PREDESTINATION
BY

THE REV. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P.

TRANSLATED BY

DOM BEDE ROSE, O.S.B., D.D.

B. HERDER

BOOK CO.

15 & 17 SOUTH BROADWAY, ST. LOUIS, MO.

AND
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Printed in US.A.
NIHIL OBSTAT
P. Hieronymus IVespe, O.S.B.

Censor deputatus

IMPRIMI POTEST
ψ Thomas Meier, O.S.B.

Abbas

NIHIL OBSTAT

Sti. Ludovici, die i. Sept., 1939
F. J. Holweck,

Censor Librorum

IMPRIMATUR

Sti. Ludovici, die 2. Sept., 1939
•J< C. H. Winkelmann, V.G.

Copyright 1939
B. HERDER BOOK CO.

Vaü-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton and New York

To
The Holy Mother of God
Mother of Divine Grace
as a
Token of Gratitude and
Filial Obedience

PREFACE
In two works 1 published some years ago, we discussed the

fundamentals of the teaching on predestination, but we did
not come directly to grips with this famous question, and a
separate study of it was felt necessary. The opportunity pre­
sented itself when we had to write on Predestination, Provi­
dence, and Premotion for the Dictionnaire de théologie,
several articles that had previously been published on these
problems in different reviews.2 The purpose of the present
work is to give substantially and in compact form the result
of those labors. St. Augustine’s phrase, “The predestination
of the saints,” reminds us that predestination to grace alone,
which does not in fact bring us to eternal life, is not in the
true sense predestination, since this latter includes the gift of
final perseverance.
In the first part of this book our studies will be concerned
with the meaning of predestination according to Scripture
and the teaching of the Church. Then we shall consider the
principal difficulties of the problem, the method to be fol­
lowed, the classification of the theological systems, and the
stand taken by St. Augustine.
In the second part we shall give the history of the various
solutions of the great problem, insisting upon the teaching of
St. Thomas, which we shall compare with the tentative solu­
tions proposed by theologians of later date, and especially
with the solutions proposed by the post-Tridentine theo­
logians.
In the third part we shall treat of grace, especially of effica1 Dieu and Providence. Both have been published in English translation.
2 Cf. infra, p. 292, note 29.
v

vi

PREFACE

cious grace, by which the effects of predestination are re­
alized in this life. These are vocation, justification, and merit.
We shall make a special study of efficacious grace in its rela­
tion to sufficient grace that is offered and even given to all.
The scope of this book from beginning to end is the recon­
ciliation of the two principles of divine predilection and possi­
ble salvation for all. On the one hand, “no one thing would
be better than another, if God did not will greater good for
one than for another.” 3 On the other hand, God never com­
mands what is impossible, but makes it possible for all who
have come to the use of reason to fulfil the precepts that are
of obligation, at the time they are of obligation, when and as
these are known by them.
The intimate reconciliation of these two principles is be­
yond our power of perception. Before our admission to the
beatific vision, this would be impossible for any created in­
tellect, either angelic or human. But we must attach equal
importance to both principles. They counteract each other,
and the history of theology as well as a thorough knowledge
of the teaching of St. Thomas, enables us to estimate each
principle at its true value, so that we vaguely foresee how in­
finite mercy, justice, and sovereign liberty are intimately rec­
onciled in the eminence of the Deity, or of the intimate life
of God.
It will serve a useful purpose to study these great questions
again at the present time, all the more so as people today
very often are not aware of the reality and value of divine
grace; for without it we can do nothing in the way of saving
our souls. The eternal reality of the problem studied in these
pages becomes more strikingly evident from the light thrown
on it by the following reflections taken from the fine book
recently published by a friend of ours.4 “The mystery of the
incarnation,” says St. Thomas, “is considered as a condescen8 Cf. St. Thomas, la, q.zo, a.3.
«J. Maritain, Science et Sagesse, pp. 43-47.

PREFACE

vii

sion of the fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather
than as the promotion of human nature already existing, as
it were, to the Godhead.” 6
‘‘There are thus two movements in the Christian world.
The movement by which it ascends to God is but the result
of the movement by which God descends into it, and this is
the first movement. And the more it yields to this movement
by which God gives Himself to it, the more the movement
is awakened in it by which it gives itself to God. For grace has
a vivifying effect, and is not, as Luther thought, a mantle
cast over a dead person. The creature, profoundly stirred to
act, arises from sleep and becomes all vigilance and activity.
In its final stage this activity is one of pre-eminence, of lov­
ing contemplation, and of superabundance. But at the same
time it is also a moral, ascetic, practical, and militant ac­
tivity. . . .
‘‘A time came when man took this second movement for
the first. In the age of anthropocentric humanism, which is
Pelagianism in action, man forgot that God is the first Mover
in the act of love, as He is the first Cause of being. Man acted
as if the creature owed its advancement to itself and not to
the operation of the divine plenitude in it. When these con­
ditions prevailed, the Christian world,6 laboring under the
triple ferment of the Renaissance, of rationalism, and of its
contrary Jansenist or Protestant tendency (which, as it seeks
to nullify man’s efforts as regards the supernatural, in the
same degree seeks to exalt them in the natural order), was
inevitably doomed to disintegration.
“Even though as Christians we remain truly loyal and obe­
dient to all that has been revealed, since grace is something
hidden the movement by which we ascend to God, that is,
s St. Thomas, Illa, q.34, a. 1 ad turn.
o By this expression the author does not mean the Church, but Christendom;
that is to say, the assembly of nations united officially even by their legisla­
tion to the Church, and it refers especially to the condition that prevailed in
Europe before the coming of Protestantism.

viii

PREFACE

our indispensable effort to attain spiritual perfection, may
veil from our eyes the descending movement and the gift of
uncreated love in us. Then is struck a discordant note, in­
creasing in volume, between life as we Christians should live it
and our consciousness and interpretation of it. Religion tends
to become less and less existential; it is swept away by appear­
ances, and we live but a superficial life. We shall always be­
lieve in grace, but we shall act as if it were but the pediment
of an edifice, and as if, even without it, on the chance suppo­
sition that it did not operate, things would still be the same,
because of precautions taken by human aids and conditions
deemed to be sufficient. When such periods occur, which act
as counter currents to grace, should we be astonished at their
anemia?
“To be sure, the Middle Ages were not such a period. The
enormous activity manifested during that period, though it
may deceive the historian, did not deceive the period itself.
The Middle Ages knew that this great and constructive work
was but the mask cloaking an invisible mystery of love and
humility. Those ages obeyed the law of the incarnation, which
continued to accomplish its effects in them. . . . Medieval
Christianity knew in a practical way that the Word came
down and was made flesh, that the Holy Spirit, following this
movement, also comes down. Medieval Christianity opened
the world of knowledge to the stream which coursed through
it gradually. Thus the world was enabled to know the order
of wisdom, and for a time it experienced in itself the realiza­
tion of the peaceful encounter and harmony of the three
wisdoms: the infused, the theological, and the metaphysical.”
We should like to set forth here the nature of the union of
these three wisdoms, as described by St. Thomas apropos of
one of the greatest problems, of this most exalted part of
divine providence—predestination.
When we consider the disorder in Europe at the present
time, and when we think of what has been happening in

PREFACE

ix

Russia and in Mexico for the past several years and of what
has happened in Spain, it is good to recall our Lord’s words
about predestination, words that will infallibly be fulfilled in
spite of all difficulties: “My sheep hear My voice. ... I give
them life everlasting, and they shall not perish for ever. . . .
No one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 7 It
occurs also at an appropriate time for us to remember that
St. Paul sees in predestination a great motive for hope, when
he writes: “We know that to them that love God all things
work together unto good, to such as according to His pur­
pose are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew He
also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of
His Son. . . . And whom He predestinated, them He also
called . . . justified . . . and glorified.” 8 St. Paul also says:
“Blessed be God . . . who hath blessed us in heavenly places.
As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world,
that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight . . . unto
the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced
us in His beloved Son.” 8
7 John io: 27-29.
8 Rom. 8: 28-30.
» Eph. 1: 3-6.

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
With his accustomed keenness of penetration and precision of
thought, Father Garrigou-Lagrange has discussed this engross­
ing problem of predestination. It is more, of course, than a
problem; it is one of the mysteries of revelation. For this rea­
son there must ever remain points about it that are obscure.
It would be absurd for anyone to expect that in this work
all difficulties are removed, and that everything is explained or
proved by reason. As Father Garrigou-Lagrange so wisely
points out, it is only when, by God’s grace, we shall be ad­
mitted to the beatific vision, that we shall see how infinite
justice, mercy, and goodness are intimately reconciled in the
eminence of the Deity. Predestination is a subject that closely
concerns these divine attributes.
The author wrote this work primarily for students of the­
ology. Gradually and carefully he has traced for us the de­
velopment of thought on this subject. Beginning with the
decisions of the Church in the earliest councils, continuing
with the statements of the Church Fathers, and ending with
the views of the leading theologians, especially of St. Thomas
Aquinas, we have presented to us in this work a body of doc­
trine that is a guide for every student and diligent inquirer in
the search for truth. In this book a sincere and, I believe, suc­
cessful effort has been made to give the true and unadulterated
doctrine of St. Thomas. To interpret aright the mind of the
Angelic Doctor is not always an easy matter, as is evident from
the history of the conflicting opinions even among the Thomists. The various errors and heresies on this subject of pre­
destination have been clearly set forth and condemned on the
authority of the Church without tire slightest hesitation.
xi

xii

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

In conclusion I wish to express my thanks and deep appreci­
ation to the Reverend Newton Thompson, S.T.D., for his
careful revision of the manuscript and his valuable sugges­
tions.
Predestination is a translation of La predestination des
saints et la grace, by Rev. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, pub­
lished by Desclee, De Brouwer & Cie, Bruges, Belgium.

CONTENTS

PART I
THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AND THE
THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
C If AFTER

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

PAGE

Predestination According to Scripture ....
3
The Teaching of the Church....................................... 8
Difficulties of the Problem..................................... 24
Classification of the Theological Systems
. . 32
St. Augustine and His First Disciples........................... 39

PART II
THE PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM
SECTION I. predestination according to the scholars
OF THE MIDDLE AGES

I. The Theologians Prior to St. Thomas.... 59
II. Doctrinal Principles of St. Thomas.................. 70
III. Predestination According to St. Thomas
... 85
IV. Scriptural Background for the Teaching of St.
Thomas............................................................... 90
V. Views of the First Thomists............................. 107
VI. The Teaching of Duns Scotus............................ 112
SECTION II. PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO THE TENETS OF
PROTESTANTISM AND JANSENISM

I. Protestantism.......................................................... 117
II. Baianism and Jansenism..........................................123
SECTION III. predestination according to the teaching
OF THE post-tridentine theologians

I. The Theory Advocated

by

xiii

Molina......................... 126

CONTENTS

xiv
CHAPTER

PAGE

II. The Congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and
Suarez.................................................................... 153
III. The Congruism of the Sorbonne............................... 163
IV. The Teaching of the Post-Tridentine Augustinians 168
V. The Teaching of the Post-Tridentine Thomists . 171

SYNTHESIS

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Definition of Predestination.................................... 183
The Cause of Predestination.................................... 194
The Motive for Reprobation................................... 206
On the Certainty of Predestination........................ 213
Conclusion.............................................................. 221

PART III
GRACE AND ITS EFFICACY

I. Efficacious Grace

and Sufficient Grace Accord­
ing to Scripture and the Declarations of the
Church.................................................... 233

The Divine Motion in General....................... 240
What Physical Premotion Is Not.................. 243
Physical Premotion According to Classic Thomism 256
Conformity with the Mind of St. Thomas . .
. 283
Ways in Which Physical Premotion Operates .
. 293
Arguments for PhysicalPremotion......................... 295
The Divine Motion and the Freedom of Our Salu­
tary Acts............................................... 316
IX. The Physical Act ofSin........................................... 324

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Appendix I. Efficacious Grace and Salutary Acts Easy to
Perform............................................... 341

Appendix II. The Opinion of Father Billot, S.J., on
Divine Motion.......................................... 353
Appendix III.

Some Objections against Premotion

Appendix IV. Dr. H. Schwamm’s Recent Work .

the

.
.

.

. 360
.371

Index.................................................................................... 377

PART I

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AND THE
THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
In the first part we shall direct attention first to the idea of
predestination as presented to us in the Scripture. Then we
shall inspect the declarations of the Church formulated on
the occasion of conflicting heresies. Thus we shall perceive
more clearly the point at issue and what precisely constitutes
the chief difficulty of the problem. Then there will be a
classification of the various theological opinions to be ex­
plained in the course of this work. At the end of this first part
we shall remind our readers of the stand taken by St. Augus­
tine and his first disciples, since this exerted a very profound
influence on the whole of medieval theology.

CHAPTER I
The Significance and Reality of Predestination
According to Scripture

The Gospel is the good tidings of the redemption of the hu­

man race which must be preached to all, for our Savior said:
"Going therefore, teach ye all nations: baptizing them in the
name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have com­
manded you. And behold I am with you all days even to the
consummation of the world.” 1 St. Paul says in like manner:
"God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowl­
edge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of
God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a
redemption for all.” 2
God never commands what is impossible and He makes the
fulfilment of His precepts really possible for all, both when
they are of obligation and according as they are known. How­
ever, there are souls that through their own fault are lost;
and souls, at times, that have enjoyed a close intimacy with
the Savior, as was the case with the “son of perdition.” There
are others, the elect, who will infallibly be saved. Among these
are children who die shortly after being baptized, and adults
who, by divine grace, not only can observe the command­
ments, but actually do so and obtain the gift of final per­
severance. Jesus in His sacerdotal prayer said to His Father:
“Those whom Thou gavest Me have I kept, and none of them
is lost, but the son of perdition, that the Scripture may be
i Matt. 28. 19-20.
* I Tim. 2: 3-5.
3

PREDESTINATION
4
fulfilled.” 8 Speaking in more general terms, Jesus says again:
“My sheep hear My voice. And I know them, and they follow
Me. And I give them life everlasting: and they shall not perish
for ever. And no man shall pluck them out of My hand. That
which My Father hath given Me is greater than all, and no one
can snatch them out of the hand of My Father. I and the
Father are one.” 4 There are elect chosen by God from all
eternity. Jesus spoke of them on several occasions. Once He
said: “Many are called, but few are chosen.” 5 He announced
the destruction of Jerusalem, the distress of those times of
trial, and He added: “Unless those days had been shortened, no
flesh should be saved; but for the sake of the elect those days
shall be shortened.” 8
The precise meaning of these utterances of our Savior are
made known to us by what St. Paul tells us about predestina­
tion, by which God directs and brings the elect infallibly to
eternal life. In one of his epistles we read: “What hast thou
that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why
dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?” 7 It is but
the comment on the words of the Master, who said: “Without
Me you can do nothing.” 8 St. Paul also says: “For it is God
who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, accord­
ing to His good will.” 8 When writing to the Ephesians, he
speaks explicitly about predestination. “Blessed be the God
and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," he says, “who hath
blessed us with spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ.
As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world,
that we should be holy and unspotted in Flis sight in charity.
Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children
s John 17: 12.
I Ibid., 10: 27-30.
ο Matt. 22: 14.
e Ibid., 24: 22.
II Cor. 4: 7.
s John 15: 5.
» Phil. 2: 13.

PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO SCRIPTURE

5

through Jesus Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose
of His will. Unto the praise and glory of His grace, in which
I le hath graced us in His beloved Son.” 10 Again, with more
< larity of precision, he writes: “We know that to them that
love God all things work together unto good: to such as ac­
cording to His purpose are called to be saints. For whom
I le foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn
amongst many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them
I le also called. And whom He called, them He also justified.
And whom He justified, them He also glorified.” 11
With St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and St. Bellarmine, we
must remark that in this last text the words, “whom He fore­
knew, He also predestinated,” do not refer to the divine fore­
knowledge of meritorious acts. Nowhere in St. Paul do we find
any foundation for this interpretation, and it would contra­
dict several of his texts, especially this one and the ones we
are about to cite. The meaning is: “those whom God fore­
knew, looking favorably upon them,” w'hich is a frequent ac­
ceptation of the verb “to know” in the Bible, as in the text:
“God has not cast away His people which He foreknew.” 12
This exegesis of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and St. Robert
Bellarmine is upheld at the present day by Lagrange, Allo,
Zahn, Jülicher, and others.13
to Eph. 1: 3-7.
11 Rom. 8: 28-30.
Rom. 11:2; cf. Matt. 7:23; Gal. 4:9; I Cor. 8:3; 13: 12; II Tim. 2:19:
l*s. 1: 6.
Father Lemonnyer, O.P., has explained the deep significance of this
standard text of Rom. 8: 28-30, in his article entitled: "Prédestination,” which
was written for the Diet, de théol. cath. He remarks that God’s intention
is manifested in this text by two acts: first, there is the act of foreknowing:
"those whom He foreknew” (29); then the act of predestinating: "whom He
predestinated” (30). But the act of first intention seems to be passed over in
silence. As a matter of fact, remarks Father Lemonnyer, it is indicated in the
final clause of v. 29: "that He might be the firstborn amongst many brethren.”
I lere we have this divine intention. . . . This presupposed intention suffices
to provide the means for its realization, that is, the discerning and decreeing
of the putting of it into effect. This discernment is the foreknowledge, and

6

PREDESTINATION

In the Epistle to the Romans (chaps. 9-12), St. Paul in
plain terms also sets forth God’s sovereign independence in
the dispensation of His graces. The Jews, who were the chosen
people, are rejected because of their unbelief, and salvation
is announced to the Gentiles as a result of Israel’s obduracy.
The Apostle prophesies, however, the final conversion and
salvation of the Jews, and he formulates the principle of
predilection, which is applied to nations and individuals:
“What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God
forbid! For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I
will have mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show
mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 14*
Hence the Apostle’s conclusion: “O the depth of the riches
of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incompre­
hensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!
For who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been
His counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him, and recom­
pense shall be made him? For of Him and by Him and in Him
are all things. To Him be glory for ever. Amen.” 16
We shall return later on to a discussion of the literal mean­
ing and scope of these texts, when we present the scriptural
background for the teaching of St. Thomas. It suffices for the
present to point out with the Thomists and St. Robert Bellarmine,16 what Scripture has to say about the gratuitousness
of predestination to eternal life. Such is the teaching of Scrip­
ture, which declares three indisputable things on this point,
namely: (1) God has chosen certain persons to constitute the
this decree is the predestination. Both are evidently acts of the practical reason
moved by a preconceived intention."
Father Lemonnyer insists upon the gratuitous character of the divine pur­
pose, which is the reason of our salvation and our call. It seems that this
gratuitousness must be extended to predestination. Cf. II Tim. 1: 9; Eph. 1: 11;
Tit. 3: 5.
i< Rom. 9: 14-17; cf. Lagrange, Epitre aux Romains, 1916, chap. 9, p. 244.
is Ibid., 11: 33-36.
i«De gratia et lib. arb., Bk. II, chaps. 9-15.

PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO SCRIPTURE

7

elect.17 (2) He has caused this election to be efficacious so that
they will infallibly get to heaven: “My sheep shall not perish
for ever. And no man shall pluck them out of My hand.” 18
"Whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom
He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified,
them He also glorified.” 19 (3) God’s choice of the elect was
entirely gratuitous and previous to any consideration of fore­
seen merits: “Fear not little flock, for it hath pleased your
Father to give you a kingdom.” 20 “You have not chosen Me,
but I have chosen you; and have appointed you, that you
should go and should bring forth fruit and your fruit should
remain.” 21 “Even so then, at this present time also, there is a
remnant saved according to the election of grace. And if by
grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more
grace.” 22 “As He chose us in Him before the foundation of
the world, that we should be holy,” 23 and not because we
were so, or because He foresaw that we would be so by our
own efforts. “For whom He foreknew (in His benevolence),
He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image
of His Son.” 24
From all these passages of Scripture, St. Augustine formu­
lated this classical definition: “Predestination is the fore­
knowledge and preparedness on God’s part to bestow the fa­
vors by which all those are saved who are to be saved.” 25 St.
Augustine is still more explicit on this point when he writes:
"God already knew, when He predestined, what He must do
to bring His elect infallibly to eternal life.” 28
ir Matt. 20: 16; 24: 31; Luke 12: 32; Rom. 8: 33; Eph. 1: 4.
is John 10: 27 t.; cf. Matt. 24: 24; John 6: 39.
1» Rom. 8: 30.
20 Luke 12: 32.
81 John 15: 16.
22 Rom. 11: 5.
23 Eph. 1: 4.
2« Rom. 8: 29.
25 De dono perseverantiae, chap. 14.
20 De praedestinatione sanctorum, chap. 10.

CHAPTER II
The Teaching of the Church

The teaching of the Church on this subject was formulated

on the one hand against Pelagianism, and on the other against
predestinarianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism.
DECLARATIONS OF THE CHURCH AGAINST

PELAGIANISM AND SEMIPELAGIANISM

The meaning and scope of the declarations of the Church
against Pelagianism and Semipelagianism are evident, if we
bear in mind the principles of these condemned doctrines and
the bearing they have on predestination.
1) The Pelagians held that grace is not necessary for the
observance of the precepts of the Christian law, but merely
for greater facility in their observance, and that by our natu­
rally good works we may merit the first grace. Hence they said
the foreknowledge of good works, whether natural or super­
natural, is the cause of predestination. Pelagianism was first
condemned in the two councils of Carthage and Milevi (416).
It was afterward condemned in the Council of Carthage held
in 418, but the canons of this council have been assigned by
mistake to the Second Council of Milevi. Canon 6 especially
has in mind this false teaching, that “without grace we can
keep the commandments . . . and that grace is not necessary
except for making it easier to keep them.”
2) The Semipelagians, as we see from the letters of SS.
Prosper and Hilary to St. Augustine, admitted: (1) that man
does not need grace for that beginning of faith and good will
8

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

9
spoken of as the “beginning of salvation,” and that he can
persevere until death without any special help; (2) that God
wills equally the salvation of all, although special graces are
■,i anted to some privileged souls; (3) consequently predes­
tination is identical with the foreknowledge of the beginning
of salvation and of merits by which man perseveres in doing
good without any special help; negative reprobation is identi< al with the foreknowledge of demerits. Thus predestination
and negative reprobation follow human election, whether
this be good or bad.
Such an interpretation eliminates the element of mystery in
predestination spoken of by St. Paul. God is not the author
but merely the spectator of that which distinguishes the elect
I t orn the rest of mankind. The elect are not loved and helped
more by God.
Concerning children who die before the age of reason, the
Semipelagians said that God predestines or reprobates them,
foreseeing the good or bad acts they would have performed
if they had lived longer. That means a foreknowledge of the
< onditionally free acts of the future or of the futuribilia, pre\ ious to any divine decree. This reminds us of the theory of
the scientia media, which was proposed later by Molina. The
opponents of this doctrine reply that such an interpretation
would mean that children are marked for reprobation on
■i< count of sins they did not commit.
Against these principles, St. Augustine, especially in his
writings toward the end of his life,1 shows from the testimony
of Holy Scripture that: (1) man cannot, without a special and
gratuitous grace, have the “beginning of salvation,” and that
lie cannot persevere until the end without a special and gra­
tuitous grace; (2) that the elect, as their name indicates, are
loved more and helped more, and that the divine election is
therefore previous to foreseen merits, which are the result of
grace; (3) that God does not will equally the salvation of all.
> PL, XLIV, 959; XLV, 993.

10

PREDESTINATION

The Council of Orange (529), in condemning Semipelagianism, took many of its formulas from the writings of St.
Augustine and St. Prosper. All historians agree that it disap­
proved of the Semipelagian denials of the gratuitousness of
grace and of its necessity for the beginning of salvation and
for final perseverance.2
That is the minimum and it is admitted by all. But many
historians and theologians, among whom are the Thomists
and Augustinians, considering the obvious sense of the terms
employed by the Second Council of Orange and of the vari­
ous statements of St. Paul, see therein an additional affirma­
tion of the intrinsic efficacy of grace, presupposed by the
principle of predilection.
We shall return to this point. But in any case, from this
minimum admitted by all we get three propositions to which
all Catholic theologians subscribe. They are: (1) Predestina­
tion to the first grace is not because God foresaw our naturally
good works, nor is the beginning of salutary acts due to
natural causes; (2) predestination to glory is not because God
foresaw we would continue in the performance of supernaturally meritorious acts apart from the special gift of final
perseverance; (3) complete predestination, in so far as it com­
prises the whole series of graces from the first up to glorifica­
tion, is gratuitous or previous to foreseen merits. These three
propositions are admitted by all Catholic theologians. But
Thomists and Augustinians on the one hand, and Molinists
and congruists on the other, differ in their interpretation of
them.
a) The first proposition which concerns the beginning of
salvation is understood by Molina, in accordance with his
principle, as meaning that “whenever the free will by its own
natural powers attempts to do what it can, God bestows the
prevenient grace, on account of Christ’s merits.” 3 The Thom2 Denz., nos. 176, 177, 179, 183, 806.
a Concordia, disp. 10, q. 14, a. 13 (1876 ed., p. 564).

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

11

ists and Augustinians understand this proposition in a differ­
ent sense, so that it reads: To the man who does what he can
with the help of actual grace, God does not refuse habitual
grace. This safeguards much better the gratuity of both acI ual and habitual graces, as defined by the Council of Orange.4
/;) The second proposition, which concerns final persever­
ance, is understood by Molinists and congruists as meaning
that the actual grace of final perseverance is extrinsically effica< ions inasmuch as our consent is foreseen by means of the
geientia media. On the contrary, Thomists and Augustinians
understand this grace to be intrinsically efficacious; and this
necms to be far more in agreement with the tenor of canon
n n of the Council of Orange which reads: “God’s help is
always to be sought even for the regenerated and holy, that
they may come to a happy end, or that they may continue in
the performance of good works.” 5 This canon summarizes
the teaching of St. Prosper.® Now St. Prosper follows St.
Augustine, who considers the great grace of final perseverance
as belonging properly to the elect, and as efficacious of itself.
It is a grace,” he says, “that is spurned by no one whose
heart is hardened, and it is therefore given that the hardness
■ >l heart may first be eliminated.” 7 Molina, admitting his de­
parture from the teaching of St. Augustine, in opposition to
him says: "It may happen that two persons receive in an equal
degree the interior grace of vocation; one of them of his
own free will is converted, and the other remains an infidel.
It may even happen that one who receives a far greater
pi evenient grace when called, of his own free will is not con­
verted, and another, who receives a far less grace, is con­
verted.”8 It seems difficult to reconcile this with what the
( Council of Trent affirms of the great gift of final persever4 Denz., nos. 176-78, 199, 200.
» Ibid., no. 183.
• />/., XLV, 1815.
» De praed. sand., chap. 8.
• l.oc. cit., disp. 12, p. 51.

PREDESTINATION

12

ance, stating that it is a “gift which cannot be obtained from
any other than from Him who is able to establish him who
standeth 8 that he stand perseveringly, and to restore him who
falleth.” 10 All these expressions seem to denote a grace that is
efficacious of itself and not because of our foreseen consent.
The Council of Trent, too, calls this grace “that great and
special gift of final perseverance. ” 11 It is hard to see how this
can finally be construed as a case of being placed in favor­
able circumstances in which God foresaw that of two persons
who receive equal help from Him, one would persevere, and
the other would not. Is not any devaluation of God’s gift a
corresponding devaluation of the mystery?
The Council of Trent also says: “No one, moreover, so
long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume as
regards the secret mystery of divine predestination as to de­
termine for certain that he is assuredly among the number of
the predestined; as if it were true that he who is justified
either cannot sin any more, or, if he do sin, that he ought to
promise himself an assured repentance. For except by special
revelation it cannot be known whom God hath chosen unto
Himself.” 12
In favor of the Augustinian and Thomist doctrine, the fol­
lowing argument has also in all fairness been brought for­
ward that, according to the Council of Trent, the grace of
final perseverance cannot be merited, at least de condigno; for
the council states that the just man can merit eternal life,
“provided he die in the state of grace.” 13 Now this latter can­
not be merited, for the state of grace and continuation in the
same, since these are the principle of merit, cannot be merited.
From this it follows that predestination to the grace of final
perseverance, by which one is ultimately disposed for heavo Rom. 14: 4.
10 Denz., no. 806.
11 Ibid., no. 826.
12 Ibid., no. 805.
is Ibid., no. 842.

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

13
ctily glory, is not because of foreseen merits. Therefore pre­
destination to heavenly glory, which is included in the former,
is also gratuitous.
If then we wish to affirm that predestination to heavenly
glory is the result of foreseen merits, we must add what would
seem to nullify this affirmation and say: provided that God
gratuitously maintains us in the possession of these merits un­
til death. As a matter of fact, Molina says, true to his principle
and it is the indispensable minimum—provided that God, ac­
cording to His entirely gratuitous good pleasure, wills to place
man in those circumstances in which He foresees by His
scientia media that this man will persevere. From this and
horn his pact theory concerning the beginning of salvation,14
Molinism avoids Semipelagianism; the Thomists, however,
think it seems to depreciate the first grace and that great and
special gift of final perseverance.
c) The third proposition. In this last case we are concerned
u ith complete predestination, which includes the whole series
<>f gr aces. All theologians are unanimous in saying against the
Scinipelagians, that this is gratuitous or previous to foreseen
merits. Molina admits it, but he adds: “To the foreknowledge
which is included in predestination on the part of the intel­
lect there is attached the condition of the use of free will with1 mt which there would have been no preordaining by God.” 15
( ontrary to this, Augustinians and Thomists understand com­
plete predestination as it is explained by St. Thomas: “It is
impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in
■encrai should have any cause as coming from us; because
whatsoever is in man disposing him toward salvation, is all
i ‘ This pact theory between God and Christ the Redeemer is thus expressed
In Molina’s Concordia, disp., 10, p. 43: "Among the laws which Christ and the
eternal Father decreed concerning the aids and gifts which Christ merited for
ns simply and freely to be bestowed upon us, there is one which was most
In conformity with reason, and it is this, that as often as we attempt to do
what we can by our own natural powers, the assistance of grace is at our dis­
posal for us to succeed in doing those things we ought for our salvation.
‘'‘Concordia, q.23, sept, concl., p. 516.

»4

PREDESTINATION

included under the effect of predestination; even the prepara­
tion for grace.” 16 Thus even the free determination disposing
one toward salvation is entirely included in the effect of
predestination. “There is no distinction,” says St. Thomas,
“between what flows from free will, and what is of predestina­
tion; as there is no distinction between what flows from a
secondary cause and from a first cause.” 17
It is clear that this way of interpreting complete predestina­
tion presupposes the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees
and of grace. It also includes, as a natural consequence, the
absolute validity of the principle of predilection; whereas
these are not presupposed in the interpretation given by
Molinists and congruists. Now St. Thomas is apparently per­
suaded that the proposition “whatsoever is in man disposing
him toward salvation, is all included under the effect of pre­
destination,” as well as the intrinsic efficacy of grace and the
principle of predilection express the teaching of St. Augus­
tine and of the Second Council of Orange. We shall leave this
for the reader to judge, and all that we shall do is to quote
the principal canons of this council.
The whole process of salvation and each of its salutary acts,
with all the goodness in them, is attributed to God by the
council. Canon 9 reads: “It is God’s gift when we think aright
and restrain ourselves from walking in the path of error and
corruption. As often as we do good, it is God who works in
us and with us enabling us to act.” 18 This canon is a recapitu­
lation of Prosper’s twenty-second sentence, which repeats the
teaching of St. Augustine.
It concerns efficacious grace by which we not only can but
actually do what is right. The fact that God operates in us,
enabling us to act, is verified in every free act disposing us
to salvation. We cannot at all see how this free determination
disposing us to salvation, as a free determination, should esie Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
17 Ibid.
is Denz., no. 182.

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

!5
tape the divine causality. The obvious sense of the text is,
lb.it God works in us and with us, as St. Paul says: “It is God
H ho worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.” 19 There
i» a grace that is efficacious in this sense that it is effective of
I lie act, although it does not exclude our co-operation, but in
a mysterious way starts it. Canon twelve formulates the princi­
ple of predilection: “God so loves us, as we shall be by the
gill of His grace, not as we are by our own merit.” Taken from
I'rosper’s fifthy-sixth sentence, it follows immediately from
this that God so much the more loves us, as we shall be bet­
te i by the gift of His grace. In other words, no one would
be better than another, if he were not loved more by God. In
the quotation of this canon,20 there is reference in the margin
to the “Indiculus,” on the Grace of God,21 where it is said:
“ I here is no other way by which anyone is pleasing to God
except by what He Himself has bestowed.” Therefore, one
is not more pleasing to God than another, without having
received more from Him. If, on the contrary, grace became
i flicacious in actu secundo by our consent, then it would fol­
low that of two men who received equal help, one would be< omc better, and this without having been loved more, helped
more, or having received more from God. This is not what
die Council of Orange declares, or the "Indiculus” on grace,
which latter is a collection of the declarations of the Roman
< I lurch, compiled in all probability by the future pope St.
I .co I. This collection of declarations by the Church met with
universal reception about the year 500.22 If it be so, how is it
>· Phil, s: 13.
»0 Denz., no. 185.
»> Ibid., no. 134.
J-As a proof of this, consult the Indiculus, Denz., nos. 131, 133. The openIng words of this latter canon are: "It is only by Christ's help that anyone
makes good use of free will.” Cf. also nos. 134, 135, 137, 141. In this last
μ le rence we read: "By God's help free will is not taken away but made
free. ... He acts, to be sure, in us so that what He wills, we both will and
dm" In no. 14s we read: "There must not be the least disparagement of the
« ih'ct and esteem of God's grace.”

PREDESTINATION

16

possible for the salutary act, in so far as it is a free determina­
tion, not to depend upon the efficacy of grace, but to be the
cause of this efficacy?
There are still other ways in which the Council of Orange
has expressed the principle of predilection. Canon sixteen
reads: “Let no one glory in what he may seem to have, as if
he had not received it.” And canon twenty states: “God does
many good things in man, which man does not accomplish;
but there is no good work done by man which God has not
assisted him to do.” 23
Taken from St. Augustine and the three hundred and
twelfth of Prosper’s sentences, these canons point out that all
good comes from God either as the author of nature or of
grace; hence it is only through having received more from
God that one is better than another. This is also the meaning
of canon twenty-two, which reads: “No man can claim as his
own anything except lying and sin. If a man hath anything of
truth and righteousness it is from that fountain which it be­
hoves us to thirst after in this desert that being, so to speak,
refreshed with some of its drops we may not faint by the
way.” 24 This canon which is taken from the writings of St.
Augustine,25 speaks of God as the author of good things both
in the order of nature and of grace; and this is more clearly
expressed in canon nineteen.2® Hence it does not follow that
all the works of infidels are sins. Some of them are morally
good in the natural order, such as paying one’s debts and pro­
viding for the support of one’s children. But even this natural
goodness comes from God, who is the author of all good; and
it is not independently of Him that such a naturally good act
is performed by this particular man and not by that other, who
is permitted to act contrariwise and sin.
All these canons of the Council of Orange, which are taken
23 Denz., nos. 189, 193.
2·« Ibid., no. 195.
23 Hom. on John 5: 1.
2β Denz., no. 19a.

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

17

horn the writings of St. Augustine or of St. Prosper show that
the least we may say is what H. Leclercq affirms in his French
translation of Hefele’s work. He writes: “What seems to be
.111 undeniable fact is, that the Church adopted (in the Sec­
ond Council of Orange) the Augustinian theory in its defense
of the fundamental principles against the Pelagians and Semi­
pelagians, of original sin, of the necessity and gratuitousness
of grace, and of our absolute dependence upon God for every
salutary act.” 27 There is no reason therefore to be astonished
that Augustinians and Thomists detected from the obvious
sense of the terms of this council the principle of predilec­
tion, this principle which presupposes the intrinsic efficacy of
grace. They also detect this principle in the epistles of St.
I’aid, for he says: “It is God who worketh in you, according
10 His good will. For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast
thou that thou hast not received? 28
Is it not this that the Semipelagians denied in saying that
God wills to save equally all men and that He is not the
author but the onlooker of what distinguishes the just from
the impious, and the elect from the rest of mankind?
DECLARATIONS OF THE CHURCH AGAINST
PREDESTINARIANISM

The declarations of the Church in the Council of Orange
express one aspect of the great mystery with which we are
concerned; the other is presented to us by what the Church
taught first of all against predestinarianism, and then against
Calvinism, Bajanism, and Jansenism.
1) In the fifth century. Lucidus, a priest of the Catholic
Church who was accused of having taught predestinarianism
or predestination to evil, made a retractation of his teaching
in the Council of Arles, which was held in the year 473. His
2’ Cf. Histoire des conciles, II, 1102 note,
se Phil. 2: 13; I Cor. 4: 7.

18

PREDESTINATION

opinion, as formulated by the council, reads as follows: “That
Christ the Lord, our Savior, did not die for the salvation of
all mankind; . . . that God’s foreknowledge forcibly impels
man to everlasting death, or that those who are lost, are lost
by God’s will. . . . Likewise I reject the opinion of one who
says that some are destined to everlasting death and others are
predestined to everlasting life.” 29 In his retraction, Lucidus
affirmed that he who is lost could have been saved.80 We must
beware of attaching too much importance to the decisions
made against Lucidus. They are the result, it has been said,
of an anti-Augustinian environment.
2) In the ninth century. As for the controversies of the
ninth century in connection with predestination, we must by
all means quote the decisions of the councils of Quierzy
(853),81 Valence (855),82 Langres, Toul, and finally Thuzey.88
From these divers texts it follows: (1) that God wills in a cer­
tain way to save all men; (2) that there is no such thing as
predestination to evil, but that God decreed from all eternity
to inflict the penalty of damnation for the sin of final im­
penitence, a sin which He foresaw and in no way caused but
merely permitted.
From the canons of the above-mentioned councils we see
the meaning and scope of these two propositions. Predestina­
tion to evil is clearly excluded in the first canon of Quierzy.
As for predestination to eternal life, it is viewed as a grace,
a special mercy as regards the elect whom God by His grace
has predestined to life, and to eternal life. The second canon
reads: “Our will, aided by prevenient grace and concomitant
is free to do what is good; and our will, forsaken by grace, is
free to do what is evil.” These latter words indicate that sin
does not happen without God’s permission, who justly al29 Denz., no. 3026.
»0 For an explanation o£ this episode, consult the Diet, de théol. cath.
si Denz., no. 316.
82 Ibid., no. 320.
83 PL, CXXVI, 123. Cf. Diet, de théol. cath., art. "Prédestination.”

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

19
lows it to happen in one, while mercifully preserving another
fioin it. This truth is brought out more clearly in the follow­
ing canon, and what is of essential significance is that portion
of it which states: “Almighty God wills without exception,
all men to be saved, though not all are saved. That some
are saved, however, is the gift of Him who saves; if some
perish, it is the fault of them that perish.” This canon is
taken from the writings of St. Prosper. From this third canon
of Quierzy we see that, if the will to save is universal, it is not
equally so for all, as the Pelagians wanted it to be. It is effica­
cious only as regards the elect, and that in virtue of a special
gift; but there is no predestination to evil. The two aspects of
the mystery are affirmed in plain language, but we fail to
perceive the mode of their intimate reconciliation. The
fourth canon of Quierzy affirms that Christ died for all men.
The third Council of Valence (855) insisted more strongly
on the gratuity of predestination to eternal life in so far as it
is distinct from simple foreknowledge, for this latter also ex­
tends to evil. According to the declarations of this council,
the least good and the least punishment that is justly inflicted,
never occur without a positive and infallible decree from
God, and no sin is committed, and nowhere by preference,
without His foreknowledge and permission.34
We know that after the Council of Langres (859), the dis­
cussions concerning predestination between Hincmar, the
great opponent of Gottschalk, and the Church of Lyons, were
terminated at Thuzey in the year 860. The synodal letter, ap­
proved in this council, contains the following affirmations.35
(1) Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done in heaven and
on earth. For nothing is done in heaven or on earth, except
what He Himself is pleased to do, or justly permits to be
done. This means that all good things, whether easy or diffi­
cult to accomplish, whether natural or supernatural, come
»« Denz., nos. 321-2«.
·» PL, CXXVI, 123.

20

PREDESTINATION

from God, and that sin does not occur, nor in this one rather
than in the other, without His divine permission. Countless
consequences evidently are included in this absolutely gen­
eral principle. The Thomists see in it the equivalent of the
principle of predilection. The other assertions of this synodal
letter are derived from this general principle. They are as
follows: (2) God wills all men to be saved and no one to per­
ish . . . nor after the fall of the first man is it His will forci­
bly to deprive man of free will. (3) That those, however, who
are walking in the path of righteousness, may continue to do
so and persevere in their innocence, He heals and aids their
free will by grace. (4) They who go far from God, who is de­
sirous of gathering the children of Jerusalem that wills it not,
will perish. (5) Hence it is because of God’s grace that the
world is saved; and it is because man has free will that the
world be judged. (6) Adam, through willing what is evil, lost
the power to do what is good. . . . Wherefore the whole
human race became a mass of perdition. If no one had been
rescued from it, God’s justice would not have been to blame.
That many are saved, however, is due to God’s ineffable grace.
This last statement repeats what SS. Augustine and Prosper
said. Thus at the end of these conferences of the ninth cen­
tury, the bishops, assembled in council at Thuzey, rejected
absolutely the theory of predestination to evil and affirmed
God’s universal will to save, as Prosper had done. God never
commands the impossible, but He wills to make it possible
for all to fulfil His precepts and obtain salvation. That is
what all the bishops assembled in this last mentioned council
affirmed with SS. Augustine and Prosper. But they do not
deny, on that account, the other aspect of the mystery, to wit:
the absolute gratuity of predestination, of true predestination
as opposed to reprobation.
3) In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This teach­
ing of the Church was confirmed both by the decisions of the
Council of Trent against the errors of Protestantism and by

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

21

the condemnation of Jansenism. The Church again declares
that man, though having contracted the stain of original sin,
is free to do good by the aid of grace, consenting to co-operate
with it, though at the same time he can resist it.30 From this
it follows that God predestines no one to evil; 87 but He wills,
<>n the contrary, the salvation of all men; and Christ dies for
.ill, although all do not receive the benefit that is the fruit of
His death, “but only those to whom the merit of His pas­
sion is communicated.” 38 In the case of adults good works are
necessary for salvation, and, in the order of execution, heav­
enly glory is the reward granted at the end of their probation
lor meritorious acts.
It is likewise declared against Jansenism that Christ did
not die only for the predestined, or only for the faithful; 38
i hat there is a grace which is truly sufficient, and which makes
the fulfilment of God’s precepts possible for all those on
whom these precepts are imposed. The Church, quoting the
words of St. Augustine, says again in refuting the Protestants
and Jansenists: “God commands not impossibilities, but, by
commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art
able, and to pray for what thou art not able to do.” 40 She
also says that “God does not abandon the just without previ­
ously having been abandoned by them.” 41 It is only mortal
sin that deprives them of sanctifying grace, and they are de­
prived of certain actual graces necessary for salvation only because they resisted sufficient graces. God does not permit us
io be tempted beyond our powers of resistance; 42 the grace
of conversion is offered to sinners,48 and only those are de­
prived of it who, failing in their duty, refuse it, this being
so Denz., no. 797; cf. no. 816.
sz Ibid., no. 827.
so Ibid., no. 795.
‘«Ibid., nos. 1096, 1294, 1380 ff.
«0 Ibid., no. 804.
o Ibid., nos. 804, 806, 1794.
42 Ibid., no. 979.
Ibid., no. 807.

22

PREDESTINATION

something which God permits, but of which He is by no
means the cause.44 The Church, however, though affirming
that God by a sufficient grace makes the fulfilment of His
precepts possible for all, none the less affirms the efficacy of
grace that actually is productive of good works. The Council
of Trent declares that “God, unless men be themselves want­
ing to His grace, as He has begun the good work, so will He
perfect it, working in them to will and to accomplish.” 45
What are we to conclude then from the teaching of the
Church against the conflicting heresies of Semipelagianism
and predestinarianism, heresies that were renewed by Cal­
vinism and Jansenism?
To sum up: Against Semipelagianism, we must say that the
Church affirms particularly three things: (a) The cause of
predestination to grace is not the foreknowledge of naturally
good works performed, nor is it due to any preliminary acts
of the natural order that are supposed to prepare for sal­
vation. (b) Predestination to glory is not due to foreseen super­
natural merits that would continue to be effective apart from
the special gift of final perseverance, (c) Complete predestina­
tion, which comprises the whole series of graces, is gratuitous
or previous to foreseen merits. And St. Thomas understands
this to mean that “whatsoever is in man disposing him towards
salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination.” 48
In a word: “that some are saved is the gift of Him who
saves." 4T
4) Against predestinarianism and the doctrines of Protes­
tantism and Jansenism that revive it, the Church teaches: (a)
God wills in a certain way to save all men and He makes the
fulfilment of His precepts possible for all; (b) There is no
predestination to evil, but God has decreed from all eternity
to inflict eternal punishment for the sin of final impenitence
♦< Ibid., nos. 816, 827, 1677.
«5 Ibid., no. 806; Phil. 2: 13.
“Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
Denz., no. 318.

THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

23

which He foresaw, He being by no means the cause of it but
merely permitting it.
We see that the teaching of the Church against these con11 icting heresies may be summed up in these profound words
of St. Prosper, which the Council of Quierzy makes its own.
Against Pelagianism and Semipelagianism the council says:
"That some are saved, is the gift of Him who saves.” Against
predestinarianism it says: "That some perish, is the fault of
those who perish.” Holy Scripture expressed the same thought
in these words: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is
only in Me.” 48
There is no difference of degree between the assent of the
Christian mind unhesitatingly given to these two great and
indisputable truths, and the mysterious mode of the intimate
reconciliation.
‘β Osee 13: 9.

CHAPTER III
The Principal Difficulties of the Problem
and the Method of Procedure
THE DIFFICULTIES

From what has just been said we see that the first difficulty
was always how to reconcile predestination with God’s will
to save all mankind. On the one hand Scripture declares that
God wills all men to be saved; 1 on the other hand, it says that
all are not predestined, but that “whom He predestined, them
He also called . . . and also justified . . . and glorified.” 2 It
even says that “He hath mercy on whom He will. And whom
He will, He hardeneth.” 3 Therefore the predestined will in­
fallibly be saved, and the others not. Hence arises the difficulty.
How can predestination, which is infallible in its effect, be
reconciled with the will to save all mankind, since the salvation
of many will not be realized?
Is it human effort that makes God’s help efficacious, or is it
the intrinsic efficacy of God’s help that prompts human effort?
And if grace is of itself efficacious, how is it that God merci­
fully grants it to the elect and justly refuses it to the rest? We
see that this mystery concerns the intimate reconciliation of
God’s infinite mercy and justice, and the free manifestation
of these divine perfections. Philosophy, confronted with a
difficulty of the same kind, has to explain how the presence
of evil, especially moral evil, can be reconciled with God’s
infinite goodness and omnipotence.
11 Tim. 2: 4.
2 Rom. 8: 29 if.
» Ibid. 9: 18.

24

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

25
A second difficulty of this problem is that it is no longer
.1 question of the two groups of human beings, the elect and
i hose not among the elect, but of individuals. The question
is this. Why has God placed in the number of the elect this
person and not that other? Why has He chosen Peter rather
than Judas, and not vice versa? Seemingly unjust is this un­
equal distribution of such gifts to human beings who are
equal both by nature and by reason of original sin.
This is the difficulty that St. Paul expresses when he writes:
What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God
loi bid. For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I
will have mercy. And I will shew mercy to whom I will shew
mercy.” * St. Paul thus answers the difficulty by affirming the
principle of predilection, or of the gratuity of grace to which
we can have no claim. Further on he states: “O the depth of
the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How
incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable
His ways!” 5 St. Augustine expresses the mystery in these
words: “Why He draweth one and not another, seek not to
judge if thou dost not wish to err.” 6
St. Thomas called special attention to these two great diffi­
culties in the mystery of predestination; one difficulty is gen­
eral in scope, the other of particular interest. He says: “The
reason for the predestination of some, and the reprobation of
others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. . . . God
wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those
whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing
them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by
means of His justice in punishing them. . . . Yet why Fie
chooses some for glory and reprobates others, has no reason
except the divine will. . . . Neither on this account can there
be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for
« Ibid. 9: 14.
0 Ibid. 11: 33.
e On St. John, hom. 26, the beginning.

26

PREDESTINATION

not unequal things. ... In things which are given gratui­
tously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (pro­
vided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringe­
ment of justice.” 7
The answers given by St. Paul, St. Augustine and St.
Thomas show there is no contradiction. But underlying these
two aspects there is an inscrutable mystery because it is es­
sentially supernatural and also because the divine interven­
tion is supremely free. This mystery is supernatural not only
modally like a miracle that can be known by natural means,
but it is supernatural because by its very nature it belongs
to that class of mysteries which concerns the intimate life
of God, such as the Trinity, and it thus transcends the natu­
ral powers of every intellect whether human or angelic, of
every created and creatable intellect. Moreover, in this mys­
tery there is the intervention of God’s supremely free good
pleasure, the divinum beneplacitum which St. Paul speaks
of. This good pleasure, which is not at all a caprice—for it
is the very essence of wisdom and holiness—is for us, as every­
thing is which concerns God’s sovereign liberty, a profound
mystery. By this good pleasure God mercifully grants His
grace to one of the two thieves crucified with the Savior,
whereas in justice He permits the other to resist to the very
end, and so lets him remain in sin.
Hence we see in this mystery an intervention of infinite
mercy and justice and of sovereign liberty, all of which abso­
lutely transcend the powers of every created and creatable in­
tellect. St. Thomas calls attention to this obscurity, which
comes either from the essentially supernatural nature of the
object, or from the fact that the truth pertains to the con­
tingent order and as yet is undetermined. He says that there
are things far removed from our knowledge, either spatially
or because of their supernatural transcendence, such as the
mystery of the Trinity, which is absolutely determined and
T Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad sum.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

27

knowable in itself, but not to us. Then there are things which,
since they are not of themselves determined, are not know­
able in themselves, such as future contingent things, the truth
of which can be determined and known by God in His su­
premely free decree.8
Such is the difficulty of the problem, or rather the great
obscurity of the mystery and dogma which claims our atten­
tion. The theologian, seeking the method to be followed,
must bear in mind what St. Thomas said: “In questions of
sacred doctrine we may have recourse to philosophy in order
to refute what is said against the faith, either by showing it to
be false, or of no consequence.” 8 Theology thus averts the
evident contradiction; but it is not its province to prove
philosophically the intrinsic possibility of mysteries. Just as
the reality of the mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation, and
pi « destination remains obscure to us in this life, so does their
intrinsic possibility. (Cf. Vatican Council; Denz., no. 1795 f.)
Thus we see the whole difficulty of the problem, and con­
sequently how easily we may be deceived unless we follow
faithfully the teaching of Holy Scripture, the councils, and
the great doctors of the Church. It is easy to favor one or other
of the contrary heresies, for instance, by speaking of the will
to save mankind in a manner that savors of Semipelagianism,
which denies the dogma of predestination; or, on the other
hand, we may speak of predestination in a manner and tone
that savors of predestinarianism, which denies the will to save
mankind. A slight exaggeration, by the addition of some ad­
verb, suffices to incline one toward either of the opposing
heresies, just as the introduction of a single note suffices to
modify one of Beethoven’s symphonies, so as to destroy its
harmony. How is the theologian to proceed in the midst of
these difficulties?
» Loc. cit., Ila Ilae, q. 171, a.3.
» In Boetium de Trinitate, q.11, a.3.

PREDESTINATION

28

THE METHOD TO BE FOLLOWED

On this point the theologian must bear in mind what the
Vatican Council says: “Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith,
when it seeks earnestly, piously, and calmly, attains by a gift
from God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of
mysteries; partly from the analogy of those things which it
naturally knows, partly from the relations which the mys­
teries bear to one another and to the last end of man. But
reason never becomes capable of apprehending mysteries as
it does those truths which constitute its proper object.” 10
The theologian must also bear in mind that just as God
permits evil only for tire sake of a greater good, so He permits
conflicting heresies for the sole reason that thus the sublimity
and value of truth may, by way of contrast, stand out more
prominently. We must then profit by these opposing heresies,
but never at the expense of detracting from the sublimity of
the mystery about which we are seeking to acquire some un­
derstanding.
A watchful theologian will observe that in this difficult
question, as in all the great problems of philosophy and
theology, the human mind, inclined to systematize and for­
getting that the tendency to synthesize is superior to the tend­
ency to systematize, is at first inclined to posit an extreme
thesis, which at times seems to express a profundity of thought,
but which in reality is superficial, as in the cases of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism. Then, by way of reaction, the mind
inclines to an antithesis just as extreme and superficial, as in
the case of predestinarianism and the errors revived by it.
Furthermore, the theologian must take note of the at­
tempts at reconciliation proposed by eclecticism, which, with­
out any guiding principle, selects what appears to it to be
the truth from the two opposing camps. By this means it gets
the impression that the solution is to be found not only midi° Cf. Ibid., no. 1796.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

29
way between the extreme errors, but that it is far above them,
.nul also above all eclectic reconciliations, and in this respect
it is like the culminating point reached by the great doctors
of the Church, who derived their spiritual sustenance from
die substantial nourishment of Scripture and tradition.
Whereas eclecticism does not go more than halfway, these
great doctors reached that higher synthesis in which the vari­
ous aspects of the real are reconciled by the light of the
Miblimest and most universal of principles. Was this not what
St. Augustine did? St. Thomas did so, too, though with greater
precision, when he brought out the full sublimity and uni­
versality contained in the principle that the love of God is
the cause of all good. Hence it follows that God wills to save
.ill men, by making it really possible for all to keep His com­
mandments, and hence it follows that one would not be bet­
ter than another, unless he were loved more by God.11
We shall insist on these principles when we come to classify
the various theological systems, and from this classification
the culminating point of the mystery will be more clearly
seen. Here we merely say that often, after we have discovered
a synthesis of a truly higher order that safeguards in its en­
tirety God’s revealed word, the human mind, like one tired
out, descends from its halfway post to consider the more or
less arbitrary combinations and fluctuations of eclecticism,
which substitutes for the divine obscurity of the mystery an
apparent clarity that is without any real foundation. Hence
the necessity of returning to the teaching of the great doctors
of the Church, who were not merely learned historians and
capable reasoners, but by the gifts of the Holy Ghost were
great contemplatives, with a profound knowledge of God’s
revelation.
Certainly we would not form a true idea of the mystery of
predestination by depreciating God’s infinite mercy, either as
regards all human beings (the will to save mankind) or as re11 Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3, 4.

30

PREDESTINATION

gards the elect (gratuity of election). Nor would we do so
by depreciating His justice which gives to all what they ab­
solutely need and which cannot punish anyone for doing
what could not be helped, since such acts would not be sins.
In the course of his investigation the theologian must not
forget that several great contemplatives, such as St. Theresa,
have declared that the greater the obscurity in the mysteries,
the greater was their attachment to them, because faith is of
things unseen and because this obscurity results not from the
absurdity or incoherence of the mysteries, but from the pres­
ence of a light too great for our feeble vision. Lastly, the
theologian must bear in mind what the great masters of the
spiritual life, such as St. John of the Cross, have said about
the passive purifications of the soul in which, as a rule, the
mystery of predestination appears in all its transcendent ob­
scurity, so that the soul which has gone through this ordeal
may feel the necessity of rising above all human conceptions
with their apparent clarity, and thus abandon itself completely
to God in sentiments of pure faith, filial confidence, and love.
St. Thomas, too,12 says that the gift of understanding puri­
fies the mind of the believer—and therefore of the theologian
—of that too great attachment to sensible images and to those
things that tend to lead them into error, thus enabling them
to penetrate beyond the meaning of Holy Scripture and enter
into the spirit of the mysteries, perceiving them in their su­
pernatural sublimity. Such is the method of procedure not
only in speculative theology, but also in contemplation, in
which no aspect of the mystery is unduly limited by the re­
strictions of reasoning. This goes to show, especially in the case
of these sublime and difficult questions, the necessity of read­
ing first of all the works of the great theologians who were also
great contemplatives. These excelled in both kinds of wis­
dom spoken of by St. Thomas: 13 acquired wisdom, which is
12 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.8, a.y.
13 Ibid., q.45, a.2.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM

31

according to the perfect use of reason, and the gift of wisdom,
which is the principle of a quasi-experimental knowledge that
has its foundation in the special inspiration of the Holy
Ghost and in the connatural disposition of charity for the
things that pertain to God. Is not this what the Vatican Coun< il alludes to in the words already quoted, when it says: “Rea­
son, indeed, enlightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly,
piously, and calmly, attains by a gift from God some, and
that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries”?
In such an atmosphere we no longer feel inclined to say
that thinking about these inscrutable mysteries is useless. On
the contrary, we see that they constitute the final goal of all
things spiritual and that they are increasingly the object of
contemplation in proportion as the Lord purifies the soul.

CHAPTER IV
The Classification

of the

Theological Systems

The revealed doctrine of predestination and of the will to

save mankind is like a mountain peak towering above the
two precipices of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the
one hand, and predestinarianism on the other.
This representation makes it easier to see how the differ­
ent theological systems are at variance with one another.
There seems to be nothing wrong in saying that on one side
of this mountain, halfway up, we find Molinism, and a little
farther up the congruism of Suarez. On the other side we
have the rigid systems of Augustinianism and Thomism,
which modify, so it seems, God’s universal will to save by
making negative reprobation consist in the positive exclusion
from heavenly glory as from a favor to which one is not en­
titled. Still midway between the two sides we find the eclec­
ticism of the congruists of the Sorbonne, who admitted the
efficacy of grace for difficult salutary acts and not for those
easy of accomplishment.
The mountain peak, which is above the various systems,
seems inaccessible to the pilgrim here on earth, to any created
intellect, even enlightened by supernatural faith and the gifts
of the Holy Ghost. To see this culminating point, the light of
glory would be indispensable, that light by which the blessed
in heaven see directly the divine essence, the Deity, which con­
tains eminently and formally the attributes of infinite mercy,
justice, and sovereign liberty, without any real distinction
between them.
This peak is inaccessible to earthly pilgrims. Before it is
3«

THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

33
reached, there is a doctrine which directs us unfailingly to it,
and which, though we do not see the peak, enables us to de­
termine its exact location. It is the doctrine that rests upon
the most sublime and universal of principles which mutually
adjust one another. It is a doctrine that deducts nothing from
these principles and that by means of them surmises where
the culminating point is to be found from which these princi­
ples are derived and toward which all things converge.
Is not this the doctrine whose major principle is that “the
love of God is the source of all good”? Subordinate to it and
offsetting each other are two other principles: God by His
love makes it possible for all to obey His precepts and at­
tain salvation; one person would not be better than another,
unless he were loved more by God.
We are thus led to a methodical classification of the sys­
tems. It is not from the defense of any Scholastic doctrine that
this classification must receive its inspiration, but this must
t ome from the two great principles of our faith. The first is
the omnipotence of God, who in His sovereign goodness
predestines and who is the author of all salvation. The sec­
ond principle is His will to save all men.
The theological systems relative to predestination have
been classified in three ways. The first classification, which is
the one more commonly proposed, considers not so much the
pi incipies as the conclusions of the theologians. The second,
proposed by Father Billot, S.J., is from the Molinist point of
view and considers rather the principles adopted by the the­
ologians. The third, proposed by Father del Prado, O.P., is
from the Thomist point of view and likewise considers not so
much the conclusions as the principles of the theologians.
i) According to the commonly proposed classification,
there are two tendencies. Some say the predestination of
adults to glory is the result of foreseen merits; these are spon­
sors of the purely Molinist view, such as Vasquez, Lessius.
Others say that the predestination of adults to glory is previ-

PREDESTINATION
34
ous to foreseen merits, and that negative reprobation or non­
election is previous to foreseen demerits. This view is upheld
by the Thomists, the Augustinians, the Scotists, and even
those congruists who are of the Bellarminian and Suarezian
type.
But of these theologians who admit the absolute gratuity
of the predestination of adults to glory, almost all of the old
school, i. e., the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists,
hold that this predestination has its foundation in the divine
predetermining decrees, whereas the congruism of Bellarmine
and Suarez rejects these decrees and retains the theory of the
scientia media to explain the distribution of the grace that is
called “congruent,” and God’s certain knowledge of the con­
sent given by the elect.
2) A second mode of classification was proposed by Father
Billot.1 Whereas for some, he says, the foundation of fore­
knowledge, which implies predestination, is in the divine pre­
determining decrees, for others it is in the scientia media.
Among these latter Father Billot distinguishes between those
who, like Vasquez and Lessius, admit the predestination of
adults after foreseen future merits, and the non-election of
certain ones after foreseen future demerits. He also distin­
guishes between those who, like Suarez, say that the pre­
destination of adults to glory is even before conditionally
future foreseen merits, and that negative reprobation or non­
election is even before future foreseen demerits. Lastly, he
distinguishes between those who hold that the predestination
of adults to glory is after foreseen merits as conditionally fu­
ture, but not as simply future. Father Billot admits the last
opinion, maintaining that it is the one Molina taught. In
other words, for Father Billot, what is absolutely gratuitous
is the divine choice of circumstances in which God places a
certain person, after having foreseen by the scientia media
that in these circumstances the consent would be freely given.
1 De Deo Uno, p. ago (last ed.).

THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

35

As for individual cases of negative reprobation or non-elecnon, Father Billot’s view does not differ much from that of
Vasquez, which latter is very difficult to establish.
3) A third classification has been proposed by Father del
Prado, O.P.2 He also takes especially into consideration the
I>1 incipies of the two leading schools, according as they ad­
mit either the divine predetermining decrees or the scientia
media. But he insists that only the theologians admitting the
divine predetermining decrees are faithful followers of St.
Thomas, who wrote: “Whatsoever is in man disposing him
toward salvation, is all included under the effect of pre­
destination, even the preparation for grace.” 8 This includes,
therefore, even the free determination of the salutary act in so
l.ir as it is in this one rather than the other, and not vice
versa. This is truly what St. Thomas meant, who previously
to the article just quoted had written: “Now there is no dis­
tinction between what flows from free will, and what is of pre­
destination; as there is no distinction between what flows
from a secondary cause and from a first cause.”
Let us add to this what Father del Prado elsewhere points
out, that only the theologians who admit the intrinsic efficacy
of the divine decrees and of grace recognize the absolute and
universal validity of the principle of predilection formulated
by St. Thomas in these words: “Since God’s love is the cause
of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than an­
other, if God did not will greater good for one than for an­
other.” 4 Further on in the same work St. Thomas likewise
wrote: “He who is better prepared for grace, receives more
grace. Yet it is not man who prepares himself for grace, ex­
cept inasmuch as his free will is prepared by God. Hence the
In st cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of God,
who dispenses His gifts of grace variously.” 8 Similarly St.
- De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 188.
» Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
« /bid., q.20, a. 3.
» Ibid., la Uae. q.112, a. 4.

PREDESTINATION
36
Thomas says: “He who make a greater effort does so because
of a greater grace; but to do so, he needs to be moved by a
higher cause.” e This principle of predilection, as we shall see,
presupposes that the divine decrees concerning our future
salutary acts are intrinsically and infallibly efficacious. Other­
wise the case might arise in which of two persons who are
loved and helped to the same extent by God and who are
placed in the same circumstances, one would correspond with
the grace received and the other would not. Thus without
having been loved and helped more by God, one would prove
to be better than the other by doing something either easy or
difficult to perform, whether this be the first or final act. This
is what, in opposition to St. Thomas, Molina maintained. He
thus reduced the principle of predilection to the choice of
favorable circumstances in which God places those whom He
foresaw by His scientia media will of necessity make good use
of the grace in these circumstances.
THE SYSTEMS COMPARED

This comparison, after what has just been said, brings us
back to the question of the value of the principle of predilec­
tion, namely, “that one thing would not be better than an­
other, if God did not will greater good for one than for the
other.” 7 Is this principle of absolute and universal validity,
as the early theologians maintained, or has it merely a rela­
tive and restricted value, as the Molinists and the congruists
think?
As we shall see when we come to explain the doctrine of St.
Thomas, in the philosophical order this principle seems to be
a corollary from the principle of causality applied to God’s
love which is the cause of all good: “Since God’s love is the
cause of goodness in things,” 8 says St. Thomas. In the super» Com. in Matt. 25: 15.
τ Loc. cit., la. q.20, a.3.
s Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.

THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

37

natural order this principle of predilection has been revealed.
St. Paul expresses it in these terms: “For who distinguisheth
thee? Or what has thou that thou hast not received?” 8 He
It nds the answer in the Old Testament, saying: “For He saith
to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And
I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.” 10 It is to this
principle of predilection that St. Augustine appeals in sup­
port of all his opinions. When the occasion arises he applies
the principle even to the angels, remarking that, if the good
and bad angels were created equally good, the former were
more abundantly assisted and attained eternal happiness,
whereas the latter, through their own defectibility, fell from
grace.11 Hence St. Augustine’s famous saying: “Why He
draweth one and not another, seek not to judge, if thou dost
not wish to err.” 12
Moreover, this principle of predilection is absolutely uni­
versal. That is why St. Thomas formulates it in the neuter:
"One thing would not be better than another, if God did not
will greater good for one than for another.” 13 This principle
is true in every order. It is true of plants with reference to
minerals, of animals, of human beings, of angels and their
acts, of things in which there is less of perfection or of good­
ness. It is also true of every man who, from whatever point of
view, is better than another, whether this is because of a
naturally or supernaturally good act performed, of an act easy
nr difficult to perform, of an act begun or sustained, of a first
or final act.
We shall see that the attempts at synthesis proposed by the
Molinists and the congruists after the time of St. Thomas,
1.11 from rising to the loftiness of these higher principles
hinnula ted by him, failed to realize the sublimity and univer» I Cor. 4: 7.
>“ Rom. 9: 15.
n De Civ. Dei, ΧΠ, 9.
·- On St. John, hom. 26, the beginning.
>> Loe. cil., la, q.20, a.3.

38

PREDESTINATION

sality of these principles as well as their philosophical and
theological validity. The principle dominating the whole
question is this: “God’s love is the cause of all goodness.” 14
It follows first of all from this that God, by reason of His love,
wills to make it possible for all to obey His commandments
and be saved. This real possibility is a good that is the result
of God’s love or of His universal will to save mankind. It is
not effective, however, in all cases, and sometimes God per­
mits the presence of evil in view of a greater good, which often
eludes us, and the reason for which we shall see clearly only
in heaven. There is in this a very great mystery.
Since God’s love is the cause of all goodness, it follows that
one thing would not be better than another if God did not
will greater good for one than for another. From this princi­
ple of predilection St. Thomas deduces all his conclusions
about predestination. For them it is like the keystone of an
arch, the principle upon which they depend for their preser­
vation and unity.
™ Ibid., a. 2.

CHAPTER V
The Standpoint of St. Augustine and His First
Disciples

St. Augustine pointed out repeatedly that the fathers who

wrote before the rise of the Pelagian heresy touched only in­
cidentally upon the problem of predestination. This circum­
stance was noted also by St. Robert Bellarmine,1 who quotes,
however, St. John Chrysostom. The latter, commenting on
St. Paul’s words, “For who distinguished! thee?” says: “There­
fore thou hast what thou hast received, and not only this or
that, but whatever thou hast. These are not thy merits, but
( iod’s gifts.” 2
We must also observe that the fathers previous to the time
of St. Augustine, especially the Greek fathers, often inter­
preted predestination as meaning the will to give glory after
this life. They scarcely spoke of it except by way of exhorta­
tion, and then they had in mind the preconceived order of ex­
ecution in which merits precede glory, whereas as intended by
< Jod it happens in the inverse order? In the order of intention God wills the end before the means; that is why He wills
i De gratia et libero arbitrio, II, 14.
» In I Cor., 4: 7, hom. 12.
» Cf. Diet, de Théol. Cath., art. “Prédestination,” by Father Simonin, O.P.
We are aware of the two different interpretations of the teaching of the
Greek fathers on this point. Petavius is of the opinion that they side with
those who believe in predestination after foreseen merits. Thotnassin main­
tains they taught predestination before foreseen merits.
In the above-mentioned article Father Simonin concludes that the Greek
fathers "neither stated nor solved the problem of predestination, as to whether
this is before or after foreseen merits; for this often presupposes a conjecture
(hat directly concerns the divine intention.” They considered rather in a con­
crete and practical manner the execution of the divine plan.
39

PREDESTINATION

40

to save the good thief to whom He grants the grace of final
perseverance. But in the order of execution He gives eternal
life as the reward of meritorious acts.
This distinction between the two orders of intention and
execution, is a distinction which, taken in general or as re­
gards human affairs, appeals to common sense. What the
mason has in mind is the end of his labor, which is the house
to be built, although this end is attained after the completion
of the work. We cannot conceive of this plan of divine provi­
dence apart from this elementary condition. God from all
eternity wills first the final end of the universe, which is the
manifestation of His goodness, and He ordains the means
which concur in this end. This will be fully realized at the
end of time, when the elect, who were chosen from all eter­
nity, have reached the end of their course.
As it always happens in such a case, this distinction between
intention and execution was only gradually applied to the
problem of predestination. At first it was applied obscurely
by St. Augustine, and then more and more explicitly by the
Scholastic theologians. Only with the rise of the Pelagian
heresy did an understanding gradually develop of the neces­
sity of considering predestination, not only in the order of
execution, by way of exhortation, but also in the order of in­
tention, so that everything pertaining to our salvation should
be attributed to God. This explanatory formula we find in the
writings of the earlier fathers, especially in St. John Chrysos­
tom’s commentary on the words of St. Paul: “For who is it
that distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast '
not received?” 4 The principle of predilection was already ob­
scurely expressed in these words. It thus became increasingly
certain that our Lord’s granting of the grace of final perse- j
verance to the good thief in preference to the other was be­
cause He willed efficaciously to save him, and this efficacious
will was from all eternity.
* I Cor. 4: 7.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

41

THE GRATUITY OF PREDESTINATION ACCORDING TO

ST. AUGUSTINE

Among the theologians who in recent times have made a
study of St. Augustine’s teaching about predestination, Father
Cayre 5 and Father J. St. Martin,® both of them Augustinian
Assumptionists, confirmed the traditional interpretation of
St. Augustine’s writings. We endorse their conclusions.’
This doctrine was more fully discussed in the treatises that
St. Augustine wrote toward the end of his life.® It was im­
plicitly contained in the following formula: “Lord, give what
Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt.” 0
We remarked above, at the close of the first chapter, that
St. Augustine deduced from the New Testament texts refer­
ring to this problem, the following definition: “Predestina­
tion is the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts
of God whereby they who are delivered are most certainly
delivered.” 10 In this definition the word “foreknowledge” is
not taken as meaning that God foresees the merits of the
elect, but that He foreknows and prepares the gifts by which
« Précis de patrologie, I, 664-77.
s Diet. de théol. cath., art. "Prédestination.”
r Father J. St. Martin (loc. cit., col. 2853) insists, and rightly so, upon the
importance of knowing whether the predestined are predestined for grace only
or also to glory. This knowledge is necessary even for a delineation of St.
Augustine’s teaching. Let us recall here the question that gave rise to so much
dispute. The Semipelagians did and could admit only predestination to
grace. It was a grace, too, which, according to their interpretation, depended
for its efficacy on free will alone. St. Augustine was particularly vehement in
refuting this theory, for he knew quite well that this was the summing up
and pivotal point of the error. According to the teaching of St. Augustine,
the reality of predestination consists in the gift of final perseverance, and
without this latter there is no predestination, notwithstanding all the other
graces received. The holy doctor is not in the least doubt about this.
s Cf. De correptione et gratia; De dono persever., De praed. sanct.
0 Ad Simplicianum, Bk. I; De dono persever., no. 53; Confessions, X, 37,
no. 60.
10 De dono persever., chap. 14.

42

PREDESTINATION

the elect will actually be saved in the order of execution. St.
Augustine clearly says the same: "By His predestination God
foreknew what He had to do,” 11 so as to direct His elect in­
fallibly to eternal life. Our Lord’s words are equivalent to
this, for He said: "My sheep . . . shall not perish for ever.
And no man shall pluck them out of My hand.” 12
For St. Augustine, predestination presupposes a decisive
and definite will on God’s part to sanctify and save freely all
the elect.13 God knows them individually and He wills to have
them perform meritoriously acts that are required for enter­
ing heaven. He wills to give them the grace to persevere until
the end, this being what St. Paul means when he says: "For it
is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish
according to His good will.” 14 The fact that God foresees our
salutary and meritorious acts presupposes, according to the
teaching of St. Augustine, the decree of the divine will as re­
gards these acts.15 Father Portalié considers that St. Augustine
favors the theory of the scientia media because of the follow­
ing sentence: “Far be it that man should have the power to
frustrate the intention of the omnipotent Being who has fore­
knowledge of all things.” 18 We know, on the contrary, that
for St. Augustine the foreknowledge of our salutary acts refers
to what God has decreed that created wills should do. The
words that immediately follow the text quoted by Father
Portalié prove this to be so, for we read: “These have but a
faint conception of so great a question, or what they have does
not suffice, who think that the omnipotent God wills some­
thing and is powerless to effect it because of weak man pre­
venting Him.” Father Portalié should have remarked that
11 De praed. sanct., chap. 10.
12 John 10:27-28.
is Cf. Enchiridion, chap, too, no. 26.
1« Phil. 2: 13: cf. De praed. sanet., XVIII, 41; De dono persever., XXIII, 63.
i’ De dono persever., XVII, 41, 47: XIX, 48: XX, 50: De praed. sanct., XVII,
34; XVIII, 37.
is Diet, de theol. cath., art. “Augustin.” This sentence is taken from St.
Augustine's Opus imperfectum contra Julianum, I, 93.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

43

Molina, on the other hand, reproved St. Augustine for not
having known of the scientia media.1''
To what cause must we assign, according to the great doc­
tor’s opinion, the efficacy of grace that is granted to the elect?
The principles laid down by him reveal his mind on this
point. God’s will, he says, is omnipotent and efficacious (most
< flicacious).18 We read in one of his treatises as follows: “There
is no doubt that human wills cannot resist (in sensu com­
posito) the will of God, who hath done whatsoever He willed
in heaven and on earth, in that He does what He wills and
when He wills. Undoubtedly He has the power to move the
human heart to submit, as it pleases Him, to His omnipotent
will.” 19 From this we see that, in St. Augustine’s view, the
decrees of the divine will are infallible not because God foreI nows that we will give our consent, but because He is omnip­
otent. He also says: “The wills of men are more in God’s
power than in their own.” 20 In another of his works he says:
"There is no doubt that we will whenever we will, but He is
the cause of our willing what is good; . . . there is no doubt
i hat we act whenever we act, but He is the cause of our acting,
by most efficaciously strengthening our will.” 21 Still more
dearly when speaking professedly on this subject of predesti­
nation, he says that “no one who is hardened in heart rejects
grace, because it is primarily given to remove this hardness
of heart.” 22
o Cf. Concordia, ed. 1876, p. 546.
18 Cf. Enchiridion, chaps. 95 ff.
1» De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.
20 Ibid., cf. De civitate Dei, V, 9.
st De gratia et libero arbitrio, chap. 16.
22 De praed. sanct., chap. 8. In his tractate ad Simplicianum, Bk. I, q.2, no.
13, St. Augustine speaks of a congruent grace that is adapted to the disposi­
tions of the individual, these being known by God. Some have sought to inter­
pret this as meaning a congruent grace that is not intrinsically efficacious,
such as we shall see later on Suarez conceives it to be. Father Guillermin
pointed out (Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 658) that St. Augustine has in mind
•in active and victorious congruency." In a word, the grace is intrinsically
efficacious.

