,
80 in the fourth, and 100 in the fifth. Here lies a far-off view,
an inkling, of Mary’s final state. Her initial plentitude of
grace surpassed the grace of all saints and angels, and her rate
of increase suffered no interruption even by sleep. Hence no
creature is more beautiful or more faithful to God.

Objections Analyzed
1. Acts, coming from a habit, must increase that habit. Yes,
but only when the act is proportioned to the habit.
2. But if one act increases the habit, why not all similar
e In Ep. ad Heb. 10:25.
» Ibid.
10 Prov. 4:18.

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BEATITUDE

acts? Yes, but only if they are similar, not merely in species,
but also in degree of intensity.
3. But every act is similar to its habit. Yes, similar in spe­
cies, but not necessarily in degree of intensity.
4. If a remiss act is sufficient disposition, both for the in­
fusion of grace and charity, and for its sacramental increase,
then, also outside the sacramental world, a remiss act should
be sufficient disposition to increase the habit. We deny the
parity. Grace and its increase come from the sacraments ex
opere operato, and God supplies the lack of disposition in
adults as he supplies the entire lack of disposition in infants
who are baptized. But, outside the sacraments, grace and its
increase arise ex opere operantis, i.e., by personal acts of con­
trition and charity.
5. But does not the Council of Trent say that the sacra­
ments cause grace according to the disposition of each recipi­
ent? Yes, but the phrase “according to” is to be understood,
not arithmetically, but proportionally, i.e., the better the dis­
position the greater is the grace received, but the grace is not
necessarily equal to a man’s disposition.
Corollary. He who has charity represented by two talents
and elicits an act equivalent to three, receives the augmenta­
tion of charity at once. But he who has charity measured by
five talents and elicits an act worth four does not at once re­
ceive an increase of charity, though his act is meritorious, and
he will receive the increase when he performs an act suffi­
ciently intense.

CHAPTER XXVIII
Corruption

and

Diminution of Habits (q.

53)

PRELIMINARIES
Moderns harp on progressive evolution, as if progress came

necessarily, as if regress were not possible. This progress they
guarantee by developing, not habits, but rules, methods, and
mechanical aids. Here Descartes was a pioneer. He denied the
very existence of habits, and even of faculties distinct from
substance. And Leibnitz meditated a machine for thinking
and computing, that thus the mind would be dispensed from
thinking distinctly. To this “democratic” conception of sci­
ence, we oppose the “aristocratic” conception, the mental no­
bility arising from permanent good habits. Modern treatises
on mental prayer need the same reminder. Methods, while
useful for beginners, can never be substitutes for supernat­
ural habits.
The progress expected from rules and methods, however
advantageous in the material and mechanical world, has not
prevented mental and moral regress toward irréligion and
atheism. And when we hear modern determinists applying
the doctrine of transmitted heredity to modern crime and in­
sanity, we wonder how they harmonize this view with uni­
versal progress. When God is denied, enigmas increase, and
insoluble questions arise.
ART. 1. CAN HABITS BE CORRUPTED?

Preliminaries

It seems that habits cannot be corrupted. 1. Nature cannot
be corrupted, and habit is second nature. 2. Spiritual habits
367

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BEATITUDE

cannot be corrupted, because they exist in an incorruptible
subject. 3. Neither corporeal transmutation, nor sickness, nor
death, can destroy the habit of knowledge or virtue, since
these exist in the spiritual and incorruptible soul.
Authority. “Forgetfulness and error corrupt knowledge.” 1
“By contrary acts virtues are generated and corrupted.” 12
First Conclusion. Health and beauty, and all corporeal
habits are corruptible, both per se and per accidens: per se,
by reason of the subject in which they exist, per accidens, by
reason of contrary causes.
Second conclusion. The habits of first principles, both spec­
ulative and practical, are incorruptible, both per se and per
accidens: per accidens because they exist in the intellect which
is incorruptible, per se because they have no contrary cause.
The notion of being, of reality, is not contrary to the notion
of nothing, since they can coexist in the same subject, though
they cannot be predicated of one and the same object. Nor
is there anything contrary to the act of the agent intellect,
which, since it abstracts ideas from phantasms, is the cause of
the habit of first principles. Hence this habit, like synderesis,
is incorruptible, both per se and per accidens.3 Unassailable
by forgetfulness or error, first principles are the adamantine
base of our intelligence, incorruptible, indestructible, even
in the minds of professed sophists, such as Hegel or Protago­
ras. Protagoras cannot simultaneously both exist and not
exist, nor simultaneously be Protagoras and not be Protagoras.
Third conclusion. Science and opinion, moral virtues and
vices, are corruptible both per se and per accidens. They are
corruptible per accidens, because, though their chief subject
is incorruptible, they reside secondarily in a corruptible sub­
ject, namely, in the internal sense-powers, imagination and
memory, or in the sense-appetite. And sciences and moral
1 De long, et brev. vitae, c. s.
2 II Eth., c. 2.
s VI Eth., c.5.

HABITS CORRUPTED AND DIMINISHED

369

virtues are corruptible per se by the law of contraries. A sci­
entific conclusion can be overthrown by a sophistic syllogism,
a true opinion by false opinion, moral virtue by the opposite
vice.
Corollary. The modern dogma of unbroken progress is
false. Regress appears in society as it does in individuals. As
example, think of the downward gradation from Lutheran­
ism to Modernism. Yet some authors seem to think that
Scotus and Suarez, by coming later, perfected St. Thomas, as
if Thomas were the thesis, Scotus the antithesis, and Suarez
the higher synthesis. The twenty-four Thomistic propositions
would merely codify an inferior period of scholastic evolu­
tion.
ART. 2. CAN HABIT BE DIMINISHED?

First conclusion. Habit can be diminished just as it can be
increased. First, remiss activity reduces subjective intensity.
Secondly, sciences and arts may decrease also in extension. As
habits increase in a twofold way, intensively and extensively,
they may also decrease in the same two ways.
Second conclusion. Decrease comes from the same causes
as does corruption. Decrease is the road to corruption, just
as generation is the foundation for increase. Reiterated acts
are the cause of increase of infused habits. The same disparity
appears in decrease. Charity can be diminished, not directly,
but only indirectly: not directly because charity is not caused
or augmented by human acts, but only by God. By mere ces­
sation from act (supposing the cessation not to be mortal sin),
charity is not diminished, nor is it diminished directly by
venial sin, because venial sin, unlike charity, is not concerned
with the last end. But indirectly charity is diminished by
venial sin, which impedes the application of charity, allows
evil inclinations to arise, thus making the exercise of charity
difficult, and disposing the soul to mortal sin, whereby char­
ity is destroyed.

BEATITUDE

370

ART. g. IS HABIT CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED
BY MERE CESSATION FROM ACT?

Conclusion. Cessation from act causes per accidens corrup­
tion or diminution of habit, because it removes the factors
which hinder corrupting or diminishing causes. Knowledge
can be overthrown, not only by error but also by forgetful­
ness. Friendships wither by lack of association. Let us apply
this conclusion, first, to virtue.
When a man does not use the habit of virtue to moderate
passions or actions, there must arise many non-virtuous pas­
sions and operations, from the inclination of the sense-appe­
tite and other exterior attractions. The same truth holds good
in the man who does not keep up the habit of mental prayer.
Second, application to knowledge. When a man ceases to
use his knowledge, for instance of theology, extraneous imagi­
nations may lead him to confuse the doctrine of charity with
the tenets of liberalism.
Corollary. In the way of virtue and science, cessation means
not to progress, and not to progress is to regress. Acts that are
good, but remiss, although they do not cause regress are still
a disposition to that regress, since they open the way to con­
trary inclinations.
Maritain4 writes: "Progressive negation of the value of
habits would need its own special history. It began in the
fourteenth century among theologians, and has now de­
scended to the lowest level.” Scotus and Occam denied spe­
cific distinction among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Further,
Scotus denied the necessity of infused moral virtues, and held
the theological virtues to be supernatural only in mode. Fol­
lowing Occam, Luther denied all infused habits, grace, in his
view, being a mere extrinsic denomination under which man
remains in his corruption.
The next step was to eliminate acquired habits. Descartes
denied the distinction between substance and accident, thus
< Art et scolastique, p. 55.