44

PREDESTINATION

Lastly, St. Augustine repeatedly teaches that predestination
is gratuitous. And he means predestination as he defined it,
which is not only to grace but also to glory; for predestination
to grace alone does not lead one effectively to eternal life. It
has but the name of predestination, since it belongs equally
to those who, after being justified, do not persevere.
This gratuity of predestination is peculiarly stressed by
him. In discussing the gift of perseverance, he says: “Of two
children equally held captive by original sin, why is one taken
and the other left? And of two wicked persons already ad­
vanced in years, why is one called and the other not? All this
pertains to the inscrutable judgments of God.” 23 He also
says: “Why God draws this one and not that other, seek not
to judge, if thou wilt not err.” 24
What precisely constitutes the crux of the mystery, accord­
ing to St. Augustine’s opinion, is man’s inability to find out
the reasons for the divine choice. He is continually harking
back to this impossibility, and his opponents find no avenue
of escape from it. This impossibility is a pledge of his fidelity
to the teaching of St. Paul. It is, so to speak, the theme of his
teaching.25
Tixeront wrote: “St. Augustine’s views, considered as a
whole, direct us toward the doctrine of predestination to
glory before foreseen merits. . . . Were it a question of the
full predestination to efficacious grace, final perseverance, and
glory, and not of predestination to glory alone, there would
be no room for doubt: the Bishop of Hippo insists again and
again upon its absolute gratuitousness.2®
23 De dono persever., chap. g.
2< In Joan., tr. 26.
2» De dono persever., VIII, 17; IX, 12, 21; XI, 25: XII, 30. De praed. sanct.,
VIII, 16; XIV, 26. De correptione et gratia, VIII, 17, ig (in the order o£ exe­
cution).
2β History of dogmas, Bk. II, p. 503; cf. Enchiridion, chaps. g8, gg; Ep., 186,
no. 15; De dono persever., chaps. 17, 25.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES
st.

Augustine’s first

45

disciples

i) St. Prosper of Aquitaine. After St. Augustine’s death an
anonymous pamphlet appeared that distorted his doctrine of
predestination. St. Prosper thereupon defended the teaching
of his master.27 St. Prosper went to Rome and obtained from
Pope St. Celestine in 431 a letter in which the Pontiff boldly
affirmed the orthodoxy of the Bishop of Hippo, at the same
lime requesting the French bishops to put an end to this ca­
lumniation of St. Augustine. But St. Prosper, upon returning
to France, had to refute another pamphlet that seems to have
been written by St. Vincent of Lerins. This saint thought the
Augustinian doctrine denied God’s will to save all men and
that it implied that God is the author of sin. St. Prosper re­
futed these conclusions;28 about 433 he wrote a book against
( iassian, in which he discusses anew the problem of grace and
free will.2’
Some Pelagians put a wrong construction upon St. Paul’s
text that “God will have all men to be saved,” ” and claimed
that God wills equally the salvation of all. In reply to these
heretics St. Augustine, arguing from the fact that all men are
not saved and from the principle of the infallible efficacy of
the divine will, had repeatedly spoken of a restricted will to
save. By this he meant the infallibly efficacious will that leads
the elect to eternal life. St. Prosper, replying to the objections
made against the teaching of his master, insists upon another
aspect of this doctrine. St. Augustine had clearly affirmed that
God does not command what is impossible, but in command­
ing admonishes thee to do what thou canst and to ask for
27 PL, LI, 155-75. Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum
Gallorum calumniantium.
28 Cf. ibid., 177-86; Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum
vincen tianarum.
20 Cf. Liber ad collatorem, ibid., 213-76.
•0 I Tim. 2: 4.

46

PREDESTINATION

what thou canst not do.” 81 God never commands what is im­
possible, otherwise no one could avoid committing actual sin,
which in this case would no longer be a sin, and the divine
chastisements inflicted for such would be a manifest injustice.
To say that God never commands the impossible means that
He wills to make it really possible for all to comply with the
precepts imposed upon them and to do so when they are im­
posed. Thus He wills to make their salvation really possible,
though He does not lead them all efficaciously to eternal life.
Moreover, St. Augustine again and again, without adding any
restrictions, explained St. Paul’s text that “Christ dies for
all.” 82
True to the teaching of his master, St. Prosper wrote as
follows: “We must most sincerely believe and profess that God
wills all men to be saved. For this, indeed, is the mind of the
Apostle, who most urgently commands, what is a most devout
custom in all the churches, that suppliant prayers be offered
to God for all men. That many of these perish is the fault of
those who perish: that many are saved is the gift of Him who
saves.” 88
In these words of St. Prosper we have formulated the two
extreme aspects of the mystery. On the one hand we have
God’s will to save all men, and on the other hand we have the
mystery of predestination, namely, that many are saved is
the gift of Him who saves.84 Concerning predestination in the
strict sense of the term, St. Prosper is equally firm in his de­
fense of St. Augustine’s opinion, and he refuses to identify
predestination with foreknowledge, because God foresees the
bad no less than the good acts, but He positively wills and is
31 De natura el gratia, PL, XLIII, 50; XLIV, 271.
32 II Cor. 5: 15; cf. PL, XLIV, 825; XLV, 1217.
83 PL, LI, 179; cf. Resp. ad 8 obj. Gallorum vincent., ibid., 162.
3< Concerning St. Prosper's point of view on this question, consult P. M.
Jacquin's article entitled "La question de la prédestination aux V® et VI®
siècles, "in the Revue d'hist, eccles., VII, 269-300: J. "Fixeront, History of
dogmas, III, pp. 283-93; Cayré, Precis de patrologie, II, 180-85.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

47

i he cause of only the latter.” He is the author of all good, and
it cannot be said that, irrespective of His divine will, one parlicular person is better than another. Predestination implies,
therefore, along with foreknowledge a love of predilection or
the will to effect in a particular person and by means of him
in preference to a certain other, this salutary good by which
such a person will actually merit and attain eternal life.88
Therefore predestination of the elect is gratuitous, as St. Au­
gustine had said.
If St. Prosper mitigated his master’s teaching on any point,
it was on the question of reprobation. He is not satisfied with
merely speaking of souls left by God in the mass of perdition,
lor he considers that reprobation is the result of personal sins
loreseen by God.87 This way of viewing it cannot be main1.1 ined as the reason for the non-election of children who die
without being baptized. As for the reprobate adults, it leaves
the question still shrouded in obscurity: their personal sins,
which are foreseen by God, could not happen without His
divine permission. Again, why has God permitted certain in­
dividuals to commit sins without efficaciously intending that
their sins should be actually forgiven, whereas He permits
•.ins in the case of the elect only to bring them to a truer hu­
mility, by which their love becomes purer?
We shall see farther on that many of St. Augustine’s dis< iples who, considering themselves to be interpreting the
mind of their master more faithfully, distinguish between
negative reprobation (non-election and the will to permit
sins that will not be forgiven), and positive reprobation (eter­
nal decree to inflict the punishment of damnation for sins
foreseen). Negative reprobation, so they say, cannot be the
i esult of personal sins foreseen by God as not calling for His
»» PL, LI, 170.
·« Ibid., 174. Resp. ad cap. Gall.
·’ ibid., 161.

PREDESTINATION
48
forgiveness; for it means nothing else but God’s permission of
these sins which, unless He permitted them, could not be
foreseen by Him. This proved, later on, to be the teaching of
St. Thomas,38 and it seems to be fully in agreement with what
St. Augustine taught.39
2) The author of a certain treatise 40 written between 430
and 460—which was about the period in which St. Prosper
lived—like a true disciple of St. Augustine, admits God’s will
to save all men, at the same time maintaining the gratuity of
predestination. To explain this will to save all men, he in­
sists upon a general grace for salvation that is offered to all,
and he distinguishes between this and a special and entirely
gratuitous grace that is given to those who are actually saved.
In addition to these general gifts . . . there is the liberal be­
stowal of a special grace.41 This special grace is the effect of a
divine predilection.
3) St. Fulgentius. At the end of the sixth century the con­
troversies on grace and predestination were resumed after the
death of the Semi pelagian bishop Faustus of Riez. St. Ful­
gentius of Ruspe then wrote a little treatise on this subject.42
He followed this up with an important letter on the question
of grace 43 and wrote a work comprising seven books in direct
refutation of the teachings of Faustus. Of this work only one
treatise remains.44 Last of all he wrote a work in vindication
of the truth of predestination and grace.40 St. Fulgentius, who
is called “Augustine in miniature,” adopts as his own the
whole of St. Augustine’s teaching on grace and its gratuity.49
as Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad gum.
se PL, XLIV, 580. 965.
·»« Ibid., LI, 647-72. De vocatione omnium gentium.
<1 Ibid., 711.
42 PL, LXV, 451-93. Liber de incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Jesu
Christi.
43 Ibid., 435-42.
44 Ibid., 151-206, Ad Monimum. Columns 153-78 are concerned with pre­
destination.
45 Ibid., 603-72.
48 Ibid., Ad Monimum, 157-60, 162-63.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

49

I le accepts, too, everything his master teaches about predesti­
nation. Complete predestination, which means to glory and to
grace, is considered by him to be absolutely free, certain, and
restricted. It is absolutely free because grace, without which
man is incapable of performing any salutary good work, is
purely a gift of God’s mercy.4’ Predestination is a certainty in
virtue of God’s omnipotent and unchangeable will.48 Finally,
it is restricted to the elect, who are called in manifestation of
God’s merciful goodness in their behalf.49
Concerning God’s will to save, in those texts in which St.
Fulgentius speaks of the divine and infallibly efficacious will
to save, he limits it, as St. Augustine did.50 He does not deny,
however, this other point of Augustinian teaching, that “God
does not command what is impossible.” He really wills to
make it possible for all to fulfil His precepts, for this is the
way by which one attains eternal life. St. Fulgentius positively
rejects predestination to sin,51 and he explains that those
whom God has not elected are justly abandoned by Him
either because of original sin, or because of pride w’hich is the
result of this sin.52
4) St. Caesarius of Arles (470-543). His sermons are also a
faithful reflection of St. Augustine’s teaching on predestina­
tion. Father Lejay says: “The problem of both salvation and
damnation is solved in the same way as St. Augustine solved
it. If the wickedness of sinners induces to hardness of heart,
it is God who removes this by His grace. If we ask why God
gives grace to some and refuses it to others, Caesarius answers
by saying with St. Augustine: As a rule God’s judgments are
hidden from the knowledge of men, but they are not unjust.
Like St. Augustine, he counterattacks by quoting the well«7 Ibid.,
Ibid.,
«» Ibid.,
“0 Ibid.,
si Ibid.,
Ibid.,

603-27, De veritate praed.
Ad Monimum, 161.
Ad Monimum, 172-74; De verit. praed., 644-45.
658 ft. Ep. 441.
Ad Monimum, 155-57, 166-^78.
166.

50

PREDESTINATION

known Pauline texts: O the depths of the riches of the wis­
dom and of the knowledge of God! O man who art thou that
repliest against God?” 53
From this we see, however, that St. Caesarius, like his mas­
ter, distinguishes between God’s permission of sin, without
which this would not happen, and the withdrawal of His grace
which, as a just punishment, presupposes on the contrary that
God foresees the sin. With this in mind he writes: “Pharao
is hardened in heart by the withdrawal of grace, but also be­
cause of his wickedness.” 54 In this there is a mystery, that
God permits sins that will not be forgiven. God often remits
sins which He has permitted, often enough, but not always.
This, too, is a mystery.
5) The Second Council of Orange (529), in which the in­
fluence of St. Caesarius of Arles preponderated, put an end to
the heated discussions between the Augustinians and the
anti-Augustinians in France, by approving the fundamental
points maintained by St. Augustine. The first eight canons of
the council were taken by St. Caesarius from St. Augustine’s
works. Another proposition was added by the Bishop of Arles
(c. 10), and then there are sixteen propositions (c. 9 and 1125) compiled by St. Prosper from St. Augustine’s works and
sent by Pope Felix IV. Pope Boniface II, his successor, con­
firmed (January 25, 531) these decisions in which Rome had
already played an important part, and he declared the profes­
sion of faith formulated by the synod to be in agreement with
the Catholic principles of the fathers.
These canons of the Council of Orange clearly affirm not
only the necessity of grace for every supernaturally good work,
but also its gratuity. By this ruling the council definitely
steered clear of Semipelagianism. On the question whether
the efficacy of grace, of which the council speaks, is intrinsic58
58 Cf. Diet, de théol., II, 2178; Caesarius of Arles, Sermons, XXII, 4:
CCLXXV, 1: Rom. 11: 33: 9: 20.
w Sermon XXII.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

51
or extrinsic, in other words, whether or not it depends upon
the fact that God foresees our consent, modern theologians
are not in agreement. Those who, like the Augustinians and
the Thomists, admit the intrinsic efficacy of grace, quote es­
pecially the following canons: (3) “If anyone says that God’s
grace can be conferred by the invocation of man, and that
this, however, is not caused by grace itself, such a person con­
tradicts the prophet Isaias or the Apostle who says: I was
found by them that did not seek Me: I appeared openly to
them that asked not after Me.” 66 (4) “If anyone says that
God waits for us to will that we may be cleansed from sin, and
who does not confess that even our wish to be cleansed from
sin is the effect of the infusion and operation of the Holy
Spirit who by the mouth of Solomon says: The will is pre­
pared by the Lord, and also the Apostle proclaiming for our
benefit that: it is God who worketh in you, both to will and
to accomplish according to His good will.” 56 (6) “If anyone
. . . does not consent to believe it to be the gift of grace it­
self, that we be obedient and humble, resists the Apostle who
says: What hast thou that thou hast not received? and By the
grace of God I am what I am.” 57 (9) “For as often as we do what
is good, God works in and with us that we may do it.” 08 (10)
“We must always implore God’s help even for those who have
been baptized and cured of their spiritual infirmities, whether
this be that they may persevere in the performance of good
works or that they may die a happy death.” 58 (12) “God loves
us because of what we will be by the gift of His grace, not
because of what we are by our own merit.” 80 (20) “There is
no good act done by man which God does not help man to
do.” 81 (22) “No one has for one’s own anything but lying and
” Denz., no. 176; cf. Rom. 10: 20; Is. 65: 1.
w Ibid., no. 172; Prov. 8: 25; Phil. 2: 13.
st Ibid., no. 179; I Cor. 4: 7; 15: 10.
’8 Ibid., no. 182.
’® Ibid., no. 183.
eo Ibid., no. 185.
« Ibid., no. 193.

PREDESTINATION
52
sin.” 62 Later on theology stated more precisely that man can
perform no supernaturally good act except by God’s super­
natural help, and no morally good deed without a help in the
natural order.
The Council of Orange makes no positive affirmation about
predestination to glory and grace; but we see that this is the
logical result of the canons just quoted, especially of canons
twelve and twenty. The latter canon reads: “There is no good
act done by man which God does not help man to do.” Canon
twelve declares that “God loves us because of what we will be
by the gift of His grace, not because of what we are by our
own merit.” These two statements along with the Pauline
text: “What has thou that thou hast not received?” 83 are
tantamount to saying that one would not be better than an­
other if one were not loved more and helped more by God,
and that in the work of salvation everything comes from God,
in this sense that we cannot detect therein the least good which
could be said to be exclusively from ourselves and not from
Him.
The Indiculus de Gratia Dei, appended to Pope Celestine’s
twenty-first letter, said the same: “For the acknowledgment
of God’s grace, the operative power and dignity of which
must not in the least be undervalued, we believe that what­
ever the canons have taught us in accordance with the afore­
said rules laid down by the Holy See is amply sufficient: so
that we absolutely do not think is Catholic what has clearly
been seen to be contrary to the foregoing decisions.” 81
Finally, the Council of Orange distinctly disapproves of
predestination to evil. On this point it says: “That some are
predestined by divine power to evil, not only we do not be­
lieve this, but also, if there are any willing to believe so great
an evil, in all detestation we anathematize them.” 88 In the
»2 Ibid., no. 195.
os I Cor. 4: 7.
0« Denz., nos. 134, 135, 139, 14«.
oo Ibid., no. 200.

ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS FIRST DISCIPLES

53
same paragraph the council affirms that all the baptized can
be saved if they will keep the commandments, for we read:
"This also we believe according to Catholic faith, that all
those who have received grace by being baptized, Christ help­
ing and co-operating with them, if they have willed to labor
faithfully, can and ought to put into effect those things that
pertain to the salvation of their souls." 88 This is what St.
Augustine said, whom the Council of Trent quoted against
the Protestants as follows: “God does not command what is
impossible, but in commanding advises you to do what you
can and to ask for what you cannot do,” 67 and again when
he said: “God does not abandon those whom He has once
justified by His grace, unless He is first abandoned by
them.” 68
Thus the two extreme aspects of the mystery were affirmed:
on the one hand, the gratuity and necessity of grace; and on
the other, the real possibility of salvation, at least for all the
baptized.
6) After the Council of Orange. St. Gregory the Great is
also distinctly of the Augustinian school. He teaches the ne­
cessity of a prevenient grace for the beginning of good works
and faith,80 and that predestination to grace and eternal life
is absolutely gratuitous, as in the case of the good thief.70 In
the seventh century, St. Isidore of Seville also taught that the
elect are gratuitously predestined to heaven,71 and that God
has prepared for the reprobates the punishments they have
deserved for their sins which have been permitted by Him.
To the question why God has freely chosen some and not
others, St. Isidore answers by saying: “In an obscurity so great
as this it is of no avail for man to investigate the divine disoo Ibid.
07 Ibid., no. 804; cf. PL, XLIII, 50.
os PL, XXVI, 29.
«° Ibid., LXXV, 1135.
70 Ibid., LXXVI, 436-37.
71 Ibid., LXXXIII, 606.

PREDESTINATION
54
pensation and examine the secret arrangements of predestina­
tion.” 72
Such is the teaching of St. Augustine’s disciples. They af­
firm the two extreme aspects of the mystery: the gratuity of
predestination and the real possibility of salvation for at least
all baptized adults. Moreover all agree in saying that no one
in this life can see how these two truths are intimately recon­
ciled, for that would be to see how God’s infinite justice,
infinite mercy, and sovereign independence or liberty are
intimately reconciled. The just mean was found in the af­
firmation of these two extreme aspects of the mystery and in
the higher contemplation of God’s infinite goodness, which
is equally the principle of His mercy and that of His justice.
On the one hand, God’s sovereign goodness is diffusive of
itself, it being the principle of His mercy; on the other hand,
it has the right to be loved above all things, it being the prin­
ciple of His justice.
St. Augustine’s disciples steered a middle course by a lov­
ing contemplation of these truths in the obscurity of faith.
This middle course was compromised in the ninth century
by the assertions of Gottschalk, which necessitated many a
struggle for its restoration.78
’2 Ibid., 6o6, no. 6.
« Ibid., CXXI, 347-66.

PART II
THE PRINCIPAL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM
OF PREDESTINATION

SECTION I
The Views

of

Predestination Held by
the Middle Ages

the

Scholars

of

The question of predestination was studied by the scholars

of the Middle Ages. They were guided by the principles
which St. Augustine formulated in defense of the teachings
of the Gospel and of St. Paul against the Pelagians and Semi­
pelagians. After the time of St. Anselm several theologians,
like Peter Lombard, were satisfied with a compilation of the
principal teachings of St. Augustine, explaining some of them
by others and reviving the memory of predestinarianism, a
heresy in direct opposition to that of Pelagianism. Not a few
theologians sought also to reconcile St. Augustine’s doctrine
with what St. John Damascene wrote concerning God’s will
to save all men, which he calls His antecedent will.
To see more clearly the meaning and scope of these works
of the Middle Ages, we should recall that St. John Damascene
and St. Augustine held different views on this subject of pre­
destination. The former 1 almost always considered the ques­
tion from the moral point of view, in its relation to God’s
goodness and men’s sins. If God is supremely good, he asks,
how does it happen that not all are saved? He answers this
question by saying that some sin and remain in sin. Con­
sequently God punishes them; but previous to the sin, God
wills the salvation of all, because He is supremely good. If
He punishes after the sin, it is because He is also supremely
just.
This answer given by St. John Damascene, which is accord1 De fide orth., II, 29.

57

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PREDESTINATION

ing to common sense and is Christian in sentiment such as
to be naturally understood by the faithful, somehow did not
take into consideration God’s omnipotence and the efficacy of
grace. It also failed to solve from the speculative point of view
many difficulties, even those to which St. Augustine replied
in his contest against the Pelagians. These heretics, denying
the mystery of predestination, claimed that God wills equally
the salvation of all, and thus they misconstrued St. Paul’s text
on this point.2
Certainly St. John Damascene had clearly affirmed in the
same passage that “every good comes from God” and that no
evil can happen unless it is permitted by Him. But many per­
sons, after they read his distinction between the antecedent
and consequent wills in God, asked this question: If God is
omnipotent, how are we to explain that His antecedent will
for the salvation for all is only partly realized? Does the divine
will meet with an insurmountable obstacle in the malice of
some? Looking at it in this way, what becomes of the revealed
mystery of predestination, which does not allow of our affirm­
ing with the Pelagians that God wills equally or in the same
way the salvation of all?
Whereas St. John Damascene insisted on God’s will to save
all mankind, St. Augustine, to correct the Pelagian and Semi­
pelagian interpretations of St. Paul’s text, which states that
“God will have all men to be saved,” 3 stressed the mystery
of predestination. At the same time he maintained that God
never commands what is impossible, and thus He wills and
actually makes it really possible for all who are bound to ob­
serve the precepts to be saved.
Thus the two extreme aspects of the mystery w'ere affirmed.
It was for the theologians to endeavor to formulate them so
well that one should not exclude the other. They all agreed
that the mode of their intimate reconciliation is just as much
2 I Tim. 2: 4.
« Ibid., 2: 4.

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

59
beyond our powers of perception as is that of God’s infinite
mercy and justice.

CHAPTER I
The Theologians Prior

to

St. Thomas

ST. ANSELM

In his treatise De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis

nec non gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio.1 St. Anselm examines
the question of predestination. We know from Eadmer 2 that
St. Anselm wrote this work toward the end of his life. The
title indicates that the treatise is divided into three questions.
We shall give a summary of the tenor and contents of the
second question, De concordia praedestinationis cum libero
arbitrio,3 which unfortunately is the shortest question in the
treatise.
Chapter I. It is concerned with the problem arising from
the agreement between predestination and human liberty.
After giving the commonly accepted definition of predestina­
tion, the author stresses the difficulty of perceiving how this
latter does not conflict with our free will. If God predestines
both the good and the bad, then nothing is left to free will,
and everything happens from necessity. If He predestines only
the good, then free will would have for its scope everything
that is bad. The two alternatives seem to exclude each other.
Chapter II. St. Anselm then investigates in what sense we
may speak of the predestination not only of the good, but
also of the bad. “God predestines the bad and their bad
deeds,” he says, “when He does not correct them and their
bad deeds. But more especially He predestines in the case of
1 PL, CLVIII, 507-42.
- Ibid., 114; Vita S. Anselmi.
s Ibid., 519-21.

6o

PREDESTINATION

those who perforin good deeds . . . because in these He is
the cause not only of their entity but also of their goodness;
but in the case of bad deeds He is the cause of their entity,
not of their badness.”
Chapter III. The author finally comes to the crucial point:
in the accomplishment or in the effects of predestination, how
is it that the divine action does not intervene alone, but is
accompanied by man’s co-operation, without one of the fac­
tors eliminating the other? In replying to this, St. Anselm has
recourse especially to affirmative statements. He says: “There
is no justice in one who does not adhere to it freely.” Then
he adds that “certain things . . . which are predestined, do
not happen by reason of that necessity which precedes and is
the cause of the occurrence, but by reason of that which fol­
lows it.” After this comes the distinguishing feature of the
author’s doctrine. He remarks that God, when He predestines,
does not do so by forcing the human will or resisting it, but
He leaves it master of itself. And although our will makes use
of its power, in the case of the good, however, nothing is done
by it except as the result of God’s grace; so that in the case of
the bad, sin must be imputed solely to their will.
We understand the method of procedure adopted by St.
Anselm. It is a very just but perhaps too restricted application
of his previous exposition of the divine foreknowledge. God
foresees infallibly the free acts of the future, at the same time
leaving their contingency intact. Therefore He can predestine
a person to perform these acts. It is possible that the effects
of this predestination will or will not be realized in time, if
we consider their cause, which is our free will. They are fore­
seen and ordained by God from all eternity, being irrevocable
and necessary in virtue of a necessity of consequence. In this
third and most important chapter of his treatise, the author
shows clearly the necessity of our free co-operation with grace.
So we see that St. Anselm seeks the solution of the problem
from the teaching of St. Augustine. Previous to this, however,

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

61

Scotus Eriugena and Gottschalk had interpreted the mind of
the Bishop of Hippo. Something more definite might have
been expected concerning the difficulties raised by them. But
the texts already quoted show how tenaciously and unequivo­
cally St. Anselm adheres to certain great principles. These
principles he maintains along with almost all his predecessors
and contemporaries. He holds that every good comes from
God, that the free determination of a salutary act in all that
constitutes it as such, is a good that comes entirely from God,
just as it comes entirely from us as a secondary cause.4 Another
principle enunciated in the same passage is, that it does not
happen independently of God’s action that this free determi­
nation of a salutary act comes or will come from this man
rather than from a certain other, whom God will permit to
fall into sin, the cause of which, however, will be solely be­
cause this other willed it.
PETER LOMBARD

The Master of the Sentences has the same view as St. Au­
gustine about predestination and reprobation, for he says:
"By predestination God foreknew those things which He
I limself would do; but He foreknew also those things which
1 le will not do, that is all evil things. He predestined those
whom He chose, but the rest He rejected as reprobates, that
is He foreknew they would sin and be condemned to eternal
death.” B God predestined those whom He chose, and this
suggests no passivity or dependence upon foreknowledge on
the part of any determination of the created order. He did
not choose the others, but foresaw and permitted their ob­
duracy in sin, and for this they are deservedly condemned to
eternal punishment. In like manner, he says: “Since predesti­
nation is preparation by God’s grace, or divine election, by
« Cf. chap. 3: De concordia praedestinationis cum libero arbitrio.
i Cf. I Sent., d. XL, 1.

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PREDESTINATION

which He chose those whom he willed before the foundation
of the world, as the Apostle says (Eph. 1:4): on the other
hand, by reprobation is to be understood the foreknowledge
of the wickedness of certain persons and eternal punishment
prepared for them . . . and the former, that is their wicked­
ness, He knows and does not prepare; the latter, that is, eter­
nal punishment, He foreknows and prepares.” 6
Predestination does not presuppose, therefore, the fore­
seeing of the merits. On this point Peter Lombard writes:
“But if we ask why some deserve to be left in their obduracy
and others to obtain mercy (or to be predestined), we find
the reason for the former, but not for the latter; for there is
no question of mercy being merited, for grace would cease to
be grace if it were not freely given, but were bestowed on ac­
count of merits.” 7 Peter Lombard then puts an objection
which has its foundation in an opinion St. Augustine held
shortly after his conversion. According to this opinion the
reason for the election of some and the non-election of others
would be because of certain merits very difficult to detect.
But he replies that St. Augustine later on gave up this opin­
ion.8 Peter Lombard insists especially on this: That reproba­
tion is not likewise the cause of evil, as predestination is the
cause of good.
As for God’s will to save all mankind, he considered it9
not only as St. John Damascene does, in its relation to God’s
sovereign goodness, but also, with St. Augustine, in its rela­
tion to the divine omnipotence and the efficacy of prayer. On
this point Peter Lombard writes as follows: “For who is so
irreverent and foolish as to say that God cannot turn men
away from willing what is evil to will what is good, if, when,
and where He has so willed it.” 10 And therefore, he adds,
e Ibid., d. XL, 4.
1 Ibid., d. XLI.
8 Retract., I, 23.
» Loc. cit., d. XLVI, XLVII.
10 Ibid., d. XLVI, 3.

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

63

when we read that “God wills to save all men,” 11 we must not
lake this to mean that His omnipotence meets with an insur­
mountable obstacle in the malice of some persons; but with
St. Augustine we must interpret this as meaning that no one
is saved unless God willed it.
In addition to this, Peter Lombard firmly maintains that
God never commands what is impossible, but makes it pos­
sible for all to observe His commandments; hence this in­
dudes the possibility for them to save their souls. In this sense
he recognizes with St. Augustine that God wills the salvation
of all those who are bound to observe the precepts, although
there may be some difficulty in the case of children who die
without being baptized.12 Thus we see that the two aspects of
the mysteries are clearly affirmed by Peter Lombard.
ALEXANDER OF HALES

This theologian quotes the current definition of predestina­
tion among the Augustinians, and these presuppose no pas­
sivity or dependence on God’s part.18 A little farther on,14
asking whether merits are the cause of predestination, he re­
plies: “By the term predestination is meant the preparation
of the divine helps, united to foreknowledge and its effects,
namely, grace and glory, which latter will be given to the
elect. Now merits are only the cause of the conferring of glory,
and not of God’s eternal choice, or of the conferring of grace.”
If Alexander says that “foreknowledge of the merits may be
the reason for the conferring of grace and glory,”18 he cer­
tainly does not mean this in the Pelagian sense, in that the
sinner can merit justification, but he merely means that he
can dispose himself for it under the influence of actual grace.
This was the comment of the editors of St. Bonaventure’s
111 Tim. 2: 4.
12 Loe. cit., XLVI, 11.
is Summa theol., la, q.28, memb. 1, a. 1-3.
1* Ibid., memb. 3, a.i.
is Ibid., ad 2um.

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PREDESTINATION

works,16 and they point out that Alexander of Hales, St. Bona­
venture, and St. Albert the Great are in agreement on this
point. The difficulties presented by this doctrine are cleared
up by what Alexander says farther on in his theological trea­
tise.17
ST. BONAVENTURE

He retains the Augustinian definition of predestination.
In that it is the preordainment of the elect to glory, together
with those helps that most certainly will enable them to attain
it, preordainment presupposes election.18 This very election
presupposes a gratuitous and special dilection, and this ap­
plies not only to God’s antecedent will but also to His conse­
quent will to save.19 Concerning election, St. Bonaventure
writes: “There are two kinds of election. One is caused by the
diversity and pre-eminence of the eligibles, and this is a con­
sequence of the eligibles, as in the case of human election;
the other accounts for the diversity in choosing, and this is
divine election, which is concerned with different natures,
not as they are but as they will be. Such election precedes and
is eternal.20 Very numerous texts in St. Bonaventure’s works
10 I Sent., d. XLI, a.i, q.2, scholion no. 2 (Quaracchi).
iiLoc tit., q.30, a.i: q.31, membr. 3: Whether God loves equally every
creature? Q-32, membr. 1: Whether among human beings God's love is
greater for the one whom He foreknew to be at the present moment in a
state of grace, than for the one who is predestined, though he is at the pres­
ent moment in a state of sin? He replies in accordance with the principle:
God's love is greater for those to whom He wills a greater good; and one
would not be better than another unless He had been loved more by God.
is I. Sent., d. XL.
18 Ibid., a.3, q. 1. In this article St. Bonaventure teaches clearly the principle
of predilection. Like St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, he holds that divine
predilection, contrary to ours, is the cause of the greater or less goodness found
in creatures and in the elect. Here we have the great and traditional principle,
namely, that one would not be better than another, unless one were loved
more by God.
20 Ibid., a.3, q.i, no. 4. The editors of the Quaracchi edition of St. Bona­
venture’s works, in commenting on this passage (ibid.) state that “it is con­
firmed by the Council of Orange, canon twelve, which reads: God loves us
such as we will be by the gift of His grace, not as we are by our own merit."

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

65

refer to the principle of predestination.21 There is therefore
no passivity or dependence in God’s foreknowledge concern­
ing a free and salutary determination of the created order.
Guided by the light of this principle, what answer does he
give to the question whether foreseen merits are the cause of
predestination? He answers22 that predestination implies
three things: an eternal design, and then its effects: justifica­
tion and glorification. Now the merits of the elect are the
cause of the subsequent glorification, but not of the eternal
design which precedes them. As for justification this cannot
be merited ex condigno, but only ex congruo, that is, by a
merit improperly so called, in so far as God does not refuse
sanctifying grace to the sinner who does what he can to ob­
tain it. But in virtue of the principle of predilection previ­
ously enunciated by him, St. Bonaventure holds that of two
sinners, one does not become better than another by dispos­
ing himself for conversion, unless he has been loved more by
God and helped more by actual grace. This is the constant
teaching of St. Augustine and, as we shall see, St. Thomas
adopted it,23 so St. Bonaventure writes concerning salutary
acts that the total effect is from the created cause and likewise
from the uncreated will.24
However, St. Bonaventure seeks to discover some motive
for this choice on God’s part. If this particular man has been
chosen in preference to a certain other, Peter in preference
to Judas, is not this because of some suitable quality in him
unknown to us, and not because of any merit on his part? He
replies in the affirmative: “If coming to particular cases, we
ask why He wills more to justify one than another, when evi­
dently the two are equally eligible, we must say that there can
be many reasons of congruence for this, so that there is no
objective certainty. Therefore, since our knowledge is de21 Consult index of Quaracchi edition under the heading “Dilectio."
--Loc. cit., d. XLI, a.i, q.i.
28 Summa theol., la, q.2g, a.5.
2<Loc. cit., d. XLV, a.2, q.2 ad mm.

66

PREDESTINATION

pendent upon objective certainty, we can discover no certain
reason for this, unless it be revealed by Him in whom there
are no doubts but only certainties.26 St. Albert the Great says
practically the same.20
Contrary to this, in virtue of the principle of predilection,
St. Thomas said: “Why He chooses some for glory, and repro­
bates others, has no reason except the divine will ... as
from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone
is in this part of the wall, and that in another.” 27 Scotus held
the same view as St. Thomas on this point, and affirmed God’s
sovereign liberty in the choice of the elect.28
Is the reason given by St. Bonaventure to be taken as ap­
plying to the future merits of the elect, when he says that the
choice is one of fittingness and not of merit? He says it would
be rash to affirm this.28 In any case, he maintains the principle
of predilection, which we have seen so emphatically affirmed
by him. It is that one would not be better than another un­
less one were loved more by God (for divine love is not caused
by the diversity of eligibles, but is the cause of them).
All these theologians, moreover, agree on this, that just as
God would have suffered no inconvenience if He had not cre­
ated, so there would have been no inconvenience to Him if
He had placed Judas in preference to Peter among the elect,
and granted him the graces that would have infallibly led him
to merit freely eternal life and persevere unto the end. As St.
Bonaventure says: “Although there can be others and more
than are predestined, yet there never will be; and if there
were, then they were from all eternity predestined. And there­
fore in this there can be no change.” 30 His conclusion is that
25 Ibid., d. XLI, a. i, q.2.
2β Stimma theol., la, tr. 16, q.65.
22 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5, ad 311m.
28 I Sent., d. XLI, q. 1.
2» Loe. cit., d. XLI, dub. 1, ed. Quaracchi, I, 742.
MIbid., d. XL, a.2, q.2, no. 5. When St. Bonaventure says that there can
be others and more, he is speaking of the certainty of salvation. He points
out that since salvation, objectively considered, depends upon the use of free

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

67

God wills to save all men in so far as He has given all the hu­
man nature, and offers to all by Christ the grace necessary for
salvation.81
ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

This doctor has discussed predestination and God’s will to
save all mankind in two of his works,82 and his teaching on
this subject is substantially the same as St. Bonaventure’s.
He states positively that divine knowledge is the cause of
things, and is not measured by them.83 It does not, however,
prescribe the characteristic trait of necessity for all things;
for there may be, as Aristotle says, a necessity of consequence
without a necessity of consequent, according to the following
example given by Boethius: What I see must be; now I see
Peter walking; therefore he must be walking, although he is
doing this freely. Thus God has infallibly foreseen contingent
events.*32
34 In like manner, God willed efficaciously from all
eternity the conversion of the good thief, and he was infallibly
converted without being in the least way compelled.85
He says, too, with St. Bonaventure, that predestination to
glory presupposes election, and this latter presupposes di­
vine predilection: “Love tends to show a preference between
persons, and to love the one preferred in view of eternal life.
Therefore love precedes election, and election precedes pre­
destination on the part of Him who loves, elects, and predes­
will, then it is to be classed among other uncertain and contingent events of
life. But on God’s part the number does not admit of either increase or de­
crease, since the certainty in question here depends upon His foreknowledge,
which is not subject to error. (Tr.)
di Ibid., d. XLVI, a.t, q.i.
32 Cf. Com. on Sentences, I, d. XLVI, XLVII; Summa theol., la, q.62, 64.
This latter work was written in 1270 after the first part of St. Thomas’ theo­
logical summa had appeared.
sa I Sent., d. XXXVIII, A, a.t; D, a.3.
34 Ibid., d. XXXVIII, E, a.4.
as Ibid., d. XLVI, C, a. 1; d. XLVII, A, a.t ad turn. Also Summa theol., la,
tr. 15, q.61, m. 2, 5, 8.

68

PREDESTINATION

tines.38 This doctrine affirms the principle of predilection,
that no created being would be better titan another unless it
were loved more by God.
What conclusion do we come to when we ask whether any­
thing we do contributes as a meritorious cause of predestina­
tion? St. Albert answers this question.37 Subsequently he gives
a clearer solution to this problem in his theological treatise.
In this latter work he says: “It is of Catholic faith that the only
cause of or good reason for predestination is the will and love
of Him who predestines. . . . Furthermore, it is of Catholic
faith that merit does not come before grace. . . ,33 However,
St. Albert affirms that “What is added to grace, is an act that
takes place in time and is measured by time, and cannot be
caused; there can, however, be a reason that may make it ap­
pear reasonable: and this reason is not antecedent but con­
comitant. Hence the reason for this may be the knowledge
of merits, because, to be sure, He gives grace to the one whom
He well knows will make good use of it.” 39
These concluding words remind us of one of Henry of
Ghent’s opinions quoted and discussed by Cajetan.40 But St.
Albert attaches much less importance to them, saying: “Some­
times God gave grace to one whom He knew would make a
bad use of it, as in the case of Judas.” 41 Similarly he says:
“Sometimes God gives grace to one whom He knows will
make a bad use of it, on account of some useful purpose it
will serve; thus He made use of the betrayal by Judas so as to
accomplish the redemption of the human race. But He would
not be a good dispenser if, without any thought of the ad­
vantage to be gained therefrom, He gave grace to one who will
make a bad use of it.” 42
se Ibid., cl. XL, a. 19.
st I Sent., <1. XLI, B. a.3.
ss Summa lheol., la, tr. 16, q.63, m. 3, a. 1.
so Ibid.
<0 Com. in lam, q.23, a.5, no. 4.
*1 Loc cit., q. 1 ad 311m.
μ Ibid., q.2, ad gum.

THEOLOGIANS PRIOR TO ST. THOMAS

69

From these formulas enunciated in the foregoing texts we
see that God gives grace either because of future merits, or
for some other useful purpose. Thus St. Albert prepares the
way for the much simpler formula which we read in the
Summa of St. Thomas, which is: “God preordained to give
grace to merit glory.” 43
St. Albert remains faithful to the principle of predilection,
and he has given us a sufficiently clear formula of it. He says:
“That is loved more which receives a greater good.” 44 And
again he says: “In all things God loves the good that is from
Him.” 45 No created being therefore would be better than
another unless it were loved more by God. “What hast thou
that thou hast not received?” 48 But, in any case, God never
commands what is impossible and He makes it possible for
all to keep His commandments.47
*3 Summa theol., la, 9.23, a.5.
Summa lheol., la, tr. 16, q.64 ad quaest. 1.
« Ibid., ad gum.
I Cor. 4: 7.
47 Ibid., la, tr. 20, q-79, a. 1: see our artide in the Revue Thomiste, March,
1931, pp. 371-86: "The will to save and predestination as St. Albert the Great
views it."

CHAPTER II
The Doctrinal Principles

of

St. Thomas

St. Thomas Aquinas developed a higher, simpler, and more

comprehensive theory concerning the great problem of the
reconciliation of God’s universal will to save with the mystery
of predestination. The limits of this book do not permit us
to trace St. Thomas’ thought in his different works, examining
them in chronological order. We have his interpretation of
St. Paul’s text on this subject.1 He has also discussed this ques­
tion from the speculative point of view.2 In his theological
treatise which he wrote toward the end of his life, he gave us
his final decision on this question.8
We shall present his point of view in these pages, stress­
ing the principle of this synthesis and how it applies, by
way of inference, to God’s universal will to save and to
the principle of predilection.4 As for the scriptural foun­
dation for this teaching, so as to avoid repetitions, we shall
examine this point in connection with the leading article
of this treatise.5 The point at issue is whether predestina­
tion depends upon the foreseeing of our merits. We shall
see that St. Thomas, like St. Augustine, is of the opinion
that the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory is
affirmed by St. Paul. Later we shall see this exegesis adopted
by St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez.
1 Cf. Com. on Rom., chaps. 8, 9. 11; Com. on Eph., chap. 1.
2 Cf. Com. on Sent., I, d. XL, XLI; Contra Gentes, Bk. HI, chap. 164; De
verit., q.6.
s Cf. Summa theol., la, q.23.
4 Ibid., q.23· All the articles of this question may be viewed as corollaries
of these two principles.
s Ibid., la, q.23, a.5.
70

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

71

We shall assign here a considerable number of pages to the
teaching of St. Thomas on this subject which concerns us, and
this for three reasons: (1) because he himself proposes it in
explanation of the revealed doctrine transmitted to us by St.
Paul, and such as St. Augustine understood it; (2) because,
the authority of St. Thomas being admitted, almost all the
theologians since his time, even the Molinists of our day,
claim to follow him; (3) because, by so doing, we shall need
to comment but briefly on it in the theoretical part of this
work. It will suffice for us to recapitulate the principles of this
teaching of St. Thomas, showing how superior they are to the
proposed attempts at synthesis as recorded in later chapters.
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THOMIST SYNTHESIS

St. Thomas had a grander conception than St. Albert the
Great and preceding theologians ever had, of the sublimity
and unlimited scope of the principle that God’s love is the
cause of goodness in things. He expressed this very forcibly
in the following passage: “It has been shown above (q. 19, a. 4)
that God’s will is the cause of all things. It must needs be,
therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only
inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then,
God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is noth­
ing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that
God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because
since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but
is moved by it as its object, our love, whereby we will good
to anything, is not the cause of its goodness. . . . On the
contrary, God’s love infuses and creates goodness in things.” 0
In substance St. Thomas had already said as much in two
fundamental articles of preceding questions.7
0 Ibid., la, q.20, a.2.
’ Ibid., q. 14, a.8: "Whether knowledge is the cause of things?”; q. 19, a.4:
"Whether God’s will is the cause of things?” These two articles will be the
source of all we have to say on this subject.

Ί*

PREDESTINATION

THE UNIVERSAL WILL TO SAVE

By the light of this principle, that God’s love is the cause of
goodness in things, St. Thomas clears up the two extreme and
apparently contradictory aspects of the mystery that confronts
us. On the one hand, we have the universal will to save,
which St. John Damascene so strenuously defended, and on
the other, we have the dogma of predestination, which was
stressed by St. Augustine.
First of all, the universal will to save is conceived not only
as a sign of God’s will, like some oral or written precept, but
it is also viewed as a will of good pleasure that really exists in
God.8 If, in truth, God’s love is the cause of the goodness in
things, then it is by reason of His will of good pleasure and
His love that He gives to all men not only a human nature by
which they can know and love Him in a natural way, but that
He also makes it possible for them to observe the precepts of
the natural law, and in this very way salvation is possible.
God can never command what is impossible, for that indeed
would be an injustice. Sin would then become inevitable,
which, in such a case, would no longer be sin, and could not
be justly punished either in this life or in the next. God, by
reason of His love, therefore, makes it possible for all to ob­
serve His precepts, avoid sin, and thus be saved.® St. Thomas
also says that even in those things that are due to one, God
gives more than strict justice demands; for mercy or entirely
gratuitous and superabundant kindness is at the root of all
divine works of justice, which presuppose that intellectual
s De verit., q.23, a. 3.
t>Loc. cit., la, q.21, a.i ad 311m, where it is stated that God gives to each
thing what is due to it by its nature and condition; also la, q.23, a.5 ad sum,
where we read that God deprives nobody of his due; la Ilae, q. 106, a.2 ad
sum, in which he states that it (New Law) gives man sufficient help to avoid
sin.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

73

creatures from purely gratuitous love were created and des­
tined for the supernatural life of eternity.10
This was the point St. John Damascene insisted upon; but
he scarcely considered it but from the moral point of view,
in its relation to the divine goodness and the malice of men.
God, he said, by an act of His antecedent will, of His goodness
wills to save all men; but, as some sin and remain in sin, by
an act of His consequent will He punishes them eternally
because He is just.
It remained for future theologians to probe this distinction
more deeply, considering it not only from the moral point
of view but also from the metaphysical, in its relation either
to God's omnipotence or to the efficacy of His will and love.
This is what St. Thomas did by the light of that principle
which, in his opinion, completely dominates the problem,
and from which a whole series of corollaries is deduced.
If God’s will and love are the cause of the goodness of crea­
tures,11 this will, in so far as it is that of the omnipotent Be­
ing, produces infallibly the good that it wills unconditionally
to be realized right at the moment,12 even that good that has
to be realized by our free act, and this without forcing the
will. He is also powerful enough to produce in and with the
will that its acts are freely performed. “Since the divine will is
perfectly efficacious,’’ says St. Thomas, “it follows not only
that things are done which God wills to be done, but also
that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills
some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the
right ordering of things, for the building up of the uni­
verse.” 13 This free mode of our acts is still an entity and
therefore is included in the adequate object of the omnipo10Ibid.,
11 Ibid.,
12 Ibid.,
is Ibid.,

la, q.21, a.4.
la, q. 19, a.4.
la, q. 19, a.6, ad nun.
la, q.19. a.8.

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PREDESTINATION

tence and love of God, the Creator.14 Only evil is excluded
from this adequate object, and therefore God cannot be the
cause of sin either directly or indirectly because of insufficient
help given.15
What metaphysical definition shall we give, then, of the
consequent and antecedent wills? St. Thomas gives us in sub­
stance the answer to this question. He points out that good is
the object of the will; now goodness, unlike truth, is formally
not in the mind but in things as they actually are. Hence we
will, truly and simply, what we will as having to be at once
realized, and this is called the consequent will, which in God
is always efficacious. As St. Thomas says: “The will is di­
rected to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves
they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a
thing simply, inasmuch as we will it when all particular cir­
cumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by will­
ing consequently. . . . Thus it is clear that whatever God
simply wills, takes place.” 10 As we shall see later on, this
principle concerning the will is of supreme importance for
St. Thomas as constituting the foundation for the distinction
between efficacious and sufficient graces.
If, on the other hand, the will is drawn to what is good in
itself regardless of the circumstances, not to a thing as it ac­
tually is, then this is called the antecedent will, which of it­
self and as such is not efficacious, since good, whether natural
or supernatural, easy or difficult to acquire, is realized only
with its accompanying circumstances. As St. Thomas says: “A
thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered,
may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circum­
stances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration
may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
it Ibid., la, q.22, a.4 ad 311m.
is Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a. 1, 2.
it Ibid., la, q. 19, a.6 ad lum.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

75

live is good, . . . but if in a particular case we add that a man
is a murderer ... to kill him is a good.” 17 Thus the mer­
chant during a storm would will (conditionally) to retain his
merchandise, but he wills to cast it into the sea so as to save
his life.18 Thus again, God wills antecedently that all the fruits
of the earth become ripe, although for the sake of a greater
good He permits this not to happen in all cases. He also wills
antecedently that all men should be saved, although, in view
of a gr eater good, of which He alone is the judge, He permits
that some commit sin and are lost.
The conclusion, then, is that God never commands what is
impossible, that by His will and His love He makes it pos­
sible for all to keep His commandments: “It (New Law) gives
sufficient help to avoid sin.” 18 God gives to each person even
more than strict justice demands.20 Thus St. Thomas explains
metaphysically the notion of antecedent will by appealing to
the definition of omnipotence, which should never be over­
looked, and in virtue of which all that God wills simply is
fulfilled.21

THE PRINCIPLE OF PREDILECTION AND WHAT

IT PRESUPPOSES

On the other hand, as regards the consequent will, St.
Thomas affirms, more clearly than anyone had done before
his time, the principle of predilection, which is that one
would not be better than another unless one were loved more
by God. As he says: “Since God’s love is the cause of goodness
in things, as has been said, no one thing would be better than
Ibid., q.19. a.6 ad mm.
Ibid., la Hae, q.6, a.6, c.
is Ibid., q. 106, a.2 ad 211m.
20Ibid., la, q.2i, a.4.
21 Ibid., q. 19, a.6.
it

PREDESTINATION
76
another if God did not will greater good for one than for
another. . . . And the reason why some things are better
than others, is that God wills them a greater good. Hence it
follows that He loves more the better things.” 22
This principle of predilection is the corollary of the preced­
ing one, that God’s love is the cause of the goodness of created
beings. It seems to follow in the philosophical order as a
necessary consequence of the principle of causality, that what
comes in addition to a thing in existence has an efficient and
supreme cause in Him who is Being itself, the source of all
being and all good. It follows also, as a consequence of the
principle of finality, that every agent acts for an end, and the
purpose of the action of the supreme agent is to manifest His
goodness, by reproducing a likeness of Himself, which is a
more or less perfect participation of His nature.
Not only is this principle of predilection a manifest truth
of the philosophical order, but it is also a revealed principle,
for it finds its special application in the order of grace which,
by its very nature, is gratuitous and makes us pleasing in God’s
sight. This principle was enunciated by God to Moses, when
He said: "I will have mercy on whom I will, and I will be
merciful to whom it shall please Me.” 23 St. Paul refers to this
revealed truth when he writes concerning the divine election
as follows: “Is there injustice with God? God forbid! For
He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have
mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy.” 24
With this same principle always in mind, St. Paul also writes:
“For who distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou
didst not receive?” 25 St. Thomas thus explains these words
in his commentary on this epistle: “Who is it that distinguish­
eth thee from the mass of those who are lost? This is more
22 Ibid., q.2o, a.3, 4.
23 Exod. 33: 19.
24 Rom. 9: 14 f.
23 I Cor. 4: 7.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

77

than thou canst do. Who is it that makes thee superior to an­
other? Thou thyself canst not do this, and therefore why art
thou proud of thyself?” 28 He says the same in commenting on
the parable of the talents: “He who makes a greater effort,
has more grace; but to make a greater effort, he needs to be
moved by a higher cause.” 27 Likewise, in asking whether
grace is greater in one than in another, he replies: “We must
not seek the first cause of this diversity in the subject (or in
man), for man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free
will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity
is to be sought on the part of God, who disposes His gifts of
grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of
the Church may result from these various degrees; even as
He instituted the various conditions of things, that the uni­
verse might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said
(Eph. 4: 7): To every one of us is given grace according to the
measure of the giving of Christ, having enumerated the vari­
ous graces (v. 12), he adds: For the perfecting of the saints
. . . for the edifying of the body of Christ.28
St. Thomas had come across this principle of predilection
formulated in different ways in the writings of St. Augustine
who, concerning the good and bad angels, says: “If both were
created equally good, then, while some fell by their evil will,
the others were more abundantly assisted, and reached that
high degree of blessedness from which they became certain
they would never fall.” 28 The good angels would not be bet­
ter than the rest unless they had been loved and helped more
by God. This same thought, variously expressed, is constantly
recurring in St. Augustine’s writings on predestination against
the Pelagians and Semipelagians.30 This is also the meaning
he gives to the famous Gospel text which St. Thomas often
2β Com. on Cor. 4: 7.
2’ Com. on Matt. 25: 15.
μ Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 112, a.4.
20 De civitate Dei, XII, g.
«ο De praedest, sand., chap 8; De dono persever., chap. 9.

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quotes: “Why He draws this one and not that other, seek not
to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 31
Having formulated this principle of predilection, that no
created being would be better than another unless it were
loved more by God,32 St. Thomas makes it the keystone of his
treatise on predestination.33 To realize fully the importance
of this principle, we must in the first place note more precisely
what it presupposes as regards the efficacy of divine love,
which is the cause of all kinds of created good. The principle
of predilection presupposes, according to St. Thomas, that
the decrees of the divine will with regard to our future salu­
tary acts, are of themselves infallibly efficacious, and not be­
cause God foresees our consent. The same must be said of
actual grace, by which we freely perform these salutary acts;
it is of itself efficacious. St. Thomas spoke of these decrees as
follows: “Determined effects proceed from His own infinite
perfection, according to the determination of His will and in­
tellect.” 34 And again he says: “Even in us the cause of one
and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the
form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it,
since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined
to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will.” 35
Similarly he remarks that: “God’s knowledge is the cause of
things, in so far as His will is joined to it.” 30
That these decrees of the divine will concerning our salu­
tary acts are of themselves infallibly efficacious and not be­
cause God foresees our consent, is evidently the meaning of
the famous eighth article of St. Thomas which we have already
quoted. In it he says: “Since the divine will is perfectly
efficacious, it follows not only that things are done which
si Com. in Joan., tr. 26.
32 Loe. cit., la, q.20, a.3.
33 Ibid., la, q.23.
34 Ibid., la, q. 19, a.4.
35 Ibid., ad 411m.
sezttd., la, q.14, a.8.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

79
God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way
that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done neces­
sarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe.” 3T In this same article St.
Thomas proposes this objection: ‘‘But the will of God cannot
be hindered. Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on
things willed.” He replies as follows: “From the very fact that
nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those
things happen which God wills to happen, but that they hap­
pen necessarily or contingently according to His will.” 87
8889
If, as all the Thomists without exception remark, these
decrees and the grace that assures their execution were not of
themselves efficacious, but only because our consent was fore­
seen by God, contrary to the principle of predilection, the
result of this would be that of two men or two angels equally
loved and helped by God, one would become better than an­
other. He would become better either because of a first or final
act, or of one easy or difficult to perform, without having been
loved and helped more by God; and then it would follow, ex­
clusive of God’s intention, first as to conditionally free acts of
the future, and then as to future acts, that of these two men
equally loved and helped, and placed in the same circum­
stances, one of them would be more virtuous than the other.
St. Augustine, when writing about the efficacy of grace,
had stated what is the foundation for the principle of predilec­
tion. He says: “And so this grace, which by divine liberality
is secretly bestowed upon human beings, is spurned by no one
hard of heart, for it is given for this very purpose that the
hardness of heart may be taken away.” sfl
87 Ibid., la, q. 19, a.8.
38 Ibid., ad 211m.
89 De praedest, sanct., chap. 8: cf. De dono persever., chap. 10; De corrept.
et gratia, chap. 9; De gratia Christi, chap. 24.

8o

PREDESTINATION
THE ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT WILLS

In no less clear terms than St. Augustine, St. Thomas ex­
presses what is the foundation for the principle of predilec­
tion, in the fine distinction he draws between the antecedent
will, which is the principle of sufficient grace, and the conse­
quent will, which is the principle of efficacious grace. On this
point he says: “Whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.” 40
God wills simply the good that must be accomplished right
at the moment, as in the example of the good thief’s con­
version, who was loved and helped more than the other. How­
ever, God made the observance of the precepts really possible
for this latter; if he was lost, it was truly his own fault, in that
he resisted the sufficient grace which was offered and even
given by Christ who was dying for him.
St. Thomas often distinguished between these two graces.
He did so, for instance, in one of his commentaries in which
he said concerning Christ as redeemer: “He is the propitiation
for our sins, efficaciously for some, but sufficiently for all, be­
cause the price of His blood is sufficient for the salvation of
all; but it has its effect only in the elect, because of the ob­
stacle to it.” 41 God often removes this obstacle, but not
always. There is the mystery. “God deprives nobody of his
due.” 42 He also “gives man sufficient help to avoid sin.” 43 As
for efficacious grace, if it is given to this particular sinner,
that is because of God’s mercy; if it is refused to a certain
other, that is because of His justice.44
A considerable number of texts could be quoted from St.
Thomas in which he clearly shows that, in his opinion, grace
is of itself efficacious, like the divine decrees, the execution of
Loc. cit., la, q. 19, a.6 ad mm.
<1 Com. in ep. ad Tit., I, 2: 6.
*-Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m.
Ibid., la Ilae, q. 106, a.2 ad 2um.
“Ibid., Ha Hae, q.2, a.5 ad lum.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

81

which is assured by it. Thus, for instance, he writes: “The
salutary work we perform is conferred upon us by God inas­
much as He operates in us, interiorly moving and urging us
to good . . . inasmuch as His power operates in us to will
and accomplish according to His good will.” 15 Elsewhere he
says: “No matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature
is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be
moved by God.” 48 “God’s intention cannot fail, according to
the saying of St. Augustine in his book on the Predestination
of the Saints (De dono persever, XIV), that by God’s gifts
whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated. Hence if
God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He
moves should attain to grace, He will infallibly attain to it,
according to John 6: 45: Everyone that hath heard of the
Father and hath learned cometh to Me.” 47 “If God moves
the will to anything, it is incompossible with this supposition,
that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible
simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved
by God necessarily.” 48
The necessity mentioned here is one of consequence, not
of consequent. A good explanation of it had already been
given by St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas improved
upon it when he showed that the divine will, by the very rea­
son of its sovereign efficacy, reaches out mightily and sweetly,
even to the free mode of our acts; it wills them to be per­
formed freely, and so they are infallibly. Bossuet admirably
expresses the mind of St. Thomas, writing as follows: “Thus
God wills from eternity all the acts that will be performed
by the free will of human beings, all the goodness and reality
there is in them. What is more absurd than to say, that it is
not because God wills, that a thing exists? Must we not say,
on the contrary, that a thing exists because God wills it? And
« Com. in ep. ad Eph., chap. 3, lect. 2.
te Loc. cit., la Hae, q.109, a. 1.
47 Ibid., q.112, a. 3.
*&Ibid., q. 10, a.4 ad 311m.

8a

PREDESTINATION

just as it happens that we are free in virtue of the decree that
wills us to be free, so it happens that we act freely in this or
that act, in virtue even of the decree which includes all this in
detail.” 40 St. Thomas had said the same: “God changes the
will without forcing it. But He can change the will from the
fact that He Himself operates in the will as He does in nature.
. . . Hence as the will can change its act for another, much
more so can God.” 50 Farther on he says: “Only God can
change the inclination of the will, which He gave it, accord­
ing as He wills, from one thing to another.” 51 Again St.
Thomas says: “God moves the will immutably on account of
the efficacy of the moving power which cannot fail; but on
account of the nature of the will that is moved, which is in­
differently disposed to various things, the will is not necessi­
tated but remains free.” 52 We shall see that the Thomists say
just this and no more. This intrinsic efficacy of the divine
decrees as regards our salutary acts is considered by St.
Thomas as even a revealed truth. He quotes, in fact, well
known scriptural texts in this sense.53 “Lord, Thou hast
wrought all our works for us.” 51 “As the divisions of waters,
so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whitherso­
ever He will He shall turn it.” 55 “For it is God who worketh
in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good
will.” 50 In his theological treatise 57 he quotes the following
passage: “O Lord, Lord almighty King, all things are in Thy
power and there is none that can resist Thy will, if Thou de­
termine to save Israel.” 58 Another text quoted is as follows:
<•9 Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.
50De Verit., q.22, a.8.
51 Ibid., a.g.
52 De malo, q.6, a. 1 ad gum.
53 Contra Gentes, Bk. Ill, chaps. 88-89.
5« Is. 26: 12.
55 Prov. 21: 1.
5β Phil. 2: 13.
57 Summa theol., la, q.103, a.7.
59 Esth. 13: 9.

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES OF ST. THOMAS

83

“And I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within
you. And I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and
will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put My spirit in the
midst of you; and I will cause you to walk in My command­
ments and to keep My judgments and do them.” 59 St. Thomas
sees the intrinsic efficacy of grace in these scriptural texts as
well as in several canons of the Second Council of Orange.60
Most of these texts of the Council of Orange are taken from
the works of St. Augustine and St. Prosper. Now St. Augus­
tine, as we have seen, held that grace is efficacious of itself.
The five canons of the Council of Orange cited in the foot­
note express in different ways this truth that every good,
whether natural or supernatural, comes from God. Now this
is the very foundation of the principle of predilection.
Thus God willed efficaciously from all eternity that the
Virgin Mary should give her free consent to the mystery of
the incarnation. This had infallibly to be fulfilled; moved
powerfully though very gently by a special grace, Mary in­
fallibly uttered her fiat with complete freedom of will. Thus,
too, Christ willed to die for us on the Cross at the hour irrev­
ocably decreed. So also the good thief and the centurion were
converted as God efficaciously willed. St. Thomas considers
this the normal consequence of God’s omnipotent will and
love. The great mystery in this begins especially with sin.
What is manifest for both St. Thomas and St. Augustine is
this, that every good, even the free determination to perform
a salutary act, comes from God, and entirely from Him as
first cause, even though this determination comes entirely
from us as secondary cause. As St. Thomas says: “There is no
distinction between what flows from free will and what is of
predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows
from a secondary cause and from a first cause.” 61
w Ez. 36: 26 £.
90 Cf. Denz., nos. 177, 182, 185, 189, 193.
ei Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

Now if the divine decrees concerning our salutary acts, and
if the actual grace which assures the execution of these de­
crees, were not of themselves efficacious, but only because our
consent was foreseen, then God’s knowledge and will would no
longer be the cause in the free determinations of our salu­
tary acts of the more intimate and better part. In that case
there would be some good, and even the best part of our
merits, which did not come from the source of all good.
Moreover, with regard to this free determination of the salu­
tary act, since God’s knowledge and will are no longer the
causes, these would be passive and dependent. We should have
to admit a passivity in the pure Act. His knowledge with re­
gard to certain determinations of the created order and even
to the best of them, would be passive, measured by this cre­
ated reality instead of measuring it.02 This would mean the
final rejection of the principle that no being would be better
than another, unless it had been loved more by God.63
la, q.14, a.8; q.19, a.4, 8.
63 Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.

μ Ibid.,

CHAPTER III
The Nature and Reason of Predestination
According to St. Thomas

With this principle of predilection as his guiding star, St.

Thomas wrote the whole question concerning predestination
in which he gives us the mature reflection of his thought on
this point. We may say that all the articles of this question
are so many corollaries of this principle. Let us note carefully
the conclusion and proof of each article. We shall again take
up the discussion of these articles in the theoretical or syn­
thetic part of this work.
i) The first article defines predestination as: “The plan of
the direction of a rational creature towards the end, i. e., life
eternal; for to destine is to direct or send.” It is therefore the
plan in God’s mind of directing this particular man or that
particular angel to tire ultimate and supernatural end. It is
this plan, once ordained and willed which, from all eternity,
determines the efficacious means that will lead this particular
man or that particular angel to his final end. In so defining
predestination St. Thomas is faithful to the very letter to St.
Augustine’s definition, who states that it is: “the foreknowl­
edge and preparation of the benefits by which most certainly
are liberated whoever are liberated.” 1 “By predestination
God knew what He Himself will do.” 2 The point at issue
here is not a foreknowledge of our merits; for this would pre­
suppose a passivity or dependence in God with regard to our
conditionally future free determinations, and then to our
future ones. The foreknowledge in question concerns what
1 De dono persever., chap. 14.
2 De praed. sanct., chap. 10.
85

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PREDESTINATION

God will do, what graces He will grant so as to lead this par­
ticular man or that particular angel to his final end. Thus
predestination, by reason of its object, is to be considered as
a part of providence. Note well that predestination so defined
is predestination to glory; the formal wording of the text is:
‘‘towards the end, i. e., life eternal.” Moreover, predestination
merely to grace is not predestination in the true sense, since
it is not the contrary of reprobation. This is admitted not only
by Thomists but also by congruists of the Bellarminian and
Suarezian type, and even by such Molinists as Father Billot.
2) The second article proves that predestination is in God
who predestines and not in the one predestined; but its effects
in the one predestined are calling, justification, and glorifica­
tion.
3) The third article defines its contrary, which is reproba­
tion. It is a part of Providence to permit certain ones to fall
into and remain in sin (negative reprobation), and for this
defection it inflicts upon them the penalty of damnation
(positive reprobation). But whereas predestination is the
cause of grace and of our salutary acts, reprobation is by no
means the cause of sin.3 Nowhere do we find in this article
that negative reprobation consists, as some later Thomists
thought, in a positive exclusion from glory on the grounds of
an undue benefit. It is merely the non-election and the will to
permit certain ones to fall into and remain in sin. We shall
see that the motive for this reprobation is indicated by St.
Thomas.·*
4) The fourth article proves that the predestined are
elected by God, so that predestination presupposes election,
and this latter presupposes love. As St. Thomas says: ‘‘Pre­
destination presupposes election in the order of reason; and
election presupposes love.” 0
s Summa theol., la, q.23, a.3 ad 211m.
« Ibid., a.5 ad 311m.
s Ibid., a. 4, c.

ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

87

Here we see the application of two principles ignored by
some later theologians. First of all we have this principle that
God, in this case as always, wills the end before the means, and
therefore He wills the predestined glory before willing them
grace by which they will merit it. Duns Scotus is not, there­
fore, as some recently maintained, the first one to apply this
principle here. St. Thomas writes on this point as follows:
“But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for
that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some
to eternal salvation presupposes in the order of reason, that
God wills their salvation, and to this belong both election
and love—love inasmuch as He wills them this particular good
of eternal salvation—since to love is to wish well to anyone,
as stated above (q. 20, a. 2, 3); election inasmuch as He wills
this good to some in preference to others, since He reprobates
some, as stated above (a. 3).” e
The second principle applied here is that of predilection:
no thing would be better than another, unless it were loved
more by God. St. Thomas, without alluding at all to the fore­
seeing of our merits, whether conditionally future or future,
excludes any idea of passivity or dependence from the divine
knowledge. He writes as follows: “Election and love, how­
ever, are differently ordered in God and in ourselves: because
in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are in­
cited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore
we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes
love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which
in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that
good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is
clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and
election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate
are objects of election and love.” 7 The Pelagians looked upon
God as merely the spectator and not the author of the good
e Ibid., a. 4.
r Ibid., a.4.

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PREDESTINATION

and salutary consent which distinguishes the just person from
the sinner. Both St. Thomas and St. Augustine maintain that
the better and more intimate part in the free determination
of this good consent must come from the source of all good.
No one has asserted this more positively than the Angelic Doc­
tor.
We shall see that Molina departs from the teaching of St.
Thomas in this fundamental article. In accordance with a
definition of liberty which, in the opinion of the Thomists,
cannot be reconciled with the principle of predilection, he
affirms that: “Of two persons who receive an equal interior
grace when called by God, it may happen that one of them,
because of the freedom of his will, is converted and the other
remains an infidel.” 8 He even affirms 0 that of two sinners,
the one who is converted is sometimes the one who received
less help from God. Contrary to the principle of predilection
formidated by St. Thomas and enunciated in various forms
by many of his predecessors, this person thus becomes better
than the other without having been loved more by God.
This explains why Molina, in contradiction to St. Thomas,
said that “election did not precede predestination.” 10 He
recognizes that St. Thomas seems to have held the contrary
opinion; 11 but he adds: “I never approved, however, of this
opinion.” 12 He speaks in the same manner of the divine mo­
tion, regretting that St. Thomas and the majority of the
Scholastics admitted with St. Augustine a predestination that
did not have its foundation in the foreknowledge of merits.
Here we detect the point about which, as we shall see, Thom­
ists and Molinists differ. What they seek to know is this:
whether the principle of predilection, which presupposes the
e Concordia, Paris ed., 1876, p. 51.
® Ibid., p. 565.
10 Ibid., p. 429.
11 Summa theol., la, 9 23, a.4.
12 Loc. cit., p. 429.

ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

89

intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace, is true or
false.
5) In the fifth article, St. Thomas deduces other conse­
quences from the principle of predilection, asking whether
the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
He gives a negative answer to this question and explains it by
a series of definite conclusions in the body of the article and
in the reply to the third objection.
It is especially in connection with this principal point at
issue that St. Thomas gives us his interpretation of the princi­
pal texts of St. Paul concerning predestination. It is of im­
portance for us to insist on them.

CHAPTER IV
The Scriptural Background for
of St. Thomas

the

Teaching

EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS

Let us consider his exegesis on the two passages to the Ephe­
sians. They are as follows: “Blessed be the God and Father
of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual
blessings in heavenly places, in Christ. As He chose us in
Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be
holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath pre­
destinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus
Christ unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will,
unto the praise of the glory of His grace. ... In whom we
are also called by lot, being predestinated according to the
purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the
counsel of His will that we may be unto the praise of His
glory.” 1
In his commentary on this epistle, St. Thomas makes three
important remarks, afterwards referred to by all the Thomists.
i) He notes that when the Apostle writes: “Who hath pre­
destinated us unto the adoption of the children,” though we
may understand these words as referring to adoptive sonship
realized here on earth by sanctifying grace, yet it is far bet­
ter to say they refer to the perfect likeness to God that will
be realized in our heavenly home, in accordance with what
St. Paul himself said: “We who have the firstfruits of the
Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for
i Eph. i : 3-6, nf.

9°

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

Qi
the adoption of the sons of God.” 2 Grace, indeed, is given
in view of future glory and, according to the teaching of St.
Thomas,3 God, all-wise as He is, wills the end before the
means. Moreover, predestination only to the life of grace and
not to glory, would be no more than predestination in name,
since many of the reprobates are so predestined.
This remark of St. Thomas is retained in substance by sev­
eral modern exegetes4 who see in this text of St. Paul an im­
mediate reference to the general election of Christians to a
life of holiness, but in such a way that the principles declared
on this subject apply as a consequence to the special election
of this particular person rather than to a certain other. St.
Thomas insists on these principles proclaimed by St. Paul.
2) He remarks that God has chosen us, not because we
were saints but that we might become saints. His words are:
“He chose us, not because we were saints, for we were not;
but He chose us that we might become saints by leading a
virtuous life and one free from vices.”
3) St. Thomas observes that, for St. Paul, God’s plan or
His eternal decree is the reason why we are predestined, and
not because He has foreseen our merits. Says St. Paul: “He
predestinated us . . . according to the purpose of His will.” 3
A beneficent design is this, which is the result of His most
pure love. St. Thomas particularly stresses this in his com­
mentary, for he says: "That anyone, however, is predestined
to life eternal . . . this is a grace given that is purely gratui­
tous . . . for no merits preceded it.” 8 It is not a question
merely of predestination to grace, but also of predestination
to glory, which is the only kind that cannot be shared in com­
mon between the elect and the reprobates.
The holy Doctor again insists on this in connection with
2 Rom. 8: 23.
3 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.4.
4 Cf. Lagrange, Ep. aux Romains, chap. 9; Vosté, Zn ep. ad Eph. 1:11.
5 Eph. 1: 5.
e Com. in ep. ad Eph. 1: 5.