HABITS CORRUPTED AND DIMINISHED

371

eliminating the accidents which we call habits, and substitut­
ing for them infallible methods of attaining knowledge. After
Descartes, method becomes the almost exclusive catchword.
The final step was envisioned by Leibnitz. His calculating
machine, releasing mankind from the burden of thought,
would create an age of light, of universal intellectual democraticisml

CHAPTER XXIX
Habits, How Distinguished (q.

54)

four articles we deal with habits as related to the
subject wherein the habit exists, to their objects, and to the
goal toward which they tend.
In

these

ART. 1. CAN MANY HABITS EXIST IN ONE SUBJECT?

First conclusion. Many entitative habits, at least many cor­
poreal habits (such as health, beauty, and strength) can exist
in one and the same subject. Corporeal elements serve nature
in diverse ways. Good proportion in the non-solid elements
constitutes health. In the solid parts (bones, muscles) it con­
stitutes strength. Harmony of members and countenance
constitutes beauty.
Second conclusion. Many operative habits can coexist in
one power. One power can be moved to act by many objects
specifically distinct, and habits are proportioned to the acts by
which they are generated. As matter is moved by agents spe­
cifically distinct into forms specifically diverse, so, for in­
stance, the intellect is moved to act by objects specifically
distinct, physical, mathematical, metaphysical, and these acts
generate corresponding habits. And, whereas matter cannot
simultaneously receive many substantial forms, one power
can simultaneously receive many habits, because habits are
accidents.
Difficulties Analyzed
1. Whereas generic diversity creates distinction of faculties,
specific diversity is the source of acts and habits. Thus our
intellect ascends, step by step, from reality in general to
changeable reality (natural science), then up to quantitative
372

HABITS, HOW DISTINGUISHED

373

reality (mathematics), and ultimately to the divine reality
(theology).
2. Although the intellect cannot understand many truths
simultaneously and actually, it can still simultaneously and
habitually be master of many and diverse branches of knowl­
edge.
ART. 2. ARE HABITS DISTINGUISHED BY THEIR OBJECTS?

Preliminaries
To attain a supernatural goal we must have a supernatural
habit. Thus Thomists in general maintain that our infused
faith and the acquired faith of the demon do not rest on the
same formal motive. Infused faith rests on the authority of
God, the Author of grace; acquired faith rests on the author­
ity of God, the Author of nature and of miracles. They also
hold that natural love of God the author of nature is distin­
guished from love of God the author of grace, by its objective
goal, whereas Molina and other Jesuit theologians teach that
an infused habit (e.g., theological faith) needs no formal ob­
ject that surpasses the powers of reason, since they deny the
principle of St. Thomas, namely, that habits are differenti­
ated by their formal objects.
Difficulties. It seems that habits are not distinguished by
specifically different objects: 1. One and the same science
reaches out to contraries, such as health and sickness. 2. One
and the same knowable truth, for instance, the earth is round,
is demonstrated in diverse sciences, in physics and in astron­
omy. 3. One and the same object, as related to different goals,
can belong to different virtues. To illustrate, money given
for love of God belongs to charity, while money given to pay
a debt belongs to justice.
General conclusion. Operative habits are distinguished by
diverse objects. Since acts differ specifically by their objects,
and since habits are simply dispositions to act, habits them­
selves must be distinguished by their objects.

374

BEATITUDE

To explain. Operative habits are essentially ordained to
produce acts: knowledge, to produce demonstration; virtue,
to bring forth virtuous acts. This principle leads St. Thomas
to consider habits, in their relation first to their active prin­
ciples, secondly to the nature of the subject, thirdly to their
objects. Difficulties arise from the caviling of the nominalist,
and the false interpretation of the Molinist.
Molinist interpretation. Molinists 1 hold that, according to
this article, an infused operative habit is specifically distinct
from an acquired habit only by reason of the effective prin­
ciple, not by reason of its formal object, since infused faith
is immediately produced by God, whereas acquired faith is
not. Thomists commonly reject this interpretation. Why?
1. Because thus we should abandon the fundamental prin­
ciple of St. Thomas,1
2 that operative habits are differentiated
by their formal object.
2. If infused faith had the same formal object as acquired
faith, it would be infused only per accidens, would be super­
natural only in the mode of its production, like infused geom­
etry or the gift of tongues, or like an eye given miraculously
to a blind man, which would not differ specifically from an
eye given by generation. Thus the essential supernaturalness
of infused virtues would be destroyed.
This doctrine of Molina comes from nominalism, which
maintains that we do not know the essences of things, the
essence of grace or of virtues, but only facts, for instance, that
this man has faith. Nominalists say further that sanctifying
grace is not intrinsically supernatural, but gives a right to
eternal life only by divine institution, by an extrinsic denomi­
nation, like a written note which promises money. Nominal­
ism thus prepared the way for Luther’s tenet, that grace is not
an infused gift of God inherent in the soul, but only an ex­
ternal imputation of the justice of Christ.
1 See Molina, Concordia, ed. Paris, 1876, pp. 34-38. Also Billot, De virt.
infusis, 1905, pp. 84-87.
2 Tabula Aurea s. v. Objectum.

HABITS, HOW DISTINGUISHED

375

3. This Molinist interpretation does not preserve the true
meaning o£ the present article, which rests on the doctrine
that every habit implies relationship to the nature of the sub
ject. The following is a synopsis of the article.
Habits are differentiated:
A. As forms passively received by their proximate prin­
ciple, whereby they are either
1. infused habits (from God as agent); or
2. acquired habits, which are either branches of knowl­
edge or moral virtues (guided by reason).
B. As dispositions related
1. to the nature of the subject: infused habits (from
God); or acquired habits, which are either good (in harmony
with nature) or bad (contrary to nature);
2. to the object of the act to be performed: infused
habits (object supernatural); or acquired habits (object natu­
rally attainable).
This synopsis shows that the three modes of distinguishing
infused habits from acquired habits are convertible. An oper­
ative acquired habit would not suit our nature, and would
not be acquired under the direction of right reason, unless it
had an object that is true, good, and naturally accessible. But
all such habits are distinguished by their special harmony
with our nature, under the special directions of reason. And
this harmony and direction depend finally on the differenti­
ating goal and object.
Similarly, a habit essentially supernatural, that is, infused
per se, would not per se belong to participated divine nature,
to sanctifying grace, and would not be infused per se, if it did
not have an object essentially supernatural. Hence relation
to the object is the primary differentiating element. What­
ever Molinists say, our assertion is this: habit can be specifi­
cally and simultaneously differentiated by its object, by the
nature in which it is, and by the active principle. But, object
removed, no habit remains.
First conclusion. Habits, as forms, are distinguished by

376

BEATITUDE

their proximate and diverse active principles. To illustrate.
Every proximate agent makes an effect specifically like itself.
A transitive action (e.g., the act of heating) is distinguished
specifically by the principle of action from which it proceeds.
Thus we admit that an entitative habit, (e.g., sanctifying
grace) is distinguished from acquired habits by its active prin­
ciple, which is God. The same truth holds good of infused
virtues and of the seven gifts, which flow from sanctifying
grace, though all these habits, as operative, are differentiated
by the goal and object to which they are proportioned.
We are dealing here, not with the supreme active principle,
but only with the proximate active principle. Thus the proxi­
mate principle in the appetitive field is the cognitive power
which represents the object. Moral virtue, in the sense-appe­
tite, is a participation in reason. In sciences, demonstration is
the active principle. The following are illustrative texts.3*
1. We learn the nature of faculty from the act to which it
is ordained.
2. The object is compared to the act of a passive power as
principle and moving cause. Color is the principle of vision.
3. To the act of an active power (e.g., augmentation) the
object is compared as terminus and goal.
4. From these two, principle and terminus, every action
gets its species: heating, for example, from an agent that is
hot, cooling from an agent that is cold.
5. Diverse demonstrative media1 are the active principles
of diverse scientific habits. But these active principles, since
they are objective, coincide with the formal motive (with the
objectum quo) by which the object is constituted as know­
able.
6. In the virtues, too, the proximate active principle is the
goal intended.5 Goal in the field of activity is like principle
3 la, q.77.
* Art. s, ad sum.
s Ibid., ad 311m.

HABITS, HOW DISTINGUISHED

377

in the field of demonstration. Diversity in goal diversifies vir­
tues, just as does diversity of active principles. As the demon­
strative principle is the formal motive quo of the conclusion,
so the proximate goal is the formal motive quo of choice.
Money for God’s sake belongs to charity, money to pay a debt
belongs to j ustice.
Second conclusion. Habit, as disposition, is specifically dis­
tinguished according to the agent’s nature. Things that are
relative are distinguished by their relation to different ter­
mini. Habits, in particular entitative habits, are good or evil
according as they are or are not in harmony with nature.
Health in man belongs to one species, health in the horse to
another species, because man’s nature is not the nature of the
horse. Acquired human virtues are specifically distinguished
from infused virtues, since the former dispose us for an act
harmonious with human nature, whereas the others dispose
us for an act harmonious with grace, that is, for participated
divine nature. And, we repeat, this distinction by relation to
nature is always found in union with the distinction by rela­
tion to object.
Third conclusion. Habits, as disposing for operation, are
differentiated by objects and goals specifically different. Oper­
ative habits, being related to distinct operative termini, must
be differentiated by those termini. This conclusion is univer­
sal, holding good of all operative habits. Since infused geom­
etry and acquired geometry have the same formal object, they
are not specifically distinct, and the infused habit is infused
only per accidens. But in virtues per se (e.g., divine faith)
the proper motive is the First Truth, the authority of God the
Revealer, the Author of grace, whereas the formal motive of
acquired faith is the natural evidence of miracles. The fol­
lowing texts are illustrative.
1. Acquired faith is not a special gift of God, but the result
of natural intellectual perspicacity.®
eIla-IIac, q.5. a. 2. ad sum et 311m.

378

BEATITUDE

2. But since a man who makes an act of faith must be ele­
vated above his nature, he must have within him a superna­
tural principle, moving him to this act.7
3. The expression “to believe” is equivocal when used of
faithful men and of demons.8 He who lacks infused faith and
has only acquired faith is like a man who hears materially the
sounds of a symphony, but does not hear the soul of the
symphony because he lacks musical appreciation.
Summary. Proportionality governs the relations of habitual
grace and infused faith to their acts, and to the objects of
those acts. In the doctrine of Molina we do not find this pro­
portionality. According to him, habitual grace and infused
faith have the same object as the nature of the soul and ac­
quired faith. But it is clear that infused faith cannot be per se
proportionate to habitual grace, unless it is addressed to an
object which is per se in harmony with habitual grace. For
the operative habit, like the operation itself, is differentiated
by its formal object.
This principle is absolute. It gives light to the whole
treatise on habits and infused virtues. It is strange that many
Molinists reject it, or retain it only in relation to charity
which remains in the fatherland, and do not retain it in treat­
ing of hope and faith. But surely faith and hope and moral
virtues are all supernatural in substance, otherwise we de­
stroy the sublimity and homogeneity of the spiritual organ­
ism.
Molina objects. “The necessity of a supernatural habit of
infused faith resides in this: acts of faith must be elicited as
suited to a supernatural end, to salvation. Hence the ac­
quired faith of the demon would be distinguished from in­
fused faith, not by its formal object, but only by its ultimate
goal.” Answer: This ultimate goal, in the Molinist theory,
does not rise higher above natural powers than does the for7IIa-IIae, q.6, a. 1.
s De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, ad 4um.

HABITS, HOW DISTINGUISHED

37g

mal object of faith or of hope. If therefore the formal object
of faith and hope can be attained naturally, by historical
knowledge of the Gospel confirmed by miracles, we cannot
see why the ultimate end, and even the object of charity, God
loved above all things, cannot be naturally attained. And thus
we would return to the Pelagians, who held that charity was
necessary only in order to love God more easily.
Corollaries. 1. Sciences are specifically distinguished by
their formal objects quod and quo, i.e., by the objective mo­
tive and active principle. Virtues, too, are distinguished by
this twofold formal object, quo and quod. Entitative habits
alone are not distinguished by their object.

Difficulties Analyzed
1. Habits are specifically distinguished, not by their mate­
rial object, but by their formal object. Thus medicine deals
with contraries, namely, health and sickness, by one and the
same formal object.
2. Sciences, too, are distinguished, not by their material
objects, but by their formal objects, namely, by their differ­
ent demonstrative principles.
3. Nor is virtue distinguished by its material object, since,
for example, money can be given for a motive either of char­
ity or of justice.
ART. 3. ARE HABITS DISTINGUISHED AS GOOD AND EVIL?

Conclusion. Good and evil distinguish habits essentially,
not only accidentally. Virtue is contrary to vice, and contra­
ries belong to different species. Habits are specifically distin­
guished, not only by their objects and active principles, but
also by the nature in which they are and with which they
either are or are not in harmony. This truth is against
Spinoza, who holds that vice comes solely from mental con­
fusion. The following texts are illustrative.
Acquired virtue, and divine virtue per se infused, are dis­

3 8o

BEATITUDE

tinct specifically. The first arises from harmony with human
nature, the second from harmony with divine nature, of
which grace is a participation.9
Is human virtue specifically distinct from heroic virtue?
Yes, if by heroic virtue you understand virtue that is per se
infused; no, if by heroic virtue you understand acquired
virtue.
Many evil habits may exist in one field of activity, since
lack of harmony with right reason may arise either from ex­
cess or from defect.
ART. 4. CAN ONE HABIT BE COMPOSED OF MANY HABITS?

Preliminaries
It may seem that one habit can be composed of many
habits: for example, geometry is constituted by many differ­
ent conclusions, and one and the same virtue has many parts.
But tire conclusion runs thus: Habit is a simple quality, not
constituted by many habits. Habit is an operative principle
which, however far its extends, has but one formal object. A
science, reaching out to a new conclusion, does not develop
a new partial habit.
Thomists commonly defend this view against those who
maintain that theology is not one simple science, but an ag­
gregation of many particular habits, dogmatic, moral, and so
on. This adverse view is radically opposed to the spirit of
science. It maintains, with Vasquez, that a man who loses in­
fused faith may still preserve the theological science whose
root is faith. But in truth, when faith, the soul of theology,
is taken away, theology itself has been destroyed.
Question. But are not the cardinal virtues composed of
various habits? Answer: Without being composed, the cardi­
nal virtues are divided, either integrally (into various func­
tions), or subjectively (into various fields of labor), or lastly
potentially (into conative adjuncts).
» la-IIae, q.63, a.4.

HABITS, HOW DISTINGUISHED

381

Thus terminates the treatise on habits, in their essence, in
their subject, in their cause, and in their distinction. On these
foundations depend all questions concerning virtues and
vices. Habit is the common genus of all of them. Neglect of
generic treatment often creates insoluble difficulties in treat­
ing of species, difficulties that can be solved only by meta­
physical study of the genus in itself.

Index
Abomination; see Hatred
Act: exterior and interior, relations
between, goof.; interior, priority
of good and evil in, 299
Action: created immanent, 235; cre­
ated transitive, 235
Active indifference; see Dominating
indifference
Act of faith, judgments prerequired
for, 244
Acts
Christian, indifference of, 59
commanded by will, 248 ff.
exterior, good and evil in, 299 ff.
of man and human acts, 34 f.
specifically indifferent, 276 ff.
subject to command, 252 ff.
Actual indifference; see Dominating
indifference
Adherence, an effect of love, 331
Advertence, degrees of, 142
Aequiprobabilism, 316 f., 319, 322
Affection, see Ecstasy
Agility of the glorified body, 118
Agony, a species of fear, 335
Alexander of Hales, a source of moral
theology, 11
Alphonsus, St.: certain conscience,
312; founder of aequiprobabilism, 13; indifferent acts, 278; op­
ponent of probabilism, 320 if.;
reflex principle, 316 t.
Alvarez: act of command, 244; act of
counsel, 246; habits in their es­
sence, 339; indifferent acts, 282;
intention, 242
Ambrose, St., a source of moral the­
ology, 10
Angelic love of God, m
Angels: and habits, 348; and the hu­
man will, 194, 196; sinlessness of
first instant, 189
Anger: causes of, 336; effects of, 336;
and hatred, 336; see also Passion