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verse eleven of this chapter: “In whom we are also called
. . . being predestinated according to the purpose of Him.”
“Therefore the reason why we are predestined,” says St.
Thomas, “is not because our merits were foreseen, but the
pure will of God is the reason for this; wherefore St. Paul
adds that it is according to the purpose of Him who worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will.” These final
words, moreover, indicate that everything which happens de­
pends upon God’s will. There is nothing, therefore, in this
text of St. Paul that points to the foreseeing of our merits as
the reason for predestination.
EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

St. Paul still more clearly expresses his mind, as St. Thomas
views it, in the Epistle to the Romans, which directly and ex­
plicitly treats of predestination with glorification as its effect:
“We know that to them that love God all things work together
unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to
be saints. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to
be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might
be the firstborn amongst many brethren. And whom He pre­
destinated, them He also glorified.” 7
In explaining this text St. Thomas insists upon this, that
everything in this life contributes to the good of those who
persevere unto the end in God’s love. This means in the life
of those predestined according to God’s purpose. He refuses
to see in the words “whom He foreknew,” any reference to
foreknowledge of merits, for, according to St. Paul, the merits
of the predestined are the effects of predestination. He re­
calls the texts so often quoted on this subject: “For who dis­
tinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not
received? It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to
accomplish, according to His good will.” 8 St. Thomas holds,
r Rom. 8: 28-30.
8 I Cor. 4: 7.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

93
therefore, that according to this text of St. Paul quoted in the
previous paragraph,” everything that directs the predestined
to eternal salvation is the effect of predestination. It is defi­
nitely formulated by him as follows: “Whatsoever is in man
disposing him towards salvation is all included under the
effect of predestination,” 10 even the free determination to
perform a salutary act.
In addition to this, St. Thomas holds that Christ’s pre­
destination to divine sonship is prior to our Savior’s foreseen
merits, since these merits presuppose the Person of the Word
made flesh and therefore His divine sonship. Now Christ’s
predestination, as St. Augustine said,11 is the eminent ex­
emplar of ours.
Concerning the ninth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the
Romans, St. Thomas recognizes that he treats in the begin­
ning of this chapter of the call of the Gentiles to the grace
of the Christian faith. In contrast to this, he treats of the un­
belief of the Jews; but St. Thomas recognizes that this chap­
ter also contains principles applicable to individual cases.
Father Lagrange 12 is in perfect agreement on this point, and
says: “It is beyond dispute that this call of the Gentiles is at
the same time a call to salvation. We cannot help thinking of
the fate of each; we transpose the terms of the proposition, we
apply St. Paul’s principles to individual cases of salvation. It
is purely a favor on God’s part when He calls one to justifica­
tion. . . . But God does not proceed in the same way toward
those whom He calls and those who are not called. . . . Ac­
cording to St. Paul, man is truly the cause of his (positive)
reprobation by reason of his sins: ‘For they stumbled at the
stumbling-stone.’ ” 13
This brings St. Thomas to explain verse thirteen. Giving a
8 Rom. 8: 28.
so Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
11 De praed. sanct., chap. 15.
12 Epitre aux Romains, p. 244.
is Rom. 9: 32.

PREDESTINATION
94
general scope to the words, “Jacob I loved,” he formulates
the principle of predilection in these terms: “Election and
love are differently ordered in God and in man. In man elec­
tion precedes love, for man is incited to love from a considera­
tion of good in the object loved; for this reason he chooses in
preference this thing to the other and makes it the object of
his love.” But whatever the Pelagians and Semipelagians may
have said about it, there can be no such dependence or pas­
sivity in God. St. Thomas continues in the same strain: “But
God’s will is the cause of all good that is in the creature, and
therefore the good by reason of which one thing is preferred
to another by way of election is consequent to God’s will,
which is concerned with His own good, and which has love
as its province.” Therefore the conclusion of St. Thomas is:
“Foreknowledge of merits cannot be the reason of predestina­
tion, since foreseen merits are the effects of predestination.”
On the contrary, demerits, of which God can by no means be
the cause, are the reason of damnation. St. Thomas finds this
thought expressed in the famous scriptural text: “Destruction
is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” 14
Such is the mystery as St. Thomas, following St. Augustine,
finds it expressed in the epistles of St. Paid. He does not seek
to make it less obscure, for that would be to detract from its
sublimity. But he brings forward the objection raised by hu­
man reason, as foreseen by St. Paul, and he stresses the more
distinctive parts of the Apostle’s reply.
The objection raised by the Pelagians and Semipelagians
against St. Augustine is not original, for it was already pro­
posed by St. Paul when he asked: “What shall we say then?
Is there injustice with God?” 15 Is there injustice on God’s
part in distributing so unequally His gifts to men who are
equal by nature?
St. Thomas remarks that St. Paul did not reply to this ob­
14 Osee 13: 9.
is Rom. 9: 14.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

95

jection by having recourse to the foreknowledge of merits as
regards the elect, as if this were the reason for their predestina­
tion. He replied, maintaining it to be a mystery of revealed
truth instead of representing it in an inferior light: “Is there
injustice with God? God forbid! For He saith to Moses: I
will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And I will show
mercy to whom I will show mercy. So then it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that showeth
mercy. . . . Therefore He hath mercy on whom He will, and
whom He will He hardeneth.” 16 St. Thomas remarks that St.
Paul affirms the principle of predilection by presenting it in
a new form, finding it revealed in these words of God to
Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I will; and I will be
merciful to whom it shall please Me.” 17 Thus our election de­
pends neither upon our will nor upon our efforts, but upon
God who shows mercy.
Concerning verses fifteen and sixteen, St. Thomas says again
that the effect of predestination cannot be the reason for this
latter. Now the good use of grace or merit is the effect of
predestination. Therefore foreseen merit cannot be the reason
for predestination. There is no other reason for this but the
will of God. Now, he goes on to say, we cannot speak of jus­
tice or injustice in cases of pure mercy; such as, for instance,
on meeting two persons, if we give to one and not to the other;
or, if two persons have equally offended us, we pardon one
and demand reparation from the other. The same is to be said
with regard to sinners. God is merciful toward the one whom
He restores to grace, and just toward the one whom He leaves
in sin. He is unjust to nobody. The conclusion therefore of
St. Thomas is that, according to St. Paul, foreknowledge of
merits cannot be the cause of predestination, and by this he
understands predestination to glory, which is the only kind
worthy of this name; for predestination only to grace is comit

Ibid., 9: 14-16, 18.
Ex. 33: 19.

PREDESTINATION
9θ
mon to the elect and many of the reprobates. Moreover, the
merits that follow justification, since they are the effects of
predestination that is peculiar to the elect, cannot be the cause
of this latter. St. Thomas is among the clearest on this point,
and we shall find him expressing himself still more clearly in
that article of the Summa, the scriptural proofs of which we
give in this chapter.
St. Thomas completes his commentary on the ninth chapter
of the Epistle to the Romans by examining the last objection
St. Paul proposes. “Thou wilt say therefore to me,” he says,
“Why doth He then find fault? For who resisteth His will?” 18
This is how St. Thomas understands the objection: Why re­
prove the sinner for not having done what he was incapable
of doing? To quote his own words: “It is useless to ask any­
one to do that which is not in one’s power to do.” This is the
well-known objection of the insufficiency of divine assist­
ance.
The way to reply to this difficulty is by saying that God
never commands what is impossible, and that He makes the
attainment of salvation really possible for all who have to
observe His commandments. Taken in this sense, we may say
that He wills to save all; 19 but, on the other hand, no one
would be better than another, unless one were loved more by
God. Affirming the principle of predilection and presenting
it in a new form, St. Paul says: “O man, who art thou that
repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that
formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the pot­
ter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessel
unto honor and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing
to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured
with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction,
that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of
is Rom. 9: 19.
is I Tim. 2: 4.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

97

mercy which He hath prepared unto glory . . . where is the
injustice?” 20
St. Paul’s reply to this objection confirms all that precedes,
as also does what he adds farther on when he asks: “Hath God
cast away His people? God forbid! ... As in the time of
Elias. . . . There is a remnant saved according to the election
of grace. And if by grace, it is not by works; otherwise grace
is no more grace.” 21
In his commentary on the concluding portion of this ninth
chapter in the Epistle to the Romans, St. Thomas remarks
once more as follows: “Whatever good a man has, must be
ascribed to the divine goodness as principal agent. For we
read in Isaias: ‘And now, O Lord, Thou art our Father, and
we are clay; and Thou art our maker and we are all the
works of Thy hands.’22 If God does not promote man to bet­
ter things, but leaving him in his weakness, makes the meanest
use of him, He does him no wrong, so that he can justly com­
plain about it.” Where is the injustice, if God permits the
bad thief to die unrepentant, and if He pardons the other so
as to declare in him the riches of His glory?
THE GRATUITY OF PREDESTINATION IN THE

THEOLOGICAL SUMMA

In the Theological Summa,23 St. Thomas only summarizes
and systematically arranges what he said in his commentary
on the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. The title
of the article is: “Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the
cause of predestination?” This means, as explained at the be­
ginning of the argument in the article: Whether God pre­
ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to
20 Rom. 9: 20-23.
21 Ibid., 11: 1-8.
22 Is. 64: 8.
2s Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.5, c. el ad 3111η.

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PREDESTINATION

anyone on account of any merits? We find the same doctrine
as set forth ill this article in other works of St. Thomas,24 but
it is expressed here in a simpler, sublimer, and more precise
manner.
According to his accustomed way of procedure in the state­
ment of the question, St. Thomas posits three difficulties, the
principal one being the very same as that formulated by St.
Paul when he asks: “Is there injustice in God?” 25 He gives at
first, in the argument on the contrary, a general and negative
answer. The Apostle wrote to Titus: “Not by the works of
justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He
saved us.” 28 Now, as it is a fact that He saves us, so He has
predestined us to salvation. Foreknowledge of merits is there­
fore not the cause or reason of predestination which, as St.
Thomas defined it in the first article, means predestination to
glory. After having formulated this negative and general re­
sponse on the authority of St. Paul, St. Thomas explains it,
recalling and refuting Origen’s error, the Pelagian and Semi­
pelagian heresies, and an opinion held by some Scholastics.
He formulates the following conclusions: (i) Pre-existing
merits in a former life cannot be the reason for predestina­
tion; 27 (2) nor can it be because of merits acquired prior to
justification; 28 (3) nor can it be because of merits acquired
after justification.
To prove this third conclusion, St. Thomas has recourse to
a principle, the force of which was not realized by many of
the later theologians. Of those who held the contrary opinion
he says: “But these seem to have drawn a distinction between
that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free
will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, how­
ever, manifest that what is of grace in the life of the predes2·· Com. in Sent., I, d. XLI, q. i, a.3; De veritate, q.6, a.2.
25 Rom. 9: 14.
26 Tit. 3: 5.
27 Rom. 9: 2.
28 II Cor. 3: 5.

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99

tined is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be
considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained
in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in
us be the reason of predestination, it will be outside the effect
of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what
Hows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the
providence of God produces effects through the operation of
secondary causes, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 8). Wherefore,
that which flows from free will is also of predestination.” 20
In other words, in the life of the predestined neither the good
use of free will nor of grace can be given as the reason for
predestination, for they are its effects. Why so? The reason is
because we cannot distinguish between what is produced by
the secondary cause and what is produced by the first cause;
these are two total causes, not co-ordinated but subordinated.
Not only does the whole effect come from both, as in the case
of two horses drawing a heavy vehicle which one of them
would not succeed in drawing alone; but, whereas one of
these horses is not moved by the other, the secondary cause
does not act except it be moved by the first Cause. On this
point Molina very plainly separates from St. Thomas.80 From
this text just quoted we see that the Angelic Doctor considers
even the free determination to perform a salutary act as
coming entirely from us as a secondary cause, and entirely
from God as first Cause, without which we would not de­
termine ourselves to act. This is but the application of princi­
ples that have already been explained by him.81 St. Thomas
also writes farther on: ‘‘Whatsoever is in man disposing him
towards salvation, is all included under the effect of pre­
destination.” 82
In the continuation of this fifth article St. Thomas formu­
lates a conclusion that to us seems accurately to express and
29 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.
30 Concordia, disp. 26.
si Loc. cit., la, q. 19, a.8.
32 Ibid., la, q.23, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

clinch several assertions of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure. He
writes: “There is no reason why one effect of predestination
should not be the reason or cause of another, a subsequent
effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause;
and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as
its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of
the matter. Thus we might say that God preordained to give
glory on account of merit, and that He preordained to give
grace to merit glory.” 33 How are we to understand this last
statement? According to all that has been quoted so far, and
taking especially into consideration the refutation of the third
error recorded in the preceding paragraph, we must under­
stand this statement to mean that God decided to give to a
certain person, for instance, to the good thief in preference
to the other, that grace which is of itself efficacious, so that he
may merit eternal glory to which He predestined him. By
this St. Thomas does not mean that God decided to give the
good thief a grace that will become efficacious by reason of
the good consent of this latter This interpretation is excluded
by what is said in the preceding paragraph: “there is no dis­
tinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from
a first cause.” It is also excluded by the final conclusion in the
argumentative part of the article, which is as follows: “In an­
other way, the effect of predestination may be considered in
general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of
predestination in general should have any cause as coming
from us; because whatever is in man disposing him towards
salvation is all included under the effect of predestination,
even the preparation for grace.” 34
Various theologians of a later date,35 contrary to this, said
that the free determination of the salutary act is neither the
effect of the divine causality nor of predestination. Undoubt33 Ibid., q.23, a.5.
3« Ibid., q.23, a.5.
35 Molina, Concordia, q.23, a.4-5, memb. ult., ed. 1876, p. 546.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

101

edly they granted that complete predestination does not de­
pend on foreseen merits, understood in this sense, that it
includes the first grace which we cannot merit; but they do
not accept the interpretation of St. Thomas, who declares
that everything in man which directs him to salvation, even
the free determination of the salutary act, is the effect of the
divine causality and of predestination. Their opinion is about
the same as the one held by those to whom St. Thomas replied
when He said that “there is no distinction between what flows
from free will and what is of predestination; as there is no
distinction between what flows from a second cause and from
a first cause.” 38
We see that these different conclusions from the argument
of the fifth article, explain the general and negative reply of
the argument on the contrary, which states that the fore­
knowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of prede­
termination. This applies to predestination to glory, which is
the only predestination that answers the definition of it given
in the first article; on the other hand, predestination to grace
is set up in opposition to reprobation. We also see that this
general answer and the conclusions explaining it are just so
many corollaries of the principle of predilection, that one
would not be better than another, unless one were loved
more by God.
THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY

In the reply to the third objection of this same fifth article
there are two final conclusions that present still more prom­
inently the scope of this great principle. The conclusion be­
fore the last is: “God willed to manifest His goodness in men,
in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His
mercy, in sparing them; and with regard to others, whom He
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This
is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.” This
3« Ibid., q.23, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

general reason has its foundation, says St. Thomas, in the
words of revelation as expressed in the Epistle to the Ro­
mans: “What if God willing to show His wrath (that is the
vengeance of His justice) and to make His power known, en­
dured (that is permitted), with much patience, vessels of
wrath, fitted for destruction, and that He might show the
riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath pre­
pared unto glory (where is the injustice?).” 87 Divine good­
ness, on the one hand, tends to communicate itself, and thus
it is the principle of mercy; on the other hand, it has an in­
alienable right to be loved above all things, and is thus the
principle of justice. It is fitting that this supreme Goodness
be manifested in its two aspects, and that the splendor of in­
finite justice appear as the refulgence of infinite mercy. Evil
is thus permitted by God only for a greater good, of which
infinite justice is the judge, and which the elect are destined
to contemplate in heaven.
Finally, in the last conclusion, St. Thomas visualizes no
longer the good and bad in general, but each one in particular.
He says: “Yet why He chooses some for glory and reprobates
others, has no reason except the divine will.” 88 St. Augustine
had said: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not,
seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” 89 He has even
shown how the foreknowledge of either future or condition­
ally future merits could not be the cause of predestination.
This last conclusion, which is common to St. Augustine and
St. Thomas, is a rigorous consequence of the principle of
predilection. “Since God’s love is the cause of the goodness of
created things, no one thing would be better than another
unless it were loved more by God.” 40 The last conclusion of
the synthesis is reunited to the principle of this latter. St.
Thomas confirms it by an analogy taken from things in nas" Rom. 9: 22 f.
as Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad gum; cf. De veritate, q.6, a.2.
3Ο'Γγ. 26 in Joan.
*0 Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

103

ture or from those made by human skill. It depends solely
upon God’s will that this particular part of matter should re­
ceive one of the lowest forms, and that other one of the
noblest. It likewise depends solely upon the artist’s will that,
among several equal stones, this particular stone should be
put in this part of the wall, and that in another. In the choice
of the elect the sovereignty of the divine liberty is made
manifest. If God, without any inconvenience to Himself,
could have not created, not willed to raise us up to the super­
natural order, not willed the incarnation, with far greater
reason He could have not chosen Peter in preference to
Judas. If He chose him, He did so most freely and because
He loved him more. All this doctrine is included in the
principle that one thing would not be better than another,
unless it were loved more by God.
There remains the other aspect of the mystery, which St.
Thomas most emphatically affirms in terminating his argu­
ment: “Neither on this account can there be said to be in­
justice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal
things. ... In things which are given gratuitously a person
can give more or less, just as he pleases—provided he deprives
nobody of his due—without any infringement of justice.” 41
God does not take away what is due to anyone, for He never
commands what is impossible; on the contrary, however, by
reason of His love He makes it really possible for all to ob­
serve His commandments, and He even grants out of His
goodness more than strict justice would demand;42 for He
often raises men many a time from the grave of sin, when
He could leave them therein.
CONCLUSION

We will conclude this exposition of the Angelic Doctor’s
doctrine by saying that St. Thomas, better than any of his
Ibid., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m.
«2 Ibid., la, q.21, a.4.

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predecessors, has set forth clearly the principles underlying
the true extreme and apparently contradictory aspects of this
great mystery. He perceives only the more clearly the sub­
limity of the mystery. He has brought out into very bold re­
lief the contrast between this light and shade in theological
matters. On the one hand, we have the shining light of the
two principles enunciated by him, one of which declares
against predestinarianism, God’s infinite justice, that He
never commands what is impossible and makes it possible for
all to be saved. The other principle, directed against Pelagianism, declares the free intervention of God’s mercy, that
one thing would not be better than another unless it were
loved more by God. But just as these two principles, viewed
separately, are certain and clear, so is their reconciliation an
impenetrable obscurity. Why is this? It is because infinite jus­
tice, infinite mercy, and sovereign liberty are reconciled only
in the eminence of the Deity, in the intimate life of God, in
which they are identified without destroying one another.
Now St. Thomas has shown that we cannot have in this life
any positive concept of the Deity as such.43 We can know God
only by what He has analogically in common with creatures;
but what belongs properly to Him is known by us only nega­
tively (as not finite being), or relatively (as supreme being).
In this sense we say that the Deity is above being and above
the one. Likewise, the divine paternity, filiation, and spiration
are manifested to us only analogically by revelation. Hence
the mystery, and especially the obscurity of the problem that
confronts us. The intimate reconciliation of infinite justice,
infinite mercy, and sovereign liberty is beyond the scope of
speculative theology and its discursive method of procedure.
By reason of its obscurity, it is the very object of faith (faith
is of things unseen) and of contemplation, which is the result
of faith enlightened by the gifts of understanding and wis**Ibid., la, q. 13, a.i.

THE SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND

105

dom: “O the depth of the riches of the knowledge and the
wisdom of God!” 44
Bossuet admirably expresses the Angelic Doctor’s thought.
Writing on this subject, he says: “I do not deny that God in
His goodness is moved to compassion for all men, nor do I
say that He does not provide the means for their eternal sal­
vation in the general dispensation of His providence. . . .
But however great may be His plans for all mankind, He
shows a certain peculiar regard and preference for a number
of them known to Him. All those whom He regards in this
manner bewail their sins and are converted in due time. . . .
This is the will of the Father who sent Me, that of all that He
hath given Me, I should lose nothing.45 And why does He in­
troduce us to these sublime truths? Does He do this to trouble
and alarm us? . . . Our Savior’s plan is this, that by contem­
plating this glance He casts in secrecy upon those whom He
knows, and whom His Father has given Him by a certain
choice, and recognizing that He can lead them to their haven
of eternal salvation by unfailing means, we should learn, first
of all, to ask for these means, and uniting our prayer with His,
say with Him: Deliver us from evil,46 or else say with the
Church: Permit us not to be separated from Thee; when our
will seeks to be its own master, permit it not; hold it in Thy
hand, change it and bring it back to Thee. . . . There is an­
other thing which our Savior wishes to teach us, and it is this;
that we abandon ourselves to His loving kindness; not that
there is no more need of action and toil on our part. . . ;
but in doing everything to the best of our ability, we must
above all give ourselves up completely to God alone, now and
forever. . . . Let no one say to me that this doctrine of grace
and of preference is the despair of good souls. What! For my
«Rom. 11: 33; cf. Com. of St. Thomas.
45 John 6: 39.
46 Matt. 6: 13.

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PREDESTINATION

greater assurance, they think of throwing me upon my own
resources, and thus rid me of my inconstancy? No, my God, I
do not consent to this. My only assurance is in abandoning
myself to Thee. . . . Help me, and I shall be saved.47 Heal
me, O Lord, and I shall be healed.48 Convert me, and I shall
be converted.” 49 All this is quite in agreement with the teach­
ing of St. Thomas on the formal motive of hope, which relies
not on our efforts, but upon God’s power to help.
Ps. 118: 117.
48Jer. 17: 14.
48 Ibid., 31: 18, cf. Médiations sur l'Evangile, La Cène, ze. partie, 72e. jour.

CHAPTER V
Predestination and the Views of the Firsi Thomists

The first Thomists who wrote on predestination follow faith­

fully the teaching of St. Thomas as just presented by us.
Especially is this the case with Capreolus, Cajetan, and Sylves­
ter of Ferrara.
Before considering these authors we would point out that
Aegidius Romanus of the Augustinian Hermits and a pupil
of St. Thomas in Paris (1269-71), wrote on this subject as
follows: “God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent
will, when we consider the order as established, its nature and
the common helps afforded; but He does not will all to be
saved by His consequent will, when we consider the execution
of the order, the individual and the special helps afforded.” 1
Among the common helps he includes the precepts and the
counsels; special helps are the conferring of grace, justifica­
tion and conversion, and perseverance in doing good. In the
same passage he makes the following observation: “The con­
ferring of grace requires the movement of free will . . .
although such willing on God’s part is effected by Him in us
through the intermediary of our free will.
1) Capreolus 1
2 emphasizes the seven conclusions quoted by
us from the works of St. Thomas, and he is unmistakably
clear in his defense of predestination to glory previous to
foreseen merits, as Dr. John Ude points out.3 In this same
work he proves (pp. 149-217) that Capreolus taught the in­
1 In Z Sent., d. XLVI, princ. 2, q.i.
2 Cf. In I Sent., d. XLI, a. 3.
s Cf. Doctrina Capreoli, "de influxu Dei in actus voluntatis humanae.”
107

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PREDESTINATION

trinsic efficacy of the divine decrees as regards our salutary
acts, and also the intrinsic efficacy of grace which is explained
as a physical but non-necessitating predetermination. His
words are: “Although God’s consequent will is always ful­
filled, yet it does not generally impose a necessity upon the
things willed.” 4 Capreolus proves this conclusion from many
texts of St. Thomas, especially from the following one: “The
divine will does not exclude contingency nor impose abso­
lute necessity on things. For God wills all that is requisite for
the thing which He wills, as already stated. Now it is befit­
ting some things, according to the mode of their nature, that
they be contingent, and not necessary. . . . Therefore He
wills certain things to be contingent. Now the efficacy of the
divine will requires not only that what God wills to be should
be, but also that it should be in the mode that God wills it to
be. . . . Therefore the efficacy of the divine will does not re­
move contingency.” 6 The divine consequent will is therefore
always of itself efficacious. Capreolus also says: “No effect pro­
ceeds from the divine knowledge without the will as inter­
mediary, and this latter determines the knowledge to realize
the effect.” 0 This means the decree without which the divine
intellect cannot know infallibly the free acts of the future,
whether these be conditional or absolute.7
2) Cajetan 8 defends, against Henry of Ghent, the teaching
of St. Thomas such as wTe have presented it. Moreover, previ­
ous to this, in commenting on the divine will9 he had posi­
tively affirmed the transcendent efficacy of the divine causality
as follows: "Because that willing is most efficacious, the effects
« Loc. cit., d. XLV, q. i, concl. 5.
0 Contra Gentes, I, 85.
e Loc. cit., d. XXV, q.2, a.2.
1 Cf. Ude, loc. cit., pp. 222-45, where the principal texts from Capreolus
are quoted, who admits, however, as all Thomists do, that one man wotdd
not be better than another, unless he were loved more by God. Cf. I Sent., d.
XLI, q. 1, a.2.
s/n lam, q.23, a.4-5.
» In q. 19, a.8, no. 10.

VIEWS OF THE FIRST THOMISTS

109

follow not only as to the things willed, but also as to the mode
of their being willed.” Far from destroying the freedom of
our acts, the divine causality, which is supremely efficacious,
produces this effect in us and with us.10 Cajetan, moreover,
admits also the principle of predilection. On this he says:
“For this reason some things are better, because God wills for
them a greater good.” 11 And again he says: “The reason why
God chose us is because He loved us.” 12 Similarly, in his
commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Cajetan wrote on
the transcendency of the mystery of predestination a page
that commands our admiration; a page in which certain asser­
tions of his,18 for which he had been criticized by Sylvester of
Ferrara,14 receive their finishing touch.
3) Sylvester of Ferrara, a contemporary of Cajetan, writes
in defense of this same doctrine in his commentary as follows:
“According as God preordained from eternity to direct some
to their ultimate end, He is said to have predestined them.
. . . But He is said to have reprobated those to whom He de­
cided from eternity not to give the final grace. . . . Whatever
there is in man ordaining him to salvation is included in
this total effect of predestination.” 15 Predestination to glory
cannot therefore be because of foreseen merits.
Sylvester, like Cajetan, refutes here Henry of Ghent; like
him, he also admits that the decrees of the divine will with
regard to our salutary acts are of themselves efficacious.16 From
this he concludes the principle of predilection.17 St. Thomas
had affirmed this principle too clearly for it to be denied by
any of his commentators. Now it presupposes, as we have
seen, that the divine decrees with regard to our salutary acts
10 Cf. In lam, 9.105, a.4-5.
11 Ibid., q.20, a.3-4.
flbid., q.23, a.4; cf. in lam, q. 14, a. 13, no. 17.
13 In lam, q.22, a.4, no. 8.
Contra Gentes, III, 94.
io Com. in Contra Gentes, III, 163.
1· Ibid., I, 85: II, 29 f.; Ill, 72 f„ 90, 94.
flbid., I, 91; III, 150.

no

PREDESTINATION

are of themselves efficacious, and not because our free con­
sent was foreseen.
Almost all the old theologians, whether they are Augustinians, Thomists, or Scotists, agree on this principal point
and on the intrinsic efficacy of grace; although they differ on
a secondary issue, which concerns the divine motion that gives
assurance of the execution of the divine decrees. The Tho­
mists, following the teaching of their master,18 maintain that
this motion is not merely of the moral or objective order, by
way of attraction, but that it is also physical or as regards the
exercise of the act. They also maintain that it is not merely a
general and indifferent premotion, but one which, without
necessitating us, inclines us infallibly, though firmly and
sweetly, to determine ourselves to perform this particular act
rather than its contrary.
The Augustinians explain the intrinsic efficacy of the di­
vine decrees and of grace by means of a motion of a moral
or objective order, which they often called a victorious delec­
tation. To this the Thomists reply that there is no such delec­
tation in the case of salutary acts performed in a state of great
aridity and with much difficulty. Moreover, they add, of
moral motions by way of attraction, seeing God face to face
is the only one that infallibly attracts.
Scotus, as we shall see, agrees with St. Thomas and the
Thomists on the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory
and on the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace;
but for the physical predetermining and non-necessitating
premotion, he substitutes a sort of sympathy that prevails be­
tween created and uncreated liberty, a sympathy that amounts
to a moral motion by way of victorious attraction.
In the great problem that confronts us, these differences of
opinion, as the Thomists have frequently pointed out, are of
secondary importance. If, in fact, we agree in admitting that
is Summa theol., la, q. 19, a. 8; q. 105, a.4-5; la Ilae, q.9, a.6; q.10, a.4
ad gum.

VIEWS OF THE FIRST THOMISTS

m

the divine decrees and grace are of themselves efficacious, and
not because our consent to them was foreseen, it is of much
less importance for us to know by what kind of motion the
execution of these decrees is assured. Likewise, if we agree that
our will moves of its own accord our two arms, it is of much
less importance for us to know by the intervention of what
nerve centers the will does so.

CHAPTER VI
Predestination According to the Teaching of
Duns Scotus
The Subtle Doctor most clearly affirms the absolute gratuity

of predestination to glory, as well as the intrinsic efficacy of
the divine decrees and of grace. He writes: "It is only because
God wills or preordains that one shall make good use of free
will that He foresees this person will make good use of it; for,
as stated in the thirty-ninth distinction (no. 1129), the
certain foreseeing of future contingent things is due to the de­
termination of these by the divine will. If, therefore, the oc­
casion presents itself to the divine will of two persons equal
in natural endowments, why, I ask, does He preordain that
this one shall make good use of free will and the other not?
There seems to be no reason to assign for this except the di­
vine will.”1 Scotus writes this against Henry of Ghent, and
on this point he is in agreement with St. Thomas.
In addition to this, he says: "In another way this can be
expressed, by saying that there is no reason for predestination
even on the part of the one predestined, such that it is in any
way prior to this predestination. But there is some cause for
(positive) reprobation.
a) This is proved first from the fact that one who wills
methodically the end and those things which are means for
attaining the end, first wills the end before willing any of
those things which are means for attaining the end, because
one wills other things in view of such end. Therefore, since
the whole of this process by which the creature capable of eter­
nal happiness is brought to the perfection of its end, the ulti1 Com. Oxon. in lum Sent., d. XLI, no. 1153, p. 1256, ed. Quaracchi.
112

THE TEACHING OF DUNS SCOTUS

n3

mate end of which is perfect happiness, God who wills to give
anything in this order, first wills the end to this creature
capable of eternal happiness, and afterwards, as it were, wills
to it those things which are in the order of means pertaining
to that end. But grace, faith, merits, and the good use of free
will, all of these are directed to this end, although some refer
more remotely and others more closely to it. Therefore God
wills eternal happiness to the creature before any of these
means; and He wills whatsoever of these means before He
foresees that it will have any of them. Therefore He does not
will eternal happiness to it because He foresaw any of these
means.
ά) In the second place this is proved from the fact that it is
only because damnation is just that it is seen to be good. As
St. Augustine says: 23‘‘God is not the avenger before one is a
sinner.” 8
In all this Scotus agrees with St. Thomas. Someone wrote
recently that Scotus is the one who first injected into this
question the principle that the one who wills methodically
the end and those things which are the means for attaining
the end, first wills the end. St. Thomas had written equiva­
lently in the following words: ‘‘Nothing is directed towards
an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the
predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes in the
order of reason that God wills their salvation; and to this be­
long both election and love.” 4
It is on the notion of merit and on the nature of the di­
vine motion assuring the execution of the divine decrees
that Scotus differs from St. Thomas. Instead of admitting a
physical and non-indifferent premotion, he speaks, as we have
seen, of a mysterious influx, called “sympathy" by several of
his disciples. In virtue of this sympathy, created liberty in2 Super Gen., XI. 17.
3 Loe. cit., no. 1154.
4 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.4.

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PREDESTINATION

clines infallibly and freely to accept the decree of divine lib­
erty, which virtually includes it.5
The Thomists reply to this, saying that this sympathy
which subordinates the created will to God, either follows as
a natural consequence of the necessary subordination of the
creature to God, and in this case liberty is out of the question;
or else it is a moral motion, of the objective order by way of
attraction, and then only the vision of God face to face can
so captivate the will as to attract it infallibly.®
But, let us repeat, this difference is of secondary importance
in the question which confronts us, since Scotus admits, as
St. Thomas and his disciples do, the absolute gratuity of pre­
destination to glory as well as the intrinsic efficacy of the di­
vine decrees with regard to our salutary acts and the grace by
which we are enabled to put them into effect.7
is Loe. tit., d. VIII, q.5; II, d. XXXVII, q.2, nos. 1 If., no. 11.
e Cf. Joan, a S. Thoma, Cursus Phil., Phil., Nat., q.12, a.3.
" If one wanted to write the history of the problem of predestination in the
fourteenth century, it would be necessary to bear in mind that Occam held
that the absolute autonomy of the divine willing makes God’s liberty the sov­
ereign arbiter of good and evil, and this to such an extent that there is no
longer anything good or evil in it, so that God could have commanded us
to hate it. Radical nominalism thus ends in absolute voluntarism and libertism, which is a sort of theological positivism.
It would also be necessary to take note of what Thomas Bradwardine taught
about predestination in his De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute
causarum (1338-46), and in his commentaries on the Sentences and the Summa
theologica. He was influenced in his writings, as several historians relate, by
Duns Scotus and Occam, who were countrymen of his. He failed to avoid
falling into certain errors that reappear in the writings of John Wyclif.
In his De causa Dei (1,2t, p. 233, ed. 1618), T. Bradwardine writes as Occam
did: "That there is no reason or necessary law in God prior to His will."
From this he deduced that the divine will is the necessitating cause, the ante­
cedent necessity, of our volitions: “Il suffices for man to be free as regards
all things that do not concern God, and that He be only God’s slave, of his
own accord, I say, not forced.” (Ibid., Ill, p. 667, E. cf. p. 675, C.) This made
him say that "God somehow wills sins as such.” Cf. Dr. S. Hahn, "Thomas
Bradwardinus und seine lehre v.d. menschlichen willensfrciheit” (Beitr. Gesch.
Phil. Mitlelalt., V. 2).
Nicholas d’Autrecourt, John of Mircourt, and John Wyclif deduced dis­
astrous consequences from Thomas Bradwardine’s principles. Wyclif taught
a necessitating predestination and went back to predestinalionism. The most
determined opponents of Bradwardine were Peter Plaoul and John of Rive.
Cf. Du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus, I, 328.

THE TEACHING OF DUNS SCOTUS

“5

CONCLUSIONS

On these essential points, almost all the old theologians,
whether Augustinians, Thomists, or Scotists, are in agreement.
Almost all admit the principle of predilection, namely, that
one man would not be better than another (by reason of an
act either easy or difficult to perform, whether the first or
final act), unless he were loved more and helped more by
God. Now this principle, as we have seen, presupposes that
the divine decrees with regard to our salutary acts are of
themselves efficacious, and not because of our foreseen con­
sent. At the same time this principle virtually includes the
doctrine of the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory
previous to foreseen merits. So speaks the Augustinian author
of the Imitation of Christ, in the following extract: “I am to
be praised in all My saints; I am to be blessed above all things
and to be honored in all whom I have thus gloriously exalted
and predestined without any merit of their own. . . . They
glory not in their own merits, inasmuch as they ascribe no
goodness to themselves but attribute all to Me who of Mine
own infinite love have given them all things. ... In Thee,
therefore, O Lord God, I place my whole hope and refuge.” 8
St. Thomas said the same when he wrote: ‘‘Since God’s love
is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be
better than another, unless it were loved more by God.” 9
To this principle we must add one no less certain, which is
that God never commands what is impossible, and wills to
make it possible for all to be saved. We already stated that it is
impossible for us, according to our present knowledge, to see
how these two principles are perfectly reconciled. As long
as we have not the light of the blessed in heaven, vivid faith
enlightened by the gifts of the Holy Ghost must preserve the
equilibrium between these two principles, and by their means
& Imitation of Christ, Bk. Ill, chaps. 58, nos. 4, 8; 59, no. 3.
9 Summa theol., la, q.20, a.4.

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PREDESTINATION

it senses the direction of the summit toward which it tends
and which cannot be seen by anyone here on earth. Thus the
two extreme aspects of the mystery are preserved intact, with­
out compromising this latter.
This admirable harmony was unknown to Protestantism,
which, in denying one of the two aspects of the mystery, gave
an entirely false interpretation of the data of revelation.

SECTION II
Predestination According to the Tenets
Protestantism and Jansenism

of

Protestantism has given us a conception of predestination
that is absolutely irreconcilable with God’s universal will to
save. On this point Jansenism differs but little from it. In the
two chapters of this section, we will consider: (i) Protes­
tantism; (2) Baianism and Jansenism.

CHAPTER I
Protestantism

1) Luther. Protestantism derived its notion of predestination
from its preconceived theory of the consequences of original
sin. According to its theory, man in a state of fallen nature no
longer has the strength, even after justification, to resist temp­
tation. We know that Luther was thus ensnared into the path
of error. The observance of the divine law and resistance
against unruly passions necessitated his making great efforts;
as humble prayer was something unknown to him, he con­
cluded that concupiscence, since the fall of man, cannot be
overcome, and that the command, “thou shalt not covet,” is
impracticable, and that God has commanded what is impos­
sible. Thus it is that, through lack of an interior justice,
which seemed impossible to him, Luther set out in quest of
an exterior justice; not recognizing the necessity of contrition
and a firm purpose of amendment, he appealed from these to
Christ and said in conclusion that man of himself is always
117

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PREDESTINATION

weak, always in a state of sin; but that Christ’s justice covers
the sins of sinners. Christ’s justice covers them and is imputed
to them.
Continuing on this path of error, Luther rejected free
will. Free will is dead, so he said. In consequence of this, the
Christian’s faith is solely God’s work. “He operates in us
without our co-operation,’’ and this faith is formal justifica­
tion. “Faith is the formal justice, by reason of which we are
justified. Faith is already the grace of justification.” The nup­
tial robe is faith without good works. For salvation nothing
more than faith is required.1 This is how Luther came to
conclude one of the fundamental principles of his doctrine,
so that he taught not only that eternal predestination is previ­
ous to foreseen merits, but also that good works performed or
merits acquired in this life are not necessary for salvation.
In proof of this he appealed to St. Paul’s epistles, falsely in­
terpreting them, and to the teaching of St. Augustine, which
he understood in a wrong sense.2 It would be a mistake, how­
ever, for one to believe that all Lutherans preserved intact
Luther’s teaching on this point. Already in 1535, Melanchthon declared good works to be necessary for salvation. Some­
thing similar to this was taught by the Interim of Augsburg,
and by that of Leipzig.8
2) Zwingli. A sort of pantheism and fatalism is what
Zwingli concludes from this teaching, as Bauer points out.4
According to his theory, creatures come from God by way of
emanation. Man is not free, but is to God as the instrument
is to the artist. God is the cause of everything, even of evil and
of sin. Sin is truly a transgression of the law, but man com­
mits it of necessity. Even God does not sin in forcing man to
sin, because there is no law for God. Original sin is the in­
clination to evil, to self-love; it is a natural malady not re1 Luther’s works, ed. Weimar, I, 105, 30 f., 35; IV, 68, 75 if.
2 See his Coin, on Epistle to Romans, chap. 9.
s Cf. Diet, de thiol, cath., art. "Merite," X, 716 if.
r Cf. Zwingli's Théologie, ihr Werden und ihr System, Halle, 1885-88.

PROTESTANTISM

119
moved by baptism, as Luther had said. Instead of the Church,
we have a democratic organization which includes only the
elect.
3) Calvin. He surpasses Luther and Zwingli in the force
of his logical conclusions.® The fundamental thesis of his doc­
trine is that some are freely predestined, and the rest are
freely and positively damned. According to his theory, God
urges man to sin, which is, however, freely committed, in the
sense that there is no exterior influence compelling man to
commit sin. There is no fatalism in this, says Calvin, but a
mysterious and just will of God, although this is beyond man’s
comprehension. On this point he writes: “We say, therefore,
as evidently attested by the Scripture, that once for all God has
decreed by His eternal and immutable plan, whom He willed
to accept for eternal salvation and whom He willed to con­
sign to eternal perdition. We say that this counsel, as regards
the elect, has its foundation in God’s mercy, without any
consideration of man’s dignity. On the contrary, admittance
to eternal life is foreclosed to all those whom He wills to de­
liver up to eternal damnation; and this is the result of His
secret and incomprehensible judgment, although it is ac­
cording to strict justice.” 8 The corresponding Latin text does
not differ from this except by the addition of “gratuitous” to
the word “mercy.” It reads as follows: “The plan, as regards
the elect, has its foundation in His gratuitous mercy.” 7 This
doctrine admits, of course, a certain necessity of good works
for the salvation of adults; but it does not acknowledge them
to be meritorious.8
The antilapsarians, who were disciples of Calvin, said that
even before Adam’s sin was foreseen, God did not will to save
all mankind. On the contrary, the infralapsarians said that, as
0 Cf. Institution chrétienne, first ed., March, 1536: final ed„ 1559.
e Cf. ibid., Bk. Ill, chap. 21, no. 7, ed. Baum, Cunitz and Reuss, IV, 467.
r Cf. ibid., Il, 686
8 Cf. C. Friethoiï, O.P., Die Praedestinationslehre bei Tomas von Aquin und
Calvin, Friburg, Switz., 1926.

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a consequence of this foreseen sin, God does not will to save
all mankind. Calvin, following up the stand taken by Wyclif,
added that those who come under the sentence of reproba­
tion are purified only externally by baptism, not receiving the
grace of this sacrament. In the sacrament of the Lord’s Sup­
per, the predestined do not receive the body of Christ, but
merely a divine power that emanates from Christ’s body pres­
ent in heaven.9 The Church is invisible, consisting of the as­
sembly of the predestined.
This Calvinist doctrine on predestination was not accepted
by those of moderate views. One of their distinguished leaders
since 1588 was James Harmensz, who was called Arminius.
He was appointed in 1602 a professor in the University of
Leyden, where the stern Gomar already held the same posi­
tion. Arminius attacked Calvin’s and Beza’s system, on certain
points attracting the attention of several Catholic theologians.
Arminius’ theory of liberty aroused the anger of some, and he
had to engage in a very spirited argument with Gomar, who
defended the following thesis: God’s free good pleasure alone
is the impelling antecedent cause of reprobation from grace
and glory to a just damnation.10 This doctrine left no trace of
the distinction between negative reprobation which permits
sin, and positive reprobation which punishes it. This doctrine
was imposed, however, by the Synod of Dordrecht. It main­
tained with the infralapsarians that at least after original sin
God no longer wills the salvation of all mankind, and that
Christ died only for the elect. This doctrine, which at first
was optional among the Calvinists of the Low Countries, was
later on made obligatory.
CONDEMNATION OF THE PROTESTANT THESES

In opposition to this, the Council of Trent had been more
explicit on these questions in formulating the revealed docs Loc. tit., Bk. IV, chap. 17, no. 12.
10 Gomar, Op. lheol., Ill, 34, 346.

PROTESTANTISM

121

trine such as always taught by the Church. The principal
definitions relative to the point at issue are found in the fol­
lowing canons of the sixth session.
Can. 4: “If anyone saith that man’s free will moved and
excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, no
wise co-operates toward disposing and preparing itself for
obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its
consent, if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does
nothing whatever and is merely passive, let him be anath­
ema.” 11
Can. 5: “If anyone saith that, since Adam’s sin, the free
will of man is lost and is extinguished; or that it is a thing
with only a name, yea, a name without a reality, a figment
in fine, introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be
anathema.” 12
Can. 6: “If anyone saith that it is not in man’s power to
make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but
properly and of Himself, in such a wise that the treason of
Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of
Paul, let him be anathema.” 18
Can. 17: “If anyone saith that the grace of justification is
attained only by those who are predestined unto life; but that
all others who are called, are called, indeed, but receive not
grace, as being by the divine power predestined unto evil;
let him be anathema.” 14
Can. 18: “If anyone saith that the commandments of God
are, even for one that is justified and constituted in grace,
impossible to keep; let him be anathema.” 15
In the eleventh canon, which is the counterpart of this last
quoted canon, the Council of Trent has in mind two propo11 Denz., no. 814; cf. no. 797.
12 Ibid., no. 815.
is Ibid., no. 816.
14 Ibid., no. 827; cf. no. 200.
is Ibid., no. 828: cf. no. 804.

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PREDESTINATION

sitions of St. Augustine, whose doctrine the Protestants ap­
pealed to in the following passages, though interpreting him
in a wrong sense: "God does not command what is impossible,
but in commanding advises you to do what you can, and to
ask for what you cannot do.” 10 “God does not abandon those
whom He has once justified by His grace, unless He is first
abandoned by them.” 17 In saying that God never commands
what is impossible, St. Augustine had equivalently affirmed
that in a certain way He wills all men to be saved, in this
sense that He wills to make it really possible for all to keep
the commandments, and that no one is lost except through
his own fault.18
18 De natura et gratia, chap. 43, no. 50.
17 Ibid., chap. 26, no. 29.
is On this possibility, read the statement of Pius IX, Denz., no. 1677.

CHAPTER II
Baianism and Jansenism

Three years before the end of the Council of Trent, in 1560,

the Sorbonne condemned eighteen propositions of Baius in
which there were traces of the Protestant principles relative
to grace and original sin. In 1567, a bull of St. Pius V con­
demned seventy-nine propositions of Baius, among which the
following that more or less directly concern our subject must
be noted: “Without the aid of God’s grace, free will has power
only to sin. All the actions of unbelievers are sins, and the
virtues of philosophers vices. Only violence is repugnant to
man’s natural liberty. Man sins even meriting damnation, in
what is done out of necessity. It is a Pelagian error to say that
there is in free will the power to avoid any sin. The integrity
in which man was created was not an exaltation of human na­
ture to which it had no claim, but its natural condition. The
elevation and exaltation of human nature to a participation
in the divine nature was due to it because of its original state
of integrity; hence it must be declared natural and not super­
natural.” 1
We perceive the trend of thought since Luther’s error and
how this pseudosupernaturalism, which confounds the two
orders of nature and grace, resulted from it. Viewed from this
angle, it approaches Pelagian naturalism, although it differs
very much from this latter in its notion of original sin and
the consequences of the same.
Luther begins by saying that concupiscence is invincible,
1 Denz., nos. 1021, 1025-28, 1066-67. ^or
exact meaning of these proposi­
tions, consult also Did. de thêol. cath., art. "Baius," II, 64 ff.
123

124

PREDESTINATION

and that certain commands, as a consequence of original sin,
are impracticable. Moreover, without the help of divine
grace, free will can do nothing but sin. Grace of itself effica­
cious, though it was not necessary for perseverance in good in
the state of innocence, became so by reason of our infirmity,
and man is powerless to resist it when it is offered to him. The
subsequent outcome of this pessimistic conception of human
nature, such as it is in the present state, was that original in­
tegrity came to be viewed as something due to human nature,
and grace, which is a participation in the divine nature, as
due to the state of natural integrity. This pessimistic view led
to the confusion of the order of nature with that of grace, a
confusion which the Pelagians reached by the inverse method.
Pelagianism is a phase of naturalism which attached no im­
portance to original sin. Baianism is another phase of natu­
ralism which attached very much importance to the fall of the
first man.
Finally, Jansenius on the subject of original justice re­
vived the errors of Baius. This explains his false doctrine con­
cerning original sin, grace, predestination, and reprobation.
According to his theory, by the sin of the first man human
nature became entirely corrupt, so that it was no longer capa­
ble of doing anything good. At the same time he denied the
freedom of the human will, declaring it to be completely pas­
sive and determined by the victorious delectation. If this de­
lectation is terrestrial, it begets sin; if it is celestial, it results
in virtue and merit; and for this, freedom from external con­
straint suffices, but not necessarily freedom from interior com­
pulsion.
The five propositions taken from his Augustinus and con­
demned by Rome, show that this doctrine differs from that
of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, though it has been at times
confused with their teaching. Whereas St. Augustine and St.
Thomas always steadfastly maintained that God never com­
mands what is impossible, but makes it really possible for all

BAIANISM AND JANSENISM

125
to keep His commandments, the following Jansenist propo­
sitions deny this; they say: (i) “For the justified, willing and
trying to do what they can, according to the present powers
they possess, some of God’s commandments are impossible to
keep. (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists in­
terior grace. (3) For meriting and demeriting in the state of
fallen nature, freedom from internal compulsion is not re­
quired; it is sufficient to be free from external constraint.
(4) It is a Semipelagian heresy to say that Christ died or shed
His blood for all men without exception.” 2 Moreover, to
understand exactly in what sense this last proposition is con­
demned, it is absolutely necessary to give in addition the text
of this condemnation, which reads as follows: “It is declared
and condemned as false, temerarious, scandalous, and, under­
stood in this sense that Christ died only for the salvation of
the predestined, it is impious, blasphemous, contumelious,
contrary to the divine compassion, and heretical.”
Jansenism was thus led to adopt a teaching on grace and
predestination that excludes God’s universal will to save. In
order to preserve intact one of the aspects of the mystery with
which we are concerned, the other was completely rejected.
Instead of a mystery of revealed truth, we have thus a cruel
and absurd doctrine, for in this case sin is inevitable, which
is no longer then a sin, and which cannot be punished, at least
with eternal punishment, without manifest cruelty. God com­
manding what is impossible ceases to be God, and in vain
would we seek to discover in Him not only mercy, but even
justice.
2 Denz., nos. 1092-94, 1096.

SECTION III
Predestination According to the Teaching
Post-Tridentine Theologians

of the

After the Council of Trent, whose especial concern was to
counteract Protestantism, L. Molina proposed a theory of
foreknowledge and predestination which was the occasion of
long controversies on these subjects, which are keenly enough
disputed even at the present day. We shall proceed to examine
the following theories, taking them in this order: (i) Molinism; (2) the congruism of Bellarmine and Suarez; (3) the
congruism of the Sorbonne; (4) the Augustinian doctrine sub­
sequent to the Council of Trent; (5) the Thomist doctrine
subsequent to the Council of Trent. In giving an account of
the doctrines of these schools, we shall at the same time point
out the difficulties presented by each.

CHAPTER I
Predestination According to the Theory Advocated
by Molina and the Molinists
That we may bring out clearly the essential points of this

theory, we shall summarize it in Molina’s own words.1 We
shall stress the principles on which it rests and compare his
teaching with that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.
1 Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, provi­
dentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione, 1595. Cf. q.23, a.4-5, disp. I, membr.
ult., Paris ed. 1876, pp. 546-49. Here Molina sums up his doctrine on this
subject.
126

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

127

WHAT MOLINISM AFFIRMS

Molina states that St. Augustine satisfactorily proved
against the Pelagians and Semipelagians that the beginning
of salvation is the result of prevenient and excitant graces,
which are given to us by Christ, according to God’s good pleas­
ure, and not according to the effort made by our free will.
Then he adds: “But Augustine believed that, connected with
what he had most correctly taught from the Scripture about
grace against the Pelagian heresy, is the question of God’s
eternal predestination, which is not according to the merits
and nature of the use of free will as foreseen by God, but only
according to His election and good pleasure (and in this
sense it is most true, as was explained in Member XII); and
it was in this sense that he interpreted in many of his works
the text of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (chap. 9), and he
restricted to this meaning the text: ‘He will have all men to
be saved’; 2 so that this is not understood to refer absolutely
to all men, but only to the predestined; (in fact St. Augustine
says so, if it be a question of the efficacious will to save). This
doctrine alarmingly disturbed the minds of many of the
faithful, especially of those living in France, not only of the un­
educated but even of the learned, and it was even the occa­
sion that their eternal salvation was placed in jeopardy. . . .
The divine-like Thomas, and subsequently many of the Scho­
lastics, followed Augustine’s opinion.” 3
On the question of true predestination, and this means pre­
destination to glory, which alone can be said to apply both to
the elect and the reprobates, Molina thus recognizes, precisely
when summing up all his teaching on this subject, that St.
Augustine, St. Thomas, and the majority of the Scholastics
taught this proposition, that God’s eternal predestination was
not according to the merits and nature of the use of free will
- I Tim. 2: 4.
s Concordia, p. 546.

128

PREDESTINATION

as foreseen by God, but solely according to God’s election
and good pleasure. In other words, he recognizes that St. Au­
gustine, St. Thomas, and the majority of the Scholastics taught
the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, not because
of foreseen merits, and Molina finds this very difficult to rec­
oncile with the freedom of our will.
Then he adds: “In our humble opinion we declare that the
whole question of reconciling the freedom of the will with
divine grace, foreknowledge, and predestination, which we
have taught throughout article thirteen of question fourteen,
and in article six of question nineteen, and throughout ques­
tion twenty-two, rests upon the following principles ... ;
and if these principles had always been given and explained,
perhaps neither the Pelagian heresy would have sprung up,
nor would the Lutherans have dared so impudently to deny
the freedom of our will . . . , nor would so many of the
faithful have been disturbed in their mind because of Au­
gustine’s opinion.” 4
This page from Molina’s work has often been quoted in
course of time by the Thomists as evidence that the author of
the Concordia had it well in mind to propose a new theory,
and one which he esteemed far superior to the teachings of
St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the majority of the Scholastics.
According to this theory, predestination to glory is not abso­
lutely gratuitous, but is on account of foreseen merits. What
are the underlying principles of this theory?
PRINCIPLES OF MOLINISM

Molina5 enunciates four that refer: (i) to the divine
concurrence; (2) to final perseverance; (3) to foreknowledge
{scientia media); (4) to the disposition of circumstances in the
life of the predestined. For greater accuracy, let us give a close
translation of the words of the Latin text.
♦ Op. cit., p. 548.
6 Ibid., p. 548.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

129

1) The first and fundamental principle is the mode of the
divine influence, both by the general concurrence in the nat­
ural acts of our free will and by the particular helps given for
supernatural acts, as already explained.® In these passages Mo­
lina strove, in fact, to establish the sufficiency of a divine si­
multaneous concurrence and of a grace which is not of itself
infallibly efficacious, but which moves one morally by way of
attraction. It becomes efficacious in actu secundo (completed
act) by means of our free consent. Thus it is that Molina af­
firmed: “The helps of prevenient and adjuvant graces, which
in the ordinary course are given to people here below, and
which may be either efficacious or inefficacious for conversion
or justification, depend upon the free co-operation of our will
with them, and so it is freely within our power either to make
them efficacious by our consent ... or inefficacious by with­
holding this consent.” 7 In like manner, he says: “Predestina­
tion was not the result of foreordaining to confer helps of
themselves efficacious.” 8 Hence we have the following affirma­
tion by Molina: “Wherefore it can happen that of two per­
sons who are called by God, each receiving an equal interior
grace, one of them of his own free will is converted, and the
other remains an unbeliever. ... It can even happen that
one prevented and called by a far greater grace, of his own
free will is not converted, and another with a far less grace
is converted.” 8 St. Thomas had written the contrary of this in
formulating the principle of predilection, which is the key­
stone of his doctrine on predestination. He says: “Since God’s
love is the cause of the goodness of things, no one thing would
be better than another, unless God willed a greater good for
this than for the other.” 10 We at once see that Molina starts
out with a conception of the created will which at least does
«Ibid., q.14, a. 13, disp. 7-25, 27.
r Ibid., q. 14, a. 13, disp. 40, pp. 230-3».
8 Ibid., p. 355; cf. p. 459.
«Ibid., q.14, a. 13, disp. 12, p. 51; cf. p. 565.
10Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.

13O

PREDESTINATION

not seem able to be reconciled with the principle of predilec­
tion, namely, that no one thing would be better than another,
unless it were loved more and helped more by God. This
principle is for St. Thomas the equivalent of the text: “For
who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not
received?” 11 It presupposes, as we have seen, that the decrees
of divine love and grace are of themselves efficacious, and not
because of our foreseen consent. We at once perceive that
these two doctrines are in opposition and we see why Molina
separated from St. Thomas concerning the divine concurrence
and predilection. He wrote, indeed, in the above quoted ques­
tion, as follows: “I am confronted by two difficulties with
regard to what St. Thomas teaches (la, q. 105, a. 5) about the
divine motion. I do not see what is this motion and applica­
tion, in secondary causes, by which God moves and applies
these causes to act. . . . And I candidly confess that I have
difficulty in understanding this motion and application which
St. Thomas requires in secondary causes.” 12
Farther on, too, after stating the doctrine according to
which divine election precedes predestination and the fore­
seeing of the merits of the elect, he writes: “And this seems
to be the opinion of St. Thomas (la, q. 23, a. 4). . . . But I
never found it acceptable.” 18
2) Second principle. No less striking is the difference be­
tween these two teachings when we consider Molina’s second
principle:
“The second principle is a lawful or rather orthodox one,
which explains the way in which the gift of perseverance op­
erates. We have, indeed, clearly shown that no adult at all
can persevere long in the state of grace without God’s help,
and for this reason perseverance in grace is God’s gift; but
God denies no one the help sufficient for perseverance. Hence111
111 Cor. 4: 7.
12 Ibid., q.14, a. 13, disp. 26, p. 152.
is Ibid., q.22, a. 1-2, disp. 2, p. 429.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

i3i

two things are necessary for the gift of perseverance. One is
that God has decided to confer those helps by means of which
He foresaw that the adult freely will persevere. The other is
that the adult’s free will is required as an indispensable con­
dition; for without it the will to confer such helps would not
imply the will to confer the gift of perseverance, which is
such that the adult will, of course, freely co-operate with these
helps so as to persevere; and it is in his power for him to
do so.” 14
In other words, the actual grace of final perseverance for
adults is not of itself efficacious, but only by reason of our
foreseen consent, so that, as Molina says,” of two dying per­
sons who are helped by equal graces, one dies a good death,
and the other does not; sometimes even the one who dies a
Christian death received a lesser grace. St. Thomas had writ­
ten the contrary of this in formulating the principle of predi­
lection: “He who makes a greater effort, has received a greater
grace; but that he makes a greater effort, he needs to be moved
by a higher cause, according to the text: ‘Convert us, O Lord,
to Thee, and we shall be converted. Lam. 5: 21.’ ” 18
According to the Thomist opinion, this Molinist concep­
tion depreciates this grace which is reserved for the elect and
which the Council of Trent calls the great and special gift of
perseverance.17 How can we possibly imagine this gift to be
equal or even inferior to the assistance given to one who does
not persevere?
3) The third principle to which Molina appeals as founda­
tion for this theory on predestination concerns the scientia
media:
“The third principle is that foreknowledge mediate bei« Ibid., q.23, a.4-5, disp. I, memb. ult., p. 548.
IS ibid., pp. 51, 565.
is in Matt. 25: 15; cf. Summa, la, q.20, a.3-4: "No one thing would be
better than another, unless it were loved more by God." Also la Hae, q. 112,
a.4.
i’ Denz., no. 806.

13 2

PREDESTINATION

tween God’s free knowledge and that which is merely natural.
By this mediate foreknowledge, as explained (q. 14, a. 13,
disp. 50 ff.), God knew, before any free act of His will, what
in each particular case the created free will would do, if God
decided to arrange the circumstances for these men or angels.
If the created free will should decide upon an opposite course
of action, as it can do, He would, nevertheless, know it by
this same foreknowledge.” 18
This theory of the scientia media, which, together with the
Molonist definition of created liberty, constitutes the keystone
of Molinism, is proposed by Molina as a new way of viewing
the question. He writes: ‘‘I do not know of anyone who has
ever advanced this theory of ours for reconciling the freedom
of the will with divine predestination.” 10
What this new theory states is this: Before any free decree
of His will, God foresaw what a certain man would freely
choose, if he were situated in certain circumstances and
prompted by a certain grace. It is not in God’s power to fore­
see by the scientia media any other thing, but He could do so
if the created free will were to choose something different.
This divine foresight depends upon the choice a person would
make in these given circumstances.
This new way of viewing the question, rejected by all
Thomists, Augustinians, Scotists, and other theologians as
contrary to God’s sovereign independence with regard to
every determination of the created order, was thus formulated
by Molina: “It was not in God’s power to know by this knowl­
edge (mediate) anything else than He actually knew. Then
again it must not be called natural even in this sense, as if it
were so innate in God that He could not know the contrary
of what He knows by it. For, if the created free will had
chosen to do the opposite, as it truly can do, this very same
18 Loc. cit., p. 549.
10 Ibid., p. 550.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

133

thing He would have known by the same knowledge, but not
that He actually knows it.” 20
According to this theory, God no longer determines what
choice the creature would make in certain circumstances.
His knowledge, said to be mediate in this case, is dependent
upon this choice and is determined by it. Is not this a positing
of passivity in pure Act, who is incapable of passivity or de­
pendence upon anything whatsoever? The dilemma still re­
mains to be solved, to wit: God determining or determined;
there is no other alternative.
Molina, it is true, not only declares that his theory is a new
one, but also that it seems to be contrary to the teaching of
St. Thomas. After explaining it, deriving his inspiration from
Origen, he adds: ‘‘Although, to tell the truth, St. Thomas
seems to suggest the contrary (la, q. 14, a. 8 ad nun), when
he explains and attempts to interpret in the opposite sense
the passage of Origen to which we shall immediately refer, in
which he is clearly of the same opinion as we are.” 21
Origen, whose views on predestination are known to be
very erroneous, had written: “A thing will happen not be­
cause God knows it as future; but, because it is future, it is
on that account known by God before it exists.” 22 If we were
to interpret literally these words of Origen, God’s knowledge,
far from being like the artist’s knowledge, the cause of things,
would be caused, measured by the things, dependent upon
them, and passive with regard to them. It would follow that
creatures do not depend upon the divine knowledge and will,
but that God’s foreknowledge depends upon them.23 That is
why St. Thomas strove to give a more benign interpretation
to these words of Origen. In this he was not followed by
Molina.
20 Ibid., q.14, a. 13, disp. 52, pp. 317-18.
21 Ibid., p. 325.
22 Com. in Rom. 8: 30.
23 Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8 ad min.

i34

PREDESTINATION

4) The fourth principle to which Molina has recourse
shows us clearly how predestination, according to his view of
it, depends upon foreseen merits, and how the principle of
predilection (that no one thing would be better than another,
unless it were loved more by God) has thus charged against
it, according to this theory, the note of relativity. We read, in
fact, concerning this: “The fourth principle is that God willed
to create this order of things preferably to any other, and in
this order to confer these particular helps preferably to certain
others, by means of which He foresaw these particular per­
sons, and not certain others, will attain to eternal life, there
being no cause or reason for this on the part of the adults,
both predestined and reprobates. And so on this account we
said that the use of free will on the part of the predestined
and the reprobates is not the cause or reason of predestina­
tion; but this must be attributed to the free will of God.” 24
This means that God’s good pleasure alone is the cause that
this particular man is placed in these particular circumstances,
in which He foresees that the man will save his soul. God
could have placed him in certain different circumstances, in
which by means of the scientia media He foresees that He
would be lost. In other words, it is perfectly gratuitous that
this particular man is predestined to live in these particular
circumstances and with these particular helps in which God
foresaw that he would be saved.
Molina also remarks: “That the divine will to place a cer­
tain man in a certain order of things and circumstances with
certain helps, can be called predestination, is due solely to
the fact that it is dependent upon merits foreseen by the
scientia media. In this sense there is a reason for the predesti­
nation of the adults, in that God foresees their merits. And
for this reason we said that there is a reason for the predestina­
tion of adults, in that the use of their free will was foreseen.” 25
2> Loc. cit., 54g.
25 Ibid., p. 549.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

135
As Father F. Cayré, A.A., says: “Without going so far as to
make out almost the same case for the elect and the reprobates,
as Vasquez does (in lam, q. 23, disp. 89), Molina so stresses the
part played by the intellect that Suarez feels obliged, by a dis­
creet counterstroke, to modify his teaching and insist much
more on the role of the will, thus coming nearer, in this deli­
cate question, to the stand taken by Bannez.” 28
Father Billot, S.J.,2’ holds that Molina, like Suarez and
Bellarmine, admitted predestination to glory apart from fore­
seen merits. Certain texts of the Concordia seem to say that
it is not because of future foreseen merits; but those we have
quoted and many others show that it is at least subsequent to
conditionally future foreseen merits, or else that it presup­
poses the foreseeing by means of the scientia media the merits
which a certain man would acquire, if he were placed in cer­
tain circumstances.
Moreover, the majority of Molinists, like Vasquez and
Lessius, hold that for Molina predestination to glory is not
only because of conditionally but also of absolutely future
foreseen merits; so that it presupposes the foreseeing of the
merits that will actually be acquired by a certain man placed
in certain circumstances; for the divine will to place him in
such circumstances can be called predestination, so said Mo­
lina, only because of its dependence upon the foreseeing of
his future merits. Thus Lessius wrote: “The absolute and im­
mediate election to glory does not take place before it is fore­
seen that one will persevere or die in a state of grace, just as
absolute reprobation does not take place before it is foreseen
that one will die in a state of sin.” 23 Vasquez, Valentia, and the
majority of the Molinists made similar statements.28
Such in substance is Molina’s view of predestination. It has
undergone slight variations of relative unimportance. Some,
-0 Précis de patrologie, II, 1930, 768.
27 De Deo uno, 1926, pp. 290-92.
28 De praedestinatione et reprobatione, sect. II, no. 6.
20 Cf. Diet, de thiol, cath., art. "Molinisme," col. 2170.

i36

predestination

as we have just said, interpret it in the sense that predestina­
tion is the result of future foreseen merits; others that it is
the result of conditionally future foreseen merits. These lat­
ter, like Father Billot, strive to make their teaching on this
point differ but little from that of St. Augustine and St.
Thomas. St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez almost succeed in
accomplishing this, when they say that for God, as for every
wise person, the choice of the means or of the graces follows
logically the appointment of the end, or, in other words,
predestination to glory, which, in this case, is conceived as
previous to foreseen merits. Some Molinists also rejected Mo­
lina’s theory of simultaneous concurrence, preferring to admit
a divine premotion that is indifferent or non-determining.
We shall return to a discussion of these variations, but let us
first state precisely their common ground of support.
WHAT IS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN MOLINISM?

We can answer this question by stating what the Molinists
are agreed upon in their defense of this doctrine. First of all,
the essence of Molinism consists in a definition of created
liberty which includes the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of
the divine decrees and of grace, obliging one to admit the
theory of the scientia media. All those theologians whose
views are either closely or remotely connected with Molinism,
are agreed on this point. Their opponents recognize also that
such is the starting-point of the Molinist system, and they re­
fuse to admit this definition which, in their opinion, is not
at all the traditional teaching.
It is thus formulated by Molina at the beginning of his
work: “That agent is said to be free, which, granted all the
requisites for action, can either act or not act.” 30 This defi­
nition, which is quoted eventually by all Molinists, does not
30 Loc. cit., pp. 51, 190, 225, 230-31, 304, 311 ff., 318, 356, 459 ft, 498, 502,
565.

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137

seem at first sight to establish a precedent. But when we see
that it is the underlying principle of all Molina’s theses,’1 and
that it necessarily implies the theory of the scientia media
unknown to all theologians previous to his time,82 we con­
clude that it is just as new as the theory which Molina told us
had never been proposed before him.88
What exactly do the terms of this definition of free will
mean for Molina and the Molinists, when it is declared to be
“a faculty which, granted all that is required for action, can
either act or not act?” These words, “granted all that is re­
quired, “denote not only what is a prerequisite for the act to
be free according to a priority of time, but also what is a pre­
requisite for it to be so according to a simple priority of na­
ture and causality, like actual grace which is received at the
very moment when the salutary act is performed. Moreover,
according to its author, this definition does not mean that,
under the influence of efficacious grace, the free will retains
the power to resist, though it never does actually will to re­
sist under the influence of this efficacious grace. It means that
grace is not of itself efficacious, but only because of our fore­
seen consent. The nature of this grace is such that God could
have foreseen not the good consent, but the actual resistance.
This definition of free will is connected indeed with the two
previously quoted propositions that concern the scientia me­
dia. They state: (1) That it was not in God’s power to know by
this knowledge anything else than He actually knew; (2) But
if the created will were to do the opposite, as it truly can, God
would have known even this by the same knowledge, but not
that He actually knows it.84 It was not in God’s power to fore­
see anything else; but He would have foreseen something
else, if the choice of the created free will had been different.
The divine foreseeing thus depends upon the choice man
si Ibid.,
»2 Ibid.,
as Ibid.,
84 Ibid.,

q. 14. a. 13, disp. 2, p. 10.
p. 318.
p. 550.
p. 318.

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would and will make on the supposition that he is placed in
certain circumstances.
This gave rise to all the controversies on this point since
the Council of Trent. But we cannot really grasp the meaning
of this definition and see all that it implies, unless we com­
pare it with its opposite. In this way, by going back to what is
the very point at issue in the controversy, it becomes clarified
and simplified.
In the opinion of the Thomists, the Molinist definition of
liberty is not formulated according to the true method of
logical procedure, because it abstracts from the object that
specifies the free act. It neglects the fundamental principle
that faculties, habits, and acts are specified by their object.
If, on the contrary, we consider the object to be the specifying
principle, then we shall say with the Thomists: Liberty is the
dominating indifference of the will as regards an object pro­
posed by the reason as not being good in every respect. The
essence of liberty consists in the dominating indifference of
the will as regards every object proposed by the reason at the
moment of consideration as good in one aspect, and not good
in another; rightly so it is the indifference as to willing or not
willing the object, an indifference that is potential on the part
of the faculty, and actual on the part of the free act. For even
when the will actually wills this object, when it is already
determined to will the same, it still tends toward this object
with an indifference that is no longer potential but actual.
Liberty, therefore, results from the disproportion prevailing
between the will that is specified by universal good and a
certain finite good, this latter object being considered good
in one aspect and not so in another. This is wrhat St. Thomas
says, for he remarks as follows: “If the will is offered an object
that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to
this of necessity.” 35 And in opposition to Suarez, the Tho­
mists add: “Even by His absolute power, God cannot, by mov­
es Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 10, a.2.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

139
ing the will, necessitate it to will a certain object, when the
indifference of judgment remains unchanged.” Why so? Be­
cause it implies a contradiction for the will to wish necessarily
the object proposed to it as indifferent by the intellect, or one
that is absolutely out of proportion to the universality of its
scope.36 What are we to conclude about the subject in ques­
tion that concerns us?
It was pointed out earlier in this work that the theologians
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries always use the same
formula, stating that if God wills efficaciously a certain salu­
tary act to be performed, such as the conversion of the good
thief or of St. Paul, this act infallibly though freely is accom­
plished, according to a necessity not of consequent but of
consequence “just as it is necessary for Socrates to sit whilst he
is seated, though it is optional for him to be seated.” 37 We
have drawn particular attention to the following important
text of St. Thomas: “If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompossible with this suggestion, that the will be not
moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently
it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.” 38
Similarly, St. Thomas says: “It is incompossible for anyone
to sit and stand at the same time, but whilst one sits, one has
the power to stand.” To deny this is to say that he who sleeps
is blind; he does not see, but he has the power to see.
In other words, according to the teaching of St. Thomas,
under the influence of efficacious grace, the free will never
wills in fact to resist and posit the contrary act (for then grace
would cease to be efficacious), but it retains the power to do
so. Does it follow then that efficacious grace is necessitating,
as the Protestants and Jansenists thought, and that liberty
strictly so called is destroyed, which consists in an indifference
as regards the two opposites, and which is free not only from
se Cf. De veritate, q.22, a.5.
st Cf. Pohle-Preuss on Grace, p. 243, for a criticism of this distinction. (Tr.)
38 Loc. cit., la Hae, q.10, a.4 ad 311m: cf. la, q.105, a.4; la Ilae, q.112, a.3;
De veritate, q.22, a.8-9: De male, q.6, a. 1 ad 311m.

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compulsion but also from necessity? By no means. For St.
Thomas, efficacious grace affects liberty by a sort of virginal
contact, without violating it. Under the influence of efficacious
grace, at the indivisible instant in which the salutary act is
performed, in our will which already determines itself and is
determined (for becoming and done are simultaneous in those
things that are done instantaneously), there is undoubtedly
no more any question of a passive or potential indifference on
the part of the will in determining itself to either of two con­
traries; but there is an actual and active dominating indiffer­
ence in the free act itself already determined which, proceeding
from a faculty, the scope of which is universal, tends not
from necessity but freely toward the chosen good, having
really within itself the power not to will it. Certainly one
cannot, in willing this thing, actually not will it, for that
would be a contradiction; but in willing it, one has really the
power not to will it, just as, according to the classical example,
one cannot at the same time be standing and seated, but,
when one is seated, it is really within one’s power to rise. St.
Thomas added that potential indifference is not of the essence
of liberty, for it does not exist in God, who is simply pure Act,
in no way potential, and sovereignly free, not only before but
in choosing, and after having determined from eternity His
choice, whom nothing created could infallibly attract or de­
termine. Under the influence of the divine and efficacious mo­
tion, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, we still retain
this dominating indifference, which is not potential but ac­
tual, and which is an image of the divine actuality. For Mo­
lina, on the contrary, it must of necessity be that, under the
influence of this so-called efficacious grace (not taking into
consideration the divine foreseeing of our consent), the free
will retains not only the actual dominating indifference,
which properly belongs to the free act that is already deter­
mined and that still tends freely toward its object; but he also
will have it retain under the influence of this grace the poten-

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141

tial indifference, and that it be within its power actually to
resist.
To this the Thomists reply that when the will actually re­
sists, the grace is no longer efficacious but merely sufficient.
Now most assuredly, he who actually fulfds a precept is cer­
tainly better, other things being equal, than he who can and
does not do so. Therefore, in virtue of the principle of predi­
lection, he who fulfils a precept is loved more and helped
more by God than he who does not do so. He receives from
God not only the power to fulfil the precept, but actually and
freely to do so. “What hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived?” 39
Certainly Molina could not ignore this last mentioned
principle. But did his theory finally lead him to respect its
truth? St. Thomas wrote: “If God moves the will to anything,
it is incompossible with this supposition, that the will be not
moved thereto.” 40 Molina, however, declared it to be at the
same time possible, at least abstracting from the fact of the
divine foreseeing of our consent, a foreseeing which St.
Thomas does not mention. For St. Thomas, it is a case of two
total and subordinated causes, the secondary determining it­
self for good only under the influence of the primary cause.
For Molina, even without taking too seriously here the famous
comparison of the barge drawn by two horses, it seems truly
to be a case of two partial and co-ordinated causes. The free
will induced to act by grace has a causality that is exclusively
its own; it is not applied to its act by God. We see that the
two rival doctrines start from very different principles.
St. Thomas and the great theologians who preceded him
start from this supreme principle: the love of God is the cause
of the goodness in things. From this they conclude that divine
love is the cause of the better part in our salutary act, its free
determination, and this cannot be withdrawn from its de30 1 Cor. 4: 7.
*0 Loe. cit., la Ilae, q. 10, a.4 ad gutn.