Anselm, St.: voluntary and involun­
tary, 151
Antonine, St.: treatment of moral
theology, 12
Anxiety, a species of sadness, 334
Apostolic life, primary and secondary
purpose of, 44
Aristippus, hedonism of, 16 f., 20, 328
Aristotle
anger, description of, 336
audacity, 335
consent, act of, 246
contemplation, the ultimate pur­
pose, 34
counsel, act of, 246
eubulia, 243 f.
fear and voluntariness, 155
freedom of will, 205
goodness of will and its object, 284
habit, definition of, 343
habits: caused by acts, 351 f.; in
their essence, 340 f.
human acts: and purpose, 45 f.;
specified by good and evil, 271
infinity of goals, 47
ignorance of evil men, 166
intellectual habits, 346
intellect, passive, meaning of, 354
memory, dry and wet, 354
morality, 16 f.; of passions, 328
morally indifferent acts, 34
natural beatitude and contempla­
tion, 83 f., 93, 128
natural finality, 39 f.
and the Prime Mover, 49 f.
probable certitude, 312
a source of traditional ethics, 27 f.
successful activity and pleasure, 69
the supreme good, 78 f.
violence and involuntariness, 153
voluntary acts in animals, 135
the will: as concerned with the
means, 176; as moved by an ex­
terior principle, 188
383

384

INDEX

Art, an intellectual habit, 346
Beatitude
Ascetical acts and mystical acts, 187
activity of the contemplative intel­
Attainment: of beatitude, 120 ff.; of
lect, 95
goal, an act of intellect, 170
activity of the intellect, 87 ff.
Audacity: and fortitude, 335 f.; see
attainability by action of higher
also Passion
creatures, 126; by creature's nat­
Augustine, St.
ural powers, 125 f.
the act of counsel, 246
attainment of, 120 ff.
analogy of love, 88
bodily perfection in, 118
body, 116 ff.
beatitude, definition of, 89
certain conscience, 312
characteristics of, 108
equilibrium and freedom, 215
chief element in, 108 f.
the eternal law and morality, 288
comprehension, 10g
delight, 108
evil as the object of the will, 172
four ultimates, 50
desired by every man, 127
goal of our activity, 95
exterior goods, 119
formally and subjectively, 82 ff.
God as man’s beatifying object, 73
good-in-itself and sense-goods, 22
inamissability of, 121 ff.
in this life, 121
grace intrinsically efficacious, 225 f.
knowledge of the angels in, 96 f.
inamissibility of beatitude, 125
man’s objective, 64 ff.
love for man, 71
necessity of good works antecedent
love of things, 54
to, 127
one last end for men, 62
rectitude of will and, 110 ff.
premotion, nature of, 239 f.
and the society of friends, 119
a source of moral theology, 10
vision of the divine essence, 97 ff.
violence and the will, 151
voluntariness: of sin, 166; without Beaudouin: aequiprobabilism, 322
Beauty, Plato on, 77
act, 138 f.
will: and freedom, 113: moved by Becanus, and the Thomistic doctrine
of beatitude, 94
God, 223; moved by the intellect,
Bcghards: beatitude as attainable by
181
natural powers, 125; beatitude in
Aureoles, ti8f.
this life, 121
Averroes: intellectual habits, 346;
passive intellect and possible in­ Beguines: beatitude in this life, 121
Bellarmine: indifference of human
tellect, 354
acts, 278; natural beatitude, 128;
Aversion, see Passion
and the Thomistic doctrine of
beatitude, 94
Baius: determinism, 203; indifferent Benedict XII: inamissibility of beati­
human acts. 280; natural effica­
tude, 121
cious desire for beatific vision, Benedict XV: Thomistic doctrine of
efficacious grace and necessity,
98, too ff.; sense appetite moving
223
the will, 221
Bentham, individual utilitarianism
Bancel: essence of morality, 263
Bannesianism, 234
of, 16 f., 20
Bane?.: gratuity of grace, 105; natural Berti, man’s desire for the beatific
vision, 104, 106
beatitude, 128; will moved by
Biel, Gabriel: evil as the object of
the intellect, 183
the will, 172
Batuzzi: chief reflex principles, 315
Billot, Cardinal: efficacious grace and
Beatific vision: beatitude, 97 ff.;
necessity, 229
measurement of, 123 f.; super­
Billot, Father, S.J.: the proof of connatural end, 97 ff.

INDEX
Billot, Father, S.J. (continued)
science for the existence of God,
290 f.
Billuart
adequate object of the will, 71 f.
aequiprobabilism, 322
commentary on the Summa, 13
divisions of voluntariness, 142 f.
essence of morality, 263
habits in their essence, 339
nature of premotion, 233
object of venial sin, 58
possibility of an indifferent human
act, 282
the will as moved by the intellect,
183
Bitterness, a species of anger, 336
Blessed Mother: impeccability of,
112; increase in virtue in, 365
Blessedness, degrees of, 120 f.
Blondel: definition of truth, 287;
proof of God's existence from
desire for God, 80 f.; proof for
impossibility of infinity of goals,
47
Bodily excellence, as man's beatifying
object, 67 f.
Bodily perfection, and beatitude,
118 f.
Body, and increase of beatitude,
n6ff.
Boethius: beatitude as a state, 83: ne­
cessity arising from second
causes, 254; pleasure and man's
beatifying object, 68
Bonaventure, St.: evil and the object
of the will, 172
Bossuet: efficacious and sufficient
grace, 226
Bouquillon: indifferent human acts,
278
Brightness, of the glorified body, 118
"By whose aid,” a circumstance of
human acts, 168
Cajetan
act of command, 249
act of counsel, 244
acts specified as good and evil, 273
commentary on the Summa, 12
elements of a voluntary act, 138

385

Cajetan (continued)
essence of morality, 263
habits in their essence, 339
infinity of uncreated good, 71
man's desire for beatific vision, 127
moral Summa of, 13
motives which move the will, 180,
>83
natural beatitude, 128
the object of venial sin, 58
premotion of the will, 239
the twelve acts, division of, 248
voluntary acts in animals, 136
Calvin: efficacious grace and neces­
sity, 203, 221 ff.; intrinsic evil of
human acts, 259
Calvinists: good works and beatitude,
127
Cappadocians, a source of moral the­
ology, 10
Capreolus: essence of morality, 263;
will as moved by the intellect,
183
Caramuel: the first chief reflex prin­
ciple, 315
Catholicism and Thomism, 17 note
Causality of God in our willing, 186
Cause of created action, 236
Causes, essential and accidental order
of, 47 ff.
Certitude, kinds of, 312
Cessation from act and result on
habit, 370 f.
Character: education, 161 f.; and
temperament, 161; and the vol­
untary, 161
Charity: corruptible and incorrupti­
ble, 123; diminution of, 369; ef­
fects of, 53; an infused virtue,
355
Choice: an act of the will, 170 f., 243:
and intention, 294 f.; and judg­
ment, 208 ff., 218; order of, in
human acts, 170; simultaneous
tendency toward end and means
by, 178; and use, 248
Christ, virtues in, 6
Church, becoming Thomistic, 17 note
Circumstance, an accident of human
acts, 167
Circumstances
affecting morality of acts, 267 ff.