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142

pendence upon the divine causality. They say that this free
determination is not exclusively ours, but that it is totally
from God as primary cause, and totally from us as premoved
secondary cause. “There is no distinction between what flows
from a secondary cause and from a first cause,” 41 says St.
Thomas. Taken in this sense we have here the case of two total
subordinated causes and not of two partial co-ordinated
causes.
St. Thomas adds that God’s transcendent causality “pro­
duces in us and with us even the free mode of our acts,” 42 for
this mode is still a being that is dependent upon the first Be­
ing. This free mode is the actual dominating indifference of
our will, which tends actually toward some particular good
that is incapable of irresistibly attracting it; for the will is spe­
cified by universal good, and it could not be irresistibly held
captive except by the attraction of seeing God face to face.
This dominating indifference of willing, which constitutes
for the will its free mode, is a participation in one of God’s
absolute perfections, this being His liberty; but it is merely
an analogical participation, for no perfection can be attrib­
uted univocally, that is, in the same sense, to God and to us.
From this St. Thomas concludes that no thing would be better
than another unless it were loved more by God.43 Thus his
entire doctrine on predestination is derived from this prin­
ciple: “Since God’s love is the cause of the goodness in things,
no one thing would be better than another, if God did not
will greater good for one than for another.” 44 It is a corollary
of the principles of causality and of the universal causality of
the first Agent. Not for one moment does St. Thomas doubt
that the laws governing free action are in harmony with those
more general laws governing being and acting, and that they
cannot contradict them.
<i Ibid.,
*2 Ibid.,
« Ibid.,
**Ibid.,

la, q.23, a.5.
la, q. 19, a. 8.
q.20, a.3.
q.20, a.3.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

143

Molina, contrary to this, starts off with a definition of free
will that excludes the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees
and of grace. Consequently the better part in our salutary
acts, their free determination, which makes them efficacious,
seems to be withdrawn from its dependence upon God’s uni­
versal causality. Hence his denial of the principle of predilec­
tion as formulated by St. Thomas. In fact we read in the
index to Molina’s work, under the heading “free will,” the
following statement: “Free will is sufficient, so that in the case
of two called and helped by an equal interior grace, one is
converted and the other not.” 45 Of two men equally helped
by God, one occasionally becomes better than the other, bet­
ter without having received more than the other. We shall
see that the principal objections of the Thomists bear upon
this point, and that at the end of the controversy we are
confronted by the dilemma of either God determining or de­
termined. There is no other alternative; for the divine fore­
knowledge, united to the divine will, is either the cause of
our free determination or else is passive in their regard. God
is either the author or merely the spectator of that which be­
gins to distinguish the just from the impious. In other words,
what does St. Paul mean when he says: “For who distinguish­
ed! thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 48
The essence of Molinism is to be found in the aforesaid
definition of free will and in the consequences it entails,
which are the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of the divine de­
crees and of grace, for which are substituted the theory of the
scientia media and of grace extrinsically efficacious by reason
of our foreseen consent. On these points, notwithstanding
their incidental differences, all Molinists are agreed.
It must be noted that in the Molinist system this definition
of free will ought to be applicable to the impeccable free will
of Christ, who, for all that, freely obeyed in such manner
«Lot. cit., p. 51.
·*» I Cor. 4: 7.

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PREDESTINATION

that He not only never did disobey, but that He never could
do so. It is a most perfect image of God’s sovereign and im­
peccable free will, in which there is no trace of any potential
dominating indifference, but only an actual dominating in­
difference as regards all created things. This, the Thomists
say, shows us that our free will persists even when, under the
influence of efficacious grace, there remains no longer the po­
tential but only the actual dominating indifference, under­
stood in this sense that God, far from forcing us, causes in us
and with us that our acts be performed freely.
THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST MOLINISM

It is easy to account for the objections raised against Mo­
lina’s work after its publication by referring to those men­
tioned in the appendix of that work.47 They are directed
principally against the three theses of Molinism, which are:
(i) its definition of free will; (2) its theory of the scientia me­
dia and of efficacious grace, especially in its relation to the
principle of predilection; (3) its theory of predestination after
foreseen merits.
1) Its definition of free will. The first opponents of Mo­
linism, as can be seen from the writings of the Thomists of
this period, affirmed that it rests entirely upon a definition of
human liberty which cannot be proved either by experience
or a priori, and which is nothing but a begging of the ques­
tion.48 It cannot be shown from experience, they say, that the
free determination of our salutary acts is independent as such
of the divine causality, and that God does not cause this in us
and with us, even to the extent that our actions are performed
freely. This mysterious divine causality, which is more inti­
mate to the free will than this latter is to itself, no more comes
*1 Concordia, pp. 575-606.
<8 Consult Bannez, Lemos, Alvarez, John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, in
their treatises on God and grace.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

145

within the scope of our experience than does the divine con­
servation which keeps us in existence.
No more could reason, so these theologians teach, prove
the validity of this definition. On the contrary, it is manifest
to reason that the potential indifference between two decisions
is not of the essence of liberty, since it could not exist in God,
who is sovereignly free, and no more is it present in our free
act that is already determined. As for the actual or active in­
difference, which is included in the free act already deter­
mined, this cannot be attributed univocally to God and to us,
but only analogically or as of things proportionately alike,
according to a participation which makes what is more inti­
mate and better in the choice of our salutary free act depend
upon God’s choice. It would be, so the Thomists said, a beg­
ging of the question to deny this dependence, thus discarding
one of the elements of the problem to be solved; and in the
name of the principle of causality, and of the universal and
transcendent pre-eminence of the divine causality, they pro­
test against this.
Revelation, they went on to remark, could not be invoked
in favor of this definition, since it speaks to us in the follow­
ing terms: "Lord almighty King . . . there is none that can
resist Thy will”;49 “As the divisions of waters, so the heart of
the king is in the hand of the Lord”; 50 “for it is God who
worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to
His good will.” 51
The Council of Trent does not impose this definition when
it declares against the Protestants who maintained that grace
efficacious of itself destroyed free will: “If anyone saith that
man’s free will moved and excited by God, by assenting to
God exciting and calling does in no wise co-operate towards
disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of jus■*8 Esther 13:9.
so Prov. 21:1.
si Phil. 2: 13.

i46

PREDESTINATION

tiftcation; that it cannot refuse its consent, if it would, but
that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is
merely passive; let him be anathema.” 52 By this definition,
in the preparation of which several Augustinians and Tho­
mists took part, is excluded, so Molina’s opponents say, the
Protestant thesis according to which grace of itself efficacious
is necessitating or irreconcilable with the principle of freedom
from necessity. By this declaration of the council, it is affirmed
that, under the influence of this grace, our will co-operates
vitally and freely with the salutary act, and that it is within
its power to resist, if it so wishes; but it does not say that under
the influence of this efficacious grace, it happens that the will
actually resists this grace and, if it were so, grace could no
longer be said to be truly efficacious, but, on the contrary, it
would be inefficacious, and through our own fault would be
sterile.58
As these Thomists point out, the Protestants said that grace
of itself efficacious is irreconcilable with freedom from neces­
sity. Now, grace is of itself efficacious. Therefore there is no
freedom from necessity. Molinism concedes the major of this
syllogism and denies the minor. The Thomists, the Augustin­
ians, and the Scotists deny the major, concede the minor, and
deny the conclusion.
2) The scientia media. The difficulties encountered in this
theory were as great as those presented by the Molinist defini­
tion of liberty which it presupposes. These objections of the
Thomists and the Augustinians are fully discussed in their
treatises on God.54
a) They say that the theory of the scientia media supposes
that, if Peter and Judas were placed in the same circumstances
and given equal graces, it could happen that one is converted
S2 Denz., no. 797. For an interpretation of this in favor of the Molinist
theory, see Pohle-Preuss on Grace, pp. 243-44. (Tr.)
63 Cf. A. Reginald, O.P., De mente concilii Tridentini, and A. Massoulié,
O.P., Divus Thomas sui interpres, Vol. I, diss. 2, q.9.
Cf. Billuart, Cursus theol., De Deo, diss. VI, a. 6.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

147
and the other not, or that entirely of his own accord the one
distinguishes himself from the other. In fact, Molina said:
“Given equal help, it can happen that of two persons called,
one is converted and the other not.” 55 And Lessius added:
“Not that he who accepts, does so by his free will alone, but
because the difference is the result of free will alone, so as
not to be due to the diversity of prevenient grace.” 50 Now,
the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists say that,
contrary to this, St. Paul wrote in one of his epistles as follows:
“For what distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou
hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou
glory as if thou hadst not received?” 07 This text is explained
by St. Augustine and St. Thomas in a sense quite the opposite
of that which the theory of the scientia media claims it to
have.68
b) Moreover, the opponents of Molinism remark that this
so-called scientia media cannot have any object; for, previous
to any divine decree, there cannot be any conditionate future
or any conditionate future that is determined. Previous to any
decree, God can well foresee, as we too can, that if Peter is
placed in certain circumstances and helped by a grace not
necessarily efficacious, there are two possibilities: for he can
be either faithful to his Master or betray Him; but He cannot
foresee infallibly which of these two possibilities Peter will
choose; for neither the scrutiny of Peter’s will, which is of
itself undetermined, nor a survey of the circumstances or of
the grace not necessarily efficacious, admit of God infallibly
foreseeing this, but merely of conjecturing it. The condition­
ate future, in fact, is more than a mere possible; it denotes a
new determination in answer to the question: Which of these
two possible alternatives would happen? To say that the con­
ditionate future is infallibly known because of God’s super55 Loc. cit., p. 51.
6β De gratia efficaci, chap. 18, no. 7.
s? I Cor. 4: 7.
58 Cf. Salmanticenses, Cursus theol., De gratia efficaci, disp. 2, dub. 1.

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comprehension in knowledge of the created will and circum­
stances, is, instead of saving free will, to fall into the error of
determinism of circumstances, which is the denial of free will;
and so we cannot assign any object to the scientia media, if
we wish to avoid determinism.
St. Thomas had written: “Contingent futures, the truth of
which is not determined, are not in themselves knowable.” 50
In his opinion, that is true of conditionally free acts of the
future as well as of absolutely free acts of the future. God
cannot see them in His essence previous to any decree; for
He would see them there on the same grounds as absolutely
necessary truths, and this would thus be a reverting to the
logical fatalism of the Stoics.
The Molinists tried hard to answer this objection, which is
considered by their opponents to be incapable of solution.
On this point Leibniz remarked: “It is amusing to see how
they torment themselves to find a way out of a labyrinth when
there is absolutely no way out.” 80
c) Again the Thomists object to the theory of the scientia
media, stating that it leads to the denial of God’s universal
causality since it takes away from the latter the better part
in our salutary acts, which is their free determination. Hence
it is derogatory to God’s omnipotence and supreme dominion,
since it claims that God cannot be the cause in us and with us
that we determine ourselves to act, and that we do so freely. It
leads also to the admission of a passivity or a dependence of
God’s foreknowledge upon this free determination of the
created order, which at first is a conditional future, and then
a simple future. God is no longer the cause but the passive
spectator of that which distinguishes the just from the impi­
ous, who are equally helped by Him in the same circum­
stances. God, no longer being the first who determines by
His free determination or election, is Himself determined;
so Loc. cit., Ila Ilae, q. 171, a.3.
eo Théodicée, Part I, chap. 48.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

149

His knowledge is passive with regard to one thing, a deter­
mination that does not come from Him. Now there is noth­
ing more inadmissible than the positing of a passivity in the
pure Act, or of a dependence in Him who is sovereignly in­
dependent and the cause of all good. The Thomists pointed
out several other inconveniences that arise from the theory of
the scientia media. It suffices to note here the principal ones.
All of them have said that the theory of the scientia media
violates the principle of predilection as formulated by St.
Thomas, which is: “Since God’s love is the source of all good,
no one thing would be better than another unless it were
loved more by God.” 61 In fact, among the most criticized of
Molina’s propositions, as the appendix to his work shows,62
there is one that must be quoted here. It is as follows: “Of two
that are called and equally aided by an interior grace, it can
happen that one of them of his own free will is converted and
the other remains an unbeliever.” 03 It was objected that this
was contrary to the principle of predilection as formulated
even before St. Thomas, by St. Paul and St. Augustine. The
principle of predilection, as we have seen, presupposes that
the divine decrees and grace are efficacious of themselves and
not because of our foreseen consent. For this reason Molina
is incapable of recognizing this principle to be of universal
and absolute validity, and he reduces it to this: It is because
God loved Peter more than Judas that He decided to place
him in a certain situation of circumstances in which He fore­
saw that Peter would be saved; and this is due solely to God’s
good pleasure. But nevertheless it remains true that such a
one elected is saved, without having been helped more than
a certain person who is lost. Molina even said: “That those
who received more help were not predestined and saved, but
that those who received less were predestined and saved, was
ei Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3.
«2 Loc. cit., pp. 592, 600. 605.
es Ibid., p. 51.

15°

PREDESTINATION

due to no other reason than that the latter refused to make
use of their native free will, so that of their own accord they
might attain salvation; but the former most assuredly did
so.” 04 This proposition was one of those most criticized from
the outset of the controversies.60
3) Predestination “because of foreseen merits.” Finally, the
opponents of Molinism raised a serious objection against the
theory of predestination “because of foreseen merits.” Re­
gardless of St. Paul’s texts to which they appealed in refuta­
tion of this theory, they brought up against it the principle
that God, like every intelligent being, wills the end before
the means, since the latter are willed only in view of the end,
and hence He wills glory to His elect before He wills the grace
by which they will merit this glory. This is what St. Thomas
had said.66
Such are the principal objections that were raised against
the Molinist theory of predestination, especially in the Con­
gregation appointed in Rome by Clement VIII and known as
De Auxiliis. The conferences lasted from January 2, 1598
until August 20, 1607. Beginning with the year 1602, the
sovereign pontiffs themselves took charge of the debates.
Eighty-five papal congregations were held, sixty-eight under
Clement VIII, and seventeen under Paul V. Under Clement
VIII what particularly came up for examination was the Mo­
linist doctrine concerning the natural power of free will, the
scientia media, predestination, and the good use of the divine
assistance. Especially so was Molina’s doctrine compared with
that of St. Augustine. The principal defenders of Thomism
were Didacus Alvarez, Thomas de Lemos, and Michael a
Ripa; the leading theologians in the Society of Jesus were
Michael Vasquez, Gregory of Valentia, Peter Arrubal, and
de Bastida, who in general recognized that the congruism
84 Ibid., p. 526.
es Ibid., appendix, p. 605.
8θ Loe. cit., la, <1-23. a.4.

THE THEORY ADVOCATED BY MOLINA

151

proposed by St. Bellarmine and Suarez was more in conform­
ity with the teachings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas than
Molinism was. On the whole, under Clement VIII, the opin­
ions were unfavorable to the author of the Concordia.
However, no sentence of condemnation was issued by Clem­
ent VIII, who died in 1605. At the end of that year Paul V
resumed the discussions and authorized even an examination
of the question of physical predetermination; but most of the
censors declared themselves to be in favor of Thomism. The
commission upheld its censures against forty-two of Molina’s
propositions. Neither Molina (-j-1600), nor Bannez (-f-1604)
saw the end of this strife. On August 28, 1607, Paul V con­
sulted for the last time the cardinals then present, who were
very divided in their opinions. The Pope then adjourned the
congregation, and ordered both parties not to indulge in mu­
tual condemnations.
It is of particular importance here to quote the conclusion
given by Paul V on August 28, 1607, after consulting various
cardinals. This is to be found in the work of P. G. Schneeman, S.J.G7 It reads as follows: “By the grace of God the coun­
cil defined it to be necessary for the free will to be moved by
God. The difficulty consists in this, as to whether it is moved
physically or morally; and although it would be desirable that
there should be no strife of this kind in the Church, for dis­
agreements often are the cause of the sudden rise of errors,
it therefore is a good thing for these disputes to be finally
settled. Nevertheless, we do not see the necessity for this at
present, in that the opinion of the Dominican fathers differs
very much from Calvin’s; for the Dominicans say that grace
does not destroy but perfects free will, and its power is such
that man acts in his own way, which is freely. But the Jesuits
differ from the Pelagians, who declared the beginning of sal­
vation originated from us, whereas the former hold quite the
er Cf. Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia
et progressus, Freiburg-Breisgau, 1881, p. 291.

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PREDESTINATION

contrary. Since there is therefore no urgent need of a defini­
tion on our part, the question can be deferred until in course
of time we are better informed about it.”
This decision was afterward confirmed by a decree of
Benedict XIV, issued on July 13, 1748.

CHAPTER II
Predestination as Explained by the Congruism
St. Robert Bellarmine and Suarez

of

These theologians admit, as the Molinists do, the scientia

media, and deny, as they do, the intrinsic efficacy of the divine
decrees and of grace; but they agree with the Thomists, the
Augustinians, and the Scotists in this sense, that they recog­
nize the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, which
they declare to be previous to foreseen merits not only as they
are future, but even as they are conditionally future. In ac­
cordance with this congruism, God makes use of the scientia
media only after He has predestined one to glory, for a dis­
tribution of the so-called congruous grace and so as to assure
Himself that it will be efficacious in certain determined cir­
cumstances. In this way the principle is saved that God wills
the end before the means, and a greater effort is made in this
system than in Molina’s to recognize the validity and uni­
versality of the principle of predilection.
exposition of this doctrine

Let us see just what congruism teaches: (i) on the absolute
gratuity of predestination to glory; (2) on congruent grace;
(3) on the scientia media.
1) The absolute gratuity of predestination to glory is dis­
tinctly the teaching of St. Bellarmine.1 His purpose is to
prove, like the Thomists and Augustinians, by means of
Scripture, tradition, and theological reasoning, the proposiiCf. De gratia et libero arbitrio, Bk. II, chaps. 9-15.
»53

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PREDESTINATION

tion that no reason can be assigned on our part for divine
predestination, which means that predestination to glory is
absolutely gratuitous, or previous to any foreseen merits. St.
Bellarmine excludes as a reason for predestination to glory,
not only all merit in the strict sense, but also all congruous
merit, whatsoever use of free will or of grace, and every in­
dispensable condition.2
He proves3 this doctrine from Scripture, which teaches
that God has elected certain persons,4 and efficaciously so, that
they may infallibly get to heaven.5 Texts in proof of this are:
“This is the will of the Father . . . that of all that He hath
given Me, I should lose nothing”;3 “No man shall pluck them
out of My hand ... no one can snatch them out of the hand
of My Father”; 7 “Whom He predestined, them He also called
. . . and justified . . . and glorified.” 8 He also proves that
God’s choice of the elect was entirely gratuitous and previous
to any foreseeing of their merits. Texts in support of this are:
“It hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom”; 0 “You
have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you, that you should
go, and should bring forth fruit”; 10 “There is a remnant
saved according to the election of grace. And if by grace, it
is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.” 11
St. Bellarmine also interprets like St. Thomas and the
Thomists the following text of St. Paul: “As He chose us . . .
that we should be holy, . . . according to the purpose of His
will.” 12 “In whom we also are called by lot, being predesti­
nated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things
2 Ibid., chap. 9.
3 Ibid., chap. 13.
« Matt. 20: 16; 24: 31: Luke 12: 32; Rom. 8: 33; Eph. 1: 4.
» Matt. 24: 24.
0 John 6: 39.
t Ibid., 10: 28 f.
e Rom. 8: 30.
« Luke 12: 32.
10 John 15: 16.
11 Rom. 11: 5 f.
12 Eph. 1:4 t.

ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE AND SUAREZ

155
according to the counsel of His will.” 18 Finally he adds 14 that
the elect were chosen gratuitously but independently of any
foreseeing of their good works, according to the teaching of
St. Paul, who says: ‘‘For when the children were not yet born,
nor had done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, ac­
cording to election might stand . . . there is a remnant saved
according to the election of grace.” 15 St. Bellarmine shows 18
that these principles of St. Paul apply not only to the election
of nations, but also to individuals chosen for eternal life. To
those who object that in St. Paul’s text17 foreknowledge pre­
cedes predestination, for he says: ‘‘Whom He foreknew, He
also predestinated,” St. Bellarmine replies that it is not a
question here of the foreknowledge of merits, for which there
would be no foundation in St. Paul’s epistles, and which
would be in contradiction to several of his texts, but the
meaning is: “whom He foreknew by the knowledge of appro­
bation, whom He loved, whom He willed, those He predes­
tined. . . . For to know and to foreknow in the Scripture are
frequently taken to mean the knowledge of approbation, as
is evident from the following text: ‘God hath not cast away
His people, which He foreknew’ ” (Rom. 11: 2).18 This is the
exegesis of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and is retained at
the present day by Fathers Lagrange, Allo, Zahn, Jülicher,
and others.
Finally, St. Bellarmine proves that, according to the teach­
ing of St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. Fulgentius, no reason
can be assigned on our part for predestination to glory. He
writes: “No reason can be assigned on our part that God
should predestine us to glory. . . . Not only do these holy
is Ibid., 1:11.
μ Loc. cit., chap. 13.
15 Rom. 9: 11; 11: 5.
w Loc. cit., chap. 13.
11 Rom. 8: 29.
is Loc. cit., chap. 13; cf. Matt. 7: 23: Gal. 4: 9: I Cor. 8: 3; 13: 12: II Tim.
2: 19; Ps. 1: 6.

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PREDESTINATION

Fathers (Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius) affirm this, but
also the more learned of their predecessors, whom the rest
subsequently followed, record this opinion as pertaining to
the Catholic faith, and they reject the contrary opinion held
by the Pelagians. I shall mention some of their works, so that
if any perchance are of the opposite opinion, they may realize,
from the judgment of these most holy Fathers, how manifestly
they err on this point.” 18 He mentions in particular two
works, one by St. Augustine,20 and the other by St. Prosper.21
In addition to this he remarks,22 as St. Augustine does, that
the Fathers who lived previous to the rise of the Pelagian
heresy touched but incidentally upon this question of pre­
destination. Fie quotes, however, St. John Chrysostom who,
on the words: ‘‘For who distinguisheth thee?” comments as
follows: “Therefore thou hast received what thou hast, neither
this only or that, but whatever thou hast. For these are not thy
merits, but God’s gifts.” 23 Finally, he points out that the fa­
thers previous to the time of St. Augustine, especially the Greek
Fathers, often took predestination as meaning the will to give
glory after this life, and that they scarcely spoke of it except
by way of exhortation, and therefore they had in mind the
order of execution, in which merits precede glorification;
whereas in the order of intention the case is the reverse. God,
in the order of intention, wills the end before the means,
glory before grace and merits; but in the order of execution
He wills glory as the reward of merits. God wills to give glory
gratuitously in the order of intention; but in the order of
execution He does not will to give it gratuitously, and this is
contrary to what the Protestants say. In this Bellarmine speaks
exactly as the Thomists do, and like them he remarks that
alter the rise of the Pelagian heresy it was necessary to con18 Ibid., chap. 11.
20 De dono persever., chaps. 18, 23.
21 Prima responsio ad objectiones Gallorum.
22 Loc. cit., chap. 14.
28 In I Cor. 4: 7, hom. 12.

ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE AND SUAREZ

157

sider predestination no longer merely in the order of execu­
tion, but also in that of intention, so that everything in the
affair of salvation may be attributed to God, as the Fathers
previous to the time of Bellarmine had said when comment­
ing on St. Paul's words: “For who distinguished! thee?”
Thus St. Robert Bellarmine saw in the absolute gratuity of
predestination the very teaching of Scripture and its great
interpreters. This accounts for the fact of his admitting St.
Augustine’s definition of predestination, which states that it
is “the foreknowledge and preparation of those gifts of God
whereby they who are liberated are most certainly liber­
ated.” 24 In support of this definition, in which the foreknowl­
edge refers not to merits but to the divine gifts, Bellarmine
appeals to the scriptural text: “No man shall pluck diem out
of My hand.” 25
Suaréz says the same. He writes as follows: “I say first: On
the part of the one predestined, there is no cause for pre­
destination inasmuch as this refers to eternal predestination
to glory or to perseverance or to sanctifying grace or to
supernaturally good acts, although for such effects, in that
they are bestowed in time, in the order of execution, some
cause or reason can be assigned on man’s part, as in the case
of glory which, in the order of execution, is given on account
of merits. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, (la, q. 23, a. 5),
with which Cajetan and other modern Thomists agree. Un­
doubtedly it is Augustine’s opinion.” 26 Since election to glory
is previous to foreseen merits, it follows for Suarez as for the
Thomists, that non-election, or negative reprobation, is also
previous to foreseen demerits.
We see that on this point of the absolute gratuity of predes­
tination to glory there is a considerable difference between the
congruism of Suarez and of Bellarmine, and the Molinism
■-> De dono persever., chap. 14, no. 35.
a5 John 10: 28.
-β De auxiliis, Bk. HI, chaps. 16-17; De causa praedest., Bk. II, chap. 23.

i58

PREDESTINATION

such as especially Vasquez, Lessius, and the majority of Moli­
nists understood it to mean. The Thomists always took care
to note this difference.27 Billuart adds that among the the­
ologians of the Society of Jesus, several agree with Bellarmine
and Suarez on this point, such as Toletus, Henriquez, Ruiz,
Typhanus.
In recent times Father Billot,28 although he disagrees with
Suarez on the question of negative reprobation, also admits
the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, this being
the only kind—and he says so with good reason—that merits
the name of predestination; for predestination to grace is
common to the elect and to many reprobates.
The difference between congruism and Molinism is less,
as we shall see, when it is a question of congruous grace; and
still less is this difference when it is a question of the scientia
media.
2) Congruous grace. The nature of this grace is well ex­
plained in a decree made famous by the general of the Jesuits,
Father Aquaviva. By it, six years after the meetings of the
Congregatio de Auxiliis, in December, 1613, he ordered the
theologians of the Society to teach congruism, “an exposition
and defense of which was given,” he said, “in the controversy
entered into by the Congregatio de Auxiliis, as being more
in agreement with the teachings of St. Augustine and St.
Thomas.” “Henceforth let our fathers,” says this decree,
“always teach that efficacious and sufficient graces do not differ
merely in actu secundo (completed act), because the one ob­
tains its effect by the co-operation of the free will and not the
other; but they differ also in actu primo (first movement), in
this sense, that, the scientia media presupposed, God Himself,
with the fixed intention of producing good, designedly chooses
those determinate means and employs them in the manner
sr Cf. Billuart, De Deo, diss. IX, a.4, sec. 2; and more recently del Prado,
O.P.. De gratia el libero arbitrio, 1911, III, 347.
23 De Deo uno, 1926, pp. 289, 291.

ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE AND SUAREZ

159

and at the moment when he knows that the effect will be in­
fallibly produced; so that, if He had foreseen the inefficacy
of these means, God would have made use of other means.
That is why, morally speaking, and considering it as a favor,
there is something more in efficacious than in sufficient grace
even in actu primo. It is in this way that God causes us to
perform the act instead of giving us the grace which enables
us to act. The same kind of reasoning applies to perseverance,
which undoubtedly is God’s gift.”
From this we see the difference between Molinism and this
type of congruism. In Molinism, God gives the grace which
He knows to be efficacious; in this type of congruism, God
gives the grace because He knows it will be efficacious. Hence
even congruous grace becomes infallibly efficacious only by
the consent of the human will, and this is foreseen by means
of the scientia media. Therefore the Thomists asked whether
the principle of predilection is truly safeguarded.20
3). The scientia media as viewed by Suarez. Whereas Bellarmine 30 explains the scientia media as Molina does, by hav­
ing recourse to the supercomprehension of causes, Suarez in
opposition to Molina writes as follows: “That God knows
our future free acts in their proximate causes because of His
perfect comprehension of our free will . . . this we must re­
ject . . . for this simply means the end of freedom . . . and
is repugnant to it.” 31 In other words, the scientia media
explained as Molina wants it to be, by the theory of the super­
comprehension of our free will if placed in certain circum­
stances, makes Suarez say, as the Thomists do, that it leads
to determinism of the circumstances.
But does Suarez have better success in explaining this
scientia media, which he wishes to retain in substance? God,
he says, previous to any decree, infallibly foresees condition20 Consult Pohle-Preuss, Grace, pp. 260-66, for a critical estimate of this
congruism. (Tr.)
so Loc. cit., Bk. IV, chap. 15.
31 De scientia futurorum contingentium, chap. 7.

16ο

PREDESTINATION

ate futures in their objective or formal truth. Of two condi­
tional contradictory propositions, such as: “If Peter were
placed in these circumstances, he would sin and he would
not sin,” the one is definitely true and the other is definitely
false. It is impossible, indeed, for both to be true or both to
be false. Therefore the infinite intelligence that penetrates
all truth, sees certainly which of the two is true and which
is false.
Suarez, the Thomists reply, forgets that Aristotle32 has
shown that of two contradictory propositions which are par­
ticular ones and which concern a contingent future event,
neither is positively true or false. If it were otherwise, as
Aristotle remarks, the truth would be in determinism or
fatalism, and our choice would not be a free one. The Stoics,
as Cicero relates,33 intended to prove determinism precisely
by the argument that, of two contradictory propositions, one
is necessarily true. Therefore, between the two propositions,
A will be, A will not be, the necessity of one of them, at the
moment I am uttering it, excludes the possibility of the other.
From all eternity is the flow of imperishable truth. From this
it would follow that creation is no longer a free act, and the
divine will would be subjected to the logical fatalism of the
Stoics.
THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONGRUISM

OF BELLARMINE AND OF SUAREZ

In this theory the principle of predilection is certainly
much better safeguarded than in Molinism. Concerning the
question of the absolute gratuity of predestination to glory, it
follows faithfully St. Paul’s interpretation given by St. Augus­
tine and St. Thomas. But, in the opinion of the Thomists,
this theory still limits the universal validity of the principle
of predilection and stamps it with the seal of relativity, in that
sa Perihermenias, Bk. I, chap. 9. See St. Thomas, commentary, lect. 13.
33 De divin., I, 55.

ST. ROBERT BELLARMINE AND SUAREZ

161

it retains the main structure of Molinism, which is the scientia
media or the denial of the intrinsic efficacy of the divine
decrees and of grace. It remains true, then, according to this
conception of the scientia media, that human effort makes
grace efficacious instead of being the result of the efficacy of
this grace; so that if two men or two angels are equally helped
by God, it may happen that one of them becomes better than
the other, though this one was not helped more, and did not
receive more than the other. Undoubtedly congruism is right
in saying that congruous grace is from the moral point of
view a greater gift than the other, but it is none the less true
that its actual efficacy is due solely to the subsequent consent
of the human will, as foreseen by the scientia media. And then
we have a recrudescence of all the difficulties of Molinism,
which seems to posit a dependence in the divine foreknowl­
edge as regards the creature, a passivity in pure Act, and leads
on our part to determinism of circumstances.84 Neither can
it be said that previous to any decree God foresees a certain
conditionate future, for instance, Peter’s infidelity, in so far
as this conditionate future is present to Him from all eternity;
for it is not independently of God’s decree that this condi­
tionate future rather than its contrary is present to Him from
all eternity; otherwise it would be present to Him as a neces­
sary truth, and thus we have again determinism.
As for what directly concerns predestination, the Thomists
as a rule point out that congruous grace, since it is not infalli­
bly efficacious of itself, is not an infallible means of leading
the elect to glory, as St. Augustine’s definition would de­
mand, which states that it is “the foreknowledge and prepara­
tion of those gifts of God, whereby they who are liberated are
most certainly liberated.” 86 Congruous grace, since it is in­
fallibly efficacious, not because God wills it but because man
wills it, does not express adequately—as Bellarmine himself
34 Cf. del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, 1911, III, 362-68.
3» Loc. cit., chap. 14, no. 35.

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PREDESTINATION

admits—the meaning of the scriptural text: “No one can
snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 36 No more does
congruous grace, since it is not infallibly efficacious of itself,
seem to express adequately the meaning of St. Augustine in
the following text: “God effects with the very wills of men
what He wills and when He wills. Undoubtedly the human
heart is inclined as it pleases His omnipotent will. . . . The
wills of human beings are more in God’s power than in their
own.” 87 And again when he says that efficacious “grace is
not spurned by the hard of heart; for this very purpose it
is bestowed, that the hardness of heart may first be taken
away.” 88
Certainly St. Augustine89 called efficacious grace congru­
ous; but his later works just quoted by us, show that at
least he came finally to the conclusion that it is a question
here not of extrinsic but of intrinsic congruousness, and this
latter is grace infallibly efficacious of itself.
These difficulties in the congruism of St. Robert Bellarmine and of Suarez made other congruists admit the neces­
sity of grace intrinsically efficacious at least for difficult acts.
This was the stand taken in the eighteenth century by the
congruists of the Sorbonne.
so John io: 29.
s’ De correptione et gratia, chap. 14.
as De praed, sand., chap. 8.
39 Ad Simplicianum, Bk. I, q.2, no. 13.

CHAPTER III
The Congruism

of the

Sorbonne

We come across this theory, though expressed with slight
differences of meaning, in the works of several theologians
of the eighteenth century, such as those of Tournely, Habert,
Ysambert, Frassen, Thomassinus, and Duhamel. St. Alphonse
is inclined to accept it. In the nineteenth century we find
Father John Hermann, C.SS.R., still admitting it, though the
way he sums it up is according to its essential principles,
which are: (i) “Grace is intrinsically efficacious, and in this
we follow the Thomists and the Augustinians as against the
Molinists. (2) Contrary to the Thomists, we say this intrin­
sically efficacious grace is not physical but merely a moral
motion. (3) Intrinsically efficacious grace is required only for
difficult salutary acts; for the easy acts, especially for prayer,
sufficient grace, which is commonly granted to all, is the only
grace that is required.” 1
Thus a middle system is established, which is in opposition
to the others, and which adopts the good points of the others.
It is an eclectic system, which lays claim to the general rejec­
tion of the scientia media of the Molinists, and to the admis­
sion of a grace not extrinsically congruous, as Suarez does, but
to one that is intrinsically congruous.
Father John Hermann writes: “According to the congruists
of the Suarezian and Bellarminian type, the infallible effect
of grace depends not upon its intrinsic power, but upon the
consent of the will or the circumstances in which a man is
placed. God cannot infallibly know what effect grace will
have, unless He has first found out by means of the scientia
1 Cf. Tractatus de divina gratia, no. 509.
■ 63

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PREDESTINATION

media whether the will, situated in these or those particular
circumstances is or is not going to accept the grace. We, how­
ever, say that it is a case of intrinsic congruousness, which is
given by God Himself to the grace, and it consists not in any
absolute entity that is superadded to the grace (and thus we
reject physical premotion), but it consists in the special mode
of the divine call, in its perfect adjustment, namely, to the
will of the one called. . . . Wherefore, in our opinion, the
congruousness of the grace reacts upon the will, and God has
no need at all of the scientia media so that He may know
what effect the grace will have.” 2
We see the consequence of this as regards predestination
and the relations of this latter to salutary acts easy to per­
form, especially to the case of prayer. This same author adds:
“Whereas Molinism and Thomism have their foundations in
indemonstrable philosophical arguments (the former in the
scientia media, the latter in physical premotion), our congruism has no special philosophic foundation, but rests solely on
the truths of faith.” 3 Yet this same Father Hermann said
elsewhere: “The Thomist system has for its foundation the
metaphysical principle that God is the first Cause and uni­
versal Mover from whom all being and action must origi­
nate.” 4 Does not this principle transcend the limits of opinion
and belong to the preambles of the faith? From this point of
view, even eclecticism cannot afford to overlook it. We may
ask ourselves whether this congruism does not violate this
principle, by denying to salutary acts easy to perform the
necessity of grace that is infallibly efficacious of itself.
THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONGRUISM OF THE SORBONNE

This new theory may seem more acceptable than Thomism
and also than Molinism to those who scarcely consider things
2 Ibid., no. 561.
3 Ibid., no. 748.
t Ibid., no. 399.

THE CONGRUISM OF THE SORBONNE

165

otherwise than from the practical point of view. It tells us,
indeed, that intrinsically efficacious grace is required only for
salutary acts difficult to perform, but not for easier ones,
such as for prayer to obtain the efficacious help. By this
theory the obscurity in the mystery seems to a great extent to
be eliminated. But if things are regarded from the speculative
point of view, this new theory has, in the opinion of the
Thomists, all the difficulties of Molinism for easy acts, and,
in the opinion of the Molinists, all the obscurities of Tho­
mism for difficult acts. In other words, from the theoretical
point of view, this congruism accumulates to itself all the
difficulties of the other systems, and, furthermore, the princi­
ples it admits for difficult acts have not the least metaphysical
validity, since they no longer apply to other acts.
In their criticism of this theory, the Thomists and Moli­
nists are agreed in saying that this congruism cannot help hav­
ing recourse to the scientia media so that salutary acts easy
to perform may be foreseen. Among Thomists of modern
times, Father del Prado writes: “The congruism of the Sor­
bonne rejects the scientia media in name, but retains it in
fact. Knowledge of simple intelligence is the name it gives
to its knowledge, but in reality it is the same as the scientia
media, because it precedes the decree of the divine will.” ·
The essence of the scientia media consists, as a matter of fact,
in the foreseeing of free conditionate futures previous to any
divine determining decree. Now such is exactly the stand
taken by the Sorbonne congruism in the case of salutary acts
easy to perform, since in this theory these acts do not demand
either divine determining decrees or grace that is infallibly
efficacious of itself. Of two persons equally helped by God,
it would happen, then, that one of them prays and the other
does not, and the former would become better without having
been loved more by God. Once more this is a violation, so the
Thomists say, of the principle of predilection, that no one
5 De gratia et libero arbitrio, 1911, HI, 390.

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PREDESTINATION

thing would be better than another, unless it were loved
more by God.
It will be said that at least man without a help that is
efficacious of itself sometimes avoids resisting grace. Father
del Prado replies to this, pointing out that for St. Thomas,
“the very fact that one does not place an obstacle to grace,
is due to grace.” 6 Not to resist grace is a good thing which
must originate from the source of all good things, that is,
from God’s love. Therefore he who does not resist is loved
more by God than he who, situated in the same circumstances,
does resist. God mercifully preserves him in the state of good­
ness, whereas he justly permits the other to commit sin, often
as a punishment for previous sin. Thus we find ourselves con­
fronted by two mysteries, the one of grace and the other of
iniquity. This congruist theory of salutary acts easy to per­
form forgets this saying of St. Augustine: “Because all good
things, great, mediocre, and least, come from God, it follows
that even the good use of free will comes from God.” 7 In
every salutary act, however trifling, there is to be found the
mystery of grace.8
In the criticism of this congruism, Thomists and Molinists
agree in saying with Schiffini: “The intrinsic and infallible
efficacy of the divine decrees and of grace either is or is not
in harmony with our liberty. If it is, why restrict it to diffi­
cult acts? If it is not, why admit it for them? The question
here is one of salutary acts, considered as acts and as supernaturally free acts, whether they are easy or difficult to per­
form; because the greater or less difficulty in performing these
acts does not change their species. Finally, prayer is not always
an easy act, especially perseverance in prayer.” 9
e In ep. ad Hebr., XII, lect. 3.
7 Retract., I, 9.
8 Cf. del Prado, loc. cit., Ill, 404 ft.
» De efficaci gratia, disp. IV, sect. 6. On this point consult the first appendix
in which a more recent opinion is examined by us concerning efficacious
grace and salutary acts easy to perform (pp. 341-52).

THE CONGRUISM OF THE SORBONNE

167

We might speak here of a congruism of later date, that of
cardinals Satolli, Pecci, and Lorenzelli and of bishops Paquet
and Janssens, O.S.B., who, rejecting outright the scientia
media and predetermining decrees, endeavor to take an in­
termediate stand. They hold that God knows conditionally
free acts of the future by means of His knowledge of simple
intelligence, before any decree of His divine will.
To this the Thomists reply that it is a confounding of the
possible with the conditionate future. This latter, even if it
will never become a reality, is more than a mere possibility.
It implies a new determination in answer to the question as
to which of two possible contradictories Peter would choose
if placed in certain circumstances. Would he or would he not
be faithful to his Master? One does not have to be omniscient
to see that there would be two possible choices here for
Peter. But previous to any determining decree, God, by His
knowledge of simple intelligence, cannot foresee what de­
cision Peter would make, which of the two possibles he would
choose.10 In the third part of this book and in the second
appendix we shall resume the discussion of the view on the
divine motion held by cardinals Satolli, Pecci, Lorenzelli,
and also by Father Billot, S.J.
We see that the outstanding difficulty of these different
forms of congruism, whether that of Suarez or of Tournely
or of Satolli, is the difficulty that is raised against the theory
of the scientia media, which truly seems to posit a depend­
ence or passivity in God’s foreknowledge toward a determina­
tion that is independent of His action. Chiefly on this account
the Augustinians and Thomists who wrote subsequent to the
Council of Trent attack the scientia media. It remains for us
now to give an account of their teaching.
i° Cf. del Prado, loc. cit., Ill, 497, 504, 506.

CHAPTER IV
Predestination According to the Teaching of the
Post-Tridentine Augustinians

Augustinianism is the name given in particular to the doc­
trine proposed in the seventeenth century by Cardinal
Noris (1631-1704) and defended later on by the theologian
Lawrence Berti (1696-1766), both of them being Augus­
tinians. They were accused of Jansenism, though they were
never condemned. Far from this being the case, their doc­
trine, as a matter of fact, differs essentially from Jansenism,
in that it sincerely affirms liberty (freedom from necessity) and
sufficient grace.
Though fully admitting for the present state of man in­
trinsically and infallibly efficacious grace, they differ from
Thomism in their manner of conceiving the influence of the
divine action on free will. For them it is a determining in­
fluence that is not physical, but merely moral. Grace acts on
the soul by way of delectation. Man in his present state is de­
termined to act either by reason of an evil delectation (con­
cupiscence) or by reason of a good and spiritual delectation
(charity). This latter is a sufficient grace when it gives the
power to overcome concupiscence; it is an efficacious grace
when it actually gains the victory over concupiscence, not
necessitating but infallibly moving the will.
This explains the conclusions relative to predestination
enunciated by L. Berti.1 In these conclusions they draw a
much finer distinction than the Thomists do, between the
present state and that of original justice, and these conclusions
i De theologicis disciplinis, Vol. I, Bk. IV, chaps. 6, 11; Bk. VI, chaps. 1-5.
168

THE POST-TRIDENTINE AUGUSTINIANS

169

presuppose that grace intrinsically and infallibly efficacious
is required in the present condition of man, not because the
created free will, whether of angel or man, depends upon
God, but because of the weakness of our free will since the
fall. These conclusions appear at the beginning of Berti’s
work,2 and are enunciated as follows: “Prop. LXXXVIII:
God does not predetermine naturally free actions, and conse­
quently He does not foresee them in the efficacious preor­
dination of His will (p. 175). Prop. XCII: The creature in the
state of innocence did not need the help of predetermining
grace, and consequently God in the efficacious decree of His
will had not the least knowledge of the perseverance of the
angels (p. 186). Prop. XCVIII: God sees future free acts of the
supernatural order, which acts refer to the state of fallen
nature, and His seeing them is dependent upon the decree of
His efficacious will (p. 197). Prop. XCIX: Human liberty is
in no way affected by the divine preordinations (p. 208). Prop.
C: By His antecedent will God wills all men to be saved,
without a single exception (p. 215). Prop. CVI: In the dogma
of predestination and grace there must be no departure from
the teaching of St. Augustine (p. 228). Prop. CXIII: Morally
virtuous acts, which are foreseen by God, by no means are the
cause of our predestination (p. 235). Prop. CXIV: Predestina­
tion to glory precedes predestination to grace (p. 237). Prop.
CXV: It is proved from Sacred Scripture that in the state of
fallen nature predestination to glory is gratuitous (p. 239).
Prop. CXVI: Our Holy Father Augustine most plainly taught
that this same predestination to glory is gratuitous (p. 242).
Prop. CXXXIII: On the part of the reprobate, original sin,
of course, is partly the cause of negative reprobation (p. 289).’’
The principal objection raised by the Thomists against
these theses of seventeenth and eighteenth century Augustinianism is that the principle of predilection formulated by
St. Augustine and St. Thomas is of absolute universality, and
-Ibid., I, xii.

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PREDESTINATION

that it applies therefore not only to man in the present state,
but also to man in the state of innocence and even to the
angels. In speaking of the angels and their predestination,
St. Augustine 3 said that if the good and the bad were created
equally good, the former, since they received more help, at­
tained eternal happiness, whereas the latter fell through their
own fault, and this, moreover, was permitted by God for a
greater good. St. Thomas gave a most universal scope to the
principle of predilection, so that it applies not only to fallen
man, but to every created being, and this not only because of
the infirmity of their nature, but also because of their de­
pendence upon God: “Since God’s love is the cause of the
goodness of things, no one thing would be better than an­
other, unless God willed a greater good for this thing than for
the other.” 4 No one angel or man, in whatever state he may
be, would be better than another, unless he were loved more
by God. The principle is of absolute universality.3
Moreover, in addition to this, the Thomists say that every
salutary act, particularly if it is performed in a state of aridity,
is not due to the victorious delectation. Finally, when this
latter is present, since it is only a moral motion, operating by
way of an objective attraction, and is not a physical motion,
emanating from it and moving the will to act, it cannot be
intrinsically and infallibly efficacious. God seen face to face
certainly would infallibly attract our will; but the case is not
the same with the pleasure we experience at the thought of
God known in the obscurity of faith.
3 De Civitate Dei, ΧΠ, g.
< Summa theol., la, q.20, a.3.
’ Cf. Billuart, Cursus theol., De gratia, diss. II, a.4.

CHAPTER V
Predestination According to the Teaching
the Post-Tridentine Thomists

of

principles on which they agree

Absolutely all the Thomists who wrote after Molina’s time

are opposed to his theory of the scientia media. In their opin­
ion it posits a dependence or passivity in God’s foreknowl­
edge with regard to a determination that is independent of
His action. The whole controversy brings us back to the
dilemma: “God determining or determined, there is no other
alternative.” We cannot admit, say the Thomists, any depend­
ence or passivity in pure Act. Hence they maintain that the
only way in which God can know conditionally free acts of
the future is in an objectively conditionate decree, and free
acts of the future only in a conditionate decree that is posi­
tive in the case of good acts, and permissive in the case of
sin. They add that the determining decree with regard to our
salutary acts is intrinsically and infallibly efficacious, but that
it is not necessitating, for it extends even to the free mode
of our acts which God wills and produces in us and with us.
God willed efficaciously from all eternity that the good thief
should be converted of his own free will on Calvary, and this
divine efficacious will, far horn destroying the freedom of
this act of conversion, produces this in him because God, who
preserves our will in existence, is more intimate to it than
it is to itself.
Thus all Thomists defend the intrinsic and infallible ef­
ficacy of the divine decrees. It is a question of the decrees that
concern our salutary acts and of the grace by which these
171

172

PREDESTINATION

acts are performed, whether these salutary acts are easy or
difficult to perform. There is no exception to the absolute
universality of these principles, since they are indeed of the
metaphysical order. They concern the creature’s act con­
sidered as a free act, and not as a difficult act. From this point
of view, intrinsically and infallibly efficacious grace was re­
quired for the salutary act as well in the state of innocence for
men and angels, as in the present state. In other words, it is
required not only on the ground of infirmity, but also on
the ground of dependence, by reason of the creature’s depend­
ence in each of its acts upon God, who is the most universal
cause of all things that come into existence, as to whatever
reality and goodness is in them.
St. Thomas had affirmed this intrinsic efficacy of the divine
decrees when he said that the divine consequent or efficacious
will concerns the good that happens or will happen at the
present moment, and that everything that God wills by this
will happens infallibly, whether it is a question of acts easy
or difficult to perform: “Whatever God simply wills takes
place; although what He wills antecedently may not take
place.” 1
This intrinsic and infallible efficacy of grace is to be under­
stood, according to the teaching of the Thomists, not as a
moral motion that influences the will by way of objective at­
traction (for only God seen face to face could infallibly at­
tract our will), but it is to be understood as a motion that
applies our will to posit its act vitally and freely,2 and for this
reason in opposition to moral motion, it is called physical
premotion.3 The Thomists even say that this motion is pre­
determining, in so far as it infallibly guarantees the execution
iSumma theol., la, q. 19, a.6 ad lum. The eighth article of this question
completes the doctrine of this article as regards the transcendent efficacy of
the divine will, which extends even to the free mode of our acts.
2 Ibid., la, q. 105, a.4, 5.
8 Consult God, His Existence and His Nature, II, 152, no. 85, for the meaning
given by Father Sertillanges, O.P., to these two words, "physical premotion.’’
(Tr.)

THE POST-TRIDENTINE THOMISTS

’73
of the predetermining eternal decree. It is not a formal but a
causal determination, which means that it infallibly moves
the will to determine itself in such a way that the result of
the deliberation is a salutary act. Then the determination of
the will is no longer causal, but formal and completed. What
would be a contradiction, would be to say that the will is
formally determined before it is formally determined.4
On these points all the Thomists are agreed, from the strict­
est, such as Bannez, Lemos, and Alvarez, to the mildest among
them, such as Gonzalez of Albeda, who defended a special
theory about sufficient grace.5 We can inform ourselves of
their views by reading their commentaries on St. Thomas.®
Of more recent date are the articles on sufficient grace by Fa­
ther Guillermin, O.P./ who, with Gonzalez de Albeda and
Massoulié, goes as far as he can in eliminating the difference
between sufficient grace and efficient grace, maintaining, how­
ever, that only this latter infallibly removes the obstacles to
the good consent of the will.®
THE PRINCIPLE OF PREDILECTION

All the Thomists, even Gonzalez, Massoulié, and Father
Guillermin, defend most firmly and as a necessary conse­
quence the principle of predilection, that “no one thing
would be better than another unless it were loved more and
helped more by God.” All admit the absolute universality of
this principle both for the state of innocence and for the
present state, and this whether it be a question of acts easy
or difficult to perform, of the initial or final act, or whether
< On this point see the third part of this book, chap. 8.
6 See Appendix I (pp. 341 if.).
e Consult in particular John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Contenson, Massoulié,
Salman licenses, Gotti, Goudin, and Billuart on the Summa theologica, la,
q.14. a.8, 13: q. 19, a.6, 8; q.23, a.4, 5; la Ilae, q. 109 if.
t Cf. Revue Thomiste (1901-03).
8 See also Father V. Carro, O.P., "De Soto a Bannez” in the Ciencia Tomista,
1928, pp. 145-78. Dr. Fred. Stegmüller: "Francisco de Victoria y la doctrina
de la gracia en la escuela salmantina,” Barcelona, pp. 227-44.

174

PREDESTINATION

it be for the beginning or continuation of the act. We cannot
dwell longer here on this point, which we have discussed at
length elsewhere.’
THE GRATUITY OF PREDESTINATION

It is by the light of the foregoing principles that the Tho­
mists who wrote after the Council of Trent explain the articles
of St. Thomas on predestination.9
1011
They defend the interpre­
tation given by St. Augustine and St. Thomas of St. Paul’s
teaching on this question, as St. Robert Bellarmine did in his
works, but they insist more than he does on the words of St.
Paul, who says: “It is God who worketh in you both to will
and to accomplish.” 11 And again when he says: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived?” 12 Thus they consider the doctrine of the absolute
gratuity of predestination to glory as directly founded on the
Scripture.
In the explanation of this doctrine they all agree in admit­
ting that predestination to glory is prior to the foreseeing of
merits, as the willing of the end is prior to the choice of the
means; but that in the order of execution God gives glory as
the reward of merits, and in this they combat the opinion of
the Protestants and the Jansenists. God freely wills to give
glory to His elect, but He does not will to give it gratuitously.
They all hold, too, that negative reprobation, by which God
wills to permit sin that deprives one of glory, is prior to the
foreseeing of demerits. Furthermore, several of them say that
original sin fails to explain it in the case of those in whom
this sin is remitted. On the contrary, positive reprobation,
9 Cf. "La grace infailliblement efficace par elle-mcme et les actes salutaires
faciles," Revue Thomiste (Nov.-Dec., 1925, and March-April, 1926). See Ap­
pendix I at the end of this book.
10 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.23.
11 Phil. 2: 13.
12 I Cor. 4: 7.

THE POST-TRIDENTINE THOMISTS

175

which inflicts the penalty of damnation, is subsequent to the
foreseeing of sin, which the penalty presupposes.
The Thomists therefore generally arrange the divine de­
crees in the following order: (1) God wills by His antecedent
will to save all men, even after original sin was committed;
and He puts at their disposal graces that are truly sufficient,
so that they may keep the commandments; for He never com­
mands what is impossible.18 (2) God has a special love for and
chooses a certain number of angels and men whom He wills
efficaciously to save.14 Predestination to glory thus precedes in
the order of intention the foreseeing of merits.15 (3) God puts
at the disposal of the elect intrinsically and infallibly effica­
cious graces whereby infallibly, although freely, they will
merit eternal life and attain it. (4) God, foreseeing in His de­
crees that His elect will persevere until the end, decides in
the order of execution preconceived by Him to grant them
glory as a reward of their merits. (5) But as He also foresees
in His permissive decrees that others will complete their time
of probation in a state of mortal sin, He positively casts them
off as reprobates on account of their sins. This order of decrees
is founded on the following principles that are admitted not
only by the Thomists, but also by Scotus, Bellarmine, and
Suarez: that the wise person wills the end before the means,
and that if the end is first in the order of intention, it is last
in the order of execution.
POINT ON WHICH THE THOMISTS DIFFER

The Thomists agree on these principal theses, and it is only
on the notion of negative reprobation that there is a slight
difference between them.
Alvarez, the Carmelites oi Salamanca, John of St. Thomas,
is Loc. cit., la, q. 19, a.6 ad lum.
1« Ibid., la, q.23, a.4.
1» Ibid., a.5.

176

PREDESTINATION

Gonet, and Contenson admitted that negative reprobation,
which applies both to angels and to men and which is prior
to the foreseeing of merits, consists in the positive exclusion
from glory, in this sense that God would have refused them
glory as a gift not due to them; then He would have permitted
their sins and decided finally to inflict on them the penalty
of damnation on account of their sins, which is positive
reprobation.” We still have in this, in contradistinction to
the Protestants, a certain difference between positive and
negative reprobation, in that the former is a penalty and the
latter is not, but merely the refusal of a pure gift.
However, many Thomists, such as Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and nearly all at the present day, reject this interpreta­
tion of it, and they give three principal reasons for this: (1)
because it is too harsh a view and can only with difficulty be
reconciled with the divine antecedent will to save all men;
(2) because it establishes an extreme parallelism between the
two orders of good and evil: God first wills glory to the elect
as a pure gift; then, in the order of execution preconceived
by Him, He wills it as a reward of their merits; but He cannot
will to exclude the others from glory before He foresaw their
demerits; for this exclusion cannot be in itself a good and
can be willed by God only as a punishment after He foresaw
their demerits; (3) this theory of the positive exclusion from
glory as being a gift not due, is not to be found in the works
of St. Thomas or in those of Capreolus, Cajetan, and Sylvester
of Ferrara, who were his first commentators. St. Thomas
wrote: “It is part of that providence to permit some to fall
away from the end (glory), and this is called reprobation.”
Toward the end of the argument in this article he says:
“Reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall
into sin (negative reprobation), and to impose the punish16 See Pohle-Preuss, Grace, pp. 217-20, for a criticism of this view especially
as regards Gonet. (Tr.)

THE POST-TRIDENTINE THOMISTS

177

ment of damnation on account of that sin (positive reprobabation).” 17
Also these last mentioned Thomists and nearly all at the
present day make negative reprobation to consist in the divine
will to permit sin, which merits exclusion from the glory of
heaven. God is not bound, indeed, to conduct effectively all
angels and men to the glory of heaven and to prevent a crea­
ture, of itself defectible, from sometimes failing. He can
permit this evil of which He is by no means the cause, and
He permits it in view of a greater good, as being a manifesta­
tion of His infinite justice.
THE CLEAR AND OBSCURE POINTS IN THOMISM

The Thomists deduce their doctrine on predestination en­
tirely from the principle of predilection: “Since God’s love is
the cause of all good, no one thing would be better than an­
other unless it were loved more by God.” 18 This principle
seems in the philosophical order to be an evident corollary
from the principles of causality and of the universal causality
of God who is the author of all good. This same principle is
found variously expressed in the revelation of both the Old
and New Testaments, as for instance: “I will have mercy on
whom I will, and I will be merciful to whom it shall please
Me. . . . For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou
that thou hast not received?” 18
Thus Thomism remains absolutely faithful to St. Augus­
tine’s interpretation of St. Paul’s texts. It represents the lu­
minous side of this doctrine, which fully safeguards the truth,
and the absolute universality of the principle of causality in
its relations to the transcendent causality of God who is the
Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.3.
is Ibid., la. q. 20, a.3.
is Ex. 33: 19; I Cor. 4: 7.

i78

PREDESTINATION

author of nature, grace, and salvation. Thomism absolutely
refuses to violate these principles by a conception of human
liberty that cannot be proved either by experience or a priori.
It vigorously refuses to deny or limit the universal laws of
being and action which clarify the whole doctrinal synthesis
of philosophy and theology, inasmuch as the proper object
of theology is God Himself, and it must therefore consider all
things, our liberty included, guided by the true concept of
God and not by one the reverse of this.
The obscurity in this doctrine is to be found when we
consider the mystery from the other angle. This presents it­
self when it is a question of explaining God’s universal will
to save, the real possibility for those not elected to keep the
commandments, and God’s permission of sin, especially of
the sin of final impenitence.
To this the Thomists reply that God most certainly wills
to save all men, in the sense that He wills to make it really
possible for them to fulfil His precepts; but this real pos­
sibility or this real power remains obscure for two reasons:
i) Everything is knowable according as it is actual. In
every doctrine that admits the principle of potency and act,
the act or determination is knowable in itself, although it
may not always be easily knowable for us, because of its eleva­
tion or spirituality, which escapes our sense perception. On
the contrary, undetermined potency, like an undeveloped
germ, is not knowable in itself, but only in its relation to act.
That is true of prime matter in its relation to form, of the
essence of things in its relation to existence, of the intellect
not yet informed by the knowable object, of the created free
will that can choose this or that, of the real power of doing
good which, however real it may be, does not pass over into
act. We have fully discussed elsewhere 20 the reason for the
obscurity in everything that remains potential.
20 Cf. Le sens commun, la philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques,
4th ed. Paris, 1935, pp. 149-53.

THE POST-TRIDENTINE THOMISTS

179

2) This real power of doing good, which does not pass over
into act, remains obscure because it includes the divine per­
mission to sin, and sin is a mystery of iniquity more obscure
in itself than the mysteries of grace. Whereas these latter are
in themselves light, truth, and goodness, the evil of sin is a
privation of being, truth, and good.
Nevertheless we see that God, who is the sovereign Good
and omnipotent, is by no means the cause of moral evil. As
St. Thomas shows,21 God cannot directly incite us to it with­
out this being a denial of Himself, and neither can it be said
that He is indirectly responsible for not having given us suf­
ficient help. He does give this help, but the sinner resists it,
and so merits to be deprived of efficacious help, as implied by
the prophet Osee speaking in God’s name, when he says: “De­
struction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” 22
Even if, by supposing an impossibility, God willed to be the
direct or indirect cause of sin, He could not do so, for de­
ficiency and disorder are not included in the adequate ob­
ject of His omnipotence. As the eye cannot see sounds, nor
the ear hear colors, still more so sovereign Goodness and Om­
nipotence cannot be the direct or indirect cause of moral evil.
God can only permit it, let it happen, and this for a greater
good, which we often fail to perceive.
Undoubtedly there is a very great obscurity in the mys­
tery of God permitting the sin of final impenitence. But no
one can prove that God by reason of His universal providence
is bound to prevent the failure and the irrevocable failure of
a creature that is by its nature defectible. God in His justice
gives the very real power to avoid this irrevocable failure, but
He does not give to all the power to avoid it de facto. It is not
impossible for Him to permit, especially after many previous
sins, that one should resist the final sufficient grace, a resist­
ance whereby the sinner merits to be deprived of the last
21 Loc. cit., la Hae, q.79, a.i, t.
22 Osee 13: 9.

18ο

PREDESTINATION

efficacious help. This is the great mystery in which is involved
the whole obscurity of non-actuated real potency, of free
potency, and the whole obscurity of the evil of sin, which is
by its nature darkness, privation of light, truth, and goodness.
The solution to the problem of evil is to be found in the
following words of St. Augustine: “Since God is supremely
good, by no means would He permit any evil in His works
unless He were powerful enough and good enough to bring
good out of evil.” 28 God can permit evil only for a greater
good. The manifestation of the splendor of God’s infinite jus­
tice and mercy is such a greater good that in many respects is
beyond our power of comprehension. This is certainly an
obscurity, but it is the very one of Christian faith, the ob­
scurity that results from the light being too strong for our
weak eyes, “the light inaccessible which God inhabits.” 24
The objections raised against the Thomist doctrine of pre­
destination state in equivalent words that this doctrine de­
stroys human liberty, that it is discouraging, and that it makes
God out to be an accepter of persons, which is a kind of in­
justice. These objections were raised by the Semipelagians
against St. Augustine. St. Paul puts the same question in one
of his epistles, when he says: “Is there injustice with God?
. . . O man, who art thou that repliest against God? . . .
Hath not the potter power to make one vessel unto honor,
and another unto dishonor?” 28
Contrary to what the Protestants and the Jansenists say, the
Thomists reply that the transcendent efficacy of the divine
decrees and grace, far from destroying our liberty or our
dominating indifference, actualizes it by causing in us and
with us that our acts be performed freely; for this latter is an
entity and a good, which comes as a necessary consequence
from the source of all reality and good.28
asEnchir., XI, 24.
24 I Tim. 6: 16.
2s Rom. 9: 14, 20, 21.
26 Loc. cit., la, q. 19. a.8; also Bossuet, Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.

THE POST-TRIDENTINE THOMISTS

181

To the second objection the Thomists reply that the doc­
trine of St. Thomas, far from being discouraging, brings out
into bold relief the formal motive of hope, which is not hu­
man effort but God’s infinite power to help. The formal
motive of a theological virtue cannot indeed be something cre­
ated; and the supernatural effort we make, aroused to this by
the efficacy of grace, cannot make this latter efficacious. It is
better, therefore, as St. Augustine said, to trust in God, who
is sovereignly good and omnipotent, rather than in ourselves,
and in our inconstancy and weakness; for, notwithstanding
the obscurity in the mystery, we are far surer of the rectitude
of the omnipotent God’s intentions than of our own. Bossuet
laid special stress on this point.27
Let no one, therefore, say: If I am predestined, whatever I
do I shall be saved; if not, whatever I do I shall be damned.
To speak thus is as false and absurd as it is for a farmer to say:
If the time for harvest is bound to come, whether I work and
sow the seed or not, it will come. The reason for this is that
predestination, like providence, concerns not only the end
but also the means that will enable us to obtain the end. The
Augustinian and Thomist doctrines, far from turning us
away from good works, as the Protestant doctrine does, urges
us to labor and strive so as to merit eternal life, telling us to
put our trust above all things in God, who alone can give
us the grace to persevere until the end, as the Council of
Trent says.
There would be acceptation of persons and therefore injus­
tice on God’s part, if He gave to one more help than to the
other, and refused what is due to the latter. But it is not so.
Grace is a gratuitous gift and God giants sufficient grace to all
those who have the obligation to keep His commandments.
If they resist it, they merit thus to be deprived of the effica­
cious help which was virtually offered to them in the pre2T Cf. Méditations sur l’Fvangile,
saints.

part., 72e jour: La prédestination des

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ceding grace. Thus, as St. Augustine said, if efficacious grace
is granted to a certain one, it is because of God’s mercy; if it
is refused to a certain other, it is because of His justice.28
It remains for us to consider the impenetrable mystery of
the intimate reconciliation of the two principles that clarify
all these problems. On the one hand, we have the principle
of predilection: no one thing woidd be better than another,
unless it were loved more by God; on the other hand, is the
principle that God never commands what is impossible, but
wills to make it possible for all to keep His commandments.
How are these two principles intimately reconciled? This
is beyond the natural powers of either the human or the
angelic intellect. It would be necessary for the intellect to
have received the light of glory so as to see how infinite justice,
mercy, and sovereign liberty are really identified, without
being destructive of one another, in the eminence of the
Deity, or in the intimate life of God.
The exposition we gave in the beginning of this work 29 of
the different theological opinions and their difficulties will
enable us the better to understand their classification and
comparison. It remains for us to combine the results of those
researches, and in this we shall be guided by the light of
revelation and the definitions of the Church.
28 Loc. cit., Ila Ilae, q.2, a.5 ad mm.
29 See part I, chap. 4.

SYNTHESIS

By way of synthesis we shall combine here the notions,
principles, and leading conclusions relative to predestination.
In formulating them we shall follow the terminology of St.
Thomas 1 and consider as he did: (i) the definition of predes­
tination; (2) its cause; (3) its certainty.
For reprobation we shall also follow his example. With
great insight he discusses it not in a question apart, as often
was done since his time, but in the very question on predes­
tination. One would destroy the harmonious blend of colors
in a picture, and the picture itself, by seeking to separate the
black from the white, the light from the shade.

CHAPTER I

How Shall We Define Predestination?

To destine means to ordain a thing or a person to something
determinate. In this sense we say that a certain object is
destined for the service of the altar and that soldiers about
to give up their lives for the safety of an army are destined
for death. In this sense the Third Council of Valencia (855),
in its third canon, spoke of the predestination of the wicked
to death in the following terms: “We unhesitatingly admit
the predestination of the elect to life and of the wicked to
death.’’ Then it immediately adds: “But God foreknew the
malice of the wicked, and because it was their own and He
was not the cause of it, He did not predestine it. The punish­
ment, of course, following their demerit, this He foreknew
1 Summa theol., la, q.23.
183

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and predestined.” 1 This means that God decided from all
eternity to inflict the penalty of damnation upon the wicked
for their sins, of which He is by no means the cause.
But the Scripture, the Church Fathers, and the theologians
generally understand by predestination: the divine preordi­
nation of the elect to glory and the means by which they will
infallibly obtain it. It is thus St. Augustine defined predesti­
nation, when he declared it to be: “The foreknowledge and
preparation of those gifts whereby whoever are liberated are
most certainly liberated.” 12 The first word of this definition,
“foreknowledge,” was previously explained by St. Augustine
in a work of his written about tire same time, when he said
that: “By predestination God foreknew those things which
He was going to do.” 3*It is not a question of a purely specu­
lative knowledge that is previous to the divine decree, but of
a practical knowledge that is subsequent to this decree.
Hence it follows that the certainty of which St. Augustine
speaks is a certainty not only of foreknowledge but also of
causality: “He foreknew those things which He was going to
do.” St. Augustine had already said on this point: “There­
fore aid was brought to the infirmity of the human will, so
that it might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by
divine grace.” * And he applied this definition to the pre­
destination of the good angels who received more help than
the others.5
St. Thomas in like manner defines predestination thus:
“The type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal
salvation, existing in the divine mind.” 6 And he states pre­
cisely that the certainty of this preordination is a certainty
not only of foreknowledge but also of causality; he says: “The
1 Denz., no. 322.
- De dono persever., chap. 14.
s De praed. sanct., chap. 10.
■> De corrept. et gratia, XII, 38.
3 De civ. Dei, XII, 9.
e Summa theol., la, q.23. a.2.

DEFINITION OF PREDESTINATION

185

number of the predestined is certain to God, not only by
way of knowledge, but also by way of principal preordina­
tion.” 7 St. Thomas develops this point in another of his
works.8
From this it follows that predestination, since it is the
efficacious ordination of the means of salvation to the end, is
an act of the divine intellect which presupposes an act of the
will. According to St. Thomas and the Thomists, it is a com­
mand that presupposes divine love and election.” God, in­
deed, ordains for Peter in preference to Judas the efficacious
means of salvation, because He wills efficaciously to save him,
because He loved him with a love of predilection and chose
him. St. Thomas expressly says: ‘‘Predestination presupposes
election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love.
The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above
(a. 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also pru­
dence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the order­
ing of some things towards an end. But nothing is directed
towards an end unless the will for that end already exists.
Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation pre­
supposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their sal­
vation; and to this belong both election and love: love,
inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
salvation ... ; election, inasmuch as He wills this good to
some in preference to others, since He reprobates some, as
stated above (a. 3). Election and love, however, are differently
ordained in God and in ourselves: because in us the will in
loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the
good that already exists; and therefore we choose someone
to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, how­
ever, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He
wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed
" Ibid., Ά."].
&De veritate, q.6, a.3.
9 Loc. cit., Ia, q.23. a.4: De veritate, q.6, a.i.

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by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
precedes election in the order of reason, and election pre­
cedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects
of election and love.” 10
This text, which ranks among the most important ones of
St. Thomas, proves especially three things: (i) That a pre­
destination only to grace has but the name of true pre­
destination, for it is common both to the elect and to many
reprobates who, having once been justified, were afterwards
estranged forever from God. (2) To speak of a predestination
to grace that would not presuppose predestination to glory,
is to forget that God wills the means only for the end, al­
though on His part there are not two successive acts, the
one referring to the end, and the other to the means. (3) If
in us love follows election, in the sense that we cherish those
whom we choose as lovable, which quality we did not cause
but found in them; in God, on the contrary, election, since
it is prior to predestination, follows love; for His creative
and conservative love, far from presupposing lovableness in
us, posits this in us, when He grants and preserves in us His
natural and supernatural gifts.
This is an application in the highest degree of the principle
of predilection: “Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in
things, no one thing would be better than another, if God
did not will greater good for one than for another.” 11 That
is why in the Scripture and Church Fathers, the predestined
are often called the elect and beloved.12 The following text
is worthy of notice: “Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess
you the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the
world.” 13
It follows, in fine, from the definition of predestination,
JO Ibid., la, q.23. a.4.
11 Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.
12 Matt. 20:16; 22:14; 24:22; Mark 13:20, 22; Rom. 8:33: Col. 3:12:
II Tim. 2: 10.
is Matt. 25: 34.

DEFINITION OF PREDESTINATION

187

as St. Thomas says, that it is, “as regards its object, a part of
providence.” 14 Providence, indeed, concerns the three orders
of grace, nature, and the hypostatic union, all of which are
ordained to the same supreme end, which is the manifesta­
tion of God’s goodness. But, whereas God’s general provi­
dence does not always attain certain particular ends, for these
are not always efficaciously but only antecedently and inefficaciously willed by Him, predestination, to be sure, always
and infallibly leads the elect to eternal life, which God
efficaciously wills for them.
IS THIS CONCEPTION OF PREDESTINATION THE KIND

Which scripture speaks of?

This predestination by which God directs infallibly cer­
tain persons rather than others to eternal life is affirmed by
revelation, whatever the Pelagians and Semipelagians may
say about it. Our Lord Jesus Christ said to those who mur­
mured at what He was saying to them, that “no man can come
to Me, except the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him; and
I will raise him up in the last day.” 15 On several occasions
He speaks of the elect,18 and He says that no one will be able
to snatch them out of His Father’s hand. “My sheep hear My
voice. . . . And I give them life everlasting; and they shall
not perish for ever, and no man shall pluck them out of My
hand. That which My Father hath given Me is greater than
all: and no one can snatch them out of the hand of My
Father.” 17 This shows that God not only knows beforehand
who are the elect, but that He also loved them, chose them
in preference to others, and that He keeps them infallibly
in His hand, which means that they are protected by His
omnipotence.
1* Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.i.
io John 6: 44.
ie Matt. 20: 16: 22: 14; 24: 22; Mark 13: 20, 22.
17 John 10: 27-29.

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This is precisely St. Paul’s point of view, for he says: “And
we know that to them that love God, all things work together
unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called
to be saints. For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated.
. . . And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And
whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He
justified, them He also glorified.” 18 These are the infallible
effects of eternal predestination. Let us note concerning the
words “whom He foreknew” in the text just quoted that it
is not said: at least those whose conditional merits He fore­
knew, and that this same expression, “whom He foreknew,”
means “whom He knew beforehand with a look of benevo­
lence,” and it applies not only to adults but also to the chil­
dren who will die soon after baptism, so as to be unable to
merit their reward. St. Augustine said on this subject: “By
predestination God foreknew those things which He was go­
ing to do.” 18 Later on St. Thomas understood this text to
mean: “Those whom He benevolently foresaw, He chose and
predestined,” and he saw the normal sequence in these acts,
in which the final practical judgment is first; then comes
election, and afterward command followed by its execution:
in other words, vocation, justification, glorification.20 These
acts, in St. Paul’s judgment, presuppose a divine intention
expressed by him in the passage just quoted, for he says:
“Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made con­
formable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first­
born amongst many brethren.” 21
Such is the divine intention that inspires all these acts; it
is in conjunction with that of God’s glory and the manifesta­
tion of His goodness as stated by St. Paul: “That He might
show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which
is Rom. 8: 28-30.
1» De praed. sand., chap. 10, no. 19: cf. De dono persever., chap. 18, no. 47.
20 Loc. cit., la, q.23, a. 1, 4.
21 Rom. 8: 29.

DEFINITION OF PREDESTINATION

189

He hath prepared unto glory.” 22 Just as plainly did St. Paul
refer to election, for he writes: “He (God) chose us in Him
(Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should
be holy. . .
23 He insisted on the sovereignly free character
of this election, saying: “In whom we also are called by lot,
being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who
worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” 24
St. Augustine, too, was able to write against the Semipela­
gians as follows: “No one who sought to avoid falling into
error, could argue against this predestination which we
defend in accordance with Holy Scripture.” 20
Moreover, evidently there is not anything done by God in
time which was not preordained by Him from all eternity;
otherwise He would begin to will something in time, or
something would happen by chance apart from any intention
or permission on His part, which is absurd. Now, it is God
who, in time, brings certain persons to eternal happiness,
which is beyond the natural powers of any created being to
attain. He therefore preordained from all eternity to bring
them to it, and this is predestination. It is therefore an es­
tablished fact that predestination is beyond the possibility
of any doubt. Furthermore, without predestination no one
would attain eternal happiness; because every good comes
from God, especially salvation and the culmination of this,
which is eternal happiness; for this is of the supernatural
order, and is absolutely beyond the natural powers of any
created or creatable being.
The Semipelagians raised the following objection: if there
is an infallible predestination, then I am either predestined
or not. If I am, whatever I do I shall infallibly be saved; if I
am not, whatever I do I shall infallibly be damned. I can
22 Ibid., g: 23: c£. Eph. 1: 12.
23 Eph. 1: 4.
2< Ibid., 1:11.
23 De dono persever., chap. ig.