386

INDEX

Circumstances (continued)
not affecting nature of acts, 283
the chief, 169
formulation of, 168
of human acts, 167 ff.
specifically differentiating acts,
282 f.
theological, 168
Clement ΧΠ: Thomistic doctrine of
efficacious grace and necessity,
223
Clement of Alexandria, St., a source
of moral theology, 10
Coercion, see Violence
Cognition, degrees of, 141 f.
Command, an act of the intellect,
170
Commanded acts, 248 ff.
Commands and character education,
161
Communism: relation of individual
to society, 75
Compassion, a species of sadness, 334
Comprehension, and beatitude, 109
Comte: habit as something passive,
340; social utilitarianism of,
16 f., 20 f.; worship of society, 71
Concina: contention against probabilism, 13; the first chief reflex
principle, 315
Concupiscence: antecedent and con­
sequent, 157 f.; a cause of sad­
ness, 334; infinite, 331 f.; and the
voluntary, 157 ff.; see also Love
Congruism, 238
Congruists: definition of liberty, 211;
the nature of premotion, 232
Conscience, 303 ff.
certain, 311 ff.
definition of, 305 f.
division of, 306 ff.
dubious, 314 ff.
erroneous, acts in accordance with,
309 f.; invincibly and vincibly,
294, 3°9 ff·; voluntarily, 294
principles of, 308 f.
probable, 319 ff.
proofs for God's existence from,
290 ff.
and synderesis, 305
true and right, 307 f.
Consent, an act of the will, 170 f.,
247

Contemplation: according to Aris­
totle, 78; the cause of joy, 37 f.
Contenson: essence of morality, 263;
object of venial sin, 58
Cooperating grace and operating
grace, 192
Corporeal habits, corruptibility of,
368
Counsel, an act of the intellect, 170 f.,
243 ff·
Counseling of lesser evil to avoid
greater, 246
Created being as man's beatifying ob­
ject, 73 ff.
Cruelty, see Hatred
Culpability, positive and negative,
'37 ff·
Cyprian, St., a source of moral the­
ology, 10

Damascene, St.: corporeal universe as
the cause of human actions, 193;
premotion, nature of, 238; vio­
lence and in voluntariness, 153;
voluntary acts in animals, 135;
voluntary human acts, 134
Decalogue: affirmative and negative
precepts of, 15; a source of moral
theology, 10
Defense of supernatural mysteries, 99
Degrees of blessedness, i2of.
Delectation: see Delight
Deliberate acts: see Human acts
Deliberation and freedom, 209
Delight: and beatitude, 108; causes
of, 333: effects of, 333; good and
evil, 333; nature and types of,
332 fDel Prado: against Molinism, 226
Denis: purpose as circumstance, 26g
Dependence, vertical and horizontal,
50
Descartes: denial of habit, 340 f., 367,
370 f.; innate ideas, 349; morality
and God's will, 26
Desire
for happiness as proof of God's ex­
istence, 79 ff.
inefficacious, an act of the will, 169
nature of, 331 f.
for qualities of last end, 97 ff.
virtual and implicit, 54
see also Passion

INDEX
Despair: and hope, 334 f.; see also
Passion
Determinism: and indeterminism,
203 f.; psychological, 215 ff.
Diana: the first chief reflex principle,
3*5
Dionysius: evil and the object of the
will, 172
Diplomatic control of reason over
sense-appetite, 185 f., 253
Discouragement, a species of fear, 335
Disposition: for beatific vision, 120 f.;
and habit, 353
Divine action and divine essence,
«33 f·
Dogmatic theology, and moral the­
ology, 4 ff.
Dominating indifference, 212 ff.
Domination and man’s beatifying ob­
ject, 67
Double effect, morality of, 145 f.
Doubt; division of, 314; practical,
solution of, 315
Durandus: intensive augmentation of
habit, 361; natural beatitude, 128
Durkheim, social utilitarianism of,
16 f., 21
Eckhart: mystic treatment of moral
questions, 12
Ecstasy, an effect of love, 331
Education and instruction, 354 f.
Effect, voluntary, 140 ff.
Efficacious grace: and necessity, 221 f.;
and premotion, 232 ff.
Efficient cause of moral theology, 18
Egoism, see Selfishness
Elicited and commanded acts, 16g ff.
Emotion, see Passion
Empiric ethics, presentation and
refutation of, 20 ff.
Empiricism: reason identical with
imagination, 272
End, see Goal
End: last, every human act willed for,
54 ff.; last, formal and material,
62 f.; ultimate objective and sub­
jective, 332
Energy in the universe, conservation
of, 193 fEnjoyment: and use, in relation to
venial sin, 59; see also Fruition

387

Enmity, see Hatred
Envy, a species of sadness, 334
Epictetus: destruction of passion, 70
Epicurus: delight and cessation of
pain, 332; individual utilitarian­
ism of, 16 f., 20; pleasure as
man’s beatifying object, 68
Equilibrium, and liberty, 215
Eternal law and the will's goodness,
287 ff.
Eternal life, 838., 123 f.
Eternity, definition of, 123
Ethics: independent, 287, 289 ff.; nat­
ural, 4; systems of, 16 ff.
Eudaemonism, error of, regarding
morality, 257
Evil: desirability per se to the will,
172 ff.; minor chosen to escape
major, 276
Evils, greatest of, 175
Evolutionism, 239, 257 f.
Example and character education,
161
Execution: of the goal, 37, 48; order
of, in human acts, 170
Exercise of act and specification of
act, 181 f.
Expectation, see Hope
Exterior goods and beatitude, 119
Exterior principle of will's motion,
187 ff.
External members, commanded acts
of, 252, 254
External power, a cause of sadness.
334

Faith: and charity, see Intellect and
will; infused and acquired, 377;
an infused virtue, 353
Fate, 192 ff.; according to the Stoics,
70
Fear: and contracts, 156 f.; and volun­
tariness, 155 ff.; species and effect
of, 335; see aiso Passion
Ferrariensis: essence of morality, 263;
gratuity of grace, 105; the will as
moved by the intellect, 183
Fideism: error regarding morality,
257; refutation of, 25 f.
Fideists: ethics and the divine will,
16 f.
Final cause: of moral theology, 18;
see also Goal

388

INDEX

Finality: of activity, three levels of,
41; analogy of, 41; human, 40 t.;
necessity of, 40 f.; universality of,
39 ff:
First principles: incorruptible habit
of, 368; an intellectual habit, 346
Formal cause of moral theology, 18
Formal indifference, see Dominating
indifference
Forming conscience, 305
Fortitude and audacity, 335 f.
Fourier, hedonism of, 16 f., 20
Freedom; of beatific love, 110 fl.; de­
grees of, 142 f.; and deliberation,
20g; and indifference, 213 ff.; see
also Liberty
Free will; definitions of, 210 f.; Stoic
denial of, 70
Friendship: in heaven, 119; see also
Love
Frins: indifferent human acts, 278
Fruition: an act of the will, 170 f.,
241; see also Lesion of the lover
Fury, a species of anger, 336
Gerson: morality and the divine will,
272, 277; mystic treatment of
moral questions, 12
Gladness, see Passion
Glory: of God, human acts directed
to, 278 ff.; human, as man’s beati­
fying object, G6
Goal
complete, three elements of, 37 f.
definition and division of, 38
and the good, 36
of human life, 3 f.
intention and execution of, 37, 48
ultimate: in general, 33 ff.; same
for all creatures, 62 f.; same for
all men, 61 f.; superfluous, 53
Goals, essential and accidental order
of, 47 ff.
God
Author of the will, 195 f.
cause: of the sinful creature, 190;
of virtue and good acts, 190
exterior principle moving will,
>94 ff·
and finality, 41
and the good, 74

God (continued)
seen as intelligible object, 81 note
and violence to the will, 149,
151 f.
Genet: commentary on the Summa,
13; essence of morality, 263;
habits in their essence, 339; tran­
sitoriness of worldly glory, 66;
the will as moved by the intel­
lect, 183
Good
and evil: exterior, and the will,
299 f.; first found in interior act,
299; sources of, 257 ff.
founded on reality, 11 f.
and the goal, 36
and God, 74
in itself and human will, 295 ff.
perfect, first natural, and first dif­
ferentiating, 51 f.
real and apparent, 172 f.
Goodness: and badness, circumstan­
tial, 267 f.; division of, 64 f.; of
will, dependent on object, 284 f.;
of will, dependent on reason,
285 ff.
Goods: external, as man’s beatifying
object, 65 ff.; spiritual and tem­
poral, 76 f.
Gospels, commentaries on, as a source
of moral theology, 10
Gregory the Great, St.: individually
indifferent acts, 278; a source of
moral theology, 10
Gregory of Nyssa, St.: nature of pre­
motion, 238
Grotius, social utilitarianism of, 20

Habit, 342; and act, 343 f.; cessation
from act, 370 f.; and disposition,
353; a quality, 442 a.
Habits, 337 ff.
of the angels, 348
arising from acts, 350 ff.; from na­
ture, 349 f.
augmentation by addition, 360 ff.
bodily, 345
corruptible
and
incorruptible,
367 ff.
diminution of, intensive and exten­
sive, 369 ff.

INDEX
Habits (continued)
distinguished by objects, 373 if.
essence of, 33g if.
good and evil, 379 f.
growth of, intensive and extensive,
357 K·
increase of, acquired and infused,
363 ff·
infused by God, 355 f.
intellectual, 346 f.
manner of distinction between,
372 ff.
multiplicity of, in single power,
37»
natural and supernatural, 355
necessity of, 344
number of, in one subject, 372 f.
operative and entitative, 341
source of, 349 ff.
and their subjects, 345 ff.
and voluntariness, 158 f.
of the will, 347 f.
Habitual intention, see Virtual inten­
tion
Harmony, natural and supernatural,
106 f.
Hatred: and anger, 336; bom of love,
33»; see also Passion
Hedonism, 20, 257
Hegel: the object of sin, 172; panthe­
istic determinism of, 203
Hell, pain of loss in, 107
Henry of Ghent: evil as an object of
the will, 172; essence of soul and
beatitude, 85
Henry de Lubac: natural beatitude,
128
Heredity and voluntariness, 159 f.
Hesitation, a species of fear, 335
Hilary, St.: goodness of the will, 286
Hobbes, individual utilitarianism of,
16 f., 20
Honors and man’s beatifying object,
66
Hope: and despair, 334 f.; and in­
fused virtue, 355; and love, 335;
see also Passion
Human action, fourfold goodness in,
268
Human acts
and actions of man, 34 t.
and circumstances, 283

389

Human acts (continued)
directed to glory of God, 278 ff.
essential morality from natural ob­
ject, 264 ff., 299
good and bad, 263 f.; consequences
of, 302
indifference of, 278 ff.
morality, intrinsic, of, 258 ff.
Human determinism, types of, 203 f.
Huss: indifferent acts, 277

Ignorance: kinds of, 163 f.; nescience
and error, 163; principles regard­
ing, 164 f.; and voluntariness,
163 ff.
Image of God, man, 3 f.
Immanent action whereby will moves
other faculties, 184
Impassibility of the glorified body,
118
Impeccability: of Blessed Virgin
Mary, 112; of blessed souls, 110 ff.,
122; and liberty, 214
Imperfect and perfect beatitude, 95 f.
Imperfection and sin, 259 f., 275 f.
Inculcation of principles in character
education, 161
Indeliberate acts, a result of habit, 38
Indeterminism and determinism,
203 f.
Indifference: and freedom, 213 ff.; of
judgment, tuff.; a species of
morality, 263; of will, see Free­
dom; see also Dominating indif­
ference
Indirect voluntary and explicit vir­
tual intention, 61
Individual and person, 75
Infinity of goals in human acts, im­
possibility of, 47 ff.
Influence, modes of, 143 f.
Innatism, 349 f.
Innocent XI: good and evil acts, 271;
the first chief reflex principle,
ahi­
inspiration of Holy Ghost and voli­
tion, 189
Instruction and education, 354 f.
Intellect: and will, in relation to
beatitude, 87 ff.; moving the will,
181 ff.; precedes will simply, 188

SOO

INDEX

Intensity of beatific love, 113
Intention
and choice, goodness of, 294 f.
differentiated by personal purpose,
273 f·
efficacious, an act of the will, 169,
171
of end and motion toward end, 242
and execution, acts of, differenti­
ated by purpose, 44 f.
of the goal, 37, 48
goodness of, dependent on object,
285
nature of, 241 f.
order of, in human acts, 169
virtual, 56, 59 ff.
Interior acts, good and evil in, 284 ff.
Intermediate goal, 36
Involuntary and its causes, 148 ff.

Jansenism: free will, 205; indifferent
human acts, 280
Jansenists: elements of fideism in,
25 f.; indifference and the will,
213; movement of the will by
God, 198; nature and superna­
ture, 106
Jansenius, Protestant determinism of,
203
Jesus Christ, love for God, 113 f.
Job, the book of, St. Gregory the
Great’s commentary on, 10
John Damascene, St., Summa of, a
source of moral theology, 10 f.
John of St. Thomas: commentary on
the Summa, 13; habits in their
essences, 339; essence of morality,
263; rectitude of the will in beat­
itude, 114; voluntary acts in ani­
mals, 136
Jovinian, degrees of beatitude, 120
Joy: a characteristic of beatitude,
88 ff.; nature of, 37 f.; see also
Delight
Judgment: in the complete human
act, 169 f.; and choice, 208 ff.;
and command, 248 ff.; practical,
an act of the intellect, 170 f.
Justin, St., divine premotion, 190 f.
Kant
and Blondel, 80 f.

Kant (continued)
categorical imperative, 276 f.
Christian influence in admission of
moral obligation, 27
conscience, 18
delight, 332
empiric ethics and happiness, 21
ethics and categorical imperative,
16
pure love and reward, 109, 112
refutation of ethics of, 22 ff.
Stoic elements in ethical system of,
70 f.
subjectivism of, 285
Knowledge: and appetite, analogy of,
135 f.; and cessation from act, 370
Koellin: act of possessing infinite
Good, 72; commentary on the
Summa, 12; habits in their es­
sence, 339; soul-goods are limited,
7*
Lactantius, a source of moral theol­
ogy, 10
Lamennais, liberalism of, 175
Languor, see Lesion of the lover
Laxism: the first chief reflex prin­
ciple, 315; good and evil specify­
ing acts, 271; probability, 320
Law, dubious, 315 f.
Ledesma, commentary on the Summa
of. 13
Lehmkuhl: indifferent acts, 278
Leibnitz: habits: denial of, 367, 371;
in their essence, 340 f.; in their
source, 349; psychological deter­
minism of, 203, 208, 215, 219
Leo XIII, and scientia media, 227
Lesion of the lover, an effect of love,
33»
Lessius, against the principle of predi­
lection, 225 f.
Levy-Bruhl, social utilitarianism of,
20 f.
Liberalism: absolute, 175 f.; and er­
roneous conscience, 311; society
and the individual, 75
Libertinarian indeterminism, see In­
determinism
Liberty
definitions of, 202 f., 210 ff.; and
equilibrium, 215

INDEX
Liberty (continued)
and impeccability, 214
and morality, 261 f.
roots of, 210
and sin, 115
types of, 202 f.
Liberium arbitrium, 203
Lorenzelli, Cardinal: the nature of
premotion, 238 f.
Loss, a cause of sadness, 334
Love, 330 ff.
and beatitude, 87 ff.
a cause of sadness, 334
effects of, 331
and hope, 335
influence of, 331
sources of, 330 f.
see also Passion
Lugo: commentary on the Summa, 13
Luther: determinism, 203; efficacious
grace and necessity, 221 ff.; hu­
man acts, intrinsically bad, 25g;
infused habits, denial of, 370;
and Occam, 25

Magister Bonae Spei, nature of be­
atitude, 85
Man: ability to sin at first instant,
18g f.; an image of God, 3 f.
Manichaeans, supreme evil of, 26
Maritain: negation of value of habits,
87°
Massoulie: sin of commission, 263
Material cause of moral theology ac­
cording to St. Thomas Aquinas,
18
Means in relation to the goal, 36
Medina: commentary on the Summa,
13; invincible ignorance, 282
Merit: and the beatific vision, 120 f.;
and demerit, before God and
man, 302
Metaphysical knowledge and beati­
tude, gg f.
Mill, Stuart: individual and social
utilitarianism, 20
Modern practices in moral theology,
13 f.
Modernists, reappearance of Bains’
doctrine among, g8
Molina
determinism by circumstance, tg3

391

Molina (continued)
efficacious grace, 224
the object of infused habits, 373 ff.,
378
against the principle of predilec­
tion, 211, 215
rejection of premotion, 14g ff.,
1 go f., 236 f.
scientia media, ig-j, 212, 223, 226 f.,
22g, 238 f.
supernatural gifts of God, 122
Molinis ts
efficacious grace and necessity,
221 ff.
equilibrium, 215
free acts, 203
potential indifference, 213
liberty, definition of, 211
indifferent premotion, ig6 ff.
Molinos: first motions of sensuality,
221
Moral
acts, multiplicity of, 302
certitude, speculative and practical,
312 f.
good, three levels in man, 65
good and evil, transcendental rela­
tions to object, 262 f.
indifference and liberty, 214
instant and physical instant, 18g f.
obligation, 287 ff.
science and prudence, 286 f.
Morality: errors regarding, 257 f.; es­
sence of, 261 f.; kinds of, 262 f.;
and liberty, 261 f.; sources of,
18. 263 ff.
Morally indifferent human acts, 34 ff.
Moral theology
and ascetical theology, 6
and casuistic theology, 6
definition of, 4
divisions of, g ff.
and dogmatic theology, 4 ff.
and mystical theology, 6f.
and natural ethics, 4
nature of, 3 ff.
patristic sources of, 10 f.
and prudence, 6
scriptural sources of, 10
Motion, divisions of, 134
Motions, sudden, 20g f.
Motive, sufficient, 215 f„ 221