ιθο

PREDESTINATION

therefore do whatever I please. St. Augustine replied at once
to the Semipelagians, pointing out that if this reasoning
were of any value, it would prevent us from admitting not
only the fact of predestination, but also that of God’s fore­
knowledge, which is admitted, however, by the Semipela­
gians.28 The Thomists replied in the same way to a similar
objection raised against them by the Molinists.
Several saints went on further to remark that if there were
any foundation for this Semipelagian dilemma, the demons
by the natural vigor of their intellect would grasp the truth
of this far better than we do and would no longer take the
trouble to tempt us. There are even some saints who replied
to the demon by turning against him this sophism, whereby
he intended to plunge them into despair, and saying: “If I
am not predestined, even without your efforts to have me
lose my soul, I shall be lost; and if I am predestined, what­
ever you do, I shall be saved.”
The decisive reply to this objection is given by St. Thomas.
He states that providence, of which predestination is a part,
does not suppress the secondary causes and concerns not only
the final effect, but also the means or the secondary causes
that must produce this effect. God does not predestine, there­
fore, the adults to the end, that is, to glory, without predestin­
ing them to the means, that is, to salutary and meritorious
good works whereby this end can and must be obtained by
them.27
The Semipelagian sophism is as false as that of the plow­
man who would say: If God has foreseen that next summer
I shall have wheat, whether I sow the seed or not, I shall
have it. “Let us not deny what is very clear,” says St. Augus­
tine, “because we do not understand what is hidden.” 28 In
2β ibid., chap. 15.
27 Loc. cit., la, q.23, a. 8.
a» De done persever., chap. 14.

DEFINITION OF PREDESTINATION

191

truth, according to the dispensation of Providence that con­
cerns the end and the means, without violating liberty, as
wheat is obtained only by the sowing of the seed, so adults
obtain eternal life only by the performance of good works.
It is in this sense that Peter says: “Labor the more, that
by good works you may make sure your calling and elec­
tion.” 29 Although election is eternal on God’s part, yet in
the order of execution, it is in time and by means of good
works that this is effected in us. We must not confuse the
two vistas of time and eternity. By God’s eternal predestina­
tion grace is given to the elect, not that they may let them­
selves get into a state of spiritual torpor, but it is given
precisely for the purpose that they may work out their salva­
tion. As St. Augustine says, it is given for them to act, not
for them to remain inactive. Such are the principal con­
sequences deduced from the definition and existence of pre­
destination.
HOW SHALL WE DEFINE REPROBATION?

The term reprobation is commonly used in reference to
our rejection of an error of judgment by the intellect, and
in reference to the moral disorder which we reject by a judg­
ment of the intellect and by an aversion of the will. In this
sense the Scripture speaks of those whom God reprobated
from all eternity. Thus St. Paul writes: “I chastise my body
. . . lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself
should become a castaway.” 30 The Scripture also makes use
of equivalent words and expressions, such as: “cursed,” 31
“vessels of wrath and dishonor,” 32 “child of hell,” 33 “son of
as II Pet. 1: to.
so I Cor. 9: 27.
si Matt. 25: 41.
32 Rom. 9: 21 f.
33 Matt. 23: 15.

• 92

PREDESTINATION

perdition.” 34 The fact that certain persons are reprobated
has therefore the certainty of faith.
St. Thomas explains it by remarking that it belongs to
God’s universal providence to permit for the general good
of the universe the failure or deficiency of certain defectible
creatures, otherwise spoken of as physical and moral evil.
Thus Providence permits the death of the gazelle for the
life of the lion, and the crime of persecutors for the heroic
patience of the martyrs. Now intellectual creatures, since they
are by nature defectible, are ordained to eternal life by
divine providence. It pertains, therefore, to this latter to
permit, for a greater good, that certain persons fail and do
not attain this end. This is called negative reprobation, quite
distinct from positive reprobation that inflicts the penalty
of damnation for the sin of final impenitence.35
Nothing, however, happens that God from all eternity has
not either willed, if it is a good, or has not permitted, if it is
an evil. Now, according to revelation, certain persons are
lost through their own fault and are eternally punished.38
This would not happen, therefore, unless God from all eter­
nity had permitted their failure to do their duty—of which,
moreover, He is by no means the cause—and if He had not
decided to punish them for it.
Is reprobation simply the denial of predestination? It im­
plies the divine permission of the sin of final impenitence
(negative reprobation), and the divine will to inflict the
penalty of damnation for this sin (positive reprobation). If
reprobation were simply the denial of predestination, it
would not be an act of providence, and the penalty of damna­
tion would not be inflicted by God. St. Thomas says: “As
predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory;
so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to
»4 John 17: 12.
Loc. cit., la, q.23· a.3.
·’« Matt. 25: 41.

DEFINITION OF PREDESTINATION

193

fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation
on account of that sin.” 37
Having defined predestination and reprobation, we must
now seek their cause.
s’ Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.3

CHAPTER II
The Cause of Predestination

What is the cause of the predestination and of the election

whereby God chose certain persons in preference to others
for the purpose of bringing them to eternal life?
The liberty of the divine election in the Old Testament
comes to our mind. Seth was elected, and not Cain; then
Noe, also Sem in preference to his two brothers; after this,
Abraham, Isaac in preference to Ismael, and finally Jacob
(Israel) was chosen. How does the case stand now as regards
each of the elect?
We saw from the definitions of the Church in the councils
of Carthage (418) and Orange (529), directed against the
Pelagians and Semipelagians, that the cause of predestina­
tion cannot be the naturally good works of certain persons
which are foreseen by God, or the naturally good beginning
of the will in performing a salutary act (initium salutis), or
the perseverance in good works until death without a special
grace.1
According to the same definitions of the councils of
Orange 2 and Trent,8 which refer to the special grace of final
perseverance, it is also beyond doubt that the cause of pre­
destination to glory cannot be because God foresees that cer­
tain persons without a special grace would retain their super­
natural merits until death: “If anyone saith that one justified
is able to persevere without the special help of God in the
iDenz., no. 183.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., nos. 806, 826, 832.

>94

THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

195

justice received; or that with this help is not able; let him
be anathema.” ♦ St. Thomas, moreover, proves inadmissible
the opinion of those who say that God chose these particular
persons in preference to others because He foreknew that
they would make good use of the grace received (at least
at the moment of death), just as the king gives a fine horse
to a rider because he foresees the good use he will make of
it. St. Thomas points out that this opinion cannot be ad­
mitted; for we cannot eliminate from our salutary acts a
part of the good as not coming from the primary cause that
is the source of all good; therefore the good use of grace in
the elect is itself an effect of predestination, and cannot there­
fore be its cause or motive. Furthermore, St. Thomas even
says: ‘‘Whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salva­
tion, is all included under the effect of predestination,” 5 and
therefore this includes even the free determination of his
salutary acts.
Is this reply of St. Thomas a cogent reply to the Molinist
opinion that maintains the cause of our predestination to
glory to be because God foresaw our merits? We leave this
for our readers to judge.
Let us recall that, according to the principle of predilec­
tion, the cause of predestination and election whereby God
chose certain persons in preference to others so as to bring
them to eternal life, is not the fact of their foreseen merits
but pure mercy, as all the Thomists, Augustinians, Scotists,
Bellarmine, too, and Suarez say, who on this point are in
agreement with St. Augustine and St. Thomas.
The foundation of the principle of predilection is not only
an established fact of the natural order, but it is also a re­
vealed truth. The Old and New Testaments make use of
most varying expressions to tell us that without exception
all good comes from God, from God’s love: that there is no
< Ibid., no. 832: cf. nos. 804, 806.
» Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

good which God by His love has not efficaciously willed: that
everything which God wills effectively comes to pass: that
no evil, either physical or moral, happens and happens in
this particular place rather than that without God’s permis­
sion. These are the most universal of principles, and they
dominate the whole question. Reference was made to them
at the opening of the Council of Thuzey (860) in the follow­
ing terms: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in
heaven and in earth,® the final perseverance of Peter, for in­
stance, in preference to that of Judas. For nothing is done in
heaven or in earth, except what it has pleased Him to do
if it is a good or what He has justly permitted to happen if
it is an evil.” 7
We find this fundamental truth expressed in very many
texts both of the Old and New Testaments. Thus w'e have:
“Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works for us”;8 “Thou
art Lord of all and there is none that can resist Thy maj­
esty”; 9 “O Lord, king of gods, and of all power . . . turn
his (king’s) heart to the hatred of our enemy”; 10 “And God
changed the king’s spirit into mildness”; 11 “As the division
of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord:
whithersoever He will He shall turn it”; 12 “As the potter’s
clay is in his hand ... so man is in the hand of Him that
made him”; 13 “I will cause you to walk in My command­
ments”; 14 “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will
and to accomplish.” 15 Several of these texts and similar ones
are quoted by the Council of Orange18 to show that every
e Ps. 134: 6.
τ PL, CXXVI, 123.
8 Is. 26: 12.
0 Esther 13: 11.
10 Ibid., 14: 12 f.
11 Ibid., 15: 11.
12 Prov. 21:1.
is Eccli. 33: 13.
i* Ezech. 36: 27.
IS Phil. 2: 13.
is Denz., nos. 176-200.

THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

197

good comes from God and that nothing good happens with­
out His having efficaciously willed it.
This foundation for the principle of predilection, to which
the Council of Thuzey refers, is not only often expressed in
Scripture, but the very principle itself is formulated in
equivalent words by St. Paul, when he says: “For what distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not re­
ceived?” 17 “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of
ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God.” 18
St. Paul even finds that the principle of predilection is ex­
pressed in the Book of Exodus,19 for he writes: “What shall
we say then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid! For
He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have
mercy. And I will show mercy, to whom I will show mercy.
So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that run­
neth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 20 We read, too, in
the Book of Psalms: “He saved me because He was well
pleased with me”; 21 “The salvation of the just is from the
Lord”; 22 “The mercies of the Lord that we are not con­
sumed.” 23 Temporal salvation is the image of eternal salva­
tion. We read, too, in the Book of Tobias these admirable
words announcing what will be explicitly made known to
us in the fulness of revelation: “He hath chastised us for our
iniquities, and He shall save us for His own mercy.” 24
Our Lord Himself spoke in the same sense: “I confess to
Thee, O Father . . . because Thou hast hid these things
from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them to little
ones. Yea, Father: for so hath it seemed good in Thy sight.” 25
>71 Cor. 4: 7.
is Π Cor. 3: 5.
is Ex. 33: 19.
20 Rom. 9: 14-16.
21 Ps. 17: 20.
22 ibid., 36: 39.
23 Lam. 3: 22.
24Tob. 13: 5.
25 Matt. 11: 25.

i g8

PREDESTINATION

According to this text, the little ones received more light
and help because such was God’s good pleasure, who loved
them more. In like manner, our Lord said to His disciples:
“Fear not, little flock, for it hath pleased your Father to give
you a kingdom.” 26 Of the elect our Lord said again that
no one can snatch them from His Father’s hand,27 which
means, without reference to the foreseen merits of the elect,
the Father’s special love for them and the infallibly efficacious
help which He will grant them, so as to have them merit
until death and save them. “None of them is lost but the
son of perdition.” 28
Finally, in St. Paul’s epistles the notions of election and
predestination are more clearly defined, and this throws new
light on the motive of predestination, as in the following
text: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual blessings in
heavenly places, in Christ. As He chose us in Him before the
foundation of the world, that we should be holy and un­
spotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto
Himself, according to the purpose of His will, unto the
praise of the glory of His grace. ... In whom we also are
called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose
of Him who worketh all things according to the counsel of
His will.” 28
This text, as many theologians, like Bellarmine and Suarez,
have remarked along with the Thomists, contains three
principal assertions: (i) God chose us, not because He fore­
saw that, if we were placed in certain circumstances, with a
certain sufficient grace, we would become holy rather than
others who were equally helped; but He chose us that we
may be holy. (2) God thus chose us and consequently pre2« Luke 12: 32.
27 John 10: 28 ft.
28 Ibid., 17: 12.
2» Eph. 1: 3-6, 11.

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destined us, according to the purpose or decree of His will,
according to His good pleasure, which is again pointed out
in verse eleven. That denotes the order of intention, in
which the end precedes the means. (3) Unto the praise and
glory of His grace, so as to bring into prominence in the
order of execution, not the power of the created free will
but the glory of His divine grace, in accordance with the
following text: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him
that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 30
Moreover, it cannot be merely predestination to grace that
is implied in these texts, since this latter is common both
to the elect and to the reprobates. It is a question of true
predestination that includes the decree to grant not only the
grace of justification, but the special gift of final persever­
ance, which, strictly speaking, cannot be merited by us. On
this point the Council of Trent, quoting St. Paul,81 says:
“God is able to establish him who standeth that he stand
perseveringly, and to restore him who falleth.” 32 It also re­
calls to mind these words of the Apostle: “Wherefore, my
dearly beloved . . . with fear and trembling work out your
salvation. For it is God who worketh in you, both to will
and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 33
Finally, almost all theologians who admitted the absolute
gratuity of predestination to salvation appealed in support
of this doctrine to St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans34 in
which, speaking of the predestination of the Gentiles and
the reprobation of the Jew's, he formulates general principles
that are evidently applicable, as Father Lagrange remarks,3’
to individuals, in accordance with the principle that “God
works in us [in each of us] both to will and to accomplish,
so Rom. g: 16.
si Ibid., 14:4.
32 Denz., 806.
33 Phil. 2: 12 f.
34 See chaps. 8, g, 11.
so Com. sur l'épitre aux Rom., chap. g.

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according to His good will.” 38 Moreover, St. Paul even says:
“That He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels
of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory. Whom also He
hath called, not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles.” 37
From this we see that he has in mind not only nations but
also individuals who will become, as he expressed it, vessels
of glory or of ignominy. In like manner, when he says:
“Whom He predestined, them He also called . . . justified
. . . and glorified,” 38 this refers to individuals.
We saw that in the words of the preceding verse, “Whom
He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to
the image of His Son,” the expression “whom He foreknew”
refers to those whom He previously looked upon with
benevolence, which is applicable even to children who died
so soon after baptism so as not to have had time for merit­
ing. The expression “whom He foreknew” does not mean
therefore “whose merits He foreknew.”
What then are the general principles formulated here by
St. Paul on the question of predestination? He defined it as
“purpose of God,” 39 “Purpose of God according to elec­
tion,” 40 “according to the election of grace,” 41 which means
a purpose or resolution according to a gratuitous election,
for he adds: “And if by grace, it is not now by works, other­
wise grace is no more grace.” 42
St. Paul explains, too, in this epistle the properties and
effects of predestination, for he says: “All things work to­
gether unto good, to such as according to His purpose, are
called to be saints.” 43 And immediately afterward he enu­
merates the three effects of predestination: vocation, justifica­
re Phil. 2: 13.
37 Rom. 9: 23 f.
se Ibid., 8: 30.
s» Ibid., 8: 28.
•»0 Ibid., 9: 11.
«1 Ibid., 11:5.
<2 Ibid., 11:6.
<3 Ibid., 8: 28.

THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

201

tion, and glorification, which, strictly speaking, apply to
individuals. Finally, he points out its infallible efficacy, which
he attributes not to the effort made by our will, but to God’s
omnipotence, saying: “If God be for us who is against us?” 44
As for the cause of predestination, he does not ascribe this
to the foreknowledge of our merits, but to God’s special
mercy, saying with Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I
will have mercy. And I will show mercy, to whom I will
show mercy.” 45*Hence it follows that “it is not of him that
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth
mercy.” 40
Finally, he proves this last assertion by an irrefutable
principle which is the principle of predilection in a new
form, for he writes: “Who hath first given to Him, and rec­
ompense shall be made Him. For of Him and by Him and
in Him, are all things.” 47 It is always to this supreme princi­
ple that he appeals, as when he asks: “For who distinguished!
thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 48
What St. Paul means in all these texts, finds its confirma­
tion in his answer to the objections which he puts to him­
self, and which were taken up later on by the Pelagians and
Semipelagians: “Hath not the potter power over the clay,
of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor and an­
other unto dishonor? What if God, willing to show His
wrath, His avenging justice, and to make His power known,
endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for de­
struction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the
vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory, where
is the injustice?” 48
St. Augustine and St. Thomas saw in all these texts of
44 Ibid., 8: 31.
45 Ibid., 9: 15.
48 Ibid., 9: 16.
47 Ibid., 11: 35 f.
48 I Cor. 4: 7.
48 Rom. 9: 21-23.

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PREDESTINATION

St. Paul the gratuity of predestination to eternal life. In
other words, they perceived the motive of this to be a special
mercy. St. Augustine often said that if God grants final per­
severance to this particular person, it is by reason of His
mercy; if He does not grant it to that other person, it is
because of just punishment of sins, in the generality of cases
repeated, and which have estranged the soul from God.50 St.
Thomas51 and St. Prosper declared the same in these words
retained by the Council of Quierzy: “That certain persons
are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; but that certain per­
sons are lost, is the fault of those who are lost.” 52
This explains the attitude of theologians such as Tanquerey who, after giving us an analysis of what St. Paul said
on predestination, writes as follows: “Moreover, all these
utterances are nothing else but the very thesis of the Tho­
mists; for they presuppose that God of His good pleasure elects
us to glory, and that all good things are the result of this
election, even our merits.” 58
In addition to these reasons which are taken from Holy
Scripture and which constitute the foundation of St. Thomas’
doctrine on the cause of predestination, 54 we have the argu­
ment of theological reasoning which the holy Doctor gives
as follows: “Predestination is a part of providence. Now
providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the in­
tellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end.
But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for
that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some
to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that
God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election
and love.” 55
so De praed. sanet., VIII.
si Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 311m; Ila llae, q.2, a.5 ad mm.
sa Denz., no. 318.
s» Synopsis theol. dogmat., Vol. II, De Deo uno, p. 325, ed. 1926.
so Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.5.
ss Ibid., la, q.23. a.4.

THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

203

In other words, whoever acts wisely, wills the end before
the means. Now God acts with sovereign wisdom, and grace
is the means with reference to glory or salvation. Therefore
God first wills glory to His elect, and then the grace so as
to have them attain it. St. Thomas, as we see, was in advance
of Scotus in the presentation of this theological argument,
and on this point Bellarmine and Suarez are in agreement
with him.
This is one of the points that illustrate most clearly how
St. Thomas and the greatest theologians along with him fear
neither logic nor mystery. It is logic itself that leads them to
the transcendence of the mystery, which is an object of con­
templation far above reasoning.
Thus the motive of predestination becomes clear and, at
the same time, that of negative reprobation as explained by
St. Thomas in the following words: “The reason for the
predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be
sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have
made all things through His goodness, so that the divine
goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided,
should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because
creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of
God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe, there
are required different grades of being; some of which hold a
high and some a low place in the universe. That this multi­
formity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows
some evils, lest many good things should never happen. Let
us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider
the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in
men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of
His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom
He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them.
This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.
To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. g: 22-23): ‘What

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if God, willing to show His wrath, that is, the vengeance of
His justice, and to make His power known, endured, that is,
permitted with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for
destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.’
And elsewhere the same Apostle wrote (II Tim. 2: 20): ‘But
in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver,
but also of wood and earth; and some, indeed, unto honour,
but some unto dishonour.’ Yet why He chooses some for
glory, and reprobates others has no reason except the divine
will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. XXVI in Joan.): ‘Why He
draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge if
thou dost not wish to err.’ Thus, too, in the things of nature,
a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether
uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the
beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of
nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this
particular form, and that under another, depends upon the
simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer
it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall and that
in another; although the plan requires that some stones
should be in this place and some in that place. Neither on
this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He
prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be
altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of
predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously.
In things which are given gratuitously a person can give
more or less, just as he pleases provided he deprives nobody
of his due, without any infringement of justice. This is what
the master of the house said: ‘Take what is thine and go thy
way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?’ ” (Matt. 20: 1415.)58
What is due to each one, what God refuses to nobody, is
™ Ibid., la, q. 23, a.5 ad 311m.

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205

sufficient grace for salvation, which makes it really possible
to keep the commandments, for God never commands what
is impossible. As for efficacious grace, especially the grace oi
final perseverance, this He grants by reason of His mercy.
But of the adults, only those are deprived of it who through
their own fault refuse to accept it. The doctors of the Church
often pointed this out in the comparison they drew between
the death of the good thief and that of Judas who resisted
the final appeal of grace.
The general motive for predestination is, therefore, the
manifestation of God’s goodness that assumes the form of
mercy in pardoning; and the motive for the predestination
of this particular person rather than a certain other, is God’s
good pleasure. If it be so, how shall we formulate in exact
terms the motive for either positive or negative reprobation?

CHAPTER III
The Motive

for

Reprobation

First of all it is clear that the positive reprobation of angels
and men presupposes that their demerits were foreseen; for
God can will to inflict the penalty of damnation only for
failure in doing one’s duty. In this all Catholics agree that
God wills not the death of the sinner, but that he be con­
verted and live.1 The theologians often quote these words
of God uttered by the prophet: “Destruction is thy own, O
Israel: thy help is only in Me.” 2
Moreover, it is evident that God can will a thing only in
so far as it is good; and for punishment to be good and just,
this presupposes a sin. In this it differs from reward, which
is good in itself, regardless of merits. Reward, in virtue of its
being an excellent gift, can be willed in the order of inten­
tion before foreseen merits, although in the order of execu­
tion and in virtue of its being a reward, it depends upon
them. We cannot say as much about punishment, nor look
for an absolute parallelism between good and evil.
The motive for negative reprobation, taken absolutely or
in a general way, is not the foreseen demerits of the repro­
bates; for this negative reprobation is nothing else but the
divine permission of these demerits, and therefore it logically
precedes instead of following the foreseeing of them. With­
out this divine permission, these demerits would not happen
in time, and from all eternity they would remain unfore­
seen. We must say, in accordance with the text just quoted
i Ezech. 33: 11; II Pet. 3:9.
2Osee 13: 9.
206

THE MOTIVE FOR REPROBATION

207

from St. Thomas,3 that the motive for negative reprobation
is that God willed to manifest His goodness not only by
means of His mercy, but also by means of His justice, and
that it belongs to Providence to permit certain defectible
beings to fail and certain evils to happen, without which
there would be no good things of a higher order.
If we ask why God chose this person and not that other,
there is, as we have seen from St. Thomas, no reason for
this but simply the divine will which is thus the motive both
for individual predestination and the negative reprobation
of this particular person rather than that other. In other
words, among equally defectible rational creatures, why the
defection of this particular person is permitted rather than
of a certain other, there is no reason for this but the divine
will. And somehow all Catholic theologians admit it, for all
of them must admit at least that God could have preserved
intact those who are lost, and permitted the fall of those who
are saved.
The principal difficulty that confronts us here is this: the
will to manifest the splendor of avenging justice before hav­
ing foreseen the defection, is to will the punishment before
the defection, and this is an injustice. Now, such would be
the case according to the preceding explanation. Therefore
it is inadmissible.
The Thomists reply by denying the major, because it con­
founds infinite justice with the punishment that is a mani­
festation of this justice. As a matter of fact, God does not will
to permit the defection because of His love to chastise, for
that would be repugnant to justice. But He permits it as a
manifestation of His infinite justice and of the right of
sovereign Good to be loved above all things, and He after­
ward inflicts the punishment on account of the defection.
In this way the punishment is but a finite means of mani­
festing infinite justice, and it is a means that is not an inter3 Summa theol., la, q.23, a.5 ad 3um.

2o8

PREDESTINATION

mediate end willed before the permission of the defection,
for it is good and just to punish only for a defection. There­
fore, most certainly God wills to permit sin, not from love
of imposing a finite chastisement, but from love of His in­
finite justice, or from love of His sovereign goodness that
has a right to be loved above all things. Finally, when God
wills to manifest His avenging justice, this truly presupposes
the possibility of sin, but not as yet that He permits or fore­
sees it. The case is quite different when He wills to inflict
the punishment of damnation.
Still the objection is raised that “God forsakes not those
who have been justified, unless He be first forsaken by them,"
as the Council of Trent says.4 Now this would be so if He
willed to permit the defection or the sin before He foresaw
it.
To this we must reply: (i) This text of the Council is
taken from St. Augustine,6 who admitted, however, that
negative reprobation or the permission of sin is logically
prior to the foreseeing of the same; (2) this text refers not
to all men, but to the just, and it means that God does not
deprive them of habitual or sanctifying grace except for mor­
tal sin; (3) it means again in a more general way that nobody
is deprived of an efficacious grace that is necessary for salva­
tion except through his own fault, for God never commands
what is impossible; (4) but this defect, on account of which
God refuses efficacious grace, would not happen without
God’s permission, which is certainly not its cause but its
indispensable condition. We must therefore distinguish be­
tween God’s mere permission of sin, which is evidently prior
to the sin permitted, and His refusal of efficacious grace on
account of this sin. This refusal is a punishment that pre­
supposes the defect, whereas the defect presupposes the divine
permission.
« Denz., no. 804.
s De natura el gratia, XXVI, 29.

THE MOTIVE FOR REPROBATION

209

God’s permission of sin, which is good in view of the end
(for a greater good), implies certainly the non-continuance
of the created will in the performance of good at that par­
ticular time. This non-continuance, not being something real,
is not a good; but neither is it an evil, for it is not the
privation of a good that is due to one; it is merely the nega­
tion of a good that is not due to one. Undoubtedly God is
bound to maintain in existence a spiritual and created will,
but He is not bound to maintain in the performance of good
this will which by its nature is defectible. If God were bound
to do so, sin would never happen, and the sinlessness of Mary
would not be a privilege. The non-continuance of our will
in the performance of good is not an evil, either of sin or of
punishment; it is a non-good: just as nescience is not ignor­
ance, but a negation and not a privation. On the contrary,
God’s withdrawal of efficacious grace is a punishment, and it
is a punishment that presupposes at least a first defection.
We may still say with St. Thomas" that, after a first sin,
the divine permission of a second and a third sin is already
a punishment for the first. But we could not say this for
God’s permission of the first sin, and the Council of Trent
just quoted cannot be applied to it.
It is certain that God’s permission of the first sin is not
subsequent to the foreseeing of it; for He can foresee a defect
only in so far as He permits it; and without His permission
it would never happen.
As a final objection, we may say that we understand, more­
over, God permitting any sin whatever, especially in the life
of the elect; for this sin is permitted only for a greater good
that concerns them personally, which is to make them more
truly humble. But how are we to explain God permitting the
sin of final impenitence?
In reply to this we must say that as a rule the sin of final
impenitence is permitted by God only as a punishment for
0 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.79. a.3.

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PREDESTINATION

many other defects and for finally resisting His last appeal.
St. Thomas writes: “The cause of grace being withheld is
not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God
who, of His own accord, withholds His grace.” 7
Certainly there is a very great mystery in this, the most
obscure of all those that concern us here; for the mysteries
of iniquity are obscure in themselves, whereas the mysteries
of grace are supremely luminous in themselves and obscure
only for us. There is something that surpasses understanding
in this, that God permits the final impenitence of some, for
instance, of the bad thief rather than of the other, as a punish­
ment for previous grave defects and for a greater good, which
includes the manifestation of the splendor of infinite justice.
We must acknowledge that this proposition is the most
obscure of all those formulated by us. But to show that no
believer can deny it, we must take into direct consideration
the contradictory proposition, and we shall see that no in­
tellect can succeed in proving it. No one can establish the
truth of this assertion, namely: God cannot permit the final
impenitence of a sinner, of the bad thief, for instance, as a
punishment for his preceding defects and in manifestation
of the divine infinite justice. This assertion cannot be proved.
Moreover, to deny the possibility of God’s permission of sin,
would be to deny the possibility of sin: contra factum non
valet ratio.
On the splendor of divine justice, it is worth noting what
St. Thomas says, when asking whether angels grieve for the
ills of those whom they guard. He replies in the negative,
and the reason He gives is: “because their will cleaves en­
tirely to the ordering of divine justice; while nothing hap­
pens in the world save what is effected or permitted by divine
justice.” 8 The author of the Imitation sets forth this splen7 ibid., q.79, a.g.
s Ibid., la, q. 113, a.7.

THE MOTIVE FOR REPROBATION

211

dor of divine justice when he says: “Be now solicitous and
sorrowful because of thy sins, that at the day of judgment
thou mayest be secure with the blessed. . . . Then shall he
stand to judge them, who doth now humbly submit himself
to the censures of men. Then shall the poor and humble
have great confidence, but the proud man shall be compassed
with fear on every side.” 9
The question has been raised whether original sin is a
sufficient motive for reprobation. Evidently not so, if it is
a question of reprobates who have been freed from original
sin, although the effects of this sin remain in them, such as
concupiscence that inclines one to evil. But the case is not
the same for unbaptized children who die before the age of
reason. Because of original sin they are deprived of the bea­
tific vision, though they do not have to suffer the punish­
ment of the senses.10
Included among the effects of reprobation are: (i) The
permission of sins that will not be forgiven; (2) God’s refusal
of grace; (3) blinding of the intellect; (4) hardening of the
heart; (5) the punishment of damnation. Sin itself is not the
effect of reprobation, for God is in no way the cause of sin,
either directly or indirectly, through lack of help. This lack
of help would be neglect on God’s part, and this is an ab­
surdity.
As for moral defection that is permitted by God, this serves
to show by way of contrast the value and power of divine
grace that makes one faithful. It is in this sense that St. Paul
said: “God . . . endured with much patience vessels of
wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches
of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared
unto glory.”11 And again, when he says: “Who hath prev Imitation, Bk. I, chap. 24, no. 4.
10 Denz., nos. 410, 1526.
11 Rom. 9: 22 £.

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PREDESTINATION

destinated us . . . according to the purpose of His will, unto
the praise of the glory of His grace.” 12
Having discussed the motives for predestination and repro­
bation, it remains for us to consider the certainty of these.
12

Eph. i: 5 f.

CHAPTER IV
On

the

Certainty of Predestination

This question can be viewed in two ways: (i) Is predestina­

tion a certainty so that its effect will infallibly come to pass?
(2) Can we be certain in this life of being predestined?
THE INFALLIBILITY OF PREDESTINATION

Predestination is absolutely certain as regards the infallible
positing of its effects, which are vocation, justification, and
glorification. Revelation affirms this by the words of our
Lord in the texts already quoted, which are: “Now this is
the will of the Father who sent Me: that of all that He hath
given Me, I should lose nothing. . . . My sheep hear My
voice . . . and they shall not perish for ever. And no man
shall pluck them out of My hand.” 1
This infallible certainty of predestination is indicated in
the definition given by St. Augustine, who says that it is
“the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of
God whereby they who are liberated are most certainly liber­
ated.” 12 This infallibility has on various occasions been af­
firmed by the councils.3
But the question is whether this certainty of predestina­
tion is merely a certainty of foreknowledge or also one of
causality. There is no doubt that the certainty of God’s fore­
knowledge of sin is merely a certainty of foreknowledge and
1 John 6: 39; 10: 27-28.
2 De dono pcrsever., chap. 14, no. 35.
s Denz., nos. 300, 316, 321, 1,784.
213

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PREDESTINATION

not of causality, since God cannot be either directly or in­
directly the cause of sin, and so the foreknown are distin­
guished from the predestined. The Council of Valencia held
in 855 said: “God foreknew the malice of the wicked be­
cause it was their own doing; He did not predestinate it,
because He was not the cause of it." 4 What is the certainty
of predestination as regards the free determination of the
salutary acts of the elect? If we take the view that God does
not cause in us and with us this determination and the free
mode of the same, we shall see in this but a certainty of fore­
knowledge. If we are of the opinion, on the contrary, that
God causes infallibly, powerfully, and suavely, this salutary
determination and its free mode, we shall see in this not
only a certainty of foreknowledge but also of casuality.
Is not this last point expressly stated by our Lord when He
says: “No man shall pluck them out of My hand"? 5 We have
the confirmation of this, too, in St. Augustine’s definition
just quoted. St. Augustine has even clearly affirmed both
these certainties in the following words: “If any of these
[the elect] perishes, God is deceived; but none of them
perishes because God is not deceived. If any of these perishes,
God is conquered by human vice; but none of them perishes,
because God is invincible.” 0
St. Thomas speaks in still clearer terms: “Since predestina­
tion includes the divine will as stated above [q. 19, a. 3, 8],
the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the
supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability
of the divine will, but it is not necessary absolutely; so the
same must be said of predestination.” ’ Predestination in­
cludes the consequent or efficacious will of saving the elect,
and St. Thomas pointed out that “whatever God simply wills
4 Ibid., no. 322.
6 John 10: 28.
0 De corrept. et gratia, chap. 7.
r Summa theol., la, q.23, a.6 ad 311m.

THE CERTAINTY OF PREDESTINATION

215

takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not
take place.” 8
In another of his works, St. Thomas states the case still
more clearly: ‘‘It cannot be said that certainty of knowledge
is the only thing superadded to providence by predestina­
tion; this is tantamount to saying that God ordains the one
predestined to salvation as He does anyone else, but that in
the case of the one predestined He knows that he will not
fail to be saved. In such a case, to be sure, there would be no
difference between the one predestined and the one not pre­
destined as regards the order of cause to effect, but only as re­
gards the foreknowledge of the event. Thus foreknowledge
woidd be the cause of predestination, and predestination
would not be because of the choice of the one predestinating,
which is contrary to the authority of the Scripture and the
sayings of the saints. Hence in addition to the certainty of
foreknowledge, there is infallible certainty in this order of
predestination as regards the effect. Yet the proximate cause
of salvation, namely, the free will, is not necessarily but con­
tingently directed to this end.” ·
The above passage is a commentary on the following words
of Jesus: ‘‘This is the will of the Father who sent Me, that of
all He hath given Me, I should lose nothing.” 10 But just as
the divine causality, far from suppressing the activity of
secondary causes, applies them to their act, so the prayers
of the saints help the elect to advance on the way to eternity;
and our good works merit for us eternal life and we shall in
fact obtain it, if we do not lose our merits, and die in the
state of grace. It is in this sense that St. Peter says: “By good
works make sure your calling and election.” 11
Is the number of the elect certain? God knows infallibly
ilbid., la, q. 19, a.6 ad turn.
De veritate, q.6, a.3.
10 John 6: 39.
11II Pet. 1: 10; see St. Thomas, la, q.23, a.8.

2l6

PREDESTINATION

the number of those who will be saved and of those who
will be lost. If it were not so, there w’ould be no certainty
about predestination. Jesus said: “I know whom I have
chosen”;12 and St. Paul wrote: “The Lord knoweth who are
His.” 18
SIGNS OF PREDESTINATION

Can we be certain in this life that we are predestined? In
answer to this question the Council of Trent says: “No one,
so long as he is in this mortal life, ought so far to presume
as regards the secret mystery of divine predestination as to
determine for certain that he is assuredly in the number of
the predestinate; as if it were true that he wdio is justified
either cannot sin any more, or, if he do sin, that he ought
to promise himself an assured repentance. For, except by
special revelation, it cannot be known whom God hath
chosen unto Himself.” 14 The reason for this is because, with­
out a special revelation, wre cannot know for certain what
depends solely upon God’s free will. Not one of the just,
unless it is specially revealed, knows whether he will per­
severe in the performance of good works and in prayer. We
shall be, says St. Paul, “heirs indeed of God and joint heirs
with Christ; yet so, if we suffer [perseveringly] with Him,
that we may be also glorified with Him.” 15
Are there, however, any signs of predestination such as to
give one a sort of moral certainty of perseverance? The
Fathers, especially John Chrysostom, Augustine, Gregory the
Great, Bernard, and Anselm, according to certain statements
of Holy Scripture, pointed out several signs of predestina­
tion often enumerated by the theologians as follows: (i) a
good life; (2) the testimony of a conscience that is free from
12 John 13: 18.
is Π Tim. 2: 19·
1« Denz., no. 805: cf. no. 826.
13 Rom. 8: 17.

THE CERTAINTY OF PREDESTINATION

217

serious sins and prepared rather to die than offend God
grievously; (3) patience in adversities endured for the love
of God; (4) readiness to hear the word of God; (5) compas­
sion for the poor; (6) love of one’s enemies; (7) humility;
(8) a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin whom we ask
every day to pray for us at the hour of our death.
Among these signs, certain ones, such as Christian patience
in adversity, are proof that the inequality of natural condi­
tions is at times more than compensated by divine grace.
This is borne out by the beatitudes as recorded in the Gospel:
“Blessed are the poor in spirit, the meek, they that mourn,
they that hunger and thirst after justice, the merciful, the
clean of heart, the peacemakers, they that suffer persecution
for justice’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.”16
These are the predestined. St. Thomas points out especially
in his teaching that to bear patiently a heavy cross and for a
long time is a sign of predestination.
IS THERE A GREAT NUMBER OF PREDESTINED?

From the Apocalypse we gather that the number of the
elect is very great, for we read: “And I heard the number of
them that were signed, an hundred forty-four thousand were
signed of every tribe of the children of Israel. . . . After
this, I saw a great multitude, which no man could number,
of all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing
before the throne and in sight of the lamb, clothed with
white robes and palms in their hands.” 17
Are there not so many elect as reprobates? St. Augustine
and St. Thomas think so, especially on account of what our
Lord said, that “many are called but few chosen.” 18 And
again when He said: “Enter ye in at the narrow gate; for
18 Matt. 5: 3-10.
ir Apoc. 7: 4, 9.
1» Matt. 20: 16; 22: 14.

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PREDESTINATION

wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruc­
tion and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is
the gate and strait is the way that leadeth to life, and few
there are that find it!” 18 St. Thomas remarked on several
occasions that although everything is ordered for good in
the universe as a whole, and in the different species, yet if
we consider the human race from the time of original sin,
evil is more prevalent in this sense, that those who follow
the senses and their passions are greater in number than those
who follow right reason; “in man alone does evil appear as
in the greater number.” 20 The elect are an elite class.21 St.
Thomas maintains, however, that the number of the angels
who were saved exceeds the number of devils,22 and he wrote
the same about the angels in another of his treatises, point­
ing out that “evil is found as in the smaller number in the
angels, because many more remained faithful than fell, and
perhaps even more than all the devils and men to be con­
demned. But in man good appears as in the smaller number
. . . because of the corruption of man due to original sin,
and the very nature of human conditions ... in which the
secondary perfections that direct human actions are not in­
nate, but either acquired or infused.” 28
In his theological treatise we read: “The good that is
proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found
in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good
that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in
the minority, and is wanting in the majority. . . . Since
eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and in so far as this is deprived
i» Ibid., 7: 13 f.
to Loc. cit., la, q.49, a.3 ad gum; q.63, a.9 ad mm; la Ilae, q.71, a.2 ad
311m; I Sent., d. 39, q.2, a.2 ad 411m; C.G., III, 6; De pot., q.3, a.6 ad 511m:
De malo, q.i, a.3 ad 1711m·, a.5 ad i6um.
21 Ibid., la, q.23, a.7 ad 311m.
22 Ibid., q.63, a.9.
231 Sent., d. 39, q.2, a.2 ad 41101.

THE CERTAINTY OF PREDESTINATION

219

of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who
are saved are in the minority.” 24
Let us bear in mind that, according to the passage of the
commentary on the Sentences just quoted, which this last
quotation does not contradict, if we include among the elect
both angels and men, then the number of the elect is per­
haps greater than that of the reprobates.
It is the common opinion of the Fathers and early theolo­
gians that the majority of human beings are not saved. They
mention in favor of this opinion Basil, John Chrysostom,
Gregory of Nazianzus, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine,
Leo the Great, Bernard, and Thomas Aquinas. In more
recent times we have Molina, Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez,
Lessius, and St. Alphonse. In the last century, of those who
depart from this common opinion, we have Father Faber in
England, Bishop Bougaud in France, and Father Castelein,
S.J., in Belgium.
Especially in the case of all those who lived before the
coming of our Lord, and of those who have not had the gos­
pel preached to them, it would seem that the formula of St.
Thomas is verified that ‘‘in man evil appears as in the greater
number,” 25 although God never commands what is impos­
sible, and He gives to all sufficient graces to keep the com­
mandments as made known to them by conscience.2’ On the
contrary, it seems well enough established that the greater
number of the baptized, both children and adults, is saved.
There are many children who die in the state of grace be­
fore attaining the use of reason.
We cannot say whether the greater number of non-Catholic
baptized adults are saved.27 On the contrary, it is probable
that the majority of adult Catholics attain eternal life, and
24£oc. cit., la. q.23, a.7 ad gum.
25 Ibid., la, q.49, a.3 ad gum.
26 Denz., no. 1,677.
22 Cf. Hugon, O.P., Dogmatica, I, 317.

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this because of the efficacy of redemption and the sacra­
ments.28
Throughout this question that is so mysterious, it is well
for us to recall here what Pius IX said about this subject in
his encyclical to the bishops of Italy on Indifferentism, which
is as follows: “It is known to us and to you that those who
labor under invincible ignorance concerning our most holy
religion and who, diligently observing the natural law and
its precepts that are engraved in the hearts of all by God,
and being ready to obey Him, lead an honest and upright
life, can, through the operative power of divine light and
grace, attain eternal life, since God, who clearly intues,
scrutinizes, and knows the minds, impulses, thoughts, and
habits of all, because of His supreme goodness and clemency,
by no means will allow anyone to be punished eternally who
was not guilty of any wilful offense. But very well known
also is the Catholic dogma, namely, that no one outside the
Catholic Church can be saved, and those contumaciously
resisting the authority of this Church, pertinacious in their
dissension, cannot obtain eternal salvation.” 20
2s Cf. Father Buonpensiere, O.P., De Deo uno, in la, q.ïj, a.7; Tanquerey,
De Deo uno, De praed., no. 41.
29 Denz., no. 1,677. This statement must be interpreted according to the
tenor of the preceding. As the supreme pontiff had just said that no one will
be punished eternally who is not guilty of any wilful offense, this statement
can mean only that those who wilfully remain outside the Catholic Church,
when they are convinced that it is the true Church, cannot be saved. (Tr.)

CHAPTER V
Conclusion
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY

OF PREDESTINATION

It remains for us to say a few words about the transcendence

of this supernatural mystery and about the mode of knowl­
edge by which in this life we are better able to reach it in
the obscurity of faith. It is one of the most striking examples
of what may be termed light and shade in theology.
In the study of God’s mysteries, especially the reconcilia­
tion of the mystery of predestination with God’s universal
will to save, we are struck by the ever increasing evidence of
certain principles which, however, can be intimately recon­
ciled only in the impenetrable obscurity of the Deity. There
we have one of the most striking illustrations of light and
shade. The principles to be reconciled are like the two quad­
rants of an intensely luminous semicircle enveloping a deeper
and inaccessible obscurity. The more luminous the two quad­
rants of the semicircle become, the more this increases in a
way the obscurity of the mystery that dominates them. On
the one hand, we see, indeed, the more clearly that God
cannot command what is impossible, and that He wills con­
sequently the salvation of all men; on the other hand, we
realize that no one thing is better than another unless it is
loved more by God, and the more, too, we see that these two
principles, so certain when viewed separately, although they
appear to be contrary, can be reconciled only in the eminence
of the Deity that is supremely obscure for us.
This mystery is far more obscure than is the reconcilia­
tion of God’s foreknowledge, decrees, and grace with our
221

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freedom of will. If God is God, it follows that He is omnip­
otent and must be able to move our free will suavely and
strongly, especially to the performance of salutary and meri­
torious acts. Otherwise, how can we explain the free and
meritorious acts which our Lord Jesus Christ’s human will
had infallibly to accomplish here below for our salvation;
or again how can we account for Mary’s “fiat” which she
had freely and infallibly to give on the day of the Annuncia­
tion, so that the Savior might be given to us?
Certainly there is a mystery in the reconciliation of the
freedom of our meritorious acts with God’s infallibly ef­
ficacious decrees. Yet far more obscure is the mystery of evil
permitted by God. Whereas the mysteries of grace, which
for us are obscure, are as clear as can be in themselves, the
mysteries of iniquity are obscure in themselves, evil being a
privation of light and goodness. From this it follows that
the solution of the great mystery with which we are con­
fronted, that of the reconciliation of predestination, con­
nected as it is with God’s universal will to save, is to be
found, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas viewed it, in the
incomprehensible and ineffable union of infinite mercy,
justice, and supreme liberty. This was often formulated by
these two great doctors who said that, if God grants the grace
of final perseverance to this particular person, He does so
because of His mercy; if He does not grant it to a certain
other, as to Judas, it is through just punishment for previous
sins and for having finally resisted the last call of grace.
It is a profound mystery which is the result of the intimate
union of the three infinite perfections of mercy, justice, and
sovereign liberty. The obscurity is great, but we see that it is
not the outcome of absurdity or incoherence. Two absolutely
certain principles lead us to it, the first being that “God never
commands what is impossible,” and the other that “no one
thing would be better than another, unless it were loved more
by God.”

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY

223

In this case, particularly, we grasp the truth of what St.
Thomas said about faith, that “it is of things not seen.” The
object of faith is essentially obscure; it is neither seen nor
known.1 But living faith that is united with charity is, as a
rule, accompanied by the gift of understanding which in the
literal sense of Holy Scripture penetrates the meaning or spirit
of the mysteries. It is also accompanied by the gift of wisdom,
which gives one a relish for them. Then the great believers
realize that in the mysteries of faith, what is more obscure
about this translucid obscurity is what is more divine, the
Deity itself, in the inaccessible eminence of which are recon­
ciled mercy, justice, and liberty. What is more obscure in the
mysteries then appears as supremely good, and whereas the
intellect is incapable of assenting to them as evident by the
light of reason, the will, actuated by the very pure love of
charity, gives its supernatural and immediate adherence to
them.2
This explains, then, why interior souls who have to undergo
the passive purifications of the spirit,3 are generally very much
tempted against hope when they think of predestination.
These temptations are permitted by God so as to make these
souls feel the necessity of rising above human arguments by
prayer, a purer faith, and a most loving confidence and aban­
donment. This is then infused contemplation, the fruit of the
gifts of understanding and wisdom, by means of which one
begins to reach in a truly higher way, in the obscurity of faith,
the culminating point of the mystery which we are discussing.
Then it is that we begin to have a foretaste of the fruits of this
exalted doctrine and, to quote the words of the Vatican Coun­
cil, that we attain “a certain very fruitful understanding of the
mystery.” *
The spiritual fruits of this mystery which concerns us here
1 Summa theol., Ila Ilae, q. 1, a.4, 5.
2 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.27, a.4: q.45, a.2.
s Cf. St. John of the Cross, "Dark night of the soul.”
« Denz., no. 1796.

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could not be better expressed than by quoting in conclusion
two of Bossuet’s letters on this subject. In his reply to a cer­
tain person who was tormented in mind, how to reconcile the
fact of God’s willing the salvation of all men with the mystery
of predestination, he said: “There are many called and few
chosen, said Jesus Christ. All of those who are called can come
if they wish to; free will is given to them for this reason, and
the purpose of grace is to conquer their resistance and help
them in their weakness. If they do not come, they have only
themselves to blame; but if they come, that is because they
received a certain divine touch urging them to make good use
of their free will. They owe their fidelity, therefore, to God’s
special goodness, for which they must be extremely grateful,
and this teaches them to humble themselves and say: ‘What
hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast re­
ceived, why dost thou glory?’5
“All that God does in time, He foresees and predestines
from all eternity. He foresaw and predestined in detail all the
means by which He had to inspire His followers with fidelity,
obedience, and perseverance. That is what predestination
means.
“The benefit of this doctrine is to have us place our will and
liberty in God’s hands, asking him to direct this will so that
it may never stray from the right path, and thanking Him for
all the good that it does and believing that He operates in it
without weakening or destroying it, but, on the contrary,
elevating, strengthening, and granting it to make good use of
itself, which is the most desirable of all good things. . . . We
must not, therefore, attribute the cause of salvation to him who
wills or to him who runs, but to God who shows mercy. This
means that neither their running nor their willing are the
primary cause, and still less the only cause of their salvation;
but this cause is the accompanying and preventing grace that
gives them strength to continue until the end, and this grace
« I Cor. 4: 7.

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225

does not act alone; for we must be faithful to it; and to ac­
complish this effect, it gives us the power to co-operate with it,
so that we can say with St. Paul: ‘Yet not I, but the grace of
God with me.’8
“God is the author of all the good we do. It is He who brings
it to completion, just as it is He who begins it. His Holy Spirit
forms in our hearts the petitions He wishes to grant. He fore­
saw and predestined all that; for predestination is nothing
else. In all this we must believe that no one perishes, no one
is cast off as a reprobate, except through his own fault. If
human reasoning finds a difficulty in this, and cannot reconcile
all phases of this holy and inviolable doctrine, faith must con­
tinue to reconcile all things, at the same time waiting until
God causes us to see everything in Him, the fountain-head.
“The whole doctrine of predestination and grace may be
summed up briefly in these words of the prophet: ‘Destruction
is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.’7 So it is. If we do
not see the consistency in all this, it suffices for us that God
knows, and we must humbly believe Him. God’s secret is His
own.” 8
In this the soul finds peace, not in descending by means of
reasoning below faith, but, on the contrary, by aspiring to the
contemplation of God’s intimate life, a contemplation which,
since it is above human reasoning, proceeds from faith en­
lightened by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
It is fitting to recall here that the formal motive of Christian
hope, like that of the other two theological virtues, must be the
uncreated Being. It is, therefore, not our personal effort but
God helping.9 Moreover, the certainty of hope differs from
that of faith in this, that it is a certainty in which the will
participates; it is also a certainty of tendency, not exactly the
certainty of salvation (for this would require a special revelao Ibid., 15: 10.
7Osee, 13:9.
s Œuvres, XI, 133 f.
9 Loc. cit., Ila Ilae, q. 17, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

tion), but it is the certainty of tending toward salvation, rely­
ing upon God’s promises and help, so that “thus hope tends
with certainty toward its end, sharing, as it were, in the cer­
tainty of faith.” 10 There is security in this.
This peace is established, if the soul trustfully abandons
itself to God, not as the quietists do, but by doing its best every
day to accomplish God’s will as made known by the command­
ments, the spirit of the counsels, and daily occurrences, and in
all else abandoning itself to the divine will of good pleasure;
for we are certain beforehand that this Will can will and per­
mit nothing except what is for the manifestation of divine
goodness, for the glory of Christ the Redeemer, and for the
spiritual and eternal welfare of those who love God and perse­
vere in this love.11
To another person who wrote him, saying: “My reasonings
on predestination, in spite of myself, disturbed me very much
in mind,” Bossuet replied again as follows: “When these
thoughts come to the mind, and only useless efforts are made
to dispel them, they must end in causing us to abandon our­
selves completely to God, assured that it is infinitely better to
leave our salvation in His hands than to rely on our own
strength. Only by thus doing shall we find peace. The whole
doctrine of the divine Master’s secret is that we must adore Him
and not claim to fathom Him. We must lose ourselves in this
impenetrable height and depth of divine wisdom and plunge
ourselves as if lost in His immense goodness, though expecting
everything from Him, without however relaxing our efforts,
which He demands from us for our salvation.” 12
It is Christian contemplation which, above the reasoning of
theological arguments, penetrates beyond the literal meaning
of the Gospel, so as to reach the spirit of the mysteries and
10 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 18, a.4.
11 On this point consult St. Francis de Sales, Love of God, Bk. VIII, chaps.
5, 9; Bk. IX, chaps. 1-8; also Conference II. (Eng. tr. by Dom Mackey, O.S.B.)
12 Loe. cit., p. 444.

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY

227

taste their sweetness. It soars not only far above the errors
that are contrary to Semipelagianism and predestinationism,
but also above the conflict of theological systems. It finds its
refuge in the Immutable, in the very spirit of God’s word. It is
this by all means that makes us understand what a doctor of the
Church, St. John of the Cross, wrote to show that, if the soul
makes too much of what seems clear, this alone accounts for
the far distant recoil from the abyss of faith.
“The understanding must remain in darkness, and must
journey in darkness, by love and in faith, and not by much
reasoning. You must be careful not to misunderstand me. . . .
The Holy Spirit illumines the understanding which is recol­
lected, and illumines it according to the manner of its recol­
lection. The understanding cannot find any other and greater
recollection than in faith. For the purer and more refined the
soul is in faith, the more it has of the infused charity of God;
and the more charity it has, the more it is illuminated and the
more gifts of the Holy Spirit are communicated to it, for
charity is the cause and the means whereby they are communi­
cated to it. And although it is true that, in this illumination of
truths, the Holy Spirit communicates a certain light to the
soul, this is nevertheless as different in quality from that which
is in faith, wherein is no clear understanding, as is the most
precious gold from the basest metal; and, with regard to its
quantity, the one is as much greater than the other as the
sea is greater than a drop of water. For in the one manner there
is communicated to the soul wisdom concerning one or two or
three truths, etc., but in the other there is communicated to it
the sum total of divine wisdom, which is the Son of God, who
communicates Himself to the soul in faith.
“And if you tell me that this is all good, and that the one
impedes not the other, I reply that this impedes it greatly if the
soul sets store by it; for to do this is to busy itself with things
which are quite clear and of little importance, yet which are

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quite sufficient to hinder the communication of the abyss of
faith, wherein God supernaturally and secretly instructs the
soul, and exalts it in virtues and gifts.” 13
In other words, grace by a secret instinct sets us at peace con­
cerning our salvation and the intimate reconciliation in God
of infinite justice, mercy, and sovereign liberty. Grace, by
this secret instinct, sets us thus at peace, because it is itself a
real and formal participation in the divine nature, in God’s
intimate life in the very Deity, in which all the divine perfec­
tions are absolutely identified.
If we stress too much our analogical concepts of the divine
attributes, we set up an obstacle to the contemplation of the
revealed mysteries. The fact that these concepts are distinct
from one another, like small squares of mosaic reproducing a
human likeness, is why they harden the spiritual aspect of
God for us. Wisdom, absolute liberty, mercy, and justice seem
in some way to be distinct in God, and then His sovereignly
free good pleasure appears in an arbitrary light, and not
entirely penetrated by wisdom; mercy seems too restricted,
and justice too rigid. But by faith illumined by the gifts of
understanding and wisdom, we go beyond the literal meaning
of the Gospel and imbibe the very spirit of God’s word. We
instinctively feel, without seeing it, how all the divine perfec­
tions are identified in the Deity, that is superior to being, the
one, the true, the intellect, and love. The Deity is superior to
all perfections that are naturally susceptible of participation,
these being contained in it formally and eminently without
any admixture of imperfection. The Deity is not naturally
susceptible of participation, either by angel or man. It is only
by grace, which is essentially supernatural, that we are per­
mitted to participate in the Deity, in God’s intimate life, inas­
much as this latter is strictly divine. Thus it is that grace is
instrumental in causing us mysteriously to reach, in the ob­
is St. John of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, Bk. Π, chap. 29, nos. 5-8.
(Eng. tr. by Allison Peers.)

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE MYSTERY

229

scurity of faith, the summit where the divine attributes are
identified. The spiritual aspect of God for us is no longer
hardened. We do not see His countenance, but we instinctively
feel it, and this secret instinctive feeling, in the supernatural
abandonment of ourselves, gives us peace.

PART III

GRACE AND ITS EFFICACY
In this third part we shall treat of grace, especially of ac­
tual efficacious grace by which the effects of predestination
are realized in time, namely: vocation, justification, and mer­
its. Our chief purpose will be to study the relations between
efficacious grace and sufficient grace that is offered and even
given to us. We shall also see that the foundation for the dis­
tinction between these two graces is, according to the teaching
of St. Thomas, the consequent will of God (which concerns
the infallible realization of good at the present moment), and
the antecedent will (which concerns good absolutely consid­
ered and not as determined by certain circumstances).1 By His
antecedent will, God wills to save all men (for it is good that
all be saved); by His consequent will, He wills efficaciously,
all things taken into consideration, to save the elect.2
That we may proceed in an orderly manner in this third
part, we shall first treat of efficacious grace and sufficient grace
according to the Scripture and the declarations of the Church;
then we shall discuss the divine motion in general, and pre­
motion such as St. Thomas and the Thomists understood it.
1 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.6 ad mm.
2 See pp. 72-75, 80-84.

CHAPTER I
Efficacious Grace and Sufficient Grace According
to Scripture and the Declarations
of the Church
the problem

We know it to be certain according to revelation, which is

contained in Scripture and tradition, that there are many
actual graces granted by God which do not produce the effect
(at least the complete effect) intended, whereas others do. The
former are called sufficient and merely sufficient. They give
the power (proximate or remote) to perform a good act, though
they do not effectively bring one to perform this very act. Man
resists their appeal. The latter graces are called efficacious,
because they cause us to act, so that we may perform the sal­
utary act.
Hence arises the question: What is the principle in dis­
tinguishing between these two kinds of graces? In other words:
The grace that is called efficacious, is it so of itself, intrinsically,
because God efficaciously wills it so, or is it only extrinsically
so, by reason of our consent foreseen by God?
The errors of the Reformers and the Jansenists gave rise to
animated discussions on this question. It was at that time that
the term sufficient was technically determined in meaning in
opposition to the term efficacious.1
i Cf. Father Chenu, O.P., "On the meaning of the word ‘sufficient’ accord­
ing to St. Thomas,” in the Revue des Sciences Phil, et Thêol., May, 1933. The
author shows, following Nicolai, that for St. Thomas “sufficient" is at times a
synonymous term for ‘efficacious’ (la, q.46, a. 1, obj. 9: I Cor. c. 15, lect. 2:
De verit., q. 14, a.t); in certain cases, however, he has given them opposite
meanings (Illa, q.79, a.7 ad 711111; De verit., q.29, a.7 ad 4um; III Sent., d. 13,
233

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PREDESTINATION

The importance of the problem is evident because of the
very opposition raised against it by the contrary heresies and
the teachings of the Catholic theologians. We may say that
for the Pelagians actual grace (for instance, the preaching of
the gospel) is made efficacious by our good consent, and in­
efficacious by the perversity of the human will. For the Re­
formers and the Jansenists, there are two kinds of actual
interior graces. One kind is efficacious of itself, the other is
inefficacious and even is not truly sufficient.
For the Thomists, there are two kinds of actual interior
graces; one kind is intrinsically efficacious of itself; for it
causes us to perform the good act; the other is inefficacious
but truly sufficient; for it gives us either the proximate or
remote power to perform the good act.*23For the Molinists,
actual sufficient grace is itself either extrinsically efficacious,
by reason of our consent that is foreseen by God by means
of the scientia media, or else it is inefficacious and merely
sufficient.8
DECLARATIONS OF THE CHURCH

The Church declared against Jansenism that there are
graces truly and merely sufficient. They are truly sufficient be­
cause they really give the power to perform a good act; and
they are merely sufficient because, through our own fault,
they do not produce their effect, or at least the complete
effect intended.
q.2, a.2, q.2, ad 511m; d. 19, q.i, a.2; In Hebr., c. 9, lect. 5; in I ad Thess. 2: 5).
According to the author of this article, the famous distinction that is nowa­
days accepted, bears on its face the mark of its modern origin (for we find
traces of it in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), and of the preoccupa­
tion of those who imposed it, such as Lessius and Catharinus.
2 Cf. Joannem a S. Thoma, O.P., Curs, theol., De gratia, disp. XXIV; Salmanticenses, Cursus theol., De gratia, disp. V, dub. 7; Lemos, O.P. Panoplia gratiae,
Vol. IV, Part 2a, p. 36; Del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, Vol. II,
chaps. 1-3.
3 Cf. Molina, Concordia, in the index under the title Auxilium efficax.

PROBLEM OF EFFICACIOUS GRACE

235

This teaching of the Church is clearly seen in the condem­
nation as heretical of the first proposition of Jansenius, which
reads as follows: “Some of God’s commandments are impos­
sible of fulfilment for the just according to their present
powers, though they desire and strive to observe them; they
stand in need, too, of the grace that would make them possible
of fulfilment.” 4 Quesnel and the pseudo-synod of Pistoia
were also condemned for having denied the existence of
truly sufficient grace.5 The second proposition of Jansenius
is very much like the first. It reads: “In the state of fallen
nature interior grace is never resisted.”8 This was tanta­
mount to saying that the only actual interior grace is effica­
cious grace.
After the condemnation of the five propositions of Jan­
senius, the great Arnauld7 admitted a little grace, which
gives the power to act in general, though it does not really
give this power at the moment when needed. The Catholic
theologians showed that this little grace, for which the great
Arnauld contended, does not safeguard the traditional teach­
ing; for it must really be possible to keep the commandments
not only in general, but in each particular case when occasion
arises.8
Besides this, the Church teaches that there is an actual
efficacious grace and that this latter does not restrain liberty.
That there is such a grace follows from the condemnation of
Pelagianism and Semipelagianism, which did not, strictly
speaking, deny that grace gives the power to act, but they
denied that it causes one to will and to act. Against these
heresies the Second Council of Orange defined: “As often
as we perform good acts, God works in us and with us, that
« Denz., no. 1,092.
s Ibid., nos. 1,359 C >»5β>·
e Ibid., no. 1,093.
" Dissert, quadripart. de gratia efficaci; and Apologie pour les Saints Pères,
Bk. IV.
s Cf. Guillermin, O.P., Revue Thomiste, 1901-03, five important articles
on sufficient grace. Consult especially 1902, p. 47 ff.

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PREDESTINATION

we may act.” 9 There is therefore a grace that effectively
operates, although it does not exclude our co-operation, but
requires and elicits it.
As for the fact that efficacious grace does not restrain our
liberty, this is clearly affirmed by the Council of Trent.10
The constant teaching of the Church affirms this, according
to which the meritorious act is the result of both human
freedom and efficacious grace. According to this teaching,
sufficient grace leaves us with no excuse before God for hav­
ing sinned, and efficacious grace does not permit us to glory
in ourselves when we have performed a good act.
WHAT IS THE FOUNDATION IN SCRIPTURE FOR THE

DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUFFICIENT GRACE AND

EFFICACIOUS GRACE?

The Scripture often speaks of the grace that does not pro­
duce its effect, and this because of man’s resistance. In the
Old Testament we read: “I called and you refused. I have
spread forth My hands all the day to an unbelieving peo­
ple, who walk in a way that is not good after their own
thoughts.” 11 In the Gospel, Jesus says: ‘‘Jerusalem, Jerusalem,
thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent
thee, how often would I have gathered together thy children,
as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and
thou wouldest not?” 12 St. Stephen, the first martyr, said to
the Jews before he died: “You stiffnecked and uncircumcised
in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Ghost.” 13 St.
Paul wrote: “And we helping do exhort you that you receive
not the grace of God in vain.” 14
All these quotations show that there are truly sufficient
0 Denz., no. 182.
10 Ibid., no. 814; see also nos. 797, 1,094.
11 Prov. 1: 24; Is. 65: 2.
12 Matt. 23: 37.
is Acts 7: 51.
1·* II Cor. 6: 1.

PROBLEM OF EFFICACIOUS GRACE

237

graces, which however, are fruitless because of our resistance.
This doctrine is proved also from what St. Paul says to
Timothy: “God will have all men to be saved and to come to
the knowledge of the truth ... for Jesus gave Himself a
redemption for all, a testimony in due times.” 18 This means
that God wills to make it really possible for all to keep His
commandments.
On the other hand the Scripture often affirms the existence
of efficacious grace that produces its effect, the salutary act.
This point is made particularly clear in the texts from the
Scripture quoted by the Second Council of Orange against
the Semipelagians, such as: “I will give you a new heart and
put a new spirit within you; and I will take away the stony
heart out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh. And
I will put My spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause
you to walk in My commandments and to keep My judg­
ments and do them.” ,e St. Paul also wrote: “It is God who
worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to
His good will.” 17 And Jesus said: “My sheep shall not perish
for ever. And no man shall pluck them out of My hand.” 18
Hence these words of the Second Council of Orange: “As
often as we perform a good act, God works with us that we
may act.” 19 Farther on20 we shall quote scriptural texts
similar to these, such as: “As the divisions of waters, so the
heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever
He will He shall turn it.” 21 “As the potter’s clay is in his
hand, to fashion and to order it; so man is in the hand of
Him that made him, and He will render to him according to
His judgment.” 22
is I Tim. 2: 4 f.
ie Ezech. 36: 26 f.
IT Phil. 2: 13.
is John 10: 27 f.
1» Denz., no. 182.
20 Chap. 7, no. 3.
21 Prov. 21: 1; cf. Esther 13: 9; 14: 13.
22 Eccli. 33: 13: cf. 33: 24-27·

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PREDESTINATION

It seems, indeed, according to the language of Scripture,
that the efficacious grace of which it speaks is efficacious of
itself, and not merely because God foresaw we would consent
to it without offering any resistance.
Hence we see that for St. Thomas and his school, the dis­
tinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace has its
ultimate foundation in the distinction between God's con­
sequent will (which concerns good infallibly to be realized
at the present moment) and his antecedent will (which con­
cerns good taken in the absolute sense and not as considered
in certain determined circumstances), such as, for instance, the
salvation of all men in so far as it is good for all to be saved.23
From this antecedent or universal will to save come the suffi­
cient graces that make it really possible for us to keep the com­
mandments, without causing anyone, however, effectively to
do so. God’s consequent will in its relation to our salutary acts
is the cause, on the contrary, of our effectively fulfilling our
duty.
This doctrine appears to have the solid support of Holy
Scripture. The same must be said of the Thomist teaching
that actual grace, which is of itself efficacious as regards an
imperfect act, such as attrition, is truly sufficient as regards a
more perfect act, such as contrition.
Hence this is the question at issue: Is the grace that is
said to be efficacious, truly so of itself intrinsically, or is it
merely extrinsically efficacious by reason of our consent that
is foreseen by God? In other words, how are we to conceive
the divine motion that inclines our will and causes it to
perform the salutary act? The relations between sufficient
grace and efficacious grace are evidently connected with this
question. Is efficacious grace included in the sufficient help
that is granted to all, just as the fruit is included in the
flower?
All Thomists agree in saying that, if a man did not resist
23 Summa theol., la, q.ig, a.6 ad lum.

PROBLEM OF EFFICACIOUS GRACE

239

sufficient grace, he would receive the efficacious grace re­
quired to enable him to do his duty. But here again is the
mystery: for to resist sufficient grace is an evil that can come
only from us; whereas not to resist sufficient grace is a good
that cannot be solely the result of our action, but one which
must come from God who is the source of all good. How then
shall we conceive the divine motion, the various modes ol
this, and its efficacy?

CHAPTER II
The Divine Motion in General
For a proper understanding of what the Thomists mean by

the expression “physical premotion/' we must recall what
led them to adopt it.
They understand this to be the answer to the question
clearly put by St. Thomas, when he asks whether God moves
all secondary causes to act.1 They answer first that the Scrip­
ture does not leave room for any doubt about this, since it
says that “God worketh all in all. For in Him we live and
move and are.” 2 Even if it is a question of our free acts, the
Scripture is no less positive in affirming that He is the prime
Mover, for we read: “Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our
works for us. For it is God who worketh in you, both to will
and to accomplish, according to His good will.”3 These
scriptural texts are so clear, they state so plainly that the ac­
tion of the creature depends upon God’s influx or upon the
divine causality, that even Suarez, although opposed to the
theory of physical premotion, wrote that it would be an
error against the faith to deny the dependence of the crea­
ture in its actions upon the first Cause.4
Equally clear stands the case from the philosophical point
of view; for just as the participated and limited being of
creatures depends upon the causality of the first Being, who
is the self-subsisting Being, so also does their action: for
there is no reality that can be excluded from His controlling
1 Summa theol., la, q. 105, a.5.
2 1 Cor. 12: 6: Acts 17: 28.
s Is. 26: 12: Phil. 2: 13.
« Disp. met., disp. 22, sect. I, par. 7.

240

THE DIVINE MOTION IN GENERAL

241

influence. It is not a question, therefore, in this case of the
necessity or existence of the divine influx, without which no
creature would act, but rather of the nature of this influx
and of the way in which it operates.
In the first place we shall see, in pointing out the manifest
errors to be avoided, what physical premotion is not, so as to
enable us to state more precisely afterward what it is. We
say then: (1) It is not a motion such as to render the action
of the secondary cause superfluous. This is directed against
occasionalism. (2) It is not a motion that would interiorly
compel our will to choose this particular thing rather than
a certain other. This is directed against determinism. (3)
Neither is it, at the opposite extreme of both occasionalism
and determinism, simply a simultaneous concurrence. (4)
Nor is it an indifferent and indeterminate motion. (5) It is
not a purely extrinsic assistance given by God.
We shall see more clearly further on that physical premo­
tion is: (1) A motion and not an ex nihilo creation, without
which our acts, created in us ex nihilo, would not be the re­
sult of the vital action of our faculties and would no longer
be ours. It is a passive motion that is received in the creature
and that is consequently something distinct either from the
divine action which it presupposes, or from our action which
follows it. It is (2) a physical and not a moral motion or one
that is the result of an object proposed to it that attracts it.
(3) It is, as regards our freedom of action, not necessitating
but predetermining, or it is not a formal but a causal pre­
determination, in the sense that it guarantees the intrinsic
infallibility of the divine decrees and moves our will to
determine itself to a certain determinate good act (the deter­
mination to a bad act, since it is itself bad and defective,
comes on these grounds from a defective cause and not from
God). Finally, we shall see that the predetermination, since it
is both formal and causal, is prior to the motion. It is identi­
cal, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, with the divine

242

PREDESTINATION

predetermining decrees that have reference to our salutary
acts; whereas the formal and no longer causal determination
is the very one of our already determined free act, which still
remains free even after its determination, just as God’s act is
free. The careful study of these different aspects of the prob­
lem is necessary so as to avoid any confusion of thought, and
it is expedient for us to begin with the negative phase of this
problem, for the expression “predetermining physical pre­
motion” is used precisely to exclude a simultaneous concur­
rence and an indifferent premotion.

CHAPTER III
What Does

not

Constitute Physical Premotion

i) The divine motion must not be understood in the sense
held by the occasionalists in that God alone would act in all
things, so that it is not the fire that gives heat, but God in
the fire, the latter being the occasion of this. If such were the
case, remarks St. Thomas,1 secondary causes would not be
causes, and, not being able to act, their presence would be to
no purpose. Moreover, their impotence would prove that God
was incapable of communicating to them the dignity of cau­
sality, action, and life, being like an artist who can produce
only lifeless works (and this would imply lack of power in
the Creator). Moreover, occasionalism leads to pantheism.
This is clear, because action follows being, and the mode of
action the mode of being. If there is but one action, which
is God’s action, then there is but one being; creatures are
absorbed in God; universal being is identical with the divine
being, as ontologist realism postulates, a fond theory of Malebranche and one that is closely associated, according to his
notion, with occasionalism.
St. Thomas, having thus refuted the occasionalism of his
time, adds that God, who created and maintains secondary
causes in being, applies them to act. He says: “God not only
gives things their form, but He also preserves them in exist­
ence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of
every action.” 2
2) The divine motion, since it does not render the action of
1 Summa theol., la, q. 105, a.5.
-Ibid., q. 105, a.5 ad gum: cf. Contra Gentes, III, 67: De potentia, q.g, a.7.
*43

244

PREDESTINATION

secondary causes superfluous but gives rise to it, cannot be
necessitating, in the sense that it would suppress all con­
tingency and liberty. But, under the divine influx, secondary
causes act as befitting their nature, either necessarily, as the
sun gives light and heat, or contingently, as fruits become
more or less ripe in time; or else freely, as in the case of man
who chooses. St. Thomas connects even this property of
divine motion with the sovereign efficacy of God’s causality,
who does not only what He wills but as He wills it; who
brings it about not only that we will but that we freely will.
On this point he writes: “Since, then, the divine will is per­
fectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done
which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things,
for the building up of the universe.” 8
The divine motion does not therefore suppress freedom of
action, but actualizes it. It eliminates only potential indif­
ference, and in return gives it the actual dominating indif­
ference of the free act, an indifference that persists after it
is already determined. This is the only indifference there is
in God, and it persists in the unchangeable free act by which
He preserves the world in existence. It is of this actual in­
difference that St. Thomas speaks when he says: “And just
as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts
being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not
deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the
cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each ac­
cording to its own nature.” 4
3) In opposition to occasionalism and determinism, would
the divine motion be merely a simultaneous concurrence as
Molina will have it to be? Molina considers the primary and
secondary causes as two partial and co-ordinated causes pro’ Ibid., la, q. 19, a.8.
« Ibid., la, q.83, a. 1 ad 311m; cf. la Ilae, q. 10, a.4.

PHYSICAL PREMOTION

245

ducing one and the same effect, similar, he says, to two men
pulling a boat: “The total effect, indeed, comes both from
God and from the secondary causes; but it comes neither
from God nor from secondary causes as total but as partial
causes, each at the same time requiring the concurrence and
influx of the other cause, just as when two men are pulling a
boat.” s From this point of view, even if the total effect is
produced by each of the two causes, in this sense that one
without the other would produce no effect, in such a case the
secondary cause is not premoved by the first. The concur­
rence of this latter is merely simultaneous, as when two men
are pulling a boat, the first exerting no influence upon the
second to cause it to act. “God’s universal concurrence.” says
Molina, “does not immediately exert an influence on the
secondary cause, so as to premove it to act and produce its
effect, but it immediately exerts an influence on the action
and the effect, along with the secondary cause.” 6
Apart from this simultaneous concurrence, which is neces­
sary for every act, Molina admits, indeed, a particular grace
for salutary acts; but this latter is not a physical motion,
attracting the will by reason of the object proposed to it.
The author of the Concordia acknowledges, moreover, that
this conception of the simultaneous concurrence, which is
necessarily connected, in his opinion, with his definition of
liberty and his theory of the scientia media, is not the view
held by St. Thomas. After setting forth what the Angelic
Doctor said 7 on the subject of the divine motion, he writes:
“I am confronted by two difficulties: (1) I do not see what is
this application in secondary causes, by which God moves
and applies these causes to act. I think rather that the fire
heats without any need of its being moved to act. And I can­
didly confess that I have difficulty in understanding this
o Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp.26 (end).
* Ibid.
1 Loe. tit., la, q. 105, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

motion and application which St. Thomas requires in second­
ary causes. ... (2) There is another difficulty: according to
this doctrine, God does not concur immediately (immediatione suppositi') in the action and effect of secondary causes,
but only through the intervention of these causes.” 8
Molina could have found the solution of these two diffi­
culties in a well-known passage of St. Thomas,9 in which it
is stated that God’s immediate influence is also exercised on
the being of the action or effect of the secondary cause, for
this latter cannot be the proper cause of its act in so far as it
is being, but only in so far as it is this individual act, its own.
In this effect, what is more universal, as being, depends upon
the more universal cause, and the more particular depends
upon the particular cause. St. Thomas remarks: “The more
universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is
being itself.” 10 Being, in so far as the being of things is con­
cerned, is an effect that belongs properly to God, by way of
creation ex nihilo and of conservation in being, or by way
of motion, which is the case of the being; itself of our acts, for
these were at first in our faculties as potential acts.
But what is of greatest interest for us now in Molina’s ob­
jection, is the way in which he avows that St. Thomas ad­
mitted that the divine motion applies secondary causes to act,
which means that St. Thomas admitted not merely a simul­
taneous concurrence, but a premotion. This word “premo­
tion” may seem to be a pleonasm, because every true motion
has a priority, if not of time at least of causality over its effect,
and in this particular case it has, for St. Thomas, a priority
over the action of the secondary cause thus applied to act.
The Thomists use the word “premotion” solely for the pur­
pose of showing that the motion of which they speak is truly
8 Concordia, p. 152, 1876 ed.
s De potentia, q.3, a.7 ad 7um.
io Loc. cit., la, q.45, a.5.

PHYSICAL PREMOTION

247

a motion that applies the secondary cause to act, and that it
is not merely a simultaneous concurrence.
Is not this latter absolutely the very opposite of occasional­
ism and determinism or fatalism? If, in truth, the divine
concurrence is merely simultaneous, it is no longer true to
say that God moves secondary causes to act, since He does
not apply them to their operations. We have in this case
merely two partial and co-ordinated causes, not two total
causes which, in their very causality, are subordinated the one
to the other, as St. Thomas had said.11 Moreover, Molina
expressly stated: “For us, the divine concurrence does not
determine the will to give its consent. On the contrary, it is
the particular influx of the free will that determines the
divine concurrence to act, according as the will is inclined
to will rather than not to will, and to will this partictdar
thing rather than a certain other.” 12 The secondary causes,
far from being determined by God to act, by their action
determine the very functioning of the divine causality which,
of itself, is indifferent.
But, if this is so, then there is something that is beyond
the scope of the universal causality of the first agent; for.
in fine, the influence exerted by the secondary cause is truly
something; it is a perfection for it to pass into act, even a
perfection so precious that Molinism is totally concerned in
safeguarding it, and it is so delicate that even God, they say,
cannot contact it.
The great difficulty is this: How could the will, which was
only in the state of potency, give itself this perfection which
it did not possess? This means that the greater comes from
the less, and this is contrary to the principles of causality and
of the universal causality of the first agent. St. Thomas was
of the opinion that to refute determinism, instead of attack­
ing the principle of causality, we must insist on the tran11 Ibid., la, q.105, a.5 ad 2um; q.23, a.5, corp.
Concordia, q.23, a.4,5, disp.i, m.7 ad 6utn.

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PREDESTINATION

scendent efficacy of the first Cause, the only one capable of
causing in us and with us that our acts be performed freely,
since it is more intimate to us than we are to ourselves, and
since this free mode of our acts is still being and for this
reason depends upon Him who is the cause of all reality and
good.
Furthermore, the Thomists say that if the divine concur­
rence, far from inclining the will infallibly to determine
itself to perform this particular act rather than a certain
other, is itself determined by the particular influx of the free
will to function in this particular way rather than in a certain
other, then the tables are turned: God by reason of His fore­
knowledge and causality, instead of determining is deter­
mined. This means that by His scientia media He foresees
what choice a certain person would make, if placed in certain
circumstances. Instead of being the cause of this foreseen
determination, He is determined and therefore perfected by
this determination which, as such, in no way comes from
Him. Now there is nothing more inadmissible than to posit
a passivity or dependence in the pure Act, who is sovereignly
independent and incapable of receiving any perfection what­
soever.
This stands out as the great objection against the Molinist
theories of the scientia media and simultaneous concurrence,
as we have elsewhere shown.13
4) May we say that the divine motion is an indifferent mo­
tion by which God would determine us only to an inde­
liberate act, so that the free will alone would determine itself
and the divine motion, to perform this or that particular
act? Some theologians thought so, especially Father Pignataro.14
13 Cf. Revue Thomiste, "The dilemma, God determining or determined,”
June, 1928, pp. 193-211; see also "God, His existence and His Nature,” Π,
529-Ό2.
14 Cf. De Deo Creatore. On page 519 of this work the author wrote: “This
motion constitutes the will as directly and proximately ready to choose"; and

PHYSICAL PREMOTION

249

The Thomists reply,15 that this theory and the scientia
media mutually support each other, and that it has to con­
tend with several of the difficulties pointed out against the
preceding. Something real would still be excluded from
God’s universal causality. There would be a determination
that is independent of the sovereign determination of pure
Act, a finite good independent of the supreme Good, a
second liberty that woidd be acting independently of the first
Liberty. That which is better in the work of salvation, the
determination of our salutary act, would not come from the
Author of salvation. Contrary to this, St. Paul said: “It is
God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,
according to His good will. For who distinguisheth thee? Or
what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 18 St. Thomas
said the same in formulating the principle of predilection:
“Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no one
thing would be better than another, if God did not will
greater good for one than for another.” 17
This doctrine of indifferent premotion, like that of simul­
taneous concurrence, cannot solve the dilemma: “God de­
termining or determined: there is no other alternative.” Will­
ingly or unwillingly, it leads to the positing of a passivity or
dependence in Him who is pure Act, especially in His
foreknowledge (scientia media) as regards our free deter­
minations, even the noblest which, as free determinations,
would not come from Him. Concerning these God would not
be the cause of them, but merely a passive onlooker.
he adds: "That the divine motion is determined to move in one particular
way those things which by nature are so determined, this I concede; that it is
so determined in contingent things, this I deny.” The Ami du Clergé (Feb­
ruary 21, 1935, pp. 392-94) assures us that when this work was published
(1899), even Father Billot did not hesitate to declare this opinion to be abso­
lutely unintelligible. On this point consult the second appendix at the end
of this book.
is Cf. Father del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 162.
ιβ I Cor. 4: 7; Phil. 2: 13.
i" Loe. cit., la, q.20, a. 3.

25°

PREDESTINATION

For these reasons, the Thomists admit that since God is
the first Cause of all existing things, with the exception of
sin, even as regards our salutary free acts, the divine decrees
are of themselves infallibly efficacious or predetermining,
and the divine motion that gives infallible assurance of their
execution is not indifferent and undetermined, but brings
us infallibly to perform a certain salutary act that is effica­
ciously willed by God, by causing in us and with us even that
this act is performed freely. Later on we shall see that this
teaching is completely in agreement with what St. Thomas
says.18
Therefore the Thomists use the expression “predetermin­
ing physical premotion” only for the purpose of excluding
the theories of simultaneous concurrence and indifferent pre­
motion. If these theories had not been proposed, as Thomas
de Lemos remarked on several occasions, the Thomists would
have been satisfied to speak about divine motion as St.
Thomas did, for every motion as such is a premotion, and
every divine motion, as divine, cannot receive a determina­
tion or perfection that is not virtually included in the divine
causality. We always come back to the same inevitable di­
lemma: “God determining or determined.”
5) Is the divine motion purely an extrinsic help given by
God, or is His action identical with His essence, without
which nothing created is received in the operative potency of
the creature, so as to make it pass into act, for instance, so
as to cause our will to perform a vital and free act?
Some theologians thought so, as cardinals Pecci and Satolli
in the time of Leo XIII; as also did bishops Paquet and
Janssens, O.S.B., in more recent times. These theologians
teach, of course, against the Molinists and Suarezians, that
the scientia media is inconceivable and that the divine influx
necessary for the free act is an intrinsically efficacious motion.
>s Ibid., la, q.14, a.5,8; q.19, a.4: a.6 ad mm: q. 19, a.8; q.83, a. 1 ad gum;
la Ilac, q.10. a.4 ad gum; q.79, a.2; De veritate, q.22, a.8,9.

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251

But they add—and in this they think that they have Cajetan’s
authority on their side—that the divine decree and concur­
rence are not predetermining and that there is no created
motion received in the operative potency of the creature so as
to cause it to pass into act. As far as they can see, God’s help
is merely extrinsic.19
Father del Prado shows 20 that there is no via media be­
tween the doctrine of the predetermining decrees and the
theory of the scientia media; for the divine knowledge of
conditionally free acts of the future presupposes indeed a
divine decree or it does not. If we reject the scientia media
and say that it does, then the decree is predetermining, for
otherwise it could not infallibly make known the condi­
tionally free act of the future or the conditionate future.
Undoubtedly, this decree does not precede our acts by a pri­
ority of time but of nature and causality, and it is measured
by the sole instant of motionless eternity. Does it follow, as
Cardinal Satolli says,21 that by the determination of this divine
decree there is no longer any mystery? Not at all, say the
Thomists, for the mystery remains in this sense, that this
predetermining divine decree reaches even to what is more
obscure for us, even to the free mode of our acts, and to the
physical act of sin without it being at all the cause, however,
of the disorder that is in this act. The same must be said for
the divine motion, for it, too, has a priority not of time but
of causality over our acts, and this kind of priority was ad­
mitted by Cajetan,22 as well as by the other Thomists.
Is there no created motion that is received in the second­
ary cause? Some thought that by the words “physical pre­
motion” the Thomists meant to qualify God’s uncreated
i® Cf. Satolli, De opérai, div., disp. II, lect. 3; Paquet, De Deo uno, disp.
Vl.q.t, a.5.
20 Loc. cit., Ill, 406, Koi-07.
21 Loc. cit.
--Com. in Iain, q.19, a.8. Cajetan here excludes priority of time, but not
of nature. Cf. N. del Prado, loc. cit.

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action, conceiving it as being in relation to ours. In that case
there would be no created motion.
The doctrine of St. Thomas and his disciples is very clear
on this point. They teach in common that even God's action
ad extra is formally immanent and virtually transitive,23 and
that there is no real relation on God’s part toward us; there
is only a relation of dependence of the creature on God, and
this is not reciprocated.24 Thus the creative action is formally
immanent and eternal, although it produces, at the time
willed in advance by God, an effect in time.25 Whereas the
formally transitive action, such as the heating of water by the
coal fire, is an accident that proceeds from the agent and
terminates in the patient, the divine action ad extra cannot
be an accident; it is really identical with God’s very essence.
It is therefore formally immanent, and, though not having
the imperfections of the formally transitive action, it re­
sembles this latter in so far as it produces either a spiritual
or corporeal effect that is really distinct from it. It is in this
sense that it is said to be virtually transitive, for it contains
eminently within itself all the perfection of a formally transi­
tive action, without any of the imperfections that essentially
belong to this latter.
From this we see that God's uncreated motion bears only
an analogical resemblance to the motion of a created agent
that is incapable of interiorly and infallibly moving our will
to choose this or that.23 The greater number of the objections
against the divine premotion are due to the fact that the
divine action is conceived as being univocal with created ac­
tion, which latter does not go so far as to cause our acts to be
performed freely.27
23 Loc. cit., la, q.25, a. 1 ad gum; Cont. Gent., IX, 23, par. 4; chap. 21, par. 3.
2-i Ibid., la, q.13, a. 12.
23 Cont. Gent., II, 35.
20 Loc. cit., la, q.19, a.8; q.105, a.4; la Ilae, q.9, a.4.
27 Cf. Zigliara, O.P., Summa phil., Theol. nat., Bk. Ill, chap. 4, a. 4, par. 5.

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253

But from the fact that the secondary cause cannot be in­
dependent of the divine action, does it follow that there is
no created motion received in the secondary cause, and one
that is prior to the operation of this latter according to a
priority not of time but of causality? Does it follow that
actual grace, whether it is operating or co-operating, is iden­
tical either with God’s uncreated action or with the salutary
act of which it is said to be the cause?
St. Thomas replies in an article in which he has treated
this question ex professo and at very great length. He writes
as follows: “What God effects in the natural thing by which
it actually acts, is solely of the intentional order, since it has
a certain incomplete being, just as colors are in the air and
artistic power in the artificer’s instrument. ... A power
peculiarly its own could have been conferred on the natural
thing, as a form permanently inhering in it; but power could
not have been given for it to act in the production of being
as the instrument of the first Cause, unless it were given the
power to be the universal principle of being. Neither could it
be given the natural power to move itself, or to preserve itself
in being. Hence just as it is evidently unreasonable to expect
that the instrument be given the power to act apart from the
artificer’s artistic movement, so also the natural thing could
not have the power conferred upon it to act apart from the
divine action.” 28
In like manner, when speaking of actual grace, St. Thomas
distinguishes the divine motion received in us both from
God and from our acts of knowing and loving, saying of
actual grace that “it is an effect of God’s gratuitous will . . .
inasmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know or will or
do something.” 29 In another of his works he expresses himself
still more clearly: “The motion of the mover precedes the
28 De potentia, q.3, a.7 ad yum.
20 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.110, a.2.

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motion of the mobile object, both intellectually and caus­
ally. 30 And again he says: “The secondary agent receives
the complement of its power from the primary Agent.” 31
The objection has been raised 32 that this received divine
motion would limit the scope of the divine causality, which
would stand in need of this determined disposition so as to
bring about the action of the secondary cause. And, more­
over, it is a contradiction to maintain that the secondary
cause is determined to act by an ultimate formality and that,
notwithstanding, it determines itself.
Father del Prado 33 replies to this by remarking that it is
not the first Cause that stands in need of this determination
received in the secondary cause, but it is this latter that needs
to be moved or applied to its act by the first Cause. The scope
of the divine causality is in no way limited by this, for God
needs only to will efficaciously so as to realize what He wills.
To the second difficulty the Thomists reply that there
would certainly be a contradiction in maintaining that the
secondary free cause is determined to act by an ultimate
formality that is peculiarly its own act, and that it determines
itself to this act. But we must not confound the motion that
causes the secondary cause to act, with the action of this
latter. Motion, for instance, efficacious grace, is given for the
purpose of action, and is not identical with it. Likewise, the
heating of water by the fire is not identical with the warmth
of this water upon surrounding objects. Moreover, as we shall
see more clearly in the following chapters, the expression
“predeterminating premotion” does not mean a formal, but
a causal, predetermination.
We have just seen what, according to classic Thomism, is
meant by divine motion. By it we see, as the Thomists say,
so Cont. Gent., Ill, 150, par. 1.
si Ibid., ΙΠ, 66, par. 4.
32 Cf. Satolli, De operat, div., disp. II, lect. 3.
»3 Loc. cit., Ill, p. 47g.

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255

how removed is the true doctrine of St. Thomas from these
two extremes, in that it rises above and beyond them.
On the one hand, the divine motion does not render the
activity of the secondary cause superfluous, as occasionalism
concluded, nor does it suppress freedom of action but actual­
izes it. On the other hand, the divine motion is not merely a
simultaneous concurrence, or an indifferent and undeter­
mined premotion that would be under the necessity of re­
ceiving from us a perfection and a new determination not
contained in its causality. Nor is it a purely extrinsic help
given by God.

CHAPTER IV
What Physical Premotion Actually
According to Classic Thomism

is

For a proper understanding of this expression, we need
merely make use of the very words of St. Thomas in explain­
ing the terms: motion, premotion, physical, and predeter­
minating.
i) It is a motion that is passively received in the secondary
cause so as to induce it to act, and, if the secondary cause is
vital and free, so as to induce it to act vitally and freely, as
we have seen St. Thomas said. This motion which, in the
supernatural order is called actual grace, is really distinct
both from God’s uncreated action upon which it depends,
and from the salutary act to which it is directed.1 On this
point all the Thomists are agreed. They say, as for instance
John of St. Thomas does: “This motion cannot be the very
action of the created cause, since this motion is prior to such
action and brings it about; it is not, therefore, the action
of the created cause, for it cannot move the cause as agent
but as patient.” 12*
We can explain this divine motion that is received in the
secondary cause by comparing it with creation in the passive
sense, about which St. Thomas spoke at considerable length.8
By this we do not mean, as at times it has been said, that the
motion in question here is creation, for our acts are not
created in us ex nihilo, as is the case with the spiritual soul
1 Summa theol., Ia Hae, q. 110, a.s; q. in, a.2.
2 Cursus phil., Phil, natur., q.25, a.2.
s Loc. cit., la, q.45, a.3.
256

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257

when it is united with the body. They are vital acts, produced
by our faculties or operative powers, and these powers, cre­
ated and preserved in being by God, need to be moved so
as to receive the complement of causality of which St.
Thomas speaks. Neither indeed is grace, whether habitual
or actual, created ex nihilo; but it is drawn from the obedi­
ential potentiality of the soul, upon which it depends as an
accident.4
But if the divine motion in question here is not creation,
in the strict sense of the term, then it can come only from
the creative cause, for only this latter is capable of produc­
ing the whole being of a given effect and all its modes,
whether the effect be necessary or free. On this point St.
Thomas, commenting on Aristotle, says: “The divine will
is to be understood as existing outside the order of beings,
like a cause that profoundly pervades all being and all its
differentiae; and since the possible and the necessary are dif­
ferentiae of being, therefore necessity and contingency in
things originate from this same divine will.” 6
Furthermore, although the motion that applies us to act
is not creation, yet for several reasons it is not unlike it. Ac­
tive creation and active motion are analogous, as also are
passively considered creation and passive motion by which
the secondary cause, as St. Thomas says, is applied to its act.
Let us see in what this twofold analogy consists.
If creation in the active sense is a divine and eternal action,
which is formally immanent and virtually transitive, crea­
tion in the passive sense is the real relation of dependence
upon God on the part of the creature that comes into exist­
ence; for “creation imports a relation of the creature to the
Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.” 8 In like man­
ner, preservation in the active sense is continued creative
* Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.113, a.9: De virtutibus in commune, a. jo ad sum et gum.
& Perihermenias, I, lect. 14; cf. Com. in Met., VI, lect. 3: la, q.19. a.8.
6 Loc. cit., la, q.45, a.3 ad gum.

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action and, in the passive sense, it is the real relation of con­
stant dependence of the being of the creature upon God.
Now just as the being of the creature is really dependent
upon the divine creative and conservative action, so also is
the action of the creature really dependent upon the divine
action that is called motion. We do not say that God creates
our acts of knowing and willing; He does not produce them
ex nihilo; for, in such event, these acts would no longer be
either vital or free. Nor do we say that God merely sustains
these acts which begin at a precise moment, though before
they did not exist. We say that God moves us to perform
them ourselves vitally and freely.
To avoid all equivocation, just as we distinguish between
active and passive creation, so we must distinguish here ’
between two similar acceptations of the word “motion.” We
have: (1) the active motion that in God, as we have said, is
a formally immanent and virtually transitive action; (2) the
passive motion by which the creature, though it had only
the power to act, is passively moved by God to become ac­
tually in act; then there is: (3) the action itself of the crea­
ture, which in us is the vital and free act of the will.
This distinction is commonly made to explain the influence
of one created agent over another, of fire, for instance, over
water. In this case we have: (1) the action of the fire: actual
heating of water; (2) the effect of this action upon the water:
it is heated; (3) the action of the heated water upon sur­
rounding objects.
In like manner, external objects and light exert an in­
fluence on the eye that is aroused to action, then the eye re­
ceives an impression, a likeness of the object, and finally it
reacts by the vital act of vision. Again, in like manner, our
immaterial will, by an immaterial action that is formally
immanent and virtually transitive, exerts an influence upon
our sensitive faculties and bodily organs so as to cause them
î Zigliara, Summa phil., Theol. nat., Bk. Ill, chap. 4, a. 4, nos. 3-5.

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to act. This is what St. Thomas calls the active use of the
will,8 which is followed by the passive use of the faculties
moved to act, and finally we have the act of these faculties,
an act that is immediately produced, elicited by them, and
commanded by the will.
We must not, therefore, confuse the divine motion that
is passively received in the secondary cause, either with the
divine active motion which is God Himself, or with the ac­
tion produced by the secondary cause. Now this confusion
is made by those who say, as Satolli does,9 that the will cannot
be determined by God to act and yet determine itself to this
act. It would be a contradiction, if the will received from
God its voluntary act complete in itself, as if it had been
created ex nihilo; then it would no longer be possible for
the will to produce this act. But what the will receives is
merely a passive motion by which it is applied to act accord­
ing to its nature, which means that it acts vitally and freely.
This motion, however, cannot be given to it by any created
or creatable spirit, however powerful it may be, but only
by God, the Author of its nature and inclination to universal
good, by God who preserves it in existence, and who is more
intimate to it than it is to itself. As Zigliara points out,1"
when persons object to physical premotion, they generally
take in an active sense what Thomists take in a passive sense;
they confound physical premotion either with the divine un­
created action, which we are incapable of receiving, or else
with our own action that supposes premotion instead of be­
ing identical with it.
The Thomists commonly define the motion received by
our will as “a divine motion by which our will is reduced
from the potency of willing to the act of willing.” 11 These
last words do not mean that God produces in us and without
s Loc. cit., la Ilae, q. 16, a. i.
s> De operat, div., op. cit.
10 Zigliara, loc. cit-.
11 Ibid.

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PREDESTINATION

us the act of willing, but that our will is moved by Him to
perform itself, and vitally, this act which is called volition.
And therefore, as Zigliara remarks,12 the act which the will
is passively brought to perform is not its own vital and free
operation, as the opponents of this doctrine suppose. It is
a supernatural movement or impulse, an actual efficacious
grace by which it performs its act, whether this be its first
vital though indeliberate act, or successive acts that terminate
a discursive deliberation. Thus it is that the actual efficacious
grace, which inclines our will to perform the salutary act,
is called “the first proximate act,” and the salutary act itself
is called “the second act,” even if it be a question of the first
salutary act.
Just as water does not heat unless it is heated, so every
secondary cause, our will, for instance, acts only if it is pre­
moved by God, the very first cause. If it were otherwise, then
this something of reality in the transition to act, which is
required for the performance of vital and free actions, would
be withdrawn from God’s universal causality that includes
everything of reality and goodness external to Himself.
Only by confusing physical premotion with our voluntary
act can anyone conclude that our will under the influence
of this motion, which is said to be in conformity with its
nature, is no longer mistress of its act.
2) In what sense is the divine motion called premotion?
To move and to be moved are correlative and synchronous
terms. There is no priority of time of active over passive
motion; they are coincident, for it is the same thing that is
produced by the mover and that is received in the movable
object, namely, the movement that proceeds from the mover
into the movable object.13
We must get away, therefore, from imaginations which
picture physical premotion as an entity which, like a small
12 Ibid.
is Cf. S. Thomam, in Phys. Arist. Ill, lect. 4, no. 10.

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261

winch placed by God in our will, would precede in time our
voluntary act: “The motion of the mover precedes the move­
ment of the movable object both intellectually and caus­
ally.” 14 We have here only a priority of causality, as in the
case of the eternal decree, which transcends time, and the
divine motion of this decree assures its execution. But with
regard to this decree, we must say that it is measured by the
unique instant of immobile eternity, which corresponds un­
changeably to every successive instant of time, as the apex
of a pyramid corresponds to all the points of its base and to
each of its sides. With regard to the motion received in the
created will, it is received at the very moment of time in
which the voluntary act is produced. In the case of the angels,
it is discrete time that is measured by its successive acts, and
this has nothing to do with the sun’s movement. In the case
of human beings, it is the continuous time of day and hours,
because of the sensible movement of our imagination and
organism, and this is inseparable from our intellectual and
volitional acts.
From this we see that physical premotion and the free act
following it instantaneously, do not depend infallibly upon
what precedes them in time—that is, in the past—but only
upon what precedes them in the ever unchangeable present
(nunc stans) of eternity, which is the measure of the divine
decrees.
The Thomists, too, cannot admit without a distinction the
Molinist definition of liberty, that it is a faculty which, if
we presuppose all that is required for the will to act, it can
still act or not act. If, by the words “presupposed all that is
required for it to act” is meant only what is required as a
prerequisite by a priority of time, then this definition is
absolutely true; but if, by these words, is meant what is re­
quired as a prerequisite by a simple priority of causality—
namely, the divine motion and the final practical judgment
i·» Contra Gentes, III, 150, par. 1.

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PREDESTINATION

that precedes the voluntary election—then the definition is
no longer true except by the aid of a distinction. Under the
influence of the divine efficacious motion that extends even
to the free mode of our acts, our will, in performing the act
efficaciously willed by God, by reason of its unlimited scope,
in that it is specified by universal good, retains the real power
not to perform the act and to perform even the contrary act
(remanet potentia ad oppositum); but it is impossible for the
will, under the influence of the divine efficacious motion,
actually to omit the performance of the act efficaciously
willed by God, or actually to perform the contrary act. St.
Thomas is explicit on this point. Of various texts it suffices
to quote the following: “If God moves the will to anything,
it is incompossible with this supposition, that the will be not
moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently
it does not follow that the will is moved by God neces­
sarily.” 15 Bannez did not say anything more forcible than
this.
The potential indifference which the faculty had before
performing its act has been replaced by the actual indiffer
ence of the act itself that is already determined, and it tends
with a dominating indifference toward a particular good
that is absolutely out of all proportion to the universal scope
of the will that is specified by universal good. The act does
not cease to be free because it is determined; otherwise no
act of the divine will would be free, since these acts are
determined from all eternity and are unchangeable. Potential
indifference is not essential to liberty, and is not to be found
in divine liberty, in which there is no actual indifference
of pure Act with regard to any finite good; it is not to be
found in the freest of our acts that still remain free after
their determination.
The word “premotion” indicates therefore a priority not
of time but merely of reason and causality, and, if this
is Loc. cit., la Ilae, q. io, a.4 ad juin.

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263

priôrity did not exist, there would no longer be motion but
merely simultaneous concurrence, such, says Molina, as of
two men drawing a boat, the first exerting no influence over
the second, but each acting independently on the boat. That
is not the way God concurs in the action of the secondary
cause; for He applies this latter to perform its act without
which this reality, which is the transition from the state of
inactive potency to the performance of the act, would be
excluded from the divine universal causality.
3) The premotion is called physical not by reason of its
opposition to the metaphysical or spiritual, but to distin­
guish it from moral motion, which moves the will by way
of an objective attraction, by proposing a good to it.
St. Thomas often distinguished between these two mo­
tions: the movement of the will as to the specification of its
act being called thus since it is derived from the object or
end, and the other as to the exercise of its act which is
derived from the agent.16 He pointed this out particularly
in another passage 11 where it is stated that God moves every
secondary cause: (1) as final end, for every operation is for
the sake of some good, real or apparent, which participates
in a likeness to the supreme Good; (2) as first Agent from
whom every subordinated agent receives its power to act.
Applying this to the will, he had just said: “Wherefore in
both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially
in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.” 18
In this preceding article St. Thomas explains these two
kinds of motion with reference to the intellect and the will,
saying that these two faculties are moved both by the object
proposed to them and, as to the exercise of their act, by God.
St. Thomas adds that God alone seen face to face can irresist­
ibly attract our will, because it is only He who can adequately
is Ibid., la Ilae, q. 10, a.2.
17 Ibid., q. 105, a.5.
is ibid., a.4; cf. ad 311m.

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PREDESTINATION

satisfy our capacity for loving.10 As for the motion that con­
cerns the exercise of the act, this can be received only from
the will itself, and this by a prior act from God, who alone
is capable of creating from nothing the spiritual soul and
directing it to universal good. The order of agents must cor­
respond to the order of ends.20
This explains, then, how God, in thus moving our will, by
interiorly inclining it, does not force it; for He moves it in
accordance with its inclination to universal good; He ac­
tualizes this general inclination and causes it powerfully and
suavely to confine itself with a dominating indifference to a
certain particular good, thus freely willed with a view to
happiness, since man naturally wills to be happy and seeks
happiness in everything he wills.
St. Thomas observes that our acts would be neither free
nor meritorious, if the will were moved by God in such
manner that it nowise would move itself; but it is not so.
He says: “But since its being moved by another does not
prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated
(ad sum), it does not therefore forfeit the motive for merit
or demerit.” 21
This last point is explained in another article,22 in which
it is stated that the will, in so far as it wills the end, moves
itself to will the means. St. Thomas remarks that, if the will
could not move itself, if it were only moved by God, then it
would never will what is sinful. The complete reply, which
has been so much discussed, is as follows: “God moves man’s
will, as the universal Mover to the universal object of the
will which is good. And without this universal motion man
cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his
reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good.
is Ibid., la Ilae, q. io, a.2.
20 Ibid., la Ilae, q.g, a.6.
21 Ibid., la, q. 105, a.4 ad gum.
22 Ibid., la Ilae, q.9, a.g.

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265

Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the
willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the
case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall see later
on (q. 10g, a. 2).” 28
Some Molinists claimed, according to this text, that for
St. Thomas the divine motion is not predetermining, and
that by the same motion which incites a person to will hap­
piness, one would perform a good act (at least naturally
good), whereas another would commit sin.
This interpretation contradicts many texts of St. Thomas,
and in the first place it is against the principle of predilec­
tion on several occasions formulated by him, according to
which, “since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things,
no one thing would be better than another, if God did not
will greater good for one than for another.” 24 Now in the
Molinist interpretation of the text with which we are con­
cerned,25 it would happen that of two men equally helped
and loved by God, one would become better than the other
by this naturally good act, for instance, which consists in
paying one’s debts. He would become better without having
received more from God. It would not depend on the free
Cause of all good that there is more of good in this man
rather than in that other.
Moreover, this Molinist interpretation is contrary to what
St. Thomas explicitly states in many texts,25 and to the con­
cluding words of the text we are discussing, which are:
“Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the
act of willing something determinate, which is good; as in
the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall see
later on.” 27
23 Ibid., la Ilae, q.g, a.6 ad gum.
24 Ibid., la. q.20, a.3.
25 Ibid., la Ilae, q.9, a. 6 ad 311m.
2« Ibid., la Ilae, q. io, a.4 ad 3um.
27 Ibid., la Ilae, q.g, a.6 ad 311m.

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The commentators 28 of St. Thomas generally admit that
it is a question of operating grace, which St. Thomas dis­
cusses later on.29 We shall see that it is so when we come to
explain the three propositions of this text just quoted. In
doing so we shall appeal to the three principal modes by
which God moves us: (i) before we deliberate: to will hap­
piness in general; (2) after we deliberate: to will a certain
particular good about which we deliberated; if the act is
supernatural it is in this case performed under the influence
of co-operating grace; (3) above and independent of our de­
liberation: by the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit,
which is an operating grace; of such a nature are the acts
which are performed by means of the gifts of the Holy
Ghost.
Several Molinists recognize that, according to St. Thomas,
in this last case there is a predetermining premotion, but
they add: then the act is neither free nor meritorious.80 Con­
trary to this, St. Thomas holds that the acts performed by
means of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, by the gift of piety, for
instance, are free and meritorious.81 The purpose of the gifts
is precisely to dispose us to receive in a docile manner the
special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, that it may be a means
of merit for us. Thus the Blessed Virgin was moved power­
fully and suavely to utter infallibly and freely her “fiat” on
the day of the annunciation in view of the redemptive pur­
pose of the incarnation, which was destined most certainly
to come to pass.82
as Ct. Billuart, De actibus humanis, diss. ΙΠ, a. 3; N. del Prado, O.P., De
gratia et lib. arb., I, 236; II, 228, 256; Garrigou-Lagrange, God, II, 80, no. 35,
p. 158.
as Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.3, a.2.
so Cf. Father de Guibert, S.J., Etudes de théologie mystique, p. 170.
si Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.68, a.3, c et ad sum.
32 The teaching of St. Thomas on operating grace (la Ilae, q.3, a.2) and
on the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost received by the gifts gives special
trouble to the Molinists. That is why they are led to modify it considerably,
and to say that this special inspiration inclines one to an act that is not free
and not meritorious, which, in its turn, prompts one (like actual grace) to

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4) In what sense is premotion said to be predetermining,
although not necessitating, that is, although in conformity
with the nature of our free will which must remain mistress
of its act? It is a question here not of a formal but of a causal
predetermination.33 The Molinists generally say that if God
by His motion determines the will to will this rather than
that, then it can no more determine itself. This confounds
causal predetermination, which inclines us strongly and
suavely to determine ourselves, with formal determination,
which is that of the voluntary act already determined, and
which follows the other according to a posteriority not of
time but of causality.
Some authors 34 admit physical premotion, but by no means
predetermination. And yet, as Cardinal Zigliara said,35 pre­
perform an act that is subsequently meritorious and that is produced by means
of the virtues.
Hence in that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not immediately tend toward
the performance of meritorious acts, it follows that the mystic life or infused
contemplation (which is the result of faith illumined by the gifts of under­
standing and wisdom) is not the formal way of sanctity, but is a gift in itself
of an extraordinary kind like visions and revelations; for sanctity cannot con­
sist of acts that are not meritorious.
As besides, the seven gifts are in all the just, these theologians are led to ad­
mit two modes of operation for the acts performed by means of the gifts; there
is the ordinary mode dependent upon graces called medicinal, by which the
non-meritorious acts that precede justification are performed: the other mode
is extraordinary, and it is such that the first has no connection with the second.
Hence we cannot see how acts so different and heterogeneous, between which
there is no subordination of inferior to superior, can proceed from the same
habit. Several of these theologians go so far as to deny the principle of the
specification of the habits by their formal objects and the specific difference
between the gifts of the Holy Ghost and the infused virtues. This completely
changes the teaching of St. Thomas about the gifts, and they strive to show
that in the Theological Sumina he even modified what he had said on this point
in his Commentary on the Sentences.
In other words, the Molinists are hard put to it by the teaching of St. Thomas
on operating grace (la Ilae, q.3, a.2), whether this refers to the acts per­
formed by means of the gifts or to the justification of the adult or to the first
voluntary act of the angel or to the liberty of the blessed or to the liberty of
Christ's impeccability.
as Cf. Zigliara, Theol. not., Bk. Ill, c. 4, a. 4, par. 6.
Cf. Pignataro, S.J., De Deo Creatore, p. 519.
sa Loc. cit.

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motion and predetermination mean the same thing; but
premotion refers to omnipotence, and predetermination to
the predetermining decree of the divine will. The divine
will predetermines that a certain salutary act, for instance,
Mary’s fiat, St. Paul’s conversion, Magdalene’s or the good
thief’s, shall be accomplished in time, on a certain day, at a
certain hour, and that it shall be accomplished freely; then
Omnipotence interiorly moves the human will without in
the least forcing it, so as to assure the execution of the decree.
St. Augustine wrote on this as follows: “Certainly we
observe His commandments, if we will. . . . Certainly we
will, when we will; but He causes us to will what is good,
of this it being said that it is God who worketh in you, both
to will and to accomplish (Phil. 2: 13). Certainly it is we
who act when we act; but He causes us to act by enabling
the will to act efficaciously, who says ‘I will cause you to walk
in My commandments and to keep My judgments, and do
them’ (Ezech. 36: 27). . . . For it is He who operates first
that we may will, and who co-operates with us when we will,
bringing what we will to completion.” 38
The divine motion received in the secondary cause is pre­
determining in so far as it gives infallible assurance of the
execution of a divine decree. It is not a formal but a causal
predetermination; whereas that of the decree is both for­
mal and causal. Finally, the determination of our voluntary
act already performed is formal and not causal; but, as we
said, far from excluding the actual dominating indifference,
it implies this; for the free act already determined remains
free; even the immutable act of divine liberty remains free
in spite of its immutability. This is what St. Thomas says:
“God alone can move the will, as an agent, without violence.
Hence it is said: ‘The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it’ (Prov. 21: 1).
And: ‘It is God who worketh in you both to will and
3β De Gratia et lib. arb., chaps. 16 f.

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to accomplish, according to His good will’ (Phil. 2: 13).
“Some, nevertheless, unable to understand how God can
cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to
liberty, have endeavoured to give a false exposition to the
authorities quoted. They say, in fact, that God causes in us
the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that.
This is the exposition of Origen (3 Peri Archon) who defended
free will in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authori­
ties. . . . But the authority of Scripture is in manifest op­
position to all this; for it is said: Ό Lord, Thou hast wrought
all our works in us’ (Is. 26: 12). Hence we receive from God
not only the power to will, but also our very operations.
Further, the very words of Solomon: ‘Whithersoever He will
He shall turn it’ (Prov. 21:1) show that the divine causality
extends not only to the will, but also to its act. . . . There­
fore in spiritual things every movement of the will must be
caused by the first will.
“The saying of Damascene in the Second Book (De orthod.
fide, c. 30), that God foreknows but does not predetermine
the things which are in our power, is to be understood as
meaning that the things which are in our power are not sub­
ject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be
necessitated thereby.” 37
In this interpretation given by St. Thomas of this text of
St. John Damascene we have non-necessitating predetermina­
tion declared to be the very teaching of St. Thomas; other­
wise he would have purely and simply admitted the words
of Damascene: “He does not predetermine.” In the construc­
tion of the phrase by St. Thomas, “non” refers directly to
“quasi,” which means that our elections or free acts are sub­
mitted to the determination of Providence, but not as though
imposing necessity on them. In other words, this predeter­
mination is non-necessitating, for it extends even to the free
mode of our acts which, pertaining to being, comes under
3" Contra Gentes, HI, 88 (end), 89 (end), 90 (end).

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the adequate object of Omnipotence; and what is not so in­
cluded is only evil, since it comes from the deficient cause.38
On this subject St. Thomas writes: “Acts of choice and
will are under the immediate governance of God (that is,
not through angelic intermediaries). . . . God alone is the
cause of our wdlling and choosing.” 30 “Although God’s ac­
tion alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, neverthe­
less the angel’s action has a certain bearing on man’s choice
by way of persuasion.” 40 “The operation of an angel and of
a heavenly body disposes a man to choose; whereas the opera­
tion of God gives completion to his choice. . . . Man does
not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that
to which the heavenly body inclines him: whereas he always
chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence
the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated . . .
whereas divine providence never fails.”41 “Man can be
directed to all things by the one divine disposition (that is
what happens in the case of the predestined).” 42
“Among the parts of the whole universe the first distinction
to be observed is between the contingent and the neces­
sary. . . . Therefore it belongs to the order of divine provi­
dence not only that such and such an effect be produced,
but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect
be produced contingently.” 43 “The divine providence is the
per se cause that this particular effect will happen contin­
gently. And this cannot fail.” 44 “God foresaw that it woidd
happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it will
be, contingently and not of necessity.” 45 “For all things are
as De veritate, q.5, a.5 ad mm.
39 Contra Gentes, III, 91, par. 1.
40 Ibid., chap. 92, par. 1.
«1 Ibid., par. 3.
izlbid., par. 10 (end).
43 Ibid., chap. 94, par. 9.
44 Ibid., par. 10.
45 Ibid., par. 11.

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foreseen by God so as to be freely done by us. . . . It be
longs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes
to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing.” 48
“Accordingly, by knowing His essence, God knows all the
things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to
the works of the intellect and will. . . . Therefore God
knows both the thoughts and the affections of the mind.” 47
All these quotations from the Contra Gentes show that for
St. Thomas the divine motion, which directs us to perform
salutary acts, is a motion that concerns the exercise of the
act or a physical motion which, of itself and infallibly, in
clines us, without compulsion, to perform this particular act
rather than a certain other, and this because the divine
causality extends even to the free mode of our acts; for this
latter still pertains to being. This means that for St. Thomas
the divine motion is predetermining although not neces­
sitating.
We find the same doctrine expounded in the following
passage: “God can change the will from the fact that He
Himself operates in the will as He does in nature; hence, as
every natural action of the will, inasmuch as it is an action,
not only is from the will as immediate agent, but is also
from God as first Agent who operates more vigorously; hence,
as the will can change its act for another, much more so can
God.” 48 The text is clear. The human will as secondary
cause determines itself to perform a certain free act; there­
fore much more so can God as the first Cause, who operates
more vigorously, incline the will infallibly to determine it­
self to perform this particular act rather than a certain other.
Thus He is the cause of St. Paul’s conversion, of Magdalene’s
or of the good thief’s.48
Ibid., par. 13.
47 Ibid., I, 68. Also Quodl., q.12, a. 6.
tsDe veritate, q.22. a.8.
ο» Ibid,, q.22, a.9; De malo, q.6, a. 1 ad 311m; also Com. in I Periher., led. 14.

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In all these texts we see that for St. Thomas the divine
causality extends even to the free mode of our determina­
tions, so that everything real and good in them depends upon
God as the first Cause, and upon us as secondary cause. In
this sense the divine motion is predetermining and not neces­
sitating.
The peculiar nature of predetermination is especially af­
firmed by St. Thomas, when commenting on our Lord’s
words: “My hour has not yet come.” 50 “By this is meant,”
says St. Thomas, “the hour of His passion, which is deter­
mined for Him not of necessity, but according to divine
providence.” It is evidently here a question of a determining
and infallible but not necessitating decree of the divine will.
In like manner, commenting on the verse, “They sought
therefore to apprehend Him: and no man laid hands on
Him, because His hour was not yet come,” 51 he says: “By
this is meant His hour predetermined not from fatal neces­
sity but by the three divine Persons.” Again, commenting
on St. John’s words, “Jesus knowing that His hour had come,
that He should pass out of this world to the Father,” 62 he
says: “Neither are we to understand by this that fatal hour,
as if subjected to the course and disposition of the stars, but
the hour determined by the disposition of divine providence.”
And concernins; the words of our Lord, “Father, the hour
is come; glorify Thy Son,” 53 he remarks: “Neither is it the
hour of fatal necessity, but of His Father’s ordination and
good pleasure.”
All these texts evidently point to a predetermining and
infallible divine decree that refers to the hour Jesus speaks
of as His own, and hence even to the free act which He had
infallibly to perform in willing to die for our salvation.
These texts also refer to the permissive decree as regards
so John 2: 4.
si Ibid., η·. go.
62 Ibid., 13: 1.
^Ibid., 17: 1.

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the sin of Judas, who before this hour could do no harm to
our Lord.
It has been claimed that the expression, “God does not
determine from necessity,” is not found in the writings of
St. Thomas.54 His commentary on the passages of St. John,
which we have just quoted, show, on the contrary, that the
hour of Jesus in which He freely offered Himself in the gar­
den of Gethsemane and in which Judas betrayed Him, was
not from necessity determined and fixed by God.
Finally, we find the same teaching in the Theological
Summa of St. Thomas, where he gave it its definite shape.
We shall quote only the principal texts. St. Thomas begins
by saying: “Determined effects proceed from His own infinite
perfection according to the determination of His will and
intellect.”55 There we have the eternal predetermining
decree. How does it safeguard our liberty? St. Thomas ex­
plains this in the fundamental text to which he always has
recourse: “Since, then, the divine will is perfectly efficacious,
it follows not only that things are done which God wills to
be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills.
Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some con­
tingently.” 58 St. Thomas states this objection: “Every cause
that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily. But
the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says:
‘Who resisteth His will?’ (Rom. 9: 19.) Therefore the will of
God imposes necessity on the things willed.” 57 Instead of
replying to this by stating, as the defenders of the scientia
media do, that God foresees what we shall freely decide upon
doing, he says: “From the very fact that nothing resists the
divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that
God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or
tu Cf. A. d’Alès, Did. apol., art. “Providence," append. "Prédetermination
physique.”
05 Loc. cit., la, q. 19, a.4.
se Ibid., a. 8.
sr Ibid., obj. 2a.

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contingently according to His will.” 58 We have already seen
the reply to this objection.59 This text also expresses with all
possible clarity, that the intrinsic and infallible efficacy ol
the decrees and the divine motion, far from destroying the
liberty of our acts, causes it; for this efficacy extends even to
the free mode of these acts, and this still pertains to being.
St. Thomas said the same in the following passage: “God,
therefore, is the first cause, who moves causes both natural
and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather
is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates
in each thing according to its own nature.” 80
Elsewhere St. Thomas explains, as he did when comment­
ing on Damascene’s statement that “God foreknows our in­
tentions, but does not predetermine them.”01 Briefly St.
Thomas replies as follows: “Damascene calls predestination
an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things
which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear
from his adding: He does not will malice, nor does He
compel virtue. Whence predestination is not excluded by
Him.”62 This text shows that St. Thomas, in excluding
necessitating admits non-necessitating predetermination that
implies, in his opinion, predestination. On this point he says:
“Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect, yet
it does not impose any necessity.” 83
All these texts enable us to see clearly the meaning of pas­
sages occurring further on in the Theological Summa of St.
Thomas on this subject. Thus we read: “Since, therefore, the
will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but
having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves
se Ibid., ad 2um.
sa Cf. Contra Gentes, III, 94, par. 11.
eo Loc. cit., la, q.83, a. 1.
ei Contra Gentes, III, 90 (end).
β2 Loc. cit., la, q.23, a. 1 ad mm.
ea Ibid., a.6.

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it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing.” 84
Throughout this question St. Thomas used the expression
“not to move of necessity” as meaning, to move without neces­
sitating. It is in this same sense that he says here “He does
not determine of necessity to one thing,” as he said in the
passages just quoted from his commentary on St. John’s Gos­
pel that have reference to the “hour” of Jesus appointed by
Providence. In all cases it is a question of a non-necessitating
predetermination, which extends even to the free mode of
our acts.
St. Thomas repeats even here that “the divine will extends
not only to the doing of something by the thing which He
moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to
the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more
repugnant to the divine motion, for the will to be moved
of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to
be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.” 85 This
means that God cannot by His motion necessitate the will
to will a particular good that is presented to it as good under
one aspect, and that is not good under another.88 Such an
object, which is absolutely inadequate to the universal scope
of the will, specifies the free act, in virtue of the principle
that acts are specified by their object; therefore the act of
the will that concerns a particular good thus proposed by
the intellect under the form of an indifferent judgment,
cannot be other than free. This constitutes, for St. Thomas,
the very definition of a free act; 87 whereas the Molinist def­
inition of liberty abstracts from the specifying object, saying:
“Liberty is the faculty which, granted all that is required
as a prerequisite for the will to act, it can either act or
not act.” The Thomists, considering that the free act, like
every act, is specified by its object, say with the Council of
e« Ibid.,
es Ibid.,
88 Ibid.,
87 Ibid.,

la Ilae, q. 10, a.4, c.
a. 4 ad mm.
q. 10, a. 2.
q. 10, a. 2.

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Trent that, “under the influence of the divine efficacious
motion, the will still has the power to resist. It can resist if
it so wills, but under the influence of efficacious grace it
never so wills, just as Socrates when seated can rise, but he
is never at the same time both seated and standing. “It is
even commonly accepted doctrine among them that “it im­
plies a contradiction for the will, when the judgment is in­
different, to be necessitated by the divine motion, which is
itself efficacious.” 68 Just as the will cannot will an unknown
good, one that is not proposed to it by the intellect, so also
it cannot will any other good than that which is proposed
to it; it cannot necessarily will what is proposed to it as not
necessarily desirable. The act specified by this object cannot
but be free, and the divine efficacious motion cannot change
its nature; therefore it is not necessitating.
However, when it is efficacious, it causes the will infallibly
to will freely this particular good rather than that other; it
is in this sense that it is predeterminating. Such is, indeed,
the mind of St. Thomas. There can be no doubt about this
if we read the reply to the third objection of this article
from which we have just quoted.80
The objection which St. Thomas states is the one that will
always be brought up by the Molinists. It is as follows: “A
thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its be­
ing supposed. But something impossible follows from the
supposition that the will does not will that to which God
moves it; because in that case God’s operation would be in­
effectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will
that to which God moves it.” Therefore it wills of necessity.
St. Thomas far from saying that God foresees our consent,
replies as follows: “If God moves the will to anything, it is
incompossible with this supposition that the will be not
moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently
es cf. Billuart, Cursus theol., De actibus humanis, diss. II, a.5.
es Loc. cit., la llae, q. 10, a.4.

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it does not follow that the will is moved by God neces­
sarily.” 70 The will truly has the power to perform the con­
trary act, but this act, which is really possible, is never really
present under the influence of efficacious grace, for this lat­
ter would no longer be efficacious. That is why actual resist­
ance is said to be incompatible with efficacious grace. So
Socrates when sitting has it in his power to stand, but he
cannot at the same time stand and sit; he must sit, while
he is seated.71
This is one of the clearest texts on this point. It evidently
affirms an infallible, but not necessitating predetermination.
It is another way of expressing what, as we have just seen,
St. Thomas said: “From the very fact that nothing resists
the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen
that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily
or contingently, according to His will.” 72 In another of his
works he wrote: “God foresaw that it would happen con­
tingently. It follows then infallibly that it will be, contin­
gently and not of necessity.” 73
The distinction between the possible and the compossible
is tantamount to the distinction between the divided and
composite senses, as St. Thomas points out when he says:
“The fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on
the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immuta­
bility of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely.” In
other words, there is necessity of consequence or a condi­
tional necessity, but not of consequent, as in the case of a
strict syllogism, the minor of which is contingent. Then he
goes on to say: “So the same must be said of predestination.
Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to
predestinate one whom He has predestined, taking it in a
Ibid., ad gum.
τι For a criticism of this illustration as applied to efficacious grace, see
Pohle-Preuss, Grace, p. 243. (Tr.)
12Ibid., la, q.19, a.8 ad sum.
is Contra Gentes, III, 94, par. 11.
to

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composite sense, though absolutely speaking, God can pre­
destinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestina­
tion is not destroyed.” 74
St. Thomas speaks just as clearly in his treatise on grace,
saying: “God’s intention cannot fail. . . . Hence if God in­
tends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves
should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, accord­
ing to John 6: 45: ‘Everyone that hath heard of the Father and
hath learned cometh to Me.’ ” 75 Similarly he says: “The Holy
Spirit infallibly effects whatsoever He wills. Hence it is im­
possible for these two things to be at the same time true: that
the Holy Spirit will to move anyone to perform an act of
charity, and that this person lose the virtue of charity by
committing sin. For the gift of perseverance is included
among God’s benefits, whereby most certainly are liberated
whoever are liberated, as Augustine says (De dono persever.,
chap. 14).” 76
So we see that for St. Thomas the foreseeing of a free
determination that would depend solely upon ourselves, is
not the foundation for this divine certainty. It has its founda­
tion in a decree of the divine will, the execution of which is
assured by the divine motion.77
All these texts presuppose a divine predetermining but
not necessitating decree, which extends even to the free mode
of our acts; and they affirm the presence of a divine motion
that assures the infallible execution of this decree. In this
sense, too, it is justly said to be predeterminating and non7« Loc. cit., la, q.23, a.6 ad 311m; cf. la, q. 14, a. 13 ad 311m.
75 Ibid., la Ilae, q.ns, a.3, c.
7β Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.24, a. 11.
77 Ibid., la, q. 14, a.8: q.19, a.3,4, C. et ad 4um; a.8; De veritate, q.6, a.3;
Quodl. XII, a.3,4; All things are predetermined and ordained is declared to be
but a Scotist infiltration into the school of Thomism. Cf. H. Schwamm, Das
gottliche Voherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten An/iangern, Innsbruch, 1934. See also on this subject M. Congar, Praedeterminare et Praedeterminatio, according to St. Thomas, Rev. Sci. Phil, et Théol., August, 1934. pp.
363-71. Likewise, P. V. Doucet, O.F.M., in Archiv. Franc. Hist., 1931, pp. 391-92,
who is against Schwamm.

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necessitating. It causes the will infallibly to determine it­
self, to perform this particular act rather than a certain other,
and it causes in us and with us all that there is of reality
and goodness in this act.78 Only evil, which is a disorder, is
not included within the scope of its causality; it is excluded
from the adequate object of Omnipotence, and far more so
than sound is from the object of sight.78
Of late years people have written: “For God to have in­
fallible knowledge of our free acts He does not need to in­
ject the element of a free determination into the drama of
our liberty, and that such a process of knowledge would be
truly anthropomorphism; it would be the knowledge of ef­
fects in their proximate cause, which is not a divine process.”
The Thomists never claimed for God the necessity of a
created motion, so that He may have infallible and eternal
knowledge of our acts; for this motion, as such, since it is
received in the created will, exists only in time. They always
said God knows our free acts in His eternal decree, and that
His motion assures its execution in time. As a matter of fact,
without this eternal decree, such a future free act would not
be present in eternity as the object of divine intuition rather
than its contrary act. God foresaw from all eternity that Paul
would freely be converted on his way to Damascus on a cer­
tain day and at a certain hour, because He had decided to
convert him efficaciously in this manner. Without this decree,
Paul’s conversion would pertain only to the order of possible
things and not to that of contingent futures.
The Molinists never proved that God cannot infallibly
move our will to determine itself freely to perform a certain
act; for it cannot be proved that God’s universal and sover­
eignly efficacious causality cannot extend even to the free
mode of our acts. This mode is still being, and is therefore
possible of realization; it is included consequently in the
78 ibid., la, q.23, a.5.
’s Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a. 1.

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PREDESTINATION

adequate object of Omnipotence, and beyond this there is
only evil, which is a privation and a disorder.
This sublime doctrine makes all the more its demand upon
us when we consider what influence God has upon the most
heroic acts of the saints, upon the “fiat” of Mary on the day
of the annunciation, and upon the meritorious acts of Jesus,
whose human will here on earth, an image of the divine will,
was both most free and impeccable.80
How does the divine motion adapt itself to the very nature
of the secondary cause? We must take this to mean, say the
Thomists, that the divine motion is actively modified by our
will w'hich receives it, for the will, in so far as it receives, is
passive. But God adapts Himself in His motion to the nature
of secondary causes, which means that He moves them ac­
cording to their nature. Thus a great artist adapts his mo­
tion to the various instruments which he uses.81 Thus St.
Thomas, commenting on St. Paul’s words on this point:
“May He fit you in all goodness that you may do His will,
doing in you that which is well pleasing in His sight through
Jesus Christ,” 82 writes: “When God incites a person to be of
good will, He applies him, that is He makes him apt. . . .
Interiorly . . . only God makes the will apt, who alone can
change the will: ‘The heart of the king is in the hand of the
Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it’ (Prov. 21: 1).
Hence it is said: Doing in you: ‘For it is God who worketh
in you, both to will and to accomplish’ (Phil. 2: 13). But
what will He do? What is pleasing in His sight, that is, He
will cause you to will what is pleasing to Him.” 83
Finally, the Thomists admit that physical premotion is
entitled to be called simultaneous concurrence, when the
created will is already in act; but it is a simultaneous conso Cf. St. Thomas, Hla, q.18, a.4 ad 311m, and the commentators apropos
of the agreement between Christ’s liberty and His impeccability.
si Cf. Zigliara, Theol. nat., Bk. HI, chap. 4, a. 4, par. 5.
82 Heb. 13: 21.
83 Com. in Ep. ad Heb., 13: 21.

PHYSICAL PREMOTION

281

currence that differs from Molina’s in this, that it is primarily
a premotion to apply the secondary cause to act.84 Under
the influence of this concurrence, the secondary cause be­
comes the instrumental cause of what is more universal in
the effect produced, namely, of its very being in so far as it
is being; whereas it is the proper cause of this effect in so far
as it is this individual effect. Thus my will is the proper
cause of my voluntary act and the instrumental cause of the
very being of this act, in virtue of the principle: “The more
universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and
prior causes.” 85 St. Thomas also says: “Furthermore, we find
that according to the order of causes is the order of effects,
which must be so because of the similarity between effect
and cause. Neither can the secondary cause exert its effect
on the primary cause by its own power, although it is the
instrument of the primary cause as regards the effect of this
latter. . . . And for this reason nothing acts to produce be­
ing except by God’s power. For being itself is the most com­
mon and first of effects, and therefore it belongs to God
alone to produce such an effect by His own power.” 88 The
created will is therefore the proper cause of its act in so far
as it is this individual act; but it is the instrumental cause
of being as regards the being of its act, vital and instrumental
being, of course, as St. Thomas remarks.87 In like manner
this apple tree is the proper cause of this particular fruit,
although God is the proper cause of the being of this same
fruit.
To sum up what we have just said as to what physical
premotion is, and to dispel the false notions that have often
been entertained about it, let us say:
1) It is a motion received in the created operative potency
si et. Goudin, O.P., Phil. Met., q.3, de praemotione, a.2; also Zigliara, loc.
cit., chap. 5 (end).
ss Loc. cit., la, q.45, a.5.
8e De potentia, q.3, a. 7 (end).
st De veritate, q.24, a. 1 ad gum.

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PREDESTINATION

in order to apply it to act. It is therefore a motion distinct
both from the uncreated action that it presupposes, and from
our action that follows it at the same moment. Efficacious
grace is neither God nor the salutary act to which it is or­
dained. Thus our action remains truly our own; it is not
created in us from nothing, but proceeds vitally from our
faculty that is applied to its act by the divine premotion.
2) It is a physical motion, as regards the exercise of the
act, and not a moral motion, or as regards the specification
of the act, a motion that results from the attraction of a
proposed object. Of all the agents that are distinct from our
will, God is the only one, moreover, who can so move it in­
teriorly according to its natural inclination to seek universal
good, which He alone was able to give it. Under the influence
of this motion, it moves itself.
3) It is a premotion according to a priority not of time,
but of reason and causality.
4) It is predetermining, according to a causal predeter­
mination distinct from the formal determination of the act
that follows it. This means that it moves our will by an in­
trinsic and infallible efficacy to determine itself to perform
this determinate good act rather than a certain other. The
determination to perform a bad act, since it is itself bad and
deficient, for this reason does not come from God, but from
a defectible and deficient liberty. The divine predetermining
motion is therefore not necessitating, for, like the divine pre­
determining decrees, the execution of which it assures, it ex­
tends even to the production in us and with us of the free
mode of our acts, which is still being, and thus it is included
in the adequate object of Omnipotence, and besides this
there is only evil.

CHAPTER V
Conformity

Doctrine
St. Thomas

of this

of

with the

Mind

All the holy Doctor’s texts just quoted in explanation of

what this motion is and what it is not, sufficiently prove that
this doctrine which we have just set forth is truly his own.
By way of synthesis, and to save the reader the trouble of
summarizing these texts, we shall draw attention here to
the leading ones and certain others that are of importance.
The necessity of giving a precise answer to certain objections
obliges us to repeat ourselves to some extent.
“Determined effects proceed from God’s own infinite per­
fection according to the determination of His will and in­
tellect.” 1 There we have the eternal predetermining decree,
which is an elective act of the divine will, and this is fol­
lowed up by the command of the divine intellect. Now the
divine motion assures the execution of this decree in time. It
is in this sense that it is said to be predetermining.
A little further on St. Thomas states this objection: “But
the will of God cannot be hindered. Therefore the will of
God imposes necessity on the things willed.” 2 This is the
ever recurring objection against the divine predetermining
decrees. St. Thomas replies: “From the very fact that noth­
ing resists the divine will it follows that not only those things
happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen neces­
sarily or contingently according to His will.” The divine pre­
determining decree, far from destroying the liberty of our
1 Summa theol., la, q. 19, a.4.
- Ibid., a.8, obj. 2a.
283

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PREDESTINATION

choice because of its ineffable efficacy, causes it in us by rea­
son of this transcendent efficacy which belongs only to God
and which extends even to the free mode of our choice; for
this mode, which is the dominating indifference of willing
as regards a good with an admixture of non-good, is still
being, and it is thus included in the adequate object of divine
power; whereas the disorder of sin cannot be included. As
St. Thomas remarks: “And just as by moving natural causes
God does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving
voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of be­
ing voluntary, but rather is He the cause of this very thing
in them.” 3
On the infallible efficacy of the predetermining decrees
and of the divine motion St. Thomas writes as follows: “The
operation of an angel merely disposes a man to choose;
whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice.
. . . Man does not always choose what his guardian angel
intends. . . . Hence the guardianship of the angels is some­
times frustrated . . . whereas divine providence never
fails.” * And again he writes: “Accordingly, by knowing His
essence God knows all things to which His causality extends.
Now this extends to the works of the intellect and will. . . .
Therefore God knows both the thoughts and affections ol
the mind.” 3 He does not know our affections independently
of His causality, but in His causality that extends even to
our most intimate affections. Does this include even our free
choices? Undoubtedly. Concerning this St. Thomas writes:
“Therefore all movements of will and choice must be traced
to the divine will: and not to any other cause, because God
alone is the cause of our willing and choosing.” · It is a ques­
tion of our elections or free choices as elections and not
merely as actions; for it concerns their free determination
s Ibid., la, q.83, a.i ad gum.
* Contra Gentes, III, 92.
ο Ibid., I, 68.
e Ibid., Ill, 91.

THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS

285

which God knows in so far as He causes it in and with us.
as was said in the preceding text.7
Let us again refer to the objection St. Thomas states about
Damascene, who wrote: "God foreknows all that is in us.
but does not predetermine it all.” 6 He replies: “Damascene
calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the
manner of natural things which are predetermined towards
one end. This is clear from his adding: He does not will
malice, nor does He compel virtue. Whence predestination
is not excluded by him.” 9 St. Thomas says the same in an­
other of his works: "The saying of Damascene (second book
of De orthod. fide, c. 30), that God foreknows but does not
predetermine the things which are in our power, is to be
understood as meaning that the things which are in our
power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such
a way as to be necessitated thereby.” 10
Sylvester of Ferrara had pointed out, long before Bannez,
that “Gregory of Nyssa in his book (De homine') and Da­
mascene (second book of De orthod. fide) seem to say that
what is within us is not subject to divine providence. But
St. Thomas replies that this means nothing else than that
the divine determination does not impose necessity upon
what is within us.” 11
Father Synave, O.P., wrote not long ago: “What St.
Thomas thought, indeed, about this question is beyond
doubt, for he said that ‘what is within us is not subject to
divine providence as if necessitated by it.’ St. Thomas ad­
mits, therefore, a divine non-necessitating determination: the
wills and choices of man are submitted to the determination
of divine providence, though this determination does not im­
pose necessity on them. It is not right to say that, according
Cf. Quodl., XII, a.6.
e De orthod. fide, Bk. II, chap. 30.
s Loc. cit., la, q.23, a. 1 ad lum.
10 Contra Gentes, III, 90 (end).
n Com. in Contra Gentes, III, 90 (end).

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PREDESTINATION

to the constant usage of St. Thomas, the idea of necessity is
necessarily implied in the verb ‘to determine.’ It is not cor­
rect to say that the expression 'not of necessity determining’
is equivalent to ‘not determining.’ . . . May we at least as­
sert that ‘to determine of necessity to one thing’ is but a clearer
and more forcible way of saying ‘to determine to one thing’?
No more so. Another text, as precise as the preceding, will
show us that this equation of the two expressions is as false
as the preceding, it being but a variant of the former by the
addition, in the two terms compared, of the expression ‘to
one thing.’ Replying to St. John Damascene who affirms that
‘what is within us is not predetermined by God but comes
from our free will,’ St. Thomas says: ‘Damascene’s state­
ment is not to be understood as meaning that all which is
within us, that what is subject to our choice, is excluded
from the scope of divine providence; but it means that all
these things are not so determined to one thing, as in the
case of those beings that are not endowed with free will.’ 12
“Human acts, in that they depend upon our choice, are
therefore truly determined to one thing. If these acts were
not so determined, St. Thomas would have said that they
are not determined by divine providence to one thing, as
those beings that are not endowed with free will. But one
will have noticed that the phrase contains the word ‘so’ to
which the negative particle at the beginning of the sentence
belongs, so that it reads: ‘they are not so determined to one
thing by divine providence, as those beings are that are not
endowed with free will.’ The determination to one thing
of free acts is not accomplished in the same way as the deter­
mination to one thing of acts that are not free. Now we know
the nature of the determination to one thing of acts that do
not depend upon free will. Everyone agrees that it is a neces­
sitating determination. It is therefore a case of recognizing
a twofold determination to one thing: a non-necessitating
De veritate, q.5, a.5 ad lum.

THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS

287

and a necessitating determination. The former pertains to
free acts, and the latter to those that are not free.” 13
In another article Father Synave confirmed this interpre­
tation with an argument that is quite conclusive. “If the
word ‘determine’ implies necessity,” he says, “why does not
St. Thomas accept St. John Damascene’s formula? . . . The
result of that would be to make St. Thomas speak to no pur­
pose. Lest it make no sense, the negative phrase of St.
Thomas: ‘What is within us is not submitted to the deter­
mination of divine providence as if it received from it a
necessitating trait,’ is to be taken as meaning that what is
within us is submitted to the determination of divine provi­
dence, although this determination does not impose neces­
sity upon it. There is no need of copious gloss, or even of any
gloss, so as to reach this obvious meaning. . . . Words are
words. It seems to me, in accordance with the most elemen­
tary laws of criticism, that we must accept this expression,
‘determination of divine providence’ as clearly established;
if it conflicts with a system or a preconceived view of deter­
mination, we should either reform the one or abandon the
other.” 14
We have proved this at length elsewhere,15 and we must
likewise take note of the following famous text of St. Thomas:
“Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not deter­
minate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to
many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it
of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains con­
tingent and not necessary, except in those things to which
it is moved naturally.” 18
Non ex necessitate must be translated here by not of neces­
sity, as it must throughout this tenth question.17 The non
is Revue Thomiste, January, 1927, p. 74.
1* Ibid., p. 241.
1“ Revue de phil., 1926, pp. 379, 423, 659; 1927, p. 303.
io Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 10, a.4.
i’ Ibid., la Ilae, q.10, a.2,3.

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PREDESTINATION

does not belong to determinat, but to ex necessitate. To
understand it otherwise would result in a faulty translation
throughout this question. Thus, in another place we read:
"Therefore the will is not moved of necessity to either of
the opposites.” 18 And again: “It will not of necessity tend
to this particular good.” 19 Also the following replies to ob­
jections: “If it (the object) is lacking in any respect, it will
not move of necessity. . . . But other things without which
the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who
wills the end.” 20
All these texts prove that there is no doubt about the mind
of St. Thomas. For him there is no necessitating predetermi­
nation; he admits, as regards our free acts, a non-necessitating
divine predetermination. This is made still clearer from the
state of the question in the famous article just quoted, in
which it is determined with marvelous precision in two of
the opening objections, these being the same as those always
brought forward by the opponents of Thomism. They are
as follows: “Every agent that cannot be resisted moves of
necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is
infinite. But something impossible follows from the supposi­
tion that the will does not will that to which God moves it;
because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual.” 21
St. Thomas replies to these objections, without referring
in the least to the divine foreknowledge of our consent by
means of a knowledge that would make us think it approaches
either proximately or remotely to the scientia media of
Molina. On the contrary, he insists upon the transcendent
efficacy of the divine causality, for he writes: “In reply to
the first objection we must say that the divine will extends
not only to the doing of something by the thing which He
is Ibid., a.2, sed contra.
is Ibid., c.
20 Ibid., ad turn et ad gum; cf. ibid., a.g, sed contra, et c.
zi Ibid., a-4, obj. i a et ga.

THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS

289

moves (and here we have election as a voluntary act), but also
to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of
that thing (and here we have the free mode of this election,
which is produced by God in and with us, when He moves
us to a particular salutary act in preference to a certain other,
and this in virtue of the intrinsic efficacy of His motion,
which man positively does not resist). And therefore it would
be more repugnant to the divine motion, for the will to be
moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than
for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.” 22
In like manner, St. Thomas again affirms the intrinsic
efficacy of the divine motion against which the objection was
raised; but he replies that under the influence of this motion
which man positively does not resist, he retains the power to
resist. He could resist if he so wills; but under the influence
of this most powerful and gentle motion he never wills to
resist. In reply to this objection, he says: “We must say that
if God moves the will to anything, it is incompossible with
this supposition that the will be not moved thereto, because
in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual (as stated
in the objection). But it is not impossible simply. Conse­
quently it does not follow that the will is moved by God
necessarily.” 23 In order to grasp the exact meaning of St.
Thomas’ replies, we must not separate them, as is so often
done in this case, from the objections he is seeking to solve.
There is no possibility of doubt. It is a case here of non­
necessitating predetermination. Under the influence of this
most powerful and gentle motion the Virgin Mary infallibly
and freely uttered her "fiat” for the fulfilment of the mystery
of the incarnation, which had infallibly to be fulfilled. Under
the influence of this motion St. Paul was freely converted
when on his way to Damascus, and the martyrs remained
22 Ibid., ad i um.
23 Ibid., ad gum.

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PREDESTINATION

firm in the faith and in their love for God in the midst of
their torments. At least this is the way St. Thomas under­
stood it. To put a different construction upon these texts
would be to drain them of their metaphysical contents. The
terms would cease to have any meaning.
The expression "non-necessitating predetermination ” is
found even several times in his works, as we have pointed
out, especially in his commentary on St. John’s Gospel, apro­
pos of the hour of the passion, which is pre-eminently Christ’s
hour. All these expressions signify a decree of the divine will
that is non-necessitating but predetermining premotion as­
suring the infallible execution of this decree, and this in a
different way both for good and bad acts, for God is the cause
of only the reality and goodness of our acts. As for moral
disorder, whenever it occurs, He permits it, though in no
way causing it, either directly or indirectly. This disorder
comes solely from the deficient cause and is not included in
the adequate object of indefectible Omnipotence, just as
sound is not included in the object of sight. The expression,
predetermining and non-necessitating “physical premotion,”
is therefore quite in conformity with the mind and even the
terminology of St. Thomas.
It has been alleged at times that certain texts of the holy
Doctor can be interpreted in the opposite sense. Goudin,
O.P., pointed out: (i) that when St. Thomas denies pre­
determination, the context shows that he then has in mind
necessitating predetermination as Damascene undei stands
it.24 (2) When St. Thomas says that the will determines itself,
he is speaking of secondary causes; and it is clear that the
deliberation is ordained to the determination of choice,
which is a free act of the will. This is affirmed by St. Thomas
in the famous text which we shall examine in the next
chapter, it reads as follows: "God moves man’s will, as the
2* Phil. Met., disp. II, q.g, a.7.

THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS

291

universal Mover to the universal object of the will, which
is good. And, without this universal motion, man cannot
will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to
will this or that which is true or apparent good. (Certainly it
is so in the order of secondary causes. That is why man
deliberates, and thus sin is possible, which answers the ob­
jection put by St. Thomas.) Nevertheless, sometimes God
moves some specially to the willing of something determin­
ate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves
by grace, as we shall state later on.” 25 In the following ques­
tion it is stated that this divine motion to will something
determinate is not necessitating, because this infallibly effica­
cious influx extends even to the free mode of our choice:
“It is incompossible with this supposition, that the will be
not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply.” 28
3) When St. Thomas says that God at times moves the will
without implanting anything in it, he means, without pro­
ducing in it an infused habit.22
4) Finally, St. Thomas has drawn a distinction between a
general motion to universal good and a particular motion
for this particular act, an act, for instance, of contrition. It
remains true as he said: "that no matter how perfect a
corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot
proceed to its act unless it be moved by God.” 28 The notion
of physical, predetermining, and non-necessitating premo­
tion is therefore quite in agreement with the teaching of St.
Thomas. We can assure ourselves of this by reading his earli­
est commentators, those who wrote long before Bannez. A
2’ Contra Gentes, III, 90 (end), a text previously quoted. See also De veritate,
q.2ï, a.6, in which he spoke of a determination to one thing by a natural in­
clination or by way of nature, which is most certainly necessitating, and is
therefore quite different from that which concerns us here; cf. loc. cit., la Hae,
q.9, a.6 ad gum; cf. la Ilae, q. 109, a.6; q. 111, a.2, q. 112, a.3.
2« Ibid., q. 10, a.4, c. et ad gum.
De potentia, q.g, a.7; De veritate, q.22, a.8.
28 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q. 109, a. 1.

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PREDESTINATION

compilation of their texts was macle by Father Dummermuth,
O.P.29
29 Cf. S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae, 1886 ("De mente S.
Thomae," pp. 23-181; “De vetere schola S. Thomae," pp. 427-557, especially
Capreolus, pp. 454-82; Ferrariensis, pp. 482-95: Cajetanus, pp. 495-506). How
the earlier Jesuit theologians interpreted the mind of St. Thomas, such as
Toletus, Molina, and Suarez, may be read pp. 685-754.
See also Dummermuth, Defensio doctrinae S. Thomae de praemotione
physica, Responsio ad RR.F. Frins, S.J., Louvain and Paris. 1895. An examina­
tion of the texts of St. Thomas, objects of the controversy and the doctrine of
the first Thomists, pp. 317-401; cf. Father Guillermin, O.P., "Sufficient grace,"
in the Revue Thomiste, 1902, pp. 75 f. (five articles). Cf. Dr. J. Ude, Doctrina
Capreoli de influxu Dei in actus voluntatis humanae, p. 158. There are various
reasons given in proof that Capreolus taught physical predetermination. Dr. J.
Ude relates that he had undertaken to write this work because he thought
Capreolus was rather opposed to physical predetermination: but an examina­
tion of the texts of this great commentator of St. Thomas made him see that
the opposite was the case. Cf. Father N. del Prado, O.P., De gratia et libero
arbitrio, 1907, II, 141-253: “De natura physicae praemotionis juxta doctrinam
sancti Thomae, et de diversis perfectionis gradibus in physica praemotione."
Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., articles on non-necessitating predetermination
in the Revue Thomiste, 1924, pp. 494-518; in the Revue de philosophie, 1926,
PP· 379~9S: 423~3.T 659-70; and in 1927, pp. 303-24; by the same author, “Le
dilemme: Dieu déterminant ou déterminé,” in the Revue Thomiste, 1928, pp
193-210; also "God, His existence and His nature," II. 529-62. Father Synave,
O. P., "Prédétermination non-necessitante et prédestination nécessitante," in
the Revue Thomiste, 1927, pp. 72-79; 240-49, a reply to Father d'Alès; by the
same author, in the Bulletin Thomiste, 1928, pp. 358-68, a criticism of the
work by Father d'Alès: Providence et libre arbitre, 1927, in which are re-as­
sembled the articles which we answered in the Revue de philosophie, 1926-27.
Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange. "La grace infailliblement efficace et les actes salutaires
faciles,” in the Revue Thomiste, November, 1925, March, 1926.
See also R. Martin, O.P., "Pour Saint Thomas et les thomistes contre le
P. Stuffier, S.J.," in the Revue Thomiste, 1924-26, a series of articles. Cf. Ven.
Carro, O.P., “El Maestro Pedro de Soto y las controversias theologicas en el siglo
XVI” (Salamanca, Vol. X, 1931). By the same author, “De Soto a Banez,” in
the Ciencia tomista, 1928, pp. 145-78, and in the Angelicum, 1932, fasc. 4, pp.
477-81. Cf. M. J. Congar: “Praedeterminare et praedeterminatio chez S.
Thomas," in the Revue des Sc. phil. et thiol., August, 1934, p. 363.