392

INDEX

Motives, moving the will, 180 ff.
Movements of the will: three initial,
192; natural and supernatural,
198
Miiller: indifferent acts, 278
Mystical acts and ascetical acts, dis­
tinction between, 187
Natalis, Alexander: commentary on
the Summa, 13
Natural beatitude, nature of, 127 ff.;
primacy of intellect or will in, 93
Natural inclination, goodness of, 52
Natural and supernatural desire for
man’s last end, 97 ff.
Natural and supernatural movements
of the will, 198
Nature: and activity, 62; and super­
nature, 97 ff.
Necessity, 201 ff.; and efficacious
grace, 221 ff.
Nemesius: fear and voluntariness,
>55; voluntariness in boys, 135
Nestorians: beatific vision and the
disembodied, 117
New Testament, a source for tradi­
tional ethics, 27 ff.
Nietzsche, “superman” of, 72
Noldin: indifferent acts, 278, 280
Nominalism: essence of morality, 261,
374
Nominalists: augmentation of habits,
361; specific distinction between
good and evil, 271
Nondespotic control of will over
sense-appetite, 185t.
Nonvoluntariness, 165
Noris: man’s desire for beatific vision,
104, 106

Obediential potency, 105 ff.; 121
Object, differentiation by, 275 f.
Objective indifference: see Dominat­
ing indifference
Objects, distinction of habits by,
373 KOccam
denial of infused habits, 370
denial of distinction among seven
gifts, 370
ethical results from nominalism of,
25 f.

Occam (continued)
ethics and the divine will, 16 f.,
277 f.
God knows only individuals, i28f.
natural and divine positive law,
265, 272
Occasionalism, 239
Old Testament, a source of tradi­
tional ethics, 27 ff.
Omission, per accidens cause of, 13g ff.
Operating grace and cooperating
grace, 192, 199
Opinion: corruptibility of, 368 f.;
probable division of, 319; and sci­
ence, 353 f.
Orange, Second Council of: condem­
nation of Pelagians, 224 f.
Pain: effects of, 334; and sadness,
333 f·
Pantheism of the Stoics, 70
Pantheistic determinism: see Deter­
minism
Paquet: intrinsically efficacious grace,
«39
Passion: definition of, 327; and in­
creased morality of an act, 328 f.
Passions: 325 ff.; concupiscible, 327,
330 ff.; in general, 327 ff.; iras­
cible, 327, 334 ff.; in particular,
33° ff·
Passive indifference: see Dominating
indifference
Passive use. 184
Pathological conditions and volun­
tariness, 162 f.
Patuzzi: contention against probabilism, 13
Paul, St.
beatific vision of, 122, 124 f.
beatitude and the body, 117
commentaries on epistles of, a
source of moral theology, 10
concupiscence of, 220
acting with doubtful or bad con­
science, 294, 312
dependency of will on God, 194 f.
do all for the glory of God, 280 f.
gifts of glorified body, 118
divine predilection, 225 f.
unity of mystical body, 251 f.

INDEX
Pecci, Cardinal: nature of premotion,
238
Pedagogical theories, 352
Pelagian indeterminism: see Indeter­
minism
Pelagianism: Christian life not super­
natural, 106
Pelagians: anticipation of Molinism,
223; condemnation of, 190, 194,
224 f.
Person and individual, 75
Personality and the soul, 117
Peter de Alliaco, nominalism of, 265,
272, 277 f.
Peter the Lombard, a source of moral
theology, 11 f.
Phenomenalism, 340 ff.
Physical: determinism, 220 f.; instant
and moral instant, 189 f.; and
physiological determinism, see
Human determinism
Pius V, St.: infidels and sin, 280
Plato
beauty, the vision of, 102 f.
natural beatitude, 128
delight, nature of, 332
evil and ignorance, 166
innate ideas and reminiscence,
349 «·
rise from the multiplicity to unity,
79
pleasure and man's beatifying ob­
ject, 68
the soul, immortality of, 77 f.
a source of traditional ethics, 27 f.
the supreme good, 77 f.
Pleasure: and man’s beatifying ob­
ject, 68 ff.; types of, 68
Plotinus: growth of habit, 358
Positivism: existence of habits, 341;
reason and imagination, 272
Positivists: no specific distinction be­
tween good and evil, 271
Potential indifference; see Dominat­
ing indifference
Power: and man's beatifying object,
67; multiplicity of habits in, 372
Practical intellect: proofs for God's
existence from, 291 f.; and specu­
lative intellect, and beatitude,
95; moving the will, 182 f.
Prayer, an act of the intellect, 250

393

Predetermination and premotion,
237 f.
Predilection, 211 f., 225
Premotion: and efficacious grace,
232 ff.; nature of, 190 ff., 232 ff.;
and predetermination, 237 f.
Presumption, a reflex principle, 317
Probabiliorism, 319 f., 322
Probabilism: on conscience, 311 f.,
314 ff., 319 ff.; the value of moral
virtues, 287
Probability, use of, 320 f.
Progress, modern theory of necessary,
364, 367, 369
Proof of God's existence from desire
for happiness, 79 ff.
Protestant determinism; see Deter­
minism
Protestants: nature and supernature,
106
Prudence: an intellectual habit, 346;
and moral science, 286 f.; opera­
tive and negative, 161 f.
Prummer: indifferent acts, 282
Psychological: consideration of hu­
man acts, 169 ff.; determinism,
see Determinism and Human de­
terminism; liberty, see Liberty
Puffendorff: social utilitarianism of,
20 f.
Purgatory, pain of loss in, 107
Purpose: in the human act, 33 ff.; as
a circumstance of human act,
45 f., 268 ff.; specification of hu­
man acts by, 42 ff.; see also Fi­
nality

Qualities, absolute and relative, 358 f.
Quesnel: purification of soul and
sensuality, 221
Quietism: pure love and desire for
reward, 57 f„ 109; conformity of
our will to divine will, 296; use­
lessness of exterior works, goof.
Raymond of Pennafort, St.: treat­
ment of moral theology, 12
Reason, commanded acts of, 252 f.
Rectitude of will, and beatitude,
110 ff.
Reflex principles, chief, 315 ff.

394

INDEX

Reginaldus: actions specified by ob­
ject, 265
Regret, a species o£ fear, 335
Results and exterior good and evil,
302
Richard of St. Victor: intense love is
violent, 331
Right reason, proximate norm of
morality, 272, 282 f., 285 f.
Rigorism, 322
Rousseau: classification of faculties,
205

Sadness
causes of, 334
good and evil, 334
and pain, 333 f.
remedies of, 334
species of, 334
see also Passion
“Safer opinion,” 31g f.
Saint Simon: moral legitimacy of all
passions, 328
Salmanticences: commentaries on the
Summa, 13: natural beatitude,
128; neglect of habits, 339: posi­
tive essence in sin of commission,
263
Satolli, Cardinal: nature of premo­
tion, 238 f.
Schopenhauer: delight, a cessation of
pain, 332
Science: and cessation from act, 370;
corruptibility of, 368 f.; an in­
tellectual habit, 346; and opinion,
353; see also Habit
Scientia media, see Molina
Scotus
beatitude, an activity of the will,
87 ff.
a dialectic antithesis to Thomas
Aquinas, 36g
divine motion in the creature, 234
fideism in, 26
freedom of beatific love and extrin­
sic impeccability, 110 if., 115 f.
indifferent acts in the individual,
34· 37· 54· 280
morality of acts dependent only on
divine will, 259, 265 f.; 270 ff., 278
natural desire for beatific vision,
101 f., 104 ff.