CHAPTER VI
The Different Ways in Which Physical
Premotion Operates
Father del Prado has discussed this question at length.1 He

shows it to be the opinion of St. Thomas, by numerous texts
taken from his works, that God moves our intellect and will
in three ways: (i) before the act of deliberation; (2) after this
act; (3) by a movement of a higher order. St. Thomas noted
these three ways in which the divine motion operates both
in the order of nature and of grace.
In the natural order God moves our will: (1) to will happi­
ness in general (or to wish to be happy); (2) to determine
itself to choose this particular good by an act of discursive de­
liberation; (3) He moves it by a special inspiration that ex­
cels any deliberation, such as happens with the man of
genius and with heroes, as Aristotle 12 remarked and also one
of his disciples 3 who argued as Plato would have done.
Likewise, in a proportionate manner, in the order of grace,
God moves our will: (1) to direct itself to its supernatural
end; (2) to determine itself to the use or practice of the in­
fused virtues by means of a discursive deliberation; (3) He
moves it in a manner that excels any deliberation by a special
inspiration, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost render us docile
to this movement.
Whether it be in the natural or in the supernatural order,
the first manner of movement precedes the deliberation of
1 De gratia et libero arbitrio, Vol. II, 1907, chapter 7, pp. 201-25; 245-58.
- Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VII, chap. 1.
3 Eudemian Ethics, Bk. VII, chap. 14; cf. St. Thomas, la Ilae, q.68, a.i.
*93

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PREDESTINATION

the will as regards the means; 4 the second follows or accom­
panies it; the third mode excels it. St. Thomas has enumer­
ated these three ways.5 It suffices here to give in English the
first of these texts which, though several seem to be ignorant
of this, is explained by the following texts, especially by those
that treat of grace, to which St. Thomas refers them.
“God moves man’s will as the universal Mover to the uni­
versal object of the will, which is good. (Thus man wills to be
happy.) And without this universal motion, man cannot will
anything. But man determines himself by his reason, to will
this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless,
sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of some­
thing determinate which is good; as in the case of those whom
He moves by grace, as we shall see later on.” 8
Having seen in what physical premotion does and does not
consist, and what are its different modes, we must speak of
the reasons why the Thomists affirm the necessity of its being
admitted.
* Summa theol., la Ilae, q.13, a.3; q.24, a.i ad 311m.
t Ibid., la Ilae, q.9, a.6 ad sum; q.68, a.2,3; q.109, a. 1,2,6,9; q. 111, a.2;
De veritate, q.24, a. 15.
8 Ibid; la Ilae, q.9, a.6 ad 3um; cf. q.109, a.2.6; q.m, a.2. Space does
not permit us here to give all these texts. On the text just quoted and its rela­
tion to the others, see Father N. del Prado, op. cit., I, 236; II, 228, 256. Consult
also the author’s “Perfection chrétienne et contemplation," Vol. I, pp. 355-70;
cf. supra, p. 266 note 32.

CHAPTER VII
Reasons for Affirming Physical Premotion

We shall here consider these reasons in the following order:

(i) in general; (2) with reference to the divine decrees con­
cerning our salutary acts; (3) so as to explain the efficacy of
grace.
GENERAL REASONS FOR ADMITTING PHYSICAL PREMOTION

1) The Thomists ultimately give two general reasons for
affirming physical premotion; one of these is to be sought in
God, the other in the secondary cause. Fundamentally the
reason is the same, though viewed under two aspects.
First reason. God is the first Mover and first cause to whom
are subordinated, even in their action, all secondary causes.
Now, without physical premotion we cannot safeguard in
God the primacy of causality or the subordination of second­
ary causes in their very action. Therefore physical premotion
is the reason why all secondary causes are subordinated to
God as first Mover and first Cause.
The major is certain both in philosophy and in theology.
It would be rash to deny it. As, indeed, it is certain that God
is the supreme Being, upon whom all beings as such immedi­
ately depend, it is equally certain that God is the supreme
efficient cause to whom all secondary causes are subordinated
even in their action. Subordination in action follows sub­
ordination in being, just as action follows being. To deny
this major would be to deny the first two classical proofs
for the existence of God as set forth by St. Thomas.1
1 Summa theol., la, q.2, a.3.

«95

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PREDESTINATION

The minor becomes evident to us, if we take note of the
fact that subordination of causes in their action consists in
this, that the first cause moves or applies secondary causes to
act, and that secondary causes act only because they are
moved by the primary cause. St. Thomas states this clearly as
follows: “Where there are several agents in order, the second
always acts in virtue of the first: for the first agent moves
the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Him­
self.” 2 Now this is the very definition of physical premotion,
which has a priority not of time but of causality over the
action of the created agent. The Thomists confirm this argu­
ment by pointing out that neither simultaneous concurrence
nor moral motion suffices to safeguard the subordination of
causes.
2) Second reason. It finds its explanation in the indigence
of the secondary cause. Every cause that is not of itself actu­
ally in act, but only in potentiality to act, needs to be physi­
cally premoved to act. Now such is the case with every
created cause, even the free cause. Therefore every created
cause needs to be physically premoved to act.
The major is certain. The classical proofs for God’s exist­
ence, such as St. Thomas understands them, have their foun­
dation in this principle, and to refuse to admit this major is
to say that the greater comes from the less, the more perfect
from the less perfect; for actually to act is a greater perfection
than being able to act. If, therefore, the faculty to act were
not moved, it would always remain in a state of potency and
would never act. St. Thomas, too, said: “Everything that is at
one time an agent actually and at another time an agent in
potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover.” 3
The minor is no less evident. If a created cause were of
itself actually in act, it would always be in act and never in
potentiality. Our intellect would always actually know all the
- Ibid., la, q. 105, a.5.
s Ibid., la Ilae, q.9, a.4.

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297

intelligible things it can know, and our will would always
actually will all the good things that will be willed by it.
Moreover, this created cause, instead of being moved to act
would be its own action; but, for that, it would have to be
its very being, to exist of itself; for action follows being, and
the mode of action the mode of being, as St. Thomas often
says.4 Therefore every created cause, that it may act, needs
to be physically premoved by God.
The free cause is no exception; for its action, as being,
depends upon the first Being; its action as action, upon the
first Agent; and as a free action, upon the first Free.5 Further­
more, the free cause is particularly indifferent of itself or
undetermined whether to act or not to act, to will this or
that, and for this reason it stands particularly in need of a
divine motion to cause it to determine itself.® The stars obey
God without knowing Him and they are powerless to dis­
obey; that the human will may freely obey Him it needs a
special divine motion or a grace that, without forcing it, will
cause it actually and freely to make its choice.
The special laws that govern human liberty cannot be
contrary to the universal laws of the real that govern the
relations between created being and God. They cannot be an
exception to these most universal laws, but are subordinate
to them.
Such are the two reasons why Thomists generally affirm
physical premotion. We say that they are two aspects of one
and the same fundamental reason: on God’s part, the primacy
of His causality, and as regards the created cause, the indi­
gence of this latter.
3) Insufficiency of the other explanations. These two rea­
sons are confirmed by the insufficiency of the other ex­
planations. The primacy of the divine causality and the
* Ibid., la, q.54, a. 1.
5 Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a.2.
e Ibid., la, q. 19, a.3 ad 511m.

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PREDESTINATION

subordination of causes are not indeed safeguarded, so the
Thomists say, either by simultaneous concurrence or by the
fact that God gave secondary causes the faculty to act.
a) Simultaneous concurrence does not move the secondary
cause to act; and exerts no direct influence upon it, causing
it to act; but this concurrence has only a simultaneous in­
fluence with it upon its effect, just as two men pulling a boat
or two horses drawing a carriage. If it were otherwise, then
this concurrence would not be merely a simultaneous but
also a previous motion. It would have a priority of causality
over the action of the secondary cause. By simultaneous con­
currence God would be only the co-principle of our acts, but
not the first Cause. There would be two partial and co­
ordinated causes (at least of causality, if not of effect) and not
two total and subordinated causes. Whereas for the Thomists
the whole of the created action comes from God as the pri­
mary cause and from the created agent as the secondary
cause.7
b) Moral motion also fails to explain it. This can, of
course, constitute the subordination of causes in the order of
final causality, for the end morally or objectively moves by
way of attraction; but it does not do so in the physical order
of efficient causality, and it is with this that we are concerned.
God, indeed, is first Mover and first Cause in this physical
order of efficient causality, and not merely in the order of
moral causality by way of attraction or end. If it were not so,
then He would be the first Mover only as regards agents en­
dowed with intellect, since only these are capable of being
moved morally by having an object proposed to them which
attracts them.
c) Finally, it is not enough to say with Durandus of St.
Pourçain 8 that God gave to secondary causes and preserves
in them the faculty of action. St. Thomas excludes this opin" Ibid., la, q. 105, a.5 ad sum.
8 In Hum Sent., d. 1, q.5.

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299

ion as erroneous.® It was admitted by Pelagius and was not
enough to declare him orthodox. Finally, it does not estab­
lish the subordination of causes in action but merely in
being. Now action follows being, and the mode of action the
mode of being. Dependence in action follows therefore de­
pendence in being.
Furthermore, it is only God who can interiorly move our
will to the exercise of its act, for He alone created and pre­
serves it, and can move it according to the natural incli­
nation He gave it for universal good. The order of agents
corresponds to the order of ends, and therefore the most
universal efficient cause can move to universal good which,
as such, is realized in God alone.10 Every other cause would
necessitate, which means that it could not cause in us and
with us that our acts should be performed freely.11
Suarez objected to this, saying that our will is of itself, if
not formally at least virtually, in act, and that thus it can pass
into act without a divine motion.12 It is easy to reply to this
objection by saying that the virtual act is distinct from the
action resulting from it. Is there, or is there not, a becoming
in this? Is its action eternal, or, on the contrary, did it appear
in time? This appearance is something new, and this be­
coming presupposes an active power which was not its own
activity, which did not even act but was only able to act.
And then, how does the virtual act reduce itself to the second
act which it did not have? To say that it did so by itself, is
to posit an absolute beginning, which is repugnant to reason;
for the greater does not come from the less, being from noth­
ing. The virtual act was therefore reduced to its second act
by an eternal mover which, in the last analysis, must be its
own activity and which cannot be the subject of becoming.
The reply to Suarez has often been that before the created
0 Contra Gentes, III, 88.
10 Loe. cit., la, q.105, a.4; la Ilae, q.9, a.6.
11 Ibid., la Ilae, q.10, a.4.
12 CI. Disp. met., disp. 29, sect. 1, no. 7.

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PREDESTINATION

will acts, its act is contained in it not virtually and eminently,
as God contains creatures and as the divine intuition con­
tains human reasoning; but it is contained virtually and
potentially, which means that it can produce its act as a
secondary cause acting under the influence of the primary
Cause.
Moreover, it is not enough to say that God moves man to
will to be happy, or to will good in general; for when our
will afterwards wills some particular good, there is then a
new actuality, which must depend as being upon the first
Being, as free act upon the first Free, as ultimate actuality
upon the supreme Actuality who is pure Act, and, if this
free act is good and salutary, it must depend as such, not
only by reason of its object, but also as to the exercise of its
act, upon the source of all good and the Author of salvation.
St. Thomas, too, said: “No matter how perfect a corporeal
or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its
act unless it be moved by God.” 13
Such are the general reasons for affirming physical premo­
tion. They become clear if we consider them with reference
to what revelation teaches us concerning the divine decrees
and efficacious grace.
PHYSICAL PREMOTION AND THE DIVINE DECREES AS
THEY RELATE TO OCR SALUTARY ACTS

Physical premotion presupposes these decrees and the in­
fallible execution of them. These decrees are admitted by
almost all the theologians who do not accept the Molinist
theory of the scientia media. This means that they are ad­
mitted by the Thomists, the Augustinians, and the Scotists,
who in a general way grant the case of the dilemma: God
determining or determined, no other alternative. In other
words, if God has not from all eternity determined our sal18 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q. 109, a.i.

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

3οι

utary free acts, then He is passive or dependent upon His
knowledge as regards the free determination made by a cer­
tain man if placed in certain circumstances (and it is only
for God to place him or not in these circumstances). As re­
gards this free determination which, as a free determination,
does not come from God, He is not the author but merely the
spectator of it. Now we can admit no passivity or dependence
in the pure Act, who is sovereignly independent as regards
everything created, as to contingent things, whether absolute
or conditional.
In the opinion of the theologians just referred to, the
existence of these divine predetermining decrees concerning
our salutary free acts has its foundation not only in the no­
tion which the philosopher perforce must have of God and
His independence, but also in divine revelation as contained
in Scripture and tradition.
i) Scriptural texts. We have the following prayer of Mardochai: “O Lord, Lord, almighty King, for all things are in
Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will. . . .
Thou art the Lord of all and there is none that can resist Thy
majesty. . . . Hear my supplication and turn our mourning
into joy.” 14 In the same book Queen Esther prays as follows:
“Give me a well ordered speech in my mouth, in the presence
of the lion (the king), and turn his heart to the hatred of our
enemy; that both he himself may perish and the rest that
consent to him.” 15 Further on we read: “And God changed
the king’s heart into mildness,” 16 and he issued an edict in
favor of the Jews. From these words we see that the infalli­
bility and efficacy of the decree of God’s will have their foun­
dation evidently in His omnipotence and not in the foreseen
consent of King Assuerus. This makes St. Augustine say,
when explaining these words: “By a most secret and most
Esther 13: 9, 11, 17.
is Ibid., 14: 13.
is Ibid., 15: 11.

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efficacious power He converts and transforms the king’s heart
from indignation to lenity.” 17
In the Book of Psalms we read: “He hath done all things
whatsoever He would.” 18 Everything He wills not condition­
ally, but absolutely, He does, even man’s free conversion, as
in the case of King Assuerus. Hence the “heart of the king is
in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn
it.” 10 The same thought is expressed somewhat differently as
follows: “As the potter’s clay is in his hand, to fashion and
order it ... so man is in the hand of Him that made
him.” 20 Isaias announces various events that will happen
against the pagan nations by means of human intervention,
especially the ruin of Babylon, and he concludes as follows:
“The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying: Surely as I have
thought, so shall it be. And as I have purposed, so shall it
fall out. . . . For the Lord of hosts hath decreed, and who
can disannul it? And His hand is stretched out, and who
shall turn it away.” 21 The hand of God signifies His omnipo­
tence; here again tire infallibility and efficacy of the divine
decree do not at all have their foundation in the foreseeing of
human consent.
It is even declared that God gives the good consent: “And
I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you;
and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and
will give you a heart of flesh . . . and I will cause you to
walk in My commandments and to keep My judgments and
do them . . . and you shall be My people and I will be your
God.” 22
Jesus also said: "Without Me you can do nothing,” 23 in
I ad Bonifatium, chap. 20.
is Ps. 113: 3.
10 Prov. 21:1.
so Eccli. 33: 13 f.
21 Is. 14: 24-27.
22 Ezech. 36: 26-28.
23 John 15: 5.
it

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

3°3

the order of salvation. Speaking of deceivers, He said: “There
shall arise false Christs . . . and shall show great signs and
wonders.” 24 Of His followers He said: “My sheep hear My
voice. And I know them, and they follow Me. And I give
them life everlasting, and they shall not perish for ever. And
no one shall pluck them out of My hand. That which My
Father hath given Me is greater than all; and no one shall
snatch them out of the hand of My Father.” 25
Again, in like manner, every time Jesus speaks of the
“hour” of His passion, He says that it has from all eternity
been determined by a divine decree, and that before this
hour no one will be able to lay hands on Him. God is there­
fore the master of the human will to such an extent that it
cannot sin except at the time permitted by God from all
eternity; also the kind of sin has been permitted without
God being directly or indirectly the cause of it. Thus we
read in the Gospel: “They sought therefore to apprehend
Him; and no man laid hands on Him, because His hour had
not yet come.” 28 Of this hour the Evangelist writes: “Jesus
knowing that His hour was come . . . having loved His own
. . . He loved them unto the end.” 27 “Father the hour is
come.” 28 We have observed that the hour appointed by
Providence is not of necessity determined. Now this is the
hour of Christ’s greatest free act. The act is one that had
therefore been from all eternity the object of a divine posi­
tive predetermining decree. It is also the hour of the greatest
sin, that of deicide. This act had been from all eternity the
object of a divine decree that was not positive but permis­
sive, so that this sin was not due to happen before this hour,
or in any other way except that permitted by God.28
Matt. 24: 24.
25 John 10: 27-30.
2β Ibid., 7: 30.
27 Ibid., 13: i.
28 Ibid., 17: 1; cf. Com. of St. Thomas on these texts of St. John.
29 Summa theol., Ilia, q.46, a. 2; q.47, a. 3,6.

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Likewise, St. Peter on the day of Pentecost said to the
Jews: “This same being delivered up, by the determinate
counsel and foreknowledge of God, you by the hands of
wicked men have crucified and slain. Whom God hath raised
up.” 30 It is also to be noticed that in this text “the deter­
minate counsel, τή ώρισμίν^ 'QovXrt,” precedes foreknowledge:
irpoyvwau τοΰ ®eoû. As St. Thomas says: “God by His eternal will
preordained Christ’s passion for the deliverance of the human
race.” 31
In like manner, St. Paul says of the resurrection: “Him God
raised up the third day; and gave Him to be made manifest,
not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God.” 32
He points out the effect of this upon the Gentiles as follows:
“And the Gentiles hearing of it were glad . . . and as many
as were ordained to life everlasting believed.” 33 He refers to
the divine predetermination in these words: “God hath deter­
mined for all mankind the appointed time and the limits of
their habitation.” 34 St. Paul relates that after his conversion,
Ananias said to him: “Brother Saul, look up. And I the same
hour looked upon him. But he said: The God of our fathers
hath preordained thee that thou shouldst know His will and
see the Just One and shouldst hear the voice from His mouth.
For thou shalt be His witness.” 35 And freely but infallibly St.
Paul testified concerning our Lord.
Finally, it was St. Paul himself who said: “To them that love
God all things work together unto good: to such as according
to His purpose are called. For whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated. . . . But when Rebecca had conceived . . .
when the children were not yet born . . . that the purpose of
God according to election might stand, not of works of Him
SO Acts a: 23.
si Loc. cit., Illa, q.47, a.3.
32 Acts 10: 40 f.
33 Ibid., 13: 48.
si Ibid., 17: 26.
33 Ibid., 22: 13-15.

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

3°5

that calleth, it was said to her: the elder shall serve the younger.
. . . What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God
forbid! For He saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I
will have mercy. And I will show mercy to whom I will show
mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” 88 In this text it is
clear that the election, the eternal decree of the divine will,
does not depend upon the foreseen consent of the human will.
God’s sovereign independence cannot be more clearly af­
firmed.
Other passages are equally to the point: “If God, willing
. . . to show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy
which He hath prepared unto glory,” 87 where is the injustice?
“But in all these things we overcome, because of Him that hath
loved us.” 88 “Hath God cast away His people? God forbid!
. . . Of old He said to Elias: I have left Me seven thousand
men that have not bowed their knee to Baal. Even so then,
at the present time also, there is a remnant saved according
to the election of grace. And if by grace, it is not now by works:
otherwise grace is no more grace. What then? That which
Israel sought, he hath not obtained; but the election hath
obtained it. And the rest have been blinded.” 88
Similarly, St. Paul said: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or
what hast thou that thou hast not received?” 40 According to
St. Paul what distinguishes the just person from the impious
one, what even begins to distinguish him, when the just person
begins to be converted, that also he received. Long afterward
St. Thomas said: “Since God's love is the cause of goodness in
things, no one thing wotdd be better than another, if God did
not will greater good for one than for another.” 41 It is the
so Rom. 8: 28; 9: 11-18.
3’ Ibid., 9: 23.
ss Ibid., 8: 37.
39 Ibid., 11: 1-7.
40 I Cor. 4: 7.
Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3.

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PREDESTINATION

principle of predilection, which applies both in the natural
and supernatural orders, and this for salutary acts either diffi­
cult or easy to perform. This principle is of absolute univer­
sality, and it supposes that God’s love for us is efficacious of
itself and not because of our foreseen good consent, since God,
the source of all good, is the primary cause of this good consent.
This principle of predilection, so clearly formulated by St.
Paul and so boldly affirming God’s sovereign independence,
is balanced by this other principle, that “God never commands
what is impossible, and makes it really possible for all adults
to obey the commandments when these are binding on them,’’
as explained by St. Paul who says: “God will have all men to
be saved.” 42
How is this second principle reconciled with the principle
of predilection? That is an inscrutable mystery. For this we
should have to see the Deity and thus realize how infinite
mercy, justice, and sovereign liberty, or God’s independence,
are there reconciled.
We read the same in St. Paul’s epistles: “As He chose us in
Him [Jesus Christ] before the foundation of the world, that
we should be holy and unspotted in His sight . . . [and not
because He foresaw our holiness]. Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto Him­
self, according to the purpose of His will, unto the praise of
the glory of His grace [and not that of man’s free will], in
which He hath graced us in His beloved Son. ... In whom
we are also called by lot, being predestinated according to the
purpose of Him who worketh all things according to the
counsel of His will. That we may be unto the praise of His
glory, we who before hoped in Christ.” 43 It is not a question
here merely of the general election of Christians, for it is stated
that one particular Christian is better than a certain other:
“For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou
421 Tim. 2: 4: see above, pp. 72-75, 80-84.
43 Eph. 1: 4-7, 11 f.

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307

hast not received?” 44 If God’s love is the source of all good,
no one thing would be better than another, unless it were
loved more by God. Again St. Paul says: “For it is God who
worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to
His good will.” 45 Therefore, so the Thomists think, the free
determination of the salutary act comes, as from its primary
source, from God, who is the first Free and the first Goodness,
from God, who is the Author of salvation.
2) Theological argument. The same doctrine is set forth by
St. Thomas when he speaks of the divine consequent or non­
conditional will: “The will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we
will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and
this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be
said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer,
but in a qualified manner or antecedently he would will him
to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Thus it is clear that
whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He
wills antecedently may not take place.” 48
In this passage St. Thomas gives us the principle of the dis­
tinction between intrinsically efficacious grace (which in­
fallibly assures the execution of the divine consequent will for
salutary acts, whether these be easy or difficult), and sufficient
grace (which corresponds to the divine antecedent will by
which God wills to make it possible for all to keep the com­
mandments and obtain salvation).
Why does St. Thomas think that everything which God wills
by His consequent or unconditional will is infallibly fulfilled?
The reason given by St. Thomas is not because God foresees
our consent, but because “nothing may fall outside the order
of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are
« I Cor. 4: 7.
Phi). 2: 13.
Loc. cit., la, q.19. a.6 ad mm.

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PREDESTINATION

included.” 47 Only the good which God willed or the evil
which He permitted can happen; for no secondary cause can
act without His concurring in the act.
The Council of Orange had said: “Let no one glory in what
he may seem to have, as if he did not receive it from God.” 48
The Council of Trent also said: “For God, unless men be
themselves wanting to His grace, as He began the good work,
so will He perfect it [working in them to will and to accom­
plish].” 49
In the opinion of the Thomists, not to admit predetermin
ing decrees in God with regard to our salutary acts, is to make
it impossible for one to solve the dilemma: God determining
or determined, no other alternative. Thus we must admit a
certain passivity or dependence in God as regards the free
decision that a certain man would make if placed in certain
circumstances, and that he will make if actually placed in such
circumstances. Is not God’s dependence upon man’s decision
admitted by Molina in the following passage? “The scientia
media on no account is to be called free, both because it pre­
cedes every free act of the divine will, and also because it was
not in God’s power to know by this knowledge anything else
than He actually knew. Furthermore, not even is it natural
in this sense, as if it were to such a degree innate to God that
He cotdd not know the opposite of that which He knows by
this knowledge. For if the created will were to do the opposite,
as it truly can, He would have known even this by the same
knowledge, but not that He actually knows it.” 50 This means
that it is not in God’s power to foresee by the scientia media
something else than what He knows by it; but He would have
known something else by it if the created will, on the supposi­
tion that it were placed in certain circumstances, had made a
different choice. Now, then, can we avoid saying that God’s
«7 Ibid., la, q. 19, a.6.
«8 Denz., no. 189; cf. can. 20, 22.
4® Ibid., no. 806; Phil. 2: 13.
so Concordia, q.14, a.13, disp. 52, Paris ed., 1876, p. 318.

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

3og

foreknowledge depends upon the choice which the created
free will would make if it were placed in certain circumstances,
and which it will make if actually placed in such circum­
stances? Evidently it follows as a logical conclusion for Molina
that actual grace, which results in the salutary act, is not in­
trinsically efficacious,51 and that with an equal or even a less
grace a particular sinner is converted, whereas a certain other
with greater help is not converted.52 In the opinion of the
Thomists, this cannot be reconciled with what St. Paul says:
“For who distinguished! thee? Or what hast thou that thou
hast not received?” 53
On the contrary, if we admit the divine predetermining
decrees with regard to our salutary acts, namely, intrinsically
and infallibly efficacious decrees, which cause even our acts
to be performed freely, actuating our liberty, then it follows
that actual grace, which is followed by the salutary act, must
also be intrinsically efficacious, so as to assure the infallible
execution of the decree which it presupposes. In the opinion of
the Thomists,54 actual grace can be intrinsically efficacious
only on condition that it is a predetermining physical but non­
necessitating premotion, in the sense explained at the begin­
ning of this third part. It remains for us to prove this.
PREDETERMINING PHYSICAL PREMOTION AND THE
EFFICACY OF GRACE

It is of faith that God grants us efficacious graces which are
not only followed by the good consent of free will, but which
in a certain manner produce it: for efficacious or effective grace
makes us act. The Pelagians and Semi pelagians denied this.
They did not refuse to admit that grace gives us the power to
perform a good act, but they denied that it causes us to will and
« Ibid., pp. 230, 459.
02 Ibid., pp. 51, 565.
os I Cor. 4: 7.
54 Cf. Billuart, O.P., De gratia, diss. 5, a.7.

gio

PREDESTINATION

do the act. The second Council of Orange explaining the
words of St. Paul, “It is God who worketh in you, both to
will and to accomplish,” 5S declares against the Semipelagians:
“If anyone, that we may be cleansed from sin, contends that
God awaits the consent of our will, and does not confess, how­
ever, that even our wish to be cleansed is effected in us by the
infusion and operation of the Holy Ghost, such a one resists
this same Holy Spirit . . . and the Apostle proclaiming for
our benefit that it is God who worketh in you both to will
and to accomplish, according to His good will.” 58
Now grace, which causes us to perform a good act, which
works in us both to will and to accomplish, makes us do the
good deed, is not merely virtually efficacious (in actu primo)
in the sense that it gives us really the power to act in a salutary
manner, for this pow’er is already given by sufficient grace even
when the salutary effect does not follow; but it is actually
efficacious or effective, for, as the Council of Orange says: “As
often as we do any good act, God works in us and with us
that we may act.” 57 In these words we have the expression of
Christian faith, and it is also of faith that under the influence
of efficacious grace so conceived, man retains his liberty of
action.68
In addition to this tire Thomists and many other theologians
interpreting these texts of the Scripture and the councils as
implying divine independence, which they consider is com­
promised by the scientia media, see in this the affirmation that
grace is efficacious of itself, and not because of our foreseen
consent.
It is of importance to note here that the doctrine of intrinsi­
cally efficacious grace, which is admitted by almost all theoPhil, z: 13.
se Denz., no. 177; cf. no. 182: “For as often as we do any good act, God works
in us and with us that we may act”; also consult Denz., nos. 176, 179, 183, 185,
193, 195, see also Indiculus de gratia Dei, nos. 131-35, 139, 141 f.
sr Ibid., no. 182.
58 Ibid., no. 814.

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

311

logians who reject the theory of the scientia media, means far
more for the Thomists than their explanation of predetermin­
ing physical premotion. Likewise, provided it is within the
power of our will to move our hand as it pleases, it is of little
consequence for us to know by means of what nerve centers
it does so. Among the Thomists, Billuart pointed this out. He
said in substance that the theologians explain in various ways
the efficacy of grace; some by means of delectation and moral
influence, others by physical predetermination, though they
do not apply this to natural acts, or to the material element
in sin. But, strictly speaking, these are philosophical questions,
whereas grace efficacious of itself in virtue of God’s omnipotent
will, independently of the creature’s consent and the scientia
media, this we defend as a theological conclusion that is con­
nected with the principles of the faith and proximate to the
faith (proximately definable). If we exclude the Molinists,
this opinion is held by almost all the schools.50 The Thomists
perceive, indeed, that this statement of intrinsically efficacious
grace is implied in the scriptural texts previously quoted con­
cerning the intrinsic efficacy of the divine decrees.00 Similarly,
they connect this doctrine with the principle of predilection,
namely: “No one thing would be better than another, if God
did not will greater good for one than for another.” 01
Now if we admit the fact of intrinsically and infallibly effi­
cacious grace, how can we account for it except by saying that
it is so by reason of the predetermining physical premotion in
the sense just explained? It has been proposed, of course, to
explain this efficacy by means of a moral causality in that the
object attracts the will, and so some have spoken, such as Berti
and Bellelius, of a victorious delectation, others of a multi­
plicity of graces that attract the will, or of a series of inde­
liberate and inefficacious good movements that incline the
so De Deo, diss. 8, a.5 (end).
so Billuart, loc. cit., diss. 5, a.6; in more recent times, cf. N. del Prado, op. cit.,
Ill, 150 if.; E. Hugon, De gratia, p. 202.
61 Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3.

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PREDESTINATION

will to make the salutary choice, and it has even been proposed
to assign to this moral motion, in one or the other of the above
mentioned modes, a physical but non-predetermining pre­
motion.
It is the common teaching of the Thomists in the tractate
on grace, that the explanations are insufficient. The funda­
mental reason they give is that God cannot infallibly move
the will by means of a moral or objective motion. Now in­
trinsically efficacious grace is that by which God infallibly
moves the will to make the salutary choice. Therefore intrinsi­
cally efficacious grace cannot be explained by simply a moral
or objective motion.
The major of this premise rests upon the principle that by a
moral or objective motion the will is reached only through
the medium of the intellect by way of objective attraction, and
is not infallibly drawn by this motion. Undoubtedly, God seen
face to face would infallibly attract our will because He ad­
equately satisfies its capacity for love. But every attraction,
however exalted it may be, is unable fully to satisfy this ca­
pacity and is fallible; it leaves the will undetermined whether
to consent or not, especially so with a weak will, with one that
is hard and indocile to the divine call, so long as it is not in­
trinsically changed.
It does not solve the difficulty to say that this moral motion
is accompanied by a celestial and victorious delectation. This
latter, which is admitted by several Augustinians, such as
Berti, cannot make the grace intrinsically and infallibly effi­
cacious; for, often enough, it does not even accompany the
motion, and when present does not infallibly produce its effect.
Often enough it is ineffective, for some are converted who were
not disposed precisely because they were drawn by a celestial
delectation that is superior to earthly things; for they were
drawn by reason of an inclination to good that is not always a
victorious delectation, but is inspired by the fear of divine
chastisements and other motives. Even saints perform many

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

3’3

good works without experiencing this victorious delectation;
and they are, at times, in a state of very great aridity, as for
instance, is the case with those who are undergoing the dark
night or passive purification of the soul. When this celestial
delectation is present, it solicits undoubtedly our free will
to act, but it does not infallibly attract the will; for it does not
fully satisfy the capacity of the will for love, as would be the
case of God seen face to face; for the will can incline us to
think of something else.82 As a matter of fact, in his choice man
is not always influenced by the greatest delectation that sud­
denly presents itself; he chooses what appears to him to be the
best right at the moment, even for the sole motive that it is of
obligation, without any previous delectation, and the superior
delectation then follows the choice, just as joy follows the ful­
filment of one’s duty.
The multiplicity of the graces of attraction would not give
the salutary acts an infallible efficacy; for the will still remains
undecided whether to consent or not, although it is ardently
solicited or inclined to give its salutary consent. Thus the
persecutors promised all the goods of this world to the holy
martyrs, at the same time attempting to frighten them by
the threat of all the torments; but neither these promises nor
threats of torments could infallibly influence their liberty of
action. In like manner, inefficacious good movements incline
the will to make the salutary choice, but they cannot infallibly
cause this act; for they, too, leave our free will undecided.
They do not effect the free choice, to say nothing of the fact
that they often have to contend with great temptations and the
fickleness of our free will in the performance of good.
Finally, an indifferent physical premotion that moves man
to will to be happy, without inclining him infallibly to will
this particular good, it, too, leaves our free will undecided. It
does not effect the free choice of a certain good.
The Thomists, too, conclude that moral motion is certainly
62 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q. 10, a.2.

3H

PREDESTINATION

required to dispose our will to make the choice, by proposing
to it an object, a good that solicits or attracts it. But intrinsi­
cally efficacious grace that infallibly moves the will to make the
free choice, must be the application of the will to the exercise
of this act. Now this is not a moral motion, or one by way of
objective attraction, but it is a physical motion. It must exert
its effect immediately from within; on the will itself, and not
through the intervention of the intellect. It must have a pri­
ority not of time but of nature or causality over the free act.
It must, finally, bring the will infallibly to perform this par­
ticular free act rather than a certain other, and cause even this
act to be performed freely. This means that it must be a pre­
determining physical and non-necessitating premotion, which
can come from God alone, and from no created agent however
superior; for only God can interiorly move the free will which
He has ordained to universal good and which He maintains in
existence. He alone by His unsullied contact can so move the
will as not to destroy its liberty, and can reconcile His infalli­
ble motion with the free mode of our acts.
Theologians always granted the Thomists that it is because
of this divine motion of itself efficacious, that the Virgin Mary
freely and infallibly uttered her “fiat” on the day of the an­
nunciation, that St. Paul was freely and infallibly converted
on his way to Damascus, that the martyrs remained freely and
infallibly faithful in the midst of most dreadful torments. But
that is to concede the metaphysical principles of the doctrine,
and, if they are metaphysical, they are applicable without
exception to all salutary acts, whether these be easy or difficult
to perform. The foregoing principles that have been formu­
lated do not take into consideration the greater or less degree
of difficulty.
On the other hand, the infallibility of the divine motion
which is affirmed by the Jansenists and Quesnel03 in terms
practically the same as those of St. Thomas, is the denial of
es Denz., nos. i ,360-63.

ARGUMENTS FOR PREMOTION

315

liberty, as well as of sufficient grace and responsibility on the
sinner’s part. The Jansenists consider grace of itself efficacious
to be necessary by reason of the weakness of human nature and
not because of the creature’s dependence upon God. They
hold that in the state of innocence intrinsically efficacious
grace was not necessary for the performance of a good act.
It is necessary only since the fall because of the consequences
of original sin, in that only freedom from coercion remains
to us and not free will (freedom from necessity).
To sum up, intrinsically and infallibly efficacious grace,
which in more precise language means predetermining and
non-necessitating premotion, is required not only for salutary
acts difficult to perform, but also for those that are easy; and
this holds good either for the commencement or continuance
in the performance of good works. “Since, indeed, God’s love
is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better
than another [by reason of an initial or final salutary act, by
one that is easy or difficult to perform, in the beginning or for
its continuance], if God did not will greater good for one than
for another.” 61
04 Loc. cit., la, q.ao, a.3.

CHAPTER VIII
The Divine Motion and the Freedom
Salutary Acts

of our

The question has been raised against the Thomist thesis that

it destroys liberty, as Calvinism does, in that it makes us main­
tain that the free will cannot resist. This is the thesis of the
Reformers that was condemned by the Council of Trent de­
fining: “If anyone shall say that man’s free will, moved and
aroused by God, by assenting to God arousing and calling,
cannot refuse to consent, if it would, but that, as something
inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive;
let him be anathema.” 1 This and other similar objections
were made to St. Augustine by the Pelagians and Semipel­
agians. St. Thomas often referred to them and solved them.2
The Thomists reply that the Council of Trent did not wish
to condemn either the doctrine of intrinsically efficacious
grace or that of physical premotion, as clearly expressed by
Benedict XIV and Clement XII. At the end of the sessions
Paul V also had declared: “The opinion of the Friars Preach­
ers differs very much from that of Calvin. For the Domini­
cans say that grace does not destroy but perfects free will, and
such is its power that it leaves man to act as befits his nature,
which is freely. The Jesuits, however, differ from the Pe­
lagians who declared the beginning of salvation to be from
ourselves, whereas the former teach quite the contrary.” ·
1 Denz., no. 814.
2 Summa theol., la, q.19, a.8; q.115, a.4; la Ilae, q. 10, a.4.
s Congregatio de Auxiliis, August 28, 1607; cf. Schneeman, S.J., Controv. de
gratia, p. 291. This decision of Paul V was afterwards confirmed by a decree
of Benedict XIV, July 13, 1748.
316

FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS

317

Evidently the Thomist doctrine differs entirely from that
condemned by the Council of Trent. According to this con­
demned doctrine, the free will does not co-operate with the
divine action. Furthermore, there were many Thomists among
the fathers of the council. One of them, Dominic Soto, was
even engaged in the drawing up of these canons. It is even
very probable that the fathers of the Council in the abovementioned canon speak of an intrinsically efficacious divine
motion; for it is this motion that Luther had in mind when
he said it could not be reconciled with free will. Therefore
the mind of the fathers is rather that the intrinsically and
infallibly efficacious divine motion does not destroy free will;
for, although man does not actually resist it, yet he retains
the power to do so; remanet potentia ad oppositum, as the
Thomists commonly say.
Moreover, the council had said previous to this: “For God,
unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as Fie has
begun the good work so will He perfect it, working in them
to will and accomplish.” 4 These last words were generally
understood by the pre-Tridentine theologians as meaning
that grace is of itself efficacious, and not because God foresaw
our consent.5
Finally, the Thomists retort by saying that it is the scientia
media which destroys liberty; for it supposes that God previ­
ous to any divine decree sees infallibly what a particular man
freely would choose if placed in certain circumstances. Flow,
indeed, can one then avoid determinism of circumstances? In
what medium can God see infallibly the determination that
would arrest the appetite of the created free will, if not in
the scrutiny of the circumstances that thence become infallibly
determining? And not having decided in favor of a divine
and non-necessitating predetermination that makes its influ* Denz., no. 806.
0 Cf. A. Reginald, O.P., De mente Cone. Trid.; also A. Massoulié, O.P., Divus
Thomas sui interpres, Vol. I, diss. 2, q.9.

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PREDESTINATION

ence felt strongly and suavely in the very depths of the free
will, is not one led to admit a very inferior sort of determin­
ism that results from the influence exerted by external things
on our spiritual will?
The canon of the Council of Trent just quoted was but the
occasion of reviving an old objection. We saw that St. Thomas
had already formulated it as clearly as possible, when he said:
“It seems that the will is moved of necessity by God. For
every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But
God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; where­
fore it is written: Who resisteth His will? (Rom. 9: 19.) There­
fore God moves the will of necessity.” We know that St.
Thomas replied to this by saying: “The divine will extends
not only to the doing of something by the thing which He
moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to
the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more
repugnant to the divine motion, for the will to be moved of
necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to
be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.” e From
this reply, what remains of the major of this objection: Every
agent that cannot be resisted, moves of necessity? St. Thomas
distinguishes as follows: If this agent causes the movement,
without causing the being to move freely, I deny the major;
if it causes the being to move and to move freely, then I con­
cede the major. Thus man under the influence of efficacious
grace remains free, although he never resists it; for it causes
in him and with him even that he act freely; it actualizes his
liberty in the order of good, and if he no longer is in a state
of potential or passive indifference, he still has an actual and
active indifference, a dominating indifference with regard
to the particular good which he chooses. This good is incapa­
ble of invincibly attracting him like the vision of God face to
face. He is inclined freely toward this good, God actualizing
this free movement; and since its free mode still is being, it is
« Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. io, a.4 ad mm.

FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS

319

included in the adequate object of divine omnipotence. Such
is manifestly the doctrine of St. Thomas. The texts just
quoted 7 clearly prove this to be the case.
Such is also the traditional teaching of classic Thomism.
Molina concedes this at the same time that he declares his de­
parture not only from the teaching of the Thomists, but even
from that of St. Thomas.8 Several Molinists made the same
admission.®
This same doctrine of St. Thomas was later on expounded
by Bossuet, who wrote: “Is there anything more absurd than
to say that the will is not free in its act because God wills it
to be free.” 10 In other words: Is there anything more absurd
than to say that the actualization of the free will destroys it?
This freedom in our acts is not only safeguarded, but is also
prodqced by God in and with us. The divine motion does not
force the will, because it operates according to the natural in­
clination of this latter. It inclines the will first toward its ade­
quate object, which is universal good, and only after this
toward an inadequate object, which is some particular good.
In the first case the divine motion causes the act to be free.
It operates interiorly, as was just said, in the very depths of
the will, as to the universality of the same, and in a sense in­
clines the will toward every degree of good, before giving
it the inclination to tend toward some particular good.11
Thus God moves us suavely and powerfully to act freely.
If the divine motion were to lose its power, it would also lose
its suavity. Incapable of reaching what is more delicate and
intimate to us, it would remain external to us, affixed, as it
were, to our created activity, something unworthy of the
t Cf. chap. 5.
s Concordia, pp. 152, 547.
0 Cf. P. Mandonnet, "Notes de l'histoire thomiste,” in the Revue Thomiste,
1914, pp. 665-79; Dummermuth, S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionis physicae,
PP- 685-754.
10 Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 7.
n Cf. John of St. Thomas, Cursus theol., in ïam, q. 19, disp. 5, a.5 f., nos.
37-55·

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PREDESTINATION

creative, conservative, and motive activity, which is more
intimate to us than we are to ourselves. Our free act there­
fore proceeds entirely from us as secondary cause, and entirely
from God as primary cause.12 When, after deliberation, we
perform the act, in virtue of the universal scope of our will
and our independence of judgment that is not necessitated by
the object, we retain the power not to perform the act.13 If
our free will were able of itself alone to determine itself, then
it would have the dignity of the first Will and would be like
to it not only analogically but also univocally. It would be
purely and simply an image of the divine liberty, instead of
there being a similarity of proportion between it and this
latter.14 Between the two there is similarity and dissimilarity.
If we consider the similarity, we must say that it is just as easy
to reconcile created liberty with the intrinsically efficacious
divine motion, as it is to reconcile God’s free act with His im­
mutability. In God freedom of action is not the dominating
potential indifference of a faculty that is capable of acting or
of not acting. With Him it is the dominating indifference of
pure Act with regard to everything created.13 Likewise, in due
proportion, under the influence of the efficacious divine mo­
tion, our liberty is no longer the potential but actual indiffer­
ence of the faculty, and its actualization does not destroy this
liberty.
If Molinism rejects this doctrine, the reason is because it
seeks to define human liberty without any reference to the
object that specifies the free act. Human liberty is a faculty
that, presupposed all that is requisite for it to act, it still can
either act or not act, and among these prerequisites it places
the divine motion, which is compatible, according to this
theory, not only with the power of resisting but also with the
actual fact of resisting.
12Z.0C. cit., la, q.23, a.5.
is Ibid., la Ilae, q. 10, a.4 ad mm.
Ibid., la, q. 19, a. 3 ad 511m.
is Ibid., la, q. 19. a.3 ad 4111η; Contra Gentes, I, 82.

FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS

321

In virtue of the fundamental principle that the faculties,
habits, and acts are specified by their object, in the definition
of free will we must consider its specifying object, and say
with the Thomists that liberty is the dominating indifference
of the will with regard to good proposed to it by the reason
as not in every respect good. The essence of liberty consists in
the dominating indifference of the will with regard to every
object proposed by the reason as at the moment good in one
aspect, and not good in another, according to the formula of
St. Thomas: “If the will is offered an object that is not good
from every point of view, it will not tend to this of neces­
sity.” 18 There is then indifference in willing or not willing
this object, a potential indifference in the faculty and an ac­
tual indifference in the free act which is not necessarily in­
clined toward it. Even when, in fact, the will actually wills
this object, when it is already determined to will this, it is
still inclined freely toward this with a dominating indiffer­
ence that is no longer potential but actual. In like manner, the
divine liberty that is already determined maintains us in exist­
ence. Liberty therefore arises from the infinite disproportion
prevailing between the will that is specified by universal good,
and a particular good which is good in one aspect, not good
or insufficient in another. The Thomists also say in opposition
to Suarez, that not even by His absolute power can God move
our will of necessity to will a certain object, the indifference
of judgment remaining as it is, so long as we judge the ob­
ject to be good in one aspect and not so in another. The rea­
son is that it implies a contradiction for the will to will of
necessity the object proposed to it by the intellect as indiffer­
ent or as absolutely out of proportion to its scope.17
That we may better grasp how the divine motion is the
cause of our free act, we must point out that this latter de­
pends upon three different finite causalities that are mutually
1« Ibid., la Ilae, q. 10, a.2.
1’ De veritate, q.22, a.5.

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PREDESTINATION

related: (i) the objective attraction of particular good; (2)
the direction of the intellect in forming a practical judgment;
(3) the efficiency or production of the free choice by the will.
The divine motion transcends these three causalities and ac­
tualizes them, without violating free will. The attraction of
the end thus remains the first of the causes, and it implies a
contradiction that our will be necessitated by the divine mo­
tion, when the judgment is indifferent or non-necessitating;
for it implies a contradiction that our will should wish an
object different from that which is proposed to it.
To sum up, as Bossuet said: “Is there anything more ab­
surd than to say that the will is not free in its act, because
God efficaciously wills it to be free?” 18 Is there anything more
inconsistent titan to say that the actualization of free will de­
stroys it?
The great mystery, too, according to St. Augustine and St.
Thomas, is not how to reconcile God’s foreknowledge and
His decrees with created liberty; for, if God is God, His
efficacious will must extend even to the free mode of our acts.
From the fact of His willing efficaciously that Paul be freely
converted on a certain day at a certain time, on his way to
Damascus, it must follow that Paul is freely converted; and,
if in this case the effect of the divine motion on the human
will does not destroy its liberty, why would it do so in other
cases?
We must seek elsewhere for the reason of this great mystery.
It is to be found in God’s permission of moral evil or sin in
this particular man or angel rather than in a certain other.
St. Augustine 10 and St. Thomas 20 say that if the grace of final
perseverance is granted, as it was to the good thief, that is be­
cause of God’s mercy; if it is not granted, that is in just pun­
ishment as a rule for repeated sins, and for having resisted the
is Loc. cit.
1» De correptione et gratia, chaps. 5 f.
20 Loc. cit., Ila Ilae, q.2, a.5 ad mm.

FREEDOM OF OUR SALUTARY ACTS

323

final appeal, a final resistance that God permits in this one
rather than in a certain other. This makes St. Augustine say:
“Why God draws this one and not that one, judge not, if
thou wilt not err.” 21 St. Thomas says in like manner: "No
one thing would be better than another, if God did not will
greater good for one than for the other.” 22
On the other hand, God never commands what is impossi­
ble. Even when Judas fell from grace, though so near to Christ
His redeemer, it was still truly possible for him to comply with
the divine law.
There is still one difficulty to be discussed, and this concerns
the act of sin.
21 In Joan., tr. 26.
22 Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3: cf. q.23, a.5 ad sum.

CHAPTER IX
The Divine Motion

and the

Physical Act of Sin

principle

It is certain that God is in no way the cause of sin, either di­
rectly or indirectly. He cannot be the direct cause of sin by in­
clining His will or a created will to it, for sin is the result of
the rational creature turning away from God, its ordained
end. Neither can He be the indirect cause of sin by neglecting
to keep us from it, as the captain of a ship who, by his neg­
ligence, is the cause of the shipwreck, when he is not at his
post watching, as he can and should be doing. Undoubtedly
it happens that God does not grant certain persons the help
that would keep them from sin; but that is in accordance
with the established order of His wisdom and justice. He is
not bound to do so. He does not owe it to Himself to keep
creatures that are by nature defectible from ever failing to
do their duty, and He can permit them to fail in view of a
higher good. Thus He permits the sin of persecutors that the
constancy of the martyrs may be made manifest.1
This divine permission of sin is in no way its cause, either
directly or indirectly; it allows this to happen. It is but the
indispensable condition. If God did not permit it, did not
allow it to happen, there would be no sin. This divine per­
mission of sin, especially in the case of the first movement by
which the first sin is committed and by which the just person
separates from God, is not a punishment, as the withdrawal
of divine grace is the result of a transgression. Every punish­
ment presupposes a transgression, and this latter would not
i Summa theol., la, q.22, a.2 ad 211m.
824

THE PHYSICAL ACT OF SIN

325

be unless it were permitted by God. This divine permission
of sin, which implies the non-conservation of a certain created
liberty in good, is not a good; but it is not an evil, for it is
not the privation of a good due to us; it is only the negation
of a good not due to us. Philosophy teaches that privation
means more than negation. God did not owe it to Himself
to preserve Lucifer or Adam in a state of innocence from
every transgression. He permitted Lucifer rather than a cer­
tain other angel to consent to a movement of pride in the
will, and in punishment for this transgression He withdrew
His grace. It is important to note here against Calvin that
the withdrawal of God’s grace means more than His simple
permission of sin; for this withdrawal is a punishment, as
St. Thomas points out.2 Now every punishment presupposes
a transgression, and every transgression presupposes a divine
permission as the indispensable condition for its existence.
However, the permission of a second sin is a punishment for
the first.
THE DIVINE CAUSALITY AND THE PHYSICAL ACT OF SIN

This granted, it is not so difficult to understand the relation
of the divine causality or physical premotion to the physical
act of sin. St. Thomas writes clearly on this subject as fol­
lows: “The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both
respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode
of its being, must be derived from the first Being, as Dionysius
declares (De div. nom., c. V). Again every action is caused by
something existing in act, since nothing produces an action
save in so far as it is in act: and every being in act is reduced
to the first Act, God, as to its cause, who is Act by His essence.
Therefore, God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is
an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a de­
fect: and this defect is from a created cause, the free will, as
2 Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a.3.

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PREDESTINATION

falling away from the order of the first Agent, God. Conse­
quently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to
the free will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a
crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which
nevertheless causes whatever movement there is in the limp­
ing. Accordingly, God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet
He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act
to have a defect.” s
The divine concurrence in the physical act of sin of which
St. Thomas speaks here is not merely a simultaneous con­
currence, as later on Molina contended, like that of two men
drawing a boat. It is a case, indeed, of two partial causes (the
partialness being of cause and not of effect, as Molina says),
which means that the two causes are co-ordinated rather than
subordinated in their causality. For St. Thomas, the secondary
cause acts only when premoved by the first; whereas neither
of the two men drawing the boat moves the other. If it were
merely a simultaneous concurrence, God would not be the
cause of the physical act of sin as an action; for the cause does
not merely accompany the effect, but precedes it at least by
a priority of nature and causality. If therefore this divine
concurrence is not merely simultaneous, it is a premotion, so
say the Thomists, and even, since we must be precise in
meaning on this point, it is a predetermining though not
necessitating premotion. But the predetermination is not to
be applied here in the same way as in a case of a good and
salutary act.
For a proper understanding of this, we must remark that
this divine motion presupposes in God an eternal decree,
which is positive and effective as regards the physical entity
of sin, and permissive as regards the deficiency. This defi­
ciency, as we have seen, is the result of a defectible and de­
ficient cause. Independently of this twofold eternal decree
on God’s part, sin was merely possible, but it was not either a
3 Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a.2.

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327

conditional or absolute future. For instance, if from all eter­
nity God had not permitted it, the sin of Judas would not
have happened; it would have been merely possible. But God
having permitted it from all eternity to happen in this par­
ticular manner, place, and time, it had to happen freely and
infallibly at this particular time and not before, with its par­
ticular kind of malice and not any other.4 Therefore the sin
of Judas presupposed an eternal decree, positive as regards
the physical entity of the act, permissive as regards its de­
ficiency. It is the same with every sin that happens in time.
To this eternal decree there corresponds a divine motion
by which God is the first Cause of the physical act of sin as a
being and an action. This divine motion can be predetermin­
ing but in a different manner from that which concerns the
good and salutary act; for it depends upon an eternal decree
that is not only positive and effective, but also permissive.
This can be better explained by pointing out that the di­
vine motion as regards the exercise of the act presupposes the
objective motion or the object as proposed. If this latter is
defective, in so far as it does not come from God, but is the
result of an evil instigation or of concupiscence, then God
cannot even counsel the physical act of sin, for this objective
advice could not exclude the malice of the act. In the case of
a good act, on the contrary, the objective motion prerequired
is good and always comes from God, at least as first Cause.
The objectivity of the defective motion having been estab­
lished, there intervenes a certain lack of consideration of his
obligation on the part of the one who is about to sin, a lack
of consideration permitted by God but by no means caused
by Him; and the lack of consideration is at least virtually
voluntary, for it is the deed of one who could and ought to
consider the divine law, if not always, at least before acting.
It is only after this, according to a priority of nature if not of
time, that the divine influence intervenes to incline the will
« See p. 303.

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PREDESTINATION

to the physical act of sin, an influence which, as in the case
of a good act, causes the will to choose freely and in no way
compels it.
It is the common teaching, too, of the Thomists that God
does not determine anyone to the material or physical act of
sin before the created will, by reason of its weakness, has de­
termined itself in a certain way to the formal element in sin.
The objective motion precedes by a priority of nature the
efficient motion. We cannot will a nothingness, but only a
proposed object; and as regards the act of sin, the defective
objective motion, which is accompanied by the lack of con­
sideration of one’s duty, precedes the divine motion that in­
clines the will to the physical act of sin. In other words, God
moves the will to the physical act of sin only when it is already
badly disposed by reason of its weakness. Thus Jesus said to
Judas, who was disposed to commit sin and took pleasure in
it: “That which thou dost, do quickly.” 6 The Lord neither
ordains nor counsels, but permits the accomplishment of the
premeditated crime.® Unless he permitted this evil, though
disapproving of it, it would not happen.
The lack of consideration of one’s duty just mentioned by
us, to which St. Thomas especially refers apropos of the sin
in the angels,7 is it truly voluntary and culpable? It certainly
is; for, as St. Thomas again explains,® the fault arises from
the fact that we begin to will and to act without taking the
law into consideration, which we could and ought then to
consider. Moreover, as the will is by nature inclined to what
is truly good, it could not be inclined toward apparent good
which is an evil, without being previously turned away, at
least virtually, from true good, causing us not to consider
this latter when the need of doing so presents itself. There is
in this a resistance to sufficient grace which virtually con5 John 13: 27.
e Cf. St. Thomas, In Joan. chap. 13, lect. 5.
i Loc. cit., la, q.62, a.i ad 411m.
s De malo, q. t, a. 3 (end).

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329

tained the offer of efficacious grace, as the fruit is contained
in the flower. On account of this resistance, God can freely
deprive us of efficacious grace, a privation that is a punish­
ment and that follows by a priority of nature the lack of
voluntary consideration which is the commencement of sin,
whereas the simple divine permission preceded it.0 We dis­
cussed this point of doctrine at length elsewhere.10
Such is the common teaching of the Thomists, as can be
gathered horn their commentaries on St. Thomas.11
Finally, we must note that predetermination to the physical
act of sin as explained, is not something of primary im­
portance in the Thomist doctrine relative to the divine de­
crees and motion; it is merely of secondary importance and a
philosophical conclusion. What is of primary importance in
this doctrine is that the divine decrees relative to our salu­
tary acts are efficacious of themselves and not because of our
consent foreseen by God. Of primary importance is the princi­
ple of predilection, which may be stated thus: “Since God’s
love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would
be better than another, if God did not will greater good for
one than for another.” 12 Everything else is of secondary im­
portance. Besides, this truth is related closely to the interior
life. Along with the dogma of creation from nothing, it is the
foundation of Christian humility. If we but reflect upon this
truth and its scope in the interior life, then it becomes the
means of dispelling all pride.
OBJECTIONS

Let us examine merely the principal objections raised
against premotion with regard to the physical act of sin.
0 De veritate, q.24, a. 14 ad 211m.
10 Cf. God, His Existence, II, 374-76, 380 if. Le sens du mystère, pp. 306-09.
11 Cf. In Summam theol., la, q.19, a.8: la Ilae, q.79, a.2. See especially
John of St. Thomas, In lam, q. 19, disp. 5, a.5 f.
12 Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.

33°

PREDESTINATION

1) It has been said that he who moves efficaciously and determinately to the act of sin, is the cause of sin. Now, accord­
ing to the Thomists, God moves in this manner. Therefore
He is the cause of sin.
The major would be true if this efficacious motion could
not account for the being of the action without at the same
time accounting for its malice. In fact, as the Thomists say,
the divine motion excludes all malice. This is what St.
Thomas himself says.13
2) But it is insisted that God moves one to the act, as it pro­
ceeds from the will. Now the act of sin, as it proceeds from
the will, is bad, for malice is not excluded. Therefore, accord­
ing to this teaching, God moves one to the bad act as such.
The Thomists reply: God moves one to the act as it pro­
ceeds effectively from the will, but not as it proceeds defec­
tively from it; for the deficiency depends solely upon a
defectible and deficient cause.
Little does it matter that the physical reality of the sinful
act and its moral disorder or its malice be inseparable; for
this malice cannot be included in the adequate object of di­
vine omnipotence. There is nothing more precise and more
precisive, if we may so say, than the adequate and formal ob­
ject of a faculty. It is that which puts within the reach of the
faculty solely what concerns this latter to the exclusion of the
rest. Thus, in a fruit, only color is the object of sight, and not
the smell or sweetness of the fruit; and as the smell of a fruit
is not included in the object of sight, so moral disorder or
malice is not included in the adequate object of the divine
indefectible power. Even if by an impossibility God were to
will it, He could not be either the direct or the indirect cause
of sin, which means the moral disorder to be found in the act.
Again, in like manner, in all that is true and good, the in­
tellect attains truth and not good, although these are not
really distinct; far more so then, the divine causality is able
is Ibid., la Ilae, q.79, a.2; see supra, pp. 325 f.

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331

to attain the physical entity of sin without extending to its
malice, which is of another order.
3) Again, it is objected that in Thomism the sinner is not
responsible for his defection; for the sufficient grace which
he receives gives him only the power to keep the command­
ments but not actually to do so, as God demands. Certainly,
sufficient grace of itself does not enable us to keep the com­
mandments, but it is sufficient in its own way, just as one
says: bread is sufficient for one’s sustenance, yet it must be
digested. The natural power of the intellect is sufficient for
acquiring a knowledge of certain truths, yet it must institute
a methodical inquiry into them so as to acquire this knowl­
edge. Christ’s passion was sufficient for our salvation, yet its
merits had to be applied by the sacraments or in some other
way.14
Moreover, sufficient grace virtually contains the efficient
grace that is offered to us in it, as the flower contains the
fruit. Even the most rigid Thomists, such as Lemos and
Alvarez, say that God in giving sufficient help offers us in
it that which is efficacious. The fruit is offered in the flower,
yet it must not be destroyed by the hail, if the fruit is to
develop. Likewise, efficient grace is offered to us in the suffi­
cient; but we must be careful not to resist this latter, a resist­
ance that would come solely from us, not from God, and that
could deprive us of the proffered efficacious grace. It is also
the common teaching of the Thomists that every actual grace
which is efficacious as regards an imperfect salutary act, such
as attrition, is sufficient as regards a more perfect act, such as
contrition. If it is not followed by culpable resistance on our
part, the efficacious grace of contrition will be given to us.
This efficacious grace is thus within our power, though cer­
tainly not as something that can be produced by us, but as a
gift that would be granted to us if our will did not resist suffi­
cient grace. Thus the Council of Trent teaches that “God,
1* Ibid., Illa, q.61, a.i ad 311m.

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PREDESTINATION

unless men be themselves wanting to His grace, as He began
the good work, so will He perfect it, working in them to will
and to accomplish.” 15 Sufficient grace that solicits our con­
version may well go further than this. We have good reason
for saying so, if we think of what our Lord did to prevent
Judas from being lost. This was evidently Judas’ own fault.
The greatest outrage that can be committed against God is to
think that He is not good enough to forgive. God never
commands what is impossible, and He tells us to do what we
can, and to ask of Him the grace to accomplish what of our­
selves we are unable to effect.
4) There is just one more objection. It is contended that
for man not to resist sufficient grace, but consent to it, effi­
cacious grace is required, according to the Thomists’ teach­
ing. Therefore, if man resists, it is because he did not receive
the efficacious grace necessary for consent. If, in fact, the
bestowal of efficacious grace is the cause of one’s not resisting,
which is a good, then its non-bestowal is the cause of one’s
resisting, which is an evil. This is an application of the axiom:
if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause
of negation. Sunrise is the cause of day, and sunset is the
cause of night.
The Thomists say that the reply to this must be that this
axiom holds good in the case of a unique cause, such as the
sun, which is either present or absent, but it does not hold
good in the case of two causes, one of which is absolutely in­
defectible and the other defectible. Thus the bestowal of
efficacious grace is the cause of the salutary act, even of the
non-resistance to grace which, since it is a good, must come
from the Author of all good; whereas the fact that grace is not
bestowed is not the cause of the omission of the salutary act.
This omission is a defect that proceeds solely from our defectibility and by no means from God. It would proceed from
Him only if He were bound, if He owed it to Himself, to
is Denz., no. 806.

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333

keep us always in the performance of good, and not permit a
defectible creature sometimes to fail. Now He can permit this
for a greater good, such as the manifestation of His mercy and
justice. Thus it is true to say that man is deprived of effica­
cious grace because he resisted sufficient grace, whereas it is
not true to say that man resists or sins because he is deprived
of efficacious grace. He resists by reason of his own defectibility, which God is not bound to remedy. God is not bound
to cause a defectible creature never to fail. “Destruction is
thy own, O Israel: thy help is only in Me.” 18 Man who is
powerless of himself alone to perform the salutary act, finds
his sufficiency in himself for failure.17
5) Some still insisted asking how we can claim that at the
moment the first sin is committed, by which a just person
separates from God, efficacious grace is refused because of a
previous defection or an accompanying resistance? This resist­
ance, far from preceding the divine refusal of efficacious help,
follows it. Hence the sinner is not to blame.
According to the teaching of St. Thomas, it is not necessary
that the first human defection precede the divine refusal of
efficacious grace by a priority of time; a priority of nature
suffices. In this we have an application of the principle of the
mutual relation between causes, which is verified in all cases
where there is the intervention of the four causes; for causes
mutually interact, though in a different order. St. Thomas in­
vokes this general principle to prove that in the justification
of the sinner, which takes place in an indivisible instant, the
remission of sin follows the infusion of grace in the formal
and efficient order, whereas liberation from sin precedes the
reception of sanctifying grace in the order of material causal­
ity. As St. Thomas says: “The sun by its light acts for the
removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumi­
nation is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of
Osee 13: 7.
i’ Denz., nos. 193, 195.

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PREDESTINATION

the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness
is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although
both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of
grace and the remission of sin regard God who justifies, hence
in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the
freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of man
justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature
the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justify­
ing grace.” 18
Now if justification is thus explained by the mutual rela­
tion between causes, then it must be the same for the loss
of grace, which is the reverse process; for the rule is the same
for contraries. As John of St. Thomas shows,10 the moment
man sins mortally and loses habitual grace, his deficiency, in
the order of material causality, precedes the refusal of God’s
actual efficacious grace and is the reason for this. From an­
other point of view, however, even the first deficiency presup­
poses God’s permission of sin, and would not result without
it. But, in opposition to justification, sin as such is the work
of the deficient creature and not of God. Therefore it is true
to say that purely and simply (simpliciter in the Scholastic
sense is the opposite of secundum quid), sin precedes God’s
refusal of efficacious grace. In other words, “God forsakes not
those who have been justified, unless He be first forsaken by
them.” 20 He withdraws habitual grace only because of mor­
tal sin, and actual efficacious grace only because of a resist­
ance, at least initial, to sufficient grace.
It concerns us here to note carefully against Calvin, as we
did at the beginning of this chapter, that the withdrawal of
divine grace spoken of by St. Thomas,21 means far more than
merely God’s permission of sin; for this divine withdrawal is
Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.113, a.8 ad mm.
ia Cursus theol., in lam, q. ig, disp. V, a.6, no. 61.
20 Denz., no. 804.
22 Loc. cit., la Ilae, q.79, a.3.

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335

a penalty.22 Every penalty presupposes at least a first defection.
This defection could not happen without God’s permission,
which is not at all its cause, but only its indispensable condi­
tion. The Thomists say that we thus avoid the contradiction
and, instead of doing away with the mystery, we thus safe­
guard it.
CONCLUSION

The chiaroscuro effects of this sublime doctrine are incom­
parably greater than those we admire in the works of the
greatest artists. On the other hand, it is absolutely clear that
God cannot will evil, that He cannot be in any way either
directly or indirectly the cause of sin. We are even far more
certain of the absolute rectitude of the divine intentions than
we are of the rectitude of our own best intentions. Conse­
quently it is equally certain that God never commands the
impossible, for that would be contrary to His justice and
goodness. He wills, therefore, to make it really possible for
all to keep His commandments and be saved.
On the other hand, it is absolutely beyond doubt that God
is the author of all good, that His love is the cause of all
created good, even of our good and salutary consent, for
otherwise, what is of preference in created things would fall
outside the scope of the divine causality. It follows, as St.
Thomas says, in accordance with St. Augustine, that “no one
thing would be better than another, if God did not will
greater good for one than for another.” 23 This law applies
equally to the state of innocence as to the present state, and
to every act, either natural or supernatural, easy or difficult,
merely begun or continued. This principle of predilection
that dominates all these problems, virtually contains the
22 Ibid.
2s Ibid., la, q.20, a.3.

PREDESTINATION
33θ
whole doctrine of predestination and the efficacy of grace to
which our Lord refers when He says: “No one can snatch
them out of the hand of My Father.” 24
How are these two great principles intimately to be recon­
ciled, which taken separately are so certain: namely, the
principle of the possibility of salvation for all mankind, and
that of divine predilection? The answer is to be found in St.
Paul’s words: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and
of the knowledge of God.” 25 We must always come back to
this answer, for there is no created intellect, either human or
angelic, that can perceive the intimate reconciliation of these
two principles before being admitted to the beatific vision.
To perceive this intimate reconciliation, in fact, would be to
perceive how infinite justice, mercy, and sovereign liberty
are identified, without being destructive of one another in
the eminence of the Deity, in God’s intimate life, in that
which is absolutely inaccessible and ineffable in Him.
Likewise, the more these two principles to be reconciled
become evident to us, the more, by way of contrast, they ap­
pear to be obscure, with a light-transcending obscurity, the
eminence of the Deity in which they are united. In this
chiaroscuro of a higher order, it is of importance for us not
to deny the clarity because of the obscurity, for that would
be to disturb the arrangement of light and shade, for thus
they are displayed to admirable effect. Let us leave the mys­
tery where it truly belongs, and we shall increasingly realize
that it must be, above all reasoning, above all speculative
theology, the object of supernatural contemplation, of this
contemplation that proceeds from faith enlightened by the
gifts of wisdom and understanding. Thus it will begin to
dawn upon us that what is more sublime in God is precisely
what remains more obscure for us, or inaccessible on account
of the feebleness of our sight. In this contemplation, grace, by

24 John 10:29.
2s Rom. 11: 33.

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337

a secret instinct, tranquiliz.es us concerning the intimate
reconciliation of infinite mercy, justice, and sovereign liberty,
and it does so precisely because it is itself a participation of
God’s intimate life. What speculative theology has to say
about the divine motion must lead us to this contemplation,
the purpose of which otherwise in great measure will be lost.
Then all becomes clear and we understand that the resulting
obscurity is not that of incoherence or absurdity, but the ob­
scurity that is the result of too great a light for our feeble
vision.29
Coming back to predestination, let us recall in conclusion
that the gratuity of predestination in the order of intention
in which the end is willed before the means, is no hindrance,
in the order of execution, to the means being realized before
the attainment of the end. In this case merits are necessary
in the adult as preceding eternal life by which they are
crowned. In this order of execution, too, the Lord says to
docile and generous souls: “Refuse me nothing, and thus My
graces will be able freely to pursue their course. I will that
thou refusest Me nothing, so that I may have nothing to re­
fuse thee. Thou art mine forever.”
As we began this work by setting forth the stand taken by
St. Augustine and his interpretation of Holy Scripture, so
let us conclude with this beautiful and sublime passage that
is found at the end of one of his works:
“But he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. . . . Let
us not therefore be eager in our disputes and sluggish in our
prayers. Let us pray, my beloved, let us pray that God give
the grace even to our enemies and especially to our brethren
and loved ones, to understand and confess that after the vast
and ineffable ruin in which through one man we were all in20 A complete bibliography of the questions in this work would be of vast
size. We have pointed out the principal works in the various chapters, and
especially on p. 292. We have made special mention of the works of Fathers
Dummermuth, N. del Prado, J. Ude, and Guillermin, as also the more recent
controversies that occurred between the years 1924 and 1927.

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PREDESTINATION

eluded, no one is freed from this except by God’s grace: and
this is not rendered to those who receive it as being due to
them on account of any merits on their part, but it is freely
given to them as a pure grace regardless of preceding merits.
There is no more illustrious example of predestination than
Jesus Himself. . . . He who made Him of the seed of David
a just man, who never would be unjust without a previous
consent of His will, makes just those who are unjust, without
any previous merit on their part, so that He may be the head
and these His members. . . . He who made Him such that
He never had nor will have His will turned to evil, makes in
His members their good from being evil. And therefore He
predestined Him and us, because, both for Him to be our
head and for us to be His members, He foreknew not our
previous merits but our future works. Those who read these
things, if they understand the same, let them give thanks to
God. But those who do not understand, let them pray that He
may be their interior teacher from whose countenance shine
forth knowledge and understanding.” 27
Jesus was predestined to be the natural Son of God before
the foreseeing of His merits; for these presuppose His divine
person and therefore His divine filiation. Now He is the
eminent exemplar of our predestination. Let us thank Him
for belonging to His Church, for having received life from
Him. In Him, with Him, and by Him, the elect will thank
God eternally for the gratuitous gift of their predestination,
which is the source of all their divine benefits, which will
have been the means of leading them to eternal life. They
will understand that when the Lord rewards their merits, He
crowns His own gifts. They will fully understand what St.
Paul meant when he said: “Blessed be the God and Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with spiritual
blessings in heavenly places, in Christ. As He chose us in Him
before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy
27 De dono persever., PL, XLV, 1033-34.

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339

and unspotted in His sight, in charity. Who hath predes­
tinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ
unto Himself, according to the purpose of His will. Unto
the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath graced
us in His beloved Son.” 28 This is practically the same as what
our Lord said: “My sheep hear My voice. . . . And I give
them life everlasting, and they shall not perish for ever. . . .
And no one can snatch them out of the hand of My Father.
I and the Father are one.” 28 “Father I will that where I am,
they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me. . . .
And I have made known Thy name to them and will make
it known, that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may
be in them, and I in them.” 20 “And not for them only do I
pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe
in Me. That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me,
and I in Thee. . . . And the glory which Thou hast given
Me, I have given to them, that they may be one, as we also
are one . . . and that the world may know that Thou hast
also loved Me.” S1
In conclusion let us repeat again what we said in the preface
to this book. Cardinal Newman remarked that in the Middle
Ages the mysteries of the faith were considered in the liturgy
primarily from the point of view of infused contemplation
and were given a poetic setting; later on they were viewed in
the light of theological wisdom, and afterwards, from the six­
teenth century, there has been at times a little too much of a
tendency to view them in the inferior light of a prudence
that forgets the sublimity of the divine plan and the depth
of God’s love, for it is only He who can thoroughly actuate
our will and move it suavely and firmly.
The final effect of predestination is expressed by the liturgy
in the hymn of vespers for the feast of the dedication of a
ss Eph. 1: 3-6.
20 John io: 27-30.
so Ibid., 17: 24, 26.
si Ibid., vj: 20-23.

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PREDESTINATION

church in verses of unsurpassed splendor of diction. In this
hymn the heavenly Jerusalem is described as being con­
structed of living stones, chiseled into shape by the Author
of salvation, polished by bruises and blows, and fittingly ar­
ranged by the hands of Christ to remain for ever in the sacred
edifice.
Jerusalem, blessed city,
Called the vision of peace,
That art built up in heaven,
Of living stones,
And with angel cohorts circled,
As a bride with thy attendants.

Many a blow and biting sculpture
Polished well those stones elect,
In their places now compacted
By the heavenly Architect,
Who therewith hath willed forever
That His palace should be decked.
Everywhere be glory and honor
To God most high,
Equally to Father and Son
And the glorious Paraclete,
To whom praise and power
Through everlasting ages.