Scotus (continued)
necessity of infused moral virtues,
denied, 370
science, complex nature of habit of,
361
seven gifts, distinction among,
denied, 370
Secondary end, see Intermediate
goal
Selfishness: causative of apparently
unrelated sins, 52 f.; positive root
of all sin, 53
Semi-Pelagians, see Pelagians
Sense-appetite: commanded acts of,
252 f.; moving the will, 184 ff.,
220 f.
Sense-delight, sole end of deliberate
act, 279
Sense and intellect, analogy between,
89
Sensibility, modern notion of, 205
Sensism, 349 f.
Sensuality: and liberty, 216; first mo­
tions of, 146 f., 253; see also Sense­
appetite
Sermon on the Mount: commentaries
on, a source of moral theology,
10; a source for traditional
ethics, 28
Sertillanges: criticism of premotio
physica, xyj
Shame, a species of fear, 335
Simar: indifferent individual human
acts, 278
Similitude, a source of love, 330 f.
Sin
cause of, 231 f.
of commission, positive essence of,
263
good deeds done in state of, 263
and imperfection, 25g f.
of omission. 137 ff.
philosophical and theological, 288,
291. 293
venial, goal of, 53, 58 f.; Thomistic
doctrine on, 59
Sinner and the beatifying object, 62
Sloth, a species of sadness, 334
Society of friends and beatitude, 119
Socrates: possibility of natural beati­
tude, 128: a source of traditional
ethics, 27 f.

INDEX
Soto, Dominic: commentary on the
Summa, 13
Soto, Peter: commentary on the
Summa, 13
Specification and exercise of act,
181 if.
Spencer: individual and social utili­
tarianism, 20
Spinoza
empiric ethics and happiness, 21
liberty, denial of, 258 f.
natural finality, denial of, 39
pantheism, affirmation of, 70
pantheistic determinism, 203
pantheistic notion of man’s love for
God, 86
purpose in divine acts, denied, 34
rational eudaemonism of, 24
vice and mental confusion, 172. 379
Standards of human action, supreme
and derived, 287 if.
Statistic determinism, see Human de­
terminism
Stoic ethics, refutation of, 24 f.
Stoics
augmentation of habits, 358 f.
good for its own sake, 16
pantheistic determinism of, 203
passions, 328
virtue as man’s beatifying object,
70 (f.
Stupor, a species of fear, 335
Suarez
beatitude and knowledge and love
of God, 93 f.
command, not a special act, 248 ff.
commentary on the Summa, 13
free will and God, 151
increase of charity and other habits,
364 f.
indifferent individual human acts,
278
judgment and choice, 208, 218
man’s tendency to his last end, 105
natural beatitude, 128
science, complex nature of habit of,
36*
supernatural gifts of God, 122
synthesis of Aquinas and Scotus,
369
Subjectivism, 257
Subtility of the glorified body, 118

395

Summa, place of moral theology in,
7f·
Suso: mystic treatment of moral ques­
tions, 12
Syllabus: condemnation of absolute
evolutionism, 257 f., 261
Sylvius: culpable omission, require­
ments for, 138; essence of sin of
commission, negative, 263; venial
sin, object of, 58
Syncretism of Thomism and Molinism, 238
Synderesis and conscience, 305
Systems of ethics, 16 ff.
Taine: no specific distinction be­
tween good and evil, 271
Tamburini: dubious law, 315
Tauter: mystic treatment of moral
questions, 12
Temperament and voluntariness,
160 f.
Tertullian, a source of moral theol­
ogy, 10
Theological circumstances, see Cir­
cumstances
Theological positivists: ethics and the
divine will, 16
Theology
and philosophy, 5
positive parts of, 6
a single and indivisible science,
5 ff·· 347. 361
specialization in, 7
speculative and practical, 4 f.
systematic, parts of, 6
Thomas a Kempis: mystic treatment
of moral questions, 12
Thomas Aquinas, St.
beatitude, an intellectual activity,
87 ff.
a dialectic thesis, 369
effects of love, 331
ethical system, scientificness of,
18 f.
finality, principles of, 39 ff.
grace and liberty, 229 ff.
human creation, reason for, 27
intellect and will in human act,
169 ff.
moral theology, four causes of, 18;
innovations in division of, nf.

39θ

INDEX

Thomas Aquinas, St. (continued)
motions of sensuality and sin, 146 f.,
253
movement of sense-appetite by will,
185 f.
movement of the will, divine, 151,
196 ff.
natural beatitude, 128
natural desire for last end, 98 ff.
omission, sins of, 139 f.
preference of Church for, 17 note,
•9
secundum quid voluntary, »47 f.
sources of morality, 263 ff.
theology as a single science, 361
venial sin, 59
virtual intention, 59 f.
will and intellect, 26
Thomism: and Catholicism, 17 note;
definition of liberty, 211 f.; divine
promotion and necessity, 222 ff.;
and Leo ΧΙΠ, 13 f.; supernatural
and natural habits, distinction
between, 373 ff.
Time, angelic and human, 123
Toleration, see Liberalism
Tostatus and the Thomistic doctrine
of beatitude, 94
Transitive action of will moving
other faculties, 194
Trent, Council of: circumstances and
species of sin, 282; efficacious
grace and necessity, 222 ff., 230;
justice augmented by good works,
357
Truth: and goodness, 87; three levels
of, 308
Ultimate: goal, never subordinated to
another goal, 52; purpose of hu­
man life, 46 ff.; purpose of the
individual, unity of, 50 ff.
Union, an effect of love, 331
Universal mover of the human will,
194 ff·
Use: active and passive, 247; act of,
247; an act of the will, 170; and
choice, 248
Utilitarianism: condemnation of, 65;
individual and social, 20 f.; see
also Empiric ethics

Valentia: indifferent acts, 278
Vasqucz
beatitude, 94
command, the act of, 248 f.
habits in their essence, 340
indifferent acts. 37, 278
natural beatitude, denial of, 128
science, complex nature of habit of,
361
theology: divisions of, 4; without
faith, 380
Vatican Council: incomprehensibility
of divine mysteries, 98 f.; natural
order and order of grace, 129
Vegetative soul, acts of, not subject
to command, 253
Venial sin, 59
Vices, corruptibility of, 368
Victoria: commentary on the Summa,
•3
Violation, voluntary and involuntary,
154 fViolence: defined by Aristotle, 149;
and involuntariness, 152 ff.; and
the will, 149 ff.
Virtual intention, kinds of, 59 ff.
Virtue: and cessation from act, 369 f.;
not man’s beatifying object, 70 ff.;
see also Habit
Virtues: division of cardinal, 380;
moral, corruptibility of, 368 f.
Volition: antecedent and consequent,
147 f.; of end, first, 187; first
and subsequent moved by God,
190 ff.
Voluntariness: definition of, 134,
136 f.; divisions of, 141 ff.; of hu­
man acts, 133 ff.; simply and
secundum quid, 155 ff.
Voluntary: perfect and imperfect,
141 ff.; and involuntary, 133(1.;
simple and secundum quid, see
also Modes of willing
Voluntary acts: meritorious or de­
meritorious, 302; praiseworthy
or blameworthy, 302
Voluntarism, results of, 92 note
Will
act of, contrary to reason, 293 f.
commanded acts of, 247 ff.

INDEX
Will (continued)
conformity between human and
divine wills, 295 if.
and corporeal world, 192 ff.
and erroneous conscience, 30g ff.
and exterior good and evil, 299 f.
goodness of: and the eternal law,
298 ff.; and God's will, 295
mistress of its own acts, 186 f.
modes of its being moved, 201 ff.
moved: by an exterior principle,
187 ff.; by intellect, 181 ff.; by
sense appetite, 184 ff.; to its act
by God, 221 ff.
mover of itself, i86f.

397

Will (continued)
natural and free acts of, got f.
not determined by self alone, 199 f.
not necessarily moved by its par­
ticular object, 202 ff.
and its object, 172 ff.
and purpose. 176 t.
and sense-appetite, 220 f.
sufficient source of its own act, 198
Willing, modes of, 147 (I.
Willing-not-to and not-willing-to, 138
Wisdom, an intellectual habit, 346

Zeal, an effect of love, 331
Zigliara, divine premotion, 237