APPENDIX I
Infallibly Efficacious Grace and Salutary Acts
Easy to Perform
We reproduce here in substance a series of articles that ap­

peared in the Revue Thomiste from November, 1925 to
March, 1926, relative to a new opinion which was then pro­
posed as being in agreement with that of the Thomists,
Gonzalez and Massoulié. For a more detailed knowledge of
this new opinion one may consult the two articles in the
Revue Thomiste, only the substance of these being given
here.
A NEW OPINION

We are asked to give our opinion of an interpretation that
has recently been proposed of the Thomist doctrine on grace.
This theory proposes to be a development of the opinion
held by Gonzalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and Reginald concern­
ing sufficient grace. Whereas the majority of the Thomists
say that sufficient grace gives merely the power to perform
the good act, the proximate power, the above-mentioned
theologians maintain that it also gives an impulse to perform
the good act. In their opinion, it is even a physical prede­
termining premotion, but a fallible one; for it does not
infallibly overcome, like efficacious grace, the obstacles that
may arise from temptation or free will itself. It is said that
this opinion differs from that commonly held by the Tho­
mists only for the purpose of explaining better the sinner’s
responsibility and real power to do good and avoid evil.
Perhaps it will complete the Thomist theory as far as cul341

342

PREDESTINATION

pability is concerned, but if we wish to extend its application
to the order of good, to salutary acts easy to perforin, it seems
to us that it has serious difficulties to contend with. We should
like merely to remind our readers here that this opinion of
Gonzalez has already been explained at length and defended
by the lamented Father Guillermin, O.P., who weighs its
advantages and disadvantages, and who understood it in a far
different sense from that proposed to us at the present day.1
We should like to insist on this difference, in that it perhaps
will enable us the better to discern between what truth there
may be in this new interpretation and what is still very de­
batable.
They readily admit that a slight modification of the doc­
trine commonly admitted by the Thomists on the distinction
between efficacious grace and sufficient grace will necessitate
modifications in other points of doctrine, such as foreknowl­
edge, providence, predestination, and reprobation. They seek,
however, to persuade us that the proposed modifications can­
not change, indeed, the substance of the Thomist doctrine,
but are merely concerned with some unimportant details that
would seem to be the result of a too rigid interpretation of
the doctrine, and this seems particularly to have been verified
in the case of Lemos and Alvarez. The tree would be the
same, but the leaves different.
It is suggested that we return to the opinion held by Gon­
zalez, Bancel, Massoulié, and Reginald, according to which
sufficient grace gives not only the proximate power to per­
form a good act, but also an impulse that actually inclines one
to the performance of the good act. We said that this sufficient
grace, according to these authors, is a fallibly physical pre­
determining motion that inclines one to the performance of
the good act, but it differs from the infallibly efficacious grace
in that it does not overcome the obstacles that may present
themselves.
i Cf. Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 654 ff.; 1903, p. 20.

APPENDIX I

343

There would seem to be a tendency to go so far with this
theory as to say it often happens that this sufficient grace (im­
pulsive) is actually the cause of salutary acts easy to perform,
such as attrition or a prayer that is still imperfect. Conse­
quently, infallibly efficacious grace would not be necessary
for these salutary acts easy to perform, but only for the diffi­
cult ones such as contrition, which is entirely distinct from
attrition.
These salutary acts easy to perform necessarily presuppose,
so they say, only a fallibly divine motion, and anterior to this
a fallibly divine decree, too. As soon as the majority of the
Thomists read this objection, there arises in their minds tlais
thought: But how can God know infallibly from all eternity
in a fallible decree the free act of attrition that will be per­
formed in time by a certain sinner in certain determined
circumstances? Let us observe that the question concerns not
only the predestined, but also those not predestined, who in
the course of their lives will make acts of attrition.
Shall we say that God infallibly knows this free act of at­
trition in so far as it is present in His eternity that embraces
all time? But this free act is present in His eternity rather
than its contrary only because of a divine decree; otherwise
it would be there on the same grounds as necessary truths
and thus we fall into the error of fatalism. The foreknowledge
of the act either does or does not precede the decree; there is
no other alternative. Hence if the divine decree concerning
the future act of attrition is fallible, God cannot have infallible
knowledge of this free act except by having recourse to the
Molinist theory of the scientia media. Now the new opinion
absolutely sets aside the scientia media because of the implied
contradictions. The divine knowledge, since it is the cause
of things, cannot be passive with regard to conditionally free
acts of the future.
It truly seems, according to this proposed new interpreta­
tion, that it may happen that with the same sufficient (im-

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PREDESTINATION

pulsive) grace, that this particular sinner may perform an act
of attrition and that a certain other may not, so that he who
does so would not receive more help than the other. How can
this conclusion be reconciled with the teaching of St. Thomas,
who says: “He who makes a greater effort does so because of
a greater grace; but to do so, he needs to be moved by a higher
cause”?2 Likewise St. Paul says: For who distinguished·! thee?
What has thou that thou hast not received? 3 St. Thomas also
says: “The first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the
part of God, who dispenses His gifts of grace variously.” 4 If
two sinners are placed in the same circumstances, and one of
them without being helped more than the other refrains
from placing an obstacle to grace, which the other places,
and performs the act of attrition, which the other fails to
perform, does not the former by this act distinguish himself
from the latter? And if he performs the act of attrition with­
out the infallibly efficacious grace, why would he not, with­
out this grace, perform the more difficult act of contrition?
Greater and less do not diversify the species. Who can say
when the more difficult act arises that would demand the
efficacious grace? s Are we not thus led to the acceptance of a
teaching which would have to contend with the principal
difficulties of Molinism for salutary acts easy to perform, and
with all the obscurities of Thomism for the difficult ones? 8
To one reading this new theory the following objection
2 In Matt. 25: 15; cf. in ep. ad Eph. 4: 7.
3 I Cor. 4: 7.
* Summa theol., la Ilae, q.112, a.4.
3 The similarity they seek to establish between the general motion and
sufficient grace, and between the special motion and efficacious grace, seems
to us contrary not only to the generally accepted interpretation among the
Thomists, but also to the text of St. Thomas in his De veritate, q.24, a. 14,
to which these Thomists appeal in proof of their theory. Cf. Billuart, De
gratia, diss. 3, a.2, no. 8.
e Cf. del Prado, De gratia et libero arbitrio, III, 423. Also Schiffini, quoted
on the same page. As for the opinion held by St. Alphonse, it is conceived
from the moral and not from the metaphysical and ontological point of view,
from which St. Thomas argues in the development of his doctrine on grace.
They are on different planes.

APPENDIX I

345

immediately presents itself: For the acceptance of this theory
it suffices, so they say, to admit that infallibly efficacious grace
is not necessary so that one avoid for some time putting any
obstacles in the way of that grace sufficient for salutary acts
easy of performance. But the fact of not putting any obstacle
in the way at the moment when the act of attrition is of ob­
ligation, would mean that this act is performed without effi­
cacious grace.
Besides, tire objection raised against foreknowledge would
always be applicable. How can God in a fallible decree fore­
see infallibly that a particular person will not put an obstacle
in the way of grace, without receiving greater help than a
certain other who will do so? At least we must admit that in
the latter case there is a permissive decree permitting the re­
sistance or failure. And then in the former case in which there
is no resistance, is not the divine decree infallibly efficacious,
if God decides to grant a physically predetermining motion
that inclines the will to act, and this without a concomitant
permission of any actual failure? This would bring us back
to the common teaching of the Thomists.
It will serve a useful purpose to recall how differently Fa­
ther Guillermin understood this theory of Gonzalez, which
he also defended, though disclosing its weak points.’
THE TRUE THEORY OF GONZALEZ, THE THOM 1ST

The proposition that infallibly efficacious grace is not nec­
essary for salutary free acts easy to perform, far from being
upheld by Father Guillermin in his exposition and defense
of the theory of Gonzalez, was attacked by him, and, in his
opinion, by Gonzalez and his successors.
Assuming by way of objection the teaching in support of
this new theory nowadays proposed, Father Guillermin wrote:
7 On these weak points, see Hugon, De gratia, p. 356. We can scarcely con­
ceive of a physical predetermining motion that is defectible.

3-16

PREDESTINATION

“There is another objection: The created free will in this
life is always defectible. But they say that it does not always
have to fail, not always place an obstacle to the motion of
sufficient grace that inclines the will actively to good. Why,
then, at least sometimes would not the will perform the good
act with the help only of sufficient grace that supplies all that
is necessary for a good action? Thus it will happen, if not
always, at least sometimes, that sufficient grace, according to
the teaching of the Molinists, becomes efficacious without
having undergone any intrinsic modification, and this for the
sole reason that the free will has determined of itself to give
its consent or at least not to put any obstacle in the way of
the sufficient motion.” 8
Father Guillermin’s reply is as follows: “Evidently from
the fact that the free will always has the power to fail, we
cannot conclude, therefore, it will always fail, always put an
obstacle to the motion of grace. But in this case the following
conclusion can be legitimately drawn. Since the defectible
free will can always and in all things fail, if it so wishes, and
put an obstacle, it will never, in any given circumstance, be
absolutely and infallibly certain that it will not actually put
an obstacle in the way of good, unless a preservative power
certainly prevents this obstacle from being placed. Without
this preservative or victorious grace over obstacles, it will be
quite possible, even probable, that in a certain case no ob­
stacle to the motion of sufficient grace will freely be placed;
it will even be morally certain that, in a long series of acts,
it will once or so happen that the free will puts no obstacle
in the way. But in any particular case, for it to be infallibly
certain that the free will, notwithstanding its defectibility,
will perform a good act, again I say that it is indispensable
for the will to receive a help from God that prevents or effi­
caciously removes every obstacle and every defection. Now
God’s plans cannot be the subject of uncertainty, and His
» Revue Thomiste, 1903, pp. 23 ft.

APPENDIX I

347

knowledge is such that He knows eternally all things, even
free acts of the future, and knowing them, as the Thomists
say, in His divine causality, this knowledge cannot be purely
conjectural. Sufficient grace which, in moving the will to
good, does not eliminate all danger of hindrance or resistance,
will not then be such as to afford a certain foundation for
God’s infallible foreknowledge. Only efficacious grace that
causes the will to perform the free act without hindrance as­
sures this foundation.”
“But it is not only to safeguard the infallible certainty of
the divine knowledge that we conclude the intervention of
grace efficacious of itself is of necessity for the effective per­
formance of every good act; there is still another more direct
and more immediate reason.10
“It seems to us of necessity to grant that God’s action
reaches all beings including all their modes, and according to
all the conditions of their existence. St. Augustine pays this
homage to God’s grace: ‘It is owing to Thy grace, and to Thy
mercy that Thou hast dissolved like ice the sins which I com­
mitted. I impute it also to Thy grace, whatever other sins I
have not committed; for what evil was there which I was not
capable of doing. I confess that all have been forgiven me as
well the evils I committed by my own will, as those which by
Thy providence I committed not.’11
“Likewise we can say,” continues Father Guillermin, “that
with sufficient grace, and without efficacious grace which re­
moves indeed possible resistance, it is not necessary for the
free will to resist, and it is not impossible for the same effec­
tively to perform the good act; but, when the resistance,
» In this way father Guillermin and the Thomists, whose theory he defends,
avoid the scientia media. But how can one do so by conceding that infallibly
efficacious grace is not necessary for the actual performance or even mere
continuance in the performance of salutary and easy free acts, such as an act
of attrition or of imperfect prayer?
i» It must be observed that this reason applies not only to difficult but also
to easy salutary acts.
h Confessions, II, 7.

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PREDESTINATION

which is always possible for a defective will, does not oppose
the motion of grace, this does not happen without a special
intervention of divine mercy whose action directs and pene­
trates everything that takes place in the order of good. . . .
“God’s decrees do not presuppose our choice. They precede
it, and when there is question of performing a good act con­
ducive to salvation these divine decrees are positively and
actively the cause of the same. Moreover, an intervention, a
divine protection that is entirely external, one that removes
the occasions or diminishes the intensity of the temptations
would not suffice; for, even with a more powerful sufficient
grace and a weaker temptation, it can still happen that the
will, since it remains free and liable to fail, resists grace and
yields to the temptation. Only an interior action, efficaciously
determining the free will, will infallibly remove the resistance
and the choice of the contrary act. . . . Only efficacious grace
has the power to overcome the obstacles.” 12
This is how Father Guillermin, in explaining and defend­
ing this theory of Gonzalez, proves that he escapes incurring
the contradictions implied by the scientia media of Molina.13
Not only Father Guillermin is of this opinion, but even
Gonzalez.14 He replies to the same difficulty by saying: “Ef­
ficacious grace is necessary to make sure of the actual consent
of our will, but it is not necessary so as to make sure that our
will have the power to be free and unimpeded from eliciting
the act if it so wishes. . . . That is said to be necessary for
our consent without which in fact our consent is never given,
although without it this can freely and without hindrance be
12 Revue Thomiste, 1903, pp. 23 ff.
13 Father Guillermin also avoids (ibid., p. 27) the same for the foreknowl­
edge of sin, by means of the classical distinction between the permissive de­
cree as to the disorder inherent in the act of sin, and the positive decree as
regards the physical entity of the act of sin. We see no advantage in distin­
guishing between the decree as such and the decree as eternal, as a substitute
for this distinction.
n Disp. I.VI1I, sect. 3.

APPENDIX I

349

given, if we so willed.” 16 Now the free consent in this case
is verified not only in acts said to be difficult, such as an act
of contrition, but also in free salutary acts that are said to be
easy, such as an act of attrition or of imperfect prayer, and
this applies to the continuation of these acts.
Bancel, too, maintains that efficacious grace is necessary for
every free salutary act, although this latter is not repugnant
to sufficient grace. Bancel writes: “Although, of course, if the
grace is merely sufficient, it is absolutely certain that with this
grace man will not act, yet that he act is not repugnant to the
nature of this grace.” 18 Massoulié says the same when, de­
fending the theory of Gonzalez de Albeda, he shows that it
manages to avoid the inconveniences of the scientia media.17
Gonzalez, too, explicitly says: “Fourthly, I say that of two
persons equally tempted, in the case of one who consents to
the promptings of the Holy Spirit, his will is always prepared
for this by a greater intrinsic prevenient grace than the one
who consents to the devil’s suggestions.” 18 It is the principle
of predilection, that no one thing would be better than an­
other unless it were loved more by God.18 “What hast thou
that thou hast not received? For who discerneth thee?” 20
They appeal to certain texts of Gonet, which would con­
tradict, so they say, what Lemos and Alvarez affirm about the
necessity of infallibly efficacious grace for every salutary act
easy of performance. But when we read the whole of these
is Quoted by Father Guillermin, Revue Thomiste, 1903, p. 26, no. 1.
is Brevis univ. theol. cursus, Vol. II, tr. 4, q.4, p. 381; quoted by Father
Guillermin, Revue Thomiste, 1902, p. 662.
it Divus Thomas sui interpres, Vol. II, diss. 3, q.6, a.2, p. 213, Roman cd.,
1709.
is Com. in lam, q. 19, a.8, disp. LVII (1637), Vol. II, p. 97; cf. ibid., pp.
42, 54· 55> 60-67, 83, 6®· ®7·
always upholds the universality of the prin­
ciple of predilection. Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, no
one thing would be better than another (even because of an act easily per­
formed), unless it were loved more and helped more by God.
™ Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3, 4.
2» I Cor. 4: 7.

35°

PREDESTINATION

texts in Gonet, we see that he speaks exactly as Alvarez does,
and that he maintains that sufficient grace, which is the sub­
ject of dispute, is called sufficient not in reference to the im­
perfect act of attrition but to the perfect act of contrition.
Then every difficulty is dispelled, for grace, said to be suf­
ficient as regards contrition, is infallibly efficacious as regards
attrition. And we find this to be the teaching of Lemos,
Alvarez, del Prado, also Gonet, even of Massoulié and all the
Thomists whom we consulted, verifying from their context
the incomplete quotations appealed to from the writings of
these authors.
For instance Gonet says: “Both kinds of help, sufficient and
efficacious, are included in the expression auxilii Dei mo­
ventis; because each consists in a certain supernatural motion
that applies the faculties of the soul to their supernatural
acts; yet with this difference, that the sufficient help merely
moves and applies the will to the performance of imperfect
acts, thereby disposing and preparing the soul for more per­
fect acts. But the efficacious help moves and applies the will
to the performance of perfect acts of contrition and charity
that finally prepare and dispose the soul for sanctifying grace,
which is the ultimate and most perfect form of the super­
natural order. Hence it is the common teaching of the Tho­
mists in agreement with Alvarez (De auxiliis, Bk. Ill, disp. 80)
that every help that is sufficient for one particular act, is also
at the same time efficacious for the performance of another to
which by an absolute decree of divine providence it is or­
dained, so that it is unconditionally sufficient and condition­
ally efficacious.” 21
The last sentence of this quotation shows that this opinion
21 De voluntate Dei, Vol. II, disp. IV, no. 147. In like manner Father del
Prado says that for every salutary act, even the one easy to perform, an in­
fallibly efficacious grace is required, which can be called sufficient not in ref­
erence to this act, but in reference to the following more perfect act. Cf.
del Prado, De gratia, III, 423.

APPENDIX I

35'

does not belong peculiarly to Lemos and Alvarez. All Tho­
mists speak as they do.
Thus everything becomes perfectly clear. Grace said to be
sufficient as regards contrition, is infallibly efficacious as re­
gards attrition. It is therefore wrong to say that Gonet and
other Thomists declare that imperfect salutary free acts do
not demand for their actual performance an infallibly effica­
cious grace.
But even Massoulié is of the same mind as Gonet, for pre­
cisely when explaining and defending the theory of Gon­
zalez and showing that this same theory does not contradict
the one held by Alvarez, he writes: “So grace is said to be
efficacious as regards the imperfect effect which it effects, but
inefficacious or sufficient as regards the ultimate and more
perfect to which it disposes, since, of course, as we explained,
it has less efficacy and power than is required for the eliciting
of the more perfect act.” 22
If, then, we inspect the contexts from which the quotations
of the various Thomists are taken, we do not find in them this
doctrine, that infallibly efficacious grace is not necessary for
the actual performance of easy salutary acts. They teach the
very contrary of this.
The new interpretation cannot be reconciled with the gen­
eral principles of St. Thomas. It goes against the principle
of predilection: “For since God’s love is the cause of good­
ness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if
God did not will greater good for one than for another.” 28
If the fact of resisting sufficient grace is an evil that can
come only from us, then the fact of not resisting is a good
that cannot be attributed solely to us, but which must come
from the source of all good. According to the teaching of St.
Thomas, if one of two persons rather than the other actually
22 Divus Thomas sui interpres, II, p. 206a.
23 Loc. cit., la, q.20, a.3.

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PREDESTINATION

makes an act of attrition, then the reason for this is that God
from all eternity willed it by His infallibly efficacious and
consequent will.24
From the very fact that these principles are of the meta­
physical order, they are without exception. For anyone to
say that they do not apply to easy acts, is to say that they no
longer are absolutely universal principles. Hence they lose
all validity and “are fit to be trodden upon by men.” Prin­
ciples are principles; to deny their universal validity is to
compromise everything.
The principle of predilection clarifies all these problems,
and the subsequent obscurity pertains not to this life but to
the next, in that it is the result of a light too great for our
feeble vision. Thus we keep the sense of the mystery without
seeking to explain it in too human a way.25
-Ί Ibid., la, q.19, a.6 ad lum.
25 The unity of the doctrine and of the Thoniist school on this subject was
pointed out by us in the Revue Thomiste, March-April, 1926. "Infallibly
efficacious grace and salutary acts easy to perform” was the title of the article
for the April number. There one will find some important texts of Gonzalez,
the Thomist, which are fully in agreement with the principles set forth by
St. Thomas.

APPENDIX II
The Opinion of Father Billot, S.J., on the Divine
Motion

A theologian who was a disciple of Father Billot, S.J., in
reviewing the articles on predestination and premotion writ­
ten by us,1 which have been reproduced and recast in this
work, wrote as follows:
“Father Garrigou-Lagrange has taken a very objective atti­
tude in the exposition of the systems, quoting texts in support
of his statements. Undoubtedly one or other of his con­
clusions will trouble a theologian who, adopting the theories
of Molina or Suarez, claims nevertheless to be a follower of
St. Thomas. Is not the repetition of the phrase appropriate
here: A friend of Plato, but more a friend of truth? . . .
“When he reminds us of the teaching of the Church in
recording the various opinions, evidently he assumes an objec­
tive attitude in doing so, but he also shows undisguised sym­
pathy for the Thomism of the Dominican school. We cannot
blame him for his preferences. We owe him a deep debt of
gratitude for his splendid articles which, notwithstanding a
certain long discursiveness of style and repetitions,2 constitute
the finest historical and doctrinal synthesis which we have ever
read on this grave problem of predestination. . . .
“The limitations of this article prevent us from vindicating
Billot’s true point of view, which Father Garrigou-Lagrange
1 Cf. Diet, de théol. cath.
2 We could have eliminated these in the present work, but we thought it
necessary to hark back frequently, as St. Thomas does, to these same prin­
ciples, so that the deep meaning and universality of the same may be readily
perceived by all.
353

354

PREDESTINATION

seems to have completely misunderstood in making out that

the famous Jesuit believed in an indifferent premotion, as a
result of which the free will would determine itself to act

and would determine the divine motion to produce this or
that particular free act. Such an opinion would have been
repudiated (we say that it was expressly repudiated) by the
cardinal, and we find no trace of it in his works. In spite of

the seemingly contrary statements, Billot’s stand, even in the
question of physical premotion, differs perhaps less than one

might imagine from the thesis defended by Father GarrigouLagrange.” 3

At our request,

L’Ami du Clergé,

in one of its later issues

(June 20, 1935, pp. 392-94), thus replied to this objection of
ours:

Objection. In reviewing the article on physical premotion,4 the

Ami

of February 21 affirms that Cardinal Billot expressly repudi­

ated the theory of an indifferent premotion attributed to him by
the author of the reviewed article.

"I would be thankful to your collaborator if he would justify
his assertion, which at first sight seems strange enough.”
Reply. In expressing our appreciation in writing of Cardinal

Billot, we felt certain of arousing in the minds of some of our
readers at least a sense of curiosity. Let us recall first of all what
Father Garrigou-Lagrange wrote:

“Would the divine motion by which God would determine us
to the performance of an indeliberate act, be an indifferent pre­
motion, so that the free will of itself would determine itself and

also the divine motion to this or that particular act? Certain theo­

logians thought so, especially L. Billot.5
“This theory and the

scientia media

mutually support each

other. There would still be some reality that eludes God’s univer­

sal causality. There would be a determination that is independent
of the sovereign causality. The nobler part in the work of salvation,

set. Ami du Clergé, February 21, 1935, pp. 114-20.
« Cf. Did. de théol. cath.
0 De Deo uno, part. II, chap. I, “De scientia Dei.”

APPENDIX II

355

the determination of our salutary act, would not come from the

Author of salvation.” 0
We said and we again say that Billot’s view, notwithstanding

appearances, does not differ so much as one would think from that

held by Father Garrigou-Lagrange.
1) Undoubtedly Billot defends the theory of the

scientia media.

But for anyone who reads without prejudice the thesis he dedi­

cated to this subject, this theory is viewed, in accordance with
the very sound Thomism of the author of this thesis, as a means

of rejecting what he believes to be the Dominican theory which
consists in a predetermination that takes away from the will the

possibility of determining itself. Moreover, as Father GarrigouLagrange candidly admits, there is a similar sentiment in the oppo­
site direction on the part of the Dominicans to use the term

predetermination

so as to discard the untenable theory of simul­

taneous concurrence or of an indifferent premotion.
2) The

scientia media

of Billot, in its final analysis, closely ap­

proaches the Dominican “knowledge of vision.” Billot, indeed,
never taught that either a simple or a conditional future is known

by God independently of the decree of His will.
Concerning conditional futures he writes as follows: “But, in

fact, because we assert that conditional futures are known by God
before any actual decree of His will, we do not exclude hypotheti­

cal decrees which God would have of moving the created will, and

of bestowing all that is required on its part.” 7 Let us see now what
a Dominican says. Father Hugon writes: “Manifestly . . . God
knows nothing as certainly and determinately future, except in the

decree of His will. And conditional futures are in some way future,
not

indeed

absolutely,

but conditionally.

Therefore

they

are

known not in God’s absolute decree, for then they would be simple
futures: but they are known in His decree that is conditioned by
the object. But a decree of this kind extends both to the object

and to the free or necessary mode of the same, so that a conditional
future would not be posited by man unless he freely determined

himself to do so under the influence of the divine motion.” 8

e Cf. Diet, de théol. cath., XIII, 36.
7 De Deo uno et trino, 1910, p. 213.
s Tract, dogm., I, 212.

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PREDESTINATION

We should indeed like to know what difference there is, how­
ever slight it may be, between the Jesuit and the Dominican texts,

both as to the doctrine and also, very much so, as to the way it is
expressed.
3) Let us add that Billot always taught that everything of a

positive nature in the determination of our free will depends upon

the divine will and the divine motion. This is clearly seen in his

argument in proof of the first Mover:

“That which is lacking in some perfection cannot be adequately

sufficient to give to itself such perfection, because nothing is ade­
quately sufficient to give to itself what it does not have. But what
is mobile lacks the act of perfection to which it is brought. Nor

can it be said that although it may be

formally lacking in

that per­

fection, yet it still has the same equivalently or virtually. For there

is only one of two possibilities. Either it has equivalently as pre­

contained in it whatever reality there is in the perfecton formally
as such, and then there can be no movement to acquire such

perfection, because a positive movement by which nothing posi­
tive is acquired is repugnant to reason. Or else it virtually has the

perfection, that is, only in the first actuality, and then it is not of
itself adequately sufficient for the second actuality, which by far
exceeds the first; but it needs to receive this, and the need of re­

ceiving excludes the perfect sufficiency of giving, as the terms evi­
dently denote.” 0

Can there be a clearer declaration of principles? Indifferent pre­
motion would be implied in this

"virtually,"

this application of

the will only in the first actuality. Now this is what Billot never

admitted. Such an indifferent motion is a contradiction in terms.
Billot was faithful to the Thomist conception of the divine motion
to the second actuality of the will in his other treatises, most espe­
cially in those that closely concern the question of physical pre­

motion.
Right away we have evidence of this in his treatise

On Sin.

The

question at issue is to explain how, notwithstanding the depend­
ence of whatever positiveness there is in our free acts upon the
divine causality, God nevertheless is not the cause of sin. He

0 Loc. cit., pp. 55 f.

APPENDIX II

857

writes: “Immediately a difficulty presents itself; for if the sub­
stance of the evil act even as a moral entity is something positive,

and if it is bound up with the very notion of sin, then one of two
alternatives follows: either sin is from God or else not everything
that actually exists depends upon the first Cause.” 10 Now Billot
was absolutely against admitting the hypothesis of this latter al­

ternative.11

We find the same doctrine in his tractate on grace: “In theology
the question comes up for examination concerning that motion
by which the will passes from the first actuality of the salutary act

to the second and deliberate actuality, and it posits the presence
of that which for the will to act freely presupposes what has al­
ready been proved.”12 The eminent theologian gives us a brief

summary of his opinion on this question in the following passage:

“We propose to declare with certainty how every being and every
mode of being comes from Him whose essence is His existence;

likewise how nothing brings anything into existence except in so
far as it acts by divine power; likewise how God is the cause of
operation in all beings, at the same time for each secondary cause

retaining intact its specific and proper activity, and, in fine, we
shall declare whatever pertains to the universal dependence of
creatures upon God and their community of relativity toward
Him.” 13 When Billot speaks of secondary causes determining

God’s general motion, he speaks as St. Thomas did. It is not a
question of determining an indifferent motion, but of explaining
how in the secondary cause the divine motion, which is capable,

because of its universality, of adapting itself to all created activi­
ties, is particularized and determined by reason of certain effects

that are proper to certain secondary causes. “Existence is the
proper effect of the first Agent,” says St. Thomas, too, “and all

other agents act inasmuch as they act in virtue of the first Agent;
but secondary agents, which are, as it were, particular ones and

10 De peccato personali et originali, p. 20.
11 For his solution of this difficulty consult L’Ami, 1928, p. 776, where we
translated into French the complete text of the Jesuit theologian.
12 The reference is to the treatise De Deo Creatore, which unfortunately
the eminent theologian never wrote.
is De gratia Christi, p. 37.

PREDESTINATION

358

which determine the action of the first Agent, produce as their
proper effects other perfections that determine existence.” 14

Father Garrigou-Lagrange could have quoted an author who

formally taught an indifferent motion in the secondary act. This
was the case with Pignataro, who wrote: “This motion constitutes

the will proximately disposed to make the choice.” The explana­

tion follows, and is thus formulated: “That the divine motion is

determined to one movement in those things which by nature are
determined to one thing, I concede; that it is so in contingent

things, I deny.” 15 There we have the motion that is undetermined
as to its effect. But in that he would have been but a far echo of
Billot who did not hesitate to declare the opinion of his confrère

when it appeared in print as absolutely unintelligible. Undoubt­
edly Father Billot truly considered himself to be the opponent of

the Dominican thesis; in truth, he had a wrong conception of it.
But expressing himself in different terms, though retaining the

mental attitude which his Jesuit training imposed upon him, he

was in truth quite in agreement with the best of Thomists.

So writes the learned reviewer of the

Ami du Clergé.

I shall reply here as I did in this same periodical. I am

happy in coming to a better understanding from the texts

just quoted that Cardinal Billot, “though retaining the men­

tal attitude imposed upon him by his Jesuit training,” was
more like a Dominican Thomist in his doctrine than at first

sight he appeared to be. My conversations with him induced
me to see considerable differences of meaning in the terms

he employed and not sufficiently to perceive certain profound
similarities in doctrine, which I am very happy to note. I

noticed especially that he defends the theory of the

media,

scientia

but it must be admitted that in his explanation of it,

he seeks to approach as near as possible the teaching of Do­

minican theologians.

However, in

the leading text quoted in the preceding

1« Contra Gentes, III, 66. The reference is to the unwritten tractate De Deo
Creatore.
is De Deo Creatore, p. 519.

APPENDIX II

359

pages, which is taken from his dogmatic treatise, instead of
reading: “We do not exclude hypothetical decrees which God
would have of moving the created will, and of bestowing all
that is required on its part,” 10 a Thomist would say: “which
God has,” and not “which God would have.” Particularly so
a Thomist would not add what we read nine lines further
on: “Therefore God sees those (conditional futures) depend­
ent upon the condition of His hypothetical motion which,
however, cannot at all be predetermining, because thus the
proper and specific mode by which free acts participate in
the divine essence would be destroyed.”
You will say to me: “that is due to the mental attitude im­
posed by the Jesuit training” upon Cardinal Billot, who was
preoccupied in rejecting, as you say, what he believed to be
the Dominican theory. On this point he had a wrong con­
ception of their teaching. And, this admitted, as for the rest
it can truly be said that we are substantially in agreement.
That is why in this work, when speaking of the indifferent
motion, I quoted Father Pignataro, S.J., in preference to
Cardinal Billot, as exponent of this opinion.
lefle Deo uno et trino, 1910.

APPENDIX III

A Reply

to

Some Well-known Objections
Premotion

against

We here insert a manuscript bearing no date, which came

into our hands some years ago, and which appears to be the
work of a sound Thomist. He succeeds well enough in reply­
ing to some very well-known objections raised against the
teaching of St. Thomas regarding the divine motion.
A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS
ON DIVINE MOTION

St. Thomas says: “But if we hold that a sacrament is an in­
strumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is
in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing
about the sacramental effects. . . . But the instrumental
power has a being that passes from one thing into another,
and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing
from agent to patient.” 1
Farther on in the same article he says: “A spiritual power
cannot be in a corporeal subject after the manner of a per­
manent and complete power. But there is nothing to hinder
an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body, in so
far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance
so as to produce a particular spiritual effect.” 2
But now it must be pointed out that this spiritual power
is something transient in a material subject, for instance, in
1 Summa theol., Illa, q.6z, a.4.
2 Ibid., ad lum.

36°

APPENDIX III

361

baptismal water, which remains material. This instrumental
power (which is a motion) is of such a nature that it in no
way intrinsically modifies the nature of the subject in which
it is found: in the present case indeed it is spiritual, and yet
the water does not become spiritual, but is elevated for the
time being to produce a spiritual effect.
There is something similar to this, as St. Thomas says, in
the very voice perceived by the senses “in which there is a
certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a men­
tal concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer.” 3 The same
is the case with the pen of the author in writing something
intelligible.
It seems now possible in a general way to understand that
it is not the function of motion to modify in any way the
nature of the subject in which it is found, but leaving the
nature or faculty absolutely unchanged physically, all that
the motion does is to actuate the same for its own operation.
The motion will be either for a necessary or free operation,
according as the agent is either necessary or free. For just as
water when moved remains material, so the will when moved
remains free; and the action of the will when moved is free
and not necessary, because such is the nature of the will.
By this, however, we assert the fact, but we have not as
yet the reason for the fact. Moreover, it seems that the reason
for this is to be sought in the very nature of this peculiar en­
tity called motion; for it is not properly being, but a be­
coming. Why indeed is water not spiritual, although it has
a spiritual quality? It is because this quality is fluid, is in the
process of becoming spiritual. Why does the will remain free
and determinating, although it receives a determinated qual­
ity? It is because that quality is not determined to a mode of
being, but is essentially fluid, or a becoming, in process of be­
ing determined. For it is nothing else but a plenitude of action
or power or an activity by which the faculty that previously
s Ibid., ad 1 inn.

3θ2

PREDESTINATION

was not actually eliciting its act is actually doing so. And just
as the power in the pen causes it actually to produce its own
action, namely, the writing, so this plenitude of action causes
the will actually to produce its own action, which is this par­
ticular action rather than a certain other, or it chooses, be­
cause its proper action is election. And here we already have
a vague idea how motion does not prevent but rather causes
the freedom of the act.
It is very difficult to see how under the influence of this
motion there is truly freedom of action, while on the one
hand the motion is a requisite for action, and on the other
that the will is not free to have it or not.
As for this it must absolutely be said that certainly the will
has no choice concerning the motion; but this is not con­
trary to liberty. For this it suffices that the act be under the
control of the will, but not the principle of the act. It is
indeed absurd and a contradiction in terms for that which
constitutes a principle to depend upon this principle. There­
fore, just as it is absurd for what constitutes the will as such
to depend upon this same will, so it is absurd for what con­
stitutes the will in act as such to depend upon this same will.
Now it is motion that constitutes the will in act, or as having
power and active indifference in act. Therefore it is absurd
for motion to depend upon the will and be under the con­
trol of the will.
In other words, so long as the will is considered without
the motion, it has not this active indifference actually but
merely potentially. Therefore it is absurd to think that pre­
vious to the motion it can exercise its active indifference,
namely, by accepting or refusing this motion.
Actual liberty is to be sought only where the will is in act.
Now the will is in act by means of motion. Therefore the will
when moved, and not before it is moved, must be actually
actively indifferent, and it must have its terminus, namely,
its act, in its power.

APPENDIX III

3θ3

But you will say: The motion itself is already determined
to one thing; therefore the will when moved is already de­
termined to one thing, and therefore is not actively indif­
ferent.
Reply: I distinguish. The motion is determined as an in­
complete being, or as determining, or as that by which the
will determines itself, or as producing the determination, this
I concede; that the motion is determined as a complete be­
ing, as a form, as ens quod, this I deny. I distinguish the con­
sequent: That the will when moved determines itself to one
thing, this I concede; that it is determined to one thing by a
determination independent of itself, this I deny.
You will insist: How can the will receive from something
external to itself a determination that must come essentially
from itself?
Reply: I distinguish. It cannot receive from something ex­
ternal to itself a determination, namely, the act that must
come essentially from itself; this I concede. It cannot receive
from something external to itself that by which it effects its
determination, that by which it determines itself; this I again
distinguish. If this something external to itself is not the first
Cause, then I concede this; if it is, then I deny this. On the
contrary, this is of necessity required so that the will may be
the principle of its act.
Still you insist: He who has the end within his grasp, has
the means also. Now motion is the means required for the
act. Therefore this must be within the reach of the will.
Reply. I distinguish the major. He must have within his
grasp the means that pertain to the principle of operative
power; this I concede. That he must have within his grasp
the principle by which the agent is constituted as actually
having power; this I deny. For one actually to have the power
presupposes that one is already constituted as the principle.
I contradistinguish the minor, and deny the consequence.
For just as, when we say that the will has dominion over itself.

364

PREDESTINATION

this means that it has dominion over its act and not over its
faculty, so when we say that it actually has dominion over
itself, this must be understood as meaning that it has do­
minion over its act, but not over that by which it is actually
constituted as having dominion over its act, namely, over
motion.
It therefore seems right to conclude that just as, when we
speak of matter and form, of essence and existence, we must
always correct by means of the intellect that imagination we
have of specific being, which is the reason for all the difficul­
ties presenting themselves against a real distinction in each
case, so we must always correct the imagination that repre­
sents motion to us as being that is complete, determined, and
predetermined; and once the imagination is given admit­
tance, immediately inextricable difficulties arise. For what is
determined cannot any more be determined; what is chosen
cannot any more be the object of choice. But if we take note
of the fact that St. Thomas always speaks of motion as a fluid
being, as a being that is essentially in the process of becoming
(not however as a relation), then all difficulties are easily
solved, or rather, of their own accord disappear. These prin­
ciples established, we may briefly sum up the teaching of St.
Thomas as follows:
CATECHISM OF MOTION

1) Can God be the cause of free being?
R. Most certainly: for otherwise He would not be Being.
2) Can God be the cause of the created free action?
R. Most certainly: for otherwise there would not be either
action or free action.
3) How can God be the cause of created free action, so that
the action of the creature, however, is truly elicited by it?
R. By motion.

APPENDIX III

365

4) What is motion?
R. Motion is that activity by which I freely determine
myself.
5) Can it be called premotion?
R. Certainly: because that by which I determine myself,
that by which I actually exercise my liberty, is by nature
prior to the exercise of my liberty; and yet it does not prevent
my being free, but even causes me to be free.
6) Is that activity or premotion something that is caused
by God?
R. I distinguish: as ens quo, I concede; as ens quod, I
deny. For it is the subjection of the creature to God as regards
action.
7) Does God determine the will by causing this activity?
R. I distinguish: He determines the will by taking away
passive indifference, this I concede; by taking away active in­
difference, this I deny. This latter is even actually caused by
this motion.
8) Is this activity or premotion something determined?
R. I distinguish: That it is determined as the principle of
determination, as that by which I determine myself, this I
concede; that it is determined, as the form which is the prin­
ciple of action, as the impression received in the eye is the
principle of vision, this I deny.
9) Can this activity be said to be indifferent?
R. I distinguish: That it is indifferent as the principle of
indifference, or inasmuch as it causes this active indifference,
this I concede; that it is indifferent as though needing a fur­
ther determination, or as though the will under its influence
is able not to act or to do something else, this again I sub­
distinguish: if this activity were not precisely that by which
the will determinately chooses one particular thing, this I
concede; if it is so, then I deny this or subdistinguish: in
sensu diviso, I concede; in sensu composito, I deny.

366

PREDESTINATION

10) Under the influence of that activity or motion the will
can act only in one way. Therefore active indifference is
taken away from this motion.
R. That the will when moved acts only in one way, this I
concede; that it can act only in one way, I subdistinguish:
because it is supposed by this activity already to have chosen
freely one particular thing, this I concede; as though it does
not always have the power of choosing something else, this
I deny.
11) It is a contradiction in terms for God to determine the
will to determine itself; for free determination must by its
very nature originate from an intrinsic principle.
R. I distinguish: It is a contradiction for God to deter­
mine by introducing into the will some determination,
namely, a determinate form, this I concede; by introducing
that by which the will determines itself, this I deny. Nay
rather, it is a contradiction in terms for the will to be able
to be determined without a determination.
As for the reason adduced, I distinguish: that the deter­
mination, namely, the free act, must originate from an in­
trinsic principle, I concede; that by which the will determines
itself, must so originate, this I deny. For just as that by which
the will is constituted as such cannot originate from an in­
trinsic principle, so neither can that by which the will is con­
stituted in act: it is absurd for the will to be able to produce
some activity before it is constituted in act.
12) That by which the will determines itself must be
within its power.
R. I distinguish: It must be within its power terminatively
(the act, namely, to which the will determines itself), this I
concede; it must be so formally, this I deny.
13) It follows therefore that the will stands in need of
something which is not within its power, so that it may
choose freely.
R. Certainly: since for the will freely to act it itself needs

APPENDIX III

867
to be a free faculty; and for it to be freely the principle of its
act, it needs to be the principle of its act; and for it freely to
exercise its active indifference, it needs to be actively indif­
ferent. All these things are not within its power, and yet no
one says that for this reason the will is not free.
14) What is the cause of the determination cannot be said
to be formally the previous determination. Therefore physi­
cal predetermination must be rejected.
R. I distinguish: The cause of the determination cannot
be said to be determination as a form determining or de­
termined, this I concede; it cannot be said to be determina­
tion or motion determining, this I deny. I distinguish the
consequent: Physical predetermination must be rejected if
the term means that a determinate form is introduced by
God into the faculty, this I concede; if the term means a mo­
tion determining and predetermining, then I deny it must
be rejected. It is not a question of a name but of a thing. If
one does not care for the name, give it up. Nevertheless a
false meaning must not be attributed to those asserting such
a doctrine, even granted that the name may be the occasion
of false interpretation.
15) Does the motion determine the will, or does it make
the w’ill determine itself?
R. It is in any case both. For God determines the will by
giving it that by which it determines itself.
16) Can the will under the influence of this motion de­
termine itself otherwise than God wills?
R. Yes: in just the same way as the will, w’hen it wills, can
determine itself otherwise than it wills.
17) It is contrary to the notion of liberty for any external
agent to make me will what it may please this agent to will.
R. I distinguish: Unless such be the pow'er of such an
agent that it gives the will that by which it wills freely, then
I concede the assertion; if the agent gives the will that by
which the will chooses freely, namely, the motion, then I

368

PREDESTINATION

deny the assertion. Certainly there can be no conception of
liberty without motion. Hence the argument is reversed.
18) That God should decide my choice is unintelligible.
R. That God should decide my choice without giving me
the principle of choosing, namely, motion, this I concede; if
He does so, then I deny the assertion. We confess, however,
that this is beyond the power of imagination; wherefore he
who, as St. Thomas says, wishes to reduce intelligible things
to sense perception, never will be able to understand motion.
ig) What is meant by saying that God eternally predeter­
mined my act?
R. It does not mean that God predestined or preformed
the act that must be mine, so that afterwards somehow He
imitates it in me; but it means that God, as the cause of free
being, eternally decided to imbue me with that activity by
which I am able to actuate or exercise my liberty, as He de­
cided to move a necessary being to perform necessary acts.
In such predefining or predetermining He most certainly
knew that my act would be elicited freely by me.
20) Can God foresee my free act before He foresees the
motion?
R. It is absolutely impossible. To foresee my act before
foreseeing the motion would be like foreseeing the act of my
will before the will itself is foreseen: which is absurd. The
will is in act only by being moved.
21) If God were to foresee my act before He foresees the
motion, would my act be free?
R. Not at all. Before God foresees the motion, He can fore­
see my act only as possible; because, before being moved, the
will is not at all determined to one thing rather than another;
and if it is determined, it is no longer free but necessary, for
evidently the determination in which liberty has no part is
necessary by natural necessity.
22) Can free will be retained by not admitting motion?

APPENDIX III

369

R. Not at all, philosophically speaking. For if, before the
exercise of my liberty or of that which implies such exercise
(which is motion) my act is supposed to be determined to
one thing rather than another, evidently my act is one of
necessity. Therefore, motion not admitted, the logical out­
come is fatalism.
In conclusion we must say that the whole explanation of
the difficulty in reconciling the divine motion with free will
seems to proceed from a false notion of divine motion. For
the divine action is conceived as being like created action.
God, however, and the free will are conceived as two co­
ordinated causes operating to produce the one effect. Once
this view is taken, there is no possibility of any rational solu­
tion of the problem. Either free will is denied or else the di­
vine action. It follows as a consequence of this that both are
denied.
But, on the contrary, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, God
and the free will are simply subordinated causes. The entire
action is from God and also from the free will; and it is en­
tirely from the free will because it is entirely from God. To
withdraw the free will from the influence of the divine action
is the same as to withdraw it from its own activity, and this
is therefore the same as to destroy it. The divine motion,
however, is precisely that by which the free will is subjected
to the divine action that it may be constituted in act.
But no created intellect can by its own power acquire a
knowledge of the divine action as it is in itself. Wherefore
the obscurity in this doctrine is an argument in favor of its
truth. Whereas in the other opinions the difficulty is funda­
mentally removed—for God woidd be acting only in a human
and created way—yet those of the opposing camp have to
contend with inexplicable difficulties and even absurdities
in explaining, namely, how the free will and the divine fore­
knowledge are to be reconciled. And these difficulties or

370

PREDESTINATION

absurdities strike at faith itself when from the divine the trans­
fer is made in a natural way to supernatural motion, or to
grace.

So ends this manuscript.
All the preceding discussion is tantamount to saying with
Bossuet that “God eternally wills all the future use of free
will as to all the goodness and reality there is in it. Nothing
is more absurd than to say a thing does not exist because God
does not will it. Must we not say, on the contrary, that it exists
because God wills it? And just as it happens that we are free
in virtue of the decree which wills us to be free, so it happens
that we act freely in this or that act, even in virtue of the de­
cree which extends to all this in detail.” 4
Briefly then, what is more absurd than to claim that the
actualization of liberty destroys it?
* Traité du libre arbitre, chap. 8.

APPENDIX IV
The Thomist Origin of the Doctrine of Predeter­
Decrees and Dr. H. Schwamm's Recent Work

mining

We take the opportunity here to thank our former pupil,
Julien Groblicki, for having written the following note, and
it gives us pleasure to publish it. It concerns Dr. Schwamm’s
recent work already mentioned in this book.1
In this present work the author sets out to prove what he
unhesitatingly asserted in his two previous works,2 after what
Father Pelster, S.J.,3 had written. It is that the doctrine of
the present-day Thomists concerning the divine predeter­
mining decrees, as the medium in which God knows con­
tingent futures, is not to be attributed to St. Thomas but to
the Subtle Doctor, and that he is the author of the same.4 Al­
though, to be sure, Scotus did not explicitly speak of the pre­
determining decrees, yet by his having presented the state of
the question in a new light, and by his inquiry into the root
cause of the contingency of things (contingency of the divine
will) he necessarily and proximately prepared the way for this
explanation.5 The author endeavors to prove three things
concerning this thesis:
I. John Scotus is the originator of this doctrine. Scotus
presented the problem in a new light0 (kernel of the prob1 See supra, p. 278 note 77. The divine foreknowledge according to Duns
Scotus and his first followers, Innsbruck, 1934.
2 Magistri Joannis de Ripa, O.F.M., “Doctrina de praescientia divina."
Analecta Gregoriana, I, Romae, 1930. Robert Cowton, O.F.M., “Uber das
gottliche vorherwissen,” Innsbruck, 1931.
3 Thomas von Sutton, O.P., “Ein Oxforder verteidiger der thomistischen
lehre," in Zeitschr. f. Kat. Theol., XLVI (1922), pp. 383 f.
4 Cf. Ibid., pp. 330, 334.
s Ibid., p. 2.
0Ibid., p. i, and generally throughout article 1.
37’

372

PREDESTINATION

lem) inasmuch as he showed the connection between God's
will and His knowledge. Just as God in all His operations
ad extra brings things into being by an act of His will, so also
He knows all that actually exists by and in the determination
of His will, or, according to modern terminology, in the de­
crees of His will. The decrees are what make contingent
futures determinately true for God. The system of predeter­
mining decrees had as a necessary and logical consequence to
be evolved from this explanation of the Scotist solution. The
disciples were not always in agreement in interpreting their
master’s doctrine. Some indeed asserted that Scotus spoke not
explicitly but virtually of concomitant or condelermining de­
crees,7 so that Mastrius and many saw that the freedom of the
human will is jeopardized by the theory of predetermining
decrees, which were admitted by others and attributed to the
Subtle Doctor.
II. Schwamm asserts that this doctrine is not to be found
in the works of St. Thomas, nor can it be deduced from his
assertions, nor can it be reconciled with his view of the
eternal presentiality of all things before God.
III. The Scotist doctrine of predetermining decrees was
adopted by the Thomists from Bannez. That he will prove
this last point in his next work is clearly enough foretold by
him at the end of the book.8
As for the first question, whatever may be said about it
(concerning Scotus and his disciples) and the first disciples
of St. Thomas—and this will be taken up by him in the work
which he has in preparation—it is certain that the author en­
tirely misunderstood the Angelic Doctor. Now I am not
speaking of his method of procedure, in that he selected only
one article for discussion,8 giving but a passing mention to
the other passages; nor do I say anything of the way in which
? See pp. 330, 331, and in various places.
s See p. 334.
0 Cf. I Sent., d. 38, q.i, a. 5.

APPENDIX IV

373

he treats the problem. For when he comes to explain the
opinion of St. Thomas which, as he sees it, “is irreconcilably
in opposition” to that of Scotus, he says:
“But perhaps the first objection that presents itself, in seek­
ing for the teaching of St. Thomas, is that these passages must
be accepted as a starting point, in which he speaks more in
favor of later Thomists. Is it necessary so as to justify oneself,
as to the meaning of any author, concerning any question we
wish to know, that we seek the explanation in those passages
in which the author expressly wishes to answer the ques­
tion?”
I pass this over, therefore, without comment, but I assert
and prove that the author, in the single text from St. Thomas
which he accepted, has still misunderstood the Angelic Doc­
tor and explained him contrary to what he meant.
For he says that not only it cannot be affirmed that St.
Thomas presupposes predetermining decrees, but that he
“positively excludes them.” St. Thomas rejected, so Schwamm
contends, even every explanation of this problem by referring
to the divine causality as insufficient and impossible. And he
deduces this conclusion from the Doctor’s words. He writes:
“But there still remains a greater doubt concerning the sec­
ondary cause, because the first and necessary cause can co­
exist with the defect of the secondary cause, just as the action
of the sun can co-exist with the barrenness of the tree. But
God’s knowledge cannot co-exist with the defect of the sec­
ondary cause; for God cannot at the same time know that
this particular person will run, and that he fails to run. To
have certain knowledge of this, we must find, indeed, some
certainty in the thing known.” 10
And this, adds Schwamm, is St. Thomas’ “foundation” 11
for his further inquiry by which he seeks for the determina­
tion in contingent things that actually exist, but not in God.
io Loc. cit., p. 94.
II Ibid., p. 95.

yji

PREDESTINATION

Hence there can be no question of explaining the divine
knowledge by an appeal to the infallibly efficient causality of
the divine will. The statements of St. Thomas are evidently
in opposition to any explanation of this kind.
CRITICISM

Dr. Schwamm’s interpretation is false. For what St. Thomas
posited in his objection, which he explained three times in
this article, Dr. Schwamm accepted and proposed as the opin­
ion of St. Thomas. This method of procedure is contrary to
sound exegesis.
Moreover, Schwamm overlooks the conclusion in the first
article of this same question, which is as follows: “the knowl­
edge of good pleasure is the cause of things.” 12
The whole article is but a solution of two objections which
St. Thomas stated at the beginning of the body of the ar­
ticle.13 The first of these difficulties arises from the consider­
ation of the divine knowledge, which is the cause of things.
Therefore, it seems to impose necessity on things foreknown,
and consequently it takes away contingency from things. In
his reply to this, the Angelic Doctor does not deny that the
divine knowledge is the cause of things and even the neces­
sarily required cause. He fully admits the major of the argu­
ment. But he adds that God’s knowledge is not the sole
cause, but that it includes secondary causes, on account of
which the effects can be either contingent or necessary, de­
pendent upon the nature of the proximate secondary causes.
For an understanding of the second difficulty, it is im­
portant to notice that it is one thing to inquire about knowl­
edge in general as such, about the notion and definition of
the same; and it is another thing to inquire about some par­
ticular knowledge, for instance, the divine knowledge. Knowl12 Cf. Summa theol., la, q.14, a.8, which concludes the same way.
is Cf. I Sent., d. 38, q.t, a.5. The same solution is given in his reply to the
first and second objections and is again given in the middle of the argu­
mentative part of the article.

APPENDIX IV

375

edge as such, which, as the Angelic Doctor says in this article,
is “certain cognition,” pertains to the notion of whatsoever
knowledge. It does not pertain to the notion of knowledge
as such, that it be the cause of the things known. This ap­
plies to divine knowledge precisely as such and according as
it is joined to the divine will. Hence after having considered
in the previous objection knowledge as the cause of things,
which applies to it inasmuch as it is divine, in this objection
he considers knowledge in general, according as it is “cer­
tain cognition,” abstracting from the fact of its being the
cause of things. That this is the intention of tire Angelic Doc­
tor is evident from his explanation of this difficulty which, as
I said, he explains three times in this article. To conclude
from this that St. Thomas denies the divine knowledge to be
the cause of things, or that he thinks the previous explana­
tion insufficient, is the same as asserting that abstraction is
the same as negation. But who can say so? In considering
universals, such as the nature of a lion or any animal, shall
we deny these exist in the concrete with their individualizing
principles? 14
Hence whatever opinion one may have of the solution of
the arguments and difficulties, whether they please one or
not, whether one consents to them or not, it cannot be con­
cluded from what St. Thomas said, as Dr. Schwamm did,
that the Angelic Doctor rejects the explanation of the knowl­
edge of contingent futures as being the cause of the same.
I think this is the meaning of the article, and it will ap­
peal to anyone who “reads it with an upright mind,” as actu­
ally the immediate disciples of St. Thomas said.
What I say concerns this text alone. There are, of course,
very many others that Schwamm interprets in the wrong
sense, and which are known to all.1'
n Loc. cit., la, q.14. a.8, c. et ad mm.
is For my part, however, if I may be permitted to say anything in addi­
tion to this, the following texts are of the greatest importance: (1) De veritate,
q.2, a. 12, sed contra, arg. 4: "God knows things inasmuch as He is their cause.

376

PREDESTINATION

We have quoted many texts from St. Thomas which show
that for him it was evident that, if God from all eternity
knew with infallible certainty St. Paul’s conversion, it is be­
cause He willed it by “the determination of His will and in­
tellect.” 16 If He had not positively willed it, there would
be no reason for this contingent future rather than its con­
trary to be eternally present to the divine vision. Nor would
He know future sins without a permissive decree.17 Dr.
Schwamm’s thesis is a challenge that can make an impres­
sion only on those who never read St. Thomas, or those who
never seriously considered the dilemma: God determining
or determined; there is no other alternative.18
But God is not only the cause of necesary but also of contingent things.
Therefore He knows both necessary and contingent things.” Cf. ibid., sed
contra, arg. 6: "To know means to know the cause of a thing. But God knows
the causes of all contingent things; for He knows Himself who is the cause
of all things. Therefore He knows contingent things." See also De veritate,
q.3, a.6. (2) Cf. Contra Gentes, I, 68: "God knows the thoughts of the mind
and movements of the will in their power and cause, since He is the uni­
versal principle of being.” Ibid., par. 2: "God’s causality extends to the opera­
tions of our intellect and will.” Ibid., par. 3, "So by knowing His intellect
and will He knows every thought and wish.” (3) Cf. Peri Hermeneias, Bk. I,
chap. 9, lect. 14. What he says in this text about contingent things He also
applies to the determination of the divine will; and this was written in the
last days of his life.
ie Loc. cit., la, q. 19, a.4.
17 See pp. 75-84, 97-101, 248-50, 267-92, 300-9. In these pages texts from St.
Thomas have been quoted that refer to determining decrees.
is See above, pp. 143, 148 f„ 248 f. Let us not forget, moreover, that the infltoence of the divine motion upon the intellect and the will to cause it to will in­
fallibly a determined thing is affirmed not only by St. Thomas, but also by
Leo ΧΠ1 in his encyclical Providentissimus Deus (Denz., no. 1,592), which is as
follows: "For by supernatural power He (the Holy Spirit) so moved and com­
pelled them (the sacred writers)—He was so present to them—that the things
which He ordered, and those only, they first rightly understood, then willed
faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with in­
fallible truth, otherwise it could not be said that He was the Author of the
entire Scripture.” Now if once, in this case of the inspiration of the Scrip­
ture, the infallible efficacy of the divine motion does not destroy liberty, then
it does not destroy it in other cases. Cf. J. M. Vosté, De divina inspiratione et
veritate sacrae Scripturae, Roma, Angelicum, 1932, pp. 46 1L

INDEX
Acts, efficacious grace and easy salu­
tary- 34*'52
Aegidius Romanus on divine will to
save all, 107
Albert the Great, St., predestination
and predilection, 67-69
Alexander of Hales, predestination
and merits, 63 f.
Allo, foreknowledge and predestina­
tion, 5
Alphonse, St., inclines to congruism
of Sorbonne, 163
Alvarez, D.: defender of Thomism,
150, 173; sufficient grace, 331, 350
Anonymous author, exposition of St.
Thomas’ teaching on divine mo­
tion, 360-69
Anselm, St., on predestination, 59 f.
Aquaviva, S.J., on congruous grace,
158 f.
Arminius, J., attacks Calvin’s view of
predestination, 120
Arnauld, A., on little grace, 235
Augustine, St.: calls efficacious grace
congruous, 162; certainty of di­
vine motion, 268; certainty of
predestination, 214: defended by
L. Berti, 169; definition of pre­
destination, 7, 184: final per­
severance, 322 f.; on grace and
salvation, 9, 16, 81, 122, 170, 182,
204, 347: his doctrine according
to Molina, 127; principle of pre­
dilection, 77, 79, 102: refutes
Semipelagian objection, 189 f.;
solution to problem of evil by,
180; sublime passage of, 337 f.
Augustinianism and predestination,
168-70

Bancel, L.: on efficacious grace, 349;
on theory of sufficient grace,
34· fBauer, B., on Zwingli’s deductions
from Luther’s doctrine, 118
Bellarmine, St.: explains scientia
media as Molina does, 159; fore­
knowledge of merits, 4 f., 153;
gratuity of predestination, 15357; 203
Benedict XIV confirms decision of
Paul V on grace, 152, 316
Berti, L.: on predestination and
efficacious grace, 168-70; on victo­
rious delectation, 311 f.
Billot, L„ S.J.: different interpreta­
tion of scientia media, 33 f„ 135;
divine motion, 353-59; indiffer­
ent premotion, 249 note 14;
Suarez’ doctrine of negative rep­
robation, 158
Billuart, R.: free will and divine mo­
tion, 276 note 68; intrinsically
efficacious grace, 311 note 61;
objections to scientia media, 146
note 54; Suarezian congruism and
Molinism, 158 note 27; sufficient
and efficient graces, 344 note 5;
universality of principle of pre­
dilection, 170 note 5
Bonaventure, St., on predestination
and merits, 64-67
Boniface II, decisions of Council of
Orange confirmed, 50
Bossuet, J.: divine motion and free
will, 319, 370: gratuity of predes­
tination, 105 f.; predestination
and divine will to save all, 224-26;
rectitude of divine plan, 181 f.
Bradwardine, T., errors on predestin­
Baianism and predestination. 168-70
ation, 114 note 7
Baius, M., condemned propositions of, Buonpensiere, H., on salvation of
adult Catholics, 219 t.
>23
377

378

INDEX

Caesarius of Arles, St., agrees with
St. Augustine on predestination
and grace, 49 f.
Cajctan, T., O.P.: divine causality
and predilection, 108 f.; priority
of divine causality, 251
Calvin, J.: predestination and repro­
bation, 119; on withdrawal of
grace and sin, 334
Capreolus, J., O.P., on predestination
and grace, 121 f.
Causes: Molina on, 129, 141, 244-48;
St. Thomas on subordination of,
141, 256-82. 295 f.
Cayré, A. A., on role of intellect in
Molinism, 135
Chenu, O.P., on meaning of "suffi­
cient," 233 note i
Chrysostom, St., on gratuity of grace,
39· >57
Cicero on Stoics' attempt to prove
determinism, 160
Circumstances: determinism of, 14649: in life of predestined, 134-36
Clement VIII, Molinism not con­
demned by, 151
Clement XII, declared Thomism not
condemned by Council of Trent,
361
Concurrence, simultaneous, 129 t.,
244-48
Congregatio de Auxiliis, on Molinism,
congruism, and Thomism, 150 f.
D’Ales, A., S.J., expression "non­
necessitating predetermination"
not in St. Thomas' works, 273
Damascene, St. John: on divine will
to save all, 57 f.: St. Thomas’ in­
terpretation of saying of, 269,
285 f.
Decrees: divine predetermining, 81 f.;
non-necessitating, 300-9, 371-76
Deity, reconciliation of attributes in,
104, 221-23, 228 f·, 336 t.
Del Prado, N., O.P.: denies indif­
ferent divine motion. 249, 251:
divine predetermining decrees,
35; easy and difficult salutary acts,
344; relation between efficacious
grace and predilection, 311; Sor­

bonne congruism criticized by,
165 f.; ways in which God moves
intellect, 334
Dilemma, God determining or deter­
mined, 143, 148 f., 248 note 13

Elect, number of; see Predestined
Election, divine; see God, love of
End, willed by God before means: St.
Bellarmine and Suarez, 155-57:
St. Thomas, 87, 99 f„ 150; Scotus,
112-14: Thomists, 174 f.

Foreknowledge; see Futures
Fulgentius, St., follows St. Augustine
on predestination and grace, 48 f.
Futures, conditionally free, 131, 135 f.,
>47
>59f-> >θ7· 308 f·. 3'7
Futures (contingent), foreknowledge
of: according to Molinism, 131 f.,
137 t., 141, 159 f.; according to
Thomism, 146-50, 171, 300-7,
34θ f·. 37°

God: His antecedent and consequent
wills, 80-84: His goodness mani­
fested by justice and mercy, 101 f„
207 f.; His love for us, 87 f., 149 f.,
173-75, 185 f.; His will to save all,
46-48, 72-75: love of, precedes
election, 87, 185; mercy of, and
predestination, 95 f„ 203-5; source
of all good, 87 f„ 149 f., 173-75,
185 f.; special motion of, 265,
«93 fGomar, F., on reprobation, 120
Gonet, J., O.P., on necessity of in­
fallibly efficacious grace, 349 f.
Gonzalez de Albeda on sufficient
grace, 341, 345-49
Goudin, O.P., interpretation of St.
Thomas' doctrine, 290 f.
Grace (efficacious): the Augustinians,
168 f.; the Church, 11-17, 235 f.;
distinction between sufficient
grace and, 80-84; and easy salu­
tary acts, 341-52; Molinists, 11,
129 f„ 137, 143, 158 t., 234, 346;
St. Augustine, 43 f.; St. Thomas,
78-83; Scotists, 114 f.; Scripture,

INDEX

236-39; Thomists, 171-73, 234,
309 ίΟ race (sufficient): the cause of co­
operation with or resistance to,
351; compared with efficacious
grace, 331, 350 t.; contains effica­
cious grace, 328 f„ 331; depriva­
tion of efficacious grace through
resistance to, 328 f„ 333 f„ 345-48;
its power to act, 234 f., 331
Gratuity of predestination; see Pre­
destination
Gregory the Great, St., on necessity of
grace and gratuity of predestina­
tion, 53
Groblicki, J., criticism of a recent
work by Schwamin, 371-75
Guillermin, O.P.: defends principle of
predilection, 173; interpretation
of Gonzalez’ theory of sufficient
grace, 343, 345-48; interpretation
of St. Augustine’s congruous
grace, 43 note 22
Hermann, J., principles of Sorbonne
congruism, 163 f.
Holy Ghost, gifts and special motion
of, 266
Hope, formal motive of and certitude
of, 225 f.
Hugon. E., O.P.: efficacious grace and
predilection, 311 note 61; salva­
tion of adult non-Catholics, 219
note 27

Impossible, never commanded by
God, 72-75, 80 f„ 115 f., 121 f.,
•23-25, 221 f„ 234-39, 335 f.
Isidore of Seville, St., on gratuity of
predestination, 53 f.
Jansenism, errors of; see Predestina­
tion
Jansenius, errors of, 124 f.
Janssens, O.S.B.: congruism of, 167;
defends extrinsic divine motion.
250 fJesus Christ, predestination of our
exemplar, 338
John of the Cross, St., on the obscu­
rity of faith, 227 f.

379

John of St. Thomas, O.P.: depriva­
tion of efficacious grace, 329 note
11, 334; divine motion and hu­
man freedom, 319 note 11; re­
futes Scotus' view of divine
motion, 113 f.; on two kinds of
interior grace, 234
Justice, reprobation and divine, 206·
10
Lagrange, M„ O.P., adheres to St.
Thomas’ doctrine on predestina­
tion to grace, 91, 93
Leclercq, H., on adoption of Augus­
tinian theory of the Church, 17
Lemonnyer, O.P., Pauline text on
predestination explained by, 5
note 13
Lemos, T., O.P.: sufficient grace vir­
tually contains efficient grace,
33·> 35°; why Thomists speak of
predetermining physical premo­
tion, 250
Leo XIII on infallibility of divine
will, 376 note 18
Lessius, L., S.J.: defense of Molina's
view of predestination, 135; de­
fense of scientia media, 147
Liberty: and divine motion, 316-23,
360-70; Molinist definition of,
136-38, 144 f.; sovereign inde­
pendence of uncreated, 88-106;
Thomist definition of, 138 f.
Lombard, P., on predestination and
divine will to save all, 31-63
Lorenzelli (cardinal), congruism of,
•67
Luther: on concupiscence, 123 f.: er­
rors on grace and free will, 117 f.

Maritain, J., on two movements in
Christian world, vii f.
Merits (future): not cause but effects
of predestination, 98-101. 194:
and predestination, 33-38, 134 f.,
150: view of Bellarmine and
Suarez, 153-59; view °f Scotus,
112 f.
Molina: definition of free will, 143 f.;
definition of liberty and conse­
quences of same, 136-43; departs

380

INDEX

Molina (continued)
from principle of predilection,
87 f.; objections to doctrine of,
144-50; principles of, 128-35;
proposes new theory of predesti­
nation, 127 f.; scientia media of,
308 f.; simultaneous concurrence
of, 244-48; Thomism admitted by,
319; three propositions differ­
ently interpreted by, 10-14
Molinism: consequences of. 139-44;
criticism of, 144-50; different in­
terpretations of, 134-36; essential
element of, 136 f.; and liberty,
138 fMotion (divine): different modes of,
293 f.; and easy salutary acts, 34152; and liberty, 316-22: and phys­
ical act of sin, 324-35; reasons for
affirmation of, 295-315; solution
of objections, 316-21, 360-69;
what it is, 256-82; what it is not,
243-55

Noris (cardinal), on divine action and
free will, 191

Occam, G„ on autonomy of divine
will, 114 note 7
Orange, Second Council of: condem­
nation of Semipelagianism, 10;
necessity and efficacy of grace, ιο­
ί 7, 235, 237'· predestination and
salvation, 52 f.
Paquet (bishop): congruism of, 167;
on extrinsic divine motion, 250 f.
Paul, St.
divine predetermination, 304
divinum beneplacitum, 26
effect of resurrection, 304
efficacious grace, 42, 237, 280, 310
God’s goodness, 188
interpreted by St. Bellarmine, 154 f.
predestination, ix, 4 f„ 90-96, 188 f.,
200 f„ 211, 338 f.
principle of predilection, 37, 76,
96 f„ 102, 188
reprobation, 191 f.
Paul V: concludes controversy on
grace, 151 f.; declaration of, 316

Pecci (cardinal): congruism of, 167;
extrinsic divine motion, 250 f.
Pelagianism, errors and condemna­
tion of, 8
Perseverance, final. 11-13, 44 f- 130 f.
Pignataro. S.J.: indifferent premotion
admitted by, 248, 358 f.; predeter­
mination denied by, 267
Pius IX, declaration on possibility of
salvation, 220
Pohle-Preuss: criticism of Gonet’s
theory of reprobation, 176 note
16; Thomist distinction criticized,
139 note 37; Thomist example
criticized, 227 note 71
Portalié, believes St. Augustine favors
scientia media, 42
Predestined, number of, 217-20
Predestinarianism, declarations of the
Church against, 17-20, 22 f.
Predetermination: causal, not formal,
267-69, 282: and efficacy of grace,
309-14; not a moral motion, 282;
not necessitating, 269-81: proof
from divine consequent will, 307 f.;
proof from Scripture, 301-7
Predilection: and St. Augustine, 77 f.;
foundation of, 37, 76, 195-99: and
Gonzalez, 349: keystone of predes­
tination, 80, 129 f„ 203; primary
importance of, 349; principle of,
14 f.; universality of, 37 f., 173 f.;
violated by scientia media, 149;
what it presupposes, 75-79
Predestination: affirmed by revela­
tion, 187-89; cause of, 87 f., 194 f.;
certainty of, 215 f.; definition of,
85, 183-86; difficulties of, 24-27;
exemplar of, 338; implies predi­
lection; 186; infallibility of. 21315: and Jansenism, 125; method
of approach to difficulties of. 28·
31; mystery of, 221-23; Part °f
providence, 187
Predestination, gratuity of: Augustinians, 168 f.; St. Augustine, 4450; St. Bellarmine and Suarez,
153-58; Scotus, 112 f.; St. Thomas
and Thomists, 90-105, 174 ff.
Prosper, St., defends St. Augustine on
predestination, 45-48

INDEX

Protestantism and doctrine of predes­
tination, 117-22
Quesnel, denial of liberty and suffi­
cient grace, 314 E.
Quierzy, Council of, on predestination
and universality of salvation, 18 f.

Reprobation: definition of negative,
175, 191 f.; definition of positive,
192; motive of negative, 206-8;
motive of positive, 206; solution
of difficulties, 208-11
St. Martin, J., on importance of dis­
tinction between predestination
to grace and to glory, 41 note 7
Satolli (cardinal): congruism of, 167;
on extrinsic divine motion, 250 f.;
on predetermination and free
will, 259
Schiffini, S.J., infallible efficacy of
divine decrees and free will, 166
Schwamm, H., on Scotist origin of
divine predetermining decrees,
278 note 77, 371-75
Scientia media: criticism of, 146-50;
Molina's view of, 146-50; of
Suaréz, 159-62
Scotus, gratuity of predestination and
efficacy of divine decrees, ii2f.
Semipelagianism, errors and condem­
nation of, 8-10, 22, 50-53
Simonin, O.P., teaching of Greek Fa­
thers on predestination, 39 note 3
Sin: and divine motion, 327-35: God
not cause of, 324 f.; its permission
distinct from a withdrawal of
• grace, 208-12; permissive decree
of, 325 f.; why permitted, 206-12
Soto, D., assisted in drawing up Tri­
dentine canons, 317
Suarez: absolute gratuity of predesti­
nation, 157; agrees with St.
Thomas on cause of predestina­
tion, 203: approaches St. Augus­
tine on predestination and merit,
136; and dependence upon First
Cause, 240; modified scientia
media of, 159-62

381

Sylvester of Ferrara: defends Thomist
doctrine of predestination and
grace, 109; on divine providence,
285
Synavc, O.P., teaching of St. Thomas
on necessitating and non-neces­
sitating predetermination, 285 f.
Tanquerey, A.: agreement between
Pauline and Thomist doctrines of
predestination, 202; majority of
adult Catholics saved, 219 f.
Tixeront, J., unconditional predesti­
nation doctrine of St. Augustine,
44
Theological systems: of predestina­
tion, 33-35; comparison of doc­
trines of, 36-38
Thomas, St.
adequate predestination explained
by. *3 Eagreement of Scotus with, 112 f.
analogical concept of God, 104
appraisal of doctrine of, 103-5
certainty of predestination, 214 t.
definition of consequent and ante­
cedent wills in God, 74 f.
divine motion, 243-81
divine motion and free will, 316-22
doctrinal principles of, 70-89
efficacy of divine decrees, 78 f.
exegesis of two texts from Ephe­
sians, 90-92
explanation of texts from Romans,
92-97
foundation of predilection, 80, 195201
foundation of premotion, 295-315
free will defined by, 139-43
gift of understanding and passive
purifications, 30 f.
God’s will to save all, 72
grace of itself efficacious, 80 f.
gratuity of predestination, 97-103
love the cause of goodness in things,
7>
Molina’s theory, 133
Molinist foreknowledge refuted by,
‘95
number of predestined, 217 f.
obscurity of predestination, 26 f.

382

INDEX

Thomas, St. (continued)
Origen favorably interpreted by,
>33
predestination and reprobation ex­
plained by, 85-89, 184-86, 191 f.,
202-4
principle of predilection, 35-38,
75 f„ 129 t., 149, 186
reason for predestination and rep­
robation, 25 f., 206-10
Scotus differs from, 113 f.
Semipelagian objection solved by,
190
Thomism: clear and obscure points
in, 175-82: principles of, 70-84,
97-106; scriptural background of,
go-97
Thomists: agreement among post­
Tridentine, 171-75; differences
among post-Tridentine, 175-77:
views of first, 107-9
Thuzey, Council of: on final perse­
verance, 12 f.: on human freedom
and universality of salvation,
20 f., 120-22, 236 f., 316-18

Ude, J., efficacy of divine decrees,
107 f„ 292

Valencia, Council of, on predestina­
tion and the divine foreknowl­
edge, 19, 183
Valentia, G.: admits conditional pre­
destination, 135; the congruism of
Suarez and Thomism, 150 f.
Vasquez, G.: congruism of Suarez and
Thomism, 150 f.; the elect and
the reprobates, 135
Vatican Council on reason and mys­
teries of faith, 28, 223
Voste, O.P.: the divine motion and
Scripture, 376 note 18; St. Paul
and predilection, 91
Will (divine): antecedent and con­
sequent. 80-84: as related to
grace, 80-84: and salvation of all,
46-48, 72-75
Wyclif, his errors adopted by Calvin,
120

Zigliara (cardinal): active and passive
motions, 258 t.: adaptation of di­
vine motion to secondary cause,
280; on wrong idea of divine
action, 252
Zwingli, pantheism and fatalism of,
118 f.